Fictionalism

Fictionalism about a region of discourse can provisionally be characterized as the view that claims made within that discourse are not best seen as aiming at literal truth but are better regarded as a sort of ‘fiction’. As we will see, this first characterization of fictionalism is in several ways rough. But it is a useful point of departure.
关于某个话语领域的虚构主义可初步界定为这样一种观点：该话语领域内的主张不应被视为追求字面真理，而应被看作某种"虚构"。后文将指出，这一初步界定存在若干不精确之处，但仍不失为有益的讨论起点。

This entry is divided into five main sections. The first section contains a brief history and overview of fictionalist views. The second section describes more carefully what different kinds of fictionalist theses there are. In the third and fourth sections, important arguments for and against fictionalism are summarized. The fifth section is devoted to a more general discussion of the philosophical significance of fictionalism.
本条目分为五个主要部分。第一部分简要介绍虚构主义观点的历史与概况；第二部分更细致地阐述不同类型的虚构主义论点；第三、四部分分别概述支持与反对虚构主义的重要论证；第五部分则专门讨论虚构主义的哲学意义。

• 1. Brief History and Overview
  1. 简史与概述
• 2. Some Qualifications and Distinctions
  2. 若干限定与区分
  • 2.1 Language and ontology
    2.1 语言与本体论
  • 2.2 Hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism
    2.2 诠释性与革命性虚构主义
  • 2.3 Meaning versus use
    2.3 意义与使用之辨
  • 2.4 Attitudes
• 3. Arguments for Fictionalism
  3. 支持虚构主义的论证
  • 3.1 Via eliminativist antirealism
    3.1 经由消除论的反实在论路径
  • 3.2 The Oracle
  • 3.3 The paradox of existence
    3.3 存在悖论
  • 3.4 Analogies with uncontroversially non-literal discourse
    3.4 与无争议非字面话语的类比
• 4. Arguments against Fictionalism
  4. 反对虚构主义的论点
  • 4.1 The phenomenological objection
    4.1 现象学质疑
  • 4.2 Can fictionalism deliver the goods?
    4.2 虚构主义能否兑现承诺？
  • 4.3 Criticisms concerning systematicity
    4.3 关于系统性的批评
  • 4.4 The fictionalist’s preferred analogies
    4.4 虚构主义者偏爱的类比
  • 4.5 Philosophy of language concerns
    4.5 语言哲学关切
  • 4.6 Old problems in new bottles?
    4.6 新瓶装旧酒？
  • 4.7 Other objections  4.7 其他反对意见
• 5. Significance
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
  其他网络资源
• Related Entries

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1. Brief History and Overview
1. 简史与概述

Some historically especially important precursors to modern fictionalism are Jeremy Bentham (see Ogden 1932), who defended the view that many entities referred to in ordinary discourse are “fictitious”, Hans Vaihinger, with his philosophy of the “as if”, and, specifically in the moral case, Friedrich Nietzsche, whose view has been argued to amount to moral fictionalism. Voltaire’s famous “If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him” can be seen as expressing a fictionalist stance toward theism. Moreover, George Berkeley’s advice to think with the learned and speak with the vulgar is often taken to express a fictionalist stance (from §51 of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, defending his immaterialism from the charge that it does not fit the way we speak). Sometimes Hume is mentioned as an early fictionalist (see for example Varzi 2013). There are arguably earlier predecessors as well. One possible example is the Pyrrhonist view that we should live without belief (see Sextus Empiricus, “Outlines of Scepticism”). Moreover, the doctrine of the two truths in Buddhist philosophy has been interpreted as a distinction between fictional truth and real truth (see Garfield 2006). Pierre Duhem (1913) argues that the dominant view on astronomy before the advent of modern physics was that a fictionalist attitude was appropriate. For some discussion of these historical precursors, see Gideon Rosen (2005) (for a discussion of Pyrrhonism, the early history of astronomy, and Bentham), Arthur Fine (1993) (for a discussion of Vaihinger), and Nadeem Hussain (2007) (for a discussion of Nietzsche and other 19th century German philosophers with fictionalist tendencies).
现代虚构主义在历史上尤为重要的先驱包括杰里米·边沁（参见奥格登 1932 年著作），他主张日常话语中提及的许多实体都是"虚构的"；汉斯·费英格及其"仿佛"哲学；以及在道德领域特别值得一提的弗里德里希·尼采，其观点被认为构成了道德虚构主义。伏尔泰的名言"如果上帝不存在，也有必要创造一个"可被视为对有神论采取的虚构主义立场。此外，乔治·贝克莱关于"与学者同思，与俗人共语"的建议（出自《人类知识原理》第 51 节，为其非物质主义辩护，反驳其不符合日常语言的指控）常被视为表达了虚构主义立场。有时休谟也被提及为早期虚构主义者（例如参见瓦尔齐 2013 年）。更早的前驱者亦不乏其人，皮浪主义者主张"无信念地生活"（参见塞克斯都·恩披里柯《皮浪学说纲要》）便是一个可能的例证。 此外，佛教哲学中的二谛学说常被诠释为虚构真理与真实真理的区分（参见 Garfield 2006）。皮埃尔·迪昂（1913）主张，在现代物理学兴起之前，天文学领域的主流观点认为采取虚构主义态度是恰当的。关于这些历史先驱的讨论，可参阅吉迪恩·罗森（2005）（涉及皮浪主义、天文学早期发展及边沁）、阿瑟·法因（1993）（讨论费英格）以及纳迪姆·侯赛因（2007）（探讨尼采及其他具有虚构主义倾向的 19 世纪德国哲学家）。

More recently, Hartry Field (1980 and 1989), Joseph Melia (e.g. 2000), Mark Balaguer (e.g. 1998a) and Stephen Yablo (see especially 2000a, 2000b, 2001 and 2002) have defended fictionalism about mathematical discourse (see here the entry on fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics); Bas van Fraassen (1980) has defended a version of fictionalism about scientific theories; Richard Joyce (2001, 2005, forthcoming), Mark Kalderon (2005a) and Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall and Caroline West (2005) have defended moral fictionalism; Kendall Walton (1985, 1990 , 2000), Mark Crimmins (1998), Stuart Brock (2002), Mark Balaguer (1998b), Anthony Everett (2005), Frederick Kroon (2000, 2004) and Stefano Predelli (2020) have defended fictionalism about things like negative existentials, identity statements, propositional attitude reports, fictional characters and fictional discourse; Peter van Inwagen (1990) and Cian Dorr and Gideon Rosen (2002) have defended fictionalism about ordinary object discourse; Bradley Armour-Garb and James Woodbridge (2015) and Alexis Burgess and John Burgess (2011) have defended fictionalism about truth; and D.M. Armstrong (1989), Gideon Rosen (1990), John Nolt (1986), and Seahwa Kim (2005) have defended modal fictionalism (see here the entry on modal fictionalism). Religious fictionalism is discussed in LePoidevin (2016, 2019) and the essays in Joyce and Kroon (forthcoming) compare moral and religious fictionalism. In recent years, mental fictionalism has become the subject of much discussion. See here the essays in Tamas Demeter, Ted Parent and Adam Toon (2022) as well as Adam Toon’s (2023). Sam Baron, Kristie Miller and Jonathan Tallant (2021) defend fictionalism about temporal thought. Naomi Thompon (2022) puts forward and motivates fictionalism about grounding. Heather Logue (2022) defends gender fictionalism. Needless to say, this is a just a sample of recent defenses of fictionalist views.
近来，哈特里·菲尔德（1980 年及 1989 年）、约瑟夫·梅利亚（如 2000 年）、马克·巴拉格尔（如 1998a）和斯蒂芬·亚布洛（尤见 2000a、2000b、2001 年及 2002 年著作）为数学话语的虚构主义立场进行了辩护（参见数学哲学中的虚构主义条目）；巴斯·范弗拉森（1980 年）提出了科学理论虚构主义的变体；理查德·乔伊斯（2001 年、2005 年及待刊）、马克·卡尔德隆（2005a）以及丹尼尔·诺兰、格雷格·雷斯塔尔和卡罗琳·韦斯特（2005 年）为道德虚构主义辩护；肯德尔·沃尔顿（1985 年、1990 年、2000 年）、马克·克里明斯（1998 年）、斯图尔特·布洛克（2002 年）、马克·巴拉格尔（1998b）、安东尼·埃弗雷特（2005 年）、弗雷德里克·克鲁恩（2000 年、2004 年）和斯特凡诺·普雷代利（2020 年）则针对否定存在命题、同一性陈述、命题态度报告、虚构角色及虚构话语等现象提出了虚构主义主张；彼得·范因瓦根（1990 年）与西安·多尔、吉迪恩·罗森（2002 年）为日常对象话语的虚构主义辩护；布拉德利·阿穆尔-加布与詹姆斯·伍德布里奇（2015 年）、亚历克西斯·伯吉斯与约翰·伯吉斯（2011 年）主张真理虚构主义；而 D.M.阿姆斯特朗（1989 年）、吉迪恩·罗森（1990 年）、约翰·诺尔特（1986 年）和金世华（2005 年）则支持模态虚构主义（参见模态虚构主义条目）。 宗教虚构主义在 LePoidevin（2016，2019）中有所讨论，而 Joyce 和 Kroon（即将出版）的论文则对道德虚构主义和宗教虚构主义进行了比较。近年来，心理虚构主义已成为广泛讨论的主题，可参阅 Tamas Demeter、Ted Parent 和 Adam Toon（2022）的论文集以及 Adam Toon（2023）的著作。Sam Baron、Kristie Miller 和 Jonathan Tallant（2021）为时间思维的虚构主义观点进行了辩护。Naomi Thompson（2022）提出并推动了基础虚构主义的论述。Heather Logue（2022）则为性别虚构主义观点辩护。毋庸赘言，这只是近期虚构主义观点辩护的部分范例。

The present entry will be more focused on fictionalism as a general strategy in philosophy than on fictionalism about specific discourses. For some recent overviews of fictionalism, see Kroon (2011), Emily Caddick Bourne (2013), John Divers and David Liggins (2005), Mark Sainsbury (2010), Lukas Skiba and Richard Woodward (2020), and the full-length book on fictionalism by Frederick Kroon, Jonathan McKeown-Green and Stuart Brock (2018). Important collections of texts on fictionalism are Mark Eli Kalderon (2005b) and Bradley Armour-Garb and Frederick Kroon (2020).
本条目将更侧重于探讨虚构主义作为一种哲学通用策略，而非针对特定论述的虚构主义。关于虚构主义的最新综述，可参阅克伦（2011）、艾米丽·卡迪克·伯恩（2013）、约翰·迪弗斯与大卫·利金斯（2005）、马克·塞恩斯伯里（2010）、卢卡斯·斯基巴与理查德·伍德沃德（2020），以及弗雷德里克·克伦、乔纳森·麦基翁-格林与斯图尔特·布洛克合著的虚构主义专著（2018）。重要的虚构主义文献汇编包括马克·埃利·卡尔德隆（2005b）和布拉德利·阿穆尔-加布与弗雷德里克·克伦（2020）的选集。

2. Some Qualifications and Distinctions
2. 若干限定与区分

The earlier provisional characterization of fictionalism needs qualification and supplementation. In this section, more precision will be provided.
先前对虚构主义的临时性描述需要加以限定和补充。本节将提供更精确的阐述。

2.1 Language and ontology
2.1 语言与本体论

A first crucial distinction is between a linguistic and an ontological thesis. The linguistic thesis is, roughly, that already expressed above, according to which utterances of sentences of the discourse are best seen not as efforts to say what is literally true, but as useful fictions of some sort. The ontological thesis, by contrast, is the thesis that the entities characteristic of the discourse do not exist, or have the ontological status of fictional entities. One can in principle embrace the linguistic thesis without embracing the ontological thesis, and vice versa. Both the provisional statement of fictionalism and the statements of these two theses mention fiction, and the thesis discussed is called “fictionalism”. But as we will see, not all theses that tend to go under the heading fictionalism relate very clearly to fiction in any ordinary sense.
首要的关键区别在于语言学论题与本体论论题之间。语言学论题大致如上所述，即认为该话语中的句子表达最好不被视为对字面真实的陈述，而应看作某种有用的虚构。相比之下，本体论论题则主张该话语特有的实体并不存在，或具有虚构实体的本体论地位。原则上，人们可以接受语言学论题而不接受本体论论题，反之亦然。无论是虚构主义的临时表述，还是这两个论题的陈述，都提到了"虚构"一词，所讨论的论题也被称为"虚构主义"。但我们将看到，并非所有归入虚构主义名下的论题都与日常意义上的虚构概念存在明确关联。

