Although the 1949 cease-fire lines became the internationally recognized political borders of Israel, they were seen by many in the Israeli military as indefensible. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} Since neither Israel nor the Arab states which signed the 1949 cease-fire agreements believed that the new lines would mark a permanent international border and since both had territorial ambitions and military plans beyond them, these lines never hardened into physically fortified borders of substance; in some places they were marked by a shallow ditch, in others by a flimsy fence. After the 1967 war, the new cease-fire lines - marked by the Suez Canal, the Jordan River and the Syrian Golan Heights - were perceived as a completion of sorts: the creation of a territorial form that resonated with the phantasmagorical Zionist dream of the ‘complete land of Israel’. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} These new boundaries were also thought to form the strategic enclosure that would buttress the defence of the state. Yet the Occupied Territories, twice the size of pre-war Israel, grew large in the national imagination. A creeping agoraphobia led to frenzied and varied attempts at studying and domesticating these territories from within and efforts to fortify their edges against counter-attack from the outside. The debates around these issues within the Israeli military and government were the first to define the terms, form and the practices of the occupation thereafter. This chapter will follow the debate around the construction (1967-73) and fall (1973) of Israel’s fortification along the Suez Canal. Following military debates and battle analysis, it attempts to trace a process of ‘civilianization’ whereby ideas and organizational systems were transferred from a military to a civilian domain, resulting, in the late 1970s, in the translation of a military occupation into a civilian one.
雖然 1949 年的停火線成為以色列國際公認的政治邊界，但在以色列軍方中，許多人認為這些邊界是無法防守的。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 由於以色列和簽署 1949 年停火協議的阿拉伯國家都不相信這些新邊界會標誌著永久的國際邊界，並且雙方都有超越這些邊界的領土野心和軍事計劃，因此這些邊界從未實質上變成堅固的防禦邊界；在某些地方，它們僅用淺溝標記，在其他地方則用脆弱的圍欄標示。1967 年戰爭後，新的停火線——以蘇伊士運河、約旦河和敘利亞戈蘭高地為界——被視為某種程度上的完成：創造了一種與「完整以色列土地」的幻想猶太復國主義夢想相呼應的領土形式。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 這些新邊界也被認為形成了戰略上的包圍，將加強國家的防禦。然而，佔領區的面積是戰前以色列的兩倍，這在國家想像中變得龐大。 一種逐漸加劇的廣場恐懼症導致了對這些領土的瘋狂和多樣化的研究與馴化嘗試，並努力加強其邊界以抵禦外部的反擊。以色列軍方和政府內部對這些問題的辯論首次界定了隨後佔領的條件、形式和實踐。本章將跟隨有關以色列在蘇伊士運河沿岸的防禦工事建設（1967-73）和崩潰（1973）的辯論。通過軍事辯論和戰鬥分析，試圖追溯一個“平民化”的過程，這一過程中思想和組織系統從軍事領域轉移到平民領域，最終在 1970 年代末將軍事佔領轉化為平民佔領。

Shortly after the 1967 war, two Israeli generals of the Labor movement started engaging in attempts to fortify different fronts of the 1967 Occupied Territories. The systems conceived by Yigal Allon (Minister of Agriculture and Director of the government Settlements Committee) and Chief of Staff Chaim Bar Lev, were products of a similar territorial doctrine - one that sought to
在 1967 年戰爭結束不久後，兩位來自工黨運動的以色列將軍開始著手加強 1967 年被佔領土的不同前線。由伊戈爾·阿隆（農業部長及政府定居點委員會主任）和參謀長哈伊姆·巴爾·列夫構思的系統，是一種相似的領土學說的產物——一種旨在

establish a line of defence along the outermost edge of the territories. The Allon plan, the first draft of which was presented to the government a few weeks after the end of the war, advocated the redrawing of state borders along the main topographical feature of the region, the Great Rift Valley, the deep tectonic crack that formed the eastern edge of the territories occupied by Israel. Allon proposed to annex a strip following the length of the rift, which extended from the Golan Heights in the north, through the Jordan Valley down to the southernmost tip of the Sinai Peninsula at the Egyptian coastal town of Sharm el-Sheilkh. This strip would generate, according to Allon, ‘maximum security and maximum territory for Israel with a minimum number of Arabs’. ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} The fact that this strip was sparsely populated was due to the fact that during the war, wanting to secure its new borderlines, the Israeli military evacuated and des royed the Palestinian villages of the Jordan Valley (except the city of Jericho), the Syrian towns and villages of the Golan Heights and all Egyptian citizens but the Bedouin in the Sinai. On this generally arid and now sparsely populated sip, remote from Israeli population cenves, Allon proposed to establish a string of agricultural Kibbutz and Moshav settlements, as well as several paramilitary outposts of the NAHAL Corps - the settlements arm of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} Although never officially endorsed by the government, the Allon plan was gradually put into effect during the first decade of the Israeli occupation under Labor administrations. The settlements in the Jordan Valley in the far eastern edge of the West Bank were to fortify this border along the Jordan River. Their establishment was perceived as the regeneration of Labor Zionism and the revival of its agricultural pioneering
在領土的最外緣建立防線。阿隆計劃的初稿在戰爭結束幾週後提交給政府，主張根據該地區的主要地形特徵——大裂谷，重新劃定國界。大裂谷是形成以色列佔領領土東邊緣的深層構造裂縫。阿隆提議併吞一條沿著裂谷延伸的地帶，該地帶從北部的戈蘭高地延伸，經約旦河谷一直到西奈半島的最南端，即埃及沿海城鎮沙姆沙伊赫。根據阿隆的說法，這條地帶將為以色列帶來「最大的安全和最大的領土，並且阿拉伯人數量最少」。這條地帶人口稀少的事實是因為在戰爭期間，以色列軍方為了保護其新邊界，撤離並摧毀了約旦河谷的巴勒斯坦村莊（除了耶利哥市）、戈蘭高地的敘利亞城鎮和村莊，以及西奈的所有埃及公民，除了貝都因人。 在這個通常乾旱且現在人口稀少的地區，遠離以色列人口中心，阿隆提議建立一系列農業基布茲和摩沙夫定居點，以及幾個以色列國防軍（IDF）下的 NAHAL 部隊的準軍事哨所。 ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} 雖然從未得到政府的正式支持，但阿隆計劃在以色列佔領的第一個十年內逐漸付諸實施，當時由工黨政府主導。約旦河谷的定居點位於約旦河的西岸最東邊，旨在加強這條邊界。它們的建立被視為工人猶太復國主義的再生和其農業開拓精神的復興。

Construction of the Bar Lev Line, circa 1971. Film stills, IDF film unit. Inages courtesy of IP
巴爾·列夫防線的建設，大約在 1971 年。電影靜態畫面，以色列國防軍電影單位。圖片由 IP 提供。
spirit. Agriculture in this axid landscape, sustained by over-extraction of water from the mountain aquifer, was seen, according to the common Zionist slogan, as an attempt to ‘make the desert bloom’. ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} The Jordan Valley was conceived as a hybrid military/civilian defensive zone, split by four parallel roads that strung together military bases and agricultural settlements. In the event of an armoured invasion from the east, the valley’s cultivated fields would be flooded, and the settlements hardened into fortified positions that would allow the military to organize and channel invading forces into designated zones of Israeli ire. Moreover, the inhabitation of the area by a civilian population, rather than military bases, was to demonstrate, according to Allon, Israel’s political resolve to annex this frontier zone.
精神。在這片由山區含水層過度開採水資源所維持的酸性景觀中，根據普遍的猶太復國主義口號，農業被視為一種“讓沙漠綻放”的嘗試。約旦河谷被構想為一個混合的軍事/民用防禦區，通過四條平行道路將軍事基地和農業定居點串聯起來。在東方發生裝甲入侵的情況下，該谷地的耕作田地將被淹沒，而定居點則加固為防禦工事，這將使軍方能夠組織並引導入侵部隊進入以色列的指定憤怒區域。此外，根據阿隆的說法，該地區由平民而非軍事基地居住，旨在展示以色列對併吞這一邊界區域的政治決心。

The Bar Lev Line was the military counterpart of the Allon plan, attempting to achieve with military strongholds what the Allon plan sought to achieve with a combination of civilian and military ones. Fearing international pressure and a possible replay of the 1956 Suez Crisis, when the US administration forced Israel (as well as France and Britain) to retreat from the areas they had occupied in Egypt, Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan did not want the IDF to reach the Suez Canal at all during the 1967 war. The IDF gained the canal regardless during the third day of the war, out of its own tactical inertia. Immediately after the war, Dayan advocated a retreat from the canal. Following the advice of Allon, however, Dayan’s chief political nival, Prime Minister Levy Eshkol, and later Golda Meir, wanted to keep the canal under Israeli concol, and close it to all shipping, in order to pressure the Egyptian government into signing a peace treaty on
巴爾·列夫防線是阿隆計劃的軍事對應，試圖通過軍事據點實現阿隆計劃所希望通過民用和軍用手段達成的目標。由於擔心國際壓力以及可能重演 1956 年蘇伊士運河危機的情況，當時美國政府迫使以色列（以及法國和英國）撤出他們在埃及佔領的地區，國防部長摩西·戴揚在 1967 年戰爭期間不希望以色列國防軍完全抵達蘇伊士運河。儘管如此，以色列國防軍在戰爭的第三天仍然因其自身的戰術慣性獲得了運河。戰後，戴揚主張從運河撤退。然而，根據阿隆的建議，戴揚的首席政治顧問、總理列維·艾什科爾，以及後來的戈爾達·梅厄，則希望將運河保持在以色列的控制之下，並關閉所有航運，以迫使埃及政府簽署和平條約。

Ariel Sharon, Chief of Southern Command (last in line, on left); Cbaim Bar Lev, Cbief of Staff (centre, on leff); and David Ben-Gurion, on the Bar Lev Line, Suez Canal, 1971
亞里爾·沙龍，南方指揮部首長（左側最後一位）；卡比姆·巴爾·列夫，參謀長（左側中間）；以及大衛·本·古里安，於巴爾·列夫防線，蘇伊士運河，1971 年

Israel’s terms. Dayan, on the other hand, did not want an agreement at all, and thought that a tactical retreat from the canal would allow Israel to permanently hold onto the rest of the Sinai Peninsula. Bar Lev was asked to provide a technical solution for fortifying the Canal against Egyptian attack. He set up a team, headed by his loyal divisional commander, Avraham Adan, to design the system of fortifications. Adan approached the design with the enthusiasm of a young architect on his firstcommission, researching historical examples and building scale models. His main influence, he later claimed in his autobiography, was the architecture of the fortications of Kibbutz Nirim in the Negev desert, one of the settlements that had become the focus of a Zionist myth after it had successfully resisted the Egyptian army in the war of $1948.{}^6$$1948.{}^6$1948.^(6)1948 .{ }^{6} Adan took a month to design the fortification system, after which construction work immediately began.
以色列的條件。另一方面，戴揚根本不想達成協議，並認為從運河進行戰術撤退將使以色列能夠永久控制西奈半島的其餘部分。巴爾·列夫被要求提供一個技術解決方案，以加強運河對埃及攻擊的防禦。他組建了一個團隊，由他忠誠的師長阿夫拉罕·阿丹負責，設計防禦工事系統。阿丹以年輕建築師首次承接委託的熱情來接近設計，研究歷史範例並製作縮尺模型。他後來在自傳中聲稱，他的主要影響來自於內蓋夫沙漠基布茲尼里姆的防禦工事建築，該地點在成功抵抗埃及軍隊的戰爭後，成為了猶太復國主義神話的焦點。阿丹花了一個月的時間設計防禦系統，隨後立即開始施工。

However, the Bar Lev Line was not so much a product of planned construction as the result of incremental evolution - a series of ‘solutions’ based upon Adan’s system to protect military forces under constant artillery fire. During the intense skirmishes of 1968-71, later known as the ‘War of Atwition’, the Line gradually became an immense infrastructural undertaking. Huge quantities of sand were shifted across the desert and piled along the eastern bank of the canal to form an artificial landscape 20 metres high, with a 45-degree incline on the side facing the Canal, and 200 kilometres long. Thirty-five Ma’ozim (strongholds), named after the fortification system in Adan’s Kibbutz, each designed for twentyfive to thirty soldiers, were situated on the sand dyke at 10 -kilometre intervals,
然而，巴爾·列夫防線並不是計劃建設的產物，而是逐步演變的結果——一系列基於阿丹系統的“解決方案”，旨在保護在持續炮火下的軍事部隊。在 1968 年至 1971 年的激烈小規模衝突中，後來被稱為“消耗戰”，該防線逐漸成為一項龐大的基礎設施工程。大量沙子被運輸到沙漠中，並堆積在運河的東岸，形成一個高達 20 米的人工景觀，面向運河的一側呈 45 度傾斜，長達 200 公里。三十五個馬奧齊姆（據點），以阿丹基布茲的防禦系統命名，每個設計容納二十五到三十名士兵，分佈在沙壩上，間隔 10 公里。
overlooking the Egyptian line a mere 200 metres away. The strongholds had deep underground bunkers, fortified by crushed rocks in nets and a fencing system made from steel lifted from the Cairo-El-Arish railway and other abandoned Egyptian agricultural equipment, and were surrounded by minefields. The entire length of the line contained emplacements for tanks, artillery pieces, mortars and machine guns. Unlike other systems of fortifications that used concrete and so could always be destroyed with enough explosive, the sand ramparts of the Bar Lev Line were designed to absorb and dissipate the impact of bombardment. The fortification thus seemed complete, and the Israeli government consequently did not feel it had to rush to the negotiating table. Since the balance of power was apparently tilted in Israel’s favour, it was generally thought that Egypt would not risk attacking. This assessment was known in the Israeli security circles as ‘the concept’.
俯瞰埃及防線，距離僅有 200 米。這些據點擁有深層地下掩體，使用網狀的碎石加固，並由從開羅-艾爾阿里什鐵路和其他被遺棄的埃及農業設備中提取的鋼材製成的圍欄系統圍繞，周圍則是地雷區。整條防線設有坦克、火炮、迫擊炮和機槍的陣地。與其他使用混凝土的防禦系統不同，這些混沙土壘的設計旨在吸收和消散轟炸的衝擊。因此，這一防禦似乎是完整的，以至於以色列政府因此不覺得需要急於進入談判桌。由於力量平衡顯然偏向以色列，普遍認為埃及不會冒險發動攻擊。這一評估在以色列安全界被稱為「概念」。

