Every area of research has two boundaries marking the point at which the process of reflection ceases to be exact and takes on a philosophical character. The pre-conditions for cognition in general, like the axioms of every specific domain, cannot be presented and tested within the latter domain, but rather they call for a science of a more fundamental nature. The goal of this science, which is located in infinity, is to think without pre-conditions - a goal which the individual sciences deny themselves since they do not take any step without proof, that is, without pre-conditions of a substantive and methodological nature. Philosophy, too, cannot completely transcend such pre-conditions with regard to its own activity when it presents and tests them. But in this case, it is always the last point of cognition at which an authoritative decision and the appeal to the unprovable arises within us, and yet in view of the advances made in terms of what can be proved this point is never definitively fixed. If the start of the philosophical domain marks, as it were, the lower boundary of the exact domain, then its upper boundary lies at the point where the ever-fragmentary contents of positive knowledge seek to be augmented by definitive concepts into a world picture and to be related to the totality of life. If the history of the sciences really does reveal that the philosophical mode of cognition is the primitive mode, is a mere estimate of the phenomena in general concepts, then this provisional procedure is nevertheless indispensable when confronted with certain questions, namely those questions - especially those related to valuations and the most general relations of intellectual life - that we have so far been unable either to answer or to dismiss. Moreover, even the empirical in its perfected state might no more replace philosophy as an interpretation, a colouring and an individually selective emphasis of what is real than would
每个研究领域都有两个界限，这两个界限标志着反思过程不再精确，而具有哲学性质。一般认知的先决条件，就像每个具体领域的公理一样，无法在后一个领域中提出和检验，而是需要一门更基本的科学。这门科学位于无限之中，其目标是在没有前提条件的情况下进行思考--个别科学否定了自己的这一目标，因为它们不会在没有证明的情况下迈出任何一步，也就是说，不会在没有实质性和方法论性质的前提条件的情况下迈出任何一步。哲学在提出和检验自己的活动时，也无法完全超越这些先决条件。但是，在这种情况下，我们总是在认识的最后一点上作出权威性的决定，并诉诸于无法证明的东西，然而，考虑到在可以证明的东西方面所取得的进展，这一点从来都不是确定无疑的。如果说哲学领域的起点标志着精确领域的下边界，那么它的上边界则是积极知识的不断碎片化的内容寻求被确定的概念扩充为世界图景并与整个生活相关联的地方。如果科学史确实揭示了哲学的认识模式是原始模式，是仅仅用一般概念对现象的估计，那么，当我们面对某些问题，即我们至今既无法回答也无法排除的问题--特别是与价值和知识生活的最一般关系有关的问题--时，这种临时程序还是不可或缺的。 此外，即使经验主义在其完善的状态下也不可能取代哲学，成为对真实事物的解释、着色和个别选择性强调，就像
the perfection of the mechanical reproduction of phenomena make the visual arts superfluous.
机械再现现象的完美性使视觉艺术成为多余。

Out of this general appraisal of philosophy’s position there emerge the rights that it possesses with regard to individual objects. If there is to be a philosophy of money, then it can only lie on either side of the economic science of money. On the one hand, it can present the pre-conditions that, situated in mental states, in social relations and in the logical structure of reality and values, give money its meaning and its practical position. This is not the question of the origin of money, for such a question belongs to history and not to philosophy. Moreover, no matter how much we appreciate the gain in the understanding of a phenomenon that is derived from a study of its historical development, its substantive meaning and importance often rest upon connections of a conceptual, psychological or ethical nature that are not temporal but rather are purely material. Such connections have, of course, been realized by historical forces, but are not exhausted by the fortuitousness of the latter. The significance, the dignity and the substance of justice, religion or knowledge lie completely beyond the question concerning the manner in which they were historically realized. The first part of this book, therefore, relates money to the conditions that determine its essence and the meaning of its existence.
从对哲学立场的这一总体评价中，可以看出哲学对个别对象所拥有的权利。如果存在货币哲学，那么它只能处于货币经济学的两侧。一方面，它可以提出先决条件，这些先决条件存在于精神状态、社会关系以及现实和价值的逻辑结构中，赋予货币以意义和实际地位。这不是货币起源的问题，因为这种问题属于历史而非哲学。此外，无论我们如何赞赏通过研究历史发展而对某一现象的理解所取得的进展，它的实质意义和重要性往往取决于概念、心理或伦理性质的联系，这些联系不是时间性的，而是纯粹物质性的。当然，这种联系是由历史力量实现的，但并不因后者的偶然性而穷尽。正义、宗教或知识的意义、尊严和实质完全超越了它们在历史上实现的方式问题。因此，本书的第一部分与决定金钱的本质及其存在意义的条件有关。

The historical phenomenon of money, the idea and structure of which I shall attempt to develop out of feelings of value, out of praxis in relation to things and the reciprocal relationships between people as its presupposition, is studied in the second part of the book in its effects upon the inner world - upon the vitality of individuals, upon the linking of their fates, upon culture in general. Here, then, it is a question, on the one hand, of connections that are basically open to exact and detailed investigation but that, given the present state of knowledge, are not studied. They can only be dealt with in a philosophical manner, namely by a general estimation, by representing individual occurrences through connections between abstract concepts. On the other hand, it is a question of mental causes that will always be a matter of hypothetical interpretation and artistic reconstruction which can never be completely free from individual colouring. This combination of the money principle with the developments and valuations of inner life stands just as far behind the economic science of money as the problem area of the first part of the book stood before it. The one part seeks to make the essence of money intelligible from the conditions and connections of life in general; conversely, the other part seeks to make the essence and organization of the latter intelligible from the effectiveness of money.
在本书的第二部分，我将从价值感、与事物相关的实践以及人与人之间的互惠关系作为其前提，研究货币这一历史现象的思想和结构对内心世界的影响--对个人的生命力、对个人命运的联系、对整个文化的影响。因此，这里的问题是，一方面，这些联系基本上是可以进行精确而详细的研究的，但在目前的知识水平下，却无法对其进行研究。只能以哲学的方式，即通过一般估计，通过抽象概念之间的联系来表示个别现象，来处理这些联系。另一方面，这是一个精神原因的问题，它永远是一个假设性解释和艺术性重构的问题，永远不可能完全摆脱个人色彩。货币原理与内心生活的发展和价值的这种结合，就像本书第一部分的问题领域一样，远远落后于货币经济科学。一部分试图从一般生活的条件和联系中理解货币的本质；反之，另一部分试图从货币的有效性中理解后者的本质和组织。

Not a single line of these investigations is meant to be a statement about economics. That is to say, the phenomena of valuation and purchase, of
这些研究中没有一句是关于经济学的。也就是说，估价和购买的现象，以及
exchange and the means of exchange, of the forms of production and the values of possession, which economics views from one standpoint, are here viewed from another. It is merely the fact that the aspect of these phenomena closest to economics is the most interesting in practical terms, is the most thoroughly investigated and can be represented in the most exact manner which has given rise to the apparent justification for regarding them simply as ‘economic facts’. But just as the appearance of a founder of a religion is by no means simply a religious phenomenon, and can also be studied by using the categories of psychology, perhaps even of pathology, general history and sociology; or just as a poem is not simply a fact of literary history, but also an aesthetic, a philological and a biographical fact; or just as the very standpoint of a single science, which is also based on the division of labour, never exhausts the totality of reality - so the fact that two people exchange their products is by no means simply an economic fact. Such a fact - that is, one whose content would be exhausted in the image that economics presents of it - does not exist. Moreover, and just as legitimately, such an exchange can be treated as a psychological fact, or as one that derives from the history of morals or even as an aesthetic fact. Even when it is considered to be an economic fact, it does not reach the end of a cul-de-sac; rather, in this guise it becomes the object of philosophical study, which examines its pre-conditions in non-economic concepts and facts and its consequences for non-economic values and relationships.
经济学从一个角度看待的交换和交换手段、生产形式和占有价值，在这里是从另一个角度看待的。这些现象中最贴近经济学的一面在实践中是最有趣的，也是研究得最透彻的，而且可以用最精确的方式表现出来，正是这一事实使我们有明显的理由把它们简单地视为 "经济事实"。但是，正如宗教创始人的出现绝不仅仅是一种宗教现象，也可以用心理学、甚至病理学、通史和社会学的范畴来研究；或者正如一首诗不仅仅是文学史上的事实，也是美学、语言学和传记学上的事实；或者正如同样建立在分工基础上的单一科学的立场永远不会穷尽现实的全部--因此，两个人交换产品的事实绝不仅仅是一个经济事实。这样的事实--也就是说，经济学所展示的形象会穷尽其内容的事实--并不存在。此外，同样合理的是，这种交换也可以被视为一种心理事实，或一种源于道德史的事实，甚至是一种美学事实。即使将其视为经济事实，它也不会走到死胡同的尽头；相反，在这种伪装下，它将成为哲学研究的对象，研究它在非经济概念和事实中的先决条件，以及它对非经济价值和关系的影响。

In this problem-complex, money is simply a means, a material or an example for the presentation of relations that exist between the most superficial, ‘realistic’ and fortuitous phenomena and the most idealized powers of existence, the most profound currents of individual life and history. The significance and purpose of the whole undertaking is simply to derive from the surface level of economic affairs a guideline that leads to the ultimate values and things of importance in all that is human. The abstract philosophical construction of a system maintains such a distance from the individual phenomena, especially from practical existence, that actually, at first sight, it only postulates their salvation from isolation and lack of spirituality, even from repulsiveness. Here the achievement of such salvation will be exemplified in only a single instance, but in one which, like money, not merely reveals the indifference of purely economic techniques but rather is, as it were, indifference itself, in that its entire significance does not lie in itself but rather in its transformation into other values. But since the opposition between what is apparently most superficial and insubstantial and the inner substance of life reaches a peak here, there must be the most effective reconciliation if this particular fact not only permeates, actively and passively, the
在这个问题情结中，金钱只是一种手段、一种材料或一个例子，用来呈现最肤浅、最 "现实 "和最偶然的现象与最理想化的存在力量、个人生活和历史最深刻的潮流之间的关系。整个工作的意义和目的只是要从经济事务的表层引申出一个准则，通向人类一切的终极价值和重要事物。抽象的哲学体系构建与个别现象，尤其是与实际存在保持着如此大的距离，以至于乍一看，它实际上只是假定它们将从孤立和缺乏灵性，甚至从令人厌恶中得到拯救。在这里，这种拯救的实现将只体现在一个例子中，但这个例子就像金钱一样，不仅揭示了纯粹经济技术的冷漠，而且它本身就是冷漠，因为它的全部意义不在于它本身，而在于它向其他价值的转化。然而，由于表面上最肤浅、最无实质意义的东西与生活的内在实质之间的对立在这里达到了顶峰，因此，如果这一特殊事实不仅主动或被动地渗透到生活的方方面面，而且还能使我们的生活变得更加丰富多彩，那么就一定能实现最有效的和解。
entire range of the intellectual world but also manifests itself as the symbol of the essential forms of movement within this world. The unity of these investigations does not lie, therefore, in an assertion about a particular content of knowledge and its gradually accumulating proofs but rather in the possibility - which must be demonstrated - of finding in each of life’s details the totality of its meaning. The great advantage of art over philosophy is that it sets itself a single, narrowly defined problem every time: a person, a landscape, a mood. Every extension of one of these to the general, every addition of bold touches of feeling for the world is made to appear as an enrichment, a gift, an undeserved benefit. On the other hand, philosophy, whose problem is nothing less than the totality of being, tends to reduce the magnitude of the latter when compared with itself and offers less than it seems obliged to offer. Here, conversely, the attempt is made to regard the problem as restricted and small in order to do justice to it by extending it to the totality and the highest level of generality.
它不仅是整个知识世界的象征，也是这个世界中运动的基本形式的象征。因此，这些研究的统一性不在于对某一特定知识内容的断言及其逐渐积累的证明，而在于从生活的每一个细节中发现其全部意义的可能性--这一点必须得到证明。与哲学相比，艺术的最大优势在于它每次都为自己设定一个单一的、狭义的问题：一个人、一道风景、一种情绪。每一次将其中一个问题扩展到一般问题，每一次对世界的大胆感触，都会被视为一种丰富、一种恩赐、一种不应得的好处。另一方面，哲学的问题不外乎是存在的整体性，它倾向于缩小后者与自身相比的规模，所提供的比它似乎必须提供的要少。反之，在这里，人们试图把问题看作是有限的、微小的，以便通过把它扩展到整体性和最高的普遍性来使它得到公正的对待。

