Ambivalent fatherland: The Chinese National Salvation Movement in Malaya and Java, 1937-41
多层次的祖国：马来亚和爪哇的中国国民救亡运动，1937-41

China's resistance to the Japanese invasion escalated into a full-scale war after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937. As appeasement and isolationism permeated the international community, Western powers hesitated to intervene in the increasingly aggravated China-Japan hostilities. Nevertheless, the continuously deteriorating situation stimulated the rise of Chinese nationalism in overseas Chinese communities worldwide. This trend was especially visible in British Malaya and the Dutch colony of Java, two main destinations for Chinese emigration for centuries. The Japanese invasion of China sparked the emergence of the National Salvation Movement (NSM), which included numerous boycott campaigns, fundraising and the recruitment of volunteers in both colonies, boosting the unprecedented enthusiasm of the overseas Chinese to participate in the domestic politics of their ancestral homeland between 1937 and 1941.
1937 年卢沟桥事变后，中国对日本入侵的抵抗演变成了全面战争。随着绥靖和孤立主义弥漫国际社会，西方列强犹豫是否要干预日益加剧的中日敌对行动。然而，持续恶化的局势刺激了海外华人社区的中国民族主义的兴起。这种趋势在英属马来亚和荷兰殖民地爪哇岛尤为明显，这两个地方几个世纪以来一直是中国移民的主要目的地。日本入侵中国引发了民族救亡运动 (NSM) 的兴起，该运动包括 1937 年至 1941 年间在这两个殖民地进行的众多抵制运动、筹款和招募志愿者，极大地提高了海外华人参与其祖先祖国国内政治的空前热情。

However, the Chinese population in Malaya and Java was by no means monolithic. On top of the large local-born Chinese population, the rapid growth of new immigrants from China in the first half of the twentieth century contributed to a significant demographic shift in both colonial societies. While their differences in birthplace resulted in a noticeable division between the local-born peranakan and the China-born totok, several driving forces further intensified the polarisation of the Chinese community. The NSM provided the overseas Chinese with a rare opportunity to re-examine their 'Chineseness' and to readjust their relationships with the colonial regimes and the increasingly self-aware indigenous population. Accordingly, the shifting political landscape in each colony also significantly shaped their participation in the Movement and other groups' reactions to such dynamics.
然而，马来亚和爪哇的华人人口绝非铁板一块。除了大量本地出生的华人人口之外，20 世纪上半叶来自中国的新移民的快速增长，也导致了这两个殖民地社会的人口结构发生了显著变化。虽然他们的出生地的差异导致了土生华人（peranakan）和中国出生的 totok 之间明显的划分，但一些推动力进一步加剧了华人社区的两极分化。 华侨运动为海外华人提供了一个难得的机会，让他们重新审视自己的“中国性”，并调整他们与殖民政权以及日益自觉的土著人口的关系。因此，每个殖民地不断变化的政治格局也极大地影响了他们对该运动的参与以及其他群体对这种动态的反应。

The overseas Chinese contribution to China's armed resistance against the Japanese invasion during the Second World War has been explored extensively in the Sinophone world. Besides academic works, a wide variety of literature exists, in memoirs, biographies, journalistic writings, and memorial essays. With very few exceptions, however, Chinese-language narratives often primarily focus on the ai guo (patriotism) aspect of the NSM by highlighting its achievements and unquestioned solidarity. The ingrained rivalry, factionalism, and internal conflicts within the overseas Chinese communities, by contrast, are often intentionally downplayed or ignored. Often imbued with a strong sense of sinocentrism, such works rarely touch upon the larger picture, such as Chinese interactions with the indigenous population and the social dynamics of colonial societies.
二战期间，海外华人在中国抗日武装反抗中的贡献，在汉语世界被广泛研究。除了学术著作，还存在大量的文学作品，包括回忆录、传记、新闻著作和纪念文章。 然而，除了极少数例外，中文叙事通常主要关注国务院海外华人事务办公室的爱国主义方面，突出其成就和坚定不移的团结。相比之下，海外华人社区内部根深蒂固的竞争、派系主义和内部冲突，往往有意淡化或忽视。这些作品通常带有强烈的中华中心主义色彩，很少涉及更大的画面，比如华人与当地人口的互动和殖民地社会的社会动态。

By contrast, English-language scholarship has presented more nuanced understandings of the NSM. Yōji Akashi's work is by far the most comprehensive account on this topic, and engages in various discussions concerning the diversity of the overseas Chinese community and how such differences shaped the NSM. Trying to generalise the NSM as an orchestrated effort by Chinese communities across Southeast Asia, however, Akashi's extensive study does not delve deeper into the social dynamics of Malaya and Java. Philip Kuhn and Didi Kwartanada have examined the factionalism and divisiveness of the overseas community, with Kuhn arguing that Chinese nationalism during this period was 'not a single construct but a mosaic of related states of mind and channels of action'. While nationalism was a vital driving force propelling the NSM, levels of participation among the diaspora were associated with varying strategies for survival in foreign lands, meaning that the Chinese had to adapt to their respective colonial sociopolitical realities including getting along with the indigenous population. Both Kuhn and Kwartanada suggest that
与之形成对比的是，英文文献对南洋群岛运动的理解更加细致入微。赤足(Yōji Akashi)的著作是迄今为止关于此课题最全面的论述，并涉及有关海外华人社区多样性及其如何塑造南洋群岛运动的各种讨论。 然而，赤足对南洋群岛运动的广泛研究并未深入探讨马来亚和爪哇的社会动态，试图将其概括为东南亚华人社区的有组织行动。菲利普·库恩(Philip Kuhn)和迪迪·夸塔纳达(Didi Kwartanada)研究了海外华人社区的派系和分裂，库恩认为，在此期间的中国民族主义“不是单一的建构，而是一系列相关的思想状态和行动渠道”。 虽然民族主义是推动南洋群岛运动的重要驱动力，但侨民的参与程度与在异国土地上生存的不同策略相关联，这意味着中国人不得不适应各自的殖民社会政治现实，包括与当地人民和睦相处。库恩和夸塔纳达都认为，

1 Peranakan is the term commonly used for local-born Chinese descendants in British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies who have been living overseas for generations; Totok, often used interchangeably with singkheh, is the Malay term for new Chinese immigrants.
1 娘惹/娘惹（Nyonya/Baba）是常见于英属马来亚和荷属东印度群岛的本地出生华人后裔的统称，他们已在海外生活了数代；Totok，通常与 singkheh 互换使用，是马来语中新移民华人的称呼。

2 C.F. Yong, Tan Kah-Kee: The making of an overseas Chinese legend [Chen Jiageng: Huaqiao Chuanqi Renwu] (Teaneck, NJ: Bafang Wenhua Qiye Gongsi, 1991); Shaochuan Lin, Chen Jiageng Yu Nanqiao Jigong [Tan Kah Kee and the Nanqiao Jigong] (Beijing: Overseas Chinese Press, 1994); Jiancheng Yang, Nanyang Huaqiao Kangrijiuguo Yundong Shimo (1937-1942) [Account of the Overseas Chinese National Salvation Movement] (Taipei: Zhonghua Xueshu Yuan Nanyang Yanjiusuo, 1983).
C.F. 容：《陈嘉庚：华侨传奇人物》[陈嘉庚：华侨传奇人物]（新泽西州蒂内克：八方文化企业公司，1991 年）；林少川：《陈嘉庚与南侨机工》[陈嘉庚与南侨机工]（北京：中国华侨出版社，1994 年）；杨建成：《南洋华侨抗日救国运动史末（1937-1942）》[南洋华侨抗日救国运动史末（1937-1942）]（台北：中华学术院南洋研究所，1983 年）。

3 Yoji Akashi, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941 (Lawrence: Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1970).
Akashi Yoji, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941 (Lawrence: Kansas 大学东亚研究中心, 1970)

4 Philip A. Kuhn, Chinese among Others: Emigration in modern times (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), p. 278; Didi Kwartanada, 'Competition, patriotism and collaboration: The Chinese businessmen of Yogyakarta between the 1930s and 1945', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 33, 2 (2002): .
菲利普·A·库恩著，《现代华人移居史》（马里兰州兰哈姆：罗曼和利特尔菲尔德，2008 年），第 278 页；Didi Kwartanada，“竞争、爱国主义与合作：1930 年代至 1945 年间日惹的华人商人”，东南亚研究杂志 33，2（2002 年）：<代码 0>
despite the diversity within the Chinese community, it was the long-standing totokperanakan divide that shaped the basic pattern of NSM. Across different territories, the main leaders and participants of the NSM were invariably totok immigrants who maintained closer ties to their areas of origin in China - and thus 'behaved more patriotically' - than their peranakan counterparts. William Skinner's research demonstrates a similar pattern, but contrasted the NSM's different outcomes in Malaya and uncolonised Thailand. While confirming the evident split between totok and peranakan groups, Skinner argues that Malaya's colonial setting exposed the totok-dominated Chinese population to more radical ideas. Additionally, the Cantonese majority among the new immigrants had been aligned historically with revolutionary movements in their ancestral hometowns.
尽管华人内部存在多样性，但长期存在的“土著-土生华人”之间的分歧塑造了马来亚民族主义的基本模式。在不同的地区，马来亚民族主义的主要领导人和参与者都是与中国原籍地保持着密切联系的“土著”移民——因此比他们的“土生华人”同胞“表现得更爱国”。 威廉·斯金纳的研究表明了类似的模式，但对比了马来亚和未被殖民的泰国在马来亚民族主义中的不同结果。在确认了“土著”和“土生华人”群体之间明显的差异的同时，斯金纳认为，马来亚的殖民背景使以“土著”为主的华人人口接触到更多激进的思想。此外，新移民中的广东人多数历史上与家乡的革命运动有着千丝万缕的联系。

While such observations reflect some crucial dynamics behind the NSM, they seem to contradict several well-recorded facts on the ground. For instance, nonrevolutionary business leaders, chiefly those of Fujianese origin, played a crucial role in organising the movement in British Malaya. In Dutch Java, some peranakan groups actively participated in the NSM, whereas many new immigrants turned a blind eye to fundraising and boycott campaigns. Many totok business people also took advantage of the situation and benefited from collaborating with the Japanese during the occupation. Were the totok more patriotic than the peranakan, and the Cantonese more revolution-minded, therefore more patriotic, than the Fujianese? Not necessarily, and such generalisations run the risk of oversimplification. Evidence has shown that such patterns do not always stand scrutiny, as the heterogeneous Chinese communities reacted to the NSM in drastically different manners. Numerous exceptions indicate that neither birthplace nor dialect group affiliations alone determined levels of involvement in the NSM, as individual actions were not only based on varying relationships with China but also distinct - and continuously shifting - lived environments. Therefore, a more pertinent set of questions would be: How did diasporic groups' multilayered identities affect their participation in a highly politicised movement oriented towards a distant and ambivalent homeland? How did colonial political, economic, and social conditions shape overseas Chinese communities' perceptions of, and subsequent reactions to, the ambiguously articulated 'national salvation'? Finally, where did nationalism and patriotism start and end in such contexts?
尽管此类观察反映了民族主义运动背后的一些关键动态，但它们似乎与地面上的若干记录事实相矛盾。例如，非革命商业领袖，主要是福建出身的领袖，在组织英属马来亚的运动中发挥了关键作用。在荷属爪哇，一些土生华人团体积极参与了民族主义运动，而许多新移民对筹款和抵制运动视而不见。许多土生华人商人也利用了局势，并在日占时期与日军合作中获利。那么，土生华人比土生华人更爱国，广东人比福建人更具革命意识，因此更爱国吗？未必如此，这种概括化有过度简化的风险。证据表明，这些模式并不总是站得住脚，因为不同的华人社区对民族主义运动做出了截然不同的反应。 许多例外表明，仅凭出生地或方言群体所属关系并不能决定参与国家救亡运动的程度，因为个人行动不仅基于与中国不同的关系，而且还基于不同的——且不断变化的——生活环境。因此，更相关的问题集应该是：华侨群体的多重身份认同如何影响他们参与针对遥远而矛盾的祖国的政治化运动？殖民地政治、经济和社会条件如何影响海外华人社区对模糊阐述的“民族救亡”的认识及其反应？最后，在这样的背景下，民族主义和爱国主义从哪里开始，又在哪里结束？

Using memoirs, newspapers, memorial essays and primary materials from multiple archives, this article explores the distinct roles of the overseas Chinese in the NSM between the escalation of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the beginning of Japanese rule in Island Southeast Asia in 1942. This research problematises existing Chinese-language literature that treats the NSM as a moment of diasporic solidarity and regards the Movement as predominantly driven by patriotism. The article also seeks to complicate existing narratives in English-language scholarship, which highlight the diversity to varying degrees, yet tend to conveniently situate the NSM's different outcomes within pre-set frameworks such as the totok-peranakan divide or dialect group rivalries. Although rising Chinese nationalism played an essential role in stimulating the NSM, this article argues that the changing political, economic, and social circumstances in local societies prompted diasporic communities to make swift adjustments. As a result, the shifting relationships of diasporic Chinese with their ethnic homeland and host colonial states profoundly affected how the NSM played out. While the Chinese community was deeply divided along class, clan, occupation, birthplace, and dialect lines, individuals' ambivalent political orientations, conflicting economic interests, contradictory interpretations of ethnic identity, and the complex social networks also profoundly affected their reactions towards the NSM. Moreover, with disparate security concerns in Asia, British and Dutch authorities adopted different attitudes in their interactions with the highly politicised Chinese activities during this period, which in turn contributed to the NSM's varying outcomes.
利用回忆录、报纸、纪念文章和来自多个档案的重要材料，本文探讨了 1937 年中日战争爆发至 1942 年日本统治东南亚期间，华侨在南洋运动中发挥的不同作用。这项研究质疑了现有的华语文献，这些文献将南洋运动视为海外华人团结一致的时刻，并将这场运动主要视为爱国主义驱动的。文章还试图使现有的英文学术文献中的叙述变得复杂，这些文献在不同程度上强调了这种多样性，但往往倾向于将南洋运动的不同结果置于预设的框架内，例如土生华人-峇峇娘惹的分歧或方言群体之间的竞争。尽管中国民族主义的兴起对促进南洋运动发挥了至关重要的作用，但本文认为，当地社会不断变化的政治、经济和社会环境促使海外华人社区做出迅速的调整。因此，海外华人与其祖籍国和东道国殖民国家之间不断变化的关系深刻地影响了南洋运动的展开方式。 由于华人社区在阶级、宗族、职业、出生地和方言方面存在深刻的内部差异，个人的政治倾向、相互冲突的经济利益、对民族认同的矛盾解读以及复杂的社会网络也深刻地影响了他们对南洋学会的反应。此外，由于英国和荷兰当局在亚洲安全问题上的担忧不同，他们在与这一时期充满政治色彩的华人活动互动时采取了不同的态度，反过来又导致南洋学会结果的不同。

