在“演绎”推理中,结论已经包含在基础信息中,并且结论排除了所有其他可能性(并且从前提的真实性中可以必然得出)。例如,如果在美国的所有 ISIS 成员都对美国安全构成严重威胁,而 X 先生是美国的一名 ISIS 成员,那么 X 先生对美国安全构成严重威胁。这一推论最终只是“将碎片拼合起来”的问题,因为基础信息已经包含了人们需要知道的一切。这意味着在演绎推理中,结论是从可用信息中提取出来的。
在“归纳”推理中,结论已包含在基础信息中,但结论并未排除所有其他可能性(且它并不必然从前提的真实性中得出)。例如,如果在中东以外地区已被识别的 ISIS 成员中有 70%具有特定特征,那么有理由认为,一般而言,中东以外地区的 ISIS 成员中有 70%也具有这一特定特征。(这是一个归纳“概括”。)或者,如果中东以外地区的 ISIS 成员中有 70%具有特定特征,且 X 先生位于中东以外地区并且是 ISIS 成员,那么 X 先生有 70%的概率拥有这一特定特征。(这是一个归纳“具体化”。)这一推理同样认为结论已包含在基础信息中(例如,那 70%已识别 ISIS 成员的特征)。但与演绎推理不同,结论并未排除所有其他可能性。还有 30%的中东以外地区 ISIS 成员不具备这一特征,以及 X 先生有 30%的概率不拥有这一特征。 X 没有那个配置文件。这意味着在归纳推理中,结论是从可用信息中推断出来的。请注意,基础信息必须非常可靠(其中一些信息实际上是先前分析的结论)。
在“溯因”推理中,结论并不包含在基础信息中,且结论排除了所有其他可能性。例如,如果 X 先生的激进观点与 ISIS 成员相似,最近从 ISIS 成员众多的地区移居美国,并被发现试图收集有关理想恐怖袭击目标的信息,那么人们可能会得出结论,认为 X 先生是 ISIS 成员是对这些信息的最佳解释。这些信息本身并未隐含(或明确)包含 X 先生是 ISIS 成员的声明。但它确实以某种方式排除了其他可能性。虽然从前提中并不能百分之百确定结论(完全有可能前提为真而结论为假),但该结论被认为是“最佳”解释。这意味着在溯因推理中,结论是对现有信息的解释。现在请注意,与演绎和归纳的例子相比,这里可用的信息要薄弱得多。
有趣的是,这一模式暗示了第四类推理,而这通常不在当代逻辑学家和哲学家所描述的范畴之内。假设 X 先生居住在一个许多人被转化为 ISIS 成员的地区,并且他与那些被招募者具有某些人口统计学上的相似性。然而,同样具有这些特征的人中也有加入抗击 ISIS 的。对于 X 先生来说,存在几种可能的路径:加入 ISIS、加入抗击 ISIS 的行列,或是试图保持中立。在这种推理中,信息显然并未预先包含结论(如同溯因推理),但与溯因推理不同的是,它并不排除其他可能性(即没有所谓“最佳”选项)。相当一部分情报分析推理(尤其是未来分析及其衍生领域)似乎属于这一类别。关于这一点,常规的逻辑模式会作何说明尚不明确。人们或许会将其归类为“溯因推理”,但鉴于其结论是对现有信息的探索(着眼于未来),似乎更有趣的是为其创造一个新的术语(或许是“预推”而非“预测”)。 这里不仅基础信息不够坚实,结论也同样不稳固。 ^(9){ }^{9}
Deductive
(de + ducere ". . .
to lead down from . . .")| Deductive |
| :--- |
| (de + ducere ". . . |
| to lead down from . . .") |
归纳{:[" (in + ducere ". . . to "],[" lead into . . .") "]:}\begin{aligned} & \text { (in + ducere ". . . to } \\ & \text { lead into . . .") } \end{aligned}
溯因( ab+a b+ ducere “...引导离开...”)
Abductive
( ab+ ducere ". . . to lead away from . . .")| Abductive |
| :--- |
| ( $a b+$ ducere ". . . to lead away from . . .") |
1. All members of ISIS in the US pose a serious threat to US security.
2. Mr.X is a member of ISIS in the US.
3. Therefore, Mr. X poses a serious threat to US security.| 1. All members of ISIS in the US pose a serious threat to US security. |
| :--- |
| 2. $\mathrm{Mr} . \mathrm{X}$ is a member of ISIS in the US. |
| 3. Therefore, Mr. X poses a serious threat to US security. |
1. 70% of identified ISIS members outside of the Middle East have a particular profile.
2. Therefore, 70% of all ISIS members outside of the Middle East have that particular profile (Inductive Generalization).
3. Mr. X. is an ISIS member outside of the Middle East.
4. Therefore, there is a 70% chance that (it is probable that) Mr. X has that particular profile (Inductive Particularization).| 1. $70 \%$ of identified ISIS members outside of the Middle East have a particular profile. |
| :--- |
| 2. Therefore, $70 \%$ of all ISIS members outside of the Middle East have that particular profile (Inductive Generalization). |
| 3. Mr. X. is an ISIS member outside of the Middle East. |
| 4. Therefore, there is a $70 \%$ chance that (it is probable that) Mr. X has that particular profile (Inductive Particularization). |
1. X 先生表达了与 ISIS 成员相似的激进观点。
2. X 先生最近从一个 ISIS 成员众多的地区搬到了美国。
3. X 先生已被确认为试图收集有关 ISIS 理想目标的信息。
4. 因此,对这些信息的最佳解释是(因此有理由相信) XX 先生是 ISIS 的成员。
1. Mr. X expresses radical views similar to members of ISIS.
2. Mr. X recently moved to the US from a region with many ISIS members.
3. Mr. X has been identified as trying to collect information about a desirable target of ISIS.
4. Therefore, the best explanation of this information is that (and so it is reasonable to believe that) Mr. X is a member of ISIS.| 1. Mr. X expresses radical views similar to members of ISIS. |
| :--- |
| 2. Mr. X recently moved to the US from a region with many ISIS members. |
| 3. Mr. X has been identified as trying to collect information about a desirable target of ISIS. |
| 4. Therefore, the best explanation of this information is that (and so it is reasonable to believe that) Mr. $X$ is a member of ISIS. |
"Deductive
(de + ducere ". . .
to lead down from . . .")" Inductive " (in + ducere . . . to
lead into . . .) " "Abductive
( ab+ ducere ". . . to lead away from . . .")"
Is the Conclusion Already Contained in the Underlying Information? Yes Yes No
Is the Conclusion Inferred in a Way That Excludes AII Alternatives? Yes No Yes
How Does Conclusion Relate to the Available Information? Conclusion Is an Extraction from the Information Conclusion Is an Extrapolation from the Information Conclusion Is an Explanation of the Information
An Example of the Type of Inference "1. All members of ISIS in the US pose a serious threat to US security.
2. Mr.X is a member of ISIS in the US.
3. Therefore, Mr. X poses a serious threat to US security." "1. 70% of identified ISIS members outside of the Middle East have a particular profile.
2. Therefore, 70% of all ISIS members outside of the Middle East have that particular profile (Inductive Generalization).
3. Mr. X. is an ISIS member outside of the Middle East.
4. Therefore, there is a 70% chance that (it is probable that) Mr. X has that particular profile (Inductive Particularization)." "1. Mr. X expresses radical views similar to members of ISIS.
2. Mr. X recently moved to the US from a region with many ISIS members.
3. Mr. X has been identified as trying to collect information about a desirable target of ISIS.
4. Therefore, the best explanation of this information is that (and so it is reasonable to believe that) Mr. X is a member of ISIS."| | Deductive <br> (de + ducere ". . . <br> to lead down from . . .") | Inductive $\begin{aligned} & \text { (in + ducere ". . . to } \\ & \text { lead into . . .") } \end{aligned}$ | Abductive <br> ( $a b+$ ducere ". . . to lead away from . . .") |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Is the Conclusion Already Contained in the Underlying Information? | Yes | Yes | No |
| Is the Conclusion Inferred in a Way That Excludes AII Alternatives? | Yes | No | Yes |
| How Does Conclusion Relate to the Available Information? | Conclusion Is an Extraction from the Information | Conclusion Is an Extrapolation from the Information | Conclusion Is an Explanation of the Information |
| An Example of the Type of Inference | 1. All members of ISIS in the US pose a serious threat to US security. <br> 2. $\mathrm{Mr} . \mathrm{X}$ is a member of ISIS in the US. <br> 3. Therefore, Mr. X poses a serious threat to US security. | 1. $70 \%$ of identified ISIS members outside of the Middle East have a particular profile. <br> 2. Therefore, $70 \%$ of all ISIS members outside of the Middle East have that particular profile (Inductive Generalization). <br> 3. Mr. X. is an ISIS member outside of the Middle East. <br> 4. Therefore, there is a $70 \%$ chance that (it is probable that) Mr. X has that particular profile (Inductive Particularization). | 1. Mr. X expresses radical views similar to members of ISIS. <br> 2. Mr. X recently moved to the US from a region with many ISIS members. <br> 3. Mr. X has been identified as trying to collect information about a desirable target of ISIS. <br> 4. Therefore, the best explanation of this information is that (and so it is reasonable to believe that) Mr. $X$ is a member of ISIS. |
本节简化并省略了逻辑学、认识论和科学哲学中的许多问题,这些问题对相关领域的学者来说至关重要,因为它们不一定与情报分析师的特定目标相关或为其优化。这些领域的学者通常关注于为概念本身提供最佳解释,而分析师则主要关注这些概念如何在实际工作中发挥作用。关于此处介绍的一些认识论概念的更全面介绍,请参见 Louis P. Pojman 的《我们能知道什么?》第二版(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2011)。关于这些问题的当前哲学观点的更深入探讨,请参见 Sven Bernecker 和 Duncan Pritchard 主编的《Routledge 认识论指南》(纽约:Routledge, 2012);Paul K. Moser 的《牛津认识论手册》(纽约:牛津大学出版社, 2002)。
例如,参见 Roger Z. George 和 James B. Bruce 主编的《分析情报:起源、障碍与创新》(华盛顿特区:乔治城大学出版社,2008 年);Roger Z. George 和 Robert D. Kline 主编的《情报与国家安全战略家》(马里兰州兰哈姆:罗曼和利特菲尔德出版社,2006 年);Mark M. Lowenthal 的《情报:从秘密到政策》第五版(加利福尼亚州千橡市:CQ 出版社,2012 年);Stephen Marrin 的《提升情报研究作为学术学科的地位》,《情报与国家安全》第 31 卷第 2 期(2016 年):266-79,以及《情报分析理论:解释与预测分析职责》,《情报与国家安全》第 22 卷第 6 期(2007 年):821-46;Julian Richards 的《情报分析的艺术与科学》(纽约:牛津大学出版社,2010 年);Timothy Walton 的《情报分析中的挑战:从公元前 1300 年至今的教训》(纽约:剑桥大学出版社,2010 年)。
Manufacture:
Acquire knowledge, adapt and apply industry| Manufacture: |
| :--- |
| Acquire knowledge, adapt and apply industry |
信息时代:人类作为“知识策展人” 20 世纪 90 年代至???
Information Age:
Humans as "Knowledge
Curators" 1990s to ???| Information Age: |
| :--- |
| Humans as "Knowledge |
| Curators" 1990s to ??? |
数字化:人类对信息的控制
信息增加:知识的创造、存储、操作和传输
Increased Information:
Creation, storage, manipulation, and transmission of knowledge| Increased Information: |
| :--- |
| Creation, storage, manipulation, and transmission of knowledge |
管理不善的信息流程:过载、无关、被黑、损坏
通过更好地管理知识来使自己或团队脱颖而出
为智慧与洞察力精选知识:适应并应用知识
Driving Technology Differentiating Environment Distinctive Risk and Threat Distinctive Reward and Opportunity Defining Work
"Nomadic Age:
Humans as "Hunter-
Gatherers" to 10,000BC" Spear Resource Scarcity: Small, mobile settlements with survival orientation "Poorly Managed Resource Collection:
Malnourishment, extinction, poisoning" Distinguish oneself or group by bringing in more or better food Hunt and Gatherer: Acquire food
"Agricultural Age:
Humans as "Cultivators"
10,000BC to 1750 s" Grain Cultivation: Human control of food "Increased Food:
Larger permanent settlements (cities), specialization, and culture" Poorly Managed Agricultural Processes: Food wasted/unused, stolen, spoiled Distinguish oneself or group by managing agriculture better; then bring in more or better resources "Farm:
Acquire resources, adapt and apply agriculture"
"Industrial Age:
Humans as
"Manufacturers" 1750s
to 1990 s" Steam-Driven Mechanization: Human control of energy "Increased Energy:
Physical capabilities magnified (when have natural resources)" Poorly Managed Industrial Processes: Unsustainability, disruption, pollution Distinguish oneself or group by managing industry better; then bring in more or better knowledge "Manufacture:
Acquire knowledge, adapt and apply industry"
"Information Age:
Humans as "Knowledge
Curators" 1990s to ???" Digitization: Human control of information "Increased Information:
Creation, storage, manipulation, and transmission of knowledge" Poorly Managed Information Processes: Overload, irrelevant, hacked, corrupted Distinguish oneself or group by managing knowledge better Curate Knowledge for Wisdom and Insight: Adapt and apply knowledge| | Driving Technology | Differentiating Environment | Distinctive Risk and Threat | Distinctive Reward and Opportunity | Defining Work |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nomadic Age: <br> Humans as "Hunter- <br> Gatherers" to $10,000 \mathrm{BC}$ | Spear | Resource Scarcity: Small, mobile settlements with survival orientation | Poorly Managed Resource Collection: <br> Malnourishment, extinction, poisoning | Distinguish oneself or group by bringing in more or better food | Hunt and Gatherer: Acquire food |
| Agricultural Age: <br> Humans as "Cultivators" <br> $10,000 \mathrm{BC}$ to 1750 s | Grain Cultivation: Human control of food | Increased Food: <br> Larger permanent settlements (cities), specialization, and culture | Poorly Managed Agricultural Processes: Food wasted/unused, stolen, spoiled | Distinguish oneself or group by managing agriculture better; then bring in more or better resources | Farm: <br> Acquire resources, adapt and apply agriculture |
| Industrial Age: <br> Humans as <br> "Manufacturers" 1750s <br> to 1990 s | Steam-Driven Mechanization: Human control of energy | Increased Energy: <br> Physical capabilities magnified (when have natural resources) | Poorly Managed Industrial Processes: Unsustainability, disruption, pollution | Distinguish oneself or group by managing industry better; then bring in more or better knowledge | Manufacture: <br> Acquire knowledge, adapt and apply industry |
| Information Age: <br> Humans as "Knowledge <br> Curators" 1990s to ??? | Digitization: Human control of information | Increased Information: <br> Creation, storage, manipulation, and transmission of knowledge | Poorly Managed Information Processes: Overload, irrelevant, hacked, corrupted | Distinguish oneself or group by managing knowledge better | Curate Knowledge for Wisdom and Insight: Adapt and apply knowledge |
例如,可以将上述三段论更一般地表达为:对于所有 xx ,如果 xx 是 P,则 xx 是 Q。 xx 是 P。因此, xx 是 QQ 。或者更正式地表达为:(1) Vx(Px rarr Qx)V x(P x \rightarrow Q x) (2) PxP x (3) Qx。这使得逻辑本质上更加“数学化”,并最终导致了今天众所周知的符号逻辑系统,这要归功于乔治·布尔(1815-1864)和戈特洛布·弗雷格(1848-1925)等人的工作。他们的工作推动了逻辑和数学的许多进步(并最终为计算机编程和建模等更广泛的表示方法奠定了基础)。然而,它从“三艺”中提取了逻辑的“普遍”适用性,并开始使其变得模糊。对逻辑感兴趣的人不得不选择易于理解但“过时”的非正式亚里士多德方法,或者更现代的正式方法。作为回应,出现了一种新的变体:“批判性思维”。在某种程度上,这种方法旨在利用现代符号逻辑的严谨性和理解,使其像亚里士多德逻辑一样更易于理解和“日常适用”。 由此产生的作品,如欧文·柯匹 1953 年的《逻辑学精要》,定义了这种“非形式逻辑”的推理方法,以及几十年来大多数人在大学“批判性思维”课程中所体验的内容。 ^(12){ }^{12}
Structural
Use of Structured Analytic Techniques by Subject Experts| Structural |
| :--- |
| Use of Structured Analytic Techniques by Subject Experts |
非正式逻辑的构建与论证和推理的评估
Informal Logical
Construction and
Assessment of
Arguments and
Inferences| Informal Logical |
| :--- |
| Construction and |
| Assessment of |
| Arguments and |
| Inferences |
思维标准要素应用于思维要素以培养积极的心理习惯
Elements of the Mind
Thinking Standards Applied to Elements of Thought to Develop Positive Mental Habits| Elements of the Mind |
| :--- |
| Thinking Standards Applied to Elements of Thought to Develop Positive Mental Habits |
描述方法的摘要
IA 中的理想推理是针对特定类型的问题使用特定的简化步骤集(“结构化分析技术”)
IA 中的理想推理是通过适当结构(有充分支持)的推理从前提(信息)到结论的推理过程
IA 中的理想推理是将理想思维标准应用于已被分解为主要要素的思考过程
驱动方法的情感
从业者(“自下而上”):现任/前任分析师寻求分类并完善“最佳实践”
Practitioner
("Bottom Up"): Present/former analysts seeking to catalog and refine "best practices"| Practitioner |
| :--- |
| ("Bottom Up"): Present/former analysts seeking to catalog and refine "best practices" |
学术(“自上而下”):学者和分析师将现有学术理论应用于 IAI A 挑战
Academic
("Top Down"): Academics and analysts applying extant academic theory to IA challenges| Academic |
| :--- |
| ("Top Down"): Academics and analysts applying extant academic theory to $I A$ challenges |
学术(“自上而下”):学者和分析师将现有学术理论应用于 IAI A 挑战
Academic
("Top Down"): Academics and analysts applying extant academic theory to IA challenges| Academic |
| :--- |
| ("Top Down"): Academics and analysts applying extant academic theory to $I A$ challenges |
定义方法的主题
分析师的问题
命题与推理
思想的部分
指导方法的标准
好方法
好的论证
好习惯
源自该方法的重大理念
理想的分析师推理针对特定类型的问题进行了定制
理想的分析师推理遵循一套普遍原则
理想的分析师推理体现了良好的思维习惯
"Structural
Use of Structured Analytic Techniques by Subject Experts" "Informal Logical
Construction and
Assessment of
Arguments and
Inferences" "Elements of the Mind
Thinking Standards Applied to Elements of Thought to Develop Positive Mental Habits"
Summary That Describes the Approach Ideal reasoning in IA is using specific simplified sets of steps ("structured analytic techniques") for specific corresponding types of problems Ideal reasoning in IA is reasoning from premises (information) to conclusions by means of properly structured (wellsupported) inferences Ideal reasoning in IA is applying ideal standards of thought to thinking that has been broken down into its major elements
Sensibility That Drives the Approach "Practitioner
("Bottom Up"): Present/former analysts seeking to catalog and refine "best practices"" "Academic
("Top Down"): Academics and analysts applying extant academic theory to IA challenges" "Academic
("Top Down"): Academics and analysts applying extant academic theory to IA challenges"
Subject That Defines the Approach Problems of Analysts Propositions and Inferences Parts of Thought
Standard That Directs the Approach Good Methods Good Argumentation Good Habits