Meanwhile, in 1971, on the other side of the Suez Canal, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat appointed Lieutenant-General Sa’ad El Shazly as Chief of the Egyptian Military Staff. Shazly’s task was to mastermind the storming of the Bar Lev Line. In his book, The Crossing of the Canal, ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} Shazly illustrated the Bar-Lev Line with the pride of a person describing an obstacle successfully breached: "the Suez canal was unique. Unique in the difficulties its construction presented to an amphibious assault force. Unique in its scale of defences the enemy had erected on top of those natural obstacles [. . . ] To all that saw it, the Suez Canal seemed an impassable barrier . . .’ The first and most difficult obstacle was the water in the canal, 'the second obstacle was a gigantic sand dune built by the enemy along the length of the eastern bank. For six years, Israeli bulldozers had laboriously piled the sand ever higher - their most sustained effort coming, naturally, at likely crossing points . . Above this formidable barrier rose the third obstacle: the 35 forts of the Bar Lev line . . . Hidden from our view, the enemy could manoeuvre its armour to reinforce any sudden weak point . . .8
同時，在 1971 年，在蘇伊士運河的另一側，埃及總統安瓦爾·薩達特任命薩阿德·艾爾·沙茲利中將為埃及軍事參謀長。沙茲利的任務是策劃攻佔巴爾·列夫防線。在他的書《穿越運河》中，沙茲利以一種描述成功突破障礙的人的自豪感來描繪巴爾·列夫防線：“蘇伊士運河是獨特的。它在建設過程中對兩棲攻擊部隊所帶來的困難是獨一無二的。敵人在這些自然障礙上所建立的防禦規模也是獨特的……對所有看到它的人來說，蘇伊士運河似乎是一道不可逾越的障礙……第一個也是最困難的障礙是運河中的水，‘第二個障礙是敵人在東岸沿線修建的巨大沙丘。六年來，以色列的推土機費力地將沙子堆得越來越高——他們最持續的努力，自然是在可能的渡口……在這道可怕的障礙上升起了第三個障礙：巴爾·列夫防線的 35 座堡壘……敵人隱藏在我們的視線之外，可以靈活調動其裝甲來加強任何突發的弱點……

Shazly contended that one of the major aims of the giant earth rampart of the Bar Lev Line was to deny the Egyptian armies a view of Israeli positions in the Sinai, while simultaneously creating the artificial topographical conditions that would allow Israelis to observe Egyptian territory. The rare advantage gained by Soviet anti-aircraft missile technology over Western fighter jets in the early 1970s, led to aerial photography missions becoming precarious, and had the effect of flattening the battlefield into a horizontal, two-dimensional surface in which the ground, eye-level perspective was reinvested with strategic significance. From the Egyptian army’s point of view, the Bar Lev Line was a visual barrier. The dyke created an immediate limit to their observational field, making a ‘blind zone’ that denied them the view of their occupied territories.
Shazly 主張，巴爾·列夫防線的巨大土壩的主要目標之一是阻止埃及軍隊觀察西奈的以色列陣地，同時創造出能讓以色列人觀察埃及領土的人工地形條件。1970 年代初期，蘇聯的防空導彈技術相對於西方戰鬥機所獲得的稀有優勢，使得空中攝影任務變得危險，並使戰場的平面化成為一個水平的、二維的表面，地面和眼平視角重新獲得了戰略意義。從埃及軍隊的角度來看，巴爾·列夫防線是一道視覺障礙。這道堤壩立即限制了他們的觀察範圍，形成了一個“盲區”，使他們無法看到被佔領的領土。

From the moment that construction started on the Bar Lev Line, barely three
從巴爾·列夫防線開始建設的那一刻起，幾乎三
months after the 1967 war, Ariel Sharon, then director of military training, began challenging the strategy of defence it embodied. This initiated the first major debate within the Israeli General Staff concerning Israel’s concept of defence. It was seen as a crucial issue over which Sharon, together with a handful of other officers - Istael Tal, Rafael Eitan and Matitiyahu Peled - were to clash repeatedly with the rest of the General Staff. The argument was polarized in increasingly geometrical terms, until the defence proposals became fully embodied within two spatial models, both derived from existing military vocabulary: linear fortification and a dynamic defence nested in a network of strongpoints in depth.’ Sharon publicly accused his superiors of ignorance and stupidity, blaming them for the mounting war casualties along the construction site of the Line, and demanded that the static defence embodied in what he called ‘the Istaeli Maginot Line’ be abandoned and replaced with a flexible system of ‘defence in depth’ comprising independent strongpoints located on hilltops in an area stretching far back from the frontline, in a way that would allow military units to travel between these strongpoints, and, in case of invasion, attack the enemy’s flank and surround it.
在 1967 年戰爭後的幾個月，當時的軍事訓練主任阿里埃爾·沙龍開始質疑其所體現的防禦策略。這引發了以色列總參謀部內部關於以色列防禦概念的第一次重大辯論。這被視為一個關鍵問題，沙龍與其他幾位軍官——伊斯特爾·塔爾、拉斐爾·艾坦和馬提提亞胡·佩萊德——將與總參謀部的其餘成員反覆發生衝突。 該論點以越來越幾何化的術語極端化，直到防禦提案完全體現在兩個空間模型中，這兩者均源自現有的軍事詞彙：線性防禦工事和嵌套在深度強點網絡中的動態防禦。沙龍公開指責他的上級無知和愚蠢，將沿著邊界建設工地的戰爭傷亡歸咎於他們，並要求放棄他所稱的「以色列馬其頓防線」所體現的靜態防禦，取而代之的是一種靈活的「深度防禦」系統，該系統由位於前線後方延伸區域的獨立強點組成，這樣可以讓軍事單位在這些強點之間移動，並在入侵的情況下攻擊敵人的側翼並包圍它。

This debate, and Sharon’s role in it, corroborated in later accounts of the 1973 war, was to become one of the most con roversial chapters in Israeli military history, so much so that the IDF has not yet published an official account of the war - partly because Sharon mobilized all his political weight to suppress it. Among the other reasons for the ambiguous and incomplete historical record is that most of the war’s leading protagonists, Istaeli and Egyptian, who physically and politically survived it, continued in political life. Their military autobiographies, as well as other oral and written accounts, contain widely differing interpretations of events that were mobilized in support for or in resistance to the dramatic political transformations of the post-1973 war period. During these processes the military achievements of the various generals as well as the performance of different units acquired immense political significance, with the constantly changing historiographies of the 1973 war tied to the political fates and fortunes of its main players. In the Israeli popular imagination, the linear, static, Bar Lev Line embodied the failing Labor Party, whereas the dynamic, flexible network promoted by Sharon, and especially the concept of ‘depth’ on which it relied, was later associated with a rejuvenated Israeli right and with the opening of Israel’s state frontiers. Accounts that foregrounded Sharon’s role in the war were generally associated with political attacks on the Labour government. After 1973, the decline of the Labour administration and the rise to power four years later of the right-wing Likud retrospectively gave more prominence to Sharon’s military role in 1973, projecting him as a national hero. The US military has itself contributed to the creation of the myth of Sharon as a ‘military genius’, finding in him a model of command according to which they could inspire military
這場辯論，以及沙龍在其中的角色，在後來對 1973 年戰爭的描述中得到了證實，將成為以色列軍事歷史上最具爭議的篇章之一，以至於以色列國防軍至今尚未發布該戰爭的官方記錄，部分原因是沙龍動用了他所有的政治影響力來壓制這一點。造成模糊和不完整歷史記錄的其他原因是，大多數在戰爭中身體上和政治上倖存的主要參與者，以色列人和埃及人，繼續參與政治生活。他們的軍事自傳以及其他口述和書面記錄，對於支持或抵抗 1973 年戰後劇變的事件，包含了截然不同的解釋。在這些過程中，各位將軍的軍事成就以及不同部隊的表現獲得了巨大的政治意義，1973 年戰爭的歷史學不斷變化，與其主要參與者的政治命運和運勢息息相關。 在以色列的民眾想像中，線性、靜態的巴爾·列夫防線體現了失敗的工黨，而沙龍所推動的動態、靈活的網絡，特別是其所依賴的“深度”概念，則後來與重振的以色列右翼及以色列國家邊界的開放相關聯。強調沙龍在戰爭中角色的敘述通常與對工黨政府的政治攻擊相關聯。1973 年之後，工黨政府的衰退以及四年後右翼利庫德黨的上台，回顧起來使沙龍在 1973 年的軍事角色更加突出，將他塑造成國家英雄。美國軍方本身也助長了沙龍作為“軍事天才”的神話，將他視為一種指揮的典範，從中激勵軍事。
ransformation after the failures of their armies in Vietnam. Ariel Sharon’s rapid, albeit not untypical, transformation from a popular military general to minister in charge of settlement activity in the first Likud government of 1977 allowed him to translate military doctrine and the principles of a dynamic battlefield into planning practices of civilian settlements and the creation of political ‘facts on the ground’.
在他們的軍隊在越南失敗後的轉型。阿里埃爾·沙龍從一位受歡迎的軍事將領迅速轉變為 1977 年第一屆利庫德政府中負責定居活動的部長，這雖然不是不典型，但使他能夠將軍事教義和動態戰場的原則轉化為民用定居點的規劃實踐，以及在地面上創造政治“事實”。

Throughout his military career, Sharon has become the personification of the Israeli ‘myth of the frontier’, ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} which celebrated the ransgression of lines and borders of all kinds. Like its American predecessor, the Israeli frontier was understood as a mythical space that shaped the character and institutions of the nation. It was also a laboratory for the emergence of and experimentation with new spatial strategies and territorial forms. According to the Israeli sociologist Adriana Kemp, between 1948 and 1967 the Istaeli state created a series of ‘rhetorical and institutional mechanisms’ that presented the frontier region as the symbolic centre of the nation, ‘a laboratory for the creation of a “new Jew”’."
在他的軍事生涯中，沙龍已成為以色列“邊疆神話”的具象化，這種神話讚美了各種界線和邊界的跨越。與其美國前身類似，以色列的邊疆被理解為一個神話空間，塑造了國家的性格和機構。它也是新空間策略和領土形式出現及實驗的實驗室。根據以色列社會學家阿德里安娜·肯普的說法，在 1948 年至 1967 年間，以色列國創造了一系列“修辭和制度機制”，將邊疆地區呈現為國家的象徵中心，“一個創造‘新猶太人’的實驗室”。

The establishment of Special Commando Unit 101 for the purpose of frontier raids, under the command of Ariel Sharon, became central to the blurring of state borders and for the distinction it created between the idea of what constituted ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the political state. Throughout its several-month independent lifespan in the second half of 1953, the unit ransgressed, breached and distorted borders of different kinds: geopolitical - its operations crossed the borders of the state; hierarchical - its members did not fully obey orders and operational outlines and often acted on theirowninitiatives; disciplinary - they wore no uniforms, and expressed an arrogant intolerance, encouraged by and embodied in Sharon himself, of all formalities perceived as urbane and outmoded ‘military procedures and bureaucracy’; and legal - the nature of their operations and their flagrant disregard for civilian life broke both the law of the Israeli state as well as international law. Although Unit 101’s activities mostly constituted the slaughter of unarmed Palestinian civilians in villages and refugee camps, and its most infamous ‘attack’ was the killing of 60 unprotected civilians in the West Bank village of Qibia, it quickly cultivated a mythic status that greatly appealed to the imagination of Israeli youth. According to Moshe Dayan, who acted as a mentor to both the unit and Sharon personally, Unit 101 was ‘a workshop for the creation of a new generation of [Hebrew] warriors’. Dayan also believed that it served a national purpose beyond the narrow military one. By turning the frontier into a mythical space and ‘border transgression . . . into a symbolic practice and a spatial ritual’,
為了進行邊境突襲而成立的特種突擊隊 101，在阿里埃爾·沙龍的指揮下，成為模糊國家邊界的核心，並創造了「內部」與「外部」政治國家的區別。在 1953 年下半年獨立存在的幾個月中，該部隊越過、違反並扭曲了不同類型的邊界：地緣政治 - 其行動跨越了國家的邊界；階層 - 其成員並未完全遵從命令和行動大綱，經常根據自己的主觀意願行動；紀律 - 他們不穿制服，並表現出一種傲慢的不可容忍，這種態度在沙龍本人身上得到了鼓勵和體現，對所有被視為世俗和過時的「軍事程序和官僚主義」的形式表示不屑；法律 - 他們的行動性質及對平民生活的公然漠視違反了以色列國的法律以及國際法。 雖然 101 單位的活動大多構成了對無武裝的巴勒斯坦平民在村莊和難民營中的屠殺，而其最臭名昭著的“攻擊”是殺害了 60 名在約旦河西岸基比亞村的無防護平民，但它迅速培養出一種神話般的地位，對以色列青年有著極大的吸引力。根據摩西·戴揚的說法，他既是該單位的導師，也是沙龍的個人導師，101 單位是“創造新一代[希伯來]戰士的工坊”。戴揚還認為，它超越了狹隘的軍事目的，服務於一個國家層面的目的。通過將邊界轉變為一個神話空間，並將“邊界越界……轉變為一種象徵性實踐和空間儀式”，
it signified the fact that the borders of the Israeli state were liquid and permeable, presenting its territoriality as a still incomplete project. ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12}
它象徵著以色列國家的邊界是流動和可滲透的，將其領土性呈現為一個尚未完成的項目。