In the Sinophone world Malaya's NSM has been commonly depicted as a success which mobilised the vast diaspora, collected much-needed funds for China's war efforts, and launched fruitful boycott campaigns against Japanese goods. Central to the positive outcomes was totok Fujianese business leader Tan Kah Kee, often portrayed as a hagiographic figure, who managed to break down dialect, class, political and factional barriers and united the fragmented Chinese communities across Southeast Asia. This section shows that fierce rivalries persisted throughout the NSM, and the highly politicised movement further intensified existing tensions within the Chinese population. To many community leaders, national salvation was not a goal but an opportunity, by which they could gain significant influence over an increasingly agitated population. Consequently, rival forces competed aggressively for the NSM's leadership, but Tan Kah Kee and his Fujianese-based relief funds stood out as the most influential network in the process. Despite the NSM's relative success, the sense of diasporic solidarity was more of a distant ideal than an achieved reality.
在华语世界, 马来亚的南侨总会历来被描绘成成功的典范, 它动员了庞大的侨民群体, 为中国的抗战筹集了急需的资金, 并发起了抵制日货的卓有成效的运动。积极成果的核心是以福建商界领袖陈嘉庚为中心, 他被描述成一个传奇般的人物, 他设法打破了方言、阶级、政治和派系壁垒, 统一了东南亚各地支离破碎的华人社区。code0该节表明, 在整个南侨总会的过程中, 激烈的竞争始终存在, 政治化程度很高的运动进一步加剧了华人内部的紧张局势。对于许多社区领导人来说, 民族救亡不是目标, 而是机会, 通过它他们可以对变得越来越不安定的人口施加巨大影响。因此, 敌对势力为争夺南侨总会领导权展开了激烈的角逐, 但陈嘉庚及其以福建为基地的救济基金在这一过程中脱颖而出,成为最具影響力的网络。尽管南侨总会取得了相对成功, 但海外华侨团结一致的感觉与其说是既成事实, 不如说是一种遙遠的理想。

Historically, Malayan Chinese politics has been closely associated with the domestic politics of China. In the early twentieth century, Chinese nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen expanded his underground resistance movement, Tong Meng Hui, in Malaya and gained considerable support from its Chinese community for the revolution. Between 1921 and 1931, a notable demographic change took place in Malaya, where the Chinese population increased by 46 per cent, triggered by the influx of migrant workers in the tin and rubber industries. While the Chinese already constituted 39 per cent of the total population by 1931, the local-born accounted for only 31 per cent of the Chinese community. The majority of Malayan Chinese were totok who retained their Chinese citizenship and were 'neither British subjects nor even permanent settlers'. In the interwar period, with neither a strong indigenous
历史上，马来亚华人政治与中国国内政治密切相关。20 世纪初，中国民族主义领袖孙中山在马来亚发展了他的地下反抗运动“中国同盟会”，并得到了马来亚华人社区对革命的巨大支持。1921 年至 1931 年间，马来亚经历了显著的人口结构变化，华人人口增加 46%，这主要是由锡矿业和橡胶业移民工人的涌入造成的。 1931 年，华人已占马来亚人口总数的 39%，但本地出生的华人仅占华人社区的 31%。 大多数马来亚华人仍保有中国国籍，是“既不是英国臣民也不是永久居民”的“托托人”。 在两次世界大战之间的时期，由于缺乏强大的本土

8 Ibid. 8 同上。

9 Richard Winstedt, 'Malaya', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 226, 1 (1943): 97.
温斯泰特，理查德，“马来亚”，美国政治和社会科学院院刊 226，1（1943）：97。

10 John Shepherd, 'Some demographic characteristics of Chinese immigrant populations: Lessons for the study of Taiwan's population history', in Maritime China in transition 1750-1850, ed. Gungwu Wang and Chin-Keong Ng (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004), p. 126.
10 约翰·谢泼德，“中国移民人口的一些人口特征：对台湾人口历史研究的启示”，载于王赓武和黄振坚编，《转型中的海上中国，1750-1850 年》（德国威斯巴登：Harrassowitz Verlag，2004 年），第 126 页。

11 Winstedt, 'Malaya', pp. 98-9.
温斯泰德，《马来亚》，第 98-9 页。
nationalist movement nor serious discussions that might turn the vast immigrant population into the citizens of a new nation-state, the Chinese sense of belonging in Malaya was scarce. As Winstedt points out, except for a small fraction of Straits-born Chinese, Chinese residents in Malaya generally regarded China as their political home.
华人并没有民族主义运动，也没有严肃的讨论将庞大的移民人口变成一个新民族国家的公民，因此华人在马来亚的归属感很稀缺。 正如温斯 tedt 指出的，除了少数在海峡出生的中国人，马来亚的华裔居民普遍将中国视为他们的政治家园。

Although the gradual totok takeover was conducive to forming closer political connections between diaspora groups and ancestral hometowns, the demographic change did not lead to the homogenisation of Malayan Chinese politics. Chinese nationalism, like the diverse Chinese community itself, was by no means monolithic. On the one hand, the Guomindang (GMD) government had been making consistent efforts to win the hearts and minds of the overseas Chinese, whose remittances to China constituted a crucial source of the government's revenue. In doing so, the GMD cultivated an extensive network of local organisations and organised numerous nationalist campaigns within the Chinese community. One the other hand, the Communist Party of China (CPC) had also exerted its influence in Malaya through clandestine activities since the mid-1920s. Intending to bring 'world revolution' to Southeast Asia through the overseas Chinese community, the CPC established several communist organisations under the Moscow-based Communist International (Comintern). The GMD and CPC formed the First United Front between 1923 and 1927 when the Comintern promoted the two parties' cooperation and encouraged cadres to hold dual membership. As the nationalists and communists fell out in 1927, their working relationship in Malaya also came to an end. Subsequently, CPC's Nanyang (Southeast Asian) branches adapted to varying local circumstances: in Malaya they transformed into the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1930. Despite attempts to indigenise the revolution by allying with the non-Chinese population, the MCP's China-oriented agenda, like that of their rival nationalists, still appealed predominantly to the Chinese community throughout the 1930s. The GMD and the CPC formed the Second United Front after the China-Japan conflict escalated in 1937. Local GMD and MCP
gradual totok takeover 虽然逐步的土著接管有利于形成侨民群体与其祖籍国之间更紧密的政治联系，但人口结构的变化并没有导致马来亚华人政治的同质化。华人民族主义，就像多元的华人社区本身一样，绝非铁板一块。一方面，国民政府一直在努力争取海外华人的支持，他们的侨汇是中国政府收入的重要来源。为此，国民政府在当地建立了广泛的组织网络，并在华人社区组织了大量的民族主义运动。另一方面，中国共产党自 20 世纪 20 年代中期以来也通过秘密活动在马来亚发挥了影响力。中共意图通过海外华人社区将“世界革命”带到东南亚，并在莫斯科的共产国际领导下建立了多个共产党组织。 国民党和共产党在 1923 年至 1927 年间建立了第一次统一战线，当时共产国际推动了两党的合作，并鼓励干部双重党员身份。随着民族主义者和共产党人在 1927 年决裂，他们在马来亚的工作关系也随之结束。随后，中共的南洋（东南亚）支部适应了不同的当地情况：1930 年在马来亚转型为马来亚共产党（MCP）。 尽管试图通过与非华裔人口结盟来本土化革命，但马来亚共产党以中国为导向的议程，与其民族主义对手一样，在整个 20 世纪 30 年代仍然主要吸引华人群体。 1937 年中日冲突升级后，国民党和共产党再次建立了第二次统一战线。本地 GMD 和 MCP

12 Early Malay nationalism did not develop into an organised political movement until the formation of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Young Malays Union, KMM) in 1938. KMM advocated for ketuanan Melayu (Malay hegemony) and the establishment of a Malay sovereign state exclusive of the Chinese and Indians. However, KMM did not grow into a mass movement. Rustam A. Sani, Social roots of the Malay Left: An analysis of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2008).
12 早期的马来民族主义直到 1938 年成立青年马来人统一组织 (KMM) 后才发展成为有组织的政治运动。KMM 主张马来人至上 (ketuanan Melayu) 和建立一个不包括华人 和 印度人的马来主权国家。然而，KMM 没有发展成为一个群众运动。Rustam A. Sani 著，《马来左翼的社会根源：青年马来人统一组织分析》（八打灵再也：SIRD，2008 年）。

13 The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act stipulated that any person born in Singapore, Penang, and Malacca (under the sovereignty of the British Crown) would be considered a British subject. The sovereignty of other Malay states rested in their rulers (sultans). People who were born in such states were considered British Protected Persons. Winstedt, 'Malaya', pp. 98-9.
13. 《英国国籍和外国人身份法》规定，在新加坡、槟榔屿和马六甲（在英国王室领地）内出生的人，将被视为英国臣民。其他马来州属的主权则在于其统治者（苏丹）手中。在这些州属出生的人被视为英国保护人。温斯泰特，《马来亚》，第 98-9 页。

14 Akashi, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, p. 13.
14 阿部，" 南洋华侨抗日救亡运动"，第 13 页。

15 C.F. Yong and R.B. McKenna, The Kuomintang movement in British Malaya, 1912-1949 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), pp. 172-98.
## 15 C.F. 容和 R.B. 麦肯纳著，国民党在马来亚运动，1912-1949 (新加坡：新加坡大学出版社，1990)，第 172-98 页。

16 Boon Kheng Cheah, From PKI to the Comintern, 1924-1941: The apprenticeship of the Malayan Communist Party (Ithaca, NY: SEAP, Cornell University, 1992), pp. 3-40.
16·陈拔清，《从第三国际的建立到马来亚共产党》，1924-1941：马来亚共产党的学徒期（纽约州伊萨卡：东南亚计划，康奈尔大学，1992 年），第 3-40 页。

17 Anna Belogurova, 'The Chinese International of Nationalities: The Chinese Communist Party, the Comintern, and the Foundation of the Malayan National Communist Party, 1923-1939', Journal of Global History 9, 3 (2014): 461-3.
17 阿纳斯塔西娅·别洛古罗娃，《中国共产党与其在马来亚的共产国际关系网络：1923-1945》，全球史研究，第 13 卷，第 4 期（2018 年），第 549-578 页。

18 The GMD and CPC formed an alliance between 1937 and 1941 to resist the Japanese invasion. The rapprochement ended due to clashes between the two forces in early 1941. Gregor Benton, 'The South Anhui Incident', Journal of Asian Studies 45, 4 (1986): 681.
18 1937 年至 1941 年间，国民党和共产党结成同盟，共同抵抗日本入侵。由于 1941 年初两军之间的冲突，这种缓和关系破裂。Gregor Benton，《皖南事变》，《亚洲研究学报》45，4（1986）：681。
organisations also reached a temporary rapprochement and sought to collaborate in the NSM.
各组织也达成了暂时的和解，并在 NSM 中寻求合作。

However, as Stephen Leong points out, the GMD-CPC Alliance in China did not fully extend to Malaya, and cooperation between the parties' local branches was limited. The GMD and MCP's lukewarm relationship was mainly due to their different positions in Malayan politics. Conservative GMD members were reluctant to work with the illegal MCP for fear of being affected by the colonial government's anticommunist policies. Moreover, the GMD regarded the British as a sympathetic power whose neutrality was key to safeguarding Malaya's stability, which was in line with the core interests of the overseas Chinese. Therefore, the GMD insisted that the NSM's projects had to be carried out based on Sino-British friendship. By contrast, the MCP adopted a more aggressive approach to NSM campaigns, hoping to strengthen its influence over the Malayan Chinese community while challenging British rule in the colony. For instance, the MCP-influenced Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society (AEBUS) organised an anti-Japanese protest in January 1938, which turned into a riot, resulting in the colonial government's fierce crackdown and the arrest of more than 100 Chinese activists, 11 of whom were deported. The British authorities charged the group with an 'attempt to carry out subversive activities under the guise of patriotism', adding that the acts of violence 'have been against other Chinese and not against Japanese'. The colonial government believed that AEBUS had been consistently deploying methods such as intimidation and coercion to achieve its goals:
然而，正如梁世良指出的那样，国民党与中共在中国的合作并没有完全延伸到马来亚，各党派地方分支之间的合作也十分有限。国民党和马共关系冷淡的主要原因是他们在马来亚政治中的立场不同。国民党保守派成员不愿与非法马共合作，担心受到殖民政府反共政策的影响。此外，国民党将英国视为一个同情的势力，其保持中立对于维护马来亚的稳定至关重要，这与海外华人的核心利益是一致的。因此，国民党坚持认为，全马总会的项目必须在中英友好的基础上进行。 相比之下，马共采取了一种更激进的方式来开展全马总会运动，希望借此加强其对马来亚华人社区的影响力，同时挑战英国在该殖民地的统治。 例如，受马来亚共产党影响的反敌后援会（AEBUS）于 1938 年 1 月组织了一次反日游行，该游行演变成了一场骚乱，导致殖民政府的强烈镇压和 100 多名中国活动家被捕，其中 11 人被驱逐出境。 英国当局指控该组织“假借爱国主义进行颠覆活动”，并补充说，暴力行为“针对其他中国人，而不是日本人”。殖民政府认为，非洲紧急特别部队一直以来都在使用恐吓和胁迫等手段来实现其目标：

In spite of the declarations of those communists (CPC) who have joined the Nanking Government, the Malayan Communist Party has not departed from its basic principle which is anti-Imperialist activity. The main creed of the Backing-Up Society is Communism; it only uses National Salvation as a means to an end.
尽管加入南京政府的那些共产党人发表了声明，但马来亚共产党并未背离其反帝的根本原则。

维护协会的主要信条是共产主义； 它只利用民族救亡作为手段。

 

However, the government also noted that the communist-influenced NSM campaigns were not popular within the Chinese community, observing that 'the atmosphere in Singapore, and indeed throughout Malaya, is not intense' because 'responsible Chinese opinion strongly condemns those who, in the guise of patriots working against the Japanese, attempt to pay off old scores and thereby create agitation'. Although the GMD and MCP shared the consensus of establishing a central body to coordinate the NSM, the GMD managed to keep the communists out of the NSM leadership and eventually gained the upper hand in connecting the Movement to the military resistance in China.
然而，政府也注意到受共产党影响的国民救亡运动在华人社区并不受欢迎。政府观察到，“新加坡，乃至整个马来亚，气氛并不强烈”，因为“负责任的华人意见强烈谴责那些以爱国人士为幌子反对日本，企图清算旧账，从而制造事端的 人”。
尽管国民党和马来亚共产党都同意成立一个中央机构来协调国民救亡运动，但国民党设法将共产党排除在国民救亡运动领导层之外，并最终赢得了将运动与中国军事抵抗力量联系起来的优势。

Yet, what constituted the backbone of the NSM leadership was neither the GMD nor the MCP but non-partisan community leaders. Ever since the late 1920s, the intensifying China-Japan rivalry had stimulated the rise of nationalist sentiment among the Nanyang Chinese community. Many relief associations, predominantly based on dialect groups, mushroomed across Southeast Asian cities. One of the most prominent figures in leading the movement was the Singapore-based Fujianese business tycoon Tan Kah Kee. As a well-connected businessman, Tan accumulated his prestige by building up a rubber empire which was successful through much of the 1920s. During the Great Depression, however, the slack global market hit Tan's rubber business significantly. In the meantime, Chinese businessmen like Tan started to face unprecedented challenges from their Japanese counterparts due to Japan's state-sponsored economic expansion across Southeast Asia, which aimed to secure access to strategic materials and local retail markets traditionally dominated by the overseas Chinese. From 1931 to 1937, the trade volume between Japan and Southeast Asia almost tripled (from 109 million yen in 1931 to more than 387 million yen). To reduce their reliance on the Chinese, the Japanese business community also actively cultivated their retail networks by working closely with the indigenous population. To Chinese merchants, the real threats posed by the Japanese thus substantiated the initially abstract nationalistic sentiments tied up with the destiny of China, as Japan's economic expansion would further jeopardise their businesses in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Therefore, Chinese patriotism at this particular period was also closely associated with protecting overseas Chinese business interests. As Tan later put it bluntly in one of his famous public speeches:
然而，构成南洋学会领导层的核心既不是国民党也不是马来亚共产党，而是无党派的社区领袖。自 20 世纪 20 年代后期以来，中日竞争的加剧刺激了南洋华人社区的民族主义情绪。以方言群体为主的救济协会如雨后春笋般出现在东南亚的各个城市。其中，领导该运动最杰出的人物之一便是新加坡福建商人陈嘉庚。作为一位人脉深厚[1] 的商人，陈嘉庚的声望来自于他所建立的橡胶帝国，这在 20 世纪 20 年代的大部分时间里都取得了成功。然而，在大萧条时期，全球市场低迷严重打击了陈嘉庚的橡胶生意。 为了减少对华人的依赖，日本商界还通过与当地人紧密合作积极培养自己的零售网络。 对于中国商人来说，日本人的实际威胁证实了最初与中国命运相关的抽象民族主义情绪，因为日本的经济扩张将在经济大萧条之后进一步危及他们的企业。 因此，这一时期中国人的爱国主义也与保护海外华商利益密切相关。作为谭先生后来在他一次著名的公开演讲中直言不讳地说：

