VII. Supervision of banks
VII.银行监管
1. Banking supervision practice
1.银行监管实践
1.1. Organisation of the supervision
1.1.监督的组织
The responsibility for the microprudential supervision in the strict sense depends on the typology of credit institutions, as illustrated in the table below.
严格意义上的微观审慎监管责任取决于信贷机构的类型，如下表所示。
Prudential supervision in the strict sense includes the supervision of solvency, liquidity and internal governance. It does not include the other areas of supervision that fall under the sole competence of the CSSF, namely:
严格意义上的审慎监管包括对偿付能力、流动性和内部治理的监管。它不包括完全属于 CSSF 管辖范围的其他监管领域，即：
• the supervision of compliance with the professional obligations regarding anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT);
- 监督遵守反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为（AML/CFT）专业义务的情况；
• the supervision of regulations for consumer protection: MiFID, laws on mortgage credits and consumer credits;
- 监督消费者保护法规：MiFID、抵押贷款法和消费者信贷法；
• the supervision of regulations relating to market integrity: European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), Securities Financing Transactions Regulation (SFTR), Benchmark Regulation (BMR) and covered bonds directive;
- 监督与市场诚信相关的法规：欧洲市场基础设施条例》（EMIR）、《证券融资交易条例》（SFTR）、《基准条例》（BMR）和担保债券指令；
• the supervision of the obligations deriving from sectoral laws on UCIs, including, in particular, the obligations related to the function of depositary bank of UCIs;
- 监督有关 UCI 的行业法律所规定的义务，特别是与 UCI 托管银行职能有关的义务；
• the supervision of obligations deriving from other European or national regulations, such as PSD2, NIS Directive and the law on payment accounts.
- 监督其他欧洲或国家法规规定的义务，如 PSD2、NIS 指令和支付账户法。
During 2023, 130.65 full-time equivalents (FTE) (129.45 in 2022) directly contributed to the various tasks in relation to the execution of the CSSF’s banking supervision mandate.
2023 年期间，有 130.65 名专职同等资历人员（FTE）（2022 年为 129.45 人）直接参与了 CSSF 银行监管任务的各项工作。
As regards the areas of supervision referred to above, the CSSF agents also participate actively in working groups which meet at European and international level.
在上述监管领域，CSSF 的工作人员还积极参与在欧洲和国际层面召开会议的工作组。
1.2. Priorities with respect to prudential supervision and banking risks
1.2.审慎监管和银行风险方面的优先事项
The CSSF defines its priorities for the supervision of credit institutions falling within its remit on an annual basis. In order to use resources as efficiently as possible, the determination of the supervisory priorities follows a risk-based approach considering the main risks and major vulnerabilities of the Luxembourg banking centre, as well as the supervisory priorities defined by the ECB and the EBA.
CSSF 每年确定其职权范围内信贷机构的监管重点。为了尽可能高效地利用资源，监管重点的确定采用基于风险的方法，考虑卢森堡银行中心的主要风险和主要弱点，以及欧洲央行和欧洲银行监管局确定的监管重点。
The priorities of the CSSF for the prudential supervision in 2023 were the following.
CSSF 在 2023 年审慎监管方面的优先事项如下。
1.2.1. Compliance/conduct risk, including money laundering and terrorist financing
1.2.1.合规/行为风险，包括洗钱和资助恐怖主义的风险
Money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) are risks inherent in the activities of international financial centres such as Luxembourg. At the level of banks, wealth management activities involving international customers are particularly exposed to such risks. Within the CSSF, the control of these risks has undergone significant developments over the last years with, in particular, a substantial increase in the number of staff and systems allowing an efficient fight against ML/TF. These developments continued in 2023 in a context of prevention (via targeted communications) as well as control (via the execution of yearly AML/CFT control plans – both off-site and on-site). Like in previous years, the outcome of these controls resulted in the CSSF imposing administrative fines on banks which did not comply with their AML/CFT-related professional obligations.
洗钱和资助恐怖主义（ML/TF）是卢森堡等国际金融中心活动中固有的风险。在银行层面，涉及国际客户的财富管理活动尤其面临此类风险。在 CSSF 内部，这些风险的控制在过去几年中取得了重大发展，特别是人员和系统数量大幅增加，从而能够有效打击 ML/TF。2023 年，在预防（通过有针对性的沟通）和控制（通过执行年度反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义的控制计划--包括非现场和现场）方面，这些发展仍在继续。与往年一样，这些控制的结果导致 CSSF 对未履行反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义相关专业义务的银行处以行政罚款。
The efficiency of the CSSF’s AML/CFT framework was assessed end of 2022 by the FATF and a mutual evaluation report, published in September 2023, identified Luxembourg as having a sound AML/CFT framework and a good understanding of its money laundering and terrorist financing risks.
反洗钱金融行动特别工作组于 2022 年底对卢森堡金融业监管委员会反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义行为框架的效率进行了评估，并于 2023 年 9 月发布了一份相互评估报告，认为卢森堡拥有健全的反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义行为框架，并对其洗钱和资助恐怖主义的风险有很好的了解。
1.2.2. Operational risk, including IT risk and cyberrisk
1.2.2.业务风险，包括信息技术风险和网络风险
The main activity of banks offering wealth and asset management (depositary banks and private banks) is the custody and management of their customers’ financial assets. The main risks linked to this type of banking activity are operational in nature and include, besides ML/TF risk, IT risk with cyberrisk for instance, resilience risk (business continuity) and risks related to the use of sub-depositary institutions and outsourcing. Moreover, the increasing digitalisation and new technologies such as DLT, digital payments or crypto-currencies bring about new challenges, both strategic and operational.
