with the collaboration of William Antholis 与威廉-安托利斯合作Carol R. Ember 卡罗尔-R-恩伯Melvin Ember 梅尔文-恩伯Zeev Maoz
The Fact of Democratic Peace 民主和平的事实
We have no quarrel with the German people. . . It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was. not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to.be determined upon in the old unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. . . . Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from.the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. 我们与德国人民无冤无仇。.德国政府参战并非出于他们的冲动。他们事先并不知情，也没有批准。这是一场决定进行的战争，就像过去决定进行的战争一样。在过去那个不愉快的年代，统治者根本不征求人民的意见，战争是为了王朝或一小撮野心家的利益而挑起和发动的，这些人习惯于把他们的同胞当作棋子和工具。自治的国家不会在邻国布满间谍，也不会设置阴谋诡计，以造成某种危急态势，使他们有机会发动攻击和征服。. . .......狡猾的欺骗或侵略计划，可能是代代相传的，只有在法庭的私密空间里，或者在狭隘的特权阶层小心翼翼的秘密背后，才能制定出来，并且不被曝光。
-Woodrow Wilson’s war message to Congress, April 2, 1917 1917年4月2日，伍德罗-威尔逊向国会发表的战争文告
The vision of a peace among democratically governed states has long been invoked as part of a larger structure of institutions and practices to promote peace among nation-states. Immanuel Kant (1970) spoke of perpetual peace based partially upon states sharing “republican constitutions.” His meaning was compatible with basic contemporary understandings of democracy. As the elements of such a constitution he identified freedom (with legal equality of subjects), representative government, and separation of powers. The other key elements of his perpetual peace were “cosmopolitan law” embodying ties of international commerce and free trade, and a “pacific union” established by treaty in international law among republics. 长期以来，民主治理国家之间的和平愿景一直被视为促进民族国家之间和平的更大体制和实践结构的一部分。伊曼纽尔-康德（Immanuel Kant，1970 年）曾谈到，永久和平的部分基础是各国共享 "共和宪法"。他的意思与当代对民主的基本理解是一致的。他认为，自由（主体在法律上平等）、代议制政府和三权分立是这种宪法的要素。他提出的永久和平的其他关键要素是体现国际商业和自由贸易联系的 "世界法"，以及各共和国之间通过国际法条约建立的 "和平联盟"。
Woodrow Wilson expressed the same vision for the twentieth century. This normative political basis of Wilson’s vision of world order, evident as early as 1894, grew naturally from his progressive inclinations in domestic politics (Knock 1992, 9ff.); and his Fourteen Points sound almost as though Kant were guiding Wilson’s writing hand. They included Kant’s cosmopolitan law and pacific union. The third point demanded “the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance”; and the fourteenth point called for “a general association of nations . . . formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political dependence and territorial integrity to great and small states 伍德罗-威尔逊对二十世纪表达了同样的愿景。威尔逊对世界秩序的这种规范性政治基础早在 1894 年就已显现，并从他在国内政治中的进步倾向中自然发展而来（Knock 1992, 9ff.）；他的十四点主张听起来几乎像是康德在指导威尔逊的写作。其中包括康德的世界法与和平联盟。第三点要求 "尽可能消除一切经济壁垒，在所有同意和平并为维护和平而结盟的国家之间建立平等的贸易条件"；第十四点呼吁 "各国......根据具体的盟约组成一个普遍的联合体"。......根据具体的盟约组成，目的是相互保证大国和小国的政治依赖性和领土完整"。
alike.” He did not so clearly invoke the need for universal democracy, since at that time not all of America’s war allies were democracies. But the suggestion of this principle is clear enough if one thinks about the domestic political conditions necessary for his first point: “Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings-of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.” Moreover, his 1917 war message openly asserted that “a steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations.”. 一样"。他没有如此明确地援引普遍民主的必要性，因为当时美国的战争盟国并非都是民主国家。但是，如果考虑到他的第一点所需的国内政治条件，这一原则的暗示就足够清晰了："公开的和平盟约，公开达成的和平协定，此后不得有任何私下的国际谅解，但外交应始终坦率地在公众的视野中进行"。此外，他在 1917 年的战争文告中公开宣称，"除非民主国家结成伙伴关系，否则永远无法维持坚定的和平协约"。
The Emergence of Democratic Peace 民主和平的出现
before World War I 第一次世界大战前
The strong norm that democracies should not fight each other seems to have developed only toward the end of the nineteenth century. That time period provides a number of examples in which stable democracies engaged in serious diplomatic disputes that took them to the brink of war, without ever actually going over the edge. In this restraint of action between democracies, and in the subsequent evaluations of the crises by the peoples and elites involved, we can discern some important differences between the expectations and norms operating among democracies and those that became operative when a democracy entered into an adversarial relationship with an authoritarian state. 民主国家不应相互争斗这一强有力的准则似乎是在 19 世纪末才形成的。在这一时期，有许多例子表明，稳定的民主国家之间发生了严重的外交争端，导致它们濒临战争边缘，但却从未真正走到战争的边缘。从民主国家之间的这种行动克制，以及当事国人民和精英随后对危机的评价中，我们可以发现民主国家之间的期望和规范与民主国家与专制国家建立敌对关系时的期望和规范之间存在着一些重要差异。
During the 1890 s Britain was engaged in a dispute with. Venezuela over the boundary between that country and British Guiana. Grover Cleveland, the American president, grew exasperated by British unwillingness to submit the matter to arbitration and, invoking the Monroe Doctrine, threatened war. The British in turn took four months to replyand then rejected the United States’ position. Cleveland sought and obtained a congressional appropriation of funds for a boundary commis-sion-in effect, enforced arbitration by the United States. In subsequent discussion, however, the United States offered to exclude from arbitration areas settled by British subjects for at least two generations, or sixty years. Charles Campbell (1974,185)(1974,185) says this “unexpected reversal virtually ensured an early termination of the controversy.” With it the British in turn backed down, and agreed to arbitration that ultimately decided the issue by a compromise that generally favored Venezuela. In doing so, “Great Britain made almost all the concessions, and all the important ones” (A. E. Campbell 1960, 27); and the United States then pressured the Venezuelans to accept the decision. 1890 年代，英国与委内瑞拉就该国与英属圭亚那之间的边界问题发生了争端。1890 年代，英国与委内瑞拉就该国与英属圭亚那之间的边界问题发生争执。美国总统格罗弗-克利夫兰（Grover Cleveland）因英国不愿将此事提交仲裁而恼羞成怒，并援引门罗主义（Monroe Doctrine）威胁发动战争。英国人花了四个月才做出答复，然后拒绝了美国的立场。克利夫兰寻求并获得了国会对边界委员会的拨款，这实际上是由美国强制仲裁。但在随后的讨论中，美国提出将英国臣民至少两代人或六十年内定居的地区排除在仲裁范围之外。查尔斯-坎贝尔（Charles Campbell） (1974,185)(1974,185) 说，这一 "出乎意料的逆转实际上确保了争议的早日结束"。"因此，英国人反过来退让，同意进行仲裁，最终以普遍有利于委内瑞拉的妥协方式解决了问题。在此过程中，"英国几乎做出了所有的让步，而且是所有重要的让步"（A. E. Campbell 1960, 27）；美国随后向委内瑞拉施压，迫使其接受裁决。
Clearly the British prime minister, Lord Salisbury, misjudged the American government’s determination, and he was not willing to fight a war. Of Cleveland’s intention we cannot be certain, but his actions look 显然，英国首相索尔兹伯里勋爵错误地估计了美国政府的决心，他不愿意打一场战争。我们无法确定克利夫兰的意图，但他的行动看起来
more like that of a poker player who expected his bluff to work, and not to be called. Both sides “blinked” in some degree-especially the British, at a time when their relations with Germany were deteriorating and they did not need another enemy. 这更像是一个扑克玩家，他希望自己的虚张声势能够奏效，而不是被人跟注。双方都在某种程度上 "眨眼 "了，尤其是英国，当时他们与德国的关系正在恶化，不需要另一个敌人。
Although important in preventing an Anglo-American war over this bagatelle, British strategic interests do not deserve all the credit for avoiding war. Stephen Rock, who has examined this and other international relationships during this time, has some illuminating comments on the public and official discourse. Describing the milieu of the Anglo-American relations-both during the crisis and over the next few years as the participants stepped back from the brink and considered what they might have done-he explains that “The reform bills of 1867 and 1884, which extended the franchise in England, had largely dissolved” the American image of England as feudal and aristocratic. “Anglo-Saxonism emerged as a major force” in relations between two nations toward the end of the nineteenth century, and burst forth in the war crisis. Feelings of AngloSaxon kinship contained strong elements of racialism and social Darwinism, but they held a serious political component as well. Richard Olney, Cleveland’s secretary of state during the Venezuelan crisis, declared in 1896, “If there is anything they [Americans] are attached to, it is to ideals and principles which are distinctly English in their origin and development. . . . Nothing would more gratify the mass of the American people than to stand . . . shoulder to shoulder with England” (all from Rock 1989, 49-56). Consider how different these sentiments were from what Americans were saying about Spain in 1898. 尽管英国的战略利益在防止英美因这一事件爆发战争方面发挥了重要作用，但这并不是避免战争的全部功劳。斯蒂芬-罗克（Stephen Rock）对这一时期的国际关系和其他国际关系进行了研究，他对公众和官方言论发表了一些富有启发性的评论。他描述了英美关系的环境--无论是在危机期间，还是在接下来的几年里，当参与方从边缘后退并思考他们本可以做些什么时--他解释说，"1867 年和 1884 年的改革法案扩大了英国的选举权，在很大程度上消解了 "美国人眼中英国封建贵族的形象。19 世纪末，"盎格鲁-撒克逊主义作为一股主要力量 "出现在两国关系中，并在战争危机中爆发。盎格鲁-撒克逊人的亲缘关系包含着强烈的种族主义和社会达尔文主义因素，但同时也蕴含着严重的政治因素。在委内瑞拉危机期间，克利夫兰的国务卿理查德-奥尔尼（Richard Olney）在 1896 年宣称："如果说他们（美国人）有什么眷恋的话，那就是眷恋在起源和发展过程中明显带有英国色彩的理想和原则。. . .没有什么比与英国并肩站在一起......更能让广大美国人民感到欣慰了"（均摘自 Rock 1989, 49-56）。想想这些观点与 1898 年美国人对西班牙的看法有多大不同。
From the other side, British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain had already praised the “common laws and common standards of right and wrong” of the two countries. Later he declared that Americans’ “laws, their literature, their standpoint on every question are the same as ours; their feeling, their interest, in the cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world, are identical with ours.” Arthur Balfour claimed that America’s “laws, its language, its literature, and its religion, to say nothing of its constitution are essentially the same as those of En-glish-speaking peoples elsewhere, [and] ought surely to produce a fundamental harmony-a permanent sympathy.” According to Rock, this feeling of homogeneity of societal attributes 另一方面，英国殖民大臣约瑟夫-张伯伦已经赞扬了两国的 "共同法律和共同的是非标准"。后来他又宣称，美国人的 "法律、文学、对每个问题的立场都与我们相同；他们对人类事业和世界和平发展的感情和兴趣与我们相同"。阿瑟-贝尔福声称，美国的 "法律、语言、文学和宗教，更不用说它的宪法，在本质上与其他地方讲英语的民族是一样的，[而且]肯定会产生一种基本的和谐--永久的共鸣"。洛克认为，这种社会属性同质性的感觉
lay behind the initial outpouring of pacifist sentiment during the Venezuelan boundary controversy and was a central element in popular and official desires for the settlement of that and other issues. . . . First, it colored the perceptions of both Englishmen and Americans, causing them to underestimate the importance of the conflict of geopolitical and economic interests between the two countries and to discount the significance of the concessions necessary to ............在委内瑞拉边界争端期间，和平主义情绪的最初爆发是由它所引发的，它也是民众和官方希望解决这一问题和其他问题的核心因素。. . .首先，这种情绪影响了英国人和美国人的看法，使他们低估了两国之间地缘政治和经济利益冲突的重要性，并低估了为实现以下目标而做出必要让步的重要性：.................
achieve an understanding. Second, it led many persons to conclude that the benefits of avoiding a fratricidal war with “racial” kin outweighed the costs of the sacrifices required for this to be accomplished. (All from Roc̣k 1989, 4956) 其次，它使许多人得出结论，认为避免与 "种族 "亲属发生自相残杀的战争所带来的好处超过了为实现这一目标所需的牺牲。其次，它使许多人得出结论，认为避免与 "种族 "亲属发生自相残杀的战争所带来的好处大于为此所需的牺牲。(均摘自 Roc̣k 1989, 4956）
In effect, an Anglo-American security community was becoming established; “the last serious threat of war between the two powers passed” (Russett 1963, 5). Allen (1955,540)(1955,540) concludes that “the British public never looked like accepting war, the American public after the first fine careless rapture drew back from the prospect of making it.” In the Span-ish-American war shortly thereafter, British sympathies were overwhelmingly with the United States (C. S. Campbell 1957, chap. 2). 实际上，英美安全共同体正在建立；"两个大国之间最后一次严重的战争威胁已经过去"（Russett，1963 年，5）。艾伦 (1955,540)(1955,540) 总结道："英国公众看起来从未接受过战争，而美国公众在第一次漫不经心的狂喜之后，对发动战争的前景望而却步"。"在此后不久的西班牙-美国战争中，英国人绝大多数同情美国（C. S. Campbell 1957 年，第 2 章）。
Meanwhile and subsequently, British and then American relations with Germany deteriorated, and ended ultimately in war. Kennedy (1980, esp. 399) contrasts Britain’s attitudes toward Germany with its new “special relationship” with the United States. Rock (1989; 56) declares, “These effects were devastatingly absent-or reversed-in the Anglo-German and German-American cases.” 与此同时，英国和美国与德国的关系也随之恶化，并最终以战争告终。Kennedy (1980, esp. 399) 将英国对德国的态度与其与美国的新 "特殊关系 "进行了对比。Rock（1989；56）宣称："在英德和德美关系中，这些影响完全不存在，或者相反。
While turn-of-the-century Britain was an industrial-capitalist, liberal, parliamentary democracy, imperial Germany was an autocratic, bureaucratic, authoritarian state. . . These differences were appreciated, and even exaggerated, on both sides of the North Sea, and they colored the attitudes and perceptions of important segments of popular opinion as well as governmental leaders themselves. Englishmen, who could agree on practically nothing else, were in fact almost unanimous in their distate for the German political system, its ideology, and its methods. . . . Both of these nations [Germany and the United States] were rising imperial powers with growing navies. Both threatened British interests in various regions of the globe. Yet Britons, while they detested and feared Germany, almost universally admired the United States and felt minimal apprehension at her ambitions. Part of this was geographic. . . . But a large portion was ideological and cultural as well. Imbued as they were with a sense of Anglo-Saxon solidarity, the vast majority of Englishmen simply did not believe that Americans could wish or do them serious harm." (Rock 1989, 86-87) 世纪之交的英国是一个工业资本主义、自由主义、议会民主制的国家，而帝国时期的德国则是一个专制、官僚、独裁的国家。. ..这些差异在北海两岸都得到了重视，甚至被夸大，它们影响了重要的大众舆论以及政府领导人本身的态度和观念。英国人在其他方面几乎无法达成一致，但事实上，他们对德国的政治体制、意识形态及其方法的厌恶几乎是一致的。. . ..这两个国家（德国和美国）都是崛起中的帝国强国，海军不断壮大。两者都威胁着英国在全球各个地区的利益。然而，英国人在憎恨和惧怕德国的同时，几乎普遍钦佩美国，对其野心的担忧微乎其微。部分原因是地理因素。. . ..但也有很大一部分是意识形态和文化方面的原因。绝大多数英国人都有一种盎格鲁-撒克逊人的团结意识，他们根本不相信美国人会希望或严重伤害他们"（Rock 1989, 86-87）。(洛克，1989 年，第 86-87 页）
The Fashoda crisis of 1898, however, which pitted Britain against France, poses a harder case. British and French interests had been advancing toward the Sudan, with Britain increasingly determined to control the area as protection for its major stake in Egypt. But French forces occupied the small fortress of Fashoda before the British could get there. When a much larger British force arrived, government leaders had to decide what to do. The French were in no position to fight. Their forces at Fashoda were far weaker, they had their hands full on the Continent with Ger- 然而，1898 年的法绍达（Fashoda）危机使英国与法国对立，提出了一个更加困难的问题。英国和法国的利益一直在向苏丹推进，英国越来越决心控制该地区，以保护其在埃及的主要利益。但是，法国军队在英国人到达之前就占领了法绍达这个小要塞。当更大规模的英国军队抵达时，政府领导人不得不决定该怎么办。法国人没有能力作战。他们在法绍达的兵力要弱得多，而且他们在欧洲大陆与德国、法国和英国的战争也让他们手忙脚乱。
many, and Britain held unquestioned naval superiority. The premier, Théophile Delcassé, admitted that “the problem is how to combine the demands of honor with the necessity of avoiding a naval war which we are absolutely incapable of carrying through” (quoted in Sanderson 1965, 359). Thus he offered compromise in several forms, ultimately offering to quit the area in return for commercial concessions. The British, however, would have none of it. They refused to negotiate so long as French forces were in the area, and the British prime minister, Lord Salisbury, seemed ready to go to war if the French would not concede totally. Ultimately they did. 英国的海军优势毋庸置疑。总理泰奥菲尔-德尔卡塞（Théophile Delcassé）承认，"问题在于如何将荣誉要求与避免一场我们绝对无法完成的海战的必要性结合起来"（引自桑德森，1965 年，359 页）。因此，他提出了多种形式的妥协方案，最终提出退出该地区以换取商业特许权。然而，英国人不同意。只要法国军队还驻扎在该地区，他们就拒绝谈判，英国首相索尔兹伯里勋爵似乎已经做好准备，如果法国人不完全让步，他们就会发动战争。最终，法国人让步了。
The most recent scholarly work on the crisis (Bates 1984, 153) concludes that “there is really no evidence in the archives in London and Paris that either government seriously considered going to war over Fashoda.” The French gave in because of their military weakness and the need to avoid isolation in their far graver quarrel with Germany. In addition, their hand was weakened by governmental instability resulting from the Dreyfus affair (Albrecht-Carrié 1970). Salisbury wanted good relations with France to counter the growing threat he felt from Germany, and generally preferred diplomacy to force. In this crisis Salisbury was the poker player. He had to play a “two-level game” (Putnam 1988) with imperialist hawks in domestic politics as well as with the French. While he might have been willing to fight if he had to, he did not want war and knew how weak the French really were. 关于这场危机的最新学术著作（贝茨，1984 年，153 页）得出结论："在伦敦和巴黎的档案中，确实没有证据表明任何一方政府认真考虑过为法绍达开战"。法国屈服的原因是其军事力量薄弱，以及需要避免在与德国的更严重争执中被孤立。此外，德雷福斯事件导致的政府不稳定也削弱了法国的力量（Albrecht-Carrié，1970 年）。索尔兹伯里希望与法国保持良好关系，以应对他所感受到的来自德国的日益增长的威胁，他一般倾向于外交而非武力。在这场危机中，索尔兹伯里是扑克牌玩家。他必须与国内政治中的帝国主义鹰派以及法国人玩一场 "两级游戏"（Putnam，1988 年）。虽然如果有必要，他可能愿意参战，但他并不想开战，而且他知道法国人到底有多虚弱。
Considerations of any norm that these two nations should not fight each other were well in the background on both sides; war was avoided primarily for other reasons. Nevertheless, sober reflection on the crisis brought the norms forward: “Both Britain and France possessed a commitment to liberalism and representative government and were opposed to autocracy and absolutism. During the period of reconciliation, numerous references were made to this effect, and to the role of this similarity in drawing the two countries together.” A Liberal party leader, H. C. G. Matthew, said: “Most Liberals regarded the Entente with France as the natural result of common democratic impulses.” Though they played little role in settling the crisis itself, these feelings were catalyzed by Fashoda and fed directly into the emerging Anglo-French entente (Rock 1989, 117-18). 双方都没有考虑过这两个国家不应该互相争斗的准则；避免战争主要是出于其他原因。尽管如此，对危机的冷静思考还是将准则向前推进了一步："英法两国都信奉自由主义和代议制，反对专制和专制主义。在和解期间，人们多次提到这一点，以及这种相似性在将两国联系在一起方面所起的作用"。自由党领袖马修（H. C. G. Matthew）说："大多数自由党人认为与法国的协约是共同民主冲动的自然结果"。虽然他们在解决危机本身并没有发挥什么作用，但这些情绪受到了法绍达的催化，并直接作用于正在形成的英法协约（Rock 1989, 117-18）。
