Hannah Arendt (1906—1975)
汉娜·阿伦特（1906—1975）
Hannah Arendt is a twentieth century political philosopher whose writings do not easily come together into a systematic philosophy that expounds and expands upon a single argument over a sequence of works. Instead, her thoughts span totalitarianism, revolution, the nature of freedom and the faculties of thought and judgment.
汉娜·阿伦特（Hannah Arendt）是一位二十世纪的政治哲学家，她的著作不容易组合成一种系统的哲学，这种哲学对一系列作品的单一论点进行阐述和扩展。相反，她的思想跨越了极权主义、革命、自由的本质以及思想和判断的能力。
The question with which Arendt engages most frequently is the nature of politics and the political life, as distinct from other domains of human activity. Arendt’s work, if it can be said to do any one thing, essentially undertakes a reconstruction of the nature of political existence. This pursuit takes shape as one that is decidedly phenomenological, a pointer to the profound influence exerted on her by Heidegger and Jaspers. Beginning with a phenomenological prioritization of the experiential character of human life and discarding traditional political philosophy’s conceptual schema, Arendt in effect aims to make available the objective structures and characteristics of political being-in-the-world as a distinct mode of human experience. This investigation spans the rest of Arendt’s life and works. During its course, recurrent themes emerge that help to organize her thought–themes such as the possibility and conditions of a humane and democratic public life, the forces that threaten such a life, conflict between private and public interests, and intensified cycles of production and consumption. As these issues reappear, Arendt elaborates on them and refines them, rarely relaxing the enquiry into the nature of political existence. The most famous facet of this enquiry, often considered also to be the most original, is Arendt’s outline of the faculty of human judgment. Through this, she develops a basis upon which publicly-minded political judgment can survive, in spite of the calamitous events of the 20th century which she sees as having destroyed the traditional framework for such judgment.
阿伦特最常涉及的问题是政治和政治生活的本质，它与人类活动的其他领域不同。阿伦特的著作，如果可以说是做任何一件事的话，本质上是对政治存在的本质进行重建。这种追求显然是现象学的，表明了海德格尔和雅斯贝尔斯对她施加的深刻影响。阿伦特从对人类生活经验特征的现象学优先化开始，抛弃了传统政治哲学的概念图式，实际上旨在将政治存在的客观结构和特征作为人类经验的一种独特模式。这项调查跨越了阿伦特的余生和作品。在此过程中，反复出现的主题有助于组织她的思想——诸如人道和民主公共生活的可能性和条件、威胁这种生活的力量、私人和公共利益之间的冲突以及生产和消费的强化循环等主题。当这些问题再次出现时，阿伦特对它们进行了详细阐述和完善，很少放松对政治存在本质的探究。这种探究最著名的方面，通常也被认为是最原始的，是阿伦特对人类判断能力的概述。通过这一点，她建立了一个基础，尽管20世纪的灾难性事件摧毁了这种判断的传统框架，但具有公众意识的政治判断可以生存。
The article proceeds by charting a roughly chronological map of her major works. It endeavours to illuminate the continuities and connections within these works in an attempt to synchronize them as a coherent but fully-functioning body of thought.
文章接着绘制了她主要作品的大致时间顺序地图。它努力阐明这些作品中的连续性和联系，试图将它们同步为一个连贯但功能齐全的思想体系。
Table of Contents 目录
- Chronology of Life and Works
生平和作品年表 - Arendt’s Thought: Context and Influences
阿伦特的思想：背景和影响 - On Totalitarianism 论极权主义
- The Human Condition
人类的处境 - On Revolution 论革命
- Eichmann and the “Banality of Evil”
艾希曼与“邪恶的平庸” - Thinking and Judging 思考与判断
- Influence 影响
- Criticisms and Controversies
批评和争议 - References and Further Reading
参考资料和延伸阅读
1. Chronology of Life and Works
1. 生平和作品年表
The political philosopher, Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), was born in Hanover, Germany, in 1906, the only child of secular Jews. During childhood, Arendt moved first to Königsberg (East Prussia) and later to Berlin. In 1922-23, Arendt began her studies (in classics and Christian theology) at the University of Berlin, and in 1924 entered Marburg University, where she studied philosophy with Martin Heidegger. In 1925 she began a romantic relationship with Heidegger, but broke this off the following year. She moved to Heidelberg to study with Karl Jaspers, the existentialist philosopher and friend of Heidegger. Under Jasper’s supervision, she wrote her dissertation on the concept of love in St. Augustine’s thought. She remained close to Jaspers throughout her life, although the influence of Heidegger’s phenomenology was to prove the greater in its lasting influence upon Arendt’s work.
政治哲学家汉娜·阿伦特（Hannah Arendt，1906-1975）1906年出生于德国汉诺威，是世俗犹太人的独生子。在童年时期，阿伦特先是搬到了柯尼斯堡（东普鲁士），后来又搬到了柏林。1922-23 年，阿伦特开始在柏林大学学习（古典学和基督教神学），并于 1924 年进入马尔堡大学，在那里她与马丁·海德格尔一起学习哲学。1925年，她开始与海德格尔谈恋爱，但第二年就断绝了关系。她搬到海德堡，师从存在主义哲学家、海德格尔的朋友卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯（Karl Jaspers）。在贾斯珀的指导下，她写了一篇关于圣奥古斯丁思想中爱情概念的论文。她终其一生都与雅斯贝尔斯保持着密切的关系，尽管海德格尔现象学的影响证明了它对阿伦特作品的持久影响更大。
In 1929, she met Gunther Stern, a young Jewish philosopher, with whom she became romantically involved, and subsequently married (1930). In 1929, her dissertation (Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin) was published. In the subsequent years, she continued her involvement in Jewish and Zionist politics, which began from 1926 onwards. In 1933, fearing Nazi persecution, she fled to Paris, where she subsequently met and became friends with both Walter Benjamin and Raymond Aron. In 1936, she met Heinrich Blücher, a German political refugee, divorced Stern in ’39, and the following year she and Blücher married in 1940.
1929 年，她遇到了年轻的犹太哲学家冈瑟·斯特恩 （Gunther Stern），并与他发生了浪漫关系，随后结婚（1930 年）。1929年，她的论文（Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin）出版。在随后的几年里，她继续参与从 1926 年开始的犹太和犹太复国主义政治。1933 年，由于担心纳粹迫害，她逃往巴黎，随后与沃尔特·本杰明和雷蒙德·阿隆相识并成为朋友。1936 年，她遇到了德国政治难民海因里希·布吕歇尔，39 年与斯特恩离婚，次年她和布吕歇尔于 1940 年结婚。
After the outbreak of war, and following detention in a camp as an “enemy alien,” Arendt and Blücher fled to the USA in 1941. Living in New York, Arendt wrote for the German language newspaper Aufbau and directed research for the Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction. In 1944, she began work on what would become her first major political book, The Origins of Totalitarianism. In 1946, she published “What is Existenz Philosophy,” and from 1946 to 1951 she worked as an editor at Schoken Books in New York. In 1951, The Origins of Totalitarianism was published, after which she began the first in a sequence of visiting fellowships and professorial positions at American universities and she attained American citizenship.
战争爆发后，阿伦特和布吕歇尔作为“敌方外国人”被关押在集中营，于 1941 年逃往美国。阿伦特现居纽约，为德语报纸《Aufbau》撰稿，并为欧洲犹太文化重建委员会（Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction）指导研究。1944年，她开始撰写她的第一本重要政治著作《极权主义的起源》。1946 年，她出版了《什么是存在哲学》，1946 年至 1951 年，她在纽约的 Schoken Books 担任编辑。1951年，《极权主义的起源》出版，之后，她开始了在美国大学担任一系列访问学者和教授职位中的第一个，并获得了美国公民身份。
In 1958, she published The Human Condition and Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess. In 1959, she published “Reflections on Little Rock,” her controversial consideration of the emergent Black civil rights movement. In 1961, she published Between Past and Future, and traveled to Jerusalem to cover the trial of Nazi Adolf Eichmann for the New Yorker.
1958 年，她出版了《人类状况》和《拉赫尔·瓦恩哈根：犹太人的生活》。1959 年，她出版了《对小石城的反思》，这是她对新兴黑人民权运动的有争议的思考。1961年，她出版了《过去与未来之间》，并前往耶路撒冷为《纽约客》报道纳粹阿道夫·艾希曼的审判。
In 1963 she published her controversial reflections on the Eichmann trial, first in the New Yorker, and then in book form as Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. In this year, she also published On Revolution. In 1967, having held positions at Berkeley and Chicago, she took up a position at the New School for Social Research in New York. In 1968, she published Men in Dark Times.
1963年，她首先在《纽约客》上发表了她对艾希曼审判的有争议的思考，然后以书的形式出版了《艾希曼在耶路撒冷：关于邪恶平庸的报告》。这一年，她还出版了《论革命》。1967年，在伯克利和芝加哥任职后，她在纽约新社会研究学院任职。1968年，她出版了《黑暗时代的男人》。
In 1970, Blücher died. That same year, Arendt gave her seminar on Kant’s philosophy of judgement at the New School (published posthumously as Reflections on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 1982). In 1971 she published “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” and the following year Crisis of the Republicappeared. In the next years, she worked on her projected three-volume work, The Life of the Mind. Volumes 1 and 2 (on “Thinking” and “Willing”) were published posthumously. She died on December 4, 1975, having only just started work on the third and final volume, Judging.