提供财富和资产管理的银行（存款银行和私人银行）的主要活动是保管和管理客户的金融资产。与这类银行活动相关的主要风险具有操作性，除 ML/TF 风险外，还包括信息技术风险（例如网络风险）、复原风险（业务连续性）以及与使用分托管机构和外包相关的风险。此外，数字化和新技术（如 DLT、数字支付或加密货币）的不断发展也带来了新的挑战，既有战略方面的，也有业务方面的。
In 2023, the CSSF deepened its understanding of the banks’ digital transformation projects and existing and emerging IT risks, notably by monitoring cyber incidents.
2023 年，CSSF 主要通过监控网络事件，加深了对银行数字化转型项目以及现有和新出现的 IT 风险的了解。
1.2.3. Credit risk
1.2.3.信用风险
The tightening in financial conditions, especially in times of strong interest rate rises, generally leads to a deterioration in the asset quality. In 2023, the CSSF continued to closely supervise the development of credit risk as well as the actions undertaken by banks, in particular as regards the credit-granting standards, monitoring outstanding debts and adequate provisioning. Throughout the year, the level of non-performing loans and the banks’ exposure to credit risk remained limited.
金融条件的收紧，尤其是在利率大幅上升时，通常会导致资产质量的恶化。2023 年，瑞士金融业监管委员会（CSSF）继续密切监督信贷风险的发展以及银行采取的行动，尤其是在信贷发放标准、未偿债务监控和充足拨备方面。在这一年里，不良贷款水平和银行面临的信贷风险仍然有限。
1.2.4. Risks related to climate change and environmental degradation
1.2.4.与气候变化和环境退化有关的风险
Following the publication of Circular CSSF 21/773 on the management of climate-related and environmental risks in June 2021, the CSSF initiated its first dedicated supervisory activities in 2023. Hence, the CSSF requested a sample of 15 banks, among the less significant banks and branches of non-EU banks which it directly supervises, to carry out a self-assessment of compliance with Circular CSSF 21/773. The exercise aimed to outline the state of play of the level of the banking sector’s alignment with the CSSF’s expectations set out in the circular. Individual recommendations were provided to the participating banks and overall feedback was addressed to the banking community. During the second half of 2023, the self-assessment was repeated with a new sample of 14 banks.
继 2021 年 6 月发布关于气候相关风险和环境风险管理的 CSSF 21/773 号通知后，CSSF 于 2023 年启动了首次专项监管活动。因此，CSSF 要求其直接监管的 15 家规模较小的银行和非欧盟银行分行对 CSSF 21/773 号通知的合规性进行自我评估。这项工作旨在概述银行业与 CSSF 在通告中提出的期望相一致的程度。向参与银行提出了个别建议，并向银行界提供了整体反馈。2023 年下半年，在 14 家银行的新样本中再次进行自我评估。
Moreover, the CSSF performed a horizontal review of the information contained in the long form reports with respect to disclosure of information on sustainable development, in accordance with SFDR. The CSSF shared the key observations with the ABBL. The CSSF, applying a risk-based approach, selected a sample of banks for which a full off-site review of their SFDR-related disclosures had been initiated in 2023.
此外，CSSF 还根据《可持续发展报告》，对长式报告中有关可持续发展信息披露的信息进行了横向审查。CSSF 与 ABBL 分享了主要意见。CSSF 采用基于风险的方法，选取了 2023 年开始对其可持续发展相关信息披露进行全面非现场审查的银行样本。
1.3. Supervision of significant institutions
1.3.对重要机构的监督
At the end of 2023, 47 banks established in Luxembourg were directly supervised by the ECB, either because they fulfil the criteria to qualify as significant institution (SI) at solo or consolidated level, or because they were part of a group considered as significant. These banks represented 70% of the total assets of the Luxembourg banks.
截至2023年底，有47家在卢森堡设立的银行直接受欧洲央行监管，原因是这些银行符合单独或合并层面的重要机构（SI）标准，或属于被视为重要机构的集团。这些银行占卢森堡银行总资产的70%。
Supervision of SIs is exercised by Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs) formed of staff members from the ECB and from the national competent authorities. At the end of 2023, the CSSF was a member of 22 JSTs for as many banking groups. Nineteen CSSF supervisors were directly involved in this supervisory system.
对附属机构的监管由联合监管小组（JST）负责，该小组由欧洲央行和国家主管当局的工作人员组成。截至 2023 年底，CSSF 已成为 22 个联合监管小组的成员，负责监管多个银行集团。CSSF 的 19 名监管人员直接参与了这一监管体系。
The SSM’s supervisory approach is described in detail in the ECB’s Supervisory Manual.
欧洲中央银行的《监管手册》详细介绍了 SSM 的监管方法。
1.4. Supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP)
1.4.监督审查和评估程序（SREP）
Since 2015, a common SREP methodology has been applied to less significant institutions (LSIs). It is based on the EBA Guidelines on SREP (EBA/GL/2018/03) and on the methodology applied to SIs by the ECB, by taking into account the principle of proportionality.
自 2015 年以来，对重要性较低的机构（LSI）采用了通用的 SREP 方法。该方法基于欧洲银行监管局的 SREP 准则（EBA/GL/2018/03）和欧洲央行适用于 SI 的方法，并考虑了比例原则。
In general, the SREP is carried out annually based on a large range of quantitative and qualitative information sources, among which the prudential reporting and internal reports provided by the bank, the reports of on-site inspections, the ICAAP6 and the ILAAP7 as well as the different stress tests. The SREP is applied, in a proportionate manner, to credit institutions having regard to the nature, scale and complexity of their activities and risks and, if relevant, their situation within the group.