Thus the feeling of common liberal and democratic values played its part in moderating power conflicts between the United States and Britain, and Britain and France. Between the United States and Germany, on the other hand, the feelings were very different. The German and American political-economic systems involved “two essentially different conceptions of the state: that of the economically liberal laissez-faire state, in which one from the German side saw only disorder, egoism, and corrup- 因此，共同的自由和民主价值观在缓和美国与英国、英国与法国之间的权力冲突方面发挥了作用。另一方面，美国和德国之间的感受却截然不同。德国和美国的政治经济制度涉及 "两种本质上不同的国家概念：一种是经济上自由放任的国家，在德国人看来，这种国家只有混乱、利己主义和腐败；另一种是经济上自由民主的国家，在美国人看来，这种国家只有混乱、利己主义和腐败。
tion, and the half-absolutist, neofeudalistic, bureaucratic state, which in American eyes destroyed the freedom of the individual and lacked democratic legitimation through the ‘voice of the people’” (Christof 1975, quoted in Rock 1989, 141). For Americans; an earlier vision of Germany. became “replaced by the picture of an increasingly repressive, militaristic, authoritarian, and autocratic society” (Rock 1989, 143). Such views were strengthened by the subsequent German war with Britain. Relationships based on type of political system reinforced strategic considerations. The ground was prepared for Wilson’s yision of a world that could be at peace if and only if it were democratic. 在美国人眼中，德国破坏了个人自由，缺乏通过'人民的声音'实现的民主合法性"（克里斯托夫，1975 年，转引自洛克，1989 年，141 页）。对美国人来说，早先对德国的看法 "被一个日益压抑、军国主义、独裁和专制的社会所取代"（Rock 1989, 143）。随后德国与英国的战争强化了这种看法。基于政治制度类型的关系强化了战略考虑。威尔逊关于世界只有民主才能和平的设想已经准备就绪。
The Spread of Democratic Peace 民主和平的传播
At the time of Kant, and even of Wilson, the hope for a world of democratic nation states was merely that: a hope, a theory perhaps, but without much empirical referent. Certainly in Kant’s time, Europe was hardly an area in which republics flourished. By the time of Wilson’s Fourteen Points there were more, in the New World as well as the Old, but the dozen or so democracies of that time still were substantially in a minority. 在康德时代，甚至在威尔逊时代，对民主民族国家世界的希望仅仅是：一种希望，也许是一种理论，但没有太多的经验参照。当然，在康德的时代，欧洲并不是一个共和政体蓬勃发展的地区。到威尔逊提出 "十四点建议 "的时候，新世界和旧世界都有了更多的民主国家，但当时的十几个民主国家在很大程度上仍然是少数。
Wilsonian “idealism” was widely regarded as discredited by the outbreak of World War II. True, the principles of collective security, as embodied in the League of Nations, failed to contain aggression by the Axis powers. In that sense, the element of international law in the Kantian and Wilsonian vision failed. But the elements of trade and democracy were never given a fair chance. International trade was damaged first by the imposition of war reparations on defeated Germany–with some of the effects forecast by Keynes (1919)-and then by the round of “beggar my neighbor” trade restraints imposed with the collapse of the world economy in the Great Depression (Kindleberger 1973). Not coincidentally, democracy also was lost in many countries; first in Russia, then Italy, Germany, Central Europe, Japan, and elsewhere. Thus the Kantian prescription once again had little basis on which to work. 第二次世界大战爆发后，人们普遍认为威尔逊的 "理想主义 "已经丧失了信誉。诚然，国际联盟所体现的集体安全原则未能遏制轴心国的侵略。从这个意义上说，康德和威尔逊理念中的国际法要素失败了。但是，贸易和民主要素却从未获得公平的机会。国际贸易首先受到了对战败国德国的战争赔款的损害--凯恩斯（1919 年）预测了其中的一些影响--然后又受到了随着大萧条时期世界经济的崩溃而实施的一轮 "以邻为壑 "的贸易限制（金德尔伯格，1973 年）。无独有偶，许多国家也失去了民主；首先是俄罗斯，然后是意大利、德国、中欧、日本和其他国家。因此，康德的处方再次失去了发挥作用的基础。
Largely unnoticed, however, was the empirical fact that democracies had rarely if ever gone to war with each other during this period. Since there were few democracies, often at a distance from each other, it is hardly surprising that their failure to fight each other was little noticed. States need both an opportunity and a willingness (Most and Starr 1989) to go to war with each other. Noncontiguous democracies, unless one or both were great powers, had little opportunity to fight each other. States cannot fight unless they can exert substantial military power against each others’ vital territory. Most states, if not great powers with “global reach” (large navies in this era; Modelski and Thompson 1988) could exert such power only against contiguous states or at least near neigh- 然而，民主国家之间在此期间很少发生战争这一经验事实却几乎没有引起人们的注意。由于民主国家很少，而且往往彼此相距甚远，因此它们之间没有发生战争也就不足为奇了。国家之间的战争既需要机会，也需要意愿（Most 和 Starr，1989 年）。非毗连的民主国家，除非其中一个或两个都是大国，否则几乎没有机会相互交战。除非能够对对方的重要领土施加强大的军事力量，否则国家之间不会发生战争。大多数国家，即使不是拥有 "全球影响力 "的大国（在这个时代拥有庞大的海军；莫德尔斯基和汤普森，1988 年），也只能对毗连的国家或至少是近邻国家施加这种力量。
bors. Furthermore, the willingness of states to fight depends in large part on issues over which they have conflicts of interest. Territorial disputes (over borders, or rights of ethnic groups whose presence is common to both) are rare in the absence of proximity (Diehl and Goertz 1992). Since relatively few of the democracies bordered each other in the 1920s and 1930s, it is not surprising that they generally avoided war with each other. Thus the empirical fact of little or no war between democracies up to this time could be obscured by the predominance of authoritarian states in the international system, and the frequent wars involving one or more such authoritarian states. One could still see the international system as not only anarchic, but in principle threatening the “war of all against all.” 这也是各国的共同利益。此外，国家是否愿意打仗在很大程度上取决于它们在哪些问题上存在利益冲突。在不毗邻的情况下，领土争端（关于边界或双方共同存在的族群的权利）很少发生（Diehl 和 Goertz，1992 年）。由于 20 世纪二三十年代相互毗邻的民主国家相对较少，因此它们一般都避免了相互间的战争，这并不奇怪。因此，在此之前民主国家之间很少或没有战争这一经验事实可能会被国际体系中专制国家的主导地位以及涉及一个或多个此类专制国家的频繁战争所掩盖。人们仍然可以认为，国际体系不仅是无政府的，而且在原则上威胁着 "所有人反对所有人的战争"。
Following World War II the situation changed, again, ironically, with a vision of war prevention geared primarily to the last war. The postWorld War II era began with the founding of the United Nations, dedi-cated-as was the League-to the general principle of collective security as carried out by Franklin Roosevelt’s “four (ultimately five) policemen” with the power of permanent representatives on the Security Council. But with the Cold War and Soviet-American deadlock in the Security Council arising almost immediately, attention shifted to the more traditional means of collective security through alliance. Despite rhetorical statements like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the fact that most-but not all-members of the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization were democracies, democracy was seen more as a binding principle of the Cold War coalition against communism than as a force actively promoting peace among democracies themselves. Moreover, many members of the wider Western alliance system (in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia) certainly were not democratic. 第二次世界大战后，情况又发生了变化，具有讽刺意味的是，预防战争的愿景主要是针对最后一场战争的。二战后的时代以联合国的成立拉开序幕，联合国与国际联盟一样，都是根据富兰克林-罗斯福提出的 "四个（最终是五个）警察 "的集体安全总原则建立的，在安理会拥有常任代表的权力。但随着冷战和苏美在安理会的僵局几乎立即出现，人们的注意力转移到了通过联盟实现集体安全这一更为传统的手段上。尽管有《世界人权宣言》等言辞激烈的声明，而且新成立的北大西洋公约组织的大多数--但不是全部--成员都是民主国家，但民主更多地被视为冷战反共联盟的约束性原则，而不是积极促进民主国家之间和平的力量。此外，更广泛的西方联盟体系（在拉丁美洲、中东和亚洲）中的许多成员当然也不是民主国家。
But by the 1970s, with the increasing numbers of democracies in the international system, the empirical fact of peace among democracies became harder to ignore. There were at one time by various counts thirtyfive or so democratic states, and more of them were proximate to one another. Still there was little war, or even serious threats of war, to be found in relationships among those democracies. And more clearly than before, the phenomenon of democratic peace extended beyond the North Atlantic area, and beyond merely the rich industrialized countries belonging to the OECD. The phenomenon began then to be more widely recognized, and by the end of the 1980s it had been widely accepted in the international relations literature, though not so easily explained. This research result is extremely robust, in that by various criteria of war and militarized diplomatic disputes, and various measures of democracy, the relative rarity of violent conflict between democracies still holds up. ^(1)By{ }^{1} \mathrm{By} early 1992 it even had passed into popular political rhetoric, with the international zone of “democratic peace” invoked in speeches by then 但到了 20 世纪 70 年代，随着国际体系中民主国家的数量不断增加，民主国家之间的和平这一经验事实变得更加难以忽视。据统计，民主国家一度达到 35 个左右，其中更多的国家彼此相邻。但在这些民主国家之间的关系中，几乎没有战争，甚至没有严重的战争威胁。与以往相比，民主和平的现象更加明显地超越了北大西洋地区，也超越了属于经合组织的富裕工业化国家。从那时起，这一现象开始得到更广泛的认可，到 20 世纪 80 年代末，它已被国际关系文献广泛接受，尽管解释起来并不那么容易。这一研究成果极其稳健，因为按照战争和军事化外交争端的各种标准，以及民主的各种衡量标准，民主国家之间暴力冲突相对罕见的现象仍然成立。 ^(1)By{ }^{1} \mathrm{By} 1992年初，它甚至成为了流行的政治辞令，在当时的演讲中，"民主和平 "的国际区域被引用。
Secretary of State James Baker and President George Bush, and by Bill Clinton during his presidential campaign. ^(2){ }^{2} 国务卿詹姆斯-贝克和乔治-布什总统，以及比尔-克林顿在竞选总统期间。 ^(2){ }^{2}
Wide recognition is not, however, synonymous with universal acceptance. It became confused with a claim that democracies are in.general, in dealing with all kinds of states, more peaceful than are authoritarian or other nondemocratically constituted states. This is a much more controversial proposition than “merely” that democracies are peaceful in their dealings with each other, and one for which there is little systematic evidence. ^(3){ }^{3} Especially in the Vietnam era of U.S. “imperial overreach,” it was a politically charged and widely disbelieved proposition. In that light, both academic observers and policymakers refused to accept even the statement that democracies are peaceful toward each other as a meaningful empirical generalization without some kind of theoretical explanation indicating that it was not merely a coincidence or accident. 然而，广泛承认并不等同于普遍接受。它与这样一种说法相混淆，即民主国家在与各种国家打交道时，总体上比专制国家或其他非民主国家更和平。与 "仅仅 "认为民主国家在相互交往中是和平的相比，这是一个更具争议性的命题，而且几乎没有系统的证据可以证明这一点。 ^(3){ }^{3} 尤其是在美国 "帝国主义过度扩张 "的越南时代，这是一个充满政治色彩、广受质疑的命题。有鉴于此，无论是学术观察家还是政策制定者，如果没有某种理论解释来说明民主国家之间的和平相处不仅仅是巧合或意外，那么他们甚至会拒绝接受民主国家之间和平相处这一有意义的经验概括。
Furthermore, some variants of the proposition took the form of statements like “democracies never go to war with each other,” or even “democracies never fight each other.” The latter statement, applied to relatively low-level lethal violence, is demonstrably wrong as a law-like “never” statement even for the modern international system. The former, limiting the statement to the large-scale and typically sustained form of organized international violence commonly designated às war, nonetheless tempts the historically minded reader to come up with counterexamples. And, especially with the key terms still largely undefined, it is not hard to identify candidate counterexamples. 此外，该命题的一些变体还表现为 "民主国家从不相互开战"，甚至 "民主国家从不相互争斗"。后一种说法适用于相对低级的致命暴力，即使对于现代国际体系而言，作为一种类似于法律的 "从不 "说法也是明显错误的。而前者则仅限于通常被称为战争的大规模、典型的持续性有组织国际暴力形式，但却诱使具有历史思维的读者提出反例。而且，特别是在关键术语在很大程度上仍未定义的情况下，找出候选反例并不难。
Democracy, War, and Other Ambiguous Terms 民主、战争和其他模棱两可的术语
This book will establish the following: First, democratically organized political systems in general operate under restraints that make them more peaceful in their relations with other democracies. Democracies are not necessarily peaceful, however, in their relations with other kinds of political systems. Second, in the modern international system, democracies are less likely to use lethal violence toward other democracies than toward autocratically governed states or than autocratically governed states are toward each other. Furthermore, there are no clearcut cases of sovereign stable democracies waging war with each other in the modern international system. Third, the relationship of relative peace among democracies is importantly a result of some features of democracy, rather than being caused exclusively by economic or geopolitical characteristics correlated with democracy. Exactly what those features are is a matter of theoretical debate, which we shall explore. 本书将阐明以下几点：首先，民主组织的政治体制一般都会受到约束，这使它们在与其他民主政体的关系中更加和平。然而，民主政体在与其他政治体制的关系中并不一定是和平的。其次，在现代国际体系中，民主政体对其他民主政体使用致命暴力的可能性低于对专制政体使用致命暴力的可能性，也低于专制政体之间使用致命暴力的可能性。此外，在现代国际体系中，没有主权稳定的民主国家之间相互发动战争的明显案例。第三，民主国家之间的相对和平关系主要是由民主的某些特征造成的，而不完全是由与民主相关的经济或地缘政治特征造成的。这些特征究竟是什么，是一个理论争论的问题，我们将对此进行探讨。
At the risk of boring the reader, further discussión requires some conceptual precision. Without it everyone can-and often does-endlessly debate counter-examples while by-passing the phenomenon itself. We 冒着让读者厌烦的风险，进一步的讨论需要一些精确的概念。没有精确的概念，每个人都可以--而且常常是--无休止地辩论反例，而绕过现象本身。我们
need to define what we mean by democracy and war, so as to be able to say just how rare an occasion it is for two democracies to go to war with each other. When we do so it will be evident that those occasions virtually never arise. We then shall spend the rest of the book trying to understand the reasons for that rarity, and its implications for international politics in the post-cold war era. 我们需要界定民主和战争的含义，以便能够说明两个民主国家之间发生战争的情况是多么罕见。当我们这样做时，就会发现这种情况几乎从未出现过。然后，我们将用本书的其余部分来理解这种罕见情况的原因及其对后冷战时代国际政治的影响。
Interstate war. War here means large-scale institutionally organized lethal violence, and to define “large-scale” we shall use the threshold commonly used in the social scientific literature on war: one thousand battle fatalities (Small and Singer 1982). The figure of one thousand deaths is arbitrary but reasonable. It is meant to eliminate from the category of wars those violent events that might plausibly be ascribed to: 国家间战争。这里的战争指的是大规模的、由机构组织的致命暴力，为了定义 "大规模"，我们将使用有关战争的社会科学文献中通常使用的临界值：一千次战斗死亡（Small 和 Singer，1982 年）。一千人死亡的数字是任意的，但也是合理的。它旨在从战争类别中剔除那些可能被合理地归因于以下方面的暴力事件：
“Accident” (e.g., planes that may have strayed across a national boundary by mistake, and been downed). "意外"（例如，飞机可能误越过国界而被击落）。
Deliberate actions by local commanders, but not properly authorized by central authorities, as in many border incidents. 地方指挥官的蓄意行动，但未得到中央当局的适当授权，如在许多边境事件中。
Limited, local authorized military actions not necessarily intended to progress to large-scale violent conflict but undertaken more as bargaining moves in a crisis, such as military probes intended to demonstrate one’s own commitment and to test the resolve of the adversary. 有限的、地方授权的军事行动，其目的不一定是发展成大规模暴力冲突，而更多的是作为危机中的讨价还价之举，如军事试探，旨在表明自己的承诺，并试探对手的决心。
Deliberate military actions larger than mere probes, but not substantially resisted by a usually much weaker adversary. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which was met with substantial nonviolent resistance but not force of arms and resulted in less than a score of immediate deaths, is such an example, and contrasts with the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 which produced roughly seventeen thousand Hungarian and Soviet dead. 蓄意的军事行动，其规模大于单纯的试探，但并未遭到通常弱小得多的对手的实质性抵抗。1968 年苏联入侵捷克斯洛伐克就是这样一个例子，当时捷克斯洛伐克遭到了大量非暴力抵抗，但并没有动用武力，直接死亡人数不到几十人，这与 1956 年苏联入侵匈牙利形成了鲜明对比，后者造成了大约 1.7 万名匈牙利人和苏联人死亡。
A threshold of one thousand battle deaths rather neatly cuts off the above kinds of events while leaving largely intact the category of most conflicts that intuitively satisfy the commonsense meaning of war. (Not, of course such rhetorical examples as the “war on poverty” or “war on drugs,” or for that matter the boat seizures and very limited exchange of gunfire [no casualties or intent to inflict casualties (see Habeeb 1988, chap. 6)] between Britain and Iceland in the 1975 “Cod War” over fishing rights.) It is also convenient that the one thousand-battle-death threshold provides a neat empirical break, with few conflicts between nation states very near it on either side. The most questionable case is probably that between Britain and the Argentine military dictatorship in 1982, over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The battle-death count is customarily given as about 950 , or just below our numerical threshold. But not to count it would be splitting hairs. It was deliberate, authorized, 以一千人战死为阈值，可以很好地切断上述各类事件的联系，同时在很大程度上保留了直观上符合战争常识含义的大多数冲突类别。(当然，不包括 "反贫困战争 "或 "反毒品战争 "等言辞激烈的例子，也不包括 1975 年英国与冰岛为争夺捕鱼权而爆发的 "鳕鱼战争 "中扣押船只和非常有限的交火[没有人员伤亡，也没有造成人员伤亡的意图（见 Habeeb 1988，第 6 章）]）。同样方便的是，一千次战斗死亡的临界值提供了一个整齐的经验断点，民族国家之间的冲突很少有任何一方非常接近这个临界值。最令人质疑的可能是 1982 年英国与阿根廷军事独裁政权之间关于福克兰群岛/马尔维纳斯群岛的冲突。按照惯例，战死人数约为 950 人，略低于我们的数字门槛。但是，如果不计算，那就太小题大做了。这是蓄意的，是经过授权的、
and involved some fierce land, naval, and air engagements and two invasions (first by Argentina, and then when the British returned to expel the Argentine invaders). It should count as a war, without apology. 它涉及一些激烈的陆海空交战和两次入侵（第一次是阿根廷入侵，第二次是英国人回国驱逐阿根廷入侵者）。毫无疑问，这应该算作一场战争。
The U.K.-Argentine war was unusual in that it inflicted very few civilian casualties. Most wars are not so limited, with civilian deaths frequently far outnumbering those of combatants. Deaths from hunger and disease may also far outnumber battle-inflicted casualties, as surely happened in many nineteenth-century wars and may well have been the case with the Iraqis after Operation Desert Storm. But the number of such deaths may be difficult or impossible to estimate reliably and may be as much a consequence of inadequate medical and public-health capabilities as of military actions. Without minimizing the human consequences of such civilian deaths, it is simply less ambiguous to limit the definition to battle deaths. Similarly, the definition omits wounded and military personnel missing in action, figures commonly included in “casualty” totals but of lower reliability. 英国与阿根廷的战争不同寻常，因为它造成的平民伤亡极少。大多数战争的平民伤亡人数并不那么有限，平民的死亡人数往往远远超过战斗人员的死亡人数。饥饿和疾病造成的死亡人数也可能远远超过战斗造成的伤亡人数，十九世纪的许多战争肯定是这样，"沙漠风暴 "行动后的伊拉克人也很可能是这样。但这种死亡人数可能难以或无法可靠估计，而且可能既是医疗和公共卫生能力不足的后果，也是军事行动的后果。在不贬低此类平民死亡对人类造成的后果的前提下，将定义局限于战死人数只是为了减少模糊性。同样，该定义也忽略了受伤人员和在行动中失踪的军事人员，这些数字通常包括在 "伤亡 "总数中，但可靠性较低。