1970年，布吕歇尔去世。同年，阿伦特在新学院举办了关于康德判断哲学的研讨会（死后出版为《康德政治哲学反思》，1982年）。1971年，她出版了《思想与道德考量》，次年出版了《共和国危机》。在接下来的几年里，她致力于她计划中的三卷本作品《心灵的生活》。第 1 卷和第 2 卷（关于“思考”和“愿意”）在死后出版。她于 1975 年 12 月 4 日去世，当时她刚刚开始创作第三卷也是最后一卷《审判》。
2. Arendt’s Thought: Context and Influences
2. 阿伦特的思想：背景和影响
Hannah Arendt is a most challenging figure for anyone wishing to understand the body of her work in political philosophy. She never wrote anything that would represent a systematic political philosophy, a philosophy in which a single central argument is expounded and expanded upon in a sequence of works. Rather, her writings cover many and diverse topics, spanning issues such as totalitarianism, revolution, the nature of freedom, the faculties of “thinking” and “judging,” the history of political thought, and so on. A thinker of heterodox and complicated argumentation, Arendt’s writings draw inspiration from Heidegger, Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and others. This complicated synthesis of theoretical elements is evinced in the apparent availability of her thought to a wide and divergent array of positions in political theory: for example, participatory democrats such as Benjamin Barber and Sheldon Wolin, communitarians such as Sandel and MacIntyre, intersubjectivist neo-Kantians such as Habermas, Albrecht Wellmer, Richard Bernstein and Seyla Benhabib, etc. However, it may still be possible to present her thought not as a collection of discrete interventions, but as a coherent body of work that takes a single question and a single methodological approach, which then informs a wide array of inquiries. The question, with which Arendt’s thought engages, perhaps above all others, is that of the nature of politics and political life, as distinct from other domains of human activity. Her attempts to explicate an answer to this question and, inter alia, to examine the historical and social forces that have come to threaten the existence of an autonomous political realm, have a distinctly phenomenological character. Arendt’s work, if it can be said to do anything, can be said to undertake a phenomenological reconstruction of the nature of political existence, with all that this entails in way of thinking and acting.
汉娜·阿伦特（Hannah Arendt）对于任何希望了解她在政治哲学方面的著作的人来说都是一个最具挑战性的人物。她从未写过任何代表系统政治哲学的东西，在这种哲学中，一个单一的中心论点在一系列作品中得到阐述和扩展。相反，她的著作涵盖了许多不同的主题，涵盖了极权主义、革命、自由的本质、“思考”和“判断”的能力、政治思想史等问题。阿伦特是一位异端和复杂论证的思想家，他的著作从海德格尔、亚里士多德、奥古斯丁、康德、尼采、雅斯贝尔斯等人那里汲取灵感。这种理论元素的复杂综合体现在她的思想显然可用于政治理论中广泛而不同的立场：例如，参与式民主主义者，如本杰明·巴伯和谢尔登·沃林，社群主义者，如桑德尔和麦金太尔，主体间主义的新康德主义者，如哈贝马斯、阿尔布雷希特·韦尔默、理查德·伯恩斯坦和塞拉·本哈比布等。然而，她的思想也许不是作为离散干预的集合，而是作为一个连贯的工作体系，采用单一的问题和单一的方法论方法，然后为广泛的调查提供信息。阿伦特的思想所涉及的问题，也许首先是政治和政治生活的本质，它与人类活动的其他领域不同。她试图阐明这个问题的答案，特别是研究威胁自治政治领域存在的历史和社会力量，具有明显的现象学特征。 阿伦特的著作，如果可以说是做任何事情的话，可以说是对政治存在的本质进行了现象学的重构，以及它所包含的思维和行为方式。
The phenomenological nature of Arendt’s examination (and indeed defense) of political life can be traced through the profound influence exerted over her by both Heidegger and Jaspers. Heidegger in particular can be seen to have profoundly impacted upon Arendt’s thought in for example: in their shared suspicion of the “metaphysical tradition’s” move toward abstract contemplation and away from immediate and worldly understanding and engagement, in their critique of modern calculative and instrumental attempts to order and dominate the world, in their emphasis upon the ineliminable plurality and difference that characterize beings as worldly appearances, and so on. This is not, however, to gloss over the profound differences that Arendt had with Heidegger, with not only his political affiliation with the Nazis, or his moves later to philosophical-poetic contemplation and his corresponding abdication from political engagement. Nevertheless, it can justifiably be claimed that Arendt’s inquiries follow a crucial impetus from Heidegger’s project in Being & Time.
阿伦特对政治生活的考察（实际上是辩护）的现象学性质可以通过海德格尔和雅斯贝尔斯对她施加的深刻影响来追溯。特别是海德格尔对阿伦特的思想产生了深刻的影响，例如：他们共同怀疑“形而上学传统”走向抽象的沉思，远离直接的和世俗的理解和参与，批判现代计算和工具性地试图秩序和统治世界，强调作为世俗表象的存在者不可消除的多元性和差异性， 等等。然而，这并不是要掩盖阿伦特与海德格尔的深刻分歧，不仅包括他与纳粹的政治联系，以及他后来转向哲学诗学沉思以及他相应地退出政治参与。尽管如此，可以有理由说，阿伦特的探究遵循了海德格尔在《存在与时间》中的重要推动力。
Arendt’s distinctive approach as a political thinker can be understood from the impetus drawn from Heidegger’s “phenomenology of Being.” She proceeds neither by an analysis of general political concepts (such as authority, power, state, sovereignty, etc.) traditionally associated with political philosophy, nor by an aggregative accumulation of empirical data associated with “political science.” Rather, beginning from a phenomenological prioritization of the “factical” and experiential character of human life, she adopts a phenomenological method, thereby endeavoring to uncover the fundamental structures of political experience. Eschewing the “free-floating constructions” and conceptual schema imposed a posterioriupon experience by political philosophy, Arendt instead follows phenomenology’s return “to the things themselves” (zu den Sachen selbst), aiming by such investigation to make available the objective structures and characteristics of political being-in-the-world, as distinct from other (moral, practical, artistic, productive, etc.) forms of life.
阿伦特作为政治思想家的独特方法可以从海德格尔的“存在现象学”中汲取的动力来理解。她既没有分析传统上与政治哲学相关的一般政治概念（如权威、权力、国家、主权等），也没有通过与“政治学”相关的经验数据的汇总积累。相反，她从对人类生活的“事实”和经验特征的现象学优先化出发，采用现象学方法，从而努力揭示政治经验的基本结构。阿伦特避开了政治哲学强加给后验经验的“自由浮动的建构”和概念图式，而是遵循现象学的“事物本身”（zu den Sachen selbst）的回归，旨在通过这种研究来提供政治存在在世界上的客观结构和特征，以区别于其他（道德的、实践的、艺术的、生产性的等）生活形式。
Hence Arendt’s explication of the constitutive features of the vita activa in The Human Condition(labor, work, action) can be viewed as the phenomenological uncovering of the structures of human action qua existence and experience rather then abstract conceptual constructions or empirical generalizations about what people typically do. That is, they approximate with respect to the specificity of the political field the ‘existentials’, the articulations of Dasein‘s Being set out be Heidegger in Being and Time.
因此，阿伦特在《人类状况》（劳动、工作、行动）中对生命活动的构成特征的阐释，可以被看作是对人类行动结构的现象学揭示，而不是关于人们通常做什么的抽象概念建构或经验概括。也就是说，就政治领域的特殊性而言，它们近似于“存在论”，即海德格尔在《存在与时间》中对“存在论”的阐述。
This phenomenological approach to the political partakes of a more general revaluation or reversal of the priority traditionally ascribed to philosophical conceptualizations over and above lived experience. That is, the world of common experience and interpretation (Lebenswelt) is taken to be primary and theoretical knowledge is dependent on that common experience in the form of a thematization or extrapolation from what is primordially and pre-reflectively present in everyday experience. It follows, for Arendt, that political philosophy has a fundamentally ambiguous role in its relation to political experience, insofar as its conceptual formulations do not simply articulate the structures of pre-reflective experience but can equally obscure them, becoming self-subsistent preconceptions which stand between philosophical inquiry and the experiences in question, distorting the phenomenal core of experience by imposing upon it the lens of its own prejudices. Therefore, Arendt sees the conceptual core of traditional political philosophy as an impediment, because as it inserts presuppositions between the inquirer and the political phenomena in question. Rather than following Husserl’s methodological prescription of a “bracketing” (epoché) of the prevalent philosophical posture, Arendt’s follows Heidegger’s historical Abbau or Destruktion to clear away the distorting encrustations of the philosophical tradition, thereby aiming to uncover the originary character of political experience which has for the most part been occluded.
这种对政治参与的现象学方法更普遍地重估或颠倒了传统上归因于哲学概念化而不是生活经验的优先权。也就是说，共同经验和解释的世界（Lebenswelt）被认为是主要的，理论知识依赖于这种共同经验，其形式是主题化或从日常经验中原始和预先反思地存在的东西中推断出来的。因此，对于阿伦特来说，政治哲学在与政治经验的关系中具有根本的模糊性，因为它的概念表述不仅阐明了前反思经验的结构，而且同样可以模糊它们，成为自给自足的先入之见，站在哲学探究和所讨论的经验之间，通过将自身偏见的镜头强加给经验来扭曲经验的现象核心。因此，阿伦特将传统政治哲学的概念核心视为一种障碍，因为它在询问者和所讨论的政治现象之间插入了预设。阿伦特没有遵循胡塞尔的方法论处方，即对流行的哲学姿态进行“括号”（epoché），而是遵循海德格尔的历史阿巴乌或解构，以清除哲学传统的扭曲外壳，从而旨在揭示政治经验的原始特征，而政治经验在很大程度上被遮蔽了。
There is no simple way of presenting Arendt’s diverse inquiries into the nature and fate of the political, conceived as a distinctive mode of human experience and existence. Her corpus of writings present a range of arguments, and develop a range of conceptual distinctions, that overlap from text to text, forming a web of inter-related excurses. Therefore, perhaps the only way to proceed is to present a summation of her major works, in roughly chronological order, while nevertheless attempting to highlight the continuities that draw them together into a coherent whole.
