Values in Nature: A Pluralistic Approach
自然界中的價值觀：一種多元化的方法

Everybody values nature in some way, and most of us value nature in many ways. The agriculturalist values nature, however implicitly, as a source of genetic diversity for crops, and for the provision of nutrients to grow them. The huntergatherer uses natural products more directly, and choosing to take and use these products indicates expected value. As populations have moved to urban areas, natural places have gained value as refuges from the chaotic and pressured lives of urban dwellers. So, there is no question, speaking thus loosely, that nature has value to human beings, and that nature and natural systems are valued, and produce values of many types for humans.
每個人都以某種方式重視自然，我們大多數人也以多種方式重視自然。農業學家重視自然，無論多麼隱晦，它都是作物遺傳多樣性的來源，也是為作物生長提供養分的來源。狩獵採集者更直接地使用天然產品，選擇服用和使用這些產品表明瞭預期價值。隨著人口向城市地區遷移，自然場所作為城市居民混亂和壓力生活的避難所越來越有價值。因此，毫無疑問，如此寬泛地說，自然對人類有價值，自然和自然系統受到重視，併為人類創造了多種類型的價值。

Accordingly, the topic of this exchange, “values in nature,” has a deceptively simple ring to it, seeming to invite respondents to list and explain the various values attributable to nature, and perhaps to provide a useful taxonomy of types of natural value. Indeed, the literature is replete with studies that, from some point of view or another, provide careful and well-thought-out categorizations of natural values. The problem is that these categorizations are expressed in many different disciplinary tongues, and often articulated in incommensurable vernaculars.
因此，這次交流的話題，“自然中的價值”，有一個看似簡單的環，似乎在邀請受訪者列出和解釋歸屬於自然的各種價值，也許是為了提供一個有用的自然價值類型的分類法。事實上，文獻中充斥著從某種角度對自然價值進行仔細和深思熟慮的分類的研究。問題在於，這些分類是用許多不同的學科語言表達的，而且經常用難以比擬的白話來表達。

In fact, one cannot even begin to list, definitively, the types of value that nature has, until we first adopt a theory of value. Values are not the kind of thing we find pre-packaged and countable; the way we think about values is thus deeply affected by the theory of value we assume or choose. So, I begin by questioning whether the topic at hand can be answered simply by reference to a few categories or types of environmental and natural values. When environmental values are identified and measured within the framework of a theory, using the technical vocabulary of that theory to express those values, it is inevitable that the assumptions of the theory will implicitly limit and shape our thinking about those values.
事實上，在我們首先採用價值理論之前，我們甚至無法開始明確地列出自然界所具有的價值類型。價值不是我們發現的那種預先打包和可計數的東西;因此，我們思考價值的方式深受我們假設或選擇的價值理論的影響。因此，我首先要問的是，是否可以簡單地通過參考環境和自然價值的幾個類別或類型來回答手頭的話題。當環境價值在理論框架內被識別和衡量時，使用該理論的技術詞彙來表達這些價值時，理論的假設不可避免地會隱含地限制和塑造我們對這些價值的思考。

In order to avoid unthinking commitments regarding the nature of environmental values, accordingly, I will begin my discussion with as few assumptions as possible, and with a brief discussion, in the next section, of the types of value theories in which environmental ethicists have expressed environmental values. Before proceeding to that step, however, I will complete this introduction by listing and explaining three broad types of criteria by which one might judge proposed theories of value. In the process, we can briefly introduce some of the controversies that have predictably occurred because various writers on the value of nature have emphasized different criteria, and have held different expectations in choosing and defending theories of value to apply to nature. In my final section, it will be possible to address the question of what values nature “has,” and how best to talk about them.
因此，為了避免對環境價值的本質做出不假思索的承諾，我將以盡可能少的假設開始我的討論，並在下一節中簡要討論環境倫理學家表達環境價值的價值理論類型。然而，在繼續這一步之前，我將通過列出和解釋三大類標準來完成本介紹，人們可以根據這些標準來判斷所提出的價值理論。在這個過程中，我們可以簡要介紹一些可以預見的爭議，因為關於自然價值的不同作者強調了不同的標準，並且在選擇和捍衛適用於自然的價值理論時持有不同的期望。在我的最後一節中，將有可能解決自然“擁有”什麼價值以及如何最好地談論它們的問題。