Unit 101 also short-circuited hierarchies within the IDF and between it and the political system, connecting Sharon, then still in his twenties, in a close strategic wiangle with Dayan and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Although this triumvirate made many of the strategic decisions during 1953, Dayan and Sharon often conspired together to mislead the ‘old man’, while Sharon himself became accustomed to misleading Dayan as to the real extent of Unit 101’s operations. But these lies were in fact a central facet of the triumvirate’s relationship. Sharon was selected for his post because, from the outset, he never asked for written orders, thereby giving Dayan and Ben-Gurion the option to deny responsibility for or knowledge of operations whenever they chose. The command style of the two men was oblique, implicit; they were accustomed to giving orders in a tangential manner: 'would it not be good if [this or that] had taken place . . . ${}^{n3}$${}^{n3}$^(n3){ }^{n 3} Dayan’s orders were always oral and ambiguous: Shlomo Gazit, one of his deputies, once observed of his commander that ‘he doesn’t lnow how to write’. ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} This tendency for the need to interpret Dayan’s speech rather than follow his orders gradually became common knowledge in the military to the degree that it could help explain how Israeli soldiers got to the canal despite Dayans orders. During the 1967 war, when Dayan ordered forces to stop short of reaching the Suez Canal, his subordinate officers were wondering ‘what does he mean when he says “stop”?’ According to Sharon’s biographer, Uzi Benziman, throughout his career Sharon was continuously promoted by Dayan because he understood the logic and potential in Dayan’s ambiguity and because he was willing to perform ‘every bad thing that Israel needed to carty out but didn’t want to be associated with - there were no orders needed, only a wink . . . and Sharon would carry out the dirty job’. ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} Dayan, however, never stopped seeing Sharon as a political rival. At the end of December 1953, upon Dayan becoming chief of staff, he adopted 101 as the model for the transformation of the rest of the IDF, merging the unit with the paratroopers, and placing Sharon in charge of both. In the following twenty years, until the 1973 wat, the IDF was central to the formation of Israeli identity. Most Israelis accordingly saw ‘parciotism’ in military terms. Sharon had a central role in this process.
單位 101 也在以色列國防軍內部及其與政治體系之間短路了階層，將當時仍在二十多歲的沙龍與戴揚及總理大衛·本-古里安緊密地聯繫在一起。儘管這個三人組在 1953 年期間做出了許多戰略決策，但戴揚和沙龍經常合謀誤導“老頭”，而沙龍自己也習慣於對戴揚隱瞞單位 101 行動的真實範圍。但這些謊言實際上是三人組關係的核心面向。沙龍之所以被選中擔任此職位，是因為從一開始，他從未要求書面命令，這使得戴揚和本-古里安在任何時候都可以選擇否認對行動的責任或知情。這兩位男性的指揮風格是間接的、隱含的；他們習慣於以旁敲側擊的方式下達命令：“如果[這或那]發生了，會不會很好……”。戴揚的命令總是口頭的且模糊不清：他的副手之一施洛莫·加齊特曾經觀察到他的指揮官“他不知道怎麼寫”。 ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} 這種需要解釋戴揚演講而非遵循其命令的趨勢，逐漸成為軍中共識，以至於可以幫助解釋以色列士兵如何在戴揚的命令下抵達運河。在 1967 年戰爭中，當戴揚命令部隊停止於蘇伊士運河之前時，他的下屬軍官們在想「他所說的‘停止’是什麼意思？」根據沙龍的傳記作者烏齊·本齊曼的說法，在他的職業生涯中，沙龍不斷受到戴揚的提拔，因為他理解戴揚模糊性中的邏輯和潛力，並且願意執行「以色列需要但不想與之相關的每一件壞事——不需要命令，只需一個眼色……沙龍就會完成髒活」。 ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} 然而，戴揚從未停止將沙龍視為政治對手。在 1953 年 12 月底，當戴揚成為參謀長時，他採用了 101 作為其餘以色列國防軍轉型的模型，將該部隊與空降兵合併，並將沙龍置於兩者的指揮之下。 在接下來的二十年裡，直到 1973 年的戰爭，以色列國防軍在以色列身份的形成中扮演了核心角色。因此，大多數以色列人將「愛國主義」視為軍事術語。沙龍在這一過程中扮演了中心角色。

Sharon’s view of the static linear fortification of the Bar Lev Line after the 1967 war was typically forthright. As he later wrote: ‘from the beginning I felt that such a line of fortifications would be a disastrous error … we would be committing ourselves to static defence. We would be making fixed targets of ourselves . . .
沙龍對 1967 年戰爭後巴爾·列夫防線靜態線性防禦工事的看法一向直言不諱。正如他後來所寫的：「從一開始我就感覺到這樣的防禦工事將是一個災難性的錯誤……我們將會承諾靜態防禦。我們將會使自己成為固定目標……」

“Plan Sirius”, manking Israeli fortifications in the Suer Canal zone before October 1973. The strongpoints, organized in depth, are marked as brown ‘ggos’.
“天狼星計劃”，在 1973 年 10 月之前標記以色列在蘇伊士運河地區的防禦工事。這些強點以深度組織，標記為棕色的「ggos」。
our positions and movements would be under constant surveillance. Our procedures would become common knowledge. Our patrols and supply convoys would be vulnerable to ambushes, mining, and shelling.’ The IDF, Shaton claimed, 'cannot win a defensive battle on an outer [canal] line …'He proposed instead that it should 'fight a defensive battle the way it should be fought - not on a forward line but in depth . . . ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16} Sharon’s alternative military strategy had the advantage of providing weight to Dayan’s politically sensitive argument that the Suez Canal be abandoned; in developing it, Sharon was most likely encouraged by Dayan off the record - but officially, Dayan chose not to intervene.
我們的立場和行動將受到持續的監視。我們的程序將成為公開的知識。我們的巡邏和補給車隊將容易受到伏擊、布雷和炮擊。IDF，沙龍聲稱，「無法在外圍[運河]線上贏得防禦戰……」他提議應該「以正確的方式進行防禦戰 - 不是在前線，而是在深度……」沙龍的替代軍事策略的優勢在於為戴揚在政治上敏感的論點提供了支持，即放棄蘇伊士運河；在發展這一策略時，沙龍很可能在非正式場合受到戴揚的鼓勵 - 但官方上，戴揚選擇不介入。

Militarily speaking, Sharon’s system was a flexible adaptation of the traditional doctrine of defence in depth. It was based upon a series of strongpoints, which Sharon called Ta’ozim to differentiate them from Adan’s Ma’ozim (strongholds), spread out on a series of hilltops at tactically important locations, overlooking the canal from a distance of about a dozen kilometres. Between these strongpoints, Sharon proposed to run unscheduled and unpredictable mobile patrols. The rationale behind this arrangement was to deny the Egyptian army an obvious target, a fixed layout against which they could plan their attack. Unlike Bar Lev, Sharon believed an attack on the Israeli defensive line on the Suez Canal
從軍事角度來看，沙龍的體系是對傳統深度防禦學說的靈活調整。它基於一系列強點，沙龍稱之為塔奧齊姆，以區別於阿丹的馬奧齊姆（據點），這些強點分佈在一系列戰略重要的山頂上，俯瞰著距運河約十公里的距離。在這些強點之間，沙龍提議進行不定期和不可預測的機動巡邏。這種安排的理由是要使埃及軍隊無法找到明顯的目標，無法針對固定的佈局來計劃攻擊。與巴爾·列夫不同，沙龍認為對以色列在蘇伊士運河的防線的攻擊是不可避免的；因此，他試圖掩蓋以色列國防軍的防禦組織。
was unavoidable and inevitable; accordingly, he sought to disguise the IDF’s defensive organization.
是不可避免的；因此，他試圖掩蓋以色列國防軍的防禦組織。

Sharon’s defensive plan aimed to maximize visual synergy, lines of fire and movement across the terrain. The isolated, semi-autonomous strongpoints were to be located so that each could be seen from those adjacent to it, and spaced apart at the distance of artillery fire so that they could cover each other. The strongholds were essentially command and logistic centres from where what Sharon called ‘armoured fists’ - tank battalions - could be mobilized against the enemy’s main effort in crossing the canal. Moreover, equipped with command, control and longrange surveillance facilities, underground bunkers, anti-aircraft positions and emplacements for tanks and artillery, each strongpoint had a semi-independent battle capacity. ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} An expanding network of roads and signal stations was to weave the strongpoints together. Towards the rear, the emplacements gave way to military training bases, airfields, camps, depots, maintenance facilities and headquarters.
沙龍的防禦計劃旨在最大化視覺協同、火力線和地形上的移動。孤立的半自主據點應該設置在可以相互看到的位置，並且間隔在炮火的距離內，以便能夠相互掩護。這些據點本質上是指揮和後勤中心，從這裡可以調動沙龍所稱的「裝甲拳頭」——坦克營，對抗敵軍在渡過運河時的主要攻勢。此外，每個據點配備了指揮、控制和遠程監視設施、地下掩體、防空陣地以及坦克和炮兵的陣地，具有半獨立的戰鬥能力。擴展的道路和信號站網絡將這些據點聯繫在一起。在後方，陣地讓位於軍事訓練基地、機場、營地、倉庫、維修設施和指揮部。

While unable to convince the IDF General Staff of his plans for the Sinai, Sharon, in his role as director of training, dispersed the various training schools under his command throughout the depth of the West Bank. Moreover, Sharon saw military installations as a first stage in the domestication and naturalization of the vast Occupied Territories: the layout and infrastructure of the camps were to become the blueprint for their civilian colonization by settlements. ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} Beyond that, it was an innovative geographical time/ space arrangement with the system of defence in depth requiring a different form of military organization. ${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19} Linear fortifications rely on the ability of central command to control all areas of the extended linear battlefield equally; in contrast, defence in depth seeks the relative dispersal of military authority and the increased autonomy of each semi-independent battle unit ${}^{20}$${}^{20}$^(20){ }^{20}
雖然無法說服以色列國防軍總參謀部接受他對西奈的計劃，沙龍作為訓練主任，將他指揮下的各種訓練學校分散到約旦河西岸的深處。此外，沙龍將軍事設施視為對廣大被佔領土的馴化和自然化的第一階段：營地的佈局和基礎設施將成為定居點對其進行民事殖民的藍圖。超越這一點，這是一種創新的地理時間/空間安排，深度防禦系統需要不同形式的軍事組織。線性防禦工事依賴於中央指揮能夠平等控制擴展的線性戰場的所有區域；相反，深度防禦則尋求軍事權威的相對分散和每個半獨立戰鬥單位的自主性增加。

Although nested in traditional military hierarchies, the system’s diffusion of the command structure allows independent units to develop what the military calls ‘flexible responsiveness’, according to which local commanders can act independently, on their own initiative, and in response to emergent necessities and opportunities without referring to central command. Diffused command has been a standard component part of a military response to the chaotic nature of battles in which chains of command and communication are often severed and the overall picture of battle is often blurred. Sharon’s command style was well suited to such a situation. It was encapsulated in his oft-repeated statement ‘tell me what to do but don’t tell me how to do it’. Although this was indicative of the command style of the IDF, Sharon took it further, seeking to break as much as possible with standard command structures and organizational forms. Equally, he often avoided - or pretended to avoid - intervening in his subordinates’ actions, providing them only with general guidelines and making them believe that they themselves had planned their own missions.
儘管嵌入傳統的軍事階層中，該系統的指揮結構擴散使得獨立單位能夠發展軍方所稱的「靈活應變」，根據這一原則，地方指揮官可以獨立行動，根據自己的主動性以及對緊急需求和機會的反應，而無需向中央指揮報告。擴散指揮一直是軍事應對戰鬥混亂特性的標準組成部分，在這種情況下，指揮和通信鏈經常被切斷，戰鬥的整體情況往往模糊不清。沙龍的指揮風格非常適合這種情況。這一點在他經常重複的話中得到了體現：「告訴我該做什麼，但不要告訴我怎麼做。」儘管這表明了以色列國防軍的指揮風格，沙龍卻進一步推進，力求儘可能打破標準的指揮結構和組織形式。同樣，他經常避免——或假裝避免——干預下屬的行動，只提供一般指導，讓他們相信自己已經計劃了自己的任務。

If the principle of linear defence is to prohibit (or inhibit) the enemy from gaining a foothold beyond it, when the line is breached at a single location - much like a leaking bucket of water - it is rendered useless. A network defence, on the other hand, is flexible. If one or more of its stongpoints are attacked and captured, the system can adapt itself by forming new connections across its depth. The category of ‘depth’ is thus not only spatial but conceptual, and is used to describe the level of synergy between various elements that compose a military system. The degree of a system’s depth lies in its distributed capacity to reorganize connections, and the degree to which these connections can permit, regulate and respond to information flow from strongpoints positioned in other areas in the battlefield. The relation between the system’s components is a relative figure defined by the speed and security of travel across its depth, between the different strongpoints. ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21}
如果線性防禦的原則是禁止（或抑制）敵人獲得超越它的立足點，那麼當防線在某一位置被突破時——就像一個漏水的水桶——它便失去了效用。另一方面，網絡防禦是靈活的。如果其一個或多個強點受到攻擊並被佔領，系統可以通過在其深度上形成新的連接來適應。因而，“深度”這一類別不僅是空間上的，也是概念上的，用來描述組成軍事系統的各種元素之間的協同程度。系統深度的程度在於其重新組織連接的分佈能力，以及這些連接能夠允許、調節和響應來自戰場其他區域強點的信息流的程度。系統組件之間的關係是一個相對的數字，由其深度中不同強點之間的旅行速度和安全性來定義。

While the rationale of the Bar Lev Line was to stop the Egyptians from disturbing the geopolitical status quo that the line delineated, Sharon’s plan conversely encouraged an Egyptian attack; Israeli forces would then counterattack the moment the enemy’s supply lines became overextended: ${}^{22}$${}^{22}$^(22){ }^{22} 'If the Egyptians did try, to cross [the canal], we could afford to let them get a mile or two inside the Sinai. Then we would be able to harass them and probe for their weak points at our convenience . . . [after which] we would be in a position to launch the kind of free-flowing mobile attack we were really good at. ${}^{23}$${}^{23}$^(23){ }^{23}
巴爾·列夫防線的理由是阻止埃及人擾亂該防線所劃定的地緣政治現狀，而沙龍的計劃則相反，鼓勵埃及發動攻擊；以色列軍隊將在敵人的補給線過度延伸的瞬間進行反擊： ${}^{22}$${}^{22}$^(22){ }^{22} 「如果埃及人真的試圖越過[運河]，我們可以允許他們進入西奈一兩英里。然後我們將能夠在方便的時候對他們進行騷擾並探查他們的弱點……[之後]我們將能夠發起我們真正擅長的那種自由流動的機動攻擊。」 ${}^{23}$${}^{23}$^(23){ }^{23}

Therefore, while the line is a military-geometrical instrument that seeks to separate two distinct hostile realms, the spatial-organizational model of the network creates a more diffused and dynamic geography. Following this logic, the system of defence in depth has the capacity to exchange space and time alternately. At the beginning of an attack it trades space for time - the attacker is allowed to gain space while the defender gains organizational time; later, it exchanges time for space as the trapping of the attacker within the web of the network enables the defender later to progress into and attack the latter’s unprotected rear.
因此，雖然這條線是一種軍事幾何工具，旨在分隔兩個不同的敵對領域，但網絡的空間組織模型創造了一種更為擴散和動態的地理環境。根據這一邏輯，深度防禦系統具有交替交換空間和時間的能力。在攻擊開始時，它用空間換取時間——攻擊者被允許獲得空間，而防禦者則獲得組織時間；隨後，隨著攻擊者被困在網絡的網中，它又用時間換取空間，使得防禦者能夠進一步進入並攻擊攻擊者未受保護的後方。

The Israeli public was exposed to the classified disputes between Sharon, Bar Lev; and the other members of the General Staff that reached their peak in 1969. Sharon was leaking them to the press, which in turn used his anonymously delivered comments to portray the military and political elites as reactionary ‘slow thinkers’, a tactic that had particular impact on Bar Lev, whom the Israeli public loved to mock for his slow, ponderous manner of speaking. The disagreement was also presented as a conflict between the tank officers with their heavy-handed, technical way of thinking and the pioneering maverick frontiersman/commando-soldier embodied by Sharon. ${}^{24}$${}^{24}$^(24){ }^{24}
以色列公眾接觸到了沙龍、巴爾·列夫及其他總參謀部成員之間的機密爭議，這些爭議在 1969 年達到了高潮。沙龍將這些爭議洩漏給媒體，媒體則利用他匿名提供的評論，將軍事和政治精英描繪成反動的「慢思考者」，這一策略對巴爾·列夫產生了特別的影響，以色列公眾喜歡嘲笑他緩慢而沉重的說話方式。這場分歧也被呈現為坦克軍官與以沙龍為代表的開拓者、特種兵之間的衝突，前者以其粗暴的技術思維方式為特徵。