一般来说，SREP 每年都会根据大量定量和定性信息来源进行，其中包括银行提供的审慎报告和内部报告、现场检查报告、ICAAP6 和 ILAAP7 以及不同的压力测试。根据信贷机构活动和风险的性质、规模和复杂程度，以及相关情况下信贷机构在集团中的地位，以适度的方式对其实施《特别监管措施》。
The interest rate risk in the banking book, the impact of the increasing interest rates on the LSIs’ profitability and risk-bearing capacity were again subject to an in-depth assessment within the SREP in 2023, with a particular focus and specific supervisory measures on credit risk.
2023 年，银行账簿中的利率风险、利率上升对 LSI 盈利能力和风险承担能力的影响将再次在 SREP 中进行深入评估，重点关注信贷风险并采取具体监管措施。
In addition to the risks impacting solvency, the SREP covered institutions’ liquidity risk by taking into account ILAAPs and stress test results.
除了影响偿付能力的风险外，《战略调整和改革方案》还考虑到了机构综合反洗钱行动计划和压力测试结果，涵盖了机构的流动性风险。
The distribution of overall SREP scores, which vary on a scale of 1 (low risk for the viability of the institution) to 4 (high risk for the viability of the institution), deteriorated slightly from 2022 to 2023 with an average of 2.46 for all LSIs in 2023.
2022 年至 2023 年，《战略成果评估报告》总分的分布略有恶化，2023 年所有 LSI 的平均分为 2.46。
Based on the conclusions of the SREP, the LSIs were required to implement a range of qualitative and quantitative measures, mainly in relation to capital ratios.
根据《战略调整和改革方案》的结论，要求地方执行机构实施一系列定性和定量措施，主要是与资本比率有关的措施。
The applicable own funds requirements under the CRR should appropriately cover the incurred risks, including in stressed conditions. Where the results of the stress tests indicate that an institution’s capital position would become vulnerable or even non-compliant with the relevant rules, the CSSF requires additional own funds in the form of Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G) to ensure that the institution remains appropriately capitalised.
CRR 规定的适用自有资金要求应适当覆盖已发生的风险，包括压力条件下的风险。如果压力测试结果表明机构的资本状况会变得脆弱，甚至不符合相关规则，CSSF 就会要求以第二支柱指导 (P2G) 的形式提供额外的自有资金，以确保机构保持适当的资本水平。
As regards all LSIs, on average, Pillar 1 (P1) and Pillar 2 (P2R) capital requirements, combined capital buffers and the P2G cumulatively amounted to 12.92% (12.25% in 2022).
就所有长期股权投资机构而言，第一支柱（P1）和第二支柱（P2R）资本要求、综合资本缓冲和 P2G 累计平均达到 12.92%（2022 年为 12.25%）。
In addition to the interventions aiming at the adequacy of the amount of capital, the CSSF took, again, some qualitative supervisory measures in 2023. As in the past, these measures mostly covered strategic planning by requiring, for example, restrictions for certain activities, a better management of liquidity risk or interest rate risk in the banking book and/or the strengthening of the internal governance framework or of the AML/CFT framework.
除了针对资本充足率的干预措施外，2023 年 CSSF 还再次采取了一些定性监管措施。与以往一样，这些措施主要涉及战略规划，例如要求限制某些活动、更好地管理银行账簿中的流动性风险或利率风险，以及/或加强内部治理框架或反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义框架。
1.5. Authorisations
1.5.授权
The CSSF mainly intervenes in four banking-related authorisation processes.
CSSF 主要干预四项与银行业相关的授权程序。
1.5.1. Authorisation of new credit institutions
1.5.1.新信贷机构的授权
Since the introduction of the SSM, the ECB has been exclusively competent for the authorisation of new credit institutions in all SSM countries. The competence for the authorisation of branches of non-EU credit institutions remains at national level.
自引入 SSM 以来，欧洲中央银行一直专门负责授权所有 SSM 国家的新信贷机构。非欧盟信贷机构分支机构的审批权仍属于国家层面。
However, the CSSF is still the entry point for the submission of authorisation files. Upon receipt of an application, the CSSF analyses it in order to verify compliance with the legal and regulatory requirements, focussing in particular on compliance with the AML/CFT regulation. In the case of Luxembourg credit institutions, the CSSF drafts a proposal, after the examination of the file, and submits it for decision to the ECB.
不过，瑞士金融业监管委员会（CSSF）仍是提交授权文件的入口。收到申请后，CSSF 会对其进行分析，以核实其是否符合法律和监管要求，尤其是是否符合反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义条例。就卢森堡信贷机构而言，CSSF 在审查文件后起草一份提案，并提交欧洲央行决定。
As regards branches of non-EU credit institutions, the authorisation is granted by the CSSF.
至于非欧盟信贷机构的分支机构，则由 CSSF 授权。
In 2023, the CSSF worked on three authorisation requests for new credit institutions. No authorisation has been granted yet and the examination of these files continues in 2024.
2023 年，CSSF 处理了三项新信贷机构的授权申请。目前尚未获得授权，2024 年将继续审查这些文件。
1.5.2. Authorisation for acquisitions of qualifying holdings
1.5.2.收购合格控股权的授权
Like the authorisation of a new institution which requires prior examination of the file by the CSSF, the subsequent acquisitions of holdings that reach or exceed 10% of the capital or that give significant influence over the institution concerned (qualifying holdings) are also examined by the CSSF and authorised by the ECB (or by the CSSF for acquisitions of holdings in non-EU credit institutions with a branch in Luxembourg), in accordance with the applicable legal and regulatory requirements.