Significant Idea That Derives from the Approach Ideal analyst reasoning is tailored to specific types of problems Ideal analyst reasoning follows a set of universal principles Ideal analyst reasoning embodies good intellectual habits| | Structural <br> Use of Structured Analytic Techniques by Subject Experts | Informal Logical <br> Construction and <br> Assessment of <br> Arguments and <br> Inferences | Elements of the Mind <br> Thinking Standards Applied to Elements of Thought to Develop Positive Mental Habits |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Summary That Describes the Approach | Ideal reasoning in IA is using specific simplified sets of steps ("structured analytic techniques") for specific corresponding types of problems | Ideal reasoning in IA is reasoning from premises (information) to conclusions by means of properly structured (wellsupported) inferences | Ideal reasoning in IA is applying ideal standards of thought to thinking that has been broken down into its major elements |
| Sensibility That Drives the Approach | Practitioner <br> ("Bottom Up"): Present/former analysts seeking to catalog and refine "best practices" | Academic <br> ("Top Down"): Academics and analysts applying extant academic theory to $I A$ challenges | Academic <br> ("Top Down"): Academics and analysts applying extant academic theory to $I A$ challenges |
| Subject That Defines the Approach | Problems of Analysts | Propositions and Inferences | Parts of Thought |
| Standard That Directs the Approach | Good Methods | Good Argumentation | Good Habits |
| Significant Idea That Derives from the Approach | Ideal analyst reasoning is tailored to specific types of problems | Ideal analyst reasoning follows a set of universal principles | Ideal analyst reasoning embodies good intellectual habits |
参见 Stephen Toulmin,《论证的用途》,更新版(纽约:剑桥大学出版社,2003 年)。
参见 Timothy van Gelder,《The Rationale for Rationale ^("m" ","Law,ProbabilityandRisk)6{ }^{\text {m" }, " ~ L a w, ~ P r o b a b i l i t y ~ a n d ~ R i s k ~} 6 (2007)》:23-42。
参见 Steven Rieber 和 Neil Thomason 所著的《创建国家分析方法研究所》,《情报研究》第 49 卷第 4 期(2005 年)。
Heuer 和 Pherson,《结构化分析技术》,170-72 页。
参见 Gheorghe Tecuci、David A. Schum、Dorin Marcu 和 Mihai Boicu 所著的《情报分析作为证据、假设和论证的发现》(纽约:剑桥大学出版社,2016 年)。
How Intelligence
Analysis
Generates the Challenge| How Intelligence |
| :--- |
| Analysis |
| Generates the Challenge |
信息时代如何加剧挑战
特质挑战(人格内部错误):“心态、偏见或谬误”
分析师在执行任何发现真相的过程中本身也是容易出错的
分析师应避免将其弱点传导至更广泛的流程中
通信平台日益开放,邀请人们在未做好准备时加入
技术挑战(过程的外部错误):“不透明或不受规则约束”
任何分析师用来发现真相的标准化/制度化过程都是可能出错的
分歧应通过独立标准而非政治压力来解决
基于意识形态的集群化增加阻碍了理性解决
首要目标挑战(不足问题):“可靠数据有限”
信念与知识之间的理论鸿沟:现有证据并不能保证真理
竞争对手/对手可能会试图阻止获取关于他们的可靠数据
不可靠数据的增加降低了(找到)可靠数据的比例
第二目标挑战(无关性问题):“误导信息”
Second Target Challenge
(Irrelevance Problem): "Misleading Information"| Second Target Challenge |
| :--- |
| (Irrelevance Problem): "Misleading Information" |
信念与知识之间的实际差距:现有证据并不总是明确表明其为证据
Practical gap between belief and knowledge:
Available evidence is not always clear that it is evidence| Practical gap between belief and knowledge: |
| :--- |
| Available evidence is not always clear that it is evidence |
竞争对手/对手可能会试图用不相关的信息来分散注意力
信息量的增加使得找到相关数据变得更难,而找到无关数据则更容易
第三目标挑战(不确定性问题):“许多可能的未来路径”
Third Target
Challenge
(Indeterminacy
Problem):
"Many Possible
Future Paths"| Third Target |
| :--- |
| Challenge |
| (Indeterminacy |
| Problem): |
| "Many Possible |
| Future Paths" |
How General Reasoning Grounds the Challenge "How Intelligence
Analysis
Generates the Challenge" How Information Age Escalates the Challenge
Trait Challenge (Inside Errors of Persons): "Mindset, Bias, or Fallacy" Analysts are fallible in themselves in implementing any process for discovering truth Analysts should mitigate transmitting their weaknesses into to the broader process Increasing openness of communicative platforms invites people to join in when they are not prepared
Technique Challenge (Outside Errors of Processes): "Not Transparent or Rule Governed" Any standardized/ institutionalized process analysts use to discover the truth is fallible Differences should be resolvable by independent standard and not political pressure Increasing amount of clustering based on ideology discourages rational resolution
First Target Challenge (Insufficiency Problem): "Limited Reliable Data" Theoretical gap between belief and knowledge: Available evidence does not guarantee truth The competitors/ adversaries may try to deny access to reliable data being available about them Increasing amount of unreliable data lowers proportion of (odds of finding) reliable data
"Second Target Challenge
(Irrelevance Problem): "Misleading Information"" "Practical gap between belief and knowledge:
Available evidence is not always clear that it is evidence" The competitors/ adversaries may try to distract with information that is not relevant Increasing amount of information makes it harder to find relevant and easier to find irrelevant data
"Third Target
Challenge
(Indeterminacy
Problem):
"Many Possible
Future Paths"" Gap between knowledge of the past and knowledge of the future: The world has the potential to change The competitors/ adversaries may try to be unpredictable (be surprising; go against expectations) Increasing amount of interaction between people magnifies individual unpredictability
"Fourth Target Challenge
(Insignificance Problem): "Need for Timely, Useful Decisions"" Gap between knowledge and wisdom: It is not always significant to every person, decision, context, and goal The competitors/ adversaries may try to force a response before the client is really "ready" Increasing speed of persons, things, and ideas further limits time for decision making| | How General Reasoning Grounds the Challenge | How Intelligence <br> Analysis <br> Generates the Challenge | How Information Age Escalates the Challenge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Trait Challenge (Inside Errors of Persons): "Mindset, Bias, or Fallacy" | Analysts are fallible in themselves in implementing any process for discovering truth | Analysts should mitigate transmitting their weaknesses into to the broader process | Increasing openness of communicative platforms invites people to join in when they are not prepared |
| Technique Challenge (Outside Errors of Processes): "Not Transparent or Rule Governed" | Any standardized/ institutionalized process analysts use to discover the truth is fallible | Differences should be resolvable by independent standard and not political pressure | Increasing amount of clustering based on ideology discourages rational resolution |
| First Target Challenge (Insufficiency Problem): "Limited Reliable Data" | Theoretical gap between belief and knowledge: Available evidence does not guarantee truth | The competitors/ adversaries may try to deny access to reliable data being available about them | Increasing amount of unreliable data lowers proportion of (odds of finding) reliable data |
| Second Target Challenge <br> (Irrelevance Problem): "Misleading Information" | Practical gap between belief and knowledge: <br> Available evidence is not always clear that it is evidence | The competitors/ adversaries may try to distract with information that is not relevant | Increasing amount of information makes it harder to find relevant and easier to find irrelevant data |
| Third Target <br> Challenge <br> (Indeterminacy <br> Problem): <br> "Many Possible <br> Future Paths" | Gap between knowledge of the past and knowledge of the future: The world has the potential to change | The competitors/ adversaries may try to be unpredictable (be surprising; go against expectations) | Increasing amount of interaction between people magnifies individual unpredictability |
| Fourth Target Challenge <br> (Insignificance Problem): "Need for Timely, Useful Decisions" | Gap between knowledge and wisdom: It is not always significant to every person, decision, context, and goal | The competitors/ adversaries may try to force a response before the client is really "ready" | Increasing speed of persons, things, and ideas further limits time for decision making |
ent 部分更深入地探讨了每一种方法,以探索该方法的整体意义。它对现实世界的情报分析师有何“不同”?当该论述转化为具体方法论时,将在后续章节中给出完整答案。但这里可以解释的是,该论述以一种更普遍的方式对分析师“产生影响”。特别是,多维方法之所以重要,是因为它确立了情报分析作为一种职业的独特性、其作为职业的价值以及分析师在该职业中的发展路径。此外,它还为开发(和评估)分析师使用的潜在方法提供了基础。
Cognitive Traits
(Characteristics of Thinkers)| Cognitive Traits |
| :--- |
| (Characteristics of Thinkers) |
认知技巧(思维中的行为)
Cognitive Techniques
(Behaviors in Thinking)| Cognitive Techniques |
| :--- |
| (Behaviors in Thinking) |
认知目标(思考领域)
Cognitive Targets
(Domains to Think About)| Cognitive Targets |
| :--- |
| (Domains to Think About) |
理想推理作为美德
理想推理作为规则
理想推理作为问题
受分析师内在因素(思维模式、偏见、谬误)的挑战
受到分析师外部的挑战(需要透明评估)
Challenged by the Analyst's
Outside (Need for Transparent Assessment)| Challenged by the Analyst's |
| :--- |
| Outside (Need for Transparent Assessment) |
受到分析对象(竞争对手或对手)的挑战
分析广度
分析深度
分析高度
通过分析天平检查法强调
通过分析过程反思法强调
Emphasized by Analytic
Process Reflection Method| Emphasized by Analytic |
| :--- |
| Process Reflection Method |
通过分析问题分类方法强调
Emphasized by Analytic
Problem Classification
Method| Emphasized by Analytic |
| :--- |
| Problem Classification |
| Method |
智力勇气(次要个人维度 1)
Intellectual Courage
(Secondary Personal Dimension 1)| Intellectual Courage |
| :--- |
| (Secondary Personal Dimension 1) |
"What Is Happening?"
(Secondary Problem-Specific Dimension 1)| "What Is Happening?" |
| :--- |
| (Secondary Problem-Specific Dimension 1) |
智力自控(次要个人维度 2)
推断合理结论(次级程序维度 2)
“为什么会发生这种情况?”(次级问题特定维度 2)
洞察力(次要个人维度 3)
Discernment
(Secondary Personal Dimension 3)| Discernment |
| :--- |
| (Secondary Personal Dimension 3) |
想象可能的替代方案(次要程序维度 3)
“这一变化可能在哪里以及何时发生?”(次要问题特定维度 3)
智力公正(次级个人维度 4)
Intellectual Fairness
(Secondary Personal Dimension 4)| Intellectual Fairness |
| :--- |
| (Secondary Personal Dimension 4) |
解读更广泛的意义(次要程序维度 4)
“客户如何应对?”(次要问题特定维度 4)
"How Can the Client
Respond to It?"
(Secondary Problem-Specific
Dimension 4)| "How Can the Client |
| :--- |
| Respond to It?" |
| (Secondary Problem-Specific |
| Dimension 4) |
Personal Dimension Procedural Dimension Problem-Specific Dimension
Who the Analyst Is as a Thinker What the Analyst Does in Thinking Where the Analyst Goes in Thinking
"Cognitive Traits
(Characteristics of Thinkers)" "Cognitive Techniques
(Behaviors in Thinking)" "Cognitive Targets
(Domains to Think About)"
Ideal Reasoning as Virtues Ideal Reasoning as Rules Ideal Reasoning as Questions
Challenged by the Analyst's Inside (Mindsets, Biases, Fallacies) "Challenged by the Analyst's
Outside (Need for Transparent Assessment)" Challenged by the Object of Analysis (The Competitor or Adversary)
Breadth of Analysis Depth of Analysis Height of Analysis
Emphasized by Analytic Balance Check Method "Emphasized by Analytic
Process Reflection Method" "Emphasized by Analytic
Problem Classification
Method"
"Intellectual Courage
(Secondary Personal Dimension 1)" "Identify Relevant
Background
(Secondary Procedural
Dimension 1)" ""What Is Happening?"
(Secondary Problem-Specific Dimension 1)"
Intellectual Self-Control (Secondary Personal Dimension 2) Infer Plausible Conclusions (Secondary Procedural Dimension 2) "Why Is This Happening?" (Secondary Problem-Specific Dimension 2)
"Discernment
(Secondary Personal Dimension 3)" Imagine Possible Alternatives (Secondary Procedural Dimension 3) "Where and When Might This Change?" (Secondary Problem-Specific Dimension 3)
"Intellectual Fairness
(Secondary Personal Dimension 4)" Interpret Broader Meaning (Secondary Procedural Dimension 4) ""How Can the Client
Respond to It?"
(Secondary Problem-Specific
Dimension 4)"| Personal Dimension | Procedural Dimension | Problem-Specific Dimension |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Who the Analyst Is as a Thinker | What the Analyst Does in Thinking | Where the Analyst Goes in Thinking |
| Cognitive Traits <br> (Characteristics of Thinkers) | Cognitive Techniques <br> (Behaviors in Thinking) | Cognitive Targets <br> (Domains to Think About) |
| Ideal Reasoning as Virtues | Ideal Reasoning as Rules | Ideal Reasoning as Questions |
| Challenged by the Analyst's Inside (Mindsets, Biases, Fallacies) | Challenged by the Analyst's <br> Outside (Need for Transparent Assessment) | Challenged by the Object of Analysis (The Competitor or Adversary) |
| Breadth of Analysis | Depth of Analysis | Height of Analysis |
| Emphasized by Analytic Balance Check Method | Emphasized by Analytic <br> Process Reflection Method | Emphasized by Analytic <br> Problem Classification <br> Method |
| Intellectual Courage <br> (Secondary Personal Dimension 1) | Identify Relevant <br> Background <br> (Secondary Procedural <br> Dimension 1) | "What Is Happening?" <br> (Secondary Problem-Specific Dimension 1) |
| Intellectual Self-Control (Secondary Personal Dimension 2) | Infer Plausible Conclusions (Secondary Procedural Dimension 2) | "Why Is This Happening?" (Secondary Problem-Specific Dimension 2) |
| Discernment <br> (Secondary Personal Dimension 3) | Imagine Possible Alternatives (Secondary Procedural Dimension 3) | "Where and When Might This Change?" (Secondary Problem-Specific Dimension 3) |
| Intellectual Fairness <br> (Secondary Personal Dimension 4) | Interpret Broader Meaning (Secondary Procedural Dimension 4) | "How Can the Client <br> Respond to It?" <br> (Secondary Problem-Specific <br> Dimension 4) |
Degree of Balance
with External
Circumstances| Degree of Balance |
| :--- |
| with External |
| Circumstances |
与内部环境的平衡程度
Degree of Balance
with Internal
Circumstances| Degree of Balance |
| :--- |
| with Internal |
| Circumstances |
与想法的平衡程度
Degree of Balance
with Ideas| Degree of Balance |
| :--- |
| with Ideas |
与他人的平衡程度
Degree of Balance
with Others| Degree of Balance |
| :--- |
| with Others |
第一级第三维度:谦逊:自信与不确定
First Tertiary
Dimension:
Humility:
Confidence vs.
Uncertainty| First Tertiary |
| :--- |
| Dimension: |
| Humility: |
| Confidence vs. |
| Uncertainty |
第四层次维度:敏感性:关注相似性 vs. 关注变化
Fourth Tertiary
Dimension:
Sensitivity:
Sees Similarity vs.
Sees Change| Fourth Tertiary |
| :--- |
| Dimension: |
| Sensitivity: |
| Sees Similarity vs. |
| Sees Change |
第七个第三维度:反思性:关注自我 vs. 关注他人
Seventh Tertiary
Dimension:
Reflectiveness: Focus
on Self vs. Focus on
Others| Seventh Tertiary |
| :--- |
| Dimension: |
| Reflectiveness: Focus |
| on Self vs. Focus on |
| Others |
第十个第三维度:现实主义:看到威胁 vs. 看到机遇
Tenth Tertiary
Dimension:
Realism:
Sees Threats vs. Sees
Opportunities| Tenth Tertiary |
| :--- |
| Dimension: |
| Realism: |
| Sees Threats vs. Sees |
| Opportunities |
第二第三维度:咨询动机:中立性 vs. 现实世界关注
Second Tertiary
Dimension:
Advisory Motivation:
Neutrality vs. Real-
World Concern| Second Tertiary |
| :--- |
| Dimension: |
| Advisory Motivation: |
| Neutrality vs. Real- |
| World Concern |
关于此主题的更多内容,可参考亚里士多德的《尼各马可伦理学》,收录于 W. D. Ross 编辑的《亚里士多德著作集》第 8 卷(伦敦:牛津大学出版社,1968 年);以及托马斯·阿奎那的《尼各马可伦理学评注》第 1-2 卷,由 C. I. Litzinger 翻译(芝加哥:亨利·雷格内里公司,1964 年)。
“规则”这一概念旨在与伊曼努尔·康德(Immanuel Kant)的《道德形而上学基础》(Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,由 Mary Gregor 和 Jens Timmermann 编辑,纽约:剑桥大学出版社,2012 年)以及约翰·斯图尔特·密尔(John Stuart Mill)的《逻辑体系》(A System of Logic,收录于《约翰·斯图尔特·密尔全集》第 7 卷,印第安纳波利斯:自由基金出版社,2006 年)等著名伦理哲学家的“规则”观念相类比并兼容。
Asks "What Is
Happening?"| Asks "What Is |
| :--- |
| Happening?" |
询问“为什么会发生这种情况?”
Asks "Why Is This
Happening?"| Asks "Why Is This |
| :--- |
| Happening?" |
询问“何时何地可能会发生这种变化?”