By the summer of 1969, when Bar Lev realized he could no longer contain Sharon’s ability to mobilize the media against the rest of the General Staff, he dismissed him from military service on a technicality: Sharon had forgotten to
到 1969 年夏天，當巴爾·列夫意識到他無法再控制沙龍動員媒體對抗其他總參謀部成員的能力時，他以技術性理由將沙龍解雇出軍隊：沙龍忘記了
sign routine documents for the renewal of his military contract. Bar Lev’s action was supported by Prime Minister Golda Meir who, remembering the days of Unit 101 and Sharon’s rumoured threats to lock the entire Israeli govemment in a room and force it to order the start of the 1967 war, saw Sharon as a liar and a ‘threat to Israel’s democracy’, a man ‘capable of surrounding the Knesset with tanks’. ${}^{25}$${}^{25}$^(25){ }^{25} In response, Sharon revoked his membership of the Labor Party, which all officers over the rank of colonel were expected to hold at the ime. He scheduled a meeting with Menachem Begin, then head of the right-wing opposition, at Jerusalem’s King David Hotel, whose lobby was generally well frequented by journalists, ensuring that the meeting was widely noted and reported. The meeting was a political masterstroke. The Labor Party was apprehensive of the possible swing in public opinion that Sharon could provoke before a general election scheduled for October 1969. Party officials forced Bar Lev to reinstate Sharon - landing him where Bar Lev needed him least and feared him most, on the banks of the Suez Canal as Chief of Southern Command. There, between 1969 and July 1973, Sharon immediately set about implementing his defensive network behind the Bar Lev Line, which was by then almost complete. After the end of the War of Attrition in 1970, Sharon started evacuating parts of the line, cutting the number of strongholds from thirty-five to twenty-two.
簽署例行文件以續簽他的軍事合同。巴爾·列夫的行動得到了總理戈爾達·梅厄的支持，她回想起 101 部隊的日子以及沙龍傳聞威脅要將整個以色列政府鎖在一個房間裡，迫使其下令開始 1967 年戰爭，將沙龍視為一個說謊者和「以色列民主的威脅」，一個「能夠用坦克包圍國會的人」。作為回應，沙龍撤回了他的工黨黨籍，當時所有上校以上的軍官都被期望持有該黨籍。他在耶路撒冷的金大衛酒店安排了一次與當時右翼反對派領袖梅納赫姆·貝京的會議，該酒店的大廳通常受到記者的青睞，確保會議受到廣泛關注和報導。這次會議是一個政治上的高明之舉。工黨對沙龍在 1969 年 10 月即將舉行的全國大選前可能引發的輿論轉變感到擔憂。黨內官員迫使巴爾·列夫重新任命沙龍——將他放在巴爾·列夫最不需要和最害怕的地方，蘇伊士運河岸邊，擔任南方指揮部的指揮官。 在那裡，從 1969 年到 1973 年 7 月，沙龍立即著手在巴爾·列夫防線後方實施他的防禦網絡，該防線到那時幾乎已經完成。在 1970 年消耗戰結束後，沙龍開始撤離防線的部分區域，將據點的數量從三十五個減少到二十二個。

The canal zone was enveloped in a frenzy of construction. Hundreds of tracks and bulldozers were assembled, and hundreds of thousands of cubic metres of crushed stone were again hauled into the desert. Mountain outposts were constructed and fortified, and a network of high-volume military roads were paved to connect them. The western Sinai Desert was fashioned by Sharon into a future battlefield, and the desert seemed to Sharon to be perfect for this; it contained only military installations, bases, roads and minefields, with no civilians to disturb the wargame. However, Sharon’s sphere of operations was soon shifted elsewhere: shortly after entering into his new post received orders from Dayan to crush Palestinian resistance entrenched within the densely populated urban areas of Gaza, where IDF units were losing control. This was the real reason Sharon was given the Southern Command: it was another of the dirty jobs no other officer wanted to - and at the time very probably could not undertake.
運河區被一片建設狂潮所包圍。數百條軌道和推土機被組裝起來，數十萬立方米的碎石再次被運送到沙漠中。山地哨所被建造並加固，並鋪設了一個高容量的軍事道路網絡以連接它們。沙龍將西西奈沙漠塑造成未來的戰場，對他來說，這片沙漠似乎非常適合；這裡只有軍事設施、基地、道路和地雷區，沒有平民打擾戰爭遊戲。然而，沙龍的作戰範圍很快就轉移到了其他地方：在他進入新職位後不久，接到了戴揚的命令，要粉碎在加沙密集城市區域內根深蒂固的巴勒斯坦抵抗，當時以色列國防軍的部隊正在失去控制。這就是沙龍被賦予南方指揮部的真正原因：這是另一項沒有其他軍官想做的髒活——而在當時，很可能也無法承擔的工作。

Since his time with Unit 101, Sharon had grown to view the armed conflict with the Palestinians as an urban problem, and the rapid expansion of the refugee camps as something that Israeli occupation forces would later call the $\mathfrak{J}$$\mathfrak{J}$J\mathfrak{J} ihad of
自從他在 101 單位的時期以來，沙龍開始將與巴勒斯坦人的武裝衝突視為一個城市問題，而難民營的快速擴張則被以色列佔領軍稱為 $\mathfrak{J}$$\mathfrak{J}$J\mathfrak{J} 的聖戰。

New rouds cafued through the Jebaba refuge camp, Gaza Smip. Israti Defence Force, 1972
新的道路穿過傑巴巴難民營，加沙地帶。以色列國防軍，1972 年

Building’. The IDF sought to address this problem by physically transforming and redesigning the very ‘habitat of terror’ whose centre was in the refugee camps. ${}^{26}$${}^{26}$^(26){ }^{26} In the years to follow, regional and urban planning was to merge into a militarized campaign against the Gaza-based resistance.
建設。以色列國防軍試圖通過實際改造和重新設計這個以難民營為中心的“恐怖棲息地”來解決這個問題。 ${}^{26}$${}^{26}$^(26){ }^{26} 在接下來的幾年中，區域和城市規劃將合併成一場針對加沙抵抗運動的軍事化運動。

After the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian groups began to establish armed cells around a loose network of local command headquarters. Without the thick jungles of Vietnam, the Fatah, PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and other armed groups that belonged to or splintered from the PLO, based their command within the dense, winding fabric of the refugee camps, which they themselves developed into an extra-territorial network of armed enclaves. From there they engaged in military operations against the occupying fotces, as well as in terror attacks against Israeli civilians and against Palestinians suspected of collaboration. The grid of roads along which UN agencies laid out prefabricated sheds to house the 1948 refugees grew into a chaotic agglomeration of structures and ad hoc extensions, forming a shifting maze of alleyways, no more than a metre or so wide. Although they came under Israeli control, the occupation forces could rarely enter the camps, make arrests, collect taxes or impose regulations.
在 1967 年佔領約旦河西岸和加沙地帶後，巴勒斯坦團體開始在一個鬆散的地方指揮總部網絡周圍建立武裝小組。沒有越南那樣茂密的叢林，法塔赫、巴勒斯坦解放人民陣線（PFLP）及其他屬於或從巴解組織分裂出來的武裝團體，將指揮部設在難民營內部密集而曲折的結構中，並將其發展成為一個超國界的武裝飛地網絡。在那裡，他們對佔領軍展開軍事行動，並對以色列平民及被懷疑合作的巴勒斯坦人發動恐怖襲擊。聯合國機構沿著為 1948 年難民設置的預製棚屋的道路網，發展成為一個混亂的建築聚集體和臨時擴展，形成一個不超過一米寬的變化迷宮。儘管這些地區在以色列控制之下，佔領軍卻很少能進入難民營，進行逮捕、徵稅或施加規範。

The counter-insurgency campaign in Gaza started in July 1971 and lasted until resistance was suppressed in February the following year. Sharon ordered extended curfews and a shoot-to-kill policy of suspected insurgents, and established assassination squads who worked their way through lists of names. Sharon was trying to break the resistance by killing anyone involved in its organization. Over a thousand Palestinians were lilled. The campaign also acquired a different dimension: that of design undertaken by destuction. Writing the latestand most brutal chapter in the urban history of the grid, Sharon ordered military bulldozers to carve wide roads through the fabric of three of Gaza’s largest refugee camps - Jabalya, Rafah and Shati. The new routes divided these camps into smaller neighbourhoods, each of which could be accessed or isolated by infantry units. Sharon also ordered the cleating of all buildings and groves in an area he de ned as a ‘security perimeter’ around the camps, effectively isolating the built-up area from its surroundings and making it impossible for anyone to enter or leave the camps without being noticed.
加沙的反叛亂運動於 1971 年 7 月開始，並持續到翌年 2 月抵抗被鎮壓為止。沙龍下令延長宵禁並對疑似叛亂分子實施射殺政策，並成立了暗殺小組，逐一處理名單上的人名。沙龍試圖通過殺死任何與其組織有關的人來打破抵抗。超過一千名巴勒斯坦人被殺。這場運動還獲得了不同的維度：即以破壞為目的的設計。在城市網格歷史上寫下最新且最殘酷的一章，沙龍下令軍用推土機在加沙三個最大的難民營——賈巴利亞、拉法和沙提之間開鑿寬闊的道路。這些新路徑將這些難民營劃分為更小的社區，每個社區都可以被步兵部隊進入或隔離。沙龍還下令清除他所定義為難民營周圍的“安全邊界”內的所有建築和樹叢，實際上將建成區與周圍環境隔離，並使任何人無法在不被注意的情況下進出難民營。
Other activities such as the paving of roads and the in roduction of street lighting, were meant to enable the occupation forces to drive into the camps rapidly and without fear of land mines. ${}^{27}$${}^{27}$^(27){ }^{27} Together, these actions caused the destruction or the damaging of about 6,000 homes in a seven-month period. ${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28} It was not the first-- nor the last - time that the single-mindedness of Sharon’s military planning was ransferred to the ground without mediation, adaptation or friction, giving the execution of his plans the functional clarity of a diagram.
其他活動，例如鋪設道路和引入街道照明，旨在使佔領軍能夠迅速且無懼地駛入營地。 ${}^{27}$${}^{27}$^(27){ }^{27} 總體而言，這些行動在七個月內造成約 6,000 棟房屋的毀壞或損壞。 ${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28} 這不是第一次——也不是最後一次——沙龍的軍事計劃的單一心智被直接轉移到地面上，沒有中介、適應或摩擦，使他的計劃執行具有圖表般的功能清晰性。

The urban destruction of the Gaza camps was complemented by proposals for two types of construction; both demonstrated Sharon’s ability to mobilize planning as a tactical tool. The irst was for Jewish settlements to be built along what he called ‘the five-finger plan’, which positioned settlements as deep wedges into Gaza in order to separate its towns and break the area into manageable sections. The southernmost ‘finger’ was to be built in the Rafah Salient, beyond the southern edge of the Gaza Strip on occupied Egyptian Sinai, and was meant to sever Gaza from the arms-smuggling routes in the Sinai Desert. The other project that Sharon enthusiastically promoted was considered more ‘experimental’ and involved the construction of new neighbouthoods for the refugees. It was designed to bring about the undoing of the refiggee camps altogether, and so remove the reasons for dissent that Israel believed was bred there through the immizeration of their Palestinian populations. When, in February 1972, Palestinian resistance appeared to have been suppressed, Dayan, reacting to home-grown and international ourage at Sharon’s excessive military measures, ransferred responsibility of the Gaza Strip from Southern to Cental Command, taking it out of Sharon’s hands. Sharon had done his job and now Dayan wanted to dissociate him from it. In the summer of 1973 Sharon finally resigned from the military when he realized he had no chance of being awarded the top job.
加沙營地的城市破壞伴隨著兩種建設提案；這兩者都展示了沙龍將規劃作為戰術工具的能力。第一種是沿著他所稱的「五指計劃」建造猶太定居點，這一計劃將定居點深深嵌入加沙，以便將其城鎮分隔開來，並將該地區劃分為可管理的區域。最南端的「指頭」將在拉法突出部建造，位於加沙地帶的南邊，超越被佔領的埃及西奈半島，旨在切斷加沙與西奈沙漠中的武器走私路線。沙龍熱衷推廣的另一個項目被認為是更「實驗性」的，涉及為難民建設新的社區。這一計劃旨在徹底消除難民營，從而消除以色列認為在那裡因巴勒斯坦人口的貧困而滋生的不滿原因。 當 1972 年 2 月，巴勒斯坦抵抗似乎已被壓制時，戴揚因國內外對沙龍過度軍事措施的憤怒而將加沙地帶的責任從南方指揮部轉移到中央指揮部，將其從沙龍的手中奪走。沙龍已經完成了他的任務，而現在戴揚希望將他與此事脫離關係。在 1973 年夏天，沙龍最終辭去了軍職，因為他意識到自己沒有機會獲得最高職位。

Egyptian militayy engineers making openings in the Bar Lev Line and moving across it, October 1973
埃及軍事工程師在巴爾·列夫防線上開口並穿越該防線，1973 年 10 月

In 1973 the Bar Lev Line looked so firm that it seemed to justify Dayan’s boast, probably for propaganda purposes, that it 'would take the American and Soviet engineer corps together to break through [it]. ${}^{29}$${}^{29}$^(29){ }^{29} The Egyptian daily $-4l$$-4l$-4l-4 l-Abram claimed, some thirty years after the war, that some Soviet military experts, themselves wanting to make a point, had argued in 1973 that nothing less than a tactical nuclear explosion would breach it. But, on 6 October 1973, on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, in a surprise Syrian-Egyptian two-front attack, it took only a few hours to break through Israeli fortifications using conventional military strategy. General Shazly recounted the clockwork operation that led to the breaching of Israeli lines on the Egyptian front:
在 1973 年，巴爾·列夫防線看起來如此堅固，以至於似乎證實了達揚的自誇，這可能出於宣傳目的，他聲稱「要突破它需要美國和蘇聯的工程師部隊一起努力」。埃及日報《阿布拉姆》在戰爭約三十年後聲稱，一些蘇聯軍事專家，出於想要表達觀點的目的，在 1973 年曾主張，只有戰術核爆炸才能突破它。然而，在 1973 年 10 月 6 日，猶太節日贖罪日，發生了突襲的敘利亞-埃及雙面攻擊，僅僅幾個小時就利用常規軍事戰略突破了以色列的防禦工事。沙茲利將軍回憶起導致突破以色列防線的精密行動：