A related problem is that of deciding which political units are to be listed as fighting in a war. Sometimes in coalition warfare most or all of the deaths in a particular coalition will be borne by one or a few members with other members formally but not practically engaged in combat. For the latter, especially in circumstances where a nominal combatant suffers few or no identifiable deaths, it seems forced to include it among war participants. Small and Singer (1982, chap. 4) use a criterion requiring a state either to commit at least one thousand troops to battle, or to suffer at least one hundred battle fatalities, in order to count as a participant. 一个相关的问题是决定哪些政治单位应被列为参战单位。有时，在联军作战中，一个特定联军的大部分或全部死亡将由一个或少数几个成员承担，而其他成员正式但实际上并未参战。对于后者，特别是在名义上的参战人员死亡很少或没有可识别死亡的情况下，似乎不得不将其列入参战人员。斯莫尔和辛格（Small and Singer，1982 年，第 4 章）使用的标准是，一个国家要想成为参战国，就必须投入至少一千人的军队参战，或者至少有一百人在战斗中死亡。
This definition also excludes, on theoretical grounds, covert actions in which one government secretly undertakes activities, including the use of lethal violence and the support of violent actors within the other government’s territory, either to coerce or to overthrow that government. Such activities may not involve deaths on the scale of “wars,” and when they do the foreign intervention is by its very covert nature hard to document (though one can often, if perhaps belatedly, discover the metaphoric “smoking gun”). But these activities, precisely because they are denied at the time by the government that undertakes them, imply very different political processes than does a war publicly and officially undertaken. Because they may be undertaken under circumstances when overt war is not acceptable they will, however, receive attention at a later point in the book. 从理论上讲，这一定义也排除了秘密行动，即一国政府在另一国政府境内秘密开展活动，包括使用致命暴力和支持暴力参与者，以胁迫或推翻该政府。这些活动可能不会造成像 "战争 "那样大规模的人员伤亡，即使造成了人员伤亡，由于其隐蔽性，外国干预也很难被记录在案（尽管人们经常会发现隐喻的 "烟枪"，但也许是姗姗来迟）。但是，正是因为这些活动在当时被实施这些活动的政府所否认，所以它们所蕴含的政治过程与公开和正式进行的战争截然不同。不过，由于这些活动可能是在公开战争不被接受的情况下进行的，因此它们将在本书的后面部分受到关注。
For purposes of theoretical precision in argument yet another qualifcation is required, and that is a definition of “interstate” war. Here that term means war between sovereign “states” internationally recognized as such by other states, including by major powers whose recognition of a government typically confers de facto statehood. Some such definition 为了在理论上精确论证，还需要另一个限定条件，那就是 "国家间 "战争的定义。在这里，"国家间 "战争指的是其他国家，包括大国，在国际上承认的主权 "国家 "之间的战争。这样的定义有
focusing on organized independent states is common in the social science literature, and is important for the analysis of this book. It is meant to exclude those “colonial” wars fought for the acquisition of territory inhabited by “primitive” people without recognized states, as practiced by nineteenth-century imperialism, or for the twentieth-century liberation of those people. War it may certainly be, but interstate it is not unless or until both sides are generally recognized as having the attributes of statehood. Applying this definition may well display a Western cultural bias, but it is appropriate to the behavior of states which, in the period, also are defined as “democratic” by the admittedly Western standards spelled out below. Nonstate participants would not meet those standards. 将重点放在有组织的独立国家上，这在社会科学文献中很常见，对本书的分析也很重要。它不包括 19 世纪帝国主义为获取没有公认国家的 "原始人 "居住的领土而进行的 "殖民 "战争，也不包括 20 世纪为解放这些人而进行的战争。战争当然是战争，但国家间战争不是国家间战争，除非或直到双方被普遍承认具有国家属性。应用这一定义很可能会显示出西方文化的偏见，但它适用于国家的行为，在此期间，这些国家也被定义为 "民主 "国家，其标准是下文所阐述的公认的西方标准。非国家参与者不符合这些标准。
Wars of liberation-with one or both parties not yet recognized as a state-are in this respect similar to those civil wars in which one or both parties to the conflict fights precisely so as to be free of sharing statehood with the other. Such wars are fought to escape from the coercive institutions of a common state, and to include them would confuse rather than clarify the generalization that democracies rarely go to war with each other. As will be clear in the next chapter, a crucial element in that generalization often depends upon the role of democratic institutions and practices in promoting peaceful conflict resolution within states. Intrastate conflicts that become so fierce that lethal violence is common often indicate that the institutions of the state have become the problem rather than the solution. For example, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland have lived in peace with each other, as separate states, since 1922; the conflict in Northern Ireland arises precisely because many people there emphatically do not wish to be governed as part of the existing common political structure. Democracies are only slightly less likely than other kinds of states to experience civil war (Bremer 1992b). 解放战争--其中一方或双方尚未被承认为国家--在这方面类似于内战，冲突的一方或双方正是为了摆脱与另一方分享国家地位而战。这种战争是为了摆脱共同国家的强制体制而进行的，将其包括在内会混淆而非澄清民主国家之间很少发生战争这一概括。下一章将明确指出，这一概括的关键因素往往取决于民主体制和实践在促进和平解决国家内部冲突方面的作用。如果国家内部冲突变得如此激烈，以至于经常出现致命暴力，这往往表明国家机构已成为问题而非解决方案。例如，自 1922 年以来，英国和爱尔兰共和国作为两个独立的国家一直和平相处；北爱尔兰之所以发生冲突，正是因为那里的许多人明确表示不希望作为现有共同政治结构的一部分接受管理。与其他类型的国家相比，民主国家发生内战的可能性略低（布雷默，1992 年 b）。
Democracy. For modern states, democracy (or polyarchy, following Dahl 1971) is usually identified with a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of citizens, a government brought to power in contested elections, and an executive either popularly elected or responsible to an elected legislature, often also with requirements for civil liberties such as free speech. ^(4){ }^{4} Huntington (1991,7,9)(1991,7,9) uses very similar criteria of “a twen-tieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.” In addition, he identifies a free election for transfer of power from a nondemocratic government as “the critical point in the process of democratization.” Ray (1993) similarly requires that the possibility for the leaders of the government to be defeated in an election and replaced has been demonstrated by historical precedent. 民主。对于现代国家而言，民主（或多政体，沿用 Dahl 1971 年的说法）通常指的是相当一部分公民拥有投票权，政府在有争议的选举中掌权，行政机构由民选产生或对民选立法机构负责，通常还要求公民享有言论自由等公民自由。 ^(4){ }^{4} 亨廷顿 (1991,7,9)(1991,7,9) 使用了非常相似的标准，即 "二十世纪的政治制度是民主的，只要其最有权力的集体决策者是通过公平、诚实和定期的选举产生的，候选人在选举中自由竞争选票，而且几乎所有成年人都有资格投票"。此外，他还将从非民主政府移交权力的自由选举确定为 "民主化进程的关键点"。雷（Ray，1993 年）同样要求，政府领导人在选举中被击败并被取代的可能性已被历史先例所证明。
A simple dichotomy between democracy and autocracy of course hides real shades of difference, and mixed systems that share features of both. Moreover, the precise application of these terms is to some degree culturally and temporally dependent. As we shall see, democracy did not mean quite the same to the ancient. Greeks as it does to people of the late twentieth century. Even in the modern era the yardstick has been rubbery. Nineteenth century democracies often had property qualifications for the vote and typically excluded women, while the United States-democratic by virtually any standard of thè day-disenfranchised blacks. Britain, with its royal prerogatives, rotten boroughs, and very’restricted franchise before the Reform Act of 1832, hardly could be counted as a democracy. Even that reform brought voting rights to less than one-fifth of adult males, so one might reasonably withhold the “democracy” designation until after the Second Reform Act of 1867, or even until the secret ballot was introduced in 1872. By then, at the latest, Britain took its place with the relatively few other states commonly characterized as democratic in the parlance of the era. But if, before the late nineteenth century, we admit countries with as few as 10 per cent of all adults eligible to vore as democratic (a criterion used by Small and Singer 1976; Doyle 1983a uses a cutoff of 30 percent of all males), by the middle to late twentieth century nothing less than a substantially universal franchise will suffice 当然，民主与专制的简单二分法掩盖了真正的差异，也掩盖了兼具两者特征的混合制度。此外，这些术语的准确应用在一定程度上取决于文化和时间。正如我们将要看到的，民主对于古希腊人和对于现代人的意义并不相同。正如我们将要看到的，民主对于古希腊人和对于 20 世纪末的人们的意义并不相同。即使在现代，民主的标准也是模糊的。十九世纪的民主国家通常对投票权有财产限制，而且通常将妇女排除在外，而美国--以当时的任何标准来看几乎都是民主国家--却剥夺了黑人的投票权。在1832年《改革法案》颁布之前，英国拥有皇室特权、腐朽的行政区和非常有限的选举权，很难被视为民主国家。即使是那次改革也只给不到五分之一的成年男性带来了选举权，因此我们可以合理地将 "民主 "的称号保留到 1867 年《第二次改革法案》之后，甚至是在 1872 年引入无记名投票之前。最迟在那时，英国已经与当时通常被称为民主国家的其他少数几个国家并驾齐驱。但是，如果在 19 世纪晚期之前，我们承认只有 10%的成年人有资格投票的国家是民主国家（斯莫尔和辛格 1976 年使用的标准；多伊尔 1983a 使用的标准是所有男性的 30%），那么到了 20 世纪中后期，不具备实质上的普遍选举权是不够的。
The term “contested elections” admits similar ambiguities, but in practice it has come to require two or more legally recognized parties. States with significant prerogatives in military and foreign affairs for nonelected agents (e.g., monarchs) should be excluded as having nonresponsible executives, even in the nineteenth century. 有争议的选举 "一词也有类似的含糊之处，但在实践中，它要求有两个或两个以上法律承认的政党。即使在 19 世纪，也应将那些在军事和外交事务中拥有重大特权的非民选代理人（如君主）国家排除在外，因为这些国家拥有不负责任的行政机构。
By the middle to late twentieth century the matter of guaranteed and respected civil rights, including rights to political organization and political expression, also become a key element in any commonsense definition of democracy (Dahl 1989). The exercise of such civil rights tends to be highly correlated with the existence of democratic institutions as just elaborated, but not perfectly so. The institutions may be found without the regular widespread exercise of the rights; the opposite (civil liberties assured, but not democratic institutions) is rarer. For purposes of the discussion here we will nevertheless not use civil liberties per se as a defining quality, and we shall also ignore the matter of free-market economic liberties. While there is very likely a causal nexus between economic liberties and secure political freedom, the relationship is complex and, unlike some authors (Rummel 1983, Doyle 1983a) I will not build it into the definition. 到 20 世纪中后期，公民权利（包括政治组织权和政治表达权）得到保障和尊重的问题也成为民主常识定义中的一个关键要素（Dahl，1989 年）。这些公民权利的行使往往与刚刚阐述的民主制度的存在高度相关，但并非完全如此。在没有定期广泛行使这些权利的情况下，也可能存在民主制度；而相反的情况（公民自由得到保证，但没有民主制度）则更为罕见。尽管如此，在本文的讨论中，我们将不把公民自由本身作为一个决定性因素，我们也将忽略自由市场的经济自由问题。虽然经济自由与安全的政治自由之间很可能存在因果关系，但这种关系非常复杂，与某些作者（Rummel 1983，Doyle 1983a）不同，我不会将其纳入定义中。
In not including civil rights and economic liberty as defining qualities of democracy we are lowering the standards by which a country can be labeled a democracy. That is highly relevant to our next topic, an examination of conflicts alleged by some scholars to be wars between democra- 如果不把公民权利和经济自由作为民主的定义品质，我们就降低了一个国家被称为民主国家的标准。这与我们的下一个话题高度相关，即研究一些学者声称是民主国家之间战争的冲突。
cies. By lowering the standards we are making it more likely that some events will be labeled wars between democracies-events that I and many other writers contend are, at most, exceedingly rare. 通过降低标准，我们使一些事件更有可能被贴上民主国家间战争的标签--而我和许多其他作家都认为，这种事件最多只是极为罕见。通过降低标准，我们使得一些事件更有可能被贴上民主国家间战争的标签--而我和许多其他作家都认为，这些事件最多只是极为罕见。
Theoretical precision, however, requires one further qualification: some rather minimal stability or longevity. Huntington (1991, 11) emphasizes stability or institutionalization as “a central dimension in the analysis of any political system.” To count a war as one waged by a democracy Doyle (1983a) requires that representative government be in existence for at least three years prior to the war. Perhaps that is a bit too long, yet some period must have elapsed during which democratic processes and institutions could become established, so that both the citizens of the “democratic” state and its adversary could regard it as one governed by democratic principles. Most of the doubtful cases arise within a single year of the establishment of democratic government. 然而，理论上的精确性还需要进一步的限定条件：某种最低限度的稳定性或长期性。亨廷顿（1991，11）强调，稳定性或制度化是 "分析任何政治制度的一个核心维度"。要将一场战争算作民主国家发动的战争，Doyle（1983a）要求代议制政府在战争前至少存在三年。也许这个时间有点太长了，但必须要有一段民主进程和民主制度得以建立的时间，这样 "民主 "国家的公民和对手都能将其视为民主原则统治下的国家。大多数疑案都发生在民主政府建立后的一年之内。
By application of these criteria it is impossible to identify unambiguously any wars between democratic states in the period since 1815. A few close calls exist, in which some relaxation of the criteria could produce such a case. But to have no clearcut cases, out of approximately 71 interstate wars involving a total of nearly 270 participants, is impressive. Even these numbers are deceptively low as representing total possibilities. For example, as listed by Small and Singer (1982), 21 states count as participating on the Allied side in World War II, with 8 on the Axis side. Thus in that war alone there were 168 pairs of warring states. Allowing for other multilateral wars, approximately 500 pairs of states went to war against each other in the period. Of these, fewer than a handful can with any plausibility at all be considered candidates for exceptions to a generalization that democracies do not fight each other. 根据这些标准，自 1815 年以来，民主国家之间不可能发生任何明确的战争。少数几次情况很接近，放宽一些标准可能会产生这样的情况。但是，在涉及近 270 个参与者的约 71 场国家间战争中，没有任何明确的案例，这就令人印象深刻了。即使是这些数字，代表的可能性总数也很低。例如，根据斯莫尔和辛格（Small and Singer，1982 年）的统计，在第二次世界大战中，盟军一方有 21 个州参战，轴心国一方有 8 个州参战。因此，仅在那场战争中就有 168 对交战国。考虑到其他多边战争，在此期间约有 500 对国家相互开战。在这些国家中，只有极少数国家可以被认为是 "民主国家不会相互争斗 "这一概括的例外情况。
Some Alleged Wars between Democracies 一些所谓的民主国家之间的战争
To see what these criteria produce, consider the list in table 1.1 of wars that have sometimes been suggested as exceptions to the generalization that democracies do not go to war with each other. 为了了解这些标准会产生什么结果，请看表 1.1 所列的战争清单，这些战争有时被认为是 "民主国家不会相互开战 "这一普遍规律的例外情况。
Four should be dismissed because they fall outside the criteria established even for any kind of interstate war in the period. The first, the War of 1812 , is easy to dismiss simply because it precedes the beginning date-1815-of the best-known compilation of all wars (Small and Singer 1982). That may seem like a cheap and arbitrary escape, but it is not. There simply were very few democracies in the international system before that date, and as we discussed with the British case above, though Britain had moved quite far from royal absolutism it just did not fit the criteria either of suffrage or of fully responsible executive. 有四场战争应予以剔除，因为它们甚至不符合这一时期任何类型的国家间战争的既定标准。第一场战争，即 1812 年战争，很容易被剔除，因为它早于最著名的战争汇编的开始日期--1815 年（斯莫尔和辛格，1982 年）。这似乎是一种廉价而武断的逃避，但事实并非如此。在此之前，国际体系中的民主国家寥寥无几，正如我们在上文讨论英国的情况时所说，尽管英国已经远离了王权专制主义，但它并不符合选举权或完全负责的行政权的标准。
The American Civil War and the Second Philippine War are also readily eliminated as plausible candidates by straightforward use of the defini- 直接使用 "美国内战 "和 "第二次菲律宾战争 "的定义，也很容易排除 "美国内战 "和 "第二次菲律宾战争 "的可能性。
Table 1.1 表 1.1
Some “Candidate” Wars between Democracies 民主国家之间的一些 "候选 "战争
War of 1812, U.S. and Great Britain
Roman Republic (Papal States) vs. France, 1849
American Civil War, 1861
Ecuador-Colombia, 1863
Franco-Prussian War, 1870
Boer War, 1899
Spanish-American War, 1898
Second Philippine War, 1899
World War I, Imperial Germany vs. western democracies 1914/17
World War II, Finland vs. western democracies 1941
Lebanon vs. Israel, 1948
Lebanon vs. Israel, 1967
tions. Whatever it may be called below the Mason-Dixon line, the Civil War is rightly named, in that the Confederacy never gained international recognition of its sovereignty; as a war for separation or to prevent separation it comes under our rubric of wars induced by the frictions of sharing common statehood. The Philippine War of 1899 was a coloinial war, in which the United States was trying to solidify control of a former Spanish colony it had acquired. The Philippine resistance constituted an authentic war of resistance against colonialism, but not on the part of an elected democratic government. This is not in any way to denigrate the resistance, but merely to insist on a distinction that will be important throughout the book: especially by the standards of Western ethnocentric attitudes at the time, the Philippine resistance was not widely regarded as “democratic” in a way that would induce either normative or institutional constraints on the United States. 内战无论在马森-迪克森线以下被称作什么，南北战争的名称都是正确的，因为南方邦联从未获得国际社会对其主权的承认；作为一场分离战争或防止分离的战争，它属于我们因共享共同国家地位的摩擦而引发的战争的范畴。1899 年的菲律宾战争是一场殖民战争，在这场战争中，美国试图巩固对其获得的前西班牙殖民地的控制。菲律宾的抵抗是一场真正的反抗殖民主义的战争，但并不是民选民主政府的战争。这绝不是要诋毁菲律宾的抵抗运动，而仅仅是为了坚持一个贯穿全书的重要区别：尤其是以当时西方民族中心主义态度的标准来看，菲律宾的抵抗运动并没有被广泛视为 "民主"，从而导致美国受到规范或制度上的限制。
The Boer War, begun in 1899, also fails to fit the requirements for an interstate war. Small and Singer (1982) identify it as an extrasystemic war because the South African Republic-by far the larger of the two Boer combatants, the other being the Orange Free State-was not generally recognized as an independent state. Britain recognized only its internal sovereignty, retaining suzerainty and requiring it to submit all treaties to the British government for approval. This, too, is properly an unsuccessful war for independence. Moreover, the two Boer republics strained the definition of democracy, then as for almost a century subsequently. Not only was suffrage restricted to the white male minority (roughly 10 percent of the adult population) in the South African Republic, but the electorate was further reduced, perhaps by half, by a property qualification and long-term residence requirements (Lacour-Gayet 1978, 168, 170, 182,194).^(5)182,194) .{ }^{5} 始于 1899 年的布尔战争也不符合国家间战争的要求。斯莫尔和辛格（Small and Singer，1982 年）认为这是一场系统外战争，因为南非共和国是迄今为止两个布尔战争方中较大的一个，另一个是奥兰治自由邦。英国只承认其国内主权，保留宗主权，并要求其将所有条约提交英国政府批准。这也是一场不成功的独立战争。此外，两个布尔共和国对民主的定义造成了压力，当时如此，此后近一个世纪也是如此。在南非共和国，不仅选举权仅限于少数白人男性（约占成年人口的 10%），而且由于财产资格和长期居住的要求，选民人数进一步减少，可能减少了一半（Lacour-Gayet 1978, 168, 170, 182,194).^(5)182,194) .{ }^{5} , pp.