Asks "When and
Where Might This
Change?"| Asks "When and |
| :--- |
| Where Might This |
| Change?" |
询问“客户如何回应?”
Asks "How Can
the Client Respond
to It?"| Asks "How Can |
| :--- |
| the Client Respond |
| to It?" |
确定正在发生之事的最合理解释理论
Determines the Most
Plausible Theory of
What Is Happening| Determines the Most |
| :--- |
| Plausible Theory of |
| What Is Happening |
辨别事件、因素和力量之间的联系
Discerns
Connections
Between Events,
Factors, and Forces| Discerns |
| :--- |
| Connections |
| Between Events, |
| Factors, and Forces |
发现未来可能变化的合理愿景
Discovers Plausible
Visions of Possible
Future Changes| Discovers Plausible |
| :--- |
| Visions of Possible |
| Future Changes |
描述可能决策对客户的重要性
Describes the
Significance of
Possible Decisions
to the Client| Describes the |
| :--- |
| Significance of |
| Possible Decisions |
| to the Client |
面对不足的挑战:从有限的可靠数据中推理
Faces the Challenge
of Insufficiency:
Reasoning from
Limited Reliable
Data| Faces the Challenge |
| :--- |
| of Insufficiency: |
| Reasoning from |
| Limited Reliable |
| Data |
面对无关性的挑战:从误导性信息中推理
Faces the Challenge
of Irrelevance:
Reasoning from
Misleading
Information| Faces the Challenge |
| :--- |
| of Irrelevance: |
| Reasoning from |
| Misleading |
| Information |
面对不确定性的挑战:推理多种可能的未来路径
Faces the Challenge
of Indeterminacy:
Reasoning about
Many Possible
Future Paths| Faces the Challenge |
| :--- |
| of Indeterminacy: |
| Reasoning about |
| Many Possible |
| Future Paths |
面对无足轻重的挑战:推理至及时且有用
Faces the Challenge
of Insignificance:
Reasoning to a
Timely, UsefuI| Faces the Challenge |
| :--- |
| of Insignificance: |
| Reasoning to a |
| Timely, UsefuI |
Assesses
Opportunities
and Threats from
Something's
Existence or Nature
in the Present| Assesses |
| :--- |
| Opportunities |
| and Threats from |
| Something's |
| Existence or Nature |
| in the Present |
评估当前某事物后果带来的机遇与威胁
Assesses
Opportunities
and Threats from
Something's
Consequences in the
Present| Assesses |
| :--- |
| Opportunities |
| and Threats from |
| Something's |
| Consequences in the |
| Present |
评估未来某事物潜力带来的机遇与威胁
Assesses
Opportunities
and Threats from
Something's
Potential in the
Future| Assesses |
| :--- |
| Opportunities |
| and Threats from |
| Something's |
| Potential in the |
| Future |
评估对机遇和威胁可能做出的回应的重要性
Assess the
Significance of
Possible Responses
to Opportunities and
Threats| Assess the |
| :--- |
| Significance of |
| Possible Responses |
| to Opportunities and |
| Threats |
"Hypothesis
Development
Dimension" "Causal Analysis
Dimension" "Futures Exploration
Dimension" "Strategy Assessment
Dimension"
"Asks "What Is
Happening?"" "Asks "Why Is This
Happening?"" "Asks "When and
Where Might This
Change?"" "Asks "How Can
the Client Respond
to It?""
"Determines the Most
Plausible Theory of
What Is Happening" "Discerns
Connections
Between Events,
Factors, and Forces" "Discovers Plausible
Visions of Possible
Future Changes" "Describes the
Significance of
Possible Decisions
to the Client"
"Faces the Challenge
of Insufficiency:
Reasoning from
Limited Reliable
Data" "Faces the Challenge
of Irrelevance:
Reasoning from
Misleading
Information" "Faces the Challenge
of Indeterminacy:
Reasoning about
Many Possible
Future Paths" "Faces the Challenge
of Insignificance:
Reasoning to a
Timely, UsefuI"
"Basic
Descriptive Analysis" "Intermediate
Descriptive Analysis" "Advanced
Descriptive Analysis" Prescriptive Analysis
"Assesses
Opportunities
and Threats from
Something's
Existence or Nature
in the Present" "Assesses
Opportunities
and Threats from
Something's
Consequences in the
Present" "Assesses
Opportunities
and Threats from
Something's
Potential in the
Future" "Assess the
Significance of
Possible Responses
to Opportunities and
Threats"
"Supports Causal
Analysis, Futures
Exploration, and
Strategy Assessment" "Assumes Hypothesis
Development;
Supports Futures
Exploration and
Strategy Assessment" "Assumes Hypothesis
Development and
Causal Analysis;
Supports Strategy
Assessment" "Assumes Hypothesis
Development,
Causal Analysis, and
Futures Exploration"| Hypothesis <br> Development <br> Dimension | Causal Analysis <br> Dimension | Futures Exploration <br> Dimension | Strategy Assessment <br> Dimension |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Asks "What Is <br> Happening?" | Asks "Why Is This <br> Happening?" | Asks "When and <br> Where Might This <br> Change?" | Asks "How Can <br> the Client Respond <br> to It?" |
| Determines the Most <br> Plausible Theory of <br> What Is Happening | Discerns <br> Connections <br> Between Events, <br> Factors, and Forces | Discovers Plausible <br> Visions of Possible <br> Future Changes | Describes the <br> Significance of <br> Possible Decisions <br> to the Client |
| Faces the Challenge <br> of Insufficiency: <br> Reasoning from <br> Limited Reliable <br> Data | Faces the Challenge <br> of Irrelevance: <br> Reasoning from <br> Misleading <br> Information | Faces the Challenge <br> of Indeterminacy: <br> Reasoning about <br> Many Possible <br> Future Paths | Faces the Challenge <br> of Insignificance: <br> Reasoning to a <br> Timely, UsefuI |
| Basic <br> Descriptive Analysis | Intermediate <br> Descriptive Analysis | Advanced <br> Descriptive Analysis | Prescriptive Analysis |
| Assesses <br> Opportunities <br> and Threats from <br> Something's <br> Existence or Nature <br> in the Present | Assesses <br> Opportunities <br> and Threats from <br> Something's <br> Consequences in the <br> Present | Assesses <br> Opportunities <br> and Threats from <br> Something's <br> Potential in the <br> Future | Assess the <br> Significance of <br> Possible Responses <br> to Opportunities and <br> Threats |
| Supports Causal <br> Analysis, Futures <br> Exploration, and <br> Strategy Assessment | Assumes Hypothesis <br> Development; <br> Supports Futures <br> Exploration and <br> Strategy Assessment | Assumes Hypothesis <br> Development and <br> Causal Analysis; <br> Supports Strategy <br> Assessment | Assumes Hypothesis <br> Development, <br> Causal Analysis, and <br> Futures Exploration |
Note: Every virtue, rule, and question is significant to every background; these questions are especially significant to the foreground of the corresponding methods. Hypothesis Development Causal Analysis Futures Exploration Strategy Assessment
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1. What Are Plausible Theories of What Is Happening? ✓
2. What Information Most Helps to Determine the Most Plausible Theory of What Is Happening? ✓
3. What Has to Be Assumed for This to Be the Most Plausible Theory of What Is Happening? ✓
4. Why Is This Series of Events Happening? ✓
5. Why Is This Ongoing Interaction Happening? ✓
6. Why Is This Unexpected Outcome Happening? ✓
7. When and Where Might This Change Plausibly Come About? ✓
8. When and Where Might This Change Cause Broader Uncertainties (and Unintended Consequences)? ✓
9. When and Where Might This Change Have Long-Term Impact? ✓
10. How Do Possible Future Contexts Affect How the Client Can Respond to It? ✓
11. How Do Possible Consequences Affect How the Client Can Respond to It? nu
12. How Do the Expectations of Other Actors Affect How the Client Can Respond to It? ✓| Note: Every virtue, rule, and question is significant to every background; these questions are especially significant to the foreground of the corresponding methods. | Hypothesis Development | | | Causal Analysis | | | Futures Exploration | | | Strategy Assessment | | |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1. What Are Plausible Theories of What Is Happening? | $\checkmark$ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. What Information Most Helps to Determine the Most Plausible Theory of What Is Happening? | | $\checkmark$ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3. What Has to Be Assumed for This to Be the Most Plausible Theory of What Is Happening? | | | $\checkmark$ | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. Why Is This Series of Events Happening? | | | | $\checkmark$ | | | | | | | | |
| 5. Why Is This Ongoing Interaction Happening? | | | | | $\checkmark$ | | | | | | | |
| 6. Why Is This Unexpected Outcome Happening? | | | | | | $\checkmark$ | | | | | | |
| 7. When and Where Might This Change Plausibly Come About? | | | | | | | $\checkmark$ | | | | | |
| 8. When and Where Might This Change Cause Broader Uncertainties (and Unintended Consequences)? | | | | | | | | $\checkmark$ | | | | |
| 9. When and Where Might This Change Have Long-Term Impact? | | | | | | | | | $\checkmark$ | | | |
| 10. How Do Possible Future Contexts Affect How the Client Can Respond to It? | | | | | | | | | | $\checkmark$ | | |
| 11. How Do Possible Consequences Affect How the Client Can Respond to It? | | | | | | | | | | | $\nu$ | |
| 12. How Do the Expectations of Other Actors Affect How the Client Can Respond to It? | | | | | | | | | | | | $\checkmark$ |
参见第 6 章对此的先前讨论,以及亚里士多德的《尼各马可伦理学》,收录于 W. D. Ross 编辑的《亚里士多德著作集》第 8 卷(伦敦:牛津大学出版社,1968 年);托马斯·阿奎那的《尼各马可伦理学评注》第 1-2 卷,由 C. I. Litzinger 翻译(芝加哥:亨利·雷格纳里公司,1964 年)。
参见第七章之前的讨论,以及伊曼努尔·康德(Immanuel Kant)的《道德形而上学基础》(Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals),由玛丽·格雷戈尔(Mary Gregor)和延斯·蒂默曼(Jens Timmermann)编辑(纽约:剑桥大学出版社,2012 年);约翰·斯图尔特·密尔(John Stuart Mill)的《逻辑体系》(A System of Logic),收录于《约翰·斯图尔特·密尔全集》第 7 卷(印第安纳波利斯:自由基金会,2006 年)。
1. How, Where, and to What Extent Did We "Consider Problem Dimensions"?
Identify the different elements of the issue, their roles, and the methods appropriate to
assess them.| 1. How, Where, and to What Extent Did We "Consider Problem Dimensions"? |
| :--- |
| Identify the different elements of the issue, their roles, and the methods appropriate to |
| assess them. |
提示:问一问:我们是如何定义分析问题的?它的组成部分是什么?
是否有任何需要首先回答的根本性问题?
"1. How, Where, and to What Extent Did We "Consider Problem Dimensions"?
Identify the different elements of the issue, their roles, and the methods appropriate to
assess them."
For a hint, ask: How did we define our analytical question? What were its components?
Were there any underlying questions identified that had to be answered first? | | 1. How, Where, and to What Extent Did We "Consider Problem Dimensions"? <br> Identify the different elements of the issue, their roles, and the methods appropriate to <br> assess them. |
| :--- | :--- |
| For a hint, ask: How did we define our analytical question? What were its components? | |
| Were there any underlying questions identified that had to be answered first? | |
4. How, Where, and to What Extent Did We "Structure Process Transparently"?
Approach the reasoning step by step, highlighting each claim and the inferences and/or
evidence relevant to it.| 4. How, Where, and to What Extent Did We "Structure Process Transparently"? |
| :--- |
| Approach the reasoning step by step, highlighting each claim and the inferences and/or |
| evidence relevant to it. |
提示:请问:我们推理的主要步骤和主要信息是什么
支持它吗?
"4. How, Where, and to What Extent Did We "Structure Process Transparently"?
Approach the reasoning step by step, highlighting each claim and the inferences and/or
evidence relevant to it."
For a hint, ask: What were the major steps in our reasoning and major information that
supports it? | | 4. How, Where, and to What Extent Did We "Structure Process Transparently"? <br> Approach the reasoning step by step, highlighting each claim and the inferences and/or <br> evidence relevant to it. |
| :--- | :--- |
| For a hint, ask: What were the major steps in our reasoning and major information that | |
| supports it? | |
情报分析问题可以理解为包含四个相互关联的推理要素:假设发展(正在发生什么)、因果分析(为什么会发生)、未来探索(何时何地可能发生变化)以及战略评估(客户如何应对 iti t )。因此,理想的情报推理描述将为这四个领域提供有用的方法。然而,这些不仅是情报分析师感兴趣的主题;在其他背景下(尽管目的不同)也已进行了详细探讨。遗憾的是,许多分析师对这些领域的长期讨论历史并不熟悉。理想的分析师推理描述应结合这些重要的外部范式,并利用其中的“最佳”部分。因此,本文描述了关于假设发展的最重要的外部“思想流派”:证伪主义、贝叶斯主义和解释主义。需要注意的是,本章并不旨在全面详尽地阐述这三种方法。 相反,本章旨在介绍这些方法,以增强情报分析师对它们的整体熟悉度,鼓励更广泛的辩论和讨论,并(最终)激发本工作的替代方法。因此,本章不会评估这些方法的合理性,而是将在每一节的结尾突出显示最终将采用的方法中特别重要的内容(在后续章节中),以推动本工作的论述。
在二十世纪上半叶(大约从 1930 年代到 1960 年代),哲学整体上(尤其是科学哲学)被逻辑实证主义(及其稍后更广泛的版本——逻辑经验主义)所主导。 ^(1){ }^{1} 这一观点在 A. J. 艾耶尔、鲁道夫·卡尔纳普、汉斯·赖欣巴哈和莫里茨·石里克等哲学家中盛行,是对十九世纪德国唯心主义的回应,后者追随 G. W. F. 黑格尔,部分通过诉诸理想化结构或形而上学实体来解释事件,这些实体在纯粹概念基础上被理性地证明为合理。逻辑实证主义者试图将哲学重新定位为一门更加经验主义、以科学为导向的学科。他们认为,唯一具有认知意义的探究要么是逻辑/数学的(基于“由定义即为真”的公理或其推论,他们称之为“分析”陈述),要么是经验的(基于可通过直接观察世界来证实的断言或其推论,他们称之为“综合”陈述)。 因此,他们认为自己在引导哲学(以及科学)走上一条在智力上更为丰硕的道路,因为唯一理性上可接受的问题(在他们看来)是那些有明确对应程序来判定其真伪的问题。所有其他主张要么被视为完全属于个人“品味”的问题,要么干脆就是毫无意义的胡言乱语。 ^(2){ }^{2} 如此一来,逻辑实证主义成为了后来被称为“科学自然主义”的早期(且尤为热忱的)版本,该主义主张只有通过自然科学确立的事物才是存在的。尽管前者在学术界已或多或少被摒弃, ^(3){ }^{3} 后者却依然相当流行。顺便一提,这两者都可视为那些认为情报分析必须是某种自然科学的人的潜在灵感来源。
尽管假设检验框架作为试图确认“覆盖法则”的吸引力及其对许多人理解科学方法的影响,但它也存在一个重要的潜在反对意见。哲学家卡尔·波普尔(1902-1994)著名地指出,它(可以说)是逻辑谬误的一个实例:否定后件(即从“如果 pp ,那么 q"q " ”的真实性推断出 qq 和 pp 也必然为真。)针对逻辑实证主义者,波普尔认为,严格来说,关于世界的理论从未被确认。相反,他声称这些理论只是面临潜在的反驳(即“证伪”),要么避免它,要么因此被拒绝。 ^(5){ }^{5} 因此,如果提出一个连接 CC 和 EE 的法则,并且条件 CC 成立,那么如果事件 EE 没有发生,那么所提出的法则就被“证伪”了。如果事件 EE 确实发生,法则并未被确认;它只是避免了证伪。假设检验是关于“提出猜想并寻找反驳”。波普尔进一步建议,
同样,人们可以使用这种方法来测试特定条件 CC 是否已经满足。如果知道 CC 和 EE 之间存在某种联系,即“如果 CC 成立,那么事件 EE 将会发生”,那么可以通过寻找事件 EE 来测试 CC 是否已经发生。如果事件 EE 没有发生,那么(鉴于两者之间的联系)条件 CC 尚未满足。例如,如果苏联要通过东欧对西德发动地面入侵,需要进行某些准备工作,那么人们可以测试他们是否有意发动这样的入侵。因为发动入侵的意图意味着要进行各种准备活动(例如,收集物资、调动部队等)。因此,如果这些准备活动没有发生,那么他们(至少目前)没有进行此类行动的意图。这正是冷战期间用来评估欧洲在任何特定时间发生战争的可能性时所使用的那种推理。
贝叶斯定理展示了如何计算在给定特定信息 II 和一组背景假设 KK 的情况下,假设 HH 的概率。该值写作“Prob (H|I&K)”,读作“在 II 和 KK 的条件下 HH 的概率”。由于所得概率值是在考虑信息后得出的,因此被称为 HH 的“后验概率”。定理指出, HH 的后验概率是三个因素的函数:(1) 在假设 HH 和背景条件 KK 下信息 II 的概率(即如果假设为真,信息存在的可能性——人们预期信息从假设中得出的理性程度:假设对 II 的预测能力);(2) 仅基于背景条件下假设 HH 的概率(即独立于信息,假设为真的可能性);以及(3) 仅基于背景条件下信息 II 的概率(即独立于假设,信息为真的可能性)。用公式表示,定理如下:
{:[" If Prob "(H∣I&K) > Prob(H∣K)", then I confirms "H],[" If Prob "(H∣I&K) < Prob(H∣K)", then I disconfirms "H],[" If Prob "(H∣I&K)=Prob(H∣K)", then I is irrelevant to "H]:}\begin{aligned}
& \text { If Prob }(H \mid I \& K)>\operatorname{Prob}(H \mid K) \text {, then I confirms } H \\
& \text { If Prob }(H \mid I \& K)<\operatorname{Prob}(H \mid K) \text {, then I disconfirms } H \\
& \text { If Prob }(H \mid I \& K)=\operatorname{Prob}(H \mid K) \text {, then I is irrelevant to } H
\end{aligned}
一种推理方法,即从众多假设中挑选出因其“解释力”而被视为“最佳”的假设,这一想法通常归功于哲学家查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔士(1839-1914)。 ^(12){ }^{12} 这一理念在二十世纪后期逐渐在哲学家中流行起来,某种程度上成为那些看似合理但不仅仅是诉诸演绎推理或归纳(统计)推理的论证的统称。随着时间的推移,这一想法进一步传播,因为它似乎很好地描述了许多科学实践(尤其是在尝试提出和测试关于新现象或尚未充分探索的事物的假设的早期阶段)。很久以后,哲学家彼得·利普顿对“最佳解释推理”进行了最为全面和有力的阐述,使其成为假设发展中一个独立且成熟的理论视角。 ^(13){ }^{13} 解释主义提出,一个假设的“可爱性”是其“可能性”的指南。也就是说,关于 XX 的假设(如果为真)能够提供对 XX 的理解的程度(其“可爱性”),就是该假设作为 XX 的合理解释的可能性(其“可能性”)。
Falsificationism
Making Conjectures
and Searching for
Refutations| Falsificationism |
| :--- |
| Making Conjectures |
| and Searching for |
| Refutations |
贝叶斯主义 基于现有证据评估概率
Bayesianism
Evaluating
Probabilities Civen
the Available
Evidence| Bayesianism |
| :---: |
| Evaluating |
| Probabilities Civen |
| the Available |
| Evidence |
Summary That
Describes the
Approach| Summary That |
| :--- |
| Describes the |
| Approach |
假设开发是根据其含义是否能抵御证伪来评估理论
Hypothesis
Development is
evaluating theories
in terms of whether
their implications
resist falsification| Hypothesis |
| :--- |
| Development is |
| evaluating theories |
| in terms of whether |