与新机构的授权需要事先接受 CSSF 的文件审查一样，达到或超过资本 10% 或对相关机构有重大影响的控股权（合格控股权）的后续收购也要接受 CSSF 的审查，并根据适用的法律和监管要求获得欧洲央行的授权（或由 CSSF 授权收购在卢森堡设有分支机构的非欧盟信贷机构的控股权）。
In 2023, the CSSF examined 17 qualifying holding files, nine of which led to an authorisation by the ECB (or the CSSF) during the year. The examination of the other files continues in 2024.
2023 年，CSSF 审查了 17 份合格控股文件，其中 9 份在年内获得了欧洲央行（或 CSSF）的授权。2024 年将继续审查其他文件。
1.5.3. Authorisation of directors and managers of banks
1.5.3.银行董事和经理的授权
In 2023, the CSSF dealt with 143 files regarding the nomination of new directors and authorised managers in Luxembourg credit institutions. The CSSF verifies the compliance of the candidates, notably in terms of good repute, professional experience and availability, with the legal and regulatory requirements. Particular attention is given to compliance with the AML/CFT legislation. Following the examination of the files by the CSSF, the nominations in SIs are forwarded to the ECB for authorisation, whereas the nominations in LSIs and third-country branches are directly authorised by the CSSF.
2023 年，CSSF 处理了 143 份有关卢森堡信贷机构新董事和授权经理提名的文件。CSSF 核查候选人是否符合法律和监管要求，特别是在良好声誉、专业经验和可用性方面。特别关注反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义立法的合规性。在 CSSF 审查档案后，SI 的提名将转交给欧洲央行授权，而 LSI 和第三国分支机构的提名则直接由 CSSF 授权。
1.5.4. Authorisation of financial holding companies
1.5.4.金融控股公司的授权
For financial holding companies subject to a procedure for approval or for exemption from approval under the CRD framework, the procedures implemented by the CSSF aim to clarify the role and responsibilities of these parent undertakings in accordance with the consolidated prudential requirements. Depending on the situation, the CSSF examines these files jointly with another competent authority.
对于在 CRD 框架下接受审批或豁免审批程序的金融控股公司，CSSF 实施的程序旨在根据综合审慎要求明确这些母公司的作用和责任。CSSF 会根据情况与另一主管机构联合审查这些文件。
In 2023, the CSSF did not receive any file as the consolidating competent authority. However, the CSSF, as competent authority of the Member State where the financial holding company is incorporated, participated in joint decision-making with the competent authority for the consolidated supervision with respect to three requests for exemption from approval which were approved.
2023 年，瑞士金融业监管局（CSSF）没有收到任何作为综合监管主管机构的文件。不过，CSSF 作为金融控股公司所在成员国的主管机构，与综合监管主管机构共同参与了三项豁免审批申请的决策，并获得了批准。
1.6. Investor protection
1.6.投资者保护
The CSSF’s action covers, inter alia, the depositary bank activities for Luxembourg-domiciled UCIs and activities governed by the MiFID II regulation. The CSSF’s supervision aims to verify that the banks observe all legal and regulatory provisions relating thereto on an ongoing basis. It is based on a set of information including in particular the long form report, the reports drawn up by the internal control function and the on-site inspections performed by the CSSF teams.
CSSF 的行动主要包括卢森堡注册的 UCI 托管银行活动以及 MiFID II 法规管辖的活动。CSSF 的监管旨在核实银行是否持续遵守所有相关法律和监管规定。监管以一系列信息为基础，尤其包括长式报告、内部控制职能部门起草的报告以及 CSSF 小组进行的现场检查。
As regards MiFID, a certain number of questionnaires were sent to credit institutions, mostly at ESMA’s request, as regards, for example, the application of the MiFID II rules with regard to marketing communications and advertisements of financial products, the cross-border provision of investment services and activities to retail clients or the marketing of contracts for difference (CFDs) to retail clients.
关于 MiFID，向信贷机构发送了一定数量的调查问卷，大部分是应 ESMA 的要求发送的，例如 MiFID II 规则在金融产品营销传播和广告、向零售客户跨境提供投资服务和活动或向零售客户营销差价合约（CFD）方面的适用情况。
It is important to remember that the CSSF works in close collaboration with ESMA and other national supervisory authorities in order to promote a harmonised supervisory framework, focussed on the protection of investors in general and of retail investors in particular.
重要的是要记住，CSSF 与欧洲证券与金融管理局 (ESMA) 及其他国家监管机构密切合作，以促进统一的监管框架，重点保护一般投资者，尤其是散户投资者。
The lessons learnt from this supervision are reflected in the SREP and, where applicable, in grievance letters addressed to banks.
从这一监督中汲取的经验教训已反映在《次区域环境方案》中，并酌情反映在给银行的申诉信中。
As regards depositary banks, it should be borne in mind that prior to starting any depositary business activities for Luxembourg-domiciled UCIs, an administrative authorisation has to be obtained from the CSSF. Any major subsequent change of the elements underlying the initial authorisation as a UCI depositary (e.g. extension of initial authorisation to other investment vehicles or any major change in the operational model) is also subject to the CSSF’s authorisation. In 2023, the CSSF processed one such authorisation.
关于存管银行，应当牢记的是，在开始 卢森堡注册的UCI的任何存管业务活 动之前，必须获得CSSF的行政授权。UCI 托管机构初始授权基础要素的任何重大后续变更（例如将初始授权扩展至其他投资工具或运营模式的任何重大变更）也必须获得CSSF的授权。2023 年，CSSF 处理了一项此类授权。
1.7. EMIR
1.7.EMIR
The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (EMIR) of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2019/834 (EMIR Refit) in 2019, aims to improve the transparency of over-the-counter derivative markets and to reduce the risks associated with these markets.
