Putting the Public Back into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and Its Future 重塑公共治理中的公眾參與：公民參與的挑戰與未來Author(s): Archon Fung 作者： 馮崇義Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 75, No. 4 (JULY/AUGUST 2015), pp. 513-522 來源：公共行政評論，第 75 卷，第 4 期（2015 年 7 月/8 月），第 513-522 頁Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration 由約翰威利父子公司應公共行政美國協會要求出版Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24757808 穩定網址： https://www.jstor.org/stable/24757808Accessed: 07-03-2025 15:17 UTC 取得時間：2025-07-03 15:17 UTC
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Putting the Public Back into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and Its Future 公共治理中重拾公共性: 公民参与的挑战及其未来
Editor’s note: Professor Archon Fung contributed one of the most recent articles selected as Public Administration Review’s 75 most influential, “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance.” In that 2006 article, Fung offered a framework for understanding the institutional possibilities for public participation. In this 75 th-anniversary essay, Fung takes stock of the prospects for citizen participation to advance three values of democratic governance. He concludes by enumerating three challenges to successful participatory governance. 編輯註：阿爾孔·馮教授撰寫了公共行政評論 75 篇最具影響力的文章之一，即「複雜治理中的參與種類」。在 2006 年的文章中，馮教授提供了一個框架來理解公共參與的制度可能性。在這個 75 週年紀念文章中，馮教授評估了公民參與促進民主治理的三個價值觀的前景。他最後列舉了成功參與治理的三個挑戰。
Abstract: The past two decades have seen a proliferation of large- and small-scale experiments in participatory governance. This article takes stock of claims about the potential of citizen participation to advance three values of democratic governance: effectiveness, legitimacy, and social justice. Increasing constraints on the public sector in many societies, combined with increasing demand for individual engagement and the affordances of digital technology, have paved the way for participatory innovations aimed at effective governance. Deepening legitimation deficits of representative government create opportunities for legitimacy-enhancing forms of citizen participation, but so far, the effect of participation on legitimacy is unclear. Efforts to increase social justice through citizen participation face the greatest obstacles. The article concludes by highlighting three challenges to creating successful participatory governance: the absence of systematic leadership, the lack of popular or elite consensus on the place of direct citizen participation, and the limited scope and powers of participatory innovations. **摘要：** 過去二十年見證了參與式治理在大規模和小規模實驗中的激增。本文根據公民參與在促進民主治理的有效性、合法性和社會正義這三方面價值上的潛力，對其進行評估。許多社會中公共部門日益嚴格的限制，再加上對個人參與日益增長的需求和數字技術的便利性，為旨在有效治理的參與式創新鋪平了道路。代議政府合法性赤字的加深為增強合法性的公民參與形式創造了機遇，但到目前為止，參與對合法性的影響尚不清楚。通過公民參與促進社會正義的努力面臨著最大的障礙。文章最後強調了創建成功參與式治理的三項挑戰：缺乏系統性領導、缺乏對直接公民參與地位的普及或精英共識，以及參與式創新的範圍和權力有限。*
Practitioner Points 執業人要點 (Traditional Chinese)
Practitioners should consider the full menu of design choices for engaging citizens. The “democracy cube” is one way of reflecting on the many other ways of designing participation-different kinds of participants; different ways of speaking, hearing, and exchanging information (e.g., small groups); and different levels of empowerment. 實務工作人員應考慮讓公民參與的全套設計選擇。「民主立方體」是一種反思設計參與的其他方法的反思方法，例如不同類型的參與者、不同的說話、聆聽和交換資訊方式（例如，小組）和不同的賦權程度。
In order to engage citizens, practitioners should be clear about the intention for convening citizens and design engagement in a way that envisions a clear path leading from engagement to the satisfaction of that intention. 為了讓市民參與，實踐者應明確說明召集市民的意圖，並以一種能夠預見從參與到滿足意圖的清晰路徑的方式設計參與。
It is important to design participation in ways that its outcomes are meaningful to participants. Frustration, cynicism, or apathy can be the results of a poorly designed public engagement process in which participants’ hopes for learning, working, or accomplishing some goal are disappointed by a process that is futile, in which the relevant decisions have been made elsewhere by someone else, or in which the choices and stakes are trivial. 在設計參與方式時，務必使其成果對參與者具有意義。公眾參與過程設計不善，可能會導致參與者感到沮喪、憤世嫉俗或漠不關心，因為他們的期望——學習、工作或實現某些目標——會因以下原因而落空：1）過程徒勞無功；2）相關決策已由其他人另行做出；3）選擇和利害關係微不足道。
Citizen participation is not just about policy; it is also deeply political. Substantial citizen engagement will be sustained over time only if citizens come to support the institutions and practices of participation-that is, if they grow into a constituency that will not just engage but also defend against efforts to reduce participation. 公民參與不僅關乎政策，它也具有深刻的政治意涵。 只有當公民開始支持參與的制度和實踐（亦即，他們逐漸成為一個不僅會參與，還會抵制減少參與的企圖的選民）時，才能持續進行重大的公民參與。
My Public Administration Review article “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance” (Fung 2006) had three aims. The first was to draw attention among public administration scholars and practitioners to the fact of the incredible diversity in the practice of public participation. Although public hearings are the ubiquitous form of participation, many other arrangements are possible. Following Robert Dahl, I used the “參與複雜治理的參與形式”這篇文章（Fung 2006）有三個目標。第一個目標是提請公共行政學者和實務工作者的注意，並瞭解公共參與實務中令人難以置信的多樣性。雖然公聽會是參與的普遍形式，但許多其他安排也是可行的。根據羅伯特·達爾，我使用了
term “minipublic” to describe this broad genus of arrangements (Fung 2003). 將「迷你公眾」一詞用於描述此廣泛的安排類型（Fung 2003 年）。
Participants could be elected or randomly chosen rather than self-selected. Instead of just speeches followed by questions, there could be actual deliberation. Conclusions reached by participants could play a greater role in shaping public policies. These possibilities were not mere theoretical potentials; rather, many 參與者可以被選舉或隨機選擇，而不是自我選擇。除了演講和隨後的問答之外，還應該有實際的討論。參與者達成的結論可能在塑造公共政策方面發揮更大的作用。這些可能性不僅僅是理論上的潛力；而是，許多
Archon Fung is academic dean and the Ford Foundation Professor of Democracy and Citizenship in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University His research explores policies, practices, and institutional designs that deepen the quality of democratic governance. He is codirector of the Transparency Policy Project and leads democratic governance programs in the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at the Kennedy School. He has authored five books, four edited collections, and more than 50 articles appearing in professional journals. E-mail: archon_fung@hks.harvard.edu Archon Fung 是哈佛大學甘迺迪政府學院的學術院長，以及福特基金會的民主和公民權利教授。他的研究探討了深化民主治理品質的政策、 praktyki 和 機構設計。他是透明政策專案的共同主任，並在甘迺迪學院民主治理和創新阿什中心領導民主治理計劃。他著有五本書、四本編輯合集和 50 多篇發表在專業期刊的文章。電子郵件：archon_fung@hks.harvard.edu
The article’s second aim was to show that these variations in design matter. In particular, public participation can be a potent means to achieve key democratic values such as legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness in governance. From this perspective, public actors ought to view participation as a potential solution to some of the democratic challenges they face. Participation is not just good in itself. Carefully craftedwhich is not to say manipulated-participation can be an effective means to accomplish the values of good governance. The third aim was to offer a focused way of organizing our thinking about participatory design choices along three dimensions that together formed the rubric of the “democracy cube”: (1) Who participates? (2) How do they communicate and make decisions? (3) What influence do they have over the resulting public decisions and actions? 參與式設計可以是一種有效的解決方案，可以應對治理所面臨的一些民主挑戰。 參與不僅僅是本身就是好的。 經過精心設計（這並不是說操縱）參與可以成為實現善政價值的有效手段。 第三個目標是提供一種集中方式，以組織我們的三個維度對參與式設計選擇的思考，這些維度共同構成了“民主立方体”的框架： (1) 誰參與？ (2) 他們如何溝通和做出決定？ (3) 他們對由此產生的公共決策和行動具有什麼影響？
“Varieties of Participation” concentrated on the “domain” (in the sense of the span of independent variables in a mathematical function) of participatory design choices. Participant selection, methods of communication and decision making, and intended influence can be thought of as the independent variables that democratic architects manipulate in order to achieve more desirable outcomes. The outcomes they seek, in turn, can be thought of as the “range” of participatory designs, if we continue using the analogue to mathematical functions. “參與種類”集中於參與式設計選擇的“範疇”(在數學函數中自變量的跨度意義上)。參與者選擇、溝通和決策方法，以及預期影響，可以被視為民主建築師為了實現更理想的結果而操作的自變量。 他們追求的結果，如果我們繼續使用數學函數的類比，則可以被視為參與式設計的“範圍”。
The present article takes stock of some broad trends in participatory governance that have unfolded since “Varieties of Participation” was published and attends more to questions about that range: What are the values that greater citizen participation might advance? What are the opportunities and challenges to doing so? I examine these questions inductively by considering a number of participatory governance innovations-and studies examining participatory governance-that have appeared since “Varieties of Participation.” 本文總結了「參與式治理的種類」出版以來在參與式治理方面出現的一些廣泛趨勢，並更多地關注該範圍的相關議題：更廣泛的公民參與可能提升哪些價值？這樣做的機會和挑戰是什麼？我將通過考察「參與式治理的種類」出版以來出現的一些參與式治理創新 - 並研究探討參與式治理的研究 - 來以歸納的方式探討這些問題。