Many writers in environmental ethics and related fields write as if environmental values can be readily observed. If, however, I am correct that environmental values are always filtered through a specific theory of value - that they can only be understood within the context of theoretical assumptions - then it is reasonable to take a step backwards and ask, “What can we expect of a theory of environmental value?” I suggest that environmental theorists, at least implicitly, choose a theory of environmental values in response to three general types of expectation - expectations that might result in criteria by which theories can be justified and explained. I will refer to these expectations as: (1) metaphysical expectations, (2) epistemological expectations, and (3) practical considerations.
環境倫理學和相關領域的許多作家在寫作時，似乎環境價值觀很容易得到遵守。然而，如果我是對的，環境價值總是通過特定的價值理論進行過濾——它們只能在理論假設的背景下理解——那麼倒退一步問道：“我們能對環境價值理論有什麼期望是合理的？我建議環境理論家，至少是隱含地，選擇一種環境價值理論來回應三種一般類型的期望——這些期望可能會導致可以證明和解釋理論的標準。我將這些期望稱為：（1） 形而上學的期望，（2） 認識論的期望，以及 （3） 實際考慮。

Many authors in environmental ethics apparently believe that a theory of environmental value should, above all else, resolve metaphysical disputes so as to place discourse about environmental values on a firm, metaphysical foundation. Interestingly, however, metaphysical reasoning can be either conservative or more radical. For example, John Passmore, author of the first book-length study of environmental ethics, argued for a human-centered, utilitarian approach to valuing nature, because this theory would square with the dominant worldview/metaphysics of Western thought, and requires no major shift in worldview and core ethical beliefs of the culture (Passmore, 1974: 101-26).
許多環境倫理學的作者顯然認為，環境價值理論首先應該解決形而上學的爭論，以便將關於環境價值的討論建立在堅實的形而上學基礎上。然而，有趣的是，形而上學的推理可以是保守的，也可以是更激進的。例如，第一本環境倫理學研究全書的作者約翰·帕斯莫爾 （John Passmore） 主張以人為中心、功利主義方法來珍視自然，因為該理論與西方思想的主流世界觀/形而上學相吻合，並且不需要對世界觀和文化的核心道德信仰進行重大轉變（Passmore，1974：101-26）。

Today, however, philosophers, self-described “radical” environmental ethicists, calling themselves “biocentrists,” or “ecocentrists,” argue that - since current treatment of nature is unacceptable - we need a metaphysical revolution that will provide a new conceptualization of the human-nature relationship. For example, J. Baird Callicott, in an essay entitled “The Metaphysical Foundations of Ecology,” states: “A consolidated metaphysical consensus thus appears to be emerging presently from twentieth-century science which may at last supplant the metaphysical consensus distilled from the scientific paradigm of the seventeenth century” (Callicott, 1989: 102). Passmore and Callicott, in their own ways, exemplify metaphysical approaches to environmental values - emphasizing the metaphysical expectation that a theory of value will clarify basic relationships between humans and nature. They differ only in that Passmore, committed to the traditional, human-centered view, takes human well-
然而，今天，自稱為“激進”環境倫理學家的哲學家，自稱“生物中心主義者”或“生態中心主義者”，認為——既然目前對自然的處理是不可接受的——我們需要一場形而上學的革命，為人與自然的關係提供一種新的概念化。例如，J. Baird Callicott 在一篇題為“生態學的形而上學基礎”的文章中指出：“因此，一種鞏固的形而上學共識似乎正在從 20 世紀的科學中出現，它最終可能會取代從 17 世紀科學範式中提煉出來的形而上學共識”（Callicott， 1989： 102）。帕斯莫爾和卡利科特以他們自己的方式體現了對環境價值的形而上學方法——強調形而上學的期望，即價值理論將闡明人類與自然之間的基本關係。它們的唯一區別在於，帕斯莫爾致力於傳統的、以人為中心的觀點，很好地看待人——
being to be the measure of value, and denies the need and the wisdom of a radical shift to a non-anthropocentric system of value. Callicott, on the other hand, embraces a radical shift, substituting a new, more holistic metaphysics and a new, more holistic and ecocentric ethic.
成為價值的衡量標準，並否認了向非人類中心主義價值體系的徹底轉變的必要性和智慧。另一方面，卡利科特接受了一個根本性的轉變，取而代之的是一種新的、更全面的形而上學和一種新的、更整體和以生態為中心的倫理學。