| their implications |
| resist falsification |
假设开发是根据其构成概率来评估理论
Hypothesis
Development is
evaluating theories
in terms of their
constitutive
probabilities| Hypothesis |
| :--- |
| Development is |
| evaluating theories |
| in terms of their |
| constitutive |
| probabilities |
假设开发是根据解释性优点来评估理论
Hypothesis
Development is
evaluating theories
in terms of their
explanatory virtues| Hypothesis |
| :--- |
| Development is |
| evaluating theories |
| in terms of their |
| explanatory virtues |
驱动方法的情感
Sensibility That
Drives the Approach| Sensibility That |
| :--- |
| Drives the Approach |
外部因素:假设的影响
External Factors:
Implications of the
hypotheses| External Factors: |
| :--- |
| Implications of the |
| hypotheses |
内部与外部因素:假设的量化特征及其影响
Internal and External
Factors:
Quantitative
features of the
hypotheses and their
implications| Internal and External |
| :--- |
| Factors: |
| Quantitative |
| features of the |
| hypotheses and their |
| implications |
内部与外部因素:假设的定性特征及其影响
Internal and External
Factors:
Qualitative
features of the
hypotheses and their
implications| Internal and External |
| :--- |
| Factors: |
| Qualitative |
| features of the |
| hypotheses and their |
| implications |
定义方法的主题
Subject That Defines
the Approach| Subject That Defines |
| :--- |
| the Approach |
H 是否抵制了所有试图证伪它的尝试
Whether H has
resisted all attempts
to falsify it| Whether H has |
| :--- |
| resisted all attempts |
| to falsify it |
H 是否为最可能的假设
Whether H is the
most probable
hypothesis| Whether H is the |
| :--- |
| most probable |
| hypothesis |
是否有更多理由相信 H H 能解释 X,而不是其他任何替代方案 H* H^(**)H^{*}
Whether there is
more reason to
believe that H H
explains X than any
alternative H* H^(**)| Whether there is |
| :--- |
| more reason to |
| believe that H H |
| explains X than any |
| alternative H* $H^{*}$ |
指导方法的标准
Standard That
Directs the
Approach| Standard That |
| :--- |
| Directs the |
| Approach |
H 的含义尚未被证明为假
Implications of H
have not been false| Implications of H |
| :--- |
| have not been false |
H 的似然和/或先验概率高于任何替代 H*的
H's likelihood and/
or prior probability
is higher than any
alternative H*'s| H's likelihood and/ |
| :--- |
| or prior probability |
| is higher than any |
| alternative H*'s |
H 会比任何替代方案 H* H^(**)H^{*} 提供更多关于 X 的理解
H would provide
more understanding
of X than any
alternative H* H^(**)| H would provide |
| :--- |
| more understanding |
| of X than any |
| alternative H* $H^{*}$ |
源自该方法的重大理念
Significant Idea That
Derives from
the Approach| Significant Idea That |
| :--- |
| Derives from |
| the Approach |
假设开发应强调潜在的否定信息
Hypothesis
Development
should emphasize
potentially
disconfirming
information| Hypothesis |
| :--- |
| Development |
| should emphasize |
| potentially |
| disconfirming |
| information |
假设发展应强调辅助假设
Hypothesis
Development should
emphasize auxiliary
assumptions| Hypothesis |
| :--- |
| Development should |
| emphasize auxiliary |
| assumptions |
假设发展应强调理论的解释优势
Hypothesis
Development
should emphasize
explanatory virtues
of theories| Hypothesis |
| :--- |
| Development |
| should emphasize |
| explanatory virtues |
| of theories |
"Falsificationism
Making Conjectures
and Searching for
Refutations" "Bayesianism
Evaluating
Probabilities Civen
the Available
Evidence" "Explanationism
Assessing
Explanatory Power"
"Summary That
Describes the
Approach" "Hypothesis
Development is
evaluating theories
in terms of whether
their implications
resist falsification" "Hypothesis
Development is
evaluating theories
in terms of their
constitutive
probabilities" "Hypothesis
Development is
evaluating theories
in terms of their
explanatory virtues"
"Sensibility That
Drives the Approach" "External Factors:
Implications of the
hypotheses" "Internal and External
Factors:
Quantitative
features of the
hypotheses and their
implications" "Internal and External
Factors:
Qualitative
features of the
hypotheses and their
implications"
"Subject That Defines
the Approach" "Whether H has
resisted all attempts
to falsify it" "Whether H is the
most probable
hypothesis" "Whether there is
more reason to
believe that H H
explains X than any
alternative H* H^(**)"
"Standard That
Directs the
Approach" "Implications of H
have not been false" "H's likelihood and/
or prior probability
is higher than any
alternative H*'s" "H would provide
more understanding
of X than any
alternative H* H^(**)"
"Significant Idea That
Derives from
the Approach" "Hypothesis
Development
should emphasize
potentially
disconfirming
information" "Hypothesis
Development should
emphasize auxiliary
assumptions" "Hypothesis
Development
should emphasize
explanatory virtues
of theories"| | Falsificationism <br> Making Conjectures <br> and Searching for <br> Refutations | Bayesianism <br> Evaluating <br> Probabilities Civen <br> the Available <br> Evidence | Explanationism <br> Assessing <br> Explanatory Power |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Summary That <br> Describes the <br> Approach | Hypothesis <br> Development is <br> evaluating theories <br> in terms of whether <br> their implications <br> resist falsification | Hypothesis <br> Development is <br> evaluating theories <br> in terms of their <br> constitutive <br> probabilities | Hypothesis <br> Development is <br> evaluating theories <br> in terms of their <br> explanatory virtues |
| Sensibility That <br> Drives the Approach | External Factors: <br> Implications of the <br> hypotheses | Internal and External <br> Factors: <br> Quantitative <br> features of the <br> hypotheses and their <br> implications | Internal and External <br> Factors: <br> Qualitative <br> features of the <br> hypotheses and their <br> implications |
| Subject That Defines <br> the Approach | Whether H has <br> resisted all attempts <br> to falsify it | Whether H is the <br> most probable <br> hypothesis | Whether there is <br> more reason to <br> believe that H H <br> explains X than any <br> alternative H* $H^{*}$ |
| Standard That <br> Directs the <br> Approach | Implications of H <br> have not been false | H's likelihood and/ <br> or prior probability <br> is higher than any <br> alternative H*'s | H would provide <br> more understanding <br> of X than any <br> alternative H* $H^{*}$ |
| Significant Idea That <br> Derives from <br> the Approach | Hypothesis <br> Development <br> should emphasize <br> potentially <br> disconfirming <br> information | Hypothesis <br> Development should <br> emphasize auxiliary <br> assumptions | Hypothesis <br> Development <br> should emphasize <br> explanatory virtues <br> of theories |
Possible Hypotheses That
Explain Information| Possible Hypotheses That |
| :--- |
| Explain Information |
用于评估假设的可能信息
Possible Information to Use
to Assess Hypotheses| Possible Information to Use |
| :--- |
| to Assess Hypotheses |
假设与信息之间的可能联系
Possible Connections
between Hypotheses and
Information| Possible Connections |
| :--- |
| between Hypotheses and |
| Information |
询问“正在发生的事情有哪些合理的理论?”
Asks "What Are Plausible
Theories of What Is
Happening?"| Asks "What Are Plausible |
| :--- |
| Theories of What Is |
| Happening?" |
询问“什么信息最能帮助确定最合理的关于正在发生事情的理论?”
Asks "What Information
Best Helps Determine the
Most Plausible Theory of
What Is Happening?"| Asks "What Information |
| :--- |
| Best Helps Determine the |
| Most Plausible Theory of |
| What Is Happening?" |
询问“要使这成为最合理的理论,需要假设什么?”
Asks "What Has to Be
Assumed for This to Be the
Most Plausible Theory of
What Is Happening?"| Asks "What Has to Be |
| :--- |
| Assumed for This to Be the |
| Most Plausible Theory of |
| What Is Happening?" |
确定哪些是独特、合理且完善的理论来解释正在发生的事情
Determines What Are
Distinct, Plausible, and Well-
Refined Theories of What Is
Happening| Determines What Are |
| :--- |
| Distinct, Plausible, and Well- |
| Refined Theories of What Is |
| Happening |
确定每个理论“适应”所有可用信息的智力“成本”是什么
Determines What Is the
Intellectual "Cost" of
Making Each Theory "Fit"
with All the Available
Information| Determines What Is the |
| :--- |
| Intellectual "Cost" of |
| Making Each Theory "Fit" |
| with All the Available |
| Information |
确定支撑“最佳理论由关键信息支持”这一主张的基础
Determines What Underlies
the Claim That the Best
Theory Is Supported by the
Key Information| Determines What Underlies |
| :--- |
| the Claim That the Best |
| Theory Is Supported by the |
| Key Information |
假设的生成
假设评估
Evaluation of Hypotheses| Evaluation of Hypotheses |
| :--- |
假设的衍生影响
Ramifications of Hypotheses| Ramifications of Hypotheses |
| :--- |
最少先决知识;认识论上悲观的
Least Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Pessimistic| Least Prerequisite |
| :--- |
| Knowledge; |
| Epistemologically Pessimistic |
Most Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Optimistic| Most Prerequisite |
| :--- |
| Knowledge; |
| Epistemologically Optimistic |
辩证假设生成方法所强调
Emphasized by Dialectical
Hypothesis Generation
Method| Emphasized by Dialectical |
| :--- |
| Hypothesis Generation |
| Method |
由 Triadic Hypothesis Development Method 强调
Emphasized by Triadic
Hypothesis Development
Method| Emphasized by Triadic |
| :--- |
| Hypothesis Development |
| Method |
由基础假设三角测量法强调
Emphasized by Underlying
Assumptions Triangulation
Method| Emphasized by Underlying |
| :--- |
| Assumptions Triangulation |
| Method |
Idea Dimension Information Dimension Implication Dimension
"Possible Hypotheses That
Explain Information" "Possible Information to Use
to Assess Hypotheses" "Possible Connections
between Hypotheses and
Information"
"Asks "What Are Plausible
Theories of What Is
Happening?"" "Asks "What Information
Best Helps Determine the
Most Plausible Theory of
What Is Happening?"" "Asks "What Has to Be
Assumed for This to Be the
Most Plausible Theory of
What Is Happening?""
"Determines What Are
Distinct, Plausible, and Well-
Refined Theories of What Is
Happening" "Determines What Is the
Intellectual "Cost" of
Making Each Theory "Fit"
with All the Available
Information" "Determines What Underlies
the Claim That the Best
Theory Is Supported by the
Key Information"
Generation of Hypotheses "Evaluation of Hypotheses" "Ramifications of Hypotheses"
"Least Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Pessimistic" "In-Between Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Moderate" "Most Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Optimistic"
"Emphasized by Dialectical
Hypothesis Generation
Method" "Emphasized by Triadic
Hypothesis Development
Method" "Emphasized by Underlying
Assumptions Triangulation
Method"| Idea Dimension | Information Dimension | Implication Dimension |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Possible Hypotheses That <br> Explain Information | Possible Information to Use <br> to Assess Hypotheses | Possible Connections <br> between Hypotheses and <br> Information |
| Asks "What Are Plausible <br> Theories of What Is <br> Happening?" | Asks "What Information <br> Best Helps Determine the <br> Most Plausible Theory of <br> What Is Happening?" | Asks "What Has to Be <br> Assumed for This to Be the <br> Most Plausible Theory of <br> What Is Happening?" |
| Determines What Are <br> Distinct, Plausible, and Well- <br> Refined Theories of What Is <br> Happening | Determines What Is the <br> Intellectual "Cost" of <br> Making Each Theory "Fit" <br> with All the Available <br> Information | Determines What Underlies <br> the Claim That the Best <br> Theory Is Supported by the <br> Key Information |
| Generation of Hypotheses | Evaluation of Hypotheses | Ramifications of Hypotheses |
| Least Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Pessimistic | In-Between Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Moderate | Most Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Optimistic |
| Emphasized by Dialectical <br> Hypothesis Generation <br> Method | Emphasized by Triadic <br> Hypothesis Development <br> Method | Emphasized by Underlying <br> Assumptions Triangulation <br> Method |
辩证假设生成聚焦于思想维度,构建合理且经过充分推敲的可能解释性假设。它将假设生成过程解释为较少是从无到有的自由概念创造,而更多地是概念的构思、孕育和成熟,直至这些思想能够在智力上独立存在。换言之,它试图通过实际使用两个假设来复制和精炼其他假设。在概念上,它借鉴了与 19 世纪哲学家 G. W. F.黑格尔的“辩证法”相关的方法论,该辩证法作为其著名的西方文明思想史的一部分被使用。在后者的理论中,思想被认为通过“抽象、否定、具体”的三重过程发展,这一过程在其工作的非哲学描述(以及其形而上学上不够复杂的追随者)中常常被简化。
H1: Neither China nor USSR Plan to Intervene H1's Auxiliary Assumptions H2: China Plans to Intervene without USSR H2's Auxiliary Assumptions H3: Both China and USSR Plan to Intervene H3's Auxiliary Assumptions
11: 300,000+ Chinese Troops Near NK Border Surprising They guard the energy infrastructure. Confirmed Not Surprising N/A Not Surprising N/A
12: China Needs Diplomatic Cover to Get UN Seat Not Surprising N/A Surprising They plan to intervene informally and unofficially. Plausible Surprising They plan to intervene informally and unofficially. Plausible
13: China Lacks Nuclear Deterrent (without USSR) Not Surprising N/A Surprising They plan to intervene informally and unofficially. Plausible Not Surprising N/A
14: USSR Wants to Avoid War with USA Not Surprising N/A Not Surprising N/A Surprising They plan to claim defense against US aggression. Plausible
15: China Does Not Want More US-Allied Pacific Neighbors Surprising Disconfirms Hypothesis China views it as too late and accepts it for now. Disconfirmed Not Surprising N/A Not Surprising N/A
Likelihood & Simplicity -1 on Likelihood -0 on Simplicity -0 on Likelihood -1 on Simplicity -0 on Likelihood -2 on Simplicity| | H1: Neither China nor USSR Plan to Intervene | H1's Auxiliary Assumptions | H2: China Plans to Intervene without USSR | H2's Auxiliary Assumptions | H3: Both China and USSR Plan to Intervene | H3's Auxiliary Assumptions |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 11: 300,000+ Chinese Troops Near NK Border | Surprising | They guard the energy infrastructure. Confirmed | Not Surprising | N/A | Not Surprising | N/A |
| 12: China Needs Diplomatic Cover to Get UN Seat | Not Surprising | N/A | Surprising | They plan to intervene informally and unofficially. Plausible | Surprising | They plan to intervene informally and unofficially. Plausible |
| 13: China Lacks Nuclear Deterrent (without USSR) | Not Surprising | N/A | Surprising | They plan to intervene informally and unofficially. Plausible | Not Surprising | N/A |
| 14: USSR Wants to Avoid War with USA | Not Surprising | N/A | Not Surprising | N/A | Surprising | They plan to claim defense against US aggression. Plausible |
| 15: China Does Not Want More US-Allied Pacific Neighbors | Surprising Disconfirms Hypothesis | China views it as too late and accepts it for now. Disconfirmed | Not Surprising | N/A | Not Surprising | N/A |
| Likelihood & Simplicity | -1 on Likelihood | -0 on Simplicity | -0 on Likelihood | -1 on Simplicity | -0 on Likelihood | -2 on Simplicity |
因果关系的描述也倾向于优先考虑“事件”(某种特定类型的一次性发生)或“因素”(事物/变量的持续特征)之间的因果关系。这最初可能看似一个不重要的区分,但它具有重大意义。因为强调前者是强调“线性”因果关系,而后者则是强调“循环”因果关系。例如,如果事件 C 导致事件 E 的产生,那并不等同于
正如事件 E 与事件 C 之间的关系。显然,事件 E 不能导致事件 C 的产生,否则事件 C 将因此(通过事件 E)自我产生!相比之下,或许变量 C 在 1 分钟时导致变量 E 拥有一个值,然后变量 E 在 2 分钟时影响变量 C 的值。因此,变量 C 在 1 分钟时的值,是变量 C 在 2 分钟时值背后的因果故事的一部分。换言之,(持续性的)变量 C 能够以一种(一次性)事件 C 无法做到的方式影响自身。类似于类型因果与实例因果之间的区分,大多数因果理论都允许在必要时同时使用这两种表述,但大多数会优先考虑其中一种视角作为更基础的观点,而将另一种视为派生。