A Speculative Retrospective of Participatory Governance 參與式治理的推測回顧
By way of orientation, consider some broad trends in the use of participatory mechanisms that have unfolded over the last decade or two. I offer these trends for the most part as speculations-because the forms of participatory innovation are often local, sometimes temporary, and highly varied, I know of no general census of participatory innovation and few efforts to quantify the instances of participatory governance at geographic scale. 藉由方向，請考慮過去十年或二十年來在參與式機制使用方面出現的一些廣泛趨勢。我多數將這些趨勢視為推測——因為參與式創新的形式通常是地方性的、有時是臨時性的，而且變化多端，我知道沒有參與式創新的總體普查，也鮮少嘗試量化各地參與式治理的实例。
Lack of quantification not withstanding, the first pattern is that there seems to have been substantial growth in participatory innovation in recent years. One dimension of that innovation is its expansion. Participatory budgeting, for example, was invented only in 1989, but it has spread very widely. Tiago Peixoto (2014) counts some 1,500 instances of participatory budgeting, spreading from Latin America to Europe, North America, and many other corners of the world. In their 2012 volume, Mansuri and Rao write that the “World Bank alone has invested about $85\$ 85 billion over the 缺乏量化不論如何，第一種模式是近年來參與式創新似乎有顯著增長。
該創新的其中一個面向是其擴張。例如，參與式預算僅在 1989 年發明，但已廣泛傳播。Tiago Peixoto (2014) 統計了約 1,500 個參與式預算案例，從拉丁美洲擴散到歐洲、北美和世界許多其他角落。Mansuri 和 Rao 在 2012 年的著作中寫道，「僅世界銀行就已投資了約 $85\$ 85 億美元
last decade on development assistance for participation” (iv). They contend that this attention to participatory development marks a sharp shift from the prior conventional wisdom regarding development that emphasized top-down expertise and, heavily influenced by thinkers such as Mansur Olson and Garrett Hardin, the need for centralized coercion to overcome collective action problems (27). 上個十年在發展援助中的參與方面，「參與式發展」的概念已引起相當大的注意，這被視為一項重大進展。一些學者如 Easterly (2006) 和 William Easterly (2006) 和 William Easterly (2006) 認為，這種對參與式發展的關注，標誌著與先前強調自上而下的專業知識和在曼瑟·奧爾森和加勒特·哈丁等思想家的強烈影響下，需要中央強制來克服集體行動問題的傳統發展觀念的重大轉變 (27)。
Public actors ought to view participation as a potential solution to some of the democratic challenges they face. 公眾人物應將參與視為解決其面臨的一些民主挑戰的可能方案。
Another dimension of expansion is scope: the injection of participation into new kinds of issues and governance questions. One of the first instances in which ordinary citizens participated in a constitutional question was initiated in 2004 with the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Participedia 2009). Since then, the idea of incorporating the direct input of ordinary citizens into questions about voting rules, districting arrangements, and other constitutional-level questions has spread to Ontario with its own citizens’ assembly (Grant 2013), to California (Sonenshein 2013), and to Iceland with its crowdsourced and participatory constitutional drafting process (Landemore 2014). At the national, regional, and local levels, the number and variety of citizen forums seem to have grown in policy areas including health care, fiscal choices, urban and regional planning, accommodating racial and ethnic diversity, and addressing the challenges of scientific and technological development. 另一個擴展的维度是範圍：將參與注入新的議題和治理問題。2004 年不列顛哥倫比亞公民大會開啟了普通公民參與憲法問題的先例之一 (Participedia 2009)。此後，將普通公民的直接意見納入投票規則、劃區安排和其他憲法層級問題的構想，已擴展到安大略省舉行自己的公民大會 (Grant 2013)、加州 (Sonenshein 2013) 以及冰島的群眾外包和參與式憲法起草程序 (Landemore 2014)。在國家、區域和地方各級，公民論壇的數量和種類似乎在醫療保健、財政選擇、城市和區域規劃、容納種族和族裔多元化以及應對科技發展帶來的挑戰等政策領域有所增加。
Furthermore, the kinds of actors who initiate and support citizen participation now constitute a diverse and mutually interacting ecology. Just a decade ago, it seemed that “minipublics”-venues for direct citizen participation ^(1){ }^{1} —unfolded primarily within the purview of administrative agencies (such as education systems, health departments, environmental agencies, or planning agencies) or came from outside government at the behest of educational, civic, or advocacy organizations (as with some deliberative polls or community-based problem-solving efforts). While many participatory initiatives still come from public agencies and civic, third-sector organizations, several important minipublics have been created by politicians operating from legislative or executive positions. The Oregon legislature, for example, created a citizen jury to review statewide ballot initiatives (Participedia 2010a). In Chicago and New York, aldermen and city counselors have used their authority to create participatory budgeting processes (Russon-Gilman 2012). As the number and diversity of minipublics have grown, associations and organizations devoted to cultivating the professional expertise-and providing the business services-required to implement successful public forums have emerged. Venerable organizations in this space include the International Association for Public Participation, Everyday Democracy, ^(2){ }^{2} the Kettering Foundation, and the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University. To name just a few, newer players include the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation, the Participatory Budgeting Project, and the Deliberative Democracy Consortium. Consultancies, both nonprofit and for-profit-such as the German-Dutch consultancy IFOK-are also active in designing and creating minipublics. 此外，現在啟動和支持公民參與的行動者類型構成了一個多元且相互互动的生態系統。就在十年前，似乎「小型公眾」 ^(1){ }^{1} -直接公民參與的場所-主要在行政機構的職權範圍內展開（例如教育體系、衛生部門、環境機構或規劃機構），或來自政府以外，應教育、公民或倡導組織的要求（如同某些審議性民意調查或基於社區的解決方案）。雖然許多參與式倡議仍然來自公共機構和公民、第三部門組織，但政治人物從立法或行政職位運作下，已建立了幾個重要的小型公眾。例如，奧勒岡州立法機關成立了一個公民陪審團來審查全州範圍的公民投票倡議（Participedia 2010a）。在芝加哥和紐約，市議員和市政顧問已利用其權限建立參與式預算流程（Russon-Gilman 2012）。 隨著迷你公眾論壇的数量和多样性不断增长，致力于培养专业知识并提供业务服务以实施成功公众论坛的协会和组织应运而生。此领域的知名组织包括国际公众参与协会、日常民主、 ^(2){ }^{2} 凯特林基金会和斯坦福大学协商民主中心。为了举几个例子，新的参与者包括国家对话和协商联盟、参与式预算项目和协商民主联盟。非营利性和营利性咨询公司（例如德国-荷兰咨询公司 IFOK）也积极参与迷你公眾論壇的设计和创建。
However, it seems that the dominant form of public engagement against which the democracy cube was directed-the public hearing or traditional public meeting-is still dominant. Despite the proliferation of sophisticated minipublics, public participation most 然而，民主立方所針對的公開參與的主要形式——公共聽證會或傳統的公開會議——似乎仍然佔主導地位。儘管各種複雜的小型公共論壇不斷湧現，大多數公眾參與
often takes the form of conventional public hearings and meetings. Because the meeting is open to the public, the participants are self-selected. As a result, those who participate are often those who are highly interested in the topics addressed. They are frequently more socioeconomically advantaged than the broader population. In terms of communication, most of the speaking is done by officials or invited guests; a few of the participants say their piece during the discussion period, but most listen as spectators. Finally, public meetings and hearings are low on the scale of influence and empowerment. They rarely attempt to reach a consensus or majority view among participant, and the results of those events seldom have more than advisory force on authorized decision makers. **傳統中文翻譯：**
通常採用公開聽證會和會議的形式。由於會議對公眾開放，參與者是自我選擇的。因此，參與者通常是對所討論議題高度感興趣的人。他們通常比更廣泛的人口社會經濟地位更高。在溝通方面，大多數發言是由官員或邀請的嘉賓進行的；一些參與者在討論期間發表意見，但大多數人像旁觀者一樣聆聽。最後，公開會議和聽證會在影響力和權力方面影響力較低。它們很少嘗試在參與者之間達成共識或多數意見，而且這些活動的結果對授權決策者通常只有諮詢作用。
In “Varieties of Participation,” I argued that public hearings occupy a very small region in the potential space of organizing of public engagement. The design space of the “democracy cube,” reproduced in figure 1, highlights three key variables in the construction of public engagement: (1) who participates, (2) how they communicate and make decisions, and (3) the extent of their influence over social action and public decisions. 在「參與的種類」中，我曾說過，公開聽證會在公共參與組織的潛在空間中只佔據了很小的一部分。圖 1 中的「民主立方體」設計空間突出了公共參與建構的 3 個關鍵變數：(1) 誰參與，(2) 他們如何溝通和做出決定，(3) 他們對社會行動和公共決定的影響程度。
With these broad patterns in mind, we turn to consider the impact of recent minipublics on three central democratic values: legitimacy, effective governance, and justice. 考慮到這些廣泛的模式，我們轉而探討近期微型公眾參與對三個中央民主價值觀的影響：正當性、有效治理和公正。
Legitimacy 合法性
In political theory, many of the justifications for greater participation, especially its deliberative variants, stem from the desire to enhance legitimacy in democratic governance (Cohen 1989; Fung 2007). A fundamental premise of representative democracy is that laws and policies are rendered legitimate because citizens have had opportunities to influence the politicians and parties that make those policies and because subsequent elections will confer opportunities to judge the effects of those policies and hold politicians accountable (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). That is, processes of political competition through elections give citizens a good reason to endorse and obey the policies that result from 在政治理論中，許多促進更多參與的理由，尤其是其協商的變體，源於在民主治理中增強合法性的願望（Cohen 1989；Fung 2007）。代議民主制度的基本前提是，法律和政策之所以具有合法性，是因為公民有機會影響制定這些政策的政治人物和政黨，而且後續的選舉將提供機會來判斷這些政策的影響並追究政治人物的責任（Przeworski、Stokes 和 Manin 1999）。也就是說，透過選舉進行政治競爭的過程，讓公民有充分的理由支持和服從由選舉產生的政策。