Two other conflicts can be dismissed because they fall short of the casualty levels required for a “war.” These are Finland’s participation in World War II on the “wrong” side and Lebanon’s involvement in the Six-Day War of 1967. Finland was actively at war only with the Soviet Union, in an attempt to wrest back the territory taken from it in the Winter War of 1939-40. Although it was nominally at war with the Western allies, there is no record of combat or casualties between Finland and democratic states that would even approach the rather low threshold specified above. In the Six-Day War of 1967 Lebanon (then still an at least marginally democratic state, as it was not when invaded by Israel in 1982) participated in “combat” only by sending a few aircraft into Israeli airspace; the planes were driven back with, apparently, no casualties at all. 还有两场冲突可以不予考虑，因为它们没有达到 "战争 "所要求的伤亡水平。它们是芬兰作为 "错误 "一方参加第二次世界大战和黎巴嫩参加 1967 年六日战争。芬兰只主动与苏联交战，试图夺回在 1939-40 年冬季战争中被夺走的领土。虽然芬兰名义上与西方盟国交战，但芬兰与民主国家之间没有任何战斗或伤亡记录，甚至没有接近上述相当低的门槛。在 1967 年的 "六日战争 "中，黎巴嫩（当时至少还是一个稍微民主的国家，因为 1982 年以色列入侵时它还不是）参加了 "战斗"，只是派遣了几架飞机进入以色列领空；这些飞机被击退，显然没有造成任何伤亡。
In the remaining six cases one or both of the participants fails the test for democracy. Lebanon’s participation in the 1948 war was well above the criterion used for a belligerent. Israel, however, had not previously been independent, and had not yet held a national election. While the authenticity of Israel’s national leadership was hardly in question, Leba-non-itself not fully democratic-could not have been expected to accredit it as a democratic state. 在其余六个案例中，一个或两个参与者都没有通过民主测试。黎巴嫩对 1948 年战争的参与远远超过了交战国的标准。然而，以色列此前尚未独立，也未举行过全国大选。虽然以色列国家领导层的真实性几乎没有疑问，但黎巴嫩本身并不完全民主，因此不能指望它成为一个民主国家。
The 1863 war between Ecuador and Colombia also fits the criteria for war, but neither regime meets any reasonable requirement for democratic stability. Both governments came to power through revolution. Colombia’s president governed with a new federal constitution promulgated only in May 1863; Ecuador’s Gabriel García Moreno became president two years earlier, but is described as heading an “autocratic regime” (Kohn 1986, 150) and governing “with absolute authority” (Langer 1972, 852). As for France against the Roman Republic, both parties were but ephemerally democratic. Following the revolution of early 1848, presidential elections took place under the new French constitution only in December of that year. The notion of a democratic Papal States sounds oxymoronic. The pope introduced a constitution with an elective council of deputies in 1848, but reserved veto power to himself and the College of Cardinals. After an insurrection in November, he fled and the Roman Republic was proclaimed in February 1849. Within two months the republic was at war with France. 1863 年厄瓜多尔和哥伦比亚之间的战争也符合战争的标准，但这两个政权都不符合民主稳定的合理要求。两国政府都是通过革命上台的。哥伦比亚总统是在 1863 年 5 月才颁布新联邦宪法的情况下执政的；厄瓜多尔的加布里埃尔-加西亚-莫雷诺在两年前就任总统，但被描述为领导着一个 "专制政权"（Kohn 1986, 150），并 "以绝对权威"（Langer 1972, 852）进行统治。至于与罗马共和国对立的法国，双方都只是昙花一现的民主国家。1848 年初的革命之后，法国在当年 12 月才根据新宪法举行了总统选举。民主教皇国的概念听起来有些矛盾。教皇在 1848 年制定了一部宪法，其中包含一个选举产生的众议院，但保留了自己和红衣主教团的否决权。11 月发生叛乱后，教皇出逃，罗马共和国于 1849 年 2 月宣告成立。不到两个月，共和国就与法国开战。
The Franco-Prussian War can be eliminated simply by looking at France. Reforms ratified in the plebiscite of May 1870 could be interpreted as making the empire into a constitutional monarchy, but war began a mere two months later. In Prussia/Germany the emperor appointed and could dismiss the chancellor; a defeat in the Reichstag did not remove the chancellor from office. The emperor’s direct authority over the army and foreign policy deprives the state of the democratic criterion 只要看一看法国，就能发现普法战争的端倪。1870年5月全民公决批准的改革可以被解释为使帝国成为君主立宪制国家，但仅仅两个月后战争就爆发了。在普鲁士/德国，皇帝任命并可以罢免首相；帝国议会的失败并不能解除首相的职务。皇帝对军队和外交政策的直接权力剥夺了国家的民主标准
The Fact of Democratic Peace - 19 民主和平的事实 - 19
of “responsible executive” on war and peace matters; Berghahn (1973, 9) calls the constitutional position of the monarchy “almost absolutist.” Doyle (1983a) rightly excludes Imperial Germany from his list of liberal states. Such a decision removes World War I from the candidate list. Berghahn（1973，9）称君主制的宪法立场 "几乎是专制主义的"。Doyle (1983a) 正确地将帝国德国排除在他的自由主义国家名单之外。这一决定将第一次世界大战从候选名单中删除。
The most difficult case is the Spanish-American War of 1898. Spain after 1890 had universal male suffrage, and a bicameral legislature with an executive nominally responsible to it. But the reality was more complex. The ministry was selected by the king, who thus remained the effective ruler of the state. Nominally competitive elections were really. manipulated by a process known as caciquismo. By mutual agreement, the Liberal and Conservative parties rotated in office; governmental changes preceded rather than followed elections. Through extensive corruption and administrative procedures the king and politicians in Madrid controlled the selection of parliamentary candidates and their election. Election results were often published in the press before polling day. The meaningless elections were thus manipulated by the king and his close advisers; the system lacked the democratic quality of a responsible executive (Carr 1980, 10-15). May (1961, 97) describes the system as “preserving the appearance of a parliamentary democracy with none of its suspected dangers.” None of the published large-scale analyses of the question of democracies fighting each other puts Spain among the democratic countries (Small and Singer 1976, Doyle 1983a; b; Chan 1984; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992a), nor do most major long-term political surveys. (Vanhanen 1984; Banks 1971; Gurr et al. 1989 code it as sharing democratic and autocratic characteristics.) 最困难的情况是 1898 年的美西战争。1890 年后的西班牙实行了男性普选制，并设立了两院制立法机构，行政机构名义上对立法机构负责。但实际情况更为复杂。部委由国王挑选，因此国王仍然是国家的实际统治者。名义上竞争激烈的选举实际上是由一种被称为 "卡西基斯莫"（caciquismo）的程序操纵的。在双方同意的情况下，自由党和保守党轮流执政；政府更迭在选举之前而不是选举之后。通过广泛的腐败和行政程序，国王和马德里的政客控制着议会候选人的遴选和选举。选举结果往往在投票日之前就在报刊上公布。因此，国王及其亲信操纵了毫无意义的选举；这种制度缺乏负责任的行政机构的民主品质（Carr 1980, 10-15）。梅（May，1961 年，97 页）将这一制度描述为 "保留了议会民主的外表，却没有任何可疑的危险"。已发表的关于民主国家之间相互斗争问题的大规模分析报告中，没有一个将西班牙列入民主国家之列（斯莫尔和辛格 1976 年；多伊尔 1983a；b；陈 1984 年；毛兹和阿卜杜拉利 1989 年；布雷默 1992a），大多数主要的长期政治调查报告也没有将西班牙列入民主国家之列。(Vanhanen 1984 年；Banks 1971 年；Gurr 等人 1989 年将其归类为具有民主和专制特征的国家）。
It seems, therefore, best to treat it as a close call but probably not a refutation even of the strong statement that democracies never make war on each other. Equally important, as we shall see later in the book, is the matter of perceptions. The Spanish political situation was at best marginal enough that key United States decisionmakers could readily persuade themselves and their audiences that it was not democratic. Consider, for example, the remarks of the two Republican senators from Massachusetts. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge: “We are there because we represent the spirit of liberty and the spirit of the new time, and Spain is over against us because she is mediaeval, cruel, dying.” Senator George Hoar: “The results of a great war [on which the U.S. was embarking] are due to the policy of the king and the noble and the tyrant, not the policy of the people” (Congressional Record, April 13, 1898, p. 3783 and April 14, 1898, p. 3831). 因此，最好的办法似乎是把它看作是一次险胜，但也许甚至不能驳倒民主国家从不相互开战的有力论断。同样重要的是观念问题，我们将在本书的后面部分看到这一点。西班牙的政治局势充其量也就是边缘化，以至于美国的主要决策者可以轻易地说服自己和受众，西班牙并不民主。例如，请看来自马萨诸塞州的两位共和党参议员的言论。参议员亨利-卡伯特-洛奇"我们在那里是因为我们代表着自由的精神和新时代的精神，西班牙与我们对立是因为她是中世纪的、残酷的、垂死的。参议员乔治-胡尔"[美国正在进行的]一场大战的结果是国王、贵族和暴君的政策造成的，而不是人民的政策造成的"（国会记录，1898 年 4 月 13 日，第 3783 页和 1898 年 4 月 14 日，第 3831 页）。
Subsequent to my writing the above, Ray (1993) has presented a thorough review of these and other alleged cases of wars between democracies, and concludes that the generalization of no wars between democracies remains true. Whether or not one holds to the lawlike “never” 在我写下上述文章之后，雷（Ray，1993 年）对这些和其他所谓的民主国家之间的战争案例进行了彻底审查，并得出结论认为，民主国家之间不发生战争的普遍性仍然是正确的。无论人们是否坚持 "永远不会 "这一规律
statement may not really be very important. Almost all of the few near misses are in the nineteenth century. Since that was an era of generally very imperfect democracy by modern criteria, it is no surprise to find most of the near misses then. 这种说法可能并不十分重要。几乎所有为数不多的几近失误都发生在 19 世纪。按照现代标准，那是一个民主普遍非常不完善的时代，因此，在那个时代发现大多数近乎失误并不奇怪。
Depending on the precise criteria, only twelve to fifteen states qualified as democracies at the end of the nineteenth century. The empirical significance of the rarity of war between democracies emerges only in the first half of the twentieth century, with at least twice the number of democracies as earlier, and especially with the existence of perhaps sixty democracies by the mid-1980s. Since the statistical likelihood of war between democracies is related to the number of pairs of democracies, the contrast between the two centuries is striking: by a very loose definition, possibly three or four wars out of roughly sixty pairs before 1900, and at most one or two out of about eighteen hundred pairs thereafter. ^(6){ }^{6} As twentiethcentury politics unfold, the phenomenon of war between democracies becomes impossible or almost impossible to find. 根据不同的精确标准，19 世纪末只有 12 到 15 个国家符合民主政体的条件。民主国家之间很少发生战争的实证意义在 20 世纪上半叶才显现出来，民主国家的数量至少是之前的两倍，尤其是到 20 世纪 80 年代中期，民主国家的数量可能达到 60 个。由于民主政体之间发生战争的统计可能性与民主政体的对数有关，因此两个世纪之间的反差非常明显：按照非常宽松的定义，1900 年前，大约六十对民主政体中可能会发生三到四次战争，而在此之后，大约一千八百对民主政体中最多只会发生一两次战争。 ^(6){ }^{6} 随着20世纪政治的发展，民主国家之间的战争现象变得不可能或几乎不可能出现。
Even with the differing definitions of democracy and of war, this generalization is exceedingly robust. Long-term rival states, with many conflicts of interest between them, have gone to war or had substantial fatal clashes only when one or both of them was not governed democratically. For example, in the case of the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, by far the worst violence erupted in 1974 under the most dictatorial government either country experienced since 1945, when the Greek colonels overthrew the elected Cypriot government of Archbishop Makarios. Faced with the prospect of forcible enosis between Greece and Cyprus, Turkey replied by invading the island and occupying nearly a third of its territory. By contrast, the 1963-64 clashes-when democratic Greek and Turkish governments supported their protégés during outbreaks on the islandswere much more easily contained, largely by an American warning and UN peacekeeping action. And confrontations later in the 1970s, between democratic governments, were restrained short of any fatalities (Markides 1977; Rustow 1987; Stearns, ed., 1992). India and Pakistan have of course fought repeatedly and sometimes bloodily during their history as independent states. Yet no fatalities are recorded in disputes between them during Pakistan’s most democratic periods of 1962-64 and 198892 (Burke 1973; Thomas 1986; Tillema 1991). 即使对民主和战争的定义不同，这一概括也是非常有力的。长期敌对的国家之间存在许多利益冲突，只有当其中一方或双方没有民主治理时，才会发生战争或重大的致命冲突。例如，在希腊和土耳其关于塞浦路斯的争端中，最严重的暴力事件发生在 1974 年，当时希腊上校推翻了马卡里奥斯大主教领导的塞浦路斯民选政府，这是 1945 年以来两国经历的最独裁的政府。面对希腊和塞浦路斯强行合并的前景，土耳其入侵该岛并占领了近三分之一的领土。相比之下，1963-64年的冲突要容易得多--当时民主的希腊和土耳其政府在岛上爆发冲突时都支持自己的拥护者。20 世纪 70 年代后期，民主政府之间的冲突也得到了控制，没有造成人员伤亡（Markides，1977 年；Rustow，1987 年；Stearns，1992 年）。当然，印度和巴基斯坦在其独立国家的历史上曾多次发生冲突，有时甚至是流血冲突。然而，在巴基斯坦最民主的 1962-64 年和 1988-92 年期间，两国之间的争端却没有造成人员死亡的记录（Burke，1973 年；Thomas，1986 年；Tillema，1991 年）。
Even the kind of crisis bargaining that uses military force in a threatening manner becomes, in the twentieth century, rare between democracies, even if not quite absent. And if there is crisis bargaining, it does not escalate to the point of war. 在 20 世纪，民主国家之间即使不是完全不存在使用军事力量进行威胁的危机讨价还价，也已变得十分罕见。即使有危机谈判，也不会升级到战争的地步。
Table 1.2 illustrates these facts in data on all militarized diplomatic disputes over the period from 1946 to 1986. “Dyad” means a pair of states; for the table we count each year of existence separately, thus Brit- 表 1.2 用 1946 年至 1986 年期间所有军事化外交争端的数据说明了这些事实。表中的 "Dyad "指的是一对国家；在本表中，我们将每个国家存在的年份分开计算，因此英国
Both States
Democratic| Both States |
| :--- |
| Democratic |
一个或两个 非民主
One or Both
Nondemocratic
One or Both
Nondemocratic| One or Both |
| :--- |
| Nondemocratic |
Total Dyads 总人数
No dispute 无争议
3,864
24,503
-28,367
Threat of force 武力威胁
2
39
- 41
Display of force 展示武力
4
116
- 120
Use of force 使用武力
8
513
521
War 战争
0
32
32
Totals 总计
3,878
25,203
29,081
Escalation Probabilities 升级概率
To threat of force 以武力相威胁
0.05%
0.16%
To display of force 展示武力
85.7%
94.4%
To use of force 使用武力
57.1%
77.9%
To war 战争
0.0%
4.6%
Highest Level of Dispute "Both States
Democratic" "One or Both
Nondemocratic" Total Dyads
No dispute 3,864 24,503 -28,367
Threat of force 2 39 - 41
Display of force 4 116 - 120
Use of force 8 513 521
War 0 32 32
Totals 3,878 25,203 29,081
Escalation Probabilities
To threat of force 0.05% 0.16%
To display of force 85.7% 94.4%
To use of force 57.1% 77.9%
To war 0.0% 4.6% | Highest Level of Dispute | Both States <br> Democratic | One or Both <br> Nondemocratic | Total Dyads |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No dispute | 3,864 | 24,503 | -28,367 |
| Threat of force | 2 | 39 | - 41 |
| Display of force | 4 | 116 | - 120 |
| Use of force | 8 | 513 | 521 |
| War | 0 | 32 | 32 |
| Totals | 3,878 | 25,203 | 29,081 |
| Escalation Probabilities | | | |
| To threat of force | 0.05% | 0.16% | |
| To display of force | 85.7% | 94.4% | |
| To use of force | 57.1% | 77.9% | |
| To war | 0.0% | 4.6% | |
Sources: See chapter 4 for sources and definitions. 资料来源：资料来源和定义见第 4 章。
ain and France in 1946 constitute one observation, and another in 1947. The highest level of conflict reached in the dispute between that pair of states is identified. (Disputes that spill over into two or more years are counted only in the year they began or were escalated to a higher level.) The phrase “politically relevant dyads” refers to all pairs of states that are contiguous or at least fairly close to each other; or where one of the states in the pair is a major power and hence has military “global reach.” This recognizes, as noted above, that the majority of states in the international. system lack the means or the interest to engage in militarized disputes with each other, and hence are irrelevant to a serious analysis. Further information on definitions and soucces can be postponed for much more detailed analysis in chapter 4. 1946年的法国和法国之间的冲突构成了一个观察点，1947年的另一个观察点也构成了一个观察点。在这对国家之间的争端中，冲突达到的最高级别被确定下来。(跨越两年或两年以上的争端只计算其开始或升级到更高水平的年份）。政治上相关的二元对立 "指的是所有毗邻或至少相当接近的国家对立；或者对立中的一个国家是大国，因此在军事上具有 "全球影响力"。如上文所述，这承认了国际体系中的大多数国家缺乏手段或兴趣参与彼此间的军事化争端，因此与严肃的分析无关。关于定义和冲突根源的更多信息可推迟到第 4 章进行更详细的分析。
The information in this simple table has several rich theoretical implications, and we shall return to it in subsequent chapters. There were no wars between democracies, and even though the number of democratic dyads is relatively small, if they had fought wars as frequently with each other as one finds in the second column, there would have been five wars between democracies. Note also that in this period there were only fourteen instances of disputing pairs involving the threat, display, or use of military force by one democracy against another. The odds that any pair of politically relevant democratic states would have a militarized dispute, at any level, in a year during this period were only 1 in 276. By contrast, if one or both states in the pair was not a democracy, the odds were as short as 1 in 36-eight times greater. Surely this is a very dramatic differ- 这个简单表格中的信息具有丰富的理论意义，我们将在以后的章节中继续讨论。民主政体之间没有战争，尽管民主政体的数量相对较少，但如果它们之间的战争像第二列那样频繁，那么民主政体之间就会有五场战争。还要注意的是，在这一时期，只有 14 对争端涉及一个民主政体对另一个民主政体威胁使用、展示或使用军事力量。在此期间，任何一对政治上相关的民主国家在一年中发生任何级别军事化争端的几率仅为 1/276。相比之下，如果这对国家中的一个或两个都不是民主国家，几率则低至 1/36--高出八倍。这无疑是一个巨大的差异
ence in behavior. The actual use of military force involved trivial occasions like the “Cod War”; very minor fire by Israel against Britain during the 1956 Suez intervention, in which the British and Israelis were in fact accomplices; brief conflict between British and Turkish forces during a 1963 peacekeeping operation on Cyprus; and Turkish sinking of a Greek boat in 1978. 在行为上的差异。实际使用军事力量的情况包括："鳕鱼战争 "等微不足道的事件；1956 年苏伊士干涉期间以色列对英国的轻微开火，而英国和以色列实际上是帮凶；1963 年在塞浦路斯维和行动期间英国和土耳其军队之间的短暂冲突；以及 1978 年土耳其击沉一艘希腊船只。
One can also use the tabular information to calculate “escalation probabilities” for militarized disputes that do occur. For democracies, the chances that any militarized dispute would progress up the scale of force were consistently lower, at every level, than for pairs in which one or both states were not democracies. For example, only a little more than half of the few disputes between democracies resulted in the actual use of force, whereas nearly 80 percent of all disputes by other kinds of pairs of states escalated at least to the use of force. For earlier periods (the nineteenth century, and 1900-1945) the relationships for conflict-proneness and escalation appear to be in the same direction-democratic pairs of states dispute less-but much weaker than in the post-1945 era (Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992a). 我们还可以利用表格信息来计算确实发生的军事化争端的 "升级概率"。对于民主国家而言，任何军事化争端升级到武力规模的几率，在各个层面上都始终低于一方或双方都不是民主国家的争端对。例如，在民主国家之间为数不多的争端中，只有一半多一点导致实际使用武力，而在其他类型国家之间的所有争端中，近 80% 至少升级到使用武力。在较早时期（19 世纪和 1900-1945 年），冲突倾向与冲突升级的关系似乎与此相同--民主国家对之间的争端较少，但比 1945 年后要弱得多（Maoz 和 Abdolali，1989 年；Bremer，1992a）。
It is tempting to believe that a norm against the use of force between democracies, and even the threat of use of force, has emerged and strengthened over time. To pursue the matter of norms, however, becomes a subject for much further analysis. The emergence of norms against democracies fighting each other is traceable, and by many theories it did indeed become a powerful restraint. Other theories, however, attribute the relative absence of lethal violence between democracies to many other influences. The next chapter lays out these partly competing, partly complementary theories in detail. 我们很容易相信，随着时间的推移，一种反对民主国家之间使用武力，甚至是威胁使用武力的准则已经出现并得到加强。然而，要探讨准则问题，还需要进行更深入的分析。反对民主国家相互争斗的规范的出现是有迹可循的，而且根据许多理论，它确实成为了一种强有力的约束。然而，另一些理论则认为，民主国家之间相对没有致命暴力是受其他许多因素影响所致。下一章将详细阐述这些部分相互竞争、部分相互补充的理论。
Consideration of the evidence then begins-in a historically problematic context, the world of ancient Greek city-states-with a detailed analysis of who fought whom during the Peloponnesian War. Whereas a number of examples of warring democratic pairs of states emerge during that era, there are hints in the historical record of restraints as well as of the instances when the restraints failed. 然后，在古希腊城邦世界这一存在历史问题的背景下，从详细分析伯罗奔尼撒战争期间谁与谁交战开始，对证据进行考量。虽然在那个时代出现了许多民主国家对战的例子，但历史记录中也暗示了克制以及克制失败的情况。