2012 年 7 月 4 日颁布的关于场外衍生品、中央对手方和交易报告库的第 648/2012 号欧洲市场基础设施法规（EU）（EMIR），经 2019 年第 2019/834 号法规（EU）（EMIR Refit）修订，旨在提高场外衍生品市场的透明度，降低与这些市场相关的风险。
The objective of the CSSF’s work is to continually improve the accuracy, precision and reliability of the reported transactions via a data analysis module. In 2023, the CSSF sent one observation letter and intervened three times in writing in order to ask for remediation of deficiencies identified at banks established in Luxembourg. In addition, based on the risk-based approach, one on-site inspection was conducted in order to ensure compliance with the regulatory requirements under EMIR.
CSSF 的工作目标是通过数据分析模块，不断提高报告交易的准确性、精确性和可靠性。2023 年，卢森堡金融业监管委员会发出了一封观察函，并进行了三次书面干预，要求在卢森堡设立的银行对发现的缺陷进行补救。此外，在基于风险的方法基础上，还进行了一次现场检查，以确保符合《欧洲货币投资条例》的监管要求。
1.8. Payment services
1.8.付款服务
Under Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment services (PSD2), transposed into national law by the Law of 20 July 2018 amending the Law of 10 November 2009 on payment services, the following reports, submitted by credit institutions in their capacity as payment service provider (PSP), were analysed by the CSSF in 2023:
根据 2015 年 11 月 25 日关于支付服务（PSD2）的第 2015/2366 号指令（欧盟）（由 2018 年 7 月 20 日修订 2009 年 11 月 10 日支付服务法的法律转化为国内法），CSSF 在 2023 年对信贷机构以支付服务提供商（PSP）身份提交的以下报告进行了分析：
• monthly statistical data on fraud relating to different payment means which are collected by the BCL based on the operational collaboration between the BCL and the CSSF;
- 每月由 BCL 根据 BCL 和 CSSF 之间的业务合作收集的与不同支付手段相关的欺诈统计数据；
• annual updated and comprehensive assessment of the ICT and security risks relating to payment services;
- 每年对与支付服务有关的信息和通信技术及安全风险进行最新的全面评估；
• 168 notifications in connection with 56 major operational or security incidents that the CSSF shared with the EBA and the BCL;
- CSSF 与 EBA 和 BCL 共享的与 56 起重大业务或安全事件有关的 168 份通知；
• summary reports of the banks’ internal audit regarding compliance of the security measures with the regulatory technical standards on strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication (RTS on SCA&CSC). This exercise concerned a selection of credit institutions according to a risk-based approach.
- 银行内部审计报告摘要，内容涉及安全措施是否符合关于客户身份验证和通用安全开放通信标准（RTS on SCA&CSC）的监管技术标准。这项工作涉及根据基于风险的方法选择的信贷机构。
The CSSF carried out checks of the credit institutions’ websites to find out whether they publish, where applicable, the quarterly statistics on the availability and performance of the dedicated interface and the interface(s) used by their payment service users according to Article 32(4) of the RTS on SCA&CSC.
CSSF 对信贷机构的网站进行了检查，以了解这些机构是否根据《关于 SCA&CSC 的 RTS》第 32(4)条的规定，公布（如适用）其支付服务用户所使用的专用接口和接口的可用性和性能的季度统计数据。
Finally, via Circular CSSF 23/845, which amends Circular CSSF 22/821, the CSSF introduced, in the long form report, a self-assessment questionnaire (SAQ) on the compliance of the security measures with the requirements laid down in the RTS on SCA&CSC to be filled in by the entities concerned.
最后，通过修订 CSSF 22/821 号通知的 CSSF 23/845 号通知，CSSF 在长式报告中引入了一份自我评估问卷 (SAQ)，由相关实体填写，内容是安全措施是否符合 SCA&CSC RTS 中规定的要求。
1.9. Recovery plans
1.9.恢复计划
Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 (BRRD) and Directive (EU) 2019/879 of 20 May 2019 (BRRD2) establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms provide the authorities with instruments which should allow them to deal with failing national or transnational banks and, thus, to limit their systemic impact.
2014 年 5 月 15 日第 2014/59/EU 号指令（BRRD）和 2019 年 5 月 20 日第 2019/879 号指令（EU）（BRRD2）建立了信贷机构和投资公司的恢复和解决框架，为当局提供了各种工具，使其能够处理倒闭的国家或跨国银行，从而限制其系统性影响。
Among the arrangements implemented by both the BRRD and BRRD2, transposed by the Law of 18 December 2015 and the Law of 20 May 2021 respectively, is the obligation to establish a recovery plan indicating notably the measures planned by an institution to restore its viability following a financial deterioration.
分别由 2015 年 12 月 18 日法律和 2021 年 5 月 20 日法律移植的 BRRD 和 BRRD2 所实施的安排中，有一项义务是制定恢复计划，主要说明机构在财务恶化后为恢复其生存能力而计划采取的措施。
In 2023, the CSSF analysed the comprehensiveness, quality and credibility of the recovery plans for which it is the direct supervisory authority.
2023 年，CSSF 对其作为直接监管机构的恢复计划的全面性、质量和可信度进行了分析。
For Luxembourg banks belonging to European groups, the CSSF participated, in its capacity as host authority, in several joint decisions on group recovery plans involving less significant institutions within the meaning of the SSM. It also contributed to the assessment of recovery plans of some banks under the direct responsibility of the ECB.