At precisely 1400 hours 200 of our aircraft skimmed low over the canal, their shadows flickering across enemy lines as they headed deep into the Sinai . . . their overflight was the signal our artillery had been waiting for . . The 4,000 men of the first assault group poured over [the Egyprian] ramparts and slithered in disciplined lines down to the water’s edge . . . a few minutes after 1420 hours, as the canisters began to belch clouds of covering smoke, our first assault wave was paddling furiously across the canal. ${}^{30}$${}^{30}$^(30){ }^{30}
在精確的 1400 小時，我們的 200 架飛機低空掠過運河，陰影在敵軍陣線上閃爍，深入西奈半島……它們的飛越是我們炮兵一直在等待的信號……第一波突擊小組的 4000 名士兵如潮水般湧過[埃及]的城牆，並有序地滑行到水邊……在 1420 小時後不久，當罐子開始噴出覆蓋煙霧的雲團時，我們的第一波突擊浪潮正拼命划過運河。

The breached Bar Lev Line, circa 1974. Film stills, IDF film unit (Images courtesy of IP)
被突破的巴爾·列夫防線，約 1974 年。電影靜態畫面，以色列國防軍電影單位（圖片由 IP 提供）

Because the attack started with an artillery barrage, the 450 Israeli soldiers manning the strongholds on the canal at the time of the attack were forced to dive into bunkers beneath the surface of the artificial landscape, thereby losing eye-contact with the Egyptian soldiers who were scaling the ramparts. By the time the bombardment stopped and the Israelis were able to resume their battle positions, the line had already been stormed and its strongholds encircled. The ramparts of sand, which had withstood two years of Egyptian artillery fire during the War of Attrition, succumbed to water. Using the Suez Canal, special units of the Egyptian engineering corps used high-pressure water cannons to dissolve the hardened packed sand and open more than seventy breaches within the artificial landscape. ${}^{31}$${}^{31}$^(31){ }^{31} The water cannons were similar to those that, throughout the late 1960s, had helped clear the banks of the upper Nile in preparation for the Aswan Dam whose construction was inaugurated in 1970; indeed, the idea for breaching the Bar Lev Line came from an Egyptian engineet employed on the Aswan Dam project. ${}^{32}$${}^{32}$^(32){ }^{32}
由於攻擊以炮火轟擊開始，當時在運河防禦工事上駐守的 450 名以色列士兵被迫潛入人工景觀表面下的掩體，從而失去了與攀登城牆的埃及士兵的視線接觸。當轟炸停止，以色列士兵能夠恢復戰鬥位置時，防線已經被攻陷，防禦工事被包圍。經歷了兩年埃及炮火的沙土城牆在水的侵蝕下屈服。埃及工程兵特種部隊利用蘇伊士運河，使用高壓水槍溶解硬化的壓實沙土，並在人工景觀中打開了超過七十個缺口。這些水槍類似於在 1960 年代末期幫助清理上尼羅河河岸以準備 1970 年啟動建設的阿斯旺大壩的設備；事實上，突破巴爾·列夫防線的想法來自於一位參與阿斯旺大壩項目的埃及工程師。

Once the Bar Lev Line had been breached, two Egyptian armies, about 100,000 soldiers, were transported over pontoon bridges and through the breaches in the earth dyke and onto the eastern, Asian, previously Israeli-controlled bank. ${}^{33}$${}^{33}$^(33){ }^{33} They advanced through the ravaged landscape a few kilometres into the Sinai. Then, wary of the fortified depth of Israeli defences and at the limit of their antiaircraft umbrella, they halted and dug themselves in, facing east. ${}^{34}$${}^{34}$^(34){ }^{34}
一旦巴爾·列夫防線被突破，兩支埃及軍隊約有 100,000 名士兵通過浮橋和地堤的缺口被運送到東部的亞洲地區，該地區之前由以色列控制。他們在被摧毀的景觀中向西奈半島內部推進了幾公里。然後，由於對以色列防禦工事的深度感到警惕，並且在他們的防空傘的極限之內，他們停下來挖掘工事，面向東方。

The dawning of 8 October 1973, two days after the Egyptian army had breached the Israeli line, heralded the most bitter military defeat in IDF history, when, in a counter-offensive, waves of bewildered Israeli tank units broke against
1973 年 10 月 8 日的黎明，距離埃及軍隊突破以色列防線的兩天後，預示著以色列國防軍歷史上最慘痛的軍事失利，當時在一次反攻中，困惑的以色列坦克部隊如潮水般衝擊。
an entrenched Egyptian army equipped with the previously little-known Sager anti-tank missiles. The Israeli counter-attack was defeated, and with it Israeli military and civilian moral. The perception that the breaching of the Bar Lev Line was akin to breaching the city walls and storming the homeland was more imaginary than real, considering the hundreds of kilometres Egyptian troops would have had to cross before reaching any Israeli settlement. But this sensation was nevertheless evoked in Dayan’s famous hysterical statement that the ‘Third Temple was falling’. The trauma of the breached line, resonant with a sense of divine punishment, began a shift in national consciousness that helped liberate Israeli religious and messianic sentiment and in four years was to force Labor out of government.
一支根深蒂固的埃及軍隊裝備著先前鮮為人知的薩格反坦克導彈。以色列的反擊被擊敗，隨之而來的是以色列軍事和民眾的士氣低落。對於突破巴爾·列夫防線的看法，認為這就像突破城牆並襲擊祖國，更多的是想像而非現實，考慮到埃及軍隊需要跨越數百公里才能抵達任何以色列定居點。然而，這種感覺在戴揚著名的歇斯底里聲明中得到了喚起，他宣稱“第三聖殿正在崩潰”。被突破的防線所帶來的創傷，與神聖懲罰的感覺共鳴，開始了國家意識的轉變，這有助於釋放以色列的宗教和彌賽亞情感，並在四年內迫使工黨退出政府。

In Israel the political significance of the 1973 war was amplified by the fact that it had started only weeks before the general elections scheduled for 31 October 1973, and a few months after both Sharon and Bar Lev had retired from military service. Both were busy campaigning for opposing political parties but when war broke out they were both called back to service. Since all senior positions were manned, each had to accept a single step down the command ladder. Sharon received command of the 143 armoured division (later known as the Likud Division) and Bar Lev the overall command of the entire southern front. As the war unfolded over the following weeks, old rivalries resurfaced when the glory-hungry generals used the military campaign as an extension of their electoral one. Sharon realized that whoever first crossed the canal to its African side would be crowned the war’s hero. Bar Lev and the other generals associated with Labor understood that if Sharon was allowed to achieve personal success he would ‘turn into a major political headache’ after the war. Sharon himself undoubtedly turned the war to personal political advantage. He used open radio communications so that many of his division’s soldiers could hear him; and he continued to leak secret military information to his large embedded entourage of admiring reporters. ${}^{35}$${}^{35}$^(35){ }^{35} The battles of 1973 demonstrated that war could be more than simply the continuation of politics by other means; it could itself become electoral politics, conducted within the resonating chamber of mediatized military manoeuvre. It also established different military officers as independent political players.
在以色列，1973 年戰爭的政治意義因其在 1973 年 10 月 31 日的總選舉前僅幾週開始而被放大，並且在沙龍和巴爾·列夫退役幾個月後發生。兩人都忙於為對立的政黨競選，但當戰爭爆發時，他們都被召回服役。由於所有高級職位都已有人擔任，每人都不得不接受指揮層級的單步降級。沙龍接管了第 143 裝甲師的指揮（後來被稱為利庫德師），而巴爾·列夫則負責整個南方戰線的總指揮。隨著戰爭在接下來的幾週中展開，舊有的競爭再次浮現，渴望榮耀的將軍們將軍事行動視為其選舉活動的延伸。沙龍意識到，誰首先越過運河到達非洲一側，誰就會被冠以戰爭英雄的稱號。與工黨相關的巴爾·列夫和其他將軍明白，如果讓沙龍獲得個人成功，他在戰後將成為一個「主要的政治麻煩」。沙龍本人無疑將戰爭轉化為個人的政治利益。 他使用開放的無線電通信，以便他的部隊中許多士兵能夠聽到他的聲音；他還繼續向他那群崇拜的記者們洩露秘密的軍事信息。1973 年的戰役表明，戰爭不僅僅是政治的延續；它本身可以成為選舉政治，在媒體化的軍事行動的共鳴室中進行。這也確立了不同的軍官作為獨立的政治參與者。

In his relentless drive towards the canal, Sharon allowed himself a large measure of autonomy, ignoring the desperate restraining orders of Bar Lev, again his direct military superior. The latter complained to Chief of Staff David Elazar that Sharon was ‘out of control’, and was disrupting the entire command hierarchy at the front: T have a divisional commander here who is a politician . . . who wants to [get the political credit for] crossing the canal.’ Elazar asked Dayan for his opinion on dismissing Sharon. Dayan agreed that 'Arik can only think “how
在他對運河的無情追求中，沙龍給了自己很大的自主權，無視巴爾·列夫的絕望限制命令，後者再次是他的直接軍事上級。後者向參謀長大衛·埃拉扎爾抱怨，沙龍已經「失控」，並且正在擾亂前線的整個指揮層級：「我這裡有一位部隊指揮官，他是一位政治家……他想要[獲得政治功勞]越過運河。」埃拉扎爾向達揚詢問解雇沙龍的意見。達揚同意「阿里克只能想到『如何……』」
will this war make [him] look, what can [he] gain from all this” . . . He is trying to do a Rommel-type breakthrough - if it works, good; if not, the People of Israel lose 200 tanks . . . ${}^{356}$${}^{356}$^(356){ }^{356} Fearful of the impact on army morale that Sharon’s removal might have, they decided for the meantime to leave him in command of his division.
這場戰爭會讓[他]看起來怎樣，[他]能從中獲得什麼……他正試圖進行類似隆美爾的突破——如果成功，那就好；如果不成功，以色列人民將損失 200 輛坦克…… ${}^{356}$${}^{356}$^(356){ }^{356} 由於擔心沙龍被撤職可能對軍隊士氣造成的影響，他們決定暫時讓他繼續指揮他的師。

Sharon was indeed deliberately out of control - and out of communication. At times he switched off his radio altogether. When he was available on the radio, it was hard to talk to him because of his wilful misundertstanding of orders; at other times, he was heard snoring into the microphone. Sharon’s attitude to military communications both concealed and emphasized his scramble to achieve those ends that he deemed politically important.
沙龍確實故意失控——並且與外界失去聯繫。有時他完全關掉無線電。當他能在無線電上聯繫時，因為他故意誤解命令，與他交談變得困難；而在其他時候，則聽到他在麥克風前打鼾。沙龍對軍事通信的態度既隱藏又強調了他為實現他認為政治上重要的目標而進行的混亂努力。

The following is a transcript of one of the rare occasions when contact was made successfully with Sharon. On the night of 17 October Sharon was called to the radio to take orders from Southern Command. The communications officer tried to remind Sharon of a plan for which he had received orders the previous day. Because it was a non-encoded radio connection, the officer dropped hints - which Sharon resolutely refiused to take:
以下是與香農成功聯繫的罕見場合之一的記錄。10 月 17 日晚上，香農被叫到無線電前，接收南方指揮部的命令。通訊官試圖提醒香農一個他前一天收到命令的計劃。由於這是一個未加密的無線電連接，官員暗示了一些信息——而香農堅決拒絕接受：

Three days earlier, on 14 October, during the second week of the war the Egyptian army, holding a narrow bridgehead a few kilometres east of the canal, tried to progress deeper into the Sinai. ${}^{388}$${}^{388}$^(388){ }^{388} The four Egyptian brigades that entered IDF defences in depth were destroyed by nightfall. The Egyptian military had to transfer more forces to hold the eastern side of the canal. Because of the new numerical balance, Sharon firially got permission to prepare for a counter-attack and cross to the western side of the canal. This was to be done according to plan ‘Stout Heart’, which Sharon had conceived, planned and prepared during his tenure as Chief of Southern Command. In the last stages of the war he led the attack through an unprotected gap in Egyptian lines, separated the second Egyptian Army from the third, reached the canal, broke through the Bar Lev Line and constructed two bridges across the water into a small enclave on the western bank of the canal that the IDF
三天前，即 10 月 14 日，在戰爭的第二週，埃及軍隊在運河東側幾公里處的狹窄橋頭堡試圖深入西奈。進入以色列國防軍防線的四個埃及旅在日落前被摧毀。埃及軍方不得不調動更多部隊以控制運河的東側。由於新的數量平衡，沙龍最終獲准準備反擊並越過運河到達西側。這將根據沙龍在擔任南方指揮部司令期間構思、計劃和準備的“堅定心志”計劃進行。在戰爭的最後階段，他通過埃及防線中的一個無防備缺口發起攻擊，將第二埃及軍與第三埃及軍隔開，抵達運河，突破巴爾·列夫防線，並在運河的西岸建造了兩座橋樑，進入以色列國防軍的一个小飛地。
dubbed ‘Africa’. Over these bridgeheads rolled most of the IDF armour, led by Adan and his deputy Dov Tamari, smashing into the rear of the third Egyptian army; it was now within striking distance of Cairo. ${}^{39}$${}^{39}$^(39){ }^{39} It was a perfect demonstration of what British war theoretician Basil Liddell Hart called the “indirect approach”. ${}^{40}$${}^{40}$^(40){ }^{40} According to this doctrine, to defeat an army it is enough to direct an attack against its weak points and unprotected rear, throwing its organizational logic off balance. The Israeli counter-crossing of the canal had created a bizarre stalemate, with the two armies exchanging sides - and continents - across the canal. Such was the power (or lack thereof) of linear defence that it was crossed twice in both directions during a war that lasted less than three weeks.
被稱為「非洲」。以阿丹及其副手多夫·塔馬里為首的大部分以色列國防軍裝甲部隊從這些橋頭堡滾滾而來，猛擊第三埃及軍的後方；此時距開羅已經在打擊範圍內。 ${}^{39}$${}^{39}$^(39){ }^{39} 這完美地展示了英國戰爭理論家巴茲爾·利德爾·哈特所稱的「間接方法」。 ${}^{40}$${}^{40}$^(40){ }^{40} 根據這一學說，要擊敗一支軍隊，只需對其弱點和無防備的後方發動攻擊，使其組織邏輯失衡。以色列對運河的反越過創造了一種奇怪的僵局，兩軍在運河兩側互換位置——甚至是大陸。線性防禦的力量（或缺乏力量）如此之大，以至於在一場持續不到三週的戰爭中，雙方在兩個方向上都越過了兩次。