We then examine the explanatory power of the competing theories during the post-World War II era-the time when by far the largest number of democracies and hence of possible warring democratic pairs existed. We will grasp the meaning of the democratic peace by establishing that the rarity of lethal violence between democracies is not due to any apparent confounding influence, but to something in the nature of the democratic-to-democratic state relationship itself, and then begin to identify what that is. 然后，我们将研究二战后各种相互竞争的理论的解释力--二战后是迄今为止民主国家数量最多的时期，也是可能发生战争的民主国家对数量最多的时期。我们将通过确定民主国家之间很少发生致命暴力事件并不是由于任何明显的混杂影响，而是由于民主国家与民主国家之间关系本身的某种性质，来把握民主和平的意义，然后开始确定这种性质是什么。
In an effort to widen the empirical net further beyond the modern Western experience, we then look at the experience of preindustrial eth- 为了在现代西方经验之外进一步扩大经验网，我们接着考察了前工业化时代的民族
nographic units-societies as studied by anthropologists. This will provide still further evidence that such polities, when governed according to democratic “participatory” principles, do not often fight similarly governed polities. 人类学家研究的地理单元--社会。这将进一步证明，当这些政体按照民主的 "参与 "原则进行治理时，往往不会与类似的政体发生冲突。
Finally, the concluding chapter considers all this evidence, and the discourse of late twentieth-century international relations, in search of glimpses into the future. It addresses the emerging policy debate about whether further democratization, in addition to being a “good thing”. for people in their relations within democratically governed countries, may be a major force to promote peace bètween countries. If so, by what principles can democracy best be advanced in a world of nationalism and ethnic hatred? What are the prudent possibilities for interventionwhether by economic means or by military force-to promote democracy? Can we grasp the possibility of a wider democratic peace? What are the prospects for building a world predominantly of democratic states that are able to live together-not without conflicts of interest, but without the large-scale lethal violence called war which has so blighted the human experience to date? 最后，本章总结了所有这些证据以及 20 世纪晚期国际关系的论述，以寻找未来的曙光。本章探讨了新出现的政策辩论，即进一步民主化除了对民主治理国家内部的人民关系是一件 "好事 "之外，是否还可能成为促进国家间和平的主要力量。如果是这样的话，在一个充满民族主义和种族仇恨的世界里，根据什么样的原则才能最好地推进民主？通过经济手段或军事力量进行干预以促进民主的谨慎可能性是什么？我们能否把握更广泛民主和平的可能性？建立一个主要由民主国家组成的世界的前景如何，这些民主国家能够共同生活在一起--不是没有利益冲突，而是没有被称为战争的大规模致命暴力，而这种暴力迄今为止一直严重破坏着人类的生活？
CHAPTER 2 第 2 章
Why Democratic Peace? 为什么是民主和平？
When democratic states were rare, the Kantian perspective had little practical import, and power politics reigned. But if the Kantian perspective is correct, recent events replacing authoritarian regimes with democratic values and institutions in much of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America ^(1){ }^{1} may have profound implications not just for governmental practices within states, but for worldwide peace among states. It may be possible in part to supersede the “realist” principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice to the exclusion of “liberal” or “idealist” ones since at least the seventeenth century. 当民主国家还很少见的时候，康德的观点没有什么实际意义，强权政治统治了一切。但是，如果康德的观点是正确的，那么最近在亚洲、东欧和拉丁美洲大部分地区发生的以民主价值观和民主制度取代专制政权的事件 ^(1){ }^{1} 可能不仅对国家内部的政府实践，而且对国家间的世界和平产生深远影响。至少自十七世纪以来，"现实主义 "原则（无政府状态、国家安全困境）一直在实践中占主导地位，而 "自由主义 "或 "理想主义 "原则则被排斥在外。
Politics within a democracy is seen as largely a nonzero-sum enterprise; by cooperating, all can gain something even if all do not gain equally, and the winners are restrained from crushing the losers. Indeed, today’s winners may, as coalitions shift, wish tomorrow to ally with today’s losers. If the conflicts degenerate to physical violence, either by those in control of the state or by insurgents, all can lose. In most international politicsthe anarchy of a self-help system with no overall governing authoritythese norms and practices are not the same. “Realists” remind us of the powerful norms of legitimate self-defense and the acceptability of military deterrence, norms much more extensive internationally than within democratic states. Politics among nations takes on a more zero-sum hue, with the state’s sovereign existence at risk. 民主制度下的政治在很大程度上被视为一种非零和的事业；通过合作，所有人都能有所收获，即使收获不均等，赢家也不会压垮输家。事实上，随着联盟的变化，今天的赢家可能希望明天与今天的输家结盟。如果冲突演变成由国家控制者或叛乱分子实施的人身暴力，那么所有人都可能失败。在大多数国际政治中，这些准则和做法并不相同，因为国际政治是无政府的自助体系，没有总体管理当局。"现实主义者 "提醒我们注意合法自卫的强大规范和军事威慑的可接受性，这些规范在国际上比在民主国家内部更为广泛。国与国之间的政治更具有零和色彩，国家主权的存在岌岌可危。
The principles of anarchy and self-help in a zero-sum world are most acute in “structural realist” theories of international relations. The nature of states’ internal systems of government is seen as nearly irrelevant; their overall behavior is basically determined by the structure of the international system and their position in that structure. “Peace” is a fleeting condition, dependent upon deterrence and eternal vigilance. By this structural realist understanding the kind of stable peace that exists among democracies cannot last, because eventually democracies would be compelled, by the structure of the international system and their eternal security dilemma, to enter a state of war or at best of military deterrence (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 1990). Realism has no place for an expectation that democracies will not fight each other. To the degree we establish that peace between democracies is a fact, and are able to explain it theoretically, we build an alternative view of the world with great import for expectations and for policy. We begin with the theories. 零和世界中的无政府和自助原则在 "结构现实主义 "国际关系理论中表现得最为突出。国家内部政体的性质几乎被视为无关紧要；国家的整体行为基本上是由国际体系的结构及其在该结构中的地位决定的。"和平 "是一种短暂的状态，取决于威慑和永恒的警惕。根据这种结构现实主义的理解，民主国家之间存在的那种稳定和平不可能持久，因为最终民主国家会迫于国际体系结构及其永恒的安全困境，进入战争状态，或充其量进入军事威慑状态（华尔兹，1979 年；米尔斯海默，1990 年）。现实主义不容许民主国家之间相互争斗。只要我们确定民主国家之间的和平是一个事实，并能从理论上加以解释，我们就能建立起另一种世界观，对预期和政策具有重大意义。我们从理论入手。
If scholars are near consensus that democratically governed states rarely go to war with each other or even fight each other at low levels of lethal violence, this does not mean there is anything like consensus on why the phenomenon occurs. Nor can the same generalization be supported for relations among other kinds of political systems (for example, military or other dictatorships). Sharing common forms of political structure and political culture in general does not prevent war between independent states. ^(2){ }^{2} If similarity of form of government in general were enough, then we would have seen peace between the Soviet Union and China, between the Soviet Union and its formerly communist East European neighbors, and between China and Vietnam. Despite important differences in political values and organization among the communist countries, they were much more like one another in values and ideology than like the democracies or even like right-wing dictatorships. Yet war between these countries, and disputes that threatened to erupt in war, were commonplace. 如果说学者们已接近达成共识，即民主治理的国家很少相互开战，甚至在致命暴力程度较低的情况下也很少相互厮杀，但这并不意味着对这一现象发生的原因已达成类似共识。对于其他类型的政治体制（如军事独裁或其他独裁）之间的关系，也不能支持同样的概括。共享共同的政治结构和政治文化并不能阻止独立国家之间的战争。 ^(2){ }^{2} 如果政府形式的相似性就足够了，那么我们就会看到苏联与中国之间、苏联与其前共产主义东欧邻国之间以及中国与越南之间的和平。尽管共产主义国家在政治价值观和组织形式上存在重大差异，但它们在价值观和意识形态上更像彼此，而不是像民主国家，甚至像右翼独裁国家。然而，这些国家之间的战争以及有可能爆发战争的争端却屡见不鲜。
Certainly some kinds of differences, if politically salient, can cause conflict. But that becomes virtually tautological unless one can specify what differences will be salient. For sixteenth-century Europe religious differences between Catholics and Protestants provided politically salient ideological reasons for killing each other; by the twentieth century those differences were irrelevant to violent conflict save in isolated pockets like Northern Ireland. Thus it seqms likely that the reasons for “democratic peace” are either rooted somehow in the nature of democracy itself, or are correlated in the modern world with the phenomenon of democracy. 当然，某些差异如果在政治上突出，就会引起冲突。但是，除非我们能明确指出哪些差异是突出的，否则这实际上就成了同义反复。十六世纪的欧洲，天主教徒和新教徒之间的宗教差异为相互残杀提供了政治上突出的意识形态理由；到了二十世纪，除了北爱尔兰这样的孤立地区，这些差异已经与暴力冲突无关。因此，"民主和平 "的原因很可能是源于民主本身的性质，或者在现代世界中与民主现象相关联。
Some scholars vigorously question the causal inference that democracies are at peace with each other simply because they are democratic. They point instead to other influences that are correlated with democracy and hence create a spurious relation between democracy itself and general peace between democratic states. Without going into the vast range of hypotheses about the causes of war and peace, we need to consider some of the most important ones that might specifically account for the relationship between democratic states. 一些学者强烈质疑民主国家仅仅因为民主而彼此和平相处的因果推论。相反，他们指出了与民主相关的其他影响因素，从而在民主本身与民主国家之间的普遍和平之间建立了一种虚假的关系。我们无需深入探讨关于战争与和平原因的各种假设，只需考虑一些可能具体解释民主国家之间关系的最重要的假设。
Alternative Explanations 其他解释
Alternative hypotheses to explain the phenomenon include the following. 解释这一现象的其他假设包括以下几种。
Transnational and international institutions make peace. The states in question are peaceful toward each other because they are bound by common ties in a network of institutions crossing national boundaries. Democracies often do share many common institutions. Analysts may 跨国和国际机构造就和平。有关国家之所以彼此和平相处，是因为它们被跨越国界的机构网络中的共同纽带所束缚。民主国家通常确实拥有许多共同的机构。分析家可能会
emphasize the role of the European Community (EC), for example, and certainly one of the major motivations of the founders of the institutions that evolved into the EC was to bind together previously hostile states so that they would be unable to make war on each other. Some international organizations clearly have this intention. Others, not primarily addressed to war prevention, help to resolve many troublesome conflicts of interest that might feed suspicion and hostility. But states and ethnic groups typically share common institutions just because they have major interests in conflict as well as in common; institutions are supposed to provide a means to resolve those conflicts peacefully. If the common institutions cannot do so, or if one party is coerced into unwillingly sharing common institutions with another, the institutions exacerbate conflict and may become the occasion for civil war. ^(3){ }^{3} Hence the existence of common intergovernmental or supranational institutions cannot so plausibly be invoked as a prior reason for the absence of war. Peaceful relations must in some degree precede the institutions. 例如，我们强调欧洲共同体（欧共体）的作用，当然，演变成欧共体的各机构创始人的主要动机之一就是将以前敌对的国家团结在一起，使它们无法相互开战。一些国际组织显然有这样的意图。还有一些国际组织的主要目的不是预防战争，而是帮助解决许多可能滋生猜疑和敌意的麻烦的利益冲突。但是，国家和族群通常都有共同的机构，这只是因为它们既有重大利益冲突，也有共同利益；机构本应提供和平解决这些冲突的手段。如果共同制度无法做到这一点，或者如果一方受到胁迫，不情愿地与另一方分享共同制度，那么这些制度就会加剧冲突，并可能成为内战的导火索。 ^(3){ }^{3} 因此，政府间或超国家共同机构的存在不能被如此合理地援引为没有战争的先决理由。和平关系必须在某种程度上先于这些机构。
An influential variant of the institutional approach focuses on transnationalism: individual autonomy and pluralism within democratic states foster the emergence of transnational linkages and institutions-among individuals, private groups, and governmental agencies. Those linkages can serve to resolve transnational conflicts peaceably and, by forming transnational alliances into other states, inhibit their national governments from acting violently toward each other. This perspective derives from classics both of international integration theory and of bureaucratic politics and foreign policy. ^(4){ }^{4} It is not, however, completely separable from the matter of democracy. Democracies foster, and are fostered by, the pluralism arising from many independent centers of power and influence; autocracies do not. Democracies are open to many private and governmental transnational linkages; autocracies rarely are. (Recall the late and unlamented Iron Curtain.) Thus transnationalism cannot easily be considered separately from the distinction between democracies and other kinds of states. Since it is substantially correlated with the “open” institutions of democratic politics, it cannot be treated analytically or empirically as an independent cause. 制度方法的一个有影响力的变体侧重于跨国主义：民主国家内部的个人自治和多元化促进了跨国联系和制度的出现--在个人、私人团体和政府机构之间。这些联系有助于和平解决跨国冲突，并通过与其他国家结成跨国联盟，抑制各国政府之间的暴力行动。这一观点源自国际一体化理论以及官僚政治和外交政策的经典著作。 ^(4){ }^{4} 然而，它与民主问题并非完全割裂开来。许多独立的权力和影响力中心所产生的多元化促进了民主政体的发展，而专制政体则不然。民主政体对许多私人和政府的跨国联系持开放态度；而专制政体则很少这样。(因此，不能简单地将跨国主义与民主政体和其他类型国家的区别割裂开来。由于跨国主义与民主政治的 "开放 "体制密切相关，因此不能将其作为一个独立的原因进行分析或实证。
Distance prevents war. Most wars are fought between physically adjacent states, thanks to their combination of capability and willingness (reasons) to fight neighbors. ^(5){ }^{5} Likewise, individuals are most likely to be murdered by friends and close relatives with whom they are are in constant contact. But until after World War II democracies tended to be relatively few and far between. Hence the absence of murderous quarrels between democracies was not too surprising, and may need-at least for the pre-1945 era-little further explanation. Even for much of the post- 距离阻碍战争。大多数战争都发生在实际相邻的国家之间，这要归功于这些国家具有与邻国作战的能力和意愿（原因）。 ^(5){ }^{5} 同样，个人最有可能被与之保持联系的朋友和近亲谋杀。但直到第二次世界大战后，民主国家往往相对较少。因此，民主国家之间没有谋杀争吵并不太令人吃惊，而且至少在 1945 年之前，可能不需要进一步解释。即使是在二战后的大部分时间里，民主国家之间也没有发生谋杀争吵。
1945 period, the rarity of contiguous democratic states outside of Western Europe might explain much of the absence of violent conflict between democracies. ^(6){ }^{6} Yet the more recent one’s snapshot of the international system, with many contiguous democracies in Europe and the Western Hemisphere, the less conclusive the distance argument seems. 在1945-1945年期间，西欧以外很少有毗连的民主国家，这在很大程度上可以解释为什么民主国家之间没有发生暴力冲突。 ^(6){ }^{6} 然而，国际体系越是在欧洲和西半球有许多毗连的民主国家，距离的论证似乎就越没有说服力。
Alliances make peace. Allies may be presumed to choose each other because of their common interests, and hence to be already peacefully. inclined toward each other. Moreover, their common interests are likely to concern security against a common enemy. If so, they are not likely to fight each other. Many democriacies have shared common interests in presenting a unified alliance front. NATO and the Western alliance system provide the most recent example, but in both world wars the democracies found themselves ranged together (with some nondemocracies alongside, to be sure) against the nondemocratic Central/Axis powers. ^(7){ }^{7} So of course democracies won’t fight each other. 结盟缔造和平。盟国之间的选择可能是出于共同利益的考虑，因此它们之间本来就有和平倾向。此外，它们的共同利益很可能涉及安全，以抵御共同的敌人。如果是这样，他们就不可能互相争斗。许多民主国家在展示统一的联盟阵线方面有着共同的利益。北约和西方联盟体系提供了最新的例子，但在两次世界大战中，民主国家都发现自己与非民主的中央/轴心国站在一起（当然也有一些非民主国家与之并肩作战）。 ^(7){ }^{7} 因此，民主国家当然不会互相争斗。
One trouble with this hypothesis is that it begs the question. Did they not fight each other because they were allied, or did they ally because they feared a common foe (and hence did not fight each other)? And if the latter, did they fear a common foe because they were united in a desire to preserve their common democratic institutions? If the latter, then democracy, not alliance, accounts for the peace among them. 这个假设的一个问题是，它引出了一个问题。他们是因结盟而不互相厮杀，还是因惧怕共同的敌人（因而不互相厮杀）而结盟？如果是后者，那么他们害怕共同的敌人，是因为他们团结一致，希望维护共同的民主制度吗？如果是后者，那么民主而非结盟才是他们之间和平的原因。
A related hypothesis accounts for peace among members of multilateral alliances not by the alliance per se, but by the active policy of a dominant major power to keep peace within the alliance. Such a hegemonic power may make it very clear to the small powers that in the interest of common security against a major power rival it simply will not tolerate violence among them. Surely in the Western Hemisphere (Rio Pact) and in NATO the United States played such a role, with threats to withhold economic and military assistance to the culprits. ^(8){ }^{8} 与此相关的一个假设认为，多边联盟成员之间的和平不是靠联盟本身，而是靠占主导地位的大国在联盟内部维持和平的积极政策。这样一个霸权国家可能会向小国明确表示，为了共同安全，它不会容忍小国之间发生暴力，以对抗大国对手。当然，在西半球（《里约公约》）和北约中，美国就扮演了这样的角色，威胁不向罪犯提供经济和军事援助。 ^(8){ }^{8}
The trouble with this variant of the hypothesis, however, is that as a generalization it is empirically backward. Repeated systematic analyses, beginning with Bueno de Mesquita’s (1981), affirm that allies are in general more likely to fight each other, even while still formally allied, than are nonallies. Again, the reasons are not so mysterious: the apparently “common” interests may be enforced by a big power with the capability and will to keep straying allies in the fold. Military action by the Soviet Union against Hungary in 1956 provides an example. Consistent with this interpretation, Bremer (1992a) finds allied states likely to fight each other when both states are militarized. But democratic allied states are different; they are not likely to have violent conflicts with each other ( Si verson and Emmons 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 16667). 然而，这一假设变体的问题在于，作为一种概括，它在经验上是落后的。从布埃诺-德-梅斯基塔（Bueno de Mesquita，1981 年）开始的反复系统分析证实，盟国之间即使仍是正式的盟国，也比非盟国更有可能相互争斗。同样，原因也并不神秘：表面上的 "共同 "利益可能是由一个有能力、有意愿将游离于盟友之外的大国强制实现的。1956 年苏联对匈牙利采取的军事行动就是一个例子。布雷默（Bremer，1992a）发现，与这一解释相一致的是，当盟国都军事化时，盟国之间很可能会发生战争。但民主盟国则不同，它们之间不可能发生暴力冲突（Si verson 和 Emmons，1991 年；Bueno de Mesquita 和 Lalman，1992 年，第 16667 页）。
Wealth makes peace. Since democracies are often wealthy, it can be hard to separate their effects. Several variants of this argument persist. One is that for politically stable, economically advanced, and rapidly growing countries the cost/benefit ratio of any war fought on or near their home territories with another advanced state looks extraordinarily unpromising. Historically many wars have been fought to acquire territory; the value of acquiring as war booty the territory of an advanced industrial country would rarely compensate for the costs of wartime destruction and the problems of pacifying newly incorporated peoples (Mueller 1989; Shepherd 1986). The disincentives would be magnified for highly interdependent economies, which suffer even from damage inflicted on each other’s territory that destroys investments, markets, or sources of imports. Interdependence also creates groups with vested interests in continuing economic exchange (Rosecrance 1986; Milner 1988). 财富造就和平。由于民主国家通常都很富裕，因此很难将两者的影响区分开来。这种说法有几种变体。一种观点认为，对于政治稳定、经济发达、发展迅速的国家来说，在本土或本土附近与另一个先进国家进行任何战争的成本/收益比都非常不乐观。历史上，许多战争都是为了获取领土而进行的；获取一个先进工业国家的领土作为战利品的价值，很少能弥补战时破坏的代价和安抚新并入的人民的问题（Mueller 1989；Shepherd 1986）。对于高度相互依存的经济体来说，这种抑制因素会被放大，因为它们甚至会因为彼此的领土遭到破坏而导致投资、市场或进口来源受损。相互依存还产生了在持续经济交流中拥有既得利益的群体（Rosecrance，1986 年；Milner，1988 年）。