Often the linguistic and the ontological thesis are run together. Nolan, Restall and West (2005) say, when introducing fictionalism, “The simplest fictionalist approach to a discourse takes certain claims in that discourse to be literally false, but nevertheless worth uttering in certain contexts, since the pretence that such claims are true is worthwhile for various theoretical purposes”. (A complication that they introduce is that some fictionalists may simply be agnostic about the relevant claims.) Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2001) says, “To be a fictionalist about Fs is to think that our naïve attitude toward F-discourse is only halfway correct: we are right in thinking that we use genuine singular terms that purport to refer to Fs, but wrong in thinking that they actually succeed in referring. In engaging in F-discourse we inadvertently slip into fictional talk”. One reason that the linguistic and ontological theses are often run together is that the linguistic thesis tends to be motivated by ontological concerns. For example, someone who is a nominalist might on that ground find herself attracted to fictionalism about mathematical discourse.
语言命题与本体论命题常被混为一谈。诺兰、雷斯塔尔与韦斯特（2005）在介绍虚构主义时指出："最简单的虚构主义处理方式认为，特定话语中的某些主张在字面上是虚假的，但在特定语境中仍值得表达，因为出于各种理论目的，假装这些主张为真是有价值的"。（他们补充的复杂性在于，某些虚构主义者可能对相关主张持不可知论态度。）佐尔坦·根德勒·萨博（2001）提出："对 F 持虚构主义立场，意味着认为我们对 F 话语的天真态度只有部分正确：我们正确认识到自己使用了旨在指称 F 的真正单称词项，却错误地认为这些词项实际完成了指称。在进行 F 话语时，我们无意中陷入了虚构性言说"。语言命题与本体论命题常被并置讨论的原因在于，语言命题往往由本体论关切所驱动。例如，唯名论者可能因此被数学话语的虚构主义所吸引。

The focus in this entry will primarily be on the linguistic thesis. The ontological thesis might be held also by someone who holds that we are better off simply abandoning or rejecting the target discourse, and that is not a distinctively fictionalist thesis.
本文主要关注语言学命题。本体论命题也可能被那些认为我们最好直接放弃或拒斥目标论述的人所持有，而这并非虚构主义特有的论点。

2.2 Hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism
2.2 诠释性虚构主义与革命性虚构主义

A second distinction is between hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism.^[1] Hermeneutic fictionalism about a discourse D is a thesis about the actual nature of the discourse: according to hermeneutic fictionalism we actually do not aim at the literal truth but only appear to or pretend to do so. Revolutionary fictionalism, by contrast, insists that when engaging in D we ought not to aim at the literal truth; the point of engaging in D can be achieved by other, preferable means. Obviously, hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism are different theses and must be evaluated separately. The rest of the discussion in section 2 will focus primarily on hermeneutic fictionalism. It should be straightforward to see how the points generalize to revolutionary fictionalism.
第二个区别在于解释性虚构主义与革命性虚构主义之间。 ^[1] 关于话语 D 的解释性虚构主义是对该话语实际本质的论断：根据解释性虚构主义，我们实际上并不追求字面真理，而只是表面上或假装这样做。相比之下，革命性虚构主义则坚持认为，在参与 D 时我们不应以字面真理为目标；参与 D 的目的可以通过其他更可取的方式实现。显然，解释性虚构主义与革命性虚构主义是不同的论断，必须分别进行评估。第 2 节余下的讨论将主要集中于解释性虚构主义。如何将这些观点推广到革命性虚构主义，应当一目了然。

2.3 Meaning versus use
2.3 意义与使用

Most hermeneutic fictionalists about some particular discourse hold that although we normally utter sentences within the discourse in a fictional spirit, we could, and perhaps sometimes do, use these sentences literally. For example, a mathematical fictionalist might hold that when we utter “there are prime numbers” in ordinary contexts we mean this in a fictional spirit, but add that when we utter this sentence in the philosophy room we sometimes intend to speak literally. But one can at least imagine a different kind of hermeneutic fictionalism. Take the case of discourse about fictional characters. A name like ‘SpongeBob’ is first introduced for the purposes of story telling and for making claims internal to the story; for example, the claim that SpongeBob lives in a pineapple under the sea. But there is disagreement about the proper account of the use of names of fictional entities in extrafictive, non-story-telling contexts, e.g. in “SpongeBob is a better role model than Superman”. Some philosophers hold that this ‘extrafictive’ use of fictional names shows that ‘SpongeBob’ has a reference outside the fiction (for example, that it refers to an abstract entity). Others hold that while ‘SpongeBob’ can be used meaningfully in such contexts, it is nonetheless, in such contexts, a mere non-referring empty name, alongside ‘Zeus’ and ‘Vulcan’. One can imagine a third kind of view, according to which names of fictional characters are, as it were, only meaningful inside the fiction. Anyone attracted to such a view must tell some special story about seeming extrafictive truths (see Brock 2002). Similarly, and returning to fictionalism, one can imagine a fictionalist about some discourse who denies that the relevant sentences even can be meaningfully used outside the fiction; who holds that the sentences only have fiction uses.
大多数关于特定话语的诠释虚构主义者认为，尽管我们通常以虚构精神在话语中表达句子，但我们也可以——有时确实会——从字面意义上使用这些句子。例如，数学虚构主义者可能主张，在日常语境中说"存在质数"时我们采用的是虚构态度，但补充说明在哲学讨论中说出这句话时，我们有时意在表达字面含义。不过人们至少可以设想另一种诠释虚构主义。以关于虚构角色的话语为例。"海绵宝宝"这类名称最初是为讲故事和提出故事内部主张而引入的，例如声称海绵宝宝住在海底的菠萝屋里。但对于虚构实体名称在非虚构、非叙事语境中的使用（如"海绵宝宝比超人更适合当榜样"这句话），哲学界对其合理解释存在分歧。部分哲学家认为这种"超虚构"用法表明"海绵宝宝"在虚构世界之外具有指称对象（例如指向某个抽象实体）。 另一些人则认为，虽然"海绵宝宝"在此类语境中可以被有意义地使用，但它与"宙斯"和"伏尔甘"一样，在这些语境中只是个无指称的空名。我们还可以设想第三种观点，即虚构角色的名称只在其所属的虚构世界内部才有意义。持此观点者必须对看似超虚构的真实陈述作出特殊解释（参见 Brock 2002）。同理，回到虚构主义论题，我们可以设想某种话语的虚构主义者会否认相关句子在虚构世界之外具有任何意义，他们认为这些句子仅具备虚构用途。

The view may sound farfetched. But Yablo (1998) comes close to suggesting a view of this sort when he says, after having motivated fictionalism about the use of names of cities, that he does not know what it would be to use “Chicago exists” more literally than he already does. Let us call the fictionalism according to which there is a literal use of the sentences in question with which the ordinary use contrasts use fictionalism; call the other meaning fictionalism. The distinction may correspond to Armour-Garb and Woodbridge’s (2015) distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic pretense. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge say that what characterizes extrinsic pretense is that we could take the utterance made literally, whereas in cases of intrinsic pretense, “the pretense is integral to the utterance saying anything at all”. Use fictionalism is arguably by far the more common doctrine. But it is worth mentioning meaning fictionalism as well, both because some fictionalists appear to endorse it, and because the distinction will be relevant to some of the arguments against fictionalism. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge call their own brand of fictionalism semantic and oppose what they call pragmatic accounts.
这种观点听起来可能有些牵强。但亚布洛（1998）在论述城市名称使用的虚构主义时，曾近乎暗示过类似观点——他表示不知道该如何比现有方式更字面化地使用"芝加哥存在"这个表述。让我们将那种认为存在与被日常用法形成对比的字面句义使用的虚构主义称为"用法虚构主义"；而将另一种称为"意义虚构主义"。这种区分或许对应着阿穆尔-加布和伍德布里奇（2015）提出的"外在假装"与"内在假装"之分。他们指出，外在假装的特征在于我们可以从字面理解话语，而在内在假装中，"这种假装对于话语能否表达任何内容具有本质意义"。用法虚构主义无疑是目前更主流的学说。但提及意义虚构主义仍有价值，既因为部分虚构主义者似乎支持这种观点，也因为这种区分将关系到某些反对虚构主义的论证。 阿穆尔-加布和伍德布里奇将他们自己的虚构主义品牌称为语义虚构主义，并反对他们所谓的实用主义解释。

There are further distinctions to draw between different kinds of fictionalism. Following Yablo (2001), one can distinguish between the following fictionalist views (about discourse about Xs):
在不同类型的虚构主义之间还存在进一步的区分。根据亚布洛（2001）的观点，可以区分以下几种关于 X 话语的虚构主义观点：

Instrumentalism: the speaker is not “really” asserting anything, only pretending to do so.
工具主义：说话者并非"真正"在断言什么，只是假装这样做。

Meta-fictionalism: the speaker is “really” asserting that according to a certain fiction, the Xs are so and so.
元虚构主义：说话者"实际上"是在断言，根据某种虚构，X 是如此这般。

Object-fictionalism: the speaker is “really” asserting that the world is in a certain condition, namely, the condition it needs to be in to make it true in the relevant fiction that the Xs are so and so.
客体虚构主义：说话者"实际上"是在断言世界处于某种特定状态，即那种使相关虚构作品中 X 事物如此这般为真的必要状态。

Figuralism: the speaker is “really” asserting that something is in a certain condition, but perhaps not the world; the Xs are functioning as representational aids in a figurative description of the Ys, where the Ys may themselves be representational aids invoked to help us describe still further objects.^[3]
形象主义：说话者"实际上"是在断言某物处于某种状态，但可能并非指现实世界；X 事物作为形象化描述 Y 事物的表征辅助工具，而 Y 事物本身也可能是被调用来帮助我们描述更深远对象的表征辅助工具。

The characterizations are abstract. An example might help. Let us take number discourse as our example, and consider these fictionalist views as applied to number discourse. The instrumentalist says that in an utterance of “the number of apples is two”, the speaker is merely pretending to assert something; nothing is really asserted. The instrumentalist does not present an alternative account of what the speaker is doing. The metafictionalist says that something is asserted along the lines of: according to the number fiction, the number of apples is two. The object fictionalist says that what is asserted is something non-number-involving about the real world — something which would make it true in the fiction that the number of apples is two: that there is an apple x and an apple y such that x and y are distinct and nothing distinct from both x and y is an apple. The characteristic objects of the discourse, the numbers, are mere aids we use to make utterances about how things stand in the real world. Yablo’s own preferred view, figuralism, is supposed to be a close cousin of object fictionalism, but with an added twist. Figuralism does not differ from object fictionalism in what it says about the example used so far. The differences only show up when we are considering utterances intuitively about these props themselves, the numbers, such as “7 is smaller than 11”. Sometimes, Yablo says, numbers — and other props — are used as mere representational aids, but sometimes they also function as things represented. (He provides as a comparison “pinpricks of conscience register less than pangs of conscience.”) In a typical utterance of “the number of apples is two”, the number functions as a representational aid. But in “there are numbers” as used by the platonist, numbers function as things represented. And in “the number of even primes is zero”, as a nominalist can be envisaged to use it when doing philosophy, saying something that given her philosophical views is true, they function both as representational aids (“number”) and as things represented (“even prime”). (Compare also the catalogue of fictionalist views in Kalderon 2005a, ch. 3.)
这些描述较为抽象。举例或许有助于理解。让我们以数字话语为例，考察这些虚构主义观点如何应用于数字话语。工具主义者认为，当某人说出"苹果的数量是两个"时，说话者只是在假装做出断言；实际上并未断言任何内容。工具主义者并未对说话者的行为提供替代性解释。元虚构主义者则认为，说话者实际上断言的是：根据数字虚构故事，苹果的数量是两个。对象虚构主义者主张，被断言的内容是与数字无关的、关于现实世界的某种陈述——这种陈述会使"苹果的数量是两个"在虚构故事中为真：即存在苹果 x 和苹果 y，且 x 与 y 不同，同时不存在既不同于 x 也不同于 y 的苹果。数字作为该话语的特征对象，仅仅是我们用来陈述现实世界状况的辅助工具。雅布罗本人推崇的比喻主义，被认为是对象虚构主义的近亲，但带有额外的理论转折。 形象主义与对象虚构主义在目前所举例子上的表述并无差异。二者的区别仅在我们考察那些直觉上涉及道具本身（如数字）的表述时才显现，例如"7 小于 11"。亚布洛指出，数字及其他道具有时仅作为表征工具使用，但有时也充当被表征对象（他类比道："良心的刺痛感弱于良心的剧痛感"）。在典型表述"苹果的数量是两个"中，数字发挥着表征工具的功能；而在柏拉图主义者使用的"存在数字"表述中，数字则作为被表征对象；当唯名论者进行哲学讨论时，如表述"偶素数的数量是零"——这种表述基于其哲学立场为真——数字同时兼具表征工具（"数量"）与被表征对象（"偶素数"）双重功能。（另可对照卡尔德隆 2005a 著作第三章中虚构主义观点的分类。）