Figure 1 Conventional Public Meetings in the Democracy Cube 圖 1 常規民主立方體中的公共會議
The bond between citizens and political institutions has weakened in the United States and other industrialized democracies. 在美國和其他工業化民主國家，公民與政治機構之間的聯繫已經減弱。
that process: they have had opportunities to choose the policy makers. It may be, however, that the legitimation capacity of these conventional mechanisms of electoral representation has declined. According to many indicia, the bond between citizens and political institutions has weakened in the United States and other industrialized democracies. Public trust in legislative and administrative organizations, membership in and identification with political parties, and rates of voting and conventional political participation have declined in many mature democracies (Dalton 2008; Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997). That decline may stem from perceptions that politicians and parties have lost touch, that these actors are beholden to some (Lessig 2011), unresponsive to many (Gilens 2012), corrupt, or simply ineffective. 該過程：他們有機會選擇決策者。然而，這些傳統選舉代表機制的合法化能力可能有所下降。根據許多指標顯示，公民與政治機構之間的聯繫在美國和其他工業化民主國家中有所減弱。在許多成熟的民主國家中，公眾對立法和行政機構的信任、對政黨的認同和參與，以及投票率和傳統政治參與率都在下降（Dalton 2008；Nye、Zelikow 和 King 1997）。這種下降可能源於人們認為政治家和政黨已經脫節，這些行為者受制於某些人（Lessig 2011），對許多人（Gilens 2012）不聞不問，腐敗或效率低下。
This crisis of legitimation creates opportunities for democratic innovations that seek to build legitimacy for legal, administrative, and even constitutional decisions. Of the three values explored in this article, the strongest driver of participatory innovations has been the quest to enhance legitimacy. The hope is that such innovations can increase legitimacy by injecting forms of direct citizen participation into the policy-making process because such participation elevates perspectives that are more closely aligned with those of the general public and because that participation offsets democratic failures in the conventional representative policy-making process. **本合法性危機為尋求為法律、行政，甚至憲政決定建立合法性的民主創新創造了機會。在這篇文章中探討的三個價值觀中，推動參與式創新的最強勁驅動力是增進合法性的追求。人們希望此類創新能夠透過將直接公民參與融入決策過程中來提升合法性，因為這種參與提升了與一般大眾觀點更加一致的觀點，並且因為這種參與抵消了傳統代表性決策過程中民主的失敗。**
Choices about the construction of electoral systems have recently been subject to prominent experiments in citizen participation. Such design choices include drawing electoral boundaries, regulating primaries, financing of campaigns, and even choices between plurality and proportional systems of voting. Historically, such choices typically were made by elected legislators. However, it is unclear why this ought to be the case. First, if citizens have the democratic right to select their political representatives, should they not also, by implication, be able to select the rules according to which they select those legislators? Second, sitting legislators have a self-interest in choosing rules of political competition that favor their own electoral prospects or those of their party and allies, whereas citizens may have other priorities such as the extent of political choice, competition, and the quality of connections between constituents and representatives (Thompson 2008). 選民對選舉制度的构建選擇最近已成為公民參與的顯著實驗主體。此類設計選擇包括劃分選舉區界線、規範初選、競選活動的經費，甚至在議席占多數和比例代表制的投票制度之間做出選擇。在歷史上，此類選擇通常是由民選立法者做出的。然而，目前尚不清楚為何應該如此。首先，如果公民有權利選擇他們的政治代表，那麼他們是否也應該能夠根據這些規則選擇立法者？其次，現任立法者有自我利益來選擇有利於他們自己或其政黨及盟友的選舉競爭規則，而公民則可能會有其他優先事項，例如政治選擇的程度、競爭以及選民與代表之間的聯繫的質量 (Thompson 2008)。
A recent series of participatory innovations have addressed this lacuna by enlisting citizens-who are not professional politicians or public officials-to redesign the rules of political competition. Consider three of these: the British Columbia and Ontario citizens’ assemblies and the California Citizens Redistricting Commission. 公眾近年積極參與政治事務，透過一系列公民大會和制度變革，重新制訂政治競爭的規則，讓非職業政治人物或公職人員得以發揮影響力。其中包括三項案例：英國哥倫比亞省和安大略省的公民大會，以及加州公民重新劃分選區委員會。
The first occurred in Canada. On that case, Dennis Thompson writes that “the conclusion that citizens have a right to govern their electoral system would have remained a theoretical ideal, had not British Columbia established its Citizens’ Assembly in 2004” (2008, 30). The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly was charged with investigating and recommending changes to improve the electoral system of the province-in particular, whether the province should move away from a system of electing representatives based on a first-past-the-post, majority-rule system to some form such as proportional representation. The body was composed of 160 citizens selected at random from 首個例子發生在加拿大。在該案例中，丹尼斯·湯普森寫道：「公民有權治理其選舉制度的結論本將只停留在理論層面上，若非卑詩省於 2004 年成立公民大會，則該結論本將只停留在理論層面上。」（2008 年，30 頁）。卑詩省公民大會的任務是調查和建議改善該省選舉制度，特別是該省是否應放棄以絕對多數制為基礎的選舉代表制度，而改為某種形式的比例代表制。該機構由 160 位從
throughout the province. These members met approximately every other weekend for one year to study and consider alternative voting arrangements. In October 2004, the assembly recommended that the province adopt a single transferable vote system. 在全省各地舉行。這些成員大約每兩週見一次面，為期一年，以研究和考慮其他投票安排。2004 年 10 月，大會建議該省採用單一可轉移投票制。
The assembly’s recommendation was put to the electorate-at-large in a referendum held concurrently with the 2005 provincial election. The referendum required approval by 60 percent of voters and simple majorities in 60 percent of the 79 districts in order to pass; final results indicate that the referendum failed with only 57.7 percent of votes in favor, although it did have majority support in 77 of the 79 electoral districts. Because this referendum was somewhat inconclusive, the government called another referendum on the same question, which was held on May 12, 2009, with the same approval thresholds. In that referendum, the single transferable vote proposal was defeated with 62 percent of voters opposing the change. (The foregoing description of the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly is drawn from Participedia [2009].) 大會的建議在 2005 年省級選舉同時舉行的一次公民投票中提交給全體選民。公民投票需要 60%的選民同意，並在 79 個選區中的 60%獲得簡單多數才能通過；最終結果顯示，公民投票以 57.7%的赞成票失敗，儘管它在 79 個選舉區中的 77 個獲得了多數支持。由於這次公投有些模棱兩可，政府在 2009 年 5 月 12 日就同樣的問題再次舉行了一次公投，並設定了相同的批准門檻。在那次公投中，單一可轉移投票提案以 62%的選民反對而被否決。（上述對卑詩省公民大會的描述來自 Participedia [2009]。）
Ontario, another Canadian province, created its own Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform in 2006 to explore alternatives to its first-past-the-post system. The Ontario assembly was composed of 103 participants, one from each riding (district) in the province. In May of the following year, the assembly recommended that the province adopt a mixed member proportional representation voting system. This method would have designated both (1) members elected in local districts and (2) members elected by the whole province from party lists as Members of Provincial Parliament. Supporters argued that voters would have greater representationwith the ability to cast two votes on the ballot-under this system. The assembly reached this decision in a 94-8 vote. However, when it was put to a provincial popular referendum, 63 percent of voters opposed the measure. ^(3){ }^{3} 安大略省是另一個加拿大省份，於 2006 年成立了自己的公民選舉改革大會，以探討其單一選區制以外的替代方案。安大略省大會由 103 名參與者組成，每個選區各一名。次年 5 月，大會建議該省採用混合比例代表制投票制度。該方法會指定{{1}}在地方選區當選的議員和{{2}}從政黨名單中由整個省份選出的議員作為省議會議員。支持者認為，在這個制度下，選民將擁有更大的代表權，因為他們可以在選票上投兩票。大會以 94 票對 8 票達成此決定。然而，當提交省級公民投票時，63% 的選民反對該措施。 ^(3){ }^{3}
Another related instance leverages citizen participation to improve the determination of electoral district boundaries. In the U.S. state of California, a 2008 referendum (Proposition 11) transferred authority for establishing electoral district boundaries for the State Assembly and State Senate of the California legislature to a new body called the California Citizens Redistricting Commission. Two years later, the voters approved Proposition 20, which expanded the authority of the commission to draw congressional district boundaries as well. Many prominent Democratic politicians opposed the commission process, fearing they would lose seats as a result of losing districting control. 在美國加州，2008 年的一項公投（第 11 號提案）將設立州議會和州參議院選舉區邊界的權力轉移給一個名為加州公民重新劃分委員會的新機構。兩年後，選民批准了第 20 號提案，該提案擴大了該委員會劃分國會選區邊界的權力。許多著名的民主党政治人物反對該委員會的程序，擔心他們會因此失去席位，因為他們失去了劃分選區的控制權。