The wealth-makes-peace argument is thus closely related to the one that transnational interests of trade and investment make peace. Writers as various as the nineteenth-century liberal Richard Cobden, the Marxist Karl Kautsky, and Joseph Schumpeter argued that the web of economic interdependence would promote international peace. Yet Lenin and other theorists of imperialism opined otherwise. Economic interdependence, for example between the United States and Japan, provides both glue and friction. Even where a relationship between trade and peace can be demonstrated, there may be a chicken-and-egg problem. Weak economicuties within the industrialized world during the Depression help explain the political tensions that produced World War II, but after that war peaceful relations were largely established before high levels of economic interdependence were reached in the 1970s (Russett and Starr 1992, 385-92). Some systematic evidence indicates that trade diminishes political conflict, with the party receiving greater benefits from trade acting on greater incentives (Gasiorowski and Polacheck 1982; Polachek 1980). But if one party perceives the benefits as markedly asymmetrical against it, the effects are not pacific. Trade between rich and poor states may concentrate on raw materials, with the threat of military action by the rich state in the background or forefront. Other research (Pollins 1989a, b) points the primary causal arrow from political relations to economic ones (“trade follows the flag”) rather than the other way. As with other generalizations, the conclusions are often context-dependent or indeterminate (Russett 1967; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 289). 因此，财富造就和平的论点与跨国贸易和投资利益造就和平的论点密切相关。十九世纪的自由主义者理查德-科布登、马克思主义者卡尔-考茨基和约瑟夫-熊彼特等作家都认为，经济相互依存的网络将促进国际和平。然而，列宁和其他帝国主义理论家却不这么认为。经济上的相互依存，例如美国和日本之间的相互依存，既是粘合剂，也是摩擦力。即使可以证明贸易与和平之间的关系，也可能存在鸡生蛋、蛋生鸡的问题。大萧条时期工业化世界内部经济责任薄弱，这有助于解释导致第二次世界大战的政治紧张局势，但战后，在 20 世纪 70 年代达到高度经济相互依存之前，和平关系已基本建立（Russett 和 Starr，1992 年，385-92 页）。一些系统性证据表明，贸易会减少政治冲突，因为从贸易中获得更大利益的一方会受到更大的激励（Gasiorowski 和 Polacheck，1982 年；Polachek，1980 年）。但是，如果一方认为贸易带来的利益对其明显不对称，那么贸易的影响就不是和平的。富国与穷国之间的贸易可能会集中在原材料上，而富国的军事行动威胁则处于背景或前沿。其他研究（Pollins 1989a，b）将主要因果箭头从政治关系指向经济关系（"贸易跟着国旗走"），而不是相反。与其他概括一样，结论往往取决于具体情况或不确定（Russett，1967 年；Bueno de Mesquita 和 Lalman，1992 年，289 页）。
Yet another variant of the wealth-makes-peace view emphasizes growth. Many democracies have experienced fairly consistent rapid economic growth during the past half-century. Rapidly growing states may generally be less inclined to initiate conflict. The reasons are similar to those regarding the connection between wealth and lack of conflict. A 财富造就和平观点的另一种变体强调增长。在过去的半个世纪里，许多民主国家都经历了相当持续的快速经济增长。快速增长的国家一般可能不太愿意挑起冲突。其原因与财富与不发生冲突之间的关系类似。A
special case, however, may be made regarding growth in democracies. States often engage in international conflict to divert attention and anger from domestic problems (Levy 1989). Democratic governments are not immune to such temptations. They often initiate international disputes during economic slowdowns or recessions, or if in economic difficulty respond more aggressively. when others initiate disputes.(Ostrom and Job 1986; Russett 1990, chap. 2; Russett and Barzilai 1991; Mintz and Russett 1992). But rapidly growing democracies would not have such an incentive for conflict between them. 然而，民主国家的增长也有其特殊性。国家经常参与国际冲突，以转移对国内问题的关注和愤怒（Levy，1989 年）。民主政府也难免受到这种诱惑。它们经常在经济放缓或衰退时挑起国际争端，或者在经济困难时，在其他国家挑起争端时做出更激烈的反应（Ostrom 和 Job，1986 年；Russett，1990 年，第 2 章；Russett 和 Barzilai，1991 年；Mintz 和 Russett，1992 年）。但是，快速发展的民主国家不会有这样的动机在它们之间制造冲突。
Political stability makes peace. The diversionary effects of economic instability are related to those of political instability. States with stable and durable political systems will lack incentives to externalize domestic discontent into conflict with foreign countries. They will be even more reluctant to engage in conflict against other states that are politically stable. If they see the government of the would-be opponent as possessing substantial legitimacy, they will expect the population at large, and those sectors of society that have ensured domestic stability, to back it in international conflict (Huth and Russett 1993, Maoz 1989). Unstable governments have more to gain from scapegoating and diversion, and are more likely to do so when they confront an adversary that faces substantial domestic political problems. 政治稳定造就和平。经济不稳定的转移效应与政治不稳定的转移效应相关。政治制度稳定持久的国家缺乏将国内不满外化为与外国冲突的动力。它们甚至更不愿意与其他政治稳定的国家发生冲突。如果他们认为潜在对手的政府拥有强大的合法性，他们就会期望广大民众以及那些确保国内稳定的社会阶层在国际冲突中支持政府（Huth 和 Russett，1993 年；Maoz，1989 年）。不稳定的政府从替罪羊和转移视线中获益更多，当他们面对一个面临重大国内政治问题的对手时，更有可能这样做。
If stable governments are less likely to initiate international disputes, especially against other stable governments; it is important to note that twentieth-century European and Anglo-American democracies were generally more stable-more durable and adaptable-than were nondemocracies (Gurr 1974). The more years a given type of political systemlasts, the better its odds of surviving another year. Perhaps the inherent stability that characterizes many democratic political systems accounts for their low rate of conflict with other democracies. In fact, the combination of variables denoted as stable democracy becomes a component of the theory to be developed and tested in this book. 如果稳定的政府不太可能挑起国际争端，尤其是针对其他稳定的政府；值得注意的是，20 世纪欧洲和英美的民主政体通常比非民主政体更加稳定--更加持久和适应性更强（Gurr，1974 年）。某类政治制度持续的年数越长，其再存活一年的几率就越大。许多民主政治制度固有的稳定性也许是它们与其他民主国家冲突率低的原因。事实上，被称为稳定民主的变量组合是本书所要发展和检验的理论的一个组成部分。
Conceptually and empirically the competing explanations overlap somewhat and reinforce each other. Some of them are quite plausible. The network of international institutions has been strongest in the past half-century among the democratic, allied, prosperous, and politically stable states of Western Europe. Yet counterexamples can be cited for each proffered explanation. There have not been wars even between poor but democratic states, yet World War II is an obvious example of a war pitting advanced capitalist states against each other. Argentina and Britain fought in 1982 despite their common alliance with the United States. The Soviet Union, after achieving apparent stability by the early 1920s, nevertheless fought four wars. Later we will analyze the incidence of wars 从概念和经验上看，这些相互竞争的解释有一些重叠，并相互加强。其中一些解释非常合理。在过去的半个世纪里，国际机构网络在民主、结盟、繁荣、政治稳定的西欧国家中最为强大。然而，每一种解释都可以举出反例。即使在贫穷但民主的国家之间也没有发生过战争，但第二次世界大战却是先进资本主义国家相互对立的明显例子。尽管阿根廷和英国与美国结成了共同的同盟，但它们还是在 1982 年打了起来。苏联在 20 世纪 20 年代初实现了表面上的稳定之后，还是打了四场战争。稍后我们将分析战争的发生率
and less violent conflicts between states in the post-1945 era, with proper statistical controls to test many of the above alternative hypotheses. Even when controls for physical distance, alliance, wealth, economic growth, and political stability are incorporated into the analysis, an independent explanatory role for democracy remains. ^(9){ }^{9} Nevertheless, no merely empirical relationship can be compelling without a powerful theoretical explanation. Nor can it be clear how widely, in different historical and cultural contexts, the relationship may apply. Two kinds of theories, one stressing norms and the other stressing political structures, offer explanations to which we now turn. 通过适当的统计控制来检验上述替代假设。即使将物理距离、联盟、财富、经济增长和政治稳定性等控制因素纳入分析，民主的独立解释作用依然存在。 ^(9){ }^{9} 尽管如此，如果没有强有力的理论解释，单纯的经验关系是无法令人信服的。我们也不清楚，在不同的历史和文化背景下，这种关系的适用范围有多广。有两种理论（一种强调规范，另一种强调政治结构）提供了我们现在要讨论的解释。
Democratic Norms and Culture? 民主规范与文化？
We should begin with the common assertion that democracies are inherently more peaceful or “dovish” internationally because of the political culture favoring the peaceful resolution of disputes, or because democratic processes produce restraint by the general populace which will have to pay the price of war in blood and money (Schumpeter 1955; Snyder 1991). Individual examples of the operation of these factors can easily be found. Over the course of a long war democratic governments may experience seriously eroding domestic support for the war effort, and may feel constrained, if they do go to war, to pursue strategies designed to minimize their own costs, especially in casualties. (U.S. strategy against Iraq in 1991 immediately comes to mind.) 我们应该从这样一个常见的论断开始，即民主政体在国际上本质上更加和平或 "鸽派"，这是因为其政治文化倾向于和平解决争端，或者是因为民主进程使广大民众保持克制，而战争的代价是流血和金钱（熊彼特，1955 年；斯奈德，1991 年）。这些因素发挥作用的实例不难找到。在长期战争过程中，民主政府可能会遇到国内对战争努力的支持被严重削弱的情况，如果他们真的参战，他们可能会感到受到限制，不得不采取旨在尽量减少自身代价，尤其是伤亡的战略。(美国在 1991 年对伊拉克采取的战略就是一例）。
This is a strong assertion, however, and, overall, the evidence for it as a generalization is not very compelling. ^(10){ }^{10} It ignores the evidence for the familiar “rally 'round the flag effect” typically induced by the threat or use of force by democracies against other countries. Hostility especially to certain kinds of foreigners-those seen as governed autocratically-can often be mobilized to support military actions by democracies (Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz 1993; Mintz and Geva 1993). Elites can even feel impelled by popular pressures to act militarily (Russett 1990, chap. 2). Also, so long as this explanation focuses on the characteristics of single states, it cannot explain the consistent evidence that democracies are about as war-prone and disputatious in general (not toward other democracies) as are other kinds of states (recently, Maoz and Abdollali 1989; Bremer 1992a; chapter 4 of this volume). Nor can it explain the pattern of nineteenth- and twentieth-century imperialism by democracies. (On Snyder’s 1991 effort see Zakaria 1992.) And it would have us believe that the United States was regularly on the defensive, rarely on the offensive, during the Cold War. Though there are elements of plausibility in the argument that democracies are inherently peaceful, it contains too many 然而，这是一个强有力的论断，而且总体而言，它作为一种概括的证据并不十分令人信服。 ^(10){ }^{10} 它忽略了民主国家对其他国家进行武力威胁或使用武力时通常会产生的 "围旗效应 "的证据。尤其是对某些类型的外国人--那些被视为专制统治的外国人--的敌意常常会被调动起来，以支持民主国家的军事行动（Geva、DeRouen 和 Mintz，1993 年；Mintz 和 Geva，1993 年）。精英们甚至会迫于民众的压力而采取军事行动（Russett，1990 年，第 2 章）。此外，只要这种解释侧重于单个国家的特征，它就无法解释以下一致的证据，即民主政体与其他类型的国家一样，普遍容易发生战争和争端（而不是针对其他民主政体）（最近，Maoz 和 Abdollali 1989；Bremer 1992a；本卷第 4 章）。它也无法解释 19 世纪和 20 世纪民主国家的帝国主义模式。(关于斯奈德在 1991 年所做的努力，见扎卡里亚，1992 年。）它会让我们相信，美国在冷战期间经常处于守势，很少处于攻势。虽然民主政体本质上是和平的这一论点有其合理性，但它包含了太多的不确定性。
holes, and is accompanied by too many exceptions, to be usable as a major theoretical building block: 孔，而且伴随着太多的例外情况，因此不能作为主要的理论基础：
A more plausible theoretical strain, however, yields a more limited assumption. It focuses on powerful norms within democratic states against the use of lethal force under certain conditions-namely, “dovishness” in relations between democracies, though not necessarily in their relations with other kinds of states. Several authors offer a petspective emphasizing social diversity, perceptions of individual rights, overlapping group memberships, cross-pressures, shifting coalitions, expectations of limited gov-ernment, and toleration of dissent by a presumably loyal opposition. The basic norm of democratic theory is that disputes can be resolved without force through democratic political processes that in some balance ensure both majority rule and minority rights. A norm of equality operates both as voting equality and certain egalitarian rights to human dignity. Democratic government rests on the consent of the governed, but justice demands that consent not be abused. Resort to organized lethal violence, or the threat of it, is considered illegitimate, and unnecessary to secure one’s “legitimate” rights. Dissent within broad limits by a loyal opposition is expected and even needed for enlightened policy-making, and the oppoṣition’s basic loyalty to the system is to be assumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. ^(11){ }^{11} 然而，一种更为合理的理论倾向产生了一种更为有限的假设。它侧重于民主国家内部反对在某些条件下使用致命武力的强大规范--即民主国家之间关系中的 "鸽派"，尽管它们与其他类型国家的关系不一定如此。一些作者提出了一种观点，强调社会多样性、对个人权利的认识、重叠的群体成员、交叉压力、不断变化的联盟、对有限政府的期望，以及对假定忠诚的反对派提出的异议的容忍。民主理论的基本准则是，可以通过民主政治程序在不使用武力的情况下解决争端，这些程序在某种程度上既能确保多数人的统治，又能确保少数人的权利。平等准则既包括投票平等，也包括某些平等的人格尊严权利。民主政府以被统治者的同意为基础，但正义要求这种同意不得被滥用。诉诸或威胁诉诸有组织的致命暴力被认为是不合法的，对于确保个人的 "合法 "权利也是不必要的。忠实的反对派在广泛的范围内提出不同意见是意料之中的，甚至是开明决策所需要的，在没有相反证据的情况下，反对派对制度的基本忠诚是可以假定的。 ^(11){ }^{11}
All participants in the political process are expected to share these norms. Even though all these images may be founded to a large extent on myth as well as on reality, they may operate as powerful restraints on violence between such systems. In practice the norms do sornetimes break down, but the normative restraints on violent behavior-by state and citizens-are fully as important as the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force in keeping incidents of the organized use of force rare. The norms themselves may be more important than any particular institutional structure (two-party/multiparty, republican/parliamentary) or formal constitutional provision. If institutions precede the development of norms in the polity, the basis for restraint is likely to be less secure. 政治进程的所有参与者都应遵守这些规范。尽管所有这些形象在很大程度上都是建立在神话和现实的基础上的，但它们可以对这些体系之间的暴力行为起到强有力的约束作用。在实践中，这些规范有时确实会被打破，但国家和公民对暴力行为的规范性约束，与国家对合法使用武力的垄断权一样重要，可以使有组织使用武力的事件保持罕见。规范本身可能比任何特定的制度结构（两党制/多党制、共和制/议会制）或正式的宪法规定更为重要。如果体制先于政体中规范的发展，那么克制的基础就可能不那么稳固。
By this hypothesis, the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries. In short, if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live-and-let-live, they will respect the rights of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite. The same structures and behaviors that “we” assume will limit our aggression, both internally and externally, may be expected similarly to limit similarly 根据这一假设，允许在国内妥协并和平解决冲突而不以暴力相威胁的文化、观念和做法，也适用于跨越国界的其他民主国家。简而言之，如果一个民主国家的人民认为自己是自主、自治的人民，共享 "生存与放任 "的准则，那么他们就会尊重他人的自决权，如果这些他人也被认为是自治的，因而不会轻易被自私自利的精英们引向侵略性的外交政策。我们 "认为会限制我们对内对外侵略的结构和行为，同样也会限制我们对内对外侵略的结构和行为。
governed people in other polities. Those who claim the principle of selfdetermination for themselves are expected to extend it to others. Within a transnational democratic culture, as within a democratic nation, others are seen as possessing rights and exercising those rights in a spirit of enlightened self-interest. Acknowledgment of those rights allows us to mitigate our fears that they will try to dominate us. That acknowledgement also prevents us from wishing to dominate them; a norm that it would be wrong to do so in effect raises the “costs” to us of doing so. 在其他政体中受统治的人民。那些为自己主张自决原则的人理应将这一原则推广到其他人身上。在跨国民主文化中，如同在民主国家中一样，他人被视为拥有权利，并本着开明自利的精神行使这些权利。承认他人的权利可以减轻我们对他人试图支配我们的恐惧。承认这些权利还能防止我们想要支配他们；认为这样做是错误的准则实际上提高了我们这样做的 "成本"。
By contrast, these restraints do not apply toward a country governed by very different and nondemocratic principles. According to democratic norms, authoritarian states do not rest on the proper consent of the governed, and thus they cannot properly represent the will of their peoplesif they did, they would not need to rule through undemocratic, authoritarian institutions. Rulers who control their own people by such means, who do not behave in a just way that respects their own people’s rights to self-determination, cannot be expected to behave better toward peoples outside their states. “Because non-liberal governments are in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity” (Doyle 1986, 1161). The essence of America’s Cold War ideology was that it had no quarrel with the Russian people, but only with the atheistic communist elites who repressed them. A vision of the other people as not in self-governing control of their own destiny justified a hostile policy. Authoritarian states are expected to aggress against others if given the power and the opportunity. By this reasoning, democracies must be eternally vigilant and may even need to engage in defensively motivated war or preemptive action anticipating an immediate attack. 相比之下，这些限制并不适用于以截然不同的非民主原则治理的国家。根据民主准则，专制国家并不以被统治者的适当同意为基础，因此它们无法适当代表本国人民的意愿，如果它们能够代表本国人民的意愿，它们就不需要通过非民主的专制机构进行统治。如果统治者通过这种方式控制本国人民，不以尊重本国人民自决权的公正方式行事，就不能指望他们对本国以外的人民表现得更好。"由于非自由主义国家政府对本国人民处于侵略状态，它们的对外关系对于自由主义国家政府来说就变得非常可疑。简而言之，自由派同胞得益于友好的假定，而非自由派同胞则遭受敌意的假定"（Doyle 1986, 1161）。美国冷战意识形态的精髓在于，它与俄罗斯人民并无过节，而只是与镇压俄罗斯人民的无神论共产主义精英有过节。认为他国人民无法自主掌握自己的命运，这为美国的敌对政策提供了理由。如果有权力和机会，专制国家就会对其他国家进行侵略。根据这一推理，民主国家必须时刻保持警惕，甚至可能需要发动出于防御动机的战争或先发制人的行动，以应对即将到来的攻击。
Whereas wars against other democratic states are neither expected nor considered legitimate, wars against authoritarian states may often be both. Thus an international system composed of both democratic and authoritarian states will include both zones of peace (actual and expected, among the democracies) and zones of war or at best deterrence betwen democratic and authoritarian states. And by this reasoning democracies may fight wars and other lethal conflicts as often as authoritarian states do-which is what most of the systematic empirical evidence indicates. They just will not fight each other. 针对其他民主国家的战争既不是预期的，也不被认为是合法的，而针对独裁国家的战争往往两者兼而有之。因此，由民主国家和专制国家组成的国际体系既包括和平区（民主国家之间的实际和平区和预期和平区），也包括民主国家和专制国家之间的战争区或最多是威慑区。根据这一推理，民主国家可能会像专制国家一样经常发生战争和其他致命冲突--这也是大多数系统性经验证据所表明的。它们只是不会互相争斗而已。
The presumption of enmity from and toward nondemocracies was exemplified by American determination to root out aggressive fascism and Nazism in Japan and Germany after World War II, and to establish the basis for democratic government there. It took more dubious forms in many Cold War interventions (including covert operations, which we shall consider later) and in the 1989 invasion of Panama. Elihu Root’s 二战后，美国决心铲除日本和德国的侵略性法西斯主义和纳粹主义，并在那里建立民主政府的基础，这就是敌视非民主国家的假定的例证。冷战时期的许多干预行动（包括秘密行动，我们将在下文中讨论）以及 1989 年入侵巴拿马的行动则表现得更加可疑。伊莱休-鲁特的
(1917) wartime rhetoric, in his presidential address to the American Society of International Law, expressed the tradition vividly: (1917 年）在美国国际法学会发表的主席演说中，生动地表达了这一传统：
So long as military autocracy continues, democracy is not safe from attacks, which are certain to come, and certain to find it unprepared. The conflict is inevitable and universal; and it is à l’outrance. To be safe democracy must kill its enemy when it can and where it can. The world can not be half democratic and half autocratic. It must be all democratic or all Prussian. There can be no compromise. If it is all Prussian, there can be no real international law. If it is all democratic, international law honored and observed may well be expected as a natural development of the principles which make democratic self-government possible. 只要军事专制还在继续，民主就无法免遭攻击，因为攻击一定会到来，而且一定会让民主措手不及。冲突是不可避免的，也是普遍存在的；冲突是不可避免的，也是普遍存在的。为了安全起见，民主必须随时随地杀敌。世界不能一半民主一半专制。它必须是全民主或全普鲁士。不能妥协。如果全是普鲁士，就不可能有真正的国际法。如果世界是民主的，那么国际法就会得到尊重和遵守，这是民主自治原则的自然发展。
These assumptions lead to the following propositions about democracies’ external relations. The norms of regulated political competition, compromise solutions to political conflicts, and peaceful transfer of power are externalized by democracies in their dealing with other national actors in world politics. On the other hand, nondemocracies may not externalize these norms. Hence, when two democracies come into a conflict of interest, they are able to apply democratic norms in their interaction, and these norms prevent most conflicts from mounting to the threat or use of military force: If they do go that far, at least they will not go to all-out war. By contrast, when a democracy comes into conflict with a nondemocracy, it will not expect the nondemocratic state to be restrained by those norms. It may feel obliged to adapt to the harsher norms of international conduct of the latter, lest it be exploited or eliminated by the nondemocratic state that takes advantage of the inherent moderation of democracies. Similarly, conflict between nondemocracies may be dominated by the norm of forceful conduct and search for decisive (noncompromise) outcome or elimination of the adversary. 根据这些假设，我们对民主政体的对外关系提出了以下命题。民主政体在与世界政治中的其他国家行为体打交道时，会将规范的政治竞争、政治冲突的妥协解决方案以及权力的和平转移等准则外部化。另一方面，非民主国家可能不会将这些准则外部化。因此，当两个民主国家发生利益冲突时，它们能够在互动中运用民主准则，而这些准则能够防止大多数冲突发展到威胁使用或使用军事力量的地步：即使冲突发展到那一步，至少也不会爆发全面战争。相比之下，当一个民主国家与一个非民主国家发生冲突时，它不会指望非民主国家会受到这些准则的约束。它可能会觉得自己有义务适应后者更为严苛的国际行为准则，以免被非民主国家利用民主国家固有的温和性而加以利用或消灭。同样，非民主国家之间的冲突也可能以武力行为准则为主导，寻求决定性（不妥协）结果或消灭对手。