Methodologically, this basic intention can be expressed in the following manner. The attempt is made to construct a new storey beneath historical materialism such that the explanatory value of the incorporation of economic life into the causes of intellectual culture is preserved, while these economic forms themselves are recognized as the result of more profound valuations and currents of psychological or even metaphysical pre-conditions. For the practice of cognition this must develop in infinite reciprocity. Every interpretation of an ideal structure by means of an economic structure must lead to the demand that the latter in turn be understood from more ideal depths, while for these depths themselves the general economic base has to be sought, and so on indefinitely. In such an alternation and entanglement of the conceptually opposed principles of cognition, the unity of things, which seems intangible to our cognition but none the less establishes its coherence, becomes practical and vital for us.
在方法论上，这一基本意图可以用以下方式表达。我们试图在历史唯物主义之下构建一个新的层次，从而保留将经济生活纳入思想文化原因的解释价值，同时承认这些经济形式本身是更深刻的价值观和心理甚至形而上学先决条件潮流的结果。对于认知实践来说，这必须在无限的互惠中发展。通过经济结构对理想结构的每一次诠释，都必须要求从更理想的深度来理解经济结构，而这些深度本身又必须寻求一般的经济基础，如此循环往复，无穷无尽。在这种概念上对立的认识原则的交替和纠缠中，事物的统一性对我们的认识似乎是无形的，但却建立了它的一致性，它对我们来说变得实际而重要。

The intentions and methods referred to here could not lay claim to any justification in principle if they were not able to serve a substantive diversity of basic philosophical convictions. It is possible to relate the details and superficialities of life to its most profound and essential movements, and their interpretation in accordance with the total meaning of life can be performed on the basis of idealism just as much as of realism, of a rational as much as a volitional or an absolutist as much as a relativistic interpretation of being. The fact that the following investigations are founded on one of these world pictures, which I consider to be the most appropriate expression of the contemporary contents of science and emotional currents and decisively exclude the opposing world picture, might secure for them at
这里提到的意图和方法，如果不能为多种多样的基本哲学信念服务，原则上就不能说是合理的。我们可以将生活的细节和表面现象与其最深刻、最本质的运动联系起来，可以在理想主义也可以在现实主义的基础上，在理性的也可以在意志的基础上，在绝对的也可以在相对的基础上，根据生活的全部意义对它们进行解释。下面的研究建立在上述世界图景之一的基础上，我认为它最恰当地表达了当代科学和情感潮流的内容，并决定性地排除了对立的世界图景。
worst the role of a mere typical example which, even if it is factually incorrect, reveals its methodological significance as the form of future truths.
最糟糕的是，它只是一个典型的例子，即使它与事实不符，但却揭示了其作为未来真理形式的方法论意义。

At no point do the amendments to the second impression affect the essential motifs. However, through new examples and discussions and, above all, through an extension of the foundations, I have attempted to increase the likelihood of these motifs being intelligible and acceptable.
对 "第二印象 "的修改丝毫不影响基本主题。然而，通过新的例子和讨论，尤其是通过对基础的扩展，我试图增加这些主题被理解和接受的可能性。

Analytical Part  分析部分

The order in which things are placed as natural entities is based on the proposition that the whole variety of their qualities rests upon a uniform law of existence. Their equality before the law of nature, the constant sum of matter and energy, the convertibility of the most diverse phenomena into one another, transform the differences that are apparent at first sight into a general affinity, a universal equality. Yet on a closer view this means only that the products of the natural order are beyond any question of a law. Their absolute determinateness does not allow any emphasis that might provide confirmation or doubt of their particular quality of being. But we are not satisfied with this indifferent necessity that natural science assigns to objects. Instead, disregarding their place in that series we arrange them in another order - an order of value - in which equality is completely eliminated, in which the highest level of one point is adjacent to the lowest level of another; in this series the fundamental quality is not uniformity but difference. The value of objects, thoughts and events can never be inferred from their mere natural existence and content, and their ranking according to value diverges widely from their natural ordering. Nature, on many occasions, destroys objects that, in terms of their value, might claim to be preserved, and keeps in existence worthless objects which occupy the place of the more valuable ones. This is not to say that there is a fundamental opposition between the
事物作为自然实体的排列顺序是基于这样一个命题，即事物的所有特性都建立在统一的存在法则之上。在自然法则面前，它们是平等的，物质和能量的总和是恒定的，最多样的现象可以相互转化，这就把乍看之下的差异转化为一种普遍的亲和力，一种普遍的平等。然而，仔细一看，这仅仅意味着自然秩序的产物不存在任何规律问题。它们的绝对确定性不允许任何可能对其存在的特殊性进行确认或怀疑的强调。但是，我们并不满足于自然科学赋予物体的这种冷漠的必然性。相反，我们不考虑它们在这一系列中的位置，而是将它们排列成另一种秩序--价值秩序--在这种秩序中，平等被完全消除，一个点的最高水平与另一个点的最低水平相邻；在这一系列中，基本品质不是统一性，而是差异性。物体、思想和事件的价值决不能仅仅从它们的自然存在和内容中推断出来，它们的价值排序与它们的自然排序大相径庭。在许多情况下，大自然会毁掉那些就其价值而言可能需要保留的物品，而让那些没有价值的物品继续存在，占据那些更有价值的物品的位置。这并不是说，"物 "与 "人 "之间存在着根本的对立。
two series, or that they are mutually exclusive. Such a view would imply a relation between the two series; it would establish, indeed, a diabolical world, determined by values, but with the signs reversed. The case is, rather, that the relation between these series is completely accidental. With the same indifference, nature at one time offers us objects that we value highly, at another time withholds them. The occasional harmony between the series, the realization through the reality series of demands derived from the value series, shows the absence of any logical relationship between them just as strikingly as does the opposite case. We may be aware of the same life experience as both real and valuable, but the experience has quite a different meaning in the two cases. The series of natural phenomena could be described in their entirety without mentioning the value of things; and our scale of valuation remains meaningful, whether or not any of its objects appear frequently or at all in reality. Value is an addition to the completely determined objective being, like light and shade, which are not inherent in it but come from a different source. However, we should avoid one misinterpretation; namely, that the formation of value concepts, as a psychological fact, is quite distinct from the natural process. A superhuman mind, which could understand by means of natural laws everything that happens in the world, would also comprehend the fact that people have concepts of values. But these would have no meaning or validity for a being that conceived them purely theoretically, beyond their psychological existence. The meaning of value concepts is denied to nature as a mechanical causal system, while at the same time the psychic experiences that make values a part of our consciousness themselves belong to the natural world. Valuation as a real psychological occurrence is part of the natural world; but what we mean by valuation, its conceptual meaning, is something independent of this world; is not part of it, but is rather the whole world viewed from a particular vantage point. We are rarely aware of the fact that our whole life, from the point of view of consciousness, consists in experiencing and judging values, and that it acquires meaning and significance only from the fact that the mechanically unfolding elements of reality possess an infinite variety of values beyond their objective substance. At any moment when our mind is not simply a passive mirror or reality - which perhaps never happens, since even objective perception can arise only from valuation we live in a world of values which arranges the contents of reality in an autonomous order.
或者说这两个系列是相互排斥的。这种观点意味着这两个系列之间存在着某种关系；实际上，它将建立一个由价值决定、但符号颠倒的恶魔世界。相反，这些系列之间的关系完全是偶然的。大自然以同样的冷漠态度，一会儿向我们提供我们所珍视的物品，一会儿又将它们拒之门外。这两个系列之间偶尔出现的和谐，通过现实系列实现从价值系列衍生出来的需求，与相反的情况一样，都清楚地表明它们之间不存在任何逻辑关系。我们可能会意识到，同一种生活体验既是现实的，又是有价值的，但在这两种情况下，体验的意义却截然不同。在描述一系列自然现象时，我们可以完全不提及事物的价值；而我们的价值尺度仍然是有意义的，无论其中的任何对象在现实中是否经常出现或根本没有出现。价值是对完全确定的客观存在的一种补充，就像光影一样，它不是客观存在所固有的，而是来自不同的来源。然而，我们应该避免一种误解，即价值概念的形成作为一种心理事实，与自然过程截然不同。一个能够通过自然规律理解世界上发生的一切事情的超人头脑，也会理解人们有价值概念这一事实。但是，对于一个纯粹从理论上构想这些概念的人来说，这些概念并没有任何意义或有效性，它们只是心理上的存在。 价值概念的意义被否定为自然界的机械因果系统，而与此同时，使价值成为我们意识一部分的心理体验本身也属于自然世界。价值作为一种真实的心理现象，是自然世界的一部分；但我们所说的价值，也就是它的概念意义，却是独立于这个世界之外的东西；它不是这个世界的一部分，而是从一个特定的视点来看整个世界。我们很少意识到这样一个事实，即从意识的角度来看，我们的整个生活都包含着对价值的体验和判断，而且只有从这样一个事实中，我们的生活才获得了意义和重要性，即机械地展开的现实元素拥有超越其客观实质的无限多样的价值。在任何时候，当我们的心灵不只是一面被动的镜子或现实时--这也许永远不会发生，因为即使是客观的感知也只能产生于估值，我们生活在一个价值世界中，它以一种自主的秩序安排着现实的内容。

Thus, value is in a sense the counterpart to being, and is comparable to being as a comprehensive form and category of the world view. As Kant pointed out, being is not a quality of objects; for if I state that an object,
因此，价值在某种意义上是存在的对应物，与作为世界观的综合形式和范畴的存在相提并论。正如康德所指出的，"存在 "并不是对象的一种品质；因为如果我说一个对象.....、
which so far existed only in my thoughts, exists, it does not acquire a new quality, because otherwise it would not be the same object that I thought of, but another one. In the same way, an object does not gain a new quality if I call it valuable; it is valued because of the qualities that it has. It is precisely its whole already determined being that is raised to the sphere of value. This is supported by a thorough analysis of our thinking. We are able to conceive the contents of our world view without regard for their real existence or non-existence. We can conceive the aggregates of qualities that we call objects, including all the laws of their interrelation and development, in their objective and logical significance, and we can ask - quite independently of this - whether, where and how often all these concepts or inner notions are realized. The conceptual meaning and determinateness of the objects is not affected by the question as to whether they do exist, nor by the question whether and where they are placed in the scale of values. However, if we want to establish either a theory or a practical rule, we cannot escape the necessity to answer these two questions. We must be able to say of each object that it exists or does not exist, and each object must have a definite place for us in the scale of values, from the highest through indifference to negative values. Indifference is a rejection of positive value; the possibility of interest remains inactive but is always in the background. The significance of this requirement, which determines the constitution of our world view, is not altered by the fact that our powers of comprehension are often insufficient to decide upon the reality of concepts, or by the fact that the range and certainty of our feelings are often inadequate to rank things according to their value, especially in any permanently and universal fashion. Over against the world of mere concepts, of objective qualities and determinations, stand the great categories of being and value, inclusive forms that take their material from the world of pure contents. Both categories have the quality of being fundamental, that is irreducible to each other or to other simpler elements. Consequently, the being of objects can never be inferred logically; being is rather a primary form of our perception, which can be sensed, experienced and believed, but cannot be deduced for somebody who does not yet know it. When this form of perception has once grasped a specific content - by a non-logical act - it can then be interpreted in its logical context and developed as far as this logical context reaches. As a rule, we are able to state why we assume the reality of a particular phenomenon; namely, because we have already assumed another phenomenon with which this one is connected by its specific characteristics. The reality of the first one, however, can be shown only by tracing it in similar fashion to a more fundamental one. This regression requires a final member whose existence
它不会获得新的品质，因为否则它就不是我想到的那个物体，而是另一个物体了。同样，如果我称一个物体为有价值的物体，它也不会获得新的品质；它之所以有价值，是因为它所具有的品质。恰恰是它已经确定的整体存在被提升到了价值的范畴。对我们的思维进行透彻的分析可以证明这一点。我们能够构想出我们世界观的内容，而无需考虑它们的真实存在与否。我们可以从客观和逻辑的角度来设想我们称之为对象的各种品质的集合体，包括它们之间相互关系和发展的所有规律，我们还可以问--完全独立于此--所有这些概念或内在观念是否、在哪里以及多长时间实现一次。对象的概念意义和确定性并不受其是否存在的问题的影响，也不受其是否以及在价值尺度中的位置问题的影响。然而，如果我们想要建立一种理论或实践规则，我们就不能逃避回答这两个问题的必要性。我们必须能够对每个对象说它存在或不存在，而且每个对象必须在价值尺度中对我们有一个明确的位置，从最高价值到冷漠价值再到负价值。冷漠是对积极价值的否定；兴趣的可能性仍然是不活跃的，但始终处于背景之中。 这一要求决定了我们世界观的构成，其意义不会因为我们的理解力往往不足以决定概念的真实性，也不会因为我们的感觉范围和确定性往往不足以根据事物的价值（尤其是以任何永久和普遍的方式）对其进行排序而有所改变。在纯粹的概念世界、客观的品质和决定的世界中，存在和价值这两个伟大的范畴屹立不倒，它们是取材于纯粹的内容世界的包容性形式。这两个范畴都具有根本性的特质，即它们之间或它们与其他更简单的元素之间是不可还原的。因此，物体的存在永远无法从逻辑上推断出来；存在是我们感知的一种主要形式，它可以被感知、体验和相信，但对于一个尚未认识它的人来说，它是无法被推断出来的。当这种感知形式通过非逻辑行为掌握了某一具体内容之后，就可以在其逻辑背景下对其进行解释，并在逻辑背景所及的范围内加以发展。通常，我们能够说明为什么我们假定某一现象是真实的，即因为我们已经假定了另一种现象，而这种现象的具体特征与另一种现象相关联。然而，第一个现象的现实性只能通过以类似的方式追溯到一个更基本的现象来证明。这种回溯需要一个最终的成员，它的存在
depends only upon a sense of conviction, affirmation and acceptance, a sense that is directly given. Valuation has exactly the same relation to objects. All proofs of the value of an object are nothing more than the necessity of recognizing for that object the same value as has been assumed, and for the time being accepted, as indubitable for another object. We will later analyse the motives of this action. Here it will suffice to say that what we consider a proof of value is only the transference of an existing value to a new object. It does not reveal the essence of value, or the reason why value was originally attached to the object from which it is transferred to others.
这种感觉是直接给予的。估价与物体的关系完全相同。对某一物品价值的所有证明，无非是必须承认该物品具有与另一物品相同的价值，而这种价值已被假定并暂时被接受为另一物品的不可否认的价值。我们稍后将分析这种行为的动机。在此，我们只需指出，我们所认为的价值证明只是将现有的价值转移到一个新的对象上。它并没有揭示价值的本质，也没有揭示价值最初被附加在对象上的原因，而价值正是从这个对象转移到其他对象上的。