因果关系的概率方法提供了一种事件驱动的分析,通常优先考虑类型(即一般性)的因果主张。在这种方法中,原因对结果“产生影响”的方式是通过增加其概率。更具体地说,在某种原因 CC 发生的情况下,某种结果 EE 发生的概率大于在原因 CC 未发生的情况下结果 EE 发生的概率(即 Prob [E∣C] > Prob[\mathrm{E} \mid \mathrm{C}]>\operatorname{Prob}[E∣-C][\mathrm{E} \mid-\mathrm{C}] )。这一范式可以追溯到早期分析哲学家汉斯·赖兴巴赫,并由其他众多思想家逐步发展,最终在埃勒里·伊尔斯的工作中得到更充分的阐述。 ^(6){ }^{6} 它将发现原因的过程作为其论述的动机,并将概率相关性视为实现这一目标的核心手段。因此,概率方法利用相关性(即事件类型/变量之间的统计/概率依赖)作为推断因果关系的手段。
利用概率相关性来推断因果关系,似乎与常被引用的格言“相关不等于因果”相悖。然而,尽管这一格言正确,它常被(隐晦地)误解为发现相关性既容易又无足轻重。不幸的是,许多人误解了真正在两者之间建立相关性的所需条件。例如,假设某一特定恐怖组织的几乎所有成员都属于某一宗教派别。有些人可能认为这意味着该派别的成员身份与该恐怖组织的成员身份相关。然而,这并不成立(至少目前如此)。因为可能该恐怖组织所在地区的所有人也都是该宗教派别的成员。在这种情况下,加入该宗教团体与是否成为恐怖组织的一员的相关性,并不比其他众多因素更显著。换言之,相关性始终不仅仅是一个单一的概率或数值,它总是两个数值之间的比较。 更准确地说,必须考虑 CsC s 的总体情况(存在/发生 CC 的案例)与 ∼Cs\sim C s 的总体情况(不存在 CC 的案例)
存在/不存在)。接着,需要考察这两类群体中 EE (即 EE 同样存在/也发生的情况)所占的百分比。若在 CC 存在的情况下 EE 比在 CC 缺失时更为普遍(或相反),则表明 CC 与 EE 存在关联。这一发现并不如想象中简单:它要求比较两个截然不同的群体(一组带有 CC ,另一组则无 CC )。单一数值,无论高低,都不足以证实两者间的相关性。
发现一个事件类型在概率上与另一个事件类型相关是重要的,这有助于识别因果关系。然而,概率相关性并不足以推断出因果关系,但除了相关性之外,还需要哪些其他因素并未被广泛认识。换句话说,如果 CC 在概率上与 EE 相关,那么除了 CC 导致 EE 之外,还有哪些其他可能性?因果关系的概率方法认为,可以解释一组特定的替代可能性,如果这些可能性被排除,那么就可以从相关性中推断出因果关系。例如,二十世纪中期的著名科学哲学家汉斯·赖兴巴赫提出,如果 CC 与 EE 相关,那么有三种可能性: CC 导致 E,EE, E 导致 CC ,或者第三件事导致 CC 和 EE (即它们是“共同原因的结果”)。 因此,如果假设原因必须在时间上先于其结果(这在原因和结果都是一次性事件的情况下是合理的),那么就可以推断出他所提出的“共同原因原则”的一个版本:如果 CC 先于 EE ,且 CC 与 EE 相关,那么要么 CC 导致 EE ,要么存在一个共同原因同时影响 CC 和 EE 。因此,如果能排除 CC 和 EE 之间存在共同原因的可能性,那么就可以利用两个事件之间的概率相关性(以及时间优先性)来推断因果关系。因此,特定类型的相关性确实意味着因果关系。
但是,如何排除 CC 和 EE 两者共同原因的可能性呢?一个想法是:如果存在 CC 和 EE 的共同原因,那意味着 CC 与 EE 的相关性完全源自 C,CoCC, C o C 的原因。因此,如果假设 CoCC o C 发生,在那些 CC 不导致 EE 的情况下, EE 在 CC 存在时并不比 CC 缺失时更有可能发生。 CC 与 EE 的相关性只是从 CC 的原因中衍生出来的(即概率 [E∣C&CoC]=Prob[E∣∼C&CoC])[\mathrm{E} \mid \mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{CoC}]=\operatorname{Prob}[\mathrm{E} \mid \sim \mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{CoC}]) )。相反,如果假设 CoCC o C 发生,但 EE 在 CC 也发生时比不发生时更有可能发生,那意味着 CC 与 EE 的相关性并非源自 CC 的原因(即概率 [E∣C&CoC] > Prob[E∣∼C&CoC])[\mathrm{E} \mid \mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{CoC}]>\operatorname{Prob}[\mathrm{E} \mid \sim \mathrm{C} \& \mathrm{CoC}]) )。这被称为“固定”或“屏蔽”共同原因。这一想法即为“因果马尔可夫条件”,它指出,即使 CC 的原因存在(无论是否包含 CC ),若 CC 在概率上仍与 EE 相关,则 CC 导致 E.^(8)E .^{8} 。因此,要推断 CC 与 EE 之间的因果关系,必须预设 CC 的原因发生,然后观察 EE 是否更有可能发生。
干预主义的因果范式也提供了一种事件驱动的解释,侧重于类型(即一般)因果主张。然而,这种方法并不主张原因通过增加其概率来“产生影响”,而是强调原因是影响结果的手段。在这一范式中,因果关系支持(原则上)两种事件之间的“可操纵性”关系,其中第一种事件是引发第二种事件的合理手段。这种方法借鉴了哲学传统中一种潜在(少数)的观点,该观点认为因果关系与能动性(即有意行为)密切相关,如近代哲学家托马斯·里德和早期分析哲学家 G. H. 冯·赖特的作品中所体现的,但在詹姆斯·伍德沃德的最新研究中得到了最充分的阐述。 ^(9){ }^{9} 目前,这一观点并不认为所有因果关系实际上都是有意图的行为者的行动,甚至也不认为它们是人类必然能够为这些目的所利用的关系(例如,月球轨道引起潮汐)。 相反,这个想法是,如果一个人有能力影响原因,那么这样做将是影响结果的一种合理方式。
干预主义范式也与另一种未在此讨论的因果关系方法相关:反事实范式,该范式将因果关系视为关于在各种可能替代情境下会发生(或不会发生)的事实,这一观点由分析哲学家大卫·刘易斯著名提出。标准的反事实方法通常被理解为一种以事件为驱动的因果关系方法,侧重于特定(即具体)的因果主张,通常被表述为(以最简单的形式)认为 CC 导致 EE 意味着如果 CC 没有发生,那么 EE 也不会发生。对于这一方法,通常会有多种重要的限定条件,但这些对于当前目的并不重要。最终,这里不深入探讨这一方法,因为它使因果分析(即证明因果主张的过程)依赖于反事实推理(即证明在不同可能替代情境下会发生或可能发生什么的过程)。 这是有问题的,因为(在作者看来)对反事实推理最合理的解释依赖于已经知道一系列因果主张。 ^(11){ }^{11} 换句话说,必须确定(一般而言)是首先评估因果主张,还是首先评估反事实主张。如果一个人这样做,
干预主义范式最具吸引力的特点之一在于,它以一种概率论及早期方法所不能的方式,帮助人们理解因果关系的重要性。特别是,为什么分析师们不仅仅满足于相关性?举例来说,如果所有分析师仅关注未来分析,那么相关性就足够了。如果事件 AA 的发生与事件 BB 高度相关(在概率上相关),那么当分析师观察到 AA 时,他们就有合理依据预测 BB 的发生。那么,为什么分析师们觉得需要比这更坚实的依据呢?原因在于,分析师们希望因果关系不仅仅支撑未来探索,还要能支撑战略评估。他们想知道,影响 AA 是否是客户影响 BB 的合理手段。他们追求的不仅仅是相关性,因为仅仅 AA 与 BB 之间的相关性,并不必然意味着 AA 是促成 BB 的合理手段(正如之前婴儿死亡率与不稳定性关系的例子所示)。 分析师们寻求的是一种不变且支持干预的相关性——他们想要的是“因果关系”。干预主义范式将注意力集中在分析师真正关心的因果关系上(特别是在情报分析这样的背景下):影响现实世界中实际事件的可能手段。尽管这种方法还有许多值得称道之处,但这一点对情报分析来说最为重要:在任何因果分析方法中,都应相应强调对可能干预的支持。
4. 系统动力学范式:因果分析作为建模持续、相互关联的因素如何随时间影响彼此行为的方式
系统动力学范式提供了一种“持续”的、由因素驱动的方法。它优先考虑系统中持续且相互关联的因素如何随时间推移影响彼此的行为。在这里,原因通过成为展现“反馈”的因果循环的一部分,主要对其效果“产生影响”,这种反馈影响着整个系统的总体行为。这些关系既可以促使因果过程朝着特定方向持续(“增强型”反馈),也可以使其朝相反方向移动(“平衡型”反馈)。如果未被其他因素制约,增强型因果循环有可能失控。那些可能朝负面方向发展的反馈循环被称为“恶性”循环,而朝正面方向发展的则被称为“良性”循环。这些仅仅是设想因果相关项作为变量时涌现出的部分动态特性,这些变量的值作为更大相互关联因果过程的一部分,随时间演变。 这种方法最初据称源自计算机工程师 Jay Forrester 的工作,随后在其继任者 John Sterman(以及后续众多“系统思考者”)手中得到了更为详尽的阐述。 ^(12){ }^{12}
举一个简单的例子,假设 X 国的安全策略是在感到威胁时增加其武器供应。这意味着随着“X 国的威胁感”增加,“X 国的武器供应”也会增加,但随着“X 国的武器供应”增加,“X 国的威胁感”会减少。因此,这个循环是“平衡的”,因为因果影响最终朝着与开始相反的方向发展。现在,当考虑到另一个行为体的策略及其与 X 国的互动时,事情开始变得有趣。假设 Y 国也有同样的安全策略,即在感到威胁时增加其武器供应,这也形成了一个平衡的反馈循环。这两个反馈循环相交,产生了第三个循环,即“X 国的武器供应”增加导致“Y 国的威胁感”增加,而“Y 国的武器供应”增加又导致“X 国的威胁感”增加。现在,这四个变量形成了一个更大的反馈循环,这个循环是“强化的”,因为因果影响在其中以开始时的相同方向结束。
图 17.1. 因果循环图示例
在这个简单模型中,除非有外部力量介入以平衡局势,否则两国有可能陷入不断升级的军备竞赛。或许 Z 国对地区稳定的渴望促使其承诺保护 X 国,从而推动局势趋于均衡。当然,这并非 Z 国行为引入系统的唯一动态。但至此,该方法的核心理念应已足够清晰。通过将因果力量构想为更大反馈结构的一部分,而这些结构又属于一个更加宏大的整体,新的关注点便落在了因果力量之间的相互作用上。
{:[" Probabilistic "],[" Locating Earlier "],[" Events That Influence "],[" the Probability "],[" of Later Events in "],[" a Sequence and "],[" Context "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Probabilistic } \\
\text { Locating Earlier } \\
\text { Events That Influence } \\
\text { the Probability } \\
\text { of Later Events in } \\
\text { a Sequence and } \\
\text { Context }\end{array}
{:[" Interventionist "],[" Identifying the "],[" Preceding Pathways "],[" to Influence an "],[" Outcome "]:}\begin{array}{c}\text { Interventionist } \\ \text { Identifying the } \\ \text { Preceding Pathways } \\ \text { to Influence an } \\ \text { Outcome }\end{array}
{:[" Systems Dynamics "],[" Modeling the Ways "],[" in Which Ongoing, "],[" Interconnected "],[" Factors Influence "],[" One Another's "]:}\begin{array}{c}\text { Systems Dynamics } \\ \text { Modeling the Ways } \\ \text { in Which Ongoing, } \\ \text { Interconnected } \\ \text { Factors Influence } \\ \text { One Another's }\end{array}
{:[" Summary That "],[" Describes the "],[" Approach "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Summary That } \\ \text { Describes the } \\ \text { Approach }\end{array}
{:[" Causal Analysis is "],[" finding probabilistic "],[" relevance between "],[" events "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Causal Analysis is } \\ \text { finding probabilistic } \\ \text { relevance between } \\ \text { events }\end{array}
{:[" Causal Analysis is "],[" finding correlations "],[" that are invariant "],[" across possible "],[" interventions "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Causal Analysis is } \\ \text { finding correlations } \\ \text { that are invariant } \\ \text { across possible } \\ \text { interventions }\end{array}
{:" Causal Analysis is ":}\begin{array}{l}\text { Causal Analysis is }\end{array}
{:[" finding feedback "],[" among ongoing, "],[" interconnected "],[" factors in a whole "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { finding feedback } \\ \text { among ongoing, } \\ \text { interconnected } \\ \text { factors in a whole }\end{array}
{:[" Sensibility That "],[" Drives the Approach "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Sensibility That } \\ \text { Drives the Approach }\end{array}
{:[" Reductive and "Fine- "],[" Grained": A "bottom "],[" up" approach "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Reductive and "Fine- } \\ \text { Grained": A "bottom } \\ \text { up" approach }\end{array}
{:[" Holistic and "Coarse- "],[" Crained": A "top "],[" down" approach "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Holistic and "Coarse- } \\ \text { Crained": A "top } \\ \text { down" approach }\end{array}
{:[" Subject That Defines "],[" the Approach "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Subject That Defines } \\ \text { the Approach }\end{array}
{:[" Individual events "],[" that happen or do "],[" not happen and "],[" their probability and "],[" context "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Individual events } \\ \text { that happen or do } \\ \text { not happen and } \\ \text { their probability and } \\ \text { context }\end{array}
{:[" Possible "],[" interventions in "],[" events and their "],[" outcomes "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Possible } \\ \text { interventions in } \\ \text { events and their } \\ \text { outcomes }\end{array}
{:[" Ongoing factors "],[" that vary in their "],[" level and their "]:}\begin{array}{l}\text { Ongoing factors } \\ \text { that vary in their } \\ \text { level and their }\end{array}
关系
" Probabilistic
Locating Earlier
Events That Influence
the Probability
of Later Events in
a Sequence and
Context " " Interventionist
Identifying the
Preceding Pathways
to Influence an
Outcome " " Systems Dynamics
Modeling the Ways
in Which Ongoing,
Interconnected
Factors Influence
One Another's "
" Summary That
Describes the
Approach " " Causal Analysis is
finding probabilistic
relevance between
events " " Causal Analysis is
finding correlations
that are invariant
across possible
interventions " " Causal Analysis is "
" finding feedback
among ongoing,
interconnected
factors in a whole "
" Sensibility That
Drives the Approach " " Reductive and Fine-
Grained: A bottom
up approach " " Experimental: An
agent-based
approach " " Holistic and Coarse-
Crained: A top
down approach "
" Subject That Defines
the Approach " " Individual events
that happen or do
not happen and
their probability and
context " " Possible
interventions in
events and their
outcomes " " Ongoing factors
that vary in their
level and their "
relationships | | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Probabilistic } \\ \text { Locating Earlier } \\ \text { Events That Influence } \\ \text { the Probability } \\ \text { of Later Events in } \\ \text { a Sequence and } \\ \text { Context }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c}\text { Interventionist } \\ \text { Identifying the } \\ \text { Preceding Pathways } \\ \text { to Influence an } \\ \text { Outcome }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c}\text { Systems Dynamics } \\ \text { Modeling the Ways } \\ \text { in Which Ongoing, } \\ \text { Interconnected } \\ \text { Factors Influence } \\ \text { One Another's }\end{array}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\begin{array}{l}\text { Summary That } \\ \text { Describes the } \\ \text { Approach }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Causal Analysis is } \\ \text { finding probabilistic } \\ \text { relevance between } \\ \text { events }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Causal Analysis is } \\ \text { finding correlations } \\ \text { that are invariant } \\ \text { across possible } \\ \text { interventions }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Causal Analysis is }\end{array}$ |
| $\begin{array}{l}\text { finding feedback } \\ \text { among ongoing, } \\ \text { interconnected } \\ \text { factors in a whole }\end{array}$ | | | |
| $\begin{array}{l}\text { Sensibility That } \\ \text { Drives the Approach }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Reductive and "Fine- } \\ \text { Grained": A "bottom } \\ \text { up" approach }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Experimental: An } \\ \text { "agent-based" } \\ \text { approach }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Holistic and "Coarse- } \\ \text { Crained": A "top } \\ \text { down" approach }\end{array}$ |
| $\begin{array}{l}\text { Subject That Defines } \\ \text { the Approach }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Individual events } \\ \text { that happen or do } \\ \text { not happen and } \\ \text { their probability and } \\ \text { context }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Possible } \\ \text { interventions in } \\ \text { events and their } \\ \text { outcomes }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{l}\text { Ongoing factors } \\ \text { that vary in their } \\ \text { level and their }\end{array}$ |
| relationships | | | |
}\}
注释
参见亚里士多德,《形而上学》,载于《亚里士多德著作集》第 9 卷,W. D. 罗斯编辑(伦敦:牛津大学出版社,1970 年)。
例如,参见 John Locke 的《人类理解论》,由 Peter H. Nidditch 编辑(纽约:牛津大学出版社,1975 年)。
这引出了由哲学家 J. L. 麦基提出的“INUS”条件理论的倒数第二个版本。根据这一理论,原因是“不充分”但“必要”的一部分,属于“非必要”但“充分”的条件。换言之,军队忠诚度的丧失是导致独裁者被推翻的条件之一,没有这些条件,独裁者就不会被推翻;然而,在具备这些条件的情况下,独裁者必然会被推翻,但这些并非唯一可能导致其下台的条件。
当一种关系的未来状态仅依赖于其当前状态时,称其具有“马尔可夫”性质(以研究该现象的俄罗斯数学家命名)。换言之,过去的状态(即 CC 的原因)并不决定其未来(仅由 CC 决定)。
参见 G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), 以及 James Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003)。当然,为了当前的讨论,该叙述已被大幅简化。
询问这一因素是否增加了结果(即起义)发生的概率。这一维度涉及因素之间是否存在真正的相关性,以及这种相关性是源于因果关系还是其他解释。因为虽然大多数人都听过“相关性不等于因果性”的陈词滥调,但很少有人知道 CC 和 EE 可以通过哪些具体方式相关,而 CC 并不导致 EE 。按顺序考虑原因,突出了 EE 是否导致 CC 的问题,这被称为“反向相关性”,以及 CC 的原因是否也导致 EE ,这被称为“共同原因效应”。当人们能够合理地排除相关性是由反向相关性或共同原因效应引起时,就有理由推断因果关系。
Tend to Shape Something's
External Characteristics| Tend to Shape Something's |
| :--- |
| External Characteristics |
倾向于塑造某物的内在特征
Tend to Shape Something's
Internal Characteristics| Tend to Shape Something's |
| :--- |
| Internal Characteristics |
数字
往往会更少
往往更大
Timing
往往更接近效果
Tend to be More Proximate
to Effect| Tend to be More Proximate |
| :--- |
| to Effect |
往往与效果较不接近
Tend to be Less Proximate
to Effect| Tend to be Less Proximate |
| :--- |
| to Effect |
现象学(其呈现方式)
Phenomenology
(How It Appears)| Phenomenology |
| :--- |
| (How It Appears) |
倾向于位于前台
倾向于在后台运行
影响程度
往往更具戏剧性
往往更为微妙
影响力类型
倾向于激活一个进程
倾向于创建一个流程
示例
在伊拉克和阿富汗对基地组织采取触发行动
Pulling a Trigger
Action against al Qaeda in Iraq
and Afghanistan| Pulling a Trigger |
| :--- |
| Action against al Qaeda in Iraq |
| and Afghanistan |
装载枪支 也门脆弱的中央政府
Loading the Gun
Yemen's Weak Central
Government| Loading the Gun |
| :--- |
| Yemen's Weak Central |
| Government |
Triggering Causes Structuring Causes
Form "Tend to Shape Something's
External Characteristics" "Tend to Shape Something's
Internal Characteristics"
Number Tend to be Fewer Tend to be Greater
Timing "Tend to be More Proximate
to Effect" "Tend to be Less Proximate
to Effect"
"Phenomenology
(How It Appears)" Tend to be in Foreground Tend to be in Background
Degree of Influence Tend to be More Dramatic Tend to be More Subtle
Type of Influence Tend to Activate a Process Tend to Create a Process
Example "Pulling a Trigger
Action against al Qaeda in Iraq
and Afghanistan" "Loading the Gun
Yemen's Weak Central
Government"| | Triggering Causes | Structuring Causes |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Form | Tend to Shape Something's <br> External Characteristics | Tend to Shape Something's <br> Internal Characteristics |
| Number | Tend to be Fewer | Tend to be Greater |
| Timing | Tend to be More Proximate <br> to Effect | Tend to be Less Proximate <br> to Effect |
| Phenomenology <br> (How It Appears) | Tend to be in Foreground | Tend to be in Background |
| Degree of Influence | Tend to be More Dramatic | Tend to be More Subtle |
| Type of Influence | Tend to Activate a Process | Tend to Create a Process |
| Example | Pulling a Trigger <br> Action against al Qaeda in Iraq <br> and Afghanistan | Loading the Gun <br> Yemen's Weak Central <br> Government |
The Relevance of Individual
or Constituent Connections| The Relevance of Individual |
| :--- |
| or Constituent Connections |
集体或整体联系的相关性
The Relevance of Collective
or Holistic Connections| The Relevance of Collective |
| :--- |
| or Holistic Connections |
意外或非预期联系的相关性
The Relevance of
Unintended or Unexpected
Connections| The Relevance of |
| :--- |
| Unintended or Unexpected |
| Connections |
询问“为什么这一系列事件会发生?”