对于属于欧洲集团的卢森堡银行，卢森堡金融业监管委员会以主办机构的身份，参与了几项关于集团恢复计划的联合决定，这些计划涉及 SSM 意义上的不太重要的机构。CSSF 还参与评估了由欧洲央行直接负责的一些银行的恢复计划。
1.10. Cooperation in banking supervision
1.10.银行监管合作
In 2023, the CSSF organised one supervisory college concerning a bank for which it exercised the ultimate consolidated supervision at European level.
2023 年，CSSF 组织了一次有关一家银行的监管学院，在欧洲层面对该银行实施最终综合监管。
As a large number of banking groups is present in the Luxembourg financial sector through subsidiaries, the CSSF regularly participates, as host supervisor, in colleges, including colleges organised by supervisory authorities from non-EEA countries. In addition to the colleges, periodical bilateral meetings take place between the CSSF and the Swiss supervisory authority, the FINMA. Cooperation with the Chinese and US authorities takes place mainly via the participation in supervisory colleges organised by these authorities. It should be borne in mind that since 2014, within the framework of the SSM, a number of supervisory colleges have been internalised. Indeed, for Luxembourg subsidiaries and branches belonging to banking groups with their group head in another Member State participating in the SSM, the coordination between authorities takes place through JSTs.
由于大量银行集团通过子公司进入卢森堡金融业，卢森堡金融业监管委员会（CSSF）作为东道主监管机构，定期参加学院会议，包括由非欧洲经济区国家监管机构组织的学院会议。除学院外，CSSF 还与瑞士监管机构 FINMA 定期举行双边会议。与中国和美国监管机构的合作主要通过参加这些机构组织的监管学院进行。需要注意的是，自2014年以来，在SSM框架内，一些监管机构已经内部化。事实上，对于属于银行集团的卢森堡子公司和分支机构，其集团总部位于另一个参与SSM的成员国，当局之间的协调通过联合技术小组进行。
One of the main objectives of the colleges is the performance of a Joint Risk Assessment based on which the colleges assess the capital adequacy of the banking groups and their subsidiaries with regard to the risks incurred, as well as their liquidity situation. Following this assessment, they take a Joint Decision on Capital and Liquidity (for EEA colleges) which is communicated to the banking groups and their subsidiaries. Moreover, the purpose of the colleges is to promote the exchange of information between authorities, including information on the situation of ML/TF compliance risks.
各机构的主要目标之一是进行联合风险评估，在此基础上评估银行集团及其附属机构在风险方面的资本充足率及其流动性状况。在评估之后，它们会就资本和流动性问题做出联合决定（针对欧洲经济区监管机构），并通报给银行集团及其附属机构。此外，合议庭的目的是促进当局之间的信息交流，包括有关 ML/TF 合规风险情况的信息。
In accordance with the AML/CFT College Guidelines of the EBA, the CSSF organised nine colleges as home authority and participated, as host authority, in 28 colleges organised by supervisory authorities of other EU Member States in 2023.
根据欧洲反洗钱与打击资助恐怖主义委员会的学院指导方针，2023 年，欧洲反洗钱与打击资助恐怖主义委员会作为本机构组织了 9 个学院，并作为主办机构参加了由其他欧盟成员国监管机构组织的 28 个学院。
The CSSF also closely collaborates with the foreign supervisory authorities within the context of the consultations provided for by the European directives and in all circumstances in which cooperation is needed.
CSSF 还在欧洲指令规定的磋商范围内以及在所有需要合作的情况下与外国监管机构密切合作。
Finally, the CSSF cooperates with the national judicial and law enforcement authorities as well as with the Commissariat aux Assurances in accordance with Article 2 of the Law of 23 December 1998 establishing a financial sector supervisory commission (“Commission de surveillance du secteur financier”) and Articles 9-1 and 9-1a of the Law of 12 November 2004 on the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Moreover, the CSSF consults the intelligence unit in the context of the procedures for authorisation and qualifying holdings, if deemed necessary.
最后，根据 1998 年 12 月 23 日关于设立金融业监督委员会（"Commission de surveillance du secteur financier"）的法律第 2 条，以及 2004 年 11 月 12 日关于打击洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为的法律第 9-1 条和第 9-1a 条，CSSF 与国家司法和执法机关以及担保委员会开展合作。此外，如果认为有必要，CSSF 还会在授权和合格持有程序方面咨询情报部门。
1.11. Stress testing
1.11.压力测试
Stress tests are exercises aiming to identify sources of risks and vulnerabilities which banks may face and to determine their impact on banks.
压力测试的目的是确定银行可能面临的风险和脆弱性来源，并确定其对银行的影响。
The CSSF is involved in stress tests at three levels:
CSSF 在三个层面参与压力测试：
• at EU level, the CSSF assists the EBA in the development of the methodology of its EU-wide stress test relating to solvency which is carried out every two years;
- 在欧盟层面，CSSF 协助 EBA 制定欧盟范围内偿付能力压力测试的方法，该测试每两年进行一次；
• at SSM level, the CSSF assists the ECB in its annual stress test exercise, in the development of a methodology and during the performance of the stress test. During the 2023 EU-wide stress test coordinated by the EBA, the ECB examined
- 在 SSM 层面，CSSF 协助欧洲央行开展年度压力测试工作、制定方法并实施压力测试。在由欧洲银行监管局协调的 2023 年欧盟范围内的压力测试期间，欧洲央行审查了
57 significant banks of the euro area. The EBA published the results obtained for the different institutions at the end of July 2023. In parallel, the ECB performed its own stress test with 41 banks under its direct supervision which had not been included in the EBA’s sample. Together, these banks represented about 80% of total euro area banking assets. The CSSF provided its technical expertise in relation to three significant banks having their group head in Luxembourg.