If we accept the existence of a value, then the process of its realization, its evolution, can be comprehended rationally, because in general it follows the structure of the contents of reality. That there is a value at all, however, is a primary phenomenon. Value inferences only make known the conditions under which values are realized, yet without being produced by these conditions, just as theoretical proofs only prepare the conditions that favour the sense of affirmation or of existence. The question as to what value really is, like the question as to what being is, is unanswerable. And precisely because they have the same formal relation to objects, they are as alien to each other as are thought and extension for Spinoza. Since both express the same absolute substance, each in its own way and perfect in itself, the one can never encroach upon the other. They never impinge upon each other because they question the concepts of objects from completely different points of view. But this disjunctive parallelism of reality and value does not divide the world into a sterile duality, which the mind with its need for unity could never accept - even though its destiny and the method of its quest may be to move incessantly from diversity to unity and from unity to diversity. What is common to value and reality stands above them: namely the contents, which Plato called ‘ideas’, the qualitative, that which can be signified and expressed in our concepts of reality and value, and which can enter into either one or the other series. Below these two categories lies what is common to both: the soul, which absorbs the one or produces the other in its mysterious unity. Reality and value are, as it were, two different languages by which the logically related contents of the world, valid in their ideal unity, are made comprehensible to the unitary soul, or the languages in which the soul can express the pure image of these contents which lies beyond their differentiation and opposition. These two compilations made by the soul, through perceiving and through valuing, may perhaps once more be brought together in a metaphysical unity, for which there is no linguistic term unless it be in religious symbols. There is perhaps a cosmic ground where the heterogeneity and divergencies that we experience between reality and value no longer
如果我们承认价值的存在，那么它的实现过程、它的演变过程就可以被理性地理解，因为一般来说，它遵循的是现实内容的结构。然而，价值的存在是一个基本现象。价值推论只是揭示了价值得以实现的条件，但却不是由这些条件产生的，正如理论证明只是准备了有利于肯定感或存在感的条件一样。关于价值究竟是什么的问题，就像关于存在是什么的问题一样，是无法回答的。正因为它们与客体有着相同的形式关系，所以它们彼此格格不入，就像斯宾诺莎眼中的思维与外延一样。既然两者都表达了同一个绝对物质，各自以自己的方式完美地存在着，那么一个就永远不会侵犯另一个。因为它们从完全不同的角度质疑对象的概念，所以永远不会相互影响。但是，现实与价值的这种不相干的平行关系并没有把世界划分为无意义的二元对立，而需要统一性的心灵永远不会接受这种二元对立--尽管它的命运和追求的方法可能是不断地从多样性走向统一性，又从统一性走向多样性。价值和现实的共同点位于二者之上：即柏拉图称之为 "理念 "的内容，即质，即在我们的现实概念和价值概念中可以被符号化和表达的东西，它们可以进入其中一个系列，也可以进入另一个系列。在这两个范畴之下是两者共同的东西：灵魂，它在其神秘的统一体中吸收一个或产生另一个。 可以说，现实和价值是两种不同的语言，通过这两种语言，世界上逻辑上相关的、在其理想统一性中有效的内容被统一的灵魂所理解，或者说，通过这两种语言，灵魂可以表达这些内容的纯粹形象，这种形象超越了它们之间的差异和对立。灵魂通过感知和估价所做的这两种汇编，或许可以再次汇集成一个形而上学的统一体，而对于这个统一体，除非是宗教符号，否则是没有语言术语的。在这里，我们所体验到的现实与价值之间的异质性和差异性不再存在。
exist, where both series are revealed as one; this unity either being unaffected by the two categories, and standing beyond them in majestic indifference, or signifying a harmonious interweaving of both, which is shattered and distorted into fragments and contrasts only by our way of regarding it, as if we had an imperfect visual faculty.
这种统一性要么不受这两个范畴的影响，漠然地屹立于它们之外，要么意味着两者的和谐交织，只是由于我们的观察方式（就好像我们的视觉能力并不完美）而被打破和扭曲成碎片和对比。

The characteristic feature of value, as it appears in contrast to reality, is usually called its subjectivity. Since one and the same object can have the highest degree of value for one soul and the lowest for another, and vice versa, and since on the other hand the most extensive and extreme differences between objects are compatible with equality of value, there appears to remain only the subject with his customary or exceptional, permanent or changing, moods and responses as the ground for valuation. This subjectivity, needless to say, has nothing to do with the subjectivity that refers to ‘my perception’ of the totality of the world. For the subjectivity of value contrasts value with the given objects, regardless of the way they are conceived. In other words, the subject who comprehends all objects is different from the subject who is confronted with the objects; the subjectivity that value shares with all other objects does not play any role here. Nor is his subjectivity merely caprice; independence from reality does not mean that value can be bestowed here and there with unrestrained and capricious freedom. Value exists in our consciousness as a fact that can no more be altered than can reality itself. The subjectivity of value, therefore, is first of all only negative, in the sense that value is not attached to objects in the same way as is colour or temperature. The latter, although determined by our senses, are accompanied by a feeling of their direct dependence upon the object; but in the case of value we soon learn to disregard this feeling because the two series constituted by reality and by value are quite independent of each other. The only cases more interesting than this general characterization are those in which psychological facts appear to lead to an opposite view.
与现实相对照的价值特征通常被称为主观性。既然同一物品对一个人的价值可能最高，对另一个人的价值可能最低，反之亦然，而另一方面，物品之间最广泛、最极端的差异也与价值平等相容，那么似乎就只剩下主体及其习惯的或特殊的、永久的或不断变化的情绪和反应作为估价的依据了。不用说，这种主体性与 "我对世界整体的感知 "的主体性毫无关系。因为价值的主体性将价值与给定的客体相对照，而不论这些客体是以何种方式被构想出来的。换句话说，理解所有客体的主体与面对客体的主体是不同的；价值与所有其他客体共享的主体性在这里不起任何作用。他的主观性也不仅仅是任性；独立于现实并不意味着价值可以无拘无束、任性自由地在这里和那里被赋予。价值作为一个事实存在于我们的意识中，它与现实本身一样无法改变。因此，价值的主观性首先只是消极的，即价值并不像颜色或温度那样依附于物体。后者虽然是由我们的感官决定的，但却伴随着一种感觉，即它们直接依赖于对象；但就价值而言，我们很快就学会了无视这种感觉，因为由现实和价值构成的两个系列是完全相互独立的。 唯一比这种一般性描述更有趣的情况是，心理事实似乎导致了相反的观点。

In whatever empirical or transcendental sense the difference between objects and subjects is conceived, value is never a ‘quality’ of the objects, but a judgment upon them which remains inherent in the subject. And yet, neither the deeper meaning and content of the concept of value, nor its significance for the mental life of the individual, nor the practical social events and arrangements based upon it, can be sufficiently understood by referring value to the ‘subject’. The way to a comprehension of value lies in a region in which that subjectivity is only provisional and actually not very essential.
无论从经验或超验的角度来看待客体与主体之间的差异，价值从来都不是客体的一种 "品质"，而是对客体的一种判断，这种判断仍然是主体所固有的。然而，无论是价值概念的深层含义和内容，还是它对个人精神生活的意义，抑或是以它为基础的实际社会事件和安排，都不能通过把价值归结为 "主体 "来充分理解。理解价值的途径在于这样一个区域，在这个区域中，主体性只是暂时的，实际上并不十分重要。

The distinction between subject and object is not as radical as the accepted separation of these categories in practical life and in the scientific world would have us believe. Mental life begins with an undifferentiated state in which the Ego and its objects are not yet distinguished; consciousness is filled with impressions and perceptions while the bearer of these contents has still not detached himself from them. It is as a result of a second-stage awareness, a later analysis, that a subject in particular real conditions comes to be distinguished from the content of his consciousness in those conditions. This development obviously leads to a situation where a man speaks of himself as ’ $I$$I$II ’ and recognizes the existence of other objects external to this ’ $I$$I$II '. Metaphysics sometimes claims that the transcendent essence of being is completely unified, beyond the opposition of subject-object, and this has a psychological counterpart in the simple, primitive condition of being possessed by the content of a perception, like a child who does not yet speak of himself as ’ $I$$I$II ', or as may perhaps be observed in a rudimentary form at all stages of life. This unity from which the categories of subject and object develop in relation to each other - in a process to be examined later - appears to us as a subjective unity because we approach it with the concept of objectivity developed later; and because we do not have a proper term for such unities, but name them usually after one of the partial elements that appear in the subsequent analysis. Thus, it has been asserted that all actions are essentially egoistic, whereas egoism has a meaning only within a system of action and by contrast with its correlate, altruism. Similarly, pantheism has described the universality of being as God, although a positive concept of God depends on its contrast with everything empirical. This evolutionary relation between subject and object is repeated finally on a large scale: the intellectual world of classical antiquity differs from that of modern times chiefly in the fact that only the latter has, on the one hand, developed a comprehensive and clear concept of the Ego, as shown by the significance of the problem of liberty which was unknown in ancient times; and on the other, expressed the independence and force of the concept of the object through the idea of unalterable laws of nature. Antiquity was much closer than were later periods to the stage of indifference in which the contents of the world were conceived as such, without being apportioned between subject and object.
主体和客体之间的区别并不像实际生活和科学界所认为的那样彻底。精神生活开始于一种未分化的状态，在这种状态中，自我和客体尚未区分开来；意识中充满了印象和知觉，而这些内容的承载者还没有脱离它们。正是由于第二阶段的认识，即后来的分析，处于特定现实条件下的主体才开始与他在这些条件下的意识内容区分开来。这种发展显然会导致这样一种情况，即一个人把自己说成是" $I$$I$II "，并承认存在着这个" $I$$I$II "之外的其他对象。形而上学有时声称，存在的超越性本质是完全统一的，超越了主客体的对立，而这在心理学上的对应物是简单、原始的知觉内容，就像一个还不会把自己说成" $I$$I$II "的孩子，或者在生命的各个阶段都可以观察到这种原始的形式。在我们看来，主体和客体这两个范畴是在以后的研究过程中相互联系发展起来的，而这种统一体在我们看来是主观的统一体，因为我们是用后来发展起来的客观性概念来对待它的；同时，我们也没有一个恰当的术语来称呼这种统一体，而通常是用后来分析中出现的某个部分要素来命名它们的。因此，有人断言，所有的行动本质上都是利己主义的，而利己主义只有在行动体系中才有意义，并与其相关的利他主义形成对比。 同样，泛神论将存在的普遍性描述为上帝，尽管上帝的正面概念取决于它与一切经验事物的对比。主体与客体之间的这种进化关系最终在很大程度上重演了：古典古代的思想世界与现代的思想世界的主要区别在于，只有后者一方面发展了全面而清晰的 "自我 "概念，这一点从古代所不知道的自由问题的意义中可以看出；另一方面，通过不可改变的自然法则的思想表达了客体概念的独立性和力量。古代比后世更接近于漠视阶段，在这一阶段，世界的内容被视为世界本身，而不在主体和客体之间进行分配。