On the international stage it was clear, however, that victory was Egypt’s and Sadat’s. Although much of their military was surrounded, the Egyptians held on to their territorial gains. When the war ended, the knotted-together positions of the two armies necessitated direct negotiations, which Sadat used to lead to the diplomatic process that would win him back the entire Sinai peninsula.
然而，在國際舞台上，勝利顯然屬於埃及和薩達特。儘管他們的軍隊大部分被包圍，埃及人仍然堅持住了他們的領土獲得。當戰爭結束時，兩軍交錯的陣地需要直接談判，薩達特利用這一點引導出贏回整個西奈半島的外交過程。

In Israel the military blow handed out by previously little-respected Arab armies was seen as proof of the fact that the military elites and ruling Labor Party were completely out of touch. As gloom descended, Sharon’s popularity increased: he was perceived as the only rebel against the government and its crony generals. After the fighting, banners were hung on his division’s vehicles, carrying the slogans that would later feature in so many political campaigns and carry the right-wing coalition to power in 1977 - ‘Arik King of Israel!’ A photograph of Sharon driving a military jeep with a bloodstained bandage around his forehead, his hair blowing in the wind, featured on the posters of his partypolitical campaign. In contrast to the ageing Meir and Dayan, he seemed to offer a youthful, energetic and anti-institutional alternative to Labor.
在以色列，之前不被尊重的阿拉伯軍隊所造成的軍事打擊被視為軍事精英和執政的工黨完全脫節的證據。隨著陰霾降臨，沙龍的受歡迎程度上升：他被視為唯一反抗政府及其裙帶將軍的人。戰鬥結束後，他的部隊車輛上懸掛著標語，這些標語後來在許多政治運動中出現，並使右翼聯盟在 1977 年掌握政權——「阿里克以色列之王！」一張沙龍駕駛軍用吉普車的照片，額頭上纏著血跡斑斑的繃帶，頭髮在風中飄揚，出現在他政黨競選的海報上。與年邁的梅爾和達揚相比，他似乎提供了一種年輕、充滿活力且反體制的工黨替代選擇。

The debate surrounding Sharon’s conduct during the 1973 war is still ongoing today. The significance of his military undertalings were exaggerated by all those who had a political stake in showing up Labor’s incompetence. They pitched him as a military genius, an unparalleled tactician who had ‘saved the nation’. Sharon indeed demonstrated he could successfully improvise amid scenes of chaos. However, what the war best demonstrated was Sharon’s understanding of conflict as a means of communication; throughout the war, his decisions were governed by his desire that his actions resonate through the media with an anxious public consciousness. It was primarily Sharon’s personality, the criticism he levelled at his superiors and his access to the media that made him the focus of attention. ${}^{41}$${}^{41}$^(41){ }^{41} His appeal stemmed from the popular perception that he was an undisciplined rebel, a radical, a violent transgressor. Sometimes he was seen as a ‘hippie’, a Kurtz-type lone-rider and the only alternative to a tired and failing political system.
關於沙龍在 1973 年戰爭期間的行為的辯論至今仍在繼續。他的軍事行動的重要性被所有希望揭露工黨無能的人誇大了。他們將他描繪成一位軍事天才，一位無與倫比的戰術家，聲稱他「拯救了國家」。沙龍確實展示了他能夠在混亂的場面中成功即興發揮。然而，這場戰爭最能展示的是沙龍對衝突作為溝通手段的理解；在整個戰爭中，他的決策受到他希望自己的行動能在媒體中引起焦慮的公眾意識共鳴的驅動。主要是沙龍的個性、他對上級的批評以及他對媒體的接觸使他成為關注的焦點。他的吸引力源於大眾對他作為一個不守規矩的叛逆者、一個激進分子、一個暴力違規者的看法。有時他被視為一個「嬉皮士」，一個庫爾茨式的孤獨騎士，成為疲憊且失敗的政治體系的唯一替代選擇。

Reinforcing the natrative that placed Sharon at the centre of a new military paradign was TRADOC, the US military Training and Doctrine Command, which was established a few months before the 1973 war. TRADOC started its activities with a comprehensive study of this conflict, examining the performance of different Western and Soviet weapons systems; it also studied IDF organizational and command structures, especially Sharon’s ‘generalship’. Tracing his military career backwards, TRADOC researchers examined Sharon’s strategies in previous battles, retelling their histories in a way that demonstrated their doctrinal aims, which engaged then with a ‘system’ approach to warfare and early engagement with network theories. ${}^{42}$${}^{42}$^(42){ }^{42} In particular, US military researchers examined Sharon’s command of an IDF divisional raid on the main Egyptian line in the northern Sinai at Abu-Ageila, on the frst night of the 1967 war. This raid, suggested the researchers, was unique by the standards of the time. It was conducted as a simultaneous attack by a multiplicity of small forces, each attacking a different unit in the synergetic Egyptian defence system - so that, instead of covering and supporting each other, as they were designed to, each of the Egyptian units was fighting for its own life. This battle exemplified for TRADOC the very approach it sought to promote. It was via the TRADOC researchers that this battle, otherwise played down in the Israeli historiography of the 1967 war-a story more concerned with emotional images of weeping soldiers at the Wailing Wall, of armoured columns storming through the desert landscape and of Egyptian casualties and abandoned military equipment - later became a central component of military education in the United States and the $1D{F}^{43}$$1D{F}^{43}$1DF^(43)1 D F^{43}
強化將沙龍置於新軍事範式中心的敘事的是美國軍事訓練與條令指揮部（TRADOC），該部門在 1973 年戰爭前幾個月成立。TRADOC 以對這場衝突的全面研究開始其活動，檢視不同西方和蘇聯武器系統的表現；它還研究了以色列國防軍（IDF）的組織和指揮結構，特別是沙龍的「將領風範」。TRADOC 的研究人員回顧了沙龍的軍事生涯，檢視他在先前戰役中的策略，以展示其教義目標，並與戰爭的「系統」方法及早期的網絡理論進行互動。特別是，美國軍事研究人員檢視了沙龍指揮以色列國防軍對埃及主線在西奈北部阿布阿蓋拉的突襲，這是在 1967 年戰爭的第一個夜晚。研究人員指出，這次突襲在當時的標準下是獨特的。 這是一場由多個小型部隊同時發起的攻擊，每個部隊攻擊埃及防禦系統中的不同單位——因此，埃及各單位並未如設計所預期那樣互相掩護和支援，而是各自為生。這場戰鬥對於 TRADOC 來說，正是其所希望推廣的戰術方法。正是通過 TRADOC 的研究人員，這場在以色列 1967 年戰爭歷史學中被淡化的戰鬥——這個故事更關注於在哭牆前流淚的士兵、穿越沙漠景觀的裝甲部隊以及埃及的傷亡和被遺棄的軍事裝備——後來成為美國軍事教育的核心組成部分。

For the US military, the battlefields of the 1973 war, one of the last "symmetrical conflicts’ pitching fully mobilized state militaries against each other, provided a laboratory for a possible European ground war with the Warsaw Pact, and had profound effects on NATO’s European geography. The military doctrine of ‘active defence,’ based upon a study of the war, was introduced in the 1976 edition of the US military field manual. Although this doctrine has since become extremely controversial, and was replaced, it emphasized the concept of ‘depth’, introducing it into the military discourse of the late 1970s and 1980s. ${}^{44}$${}^{44}$^(44){ }^{44} The doctrine of ‘active defence’ translated the paradigm of US military operations into a territorial model that led to the construction of an expanded network of American military bases within potential battlefields in West Germany. ${}^{45}$${}^{45}$^(45){ }^{45}
對於美國軍方來說，1973 年戰爭的戰場是最後幾場「對稱衝突」之一，這場衝突使完全動員的國家軍隊彼此對抗，為可能的與華沙公約的歐洲地面戰爭提供了一個實驗室，並對北約的歐洲地理產生了深遠的影響。基於對這場戰爭的研究，1976 年版的美國軍事手冊中引入了「主動防禦」的軍事學說。儘管這一學說自此變得極具爭議，並被取代，但它強調了「深度」的概念，並將其引入 1970 年代末和 1980 年代的軍事話語中。 ${}^{44}$${}^{44}$^(44){ }^{44} 「主動防禦」的學說將美國軍事行動的範式轉化為一種領土模型，導致在西德潛在戰場內建設擴展的美國軍事基地網絡。 ${}^{45}$${}^{45}$^(45){ }^{45}

The IDF’s crossing of the Suez Canal also triggered a seties of global reactions. On 16 October 1973, incidentally the day Israeli forces established a foothold on the western (African) bank of the Canal, the Arab states announced a blanket 70 per cent increase in oil prices and a progressive monthly 5 per cent reduction in output, which would continue until Israel withdrew completely from the Occupied Territories and ‘restored thelegalrights of the Palestinians’. On 23 December,
以色列國防軍穿越蘇伊士運河也引發了一系列全球反應。1973 年 10 月 16 日，恰好是以色列軍隊在運河的西岸（非洲岸）建立據點的日子，阿拉伯國家宣布全面提高 70%的油價，並逐步每月減產 5%，這將持續到以色列完全撤出被佔領土並“恢復巴勒斯坦人的合法權利”。1973 年 12 月 23 日，

OPEC members decided to double the already inflated oil prices - in fact, the price of a barrel of oil quadrupled from $\mathrm{\$}2.50$$\mathrm{\$}2.50$$2.50\$ 2.50 before the war to $\mathrm{\$}10$$\mathrm{\$}10$$10\$ 10 at the beginning of 1974. The world was plunged into recession and an inflationary spiral that lasted a decade. It precipitated a shift in the global economy from the socio-political unity that the Keynesian, welfare, state-centric model sought to create and maintain towards the network economies of neo-liberalism. Indeed, the 1973 war coincided with major transformations worldwide-industrial production retreated in favour of an ‘immaterial’ service sectors that gradually shifted its production from analogue to digital technology, and one increasingly interested in flexible and dynamic networks.
石油輸出國組織（OPEC）成員決定將已經膨脹的油價翻倍——事實上，從戰爭前的 $\mathrm{\$}2.50$$\mathrm{\$}2.50$$2.50\$ 2.50 到 1974 年初的 $\mathrm{\$}10$$\mathrm{\$}10$$10\$ 10 ，每桶油的價格四倍增長。世界陷入了經濟衰退和持續十年的通貨膨脹螺旋。這促使全球經濟從凱恩斯主義、福利國家中心模型所尋求創造和維持的社會政治統一，轉向新自由主義的網絡經濟。確實，1973 年的戰爭與全球範圍內的重大變革同時發生——工業生產退縮，轉向逐漸將生產從類比技術轉向數字技術的“非物質”服務部門，並越來越關注靈活和動態的網絡。

In the Middle East, an arms race in conventional weapons ensued, partially supported by the increased oil revenues of the Arab states. ${}^{46}$${}^{46}$^(46){ }^{46} Total Israeli spending on security itself grew to a monstrous 23 per cent of the state’s GDP, almost 30 per cent of the state budget, which in the years 1974-85 led to a massive economic crisis that further increased Israel’s reliance on financial and political aid from the United States. ${}^{47}$${}^{47}$^(47){ }^{47}
在中東，常規武器的軍備競賽隨之而起，部分受到阿拉伯國家增加的石油收入的支持。 ${}^{46}$${}^{46}$^(46){ }^{46} 以色列在安全上的總支出增長到國內生產總值的 23%，幾乎占國家預算的 30%，這在 1974 年至 1985 年間導致了一場巨大的經濟危機，進一步增加了以色列對美國的財政和政治援助的依賴。 ${}^{47}$${}^{47}$^(47){ }^{47}

The debate between the two different military doctrines of territorial organization - linear fortifications and a network of strongholds laid out throughout their depth - recalls comparisons suggested by Antonio Gramsci between the ‘war of position’ and ‘war of manoeuvre’, with similar political patterns. ${}^{48}$${}^{48}$^(48){ }^{48} For Gramsci, the shift from the former to the latter implies an erosion in political hegemony. He noted (allegorically perhaps) that since linear defence ‘demands enormous sacrifices by an infinite mass of people . . an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is necessary, and hence a more “interventionist” government . . . [that will] organize permanently the “impossibility” of internal disintegration - with control of every kind, political, administrative, etc’. ${}^{49}$${}^{49}$^(49){ }^{49} The political ‘war of manoeuvre’, by contrast, exists according to Gramsci as a multiplicity of noncentralized and loosely coordinated actions that aggressively compete with the power of the state.
兩種不同的軍事組織學說之間的辯論——線性防禦工事與在其深度佈置的強固據點網絡——讓人想起安東尼奧·葛蘭西所提出的「位置戰爭」與「機動戰爭」之間的比較，並且有著相似的政治模式。對葛蘭西而言，從前者轉向後者意味著政治霸權的侵蝕。他（或許是隱喻地）指出，由於線性防禦「需要無數人付出巨大的犧牲……因此需要前所未有的霸權集中，從而需要一個更具“干預性”的政府……[這將] 永久性地組織內部解體的“不可能性”——控制各種形式的政治、行政等」。相對而言，葛蘭西認為政治的「機動戰爭」存在於一系列非集中且鬆散協調的行動中，這些行動積極地與國家的權力競爭。

In local terms, the breaking of the Bar Lev Line seemed to have turned the former model into the latter. The war and the breaching of the line fragmented more than military geography. It dislocated the cohesive structures that seemed to have held Israeli society together, and set in motion a general process of social and political upheaval that shattered the unity and hegemony of the state. Indeed, in the post-1973 period, processes of fragmentation took place in the social, economic, political and geographic arenas. The political hegernony of the Labor
在當地的語境中，巴爾·列夫防線的突破似乎將前者轉變為後者。戰爭和防線的突破不僅破壞了軍事地理，還使得原本看似將以色列社會凝聚在一起的結構發生了位移，並啟動了一個社會和政治動盪的普遍過程，打碎了國家的統一與霸權。事實上，在 1973 年後的時期，社會、經濟、政治和地理領域都發生了碎片化的過程。工黨的政治霸權
movement started to cede power to a variety of micro-political, non-governmental, extra-parliamentary organizations and pressure groups that began to comprise a larger, more complex and multipolar political landscape. These organizations challenged the state centralized power structure, a structure best described by the term ‘Statism’ - in Hebrew Mamlabtiyut, literally ‘kingdomhood’.
運動開始將權力讓渡給各種微型政治、非政府、超議會組織和壓力團體，這些組織開始構成一個更大、更複雜和多極的政治格局。這些組織挑戰了國家集中權力結構，這一結構最適合用“國家主義”一詞來描述——在希伯來語中為 Mamlabtiyut，字面意思是“王國狀態”。