Asks "Why Is This Series of
Events Happening?"| Asks "Why Is This Series of |
| :--- |
| Events Happening?" |
询问“为什么这种持续的互动正在发生?”
Asks "Why Is This Ongoing
Interaction Happening?"| Asks "Why Is This Ongoing |
| :--- |
| Interaction Happening?" |
询问“为什么会出现这种意外结果(作为客户行为的后果)?”
Asks "Why Is This
Unexpected Outcome
Happening (as a Result of
the Client's Actions)?| Asks "Why Is This |
| :--- |
| Unexpected Outcome |
| Happening (as a Result of |
| the Client's Actions)? |
辨别特定事件及其背景条件的类型和相关程度
Discerns Type and Degree of
Relevance of Specific Events
and Their Background
Conditions| Discerns Type and Degree of |
| :--- |
| Relevance of Specific Events |
| and Their Background |
| Conditions |
辨别整体中交互因素持续“反馈”行为的相关性
Discerns Relevance of
Ongoing "Feedback"
Behavior of Interacting
Factors in a Whole| Discerns Relevance of |
| :--- |
| Ongoing "Feedback" |
| Behavior of Interacting |
| Factors in a Whole |
识别当前背景与先前背景(及预期)差异的相关性
Discerns Relevance of How
Present Background Differs
from Previous Background
(and Expectations)| Discerns Relevance of How |
| :--- |
| Present Background Differs |
| from Previous Background |
| (and Expectations) |
"自下而上"与还原性
“自上而下”与整体性
《头脑特工队》与两者之间
"Inside Out" and
In-Between| "Inside Out" and |
| :--- |
| In-Between |
最少先决知识;认识论上悲观的
Least Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Pessimistic| Least Prerequisite |
| :--- |
| Knowledge; |
| Epistemologically Pessimistic |
Most Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Optimistic| Most Prerequisite |
| :--- |
| Knowledge; |
| Epistemologically Optimistic |
通过比较影响分类方法强调
Emphasized by Comparative
Influence Classification
Method| Emphasized by Comparative |
| :--- |
| Influence Classification |
| Method |
通过因果循环图方法强调
Emphasized by Causal Loop
Diagramming Method| Emphasized by Causal Loop |
| :--- |
| Diagramming Method |
背景转移分析法强调
Emphasized by Background
Shift Analysis Method| Emphasized by Background |
| :--- |
| Shift Analysis Method |
Sequence Dimension System Dimension Surprise Dimension
"The Relevance of Individual
or Constituent Connections" "The Relevance of Collective
or Holistic Connections" "The Relevance of
Unintended or Unexpected
Connections"
"Asks "Why Is This Series of
Events Happening?"" "Asks "Why Is This Ongoing
Interaction Happening?"" "Asks "Why Is This
Unexpected Outcome
Happening (as a Result of
the Client's Actions)?"
"Discerns Type and Degree of
Relevance of Specific Events
and Their Background
Conditions" "Discerns Relevance of
Ongoing "Feedback"
Behavior of Interacting
Factors in a Whole" "Discerns Relevance of How
Present Background Differs
from Previous Background
(and Expectations)"
"Bottom Up" and Reductive "Top Down" and Holistic ""Inside Out" and
In-Between"
"Least Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Pessimistic" "In-Between Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Moderate" "Most Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Optimistic"
"Emphasized by Comparative
Influence Classification
Method" "Emphasized by Causal Loop
Diagramming Method" "Emphasized by Background
Shift Analysis Method"| Sequence Dimension | System Dimension | Surprise Dimension |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| The Relevance of Individual <br> or Constituent Connections | The Relevance of Collective <br> or Holistic Connections | The Relevance of <br> Unintended or Unexpected <br> Connections |
| Asks "Why Is This Series of <br> Events Happening?" | Asks "Why Is This Ongoing <br> Interaction Happening?" | Asks "Why Is This <br> Unexpected Outcome <br> Happening (as a Result of <br> the Client's Actions)? |
| Discerns Type and Degree of <br> Relevance of Specific Events <br> and Their Background <br> Conditions | Discerns Relevance of <br> Ongoing "Feedback" <br> Behavior of Interacting <br> Factors in a Whole | Discerns Relevance of How <br> Present Background Differs <br> from Previous Background <br> (and Expectations) |
| "Bottom Up" and Reductive | "Top Down" and Holistic | "Inside Out" and <br> In-Between |
| Least Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Pessimistic | In-Between Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Moderate | Most Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Optimistic |
| Emphasized by Comparative <br> Influence Classification <br> Method | Emphasized by Causal Loop <br> Diagramming Method | Emphasized by Background <br> Shift Analysis Method |
比较影响分类优先考虑序列维度,并发现特定事件及其背景条件与某一特定结果之间的相关程度和类型。从哲学上讲,它始于 19 世纪的思想和约翰·斯图尔特·密尔著名的因果影响方法,包括“求同法”和“求异法”。 ^(2){ }^{2} 在前者中,分析者考察存在效果的案例,以识别它们的共同点。在后者中,分析者比较不存在效果的案例与存在效果的案例,以识别它们之间的差异。通过这些方法,分析者可以识别潜在的因果因素。然后,该方法从因果关系的概率范式(以及密尔所称的“共变法”)中汲取灵感,通过比较潜在原因存在与不存在的案例,寻找真正的相关性。 与效应发生频率较高相关的因素随后会被检查,以确定它们是否可能实际上是由诸如“反向相关性”或“共同原因效应”等虚假相关性引起的。这一过程受到“赖欣巴赫原则”的启发,该原则大致认为,如果 AA 和 BB 相关,且 AA 在时间上先于 BB ,那么要么 AA 和 BB 有共同原因,要么 AA 导致 B.^(3)B .{ }^{3} 。借鉴科学哲学家弗雷德·德雷茨克的观点,经过这一过程后幸存的关系被分类为“触发”(更接近的前景事件或因素,“激活”现有的因果潜力)或“结构化”(较不接近的背景事件或因素,创造但不激活因果潜力),以及“主要”或“辅助”。 ^('){ }^{\prime} 虽然这大大简化了因果关系的概率范式,但对于情报分析师在强调探索个体因果关系及因果分析的序列维度时,这是一种有效操作其最重要概念的方式。
因果循环图强调系统维度,并识别整体中互动因素的持续行为(特别是反馈)。从概念上讲,它建立在“系统思考”和“系统动力学”中建模因果力量的传统之上,使用因果循环图。 ^(5){ }^{5} 这种方法代表了在某一背景下主要行动者的“心智模型”(涉及他们个人策略的因果因素),以探索这些不同的持续动态如何相互影响。每个心智模型被表示为一个因果力量循环,其中(大致上)行动者影响因素 AA ,进而影响因素 BB ,从而影响因素 CC ,这又将反过来影响他们继续影响 AA 的程度。当他们被鼓励继续朝同一方向前进时,这是一种“增强”反馈;当他们被鼓励朝相反方向移动时,这是一种“平衡”反馈。特别令人感兴趣的是每个循环之间的反馈如何影响其他循环。例如,是否存在其他循环能够防止增强循环失控? 这些问题和其他问题有助于引导分析者考虑更广泛的因果力量,而不仅仅是单个参与者的具体策略。虽然这种方法是对系统动力学范式的显著简化,但它为分析者探索集体因果关系和因果分析的系统维度提供了一种现实的方式。
步骤 4. 检查相关性是否可能源于“反向关联”:如果 CC 导致 EE ,那么 CC 和 EE 将相关;但如果 EE 导致 CC ,它们同样会相关。在多大程度上可以合理排除后者?(反向关联 == :潜在原因实际上是结果,而潜在结果实际上是原因)。能够排除的程度,即是其作为因果相关性继续被探索的程度。
“时间优先性”策略:尝试确立 CC 和 EE 具有精确的时间框架,使得 C 在时间上先于 E。由于时间上较晚的事物无法因果影响时间上较早的事物,因此 EE 不能导致 CC (即这不属于“反向相关性”的情况)。
步骤 5. 检查相关性是否可能源于“共同原因效应”:如果 CC 导致 EE ,C 和 E 将相关;但如果某物 CoCC o C 同时导致 CC 和 EE ,它们也会相关。后者能在多大程度上被排除?(共同原因效应 == ,潜在原因和潜在效果都是第三个事件/因素的结果—— CC 的原因也导致 E。)这种排除的程度,即是其作为因果相关性继续被探索的程度。
“固定共同原因”策略:尝试识别 CC 的原因,并假设 C 的原因存在但(与事实相反)C 不存在。那么 EE 是否仍会发生?如果认为 EE 仍会发生是合理的,那么这表明 EE 更多是由于 CC 的原因,而非 CC 本身。相反,如果认为 EE 不会发生(或不太可能发生)是合理的,那么这表明 EE 更多是由于 CC ,而不仅仅是 CC 的原因(即这不是“共同原因效应”的情况)。
Numerators Added Together = Total Number of Cases Where Effect Occurs Denominators Added Together = Total Number of Cases Number of Cases Where the Potential Cause Is Present Frequency of the Effect among Cases Where the Potential Cause Is Present Number of Cases Where the Potential Cause Is Absent Frequency of the Effect among Cases Where the Potential Cause Is Absent Correlation? (i.e., First Frequency Is Significantly Higher or Lower Than Second)
https://cdn.mathpix.com/cropped/2025_02_24_452ab6fce6dfa6f20380g-222.jpg?height=45&width=223&top_left_y=2420&top_left_x=1044 Large Youth Population 8 5//8=0.625 6 2//6=0.33 YES: Higher
High Youth Unemployment 8 6//8=0.75 6 1//6=0.16 YES: Higher
Low Per Capita Income 8 6//8=0.75 6 1//6=0.16 YES: Higher
Complete Lack of Democracy 11 5//11=0.45 3 2//3=0.66 NO
Long-Serving Leader (15+) 7 4//7=0.57 7 3//7=0.43 NO
High Government Corruption 6 6//6=1.00 8 1//8=0.125 YES: Higher
Minor Protests 12 7//12=0.58 2 0//2=0.00 YES: Higher
Concessions Offered 10 6//10=0.60 4 1//4=0.25 YES: Higher
Massive Military Crackdown 4 4//4=1.00 10 3//10=0.30 YES: Higher
Not an Oil-Based Economy 6 4//6=0.66 8 3//8=0.375 YES: Higher
Government Is a Monarchy 8 1//8=0.125 6 6//6=1.00 YES: Lower
Previous/Recent Uprisings 3 3//3=1.00 11 4//11=0.36 YES: Higher
Independent Military 3 3//3=1.00 11 4//11=0.36 YES: Higher| Numerators Added Together = Total Number of Cases Where Effect Occurs Denominators Added Together $=$ Total Number of Cases | | Number of Cases Where the Potential Cause Is Present | Frequency of the Effect among Cases Where the Potential Cause Is Present | Number of Cases Where the Potential Cause Is Absent | Frequency of the Effect among Cases Where the Potential Cause Is Absent | Correlation? (i.e., First Frequency Is Significantly Higher or Lower Than Second) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Large Youth Population | 8 | $5 / 8=0.625$ | 6 | $2 / 6=0.33$ | YES: Higher |
| | High Youth Unemployment | 8 | $6 / 8=0.75$ | 6 | $1 / 6=0.16$ | YES: Higher |
| | Low Per Capita Income | 8 | $6 / 8=0.75$ | 6 | $1 / 6=0.16$ | YES: Higher |
| | Complete Lack of Democracy | 11 | $5 / 11=0.45$ | 3 | $2 / 3=0.66$ | NO |
| | Long-Serving Leader (15+) | 7 | $4 / 7=0.57$ | 7 | $3 / 7=0.43$ | NO |
| | High Government Corruption | 6 | $6 / 6=1.00$ | 8 | $1 / 8=0.125$ | YES: Higher |
| | Minor Protests | 12 | $7 / 12=0.58$ | 2 | $0 / 2=0.00$ | YES: Higher |
| | Concessions Offered | 10 | $6 / 10=0.60$ | 4 | $1 / 4=0.25$ | YES: Higher |
| | Massive Military Crackdown | 4 | $4 / 4=1.00$ | 10 | $3 / 10=0.30$ | YES: Higher |
| | Not an Oil-Based Economy | 6 | $4 / 6=0.66$ | 8 | $3 / 8=0.375$ | YES: Higher |
| | Government Is a Monarchy | 8 | $1 / 8=0.125$ | 6 | $6 / 6=1.00$ | YES: Lower |
| | Previous/Recent Uprisings | 3 | $3 / 3=1.00$ | 11 | $4 / 11=0.36$ | YES: Higher |
| | Independent Military | 3 | $3 / 3=1.00$ | 11 | $4 / 11=0.36$ | YES: Higher |
表 19.3 比较影响分类步骤 3-7 的示例
步骤 3:确认相关性:当原因存在时,效果是否显著更频繁?
步骤 4:检查反向相关性:是否可以合理排除?
Step 4:
Check for Reversed Relevance: Can It Reasonably Be Excluded?| Step 4: |
| :--- |
| Check for Reversed Relevance: Can It Reasonably Be Excluded? |
步骤 5:检查共同原因的影响:能否合理地排除?
Step 5:
Check for Effects of a Common Cause: Can It Reasonably Be Excluded?| Step 5: |
| :--- |
| Check for Effects of a Common Cause: Can It Reasonably Be Excluded? |
第 6 步:关联类型:触发还是构建?
Step 6:
Type of Relevance: Triggering or Structuring?| Step 6: |
| :--- |
| Type of Relevance: Triggering or Structuring? |
第 7 步:相关性程度:主要或辅助?
Step 7:
Degree of Relevance: Primary or Contributing?| Step 7: |
| :--- |
| Degree of Relevance: Primary or Contributing? |
大量青年人口
YES
YES
YES
结构化
贡献
青年高失业率
YES
YES
NO
N/A
N/A
人均收入低
YES
YES
NO
N/A
N/A
完全缺乏民主
NO
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
长期任职的领导者(15 年以上)
NO
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
家
高政府腐败
YES
YES
YES
结构化
主要
砣
小型抗议活动
YES
YES
YES
触发
贡献
皆
提供的优惠
YES
NO
N/A
N/A
N/A
大规模军事镇压
YES
NO
N/A
N/A
N/A
非石油经济
YES
YES
YES
结构化
贡献
政府不是君主制
YES
YES
YES
结构化
主要
先前/最近的起义
YES
YES
YES
结构化
主要
独立军事
YES
YES
NO
N/A
N/A
Step 3: Confirm Correlations: Is Effect Significantly More Frequent When Cause Is Present? "Step 4:
Check for Reversed Relevance: Can It Reasonably Be Excluded?" "Step 5:
Check for Effects of a Common Cause: Can It Reasonably Be Excluded?" "Step 6:
Type of Relevance: Triggering or Structuring?" "Step 7:
Degree of Relevance: Primary or Contributing?"