This development which separates subject and object appears to be sustained on both sides by the same theme, but operating at different levels. Thus, the
这种将主体和客体分离开来的发展似乎是由相同的主题在双方支撑的，但却在不同的层面上运作。因此
awareness of being a subject is already an objectification. This is a basic feature of the mind in its form as personality. The fundamental activity of our mind, which determines its form as a whole, is that we can observe, know and judge ourselves just like any other ‘object’; that we dissect the Ego, experienced as a unity, into a perceiving subject and a perceived object, without its losing its unity, but on the contrary with its becoming aware of its unity through this inner antagonism. The mutual dependence of subject and object is here drawn together in a single point; it has affected the subject itself, which otherwise stands confronting the world as object. Thus man has realized the basic form of his relation to the world, of his acceptance of the world, as soon as he becomes aware of himself and calls himself ’ I '. But before that happens there exists - in respect of meaning as well as of mental growth - a simple perception of content which does not distinguish between subject and object and is not yet divided between them. Regarded from the other side, this content itself, as a logical and conceptual entity, likewise lies beyond the distinction between subjective and objective reality. We can think of any object simply in terms of its qualities and their interconnection without asking whether or not this ideal complex of qualities has an objective existence. To be sure, so far as such a pure objective content is thought, it becomes a conception and to that extent a subjective structure. But the subjective is here only the dynamic act of conception, the function that apprehends the content; in itself this content is thought of as being independent of the act of conceiving. Our mind has a remarkable ability to think of contents as being independent of the act of thinking; this is one of its primary qualities, which cannot be reduced any further. The contents have their conceptual or objective qualities and relationships which can be apprehended but which are not thereby completely absorbed; they exist whether or not they are part of my representation and whether or not they are part of objective reality. The content of a representation does not coincide with the representation of contents. The simple undifferentiated conception that consists only in becoming aware of a content cannot be characterized as subjective, because it does not yet know the contrast between subject and object. Similarly, the pure content of objects or conceptions is not objective, but escapes equally this differential form and its opposite, while being ready to present itself in one or the other. Subject and object are born in the same act: logically, by presenting the conceptual ideal content first as a content of representation, and then as a content of objective reality; psychologically, when the still ego-less representation, in which person and object are undifferentiated, becomes divided and gives rise to a distance between the self and its object, through which each of them becomes a separate entity.
作为主体的意识已经是一种客体化。这是作为人格形式的心灵的基本特征。我们心灵的基本活动决定了它的整体形式，那就是我们可以像其他 "客体 "一样观察、认识和判断我们自己；我们把作为统一体体验的 "自我 "分解为感知的主体和感知的客体，但它并没有丧失其统一性，相反，它通过这种内在的对立意识到了自己的统一性。在这里，主体和客体的相互依存关系被集中到了一点上；它影响到了主体本身，否则主体就会作为客体与世界对峙。因此，当人意识到自己并称自己为 "我 "时，他就已经认识到了自己与世界关系的基本形式，认识到了自己对世界的接受。但是，在此之前，就意义和精神成长而言，存在着一种对内容的简单感知，这种感知不区分主体和客体，也尚未在两者之间进行划分。从另一个角度看，这种内容本身作为一个逻辑和概念实体，也同样超越了主观和客观现实之间的区别。我们可以简单地从客体的特质及其相互联系的角度来思考任何客体，而不必追问这种理想的特质复合体是否具有客观存在。可以肯定的是，只要思考到这种纯粹的客观内容，它就会成为一种概念，并在一定程度上成为一种主观结构。但在这里，主观只是构思的能动行为，是理解内容的功能；这个内容本身被认为是独立于构思行为的。 我们的思维有一种非凡的能力，可以把内容看作是独立于思维行为之外的；这是思维的主要特质之一，无法再进一步简化。内容有其概念或客观的特质和关系，它们可以被理解，但并不因此而被完全吸收；无论它们是否是我的表象的一部分，也无论它们是否是客观现实的一部分，它们都是存在的。表象的内容与内容的表象并不一致。仅仅意识到一个内容的简单的无差别的概念不能被描述为主观的，因为它还不知道主体和客体之间的对比。同样，客体或概念的纯粹内容也不是客观的，而是同样摆脱了这种有差别的形式及其对立面，同时随时准备以一种或另一种形式呈现自己。主体和客体是在同一行为中诞生的：在逻辑上，先是作为表象的内容，然后作为客观现实的内容呈现出概念的理想内容；在心理上，当人和客体无差别的、仍然没有自我的表象变得分裂，并在自我和客体之间产生距离，通过这种距离，它们各自成为一个独立的实体。

This process, which finally produces our intellectual world view, also occurs in the sphere of our volitional practical activity. Here also the distinction between the desiring, consuming, valuing subject and the valued object does not comprehend all aspects of mental life, nor all the objective circumstances of practical activity. Human enjoyment of an object is a completely undivided act. At such moments we have an experience that does not include an awareness of an object confronting us or an awareness of the self as distinct from its present condition. Phenomena of the basest and the highest kind meet here. The crude impulse, particularly an impulse of an impersonal, general nature, wants to release itself towards an object and to be satisfied, no matter how; consciousness is exclusively concerned with satisfaction and pays no attention to its bearer on one side or its object on the other. On the other hand, intense aesthetic enjoyment displays the same form. Here too ‘we forget ourselves’, but at the same time we no longer experience the work of art as something with which we are confronted, because our mind is completely submerged in it, has absorbed it by surrendering to it. In this case, as in the other, our psychological condition is not yet, or is no longer, affected by the contrast between subject and object. Only a new process of awareness releases those categories from their undisturbed unity; and only then is the pure enjoyment of the content seen as being on the one hand a state of the subject confronting an object, and on the other the effect produced by an object that is independent of the subject. This tension, which disrupts the naive-practical unity of subject and object and makes us conscious of each in relation to the other, is brought about originally through the mere fact of desire. In desiring what we do not yet own or enjoy, we place the content of our desire outside ourselves. In empirical life, I admit, the finished object stands before us and is only then desired - if only because, in addition to our will, many other theoretical and emotional events contribute to the objectification of mental contents. Within the practical world, however, in relation to its inner order and intelligibility, the origin of the object itself, and its being desired by the subject, are correlative terms - the two aspects of this process of differentiation which splits the immediate unity of the process of enjoyment. It has been asserted that our conception of objective reality originates in the resistance that objects present to us, especially through our sense of touch. We can apply this at once to the practical problem. We desire objects only if they are not immediately given to us for our use and enjoyment; that is, to the extent that they resist our desire. The content of our desire becomes an object as soon as it is opposed to us, not only in the sense
这个最终产生我们的知识世界观的过程，也发生在我们的意志实践活动领域。在这里，欲望、消费、价值主体与价值客体之间的区别并不能涵盖精神生活的所有方面，也不能涵盖实践活动的所有客观情况。人对客体的享受是一种完全独立的行为。在这种时刻，我们的体验并不包括对我们所面对的客体的认识，也不包括对有别于自身现状的自我的认识。最基本和最高级的现象在这里交汇。粗暴的冲动，特别是非个人的、普遍的冲动，希望向一个对象释放自己，并得到满足，不管是怎样的满足；意识只关注满足，而不关注它的承受者或它的对象。另一方面，强烈的审美享受也表现出同样的形式。在这里，我们也 "忘记了自己"，但同时我们不再把艺术作品当作我们所面对的东西来体验，因为我们的心灵已经完全沉浸其中，并通过臣服于它而吸收了它。在这种情况下，正如在另一种情况下一样，我们的心理状态尚未或不再受到主体与客体之间对比的影响。只有在新的认识过程中，这些范畴才会从它们不受干扰的统一中释放出来；也只有在这个时候，对内容的纯粹享受才会被视为一方面是主体面对客体的状态，另一方面是客体产生的独立于主体的效果。 这种张力打破了主体与客体的天真-实践统一，使我们意识到两者之间的关系，而这种张力最初是通过欲望这一事实产生的。在渴望我们尚未拥有或享受的东西时，我们将欲望的内容置于自身之外。我承认，在经验生活中，完成的对象就摆在我们面前，只有在这个时候，我们才会产生欲望--如果这仅仅是因为，除了我们的意志之外，还有许多其他的理论和情感事件促成了心理内容的对象化。然而，在实践世界中，就其内在秩序和可理解性而言，客体本身的起源和客体被主体所渴求是相关联的--是这一分化过程的两个方面，而这一分化过程分裂了享受过程的直接统一性。有人断言，我们对客观现实的概念源于客体向我们展示的阻力，尤其是通过我们的触觉。我们可以立即将这一观点应用到实际问题中。我们对物体的欲望，只有在它们没有被立即给予我们使用和享受时才会产生；也就是说，只有在它们抵制我们的欲望时才会产生。我们欲望的内容一旦与我们对立，就会成为对象，这不仅是指
of being impervious to us, but also in terms of its distance as something not-yet-enjoyed, the subjective aspect of this condition being desire. As Kant has said: the possibility of experience is the possibility of the objects of experience - because to have experiences means that our consciousness creates objects from sense impressions. In the same way, the possibility of desire is the possibility of the objects of desire. The object thus formed, which is characterized by its separation from the subject, who at the same time establishes it and seeks to overcome it by his desire, is for us a value. The moment of enjoyment itself, when the opposition between subject and object is effaced, consumes the value. Value is only reinstated as contrast, as an object separated from the subject. Such trivial experiences as that we appreciate the value of our possessions only after we have lost them, that the mere withholding of a desired object often endows it with a value quite disproportionate to any possible enjoyment that it could yield, that the remoteness, either literal or figurative, of the objects of our enjoyment shows them in a transfigured light and with heightened attractions - all these are derivatives, modifications and hybrids of the basic fact that value does not originate from the unbroken unity of the moment of enjoyment, but from the separation between the subject and the content of enjoyment as an object that stands opposed to the subject as something desired and only to be attained by the conquest of distance, obstacles and difficulties. To reiterate the earlier analogy: in the final analysis perhaps, reality does not press upon our consciousness through the resistance that phenomena exert, but we register those representations which have feelings of resistance and inhibition associated with them, as being objectively real, independent and external to us. Objects are not difficult to acquire because they are valuable, but we call those objects valuable that resist our desire to possess them. Since the desire encounters resistance and frustration, the objects gain a significance that would never have been attributed to them by an unchecked will.
这不仅是指它对我们的不可见性，而且还指它作为尚未享受的东西的距离，这一条件的主观方面就是欲望。正如康德所说：经验的可能性就是经验对象的可能性--因为有经验就意味着我们的意识从感觉印象中创造了对象。同样，欲望的可能性就是欲望对象的可能性。这样形成的客体对我们来说是一种价值，它的特点是与主体相分离，主体在建立客体的同时又试图通过欲望来克服客体。当主体与客体之间的对立消失时，享受的瞬间本身就消耗了价值。价值只是作为对比，作为与主体分离的客体才得以恢复。我们只有在失去财产之后才会体会到它们的价值，仅仅是扣留一件心仪的物品往往就会赋予它与它可能带来的任何享受极不相称的价值，我们享受的对象的遥远（无论是字面意义上的还是形象意义上的）使它们变得光彩照人，吸引力倍增--所有这些都是衍生物、所有这些都是一个基本事实的衍生物、变体和混合体，这个基本事实就是：价值并不是源于享受时刻的完整统一，而是源于主体与享受内容之间的分离，享受内容作为一种客体，与主体相对立，是一种渴望的东西，只有通过征服距离、障碍和困难才能达到。 重申一下之前的比喻：归根结底，也许现实并不是通过现象所产生的阻力来压迫我们的意识，而是我们把那些带有阻力和抑制感的表象记录为客观真实的、独立的和外在于我们的表象。物品之所以难以获得，并不是因为它们有价值，而是我们把那些抵制我们占有欲望的物品称为有价值的物品。由于欲望遇到了阻力和挫折，这些物品就获得了一种意义，而这种意义是不受约束的意志永远不会赋予它们的。