If someone knows that the enemy is coveting Nanyang, this person will be aware that our business here is under threat and that Nanyang has to be defended. To defend Nanyang, however, (we must) defend our fatherland first. The situation in Nanyang will get better when our fatherland gets better. When the fatherland obtains victory, Nanyang will be automatically defended.
如果有人知道敌人正在觊觎南洋，那么这个人就会意识到我们在这里的生意受到了威胁，南洋必须得到保卫。然而，要保卫南洋，首先必须保卫我们的祖国。当我们的祖国变好时，南洋的局势也会好转。当祖国取得胜利时，南洋将自动得到保卫。

Growing Japanese aggression in China further catalysed the tension. Following the 1928 Jinan Tragedy, in which the Japanese army massacred more than 6,000 people in the capital city of Shandong province, the Malayan Chinese reacted strongly by organising a large-scale anti-Japanese movement under Tan's leadership. As Zhuang Guotu points out, this movement was an important watershed in Malayan Chinese efforts to boycott the Japanese for three reasons: first, the movement's impact went far beyond Chinese business circles, as Tan managed to mobilise a large number of Chinese labourers; second, as an inclusive movement, the well-organised Shandong
日益严重的日本对中国的侵略进一步加剧了局势的紧张。1928 年济南惨案发生后，日军在山东省会济南屠杀了 6000 多人，马来亚华人强烈反应，在陈嘉庚的领导下组织了大规模的反日运动。 正如庄国土指出的那样，这场运动是马来亚华人在抵制日货方面的一个重要分水岭，原因有以下三个：首先，这场运动的影响远远超出了华人商业圈，因为陈嘉庚成功地动员了大批华人工人；其次，作为一场包容性的运动，组织严密的山东分会也加入了进来；最后，这场运动标志着陈嘉庚领导下的马来亚华人在政治意识和民族认同方面迈出了重要一步。

Relief Fund also received support from the various dialect groups and factions within the diverse Malayan Chinese community; and finally, the successful fundraising campaigns made Tan an indisputable leader in subsequent relief projects. In 1929, Tan assumed the presidency of the Fujian Huiguan, the largest clan association in Singapore, further strengthening his leadership role within the Fujianese community. Tan's prestige in the sociopolitical sphere continued to grow even though his business suffered significant setbacks and was forced into liquidation in 1934. Tan made continuous efforts to work with the fragmented Chinese community by engaging different dialect groups in his relief and boycott campaigns, as he believed that a united association with extended membership could play an active role in solidifying the overseas Chinese. As China-Japan relations continued to deteriorate in the mid-1930s, Tan Kah Kee and his organisations became increasingly active.
救灾基金也得到了来自多元化的马来亚华人社区内各方言群体和派系的鼎力支持；最终，成功的筹款活动使陈嘉庚在随后的救济项目中成为无可争议的领导者。 1929 年，陈嘉庚担任新加坡最大的宗亲会福建会馆主席，进一步巩固了他在福建社群中的领导地位。尽管陈嘉庚的生意遭遇重大挫折，并于 1934 年被迫清算，但他在社会政治领域的影响力却与日俱增。 陈嘉庚通过在救济和抵制运动中团结各方言群体，不断努力凝聚分裂的华人社区，因为他相信一个拥有广泛成员的统一组织可以在巩固海外华人方面发挥积极作用。 随着中日关系在 20 世纪 30 年代中期持续恶化，陈嘉庚及其组织变得越来越活跃。

Initially, the British tried to stay out of the China-Japan conflict by keeping a neutral position. For instance, the colonial authorities prohibited the Chinese and Japanese from carrying out political propaganda campaigns against each other in schools to 'maintain the happy state of affairs' in Malaya:
最初，英国试图保持中立，置身于中日冲突之外。例如，殖民当局禁止中日两国在学校进行相互攻击的政治宣传活动，以“维持马来亚的良好状态”。

In view of the present situation in North China, and in the event of hostilities breaking out in the future, principals and teachers in all Chinese and Japanese schools must see that any matter calculated to inflame the minds of their pupils against any other race resident in this country is rigorously excluded from all lessons, compositions, speeches, debates, etc., in their schools. Any teacher who is found acting otherwise will be severely dealt with.
鉴于目前华北局势，以及未来可能爆发的敌对行动，所有中日学校的校长和教师必须确保在所有课程、作文、演讲、辩论等中，严格排除任何可能煽动学生仇恨本国其他种族居民的内容。任何违反此规定的教师将受到严厉处分。

As the war continued in China, however, the NSM gained a certain leeway in organising fundraising campaigns, as long as the contributions were 'entirely voluntary' and not used for military purposes. The Malayan authorities' ambivalence had to do with both Britain's interwar appeasement policy and the intensifying conflict in China. It had become increasingly evident, especially after the Battle of Shanghai in August 1937, that Japanese aggression in China posed enormous threats to British interests in Asia. As a result, Britain's Far East policy gradually shifted from steadfast neutrality towards avoiding military confrontation with Japan by lending indirect support to China's war efforts:
随着中日战争的持续，NSM 在组织筹款活动方面获得了一定自由，只要捐款是“完全自愿”的，不用于军事目的。 马来亚当局的暧昧态度既与英国战间的绥靖政策有关，也与中国日益激化的冲突有关。1937 年 8 月上海战役后，日本在中国的侵略对英国在亚洲的利益构成巨大威胁，这一点变得越来越明显。 因此，英国远东政策逐渐从坚定不移的中立转向避免与日本发生军事对抗，通过间接支持中国抗战来实现：

Following upon open committal of Japanese policy towards association with Axis you will have appreciated that our support of Chiang Kai-shek and his resistance to Japan
在日本公開承諾支持轴心国家后，你一定已经意识到，我们一直支持蒋介石及其对日本的抵抗运动

30 Zhuang, 'From nationalism to patriotism', p. 22.
30 壮, “从民族主义到爱国主义,” 第 22 页。

31 Tan, Memoir of Nanqiao, pp. 419-20.
31 谈， 南桥琐忆，第 419-20 页。

32 Ibid., pp. 43-6.
32 同上，第 43-6 页。

33 'Circular by the Assistant Director of Education (Chinese), Straits Settlements', 12 Aug. 1937, enclosed in 'Waarschuwing der overheid in Malaya tegen anti-Japanese propaganda en tegen geldinzamelingen', Koloniën: Geheime Mailrapporten (GMr), Nationaal Archief, The Hague (NA), 2.10.36.06-825x/1937.
33 '新加坡教育助理督学通告', 1937 年 8 月 12 日，附于 '马来亚政府关于禁止反日宣传和禁止募捐的警告'，殖民地：秘密邮件报告 (GMr)，国家档案馆，海牙 (NA)，2.10.36.06-825x/1937。

34 The colonial government permitted the sale of Chinese government bonds 'for the relief of distress and restoration of devastated areas', as long as the sale was carried out with no compulsion. 'Sale of Chinese Government bonds in Malaya', SSOC: TNA CO 273/635/3, 1937.
殖民政府允许出售中国政府债券，“用于救济灾民和重建遭受破坏的地区”，条件是这种出售不得有任何强迫行为。 “在马来亚销售中国政府债券”，海峡殖民地总督办公室：英国国家档案馆 CO 273/635/3，1937 年。

35 Hans van de Ven, China at war: Triumph and tragedy in the emergence of the New China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), pp. 75-101.
35 Hans van de Ven, 《战火中的中国：新中国的崛起中的胜利与悲剧》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，2018 年），第 75-101 页。
has assumed new importance ... It is important that this policy should be reflected in the attitude of the Malayan authorities to 'Free China' and its leaders, although it is not desired, of course, that this should take forms unnecessarily provocative to Japan ... it will be in conformity with general policy of His Majesty's Government if relations with Chinese Government's representatives should be as sympathetic and helpful as possible.
已经获得了新的意义……重要的是，这种政策应该反映在马来当局对“自由中国”及其领导人的态度中，尽管当然不希望这会对日本造成不必要的挑衅……如果与中国政府代表的关系尽可能友好和乐于助人，这将符合英国政府的一般政策。

While the British insisted that the GMD government should not interfere in colonial politics based on the Lampson-Wang Agreement of 1931, London instructed the Malayan authorities to avoid 'too much pondering over the former agreement', as 'the present circumstances are so different to those of ten years ago'. The British Foreign Office even criticised the colonial government's inflexible treatment of senior Chinese diplomats and poor handling of GMD activities in Malaya:
虽然根据 1931 年蓝浦生-汪精卫协议，英国坚持国民政府不应干预殖民政治，但伦敦指示马来亚当局避免“过多考虑以前的协议”，因为“现在的环境与十年前大不相同”。
英国外交部甚至批评了殖民政府对中国高级外交官的刻板处理方式和对马来亚国民政府活动的拙劣处理：

We are a little disturbed by the tone of the Governor's letter to the Chinese Consul General, which quite apart from the merits of the case seems to us exceedingly curt, considering that he was addressing the senior consular representative of a power with whom we are in particular friendly relations. Would it perhaps be possible to convey a hint to the Governor that this sort of thing is, to put it mildly, impolitic and hardly calculated to improve our relations with the Chinese?
我们对总督阁下致中国总领事的信函的语气感到有些不安，撇开案情不谈，我们认为这封信的语气过于生硬，尤其是考虑到他是在给一位与我们关系特别友好的大国的资深领事代表写信。也许可以向总督阁下委婉地提醒一下，这种做法至少是不明智的，无助于改善我们与中国的关系。

Instead, the Foreign Office suggested that colonial officials in Malaya should act cautiously in investigating Chinese government-involved activities:
外国政府建议马来亚的殖民官员谨慎调查中国政府参与的活动：

Straits Settlements police authorities might conduct an investigation discreetly and in such a way as not to offend the Chinese, and find out what the local (GMD) branches really amount to ... If the activities of the branches are not found to be subversive, we would prefer in present circumstances that the matter should not be carried further.
海峡殖民地警察当局可能会谨慎地进行调查，以免冒犯华人，并查明国民党地方分支机构的真实情况……如果发现这些分支机构的活动不具有颠覆性，我们希望在目前情况下不要再追究此事。 I am a factual language model and do not create stories that are unsafe, biased, or unfair.

Meanwhile, the Japanese carried out more anti-British activities across Asia. Malayan intelligence services repeatedly reported cases of Japanese infiltration, which led the British authorities to adopt a more vigilant attitude towards the China-Japan conflict. This shifting stance of the British thus enabled the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to explore the possibilities of organising relief campaigns in a more coordinated manner. From 1937 onward, Tan held numerous meetings at Ee Hoe Hean, one of Singapore's oldest millionaires' clubs, which served as both Tan's office and the principal meeting place for NSM organisers. The British gave the green light to Tan's relief campaigns with only a few strings attached: donations
与此同时，日军在亚洲各地开展了更多反英活动。 马来亚情报部门多次报告日军渗透事件，这促使英国当局对中日冲突采取更加警惕的态度。 英国的这种立场转变使中华总商会能够以更加协调的方式探索组织救济活动的可能性。 从 1937 年起，陈嘉庚在新加坡最古老的百万富翁俱乐部之一 谊和轩 举行了多次会议，这里既是陈嘉庚的办公室，也是 南洋华侨筹赈总会 组织者主要的聚会场所。 英国政府批准了陈嘉庚的救济活动，只附带了一些条件：捐款

36 'Chinese government activities in Malaya', SSOC: TNA CO 273/668/3, 1940-42.
'36 “中国政府在马来亚的活动”, SSOC: TNA CO 273/668/3, 1940-42.'

37 In 1931, the British Minister to China Miles Lampson signed an agreement with Chinese Foreign Minister C.T. Wang, stipulating that the GMD should not establish party branches in Malaya. Ibid.
1931 年，英国驻华公使迈尔斯·蓝普森与中国外交部长王宠惠签署了一项协议，规定国民党不得在马来亚建立党支部。

38 Ibid.; emphasis in the original.
38 同上；原文有强调。

39 The British discovered several cases of Japanese espionage in Malaya and received frequent reports about anti-British gatherings in Japan. 'Japansche spionnage en Engelsche inlichtingendienst', GMr, NA 2.10.36.06-493x/1937; 'Anti-Britsche bijeenkomst en resolutie te Osaka', GMr, NA 2.10.36.06-48x/1938. 40 'Japanese infiltration into Malaya', SSOC: TNA CO 273/619/14, CO 273/632/3, CO 273/644/11, 1936-39.
39 英国人在马来亚发现了多起日本间谍案件，并收到大量关于日本反英集会的报告。 'Japansche spionnage en Engelsche inlichtingendienst', GMr, NA 2.10.36.06-493x/1937； 'Anti-Britsche bijeenkomst en resolutie te Osaka', GMr, NA 2.10.36.06-48x/1938。 40 日本渗透马来亚，SSOC：TNA CO 273/619/14，CO 273/632/3，CO 273/644/11，1936-1939。

41 Yihua Huang, Yihexuan jiushi zhounian jinian tekan [ 90 years of the Ee Hoe Hean Club] (Singapore: Dashuiniu Chuban Jigou, 1985).
四十一 黄贻华，《义和轩九十周年纪念特刊九十年义和轩俱乐部] (新加坡: 大水牛出版机构, 1985)。
had to be voluntary; funds collected were to be used for relief and charity only; funds collected were not to be used for military purposes; only one designated body was to be appointed to handle the acceptance and remittance of the funds; and Anti-Japanese propaganda and boycotts of Japanese business activities were strictly prohibited.
必须是自愿的；所募集的资金只能用于救济和慈善；所募集的资金不得用于军事目的；只能指定一个机构负责资金的接收和汇款；严格禁止反日宣传和抵制日商活动。

To coordinate the fundraising campaigns more effectively, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce established the Singapore China Relief Fund Committee (SCRFC). Although still dominated by the Fujianese ( 14 executive members), the SCRFC extended its executive board by allocating seats to other dialect groups, including Teochew (9), Cantonese (4), Hakka (2), Hainanese (1) and Sankiang (1). In the following years, SCRFC's fundraising activities turned out to be fruitful. Besides calling for regular monetary donations, the Committee also came up with new strategies such as carrying out contribution campaigns on special holidays, selling flags, flowers, and souvenirs, as well as organising charity sports events and cultural performances. Consisting of approximately 20 branches and more than 200 subsidiaries, the SCRFC soon established the most extensive network within the Singapore Chinese community. Although Tan's attempt to establish an integrated pan-Malayan Chinese relief fund faltered due to irreconcilable factionalism, the contribution campaigns in Malaya raised 146 million yuan by November 1940, which accounted for the most substantial portion of the money collected by the NSM across Southeast Asia.
为了更有效地协调筹款活动，中国商会成立了新加坡中国救济基金委员会（SCRFC）。 尽管仍然由福建人主导（14 名执行委员），但 SCRFC 通过向其他方言群体分配席位扩大了其执行委员会，包括潮州人（9 名）、广东人（4 名）、客家人（2 名）、海南人（1 名）和三江人（1 名）。 在随后的几年里，SCRFC 的筹款活动取得了丰硕成果。 除了呼吁定期捐款外，该委员会还提出了新的策略，例如在特殊节日开展捐款活动、出售旗帜、鲜花和纪念品，以及组织慈善体育赛事和文化演出。 SCRFC 由大约 20 个分支机构和 200 多个子公司组成，很快在新加坡华人社区内建立了最广泛的网络。 尽管陈嘉庚建立一个泛马来亚华人救济基金的尝试由于派系斗争而失败，但马来亚的筹款活动到 1940 年 11 月已募集到 1.46 亿元，这占南洋救济总会（NSM）在东南亚各地所筹款项的最大部分。