Large Youth Population YES YES YES Structuring Contributing
High Youth Unemployment YES YES NO N/A N/A
Low Per Capita Income YES YES NO N/A N/A
Complete Lack of Democracy NO N/A N/A N/A N/A
Long-Serving Leader(15+) NO N/A N/A N/A N/A
家 High Government Corruption YES YES YES Structuring Primary
砣 Minor Protests YES YES YES Triggering Contributing
皆 Concessions Offered YES NO N/A N/A N/A
Massive Military Crackdown YES NO N/A N/A N/A
Not an Oil-Based Economy YES YES YES Structuring Contributing
Government Not a Monarchy YES YES YES Structuring Primary
Previous/Recent Uprisings YES YES YES Structuring Primary
Independent Military YES YES NO N/A N/A| | | Step 3: Confirm Correlations: Is Effect Significantly More Frequent When Cause Is Present? | Step 4: <br> Check for Reversed Relevance: Can It Reasonably Be Excluded? | Step 5: <br> Check for Effects of a Common Cause: Can It Reasonably Be Excluded? | Step 6: <br> Type of Relevance: Triggering or Structuring? | Step 7: <br> Degree of Relevance: Primary or Contributing? |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| | Large Youth Population | YES | YES | YES | Structuring | Contributing |
| | High Youth Unemployment | YES | YES | NO | N/A | N/A |
| | Low Per Capita Income | YES | YES | NO | N/A | N/A |
| | Complete Lack of Democracy | NO | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| | Long-Serving Leader(15+) | NO | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| 家 | High Government Corruption | YES | YES | YES | Structuring | Primary |
| 砣 | Minor Protests | YES | YES | YES | Triggering | Contributing |
| 皆 | Concessions Offered | YES | NO | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| | Massive Military Crackdown | YES | NO | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| | Not an Oil-Based Economy | YES | YES | YES | Structuring | Contributing |
| | Government Not a Monarchy | YES | YES | YES | Structuring | Primary |
| | Previous/Recent Uprisings | YES | YES | YES | Structuring | Primary |
| | Independent Military | YES | YES | NO | N/A | N/A |
步骤 1. 描述主要参与者如何尝试影响该领域:识别(a)谁对当前情况有强烈兴趣,(b)他们的目标,(c)可用于跟踪他们向目标进展或偏离的变量(即“指标变量”),(d)他们影响该变量的主要策略(如果某个参与者似乎没有独特可识别的策略,则考虑将该参与者与另一个参与者合并),以及(e)该策略中涉及的变量序列(例如,X 到 Y 再到指标变量)。
注意:这里的“变量”或适当的因果“因素”是真正的变量:某种可随时间增加或减少的可确定特征。
第二步:将每个参与者的策略描述为随时间重复的模式(即反馈循环):对于每个策略,将其涉及的因素布局为一个循环(使用箭头将每个因素连接到下一个,最后一个连接到第一个)。对于每个因素,确定其与下一个因素的关系性质(如果两个因素一起上升或下降,则用 SS 标记箭头;如果一个上升导致另一个下降或一个下降导致另一个上升,则用 OO 标记箭头)。对于每个循环,确定它是“强化型”(影响通过循环结束时与开始时相同)还是“平衡型”(循环结束时与开始时相反)。
Arab-Israeli
Peace; Preserve US Alliances with Arab States| Arab-Israeli |
| :--- |
| Peace; Preserve US Alliances with Arab States |
强有力的政权确保强大的埃及(而非受激进分子控制)
生活在相对和平与安全中,享有他们珍视的权利
推翻穆巴拉克;对抗美国影响;削弱以色列
c. 需关注的指标/关键变量
阿拉伯-以色列冲突数量;埃及对美国倡议的支持数量
政权的力量
公共服务质量
政权的力量
d. 影响关键变量的策略
向穆巴拉克提供援助,以确保他支持 a)美国的倡议和 b)阿拉伯与以色列的和平
通过利用美国援助确保权力:a) 提供公共服务和 b) 压制异议
Secure Power by Using US Aid to a) Provide Public Services and
b) Suppress
Dissension| Secure Power by Using US Aid to a) Provide Public Services and |
| :--- |
| b) Suppress |
| Dissension |
充分公共服务的压力机制
反击穆巴拉克以 a) 使公众舆论反对他 和 b) 增加他们在该地区的影响力
Retaliate against Mubarak to a)
Turn Public
Opinion against
Him and b)
Increase Their
Influence in Region| Retaliate against Mubarak to a) |
| :--- |
| Turn Public |
| Opinion against |
| Him and b) |
| Increase Their |
| Influence in Region |
e. 策略中涉及的变量序列
1) 美国援助;2) 政权力量;3a) 埃及对美国倡议的支持;3b) 阿以冲突
1) US Aid; 2)
Regime's Power;
3a) Egyptian
Support for US
Initiatives; 3b)
Arab-Israeli
Conflict| 1) US Aid; 2) |
| :--- |
| Regime's Power; |
| 3a) Egyptian |
| Support for US |
| Initiatives; 3b) |
| Arab-Israeli |
| Conflict |
1a) 公共服务质量;1b) 对反对派的压制;2) 公众反对;3) 政权权力
1a) Quality of Public Services;
1b) Suppression of Opposition;
2) Public
Opposition; 3)
Regime's Power| 1a) Quality of Public Services; |
| :--- |
| 1b) Suppression of Opposition; |
| 2) Public |
| Opposition; 3) |
| Regime's Power |
1) 公众反对;2) 公共服务质量
1) Public Opposition;
2) Quality of Public Services| 1) Public Opposition; |
| :--- |
| 2) Quality of Public Services |
1) 压制反对派;2) 攻击与宣传;3a) 公众反对;3b) 激进分子影响;4) 政权力量
1) Suppression of Opposition;
2) Attacks and
Propaganda;
3a) Public
Opposition;
3b) Influence
of Radicals; 4)
Regime's Power| 1) Suppression of Opposition; |
| :--- |
| 2) Attacks and |
| Propaganda; |
| 3a) Public |
| Opposition; |
| 3b) Influence |
| of Radicals; 4) |
| Regime's Power |
a. Actors US Government Mubarak Egyptian Citizens Radicals
b. Main Goal(s) "Arab-Israeli
Peace; Preserve US Alliances with Arab States" Strong Regime to Ensure a Strong Egypt (and One Not Controlled by Radicals) Live in Relative Peace and Safety with Rights They Value Overthrow Mubarak; Counter US Influence; Undermine Israel
c. Indicator/Key Variable(s) to Watch Amount of Arab-Israeli Conflict; Amount of Egyptian Support for US Initiatives Regime's Power Quality of Public Services Regime's Power
d. Strategy to Influence Key Variable(s) Provide Aid to Mubarak to Secure His Support for a) US Initiatives and b) Arab Peace with Israel "Secure Power by Using US Aid to a) Provide Public Services and
b) Suppress
Dissension" Pressure Regime for Adequate Public Services "Retaliate against Mubarak to a)
Turn Public
Opinion against
Him and b)
Increase Their
Influence in Region"
e. Sequence of Variables Involved in Strategy "1) US Aid; 2)
Regime's Power;
3a) Egyptian
Support for US
Initiatives; 3b)
Arab-Israeli
Conflict" "1a) Quality of Public Services;
1b) Suppression of Opposition;
2) Public
Opposition; 3)
Regime's Power" "1) Public Opposition;
2) Quality of Public Services" "1) Suppression of Opposition;
2) Attacks and
Propaganda;
3a) Public
Opposition;
3b) Influence
of Radicals; 4)
Regime's Power"| a. Actors | US Government | Mubarak | Egyptian Citizens | Radicals |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| b. Main Goal(s) | Arab-Israeli <br> Peace; Preserve US Alliances with Arab States | Strong Regime to Ensure a Strong Egypt (and One Not Controlled by Radicals) | Live in Relative Peace and Safety with Rights They Value | Overthrow Mubarak; Counter US Influence; Undermine Israel |
| c. Indicator/Key Variable(s) to Watch | Amount of Arab-Israeli Conflict; Amount of Egyptian Support for US Initiatives | Regime's Power | Quality of Public Services | Regime's Power |
| d. Strategy to Influence Key Variable(s) | Provide Aid to Mubarak to Secure His Support for a) US Initiatives and b) Arab Peace with Israel | Secure Power by Using US Aid to a) Provide Public Services and <br> b) Suppress <br> Dissension | Pressure Regime for Adequate Public Services | Retaliate against Mubarak to a) <br> Turn Public <br> Opinion against <br> Him and b) <br> Increase Their <br> Influence in Region |
| e. Sequence of Variables Involved in Strategy | 1) US Aid; 2) <br> Regime's Power; <br> 3a) Egyptian <br> Support for US <br> Initiatives; 3b) <br> Arab-Israeli <br> Conflict | 1a) Quality of Public Services; <br> 1b) Suppression of Opposition; <br> 2) Public <br> Opposition; 3) <br> Regime's Power | 1) Public Opposition; <br> 2) Quality of Public Services | 1) Suppression of Opposition; <br> 2) Attacks and <br> Propaganda; <br> 3a) Public <br> Opposition; <br> 3b) Influence <br> of Radicals; 4) <br> Regime's Power |
The Agent:
The Client or a Competitor/
Adversary| The Agent: |
| :--- |
| The Client or a Competitor/ |
| Adversary |
政府
问题:可能产生的意外后果
The Problem:
Possible Unexpected Consequence| The Problem: |
| :--- |
| Possible Unexpected Consequence |
特定宗教或其他意识形态团体的复兴(抵抗力和韧性增长)
Revival (resistant and resilient growth) of a targeted
religious or other ideological group| Revival (resistant and resilient growth) of a targeted |
| :--- |
| religious or other ideological group |
第一步:当前或稍后出现的问题及其后果
Step 1:
Current or Later Time of Problem
with the Consequence| Step 1: |
| :--- |
| Current or Later Time of Problem |
| with the Consequence |
现在
步骤 2:问题发生前无后果的早期时间
Step 2:
Earlier Time before Problem
without the Consequence| Step 2: |
| :--- |
| Earlier Time before Problem |
| without the Consequence |
10 years ago
步骤 3:转变:后期背景(有效案例)与早期背景(无效案例)的区别
Step 3:
The Shift: How the Later
Background (Cases with
Effect) Differs from the Earlier
Background (Cases without Effect)| Step 3: |
| :--- |
| The Shift: How the Later |
| Background (Cases with |
| Effect) Differs from the Earlier |
| Background (Cases without Effect) |
"Government pressure "confirms" group's predictions
*Neup's ideology includes its "targeted" status
about the world
"Members who are targeted by government pressure
"prove" their allegiance to the group| "Government pressure "confirms" group's predictions |
| :--- |
| *Neup's ideology includes its "targeted" status |
| about the world |
| "Members who are targeted by government pressure |
| "prove" their allegiance to the group |
步骤 4:代理行为促成向后期背景的转变
Step 4:
Agent's Actions Contributing to
the Shift to the Later Background| Step 4: |
| :--- |
| Agent's Actions Contributing to |
| the Shift to the Later Background |
政府施压该团体的工作改变了(实际上)成为其成员的意义
Government's work to pressure the group changes what
it means (practically) to be a member of it| Government's work to pressure the group changes what |
| :--- |
| it means (practically) to be a member of it |
第 5 步:合理原因?(即,如果未采取该行动,则效果很可能不太可能出现)
Step 5:
Plausible Cause? (i.e., if the action
had not been done, then the effect
would plausibly have been less
likely)| Step 5: |
| :--- |
| Plausible Cause? (i.e., if the action |
| had not been done, then the effect |
| would plausibly have been less |
| likely) |
是的
"The Agent:
The Client or a Competitor/
Adversary" Government
"The Problem:
Possible Unexpected Consequence" "Revival (resistant and resilient growth) of a targeted
religious or other ideological group"
"Step 1:
Current or Later Time of Problem
with the Consequence" Present
"Step 2:
Earlier Time before Problem
without the Consequence" 10 years ago
"Step 3:
The Shift: How the Later
Background (Cases with
Effect) Differs from the Earlier
Background (Cases without Effect)" ""Government pressure "confirms" group's predictions
*Neup's ideology includes its "targeted" status
about the world
"Members who are targeted by government pressure
"prove" their allegiance to the group"
"Step 4:
Agent's Actions Contributing to
the Shift to the Later Background" "Government's work to pressure the group changes what
it means (practically) to be a member of it"
"Step 5:
Plausible Cause? (i.e., if the action
had not been done, then the effect
would plausibly have been less
likely)" Yes| The Agent: <br> The Client or a Competitor/ <br> Adversary | Government |
| :--- | :--- |
| The Problem: <br> Possible Unexpected Consequence | Revival (resistant and resilient growth) of a targeted <br> religious or other ideological group |
| Step 1: <br> Current or Later Time of Problem <br> with the Consequence | Present |
| Step 2: <br> Earlier Time before Problem <br> without the Consequence | 10 years ago |
| Step 3: <br> The Shift: How the Later <br> Background (Cases with <br> Effect) Differs from the Earlier <br> Background (Cases without Effect) | "Government pressure "confirms" group's predictions <br> *Neup's ideology includes its "targeted" status <br> about the world <br> "Members who are targeted by government pressure <br> "prove" their allegiance to the group |
| Step 4: <br> Agent's Actions Contributing to <br> the Shift to the Later Background | Government's work to pressure the group changes what <br> it means (practically) to be a member of it |
| Step 5: <br> Plausible Cause? (i.e., if the action <br> had not been done, then the effect <br> would plausibly have been less <br> likely) | Yes |
The Agent:
The Client or a Competitor/
Adversary| The Agent: |
| :--- |
| The Client or a Competitor/ |
| Adversary |
美国及其西方盟国
问题:可能产生的意外后果
The Problem:
Possible Unexpected Consequence| The Problem: |
| :--- |
| Possible Unexpected Consequence |
“复兴的”俄罗斯:与美国/西方大国关系的恶化
"Resurgent" Russia: Deteriorating Relations with US/
Western Powers| "Resurgent" Russia: Deteriorating Relations with US/ |
| :--- |
| Western Powers |
第一步:当前或稍后出现的问题及其后果
Step 1:
Current or Later Time of Problem
with the Consequence| Step 1: |
| :--- |
| Current or Later Time of Problem |
| with the Consequence |
2000 年代末期+
步骤 2:问题发生前无后果的早期时间
Step 2:
Earlier Time before Problem
without the Consequence| Step 2: |
| :--- |
| Earlier Time before Problem |
| without the Consequence |
20 世纪 90 年代初
步骤 3:转变:后期背景(有效案例)与早期背景(无效案例)的区别
Step 3:
The Shift: How the Later
Background (Cases with
Effect) Differs from the Earlier
Background (Cases without Effect)| Step 3: |
| :--- |
| The Shift: How the Later |
| Background (Cases with |
| Effect) Differs from the Earlier |
| Background (Cases without Effect) |
*美国/北约/欧盟与前苏联国家的联系 *美国/西方在中东的行动
*US/NATO/EU connections with former Soviet states
*US/Western action in Middle East| *US/NATO/EU connections with former Soviet states |
| :--- |
| *US/Western action in Middle East |
步骤 4:代理行为促成向后期背景的转变
Step 4:
Agent's Actions Contributing to
the Shift to the Later Background| Step 4: |
| :--- |
| Agent's Actions Contributing to |
| the Shift to the Later Background |
US/NATO/EU effort to encourage post-Soviet states to
have democracy, free markets, strong military ties with
the West (some even NATO membership)| US/NATO/EU effort to encourage post-Soviet states to |
| :--- |
| have democracy, free markets, strong military ties with |
| the West (some even NATO membership) |
第 5 步:合理原因?(即,如果未采取该行动,则效果很可能不太可能出现)
Step 5:
Plausible Cause? (i.e., if the
action had not been done, then
the effect would plausibly have
been less likely)| Step 5: |
| :--- |
| Plausible Cause? (i.e., if the |
| action had not been done, then |
| the effect would plausibly have |
| been less likely) |
是的
"The Agent:
The Client or a Competitor/
Adversary" US and Allied Western Powers
"The Problem:
Possible Unexpected Consequence" ""Resurgent" Russia: Deteriorating Relations with US/
Western Powers"
"Step 1:
Current or Later Time of Problem
with the Consequence" Late 2000s+
"Step 2:
Earlier Time before Problem
without the Consequence" Early 1990s
"Step 3:
The Shift: How the Later
Background (Cases with
Effect) Differs from the Earlier
Background (Cases without Effect)" "*US/NATO/EU connections with former Soviet states
*US/Western action in Middle East"
"Step 4:
Agent's Actions Contributing to
the Shift to the Later Background" "US/NATO/EU effort to encourage post-Soviet states to
have democracy, free markets, strong military ties with
the West (some even NATO membership)"
"Step 5:
Plausible Cause? (i.e., if the
action had not been done, then
the effect would plausibly have
been less likely)" Yes| The Agent: <br> The Client or a Competitor/ <br> Adversary | US and Allied Western Powers |
| :--- | :--- |
| The Problem: <br> Possible Unexpected Consequence | "Resurgent" Russia: Deteriorating Relations with US/ <br> Western Powers |
| Step 1: <br> Current or Later Time of Problem <br> with the Consequence | Late 2000s+ |
| Step 2: <br> Earlier Time before Problem <br> without the Consequence | Early 1990s |
| Step 3: <br> The Shift: How the Later <br> Background (Cases with <br> Effect) Differs from the Earlier <br> Background (Cases without Effect) | *US/NATO/EU connections with former Soviet states <br> *US/Western action in Middle East |
| Step 4: <br> Agent's Actions Contributing to <br> the Shift to the Later Background | US/NATO/EU effort to encourage post-Soviet states to <br> have democracy, free markets, strong military ties with <br> the West (some even NATO membership) |
| Step 5: <br> Plausible Cause? (i.e., if the <br> action had not been done, then <br> the effect would plausibly have <br> been less likely) | Yes |
第八部分
情报分析师的未来探索理论
关于“何时何地可能发生变化?”的推理范式
22
重要的现有未来探索方法
预测、大趋势和情景范式
摘要
在回答情报分析问题时,涉及四种相互交织的推理类型:假设发展(发生了什么)、因果分析(为什么会发生)、未来探索(何时何地可能发生变化)以及战略评估(客户如何应对 iti t )。对于分析师而言,理想的推理描述应包括对这四方面的合理方法。然而,这些领域不仅对情报分析师具有吸引力,也在其他背景下成为广泛研究的焦点。但并非所有分析师都熟悉这些其他可用的描述,或了解它们背后的假设。因此,本章探讨了未来探索的三种主要现有方法:预测范式、大趋势范式和情景范式。与本书类似章节一样,接下来的内容并非旨在全面详尽地阐述这三种观点。 相反,它旨在为分析人员提供一个概览,以增进对其的整体熟悉度,激发更广泛的辩论和讨论,并(最终)突显他们对另一种叙述的贡献,该叙述以情报分析的具体挑战为重点。
Forecasting
Projecting the Most
Probable Specific
Outcome according
to Stable, Rule-
Governed Patterns| Forecasting |
| :--- |
| Projecting the Most |
| Probable Specific |
| Outcome according |
| to Stable, Rule- |
| Governed Patterns |
大趋势 根据其潜力和发展状态预测最可能的总体模式
Megatrend
Projecting the Most
Probable General
Pattern according
to Its Potential
and State of
Development| Megatrend |
| :---: |
| Projecting the Most |
| Probable General |
| Pattern according |
| to Its Potential |
| and State of |
| Development |
情景发展 可能结果的合理性
Scenario
Aeveloping Plausible