阿伦特对政治的本质和命运的多样化探究没有简单的方式，政治被认为是人类经验和存在的一种独特模式。她的著作语料库提出了一系列论点，并发展了一系列概念上的区别，这些区别从文本到文本重叠，形成了一个相互关联的摘录网络。因此，也许唯一的办法是大致按时间顺序对她的主要作品进行总结，同时试图突出将它们组合成一个连贯整体的连续性。
3. On Totalitarianism 3. 论极权主义
Arendt’s first major work, published in 1951, is clearly a response to the devastating events of her own time – the rise of Nazi Germany and the catastrophic fate of European Jewry at its hands, the rise of Soviet Stalinism and its annihilation of millions of peasants (not to mention free-thinking intellectual, writers, artists, scientists and political activists). Arendt insisted that these manifestations of political evil could not be understood as mere extensions in scale or scope of already existing precedents, but rather that they represented a completely ‘novel form of government’, one built upon terror and ideological fiction. Where older tyrannies had used terror as an instrument for attaining or sustaining power, modern totalitarian regimes exhibited little strategic rationality in their use of terror. Rather, terror was no longer a means to a political end, but an end in itself. Its necessity was now justified by recourse to supposed laws of history (such as the inevitable triumph of the classless society) or nature (such as the inevitability of a war between “chosen” and other “degenerate” races).
阿伦特的第一部重要著作出版于1951年，显然是对她那个时代的毁灭性事件的回应——纳粹德国的崛起和欧洲犹太人的灾难性命运，苏联斯大林主义的兴起及其对数百万农民的灭绝（更不用说思想自由的知识分子、作家、艺术家、科学家和政治活动家了）。阿伦特坚持认为，这些政治邪恶的表现不能被理解为仅仅是现有先例的规模或范围的扩展，而是它们代表了一种完全“新颖的政府形式”，一种建立在恐怖和意识形态虚构之上的政府形式。在旧暴政使用恐怖作为获得或维持权力的工具的地方，现代极权主义政权在使用恐怖时几乎没有表现出战略理性。相反，恐怖不再是达到政治目的的手段，而是目的本身。现在，它的必要性可以通过诉诸所谓的历史规律（例如无阶级社会的不可避免的胜利）或自然法则（例如“被选中的”和其他“堕落的”种族之间的战争的必然性）来证明。
For Arendt, the popular appeal of totalitarian ideologies with their capacity to mobilize populations to do their bidding, rested upon the devastation of ordered and stable contexts in which people once lived. The impact of the First World War, and the Great Depression, and the spread of revolutionary unrest, left people open to the promulgation of a single, clear and unambiguous idea that would allocate responsibility for woes, and indicate a clear path that would secure the future against insecurity and danger. Totalitarian ideologies offered just such answers, purporting discovered a “key to history” with which events of the past and present could be explained, and the future secured by doing history’s or nature’s bidding. Accordingly the amenability of European populations to totalitarian ideas was the consequence of a series of pathologies that had eroded the public or political realm as a space of liberty and freedom. These pathologies included the expansionism of imperialist capital with its administrative management of colonial suppression, and the usurpation of the state by the bourgeoisie as an instrument by which to further its own sectional interests. This in turn led to the delegitimation of political institutions, and the atrophy of the principles of citizenship and deliberative consensus that had been the heart of the democratic political enterprise. The rise of totalitarianism was thus to be understood in light of the accumulation of pathologies that had undermined the conditions of possibility for a viable public life that could unite citizens, while simultaneously preserving their liberty and uniqueness (a condition that Arendt referred to as “plurality”).
对于阿伦特来说，极权主义意识形态的大众吸引力及其动员民众听命于他们的能力，取决于人们曾经生活的有序和稳定的环境的破坏。第一次世界大战、大萧条的影响以及革命动乱的蔓延，使人们愿意宣扬一个单一、明确和毫不含糊的理念，将责任归咎于灾难，并指出一条明确的道路，确保未来免受不安全和危险的影响。极权主义意识形态提供了这样的答案，声称发现了一把“历史的钥匙”，可以用它来解释过去和现在的事件，并通过听从历史或自然的吩咐来确保未来。因此，欧洲人民对极权主义思想的适应是一系列病态的结果，这些病态侵蚀了作为自由和自由空间的公共或政治领域。这些病态包括帝国主义资本的扩张主义及其对殖民镇压的行政管理，以及资产阶级篡夺国家作为促进其自身局部利益的工具。这反过来又导致了政治体制的丧失，以及作为民主政治事业核心的公民原则和协商共识的萎缩。因此，极权主义的兴起应该从病态的积累来理解，这些病态破坏了可行的公共生活的可能性条件，这种公共生活可以团结公民，同时保持他们的自由和独特性（阿伦特称之为“多元性”）。
In this early work, it is possible to discern a number of the recurrent themes that would organize Arendt’s political writings throughout her life. For example, the inquiry into the conditions of possibility for a humane and democratic public life, the historical, social and economic forces that had come to threaten it, the conflictual relationship between private interests and the public good, the impact of intensified cycles of production and consumption that destabilized the common world context of human life, and so on. These themes would not only surface again and again in Arendt’s subsequent work, but would be conceptually elaborated through the development of key distinctions in order to delineate the nature of political existence and the faculties exercised in its production and preservation.
在这部早期作品中，我们可以看出一些反复出现的主题，这些主题将组织阿伦特一生的政治著作。例如，探究人道和民主的公共生活的可能性条件，威胁到这种生活的历史、社会和经济力量，私人利益与公共利益之间的冲突关系，破坏人类生活共同世界环境的生产和消费循环加剧的影响， 等等。这些主题不仅在阿伦特后来的著作中一次又一次地出现，而且通过发展关键的区别在概念上加以阐述，以描述政治存在的本质以及在政治的产生和保存过程中所发挥的能力。
4. The Human Condition
4. 人类状况
The work of establishing the conditions of possibility for political experience, as opposed to other spheres of human activity, was undertaken by Arendt in her next major work, The Human Condition (1958). In this work she undertakes a thorough historical-philosophical inquiry that returned to the origins of both democracy and political philosophy in the Ancient Greek world, and brought these originary understandings of political life to bear on what Arendt saw as its atrophy and eclipse in the modern era. Her goal was to propose a phenomenological reconstruction of different aspects of human activity, so as to better discern the type of action and engagement that corresponded to present political existence. In doing so, she offers a stringent critique of traditional of political philosophy, and the dangers it presents to the political sphere as an autonomous domain of human practice.
与人类活动的其他领域相比，阿伦特在她的下一部重要著作《人类状况》（1958）中承担了为政治经验建立可能性条件的工作。在这部作品中，她进行了彻底的历史哲学探究，回到了古希腊世界民主和政治哲学的起源，并将这些对政治生活的原始理解带到了阿伦特所看到的现代政治生活的萎缩和黯然失色中。她的目标是对人类活动的不同方面进行现象学重建，以便更好地辨别与当前政治存在相对应的行动和参与类型。在此过程中，她对传统的政治哲学进行了严厉的批判，以及它对作为人类实践的自主领域的政治领域所构成的危险。
The Human Condition is fundamentally concerned with the problem of reasserting the politics as a valuable ream of human action, praxis, and the world of appearances. Arendt argues that the Western philosophical tradition has devalued the world of human action which attends to appearances (the vita activa), subordinating it to the life of contemplation which concerns itself with essences and the eternal (the vita contemplativa). The prime culprit is Plato, whose metaphysics subordinates action and appearances to the eternal realm of the Ideas. The allegory of The Cave in The Republic begins the tradition of political philosophy; here Plato describes the world of human affairs in terms of shadows and darkness, and instructs those who aspire to truth to turn away from it in favor of the “clear sky of eternal ideas.” This metaphysical hierarchy, theôria is placed above praxis and epistêmê over mere doxa. The realm of action and appearance (including the political) is subordinated to and becomes instrumental for the ends of the Ideas as revealed to the philosopher who lives the bios theôretikos. In The Human Condition and subsequent works, the task Arendt set herself is to save action and appearance, and with it the common life of the political and the values of opinion, from the depredations of the philosophers. By systematically elaborating what this vita activa might be said to entail, she hopes to reinstate the life of public and political action to apex of human goods and goals.
《人类状况》从根本上讲，关注的是将政治重新确立为人类行动、实践和表象世界的宝贵资源的问题。阿伦特认为，西方哲学传统贬低了关注表象的人类行动世界（vita activa），将其从属于沉思的生活，而沉思生活关注本质和永恒（vita contemplativa）。罪魁祸首是柏拉图，他的形而上学将行动和表象从属于理念的永恒领域。《共和国洞穴》的寓言开创了政治哲学的传统;在这里，柏拉图用阴影和黑暗来描述人类事务的世界，并指示那些渴望真理的人远离真理，转而支持“永恒理念的晴朗天空”。这种形而上学的等级制度，theôria被置于实践之上，书信被置于纯粹的doxa之上。行动和表象的领域（包括政治的）从属于思想的目的，并成为思想目的的工具，正如向生活在bios theôretikos中的哲学家所揭示的那样。在《人类状况》和随后的著作中，阿伦特为自己设定的任务是拯救行动和外表，以及随之而来的政治和舆论价值的共同生活，免受哲学家的掠夺。通过系统地阐述这种生命活动可能意味着什么，她希望将公共和政治行动的生命恢复到人类利益和目标的顶峰。
a. The Vita Activa: Labor, Work and Action
一个。Vita Activa：劳动、工作和行动
In The Human Condition Arendt argues for a tripartite division between the human activities of labor, work, and action. Moreover, she arranges these activities in an ascending hierarchy of importance, and identifies the overturning of this hierarchy as central to the eclipse of political freedom and responsibility which, for her, has come to characterize the modern age.