A broader distinction is that between what can be called content fictionalism and force fictionalism. The content fictionalist holds that in (ordinary) utterances of sentences of D some content is asserted, but what is asserted is something other than their literal content. The force fictionalist holds that the content expressed in an (ordinary) utterance of a sentence of D is not asserted: instead some other speech act is performed. Instrumentalism is a form of force fictionalism. The other forms of fictionalism distinguished are in the first instance forms of content fictionalism. Notice that content and force fictionalism can be combined. A fictionalist can hold both that in an (ordinary) utterance of sentence of D, the literal content of the sentence is conveyed but not asserted, and that some content other than the literal content is asserted. This is even a rather natural view: in an ordinary utterance of a sentence of D, the speaker pretends-true the literal content of the sentence, and in so doing she asserts something other than the literal content.
更广泛的区分在于所谓内容虚构主义与语力虚构主义之间。内容虚构主义者认为，在 D 类句子的（日常）表述中，确实断言了某些内容，但所断言的并非其字面内容。语力虚构主义者则认为，D 类句子（日常）表述中所表达的内容并未被断言，而是执行了其他言语行为。工具主义是语力虚构主义的一种形式。其他被区分的虚构主义形式首先属于内容虚构主义范畴。值得注意的是，内容与语力虚构主义可以相互结合——虚构主义者既可主张在 D 类句子的（日常）表述中传达了但未断言句子的字面内容，又可主张断言了字面内容之外的某些内容。这甚至是相当自然的观点：在 D 类句子的日常表述中，说话者假装其字面内容为真，并借此断言了字面内容之外的某些内容。

Thus far matters have been presented as if the content fictionalist must put forward a thesis about what is asserted when the relevant sentences are uttered. But again there are different kinds of views. A fictionalist can in principle refrain from saying that the fictionalist content is asserted and instead say that the content is put forward in some other way. Compare how some things that are communicated are merely pragmatically implicated. (See the entries on implicature and on pragmatics.) However, the following discussion will disregard this complication and speak of the content fictionalist as putting forward a thesis about what is asserted.
迄今为止的讨论似乎表明，内容虚构主义者必须提出一个关于相关语句被说出时所断言内容的命题。但实际上还存在不同类型的观点。原则上，虚构主义者可以避免声称虚构主义内容是被断言的，转而主张该内容是以其他方式呈现的。这类似于某些被传达的内容仅通过语用含义来实现的情况。（参见关于"含义"和"语用学"的条目。）不过，下文讨论将忽略这一复杂情况，仍将内容虚构主义者视为提出关于断言内容的命题。

Sometimes when fictionalism is discussed, it is presupposed that fictionalism would have to be of the meta-fictionalist variety. This is a mistake. There are objections to meta-fictionalism that do not generalize to other fictionalist theses. Joyce (2005) stresses that meta-fictionalism does not adequately distinguish between telling a story and describing a story. When we engage in fiction we do the former, but the meta-fictionalist has it that we do the latter. Yablo (2001) stresses, in the case of mathematical fictionalism, that in ordinary uses of mathematical sentences, we seem to assert something apriori and necessary, but it does not seem apriori and necessary that according to the fiction of standard mathematics, things stand thus-and-so. Generally, meta-fictionalism appeals to an “according to the fiction…”-operator, but the problems that arise regarding this are beside the point on either of the other fictionalist views. (See Kim 2005 for a discussion of some of the problems that arise, having to do with, e.g., the contingent existence of fictions.)
在讨论虚构主义时，有时会预设它必须属于元虚构主义类型。这种观点是错误的。针对元虚构主义的某些反对意见并不适用于其他虚构主义论点。乔伊斯（2005）强调，元虚构主义未能充分区分讲述故事与描述故事的行为——我们进行虚构时从事的是前者，而元虚构主义者却认为我们在做后者。亚布洛（2001）以数学虚构主义为例指出，在日常使用数学语句时，我们似乎是在断言某种先验且必然的内容；但若说"根据标准数学的虚构，事情是如此这般"，这种表述本身并不显得具有先验性或必然性。总体而言，元虚构主义依赖于"根据该虚构……"的操作符，但由此产生的问题与其他虚构主义观点并无关联。（关于相关问题的讨论，例如涉及虚构作品偶然存在性等议题，可参阅金 2005 年的研究。）

2.4 Attitudes

There is also a question of what mental attitude the hermeneutic fictionalist about a discourse D should say that we have toward utterances made within D. As the name “fictionalism” indicates, the attitude is often taken to be the attitude, whatever exactly it is, that we have toward paradigmatic cases of fiction. (The motivation for adopting the attitude may be different in paradigmatic cases of fiction than in the case of one of the discourses under consideration here. But that is different.) The attitude is also often said to be that of pretense or make-believe. Those who compare D with make-believe normally rely on the account of make-believe of Walton (1990, 1993). Yablo’s (e.g. 1998, 2001, 2002) brand of hermeneutic fictionalism is one example. The Yablo-Walton view is usefully divided into two parts. First, the statements made within D are likened to metaphorical statements. Second, a pretense account of metaphor is given. On this type of view on metaphor, a metaphorical utterance is one that represents the world as it needs to be in order to make the utterance pretense-worthy in a game of make-believe that it suggests. An example may help. Just as “Bert is carrying a gun” can be made true, in the pretense relevant to this utterance, by Bert’s holding a twig, so, on this view on metaphor, can Romeo’s “Juliet is the sun” be made true by features of Juliet and of the relation between Romeo and Juliet, given the pretense that Romeo’s utterance makes relevant. For example, the utterance may be made true by Juliet’s bearing the right type of real-world relation to Romeo’s well-being. (See Wearing 2012 for criticism of this kind of view on metaphor.)
关于话语 D 的诠释虚构主义者还应说明我们对 D 内话语持何种心理态度。"虚构主义"这一名称暗示，这种态度通常被认为是我们对典型虚构作品所持的态度（无论其确切定义为何）。（在典型虚构作品与当前讨论的话语中，采取这种态度的动机可能不同，但这是另一回事。）该态度也常被描述为假装或假扮。将 D 与假扮类比的研究者通常依据沃尔顿（1990, 1993）的假扮理论。雅布洛（如 1998, 2001, 2002）提出的诠释虚构主义便是其中一例。雅布洛-沃尔顿观点可划分为两部分：首先，将 D 内陈述比作隐喻性陈述；其次，对隐喻提出假装论解释。根据这类隐喻观，隐喻性话语是通过暗示某种假扮游戏，来呈现为使该话语值得假装所需的世界状态。举例说明或许更清晰。 正如"伯特带着枪"这句话，在相关虚构情境中可以通过伯特拿着一根树枝而成立；同样地，根据这种隐喻理论，罗密欧所说的"朱丽叶是太阳"也可以因为朱丽叶的特质以及她与罗密欧之间的关系而成立——前提是罗密欧的这句话创造了相应的虚构情境。例如，这句话可能因为朱丽叶对罗密欧的幸福产生了某种现实世界中真实存在的重要关联而成立。（关于对此类隐喻理论的批评，参见 Wearing 2012 年的研究。）

Clearly there are views between a paradigmatic fictionalist view on D such as that D is best given a metaphor/pretense account and a paradigmatic realist view that ordinary assertions within D aim at literal truth. (i) Van Fraassen (1980), discussing scientific discourse, emphasizes that our attitude toward our best theory of the world is, or should be, ‘acceptance’ rather than belief, where acceptance is an attitude that falls short of belief. (ii) Yablo (2006) has investigated the possibility that when engaging in mathematical discourse we presuppose that mathematical entities exist. (And while it is possible to assimilate presupposition to pretense such an assimilation is not part of Yablo’s official story.) Compare here also Hinckfuss (1993). (iii) A suggestion put forward in Eklund (2005) is that when it comes to a variety of sentences we use, we are often simply indifferent to some implications of what they express: the fictionalist can appeal to this and say that we are indifferent to the real-world existential implications of mathematical statements. (iv) Walton (1990) himself insists that even if he is giving a pretense account, the claim is not that speakers themselves actively engage in pretense. For a pretense account to be correct of the utterances of some given speaker, it is enough that the speaker participates in a pretense discourse. Compare here also how Crimmins’ (1998), when talking about what he calls “shallow pretense”, emphasizes that, despite the talk of pretense, “we are instituting a manner of speaking, not painting a fantasy world”. Which of these different theses to call “fictionalist” is a matter of terminological choice. But arguably, all the theses listed share the main attractions of paradigmatic versions of fictionalism. For example, they serve to avoid ontological commitment as much as paradigmatic versions of fictionalism do.
显然，在关于 D 的典型虚构主义观点（如认为 D 最好通过隐喻/假装理论来解释）与典型实在论观点（即 D 中的日常断言旨在追求字面真理）之间，还存在其他中间立场。(i) 范·弗拉森（1980）在讨论科学话语时强调，我们对世界最佳理论的态度是（或应该是）“接受”而非相信，这里的接受是一种不达到信念程度的认知态度。(ii) 雅布洛（2006）探讨了这样一种可能性：当我们参与数学话语时，我们预设了数学实体的存在。（尽管可以将预设同化为假装，但这种同化并非雅布洛正式论述的一部分。）亦可参照欣克福斯（1993）的相关论述。(iii) 埃克隆德（2005）提出的观点认为，对于我们所使用的各类语句，我们往往对其表达的某些隐含意义漠不关心：虚构主义者可以借此主张，我们对数学陈述在现实世界中存在的隐含意义持漠视态度。 (iv) 沃尔顿(1990)本人坚称，即便他提出的是假装理论，其主张也并非指言说者本身主动进行假装行为。对于特定言说者的话语而言，只要该言说者参与了假装性话语实践，假装理论就足以成立。可参照克里明斯(1998)论及所谓"浅层假装"时的强调：尽管使用了假装这一表述，"我们是在确立一种言说方式，而非构建幻想世界"。这些不同论点中哪些应被称为"虚构主义"，属于术语选择问题。但可以说，所有列举的论点都具备虚构主义典范版本的核心吸引力。例如，它们与虚构主义典范版本同样有效地避免了本体论承诺。

3. Arguments for Fictionalism
3. 虚构主义的论证

Given the variety of fictionalisms it is hard to provide a succinct survey of the arguments for and against fictionalism simpliciter. This section is devoted to an overview of certain fictionalism-relevant arguments, together with remarks on what forms of fictionalism these arguments purport to justify. The overview focuses primarily on the kinds of arguments that appear to be of relevance for fictionalism as a general philosophical strategy, instead of arguments that seem only to promise to be relevant to fictionalism about a specific subject matter.
鉴于虚构主义的多样性，很难对其支持与反对的论点进行简明概述。本节致力于综述某些与虚构主义相关的论证，并评述这些论证旨在为哪些形式的虚构主义提供依据。概述主要聚焦于那些似乎与虚构主义作为一种普遍哲学策略相关的论证类型，而非仅针对特定主题领域的虚构主义可能相关的论证。

3.1 Via eliminativist antirealism
3.1 经由消除主义的反实在论

One historically important argument for fictionalism goes as follows. Suppose that we have an independent argument for eliminativist antirealism about a particular discourse (whether it be mathematical discourse, or moral discourse, or … .): an argument to the effect that the atomic sentences of the discourse are all untrue, either because the characteristic objects of the discourse do not exist — there are no numbers — or because its characteristic predicates are uninstantiated — nothing is right, good, etc. This eliminativist antirealism threatens to convict ordinary speakers of massive, widespread error. This is often regarded as a serious problem. It is here that fictionalism comes to the rescue: if we suppose that the utterances in question are made in a fictional spirit, then eliminativist antirealism about (say) mathematics does not commit ordinary speakers of massive error.
历史上支持虚构主义的一个重要论证如下。假设我们已有支持对某种特定话语（无论是数学话语、道德话语还是其他）采取消除式反实在论的独立论证：该论证认为该话语中的所有原子句皆为不真实，要么因为该话语特有的对象并不存在——比如不存在数字，要么因为其特有谓词未被实例化——没有任何事物是正确、善良等等。这种消除式反实在论可能将普通说话者置于大规模、普遍性错误的境地，这通常被视为严重问题。正是在此处，虚构主义提供了解决方案：如果我们假设相关话语是以虚构精神作出的陈述，那么（例如）数学领域的消除式反实在论就不会使普通说话者犯下大规模错误。