Throughout the autumn and winter of 1973-74, the Labor $r_{\text{government was}}$$r_{\text{government was }}$r_("government was ")r_{\text {government was }} confronted by a nationwide wave of demonstrations, which ended up bringing down the Meir-Dayan government. The protests were the first public expressions of dissent in Israel concerning issues of security. Other movements were already emerging before the war ${}^{50}$${}^{50}$^(50){ }^{50} - for example the Israeli ‘Black Panthers’, a protest movement of Mizrahi Jews that came to public attention in Jerusalem in 1971 ${}^{51}$${}^{51}$^(51){ }^{51} (and of whom Golda Meir famously remarked that they were ‘not nice’). The difference was that the postwar protesters were coming from the affluent layers of Israeli society and from soldiers returning from battle. That the political dissent was closely associated with the breaching of the Bar Lev Line is evidenced by the fact that Moti Ashkenazi, who established one of the protest movements and soon became its symbol, was a reserve of ficer who, during the war, commanded the only stronghold on the Bar Lev Line - stronghold Budapest - which did not fall to the Egyptians. Whether they were promoting left- or right-wing agendas, expansionist or partitionist politics, the protesters did so with the atritude and some of the style of the US anti-Vietnam War movement, which paradoxically found in Sharon, again, the very image of the anti-institutional rebel. ${}^{52}$${}^{52}$^(52){ }^{52}
在 1973 年至 1974 年的秋冬季節，工黨面臨著全國範圍的示威潮，最終導致梅爾-達揚政府的垮台。這些抗議活動是以色列對安全問題的首次公開異議表達。在戰爭之前，其他運動已經開始出現——例如以色列的「黑豹」運動，這是一個於 1971 年在耶路撒冷引起公眾注意的米茲拉希猶太人的抗議運動（而戈爾達·梅爾曾著名地評論他們「不太好」）。不同之處在於，戰後的抗議者來自以色列社會的富裕階層以及從戰鬥中回來的士兵。政治異議與巴爾·列夫防線的突破密切相關，這一點由摩提·阿什肯納齊的事例證明，他創立了其中一個抗議運動並迅速成為其象徵，他是一名預備役軍官，在戰爭期間指揮著唯一未落入埃及人之手的巴爾·列夫防線據點——布達佩斯據點。 無論他們是在推動左翼或右翼議程、擴張主義或分裂主義政治，抗議者都以美國反越戰運動的態度和某種風格進行抗議，這在矛盾中再次將沙龍視為反體制叛逆者的形象。

In the following year in Cairo, Palestinian delegates at the ${12}^{\text{dh}}$${12}^{\text{dh }}$12^("dh ")12^{\text {dh }} Palestinian National Council interpreted the wave of protest in Istael as heralding the possible beginning of civil war and Israel’s imminent collapse. The delegates passed a resolution stating that the PLO would form a Palestinian government in every area of Palestine that might be liberated. Although the political implications of this position were clearly articulated and officially adopted only in 1988, the 1974 resolution was effectively the first time that the PLO accepted a two-state solution, even if this acceptance was seen only as a temporary stage in the complete liberation of Palestine. ${}^{53}$${}^{53}$^(53){ }^{53} In fact, at the same time, the 1973 oil crisis kick-started a process that gave birth to a multiplicity of ‘sovereignty-free actors’ worldwwide. These were independent organizations as varied as protest and revolutionary movements, religious groups, humanitatian organizations, new businesses and guerrilla groups who positioned themselves on the international stage, conducting ‘private sphere diplomacy’ and engaging in actions previously reserved for states only. ${}^{54}$${}^{54}$^(54){ }^{54}
在接下來的一年，在開羅，巴勒斯坦代表在 ${12}^{\text{dh}}$${12}^{\text{dh }}$12^("dh ")12^{\text {dh }} 巴勒斯坦國民議會中解釋以色列的抗議浪潮為內戰可能開始和以色列即將崩潰的前兆。代表們通過了一項決議，聲明巴勒斯坦解放組織將在每個可能被解放的巴勒斯坦地區成立巴勒斯坦政府。儘管這一立場的政治含義在 1988 年才被明確表達並正式採納，但 1974 年的決議實際上是巴勒斯坦解放組織首次接受兩國方案，即使這一接受僅被視為巴勒斯坦完全解放的暫時階段。 ${}^{53}$${}^{53}$^(53){ }^{53} 事實上，與此同時，1973 年的石油危機啟動了一個過程，催生了全球多樣的「無主權行為者」。這些是獨立的組織，涵蓋抗議和革命運動、宗教團體、人道主義組織、新企業和游擊隊等多種形式，它們在國際舞台上定位自己，進行「私人領域外交」，並參與以前僅限於國家的行動。 ${}^{54}$${}^{54}$^(54){ }^{54}

In Israel this process was best exemplified by the consolidation as an extraparliamentary organization of a powerfal new brand of national-religious Zionism, one that knitted together disparate and contradictory threads already existing
在以色列，這一過程最好的例證是將一種強大的新型國家宗教猶太主義作為一個超越議會的組織進行整合，這種主義將已經存在的不同和矛盾的線索編織在一起
within Zionism - pioneering and militarism, religion, nationalism and messianism. The core of the religious-messianic right-wing Gush Emunim (Block of Faithful), which was founded to promote the Jewish settlement of the 1967 occupied territories, was formed by demobilized soldiers and officers who had served together during the 1973 war. Its ideas were consolidated by soldiers stationed on the Suez Canal before the IDF completed its withdrawal from the area in March 1974. For these activists the 1973 war was a part of a messianic process that started with the conquests of 1967 , and was a test for the nation of Israel. They viewed any conflict as a war over Jerusalem, and thus a war against God, a point seemingly underscored by the timing of the Arab armies’ attack on Yom Kippur. The Israeli victory to come, through their combined effort, would thus be the victory of the ‘rule of God’, a conquest of light over darkness. For them, the moment of national regeneration - a revival that could only come through belief - must emerge from below, from the people themselves, because earthly governments failed them. Indeed, once the messianic process of settlement was under way, no withdrawal ordered by the government from any part of the holy land was to be countenanced.
在猶太復國主義中 - 先驅與軍事主義、宗教、民族主義和彌賽亞主義。宗教彌賽亞主義右翼的信仰之塊（Gush Emunim）核心，成立於促進 1967 年佔領區的猶太人定居，主要由在 1973 年戰爭中共同服役的退伍軍人和軍官組成。其思想由駐守於蘇伊士運河的士兵鞏固，直到以色列國防軍在 1974 年 3 月完成從該地區的撤退。對於這些活動家來說，1973 年戰爭是從 1967 年征服開始的彌賽亞過程的一部分，並且是以色列民族的考驗。他們將任何衝突視為對耶路撒冷的戰爭，因此是對上帝的戰爭，這一點似乎在阿拉伯軍隊在贖罪日的攻擊時機上得到了強調。隨著他們的共同努力，隨之而來的以色列勝利將是“上帝的統治”的勝利，是光明戰勝黑暗的征服。對他們來說，民族再生的時刻 - 只有通過信仰才能實現的復興 - 必須從基層出現，來自人民自身，因為世俗政府未能滿足他們的需求。 確實，一旦彌賽亞的定居過程開始，政府不應該從任何聖地撤回命令。

The emergence of Gush Emunim could also be seen as part of a general revival of political religion around the globe from Iran to the United States, loosely collected under the term ‘fundamentalism’. Gush Emunim attempted to liberate some of the previously repressed messianic sentiments within Zionism, and to invert the social hierarchies and cultural values within Israeli society. ${}^{55}$${}^{55}$^(55){ }^{55} In particular, the organization sought to replace the secular, and therefore temporary, ‘state of Israel’ with the transcendental power of the complete and permanent 'land of Israel. ${}^{56}$${}^{56}$^(56){ }^{56} For the settlers of Gush Emunim, the frontiers of the West Bank and the Sinai were a zone liberated from the stifling ‘statism’ of government, the conceptual terrain for the formation of yet a new Israeliness, one that sought to combine some of the rough and rugged characteristics of frontier individuality, intolerance to the law and central government, with a devotional and pious way of life. ${}^{57}$${}^{57}$^(57){ }^{57}
古什·艾穆尼姆的出現也可以被視為全球範圍內政治宗教的一次普遍復興，從伊朗到美國，這種現象被籠統地稱為「基要主義」。古什·艾穆尼姆試圖釋放以色拉主義中先前被壓抑的彌賽亞情感，並顛覆以色列社會中的社會階層和文化價值觀。 ${}^{55}$${}^{55}$^(55){ }^{55} 特別是，該組織試圖用完整和永久的「以色列土地」的超越力量來取代世俗的，因此是暫時的「以色列國」。 ${}^{56}$${}^{56}$^(56){ }^{56} 對於古什·艾穆尼姆的定居者來說，約旦河西岸和西奈的邊界是一個從政府的壓抑「國家主義」中解放出來的區域，是形成一種新的以色列身份的概念領域，這種身份試圖結合邊疆個體的粗獷特徵、對法律和中央政府的不容忍，以及一種虔誠的生活方式。 ${}^{57}$${}^{57}$^(57){ }^{57}

Demobilized soldiers from the 1973 war also formed the basis of an organization that in 1978 evolved into Peace Now, which had an entirely opposite aim to that of Gush Emunim: to promote peace treaties with Arab governments based on security arrangements and the formula of ‘land for peace’. Within a weakened centralized state, these two non-governmental organizations were the key protagonists in the reshaping of an extended political field. It was Gush Emunin, however, that best managed to exploit government weaknesses and organizational chaos, and build for itself a small settlement empire within an expanding (mini) state empire.
1973 年戰爭後的退伍軍人也形成了一個組織，該組織在 1978 年演變為「現在和平」，其目標與「信仰之隊」完全相反：促進與阿拉伯政府基於安全安排和「土地換和平」公式的和平條約。在一個削弱的中央集權國家中，這兩個非政府組織是重塑擴展政治領域的關鍵主角。然而，「信仰之隊」卻最能夠利用政府的弱點和組織的混亂，並在擴張的（小型）國家帝國內為自己建立一個小型定居點帝國。

The febrile postwar political climate brought Likud’s combination of right-wing foreign policy and hands-off economic policy to power under Menachem Begin in May 1977. In this election Sharon did not run on the Likud ticket but at the head of a small party that he had formed called ‘Shlomzion’. After gaining only two seats he joined his party with Likud. Sharon demanded the Defence Ministry, but was instead appointed Minister of Agriculture; he also took over the Ministerial Committee for Settlement. He made the latter position into an influential and powerful portfolio in an administration of politicians who, with the exception of Dayan - who had also crossed political lines and joined Likud - were accustomed to permanent roles in political opposition, lacking any experience in government.
戰後的發燒政治氣候使利庫德黨在梅納赫姆·貝京的領導下於 1977 年 5 月掌握了結合右翼外交政策和不干預經濟政策的權力。在這次選舉中，沙龍並未以利庫德黨的名義參選，而是以他所成立的小黨“舒洛姆齊昂”的領導者身份參選。獲得僅兩個席次後，他將自己的政黨與利庫德黨合併。沙龍要求擔任國防部長，但最終被任命為農業部長；他還接管了定居點部長委員會。他將後者的職位變成了一個在一個政治家組成的政府中具有影響力和權力的職位，這些政治家除了戴揚（他也跨越了政治界限並加入了利庫德黨）外，習慣於在政治反對派中擔任永久角色，缺乏任何政府經驗。

By the time Likud came to power, almost thirty settlements inhabited by some 4,500 Israelis had already been established in the West Bank, mostly within the borders of the Allon plan, but also in Hebron and in Gush Etzion southwest of Jerusalem. ${}^{58}$${}^{58}$^(58){ }^{58} Having publicly demonstrated the shortcomings of the Bar Lev Line, and having used the war to prove his point to the Israeli public, Sharon now turned against the second of the Labor defence lines. Seeking to implement the lessons learned from the 1973 Sinai campaign, Sharon claimed that: ‘. . . a thin line of settlements along the Jordan [i.e. the linear Allon plan] would not provide a viable defence unless the high terrain behind it was also fortified… the vital strategic issue was how to give depth to the coastal plain . . . the answer was to build a [network] of urban, industrial settlements on the ridges overlooking the plain’. ${}^{59}$${}^{59}$^(59){ }^{59}
當利庫德黨上台時，約旦河西岸已經建立了近三十個定居點，居住著約 4,500 名以色列人，這些定居點大多位於阿隆計劃的邊界內，但也包括希伯倫和耶路撒冷西南的古什艾齊翁。沙龍公開展示了巴爾·列夫防線的缺陷，並利用戰爭向以色列公眾證明了他的觀點，現在他轉而反對工黨的第二道防線。沙龍試圖實施 1973 年西奈戰役中學到的教訓，聲稱：「……沿約旦河的薄弱定居線（即線性阿隆計劃）不會提供可行的防禦，除非其後方的高地也得到加固……關鍵的戰略問題是如何為沿海平原提供深度……答案是建造一個位於俯瞰平原的山脊上的城市和工業定居點的[網絡]。」

Forty days after assuming ministerial office, Sharon announced the first proposal in a series of plans for the creation of Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank. The plan was prepared in collaboration with the architect Avraham Wachman, a professor at the Technion Institute of Technology in Haifa. Wachman was by then already world renowned for his role in the development of the Eshkol-Wachman Movement Notation, designed in 1958 to enable choreographers to ‘write’ a dance down on paper like composers write notes. And so Sharon’s plan for the colonization of the depth of the West Bank emerged out of the meeting of the architect of dance notation with the architect of manoeuvrewarfare. ${}^{60}$${}^{60}$^(60){ }^{60} The plan projected a network of more than a hundred points to be inhabited by suburban, urban and industrial settlements on the mountain ridges across the depth of the West Bank. ${}^{61}$${}^{61}$^(61){ }^{61} According to the plan, settlements were to be organized in sustainable ‘blocks’, in which a number of smaller rural and suburban settlements would receive services from larger urban, industrial ones. ${}^{62}$${}^{62}$^(62){ }^{62} Each block of settlements was to be connected along major highways to other
在就任部長職位四十天後，沙龍宣布了一系列計劃中的第一項提案，旨在於約旦河西岸建立猶太人定居點。該計劃是與海法理工學院的建築師阿夫拉罕·瓦赫曼合作準備的。到那時，瓦赫曼已因其在 1958 年設計的艾什科爾-瓦赫曼運動符號系統中的角色而享譽全球，該系統使編舞者能夠像作曲家寫樂譜一樣將舞蹈“寫”在紙上。因此，沙龍的約旦河西岸深處殖民計劃源於舞蹈符號的建築師與機動戰爭的建築師的會晤。該計劃預測在約旦河西岸深處的山脊上建立一個由郊區、城市和工業定居點組成的超過一百個點的網絡。根據該計劃，定居點將被組織成可持續的“區塊”，其中一些較小的農村和郊區定居點將從較大的城市和工業定居點獲得服務。每個定居點區塊將沿主要高速公路與其他定居點相連。
such conurbations, and to the main metropolitan centres in Israel proper. The high-volume traffic network that would connect the settlement blocks was itself to be protected by other settlements along the routes.
這些城市群，以及以色列本土的主要大都市中心。將連接定居區的高流量交通網絡本身將受到沿路其他定居點的保護。