57 家欧元区重要银行。欧洲银行监管局于 2023 年 7 月底公布了不同机构的评估结果。与此同时，欧洲央行对其直接监管的 41 家银行进行了压力测试，这些银行未被纳入欧洲银行监管局的样本。这些银行的资产总额约占欧元区银行资产总额的 80%。卢森堡金融业监管委员会（CSSF）为集团总部设在卢森堡的三家重要银行提供了技术专业知识。
• at national level, the CSSF carries out solvency and other stress tests or sensitivity analyses on an annual or half-yearly basis. The aggregated results of these analyses are regularly presented to international organisations such as the IMF or the OECD which regularly request the CSSF’s point of view on the stability of the Luxembourg banking sector.
- 在国家层面，CSSF 每年或每半年进行一次偿付能力和其他压力测试或敏感性分析。这些分析的综合结果定期提交给国际组织，如国际货币基金组织（IMF）或经济合作与发展组织（OECD），这些组织定期要求 CSSF 就卢森堡银行业的稳定性提出意见。
The results of the solvency stress tests are a source of information to (i) compare, judge and, where appropriate, challenge the results of the stress tests carried out internally by banks in the framework of their ICAAP, (ii) help assess the solvency risk of the institutions, and (iii) help assess the situation and future capital requirements of a bank as a preventive approach. The results of the stress tests form a starting point for the determination of the LSIs’ capital levels under Pillar 2 (Pillar 2 Guidance - P2G). A similar approach is adopted as regards liquidity.
偿付能力压力测试的结果是一种信息来源，可用于：(i) 比较、判断并在适当情况下质疑银行在《综合内部审计与分析方法》框架内进行的压力测试的结果；(ii) 帮助评估机构的偿付能力风险；(iii) 作为一种预防性方法，帮助评估银行的状况和未来的资本要求。压力测试的结果是根据第二支柱（第二支柱指南 - P2G）确定长期投资机构资本水平的起点。在流动性方面也采用了类似的方法。
1.12. Intra-group credit risks
1.12.集团内部信贷风险
One of the main risks monitored by the CSSF is related to the significant exposures of Luxembourg banks to banking entities of their group.
CSSF 监测的主要风险之一与卢森堡银行对其集团内银行实体的重大风险敞口有关。
The Luxembourg banking sector is primarily composed of subsidiaries and branches of large international banking groups which carry out activities of private banking and/or custody of financial assets in Luxembourg. These activities generate excess liquidity which is either maintained in Luxembourg as liquidity buffer (often deposited with the BCL) or lent to the parent company.
卢森堡银行业主要由大型国际银行集团的子公司和分行组成，这些子公司和分行在卢森堡开展私人银行业务和/或金融资产托管活动。这些活动产生的过剩流动性要么留在卢森堡作为流动性缓冲（通常存入卢森堡中央银行），要么借给母公司。
In total, intra-group exposures represented 33% of the assets of the Luxembourg banking sector at the end of 2023. In line with the European rules in this regard and Article 56-1 of the Law of 5 April 1993 on the financial sector, these exposures often represent a multiple of a bank’s own funds. In these cases, the CSSF follows and controls compliance by the banks with the legal conditions provided for in the above-mentioned Article 56-1.
截至2023年底，集团内部风险敞口总计占卢森堡银行业资产的33%。根据这方面的欧洲规则和 1993 年 4 月 5 日关于金融业的法律第 56-1 条，这些风险敞口往往是银行自有资金的倍数。在这种情况下，CSSF 会跟踪并控制银行遵守上述第 56-1 条规定的法律条件。
2. Developments in the banking sector in 2023
2.2023 年银行业的发展
2.1. Development in the number of credit institutions
2.1.信贷机构数量的发展
With 119 entities authorised at the end of the financial year 2023, the number of banks decreased by two entities as compared to 31 December 2022.
截至 2023 财年末，共有 119 家银行获得授权，与 2022 年 12 月 31 日相比，银行数量减少了两家。
Four new banks started their activities in 2023.
四家新银行于 2023 年开始营业。
Six banks were deregistered from the official list during 2023.
2023 年期间，六家银行从官方名单中注销。
2.2. Development in banking employment
2.2.银行业就业发展情况
As at 31 December 2023, the number of employees in Luxembourg credit institutions8 amounted to 26,254 compared to 26,012 as at 31 December 2022, representing an increase of 242 people on an annual basis. In 32% of banks, employment increased whereas in 55% of them it decreased.
截至2023年12月31日，卢森堡信贷机构8 的员工人数为26,254人，而截至2022年12月31日为26,012人，每年增加242人。32%的银行增加了员工人数，55%的银行减少了员工人数。
Compared to the figures of end December 2022, the distribution of employment according to men and women remained almost unchanged with 55% men and 45% women.
与 2022 年 12 月底的数字相比，男女就业分布基本保持不变，男性占 55%，女性占 45%。
2.3. Development of balance sheet and off-balance sheet items
2.3.资产负债表和资产负债表外项目的发展情况
The balance sheet total remained relatively stable compared to 2022 (+0.6%). The slight growth from EUR 923.1 billion to EUR 929.0 billion went hand in hand with, on the assets side, a rise in loans and advances to credit institutions which largely offset the decrease in loans and advances to central banks, households and non-financial companies. On the liabilities side, the growth in amounts owed to credit institutions was offset by a fall in amounts owed to non-monetary investment funds and central banks.
资产负债表总额与 2022 年相比保持相对稳定（+0.6%）。从 9,231 亿欧元到 9,290 亿欧元的小幅增长，在资产方面，信贷机构贷款和垫款的增加在很大程度上抵消了中央银行、家庭和非金融公司贷款和垫款的减少。在负债方面，对信贷机构欠款的增长被对非货币投资基金和中央银行欠款的下降所抵消。
As regards off-balance sheet exposures, the Luxembourg banking sector had granted loan commitments and financial guarantees amounting to EUR 155.2 billion as at 31 December 2023 (-7.7% over a year).