As set out, this is an argument for hermeneutic fictionalism. Revolutionary fictionalism, aiming to secure a purpose that mathematical discourse can serve even if mathematical entities do not exist, would not avert the threat that the eliminativist antirealist would have to say of ordinary speakers that they are in massive error. But there is a nearby argument for revolutionary fictionalism. It goes like this: Eliminativist antirealism threatens to come at a serious cost. If by the lights of our philosophy of mathematics there are no mathematical entities, it seems mathematical discourse must be abandoned (because mathematical utterances are systematically untrue): such discourse cannot be worthwhile. It is here that revolutionary fictionalism comes to the rescue: so long as there is some worthwhile aim of mathematical discourse despite the nonexistence of mathematical entities, mathematical discourse need not be abandoned.
如上所述，这是对诠释虚构主义的论证。革命虚构主义旨在确保数学论述能够实现某种目的，即使数学实体不存在，它也无法消除消除论反实在论者不得不认为普通说话者存在大量错误的威胁。但有一个与之相近的论证支持革命虚构主义，其思路如下：消除论反实在论可能要付出沉重代价。如果根据我们的数学哲学观点，数学实体并不存在，那么数学论述似乎必须被抛弃（因为数学陈述系统性地不真实）：这种论述不可能有价值。正是革命虚构主义在此施以援手：只要数学论述存在某种有价值的目标，即使数学实体不存在，数学论述也不必被抛弃。

Consider, as illustration, some specific motivations for revolutionary fictionalism. First, Joyce (2005; see also his forthcoming) on moral fictionalism. Joyce starts out from the assumption that, when taken literally, moral sentences are systematically untrue, and seeks to show that it can still be practically useful to pretend that it is not so. Joyce asks first what the benefits are of believing that some acts are morally right and others morally wrong, and thinks that even when such a belief is false, it can be valuable: “The distinctive value of categorical imperatives is that they silence calculations. In this manner, moral beliefs function to bolster self-control against practical irrationality” (301). The basic idea is that for prudential reasons, essentially reasons such as those suggested by Hobbes and Hume, one ought generally to act in accordance with alleged moral requirements (“the fear of punishment, the desire for an ongoing beneficial relationship, the motivation to maintain a good reputation, the simple fact that one on the whole likes one’s fellows,…”). But were it not for the moral beliefs one might still be tempted by the short term gains from acting immorally. Turning to moral fictionalism, Joyce thinks that the make-believe that moral properties are instantiated can have the same benefits as the genuine belief that they are. In general, fictions can produce real emotions, which have motivational effects. Joyce remarks, “Human motivation is often aroused more effectively by mental images than by mental calculation”. Second, consider Field’s (1980, 1989) revolutionary fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics. On Field’s view the function of mathematics is to facilitate inferences from certain empirical, and nominalistically acceptable, statements to others. A mathematical theory can perform this function so long as it is conservative, where a mathematical theory T is conservative if, roughly, for every nominalistic theory N, T+N has no consequences for the ontology of N that are not consequences of N alone. The important point is that a mathematical theory need not be true in order to be useful in this way. In both these cases, the supposed lesson from the considerations adduced is that pretense would serve us as well as real belief or real assertion.
以革命性虚构主义的具体动机为例进行说明。首先来看乔伊斯（2005；另见其即将出版著作）关于道德虚构主义的论述。乔伊斯从这样一个假设出发：当按字面理解时，道德语句在系统层面上是不真实的，但他试图证明，假装事实并非如此仍具有实践价值。乔伊斯首先探讨了相信某些行为在道德上是正确的而另一些是错误的能带来什么益处，并认为即使这种信念是错误的，它仍然具有价值："绝对命令的独特价值在于它们能终止算计。通过这种方式，道德信念发挥着增强自控力以对抗实践非理性的作用"（301 页）。其核心观点是：基于审慎理由——本质上类似于霍布斯和休谟所提出的那些理由——人们总体上应当按照所谓的道德要求行事（"对惩罚的恐惧、对持续互利关系的渴望、维护良好声誉的动机、以及单纯因为总体上喜欢同伴这一事实……"）。 但若不是出于道德信念，人们可能仍会被不道德行为带来的短期利益所诱惑。转向道德虚构主义，乔伊斯认为，假装道德属性被实例化可以产生与真正相信它们存在相同的益处。一般而言，虚构能引发真实情感，从而产生激励效果。乔伊斯指出："人类动机往往更容易被心理意象而非心理计算所激发"。其次，考虑菲尔德（1980, 1989）在数学哲学中提出的革命性虚构主义。在菲尔德看来，数学的功能是促进从某些经验性且唯名论可接受的陈述到其他陈述的推理。只要数学理论具有保守性，它就能发挥这种功能——粗略地说，当对于每个唯名论理论 N 而言，T+N 不会对 N 的本体论产生超出 N 单独所能产生的结论时，数学理论 T 就是保守的。关键在于，数学理论无需为真即可以此方式发挥作用。 在这两种情况下，所提出的考量都试图说明：假装与真实信念或真实断言同样能满足我们的需求。

This first kind of argument for fictionalism is only an indirect argument for a fictionalist view. It says only that if we have reason to embrace eliminativist antirealism about some discourse, then fictionalism about the discourse should also be attractive.
第一种支持虚构主义的论证只是对虚构主义观点的间接论证。它仅仅表明，如果我们有理由对某种论述采取消除主义的反实在论立场，那么关于该论述的虚构主义观点也应当具有吸引力。

3.2 The Oracle

Suppose a being you are certain is an omniscient Oracle told you there are not in fact any abstract entities; you come to believe this claim. Would you not go on talking as before? Wouldn’t you continue to say things like “You can’t tile that rectangular floor with 17 tiles, for 17 is a prime number” and other seemingly committing sentences? And would anything really, so to speak, be or feel different about your use of these sentences?
假设你确信一位全知的先知告诉你，事实上并不存在任何抽象实体；你开始相信这一说法。难道你不会继续像以前那样说话吗？难道你不会继续说"你不能用 17 块瓷砖铺满那个长方形地板，因为 17 是个质数"这类看似承诺性的句子吗？而且说真的，你使用这些句子时，是否真的会有什么不同或感觉不同呢？

If the verdict is that we really would continue using these sentences as before and nothing would seem different about our use of them, then we have here an argument for hermeneutic fictionalism. After the Oracle’s pronouncement we arguably no longer commit ourselves to the existence of abstract entities. But if we are just going on as before, we were not thus committing ourselves earlier either.
如果结论是我们确实会继续像以前一样使用这些句子，并且在使用方式上没有任何不同，那么这里就存在支持诠释虚构主义的论据。在神谕宣布之后，可以说我们不再承诺抽象实体的存在。但如果我们仍像从前一样行事，那么我们之前也并未真正做出这种承诺。

The Oracle argument has primarily been used in discussions of abstract objects. But the strategy is clearly in principle generalizable. Take for instance the moral case. Suppose an Oracle were to tell you that really there are no moral facts. It can be argued that this would not cause you to change your practice of making moral assertions. The case can be argued to be analogous with the mathematics case.
神谕论证主要被用于关于抽象对象的讨论中。但这一策略显然在原则上具有普适性。以道德领域为例，假设有位神谕告诉你事实上并不存在道德事实。可以论证这不会导致你改变做出道德断言的行为方式。这种情况可以被认为与数学案例具有相似性。

The Oracle argument assumes that the ontological commitments of a speaker’s assertions are transparent to the speaker. It can legitimately be denied that speakers have the relevant sort of access to their commitments. As stated, the argument is obviously an argument for hermeneutic, not revolutionary, fictionalism. An Oracle argument for revolutionary fictionalism would rather emphasize that the Oracle’s statement would give us no reason to abandon the discourse.
神谕论证假定说话者对其断言的本体论承诺具有透明性。但完全可以否认说话者能获得这种关于自身承诺的相关认知。如前所述，该论证显然是为诠释性虚构主义而非革命性虚构主义服务的。若要为革命性虚构主义构建神谕论证，则更应强调神谕的陈述不会给我们放弃该话语体系提供理由。

(The Oracle argument is from Yablo 2000a. The thought experiment itself is originally from Burgess and Rosen 1997.)
（神谕论证源自 Yablo 2000a。该思想实验最初出自 Burgess 和 Rosen 1997 年的著作。）

3.3 The paradox of existence
3.3 存在悖论

Here is a kind of puzzle or paradox that several philosophers have stressed. On the one hand, existence questions seem hard. The philosophical question of whether there are abstract entities does not seem to admit of an easy or trivial answer. At the same time, there seem to be trivial arguments settling questions like this in the affirmative. Consider for instance the arguments, “2+2=4. So there is a number which, when added to 2, yields 4. This something is a number. So there are numbers”, and “Fido is a dog. So Fido has the property of being a dog. So there are properties.” How should one resolve this paradox? One response is: adopt fictionalism. The idea would be that in the philosophy room we do not speak fictionally, but ordinarily we do. So in the philosophy room, the question of the existence of abstract entities is hard; outside it, the question is easy. When, ordinarily, a speaker utters a sentence that semantically expresses a proposition that entails that there are numbers, what she says is accurate so long as according to the relevant fiction, there are numbers. But when she utters the same sentence in the philosophy room, she speaks literally and then what she asserts is something highly non-trivial. The fictionalism that would seem to be motivated by this reasoning is use fictionalism.
多位哲学家都强调过这样一种谜题或悖论。一方面，存在性问题似乎难以解答。关于是否存在抽象实体的哲学问题，似乎无法轻易给出答案。但与此同时，又似乎存在一些琐碎的论证能轻易肯定这类问题。例如考虑以下论证："2+2=4。因此存在某个数，当它与 2 相加时得到 4。这个某物是一个数。所以数是存在的"；以及"菲多是一只狗。因此菲多具有'是狗'这一属性。所以属性是存在的。"人们该如何解决这个悖论？一种回应是：采用虚构主义。其核心观点是：在哲学讨论中我们不使用虚构语言，但在日常中我们确实如此。因此在哲学讨论中，抽象实体存在与否是个难题；而在哲学讨论之外，这个问题则很简单。当说话者日常说出一句在语义上表达"数存在"这一命题的句子时，只要相关虚构设定中存在数，她所说的就是准确的。 但当她在哲学教室里说出同样的话时，她是在字面意义上陈述，此时她所主张的便是极具实质性的内容。由此推理所激发的虚构主义可称为"用法虚构主义"。

(See, e.g., Yablo 2000a, Szabó 2001, Hofweber 2000, and Thomasson 2013 for discussion of this type of argument. However, of these authors, only Yablo uses the paradox of existence to motivate fictionalism. Szabó, Hofweber and Thomasson all prefer other diagnoses.)
（关于这类论证的讨论，可参见 Yablo 2000a、Szabó 2001、Hofweber 2000 和 Thomasson 2013 等文献。不过在这些作者中，只有 Yablo 运用存在悖论来支持虚构主义立场，Szabó、Hofweber 和 Thomasson 都倾向于其他解释方案。）

3.4 Analogies with uncontroversially non-literal discourse
3.4 与无争议非字面表述的类比

One way to argue for fictionalism about a region of discourse is to show that our use of declarative sentences within the discourse resembles our use of non-literal language in other areas. Here are three considerations that can be brought up under this heading.
为某个话语领域的虚构主义辩护的一种方式是，展示我们在该话语中使用陈述句的方式，类似于我们在其他领域使用非字面语言的方式。以下是这一思路下可以提出的三点考量。

(1) Unobtrusive metaphors — metaphors that easily go unnoticed — are quite common. So we should not be surprised if some philosophically interesting discourse should turn out to be permeated by such metaphors. Consider the following list from Yablo (2000a):
(1) 不易察觉的隐喻——那些容易被忽视的隐喻——相当常见。因此，如果某些具有哲学意义的话语最终被发现充斥着此类隐喻，我们也不应感到惊讶。试看 Yablo（2000a）列举的以下例子：

They put a lot of hurdles in your path, there’s a lot that could be said about that, there’s no precedent for that, something tells me you’re right, there are some things better left unsaid, there is something I forgot to tell you, viz. how to operate the lock, nothing gets my goat as much as chewing gum in class, a lot you can do for me, let’s roll out the red carpet, the last thing I want is to…, their people have risen in my esteem, I took her into my confidence, my patience is nearly exhausted, I’ll take my chances, there’s a trace of sadness in your eyes, a growing number of these leaks can be traced to Starr’s office, she’s got a lot of smarts, let’s pull out all the stops, let’s proceed along the lines suggested above.
他们在你前进的路上设置重重障碍，关于这点有很多可说，此事尚无先例，直觉告诉我你是对的，有些事还是不说为妙，有件事我忘了告诉你，即如何操作这把锁，课堂上嚼口香糖最让我恼火，你能帮我不少忙，让我们铺开红毯隆重迎接，我最不愿做的事就是……，他们的人在我心中地位提升了，我向她吐露了心事，我的耐心快耗尽了，我要碰碰运气，你眼中有一丝忧伤，越来越多的泄密事件可追溯到斯塔尔的办公室，她非常聪明，让我们全力以赴，让我们按上述建议的方案推进。