The Redistricting Commission would eventually consist of 14 members-five registered Democrats, five Republicans, and four members who did not belong to either major party. These 14 people came from an original pool of 30,000 applicants from throughout the state in a process led by the state auditor’s office, with requirements that commissioners not have close connections to political officials (defined as a conflict of interest) and that they possess “relevant analytical skills, ability to be impartial, and appreciation for California’s diverse demographics and geography.” ^(4){ }^{4} 重劃選區委員會最終將由 14 名成員組成，其中 5 名為註冊的民主黨人，5 名為共和黨人，4 名不屬於任何主要政黨的成員。這 14 人來自全州 30,000 名申請者，經由州審計長辦公室主導的程序產生，該程序要求委員不得與政治官員有密切關聯（定義為利益衝突），並且他們必須具備「相關分析技能、公正能力，以及對加州多元化人口結構和地理的了解」。 ^(4){ }^{4}
Once selected, the commission began its work of redistricting California in early 2011. Throughout that year, the commission—well supported by analytic staff—engaged in a painstaking 經過甄選後，委員會於 2011 年初開始進行加州選區重劃工作。整年期間，在分析人員的支持下，委員會兢兢業業地從事一項 painstaking
process of 70 public hearings throughout the state, gathering some 22,000 written comments, conducting deliberations, and producing draft maps. By the end of 2011, it had produced a new map of California’s 177 state and federal electoral districts. These maps were widely praised by electoral reform groups and survived a challenge in the Supreme Court of California in a 7-0 decision upholding the constitutionality of the senate maps. A survey conducted by the field organization found that one-third of California respondents knew of the work of the commission, and among these, approval outweighed disapproval by a margin of 2-12-1. Furthermore, several independent analysts concluded that the new districts significantly increased political competitiveness (Sonenshein 2013, 70-71). 在全州舉行 70 場公開聽證會、收集約 22,000 份書面意見，進行審議並繪製草圖。在 2011 年底之前，它製作了加州 177 個州和聯邦選舉區的新地圖。這些地圖受到選舉改革團體的廣泛讚譽，並在加州最高法院 7-0 關於參議院地圖違憲性的裁判中倖免於難。由實地組織進行的調查發現，三分之一的加州受訪者熟悉委員會的工作，在這些受訪者中，滿意度遠比不滿意度高出 2-12-1 。此外，幾位獨立分析師得出結論，新的選區顯著提高了政治競爭力（Sonenshein 2013，70-71）。
A core design feature of these three bodies is that they impaneled a relatively small group of citizens over an extended period in order to solve a complex design problem that was laden with normative and empirical challenges. Because they were well supported by staff and field experts, it seems that these citizens-who were not, for the most part, political scientists, constitutional scholars, or policy professionals-were able to gain the area-specific knowledge necessary to make informed decisions. The technical constraints of these tasks-deliberation around voting systems and electoral maps-probably set an upper bound on the core size of the group to dozens or low hundreds (as in the British Columbia case), but probably not into the thousands. Perhaps because of this limitation, another important design feature of these quasi-constitutional decisions is that they included stages at which the core group in the assembly or commission listened-through written testimony, the Internet, and face-to-face assemblies-to other citizens and tried to incorporate their views and priorities. Compared with more common alternatives, these citizens’ assemblies sought to improve the legitimacy of these public decisions by creating a prominent role for citizens (who were not also public officials or politicians) in these processes. 這些團體的核心設計特點是，他們在一段延長時間內，由一小群公民組成，以解決一個充滿規範和經驗挑戰的複雜設計問題。由於他們得到了工作人員和領域專家的良好支持，似乎這些公民--他們大多數不是政治學家、憲法學者或政策專業人士--能夠獲得做出明智決策所需的特定領域知識。這些任務的技術限制--圍繞投票制度和選舉地圖進行的討論--可能將核心小組的規模上限設定為數十或數百人（如不列顛哥倫比亞省的案例），但可能不會達到數千人。也許是因為這個限制，這些準憲法決策的另一個重要設計特點是，它們包括了這樣一些階段，即議會或委員會的核心小組通過書面證詞、網際網路和面對面的會議傾聽其他公民的意見，並試圖將他們的觀點和優先事項納入其中。 與更常見的替代方案相比，這些公民大會通過在這些過程中為公民（非公職人員或政治家）設立一個重要的角色，從而提高了這些公共決策的合法性。
Looking into the future, the most important institutional design question for such processes concerns the extent to which they are empowered: who decides whether their recommendations become law or policy? The safe route for legislatures and elected executives, and perhaps the one taken most often, is to make the outputs of such commissions advisory to politicians. But when suspicions about legitimacy focus on those very politicians, the legitimating capacity of an advisory citizen body is limited. The designers of the three cases discussed here chose a different path. The citizens’ assemblies in British Columbia and Ontario were advisory to the citizens as such, and this relationship was institutionalized in the form of binding referenda on the assemblies’ recommendations. The California Citizens Redistricting Commission was directly empowered to draw the electoral maps. 展望未來，這類流程最重要的制度設計問題在於它們的權力範圍：誰決定它們的建議是否成為法律或政策？對立法機構和民選行政人員來說，最安全的路徑，也許也是最常被採用的路徑，是讓這些委員會的產出對政治人物具有諮詢性質。但當對合法性的懷疑集中在這些政治人物身上的時候，諮詢公民團體的合法化能力就受到限制。這裡討論的三個案例的設計者選擇了不同的路徑。不列顛哥倫比亞省和安大略省的公民大會對公民具有諮詢性質，這種關係以具有約束力的公投形式在公民大會的建議中得到制度化。加州公民重新劃分選區委員會被直接賦予繪製選區地圖的權力。
One reason this shift may increase legitimacy is that it avoids an obvious conflict of interest: when sitting politicians make the rules of the game, they have strong incentives to make rules that favor their own electoral prospects or those of their party. Properly vetted, citizens who are not political professionals may act for reasons that advance interests that are more broadly shared by other citizens-for example, interests in the integrity of the electoral process, in political competitiveness and choice, and in respecting existing communities. A second instrumental reason is that citizens may possess 避免利益衝突：非專業政治人員可能基於更廣泛的社會利益行事，例如選舉制度的完整性、政治競爭與選擇以及尊重既有社群。
## 另一項工具性的理由是，公民可能具備特定專業知識或經驗，這些知識或經驗對政治決策有價值，但現任政治人物可能缺乏。
epistemic advantages over more professional political actors. In particular, they may be more attuned to relevant political values, more open to new inputs, and more aware of existing realities of existing social communities and their boundaries. A third, less instrumental reason is that-as with well-accepted institutions such as juries in court trials-legitimacy may adhere to basic identification between citizens at-large and decision makers: the sense that it is appropriate for “someone like me” (i.e., someone sitting on a citizens’ assembly) to make decisions about the political rules of the game. 認識到政治價值，更願意接受新的投入，以及更了解現有社會社群及其界限的現狀。第三個不那麼工具性的原因是 - 與法庭審判中的陪審團等公認的機構一樣 - 合法性可能取決於廣大公民與決策者之間的基本認同：即「像我這樣的人」（即坐在公民大會中的人）對政治規則做出決策是合適的。
But, of course, the notion that more intensive forms of citizen participation will increase democratic legitimacy is an ambition rather than a guarantee. Our political experience and the literature on participation are replete with cautionary tales in which participants have been co-opted (see, classically, Piven and Cloward 1977) or in which some influential participants co-opt organizations that ought to serve more general interests (classically again, see Selznick 1949). 但當然，認為更密集形式的公民參與將會提高民主合法性只是一個願望，而不是一個保證。我們的政治經驗和關於參與的文獻都充斥著警示性故事，在這些故事中，參與者被收買（請參閱經典的 Piven 和 Cloward，1977 年），或者一些有影響力的參與者收買了原本應該服務於更廣泛利益的組織（再次請參閱經典的 Selznick，1949 年）。
Effective Governance 善政
A second value that participatory innovations sometimes seek to advance is effective governance. Governance is effective to the extent that governance arrangements are capable of solving the substantive problems that they are set to address: providing education, caring for the indigent, creating security, and providing public goods and services. 參與式創新有時旨在促進的第二個價值是有效的治理。治理的有效性取決於治理安排是否能夠解決其設定的實質問題：提供教育、照顧窮人、創造安全以及提供公共產品和服務。
In “Varieties of Participation,” I focused on participatory innovations that increase effectiveness through the reform of particular administrative agencies such as police departments, school systems, or environmental regulators. By reorganizing themselves to incorporate greater citizen participation, public agencies can increase their effectiveness by drawing on more information and the distinctive capabilities and resources of citizens. Forms of administrative participation that aim to increase effectiveness in this way include community policing beat meetings (Skogan and Hartnett 1997), local school councils (Fung 2004), and watershed associations (Sabatier et al. 2005; Weber 2003). 在「參與的多樣性」中，我專注於參與式創新，它通過改革特定行政機構（如警察部門、學校系統或環境監管機構）來提高效率。通過改組機構以納入更多的公民參與，公共機構可以通過利用更多信息以及公民的獨特能力和資源來提高其效率。旨在通過這種方式提高效率的行政參與形式包括社區警務例行會議（Skogan 和 Hartnett 1997）、地方學校委員會（Fung 2004）和流域協會（Sabatier 等人 2005；Weber 2003）。
Whereas administrative participation is still an important phenomenon, the most promising ways for citizens to contribute to effective problem solving may lie in other domains. In this article, I draw the reader’s attention to two other modes of participation that aim to increase effective governance: multisectoral problem solving and individualized engagement. The policy scope of the first is broader than a single agency, while the second is more narrowly focused than administrative participation. 鉴于行政参与仍然是一个重要的现象，公民为有效解决问题做出贡献的最有希望的方式可能在于其他领域。在本文中，我将读者的注意力吸引到另外两种旨在提高治理有效性的参与模式：跨部门问题解决和个性化参与。第一种政策范围比单个机构更广，而第二种政策范围比行政参与范围更窄。
Multisectoral Problem Solving 多元部門解決方案