Value, which appears at the same time and in the same process of differentiation as the desiring Ego and as its correlate, is subordinate to yet another category. It is the same category as applies to the object that is conceived in theoretical representations. We concluded, in that case, that the contents that are realized in the objective world and also exist in us as subjective representations have, in addition, a peculiar ideal dignity. The concepts of the triangle or of the organism, causality or the law of gravitation have a logical sense, an inner structural validity which indeed determines their realization in space and in consciousness; but even if they were never realized, they would still belong to the ultimate unanalysable category of the valid and significant, and would differ entirely from fantastic and
价值与欲望自我同时出现在同一分化过程中，并与欲望自我相关联，它从属于另一个范畴。它与理论表象中构想的对象属于同一范畴。在这种情况下，我们得出结论：在客观世界中实现的、同时也作为主观表象存在于我们心中的内容，除此之外，还具有一种特殊的理想尊严。三角形概念或有机体概念、因果关系概念或万有引力定律概念具有逻辑意义，具有内在结构的有效性，这种有效性确实决定了它们在空间和意识中的实现；但是，即使它们从未实现，它们仍然属于有效和有意义的终极不可分析的范畴，与梦幻的和无意义的概念完全不同。
contradictory conceptual notions to which they might be akin in their reference to physical and mental non-reality. The value that is attributed to the objects of subjective desire is analogous to this, with the qualifications required by its different sphere. Just as we represent certain statements as true while recognizing that their truth is independent of our representation, so we sense that objects, people and events are not only appreciated as valuable by us, but would still be valuable if no one appreciated them. The most striking example is the value that we assign to people’s dispositions or characters, as being moral, dignified, strong or beautiful. Whether or not such inner qualities ever show themselves in deeds that make possible or demand recognition, and whether their bearer himself reflects upon them with a sense of his own value, appears to us irrelevant to their real value; still more, this unconcern for recognition endows these values with their characteristic colouring. Furthermore, intellectual energy and the fact that it brings the most secret forces and arrangements of nature into the light of consciousness; the power and the rhythm of emotions that, in the limited sphere of the individual soul, are yet much more significant than the external world, even if the pessimistic view of the predominance of suffering in the world is true; the fact that, regardless of man, nature moves according to reliable fixed norms, that the manifold natural forms are not incompatible with a more profound unity of the whole, that nature’s mechanism can be interpreted through ideas and also produces beauty and grace - all this leads us to conceive that the world is valuable no matter whether these values are experienced consciously or not. This extends all the way down to the economic value that we assign to any object of exchange, even though nobody is willing to pay the price, and even though the object is not in demand at all and remains unsaleable. Here too a basic capacity of the mind becomes apparent: that of separating itself from the ideas that it conceives and representing these ideas as if they were independent of its own representation. It is true that every value that we experience is a sentiment; but what we mean by this sentiment is a significant content which is realized psychologically through the sentiment yet is neither identical with it nor exhausted by it. Obviously this category lies beyond the controversy about the subjectivity or objectivity of value, because it denies the relation to a subject that is indispensable for the existence of an ‘object’. It is rather a third term, an ideal concept which enters into the duality but is not exhausted by it. In conformity with the practical sphere to which it belongs, it has a particular form of relationship to the subject which does not exist for the merely abstract content of our theoretical concepts. This form may be described as a claim or demand. The value that attaches to any object, person,
这些概念在提到物质和精神的非现实性时，可能与之相似。赋予主观欲望对象的价值与此类似，但因其领域不同而有所区别。正如我们将某些陈述表述为真实的同时也认识到它们的真实性与我们的表述无关一样，我们感觉到物体、人和事件不仅被我们视为有价值的，而且如果没有人欣赏它们，它们仍然是有价值的。最显著的例子就是我们对人的性情或性格赋予的价值，如道德、尊严、坚强或美丽。在我们看来，这些内在品质是否在行为中表现出来，从而得到认可或要求得到认可，以及这些品质的拥有者本人是否对其自身的价值有所反思，都与它们的真正价值无关；而且，这种对认可的不在意赋予了这些价值以特有的色彩。此外，智慧的能量，以及它将自然界最隐秘的力量和安排带入意识之光的事实；情感的力量和节奏，在个人灵魂的有限范围内，却比外部世界重要得多，即使关于世界上苦难占主导地位的悲观观点是正确的；无论人类与否，大自然都会按照可靠的固定准则运行，多种多样的自然形式与更深刻的整体统一性并不冲突，大自然的机制可以通过思想来解释，也可以产生美和优雅--所有这些都让我们想到，无论这些价值是否被有意识地体验到，世界都是有价值的。 这一直延伸到我们赋予任何交换对象的经济价值，即使没有人愿意支付这个价格，即使这个对象根本没有需求，仍然无法出售。在这里，思维的一种基本能力也变得显而易见：那就是将自身与它所构想的观念分离开来，并把这些观念当作独立于它自身的表象来表述。诚然，我们体验到的每一种价值都是一种情感；但我们所说的情感是指一种重要的内容，它通过情感在心理上得以实现，但既不与情感相同，也不被情感所穷尽。显然，这一范畴超越了关于价值的主观性或客观性的争论，因为它否认了 "客体 "存在所不可或缺的与主体的关系。相反，它是第三个术语，是一个理想的概念，它进入了二元对立，但并没有被二元对立所穷尽。与它所属的实践领域相一致，它与主体有一种特殊的关系形式，而我们的理论概念的抽象内容并不存在这种关系形式。这种形式可以被描述为要求或需求。任何物体、人所具有的价值、
relationship or happening demands recognition. This demand exists, as an event, only within ourselves as subjects; but in accepting it we sense that we are not merely satisfying a claim imposed by ourselves upon ourselves, or merely acknowledging a quality of the object. The ability of a tangible symbol to awaken in us religious feelings; the moral challenge to revolutionize particular conditions of life or to leave them alone, to develop or retard them; the feeling of obligation not to remain indifferent to great events, but to respond to them; the right of what is perceived to be interpreted in an aesthetic context - all of these are claims that are experienced or realized exclusively within the Ego and have no counterpart or objective point of departure in the objects themselves, but which, as claims, cannot be traced either to the Ego or to the objects to which they refer. Regarded from a naturalistic point of view such a claim may appear subjective, while from the subject’s point of view it appears to be objective; in fact, it is a third category, which cannot be derived from either subject or object, but which stands, so to speak, between us and the objects. I have observed that the value of things belongs among those mental contents that, while we conceive them, we experience at the same time as something independent within our representation, and as detached from the function by which it exists in us. This representation, when its content is a value, appears upon closer scrutiny as a sense that a claim is being made. The ‘function’ is a demand which does not exist as such outside ourselves, but which originates in an ideal realm which does not lie within us. It is not a particular quality of the objects of valuation, but consists rather in the significance that the objects have for us as subjects through their position in the order of that ideal realm. This value, which we conceive as being independent of its recognition, is a metaphysical category, and as such it stands as far beyond the dualism of subject and object as immediate enjoyment stands below it. The latter is a concrete unity to which the differentiating categories have not yet been applied; the former is an abstract or ideal unity, in whose self-subsistent meaning the dualism has again disappeared, just as the contrast between the empirical Ego and the empirical Non-Ego disappears in the all-comprehending system of consciousness that Fichte calls the Ego. At the moment of complete fusion of the function and its content, enjoyment cannot be called subjective, because there is no counterposed object that would justify the concept of a subject. Likewise, this independent, self-justifying value is not objective simply because it is conceived as independent by the subject who conceives it; although it becomes manifest within the subject as a claim for recognition, it will not forfeit anything of its reality if this claim is not fulfilled.
关系或事件要求得到承认。作为一个事件，这种要求只存在于作为主体的我们内部；但在接受这种要求时，我们会感觉到，我们不仅仅是在满足自己强加给自己的要求，也不仅仅是在承认对象的一种品质。有形的符号能够唤起我们的宗教情感；道德上的挑战是彻底改变特定的生活条件，还是放任不管、发展或延缓它们；有义务不对重大事件无动于衷，而是对它们做出反应；所感知的事物有权在审美的背景下被解释--所有这些都是完全在 "自我 "中体验或实现的诉求，在客体本身中没有对应或客观的出发点，但作为诉求，它们既不能追溯到 "自我"，也不能追溯到它们所指向的客体。从自然主义的角度来看，这种主张似乎是主观的，而从主体的角度来看，它似乎是客观的；事实上，它是第三类主张，既不能来自主体，也不能来自客体，可以说，它处于我们与客体之间。我已经指出，事物的价值属于这样一些精神内容：当我们构想它们时，我们同时体验到它们是独立于我们的表象之外的东西，并且脱离了它存在于我们之中的功能。当这种表象的内容是一种价值时，仔细观察就会发现它是一种要求的感觉。这种 "功能 "是一种要求，它本身并不存在于我们自身之外，而是源于一个并不在我们内部的理想领域。 它不是估价对象的特定品质，而是对象通过其在理想领域的秩序中所处的位置而对作为主体的我们所具有的意义。我们认为这种价值独立于对它的认识，它是一个形而上学的范畴，因此它超越了主体与客体的二元对立，就像直接享受低于主体与客体的二元对立一样。后者是一个具体的统一体，尚未对其使用区分的范畴；前者是一个抽象的或理想的统一体，在其自存的意义中，二元论再次消失了，正如经验的 "自我 "与经验的 "非我 "之间的对比在费希特称之为 "自我 "的全知全能的意识系统中消失了一样。在功能与其内容完全融合的那一刻，享受就不能被称为主观的，因为不存在可以证明主体概念合理性的对立客体。同样，这种独立的、自圆其说的价值也不是客观的，仅仅因为它被设想它的主体设想为独立的；尽管它在主体内部显现为一种要求承认的诉求，但如果这种诉求没有得到满足，它也不会丧失其现实性中的任何东西。

This metaphysical sublimation of value does not play any role in the valuations of daily life, which are concerned only with values in the consciousness of the subject and with the objectivity that emerges as a counterposed object in this psychological process of valuation. I showed earlier that this process of the formation of values develops with the increase in distance between the consumer and the cause of his enjoyment. The differences in valuation which have to be distinguished as subjective and objective, originate from such variations in distance, measured not in terms of enjoyment, in which the distance disappears, but in terms of desire, which is engendered by the distance and seeks to overcome it. At least in the case of those objects whose valuation forms the basis of the economy, value is the correlate of demand. Just as the world of being is my representation, so the world of value is my demand. However, in spite of the logical-physical necessity that every demand expects to be satisfied by an object, the psychological structure of demand is such that in most cases it is focused upon the satisfaction itself, and the object becomes a matter of indifference so long as it satisfies the need. When a man is satisfied with any woman whatsoever, without exercising an individual choice, when he eats anything at all that he can chew and digest, when he sleeps at any resting place, when his cultural needs can be satisfied by the simplest materials offered by nature, then his practical consciousness is completely subjective, he is inspired exclusively by the agitations and satisfactions of his own subjective condition and his interest in objects is limited to their being the causes of these effects. This fact is observed in the naive need for projection by primitive man, who directs his life towards the outside world and takes his inner life for granted. But the conscious wish cannot always be taken as a sufficient index of the really effective valuation. Often enough it is some expediency in the direction of our practical activities that leads us to regard an object as valuable, and it is not in fact the significance of the object but the possible subjective satisfaction that excites us. From this condition - which is not always temporally prior but is, so to speak, the simplest and most fundamental and thus in a systematic sense prior - consciousness is led to the object along two roads which finally merge. When an identical need rejects a number of possible satisfactions, perhaps all but one, and when, therefore, it is not satisfaction as such but satisfaction by a specific object that is desired, there begins a fundamental reorientation from the subject to the object. It may be said that this is still only a question of the subjective satisfaction of need, but that in this second case the need is differentiated to such an extent that only a specific object can satisfy it. In this case also the object is only the cause of sensation and is not valued in itself. Such an objection would indeed nullify
这种形而上学的价值升华在日常生活的价值评价中不起作用，因为日常生活的价值评价只涉及主体意识中的价值，以及在这一心理评价过程中作为对立客体出现的客观性。我在前面已经指出，这种价值形成的过程是随着消费者与其享受的原因之间的距离增大而发展的。评价的差异必须区分为主观和客观的差异，这种差异源于距离的变化，不是从享受的角度来衡量，因为在享受的过程中，距离消失了，而是从欲望的角度来衡量，因为欲望是由距离引起的，并试图克服距离。至少在那些价值构成经济基础的物品中，价值是需求的对应物。正如存在的世界是我的表象，价值的世界也是我的需求。然而，尽管从逻辑和物理上讲，每一种需求都希望得到一个对象的满足，但需求的心理结构是这样的：在大多数情况下，需求的重点是满足本身，只要能满足需求，对象就变得无关紧要。当一个人对任何女人都感到满意，而无需进行个人选择时，当他吃任何可以咀嚼和消化的东西时，当他在任何休息的地方睡觉时，当他的文化需求可以通过大自然提供的最简单的材料得到满足时，那么他的实践意识就是完全主观的，他的灵感完全来自于自己主观条件的激动和满足，他对物体的兴趣仅限于它们是这些效果的原因。 原始人对投射的天真需求就反映了这一事实，他们将自己的生活指向外部世界，而将自己的内在生活视为理所当然。但是，我们不能总是把有意识的愿望当作真正有效价值的充分指标。通常情况下，是我们在实际活动中的某种权宜之计使我们认为某个物品是有价值的，而实际上激发我们的并不是物品的意义，而是可能的主观满足。从这个条件出发--这个条件并不总是时间上的先决条件，但可以说是最简单、最基本的条件，因此在系统意义上是先决条件--意识沿着两条最终汇合的道路走向对象。当一种相同的需求拒绝了许多可能的满足，也许是除了一种之外的所有可能的满足，因此，当渴望的不是满足本身，而是某个特定对象的满足时，就开始了从主体到客体的根本性的重新定向。可以说，这仍然只是一个主观需求满足的问题，但在第二种情况下，需求被区分开来，以至于只有特定的客体才能满足它。在这种情况下，对象也只是感觉的原因，其本身并不具有价值。这种反对意见会使
the difference, if it were the case that the differentiation of the impulse directed it exclusively upon a single satisfying object and ruled out the possibility of satisfaction through any other object. However, this is a very rare and exceptional case. The broader basis from which even the most highly differentiated impulses evolve, and the original diffuseness of need which includes only a drive but not yet a definite single goal, remain as a substratum upon which a consciousness of the individual character of more specific desires for satisfaction develops. The circle of objects that can satisfy the subject’s needs is diminished as he becomes more refined, and the objects desired are set in a sharper contrast with all the others that might satisfy the need but are no longer acceptable. It is well known from psychological investigations that this difference between objects is largely responsible for directing consciousness towards them and endowing them with particular significance. At this stage the need seems to be determined by the object; feeling is guided increasingly by its terminus ad quem instead of its terminus a quo, in the measure that impulse no longer rushes upon every possible satisfaction. Consequently, the place that the object occupies in our consciousness becomes larger. There is also another reason for this. So long as man is dominated by his impulses the world appears to him as an undifferentiated substance. Since it represents for him only an irrelevant means for the satisfaction of his drives - and this effect may arise from all kinds of causes - he has no interest in the nature of the objects themselves. It is the fact that we need a particular single object that makes us acutely aware that we need an object at all. But such awareness is, so to speak, more theoretical - and it diminishes the blind energy of the impulse which is directed only to its own extinction.
如果冲动的分化只指向一个满足的对象，而排除了通过其他任何对象来满足的可能性，那么就会产生差异。然而，这是一种非常罕见的例外情况。即使是分化程度最高的冲动也是在更广泛的基础上发展起来的，而最初的需求的分散性只包括一种动力，但还不包括一个确定的单一目标。随着主体的日益完善，能够满足其需求的对象的范围也在缩小，所需的对象与其他所有可能满足需求但不再被接受的对象形成了更鲜明的对比。心理学研究清楚地表明，对象之间的这种差异在很大程度上会引导人们的意识转向这些对象，并赋予它们特殊的意义。在这一阶段，需要似乎是由对象决定的；感觉越来越多地受到对象的终结而不是终结的引导，因为冲动不再冲向每一个可能的满足。因此，对象在我们意识中占据的位置变得更大。还有另一个原因。只要人被冲动所支配，世界在他看来就是无差别的物质。因为对他来说，世界只是满足他的冲动的一种无关紧要的手段--这种效果可能来自各种原因--所以他对物体本身的性质不感兴趣。正是我们需要一个特定的单一对象这一事实，使我们敏锐地意识到我们需要一个对象。 但可以说，这种认识更多的是理论上的，它削弱了冲动的盲目能量，而冲动的目的只是为了自己的灭亡。