According to the Sharon-Wachman plan, the settlements would also function as barriers, enveloping the Palestinian-populated mountain region from both east and west, and fragmenting it internally with Israeli east-west traffic corridors and by settlements located on the Palestinian road network. The Sharon-Wachman plan was not therefore a network of fortifications placed in an empty abstract space; rather, it was a network superimposed upon another, the pre-existing living Palestinian spaces. The aim of the Israeli settlement and roads was to splice and paralyze the Palestinian one. The result would be several isolated Palestinian cantons, each around a major city, with the connections controlled by Israel. Years later, the Israeli activist Jeff Halper called the interlocking series of settlements, roads, barriers, and military bases built throughout the West Bank, the ‘matrix of control’, and likened it to a game of ‘Go’ - inadvertently referencing Deleuze and Guattari: ${}^{63}$${}^{63}$^(63){ }^{63} 'The Matrix, an intricate and an interlocking series of control mechanisms, resembles the Japanese game of “Go”. Instead of defeating your opponent as in chess, in “Go” you win by immobilizing the other side, by gaining control of key points of a matrix, so that every time your opponent moves he or she encounters another obstacle. ${}^{64}$${}^{64}$^(64){ }^{64} The nodes of the West Bank’s matrix of control act as on/ off valves regulating movement, replacing the necessity for the physical presence of Israeli forces within Palestinian cities. This distributed logic would later allow Israelis to pull out of densely inhabited Palestinian areas under the terms of the Oslo Accord while still dominating the Palestinians physically, collectively and politically by remotely controlling their movements.
根據沙龍-瓦赫曼計劃，定居點也將作為屏障，從東西兩側包圍巴勒斯坦人居住的山區，並通過以色列的東西交通走廊和位於巴勒斯坦道路網絡上的定居點在內部進行碎片化。因此，沙龍-瓦赫曼計劃並不是一個置於空曠抽象空間中的防禦工事網絡；而是一個重疊於另一個網絡之上，即先前存在的巴勒斯坦生活空間。以色列的定居點和道路的目的是切割和癱瘓巴勒斯坦的空間。結果將是幾個孤立的巴勒斯坦區域，每個區域圍繞著一個主要城市，連接由以色列控制。多年後，以色列活動家傑夫·哈爾珀稱整個約旦河西岸建造的相互交織的定居點、道路、屏障和軍事基地為“控制矩陣”，並將其比作一場“圍棋”遊戲——無意中提及德勒茲和瓜塔里： ${}^{63}$${}^{63}$^(63){ }^{63} “矩陣，一個錯綜複雜且相互交織的控制機制系列，類似於日本的‘圍棋’遊戲。” 在「圍棋」中，與棋類比賽中擊敗對手不同，你是通過使對方無法行動來獲勝，通過控制矩陣的關鍵點，使得每當對手移動時，他或她都會遇到另一個障礙。 ${}^{64}$${}^{64}$^(64){ }^{64} 約旦河西岸的控制矩陣的節點充當開關閥，調節移動，取代以色列軍隊在巴勒斯坦城市內實體存在的必要性。這種分散的邏輯後來使以色列人在奧斯陸協議的條款下撤出人口稠密的巴勒斯坦地區，同時仍然在身體上、集體上和政治上主導巴勒斯坦人，通過遠程控制他們的行動。

On the smaller, tactical scale of the Sharon-Wachman plan, individual settlements were located on strategic summits, thereby allowing them to function as observation points: maintaining visual connection with each other and overlooking their surroundings, main traffic arteries, strategic road junctions and Palestinian cities, towns and villages. Sharon claimed that ‘there was no place [settlement] that was built without a reason’. ${}^{65}$${}^{65}$^(65){ }^{65} The logic of visibility - to both see and be seen - dictated the overall mode of design. Visual domination was important not only in order to exercise domination, but to demonstrate the presence of the occupation’s power. Sharon, flying over the Occupied Territories once remarked: 'Arabs should see Jewish lights every night from 500 metres. ${}^{66}$${}^{66}$^(66){ }^{66} Tactical consideration engaged simultaneously thus with both seeing and being seen. The sense of always being under the gaze was intended to make the colonized internalize the facts of their domination.
在沙龍-瓦赫曼計劃的較小戰術層面上，個別定居點位於戰略高地上，從而使它們能夠作為觀察點運作：保持彼此之間的視覺聯繫，並俯瞰周圍環境、主要交通幹道、戰略道路交匯處以及巴勒斯坦城市、城鎮和村莊。沙龍聲稱「沒有一個[定居點]是沒有理由而建造的」。可見性的邏輯——既要看見也要被看見——主導了整體設計模式。視覺上的主導地位不僅對於行使統治至關重要，還用以展示佔領力量的存在。沙龍曾在飛越被佔領土時評論道：「阿拉伯人應該每晚從 500 米的高度看到猶太人的燈光。」戰術考量因此同時涉及到看見和被看見的問題。始終處於他人目光之下的感覺旨在使被殖民者內化其統治的事實。

Sharon’s plan was not officially accepted by the first Begin government indeed it was unintelligible to most of its members - but the government did
沙龍的計劃並未被第一屆貝根政府正式接受，事實上對於其大多數成員來說是難以理解的——但政府確實有

IDF defence in depth tbrought the West Bank, late 1970s. The “eggs” represent military strongpoints. Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies 1982.
以色列國防軍在約旦河西岸的深度防禦，1970 年代末。“蛋”代表軍事據點。雅菲戰略研究中心，1982 年。
authorize some settlements, and more were built without official permission through Sharon’s private initiative. By the late 1970s and early 1980s there began the frenzy of construction that was indicative of Sharon’s proximity to executive power. A growing spider’s web of installations was being spun throughout the West Bank. Like the Sinai a few years previously, the land was being inscribed by two symbiotic and synergetic instruments of territorial expansion: the settlement point and the road network. The latter served the former, the former overlooked and protected the latter.
授權一些定居點，更多的則是在沙龍的私人倡議下未經官方許可而建造的。到了 1970 年代末和 1980 年代初，建設的狂潮開始出現，這顯示出沙龍與執行權力的接近。整個約旦河西岸正在編織出一張日益增長的蜘蛛網。就像幾年前的西奈一樣，這片土地正被兩種共生且協同的領土擴張工具所刻劃：定居點和道路網絡。後者服務於前者，前者則監視並保護後者。

Without full government backing, and fearing the reversal of his project, Sharon was reluctant to implement his plans sequentially, one settlement after the other, but adopted a simultaneous approach. He believed that it was important ‘to secure a presence first [in all points] and only then build the settlements up’. ${}^{67}$${}^{67}$^(67){ }^{67} He wanted to establish the entire skeleton for the geography of occupation,
在缺乏政府全力支持的情況下，沙龍擔心他的計劃會被推翻，因此不願意按順序逐個實施他的計劃，而是採取了同時進行的方法。他認為“首先要確保在所有點上有存在，然後再建設定居點”是重要的。 ${}^{67}$${}^{67}$^(67){ }^{67} 他想要為佔領的地理建立整個骨架，

Ariel Sharon as minister of Agricultur and Head of the Government’s settlement committee, 1979. Pbotograph: Arnold Newman, Getty Images.
亞里爾·沙龍作為農業部長及政府安置委員會主席，1979 年。照片：阿諾德·紐曼，蓋蒂圖片社。
present it as an ineradicable fact on the ground and later allow it to evolve and consolidate. He accordingly started scattering the West Bank with small outposts, some hardly more than footholds, composed of tents or mobile homes, knowing that each of these places, once established on the ground, could later grow into a settlement. Journalists writing in this period described the outposts as akin to frontier towns in the wild American West: caravans organized in a circle around a windswept hilltop, inhabited by rugged but enthusiastic settlers slinging the straps of their guns around their shoulders. To complete the analogy, even their religious Tzitziot (the tassels attached to garments worn by observant Jews) resembled those of ponchos.
將其作為一個不可根除的事實呈現於現實中，並隨後允許其演變和鞏固。因此，他開始在約旦河西岸散佈小型前哨基地，有些幾乎只是立足點，由帳篷或移動房屋組成，知道這些地方一旦在地面上建立，將來可能會發展成為定居點。在這一時期撰寫的新聞報導中，記者們將這些前哨基地比作美國西部的邊境小鎮：圍繞著一個風吹草動的山頂組織成圓形的車隊，居住著堅韌但熱情的定居者，將槍帶搭在肩上。為了完成這一類比，他們的宗教 Tzitziot（猶太教徒穿著的衣物上附加的流蘇）甚至與斗篷的流蘇相似。

The outposts had a potential for immediacy, mobility and flexibility; they were the perfect instruments of colonization. Tents and prefabricated homes could be deployed quickly and under cover of night on the back of trucks or, in cases where a road was not available, by helicopter. Named after their topographical
前哨基地具有即時性、機動性和靈活性的潛力；它們是殖民的完美工具。帳篷和預製房屋可以迅速部署，並在夜間的掩護下通過卡車運送，或者在沒有道路的情況下，通過直升機運送。以其地形特徵命名的
latitude - ‘hill 777’, ‘hill 851’ - settlement outposts are often referred to in Hebrew as ‘points on the ground’, and a single settlement sometimes simply as Nekuda - ‘point’ in Hebrew (Nekuda is also the title of the official journal of the settlers’ movement). This is indicative of a planning culture that conceived the settlements in essence more in terms of their strategic location than as places of residence. Strategy is the choice of points where force is to be applied, and points themselves are nothing but coordinates, abstract pasitioning. The rigidity of the prefabricated caravans and mobile homes allowed for the quick multiplication and flexible distribution of settlements: an instant urbanism. The outpost-seed could then evolve into a ‘mature’ settlement when conditions permitted. This is the reason why contemporary outposts (numbering 103 at present, according to ‘Peace Now’) should not be seen differently to settlements, but rather as a stage in their evolution.
緯度 - ‘山丘 777’，‘山丘 851’ - 定居點前哨在希伯來語中通常被稱為‘地面上的點’，而單一定居點有時簡單地稱為 Nekuda - 在希伯來語中意為‘點’（Nekuda 也是定居者運動官方期刊的標題）。這表明了一種規劃文化，將定居點的本質更多地視為其戰略位置，而非居住地。戰略是選擇施加力量的點，而這些點本身不過是坐標，抽象的定位。預製的旅館和移動房屋的剛性使得定居點的快速增殖和靈活分佈成為可能：一種瞬間城市化。當條件允許時，前哨種子可以發展成為一個‘成熟’的定居點。這就是為什麼當前的前哨（根據‘和平現在’的資料，目前數量為 103）不應被視為與定居點不同，而應被視為其演變的一個階段。

The network of roadways that was purportedly built for the purpose of facilitating military manoeuvres became effective instruments of development - not only for the ideological core of Gush Emunim, but for Israeli suburbdwellers. The settlements project was explained to an Israeli public traumatized by the 1973 war as a defensive system designed to help protect the state from invasion, a precaution against another surprise conventional war, this time not in the ‘endless’ open deserts of the Sinai but much closer to home - in the West Bank. Sharon, expert in manipulating and profiting from public fear, warned: ‘If we don’t begin settling in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank], Jordanian artillery will come to us.’ He later explained in military terms the logic of defence embodied in the project: 'In any attack our lines had to be held by limited regular forces in conjunction with the civilian communities whose role is to guard our borders, secure roads, insure communications, and so on … [the West Bank settlements] would be organized for defence, with their own weapons and ammunition, their contingency plans and their integration into the overall defensive system. ${}^{968}$${}^{968}$^(968){ }^{968} Battlefield terms such as strongpoint, advance, penetration, encirclement, envelopment, surveillance, control and supply lines migrated, from the military to the civilian sphere. For Sharon the architect/general, politics was war as much as war was politics and both were exercised in space making. The concept of ‘depth’ was also civilianized. Flexibility became the hallmark of Sharon’s work as an architect across the Israeli frontier. The mobile home and later the small red-roofed single family house replaced the tank as a basic battle unit; homes, like armoured divisions, were deployed in formation across a theatre of operations to occupy hills, to encircle an enemy, or to cut its communication lines. Sharon 'trekked from place to place, climbing with map in hand to decide where settlements would be located, looking for high, important terrain and vital road junctions. ${}^{39}$${}^{39}$^(39){ }^{39} In the hands of
據稱為了促進軍事演習而建造的道路網絡，成為了發展的有效工具——不僅對於古什·艾穆寧的意識形態核心，還對以色列的郊區居民。定居點計劃向一個因 1973 年戰爭而受到創傷的以色列公眾解釋為一個防禦系統，旨在幫助保護國家免受入侵，這是一種防範再次發生突襲常規戰爭的預防措施，這次不是在西奈的“無盡”開放沙漠中，而是更接近家園——在約旦河西岸。沙龍，擅長操縱和利用公眾恐懼的人，警告道：“如果我們不開始在猶太和撒馬利亞[約旦河西岸]定居，約旦的炮火將會來到我們這裡。”他後來用軍事術語解釋了該計劃所體現的防禦邏輯：“在任何攻擊中，我們的防線必須由有限的常規部隊與民間社區共同維持，這些社區的角色是保護我們的邊界，確保道路安全，保證通信等等……[約旦河西岸的定居點]將被組織起來以進行防禦，擁有自己的武器和彈藥，應急計劃以及與整體防禦系統的整合。” ${}^{968}$${}^{968}$^(968){ }^{968} 戰場術語如據點、推進、穿透、包圍、包抄、監視、控制和補給線從軍事領域轉移到了民用領域。對於建築師/將軍沙龍來說，政治與戰爭一樣，都是戰爭，兩者都在空間的塑造中進行。‘深度’的概念也被民用化。靈活性成為沙龍在以色列邊界上作為建築師工作的標誌。移動房屋，後來的小紅頂單戶住宅取代了坦克，成為基本的戰鬥單位；住宅像裝甲師一樣，按照編隊在作戰區域中部署，以佔領山丘、包圍敵人或切斷其通信線。沙龍“從一個地方跋涉到另一個地方，手持地圖攀登，以決定定居點的設置位置，尋找高地、重要地形和重要的道路交匯點。 ${}^{39}$${}^{39}$^(39){ }^{39} 在

Sharon, his followers and colleagues, architecture and planning were presented as a continuation of war by other means. The civilianization of military terms was to lead in turn to the militarization of all other spheres of life. War was only over because it was now everywhere.
沙龍、他的追隨者和同事手中，建築和規劃被呈現為以其他方式延續戰爭。軍事術語的民用化反過來又導致了所有其他生活領域的軍事化。戰爭之所以結束，只因為它現在無處不在。

The “ascent” of the Elon Moreh Settlement core to Sebastia, West Bank, December 1975.
以色列西岸塞巴斯蒂亞的埃隆·莫雷定居點核心的「上升」，1975 年 12 月。