Axelrod’s (1984, 1986; also Behr 1980; Dacey and Pendegraft 1988) work on the evolution of cooperation and norms shows how norms of behavior depend heavily on the environment in which they are applied. When a player employing a conditionally cooperative strategy like tit-for-tat is confronted by someone playing a consistently noncooperative strategy, noncooperation dominates. Short of teaching cooperation to “meanies”-which takes a long time-noncooperative strategies typically force cooperative strategies to become noncooperative. ^(12){ }^{12} 阿克塞尔罗德（Axelrod，1984 年、1986 年；另见贝尔，1980 年；戴西和彭德格拉夫，1988 年）关于合作与规范演变的研究表明，行为规范在很大程度上取决于其适用的环境。当一个采用有条件合作策略（如针锋相对）的棋手遇到一个始终采用非合作策略的棋手时，非合作就会占主导地位。非合作策略通常会迫使合作策略变成非合作策略。 ^(12){ }^{12}
Legal systems in democratic states seem to make distinctions between democratic and authoritarian states when deciding whether to enforce in their own courts the laws of other nations. Other democratic states are recognized as within a “zone of law,” a legal community defined by various institutional and ideological similarities. Courts in democracies share enough common values to recognize and enforce each other’s law in 民主国家的法律制度在决定是否在本国法院执行其他国家的法律时，似乎会对民主国家和专制国家加以区分。其他民主国家被视为 "法律区 "内的国家，这是一个由各种制度和意识形态相似性所界定的法律共同体。民主国家的法院有足够多的共同价值观，可以在以下情况下承认并执行对方的法律
accord with pluralist principles of tolerance and reciprocity. They do not, however, recognize the legal systems of nondemocratic states as equal partners; they are seen as lacking the political autonomy of democratic legal systems, and hence not appropriate as providing norms for conflict resolution (Burley 1992). 符合宽容和互惠的多元化原则。然而，它们并不承认非民主国家的法律体系是平等的合作伙伴；它们被视为缺乏民主法律体系的政治自主性，因此不适合作为解决冲突的准则（伯利，1992 年）。
Governments and political institutions can change rapidly after a revolution, but norms take time to develop. Laws can change faster than the practices in which norms are embedded. Formal norms such as one of nonrecourse to war can be written into a constitution, but become effective only with the repeated practice of bargaining and conciliation (Kratochwil 1991). Thus if violent conflicts between democracies do occur, we would expect them to take place between democratic states that are relatively young in terms of the tenure of the democratic regime. That is, they would occur between states in at least one of which democratic norms have not matured to a degree that is expressed in moderate and dependable strategies of peaceful conflict management. Democratic governments in which democratic norms are not yet fully developed are likely to be unstable, or to be perceived by other states as unstable, so they may be unable to practice norms of democratic conflict resolution internationally. Equally important, the democratic states with whom they develop conflicts of interest may not perceive them as dependable in their practices. Newness and instability cloud others’ perceptions. 革命之后，政府和政治体制可以迅速改变，但规范的制定需要时间。法律的变化速度可能快于规范所蕴含的实践。像不诉诸战争这样的正式规范可以写入宪法，但只有在反复的讨价还价与和解实践中才能生效（Kratochwil，1991 年）。因此，如果民主国家之间真的发生了暴力冲突，我们预计这些冲突会发生在民主政权相对年轻的民主国家之间。也就是说，至少有一个国家的民主准则还没有成熟到可以通过温和、可靠的和平冲突管理策略表现出来的程度。民主准则尚未完全成熟的民主政府很可能是不稳定的，或被其他国家视为不稳定的，因此它们可能无法在国际上实践民主解决冲突的准则。同样重要的是，与它们发生利益冲突的民主国家可能认为它们的做法不可靠。新生事物和不稳定性会影响其他国家的看法。
Of course, democracies have not fought wars only out of motivations of self-defense, however broadly one may define self-defense to include anticipation of others’ aggression or to include “extended deterrence” for the defense of allies and other interests. Many of them have also fought imperialist wars to acquire or hold colonies, or to retain control of states formally independent but within their spheres of influence. Here is another aspect of perception and misperception, of cases where democracies have fought against people who on one ground or another could be characterized as not self-governing. 当然，民主国家并不只是出于自卫的动机才发动战争，无论人们对自卫的定义有多么宽泛，包括防备他国侵略，或包括为保卫盟国和其他利益而进行的 "延伸威慑"。它们中的许多国家还进行帝国主义战争，以获取或占有殖民地，或保持对形式上独立但在其势力范围内的国家的控制。这里还涉及另一个方面的认识和误解，即民主国家曾与基于某种原因可被定性为非自治国家的人民交战。
The nineteenth-century objects of colonial expansion were peoples who in most instances were outside the European state system. They were in most instances not people with white skins, and whose institutions of government did not conform to the Western democratic institutional forms of their colonizers. Europeans’ ethnocentric views of those peoples carried the assumption that they did not have institutions of self-government. Not only were they available for imperial aggrandizement, they could be considered candidates for betterment and even "liberation"the white man’s burden, or mission civilatrice. They could be brought the benefits not only of modern material civilization, but of Western principles of self-government. If they did not have such institutions already, then by definition they were already being exploited and repressed. Their 十九世纪殖民扩张的对象在大多数情况下是欧洲国家体系之外的民族。在大多数情况下，他们不是白种人，其政府机构也不符合殖民者的西方民主体制形式。欧洲人对这些民族的种族中心主义观点认为他们没有自治机构。他们不仅是帝国扩张的对象，而且可以被视为改善甚至 "解放 "的候选者，即白人的负担或文明使命。他们不仅可以享受现代物质文明的好处，还可以享受西方自治原则的好处。如果他们还没有这样的制度，那么顾名思义，他们已经受到了剥削和压迫。他们的
governments or tribal leaders could not, in this ethnocentric view, be just or consensual, and thus one need have few compunctions about conquering these legitimate candidates for “liberal” imperialism. ^(13){ }^{13} Later; when Western forms of self-government did begin to take root on a local basis in many of the colonies, the extremes of pseudo-Darwinian racism. lost their legitimacy. Decolonization came not only because the colonial governments lost the power to retain their colonies, but because in many cases they lost confidence in their normative right to rule. 在这种以种族为中心的观点看来，政府或部落首领不可能是公正的或双方同意的，因此人们在征服这些 "自由 "帝国主义的合法候选者时就不会有什么顾虑了。 ^(13){ }^{13} 后来，当西方的自治形式开始在许多殖民地扎根时，伪达尔文主义的极端种族主义就失去了合法性。非殖民化的出现不仅是因为殖民地政府失去了保留殖民地的权力，还因为在很多情况下，殖民地政府对自己的规范统治权失去了信心。
We can now summarize all this discussion about restraints on violent conflict among democracies in a set of propositions as follows. 现在，我们可以用以下一组命题来概括所有这些关于限制民主国家间暴力冲突的讨论。
The Cultural Normative Model 文化规范模式
In relations with other states, decisionmakers (whether they be few or many) will try to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as have been developed within and characterize their domestic political processes. 在与其他国家的关系中，决策者（无论是少数还是多数）都会努力遵循在其国内政治进程中形成并成为其特点的解决冲突准则。
They will expect decisionmakers in other states likewise to follow the same norms of confict resolution as have been developed within and characterize those other states’ domestic political processes. 他们将期望其他国家的决策者同样遵循在这些其他国家的国内政治进程中形成并成为其特点的冲突解决准则。
A. Violent conflicts between democracies will be rare because: A.民主国家之间很少发生暴力冲突，因为
In democracies, the relevant decisionmakers expect to be able to resolve conflicts by compromise and nonviolence, respecting the rights and continued existence of opponents. 在民主国家，相关决策者希望能够通过妥协和非暴力的方式解决冲突，尊重反对者的权利和继续生存的权利。
Therefore democracies will follow norms of peaceful conflict resolution with other democracies, and will expect other democracies to do so with them. 因此，民主国家将遵循与其他民主国家和平解决冲突的准则，并期望其他民主国家也这样做。
The more stable the democracy, the more will democratic-norms govern its behavior with other democracies, and the more will other democracies expect democratic norms to govern its international behavior. 民主政体越稳定，其与其他民主政体的行为就越受民主准则的约束，其他民主政体也就越期待民主准则来约束其国际行为。
If violent conflicts between democracies do occur, at least one of the democracies is likely to be politically unstable. 如果民主国家之间真的发生暴力冲突，那么至少有一个民主国家很可能政局不稳。
B. Violent conflicts between nondemocracies, and between democracies and nondemocracies, will be more frequent because: B.非民主国家之间以及民主国家与非民主国家之间的暴力冲突会更加频繁，因为
In nondemocracies, decisionmakers use, and may expect their opponents to use, violence and the threat of violence to resolve conflict as part of their domestic political processes. 在非民主国家，作为国内政治进程的一部分，决策者使用暴力和威胁使用暴力来解决冲突，他们也可能希望对手使用暴力和威胁使用暴力来解决冲突。
Therefore nondemocracies may use violence and the threat of violence in conflicts with other states, and other states may expect them to use violence and the threat of violence in such conflicts. 因此，非民主国家可能会在与其他国家的冲突中使用暴力和威胁使用暴力，而其他国家也可能期望它们在此类冲突中使用暴力和威胁使用暴力。
Democratic norms can be more easily exploited to force concessions than can nondemocratic ones; to avoid exploitation democracies may adopt nondemocratic norms in dealing with nondemocracies: 与非民主规范相比，民主规范更容易被利用来迫使非民主国家做出让步；为了避免被利用，民主国家在与非民主国家打交道时可能会采用非民主规范：
The numbered propositions are part of the deductive structure, and whereas it will be useful further to illustrate their application and plausibility, we will not subject most of them to rigorous empirical testing. The basic empirical statements A and B, however, will be so tested, in the form that violent conflicts between democracies should be observed much less frequently than between democracies and nondemocracies. Indeed, because of the susceptibility of democratic norms to exploitation, we may well find violent conflicts between democracies and at least some kinds of nondemocracies to be more frequent than would be expected if conflicts were distributed around the international system totally by chance. Proposition 6, that if violent conflicts do arise between democracies at least one of the democracies is likely to be politically unstable, also is empirically testable. As such, it can provide some extra empirical content to the basic hypothesis about the relative frequency of violent conflict of democracies with other democracies and with nondemocracies. 这些编号命题是演绎结构的一部分，尽管进一步说明其应用和合理性是有用的，但我们不会对其中大部分命题进行严格的实证检验。不过，基本的经验陈述 A 和 B 将接受检验，即民主国家之间的暴力冲突应该比民主国家与非民主国家之间的冲突少得多。事实上，由于民主规范容易被利用，我们很可能会发现，民主国家与至少某些非民主国家之间的暴力冲突，要比如果冲突完全是偶然地分布在国际体系中的情况下所预期的更加频繁。命题 6 认为，如果民主国家之间确实发生了暴力冲突，那么其中至少有一个民主国家很可能政局不稳，这一命题也是可以通过实证检验的。因此，它可以为关于民主政体与其他民主政体和非民主政体之间暴力冲突相对频率的基本假设提供一些额外的经验内容。
Propositions 5 and 6 therefore incorporate into the cultural/normative theoretical structure the point about political stability that was initially treated as one of several alternative perspectives on the phenomenon of peace between democracies. They do not yet, however, indicate just why force might be used when one democracy in a pair is politically unstable. 因此，命题 5 和命题 6 将有关政治稳定的观点纳入了文化/规范理论结构，而这一观点最初被视为民主政体间和平现象的几种备选观点之一。然而，这两个命题还没有说明，当一对民主政体中的一个民主政体政治不稳定时，为什么会使用武力。
As noted in the discussion about the possible role of economic growth or its absence, increasing evidence is accumulating that democracies are more likely to use or threaten to use military force, in general, when the economy has been doing badly. Most of the studies cited there also indicate that democracies are more likely to use or threaten to use military force in the year or months immediately preceding an election. ^(14){ }^{14} The motivation, of diverting hostility toward foreigners and of producing a “rally 'round the flag” effect for the party in power, is similar. If we expand the notion of political instability to include domestic political threats to the government because of its economic policy shortcomings, or competition in a close election, this gives us a temporal context for the possible use of military force by democracies. It suggests that the “unstable” state will initiate, or escalate, the use of force in a diplomatic dispute. But it does not tell us against whom it may direct that force. 正如在讨论经济增长或经济不增长的可能作用时所指出的，越来越多的证据表明，一般来说，当经济表现不佳时，民主国家更有可能使用或威胁使用军事力量。其中引用的大多数研究还表明，民主国家在大选前一年或几个月更有可能使用或威胁使用军事力量。 ^(14){ }^{14} 其动机是相似的，都是为了转移对外国人的敌意，并为执政党产生 "团结一致 "的效果。如果我们将政治不稳定的概念扩大到包括因经济政策缺陷或选举竞争激烈而对政府造成的国内政治威胁，这就为我们提供了民主国家可能使用军事力量的时间背景。这表明，"不稳定 "的国家会在外交争端中发起或升级使用武力。但这并没有告诉我们它可能对谁使用武力。
To do that, we can elaborate the hypothesis as suggesting that the threat or use of force will be directed against states that a democracy perceives as politically unstable. At least two possible reasons for this come to mind: The state may see an unstable democratic regime as under these political pressures, and hence as a real danger needing to be forcibly constrained or deterred. Alternatively, an unstable democratic regime may seem a publicly more legitimate and acceptable object for diverting hostility and provoking a 'rally effect. That is, the government may truly feel itself threatened in some degree by such a regime, or, if not, it may 为此，我们可以将这一假设解释为，武力威胁或使用武力将针对民主国家认为政治不稳定的国家。我们至少可以想到两个可能的原因：国家可能认为一个不稳定的民主政权正承受着这些政治压力，因此是一个需要武力制约或威慑的真正危险。或者，一个不稳定的民主政权似乎是一个更合法、更容易被公众接受的对象，可以转移敌意，激起 "反弹效应"。也就是说，政府可能真的觉得自己在某种程度上受到了这样一个政权的威胁，或者，如果不是这样，它可能会
believe that the public will at least accept perception of a threat. If the adversary is perceived as a stable democracy, by contrast, the cultural/ normative argument suggests little political beneft in trying to invoke a rally against it. Thus instability may work both as encouraging the use or threat of force by the “unstable” regime, and in selecting an “unstable” object for the exercise of force. 相信公众至少会接受威胁的概念。相反，如果对手被认为是一个稳定的民主国家，那么从文化/规范的角度来看，试图唤起人们对它的反弹在政治上并无多大益处。因此，不稳定既可以鼓励 "不稳定 "的政权使用或威胁使用武力，也可以选择 "不稳定 "的对象使用武力。
Empirically it will be very difficult to sort out the mechanism systematically. Even in the 1946-86 period with many democracies in the international system, table 1.2 showed only fourteen militarized disputes between democracies. In their manifestation of threat or use of force all of them were extremely localized, typically an air incursion or shelling in the general direction of a boat lasting a single day. None were reciprocated uses of military force, in which the attacked party made any military reprisal, and nearly all of them were bloodless. Most could plausibly have been unauthorized acts by local commanders. In most instances it is hard to show that they were deliberate and considered governmental acts of the sort plausibly included under the rubric of politically motivated incidents just discussed. And while one can identify who actually used force or first threatened to use it, it is not so easy to say which side played the greater role in provoking the incident. Thus one should not expect to find a systematic pattern of motivation in such low-level incidents. In nearwars, however-where the level of violence may be greater, and the degree of central control and deliberate act may be stronger-we may find some such evidence. 从经验上讲，要系统地理清这一机制非常困难。即使在国际体系中有许多民主国家的 1946-86 年期间，表 1.2 也只显示了民主国家之间的 14 起军事化争端。在武力威胁或使用武力的表现形式上，所有这些争端都极为局部，通常是对一艘船的空中入侵或炮击，持续时间只有一天。没有一次是对等使用军事力量，即被攻击方进行任何军事报复，而且几乎所有这些事件都是不流血的。大多数都可能是当地指挥官未经授权的行为。在大多数情况下，很难证明它们是蓄意的、被认为是政府行为的，也就是刚才讨论的出于政治动机的事件。虽然我们可以确定是谁实际使用了武力或首先威胁使用武力，但要说哪一方在挑起事件中发挥了更大的作用却不那么容易。因此，我们不应期望在此类低级事件中找到系统的动机模式。然而，在近战中--暴力程度可能更高，中央控制和蓄意行为的程度可能更强--我们可能会发现一些这样的证据。
We should also, by extension, expect such events to occur between states where one or both states’ status as a democracy leaves some basis for doubt. Perceptions of instability may be based on the recency and immaturity of experience with democratic processes and norms: a new democracy will not yet have developed wide experience in practices of democratic conflict resolution. Perceptions of instability may also be based on a high degree of violent opposition to the democratic government: a democracy under siege of domestic terrorism, insurgency, or civil war is one in which the ostensible norms of peaceful conflict resolution simply are not working well. If a government’s practice of democratic forms of government is very recent and subject to violent domestic challenge, or its practice of democracy is incomplete or imperfect by the standards of the day, it may be imperfectly constrained by the norms of democratic government that are supposed to keep conflict nonviolent. Or uncertainty about the commitment to democratic norms by the state with which one has a conflict of interest may lead to perceptions and expectations that it will practice those norms imperfectly. 推而广之，我们也应预期此类事件会发生在一国或两国的民主地位存在疑问的国家之间。对不稳定的看法可能是基于对民主进程和规范的经验尚浅和不成熟：一个新的民主国家还没有在民主解决冲突的实践中积累广泛的经验。对不稳定性的看法也可能是基于对民主政府的强烈暴力反对：在国内恐怖主义、叛乱或内战的围攻下，一个民主国家的和平解决冲突的表面准则根本无法很好地发挥作用。如果一个政府实行民主政体的时间很短，并且受到国内暴力的挑战，或者按照当时的标准，其民主政体的实践并不完整或不完善，那么它就可能没有完全受到民主政体规范的约束，而这些规范本应使冲突保持非暴力。或者，与自己有利益冲突的国家对民主准则的承诺存在不确定性，这可能导致人们认为并期望它将不完善地实践这些准则。
The list of numbered propositions above often implies a dichotomy between democratic and nondemocratic states. But in the real world such 上述一系列编号命题往往意味着民主国家与非民主国家的二分法。但在现实世界中，这种
a dichotomy masks degrees of democratic practice. Therefore if we find militarized disputes between democracies we should typically find that one party or both is only recently democratic, is subject to violent domestic challenge, or is toward the center of a democratic to nondemocratic continuum. We should also, in a revised version of proposition 6, look for evidence that one party, correctly or not, perceives the other as not really democratic. 二分法掩盖了民主实践的程度。因此，如果我们发现民主国家之间存在军事化争端，我们通常会发现其中一方或双方最近才开始民主化，在国内受到暴力挑战，或处于从民主到非民主的连续体的中心。在命题 6 的修订版中，我们还应该寻找证据，证明一方（无论正确与否）认为另一方并非真正民主。
Structural and Institutional Constraints? 结构和体制限制？
As with the normative and cultural argument, it is best to avoid assuming that democracies are dovish or peaceful in all their relations. Rather, a plausible argument can be constructed on the strategic principles of rational action; that is, about how states, in interactions of threat and bargaining, behave in anticipation of how their bargaining adversaries will behave. Decisionmakers develop images of the government and public opinion of other countries. They regard some governments or peoples as slow to fight, or as ready and eager to do so. In forming these images leaders look for various cues: in other leaders’ and countries’ past behavior in diplomatic or military disputes, and in other countries’ form of government. Perhaps other governments will see a democracy as culturally (normatively) dovish on the above grounds, but Kant’s own view argued that institutional constraints-a structure of division of powers, checks and balances-would make it difficult for democratic leaders to move their countries into war. 与规范和文化论证一样，最好避免假设民主国家在所有关系中都是鸽派或和平的。相反，我们可以根据理性行动的战略原则，即国家在威胁和讨价还价的互动中，如何预测讨价还价的对手的行为，来构建一个合理的论点。决策者会对其他国家的政府和公众舆论产生印象。他们认为某些政府或人民迟迟不肯战斗，或随时准备战斗。在形成这些形象的过程中，领导人会寻找各种线索：其他领导人和国家过去在外交或军事争端中的行为，以及其他国家的政府形式。也许其他国家的政府会基于上述理由将民主国家视为文化上（规范上）的 "鸽派 "国家，但康德认为，制度上的约束--权力分工、制衡结构--会使民主国家的领导人难以将其国家推向战争。