In the public sector, multisectoral problem solving arises as a solution to an organizational problem: “the dynamic complexity of many public problems defies the confines of the established ‘stove-piped’ systems of problem definition, administration, and resolution” (Weber and Khademian 2008). One way to overcome the barriers to pooling knowledge and coordinating action is to create organizational networks that span the relevant organizations in order to more effectively address those “wicked problems.” A central 在公共部門，多部門問題解決成為組織問題的解決方案：「許多公共問題的動態複雜性挑戰了既定的『剛性』問題定義、行政和解決方案的體系。」（韋伯和哈德米安，2008 年）。克服知識彙集和協調行動障礙的一種方法是創建跨越相關組織的組織網路，以便更有效地解決這些「棘手問題」。一個中心
idea-common by now in the practice of public administration scholarship and practice-is that the solutions to many substantive problems require expertise and capacity across different disciplines (e.g., policing and social services and education) and even across public, private, and civic sector organizations. Thus, either by incremental organizational evolution or by intentional design, networks of organizations that span these disciplines and sectors have emerged to grapple with wicked problems (see Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; for an excellent discussion of collaborative governance efforts, see Ansell and Gash 2008). 如今在公共行政學術研究和實務中，一個普遍的想法是解決許多實質性問題需要跨越不同學科(例如，警務、社會服務和教育)甚至跨越公共、私人和公民部門組織的專業知識和能力。因此，不論是組織的漸進演變或是有意的設計，橫跨這些學科和部門的組織網絡已經浮出檯面，以應對錯綜複雜的問題(請參閱 Goldsmith 和 Eggers 2004 年的著作；欲瞭解協作治理工作的優質討論，請參閱 Ansell 和 Gash 2008 年的著作)。
Many multisectoral problem-solving, networked governance, or collaborative governance efforts do not create a substantial role for citizens. In some instances, however, multisectoral problem solving revolves around direct citizen participation. We call this variant participatory multisectoral problem solving. Why involve citizens given the cost in time and coordination that such involvement poses? Citizens can make several important contributions to solving wicked problems. First, citizens can help frame the particular problem in more accurate and viable ways than professionals acting alone. Second, when decisions involve important ethical or material trade-offs, citizens may be best placed to adjudicate those trade-offs. Third, citizens, who are often most affected by efforts to address public problems, are well placed to provide information relevant to devising solutions and evaluating implementation. Finally, citizens can sometimes become directly engaged in solving public problems and thus contribute additional resources through coproduction. 多部門解決問題、網路治理或協作治理的努力，並未為公民創造實質性的角色。然而，在某些情況下，多部門問題解決圍繞著公民直接參與進行。我們稱這種變體為參與式多部門問題解決。為什麼要讓公民參與，即使這種參與會帶來時間和協調上的成本？公民可以對解決棘手問題做出幾項重要的貢獻。首先，公民可以幫助以比專業人員單獨行動更準確和可行的方式構建特定問題。其次，當決策涉及重要的道德或物質權衡時，公民可能是裁決這些權衡的最佳人選。第三，公民通常受解決公共問題的努力影響最大，因此他們可以提供與制定解決方案和評估實施相關的信息。最後，公民有時可以直接參與解決公共問題，從而通過聯合生產貢獻額外的資源。
In Albuquerque, New Mexico, for example, several local civic organizations partnered with a national organization called Everyday Democracy to devise strategies to improve the welfare of children in New Mexico. By way of background, children and teens in New Mexico trail the country on important indicators of educational and social achievement, partly because of poverty and social isolation. The program was called Strong Starts for Children (SSFC) and began in 2010 in the Albuquerque and Santa Fe areas. 例如在美國新墨西哥州的阿爾伯克基，幾個當地公民組織與一個叫做“日常民主” 的全國性組織合作，制定策略以改善新墨西哥州兒童的福祉。作爲背景，在新墨西哥州，由於貧困和社會孤立，兒童和青少年在教育和社會成就的重要指標方面落後於全國。該項目稱為“兒童強勢開端”（SSFC），並於 2010 年在阿爾伯克基和聖達菲地區啟動。
Although the initiative was led by five area civic groups-the All Indian Pueblo Council, Cuidando los Niños, Native American Professional Parent Resources, Inc., the University of New Mexico Family Development Program, and Youth Development, Inc.-SSFC focused first on convening ordinary citizens in “dialogue circles.” Each of the five civic organizations recruited area residents to participate in small group discussions about early child development and education. Each circle was composed of 8-10 participants and deliberated for five two-hour long sessions. According to Everyday Democracy, a total of 290 people participated in the circles. 儘管該倡議是由五個地區的公民團體領導—全印第安普韋布洛理事會、照顧兒童、美洲原住民專業家長資源公司、新墨西哥大學家庭發展計畫和青年發展公司—但南大社區基金會首先將重點放在讓普通公民參與「對話圈」中。這五個公民組織中的每一個組織都招募了地區居民來參與關於早期兒童發展和教育的小組討論。每個圈子由 8-10 位參與者組成，並進行了五次兩小時的會議。據《日常生活中的民主》報導，共有 290 人參與了這些圈子。
These deliberations were led by trained facilitators, and each group was given informational discussion guides on child education prepared by Everyday Democracy. Each group moved through several structured stages of deliberation. They first became acquainted with each other. Then, they discussed why child development was important for each of them-the underlying values at stake in this question. Next, they sought to create together and agree on the goals and objectives that would constitute a successful environment 這些審議由訓練有素的促進者帶領，每個小組都收到由日常民主協會準備的兒童教育資訊討論指南。每個小組都經歷了幾個結構化的審議階段。 他們首先互相認識。 然後，他們討論為什麼兒童發展對他們每個人都很重要——這個問題所涉的基礎價值觀。 接著，他們試圖共同創造並 согласовать 目標和客觀，使其成為一個成功的環境。=
of child development and education. They also sought to identify the challenges and obstacles that prevented children from achieving success and organizations from creating a successful environment. 兒童發展和教育方面的專家。他們還探討了兒童成功和組織創造成功環境面臨的挑戰和障礙。
Finally, participants formulated and proposed solutions for addressing the challenges using their own resources, those of the civic organizations that convened them, and the broader governments and community in the area. 最後，參與者在他們自己的資源、召集他們的公民組織的資源，以及該地區更廣泛的政府和社區的資源的幫助下，制定並提出了解決挑戰的方案。
Each dialogue circle deliberated to identify the best solutions in terms of feasibility, effectiveness, implementation time frame, cost, the capabilities of the implementing community organization, and the need for coordination with government, private sector, civil society, and other actors. Participants voted to identify what they believed to be the three best solutions for improvement in early childhood development and education based on what the sponsoring community organization could implement. Finally, each dialogue circle appointed a member to represent the circle during a subsequent deliberation called an Action Forum. The participants were asked to evaluate each of the proposed solutions according to criteria such as feasibility, effectiveness, cost, timeliness, and availability of necessary resources. Participants then voted to select their top three proposals. 每個對話圈都經過審議，以確定最佳的解決方案，這些方案在可行性、有效性、實施時間框架、成本、執行社區組織的能力以及與政府、私營部門、公民社會和其他行為者協調的需要等方面進行了評估。參與者投票選出他們認為在幼兒發展和教育方面可以由贊助社區組織實施的三個最佳改進方案。最後，每個對話圈都指派一名成員在隨後的行動論壇中代表該圈。與會者被要求根據可行性、有效性、成本、時效性和必要資源的可用性等標準，對每個擬議的解決方案進行評估。然後，參與者投票選出他們最看好的三個提案。
The SSFC project aimed not just to discuss the problems that New Mexico’s children face but also to advance concrete strategies to address those problems. Their strategies were addressed to two types of organizations. First, the five convening civic organizations were themselves engaged in a range of child welfare activities, including direct service provision. The circles made a range of recommendations for programming changes that these organizations should make, including expanding early child programming, native language preservation, additional activities to raise public awareness, and the creation of community centers with early child programming. Second, one of the concluding stages of SSFC was a Policy Forum in which many participants in the circles convened to develop a series of policy recommendations for local and state government. These recommendations included the universal (not means-targeted) availability of voluntary early child education programs, greater local control for early child programming, and requirements for businesses to adopt more family-friendly policies to support families in their early child care and education efforts (see Everyday Democracy 2011). 社會服務聯誼會 (SSFC) 的項目不僅旨在討論新墨西哥州兒童面臨的問題，還要提出解決這些問題的具體策略。他們的策略針對兩種組織。首先，五個召集的公民組織本身就參與了一系列兒童福利活動，包括直接提供服務。這些圈子提出了一系列針對這些組織應做出的方案變革的建議，包括擴展早期兒童方案、保留母語、增加提高公眾認識的活動以及建立帶有早期兒童方案的社區中心。其次，SSFC 的結尾階段之一是政策論壇，許多參與圈子的人員齐聚一堂，制定了一系列針對地方和州政府的政策建議。這些建議包括普及 (非以收入為目標) 自願早期兒童教育方案、地方對早期兒童方案的更大控制權以及企業制定更友好的家庭政策以支持家庭在早期兒童保育和教育工作中的要求 (見 Everyday Democracy 2011)。