Since the differentiation of need goes hand in hand with the reduction of its elemental power, consciousness becomes more able to accommodate the object. Or regarded from the other aspect: because consciousness is constrained by the refinement and specialization of need to take a greater interest in the object, a certain amount of force is removed from the solipsistic need. Everywhere the weakening of the emotions, that is to say of the absolute surrender of the Ego to his momentary feelings, is correlated with the objectification of representations, with their appearance in a form of existence that stands over against us. Thus, for instance, talking things over is one of the most powerful means for subduing emotions. The inner process is, as it were, projected by the word into the external world; it now stands over against the individual like a tangible structure, and the intensity of the emotions is diverted. The tranquillization of the passions, and the representation of the objective world as existing and significant, are two sides of one
由于需求的分化与其要素力量的减弱相伴而生，意识变得更能容纳客体。或者从另一个角度来看：由于意识受到需求的细化和专业化的制约，对客体产生了更大的兴趣，因此，唯我主义需求的某种力量也被消除了。在任何地方，情感的弱化，即自我对瞬间情感的绝对屈服，都与表象的对象化有关，都与表象出现在与我们对立的存在形式中有关。因此，举例来说，把事情说清楚是抑制情绪最有力的手段之一。内心的过程通过言语投射到外部世界；现在，它就像一个有形的结构矗立在个人面前，情绪的强度得到了转移。激情的平息与客观世界的存在和重要性的再现是同一事物的两个方面。
and the same basic process. The diversion of inner interest from mere need and its satisfaction to the object itself, as a result of diminishing the possibility of satisfying the need, can obviously be brought about and strengthened just as well from the side of the object, if the latter makes satisfaction difficult, rare, and to be attained only indirectly or by exceptional effort. Even if we assume a highly differentiated desire concentrated upon selected objects, satisfaction might still be regarded as more or less a matter of course so long as there is no difficulty or resistance. What really matters, in order to conceive the independent significance of objects, is the distance between them and our impression of them. It is one of the numerous cases in which one has to stand back from the objects, to establish a distance between them and oneself, in order to get an objective picture of them. This is certainly no less subjective a view than the unclear or distorted picture that is obtained when the distance is too great or too small; but inner expediential reasons of our cognition lay a special emphasis upon subjectivity in the case of these extremes. At first, the object exists only in our relationship to it and is completely absorbed in this relationship; it becomes something external and opposed to us only in the degree that it escapes from this connection. Even the desire for objects, which recognizes their autonomy while seeking to overcome it, develops only when want and satisfaction do not coincide. The possibility of enjoyment must be separated, as an image of the future, from our present condition in order for us to desire things that now stand at a distance from us. Just as in the intellectual sphere the original oneness of perception, which we can observe in children, is only gradually divided into awareness of the self and of the object, so the naive enjoyment of objects only gives way to an awareness of the significance of things, and respect for them, when the objects are somewhat withdrawn. Here, too, the relationship between the weakening of desire and the beginning of an objectification of values is apparent, since the decline of the elemental strength of volition and feeling favours the growing awareness of the self. So long as a person surrenders unreservedly to a momentary feeling and is completely possessed by it, the Ego cannot develop. The awareness of a self that exists beyond its various emotions can emerge only when it appears as an enduring entity amid all these changes, and when the emotions do not absorb the whole self. The emotions must leave a part of the self untouched, as a neutral point for their contrasts, so that a certain reduction and limitation of the emotions allows the self to develop as the unchanging bearer of diverse contents. In all areas of our life Ego and object are related concepts, which are not yet separated in the initial forms of representation and only become differentiated through each other; and in just the same way, the
这也是一个基本过程。内心的兴趣从单纯的需要及其满足转移到对象本身，是满足需要的可能性减小的结果，如果对象使满足变得困难、罕见，并且只能间接地或通过特殊的努力才能达到，那么这种转移显然也可以从对象方面带来和加强。即使我们假定一种高度分化的欲望集中在选定的对象上，只要没有困难或阻力，满足或多或少仍可被视为理所当然的事。为了理解物体的独立意义，真正重要的是它们与我们对它们的印象之间的距离。在许多情况下，我们必须远离对象，在对象和自己之间保持一定的距离，才能对它们有一个客观的认识。这当然不亚于距离过大或过小时所获得的不清晰或扭曲的画面，但我们认知的内在权宜之计在这些极端情况下特别强调主观性。起初，对象只存在于我们与它的关系中，并完全被这种关系所吸收；只有当它摆脱这种关系时，它才成为外在的东西，并与我们相对立。即使是对客体的欲望，它在承认客体的自主性的同时也试图克服这种自主性，这种欲望只有在欲望和满足不一致时才会产生。享受的可能性作为未来的形象，必须与我们的现状相分离，这样我们才会渴望现在与我们有距离的事物。 正如在智力领域，我们可以观察到儿童最初的知觉的单一性只是逐渐分为对自我的认识和对客体的认识一样，对客体的天真享受也只是在客体有所退缩时才让位于对事物意义的认识和对它们的尊重。在这里，欲望的减弱与价值对象化的开始之间的关系也是显而易见的，因为意志和感觉的要素力量的减弱有利于自我意识的增强。只要一个人毫无保留地屈服于一时的感觉，并完全为其所占有，自我就不可能得到发展。只有当自我作为一个持久的实体出现在所有这些变化中时，当情绪不吸收整个自我时，超越各种情绪的自我意识才能出现。情绪必须不触及自我的一部分，作为其对比的中和点，这样，情绪的某种减少和限制就能使自我发展为不同内容的不变承载者。在我们生活的各个领域中，自我和客体都是相关的概念，它们在最初的表象形式中尚未分开，只有通过彼此的区别才会变得不同；同样，自我和客体也是相关的概念，它们在最初的表象形式中尚未分开，只有通过彼此的区别才会变得不同。
independent value of objects develops only by contrast with an Ego that has become independent. Only the repulsions that we experience, the difficulties of attaining an object, the waiting and the labour that stand between a wish and its fulfilment, drive the Ego and the object apart; otherwise they remain undeveloped and undifferentiated in the propinquity of need and satisfaction. Whether the effective definition of the object arises from its scarcity, in relation to demand, or from the positive effort to acquire it, there is no doubt that only in this way is distance established between the object and ourselves which enables us to accord it a value beyond that of being merely enjoyed.
物体的独立价值只有在与已经独立的 "自我 "的对比中才能得到发展。只有我们所经历的排斥、获得对象的困难、愿望与实现之间的等待和劳动，才会使自我与对象相分离；否则，它们在需求与满足的相称性中仍然是不发达和无差别的。毫无疑问，只有这样才能在客体与我们之间建立起距离，使我们能够赋予客体一种超越单纯享受的价值。

It may be said, therefore, that the value of an object does indeed depend upon the demand for it, but upon a demand that is no longer purely instinctive. On the other hand, if the object is to remain an economic value, its value must not be raised so greatly that it becomes an absolute. The distance between the self and the object of demand could become so large - through the difficulties of procuring it, through its exorbitant price, through moral or other misgivings that counter the striving after it - that the act of volition does not develop, and the desire is extinguished or becomes only a vague wish. The distance between subject and object that establishes value, at least in the economic sense, has a lower and an upper limit; the formula that the amount of value equals the degree of resistance to the acquisition of objects, in relation to natural, productive and social opportunities, is not correct. Certainly, iron would not be an economic value if its acquisition encountered no greater difficulty than the acquisition of air for breathing; but these difficulties had to remain within certain limits if the tools were to be manufactured which made iron valuable. To take another example: it has been suggested that the pictures of a very productive painter would be less valuable than those of one who was less productive, assuming equal artistic talent. But this is true only above a certain quantitative level. A painter, in order to acquire the fame that raises the price of his pictures, is obliged to produce a certain number of works. Again, the scarcity of gold in some countries with a paper currency has created a situation in which ordinary people will not accept gold even when it is offered to them. In the particular case of precious metals, whose suitability as the material of money is usually attributed to their scarcity, it should be noted that scarcity can only become significant above a considerable volume, without which these metals could not serve the practical demand for money and consequently could not acquire the value they possess as money. It is, perhaps, only the avaricious desire for an unlimited quantity of goods, in terms of which all values are scarce, that leads us to overlook that a certain proportion between scarcity
因此可以说，物品的价值确实取决于对它的需求，但这种需求不再是纯粹的本能需求。另一方面，如果物品要保持其经济价值，那么它的价值就不能提升得太高，以至于成为一种绝对的价值。自我与需求对象之间的距离可能会变得如此之大--由于难以获得、价格昂贵、道德或其他方面的疑虑抵消了对需求对象的追求--以至于意志行为无法发展，欲望熄灭或仅仅成为一种模糊的愿望。确定价值的主体与客体之间的距离，至少在经济学意义上，是有下限和上限的；价值量等于获得客体的阻力程度，与自然、生产和社会机会有关的公式是不正确的。当然，如果获得铁的困难并不比获得呼吸用的空气更大，那么铁就不具有经济价值；但是，如果要制造出使铁具有价值的工具，这些困难就必须保持在一定的限度内。再举一个例子：有人说，假设一个画家的艺术才能相同，那么他的画作的价值就会低于一个生产力较低的画家的画作的价值。但这只是在一定的数量水平之上才是正确的。画家为了获得名气，提高画作的价格，就必须创作一定数量的作品。同样，在一些使用纸币的国家，黄金的稀缺性造成了这样一种情况：即使有人向普通人提供黄金，他们也不会接受。 在贵金属的特殊情况下，贵金属作为货币材料的适宜性通常被归因于其稀缺性，但应该指出的是，稀缺性只有在相当大的数量之上才会变得重要，没有这种稀缺性，这些金属就无法满足对货币的实际需求，因而也就无法获得它们作为货币所具有的价值。也许只有对无限量商品的贪婪欲望才会导致我们忽视稀缺性与货币价值之间的一定比例关系。
and non-scarcity, and not scarcity itself, is the condition of value. The factor of scarcity has to be related to the significance of the sense for differences; the factor of abundance to the significance of habituation. Life in general is determined by the proportion of these two facts: that we need variety and change of content just as we need familiarity; and this general need appears here in the specific form that the value of objects requires, on the one hand, scarcity - that is to say, differentiation and particularity - while on the other hand it needs a certain comprehensiveness, frequency and permanence in order that objects may enter the realm of values.
价值的条件是 "不稀缺"，而不是 "稀缺 "本身。稀缺的因素必须与差异感的意义相关联；丰富的因素与习惯的意义相关联。一般生活是由这两个事实的比例决定的：我们需要内容的多样性和变化，就像我们需要熟悉感一样；这种一般需要在这里以具体的形式出现：一方面，对象的价值需要稀缺性，也就是说，需要差异化和特殊性，另一方面，它需要一定的全面性、经常性和持久性，以便对象可以进入价值领域。