Whether one’s appeal to metaphysics is conservative or radical, the implication is that an important aspect of understanding environmental values is to make these values “fit” into an acceptable, and deep, conception of the world - a metaphysic or a “worldview.” What is of course problematic is whether one can, independently, decide what our metaphysical views “should” be (in order to derive from them an appropriate theory of value), or whether, alternatively, one should get one’s values “right,” and then choose a metaphysic to support them. Despite this bewildering quandary, many writers on environmental ethics have assumed that the key issue regarding environmental values is to associate one’s theory of value with an appropriate metaphysical view of the world.
無論一個人對形而上學的訴求是保守的還是激進的，這意味著理解環境價值的一個重要方面是使這些價值“適合”一個可接受的、深刻的世界概念——形而上學或“世界觀”。當然，有問題的是，一個人是否能夠獨立地決定我們的形而上學觀點“應該”是什麼（以便從中得出一個適當的價值理論），或者，一個人是否應該把自己的價值觀“正確”，然後選擇一個形而上學來支持它們。儘管存在這種令人困惑的困境，但許多環境倫理學作家認為，關於環境價值的關鍵問題是將一個人的價值理論與適當的形而上學世界觀聯繫起來。

When choosing a theory of values, on our way to developing a theory of environmental values, I - and many others - seek a theory that supports justification and reason-giving in deliberation about values. For both practical (see “Practical considerations” below) and theoretical reasons, it would seem that - other things being equal - we would prefer a theory of environmental values according to which at least some value statements can be verified and supported. Given that some form of a justificatory method seems necessary to generate any moral arguments, one would expect that most theorists of environmental values would insist that any theory they choose would make clear - or at least leave open - ways to justify or warrant value claims with some form of evidence. Nevertheless, theorists do place very different weight on epistemological criteria, and employ very different epistemological approaches to understanding and justifying value claims. Because of this latter problem, it may make sense to follow John Dewey, who eventually stopped talking about “truth,” about “certainty,” and about “justifications,” preferring instead to insist on a minimal epistemological requirement: our theory of value should at least allow “warranted assertability” of value claims by offering progressively more experiential - in the best case, experimental - evidence to support them.
在選擇價值理論時，在我們發展環境價值理論的道路上，我 - 和許多其他人 - 尋求一種支持在考慮價值時進行合理化和推理的理論。出於實際（參見下面的“實際考慮”）和理論原因，在其他條件相同的情況下，我們似乎更喜歡環境價值理論，根據該理論，至少可以驗證和支援一些價值陳述。鑒於某種形式的論證方法似乎是產生任何道德論證所必需的，人們可以預期，大多數環境價值理論家會堅持認為，他們選擇的任何理論都會用某種形式的證據來明確——或者至少留下開放——方法來證明或保證價值主張。然而，理論家們確實對認識論標準給予了非常不同的重視，並採用了非常不同的認識論方法來理解和證明價值主張。由於後一個問題，追隨約翰·杜威（John Dewey）可能是有意義的，他最終不再談論“真理”、“確定性”和“正當性”，而是寧願堅持一個最低的認識論要求：我們的價值理論至少應該通過提供逐漸更多的經驗性——在最好的情況下，是實驗性的——證據來支持價值主張的“有根據的斷言”。

Turning away from theoretical considerations, it is also important to evaluate a theory of environmental values for its practical impacts. Any theory of environmental values that passes the minimal and warranted assertability test mentioned above will have an important practical advantage over more subjectivist theories of value: activists must feel free to argue that their proposed policies are morally obligatory, a type of epistemological status that cannot be achieved within a purely subjectivist theory of value.
撇開理論考慮不談，評估環境價值理論的實際影響也很重要。任何通過上述最低限度和有根據的可斷言性測試的環境價值理論，都將比更主觀主義的價值理論具有重要的實際優勢：活動家必須自由地爭辯說，他們提出的政策在道德上是強制性的，這種認識論地位在純粹的主觀主義價值理論中是無法實現的。

One might also judge a theory of value to be useful if that theory allows quantification, or other clear forms of measurement, so that values can be compared
如果價值理論允許量化或其他明確的測量形式，以便可以比較價值，那麼該理論也可能判斷該理論是有用的

300 Bryan G. Norton  300 布萊恩·諾頓