至于资产负债表外的风险敞口，截至2023年12月31日，卢森堡银行业发放的贷款承诺和财务担保总额为1,552亿欧元（比一年前减少7.7%）。
2.4. Development in the profit and loss account
2.4.损益表的变化情况
In 2023, the 51.0% increase in net interest income over a year greatly contributed to the 45.1% rise in profit before provisions and taxes which reached EUR 8,942 million. Due to the slower rise in provisions, net profit for the year 2023 increased by 67.3% compared to 2022 and amounted to EUR 6,603 million. It should be noted that 85% of the banks ended the year 2023 with a positive net result (77% in 2022).
2023 年，净利息收入比上年增长 51.0%，极大地促进了拨备和税前利润增长 45.1%，达到 89.42 亿欧元。由于准备金增长放缓，2023 年的净利润与 2022 年相比增长了 67.3%，达到 66.03 亿欧元。值得注意的是，85% 的银行在 2023 年末的净利润为正数（2022 年为 77%）。
The rise in interest-rate margin by 51.0% coincided with the rise in interest rates and 80% of the banks benefitted from it.
在利率上升的同时，息差也上升了 51.0%，80% 的银行从中受益。
Net fee and commission income decreased by 3.2% year-on-year. This fall only concerns 53% of the banks and breaks down very unevenly among them.
手续费和佣金净收入同比下降 3.2%。这一下降仅涉及 53% 的银行，而且各银行之间的差距非常大。
General expenses (+7.3%) continued their upward trend for 81% of the banks. This growth mainly results from the significant rise in staff costs (+10.9%) against a backdrop of inflation.
81% 的银行的一般费用（+7.3%）继续呈上升趋势。增长的主要原因是在通货膨胀的背景下，员工成本大幅上升（+10.9%）。
Given the allocations to provision for risk, which mark a return to the mean following an exceptional year 2022, net results grew by 67.3% year-on-year. In 2022, these provisions increased strongly in relation to commitments to Russian counterparties.
考虑到风险准备金的分配，这标志着继 2022 年的特殊年份之后又回到了平均水平，净业绩同比增长了 67.3%。2022 年，这些准备金大幅增加，与对俄罗斯交易对手的承诺有关。
The above-mentioned developments led to a historically low cost-to-income ratio of 48%, against 56% in 2022. Despite this positive development at sectoral level, 17 banks recorded a cost-to-income ratio above 100% as at 31 December 2023.
上述发展导致成本收入比达到历史最低水平，为 48%，而 2022 年为 56%。尽管在部门层面取得了这一积极进展，但截至 2023 年 12 月 31 日，仍有 17 家银行的成本收入比超过了 100%。
2.5. Solvency and liquidity ratios
2.5.偿付能力和流动性比率
The banks of the Luxembourg financial centre continued to register high prudential ratios. The average capital ratio total of the banking sector rose from 23.1% to 23.8% during 2023, and remained largely above the regulatory threshold (exclusive of variable buffers) set at 10.5%.
卢森堡金融中心的银行继续保持较高的审慎比率。2023年期间，银行业的平均资本比率总额从23.1%上升至23.8%，并在很大程度上保持在10.5%的监管门槛（不包括可变缓冲）之上。
• Liquidity Coverage Requirement (LCR)
- 流动性覆盖要求 (LCR)
As at 31 December 2023, the weighted average of the LCR of Luxembourg banks and Luxembourg branches of banks having their registered office outside the EU amounted to 249% as compared to 200% at the end of December 2022. The minimum regulatory threshold is set at 100%.
截至 2023 年 12 月 31 日，卢森堡银行和注册地在欧盟以外的银行卢森堡分行的加权平均 LCR 为 249%，而 2022 年 12 月底为 200%。最低监管门槛设定为100%。
At aggregate level, the liquidity buffer is mainly composed by Level 1 assets. The short-term deposits made with the BCL still represented the major part of the Luxembourg banks’ liquid assets.
总体而言，流动性缓冲主要由一级资产构成。在卢森堡中央银行的短期存款仍然是卢森堡银行流动资产的主要部分。
• Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
- 净稳定资金比率（NSFR）
The weighted average of the NSFR of Luxembourg banks and Luxembourg branches of banks having their registered office outside the EU amounted to 154% as at 31 December 2023, as compared to 156% at the end of December 2022. The minimum regulatory threshold is set at 100%.
截至 2023 年 12 月 31 日，卢森堡银行和注册地在欧盟以外的银行卢森堡分行的加权平均 NSFR 为 154%，而 2022 年 12 月底为 156%。最低监管门槛设定为100%。
• Asset encumbrance ratio
- 资产占用率
Luxembourg banks have a low asset encumbrance ratio. As at 31 December 2023, this ratio amounted to 6.20% (6.65% in 2022) on weighted and aggregate basis, showing that most of the Luxembourg banks’ assets were unencumbered. Only six banks presented an asset encumbrance ratio exceeding 15% due to their business model. This was especially the case of banks issuing covered bonds. In accordance with the current regulations, these banks were subject to additional reporting requirements.
卢森堡银行的资产抵押率较低。截至2023年12月31日，该比率加权合计为6.20%（2022年为6.65%），表明卢森堡银行的大部分资产未被抵押。只有六家银行由于业务模式的原因，资产抵押率超过15%。发行担保债券的银行尤其如此。根据现行法规，这些银行必须遵守额外的报告要求。