Scholars of participatory and collaborative governance have debated many dimensions on which the effectiveness of such efforts might be reckoned: influence on decisions and policies, on outcomes such as welfare and risk, and on the problem-solving and collaborative capacities of organizations and citizens (Rogers and Weber 2010). While it is too early to assess whether SSFC will measurably improve the condition of children in Santa Fe and New Mexico more broadly, it seems that the effort has influenced the actions of civic and government organizations. The five convening civic organizations seem to have been receptive to many of the recommendations from the dialogue circles, embracing language policy recommendations and beginning programs to engage students in the development of public awareness materials about disadvantaged, especially homeless, children. Partly in response to the recommendations of SSFC, New Mexico enacted the Early Childhood Care and Education Act (S.B. 120) in April 2011. 學者們對參與性和協作治理的有效性進行了許多方面的辯論，這些方面可能包括對決策和政策的影響、對福利和風險等結果的影響，以及對組織和公民的解決問題和協作能力的影響（Rogers 和 Weber，2010 年）。雖然現在評估 SSFC 是否會顯著改善聖達菲和新墨西哥州更廣泛地區兒童的狀況還為時過早，但似乎該努力已影響到公民和政府組織的行動。這五個召集公民組織似乎接受了對話圈的許多建議，採納了語言政策建議，並開始實施讓學生參與弱勢兒童（尤其是無家可歸兒童）的公共意識宣導材料的開發。部分是為了回應 SSFC 的建議，新墨西哥州於 2011 年 4 月頒布了《早期兒童保育和教育法》（S.B. 120）。
Individualized Engagement 個別參與
A different set of methods for enhancing effective problem solving revolves around individual learning and conduct rather than collective decision making and social action. Whereas multisectoral problem solving harnesses the insight that solutions to many wicked problems require information and action spanning different organizations and even sectors of society, individual engagement turns on two observations. The first is that some social problems result from individual problems. The second is that many of those social problems with be more easily solved if the affected individuals can be actively enlisted in solving them. Think of this phenomenon as individual, even personalized, coproduction. 個人、甚至個性化共同生產的現象。
The basic dynamics of individualized coproduction are familiar. Every parent who has gone to a parent-teacher conference, discussed his or her child’s strengths and weaknesses, and then worked with the student has participated in this kind of coproduction. Several broad developments, however, may signal opportunities for more effective governance through individualized engagement. First, survey results show that those in younger generations seek ways to become more deeply engaged with the public problems they care deeply about and may even expect a deeper, more discursive level of engagement with organizations than their predecessors (Public Opinion Project 2013). If true, this trend creates the potential for greater individualized coproduction. Second, digital technologies and social media create the resources, at least potentially, for citizens to acquire information about public problems and data about themselves that make them more competent partners in public problem solving. Third, in domains such as health, education, and consumer protection, public action based solely on governmental capacities may have reached limits that might be transcended by engaging citizens as coproducers. 個別化共同製作的基本動態是大家所熟悉的。 每個參加過家長教師會議、討論孩子優缺點，然後與學生一起努力的家長都參與了這種共同製作。 然而，幾項廣泛的發展可能意味著透過個別化參與進行更有效治理的機會。 首先，調查結果顯示，年輕世代的人們尋求更深入參與公共問題的方式，這些問題是他們深切關心的，甚至可能期望比他們的前輩更深入、更具討論性的參與組織（公共意見專案 2013）。 如果屬實，這種趨勢將為更廣泛的個別化共同製作創造潛力。 其次，數位科技和社群媒體創造了資源，至少潛在地，讓公民可以獲取有關公共問題的資訊和自身數據，使他們在公共問題解決中成為更勝任的合作夥伴。 第三，在健康、教育和消費者保護等領域，僅依賴政府能力的公共行動可能已達到極限，而這極限有可能透過將公民視為共同生產者而超越。
One advanced example of individualized coproduction comes from pediatric health care. Pediatric irritable bowel disease (IBD) affects some 60,000 children in the United States. Its symptoms range from indigestion to gut pain and, in its severe forms, extreme weight loss and debilitating pain. The Collaborative Care Network, or C 3 N , is a group of some 65 hospitals and centers that together treat 18,000 children afflicted with IBD. (This description of the Collaborative Care Network is drawn from research conducted by Dina Kraft for the Transparency Policy Project in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.) C3N members have used digital data tools and created informational and treatment networks among patients, among doctors, and between patients and doctors that engage young people much more actively in the monitoring and treatment of their conditions and improve the quality of care that doctors provide. C3N provides a range of digital tools, including applications and reminders, through which patients can closely monitor and record their own condition and behavior: diet, energy levels, therapeutic compliance, sense of wellbeing, and so on. It has also created a social network among patients in which they share their own experiences and strategies of disease management. But C3N is not limited to patients. It has also created separate networks for health care providers to compare notes, analyze data for both general and individual patterns of therapeutic success, and identify and diffuse best practices. 一個先進的個別聯合製作範例來自兒童醫療保健。兒童發炎性腸病 (IBD) 影響美國約 60,000 名兒童。其症狀從消化不良到腸道疼痛，在嚴重情況下，會導致極度體重減輕和令人衰弱的疼痛。協作照護網路或 C3N 是一個由約 65 家醫院和中心組成的團體，共同治療 18,000 名罹患 IBD 的兒童。（協作照護網路的描述摘自由 Dina Kraft 為哈佛大學甘迺迪政府學院的透明度政策計畫進行的研究。）C3N 成員已使用數位數據工具，並在患者、醫生之間以及患者與醫生之間建立資訊和治療網路，這些網路讓年輕人更積極地參與其病況的監控和治療，並提高醫生提供的照護品質。C3N 提供一系列數位工具，包括應用程式和提醒，患者可透過這些工具密切監控和記錄自己的病況和行為：飲食、能量水平、治療依從性、幸福感等等。 它也為患者建立了一個社交網絡，他們在其中分享自己的疾病管理經驗和策略。但 C3N 不僅限於患者。它還為醫療保健提供者建立了單獨的網絡，以便比較注意事項、分析一般和個別治療成功模式的數據，以及識別和傳播最佳實踐。
C3N seems to have improved the value of visits between doctors and patients by providing doctors with much more information C3N 似乎透過提供醫生更多資訊來提高醫生和病人之間的訪視價值
about individual patients before their meetings. One central goal of C3N is to increase the rates of remission for those who suffer from pediatric IBD. On this measure, C3N has been even more successful than its creators had hoped. Before 2007, when C3N was created, standards of care had achieved 55 percent remission rates for the disease. By 2011, C3N had increased the remission rates for its patients to 78 percent. 關於個別患者在會面前的情況。C3N 的主要目標之一是提高患有兒童 IBD 的患者的緩解率。在這個指標上，C3N 的成功甚至超過了其創建者的預期。在 2007 年 C3N 建立之前，護理標準已達到 55% 的疾病緩解率。到 2011 年，C3N 已將其患者的緩解率提高到 78%。
The Collaborative Care Network and other forms of individualized coproduction engage citizens in a very different way than the kinds of minipublics that Dahl imagined and most democratic theorists have considered. That is because we usually think of the democratic role of citizens as influencing-whether indirectly through elections or directly through participatory mechanisms-public policies. From a broader vantage, however, democratic governance ought to include a fuller range of activities through which individuals influence organizational decisions and actions-and themselves take action-to protect their interests. In a system of institutionalized coproduction such as C 3 N , that is just what patients do. They not only change their own behavior but also participate in the transformation of how care for many pediatric IBD sufferers is provided. Those changes come not through a clear decision-making process, such as those of citizens’ assemblies, but rather through the continuous accretion of therapeutic testing, behavioral change, reporting, data gathering, and analysis that occurs between thousands of interconnected patients and their doctors over long spans of time. In the aggregate, of course, individual improvements in areas such as education or health must count as helping to solve public problems. 協作護理網路 (C 3 N ) 和其他形式的個人化共同生產，以與 Dahl 想像和大多數民主理論家考慮的各種小型公眾截然不同的方式讓公民參與。這是因為我們通常將公民的民主角色視為影響，無論是通過選舉間接還是通過參與機制直接影響公共政策。然而，從更廣泛的角度來看，民主治理應該包括個人影響組織決策和行動以保護其利益的更廣泛的活動範圍，並採取行動以保護其利益。在像 C 3 N 這樣的制度化共同生產系統中，患者正是這樣做的。他們不僅改變自己的行為，還參與改變許多兒童 IBD 患者的護理方式。這些變化不是通過明確的決策過程（例如公民大會）實現的，而是通過數千名相互聯繫的患者及其醫生在很長時間內發生的治療測試、行為改變、報告、數據收集和分析的持續累積實現的。 總的來說，當然，在教育或健康等領域的個別改進必須算作有助於解決公共問題。
Participatory budgeting encompasses a variety of institutional designs in which direct citizen participation is a constitutive element but the advance of social justice is a contingent consequence. 參與式預算涵蓋各種制度設計，其中公民直接參與是構成要素，但促進社會正義是一個偶然的結果。
baked a preference for the disadvantaged into the original participatory budget by weighting the amounts of public investment that different parts of the city received according to their relative levels of deprivation. Neighborhoods with subpar infrastructure levels would receive more funds for participants to allocate (Santos 1998). 用權衡城市不同地區根據其相對貧困程度獲得的公共投資金額，將對弱勢群體的偏好納入原始參與式預算。基礎設施水平較差的社區將獲得更多資金供參與者分配 (Santos 1998)。
But even as participatory budgeting reforms have spread to hundreds of other cities across the globe, the original emphasis on social justice seems to have receded. Gianpaolo Baiocchi explains why, from this perspective, participatory budgeting has not traveled well (Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012). In its original instantiation, participatory budgeting was a means for a left party to accomplish its redistributive and electoral objectives. Reformers in many other places, however, adopted participatory budgeting as a way to advance other objectives such as civic education and popular legitimation. That is, they sought to advance good governance rather than increase social justice. These reformers created versions of participatory budgeting that do produce new ways for citizens to engage in the direct allocation of public investments, but without the elements-such as a redistributive allocation formula and attention to popular mobiliza-tion-necessary to advance distributive justice. 但即使隨著參與式預算改革擴散到全球數百個城市，最初對社會正義的重視似乎已逐漸消退。Gianpaolo Baiocchi 解釋了為什麼從這個角度來看，參與式預算並未產生良好的效果（Ganuza 和 Baiocchi 2012）。在最初的實施過程中，參與式預算是一種左翼政黨用來實現其再分配和選舉目標的手段。然而，許多其他地方的改革者採用參與式預算作為促進其他目標（例如公民教育和民意認可）的一種方式。也就是說，他們尋求促進善政，而不是增加社會正義。這些改革者創造了參與式預算的版本，這些版本確實為公民提供了參與公共投資直接分配的新方式，但沒有包含促進分配正義所需的要素（例如重新分配分配公式和關注民意動員）。