Democracies are constrained in going to war by the need to ensure broad popular support, manifested in various institutions of government. Leaders must mobilize public opinion to obtain legitimacy for their actions. Bureaucracies, the legislature, and private interest groups often incorporated in conceptualizations of the “state” must acquiesce. The nature and mix of institutions varies in different kinds of states (for example, “strong” states and “weak” states, parliamentary and presidential systems) but it is complex. Popular support in a democracy can be built by rhetoric and exhortation, but not readily compelled. 民主国家在发动战争时受到限制，因为需要确保广泛的民众支持，这体现在各种政府机构中。领导人必须动员公众舆论，为自己的行动争取合法性。官僚机构、立法机构以及通常被纳入 "国家 "概念的私人利益集团必须默许。不同类型的国家（如 "强势 "国家和 "弱势 "国家、议会制国家和总统制国家）的机构性质和组合各不相同，但都很复杂。在民主制度下，民众的支持可以通过言辞和劝说来建立，但并不容易被强迫。
The complexity of the mobilization process means that leaders will not readily embark on an effort to prepare the country for war unless they are confident they can demonstrate a favorable ratio of costs and benefits to be achieved, at acceptable risk. ^(15){ }^{15} Moreover, the complexity of the process requires time for mobilization, as the leaders of various institutions are convinced and formal approval is obtained. Not only may it take longer for democracies to gear up for war, the process is immensely more public than in an authoritarian state. Democratic governments can respond to sudden attack by using emergency powers, and by the same powers can 动员过程的复杂性意味着，除非领导人有信心能够证明，在可接受的风险下，实现的成本与收益之间存在有利的比率，否则他们不会轻易着手为国家备战。 ^(15){ }^{15} 此外，由于过程的复杂性，动员工作需要时间，因为要说服各个机构的领导人并获得正式批准。民主国家不仅可能需要更长的时间为战争做好准备，而且这一过程比专制国家更加公开。民主政府可以通过使用紧急权力来应对突然袭击，同样的权力也可以
even strike preemptively in crisis: But in normal times they are ill suited to launching surprise attacks. ^(16){ }^{16} Apparently for these reasons, major-power democracies seem never to have launched preventive war (a deliberate attack not under immediate provocation) against another major power. (Schweller 1992). The greater the scale, cost, and risk of using violence; the more effort must be devoted to preparations in public, and of the public. 甚至在危机中先发制人：但在平时，它们并不适合发动突然袭击。 ^(16){ }^{16} 显然，由于这些原因，大国民主国家似乎从未对另一个大国发动过预防性战争（非直接挑衅的蓄意攻击）。(Schweller 1992）。使用暴力的规模越大、成本越高、风险越大，就越需要在公开场合和公众面前努力做好准备。
Even if two states were totally ignorant of each other’s form of government, structural delays in the process of mobilization for war in both states would provide time to elapse for negotiation and other means of peaceful conflict resolution. Yet perceptions matter here too: If another nation’s leaders regard a state as democratic, they will anticipate a difficult and lengthy process before the democracy is likely to use significant military force against them. They will expect an opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement if they wish to achieve such a settlement. Perhaps most importantly, a democracy will not fear a surprise attack by another democracy, and thus need not cut short the negotiating process or launch a preemptive strike in anticipation of surprise attack. 即使两国完全不了解对方的政府形式，两国战争动员过程中的结构性延迟也会为谈判和其他和平解决冲突的方式提供时间。然而，观念在这里也很重要：如果另一个国家的领导人认为另一个国家是民主国家，他们就会预期在民主国家可能对其使用大量军事力量之前，会有一个艰难而漫长的过程。如果他们希望通过谈判达成解决，他们会期待有机会这样做。也许最重要的是，一个民主国家不会害怕另一个民主国家的突然袭击，因此不必缩短谈判进程，也不必在预计会有突然袭击的情况下发动先发制人的打击。
If democratic leaders generally consider other democracies to be reluctant and slow to fight because of institutional constraints (and possibly because of a general aversion of the people to war), they will not fear being attacked by another democracy. Two democratic states-each constrained from going to war and anticipating the other to be so inhibitedlikely will settle their conflicts short of war. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992, chap. 4) provide a deductive argument that two such states, each with perfect information about the other’s constraints, will always settle their conflicts by negotiation or by retaining the status quo. In the real world perfect information is lacking, but the presence of democratic institutions provides a visible and generally correct signal of “practical dovishness”-restraints on war in the form of institutional constraint if not of inherent disposition. Reading that sign, democracies will rarely if ever go to war with each other. 如果民主国家的领导人普遍认为其他民主国家由于制度限制（也可能是由于人民普遍厌恶战争）而不愿意和迟迟不开战，那么他们就不会害怕受到另一个民主国家的攻击。两个民主国家--每个国家都受到限制而不敢开战，并且预计另一个国家也会受到限制--很可能会在不开战的情况下解决冲突。Bueno de Mesquita 和 Lalman（1992 年，第 4 章）提出了一个演绎论证，即两个这样的国家，如果各自对对方的约束条件都有完美的信息，那么它们总是会通过谈判或维持现状来解决冲突。在现实世界中，完美信息是缺乏的，但民主制度的存在提供了一个可见的、普遍正确的 "实际多维 "信号--以制度约束的形式对战争的限制，如果不是固有的倾向的话。读懂了这一信号，民主国家之间就很少会发生战争。
Leaders of nondemocratic states may also anticipate that a democratic country will be slow to go to war. But if they are themselves aggressive, they may be more likely to threaten or bully a democracy to make concessions. In turn, that would raise the threshold of provocation facing the democracy, and perhaps overcome its initial inhibition against fighting. That would explain why the overall frequency of war fighting by democracies is no different from that of nondemocratic states. ^(17){ }^{17} But leaders of two nondemocratic states, neither encumbered by powerful structural constraints, are more likely than two democratic states to escalate to war. 非民主国家的领导人也可能预料到民主国家会迟迟不开战。但是，如果他们本身具有侵略性，他们可能更倾向于威胁或欺压民主国家做出让步。反过来，这又会提高民主国家面临挑衅的门槛，也许会克服其最初对战争的抑制。这就可以解释为什么民主国家的总体战争频率与非民主国家没有什么不同。 ^(17){ }^{17} 但是，两个非民主国家的领导人都没有受到强大的结构性约束，他们比两个民主国家更有可能升级为战争。
This argument can be summarized as follows. 这一论点可归纳如下。
The Structurai/lnstitutional Model: 结构/体制模式：
A. Violent conflicts between democracies will be infrequent because: A.民主国家之间很少发生暴力冲突，因为
In democracies, the constraints of checks and balances, division of power, and need for public debate to enlist widespread support will slow decisions to use large-scale violence and reduce the likelihood that such decisions will be made. 在民主政体中，制衡的约束、权力的划分以及需要通过公开辩论来争取广泛支持等因素，都会延缓做出使用大规模暴力的决定，并降低做出此类决定的可能性。
Leaders of other states will perceive leaders of democracies as so constrained. 其他国家的领导人会认为民主国家的领导人受到了这种限制。
Thus leaders of democracies will expect, in conflicts with other democracies, time for processes of international conflict resolution to operate, and they will not fear surprise attack. 因此，在与其他民主国家发生冲突时，民主国家的领导人会期待国际冲突解决进程有足够的时间来运作，他们不会害怕突然袭击。
B. Violent conflicts between nondemocracies, and between democracies and nondemocracies, will be frequent because: B.非民主国家之间以及民主国家与非民主国家之间的暴力冲突会频繁发生，因为
Leaders of nondemocracies are not constrained as leaders of democracies are, so they can more easily, rapidly, and secretly initiate large-scale violence 非民主国家的领导人不像民主国家的领导人那样受到制约，因此他们可以更容易、更迅速、更秘密地发起大规模暴力活动
Leaders of states (democracies and nondemocracies) in conflict with nondemocracies may initiate violence rather than risk surprise attack. 与非民主国家发生冲突的国家（民主国家和非民主国家）领导人可能会主动采取暴力行动，而不是冒险发动突然袭击。
Perceiving that leaders of democracies will be constrained, leaders of nondemocracies may press democracies to make greater concessions over issues in conflict. 非民主国家的领导人认为民主国家的领导人会受到制约，因此可能会迫使民主国家在冲突问题上做出更大让步。
Democracies may initiate large-scale violence with nondemocracies rather than make the greater concessions demanded. 民主国家可能会与非民主国家发生大规模暴力冲突，而不是做出更大的让步。
Distinguishing the Explanations 区分解释
The cultural/normative and institutional/structural explanations are not neatly separable. Institutions depend on norms and procedures. For example, stability, which we treated as a measure of normative acceptance of democratic processes, is also an institutional constraint if political structures are not subject to overthrow. States may also consider the dominant norms in other states, as well as their institutions, as signals; thus both explanations also depend in part on perceptions. Great emphasis on reading signals of the other’s intention, however, slights the importance of self-constraint. Institutions may slow or obstruct one’s own ability to fight. Perhaps more importantly, a norm that it is somehow not “right” to fight another democracy raises the moral and political cost, and thus limits one’s own willingness to do so. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) neglect this, as well as the opposition a democratic government might find among its own population against fighting another democratic government (Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz 1993). Within democracies, structural impediments to using force are less strong than 文化/规范和制度/结构的解释并不能截然分开。制度取决于规范和程序。例如，如果政治结构不会被推翻，那么稳定也是一种制度约束，我们将其视为民主程序规范接受度的衡量标准。各国也可以将其他国家的主流规范及其制度视为信号；因此，这两种解释在一定程度上也取决于认知。然而，过于强调解读他国意图的信号会忽略自我约束的重要性。制度可能会减缓或阻碍一个人自身的战斗能力。也许更重要的是，认为与另一个民主国家作战在某种程度上是不 "正确 "的准则会提高道德和政治成本，从而限制自己的作战意愿。Bueno de Mesquita 和 Lalman（1992 年）忽视了这一点，也忽视了民主政府可能会发现自己的民众反对与另一个民主政府作战（Geva、DeRouen 和 Mintz，1993 年）。在民主政体内部，使用武力的结构性障碍不如民主政体那么强烈。
within autocracies; normative restraints must bear the load. So we should not assume that normative constraints are unimportant in relations between democracies. Both norms and institutions may contribute to the phenomenon of peace between democracies; they are somewhat complementary and overlapping. But they are also in some degree distinctive and competing explanations, allowing us to look for greater impact of one or another in various contexts. 在专制国家内部，规范性约束必须承担这一重任。因此，我们不应认为规范性约束在民主国家之间的关系中不重要。规范和制度都可能促成民主国家之间的和平现象；它们在某种程度上是互补和重叠的。但是，它们在某种程度上也是独特的和相互竞争的解释，使我们能够在不同的情况下寻找其中一个或另一个更大的影响。
Other influences, such as trade and the network of international law and organizations as suggested by Kant, likely also play a role in directly supplementing and strengthening that of democracy. Further elaboration of the theoretical arguments is probably needed. Certainly, detailed empirical work is necessary on how institutions operate, and on how perceptions toward other countries evolve, so as to make it possible to weigh the relative power of institutional and normative explanations. So too is the creation and application of systematic empirical tests to differentiate between the two kinds of explanations for violence in the modern interstate system. One such test, distinguishing between measures of democracy. as stability (normative) and of democracy as the adoption of particular institutions, will be performed later in this book. The prediction about stable democracies being less likely than unstable ones to use military force against each other is embedded in the normative model, and more tenuously so in the structural one. 其他影响因素，如康德提出的贸易以及国际法和国际组织网络，也可能对民主起到直接补充和加强的作用。理论上的论点可能需要进一步阐述。当然，有必要对制度如何运作以及对其他国家的看法如何演变进行详细的实证研究，以便能够权衡制度解释和规范解释的相对力量。同样，还需要建立和应用系统的实证检验，以区分现代国家间体系中对暴力的两种解释。本书稍后将进行这样的测试，区分作为稳定性（规范性）的民主措施和作为采用特定制度的民主措施。关于稳定的民主政体比不稳定的民主政体更不可能互相使用军事力量的预测是规范模型中的内容，而结构模型中的内容则更为微弱。
Another way of differentiating between the two is to look for other hypotheses that may be derived from either, and tested. One such hypothesis for the normative model is represented in work by Dixon (1993, also 1992). He postulates that democracies, with norms of using third-party intervention for peaceful and non-coercive resolution of conflicts internally, will carry those norms into management of their international conflicts with other democracies. Dixon then looks at how international conflicts have been settled in the post-World War II era: Not only does he confirm our results from table 1.2 that conflicts between democracies are much less likely to escalate to lethal violence and to be settled peacefully, but he finds that they are much more likely to be settled by some means of third-party conflict management, such as the use of good offices, mediation, and intervention. Also, all conflicts between democracies were ended either by agreement or by stalemate; none terminated in a settlement imposed by one of them or by a third party. Such a pattern is much more readily explicable by common norms than by characteristics of internal democratic institutions acting as constraint. Leng (1993) similarly infers support for the normative argument from evidence that in interstate crises democracies are much more likely to use strategies of reciprocating the escalatory or de-escalatory moves of other states than are authoritarian regimes. He argues that reciprocation is an engrained dem- 区分这两种模式的另一种方法是寻找可从其中任何一种模式引申出的其他假设，并对其进行检验。迪克森（Dixon，1993 年，也是 1992 年）的研究就代表了规范模式的一种假设。他假定，民主国家如果有利用第三方干预以和平、非胁迫方式解决国内冲突的规范，那么在处理与其他民主国家的国际冲突时也会遵循这些规范。随后，迪克森考察了二战后国际冲突的解决方式：他不仅证实了我们在表 1.2 中得出的结果，即民主国家之间的冲突升级为致命暴力的可能性要小得多，而且和平解决的可能性也要小得多。此外，民主国家之间的所有冲突都以协议或僵局结束，没有一场冲突是以其中一方或第三方强加的解决方案结束的。这种模式更容易用共同规范来解释，而不是用作为制约因素的内部民主机构的特点来解释。Leng (1993)同样从以下证据推断出规范论点的支持：在国家间危机中，民主政体比专制政权更有可能使用互惠策略，以应对其他国家的升级或降级行动。他认为，互惠是一种根深蒂固的规范。
ocratic norm, as constrasted with behavior like bullying, appeasing, or stonewalling. 与恃强凌弱、姑息迁就或搪塞等行为形成对比的是，"傲慢 "是一种政治准则。
Another test can be derived from the patterns of strategic interaction as discussed in the model of structural constraints. By that argument, two democracies engaged in a conflictual bargaining process with each other can reasonably expect each other not to escalate the dispute to the point of war or serious violence. Therefore, many bargaining models predict there would be few strategic restraints on escalating the conflict up to, but not beyond, the point of an exchange of lethal violence. In fact, each state might have strong incentives to go that far for the purpose of showing resolve; perhaps even escalating to the first (limited) use of force in confidence that the other would be unlikely to reply in any substantial military manner. Such behavior is implicit in the bargaining “game” of chicken, which is widely applied to crisis negotiation (Brams and Kilgore 1988; Brams 1990; Poundstone 1992). This reasoning, therefore, leads to the prediction that disputes between democracies should commonly escalate to the display and even limited use of force, though not to war. But as table 1.2 showed, that is not the case. Democracy/democracy pairs are less likely to enter into militarized disputes at all than are other pairs of states, and less likely to escalate them at any level up the escalation lad-der-not just at the top to war. ^(18){ }^{18} 另一个检验标准可以从结构制约模型中讨论的战略互动模式中得出。根据这一论点，两个民主国家在冲突中相互讨价还价，可以合理地预期对方不会将争端升级到战争或严重暴力的地步。因此，许多讨价还价模型预测，在冲突升级到但不超过致命暴力交换的程度时，几乎不会有战略限制。事实上，每个国家都可能有强烈的动机为了显示决心而走到那一步；甚至可能升级到第一次（有限的）使用武力，因为他们相信对方不太可能以任何实质性的军事方式作出回应。这种行为隐含在讨价还价的 "鸡肉游戏 "中，被广泛应用于危机谈判中（Brams and Kilgore 1988; Brams 1990; Poundstone 1992）。因此，根据这一推理可以预测，民主国家之间的争端通常会升级到展示甚至有限使用武力，但不会升级到战争。但如表 1.2 所示，事实并非如此。与其他国家对相比，民主/民主国家对根本不可能陷入军事化争端，也不可能在争端升级的任何层次上升级--而不仅仅是在顶端升级到战争。 ^(18){ }^{18}
Rather, this suggests that to use or threaten to use force is not usually normatively acceptable behavior in disputes between democracies, even in the form of symbolic, ritualized bargaining behavior. Relations between democracies therefore fit into the category of “stable peace” (Boulding 1979) or a “security community” (Deutsch et al. 1957) in which states not only do not fight each other, they do not expect to fight each other, or significantly prepare to fight each other. In such relationships disputes are routinely settled without recourse to threat and military deterrence. Dependent as the definition of security community has been on expectations, it has been a difficult phenomenon to observe reliably; here, in the relative absence of militarized dispute and escalation, is a reasonably objective measure. 相反，这表明在民主国家之间的争端中，使用或威胁使用武力通常不是规范上可接受的行为，即使是象征性的、仪式化的讨价还价行为。因此，民主国家之间的关系属于 "稳定和平"（Boulding，1979 年）或 "安全共同体"（Deutsch 等，1957 年）的范畴，在这种关系中，国家不仅不会相互争斗，也不会期望相互争斗，或为相互争斗做重大准备。在这种关系中，争端通常无需诉诸威胁和军事威慑即可解决。由于安全共同体的定义依赖于预期，因此很难对这一现象进行可靠的观察。
We shall continue to juxtapose the normative and structural models for their relative explanatory power throughout the book. It is also important to explore the outer limits of the empirical domain to which the proposition about lack of war between democracies may apply. All the systematic empirical work to date has employed modern and Westernized definitions of both war and democracy. Careful relaxation of these definitions, in ways appropriate to other times and contexts, may also produce insights about the relative importance of normative and institutional constraints. 在本书中，我们将继续把规范模式和结构模式并列起来，以确定它们的相对解释力。同样重要的是，我们要探索关于民主国家之间缺乏战争的命题可能适用的经验领域的外部界限。迄今为止，所有系统的实证研究都采用了现代和西方化的战争与民主定义。以适合其他时代和背景的方式仔细放宽这些定义，也可能会对规范和制度约束的相对重要性有所启发。
The Imperfect Democratic Peace of Ancient Greece 古希腊不完美的民主和平
With William Antholis 与威廉-安托利斯
As a basis for understanding better the sources and nature of peace among modern democracies, we begin with the only other well-documented state system with a large number of democratic regimes-the citystate system in Greece during the late fifth century в.c. That examination allows us to consider influences that restrained, or failed to restrain, democracies from fighting each other in a political and cultural context very different from the modern state system. Doing so may help give insights into the role that related yet quite different institutions and perceptions have played in restraining such conflict more recently. 作为更好地理解现代民主政体之间和平的来源和性质的基础，我们从唯一一个有大量民主政体记载的国家体系--公元前五世纪晚期希腊的城邦体系--开始研究。这种研究使我们能够考虑在与现代国家体系截然不同的政治和文化背景下，抑制或未能抑制民主政体相互争斗的影响因素。这样做可能有助于深入了解相关但截然不同的制度和观念在近期抑制此类冲突方面所起的作用。
We first establish some definitions, appropriate to the conditions of ancient Greece, by which to identify autonomous states, democracies, and wars. Next we look at the aggregate evidence of who fought whom, and find that support for the proposition that democracies fight one another less often than they fight other states is mixed and inconclusive. We then show why the aggregate evidence is misleading-largely exaggerating the disposition of democracies to fight each other-by looking in detail at the cases that deviate from the hypothesis. Finally we discuss the fragile emergence, during the Peloponnesian War era, of some normis that democracies should not fight each other; and briefly address some alternative hypotheses. 我们首先根据古希腊的国情确定了一些定义，以此来识别自治国家、民主政体和战争。接下来，我们研究了谁与谁交战的综合证据，发现民主政体之间的交战少于与其他国家的交战，这一命题的支持度参差不齐，没有定论。然后，我们通过详细研究偏离假设的案例，说明为什么总体证据具有误导性--在很大程度上夸大了民主政体相互交战的倾向。最后，我们讨论了伯罗奔尼撒战争时代一些关于民主政体不应相互争斗的准则的脆弱出现；并简要讨论了一些替代性假设。
Democracy, Autonomy, and War in 民主、自治与战争
Ancient Greece 古希腊
Anyone familiar with the Peloponnesian War will surely recall instances of democracies fighting one another-most notably the great clash between Athens and Syracuse. Many scholars have speculated on the incidental causes and meanings of such conflicts (Ste. Croix 1954-55, 1972; Bradeen 1960; Gillis 1971; Legon 1968; Pope 1988; Quinn 1964; Sabin 1991), but no one has conducted a systematic examination of the frequency and causes of wars between Greek democracies. ^(1){ }^{1} 熟悉伯罗奔尼撒战争的人一定会记得民主国家之间相互争斗的事例，其中最著名的是雅典和锡拉库扎之间的大冲突。许多学者对此类冲突的偶然原因和意义进行了猜测（Ste. Croix 1954-55, 1972; Bradeen 1960; Gillis 1971; Legon 1968; Pope 1988; Quinn 1964; Sabin 1991），但没有人对希腊民主国家之间战争的频率和原因进行过系统的研究。 ^(1){ }^{1}