The idea is that there are many unobtrusive metaphors; and that if metaphors can often be this unobtrusive, then maybe the non-literalness of our actual utterances of sentences of D is also unobtrusive. Of course, the claim that all the above sentences are examples of metaphors is controversial. One can insist that some of the examples are not metaphors but idioms. And one can insist that for some of the examples, the only reason to regard them as non-literal would stem from a prior conviction that their literal truth would require metaphysical absurdities. But so long as there are a fair number of unobtrusive metaphors, Yablo has a point.
其核心观点在于：生活中存在大量不易察觉的隐喻；如果隐喻常常能如此隐蔽地存在，那么我们实际说出的 D 类句子的非字面性可能同样不易察觉。当然，将所有上述句子都视为隐喻例证的观点存在争议。有人会坚称部分例子属于习语而非隐喻，也有人会主张某些例子之所以被视为非字面表达，仅仅是因为人们预先认定其字面真值会引发形而上学的荒谬结论。但只要存在相当数量不易察觉的隐喻，亚布洛的论点就具有说服力。

(2) Relatedly, one way that fictionalists try to argue for their doctrines is by appeal to cases where, supposedly, fictionalist theses are obviously true. Consider first motion discourse. Some fictionalists (e.g. Boghossian and Velleman 1997 and van Inwagen 1990) appeal to how we happily say things like “the sun rises” despite knowing fully well that this sentence is not literally true in the relevant contexts of utterance. The idea is that for the literal truth of these sentences, a Ptolemaic, absolutist worldview would have to be correct. But obviously, even though we use these sentences to make assertions, we do not believe this sort of worldview to be true. We engage instead in a Ptolemaic, absolutist fiction. Next consider expressions of the form ‘the average F’. We routinely utter declarative sentences containing such expressions in subject position; it seems that for such a sentence to be literally true there would really have to be an average F. This seems absurd. It seems odd that we should cheerfully commit ourselves to such an absurdity. Hence, it is sometimes suggested (see, e.g., Yablo 2000a), hermeneutic fictionalism is true of the use of these expressions.
(2) 与此相关的是，虚构主义者论证其学说的一种方式，是援引那些据称虚构主义命题明显成立的案例。首先考虑运动话语。某些虚构主义者（如 Boghossian 与 Velleman 1997、van Inwagen 1990）指出，我们尽管完全清楚"太阳升起"这类表述在相关语境中并非字面真实，却仍乐于使用。其核心观点在于：要使这些句子获得字面真实性，就必须接受托勒密式的绝对主义世界观。但显然，即便我们运用这些句子进行断言，也并不相信这类世界观的真实性——我们实际上是在参与托勒密式绝对主义的虚构。再考虑"平均 F"这类表达式。我们惯常在主语位置使用包含此类表达式的陈述句；要使这类句子字面上为真，就必须真实存在某个"平均 F"。这显然荒谬。我们竟能欣然接受如此荒谬之事，着实令人费解。因此有学者（如 Yablo 2000a）主张，对这些表达式的使用应采取诠释性虚构主义的立场。

(3) Both in his (2000a) and elsewhere, Yablo draws up a list of analogies between on the one hand uncontroversially non-literal discourse and on the other hand discourse about “platonic objects”, which for present purposes one can think of these simply as would-be objects ripe for fictionalist treatment. I will not here reproduce the whole list, but here are representative samples:
(3) 在其 2000a 年著作及其他论述中，亚布罗列出了一系列类比：一边是毫无争议的非字面论述，另一边则是关于"柏拉图式对象"的论述——就当前讨论而言，我们可以将这些对象简单视为适合接受虚构主义处理的潜在对象。此处我不打算复述整个清单，仅列举若干代表性示例：

• Paraphrasability: [Creatures of metaphorical make-believe] are often paraphrasable away with no felt loss of subject matter. ‘That was her first encounter with the green-eyed monster’ goes to ‘that was her first time feeling jealous’. ‘That really gets my goat’ goes to ‘that really irritates me’.
  可转述性：[隐喻性虚构产物]往往能够在不损失实质内容的情况下被转述。"那是她第一次遇见绿眼怪物"可以转述为"那是她第一次感到嫉妒"。"那真的牵走了我的山羊"可以转述为"那真的惹恼了我"。

  [Platonic objects] are often paraphrasable away with no felt loss of subject matter. ‘There is a possible world with furry donkeys’ goes to ‘furry donkeys are possible’. ‘She did it one way or another’ goes to ‘she did it somehow’. Etc.
  [柏拉图式对象]往往可以通过转述消除，而不会让人感到主题的缺失。"存在一个有毛驴的可能世界"可以转述为"毛驴是可能存在的"。"她用这样或那样的方式做了这件事"可以转述为"她以某种方式做了这件事"。等等。

• Silliness: [Creatures of metaphorical make-believe] invite ‘silly questions’ probing areas the make-believe does not address, e.g. we know how big the average star is, but where is it located? You say you lost your nerve, has it been turned in? Do you plan to drop-forge the uncreated conscience of your race in the smithy of your soul?
  荒谬性：[隐喻性虚构的生物]会引发"愚蠢的问题"，这些问题探究虚构未涉及的领域，例如我们知道普通恒星有多大，但它位于何处？你说你失去了勇气，它被上交了吗？你打算在你灵魂的铁匠铺里，用落锤锻造你那尚未形成的种族良知吗？

  [Platonic objects] invite questions which are similarly silly. What are the intrinsic properties of the empty set? Is the event of the water’s boiling itself hot? Are universals wholly present in each of their instances? Do relations lead a divided existence, parcelled out among their relata?
  [柏拉图式对象]引发的问题同样荒谬。空集的内在属性是什么？水沸腾这一事件本身是热的吗？共相是否完全存在于它们的每一个实例中？关系是否过着一种分裂的存在，被分配在它们的相关项之间？

It is obviously debatable exactly how telling these analogies are. One may for example reasonably suspect that the claim that the supposedly silly questions about platonic objects really all are silly will have appeal only for philosophers of a certain bent of mind.
这些类比的说服力显然存在争议。例如，人们可以合理地怀疑，关于柏拉图式对象的那些所谓愚蠢问题全都愚蠢的主张，可能只对具有某种思维倾向的哲学家有吸引力。

4. Arguments against Fictionalism
4. 反对虚构主义的论据

Turn now to arguments against fictionalism. As with the arguments for fictionalism, the focus will be on arguments that are relevant to fictionalism as a general metaphysical strategy, rather than arguments that only are relevant to fictionalism about a given subject matter. Many of the arguments discussed here are directed primarily against fictionalism of the hermeneutic variety.
现在转向反对虚构主义的论证。与支持虚构主义的论证一样，这里的重点将放在那些与虚构主义作为一般形而上学策略相关的论证上，而非仅针对特定主题领域的虚构主义论证。下文讨论的许多论证主要针对诠释性虚构主义。

4.1 The phenomenological objection
4.1 现象学异议

The most obvious objection to fictionalism is that it seems just absurd to assimilate some seemingly sober discourse such as mathematical or modal or moral discourse to make-believe and fiction. (“Mathematical discourse just doesn’t seem at all like a fairytale.”) This is an objection specifically targeted against hermeneutic fictionalism; it is plainly irrelevant as directed against a revolutionary fictionalist.
对虚构主义最明显的反对意见是，将数学、模态或道德等看似严肃的论述同化为假装和虚构似乎非常荒谬。（"数学论述看起来一点也不像童话。"）这一反对意见特别针对诠释性虚构主义；若指向革命性虚构主义者则显然无关紧要。

We have already seen some fictionalist replies to this objection. One reply (section 3.4) is that, philosophically interesting discourses aside, we engage in make-believe and fiction more often than we ordinarily tend to think. Another reply — related to the distinctions drawn in section 2.4 — is that there are variants of fictionalism that do not claim there to be a close analogy between the target discourse on the one hand and fiction and make-believe on the other. For discussion of the phenomenological objection, see, e.g., Brock (2014).
我们已经看到虚构主义者对此反对意见的一些回应。一种回应（第 3.4 节）是，撇开哲学上引人关注的论述不谈，我们从事假装和虚构行为的频率比通常认为的要高。另一种回应——与第 2.4 节所作的区分相关——是存在某些虚构主义变体，它们并不主张目标论述与虚构及假装行为之间存在紧密类比。关于现象学反对意见的讨论，可参阅如 Brock（2014）。

There have been attempts to make what is essentially the phenomenological objection more precise. Jason Stanley (2001) has two related objections concerning the nature of the fictionalist’s appeal to pretense. First, the hermeneutic fictionalist says that we are engaged in make-believe where it doesn’t seem to us that we are. Stanley says, “If the hermeneutic fictionalist is correct, then x can bear the propositional attitude of pretense toward a proposition, without it being in principle accessible to x that x bears the propositional attitude of pretense towards that proposition. But this introduces a novel and quite drastic form of failure of first-person authority over one’s own mental states”. Second, by what the fictionalist says, the same psychological mechanisms as are involved in make-believe are involved in understanding the use of a discourse of which fictionalism is true. But it seems this can be shown to be problematic on empirical grounds. Autistic persons have difficulties with make-believe, so by the fictionalist’s hypothesis they should likewise have difficulties understanding the use of a discourse of which fictionalism is true. But autistic persons do not have difficulties with mathematical discourse, or modal discourse, or discourse concerning negative existentials, etc. (For discussion of Stanley’s autism objection, see Liggins 2010.)
曾有学者尝试使本质上属于现象学层面的质疑更加精确化。杰森·斯坦利（2001）针对虚构主义者诉诸假装行为的本质提出了两个相互关联的质疑。首先，诠释性虚构主义者声称我们在进行假装游戏，而我们自身并未意识到这种状态。斯坦利指出："如果诠释性虚构主义者是正确的，那么个体 x 可以对某个命题持有假装性的命题态度，同时这种态度在原则上对 x 而言是不可觉察的。但这引入了一种关于自我心理状态第一人称权威性的全新且极端的失效形式。"其次，根据虚构主义者的说法，理解虚构主义所适用的论述时，所涉及的心理机制与进行假装游戏时相同。但实证研究表明这种观点存在问题——自闭症患者在假装游戏方面存在障碍，因此根据虚构主义者的假设，他们在理解虚构主义所适用的论述时理应同样存在困难。 但自闭症患者在数学论述、模态论述或关于否定存在性的论述等方面并无困难。（关于斯坦利自闭症异议的讨论，参见 Liggins 2010。）

4.2 Can fictionalism deliver the goods?
4.2 虚构主义能否兑现承诺？

Even though there are many different arguments for and motivations behind fictionalism, one main motivation is clearly the ontological one. Fictionalism about a discourse D is often seen as attractive precisely because it promises to get around otherwise potentially serious philosophical problems regarding D’s ontology. But one worry is that fictionalism can fail to make good on this promise. Here are some examples of how this can happen.
尽管支持虚构主义的论点和动机多种多样，但一个主要的动机显然是本体论层面的。关于话语 D 的虚构主义之所以具有吸引力，恰恰在于它有望规避原本可能涉及 D 本体论的严重哲学难题。然而令人担忧的是，虚构主义可能无法兑现这一承诺。以下是一些可能出现的失败情形。

First, according to fictionalism about a given discourse, the discourse is in important respects analogous to paradigmatic cases of fiction. This is supposed to have ontological advantages. Specifically, the entities characteristic of the relevant discourse are sometimes supposed to then have the same ontological status as fictional entities. But if fictional entities are problematic in their own right, then not much is gained by this move. Fictionalism about fictional characters — see, e.g., Brock (2002), and Everett (2005), and ch. 10 of Walton (1990) — is one attempt to get around this problem. A different response to the objection is that it takes the label “fictionalism” too seriously. Again to stress, some prominent views going under the heading of fictionalism claim only that in ordinary utterances of sentences of some discourse, speakers don’t aim at literal truth. That claim by no means amounts to saying that the putative entities of the discourse have the same ontological status as fictional entities, whatever exactly that status is.
首先，根据关于特定话语的虚构主义，该话语在许多重要方面类似于典型的虚构案例。这被认为具有本体论优势。具体而言，相关话语所特有的实体有时被认为因此具有与虚构实体相同的本体论地位。但如果虚构实体本身存在问题，那么这一策略就收效甚微。关于虚构角色的虚构主义——参见如布洛克（2002）、埃弗雷特（2005）及沃尔顿（1990）第 10 章——正是试图规避该问题的一种方案。对此异议的另一种回应是：这种批评过分拘泥于"虚构主义"的标签。需要再次强调的是，某些以虚构主义为名的著名观点仅主张：在特定话语的日常语句表述中，说话者并不以字面真理为目标。这一主张绝不意味着该话语所假定的实体与虚构实体具有相同的本体论地位——无论这种地位究竟为何。