Social justice receded from the agenda of participatory budgeting as that participatory technique spread across the globe because the agents of its reproduction were often motivated by other governance priorities. Recent experience shows that there is no necessary bias toward social justice in participatory budgeting or other participatory innovations. Rather, participatory budgeting encompasses a variety of institutional designs in which direct citizen participation is a constitutive element but the advance of social justice is a contingent consequence. Whether some instantiation of participatory budgeting advances social justice depends, first and foremost, on the aims of the political agents who design and implement it. 社會正義從參與式預算的議程中退卻，因為這種參與式技術在全球範圍內傳播，因為其複製的代理人通常受其他治理優先事項的驅動。最近的經驗表明，在參與式預算或其他參與式創新中，並不存在對社會正義的必要偏見。相反，參與式預算涵蓋了各種制度設計，其中直接公民參與是一個構成要素，但社會正義的進步是一個偶然的結果。參與式預算的某種實例是否促進社會正義，首先取決於設計和實施它的政治代理人的目標。
This truth about participatory budgeting also holds for participatory governance generally. Advancing social justice through participatory governance is a nontrivial achievement. It requires at least two necessary conditions. First, reform champions must simultaneously seek both greater public engagement and greater equality. Second, champions must have the imagination and resourcefulness to design and implement participatory institutions that work. 這些關於參與式預算的真理也普遍適用於參與式治理。透過參與式治理提倡社會正義是一項重大的成就。它至少需要兩個必要的條件。首先，改革的倡導者必須同時追求更大的公共參與和更大的平等。其次，倡導者必須具備想像力和資源，才能設計和實施有效的參與式制度。
Governments, civil society groups, and others have successfully implemented many participatory governance projects in recent years, and the trend seems to be growing. For the most part, however, these projects seem geared to advance values such as the legitimacy or efficacy of public action-as described in the two previous sections-rather than social justice. Unlike the Workers’ Party in Porto Alegre, most of the politicians and public officials who have created participatory governance institutions in recent years seem not to have viewed greater citizen participation as a way to equalize the distribution of resources or access to public goods and services. Because they have not been so motivated, the participation projects they created have not, for the most part, been designed to advance social justice. 政府、民间社会团体和其他人近年来已成功实施了许多参与式治理项目，而且这一趋势似乎正在增长。然而，在很大程度上，这些项目似乎旨在提高公共行动的合法性或效力等价值观——如前两节所述——而不是社会正义。与阿雷格里港的工人党不同，近年来创建参与式治理机构的大多数政治家和公共官员似乎没有将更多的公民参与视为一种平衡资源分配或获取公共物品和服务的方式。由于他们没有这样的动机，他们创建的参与项目在很大程度上并没有被设计用来促进社会正义。
Even when not self-consciously motivated to advance social justice, participatory innovations can sometimes do so indirectly. That is, participatory reforms that are driven by desires to increase the legitimacy or effectiveness of democratic governance can sometimes also increase social justice. 即使參與式創新並非出自於促進社會正義的自覺動機，它有時也能間接地做到這一點。也就是說，旨在提升民主治理的合法性或有效性的參與式改革，有時也能促進社會正義。
The legitimacy deficits of governance institutions, for instance, sometimes stem from problems of exclusion (in that some people are systematically excluded) or lack of deliberation (in that some views or perspectives are systematically excluded or the decisionmaking process is unreasonable). When participatory governance reforms successfully incorporate people or views that were previously excluded, this can increase equality by enabling them to advocate more effectively for goods and services, rights, status, and authority. Although more time must pass before its substantive policy consequences manifest, increased electoral competitiveness from the redistricting reforms of the California Citizens Redistricting Commission may render both political parties more responsive to Californians broadly. That responsiveness, in turn, may generate a more just allocation of the benefits and burdens of public policy. 治理機構的合法性赤字，例如，有時源於排斥問題（即某些人被系統性地排除在外）或缺乏審議（即某些觀點或觀點被系統性地排除在外，或決策過程不合理）。當參與式治理改革成功地納入先前被排除在外的人員或觀點時，這可能會增加平等，因為可以讓他們更有效地倡導商品和服務、權利、地位和權威。雖然在其實質性政策後果顯現之前需要更多時間，但來自加州公民重新劃分選區委員會的重新劃分選區改革增加的選舉競爭可能會使這兩個政黨對加州選民的回應更加積極。這種回應反過來可能會更公正地分配公共政策的利益和負擔。
Innovations that enhance the efficacy of governance can also indirectly advance social justice. When governments-or social partnershipscreate and deliver services such as education, human care, public health, training, security, or environmental protection more effectively, the users of those services benefit. We think of such services as benefiting everyone, or the public generally (hence we call them public services or public goods). In every actual case, however, some benefit more than others. Improving public primary education benefits different groups than higher education advances. When community policing improves public safety, people in high-crime areas benefit more than people who live in communities that were already safe. 創新可以提高治理效能，間接促進社會公正。當政府或社會合作夥伴更有效率地創建和提供教育、人文關懷、公共衛生、培訓、安全或環境保護等服務時，這些服務的使用者將會受益。我們認為這些服務是為所有人或公眾提供的（因此我們稱之為公共服務或公共產品）。然而，在每個實際案例中，有些人比其他人受益更多。改善公共基礎教育的受益群體不同於高等教育的進步。當社區警務改善公共安全時，高犯罪率地區的人比居住在原本就安全的社區的人受益更多。
access of the disadvantaged to decision-making processes or to quality public goods and services. 弱勢社群能夠參與決策過程，以及取得優質公共物品及服務。
Challenges to Participatory Innovation 挑戰參與式創新
Although initiatives in participatory governance have proliferated in many domains in recent years, many challenges to deepening democracy through increased citizen participation remain. Consider briefly three of these. 儘管近年來各領域的參與式治理倡議激增，但透過增加公民參與來深化民主仍面臨許多挑戰。以下簡要概述其中三個挑戰。
The first is leadership. It is almost tautological to observe that every significant participatory innovation has a champion, or set of champions, in government or civil society that has the creativity to adapt some participatory design to particular needs and circumstances, the political savvy to identify and organize allies in this endeavor, and the perseverance to see the enterprise through. 最重要的是領導力。觀察到每個重要的參與式創新都有一位或多位在政府或公民社會中的倡導者幾乎是廢話，這些倡導者擁有創造力，可以根據特定需求和情況調整某些參與式設計，並具有政治頭腦，可以識別並組織盟友參與這項事業，並且有毅力貫徹始終。
Leadership in participatory innovation has been fickle because its sources have been opportunistic and, for the most part, unsystematic. Often, participation projects are born from the coincidental alignment of forces. A community organization might demand greater voice for its members over some local issue when a philanthropy wants to invest in civic engagement and a local politician needs to shore up support in that community. These forces might converge on local school control or participatory budgeting as a public engagement reform that advances each of the different ends. Such alignments form weak foundations on which to sustain or expand participatory governance because motives that generate initial enthusiasm for participation may soon fade or shift toward other objectives. 參與式創新的領導力一直變化無常，因為其來源是機會主義的，而且在很大程度上是無系統的。通常，參與項目源於機遇性的力量一致。當一個慈善機構想要投資公民參與，而當地政治家需要在該社區獲得支持時，社區組織可能會要求其成員在某個地方議題上擁有更大的發言權。這些力量可能會集中在地方學校控制或參與式預算上，作為一種推進不同目標的公共參與改革。這種一致性形成了薄弱的基礎，無法維持或擴大參與式治理，因為推動參與初期熱情的動機可能很快就會消失或轉向其他目標。
What changes would produce more systematic political, civic, and administrative leadership for participatory innovation? At an abstract level, more consistent leadership in this domain requires the creation of more powerful and systematic incentives for organizational leaders to create effective forms of public engagement. Those incentives would most likely come from constituents who demand greater participation in public decision making. The model here is once again Porto Alegre, where for a decade the Workers’ Party deepened its base of electoral support because the participatory budgeting programs they championed were popular among voters. As far as I know, few other political (or civic) leaders have been able to translate their commitment to participatory democracy into a source of political capital rather than a drain on it. 在制度層面上，此領域更一致的領導，需要創造更強大、更系統的誘因，鼓勵組織領導者建立有效的公共参与形式。 這些誘因最有可能來自要求更大參與公共决策的選民。 此處的模範例子再次是阿雷格雷港， 在那裡，工人黨十年以來，加深其選舉基礎的支持是因為他們所倡導的參與式預算計畫廣受歡迎。 就我所知，很少其他政治（或民事）領導人能夠將其對參與式民主承諾转化為政治資本的來源，而非消耗掉它。