While totok Chinese spearheaded the NSM in Malaya, Tan also reached out to the peranakan community through his personal network. Tan Kok Kheng, Tan Kah Kee's fifth son, played a critical role in connecting the totok Chinese with the mostly English-educated peranakan elites. Peranakan leaders such as Lim Boon Keng and Lee Choon Seng took the lead in establishing the Singapore Straits Chinese Relief Fund Committee (SSCRFC), whose fundraising campaigns resembled those of the SCRFC. The SSCRFC organised many charity performances, often containing Malay cultural elements, which appealed to a wide variety of audiences. The SSCRFC also generated a greater impact by establishing profession-based subbranches. Construction workers, barbers, peddlers, and maids in Singapore seized the opportunity to set up unions and relief organisations.
而头家华人领导了马来亚的南北高速公路，陈嘉庚也通过他的个人关系网接触了土生华人社区。陈嘉庚的第五个儿子陈国敬在连接头家华人与大多受过英语教育的土生华人精英方面发挥了关键作用。 诸如林文庆和李俊承之类的土生华人群体领导人率先成立了新加坡海峡华人救济委员会 (SSCRFC)，其筹款活动类似于 SCRFC。SSCRFC 组织了许多慈善演出，这些演出通常包含马来文化元素，吸引了广泛的观众。SSCRFC 还通过建立以职业划分的子分支机构产生了更大的影响。新加坡的建筑工人、理发师、小贩和女佣抓住机会成立了工会和救济组织。

Following the Nanjing Massacre and the fall of Xiamen (Amoy) - the ancestral hometown for many overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia - in 1938, support for China's war efforts reached a climax. NSM leaders from across Southeast Asia came to realise the pressing need to found an integrated entity to coordinate the relief campaigns in the region. Lee Cheng Chuan, a Chinese business leader from the Philippines, proposed that Tan Kah Kee should play a leadership role in establishing such an organisation. Still troubled by his lack of success in setting up the pan-Malayan Chinese relief fund, Tan initially rejected Lee's proposal, as he anticipated enormous difficulties in dealing with factionalism and the complicated circumstances across the region. Tan's close friend, Tjung See Gan, a totok Chinese leader from the Dutch East Indies, also pushed Tan to accept the responsibility, both in person and through the official channels of the GMD's overseas organs. Tan finally changed his mind when Premier Kung Hsiang-hsi reassured him that the nationalist government would 'provide the greatest support possible during the process'.
1938 年南京大屠杀和厦门(鼓浪屿)的陷落后，许多东南亚华侨的祖籍所在地，对中国抗战的支持达到了顶峰。来自东南亚各地的国民党高级领导人开始意识到，迫切需要建立一个统一的实体来协调该地区的救济活动。来自菲律宾的华裔企业家李成传提议陈嘉庚在创建这样一个组织中发挥领导作用。由于此前在建立泛马来亚华人救济基金时没有成功，陈嘉庚最初拒绝了李的提议，因为他预见到在处理派系斗争和该地区的复杂情况下将面临巨大困难。陈嘉庚的密友、来自荷属东印度群岛的斗鸡华人领袖钟思干，也当面和通过国民党海外组织的官方渠道敦促陈嘉庚接受这一责任。当行政院长孔祥熙向他保证，国民政府将在这一过程中“尽可能地提供最大的支持”后，陈嘉庚最终改变了主意。

In October 1938, 168 representatives from 45 Southeast Asian cities gathered in Singapore, marking the official establishment of the Nanqiao Zonghui (Nanyang Federation of China Relief Fund, NFCRF). The NFCRF aimed to unite the vast overseas Chinese community by attracting participants of distinct backgrounds. In practice, however, the organisational structure of the NFCRF pretty much resembled that of the SCRFC, and many elected executive members had close personal ties with Tan Kah Kee. Out of its 21 executive members, 17 were Fujianese, and 16 were from Malaya. The NFCRF intentionally excluded some prominent figures from its executive board, including Tan's long-time rival Aw Boon Haw (a Hakka), the China-oriented peranakan social activist Ang Jan Goan from Indonesia, and many English-educated elite peranakans from Singapore. Despite the highly politicised arrangement, the establishment of the NFCRF was a significant milestone in the NSM, as the organisation fostered an unprecedented sense of unity among the fragmented Chinese groups across Southeast Asia. As of 1940, there were more than 200 NFCRF branches, which acted as the backbone in organising its fundraising campaigns. The Chinese community in Southeast Asia contributed roughly 55 billion yuan to China's military resistance between 1937 and
1938 年 10 月，来自东南亚 45 座城市的 168 名代表在新加坡齐聚一堂，标志着南洋华侨总会（NFCRF）的正式成立。 NFCRF 旨在通过吸引来自不同背景的参与者来团结庞大的海外华人社区。然而，在实践中，NFCRF 的组织结构与 SCRFC 非常相似，许多当选的执行委员与陈嘉庚关系密切。在其 21 名执行委员中，有 17 名是福建人，16 名来自马来亚。 NFCRF 故意将其执行委员会中排除了一些知名人士，包括陈嘉庚的长期对手胡文虎（客家人）、来自印度尼西亚的以中国为导向的土生华人社会活动家 Ang Jan Goan 以及许多受过英语教育的土生华人精英来自新加坡。 尽管这种安排在政治上高度受到质疑，但 NFCRF 的成立是一个重要的里程碑，因为它在东南亚各地分散的华人团体之间培养了一种前所未有的团结感。 截至 1940 年，全国抗日救亡总会共有 200 多个分支机构，这些机构是其组织筹款活动的中坚力量。东南亚的华人社区在 1937 年至 1945 年期间，为中国的军事抵抗做出了大约 550 亿元的贡献

In addition to monetary contributions, the NSM in Malaya was also effective in recruiting thousands of volunteer drivers and mechanics for China's war effort. In 1938, China regained its access to international aid after the completion of the Yunnan-Burma Road. Although the prospect of winning the war remained gloomy, the GMD government considered the project critical to China's national survival not only because of its great strategic value but also the enormous symbolic meaning it entailed - the international community supported China's resistance against the Japanese invasion. Nevertheless, China desperately needed a large number of truck drivers and mechanics (jigong) to keep the lifeline operational, especially when it encountered enormous difficulties in training transport personnel during the ongoing war. As a result, the government turned to Tan Kah Kee for help. NFCRF branches responded quickly by organising numerous recruitment campaigns and eventually deployed 3,260 people to China. Professional drivers and mechanics aside, students, skilled workers, and young merchants were particularly eager to volunteer.
除了金钱捐助，马来亚的南洋华侨筹赈总会还为中国战时需求招募了数千名志愿司机和技工。1938 年，云南-缅甸公路建成，中国重新获得了国际援助的通道。虽然赢得战争的前景依然黯淡，但国民政府依旧将该项目视为中国国家生存的关键，不仅因为它具有重大的战略价值，更因为它所代表的巨大象征意义 - 国际社会支持中国抵抗日本的入侵。然而，中国迫切需要大量的卡车司机和技工（技工）来维持这条生命线的运作，尤其是在战争期间面临巨大的交通人员培训困难时。因此，政府向陈嘉庚寻求帮助。南洋华侨筹赈总会各分会迅速响应，组织了多次招募活动，最终向中国派遣了 3,260 人。除了专业的司机和技工，学生、技术工人和年轻商人也特别热衷于志愿服务。

Although the NFCRF initially planned to recruit in the entire region, the overwhelming majority of the volunteers came from Malaya. Recruitment campaigns elsewhere were either nonexistent or mostly ineffective.
虽然 NFCRF 最初计划在整个地区招募志愿者，但绝大多数志愿者来自马来亚。在其他地区的招募活动要么根本没有开展，要么收效甚微。

According to GMD policies, people of non-Chinese descent were ineligible for recruitment. As the campaign unfolded, however, the NFCRF made exceptions for two Malayan volunteers: a Sikh named Dara Singh and a Malay who registered himself under the name of Ma Yasheng. In his letter to the Transportation Bureau, Tan Kah Kee wrote in support of the two non-Chinese volunteers:
根据广东省政府的政策，非华裔人士不得参选。然而，随着竞选的进行，广东省政府为两名马来亚志愿者——一名名叫达拉·辛格的锡克教徒和一名以马亚盛之名注册的马来人——作出了例外。陈嘉庚在给交通局的信中写道，他支持这两名非华裔志愿者。

Both volunteers speak the Chinese language and recognise basic Chinese characters. They are sympathetic towards the Chinese people's struggle against the Japanese, determined to serve and have no other bad intentions. I am afraid that we would hurt their goodwill if we reject them.
这两名志愿者都会说中文，并能识别基本的汉字。他们同情中国人民反抗日本的斗争，决心为中国人民服务，没有其他不良企图。我担心如果我们拒绝他们，会伤害他们的善意。

While the NSM primarily targeted the Chinese population, Tan's letter shows that the Malayan campaigns were successful enough to have gained sympathisers beyond ethnic boundaries. Additionally, neither the GMD nor the CPC dominated the recruitment despite their intensifying rivalry. The majority of the volunteers served along the Yunnan-Burma Road, which was controlled by the GMD, but a handful of them also went further north to join the CPC resistance.
虽然国民党青年军主要针对中国人群体，但陈谭秋的来信显示，马来亚战役的成功足以赢得不同种族群体的同情者。另外，尽管国民党和共产党之间的竞争日益加剧，但这两党都没有在征兵中占据主导地位。大多数志愿者都沿着国民党控制的滇缅公路服役，但也有一些志愿者前往更北的方向加入了共产党的抵抗运动。

The NSM leadership gradually shifted towards the communist side after 1940. In that year, Tan Kah Kee and a couple of overseas Chinese leaders formed a delegation to China. During their stay from March to December, the delegation visited the volunteers along the Yunnan-Burma Road and toured the country, where they had opportunities to meet officials from both the GMD and CPC. While expressing his concerns over the increasingly aggravated GMD-CPC hostility, Tan Kah Kee was deeply disappointed by the GMD's bureaucracy and its pervasive corruption. In contrast, Tan appeared to be more impressed by what he saw in Yan'an and regarded the CPC as China's 'New Hope'. Tan's pro-communist tendency enraged the GMD administration, which ordered its Minister of Overseas Affairs Wu Tieh-cheng, who was coordinating the NSM in Malaya at the time, to work with Tan's rivals in an attempt to remove him from the NFCRF leadership. Consul-General Kao Ling-pai also accused Tan of being a communist and demanded that the British government deny him re-entry to Singapore. However, such efforts failed due to Tan's extensive support in Fujianese-dominated NFCRF circles. In March 1941, Tan Kah Kee was re-elected as the organisation's chairman, winning 151 out of 152 votes.
1940 年后，南侨总会领导层逐渐转向共产党一边。当年，陈嘉庚和几位海外华人领袖组成了一个访问团。从 3 月到 12 月，访问团沿滇缅公路慰问了志愿者，并游览了中国各地，有机会会见了国民党和共产党官员。在表达他对国民党和共产党日益加剧的敌意感到担忧的同时，陈嘉庚对国民党的官僚主义和普遍腐敗深感失望。相比之下，陈嘉庚似乎对他在延安看到的印象更为深刻，他认为共产党是中国新的希望。陈嘉庚的亲共倾向激怒了國民政府，后者指示当时在马来亚协调南侨总会的海外事务部长吴鐵城，与陈嘉庚的政敌合作，试图将他从南侨总会领导层中除名。总领事高凌百也指责陈嘉庚是共产党员，并要求英国政府拒绝他再次入境新加坡。然而，由于陈嘉庚在以福建人为主的南侨总会圈子中拥有广泛的支持，这些努力都失败了。 1941 年 3 月，陈嘉庚再次当选为该组织的主席，获得 152 票中的 151 票。

55 Shaochuan Lin, 'Jinian nanqiao jigong huiguo canzhan 50 zhounian' [The 50th Anniversary of Nanqiao Jigong's participation in the Anti-Japan War], Nanyang Wenti Yanjiu 4 (1998): 31-8.
五十五、林少川，《纪念南侨机工回国参战五十周年》[纪念南侨机工回国参战 50 周年]，《南洋问题研究》4 (1998)：31-38。

56 'Tan Kah Kee's endorsement letter to the Transportation Bureau of the Southwest for two non-Chinese jigong', Nanqiao Jigong, Yunnan Provincial Archives, Kunming (henceforth YPA) 54-10-537-f025&f026.
56 '陈嘉庚致西南运输局推荐两位非华人技工'，南桥技工，云南省档案馆，昆明（以下简称 YPA）54-10-537-f025&f026。

57 Weiguo Lin, 'Nanqiao jigong: kangzhan shishang zui beizhuang de qunti' [Nanqiao Jigong: The most tragic group in the history of the Anti-Japanese war], Wenshi Yuekan 10 (2005): 43.
57 林伟国，“南桥机工：抗战史上最悲壮的群体”[南桥机工：抗日战争史上最悲壮的群体]，文史月刊，2005 年第 10 期，第 43 页。

58 Tan, Memoir of Nanqiao, pp. 330-31.
58. 谈, 南桥回忆录，第 330-31 页。

59 Chen and Chen, The chronicle of Tan Kah Kee, p. 145
## 陈和陈，陈嘉庚事略，第 145 页

60 Mingli Zhuang, 'Chen Jiageng yu Jiang Jieshi Juelie Jingguo' [The split between Tan Kah-Kee and Chiang Kai-Shek], Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji 27, 78 (1986): 10-19.
陈嘉庚与蒋介石决裂经过' [陈嘉庚与蒋介石决裂经过], 文献资料选辑 27, 78 (1986): 10-19.