Second, consider Peter van Inwagen’s (1990) fictionalism about ordinary objects. Van Inwagen suggests that when we say, e.g., “There is a table here”, what we really assert is something like: there are simples arranged tablewise here. Sider (1993) notes a problem: van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy presupposes that there are simples and not gunk (in other words, it presupposes that all objects decompose into minimal parts, ‘simples’) and there is no straightforward way of reformulating it so as to take into account the possibility of gunk. If indeed it seems at all wrong that in our everyday discourse we should manifest a preference for the hypothesis that there are macrophysical objects over agnosticism about the matter, it should anyway seem more wrong still that in our ordinary practices we should manifest a preference for the hypothesis that there are simples rather than gunk. Sider’s point concerns only van Inwagen’s specific strategy. But there is a general lesson nearby: the adequacy of the paraphrases might itself depend on substantive metaphysical assumptions.
其次，考虑彼得·范·因瓦根（1990）关于日常对象的虚构主义。范·因瓦根提出，当我们说"这里有一张桌子"时，实际上断言的是类似"这里有以桌子方式排列的简单体"这样的内容。赛德（1993）指出一个问题：范·因瓦根的转述策略预设了存在简单体而非"胶状物"（即预设所有对象都可分解为最小部分——"简单体"），且无法直接调整该策略以兼容"胶状物"存在的可能性。如果说在日常话语中表现出对宏观物理对象假说的偏好（而非对此问题持不可知态度）已显得不妥，那么在普通实践中表现出对"存在简单体而非胶状物"假说的偏好就更加不妥了。赛德的批评仅针对范·因瓦根的具体策略，但这里隐含一个普遍启示：转述的恰当性本身可能依赖于实质性的形而上学假设。

4.3 Criticisms concerning systematicity
4.3 关于系统性的批评

One main worry that Stanley (2001) presses with respect to hermeneutic fictionalism concerns systematicity. Take the case of mathematics. Infinitely many sentences belong to mathematical discourse, and to be competent with mathematical discourse involves having the competence to grasp these infinitely many sentences. Standard considerations concerning the finitude of our minds require that our grasp of these infinitely many sentences is something we have by virtue of our grasp of some finite set of principles: a compositional semantic theory is required. But it is, the worry goes, unclear what a compositional fictionalist semantic theory might conceivably look like.
斯坦利(2001)对诠释虚构主义提出的主要质疑涉及系统性。以数学为例：数学话语包含无限多的语句，而要掌握数学话语就意味着要具备理解这无限多语句的能力。考虑到人类心智的有限性，我们只能通过掌握某些有限原则来理解这些无限语句：这就需要组合性语义理论。但质疑者指出，我们难以设想组合性虚构主义语义理论可能呈现何种形态。

Yablo’s (2001) response to the systematicity objection is to say, “There are kinds of speech that finite beings clearly do understand, yet whose semantics does not seem to be compositional. One does not expect a compositional semantics for hyperbole, metonymy, or irony: one does not expect a compositional semantics for speech governed by shifting presuppositions. Somehow, though, we understand. This suggests that [hermeneutic fictionalist] analyses directed at kinds of speech that resemble hyperbole, metonymy, or etc. should not be held to the standard of strong-systematicity-or-bust”. One can be sympathetic to much of what Yablo says but think that the reason why we do not expect a compositional semantics for hyberbole is that we do not really expect a semantics for hyperbole at all. We do not think that there are certain sentences that have hyperbolic meanings — whatever that would amount to — but rather that sometimes some sentences are used hyperbolically. Even so, there is something telling about what Yablo says. The analogy with hyperbole and irony shows Yablo to be a use fictionalist: his hypothesis is not one about the types of meanings mathematical sentences have but about what we ordinarily do with mathematical sentences. From this perspective, the demand for a compositional fictionalist semantics for mathematical sentences is misplaced, for the reason that the fictionalist does not propose a special semantics for mathematical sentences at all.
亚布洛（2001）对系统性异议的回应是："有些话语类型显然是有限存在者能够理解的，但其语义似乎并不具有组合性。人们不会期待对夸张、转喻或反讽进行组合语义分析：也不会期待对受变化预设支配的言语进行组合语义分析。然而不知何故，我们却能理解。这表明[诠释虚构主义]针对类似夸张、转喻等话语类型的分析，不应被强系统性标准所束缚。"人们可能赞同亚布洛的大部分观点，但同时认为我们之所以不期待对夸张进行组合语义分析，是因为我们根本不期待对夸张进行任何语义分析。我们并不认为存在某些具有夸张意义的句子——无论这意味着什么——而是认为某些句子有时会被夸张地使用。即便如此，亚布洛的论述仍具有启发性。 与夸张和反讽的类比表明亚布洛属于使用虚构主义者：他的假说并非关于数学语句具有何种意义类型，而是关于我们通常如何使用数学语句。从这个角度看，要求为数学语句提供组合性虚构主义语义学是错位的，因为虚构主义者根本未提出任何特殊的数学语句语义学。

These remarks are not meant to indicate that the mathematical fictionalist does not owe us a systematic account of what is communicated by mathematical sentences. The point is just that whatever is owed, it is not a compositional semantics. Yablo’s analogy, hyperbole, can be used to make the point, despite the obvious differences between this case and the mathematics case. All that is needed properly to understand hyperbole is an ordinary compositional semantics giving the literal meanings of the sentences involved plus a general principle relating the propositions semantically expressed by the sentences to the inflated propositions the sentences express when used hyperbolically. Similarly, given use fictionalism all that is needed properly to understand what is communicated in ordinary utterances of mathematical sentences is an ordinary compositional semantics, together with principles linking the literal contents of mathematical sentences to what the fictionalist says the utterances ordinarily convey.
这些论述并非意在表明数学虚构主义者无需向我们提供关于数学句子所传达内容的系统性解释。关键在于，无论需要提供什么，它都不是组合语义学。亚布洛的类比——夸张修辞——可以用来阐明这一点，尽管这种情况与数学案例存在明显差异。要正确理解夸张修辞，所需的不过是一个普通的组合语义学，给出相关句子的字面意义，再加上一个将句子语义表达的命题与夸张使用时表达的夸大命题联系起来的一般原则。同样，根据使用虚构主义，要正确理解数学句子在日常表达中所传达的内容，所需的也不过是一个普通的组合语义学，以及将数学句子的字面内容与虚构主义者所说的日常表达内容联系起来的原则。

4.4 The fictionalist’s preferred analogies
4.4 虚构主义者偏爱的类比

As noted above, one way that fictionalists try to argue for their doctrines is by appeal to cases where, supposedly, fictionalist theses are obviously true. Two such cases are motion discourse, and talk about ‘the average F’. However, in both of these cases, it can plausibly be argued that proper attention to the semantics undercuts the fictionalist’s claim.
如上所述，虚构主义者为其学说辩护的一种方式，是援引那些据称能明显体现虚构主义命题成立的案例。其中两个典型案例涉及运动话语和关于"平均 F"的讨论。然而在这两种情形中，通过恰当关注语义学分析，都能有力反驳虚构主义者的主张。

First, critics such as Stanley (2001) stress that while terms of the form ‘the average F’ superficially seem like singular terms, they do not behave semantically like ordinary singular terms. But if they do not behave semantically like ordinary singular terms there is no call for a fictionalist account explaining why we do not commit ourselves to there being entities such as the average F when assertively uttering sentences of the form “the average F is G” (see also Kennedy and Stanley 2009).
首先，斯坦利（2001）等批评者强调，虽然"平均 F"这类表述在表面上看似单称词项，但其语义行为与普通单称词项并不相同。既然它们在语义上不表现为普通单称词项，就无需采用虚构主义来解释：为何当我们断言"平均 F 是 G"这类句子时，并未承诺存在"平均 F"这样的实体（另见肯尼迪与斯坦利 2009）。

Turn next to motion discourse. Brendan Jackson (2007) argues that any temptation to be a fictionalist about motion discourse stems from an oversimplified conception of the semantics of the relevant sentences. Compare
接下来讨论运动话语。布伦丹·杰克逊（2007）指出，任何对运动话语采取虚构主义的倾向，都源于对相关句子语义的过度简化理解。试比较：

1. Europe is small.  欧洲面积很小。
2. That cell phone is a bit heavy.
   那部手机有点重。
3. The remote is to the left of the television.
   遥控器在电视机的左侧。
4. A lion is hiding behind the bush.
   一头狮子正躲在灌木丛后。

Jackson notes two things. First, these cases are “analogous to what is going on when we utter typical motion ascriptions. We can describe all these utterances as incomplete, in the sense that there is some parameter — a comparison class, a purpose, a perspective or a frame of reference — that must be taken into account if the utterance is to be regarded as expressing a possibly true proposition, and yet the utterance contains no explicit word or phrase that specifies a value for this parameter”. And second, the standard semantic account of what is going on in (1)–(4) is that the sentences are simply context-sensitive. There is no need for a fictionalist proposal to explain why in typical utterances of them we express something true. According to Jackson, the same story can be told in the case of motion ascriptions.
杰克逊指出了两点。首先，这些案例"类似于我们做出典型运动归因时的情况。我们可以将这些表述描述为不完整的——即若要认为某个表述表达了可能为真的命题，就必须考虑某些参数（比较类别、目的、视角或参照系），但该表述本身并未包含明确指定这些参数值的词语或短语"。其次，对(1)-(4)中现象的标准语义学解释是：这些句子本身就具有语境敏感性。我们不需要借助虚构主义理论来解释为何在日常表述中能表达真实内容。杰克逊认为，运动归因的情况亦可作如是观。

The points concerning motion discourse and ‘the average F’ in the first instance cast doubt only on some specific examples that fictionalists tend to use to motivate their fictionalist theses. But they also suggest a more general lesson: fictionalist theses can often be undercut by closer attention to the semantics of the discourse in question.
关于运动话语和"平均 F"的讨论最初只是对虚构主义者用来支持其理论的一些具体案例提出了质疑。但它们也揭示了一个更普遍的教训：只要更仔细地考察相关话语的语义学，往往就能削弱虚构主义理论的基础。

4.5 Philosophy of language concerns
4.5 语言哲学关切

The hermeneutic fictionalist about a discourse D typically claims that there is a radical mismatch between on the one hand what we may call the assertoric contents of utterances of sentences of D (what is expressed in ordinary utterances of these sentences) and on the other hand the semantic contents of these sentences (what these sentences semantically express, in the contexts of utterance). But when it is stated thus baldly what the strategy is, two related worries should immediately arise, having to do with foundational issues in the philosophy of language.
诠释型虚构主义者针对话语 D 通常声称：一方面是我们所谓的 D 语句在言说时的断言内容（这些语句在日常言说中所表达的内容），另一方面是这些语句的语义内容（这些语句在言说语境中从语义上表达的内容），二者之间存在根本性错位。但当这个策略被如此直白地表述时，两个相关的担忧会立即浮现，它们都与语言哲学的基础问题有关。

Many philosophers would agree that the semantic content of a sentence is somehow determined, at least largely, by what the sentence is customarily used to express. This would seem to entail that there must be a close connection between the semantic content of a sentence and how the sentence is customarily used. But then it is odd if there is the kind of systematic mismatch between assertoric content and semantic content that the fictionalist claims that there is; or that is the worry.
许多哲学家会同意，句子的语义内容至少在某种程度上是由该句子习惯上表达的内容所决定的。这似乎意味着句子的语义内容与其惯常用法之间必然存在紧密联系。但如此一来，若断言内容与语义内容之间存在虚构主义者所声称的那种系统性错位，就显得颇为奇怪——这正是令人担忧之处。

There are deep and unresolved issues in philosophy of language concerning the nature of assertoric and semantic content, respectively, and concerning the relation between them. While these issues remain unresolved, it may be premature to put forward strong claims about the relation of the assertoric and semantic contents. Generally, and relating back to the points made in the previous subsection, it can be suspected that fictionalists tend to have a too simple view of semantic content.
关于断言内容与语义内容的本质及其相互关系，语言哲学中存在着诸多深刻而未解决的议题。在这些问题悬而未决之际，对断言内容与语义内容的关系提出强硬主张可能为时过早。总体而言，结合前文所述观点，我们有理由怀疑虚构主义者对语义内容的理解往往过于简单化。