在《人类状况》中，阿伦特主张将劳动、工作和行动的人类活动分为三方。此外，她将这些活动安排在重要性的上升等级中，并确定这种等级制度的推翻是政治自由和责任黯然失色的核心，对她来说，政治自由和责任已成为现代的特征。
i. Labor: Humanity as Animal Laborans
i. 劳动：作为动物劳动者的人类
Labor is that activity which corresponds to the biological processes and necessities of human existence, the practices which are necessary for the maintenance of life itself. Labor is distinguished by its never-ending character; it creates nothing of permanence, its efforts are quickly consumed, and must therefore be perpetually renewed so as to sustain life. In this aspect of its existence humanity is closest to the animals and so, in a significant sense, the least human (“What men [sic] share with all other forms of animal life was not considered to be human”). Indeed, Arendt refers to humanity in this mode as animal laborans. Because the activity of labor is commanded by necessity, the human being as laborer is the equivalent of the slave; labor is characterized by unfreedom. Arendt argues that it is precisely the recognition of labor as contrary to freedom, and thus to what is distinctively human, which underlay the institution of slavery amongst the ancient Greeks; it was the attempt to exclude labor from the conditions of human life. In view of this characterization of labor, it is unsurprising that Arendt is highly critical of Marx’s elevation of animal laborans to a position of primacy in his vision of the highest ends of human existence. Drawing on the Aristotelian distinction of the oikos (the private realm of the household) from the polis (the public realm of the political community), Arendt argues that matters of labor, economy and the like properly belong to the former, not the latter. The emergence of necessary labor , the private concerns of the oikos, into the public sphere (what Arendt calls “the rise of the social”) has for her the effect of destroying the properly political by subordinating the public realm of human freedom to the concerns mere animal necessity. The prioritization of the economic which has attended the rise of capitalism has for Arendt all but eclipsed the possibilities of meaningful political agency and the pursuit of higher ends which should be the proper concern of public life.
劳动是与人类生存的生物过程和必需品相对应的活动，是维持生命本身所必需的实践。劳动以其永无止境的特征而著称;它没有创造任何永恒的东西，它的努力很快就会被消耗殆尽，因此必须不断更新以维持生命。在其存在的这一方面，人类最接近动物，因此，在重要意义上，人类是最不人道的（“人类[原文如此]与所有其他形式的动物生命共享的东西不被认为是人类”）。事实上，阿伦特将这种模式下的人类称为动物劳动者。因为劳动活动是受必然性支配的，所以作为劳动者的人等同于奴隶;劳动的特点是不自由。阿伦特认为，正是承认劳动与自由背道而驰，从而与人类特有的东西背道而驰，这是古希腊人奴隶制制度的基础;这是试图将劳动排除在人类生活条件之外的企图。鉴于这种对劳动的刻画，阿伦特高度批评马克思在人类生存的最高目标愿景中将动物劳动者提升到首要地位也就不足为奇了。阿伦特借鉴了亚里士多德对oikos（家庭的私人领域）和polis（政治共同体的公共领域）的区分，认为劳动、经济等问题应该属于前者，而不是后者。 必要劳动的出现，即oikos的私人关注，进入公共领域（阿伦特称之为“社会的兴起”），对她来说，通过将人类自由的公共领域从属于纯粹的动物需求，破坏了适当的政治。在阿伦特看来，伴随着资本主义的兴起，对经济的优先考虑几乎使有意义的政治机构和追求更高目标的可能性黯然失色，而这些目标应该是公共生活的适当关注点。
ii. Work: Humanity as Homo Faber
ii. 作品：作为 Homo Faber 的人类
If labor relates to the natural and biologically necessitated dimension of human existence, then work is “the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is not embedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species’ ever-recurring life-cycle.” Work (as both technê andpoiesis) corresponds to the fabrication of an artificial world of things, artifactual constructions which endure temporally beyond the act of creation itself. Work thus creates a world distinct from anything given in nature, a world distinguished by its durability, its semi-permanence and relative independence from the individual actors and acts which call it into being. Humanity in this mode of its activity Arendt names homo faber; he/she is the builder of walls (both physical and cultural) which divide the human realm from that of nature and provide a stable context (a “common world”) of spaces and institutions within which human life can unfold. Homo faber‘s typical representatives are the builder, the architect, the craftsperson, the artist and the legislator, as they create the public world both physically and institutionally by constructing buildings and making laws.
如果劳动与人类生存的自然和生物学上必要的维度有关，那么工作就是“与人类存在的非自然性相对应的活动，这种活动不嵌入物种不断重复的生命周期中，其死亡率也不被物种不断重复的生命周期所补偿。工作（既是技术又是诗歌）对应于人造事物世界的制造，人工结构在时间上超越了创造行为本身。因此，工作创造了一个不同于自然界中任何事物的世界，这个世界以其持久性、半持久性和相对独立于召唤它的个体行为者和行为而著称。人类在这种活动模式下，阿伦特将其命名为 homo faber;他/她是墙（包括物质和文化）的建造者，这些墙将人类领域与自然领域分开，并为人类生活提供了可以展开的空间和机构的稳定环境（“共同世界”）。Homo Faber 的典型代表是建筑商、建筑师、工匠、艺术家和立法者，因为他们通过建造建筑物和制定法律在物理和制度上创造了公共世界。
It should be clear that work stands in clear distinction from labor in a number of ways. Firstly, whereas labor is bound to the demands of animality, biology and nature, work violates the realm of nature by shaping and transforming it according to the plans and needs of humans; this makes work a distinctly human (i.e. non-animal) activity. Secondly, because work is governed by human ends and intentions it is under humans’ sovereignty and control, it exhibits a certain quality of freedom, unlike labor which is subject to nature and necessity. Thirdly, whereas labor is concerned with satisfying the individual’s life-needs and so remains essentially a private affair, work is inherently public; it creates an objective and common world which both stands between humans and unites them. While work is not the mode of human activity which corresponds to politics, its fabrications are nonetheless the preconditions for the existence of a political community. The common world of institutions and spaces that work creates furnish the arena in which citizens may come together as members of that shared world to engage in political activity. In Arendt’s critique of modernity the world created by homo faber is threatened with extinction by the aforementioned “rise of the social.” The activity of labor and the consumption of its fruits, which have come to dominate the public sphere, cannot furnish a common world within which humans might pursue their higher ends. Labor and its effects are inherently impermanent and perishable, exhausted as they are consumed, and so do not possess the qualities of quasi-permanence which are necessary for a shared environment and common heritage which endures between people and across time. In industrial modernity “all the values characteristic of the world of fabrication – permanence, stability, durability…are sacrificed in favor of the values of life, productivity and abundance.” The rise of animal laborans threatens the extinction of homo faber, and with it comes the passing of those worldly conditions which make a community’s collective and public life possible (what Arendt refers to as “world alienation”).
应该清楚的是，工作在许多方面与劳动有明显的区别。首先，劳动受制于动物性、生物学和自然的要求，而劳动则根据人类的计划和需要塑造和改造自然界，从而侵犯了自然界;这使得工作成为一种明显的人类（即非动物）活动。其次，由于劳动受人的目的和意图支配，它处于人的主权和控制之下，因此它表现出一定的自由品质，这与受制于自然和必然性的劳动不同。第三，劳动与满足个人的生活需要有关，因此本质上仍然是私人事务，而工作本质上是公共的;它创造了一个客观和共同的世界，既站在人类之间，又将他们团结在一起。虽然工作不是与政治相对应的人类活动方式，但它的捏造仍然是政治共同体存在的先决条件。由机构和空间组成的共同世界为公民提供了舞台，公民可以作为共享世界的成员聚集在一起参与政治活动。在阿伦特对现代性的批判中，由智人创造的世界正受到上述“社会的兴起”的威胁。劳动活动及其果实的消费已经占据了公共领域的主导地位，它不能提供一个人类可以追求更高目标的共同世界。劳动及其影响本质上是无常的和易腐烂的，在消耗时会耗尽，因此不具备准永久性的品质，而这种品质对于人与人之间和跨越时间的共同环境和共同遗产是必不可少的。 在工业现代性中，“制造世界的所有价值特征——持久性、稳定性、耐用性......为了生命、生产力和富足的价值观而牺牲。动物劳动者的兴起威胁着人类的灭绝，随之而来的是那些使社区的集体和公共生活成为可能的世俗条件的消逝（阿伦特称之为“世界异化”）。
iii. Action: Humanity as Zoon Politikon
iii. 行动：作为 Zoon Politikon 的人性
So, we have the activity of labor which meets the needs that are essential for the maintenance of humanities physical existence, but by virtue of its necessary quality occupies the lowest rung on the hierarchy of the vita activa. Then we have work, which is a distinctly human (i.e. non-animal) activity which fabricates the enduring, public and common world of our collective existence. However, Arendt is at great pains to establish that the activity of homo faber does not equate with the realm of human freedom and so cannot occupy the privileged apex of the human condition. For work is still subject to a certain kind of necessity, that which arises from its essentially instrumental character. As technê andpoiesis the act is dictated by and subordinated to ends and goals outside itself; work is essentially ameans to achieve the thing which is to be fabricated (be it a work of art, a building or a structure of legal relations) and so stands in a relation of mere purposiveness to that end. (Again it is Plato who stands accused of the instrumentalization of action, of its conflation with fabrication and subordination to an external teleology as prescribed by his metaphysical system). For Arendt, the activity of work cannot be fully free insofar as it is not an end in itself, but is determined by prior causes and articulated ends. The quality of freedom in the world of appearances (which for Arendt is the sine qua non of politics) is to be found elsewhere in the vita activa, namely with the activity of action proper.
