罗曼对他从未经历过的时代怀有一种乡愁。一个世纪前，制造商在商品流通管理中占据主导地位。当时新兴的品牌命名实践与直接面向购买公众的广告相结合，使制造商成为生产/分销链中的主导环节。但好景不长：当零售商开始以企业家思维运作时，权力天平发生了倾斜。他们为自己的商品打上品牌——即今天我们所说的自有品牌（Private Label，简称 PL）——甚至推出自营产品（陈列在店内熟食区）。快进一百年到今天，顶尖零售商以数字化货架调整的速度、第一方（实时）数据、以及对物流的掌控（从材料选用到产量控制）来管理其自有品牌，这些正是大多数快消品品牌梦寐以求的。
Argh! Private Labels are eating my lunch
啊！自有品牌正在蚕食我的市场份额
From the get-go, PL had an advantage as their survival rate trumps that of branded new products, also their natural charm with low- and high-income households puts no limits on purchase intent. But it’s macroeconomics that fuelled their prosperity; every single crisis of our permacrisis has accelerated the market share of PL, chipping away at that of brands.
从一开始，自有品牌就占据优势——其存活率远超品牌新品，且对高低收入家庭的自然吸引力使得购买意愿不受限。但真正推动其繁荣的是宏观经济；我们长期危机中的每一次动荡都加速了自有品牌市场份额的增长，逐步侵蚀品牌阵地。
Another PL share record in Europe and USA early 2024
2024 年初欧美自有品牌份额再创新高
Our BrandZ analysis predicts that PL’s value share (% of money spent on PL in the category) will grow over the next 12 months. But contrary to popular belief, price is not the single reason to choose Private Label products; more than 50% of shoppers are attracted to them for their perceived quality, and a third of them see no differentiation between PL and the branded offering – so why not?
我们的 BrandZ 分析预测，未来 12 个月内自有品牌（PL）的价值份额（即该品类中消费者在 PL 上的支出占比）将持续增长。但与普遍认知相反，价格并非选择自有品牌产品的唯一理由；超过 50%的消费者因其感知质量而被吸引，其中三分之一的人认为 PL 与品牌产品并无差异——既然如此，何乐而不为呢？
How can Roman, the CMO of a medium-sized brand in the soft drink category, stop the loss to PL? There are three steps:
作为软饮品类中型品牌的首席营销官，Roman 该如何阻止市场份额被 PL 侵蚀？可分三步走：
1. Make price your ally
1.让价格成为你的盟友
Are there too many PL brands around you? Fret not. Our BrandZ analysis of over 1,000 categories proves that the presence of PL doubles the perceived price range, and so the strongest brands (the ones that are meaningfully different to more people) can command a price premium.
周围自有品牌林立？无需担忧。我们对 1000 多个品类的 BrandZ 分析表明，PL 的存在会使消费者感知价格区间翻倍，因此最具竞争力的品牌（即对更多人具有显著差异化的品牌）能够获得溢价空间。
Saying this, our research into different pricing strategies suggests that brands that show pricing constraint win. Over the last four years, prices of winning brands went up by just over 20%, while losing brands increased prices by more than 30%. Notably, the winners increased prices less than PL.
值得注意的是，我们对不同定价策略的研究显示，实施价格克制的品牌往往胜出。过去四年间，赢家品牌的涨幅略超 20%，而失利品牌的提价幅度超过 30%。尤为关键的是，赢家品牌的涨价幅度始终低于 PL 品牌。
Winning brands have increased prices less than losing ones and less than PL
胜出的品牌比失败品牌和自有品牌（PL）提价幅度更小
2. Stay active, innovate and thus stand out
2.保持活跃，不断创新，从而脱颖而出
Brands with high penetration are more likely to decline than grow. In fact, the average top 10 brand in Europe has lost 0.14% share to PL within three years.
市场渗透率高的品牌更可能面临下滑而非增长。实际上，欧洲前十大品牌平均在三年内将 0.14%的市场份额拱手让给了自有品牌。
Interestingly, those that fail to find new space with no new products on the shelf lost twice as much, whereas those that launched the most new SKUs were in the top quartile of winning brands. Being active allows you to better defend your share: not only to get incremental sales from new products but also to keep your existing assortment on the retailer’s shelf.