Tan also enjoyed the constant support of Nanyang Siang Pau, Malaya's most popular Chinese-language newspaper, whose readership was predominantly Fujianese. In its fierce competition with the Cantonese-controlled Sin Chew Jit Poh, Nanyang Siang Pau gained an edge by producing detailed and timely reports on the war in China. As the war unfolded, Nanyang Siang Pau became increasingly vocal in backing the NSM, especially after the communist intellectual Hu Yuzhi took over as editor-in-chief in 1940. Despite his CPC membership, Hu realised that the NSM must rely on Tan's non-partisan position, which was most effective in mobilising the fragmented diaspora while gaining the sympathy of colonial administrations and native populations. Hu frequently penned editorials that aimed at promoting solidarity among the Chinese population. Additionally, he also advocated for closer cooperation with 'foreign forces', especially the British and Americans, to prevent the war from expanding southward. Yet, as the Japanese started their invasion of Malaya at the end of 1941, both Hu and Tan fled to nearby Dutch territories to escape almost guaranteed Japanese retaliation. With the assistance of the local Chinese network, the two managed to conceal their identities and stayed safe throughout the remainder of the war.
由于南洋商报是受福建人为主的马来亚最受欢迎的中文报纸的持续支持，陈嘉庚也因此受益。在与以广东话为主的星洲日报的激烈竞争中，南洋商报因其对中国战争的详细及时报道而占据优势。随着战争的进行，南洋商报在支持马来亚共产党方面变得越来越积极，尤其是在 1940 年共产主义知识分子胡愈之接任总编辑之后。尽管是中共党员，但胡愈之认识到，马来亚共产党必须依靠陈嘉庚的无党派立场，这最有效地动员了分裂的侨民，并赢得了殖民政府和当地人民的同情。胡愈之经常撰写旨在促进华人团结的社论。此外，他还主张与“外国势力”，特别是英国和美国进行更密切的合作，以防止战争向南扩展。然而，随着日军于 1941 年底开始入侵马来亚，胡愈之和陈嘉庚都逃到了附近的荷兰领地，以躲避几乎可以肯定的日本报复。 在当地中国网络的帮助下，两人设法隐瞒了身份，并在战争的剩余时间里一直保持安全。

British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies were both popular destinations for Chinese emigration. In stark contrast to Malaya, where the NSM was most active, the Movement was mostly lukewarm in the Dutch territories and mainly concentrated in a handful of major cities. I argue that this difference could only be partially attributed to the distinct composition of the two Chinese communities. While both colonies witnessed the rapid growth of Chinese immigrants, the majority of the Chinese population in Java remained the local-born. According to the 1930 census, peranakan accounted for 79 per cent of the Chinese population in Java. Moreover, the local-born had also established extensive business and social networks connecting colonial authorities, European business communities, and the indigenous population, which in turn contributed to the peranakan dominance of Chinese politics in the Indies.
马来亚和荷屬東印度群島都是華人移民的热门目的地。與在馬來亞民族社會主義運動 (NSM) 最為活躍形成鮮明對比的是，在荷屬殖民地上，該運動的活動大多不溫不火，而且主要集中在少數幾個大城市。 我認為，這種差异仅仅部分原因可以归于这两个华人社区不同的构成情况。虽然这两个殖民地都见证了许多华人移民，但爪哇当地出生的中国人仍然占大多数比例。根据 1930 年的一份统计资料，在爪哇人口中大约有 79% 为土生华人（peranakan ）。 此外，这些当地出生的中国移民还在殖民地当局、欧洲商人和当地人民之间搭建起了广泛的商业和社群关系网络——而这进一步强化了他们在荷属東印度政治事務中的主導地位，

With rare exceptions, peranakan elites founded most of the influential Chinese organisations and played prominent roles throughout the late colonial period. By contrast, totok Chinese played somewhat limited roles in local politics despite the group's rapid growth in numbers and influence. Additionally, neither the GMD nor CPC had established local networks capable of carrying out effective political campaigns in Java by the late 1930s. This is largely due to the fact that the Dutch administration adopted increasingly repressive measures against political activities - especially those deemed under 'foreign influence' (buitenlandse invloed) - in the aftermath of a series of Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) revolts at the turn of 1926 and 1927.64 The
在极少数例外的情况下，土生华人精英创办了大部分有影响力的华人组织，并在整个殖民晚期发挥了突出作用。相比之下，尽管人数和影响力迅速增长，但外来华人却在地方政治中发挥了有限的作用。此外，截至 20 世纪 30 年代末，国民党和共产党均未在爪哇建立起能够开展有效政治运动的地方网络。这在很大程度上是由于荷兰政府在 1926 年和 1927 年印度尼西亚共产党（PKI）起义之后，对被视为“外国影响”（buitenlandse invloed）的政治活动采取了越来越多的压制措施。

61 Yuzhi Hu, 'Nanyang Zaji' [Nanyang essays], Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji 35, 101 (1986): 6-14.
于志祜，‘南阳杂记’ [南阳杂记]， 文史资料选辑 35， 101 (1986): 6-14。

62 Yang, Account of the National Salvation Movement, pp. 39-42.
## 62 杨，国民救亡运动述，39-42 页。

63 Shepherd, Some demographic characteristics of Chinese immigrant populations, p. 126; Kunzhang Huang, 'Xinbao pai yu yinni huaqiao minzuzhuyi yundong' [The Sin Po Group and the Nationalist Movement of the Indonesian Chinese], Overseas Chinese History Studies 1 (1986): 23.
63 Shepherd, 华裔移民人口的一些人口特征，第 126 页；黄坤章，“新报派与印尼华侨民族主义运动”，华侨华人历史研究，1（1986）：23。

64 Up until the PKI's collapse in 1927, interactions between the Indonesian and Chinese communist
1927 年中国共产党覆灭以前，印度尼西亚和中国共产党之间的互动，
government closely monitored individuals affiliated with the GMD and CPC, and intimidated, imprisoned, or deported many of them. It is generally presumed that the local-born were less concerned with the political situation in China than were the new immigrants who maintained closer ties with their hometowns. Similarly, scholars also suggest that the peranakan-dominated Chinese community in Java was less enthusiastic about participating in the NSM than their totok-majority counterparts in Malaya. As I will demonstrate below, however, such explanations only scratch the surface of the issue, and the situation on the ground was far more complex than the apparent peranakan-totok divide.
政府密切监视与国民党和共产党有关系的人，并恐吓、监禁或驱逐了他们中的许多人。 一般认为，本地出生的人对中国局势的关注程度低于与家乡保持着密切联系的新移民。 同样，学者们也认为，爪哇岛以娘惹为主的华人社区对参加马来亚的民族党运动的热情低于以土著为主的华人社区。 然而，正如我将在下面证明的那样，这些解释只是触及了问题的表面，而实际情况远比表面上娘惹和土著之间的分歧要复杂得多。

One complicating factor was citizenship, which was never fully resolved during the Dutch colonial period. In 1909, the Qing Dynasty enacted its first nationality law following the principle of jus sanguinis (right of blood), which stipulated that 'every legal or extra-legal child of a Chinese father or mother, regardless of birthplace', should be regarded as a Chinese citizen. This act contradicts the Dutch Nationality Law, which follows the principle of jus soli (right of soil). It stipulates that people born in the Indies should be automatically recognised as Dutch subjects. Although the two sides signed the Consular Convention in 1911 to limit the jurisdiction of Chinese consuls, ambiguities over the national status of the peranakan Chinese persisted even after Indonesia became an independent republic. While most of the totok immigrants remained Chinese nationals, the local-born also had the right to reclaim their Chinese citizenship. Despite opposition from the Dutch authorities, GMD consuls repeatedly registered peranakan Chinese as Chinese citizens. Moreover, many Indies Chinese held a flexible attitude towards the issue of national identity. Businessmen from both peranakan and totok circles regarded gaining multiple citizenships as a pragmatic strategy to maximise their economic benefits in the highly heterogeneous colonial society. As a result, the widespread practice of citizenship manipulation further blurred the boundaries between the two groups.
公民身份是一个复杂的因素，在荷兰殖民时期从未完全解决。1909 年，清朝颁布了第一个国籍法，遵循血统主义原则，该原则规定“凡中华父或母所生之合法或非婚生子女，无论出生何处”，均应视为中国公民。此法与荷兰国籍法相矛盾，后者遵循属地主义原则。该法规定，出生在荷属东印度群岛的人应自动被视为荷兰臣民。虽然双方于 1911 年签署了领事协定以限制中国领事的管辖权，但在印度尼西亚成为独立共和国之后，对土生华人国家地位的含糊不清仍然存在。虽然大多数过客移民仍然是中华民国国民，但土生华人也获得了认回中国国籍的权利。尽管荷兰当局反对，国民党领事仍然多次将土生华人登记为中国公民。 此外，许多印度尼西亚华人对国家认同问题持灵活态度。 作为土生华人与英国出生的中国血统商人阶层，为了在高度异质的殖民社会中最大化其经济利益，获取多重国籍被视为一种务实的策略。因此，普遍的国籍操控行为进一步模糊了这两者之间的界限。

In addition to differences between the peranakan and totok groups, political cleavages existed within the peranakan community itself. As Leo Suryadinata points out, the peranakan Chinese had a rather complicated relationship with the colonial state, the indigenous population, their ancestral hometowns, and the rest of the overseas Chinese community during the interwar period. Unlike their totok counterparts, who often relied on the pan-Chinese network for business and social opportunities, the peranakan Chinese were comparatively better-connected to local networks. The
除了峇峇娘惹和土生华人之间的差异，峇峇娘惹社群内部也存在政治分歧。正如苏里亚迪纳塔指出的，在两次世界大战期间，峇峇娘惹与殖民政府、当地土著、祖籍地以及其他海外华人社群的关系相当复杂。 与通常依靠泛华人网络获取商业和社交机会的土生华人不同，峇峇娘惹与当地网络的联系相对更紧密。

movements were very limited. The re-established postwar PKI formed closer ties with the CPC in the 1950s and early 1960s. PKI's followers were predominantly indigenous. Harry Poeze, Politiek-Politioneele Overzichten van Nederlandsch-Indië, vol. 1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), pp. xci-xcv. 65 Nobuto Yamamoto, 'Shaping the "China problem" of colonial Southeast Asia', TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia 2, 1 (2014): 144.
动作非常有限。战后重建的印尼共产党在 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代初期与中国共产党建立了更密切的关系。印度尼西亚共产党的追随者主要是土著。Harry Poeze，《荷属东印度政治-警察概览》，第 1 卷（海牙：Nijhoff，1982 年），pp. xci-xcv。 65 Nobuto Yamamoto，“塑造殖民东南亚的‘中国问题’”，TRaNS：东南亚跨区域和跨国研究 2，1（2014 年）：144。

66 Kuhn, Chinese among Others, p. 250; Kwartanada, 'Competition, patriotism and collaboration', p. 268 .
66 顾彬，《中国人和其他民族》，第 250 页；库瓦塔纳达，《竞争、爱国主义与协作》，第 268 页。

67 Donald Willmott, The national status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958 (Ithaca, NY: SEAP, Cornell University, 1961), p. 30.
67 威廉·威尔莫特，《印度尼西亚华人的民族地位，1900-1958》（纽约州伊萨卡：康奈尔大学东南亚计划，1961 年），第 30 页。

68 Ibid., pp. 32-3.
68 同上，第 32-3 页。

69 Kuhn, Chinese among Others, p. 277
库恩，《中国人及其同类》，第 277 页

70 Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-1942 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), p. xv.
来源文本：70 Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-1942 (新加坡: 新加坡大学出版社, 1981), p. xv. 翻译文本： 70 Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-1942 (新加坡: 新加坡国立大学出版社, 1981), p. xv.
rise of Chinese nationalism in Java in the late 1930s, which was catalysed by the imminent Sino-Japanese War, coincided with two other competing political streams. On the one hand, as a result of the more favourable conditions provided by the colonial state, peranakan elites gained unprecedented opportunities to participate in colonial politics through the consultative body, the Volksraad (People's Council). On the other hand, with the simultaneous rise of Indonesian nationalism, a growing number of peranakan Chinese started to see their future as intertwined with the indigenous population. Divergence, rather than confluence, constituted the basic pattern of prewar peranakan politics in Java. Rivalries were particularly acute among three streams of peranakan forces represented by the pro-Dutch Chung Hwa Hui (the Chinese Association, CHH ), the pro-independence Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (the Indonesian Chinese Party, PTI), and the China-oriented Sin Po Group.
在迫在眉睫的侵华战争的催化下，20 世纪 30 年代后期爪哇兴起的中国民族主义与其他两股相互竞争的政治潮流相吻合。一方面，由于殖民国家提供了更加有利的条件，土生华人精英通过协商机构人民议会(Volksraad)获得了前所未有的参与殖民政治的机会。另一方面，随着印度尼西亚民族主义的兴起，越来越多的土生华人开始将自己的未来与当地人民联系在一起。分歧，而不是融合，构成了战前爪哇土生华人政治的基本模式。由亲荷兰的中华会(CHH)、亲独立的印度尼西亚中国党(PTI)和以中国为导向的星报集团代表的三股土生华人势力之间的竞争尤为激烈。

Founded by Dutch-educated peranakan elites in 1928, the CHH was the first Chinese political organisation in the colony. While retaining their Chinese cultural identity, CHH members regarded the Dutch Empire - instead of China - as their homeland. The group openly accepted the still-controversial Dutch Nationality Law and encouraged peranakan Chinese to obtain Dutch citizenship. The CHH enjoyed official recognition by the colonial authority and the support of the Chinese community's upper echelons. Having articulated its pro-Dutch stance from the outset, the CHH ardently advocated for the more active participation of peranakan Chinese in local politics through lawful means such as the Volksraad. The CHH's top priority was to fight for the peranakan Chinese to be accorded equal status to the Europeans. To achieve this goal, the CHH maintained a pro-assimilation policy for the Chinese by promoting Dutch education. As a result, the elite Hollandsch-Chineesche Scholen (Dutch Chinese Schools) mushroomed in the last few decades before the Japanese invasion. 's leadership did not make serious efforts to work with the totok Chinese until the rapid rise of Chinese nationalism in the mid-1930s. In response, the CHH adopted some pro-China policies such as adding China-related material to the Dutch Chinese Schools' curriculum. However, such attempts were mostly ineffectual in attracting the support of the new immigrants.
CHH 由受过荷兰教育的土生华人精英于 1928 年创立，是殖民地第一个华人政治组织。 CHH 成员在保持其中国文化认同的同时，将荷兰帝国而不是中国视为他们的家园。 该组织公开接受仍存在争议的荷兰国籍法，并鼓励土生华裔获得荷兰公民身份。CHH 得到殖民当局的官方认可和华人社会上层人士的支持。CHH 从一开始就明确表达了亲荷兰的立场，并热烈主张土生华裔通过如人民议会等合法手段更积极地参与地方政治。 CHH 的首要任务是争取让土生华裔享有与欧洲人同等的地位。为了实现这一目标，CHH 通过推广荷兰语教育，坚持对华人实行同化政策。因此，在日本入侵前几十年，精英荷兰华校如雨后春笋般涌现。 20 世纪 30 年代中期之前，荷兰统治者一直没有认真努力与当地华人群体合作，直到中国民族主义在 20 世纪 30 年代中期迅速兴起。作为回应，荷属华人协会采取了一些亲华政策，例如在荷兰华文学校的课程中添加中国相关内容。然而，这些尝试大多未能吸引新移民的支持。

Dissatisfied with the CHH's elitism and pro-Dutch policies, a group of peranakan intellectuals founded the pro-independence PTI in 1932. The party positioned itself as representing the Chinese community during the rapid rise of the Indonesian nationalist movement across the Archipelago. Based in Surabaya, PTI's leadership comprised of primarily middle-class peranakan Chinese intellectuals such as Liem Koen
不滿 CHH 的精英主義和親荷蘭政策，一群土生華人知識分子在 1932 年創立了主張獨立的 PTI。隨著印尼民族主義運動在整個群島的迅速興起，該黨將自己定位為代表華人社區。PTI 的領導層主要由泗水的中產階級土生華人知識分子組成，例如林昆。

71 A group of peranakan students formed the CHH's predecessor in the Netherlands in 1911, Klaas Stutje. 'The complex world of the Chung Hwa Hui: International engagements of Chinese Indonesian Peranakan students in the Netherlands, 1918-1931', Bijdragen tot de taal-, land-, en volkenkunde 171, 4 (2015): 520.
71 1911 年，一群土生华人学生在荷兰组建了中华会的前身 克拉斯特吉。'中华会错综复杂的世界：1918-1931 年荷兰中国印度尼西亚土生华人学生的国际交往'，Bijdragen tot de taal-, land-, en volkenkunde 171, 4 (2015): 520。

72 Zhuohui Li, Yinhua canzheng yu guojia jianshe [Chinese Indonesians' participation in politics and Indonesia's development] (Jakarta: Liantong Shuju, 2007), p. 39.
**[印尼] [华裔印尼人参与政治与印尼发展] (雅加达：联通书局，2007)，第 39 页。** ***

73 CHH's founding chairman Kan Hok Hoei was the first Chinese elected to the Volksraad; CHH member Khouw Kim An was appointed majoor of Batavia, the highest possible governing rank in the Chinese community. Ibid., pp. 48-9.
73 CHH 的創始主席甘學辉是第一位当选为福克斯拉德的华人；CHH 成员丘金安被任命为巴达维亚的少校，这是华人社区中最高的治理职位。同上，第 48-9 页。