因此，我们有劳动活动，它满足了维持人文学科物质存在所必需的需要，但由于其必要的质量，它占据了生命活动等级的最低等级。然后我们有工作，这是一种明显的人类（即非动物）活动，它制造了我们集体存在的持久、公共和共同的世界。然而，阿伦特煞费苦心地证明，智人的活动并不等同于人类自由的领域，因此不能占据人类状况的特权顶点。因为工作仍然受制于某种必要性，这种必要性源于其本质的工具性。作为技术和poiesis，行为是由其自身之外的目的和目标所支配并服从于其目的和目标;从本质上讲，工作是实现将要制造的东西（无论是艺术品、建筑物还是法律关系结构）的手段，因此与该目的的纯粹目的性关系。（同样，柏拉图被指责为行动的工具化，将其与捏造混为一谈，并服从于他的形而上学体系所规定的外部目的论）。对于阿伦特来说，工作活动不可能是完全自由的，因为它本身不是目的，而是由先验原因和明确的目的决定的。表象世界的自由品质（对阿伦特来说，这是政治的必要条件）可以在生命的其他地方找到，即行动本身的活动。
The fundamental defining quality of action is its ineliminable freedom, its status as an end in itself and so as subordinate to nothing outside itself. Arendt argues that it is a mistake to take freedom to be primarily an inner, contemplative or private phenomenon, for it is in fact active, worldly and public. Our sense of an inner freedom is derivative upon first having experienced “a condition of being free as a tangible worldly reality. We first become aware of freedom or its opposite in our intercourse with others, not in the intercourse with ourselves.” In defining action as freedom, and freedom as action, we can see the decisive influence of Augustine upon Arendt’s thought. From Augustine’s political philosophy she takes the theme of human action as beginning:
行动的根本决定性品质是它不可消除的自由，它本身就是目的，因此从属于任何外在的东西。阿伦特认为，把自由主要看作是一种内在的、沉思的或私人的现象是错误的，因为它实际上是活跃的、世俗的和公共的。我们对内在自由的感觉是衍生的，因为第一次体验到“一种作为有形的世俗现实的自由的条件。我们首先在与他人的交往中意识到自由或自由的对立面，而不是在与自己的交往中。在将行动定义为自由，将自由定义为行动时，我们可以看到奥古斯丁对阿伦特思想的决定性影响。从奥古斯丁的政治哲学出发，她以人类行动为主题：
To act, in its most general sense, means to take initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, ‘to begin,’ ‘to lead,’ and eventually ‘to rule’ indicates), to set something in motion. Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into action.
行动，就其最一般的意义而言，意味着采取主动，开始（正如希腊语archein，“开始”，“领导”，最终“统治”所表示的），使某事开始行动。因为他们是初学者，新来者和初学者由于出生，男人采取主动，被促使采取行动。
And further, that freedom is to be seen:
此外，这种自由是可以看到的：
as a character of human existence in the world. Man does not so much possess freedom as he, or better his coming into the world, is equated with the appearance of freedom in the universe; man is free because he is a beginning…
作为人类在世界上存在的一个特征。人与其说是拥有自由，不如说是他来到这个世界，等同于宇宙中自由的出现;人是自由的，因为他是一个开始......
In short, humanity represents/articulates/embodies the faculty of beginning. It follows from this equation of freedom, action and beginning that freedom is “an accessory of doing and acting;” “Men are free…as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same.” This capacity for initiation gives actions the character of singularity and uniqueness, as “it is in the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be expected from whatever happened before.” So, intrinsic to the human capacity for action is the introduction of genuine novelty, the unexpected, unanticipated and unpredictable into the world:
简言之，人性代表/表达/体现了开始的能力。从自由、行动和开始的等式中可以看出，自由是“做事和行动的附属品”;“男人是自由的......只要他们行动，既不之前也不后;因为自由和行动是一样的。这种启动能力使行动具有独特性和独特性，因为“开始的本质是开始新事物的开始，而这种新事物是以前发生的任何事情都无法预料的。因此，人类行动能力的内在因素是将真正的新奇事物、意想不到的、不可预测的事物引入世界：
The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle.
新事物总是在统计定律及其概率的压倒性几率下发生，对于所有实际的日常目的来说，这相当于确定性;因此，新事物总是以奇迹的幌子出现。
This “miraculous,” initiatory quality distinguishes genuine action from mere behavior i.e. from conduct which has an habituated, regulated, automated character; behavior falls under the determinations ofprocess, is thoroughly conditioned by causal antecedents, and so is essentially unfree. The definition of human action in terms of freedom and novelty places it outside the realm of necessity or predictability. Herein lies the basis of Arendt’s quarrel with Hegel and Marx, for to define politics or the unfolding of history in terms of any teleology or immanent or objective process is to deny what is central to authentic human action, namely, its capacity to initiate the wholly new, unanticipated, unexpected, unconditioned by the laws of cause and effect.
这种“神奇的”启蒙性将真正的行动与纯粹的行为区分开来，即与具有习惯性、规范性、自动化性质的行为区分开来;行为属于过程的决定，完全受因果前因的制约，因此本质上是不自由的。从自由和新颖性的角度对人类行动的定义将其置于必要性或可预测性的领域之外。这就是阿伦特与黑格尔和马克思争论的基础，因为用任何目的论或内在的或客观的过程来定义政治或历史的展开，就是否认真正的人类行动的核心，即它发起全新的、未预料到的、出乎意料的、不受因果律制约的全的能力。
It has been argued that Arendt is a political existentialist who, in seeking the greatest possible autonomy for action, falls into the danger of aestheticising action and advocating decisionism. Yet political existentialism lays great stress on individual will and on decision as “an act of existential choice unconstrained by principles or norms.” In contradistinction, Arendt’s theory holds that actions cannot be justified for their own sake, but only in light of their public recognition and the shared rules of a political community. For Arendt, action is a public category, a worldly practice that is experienced in our intercourse with others, and so is a practice that “both presupposes and can be actualized only in a human polity.” As Arendt puts it:
有人认为，阿伦特是一个政治存在主义者，在寻求行动的最大自主权时，他陷入了将行动审美化和倡导决定主义的危险。然而，政治存在主义非常强调个人意志和决策，认为它是“不受原则或规范约束的存在选择行为”。与此相反，阿伦特的理论认为，行动不能为了行动本身而被证明是正当的，而只能根据公众对行动的承认和政治共同体的共同规则来证明。对于阿伦特来说，行动是一个公共范畴，一种在我们与他人交往中体验到的世俗实践，因此也是一种“既以人类政体为前提，又只能在人类政体中实现”的实践。正如阿伦特所说：
Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men…corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality is specifically the condition – not only theconditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam – of all political life .
行动，男人之间唯一直接发生的活动......与人类的多元性条件相对应，与人而不是人生活在地球上并居住在世界上的事实相对应。虽然人类状况的所有方面都以某种方式与政治有关，但这种多元性是所有政治生活的具体条件——不仅是必要条件，而且是必要条件。
Another way of understanding the importance of publicity and plurality for action is to appreciate that action would be meaningless unless there were others present to see it and so give meaning to it. The meaning of the action and the identity of the actor can only be established in the context of human plurality, the presence others sufficiently like ourselves both to understand us and recognize the uniqueness of ourselves and our acts. This communicative and disclosive quality of action is clear in the way that Arendt connects action most centrally to speech. It is through action as speech that individuals come to disclose their distinctive identity: “Action is the public disclosure of the agent in the speech deed.” Action of this character requires a public space in which it can be realized, a context in which individuals can encounter one another as members of a community. For this space, as for much else, Arendt turns to the ancients, holding up the Athenian polis as the model for such a space of communicative and disclosive speech deeds. Such action is for Arendt synonymous with the political; politics is the ongoing activity of citizens coming together so as to exercise their capacity for agency, to conduct their lives together by means of free speech and persuasion. Politics and the exercise of freedom-as-action are one and the same:
理解宣传和多元化对行动的重要性的另一种方式是认识到，除非有其他人在场看到它并赋予它意义，否则行动将毫无意义。行动的意义和行为者的身份只能在人类多元性的背景下建立，其他人的存在足够像我们，既能理解我们，又能认识到我们自己和我们行为的独特性。这种行动的交际性和披露性在阿伦特将行动与言语最集中地联系起来的方式中是显而易见的。正是通过作为言论的行动，个人才开始披露他们的独特身份：“行动是代理人在言语行为中的公开披露。这种性质的行动需要一个可以实现它的公共空间，一个个人可以作为社区成员相互相遇的环境。对于这个空间，就像其他许多空间一样，阿伦特转向古人，将雅典城邦作为这样一个交流和披露言语行为空间的典范。对于阿伦特来说，这种行动是政治的代名词;政治是公民聚集在一起的持续活动，以行使他们的代理能力，通过言论自由和说服自由共同生活。政治和行使自由作为行动是一回事：
…freedom…is actually the reason that men live together in political organisations at all. Without it, political life as such would be meaningless. The raison d’être of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action.
...自由。。。其实就是男人在政治组织中共同生活的原因。没有它，这样的政治生活将毫无意义。政治存在的理由是自由，而政治的经验领域是行动。
5. On Revolution 5. 论革命
From the historical-philosophical treatment of the political in The Human Condition, it might appear that for Arendt an authentic politics (as freedom of action, public deliberation and disclosure) has been decisively lost in the modern era. Yet in her next major work, On Revolution (1961) she takes her rethinking of political concepts and applies them to the modern era, with ambivalent results.
从《人类状况》中对政治的历史哲学处理来看，对阿伦特来说，真正的政治（如行动自由、公共审议和披露）在现代已经决定性地消失了。然而，在她的下一部重要作品《论革命》（1961）中，她对政治概念进行了重新思考，并将其应用于现代，结果却是矛盾的。
Arendt takes issue with both liberal and Marxist interpretations of modern political revolutions (such as the French and American). Against liberals, the disputes the claim that these revolutions were primarily concerned with the establishment of a limited government that would make space for individual liberty beyond the reach of the state. Against Marxist interpretations of the French Revolution, she disputes the claim that it was driven by the “social question,” a popular attempt to overcome poverty and exclusion by the many against the few who monopolized wealth in the ancien regime. Rather, Arendt claims, what distinguishes these modern revolutions is that they exhibit (albeit fleetingly) the exercise of fundamental political capacities – that of individuals acting together, on the basis of their mutually agreed common purposes, in order to establish a tangible public space of freedom. It is in this instauration, the attempt to establish a public and institutional space of civic freedom and participation, that marks out these revolutionary moments as exemplars of politics qua action.