有趣的是，那些未能通过新品拓展货架空间的品牌损失幅度是其他品牌的两倍，而推出最多新 SKU 的品牌则跻身于表现最佳的前 25%之列。保持活跃不仅能通过新品带来增量销售，更能确保现有产品线稳居零售商货架，从而更好地捍卫市场份额。
Our results align with Professor L. Lamey’s extensive research on how brands can fight against PL. Lamey urges brands not to compete on price but to double down on quality. The single best way to keep customers from abandoning brand products, she concludes, is to introduce significant, distinctive innovations that are truly different and noticeably better.
我们的研究结果与 L·拉米教授关于品牌如何对抗自有品牌的深度研究不谋而合。拉米教授强调品牌不应陷入价格战，而应全力提升品质。她指出，防止消费者弃用品牌产品的终极策略是推出具有显著差异性、真正独特且明显更优的重大创新产品。
3. Fish where the fish are
3.在鱼群所在处垂钓
What if you could use consumers’ unloyal tendencies in your favour? The perpetually curious shoppers (let’s call them Nudgeables) make up 15% of the addressable market and can unlock billions of value: in the UK alone, this group amounts to 3.6 million households. By predisposing them and making your products more present, more visible and more accessible to them at the point of purchase, you can improve your marketing efficiency by 24%. How come?
若能善用消费者的不忠诚倾向会怎样？那些永远充满好奇的购物者（我们称之为“易被引导者”）占可触达市场的 15%，能释放数十亿价值：仅在英国，这一群体就涵盖 360 万户家庭。通过在购买点预先影响他们，使你的产品更显眼、更易获取，营销效率可提升 24%。原因何在？
Our study proves that there is a strong correlation between penetration growth and % of Nudgeables for a brand. A recent case study from the UK reveals that 77% of growing soft drink brands are over-represented by these brand-switchers. To illustrate, we picked the top six medium sized brands in terms of five-year average penetration growth – Costa, Monster, Red Bull, London Essence Co., Lipton Ice, and Rubicon; all these brands reported significant over-representation of Nudgeables vs. their category.
我们的研究证明，品牌渗透率增长与“易被引导者”占比存在强相关性。英国近期案例显示，77%增长的软饮品牌中这类品牌转换者比例显著偏高。例如，我们选取了五年平均渗透率增长排名前六的中型品牌——咖世家、魔爪、红牛、伦敦 essence 公司、立顿冰茶和 Rubicon；这些品牌的“易被引导者”占比均显著高于品类平均水平。
Predisposed undecided consumers = penetration gains
预先影响的犹豫消费者 = 渗透率增长
Leveraging the Nudgeables’ potential is likely the most lucrative opportunity for brand growth as it limits PL share gain and feeds brands’ own penetration gains.
Flip the narrative
“The scariest thing about private label”, Mark Ritson shared, “is not that it picks up share when times are tough, it’s that it never quite relinquishes it”. Someone once told him this. It was likely Professor Jan-Benedict Steenkamp. In his research with Lamey, they discovered that brands claw back about 1/3 of their market share loss after a recession ends. The remaining 2/3 is somewhat lost forever as people get accustomed to PL and learn to appreciate their quality.
Does this mean that PL share gains are inevitable? Not necessarily. The average category might have seen a 2.2% PL share increase since 2019, but the story flips in categories where the strongest performing brands compete. There, PL has actually lost share.
Strong brands have been pushing back in many ways: Magnum and LEGO for instance used advertising (award-winning advertising as judged by consumers themselves) to defend their price premium and gain back those who had got distracted by brand-alikes. Others (like Premier Foods) reigned in promotions or even redefined their prices at a lower level, like Wray. Many simply kept reinforcing their meaningful difference; like Mutti who refocused on quality (100% Italian tomatoes!) and ItalPizza who never stopped innovating their flavour options. At the heart of their every action lies the realisation that it’s a lot easier to get people to try something new than it is to convince them to stick with it. Consumers who are ‘forced’ by the cost-of-living crisis to try out PL, won’t return to brands unless brands reward them with a better value/price equation.
If we were to give Roman a single piece of advice, this would be to use value as a moat of protection against PL. Imagine a marketing-euphoric scenario where a slowdown in consumer spending was seen as an opportunity, not a threat. During the 2008 financial crisis, Roman and his team refreshed their brand. During Covid-19, they became more unmissably superior. During the 2022 inflationary peak, they gave consumers more value for the money they spent. By 2024, they were managing a stronger brand, one that showed resilience to market shocks and for which many consumers would resist the replacement temptation with a PL. Yes, people would still waver between trust, credibility, quality and ‘saving money’, but more often than not, consumer predisposition would load the dice in the brand’s favour.