A second challenge, related to the first, is the lack of a broad popular articulation and agreement on the role of nonelectoral public participation in contemporary democratic institutions. While there are disagreements on the edges of representative democracy, there is broad understanding and agreement on core institutions and practices such as equal universal suffrage and regular competitive elections. That understanding and agreement allow democratic reform leaders to more easily explain the problems they are addressing ( X is denied the right to vote), coordinate on solutions (restore X’s right to vote), and build popular support for their efforts (when one of us cannot vote, it is an insult to our entire democratic system). 缺乏對非選舉公共參與在當代民主制度中的作用的廣泛普遍的表述和共識，這是一個與第一個相關的第二個挑戰。雖然在代議制民主的边缘存在分歧，但對核心制度和實踐，例如平等的普遍選舉和定期的競爭性選舉，存在廣泛的理解和共識。這種理解和共識使民主改革領導人更容易解釋他們正在解決的問題（X 被剥奪投票權）、協調解決方案（恢復 X 的投票權）以及為他們的努力建立廣泛的公众支持（當我們中的一個人不能投票時，這是一種對我們整個民主制度的侮辱）。
There is not yet any analogous consensus understanding of the proper role or consequences of direct public engagement. Is it a privilege for young people in Boston to help decide what kinds of youth-oriented public projects should be built? Or, conversely, would it be wrong to deny them that influence? Are developers and zoning authorities obligated to consult with nearby residents when planning significant structures, or have the electoral and regulatory processes already fulfilled democratic requirements? Does parental involvement in schools make them more effective or hamper professional educators? The lack of any background agreement, or even common orientation, on even basic questions about public participation makes the job of those who champion participatory innovation much more difficult. Almost every single time, such champions must develop freestanding explanations and justifications anew-explaining to allies, supporters, and opponents alike why increased public engagement might be desirable in itself, might have good consequences, and what it could look like. There would be much more friction and unevenness in elections in the United States if, every two years, supporters of representative democracy had to convince people in every community across the country why voting is desirable and explain how to conduct elections.
A third challenge, related to the prior two, is triviality. Although the number of participatory governance innovations seems to have proliferated in recent years, the reach of many of those innovations is quite limited, even to the point of rendering them trivial. This is the park bench problem. When a city grants residents the power to decide which color that their park benches should be painted, this increases citizen participation, but not in a meaningful way. There are many different ways to restrict participation so that, at the limit, it is trivial: participants exercise little influence over outcomes, the agenda of issues that they consider can be highly constrained, or the resources and authorities invested in a participatory process can be tiny. 第三個與前兩者相關的挑戰是瑣碎性。儘管近年來參與式治理創新的數量似乎有所增加，但其中許多創新的影響範圍非常有限，甚至到了使它們變得微不足道的程度。這就是公園長凳問題。當一個城市賦予居民決定公園長凳要塗成什麼顏色的權力時，這會增加公民參與，但卻不是以有意義的方式。限制參與有很多種不同的方法，以至於在極限情況下，它會變得微不足道：參與者對結果的影響很小，他們可以考慮的問題議程受到高度限制，或者參與式過程中投入的資源和權力可能非常微薄。
Triviality jeopardizes participatory governance in several ways. Most importantly, a trivial form of citizen participation will almost certainly result in widespread disappointment. By definition, a trivial kind of participation cannot advance any of the objectiveslegitimacy, efficacy, or justice-discussed earlier. Participants usually engage in participatory processes to meet needs and desires that they have, and they cannot do so through a trivial process. A secondorder risk is that officials, evaluators, and citizens will mistake the shortcomings of trivial participation for the failures of participation generally. Those in communities with little experience with direct citizen participation-where cases such as Porto Alegre’s participatory budget and the California Citizens Redistricting Commission are exotic-may easily make the mistake of thinking that participation is necessarily trivial because empowered, nontrivial forms of participation exceed the horizons of their political imagination.
Conclusions 結論
The past decade has seen substantial growth not just in the scholarship surrounding participatory governance but also in the practice itself. Increasing citizen participation is sometimes seen as a way to increase the efficacy of regulation, improve the provision of public goods and services, and bolster outcomes in areas such as health and education that straddle the boundaries between public and private, social and individual. If young people continue to demand 過去十年不僅在參與式治理的學術研究方面，也在實踐方面取得了顯著的增長。 提高公民參與度有時被視為提高法規效率、改善公共產品和服務提供，以及促進健康和教育等跨越公共和私人、社會和個人之間界限的領域的成效的一種方式。 如果年輕人繼續要求
greater engagement with the institutions that affect them and digital technologies continue to make information more accessible, we can expect both the demand for avenues of coproduction and the potential of its contributions to increase. 隨著民眾更積極參與影響自身的機構，以及數位科技持續提升資訊的取得便利性，對於共同創作管道之需求，以及其貢獻潛力的預期，皆可望增長。
Citizen participation is also sometimes seen as a solution to a quite different problem: shoring up the democratic legitimacy of governance processes. Representative democratic governance now faces several critical legitimation problems. In the United States especially, the corruption of the political process by financial power is very widely acknowledged as a deep injury to democratic ideals, but widespread despair about the inability to heal this injury is quickly hardening into a broader cynicism about the political system. In other mature representative democracies, where the challenges to its legitimacy are somewhat less acute, the unmistakable symptoms of political malaise manifest themselves as declines in party membership, decreased electoral turnout, and a rise of nontraditional parties and other political formations. Unless and until these party systems develop solutions to reconnect with popular constituencies and properly articulate their interests within the framework of representation, these legitimacy deficits will continue to deepen. Against such a political background, we can expect experiments and innovations such as the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, the California Citizens Redistricting Commission, and the Icelandic Constitutional Council to continue and perhaps proliferate. It is important to note, however, that we do not yet know whether such efforts can indeed help to repair the legitimacy of democratic governance processes. The normative and empirical version of that question-the effect of direct citizen participation through minipublics such as citizens’ assemblies on democratic legitimacy-is one that merits continued attention.
Many participatory democrats hope that participatory governance reforms will also advance social justice. It is here that direct citizen participation faces its greatest challenges. This is not principally a problem of institutional design. There are many designs for citizen participation that would, in many different contexts, result in public decisions and social actions that advantage those who are now socially and economically disadvantaged. Rather, the challenge is political. In most contexts, the organizations and leaders who possess the resources and authority to create significant participatory governance initiatives simply lack the motivation to advance social justice through those projects (in contrast, they are sometimes strongly motivated to enhance governance effectiveness or legitimacy). This pattern is not universal-as the case of the Workers’ Party in Porto Alegre in the 1990s shows. The challenge, then, for those who seek justice through participation is, in the first instance, a political challenge rather than an institutional design problem. They must create the political conditions under which powerful organizations and leaders are motivated to advance social justice. Only then will those leaders be interested in learning whether and how greater citizen participation can increase justice.
Notes 注意
For a restrictive definition of minipublics, see Smith and Ryan (2014). In this article, I use the broader conception outlined in “Recipes for Public Spheres” (Fung 2003). 關於迷你公眾的嚴格定義，請參閱 Smith 和 Ryan (2014)。在本文中，我採用了「公共領域的食譜」中概述的更廣泛的概念（Fung 2003）。
Disclosure: The author of this paper serves on the board of directors of Everyday Democracy. 披露：本文作者在 Everyday Democracy 董事會任職。
This description of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly for Electoral Reform is drawn from Participedia (2010b). 此段文字描述安大略省公民選舉制度大會，摘錄自 Participedia (2010b)。
For a detailed description of the California Citizens Redistricting Commission, see Sonenshein (2013). 對於加州公民重新劃分選區委員會的詳細描述，請參閱 Sonenshein (2013)。
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