I would like to show the universal significance of distance for supposedly objective valuation by an example that has nothing to do with economic values and which therefore illustrates the general principle, namely aesthetic valuation. What we call the enjoyment of the beauty of things developed relatively late. For no matter how much immediate sensual enjoyment may exist even today in the individual case, the specific quality of aesthetic enjoyment is the ability to appreciate and enjoy the object, not simply an experience of sensual or supra-sensual stimulation. Every cultivated person is able to make a clear distinction in principle between the aesthetic and the sensual enjoyment of female beauty, even though he may not be able to draw the line between these components of his impression on a particular occasion. In the one case we surrender to the object, while in the other case the object surrenders to us. Even though aesthetic value, like any other value, is not an integral part of the object but is rather a projection of our feelings, it has the peculiarity that the projection is complete. In other words, the content of the feeling is, as it were, absorbed by the object and confronts the subject as something which has autonomous significance, which is inherent in the object. What was the historical psychological process in which this objective aesthetic pleasure in things emerged, given that primitive enjoyment which was the basis for any more refined appreciation must have been tied to direct subjective satisfaction and utility? Perhaps we can find a clue in a very simple observation. If an object of any kind provides us with great pleasure or advantage we experience a feeling of joy at every later viewing of this object, even if any use or enjoyment is now out of the question. This joy, which resembles an echo, has a unique psychological character determined by the fact that we no longer want anything from the object. In place of the former concrete relationship with the object, it is now mere contemplation that is the source of enjoyable sensation; we leave the being of the
我想通过一个与经济价值无关的例子来说明距离对于所谓客观评价的普遍意义，这个例子就是审美评价。我们所说的对事物之美的享受发展得相对较晚。因为，无论在今天的个案中存在多少直接的感官享受，审美享受的具体特质是欣赏和享受对象的能力，而不仅仅是感官或超感官刺激的体验。每一个有修养的人都能在原则上明确区分对女性美的审美享受和感官享受，尽管他可能无法在特定场合划清印象中这两种享受的界限。在一种情况下，我们臣服于对象，而在另一种情况下，对象臣服于我们。尽管审美价值与其他价值一样，不是对象的组成部分，而是我们感受的投射，但它有一个特点，即投射是完整的。换句话说，感受的内容被客体所吸收，并作为客体所固有的、具有自主意义的东西面对主体。既然作为任何更高雅欣赏的基础的原始享受必须与直接的主观满足和效用联系在一起，那么这种客观的审美愉悦产生的历史心理过程是怎样的呢？也许我们可以从一个非常简单的观察中找到线索。 如果一件物品能给我们带来极大的快乐或好处，那么我们以后每次看到这件物品时，都会体验到一种快乐的感觉，即使现在已经不可能再使用或享受它了。这种类似于回声的喜悦具有独特的心理特征，这是由我们不再想从物品中得到任何东西这一事实决定的。取而代之的是单纯的沉思，这才是快乐感觉的来源。
object untouched, and our sentiment is attached only to its appearance, not to that which in any sense may be consumed. In short, whereas formerly the object was valuable as a means for our practical and eudaemonistic ends, it has now become an object of contemplation from which we derive pleasure by confronting it with reserve and remoteness, without touching it. It seems to me that the essential features of aesthetic enjoyment are foreshadowed here, but they can be shown more plainly if we follow the changes in sensation from the sphere of individual psychology to that of the species as a whole. The attempt has often been made to derive beauty from utility, but as a rule this has led only to a philistine coarsening of beauty. This might be avoided if the practical expediency and sensual eudaemonistic immediacy were placed far enough back in the history of the species, as a result of which an instinctive, reflex-like sense of enjoyment in our organism were attached to the appearance of objects; the physico-psychic connection would then be genetic and would become effective in the individual without any consciousness on his part of the utility of the object. There is no need to enter into the controversy about the inheritance of such acquired associations; it suffices here that the events occur as if such qualities were inheritable. Consequently, the beautiful would be for us what once proved useful for the species, and its contemplation would give us pleasure without our having any practical interest in the object as individuals. This would not of course imply uniformity or the reduction of individual taste to an average or collective level. These echoes of an earlier general utility are absorbed into the diversity of individual minds and transformed into new unique qualities, so that one might say that the detachment of the pleasurable sensation from the reality of its original cause has finally become a form of our consciousness, quite independent of the contents that first gave rise to it, and ready to absorb any other content that the psychic constellation permits. In those cases that offer realistic pleasure, our appreciation of the object is not specifically aesthetic, but practical; it becomes aesthetic only as a result of increasing distance, abstraction and sublimation. What happens here is the common phenomenon that, once a certain connection has been established, the connecting link itself disappears because it is no longer required. The connection between certain useful objects and the sense of pleasure has become so well established for the species through inheritance or some other mechanism, that the mere sight of these objects becomes pleasurable even in the absence of any utility. This explains what Kant calls ‘aesthetic indifference’, the lack of concern about the real existence of an object so long as its ‘form’, i.e. its visibility, is given. Hence also the radiance and transcendence of the beautiful, which arises from the temporal remoteness
我们的情感只依恋于它的外表，而不是在任何意义上都可能被消耗掉的东西。总之，以前，物体作为我们实现实用和权力目的的手段是有价值的，而现在，它已成为我们沉思的对象，我们通过矜持地、遥远地面对它，而不去触碰它，从中获得快乐。在我看来，这里已经预示了审美享受的基本特征，但如果我们将感觉的变化从个体心理领域延伸到整个物种领域，就能更清楚地看到这些特征。人们常常试图从实用中推导出美，但通常这只会导致美变得庸俗化。如果把实用的权宜之计和感官的直接性放在物种历史的足够靠后的位置，我们的机体就会对物体的外观产生一种本能的、条件反射式的享受感，这样就可以避免这种情况的发生。我们没有必要去争论这种后天联想的遗传问题，只需知道这些事件的发生就好像这种特质是可以遗传的一样。因此，对我们来说，美丽的东西就是曾经被证明对物种有用的东西，对它的欣赏会给我们带来快乐，而我们对作为个体的物体却没有任何实际的兴趣。当然，这并不意味着千篇一律，也不意味着将个人品味降低到平均水平或集体水平。 这些先前的一般效用的回声被吸收到个体心灵的多样性中，并转化为新的独特品质，因此可以说，愉悦的感觉从其原始原因的现实中分离出来，最终成为我们意识的一种形式，完全独立于最初产生它的内容，并随时准备吸收心理星座所允许的任何其他内容。在那些能带来现实快感的情况下，我们对对象的欣赏并不是专门的审美，而是实用的；只有在距离拉大、抽象化和升华的过程中，它才成为审美的结果。这里发生的是一种常见的现象，即一旦建立了某种联系，这种联系本身就会消失，因为不再需要它了。某些有用的东西与愉悦感之间的联系，通过遗传或其他机制，已经在物种中如此牢固地建立起来，以至于即使没有任何效用，只要看到这些东西就会感到愉悦。这就解释了康德所说的 "审美冷漠"，即只要对象的 "形式"，即其可见性，就不关心对象的真实存在。因此，美的光芒和超越性也源于时间上的遥远性。
of the real motives in which we now discover the aesthetic. Hence the idea that the beautiful is something typical, supra-individual, and universally valid; for the evolution of the species has long ago eliminated from these inner states of mind anything specific and individual in the motives and experiences. In consequence it is often impossible to justify on rational grounds aesthetic judgments or the opposition that they sometimes present to what is useful and agreeable to the individual. The whole development of objects from utility value to aesthetic value is a process of objectification. When I call an object beautiful, its quality and significance become much more independent of the arrangements and the needs of the subject than if it is merely useful. So long as objects are merely useful they are interchangeable and everything can be replaced by anything else that performs the same service. But when they are beautiful they have a unique individual existence and the value of one cannot be replaced by another even though it may be just as beautiful in its own way. We need not pursue these brief remarks on the origin of aesthetic value into a discussion of all the ramifications of the subject in order to recognize that the objectification of value originates in the relative distance that emerges between the direct subjective origin of the valuation of the object and our momentary feeling concerning the object. The more remote for the species is the utility of the object that first created an interest and a value and is now forgotten, the purer is the aesthetic satisfaction derived from the mere form and appearance of the object. The more it stands before us in its own dignity, the more we attribute to it a significance that is not exhausted by haphazard subjective enjoyment, and the more the relationship of valuing the objects merely as means is replaced by a feeling of their independent value.
我们现在发现审美的真正动机。因此，人们认为美是一种典型的、超个人的、普遍有效的东西；因为物种的进化早已从这些内在的精神状态中消除了动机和经验中任何具体的和个人的东西。因此，审美判断或审美判断有时与对个人有用和合意的东西的对立，往往无法以理性为依据。物品从实用价值到审美价值的整个发展过程就是一个对象化的过程。当我称一件物品为美时，它的品质和意义就会比仅仅有用的物品更加独立于主体的安排和需求。只要物品是有用的，它们就可以相互替换，任何东西都可以被提供相同服务的其他东西所取代。但是，当它们是美的时候，它们就有了独特的个体存在，一个物体的价值是无法被另一个物体所替代的，即使它可能以自己的方式同样美丽。我们不需要把这些关于审美价值起源的简短论述扩大到对主体的所有影响的讨论中，就可以认识到，价值的对象化起源于对象价值的直接主观起源与我们对对象的瞬间感受之间出现的相对距离。对于物种来说，最初产生兴趣和价值而现在被遗忘的对象的效用越遥远，从对象的单纯形式和外观中获得的审美满足感就越纯粹。 它越是以其自身的尊严矗立在我们面前，我们就越是赋予它一种意义，而这种意义不会被随意的主观享受所耗尽，我们也就越是将物品仅仅作为手段来看待，而代之以对其独立价值的感受。

I have chosen the above example because the objectifying effect of what I have called ‘distance’ is particularly clear when it is a question of distance in time. The process is, of course, intensive and qualitative, so that any quantitative designation in terms of distance is more or less symbolic. The same effect can be brought about by a number of other factors, as I have already mentioned: for example, by the scarcity of an object, by the difficulties of acquisition, by the necessity of renunciation. Even though in these economically important instances the significance of the objects remains a significance for us and so dependent upon our appreciation, the decisive change is that the objects confront us after these developments as independent powers, as a world of substances and forces that determine by their own qualities
我之所以选择上述例子，是因为我所说的 "距离 "的客观化效果在时间距离问题上尤为明显。当然，这个过程是密集的、定性的，因此任何距离的定量描述或多或少都是象征性的。正如我已经提到的，其他一些因素也会产生同样的效果：例如，物品的稀缺、获取的困难、放弃的必要性。尽管在这些经济上重要的情况下，物品的意义对我们来说仍然是一种意义，因此取决于我们的鉴赏能力，但决定性的变化是，在这些发展之后，物品作为独立的力量，作为一个由物质和力量组成的世界，以其自身的特质决定着我们的面对面。
whether and to what extent they will satisfy our needs, and which demand effort and hardship before they will surrender to us. Only if the question of renunciation arises - renunciation of a feeling that really matters - is it necessary to direct attention upon the object itself. The situation, which is represented in stylized form by the concept of Paradise, in which subject and object, desire and satisfaction are not yet divided from each other - a situation that is not restricted to a specific historical epoch, but which appears everywhere in varying degrees - is destined to disintegrate, but also to attain a new reconciliation. The purpose of establishing a distance is that it should be overcome. The longing, effort and sacrifice that separate us from objects are also supposed to lead us towards them. Withdrawal and approach are in practice complementary notions, each of which presupposes the other; they are two sides of our relationship to objects, which we call subjectively our desire and objectively their value. We have to make the object enjoyed more remote from us in order to desire it again, and in relation to the distant object this desire is the first stage of approaching it, the first ideal relation to it. This dual significance of desire - that it can arise only at a distance from objects, a distance that it attempts to overcome, and yet that it presupposes a closeness between the objects and ourselves in order that the distance should be experienced at all - has been beautifully expressed by Plato in the statement that love is an intermediate state between possession and deprivation. The necessity of sacrifice, the experience that the satisfaction of desire has a price, is only the accentuation or intensification of this relationship. It makes us more distinctly aware of the distance between our present self and the enjoyment of things, but only by leading along the road towards overcoming it. This inner development towards the simultaneous growth of distance and approach also appears as a historical process of differentiation. Culture produces a widening circle of interests; that is, the periphery within which the objects of interest are located becomes farther and farther removed from the centre, the Ego. This increase in distance, however, depends upon a simultaneous drawing closer. If objects, persons and events hundreds or thousands of miles away acquire a vital importance for modern man, they must have been brought much closer to him than to primitive man, for whom they simply do not exist because the positive distinction between close and far has not yet been made. These two notions develop in a reciprocal relation from the original undifferentiated state. Modern man has to work in a different way, to apply a much greater effort than primitive man; the distance between him and the objects of his endeavours is much greater and much more difficult obstacles stand in his way, but on the other hand he acquires a greater quantity of
它们是否能满足我们的需要，以及满足的程度如何；它们需要我们付出努力和艰辛，才会向我们屈服。只有在出现放弃的问题时--放弃一种真正重要的感情--才有必要把注意力放在对象本身上。天堂 "这一概念以风格化的形式表现了主体与客体、欲望与满足尚未相互分离的状况--这种状况并不局限于某个特定的历史时代，而是在不同程度上随处可见--它注定会解体，但也会实现新的和解。建立距离的目的是为了克服距离。将我们与对象分开的渴望、努力和牺牲也应该引导我们走向对象。退出和接近实际上是互补的概念，二者互为前提；它们是我们与对象关系的两面，我们主观上称之为欲望，客观上称之为价值。我们必须让所享受的对象离我们更远，才能再次对它产生欲望，而对于遥远的对象来说，这种欲望是接近它的第一阶段，是与它的第一种理想关系。欲望的这种双重意义--它只能在与客体有距离的情况下产生，它试图克服这种距离，但它又以客体与我们之间的亲近为前提，以便体验这种距离--柏拉图在 "爱是一种介于占有与剥夺之间的中间状态 "的论述中得到了很好的表达。牺牲的必要性，欲望的满足需要付出代价的体验，只是这种关系的突出或强化。 它使我们更清楚地意识到我们现在的自我与享受事物之间的距离，但这只是通过引导我们走向克服这种距离的道路。这种距离与接近同时增长的内在发展也是一个历史性的分化过程。文化产生了一个不断扩大的兴趣圈，也就是说，兴趣对象所处的外围与中心（自我）的距离越来越远。然而，这种距离的拉大取决于同时距离的拉近。如果数百或数千英里之外的物体、人和事件对现代人具有重要意义，那么这些物体、人和事件与现代人的距离一定比与原始人的距离近得多，因为对原始人来说，这些物体、人和事件根本就不存在，因为当时还没有明确区分远近。这两个概念是从原始的无差别状态发展而来的，是一种相互关系。现代人必须以不同的方式工作，付出比原始人大得多的努力；他与努力对象之间的距离要大得多，阻碍他前进的障碍也要困难得多，但另一方面，他又获得了更多的 "远"。
objects, ideally through his desire and in practice through his work. The cultural process - which transposes the subjective condition of impulse and enjoyment into the valuation of objects - separates more distinctly the elements of our dual relationship of closeness and distance.
在理想情况下，他通过自己的欲望，而在实践中，他通过自己的作品来欣赏物品。文化过程--将冲动和享受的主观条件转化为对物品的评价--将我们亲近和疏远的双重关系中的元素更加清晰地分离开来。