One fictionalist reply to these concerns is to say that it is only for argument’s sake that she adopts a conservative view of the semantic contents of the sentences of the discourse in question. She can say that her basic point is that the discourses are not in fact ontologically committing. If the sentences are not ontologically committing even when they are used literally, that is fine. What she is arguing is that even assuming that the sentences are ontologically committing as used literally, there is reason to think that the discourse is not ontologically committing. Perhaps, in light of the point about how use determines meaning, the fact that our use of the sentences is not ontologically committing should cast doubt on any semantics of these sentences given which they are. But that does not affect the more general philosophical point the fictionalist is typically concerned to make: that the discourse is not ontologically committing.
虚构主义者对此的一种回应是，她之所以对相关话语中句子的语义内容采取保守观点，仅仅是为了论证的需要。她可以指出，其核心观点在于这些话语实际上并不具有本体论承诺。即使这些句子在字面使用时也不具备本体论承诺，那也无妨。她所论证的是：即便假设这些句子在字面使用时具有本体论承诺，仍有理由认为该话语整体不具备本体论承诺。或许，根据"使用决定意义"这一观点，我们使用这些句子时不带有本体论承诺的事实，应当对任何认为这些句子具有本体论承诺的语义理论提出质疑。但这并不影响虚构主义者通常想要阐明的更普遍的哲学观点：该话语体系不具有本体论承诺。

4.6 Old problems in new bottles?
4.6 新瓶装旧酒？

One kind of worry one might have about fictionalism is that it does not really, by itself, help avoid the problems that beset similar approaches. Here are two examples.
关于虚构主义的一种担忧是，它本身并不能真正帮助规避困扰类似理论的那些问题。这里举两个例子说明。

(1) Paraphrase. Since long before fictionalism really came into vogue, philosophers have liked to appeal to paraphrase: it has often been claimed that sentences which seem to express such-and-such propositions, really only express such-and-such other propositions. (E.g., it sounds as if you are genuinely talking about external objects, but really you are only claiming something about actual and possible sense-data.) Often such appeals to paraphrase have foundered upon the details: telling objections have shown how the paraphrases fail to deal with all the sentences within the purview of the proposal. Objections to some fictionalist theories that have been proposed take a similar form, since some fictionalists in effect offer paraphrases. Take for instance van Inwagen’s (1985) objection to fictionalism about fictional characters, as espoused for instance by Kendall Walton (1985, 1990, 2000). Consider van Inwagen’s pair of sentences,
(1) 改写策略。早在虚构主义盛行之前，哲学家们就热衷于诉诸改写策略：人们常声称某些看似表达特定命题的句子，实际上仅表达另一些命题（例如，表面上你在谈论外部对象，实则只是在断言某些实际与可能的感知材料）。这类改写主张往往在细节处搁浅——有力的反驳指出这些改写方案无法涵盖该理论视野内的所有句子。针对某些虚构主义理论的反对意见也采取类似形式，因为有些虚构主义者实质上提供的正是改写方案。以范·因瓦根（1985）对肯德尔·沃尔顿（1985,1990,2000）所主张的虚构角色虚构主义的反驳为例，考察范·因瓦根提出的那组句子：

(S1)

There is a fictional character who, for every novel, either appears in that novel or is a model for a character who does.
存在这样一个虚构角色：对于每部小说而言，要么该角色出现在小说中，要么是小说中某个角色的原型。

and

(S2)

If no character appears in every novel, then some character is modeled on another character.
如果没有角色出现在所有小说中，那么某些角色必定以其他角色为原型。

Sentence (S1) seems to entail sentence (S2), but, the charge is, the paraphrases offered by Walton do not respect this. The paraphrases that Walton offers are of the form “To engage in pretense of kind K is fictionally to speak truly in a game of such-and-such a sort”: but then the paraphrase of (S2) is not entailed by the paraphrase of (S1). There is naturally much that can be said about the objection. (The reply Walton (2000) himself gives is that the claim that (S1) entails (S2) is itself pretend-true.) The same sort of objection is pressed by Richard (2000), Stanley (2001) and Kroon (2004) against Mark Crimmins’ (1998) fictionalism about propositional attitude talk and discourse involving empty names.
句子(S1)似乎蕴含句子(S2)，但批评者指出沃尔顿提供的改写并未体现这种关联。沃尔顿提出的改写形式是"进行类型 K 的假装行为，就是在某种特定游戏中虚构地说真话"：如此一来，(S1)的改写版本并不能推导出(S2)的改写版本。对此质疑自然存在诸多讨论空间。（沃尔顿(2000)本人的回应是：所谓"(S1)蕴含(S2)"这一主张本身就是假装为真的。）类似的质疑也被理查德(2000)、斯坦利(2001)和克鲁恩(2004)用于批判马克·克里明斯(1998)关于命题态度话语及空名论述的虚构主义理论。

(2) In his (2005a) defense of a version of moral fictionalism, Mark Kalderon argues that would-be non-cognitivists who seek to avoid the Frege-Geach problem (for a presentation of this problem see the Embedding Problem section of the entry on moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism) should adopt a version of moral fictionalism. The resulting theory would be one according to which moral sentences have ordinary representational contents, but acceptance of moral sentences does not amount to belief in the literal truth of these contents but rather only to holding a non-cognitive attitude toward them. The reason why this is supposed to get around the Frege-Geach problem would be that arguments like
(2) 马克·卡尔德隆在其 2005 年著作中为某种道德虚构主义辩护时提出，那些试图回避弗雷格-吉奇问题（关于该问题的阐述可参阅"道德认知主义与非认知主义"词条中的"嵌入问题"章节）的非认知主义者应当采纳某种道德虚构主义版本。这种理论主张道德语句具有常规的表征内容，但对道德语句的接受并不意味着相信这些内容的字面真实性，而仅代表对其持有非认知态度。该理论被认为能规避弗雷格-吉奇问题的原因在于，诸如...的论证

(P1)

Stealing is wrong.  偷窃是错误的。

(P2)

If stealing is wrong, then getting one’s little brother to steal is wrong.
如果偷窃是错误的，那么指使弟弟去偷窃也是错误的。

(C)

So, getting one’s little brother to steal is wrong.
因此，指使弟弟去偷窃是错误的。

turn out on this revised non-cognitivist view to be straightforwardly valid: for the proposition semantically expressed by the conclusion sentence is entailed by the propositions semantically expressed by the premise sentences.
根据这种修正后的非认知主义观点，该论证显然是有效的：因为结论句在语义上表达的命题，是由前提句在语义上表达的命题所蕴含的。

However, one may reasonably worry that the envisaged fictionalist move in fact doesn’t help at all with the Frege-Geach problem. Someone actually putting forward an argument like this would be presenting a good argument. But for this to be so, what the arguer actually expresses by the premise sentence must provide good reason to accept what she actually expresses by the conclusion sentence. Since what the arguer actually expresses is, on the fictionalist view, different from what the sentences she utters semantically express, it is not sufficient for the fictionalist to point to how the sentences (P1) and (P2), when taken literally, express propositions that entail the proposition expressed by the sentence (C) taken literally. Kalderon’s moral fictionalist faces the problem of giving an account that respects the fact that the argument actually put forward is valid. But this seems not to be essentially different from the traditional non-cognitivist’s problem of saying what the meanings of the relevant sentences are such that the impression that the argument is valid can be respected. (This objection to Kalderon was stated, more briefly, in the original 2007 version of this entry, and was also presented, independently, in Lenman 2008. Kalderon replied to it in his 2008a and 2008b, and Eklund 2009 is in turn a reply to Kalderon. See also ch. 6 of Miller 2013.)
然而，人们有理由担忧这种虚构主义策略实际上对解决弗雷格-吉奇问题毫无助益。真正提出此类论证的人，本应是在提出一个有效论证。但要使论证成立，论证者通过前提句实际表达的内容必须为其通过结论句实际表达的内容提供充分理由。根据虚构主义观点，论证者实际表达的内容与其所说语句在语义上表达的内容并不相同，因此虚构主义者仅指出（P1）和（P2）这两个语句在字面意义上表达的命题如何蕴含（C）语句字面表达的命题是不够的。卡尔德隆的道德虚构主义面临的问题是：如何给出一种解释以尊重"所提出的论证实际有效"这一事实。但这与传统非认知主义者面临的问题——即说明相关语句的意义如何能体现论证有效性印象——似乎并无本质区别。 （这一对卡尔德隆的反对意见在 2007 年本条目原始版本中已有更简短的表述，同时也被莱南在 2008 年独立提出。卡尔德隆在其 2008a 和 2008b 文章中作出回应，而埃克隆德 2009 年的文章则是对卡尔德隆的反驳。另见米勒 2013 年著作第 6 章。）

4.7 Other objections  4.7 其他反对意见

This section briefly presents three other general objections to fictionalism.
本节简要介绍针对虚构主义的另外三种普遍性反对意见。

One recurring concern with fictionalism is that the fictionalist draws a distinction without a difference: there is no real difference between belief and the supposed distinct attitude that the fictionalist posits. (For discussion, see Daly (2008), Horwich (1991), O’Leary-Hawthorne (1994), Rosen (2020), Rosen and Burgess (2005) and Thomasson (2013).) As just stated, the objection may sound like an obvious non-starter: of course there is a difference between belief and whatever attitude it is that we take toward fiction. But there are some reasons to still take the objection seriously. First, as already stressed, fictionalists do often appeal to a different attitude from the one we adopt toward paradigmatic cases of fiction, and for that reason alone one cannot move straight from the obvious possibility of engaging in fiction to the possibility of us doing what the philosophical fictionalist says we do, or should do. Second, it is characteristic of fiction that we sometimes do abandon the perspective internal to the fiction and instead adopt an external, critical perspective. Nothing similar seems to standardly be going on with, say, mathematical discourse or moral discourse. However, these points noted, it is still natural for the fictionalist to shrug off this concern, saying with Rosen (2020) that the question of whether someone who is generally disposed to behave as if p really beliefs that p can simply be settled by what the person is disposed to say upon reflection regarding whether she believes that p or not.
虚构主义反复面临的一个担忧是，虚构主义者所做的区分实则无差别：在信念与虚构主义者所假设的独特态度之间并不存在实质差异。（相关讨论参见 Daly（2008）、Horwich（1991）、O'Leary-Hawthorne（1994）、Rosen（2020）、Rosen 与 Burgess（2005）以及 Thomasson（2013）的著作。）正如所述，这种反对意见初听可能显得毫无根据：我们对待虚构作品的态度与信念之间当然存在差异。但仍有理由认真对待这一质疑。首先，正如前文强调的，虚构主义者确实常诉诸一种不同于典型虚构作品接受态度的特殊态度，仅此一点就不能直接从参与虚构的可能性，直接推导出哲学虚构主义者声称我们正在或应当从事之事的可能性。其次，虚构作品的典型特征在于，我们有时会放弃虚构内部的视角，转而采取外部批判性视角。而在数学话语或道德话语中，通常并不存在类似的情形。 然而，尽管注意到这些观点，虚构主义者仍可以自然地摆脱这种担忧，正如罗森（2020）所言，一个通常倾向于表现得好像相信 p 的人是否真的相信 p，这个问题只需通过考察此人在反思时倾向于如何表述自己是否相信 p 就能解决。

Second, there is the incompleteness objection. Ordinary fictions are incomplete. While Gravity’s Rainbow tells us some things about Tyrone Slothrop it is simply silent regarding other things. Are the fictions that the fictionalist relies on similarly incomplete? Insofar as it is so, a problem looms. If the fictionalist maintains, for every sentence of a given discourse, that this sentence is true iff it is true according to the relevant fiction, then if the fiction is simply silent on whether p, neither “p” nor “~p” is true, for neither is true according to the relevant fiction. A number of different solutions have been suggested to this problem. See Rosen (1990), Nolan (2020), Skiba (2016), and Woodward (2012) for discussions. Let me here just stress that the problem only clearly arises for certain forms of fictionalism. At least as stated, the objection depends on taking the analogy with fiction quite seriously, and also on the fictionalism in question having to do with meaning rather than use. If the fictionalist just aims to put forward a thesis about use, then the incompleteness objection is no more problematic than that utterances of sentences often can fail to be true or false, for a number of different reasons.
其次是不完备性异议。普通虚构作品具有不完备性。虽然《万有引力之虹》向我们讲述了关于泰隆·斯洛思罗普的某些事情，但对其他方面却只字未提。虚构主义者所依赖的虚构是否同样不完备？若确实如此，问题便随之而来。如果虚构主义者主张，对于特定论述中的每个句子，该句子为真当且仅当它在相关虚构中为真，那么当虚构对命题 p 保持沉默时，"p"与"~p"皆不为真，因为二者在相关虚构中均不成立。针对此问题已有多种解决方案被提出，相关讨论可参见罗森（1990）、诺兰（2020）、斯基巴（2016）和伍德沃德（2012）的著作。此处需要强调的是，该问题仅在某些特定形式的虚构主义中才会明确显现。至少就表述而言，这个异议依赖于对虚构类比的高度严肃对待，同时也与所讨论的虚构主义涉及意义而非用法有关。 如果虚构主义者仅仅旨在提出一个关于语言使用的论点，那么不完备性异议就并不比语句表达常因各种原因无法判定真假更成问题。