阿伦特对自由主义和马克思主义对现代政治革命（如法国和美国）的解释提出异议。与自由主义者相反，他们质疑这些革命主要关注的是建立一个有限的政府，为国家无法触及的个人自由腾出空间。她反对马克思主义对法国大革命的解释，反驳了法国大革命是由“社会问题”驱动的主张，这是一种普遍的尝试，旨在克服贫困和多数人对旧政权中垄断财富的少数人的排斥。相反，阿伦特声称，这些现代革命的区别在于，它们表现出（尽管是短暂的）基本政治能力的行使——个人在共同商定的共同目标的基础上共同行动，以建立一个有形的自由公共空间。正是在这种安装中，试图建立一个公民自由和参与的公共和制度空间，标志着这些革命时刻成为政治和行动的典范。
Yet Arendt sees both the French and American revolutions as ultimately failing to establish a perduring political space in which the on-going activities of shared deliberation, decision and coordinated action could be exercised. In the case of the French Revolution, the subordination of political freedom to matters of managing welfare (the “social question”) reduces political institutions to administering the distribution of goods and resources (matters that belong properly in the oikos, dealing as they do with the production and reproduction of human existence). Meanwhile, the American Revolution evaded this fate, and by means of the Constitution managed to found a political society on the basis of comment assent. Yet she saw it only as a partial and limited success. America failed to create an institutional space in which citizens could participate in government, in which they could exercise in common those capacities of free expression, persuasion and judgement that defined political existence. The average citizen, while protected from arbitrary exercise of authority by constitutional checks and balances, was no longer a participant “in judgement and authority,” and so became denied the possibility of exercising his/her political capacities.
然而，阿伦特认为，法国和美国的革命最终都未能建立一个持久的政治空间，在这个空间中，可以进行共同审议、决策和协调行动的持续活动。就法国大革命而言，政治自由从属于管理福利的事务（“社会问题”），使政治机构沦为管理商品和资源的分配（这些事务本应属于oikos，处理人类生存的生产和再生产）。与此同时，美国革命避免了这种命运，并通过宪法设法在评论同意的基础上建立了一个政治社会。然而，她认为这只是部分和有限的成功。美国未能创造一个公民可以参与政府的制度空间，在这个空间中，他们可以共同行使定义政治存在的言论自由、说服和判断的能力。普通公民虽然受到宪法制衡的保护，不受任意行使权力的影响，但不再是“判断和权威”的参与者，因此被剥夺了行使其政治能力的可能性。
6. Eichmann and the “Banality of Evil”
6.艾希曼和“邪恶的平庸”
Published in the same year as On Revolution, Arendt’s book about the Eichmann trial presents both a continuity with her previous works, but also a change in emphasis that would continue to the end of her life. This work marks a shift in her concerns from the nature of political action, to a concern with the faculties that underpin it – the interrelated activities of thinking and judging.
阿伦特关于艾希曼审判的书与《论革命》同年出版，既延续了她以前的作品，也改变了重点，这种变化将持续到她生命的尽头。这项工作标志着她关注点从政治行动的本质转向关注支撑它的能力——思考和判断的相互关联的活动。
She controversially uses the phrase “the banality of evil” to characterize Eichmann’s actions as a member of the Nazi regime, in particular his role as chief architect and executioner of Hitler’s genocidal “final solution” (Endlosung) for the “Jewish problem.” Her characterization of these actions, so obscene in their nature and consequences, as “banal” is not meant to position them as workaday. Rather it is meant to contest the prevalent depictions of the Nazi’s inexplicable atrocities as having emanated from a malevolent will to do evil, a delight in murder. As far as Arendt could discern, Eichmann came to his willing involvement with the program of genocide through a failure or absence of the faculties of sound thinking and judgement. From Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem (where he had been brought after Israeli agents found him in hiding in Argentina), Arendt concluded that far from exhibiting a malevolent hatred of Jews which could have accounted psychologically for his participation in the Holocaust, Eichmann was an utterly innocuous individual. He operated unthinkingly, following orders, efficiently carrying them out, with no consideration of their effects upon those he targeted. The human dimension of these activities were not entertained, so the extermination of the Jews became indistinguishable from any other bureaucratically assigned and discharged responsibility for Eichmann and his cohorts.
她有争议地使用“邪恶的平庸”一词来描述艾希曼作为纳粹政权成员的行为，特别是他作为希特勒种族灭绝“最终解决方案”（Endlosung）的首席设计师和刽子手的角色。她将这些行为描述为“平庸”，这些行为在性质和后果上如此淫秽，并不意味着将它们定位为工作日。相反，它旨在反驳对纳粹莫名其妙的暴行的普遍描述，认为这种描述源于邪恶的邪恶意志，一种谋杀的乐趣。据阿伦特所知，艾希曼之所以愿意参与种族灭绝计划，是因为缺乏健全的思考和判断能力。从艾希曼在耶路撒冷的审判中（以色列特工发现他躲藏在阿根廷后，他被带到了耶路撒冷），阿伦特得出结论，艾希曼远没有表现出对犹太人的恶意仇恨，这可以从心理上解释他参与大屠杀的原因，艾希曼是一个完全无害的人。他不假思索地行动，听从命令，有效地执行命令，而不考虑它们对他所针对的人的影响。这些活动的人性因素没有得到重视，因此对犹太人的灭绝与艾希曼及其同伙的任何其他官僚分配和履行的责任都没有区别。
Arendt concluded that Eichmann was constitutively incapable of exercising the kind of judgement that would have made his victims’ suffering real or apparent for him. It was not the presence of hatred that enabled Eichmann to perpetrate the genocide, but the absence of the imaginative capacities that would have made the human and moral dimensions of his activities tangible for him. Eichmann failed to exercise his capacity of thinking, of having an internal dialogue with himself, which would have permitted self-awareness of the evil nature of his deeds. This amounted to a failure to use self-reflection as a basis forjudgement, the faculty that would have required Eichmann to exercise his imagination so as to contemplate the nature of his deeds from the experiential standpoint of his victims. This connection between the complicity with political evil and the failure of thinking and judgement inspired the last phase of Arendt’s work, which sought to explicate the nature of these faculties and their constitutive role for politically and morally responsible choices.
阿伦特的结论是，艾希曼在结构上无法做出那种判断，而这种判断会使他的受害者的痛苦对他来说是真实的或显而易见的。使艾希曼能够实施种族灭绝的不是仇恨的存在，而是缺乏想象力，而这种想象力本来可以使他的活动的人性和道德层面对他来说是有形的。艾希曼没有运用他的思考能力，没有与自己进行内部对话的能力，而这种对话本可以使他意识到自己行为的邪恶本质。这相当于没有使用自我反省作为判断的基础，而这种能力本来需要艾希曼发挥他的想象力，以便从受害者的经验角度来思考他的行为的性质。与政治邪恶的共谋与思考和判断的失败之间的这种联系激发了阿伦特工作的最后阶段，该阶段试图阐明这些能力的性质及其在政治和道德上负责任的选择中的构成作用。
7. Thinking and Judging
7. 思考和判断
Arendt’s concern with thinking and judgement as political faculties stretches back to her earliest works, and were addressed subsequently in a number of essays written during the 1950s and 1960s. However, in the last phase of her work, she turned to examine these faculties in a concerted and systematic way. Unfortunately, her work was incomplete at the time of her death – only the first two volumes of the projected 3-volume work, Life of the Mind, had been completed. However, the posthumously publishedLectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy delineate what might reasonably be supposed as her “mature” reflections on political judgement.
阿伦特对作为政治能力的思考和判断的关注可以追溯到她最早的作品，随后在1950年代和1960年代写的一些文章中得到了解决。然而，在她工作的最后阶段，她转而以协调和系统的方式研究这些院系。不幸的是，在她去世时，她的作品尚未完成——计划中的三卷本作品《心灵生活》的前两卷已经完成。然而，康德死后出版的《康德政治哲学讲座》描绘了她对政治判断的“成熟”思考。
In the first volume of Life of the Mind, dealing with the faculty of thinking, Arendt is at pains to distinguish it from “knowing.” She draws upon Kant’s distinction between knowing or understanding (Verstand) and thinking or reasoning (Vernunft). Understanding yields positive knowledge – it is the quest for knowable truths. Reason or thinking, on the other hand, drives us beyond knowledge, persistently posing questions that cannot be answered from the standpoint of knowledge, but which we nonetheless cannot refrain from asking. For Arendt, thinking amounts to a quest to understand the meaning of our world, the ceaseless and restless activity of questioning that which we encounter. The value of thinking is not that it yields positive results that can be considered settled, but that it constantly returns to question again and again the meaning that we give to experiences, actions and circumstances. This, for Arendt, is intrinsic to the exercise of political responsibility – the engagement of this faculty that seeks meaning through a relentless questioning (including self-questioning). It was precisely the failure of this capacity that characterized the “banality” of Eichmann’s propensity to participate in political evil.
在《心灵生活》的第一卷中，阿伦特谈到了思维的能力，他煞费苦心地将其与“认识”区分开来。她借鉴了康德对认识或理解（Verstand）和思维或推理（Vernunft）的区分。理解产生积极的知识——这是对可知真理的追求。另一方面，理性或思维驱使我们超越知识，不断提出无法从知识的角度回答的问题，但我们仍然不能不问。对于阿伦特来说，思考相当于一种对理解我们世界意义的探索，是对我们所遇到的事物的无休止的质疑。思考的价值不在于它产生了可以被认为是已解决的积极结果，而在于它不断地一次又一次地质疑我们赋予经验、行动和环境的意义。对于阿伦特来说，这是行使政治责任的内在条件——这种通过无情的质疑（包括自我质疑）寻求意义的能力的参与。正是这种能力的失败，才是艾希曼参与政治邪恶的倾向的“平庸”的特征。
The cognate faculty of judgement has attracted most attention is her writing on, deeply inter-connected with thinking, yet standing distinct from it. Her theory of judgement is widely considered as one of the most original parts of her oeuvre, and certainly one of the most influential in recent years.