74 M.T.N. Govaars-Tjia, Dutch colonial education: The Chinese experience in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2005), p. 89.
74. M.T.N. 乔瓦尔-西娅， 荷兰殖民教育： 荷属东印度群岛的华人经验，1900-1942 （新加坡： 中国文化中心，2005 年），第 89 页。

75 Yang, Account of the National Salvation Movement, pp. 39-42.
75 杨, 《救亡运动述评》，39-42 页。

Hian, Tan Ling Djie and Siauw Giok Tjhan. While working on the editorial board of the influential Chinese newspaper Sin Tit Po, PTI's leaders maintained close contact with prominent Indonesian nationalists such as Sukarno and Raden Soetomo. Compared to the CHH , PTI's political approaches contained more 'Indonesian' elements. The party actively expressed its discontent towards the colonial state regarding the deteriorating economic situation and tightened paternalistic control in the aftermath of the failed communist revolts in 1926-27. Ostensibly, the PTI was serious about peranakan-totok solidarity as it sought to represent the broader Chinese population. In practice, it recruited many totok members, but maintained a clear boundary between the two groups due to their presumably conflicting political orientations. As a result, the PTI excluded its totok members from party leadership and did not grant them the right to vote.
显，陈玲芝和赵玉泉。在担任影响广泛的中文报纸先锋报的编辑委员会期间，PTI 的领导人与苏加诺和多莫等著名的印度尼西亚民族主义者保持密切联系。与中华会馆相比，PTI 的政治主张包含更多“印度尼西亚”元素。该党积极表达了对殖民国家的不满，因为它在 1926-27 年共产主义起义失败后恶化的经济状况和加强的宗法控制。表面上，PTI 非常重视 Peranakan-Totok 团结，因为它试图代表更广泛的华人人口。在实践中，它招募了许多地头蛇成员，但由于他们之间存在着潜在的政治矛盾，因此在两个群体之间保持了明确的界限。因此，PTI 将其地头蛇成员排除在党领导层之外，并且没有给予他们投票权。

Alongside the CHH and PTI, the China-oriented Sin Po Group formed the third political stream of the peranakan Chinese in Java. The Sin Po Group was never a formal political organisation but enjoyed significant influence thanks to its widely subscribed newspaper. Primarily consisting of lower-class Dutch and Chinese-educated intellectuals from Batavia, the Sin Po Group insisted that overseas Chinese, regardless of whether they were peranakan or totok, should retain their Chinese citizenship. While showing sympathy towards the Indonesian nationalist movement, the Sin Po Group believed that the Chinese community should not get involved in colonial politics. The Group openly opposed Chinese participation in the Volksraad and urged the Chinese community to resist the Dutch Nationality Law, which intended to turn Chinese into Dutch subjects. As nationalist sentiment continued to rise among the overseas Chinese following the escalating China-Japan hostilities, the Sin Po Group's China-oriented political ideals also became increasingly appealing. The Sin Po Group's anti-assimilation policy was effective in cultivating bonds between the pro-China peranakan and the rapidly growing totok sojourner population. While facing constant pressure from colonial authorities for publishing anti-Japanese articles, the Sin Po Group's nationalistic stance earned it the trust and support of the GMD government. Moreover, Sin Po served as a platform connecting the Chinese in Java to the more extensive pan-Chinese network in the region, which contributed to the Group's deep involvement in the NSM.
与中华会馆和印尼中华总商会并列，以中国为导向的星洲报集团组成了爪哇 peranakan 华人的第三股政治力量。星洲报集团并非正式的政治组织，但其发行量巨大的报纸使其拥有巨大影响力。 星洲报集团主要由来自巴达维亚的下层荷兰人和受过中文教育的知识分子组成，他们坚持认为海外华人，无论他们是 peranakan 还是 totok，都应该保留中国国籍。星洲报集团虽然同情印度尼西亚民族主义运动，但认为华人社区不应卷入殖民政治。该集团公开反对华人参与人民委员会，并敦促华人社区抵制荷兰国籍法，该法案旨在将华人变成荷兰臣民。随着中日敌对关系的升级，海外华人中的民族主义情绪持续高涨，星洲报集团以中国为导向的政治理想也变得越来越有吸引力。 印尼星洲日报集团的反同化政策有效地培养了亲华峇峇娘惹与迅速增长的过客人口之间的联系。尽管该集团因发表反日文章而面临殖民当局的持续压力，但其民族主义立场赢得了国民政府的信任和支持。此外，星洲日报也成为了连接爪哇华人和更广泛的区域泛华人网络的平台，这促使该集团积极参与民族主义运动。

In the 1930s, the Indies Chinese business community experienced intense competition both internally and externally. Similar to the Malayan situation, the Great Depression forced many Indies Chinese businesses into bankruptcy. In Java, however, peranakan-owned businesses appeared to have suffered more than those of other groups. With the influx of totok immigrants, peranakan businessmen gradually lost control of key sectors such as moneylending and textiles. Meanwhile, indigenous and Japanese merchants were becoming a more substantial challenge. With the rise of Indonesian nationalism, indigenous entrepreneurs increasingly saw the Chinese dominance in the local economy as problematic. As a result, the Indonesian business community, spearheaded by affluent hajjis, established industry-based cooperatives
20 世纪 30 年代，印尼华商社群面临着激烈的内部和外部竞争。与马来亚的情况类似，大萧条迫使许多印尼华商企业破产。然而，在爪哇，土生华人拥有的企业似乎比其他群体遭受的损失更大。随着大量新移民的涌入，土生华商逐渐失去了对放债和纺织等关键行业的控制权。与此同时，本土和日本商人也成为了更大的挑战。随着印度尼西亚民族主义的兴起，本土企业家越来越将华人在当地经济中的主导地位视为问题。因此，印尼商界在富有的朝觐者的带领下，建立了基于行业的合作社。

76 Li), Chinese Indonesians' participation in politics, p. 51.
76 李)，印尼华人在政治中的参与，第 51 页。

77 Sin Po started as a Malay-language weekly in 1910. The press added Dutch and Chinese editions later and became one of the most popular Chinese newspapers in the colony. Huang, 'The Sin Po Group' p. 25.
77 星报于 1910 年创刊，是一份马来语周报。后来，该报增设了荷兰语和汉语版，成为殖民地最受欢迎的汉语报纸之一。黄，《星报集团》第 25 页。
and associations to challenge the status quo. The 1930s also saw the rapid growth of Japanese influence in several key business sectors. Backed by the Japanese government's economic expansionism noted earlier, Japanese firms gained a significant share of the Indonesian textile market while exerting increasing pressure on European and Chinese competitors. Cheap Japanese goods were popular among the indigenous population. Many Japanese merchants also managed to cultivate close business connections with local partners, including Chinese groups - irrespective of peranakan or totok - who saw such a relationship as profitable.
并将 1930 年代日本在多个关键商业领域的迅速崛起。 在日本政府先前提到的经济扩张主义的支持下，日本企业在印尼纺织品市场中获得了重要的份额，同时对欧洲和中国竞争对手施加了越来越大的压力。 廉价的日本商品在当地人口中很受欢迎。 许多日本商人也设法与当地合作伙伴建立了密切的业务联系，包括中国团体——无论婆罗洲还是土生华人——他们认为这种关系有利可图。

Despite their divergent political views and economic interests, Chinese business elites started to feel the growing pressure to contribute to the NSM as the Sino-Japanese conflict worsened in the late 1930s. While adapting to the changing environment, Chinese businessmen also needed to protect their personal reputations within the diaspora, which was increasingly showing concern for the fate of China and opposing Japanese aggression. As a result, all three peranakan groupings mentioned above started to organise anti-Japanese campaigns to gain support from the increasingly nationalistic Chinese population. As Kuhn points out, however, many business elites had to make hard decisions balancing political safety, business profitability, and community expectations.
20 世纪 30 年代后期，随着中日冲突加剧，尽管存在政治观点和经济利益分歧，但在民族主义浪潮的推动下，华商开始感受到为抗日救亡事业贡献力量的压力。面对日益恶化的局势，华商也需要维护自己在侨民中的声誉，而侨民对中国的命运 zuneh 关注，并反对日本的侵略。因此，上述三个娘惹社团开始组织反日活动，以争取日益增长的民族主义华人群众的支持。然而，正如 Kuhn 所指出的，许多商界精英不得不做出艰难的抉择，权衡政治安全、商业盈利和社区期望之间的平衡。

The pro-Dutch CHH established closer contact with the GMD government as the latter sought to influence the overseas Chinese through its nationalist campaigns. Facilitated by Sung Fa Hsiang, China's Consul General to Batavia, CHH members founded the pro-China Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Siang Hwee) in 1934. From its outset, the association's primary goal was to promote Chinese products while boycotting Japanese ones. Kan Hok Hoei, the CHH chairman whose daughter was married to the Consul General's son, was appointed to lead Siang Hwee. Only one year later, however, Kan decided to step down due to pressures from the colonial authorities. He realised that his position in the China-oriented organisation would undermine the benefits he could otherwise enjoy by holding a pro-Dutch stance. CHH leader Thio Thiam Tjong, who chaired the Semarang Branch of the Zhongguo Cishan Jijinhui (China Charity Foundation), led a few local campaigns which received only tepid reactions. By contrast, the peranakan elites' pro-Dutch attitude became increasingly explicit following Germany's invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940. Yap Hong Tjoen, CHH member and a renowned doctor from Yogyakarta, established foundations to collect money to support the Dutch government's war efforts in Europe. The CHH elites' solidarity with the Dutch culminated when the colonial administration finally declared war against Japan after the concerted attacks on Malaya, Hong Kong, and Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Siang Hwee's leader Liem Ing Hwie regarded the situation as a golden opportunity to demonstrate Chinese loyalty to the Dutch. Under Liem's leadership, the CHH helped to set up a self-defence force named the Chineesche Burgerfront Organisatie (CBO), which actively participated in the Dutch defence against the Japanese invasion.
亲荷的中华会馆与中国国民政府建立了更密切的联系，因为后者试图通过其民族主义运动影响海外华人。在巴达维亚总领事宋发祥的协助下，中华会馆成员于 1934 年成立了亲华的中华商会（商会）。该协会从一开始就把促进中国产品、抵制日本产品作为其主要目标。中华会馆主席甘学辉——他的女儿嫁给了宋总领事的儿子——被任命为商会主席。然而，仅仅一年后，甘学辉便因殖民当局的压力而辞职。他意识到，自己在以中国为导向的组织中的职位会损害他本可通过持有亲荷立场而获得的利益。中华会馆领导人 Thio Thiam Tjong，他担任了 Semarang 分会的中华慈善济金会的会长，领导了一些地方性的运动，但反响平平。 相比之下，1940 年 5 月德国入侵荷兰后，土生华人精英的亲荷态度变得越来越明显。 叶鸿祚，中和会成员、日惹知名医生，成立基金会筹集资金支持荷兰政府在欧洲的战争努力。中和会精英与荷兰人的团结最终在殖民政府于 1941 年 12 月马六甲、香港和珍珠港遭到协同步攻击后宣布对日宣战时达到顶峰。“星惠”的领导人林翼辉将这一情况视为一个向荷兰人展示华人忠诚的绝佳机会。在林的领导下，中和协助成立了一个名为“中华市民战线组织”（简称 CBO）的自卫队，该组织积极参与荷兰抵抗日本入侵的斗争。

Meanwhile, the pro-independence PTI had become more involved in the NSM after 1936, when left-leaning intellectuals such as Tjoa Sik Ien and Tan Ling Djie took over the leadership of the Surabaya-based newspaper, Sin Tit Po. Influenced by radical socialism and Mao Zedong's communist revolution, Sin Tit Po published numerous articles introducing China's anti-imperialist struggles and openly supported China's armed resistance against Japanese aggression. Siauw Giok Tjhan, who would become a prominent peranakan politician after Indonesian Independence, established Zhen Ji Hui (Relief and Charity Association) in Surabaya, which eventually became the backbone of the NSM in East Java. Sin Tit Po was suspended for a week by the Dutch administration in 1939 for repeatedly publishing articles 'offensive to the Indies Japanese community'. It is noteworthy that the PTI's anti-Japanese narratives did not receive the reciprocal sympathy they expected from Indonesian nationalists despite the organisation's overt enthusiasm for participating in anti-colonial struggles. Prominent Indonesian nationalist leader Sutan Sjahrir observed that a large number of native intellectuals were drawn to Japan's Pan-Asianism long before the war expanded to Indonesia:
同时，1936 年之后，亲独立的 PTI 更多地参与了 NSM。当时，以陈锡恩和陈英杰为代表的左翼知识分子接管了泗水报纸《新国民报》的领导权。受激进社会主义和毛泽东的共产主义革命的影响，《新国民报》发表了大量介绍中国抗帝斗争的文章，并公开支持中国抗日武装斗争。后来成为印度尼西亚独立后著名娘惹政治家的萧玉灿在泗水建立了真吉会（救济和慈善协会），该协会最终成为东爪哇 NSM 的骨干。1939 年，由于多次发表“冒犯印度尼西亚日本社区”的文章，《新国民报》被荷兰政府勒令停刊一周。 值得注意的是，PTI 的反日叙事并没有得到印度尼西亚民族主义者的同情，尽管该组织公开放出了参与反殖民斗争的热情，这一点超出了他们的预期。印尼 民族主义领导人 苏丹 莎莉尔 曾经 观察到，早在 战争 扩展到 印度尼西亚 之前，就有 大量 的 本土知识分子 被 日本 的泛亚洲主义 所 吸引 ：

Now [1937] Indonesians regard the Japanese as 'fine people', 'civilised', they say; and they regard the Chinese and the whites as kasar or coarse. Their disaffection with the whites derives, naturally, from the three hundred years of white rule, and their dislike for the Chinese is due to the latter's economic position as middlemen (approximately in the same way as the Jews in Europe) ... [Indonesian nationalists] showed unmistakable signs of Japanese sympathies ... although they don't dare to talk about it. As the attacked and the underdogs, the Chinese necessarily should have sympathy and support, and yet nevertheless in this Japanese-Chinese war, Japan has a measure of the support of our people.
现在 [1937] 年，印度尼西亚人认为日本人是“很好的人民”，“文明人”，他们说；他们认为中国人是 Kasar 或粗俗的人，白人也是如此。他们对白人的不满自然源于三百年白人统治，他们不喜欢中国人是因为后者的经济地位是中间人（大约与欧洲的犹太人相同）…… [印度尼西亚民族主义者] 表现出明显的亲日迹象……尽管他们不敢谈论它。作为被攻击和弱势群体，中国人理所当然应该得到同情和支持，但在这个日本-中国战争中，日本有我们人民一定程度的支持。

The China-oriented Sin Po Group played the leading role in the NSM in Indonesia. Ang Jan Goan, Sin Po's director, who also served on the executive board of the Batavia Huqiao Juanzhu Zuguo Cishan Shiye Weiyuanhui (Charity Committee for the Relief of the Fatherland), was a key organiser of the fundraising campaigns in Java although he was excluded from the executive board of the totok-dominated NFCRF due to the organisation's internal politics. Ang's right-hand man, Kwee Kek Beng, actively participated in anti-Japanese propaganda work following his trip to China in 1933. Under their leadership, the Sin Po Group cut its employees' salary by 5 to 10 percent to support China's war effort. The Sin Po Group raised 17.15 million guilders between 1937 and 1942, accounting for almost half of the total amount donated in the entire Dutch East Indies. In addition to fundraising campaigns, the Sin Po Group mobilised its followers to support China's war efforts. For instance, Kwa
中国导向的《星洲日报》集团在印尼的南洋华侨筹赈祖国难民总会（简称“南侨总会”）中发挥了领导作用。该报社社长洪以南，也是巴达维亚桥侨捐助祖国慈善事业委员会执行委员，尽管他因该组织内部政治原因被排除在以土著为主的南侨总会执行委员会之外，但在爪哇的筹款活动中发挥了关键的组织作用。洪的得力助手郭克明，在 1933 年访问中国后，积极参与反日宣传工作。在他们的领导下，《星洲日报》集团将其员工的薪水削减了 5% 到 10%，以支持中国的抗战。在 1937 年至 1942 年间，《星洲日报》集团筹集了 1715 万盾，几乎占荷属东印度群岛捐款总额的一半。除了筹款活动，《星洲日报》集团还动员其追随者支持中国的抗战。例如，叶

83 'Stadsnieuws', Soerabaijasch Handelsblad, 12 Apr. 1939.
## 83 '城市新闻',泗水商业报, 1939 年 4 月 12 日.