The subjective events of impulse and enjoyment become objectified in value; that is to say, there develop from the objective conditions obstacles, deprivations, demands for some kind of ‘price’ through which the cause or content of impulse and enjoyment is first separated from us and becomes, by this very act, an object and a value. The fundamental conceptual question as to the subjectivity or objectivity of value is misconceived. The subjectivity of value is quite erroneously based upon the fact that no object can ever acquire universal value, but that value changes from place to place, from person to person, and even from one hour to the next. This is a case of confusing subjectivity with the individuality of value. The fact that I want to enjoy, or do enjoy, something is indeed subjective in so far as there is no awareness of or interest in the object as such. But then an altogether new process begins: the process of valuation. The content of volition and feeling assumes the form of the object. This object now confronts the subject with a certain degree of independence, surrendering or refusing itself, presenting conditions for its acquisition, placed by his original capricious choice in a law-governed realm of necessary occurrences and restrictions. It is completely irrelevant here that the contents of these forms of objectivity are not the same for all subjects. If we assumed that all human beings evaluated objects in exactly the same way, this would not increase the degree of objectivity beyond that which exists in an individual case; for if any object is valued rather than simply satisfying desire it stands at an objective distance from us that is established by real obstacles and necessary struggles, by gain and loss, by considerations of advantage and by prices. The reason why the misleading question about the objectivity or subjectivity of value is raised again and again is that we find empirically an infinite number of objects that are entirely the products of representations. But if an object in its finished form arises first in our consciousness, its value seems to reside entirely in the subject; the aspect from which I began - the classification of objects in the two series of being and value - seems to be identical with the division between objectivity and subjectivity. But this fails to take into account that the object of volition is different from the object of representation. Even though both may occupy the same place in the series of space, time and quality, the desired object confronts us in a different way and has quite a different significance from the represented object. Consider the analogy of love. The person we love is not the same being as our reason represents. I am
冲动和享受的主观事件在价值中客观化了；也就是说，客观条件中出现了障碍、剥夺、对某种 "价格 "的要求，通过这些，冲动和享受的原因或内容首先与我们分离，并通过这一行为成为客体和价值。关于价值的主观性或客观性的基本概念问题被误解了。价值的主观性错误地建立在这样一个事实之上，即任何物品都不可能获得普遍价值，而价值会因地、因人、甚至因时间而改变。这是混淆了价值的主观性和个体性。我想享受或确实享受某种事物这一事实确实是主观的，因为我并没有意识到或对该事物本身感兴趣。但是，一个全新的过程开始了：价值评估的过程。意志和感觉的内容具有客体的形式。这个客体现在以某种程度的独立性面对主体，交出或拒绝自己，提出获得客体的条件，将主体原本任性的选择置于一个由必然发生和限制组成的法律支配的领域中。在这里，这些客观性形式的内容对于所有主体来说并不相同，这一点完全无关紧要。 如果我们假定所有人都以完全相同的方式来评价物品，那么这并不会增加客观性的程度，而不会超出个别情况下存在的客观性；因为如果任何物品的价值不仅仅是满足欲望，那么它与我们之间的客观距离是由现实障碍和必要的斗争、得失、利益考虑和价格所决定的。价值的客观性或主观性这个令人误解的问题之所以一再被提出，是因为我们根据经验发现有无数的物品完全是表象的产物。但是，如果一个对象的完整形式首先出现在我们的意识中，那么它的价值似乎就完全存在于主体之中；我一开始提到的那个方面--把对象分为存在和价值两个系列--似乎与客观性和主观性的划分是一致的。但这并没有考虑到意志的客体与表象的客体是不同的。即使两者在空间、时间和质量系列中占据相同的位置，但意志对象以不同的方式面对我们，其意义也与表象对象截然不同。以爱情为例。我们所爱的人与我们的理性所代表的存在并不相同。我是
not referring here to the distortions or falsifications that emotions may produce in the object of cognition; for these remain within the sphere of representation and of intellectual categories, even though the content is modified. It is in a completely different way from that of intellectual representations that the beloved person is an object to us. Despite the logical identity it has a different meaning for us, just as the marble of the Venus de Milo means different things for a crystallographer and an art critic. A single element of being, although recognized as one and the same, can become an object for us in quite different ways: as an object of representation, and as an object of desire. Within each of these categories the confrontation between subject and object has other causes and other effects, so that it leads only to confusion if the practical relation between man and his object is equated with the alternative between subjectivity and objectivity which is valid only in the realm of intellectual representation. For even though the value of an object is not objective in the same manner as colour or weight, it is also not at all subjective in the sense of corresponding with this kind of objectivity; such subjectivity would apply rather to a perception of colour resulting from a deception of the senses, or of any other quality of the object based on a mistaken conclusion, or of a quality suggested by superstition. The practical relation to objects, however, produces a completely different kind of objectivity, because the conditions of reality withdraw the object of desire and enjoyment from the subjective realm and thus produce the specific category that we call value.
这里指的不是情感在认知对象中可能产生的扭曲或篡改；因为这些扭曲或篡改仍然属于表象和知性范畴的范畴，尽管其内容已被修改。对我们来说，所爱的人是一个对象，这与智力表象的方式完全不同。就像米罗的维纳斯大理石对晶体学家和艺术评论家的意义不同一样，尽管存在着逻辑上的同一性，它对我们却有着不同的意义。一个单一的存在元素，尽管被认为是同一的，但对我们来说，却可以以完全不同的方式成为对象：作为表象的对象，以及作为欲望的对象。主体与客体之间的对抗在每一个范畴内都有其他的原因和影响，因此，如果把人与客体之间的实际关系等同于主观与客观之间的替代关系，只会导致混乱。因为，尽管物体的价值不像颜色或重量那样具有客观性，但它也完全不具有与这种客观性相对应的主观性；这种主观性反而适用于因感官欺骗而产生的对颜色的感知，或基于错误结论而产生的对物体其他品质的感知，或迷信所暗示的品质的感知。然而，与对象的实际关系产生了一种完全不同的客观性，因为现实的条件使欲望和享受的对象脱离了主观领域，从而产生了我们称之为价值的特定范畴。

Within the economic sphere, this process develops in such a way that the content of the sacrifice or renunciation that is interposed between man and the object of his demand is, at the same time, the object of someone else’s demand. The one has to give up the possession or enjoyment that the other wants in order to persuade the latter to give up what he owns and what the former wants. I shall show that the subsistence economy of an isolated producer can be reduced to the same formula. Two value formations are interwoven; a value has to be offered in order to acquire a value. Thus it appears that there is a reciprocal determination of value by the objects. By being exchanged, each object acquires a practical realization and measure of its value through the other object. This is the most important consequence and expression of the distance established between the objects and the subject. So long as objects are close to the subjects, so long as the differentiation of demand, scarcity, difficulties and resistance to acquisition have not yet removed the objects to a distance from the subject, they are, so to speak, desire and enjoyment, but not yet objects of desire and enjoyment. The process that I have outlined through which they become objects is brought
在经济领域，这一过程的发展方式是，在人与他的需求对象之间的牺牲或放弃的内容，同时也是其他人的需求对象。一个人必须放弃另一个人想要的占有或享受，才能说服后者放弃他所拥有的和前者想要的东西。我将说明，一个孤立的生产者的生存经济也可以归结为同样的公式。两种价值形态交织在一起；必须提供一种价值才能获得一种价值。由此看来，价值是由物品相互决定的。通过交换，每个物品都通过另一个物品获得其价值的实际实现和衡量。这是客体与主体之间建立距离的最重要的结果和表现。只要客体接近主体，只要需求的差异化、稀缺性、获取的困难和阻力尚未使客体远离主体，客体就可以说是欲望和享受，但还不是欲望和享受的客体。我所概述的使它们成为客体的过程是
to completion when the object, which is at the same time remote and yet overcomes the distance, is produced specifically for this purpose. Thus, pure economic objectivity, the detachment of the object from any subjective relationship to the subject, is established; and since production is carried out for the purpose of exchange with another object, which has a corresponding role, the two objects enter into a reciprocal objective relationship. The form taken by value in exchange places value in a category beyond the strict meaning of subjectivity and objectivity. In exchange, value becomes suprasubjective, supra-individual, yet without becoming an objective quality and reality of the things themselves. Value appears as the demand of the object, transcending its immanent reality, to be exchanged and acquired only for another corresponding value. The Ego, even though it is the universal source of values, becomes so far removed from the objects that they can measure their significance by each other without referring in each case to the Ego. But this real relationship between values, which is executed and supported by exchange, evidently has its purpose in eventual subjective enjoyment, that is, in the fact that we receive a greater quantity and intensity of values than would be possible without exchange transactions. It has been said that the divine principle, after having created the elements of the world, withdrew and left them to the free play of their own powers, so that we can now speak of an objective cosmos, subject to its own relations and laws; and further, that the divine power chose this independence of the cosmic process as the most expedient means of accomplishing its own purposes for the world. In the same way, we invest economic objects with a quantity of value as if it were an inherent quality, and then hand them over to the process of exchange, to a mechanism determined by those quantities, to an impersonal confrontation between values, from which they return multiplied and more enjoyable to the final purpose, which was also their point of origin: subjective experience. This is the basis and source of that valuation which finds its expression in economic life and whose consequences represent the meaning of money. We turn now to their investigation.
当客体专门为此目的而生产时，它既遥远又克服了距离，从而完成了生产。这样，纯粹的经济客观性就建立起来了，客体脱离了与主体的任何主观关系；由于生产是为了与另一个具有相应作用的客体进行交换，两个客体就进入了相互的客观关系。价值在交换中的形式将价值置于主观和客观的严格意义之外。在交换中，价值变得超主体、超个体，但又不成为事物本身的客观品质和现实。价值是作为客体的需求出现的，它超越了客体的内在现实，只能用另一种相应的价值来交换和获取。自我 "虽然是价值的普遍来源，但却与客体相去甚远，以至于客体可以相互衡量各自的意义，而无需逐一参照 "自我"。但是，这种通过交换来实现和支持的价值之间的真实关系，在最终的主观享受中显然是有其目的的，也就是说，我们得到的价值的数量和强度比没有交换交易时更大。有人说，神的原则在创造了世界的各个要素之后，就退出了世界，让它们自由地发挥自己的力量，因此，我们现在可以说，宇宙是客观的，受其自身关系和规律的制约；此外，神的力量选择了宇宙进程的这种独立性，作为实现自己对世界的目的的最有利手段。 同样，我们给经济物品注入价值量，就好像它是与生俱来的品质一样，然后把它们交给交换过程，交给由这些价值量决定的机制，交给价值之间的非个人对抗，从那里，它们成倍增加，更愉快地回到最终目的，这也是它们的起源：主观经验。这就是在经济生活中得以体现的估价的基础和来源，其结果代表了货币的意义。我们现在来研究它们。

The technical form of economic transactions produces a realm of values that is more or less completely detached from the subjective-personal substructure. Although the individual buys because he values and wants to consume
经济交易的技术形式所产生的价值领域，或多或少地完全脱离了主观个人的次结构。尽管个人购买的原因是他重视并希望消费