最引人注目的判断力是她的写作，它与思维有着深刻的联系，但又与思维截然不同。她的判断理论被广泛认为是她作品中最具原创性的部分之一，当然也是近年来最具影响力的部分之一。
Arendt’s concern with political judgement, and its crisis in the modern era, is a recurrent theme in her work. As noted earlier, Arendt bemoans the “world alienation” that characterizes the modern era, the destruction of a stable institutional and experiential world that could provide a stable context in which humans could organize their collective existence. Moreover, it will be recalled that in human action Arendt recognizes (for good or ill) the capacity to bring the new, unexpected, and unanticipated into the world. This quality of action means that it constantly threatens to defy or exceed our existing categories of understanding or judgement; precedents and rules cannot help us judge properly what is unprecedented and new. So for Arendt, our categories and standards of thought are always beset by their potential inadequacy with respect to that which they are called upon to judge. However, this aporia of judgement reaches a crisis point in the 20th century under the repeated impact of its monstrous and unprecedented events. The mass destruction of two World Wars, the development of technologies which threaten global annihilation, the rise of totalitarianism, and the murder of millions in the Nazi death camps and Stalin’s purges have effectively exploded our existing standards for moral and political judgement. Tradition lies in shattered fragments around us and “the very framework within which understanding and judging could arise is gone.” The shared bases of understanding, handed down to us in our tradition, seem irretrievably lost. Arendt confronts the question: on what basis can one judge the unprecedented, the incredible, the monstrous which defies our established understandings and experiences? If we are to judge at all, it must now be “without preconceived categories and…without the set of customary rules which is morality;” it must be “thinking without a banister.” In order to secure the possibility of such judgement Arendt must establish that there in fact exists “an independent human faculty, unsupported by law and public opinion, that judges anew in full spontaneity every deed and intent whenever the occasion arises.” This for Arendt comes to represent “one of the central moral questions of all time, namely…the nature and function of human judgement.” It is with this goal and this question in mind that the work of Arendt’s final years converges on the “unwritten political philosophy” of Kant’s Critique of Judgement.
阿伦特对政治判断的关注，以及它在现代的危机，是她作品中反复出现的主题。如前所述，阿伦特哀叹现代的“世界异化”，一个稳定的制度和经验世界的破坏，可以为人类组织集体生存提供稳定的环境。此外，人们会记得，在人类行动中，阿伦特认识到（无论好坏）将新的、意想不到的和意想不到的事物带入世界的能力。这种行动的品质意味着它不断威胁着蔑视或超越我们现有的理解或判断类别;先例和规则不能帮助我们正确判断什么是前所未有的和新的。因此，对于阿伦特来说，我们的思想范畴和标准总是被它们与它们被要求判断的事物相比的潜在不足所困扰。然而，这种判断的荒谬在20世纪在其可怕和前所未有的事件的反复冲击下达到了危机点。两次世界大战的大规模破坏、威胁全球毁灭的技术的发展、极权主义的兴起、数百万人在纳粹死亡集中营的谋杀和斯大林的清洗，有效地打破了我们现有的道德和政治判断标准。传统存在于我们周围的破碎碎片中，“理解和判断的框架已经消失了。在我们的传统中传给我们的共同理解基础似乎无可挽回地丧失了。阿伦特直面这样一个问题：人们凭什么可以判断那些史无前例的、不可思议的、违背我们既定理解和经验的可怕事物？ 如果我们要做出判断，它现在必须是“没有先入为主的类别和......没有一套习惯规则，即道德“，它必须是”没有栏杆的思考“。为了确保这种判断的可能性，阿伦特必须证明，事实上存在着“一种独立的人类能力，不受法律和公众舆论的支持，只要有机会，它就会完全自发地重新判断每一个行为和意图。对阿伦特来说，这代表了“有史以来的核心道德问题之一，即......人类判断的本质和功能。正是基于这个目标和这个问题，阿伦特最后几年的工作集中在康德《判断力批判》的“不成文的政治哲学”上。
Arendt eschews “determinate judgement,” judgement that subsumes particulars under a universal or rule that already exists. Instead, she turns to Kant’s account of “reflective judgement,” the judgement of a particular for which no rule or precedent exists, but for which some judgement must nevertheless be arrived at. What Arendt finds so valuable in Kant’s account is that reflective judgement proceeds from the particular with which it is confronted, yet nevertheless has a universalizing moment – it proceeds from the operation of a capacity that is shared by all beings possessed of the faculties of reason and understanding. Kant requires us to judge from this common standpoint, on the basis of what we share with all others, by setting aside our own egocentric and private concerns or interests. The faculty of reflective judgement requires us to set aside considerations which are purely private (matters of personal liking and private interest) and instead judge from the perspective of what we share in common with others (i.e. must bedisinterested). Arendt places great weight upon this notion of a faculty of judgement that “thinks from the standpoint of everyone else.” This “broadened way of thinking” or “enlarged mentality” enables us to “compare our judgement not so much with the actual as rather with the merely possible judgement of others, and [thus] put ourselves in the position of everybody else…” For Arendt, this “representative thinking” is made possible by the exercise of the imagination – as Arendt beautifully puts it, “To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one’s imagination to go visiting.” “Going visiting” in this way enables us to make individual, particular acts of judgement which can nevertheless claim a public validity. In this faculty, Arendt find a basis upon which a disinterested and publicly-minded form of political judgement could subvene, yet be capable of tackling the unprecedented circumstances and choices that the modern era confronts us with.
阿伦特回避了“确定性判断”，即将细节纳入已经存在的普遍或规则之下的判断。取而代之的是，她转向康德对“反思性判断”的描述，即对一个特定的判断，它不存在任何规则或先例，但仍然必须做出一些判断。阿伦特在康德的叙述中发现的如此有价值的是，反思性判断从它所面对的特殊性出发，但仍然有一个普遍化的时刻——它从所有拥有理性和理解能力的存在者所共有的能力的运作出发。康德要求我们从这个共同的立场出发，根据我们与所有其他人分享的东西，把我们自己以自我为中心和私人的关注或利益放在一边。反思性判断的能力要求我们抛开纯粹私人的考虑（个人喜好和私人利益的问题），而是从我们与他人的共同点（即必须无私）的角度进行判断。阿伦特非常重视这种“从其他人的角度思考”的判断能力的概念。这种“拓宽的思维方式”或“扩大的心态”使我们能够“将我们的判断与其说与实际情况进行比较，不如与他人的判断进行比较，[从而]将自己置于其他人的位置......”对于阿伦特来说，这种“代表性思维”是通过想象力的锻炼而实现的——正如阿伦特所说的那样，“以扩大的心态思考意味着一个人训练自己的想象力去参观。以这种方式“访问”使我们能够做出个人的、特定的判断行为，但这些行为仍然可以声称具有公共效力。 在这种能力中，阿伦特找到了一种基础，在这种基础上，一种无私的、具有公共意识的政治判断形式可以存在，但又能够应对现代时代面临的前所未有的环境和选择。
8. Influence 8. 影响
We can briefly consider the influence that Arendt’s work has exerted over other political thinkers. This is not easy to summarize, as many and varied scholars have sought inspiration from some part or other of Arendt’s work. However, we may note the importance that her studies have had for the theory and analysis of totalitarianism and the nature and origins of political violence. Similarly, her reflections on the distinctiveness of modern democratic revolutions have been important in the development of republican thought, and for the recent revival of interest in civic mobilizations and social movements (particularly in the wake of 1989’s ‘velvet revolutions’ in the former communist states of Eastern and Central Europe).
我们可以简要地考虑一下阿伦特的著作对其他政治思想家的影响。这并不容易总结，因为许多不同的学者都从阿伦特作品的某些部分或其他方面寻求灵感。然而，我们可以注意到她的研究对极权主义的理论和分析以及政治暴力的性质和起源的重要性。同样，她对现代民主革命独特性的思考对于共和思想的发展以及最近对公民动员和社会运动的兴趣的复兴（特别是在1989年东欧和中欧前共产主义国家的“天鹅绒革命”之后）具有重要意义。
More specifically, Arendt has decisively influenced critical and emancipatory attempts to theorize political reasoning and deliberation. For example, Jürgen Habermas admits the formative influence of Arendt upon his own theory of communicative reason and discourse ethics. Particularly important is the way in which Arendt comes to understand power, namely as “the capacity to agree in uncoerced communication on some community action.” Her model of action as public, communicative, persuasive and consensual reappears in Habermas’ thought in concepts such as that of “communicative power” which comes about whenever members of a life-world act in concert via the medium of language. It also reappears in his critique of the “scientization of politics” and his concomitant defense of practical, normative reason in the domain of life-world relations from the hegemony of theoretical and technical modes of reasoning. Others (such as Jean-Luc Nancy) have likewise been influenced by her critique of the modern technological “leveling” of human distinctiveness, often reading Arendt’s account in tandem with Heidegger’s critique of technology. Her theory of judgement has been used by Critical Theorists and Postmoderns alike. Amongst the former, Seyla Benhabib draws explicitly and extensively upon it in order to save discourse ethics from its own universalist excesses; Arendt’s attention to the particular, concrete, unique and lived phenomena of human life furnishes Benhabib with a strong corrective for Habermas’ tendency for abstraction, while nonetheless preserving the project of a universalizing vision of ethical-political life. For the Postmoderns, such as Lyotard, the emphasis placed upon reflective judgement furnishes a “post-foundational” or “post-universalist” basis in which the singularity of moral judgements can be reconciled with some kind of collective adherence to political principles.