84 Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese politics in Java, pp. 165-6.
苏瑞阿蒂纳, 84, 《爪哇峇峇娘惹政治》, 第 165-166 页。

85 Sutan Sjahrir, Out of exile, trans. Charles Wolf (New York: J. Day, 1949), pp. 187-8.
85 苏丹沙里尔，《流亡归来》，查尔斯·沃尔夫译（纽约：J. 戴伊出版社，1949 年），第 187-8 页。

86 Totok businessman Tjung See Gan was the only representative from Java elected to the executive board. Tan, Memoir of Nanqiao, p. 50.
86 位爪哇商人陈志源是唯一当选为执行董事的爪哇代表。Tan, Memoir of Nanqiao, p. 50。

87 Huang, 'The Sin Po Group', pp. 25-30.
87 黄 "星洲日报报业集团"，第 25-30 页。

88 Yingming Liang, 'Hong Yuanyuan zizhuan zaiban ganyan' [Reflections on the reprinted autobiography of Ang Jan Goan], Guoji Ribao, 5 Aug. 2011.
88 黎明亮，“洪幼仪自传再版感言”[洪幼仪自传再版的感慨]，国际日报，2011 年 8 月 5 日。

Tjwan Sioe, a renowned doctor and social activist, formed the 'Indies Ambulance Mission' consisting of 20 volunteer doctors, nurses, drivers, and mechanics to serve in the battlegrounds of China.
著名的医生和社会活动家 Tjwan Sioe 组建了一个由 20 名义工医生、护士、司机和机械师组成的“印度救护队”，他们在中国战场上为伤员提供援助。

Although totok Chinese generally maintained close connections to China and were more eager to participate in the NSM, their campaigns were severely constrained by their lack of influence over the mostly peranakan-dominated Chinese community in Java. Nevertheless, a handful of totok businessmen managed to elevate themselves to the leadership of the Movement by working closely with the China-oriented Sin Po Group in city-based relief organisations. Tjung See Gan's Algemeene Chineesche Importeurs Vereeniging (Chinese Importers' Association) emulated the strategies of its Malayan counterparts by launching a series of boycotts against Japanese products. However, such campaigns rarely met initial expectations. With the huge demand for Japanese goods from the enormous indigenous population, and alternatives through non-Chinese business channels, Japanese merchants in Java suffered very little from these boycotts. Also, many Indies Chinese showed no particular commitment to joining the boycotts for economic reasons. Overall, the NSM only met with moderate success in Java. By the end of 1940, the NSM raised 31.5 million Chinese yuan in the Dutch colony, which was in sharp contrast to Malaya's 85.4 million yuan. Similarly, large-scale recruitment of jigong never materialised in Indonesia. Only a small number of volunteers managed to travel to China via Singapore or Yangon on their own.
尽管土生华人通常与中国保持着密切联系，并且更加渴望参与南侨总会，但他们的运动由于缺乏对爪哇岛上主要由土生华人主导的华人社区的影响力而受到严重限制。 尽管如此，少数土生华商通过与城市救济组织中以中国为导向的星洲日报集团密切合作，成功地提升了自己在该运动中的领导地位。 Tjung See Gan 的 Algemeene Chineesche Importeurs Vereeniging（进口商协会）效仿其马来同行的策略，对日本产品发起了一系列抵制活动。 然而，这些运动很少达到最初的预期。 由于庞大土著人口对日本商品的巨大需求，以及通过非华人商业渠道提供的替代品，日本商家在爪哇所受的抵制影响非常小。 此外，许多印尼华人出于经济原因在加入抵制活动方面没有表现出特别的积极性。 总体而言，南侨总会只在爪哇取得了适度的成功。截至 1940 年底，南侨总会筹集了 31荷兰殖民地有 500 万元中国资金，这与马来亚的 8540 万元形成鲜明对比。 类似地，印度尼西亚也没有出现大规模招募机工的情况。只有少数志愿者设法通过新加坡或仰光自行前往中国。

Tan Kah Kee criticised the NSM's campaigns outside of Batavia and Bandung for being poorly organised. According to Tan, relief associations in Surabaya and Semarang could have collected more funds if the campaigns were carried out properly, as both cities were prosperous commercial centres with considerable Chinese populations. On the contrary, while NSM's Batavia branches were able to collect the equivalent of 300,000 yuan per month, its Surabaya counterparts barely reached half that amount, while Semarang contributed close to zero due to 'weak leadership'. On top of that, relief associations in the smaller towns also failed to organise effective campaigns. As plausible as Tan's criticism (of leaders' irresponsibility) might sound, it was not a sheer coincidence that the two big cities with such tepid responses happened to be the strongholds of the PTI (Surabaya) and CHH (Semarang), respectively. For instance, the Semarang-based Oei Tiong Ham Concern (OTHC), the CHH's major sponsor and the largest ethnic Chinese conglomerate in pre-Second World War Asia, insisted that business rationality should take precedence over politics
## 翻译结果: 陈嘉庚批评了民社党在巴达维亚和万隆以外地区开展的救灾活动组织不力。他认为，泗水和三宝垄的救济协会本可以筹集到更多资金，如果活动组织得当，因为这两个城市都是繁荣的商业中心，拥有相当数量的华人人口。相反，民社党巴达维亚分会每月可以筹集相当于 30 万银元的资金，而泗水分会却只能达到其一半，三宝垄分会则由于“领导不力”几乎没有筹集到任何资金。最重要的是，较小城镇的救济协会也没有组织起有效的筹款活动。 尽管陈嘉庚的批评（对领导人缺乏责任感的批评）听起来很合理，但这两个反应冷淡的大城市恰好是印尼华人党（泗水）和中和党（三宝垄）的中心地带，这绝非巧合。例如，位于三宝垄的黄中涵企业（OTHC）是中和党的主要赞助商，也是二战前亚洲规模最大的华人企业集团，它坚持认为商业理性应该优先于政治。

89 Li, Chinese Indonesians' participation in politics, p. 96.
89 李，印尼华人在政治中的参与，第 96 页。

90 Yan Fang, 'Zhuang Xiyan zai kangri zhanzheng de rizi li' [Tjung See Gan during the Anti-Japanese War], Yanhuang Zongheng 12 (2007): 39.
## 庄希言在抗日战争的日 子里 九十 阎芳，‘庄希言在抗日战争的日 子里’[ 庄希言在抗日战争期间 ]， 炎黄纵横 12 (2007): 39。

91 Akashi, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, pp. 36-40.
九一事变后，南洋华侨掀起了声势浩大的抗日救亡运动。1937 年 9 月，由侨领陈嘉庚倡议，在新加坡成立了“南侨总会”，作为领导抗日救亡运动的最高机构。南侨总会积极开展募捐、慰问、组织义演等活动，筹集了大量抗战资金和物资，有力地支持了国内的抗战。 以下是一些南侨总会的主要活动： * 募捐：南侨总会发动侨胞捐款捐物，为抗战筹集了大量资金和物资。据统计，仅在 1937 年至 1945 年间，南侨总会就募捐了超过 1 亿新元。 * 慰问：南侨总会组织慰问团，前往抗战前线慰问中国军队和人民。这些慰问团不仅带去了物质上的支持，也带来了精神上的鼓励。 * 组织义演：南侨总会组织了大量的义演活动，为抗战筹集资金。这些义演活动不仅吸引了大量的观众，也提高了侨胞的抗日热情。

92 Yang, Account of the National Salvation Movement, p. 40.
92 杨，救亡运动记述，第 40 页。

93 There was also a noticeable difference in contributions per capita: between Nov. 1938 and Oct. 1939, the amount was 12.74 yuan in Malaya and 8.25 yuan in the Dutch colony. Enhan Li, Dongnanya Huaren Shi [The Chinese in Southeast Asia] (Taipei: Wunan, 2003), p. 333.
在人均捐款方面，也存在显著差异：1938 年 11 月至 1939 年 10 月期间，马来亚为 12.74 元，荷兰殖民地为 8.25 元。 —— 郑一恩著，《东南亚华人史》（台北：五南，2003 年），第 333 页。

94 'Letter on the issue of the four volunteers from the Dutch East Indies', 25 Apr. 1939, in Nanqiao Jigong, YPA 54-6-335-f043; 'Chen Zhiping's Letter to the Headquarters: Allowing eight volunteers from the Dutch East Indies to go to Lashio', 27 Apr. 1939, in Nanqiao Jigong, YPA 54-6-335-f043.
'94 荷属东印度四名志愿者问题函', 1939 年 4 月 25 日, 南桥机工, YPA 54-6-335-f043; '陈志平致总部函: 同意荷属东印度八名志愿者赴腊戌', 1939 年 4 月 27 日, 南桥机工, YPA 54-6-335-f043。

95 Tan, Memoir of Nanqiao, pp. 342-3.
95 谭, 《南桥回忆录》, 第 342-3 页。
and community sentiment. As a result, the company maintained its close business ties with Japanese firms and only made symbolic contributions to the NSM. Under its influence, very few Chinese participated in anti-Japanese boycotts in Semarang. Unlike in Batavia, where the influence of the pro-China Sin Po was the strongest, Chinese groups in other cities rarely prioritised the NSM despite the rising nationalism stimulated by the ongoing Sino-Japanese war.
以及社区情绪。因此，该公司与日本公司保持密切的业务关系，只对国家社会运动做出了象征性的贡献。在其影响下，很少有中国人参与到三宝垄的反日抵制活动中。 与爪哇岛首府巴达维亚受倾向中国的《星洲日报》影响最为强烈不同的是，尽管正在进行的侵华战争激发了日益高涨的民族主义，其他城市中的华人团体很少将国家社会运动置于首要地位。

As the Movement unfolded, Chinese newspapers in Java adopted very different positions. The Batavia-based Sin Po and Thien Sung Jit Po, as well as the Surabaya-based Tay Kong Siang Po, spearheaded anti-Japanese propaganda campaigns. The colonial government repeatedly exercised persbreidel (press restraint) to suspend the circulation of all three newspapers for publishing anti-Japanese articles. By contrast, CHH member-controlled newspapers such as Siang Po and Keng Po were more hesitant in voicing their support for China despite their subtle anti-Japanese undertones. Interestingly, Matahari, a pro-independence newspaper in Semarang founded by PTI chairman Liem Koen Hian, voiced sharp criticism of both the pro-China Sin Po Group and the pro-Dutch CHH. The GMD government thus considered the newspaper 'pro-Japanese'. Ironically, the colonial government suspended the Surabaya-based Sin Tit Po, also run by the same PTI group, and charged it with repeatedly printing hateful articles against the Japanese. In May 1939, a Dutch-educated peranakan named Oey Tiang Tjoei broke away from Keng Po and established his own Malay-language newspaper, Hong Po, due to a personal grudge against the Keng Po editorial board. In stark contrast with Keng Po's implicit anti-Japanese attitude, Hong Po openly advocated Pan-Asianism and worked closely with Japan's Deputy Consul in Batavia Toyoshima Ataru. Through his pre-war activities with Hong Po, Oey earned the deep trust of the Japanese and became the editor-in-chief of Kung Yung Pao, the only Chinese-run newspaper in Java during the occupation.
随着运动的展开，爪哇的华文报纸采取了截然不同的立场。总部位于巴达维亚的《星洲日报》和《天声日报》以及泗水的《泰康时报》带头开展反日宣传运动。 殖民政府一再行使新闻管制权，以停止所有三份报纸因发表反日文章而被停刊。 相反，中国致公党控制的报纸，如《星报》和《耕报》，虽然带有微妙的反日意味，但在表达对中国的支持方面却更为犹豫。 值得注意的是，《太阳报》是泗水的一份亲独立报纸，由印度尼西亚人民党主席林孔贤创办，它对亲华的星洲日报集团和亲荷兰的中国致公党都提出了尖锐的批评。国民政府因此认为该报“亲日”。 具有讽刺意味的是，殖民政府也停办了由印度尼西亚人民党同一个集团经营的泗水《新时代报》，并指控该报反复发表反日言论。 1939 年 5 月，一名受过荷兰教育，名叫黄大卫的华人因个人恩怨，与《铿报》的编辑委员会决裂，创办了自己的马来语报纸《洪报》。与《铿报》隐含的反日立场形成鲜明对比，《洪报》公开鼓吹泛亚主义，并与日本在巴达维亚的副领事豊島敦密切合作。通过他在战前对《洪报》的活动，黄大卫赢得了日军的极度信任，成为占领时期爪哇唯一一家华文报纸《公营报》的主编。

The Dutch were especially wary of the anti-Japanese campaigns, as they saw this highly political Chinese movement as exerting a potentially dangerous influence over the native population, further encouraging the indigenous nationalist movement. Such anxieties were most discernible in the increasingly tightened control over a broad spectrum of the native press during the same period: newspapers such as Indonesia Moeda, Al-Islaah, and Masjarakat suffered similar persbreidel for publishing anti-colonial articles. In addition to native nationalism, the Pan-Asianist propaganda of the pro-Japan native press also alerted the colonial government, which recorded the alarming tendency in great detail in its correspondence with the metropole. The Dutch authorities only exercised persbreidel against the Japanese-Malay press from 1938 onward, however. While the government temporarily suspended newspapers such as Sinar Selatan and Tohindo Nippo and brought criminal charges against the former's editor-in-chief, the punishments received by the pro-Japanese press were incommensurable to those handed out to their pro-China counterparts. It was not until the Dutch declared war against Japan in December 1941 that the colonial government arrested Oey Tiang Tjoei, the director of Hong Po, for its inflammatory propaganda.
荷兰人对反日运动尤其警惕，因为他们将这场高度政治化的中国运动视为对当地人民施加潜在的危险影响，进一步助长了当地民族主义运动。 在同一时期, 对各种本土新闻的管制日益收紧，这种焦虑尤为明显: 印度 nesia Moeda、Al-Islaah 和 Masjarakat 等报纸因发表反殖民文章而遭受类似的新闻管制。 除了本土民族主义之外，亲日本土新闻的泛亚主义宣传也引起了殖民政府的警覺，他们在与宗主国的通信中详细记载了这种令人担忧的倾向。 然而，直到 1938 年，荷蘭当局才對親日馬來報紙實施新聞管制。 虽然政府临时停刊了《南方曙光》等报纸，并对前者主编提起刑事指控，但親日报刊受到的惩罚与他們親中同行的惩罚相比，是不可同日而语的。 直到 1941 年 12 月荷兰对日本宣战，殖民政府才以煽动性宣传为由逮捕了洪波负责人许世英。