Third, there is the Brock-Rosen objection, primarily discussed as an objection to modal fictionalism. (The objection is presented in Brock 1993 and Rosen 1993. The presentation below follows Divers and Hagen’s (2006) presentation.) Consider the proposition
第三，存在布洛克-罗森异议（Brock-Rosen objection），该异议主要作为对模态虚构主义的反驳被讨论。（该异议由布洛克 1993 年和罗森 1993 年提出，以下论述遵循戴弗斯与哈根 2006 年的表述。）考虑命题

(P)

There is a plurality of worlds,
存在多元世界，

where by ‘worlds’ we mean Lewisian possible worlds. The modal fictionalist doesn’t want to commit herself to the literal truth of P. But the objection is that she ends up doing so anyway. For
此处"世界"指刘易斯式可能世界。模态虚构主义者不愿承诺 P 的字面真值，但异议指出她终究无法避免。因为

(1)

According to the modal fiction, at every world, P.
根据模态虚构，在每个世界中 P 都成立。

Now, the modal fictionalist holds, the objection goes, that for every modal sentence ‘A’,
模态虚构主义者认为，反对意见指出，对于每一个模态语句"A"，

(M)

‘A’ is true iff according to the modal fiction, A*,
"A"为真当且仅当根据模态虚构，A*成立

where ‘A*’ is the translation of ‘A’ into possible worlds talk.
其中"A*"是将"A"翻译为可能世界话语的表述。

An instance of (M) is then
于是(M)的一个实例即为

(2)

‘Necessarily P’ is true iff according to the modal fiction, at every world, P.
"必然 P"为真，当且仅当根据模态虚构，在所有世界中 P 成立。

By (1) and (2) together with disquotational principles concerning truth,
根据(1)和(2)以及关于真理的去引号原则，

(3)

Necessarily P.

And hence,

(4)

P.

Although the Brock-Rosen objection was first raised against modal fictionalism and has been most discussed in that context, it is important to note that the objection generalizes. For instance, one can run a similar argument in the case of numbers. (This was first stressed in Nolan and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1996.)
尽管布鲁克-罗森异议最初是针对模态虚构主义提出的，且在该语境下讨论最多，但需注意该异议具有普适性。例如，在数学对象领域也可以构建类似论证（这一点最早由诺兰和奥利里-霍桑在 1996 年强调）。

One diagnosis — and possible resolution — of this problem relates to the distinctions earlier drawn. According to this diagnosis, what the objection at most shows is that the fictionalist should be a use fictionalist. If any kind of fictionalist has to rely on general translation schemes such as (M) or (#) it is the meaning fictionalist. The use fictionalist can, with no real loss, employ them more selectively: it is only when speaking within the fiction that we rely on them. (For this diagnosis, presented in different terms, see Nolan and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1996, Yablo 2001, and Woodward 2007. For more on the Brock-Rosen objection to modal fictionalism, see the entry on modal fictionalism.)
对此问题的一种诊断——及其可能的解决方案——与先前所作的区分相关。该诊断认为，该异议至多表明虚构主义者应当成为用法虚构主义者。如果任何类型的虚构主义者都必须依赖(M)或(#)这类普遍转换方案，那只能是意义虚构主义者。用法虚构主义者完全可以更有选择性地运用这些方案：只有当我们处于虚构话语内部时才需要依赖它们（相关诊断参见诺兰和奥利里-霍桑 1996 年、雅布洛 2001 年及伍德沃德 2007 年以不同术语的论述。关于布鲁克-罗森对模态虚构主义的异议，详见模态虚构主义词条）。

5. Significance

Let us lastly turn to the broader picture: the general philosophical significance of fictionalism.
最后让我们转向更宏观的图景：虚构主义的总体哲学意义。

Obviously, and as earlier remarked, the hermeneutic fictionalist can come to the eliminativist antirealist’s aid: adopting fictionalism is for the eliminativist antirealist a more attractive alternative than to adopt some form of error theory.^[4] Quite apart from positive motivations for antirealism, fictionalism is also of relevance for evaluating particular arguments for realist views. Let me discuss two such arguments.
显然，正如前文所述，诠释性虚构主义者可以为消除主义反实在论者提供帮助：对消除主义反实在论者而言，采用虚构主义比采用某种形式的错误理论更具吸引力。 ^[4] 除了反实在论的积极动机外，虚构主义对于评估实在论观点的特定论证也具有重要意义。下面我将讨论两个此类论证。

First, consider we may call ordinary language arguments. An ordinary language argument for the existence of Fs goes as follows. “(1) Sentences thus-and-such are true. (2) (Semantic analysis shows that) for those sentences to be true, there must be Fs. (3) So, there must be Fs.” An argument of this form is clearly valid. The question of the soundness of an argument of this kind comes down to whether the premises are true. Hermeneutic fictionalism presents problems for the justification of premise (1). Maybe all that is evident from ordinary discourse is that we somehow convey or communicate true propositions when uttering the relevant sentences. But hermeneutic fictionalism indicates how we can do so without the sentences semantically expressing true propositions. Thomasson (2013) is a recent extended discussion of the relation between fictionalism and her own preferred ontological view, which is argued for by what she calls “easy arguments”, a kind of ordinary language arguments. Thomasson’s ontological deflationism says, roughly, that all manners of philosophically controversial entities exist, and do so in some sense trivially. The way Thomasson presents things, fictionalism and ontological deflationism are in conflict. But if fictionalism is only a linguistic thesis (compare the distinction between the ontological thesis and the linguistic thesis) — and that is how Thomasson appears to understand it — that’s not quite true. What is true is that fictionalism presents problems for Thomasson’s specific way of arguing for ontological deflationism, by appeal to ordinary language arguments. If we are only speaking fictionally, then what is trivial concerns only what exists according to the relevant fiction and not what non-fictionally exists.
首先，考虑我们可称之为日常语言论证的论点。一个关于 F 存在的日常语言论证如下："（1）如此这般的句子为真。（2）（语义分析表明）要使这些句子为真，必须存在 F。（3）因此，必须存在 F。"这种形式的论证显然是有效的。这类论证的可靠性问题归根结底在于前提是否为真。诠释虚构主义对前提（1）的正当性提出了质疑。或许从日常话语中能明显看出的只是：当我们说出相关句子时，我们以某种方式传达或交流了真实命题。但诠释虚构主义表明，我们可以在句子语义上不表达真实命题的情况下做到这一点。托马森（2013）最近详细讨论了虚构主义与她本人偏好的本体论观点之间的关系，后者通过她所称的"简易论证"（一种日常语言论证）得以确立。托马森的本体论紧缩论大致认为，所有哲学上存在争议的实体都以某种微不足道的方式存在。 按照托马森的表述方式，虚构主义与本体论紧缩主义存在冲突。但如果虚构主义仅是一种语言学论题（对比本体论论题与语言学论题的区别）——而这正是托马森似乎理解它的方式——这种说法并不完全准确。实际情况是，虚构主义对托马森通过日常语言论证来支持本体论紧缩主义的特定论证方式提出了挑战。如果我们只是在虚构意义上言说，那么那些琐碎之事仅涉及相关虚构故事中的存在物，而非非虚构层面的实在存在。

Second, consider indispensability arguments. Let us again take mathematics as our example. One of the most influential arguments for platonism in the philosophy of mathematics is the indispensability argument, according to which quantification over mathematical entities is indispensable to our best theory of the world, and hence we should take mathematical entities to exist. (This is a very rough characterization of indispensability arguments. For more detail see the entry on indispensability arguments in the philosophy of mathematics.) The possibility of revolutionary fictionalism suggests a complication: even if, in some sense, quantification over mathematical entities is indispensable to our best theory of the world, perhaps it is not literal quantification over mathematical entities that is thus indispensable. The possibility of hermeneutic fictionalism suggests another kind of complication. Our guide to what the best theory of the world is comes from what science puts forward. But if we cannot trust that scientists aim at the literal truth, that complicates matters.
其次，考虑不可或缺性论证。让我们再次以数学为例。数学哲学中支持柏拉图主义最具影响力的论证之一就是不可或缺性论证，该论证认为对数学实体的量化是我们描述世界的最佳理论所不可或缺的，因此我们应当承认数学实体的存在。（这是对不可或缺性论证的粗略概括，详见数学哲学中关于不可或缺性论证的条目。）革命虚构主义的可能性提出了一个复杂问题：即使从某种意义而言，对数学实体的量化确是我们最佳理论所不可或缺的，但这种不可或缺的量化或许并非字面意义上对数学实体的量化。诠释虚构主义的可能性则揭示了另一重复杂性。我们判断何为最佳世界理论的依据来自科学界的表述。但若科学家们未必以追求字面真理为目标，情况就变得复杂了。

Indispensability arguments are associated a ‘Quinean’ approach to ontology. Given this approach — the approach of many of those theorists today who take ontology seriously — we should believe in those entities that our best theory of the world quantifies over. Although fictionalism presents problems for specific Quinean arguments, like the indispensability argument, fictionalists are naturally taken to be methodological allies of orthodox Quineans. They can agree with orthodox Quineans that we should believe in those entities that our best theory of the world quantifies over. It is only that they would stress that we must understand this to mean “literally quantifies over”, and that in some interesting cases the condition of literalness is not satisfied.
不可或缺性论证与一种"奎因式"的本体论方法相关联。鉴于这种方法——当今许多认真对待本体论的理论家所采用的方法——我们应当相信那些被我们关于世界的最佳理论所量化的实体。尽管虚构主义对某些特定的奎因式论证（如不可或缺性论证）提出了质疑，但虚构主义者自然被视为正统奎因主义者在方法论上的盟友。他们可以同意正统奎因主义者的观点，即我们应当相信那些被我们关于世界的最佳理论所量化的实体。只不过他们会强调，我们必须将其理解为"字面上量化的"，而在某些有趣的情形中，这种字面性条件并未得到满足。

More radically, however, the theme of one of Yablo’s earliest papers on fictionalism, Yablo (1998), is that the availability of fictionalism as a theoretical option presents problems for ontology as a serious enterprise. Given that when the Quinean says that we should believe in what the best theory quantifies over, this must be understood to mean “literally quantifies over”. But then the Quinean program in ontology relies on the literal/fictional distinction. But this distinction is problematic: saying what parts of our speech are fictional and which are literal is, Yablo argues, at least as problematic as saying which sentences are synthetic and which are analytic. So there is at least as good reason to doubt the literal/fictional distinction — and hence the Quinean program in ontology — as there is to doubt the analytic/synthetic distinction. This is ad hominem, since Quine himself famously attacked the analytic/synthetic distinction.
然而更激进的是，雅布洛早期关于虚构主义的论文《雅布洛（1998）》的核心论点是：虚构主义作为一种理论选项的存在，对本体论作为一项严肃事业构成了挑战。当奎因主义者主张我们应当相信最佳理论所量化的对象时，这必须被理解为"字面上量化的对象"。但如此一来，奎因式的本体论研究纲领就依赖于字面/虚构的区分。雅布洛指出，这种区分本身存在问题：要判定我们言语中哪些部分是虚构、哪些是字面表述，其难度至少不亚于区分分析命题与综合命题。因此，我们有至少同样充分的理由质疑字面/虚构的区分——进而质疑奎因式的本体论研究纲领——正如我们质疑分析/综合的区分那样。这一论证具有"以子之矛"的性质，因为奎因本人正是以批判分析/综合区分而闻名。

There are two metaontological points that someone might be inclined to make here. A relatively moderate point is that it is often so hard to make out on what side of the literal/fictional distinction some discourse falls that arguments of the Quinean kind seldom are well supported. A different point is that there is sometimes — or, in the most radical version of the idea, always — no fact of the matter as to whether some piece of discourse is literal or fictional. It is the most radical point here that is the most closely analogous to what Quine says about the analytic/synthetic distinction.
此处有人可能想提出两个元本体论观点。相对温和的观点是：由于往往难以判定某些论述究竟属于字面陈述还是虚构范畴，奎因式论证很少能得到充分支持。另一个更激进的观点认为，有时（或在该理论最极端的版本中，永远）不存在判定某段论述属于字面还是虚构的客观标准。这里最激进的观点与奎因对分析/综合区分的论述最具可比性。

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