更具体地说，阿伦特决定性地影响了将政治推理和审议理论化的批判和解放尝试。例如，尤尔根·哈贝马斯（Jürgen Habermas）承认阿伦特对他自己的交际理性和话语伦理理论产生了形成性影响。尤为重要的是，阿伦特对权力的理解，即“在非胁迫的沟通中就某些社区行动达成一致的能力”。她的行动模式是公共的、交际的、有说服力的和双方同意的，在哈贝马斯的思想中重新出现在诸如“交际权力”的概念中，每当生活世界的成员通过语言媒介一致行动时，就会产生这种能力。它也再次出现在他对“政治科学化”的批判中，以及他同时为生活与世界关系领域的实践、规范理性辩护，以摆脱理论和技术推理模式的霸权。其他人（如让-吕克·南希）也同样受到她对现代技术对人类独特性的“平衡”的批判的影响，经常将阿伦特的叙述与海德格尔对技术的批判结合起来阅读。她的判断理论被批判理论家和后现代主义者所使用。在前者中，塞拉·本哈比布（Seyla Benhabib）明确而广泛地借鉴了它，以将话语伦理从其自身的普遍主义过度中拯救出来;阿伦特对人类生活中特殊、具体、独特和活生生的现象的关注，为本哈比卜提供了对哈贝马斯抽象倾向的有力纠正，同时保留了伦理政治生活的普遍化愿景。 对于利奥塔等后现代主义者来说，对反思性判断的强调提供了一个“后基础”或“后普遍主义”的基础，在这个基础中，道德判断的独特性可以与某种对政治原则的集体坚持相协调。
9. Criticisms and Controversies
9. 批评和争议
It is worth noting some of the prominent criticisms that have been leveled against Arendt’s work.
值得注意的是，对阿伦特的作品提出了一些突出的批评。
Primary amongst these is her reliance upon a rigid distinction between the “private” and “public,” the oikos and the polis, to delimit the specificity of the political realm. Feminists have pointed out that the confinement of the political to the realm outside the household has been part and parcel of the domination of politics by men, and the corresponding exclusion of women’s experiences of subjection from legitimate politics. Marxists have likewise pointed to the consequences of confining matters of material distribution and economic management to the extra-political realm of the oikos, thereby delegitimating questions of material social justice, poverty, and exploitation from political discussion and contestation. The shortcoming of this distinction in Arendt’s work is amply illustrated by a well-known and often-cited incident. While attending a conference in 1972, she was put under question by the Frankfurt School Critical Theorist Albrecht Wellmer, regarding her distinction of the “political” and the “social,” and its consequences. Arendt pronounced that housing and homelessness (themes of the conference) were not political issues, but that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualization of freedom; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the oikos. It may be said that Arendt’s attachment to a fundamental and originary understanding of political life precisely misses the fact that politics is intrinsically concerned with the contestation of what counts as a legitimate public concern, with the practice of politics attempting to introduce new, heretofore ‘non-political’ issues, into realm of legitimate political concern.
其中最主要的是她依靠“私人”和“公共”、oikos 和城邦之间的严格区分来界定政治领域的特殊性。女权主义者指出，将政治局限于家庭以外的领域是男性统治政治的一部分，因此将女性的服从经验排除在合法政治之外。马克思主义者同样指出了将物质分配和经济管理问题局限于oikos的政治之外领域的后果，从而使物质社会正义、贫困和剥削问题从政治讨论和争论中丧失了合法性。在阿伦特的著作中，这种区分的缺点被一个众所周知且经常被引用的事件充分说明。1972年，在参加一次会议时，法兰克福学派批判理论家阿尔布雷希特·韦尔默（Albrecht Wellmer）对她对“政治”和“社会”及其后果的区分提出了质疑。阿伦特宣称，住房和无家可归（会议的主题）不是政治问题，而是政治之外的问题，是实现自由的领域;政治是关于人类在言语和行为上的自我披露，而不是关于商品的分配，它属于社会领域，是 oikos 的延伸。可以说，阿伦特对政治生活的基本和原始理解的执着恰恰忽略了这样一个事实，即政治本质上关注的是争夺什么是合法的公共关注，而政治实践试图将新的、迄今为止的“非政治”问题引入合法的政治关注领域。
Arendt has also come under criticism for her overly enthusiastic endorsement of the Athenian polis as an exemplar of political freedom, to the detriment of modern political regimes and institutions. Likewise, the emphasis she places upon direct citizen deliberation as synonymous with the exercise of political freedom excludes representative models, and might be seen as unworkable in the context of modern mass societies, with the delegation, specialization, expertise and extensive divisions of labor needed to deal with their complexity. Her elevation of politics to the apex of human good and goals has also been challenged, demoting as it does other modes of human action and self-realization to a subordinate status. There are also numerous criticisms that have been leveled at her unorthodox readings of other thinkers, and her attempts to synthesize conflicting philosophical viewpoints in attempt to develop her own position (for example, her attempt to mediate Aristotle’s account of experientially-grounded practical judgement (phronesis) with Kant’s transcendental-formal model).
阿伦特也因过于热情地支持雅典城邦作为政治自由的典范而受到批评，损害了现代政治制度和制度。同样，她强调公民的直接审议是行使政治自由的同义词，排除了代议制模式，在现代大众社会的背景下可能被视为行不通，因为处理其复杂性需要授权、专业化、专业知识和广泛的分工。她将政治提升到人类利益和目标的顶点也受到了挑战，就像其他人类行动和自我实现模式一样，将其降级为从属地位。她对其他思想家的非正统解读，以及她试图综合相互冲突的哲学观点以试图发展自己的立场（例如，她试图将亚里士多德对基于经验的实践判断（phronesis）的解释与康德的先验形式模型进行调解）。
All these, and other criticisms notwithstanding, Arendt remains one of the most original, challenging and influential political thinkers of the 20th century, and her work will no doubt continue to provide inspiration for political philosophy as we enter the 21st.
儘管有這些以及其他批評，阿倫特仍然是20 th 世紀最具創創性、最具挑戰性和影響力的政治思想家之一，她的著作無疑將繼續為我們進入21世紀的政治哲學提供靈感 st 。
10. References and Further Reading
10. 参考文献和延伸阅读
a. Major Works by Arendt
a. 阿伦特的主要著作
- The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, Harcourt, 1951
《极权主义的起源》，纽约，哈考特出版社，1951年 - The Human Condition, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958
《人类状况》，芝加哥，芝加哥大学出版社，1958年 - Between Past and Future, London, Faber & Faber, 1961
《过去与未来之间》，伦敦，Faber & Faber出版社，1961年 - On Revolution. New York, Penguin, 1962
关于革命。纽约，企鹅出版社，1962年 - Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil, London, Faber & Faber, 1963
《艾希曼在耶路撒冷：关于邪恶平庸的报告》，伦敦，Faber & Faber出版社，1963年 - On Violence, New York, Harcourt, 1970
《论暴力》，纽约，哈考特，1970年 - Men in Dark Times, New York, Harcourt, 1968
《黑暗时代的男人》，纽约，哈考特，1968年 - Crisis of the Republic, New York, Harcourt, 1972
《共和国危机》，纽约，哈科特，1972年 - The Life of the Mind, 2 vols., London, Secker & Warburg, 1978
The Life of the Mind， 2 vols.， London， Secker & Warburg， 1978 - Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1982
《康德政治哲学讲座》，布莱顿，收割机出版社，1982年 - Love and St. Augustin, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996
《爱与圣奥古斯丁》，芝加哥，芝加哥大学出版社，1996年
b. Recommended Further Reading
b. 推荐延伸阅读
- Benhabib, Seyla: The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. London, Sage, 1996
Benhabib，Seyla：汉娜·阿伦特（Hannah Arendt）的不情愿的现代主义。伦敦， Sage， 1996 - Bernstein, Richard J: ‘Hannah Arendt: The Ambiguities of Theory and Practice’, in Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives, Terence Ball (ed.). Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1977
伯恩斯坦，理查德J：'汉娜·阿伦特：理论与实践的歧义'，在《政治理论与实践：新视角》中，特伦斯·鲍尔（编辑）。明尼阿波利斯，明尼苏达大学出版社，1977 年 - Bernstein, Richard J: Philosophical Profiles: Essays in a Pragmatic Mode. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1986
伯恩斯坦，理查德 J：哲学概况：实用模式的论文。剑桥，政治出版社，1986 - Critchley, Simon & Schroeder, William (eds): A Companion to Continental Philosophy. Oxford, Blackwell, 1998
克里奇利，西蒙和施罗德，威廉（编辑）：大陆哲学的伴侣。牛津，布莱克威尔，1998 - d’Entrèves, Maurizio Passerin: The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt. London, Routledge, 1994
d'Entrèves，Maurizio Passerin：汉娜·阿伦特的政治哲学。伦敦，劳特利奇，1994 - Flynn, Bernard: Political Philosophy at the Closure of Metaphysics. New Jersey/London: Humanities Press International, 1992
弗林，伯纳德：形而上学结束时的政治哲学。新泽西/伦敦：国际人文出版社，1992 年 - Habermas, Jürgen: ‘Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power’ in Philosophical-Political Profiles. London, Heinemman, 1983
哈贝马斯，于尔根：《汉娜·阿伦特：论权力的概念》，载于《哲学政治概况》。伦敦，海内曼，1983 - Hinchman, Lewis P. & Hinchman, Sandra K: ‘In Heidegger’s Shadow: Hannah Arendt’s Phenomenological Humanism’, in The Review of Politics, 46, 2, 1984, pp 183-211
Hinchman， Lewis P. & Hinchman， Sandra K： 'In Heidegger's Shadow： Hannah Arendt's Phenomenological Humanism'， in The Review of Politics， 46， 2， 1984， pp 183-211 - Kielmansegg, Peter G., Mewes, Horst & Glaser-Schmidt, Elisabeth(eds): Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss: German Emigrés and American Political Thought after World War II. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995
- Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe & Nancy, Jean-Luc: Retreating the Political, Simon Sparks (ed). London, Routledge, 1997
- Parekh, Bhikhu: Hannah Arendt & The Search for a New Political Philosophy. London & Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1981
- Villa, Dana: Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1996
- Villa, Dana (ed): The Cambridge Companion to Arendt. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000
Author Information
Majid Yar
Email: m_yar@hotmail.com
Lancaster University
United Kingdom