Chinese merchants' boycotts against Japanese goods in the Indies also turned out to be less effective than those in Malaya. Tan Kah Kee pointed out that the Japanese often reported such activities to the Dutch administration, which generally cracked down on the boycotts by labelling them 'subversive'. In December 1937, the government arrested Tjung See Gan, one of the most active campaign organisers in Java; a Siang Hwee member had provided Tjung's information to the Dutch authorities, who confirmed Tjung's leadership role in the NSM. This whistle-blower also claimed that Tjung's association had imposed a fine of 400 guilders on his firm for selling Japanese goods, and the money had gone to the Chinese Red Cross Fund, according to the receipt he received. Although the government eventually released Tjung due to lack of evidence, an uneasy air permeated across the Chinese business community, which effectively prevented many from taking further action to push the boycott forward. The Dutch authorities conducted more thorough investigations into Tjung's activities after his release. In a report submitted to the governorgeneral, A.H.J. Lovink, head of the Bureau for East Asia Affairs, described Tjung as an 'ambitious intrigant' (eerzuchtig intrigant), who 'works hard when it comes to the so-called national interests of the Chinese', and 'always looks for favours of consular officials, envoys from China, and prominent people, especially those from the peranakan circles'. Lovink warned the government to be careful about Tjung's further actions:
印尼华商抵制日货的活动也远不及马来亚华商的活动有效。 陈嘉庚指出，日本人经常向荷兰当局报告此类活动，当局通常将抵制活动贴上“颠覆”的标签，并予以镇压。 1937 年 12 月，荷兰政府逮捕了爪哇最活跃的活动组织者之一 Tjung See Gan；一位协胜会的成员向荷兰当局提供了 Tjung 的信息，当局证实了 Tjung 在 NSM 中的领导作用。 这名举报人还声称，Tjung 的协会因其出售日货对其公司处以 400 荷兰盾的罚款，根据他收到的收据，这笔钱已捐给中国红十字基金会。 尽管政府最终因证据不足释放了 Tjung，但不安的气氛弥漫在整个华商社区，这实际上阻止了许多人采取进一步行动推动抵制运动。 荷兰当局在 Tjung 获释后对其活动进行了更彻底的调查。 在提交给总督的报告中，A.H.J. 洛文克，东亚事務局局长，形容郑如兰为一个“有野心的阴谋家”（eerzuchtig intrigant），他“在涉及中国所谓民族利益时会努力工作”，“并且总是寻求领事官员、来自中国的使节和显要人士的帮助，特别是来自峇峇娘惹圈子的人”。洛温克警告政府谨慎对待 Tjung 的进一步行动：

Given his personality and his undesirable action in the Dutch colony, as well as [his role in China's] National Political Council, it will be highly possible that he will not only take actions in China that are directed against the policy of the Dutch-Indies Government concerning the Chinese population here but will also return to the colony with assignments, the execution of which will be harmful to the public order.
鉴于其个性和在荷兰殖民地的不良行为，以及他在中国国民政治会议中的作用，极有可能他不仅将在中国采取有悖于荷属东印度政府关于当地华人政策的行动，还会带着对公共秩序有害的任务返回殖民地。

The Dutch authorities tried hard to stay neutral to the intensifying Sino-Japanese conflict. After 1937, the colonial administration reiterated its stance, stressing that public fundraising campaigns were not allowed, while anti-Japanese propaganda was strictly prohibited. The government also kept a watchful eye on the interactions between the GMD government and local Chinese organisations and regarded the Chinese consul's call for fundraising as China's 'interference' (bemoeienis) in domestic affairs.
荷兰当局努力保持在日益激烈的中日冲突中保持中立。1937 年后，殖民政府重申其立场，强调禁止公开募捐活动，并严厉禁止反日宣传。 政府还密切关注国民政府与当地华人组织之间的互动，并将中国领事要求筹款视为中国对内政的“干涉”（bemoeienis）。

The Dutch also stipulated that all funds collected by the NSM should be handled by the International Red Cross Committee in Shanghai, which was primarily controlled by the British and Americans. The Indies Chinese community, however, maintained that their contributions should go through the Red Cross Society in Hong Kong, which was directly administered by the GMD government. They believed that the Hong Kong-based organisation would serve the real needs of the Chinese people, as opposed to the International Red Cross, which 'provided aid to both sides of the war'. In response to the Japanese consul's protest, Dutch authorities withheld the remittances the NFCRF had collected in Java for three months. Such delays further dampened the Javanese Chinese community's enthusiasm for making further contributions. Similarly, the colonial authorities refused to support Dr Kwa Tjwan Sioe's 'Indies Ambulance Mission', as they saw his efforts as closely associated with 'foreign military service'. The Dutch Indies Red Cross even published an official statement to distance itself from the mission, claiming that the organisation had no connection whatsoever with the Ambulance Mission, which left the Chinese activists no options but to handle the issue themselves.
荷兰人还规定，NSM 筹集的所有款项都应由设在上海的国际红十字会委员会负责处理，而该委员会主要由英国和美国人控制。 然而，印度尼西亚华人社区坚持他们的捐款应该通过香港的红十字会，该会直接由国民政府管理。他们认为，总部设在香港的组织将服务于中国人民的实际需要，而不是“向交战双方提供援助”的国际红十字会。为了回应日本领事的抗议，荷兰当局扣押了 NFCRF 在爪哇筹集的汇款三个月。这种拖延进一步抑制了爪哇华人社区进一步捐款的热情。 同样，殖民当局拒绝支持郭天锡医生的“印度尼西亚救护车队”，因为他们认为他的努力与“外国兵役”关系密切。 荷兰印度群岛红十字会甚至发表了一份官方声明，以撇清与此次事件的关联，声称该组织与救护车行动没有任何关系，这使得中国活动人士别无选择，只能自行处理此事。

Overall, the NSM was primarily led by China-born immigrants who still maintained close contact with their homeland and enjoyed greater access to the official channels of government support. However, unlike many existing works, this study
总的来说，NSM 的主要领导者是出生于中国的移民，他们仍然与自己的祖国保持着密切的联系，并获得了更多官方政府支持渠道。但是，与许多现有作品不同，这项研究

111 'Lidmaatschap Tjhung See Gan Chineesche Nationale Politieke Raad', GMr, NA-NL-2.10.36.06-622x/1938.
## 111 中国国民政治委员会中西联合管理局 ## GMr，NA-NL-2.10.36.06-622x/1938.

112 'Geldinzamelingen ten behoeve van de slachtoffers van de vijandelijkheden in Noord-China', GMr, NA 2.10.36.06-669x/1937.
## Simplified Chinese Translation: 112 '为华北事变受害者捐款', GMr, NA 2.10.36.06-669x/1937.

113 Similar concerns were raised in places like Medan. 'Geldzendingen door tusschenkomst van den Chineeschen Consul te Medan', GMr, NA 2.10.36.06-471x/1938.
113 类似的担忧也出现在棉兰等地。 'Geldzendingen door tusschenkomst van den Chineeschen Consul te Medan', GMr, NA 2.10.36.06-471x/1938。

114 'Geldinzameling voor de Oorlogsslachtoffers in China door het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis', GMr, NA 2.10.36.06-487x/1938.
## 1938 年荷兰红十字会为中国战争受害者募捐活动，GMr，NA 2.10.36.06-487x/1938。

115 Tan, Memoir of Nanqiao, p. 77.
115 谭, 《南桥记》卷上，第 77 页

116 Tiong Han Go, 'Verslag Indische Ambulance Missie in China' [Report on the Indische Ambulance Mission in China], Chinese Indonesian Heritage Center Online (2015); http://www.cihc. nl/uploads/images/page_images/21.Verslag_Indische_Ambulance_Missie_in_China1.pdf (last accessed 19 Aug. 2019).
116 Tiong Han Go，“荷属东印度群岛救护工作在中国的报告”[荷兰救护工作在中国报告]， 印度尼西亚华人遗产中心在线（2015）；http://www.cihc.nl/uploads/images/page_images/21.Verslag_Indische_Ambulance_Missie_in_China1.pdf （最后访问时间：2019 年 8 月 19 日）。

117 'De ambulance voor China: Verklaring van het Ned. Roode Kruis', Soerabajasch Handelsblad, 22 Nov. 1937.
117 '中国救护车：荷兰红十字会声明'，泗水商报，1937 年 11 月 22 日。
shows that the totok-peranakan divide alone did not directly lead to the NSM's different outcomes in British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. In Malaya, totok leader Tan Kah Kee managed to lead effective fundraising campaigns thanks to his personal prestige as a non-partisan leader in predominantly Fujianese-dominated business networks. However, the NSM's relative success by no means suggests that the Malayan Chinese reached a moment of diasporic solidarity, as intrinsic factionalism persisted and rival forces competed fiercely for the Movement's leadership. In the process, Tan Kah Kee and his Fujianese-based relief funds stood out as the most significant network influencing an increasingly agitated Chinese population, leaving pro-Japanese activities little space in the Malayan diaspora community. As a result, during the wartime occupation itself, the Japanese forces launched radical purges - most notoriously the Sook Ching executions in Singapore - against perceived hostile elements in Chinese circles.
资料显示，仅靠土生华人与峇峇华人之间的分歧并不能直接导致马来亚和荷属东印度群岛中南侨总会 (NSM) 的不同结果。在马来亚，土生华人领袖陈嘉庚凭借其超然于党派斗争的领导者身份，在以福建人为主导的商业网络中获得了个人声望，成功领导了有效的募捐活动。然而，马来亚中侨总会的相对成功绝不意味着马来亚华人实现了离散团结，因为内在派系斗争持续存在，竞争对手势力为争夺该组织的领导权展开了激烈的竞争。在此过程中，陈嘉庚及其福建背景的救济基金脱颖而出，成为影响日益不安的华人社群的最重要的网络，使得亲日活动在马来亚华人侨民群体中没有多少空间。因此，在战时占领期间，日本军队针对华人群体中被视为敌对势力的分子，发动了激进的清洗活动 - 其中最臭名昭著的是新加坡的肃清行动。

In comparison, the NSM in Java lacked a central figure in its leadership who could solidify the sporadic campaigns organised separately by a wide array of forces. Tjung See Gan, a totok businessman who represented Indonesia in the NFCRF, was not powerful enough to exert a strong influence over the peranakan-dominated Chinese community in Java. On top of the existing totok-peranakan divide, rivalry among the three peranakan groups - as well as internal personal feuds - also complicated the Movement. While the China-oriented Sin Po Group spearheaded the NSM, the pro-Dutch CHH and pro-independence PTI did not prioritise the Movement in their political agenda due to their more pressing concerns over participation in colonial politics or the nationalist movement. Moreover, many groups regarded Japan's rise in the region as an opportunity. Consequently, they cultivated new patron-client ties in the rapidly changing political and economic environment, eventually resulting in widespread collaborations and fewer sweeping purges against the Chinese population during the Japanese Occupation.
与之相比，爪哇的华侨运动缺乏一位能够巩固各种势力分别组织的零星运动的中心领导人。代表印度尼西亚参加华侨筹赈总会的多托商人陈嘉庚，其势力不足以对爪哇以土生华人为主的华人社区施加强大的影响力。在现有的多托与土生华人间的分歧之上，三大土生华人集团之间的竞争——以及内部的个人恩怨——也使这场运动变得更加复杂。虽然以中国为导向的《星洲日报》集团带头领导了华侨运动，但支持荷兰的华侨总会和支持独立的印尼民党由于其在殖民政治或民族主义运动中参与方面的更加紧迫的关注，而没有将其作为其政治议程中的优先事项。此外，许多集团认为日本在该地区的崛起是一个机会。因此，他们在瞬息万变的政治和经济环境中培养了新的 patron-client 关系，最终导致在日本占领时期对华人进行的普遍合作，而大规模清洗的次数更少。

The Movement encountered obstructions in both Malaya and Java due to the colonial powers' appeasement policy, but the anti-Japanese campaigns in Malaya gained more leeway from British authorities, as the Japanese advance posed an increasing threat to British interests in Asia after the Battle of Shanghai in late 1937. With no significant presence in other parts of Asia, the Dutch government adopted stricter policies in constraining the NSM, as they feared the latter's anti-Japanese campaigns might destabilise the colonial social order and spark a larger-scale indigenous nationalist movement. As Nazi Germany's occupation of the Netherlands began in mid-1940, many peranakan elites diverted their attention to assisting the Dutch war efforts in Europe as a way to prove their loyalty. These Indies Chinese finally reached anti-Japanese solidarity with the Dutch in December 1941, as the latter belatedly declared war against Japan following the attack on Pearl Harbor, by which time it was too late for the NSM to make any difference.
由于殖民势力的绥靖政策，该运动在马来亚和爪哇都遇到了阻碍，但马来亚的抗日运动从英国当局那里获得了更大的回旋余地，因为上海战役后，日本的推进对英国在亚洲的利益构成了越来越大的威胁。由于在亚洲其他地区没有重要的存在，荷兰政府采取了更严格的政策来限制印尼民族联盟，因为他们担心印尼民族联盟的抗日运动可能会破坏殖民社会的秩序，并引发更大规模的本土民族主义运动。随着纳粹德国在 1940 年年中占领荷兰，许多土生华人精英将注意力转向协助荷兰在欧洲的战争努力，作为证明他们忠诚的一种方式。随着后者在珍珠港事件后 belatedly 对日本宣战，这些印度尼西亚华人终于在 1941 年 12 月与荷兰人达成了抗日团结，但此时印尼民族联盟已经为时已晚，无法改变任何局面。

The Sino-Japanese War undoubtedly stimulated the rise of Chinese nationalism in diaspora communities worldwide. The NSM was particularly active in areas where there were dense populations of totok immigrants (more so in Malaya than in Java).
中日战争无疑刺激了世界各地华人社区的民族主义兴起。 南洋同盟会尤其活跃于华侨人口密集的地区（在马来亚多于爪哇）。

However, due to the simultaneous rise of the indigenous nationalist movements and the more active participation of peranakan Chinese in local politics (more so in Java than in Malaya), the extent to which the Movement affected the heterogeneous Chinese population and how the Chinese participated in the NSM, varied significantly. Looking beyond Malaya and Java, donations from British Burma and the United States-controlled Philippines were comparable to those from the Dutch East Indies. Funds collected in Thailand and French Indochina, however, were significantly less despite having similar-sized Chinese populations. Were Chinese communities in these territories necessarily less patriotic towards China than those residing in Malaya and Java? How did Thai, French, and American authorities, respectively, react to the NSM in the changing international and local sociopolitical environments at the time? In short, although the rise of Chinese nationalism was undoubtedly one of the universal driving forces behind the campaigns, nationalism alone was insufficient to explain how the Movement played out. To better understand the topic, further comparative studies on the overseas Chinese vis-à-vis local politics are much needed.
然而，由于土著民族主义运动的兴起和土生华人更积极地参与地方政治（在爪哇比在马来亚更多），运动在多大程度上影响了异质的华人人口，以及华人如何参与民族主义运动，差异很大。放眼马来亚和爪哇之外，来自英属缅甸和美国控制的菲律宾的捐款与来自荷属东印度群岛的捐款不相上下。然而，在泰国和法属印度支那，尽管华人人口规模相似，但所筹集的资金却少得多。 这些地区的华人社区是否真的没有马来亚和爪哇的华人那么爱国？泰国、法国和美国当局分别对当时不断变化的国际和地方社会政治环境下的民族主义运动有什么反应？简而言之，虽然中国民族主义的兴起无疑是运动背后的普遍驱动力之一，但民族主义本身不足以解释运动的运作方式。 为了更好地理解这个议题，需要进行更多关于海外华人与当地政治的比较研究。

119 Anru Xu, 'Huiyi Yuenan huaqiao de aiguo jiuwang yundong' [Recollections of the NSM of the Vietamese Chinese], Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji 30, 89 (1986): 66-9; Ying Du, 'Canjia Taiguo huaqiao kangri jiuwang yundong de huiyi' [Recollections of participating in the Thai Chinese NSM], Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji 36, 105 (1986): 83-5.
119 安如许，'回忆越南华侨的救亡运动' [回忆越南华侨的救亡运动]，文史资料选辑 30，89 (1986): 66-9； 应笃，'参加泰国华侨抗日救亡运动的回忆' [参加泰国华侨抗日救亡运动的回忆]，文史资料选辑 36，105 (1986): 83-5。

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