of Outcomes| Scenario |
| :---: |
| Aeveloping Plausible |
| of Outcomes |
描述方法的摘要
Summary That
Describes the
Approach| Summary That |
| :--- |
| Describes the |
| Approach |
Futures Exploration
is finding
identifiable, formally
representable, and
stable patterns
within something's
historical behavior to
infer its likely future| Futures Exploration |
| :--- |
| is finding |
| identifiable, formally |
| representable, and |
| stable patterns |
| within something's |
| historical behavior to |
| infer its likely future |
未来探索旨在发现具有足够潜力和影响力的相似趋势群体,以显著影响未来
Futures Exploration
is finding groups of
similar trends with
enough potential
in their strength
and scope to
influence the future
significantly| Futures Exploration |
| :--- |
| is finding groups of |
| similar trends with |
| enough potential |
| in their strength |
| and scope to |
| influence the future |
| significantly |
未来探索是寻找影响结果的最关键力量/趋势,并考虑它们可能的发展方向及可能产生的结果
Futures Exploration
is finding the most
critical forces/
trends influencing
an outcome and
considering the ways
they could go and
the possibilities that
might result| Futures Exploration |
| :--- |
| is finding the most |
| critical forces/ |
| trends influencing |
| an outcome and |
| considering the ways |
| they could go and |
| the possibilities that |
| might result |
驱动方法的情感
Sensibility That
Drives the Approach| Sensibility That |
| :--- |
| Drives the Approach |
自信:将未来探索的目标视为最不确定的因素(通常也最不依赖人类决策的影响)
Confident:
Sees targets of
Futures Exploration
as least uncertain
(and usually the
least dependent on
influence of human
decision making)| Confident: |
| :--- |
| Sees targets of |
| Futures Exploration |
| as least uncertain |
| (and usually the |
| least dependent on |
| influence of human |
| decision making) |
Moderate:
Sees targets of
Futures Exploration
as somewhat
uncertain (and
usually somewhat
dependent on
human decision
making)| Moderate: |
| :--- |
| Sees targets of |
| Futures Exploration |
| as somewhat |
| uncertain (and |
| usually somewhat |
| dependent on |
| human decision |
| making) |
Scenario,Aeveloping Plausible,of Outcomes
Summary That,Describes the,Approach
Futures Exploration,is finding,identifiable, formally,representable, and,stable patterns,within something's,historical behavior to,infer its likely future
Futures Exploration,is finding groups of,similar trends with,enough potential,in their strength,and scope to,influence the future,significantly
Futures Exploration,is finding the most,critical forces/,trends influencing,an outcome and,considering the ways,they could go and,the possibilities that,might result
Sensibility That,Drives the Approach
Confident:,Sees targets of,Futures Exploration,as least uncertain,(and usually the,least dependent on,influence of human,decision making)
Moderate:,Sees targets of,Futures Exploration,as somewhat,uncertain (and,usually somewhat,dependent on,human decision,making)| Scenario <br> Aeveloping Plausible <br> of Outcomes |
| :---: |
| Summary That <br> Describes the <br> Approach |
| Futures Exploration <br> is finding <br> identifiable, formally <br> representable, and <br> stable patterns <br> within something's <br> historical behavior to <br> infer its likely future |
| Futures Exploration <br> is finding groups of <br> similar trends with <br> enough potential <br> in their strength <br> and scope to <br> influence the future <br> significantly |
| Futures Exploration <br> is finding the most <br> critical forces/ <br> trends influencing <br> an outcome and <br> considering the ways <br> they could go and <br> the possibilities that <br> might result |
| Sensibility That <br> Drives the Approach |
| Confident: <br> Sees targets of <br> Futures Exploration <br> as least uncertain <br> (and usually the <br> least dependent on <br> influence of human <br> decision making) |
| Moderate: <br> Sees targets of <br> Futures Exploration <br> as somewhat <br> uncertain (and <br> usually somewhat <br> dependent on <br> human decision <br> making) |
怀疑者:认为未来探索的目标最为不确定(通常也最依赖于人类决策的影响)
Skeptical:
Sees targets of
Futures Exploration
as most uncertain
(and usually ye
most dependent on
influence of human
decision making)| Skeptical: |
| :--- |
| Sees targets of |
| Futures Exploration |
| as most uncertain |
| (and usually ye |
| most dependent on |
| influence of human |
| decision making) |
定义方法的主题
Subject That Defines
the Approach| Subject That Defines |
| :--- |
| the Approach |
规律性:某一类型事件的既定频率
Regularities:
An established
frequency of a type
of event| Regularities: |
| :--- |
| An established |
| frequency of a type |
| of event |
大趋势:并非孤立的单一趋势,而是相似趋势与关系的一般集合
Megatrends:
Not isolated singular
trends, but general
sets of similar trends
and relationships| Megatrends: |
| :--- |
| Not isolated singular |
| trends, but general |
| sets of similar trends |
| and relationships |
情景:一种或多种因果力量(或趋势)在特定情况下可能演变的潜在方式
Scenario:
A possible way that
one or more causal
forces (or trends)
could evolve ina a
specific situation| Scenario: |
| :--- |
| A possible way that |
| one or more causal |
| forces (or trends) |
| could evolve ina a |
| specific situation |
指导方法的标准
Standard That
Directs the
Approach| Standard That |
| :--- |
| Directs the |
| Approach |
特定结果的概率
Probability of
Specific Outcomes| Probability of |
| :--- |
| Specific Outcomes |
一般模式的概率
Probability of
General Patterns| Probability of |
| :--- |
| General Patterns |
特定结果的合理性
Plausibility of
Specific Outcomes| Plausibility of |
| :--- |
| Specific Outcomes |
源自该方法的重大理念
Significant Idea That
Derives from the
Approach| Significant Idea That |
| :--- |
| Derives from the |
| Approach |
未来探索应强调作为因果分析的延伸
Futures Exploration
should emphasize
being an extension
of Causal Analysis| Futures Exploration |
| :--- |
| should emphasize |
| being an extension |
| of Causal Analysis |
未来探索应强调一般模式的更广泛影响
Futures Exploration
should emphasize
broader implications
of general patterns| Futures Exploration |
| :--- |
| should emphasize |
| broader implications |
| of general patterns |
"Forecasting
Projecting the Most
Probable Specific
Outcome according
to Stable, Rule-
Governed Patterns" "Megatrend
Projecting the Most
Probable General
Pattern according
to Its Potential
and State of
Development" "Scenario,Aeveloping Plausible,of Outcomes
Summary That,Describes the,Approach
Futures Exploration,is finding,identifiable, formally,representable, and,stable patterns,within something's,historical behavior to,infer its likely future
Futures Exploration,is finding groups of,similar trends with,enough potential,in their strength,and scope to,influence the future,significantly
Futures Exploration,is finding the most,critical forces/,trends influencing,an outcome and,considering the ways,they could go and,the possibilities that,might result
Sensibility That,Drives the Approach
Confident:,Sees targets of,Futures Exploration,as least uncertain,(and usually the,least dependent on,influence of human,decision making)
Moderate:,Sees targets of,Futures Exploration,as somewhat,uncertain (and,usually somewhat,dependent on,human decision,making)""Skeptical:
Sees targets of
Futures Exploration
as most uncertain
(and usually ye
most dependent on
influence of human
decision making)"
"Subject That Defines
the Approach" "Regularities:
An established
frequency of a type
of event" "Megatrends:
Not isolated singular
trends, but general
sets of similar trends
and relationships" "Scenario:
A possible way that
one or more causal
forces (or trends)
could evolve ina a
specific situation"
"Standard That
Directs the
Approach" "Probability of
Specific Outcomes" "Probability of
General Patterns" "Plausibility of
Specific Outcomes"
"Significant Idea That
Derives from the
Approach" "Futures Exploration
should emphasize
being an extension
of Causal Analysis" "Futures Exploration
should emphasize
broader implications
of general patterns" "Futures Exploration
should emphasize
well-developed
alternatives"| | Forecasting <br> Projecting the Most <br> Probable Specific <br> Outcome according <br> to Stable, Rule- <br> Governed Patterns | Megatrend <br> Projecting the Most <br> Probable General <br> Pattern according <br> to Its Potential <br> and State of <br> Development | Scenario <br> Aeveloping Plausible <br> of Outcomes <br> Summary That <br> Describes the <br> Approach <br> Futures Exploration <br> is finding <br> identifiable, formally <br> representable, and <br> stable patterns <br> within something's <br> historical behavior to <br> infer its likely future <br> Futures Exploration <br> is finding groups of <br> similar trends with <br> enough potential <br> in their strength <br> and scope to <br> influence the future <br> significantly <br> Futures Exploration <br> is finding the most <br> critical forces/ <br> trends influencing <br> an outcome and <br> considering the ways <br> they could go and <br> the possibilities that <br> might result <br> Sensibility That <br> Drives the Approach <br> Confident: <br> Sees targets of <br> Futures Exploration <br> as least uncertain <br> (and usually the <br> least dependent on <br> influence of human <br> decision making) <br> Moderate: <br> Sees targets of <br> Futures Exploration <br> as somewhat <br> uncertain (and <br> usually somewhat <br> dependent on <br> human decision <br> making)Skeptical: <br> Sees targets of <br> Futures Exploration <br> as most uncertain <br> (and usually ye <br> most dependent on <br> influence of human <br> decision making) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Subject That Defines <br> the Approach | Regularities: <br> An established <br> frequency of a type <br> of event | Megatrends: <br> Not isolated singular <br> trends, but general <br> sets of similar trends <br> and relationships | Scenario: <br> A possible way that <br> one or more causal <br> forces (or trends) <br> could evolve ina a <br> specific situation |
| Standard That <br> Directs the <br> Approach | Probability of <br> Specific Outcomes | Probability of <br> General Patterns | Plausibility of <br> Specific Outcomes |
| Significant Idea That <br> Derives from the <br> Approach | Futures Exploration <br> should emphasize <br> being an extension <br> of Causal Analysis | Futures Exploration <br> should emphasize <br> broader implications <br> of general patterns | Futures Exploration <br> should emphasize <br> well-developed <br> alternatives |
虽然未来探索在分析师推理中经常扮演直接角色,但它也常发挥间接作用。间接的未来探索问题本身并非未来问题,却预设了它们的答案。例如,“如何削弱拉丁美洲毒品卡特尔的政治影响力?”、“伊拉克入侵后如何维持地区稳定?”以及“阿富汗政府如何为联军撤离做最佳准备?”这些问题本身并不具备“这一变化可能在何时何地发生?”的形式,但解答它们仍需考虑不同的未来情景。也就是说,要理解不应对拉丁美洲毒品卡特尔政治影响力的潜在风险,人们可能会思考它们如何推动国家成为事实上的毒品国家。同样,为了在伊拉克入侵后促进地区稳定,必须评估其更广泛的区域影响。而为联军撤离阿富汗做准备,则需考虑其可能带来的后果。 更一般地说,任何形式为“客户如何应对 ItI t ?”的战略评估问题,都将基于对他们可能应对的未来“它”的评估。在某些情况下,这种分析可能已经完成,但如果没有,那么未来探索在分析师推理中就扮演着关键的间接角色:为战略评估奠定基础。
多维未来探索方法也可以被理解为一种反事实叙述。所谓“反事实”,是一种条件式(“如果……那么……”)陈述,它将“与已知事实相反”的特定替代可能性与使用“可能”或“将会”提出的结果联系起来(例如,“如果国家 XX 获得了核武器,那么他们很可能会对 YY 国使用。”)。反事实既可以考虑过去的替代可能性(即未发生但本可能发生的事情),也可以考虑未来的替代可能性(即预计不会发生但可能发生的事情)。许多人熟悉指向过去的反事实概念,如“另类”历史或政治学思想实验(例如,探讨“如果希特勒遵守了与苏联的条约,会怎样”)。
斯大林在二战期间?”)或心理学和咨询领域(例如,询问某人“如果你在生活中做出了不同的选择会怎样?”)。然而,对这些条件句还有另一种解释,这种解释在文艺复兴时期流行,并探讨了“自由的假设性情境”,评估了某人可能做出的未来选择的后果。这种方法在十六世纪耶稣会修士路易斯·德·莫利纳(Luis de Molina)关于神圣预知的论述中最为突出,他认为上帝通过了解所有真实的未来指向的假设性情境来知晓未来。虽然这在哲学神学中的效用是另一个有争议的话题,但用它来支持人类“预知”的论述在这里特别有用。这一点莫利纳本人并未探讨,但由该作者在其他地方发展,他提出,过去指向的假设性推理的有用规范性模型(如何证明这些主张)将与未来指向的假设性推理的可行规范性模型具有相同的结构。 ^(1){ }^{1}
未来导向的反事实推理代表了一种统一的未来探索方法,它同等重视其所有维度(即起源、影响范围和结果)。该方法从“开始到结束”评估一个特定的可能未来变化,包括其原因、背景和后果。其结果是确立关于“与预期事实相反”的可能性后果的具体主张。这些未来的反事实陈述形式为“如果未来变化 XX 发生,那么 YY 可能会随之而来”或“如果未来变化 XX 发生,那么 YY 很可能会随之而来”。该方法不仅探讨未来变化可能如何发生,还探讨未来变化可能如何引发更广泛的不确定性(及意外后果),以及该未来变化可能带来的后果。在从当前相关力量的因果分析(“给定”:相关因果因素)开始的背景下,首先评估该可能性最可能发生的方式(“如果”:起源维度)。例如,不能简单地假设知道一个盟国如何可能遭遇不稳定。 首先,必须评估这种情况最可能发生的方式。其次,不能简单地将对未来可能性的估计与其他评估结果直接结合。相反,分析师需要评估,在更广泛的背景下,当这种未来可能性与其他因果力量相结合时,可能会产生哪些更广泛的后果(即“AND”:影响维度)。不稳定如何不仅影响盟国,还会波及更广泛的世界?再次,不能仅仅识别在这一未来中看似可能发生的一两件事。相反,必须评估哪些结果很可能会出现,哪些结果可能合理跟随(即“THEN”:结果维度)。从不稳定性中可能衍生出的全部相关结果有哪些?
Causes of Possible Future
Changes| Causes of Possible Future |
| :--- |
| Changes |
未来可能变化的背景
Context of Possible Future
Changes| Context of Possible Future |
| :--- |
| Changes |
未来可能变化的后果
Consequences of Possible
Future Changes| Consequences of Possible |
| :--- |
| Future Changes |
询问“这种变化可能在何时何地合理发生?”
Asks "When and Where
Might This Change Plausibly
Come About?"| Asks "When and Where |
| :--- |
| Might This Change Plausibly |
| Come About?" |
询问“这种变化何时何地可能引发更广泛的不确定性(及意外后果)?”
Asks "When and Where
Might This Change Cause
Broader Uncertainties
(and Unintended
Consequences)?"| Asks "When and Where |
| :--- |
| Might This Change Cause |
| Broader Uncertainties |
| (and Unintended |
| Consequences)?" |
询问“这种变化何时何地可能产生长期影响?”
Asks "When and Where
Might This Change Have
Long-Term Impact?"| Asks "When and Where |
| :--- |
| Might This Change Have |
| Long-Term Impact?" |
发现未来可能性成为现实的最合理方式
Discovers the Most Plausible
Way a Future Possibility
Might Come to Be| Discovers the Most Plausible |
| :--- |
| Way a Future Possibility |
| Might Come to Be |
在更广泛的背景下发现未来可能性的更广泛(意外)后果
Discovers the Broader
(Unintended) Consequences
of a Future Possibility in the
Larger Context| Discovers the Broader |
| :--- |
| (Unintended) Consequences |
| of a Future Possibility in the |
| Larger Context |
探索未来可能性中合理(且可能)的后续发展
Discovers What Might
Plausibly (and Would
Probably) Follow from the
Future Possibility| Discovers What Might |
| :--- |
| Plausibly (and Would |
| Probably) Follow from the |
| Future Possibility |
叙事开始
叙事中部
叙事结束
最少先决知识;认识论上悲观的
Least Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Pessimistic| Least Prerequisite |
| :--- |
| Knowledge; |
| Epistemologically Pessimistic |
Most Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Optimistic| Most Prerequisite |
| :--- |
| Knowledge; |
| Epistemologically Optimistic |
由收敛场景开发方法强调
Emphasized by Convergent
Scenario Development
Method| Emphasized by Convergent |
| :--- |
| Scenario Development |
| Method |
通过 Ripple Effect Analysis Method 强调
Emphasized by Ripple Effect
Analysis Method| Emphasized by Ripple Effect |
| :--- |
| Analysis Method |
通过 Divergent Scenario Development Method 强调
Emphasized by Divergent
Scenario Development
Method| Emphasized by Divergent |
| :--- |
| Scenario Development |
| Method |
在面向未来的反事实推理下统一(作为阶段 I、II 和 III)
Origin Dimension Outreach Dimension Outcome Dimension
"Causes of Possible Future
Changes" "Context of Possible Future
Changes" "Consequences of Possible
Future Changes"
"Asks "When and Where
Might This Change Plausibly
Come About?"" "Asks "When and Where
Might This Change Cause
Broader Uncertainties
(and Unintended
Consequences)?"" "Asks "When and Where
Might This Change Have
Long-Term Impact?""
"Discovers the Most Plausible
Way a Future Possibility
Might Come to Be" "Discovers the Broader
(Unintended) Consequences
of a Future Possibility in the
Larger Context" "Discovers What Might
Plausibly (and Would
Probably) Follow from the
Future Possibility"
Narrative Beginning Narrative Middle Narrative End
"Least Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Pessimistic" "In-Between Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Moderate" "Most Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Optimistic"
"Emphasized by Convergent
Scenario Development
Method" "Emphasized by Ripple Effect
Analysis Method" "Emphasized by Divergent
Scenario Development
Method"
Unified under Future-Directed Counterfactual Reasoning (as Stages I, II, and III) | Origin Dimension | Outreach Dimension | Outcome Dimension |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Causes of Possible Future <br> Changes | Context of Possible Future <br> Changes | Consequences of Possible <br> Future Changes |
| Asks "When and Where <br> Might This Change Plausibly <br> Come About?" | Asks "When and Where <br> Might This Change Cause <br> Broader Uncertainties <br> (and Unintended <br> Consequences)?" | Asks "When and Where <br> Might This Change Have <br> Long-Term Impact?" |
| Discovers the Most Plausible <br> Way a Future Possibility <br> Might Come to Be | Discovers the Broader <br> (Unintended) Consequences <br> of a Future Possibility in the <br> Larger Context | Discovers What Might <br> Plausibly (and Would <br> Probably) Follow from the <br> Future Possibility |
| Narrative Beginning | Narrative Middle | Narrative End |
| Least Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Pessimistic | In-Between Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Moderate | Most Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Optimistic |
| Emphasized by Convergent <br> Scenario Development <br> Method | Emphasized by Ripple Effect <br> Analysis Method | Emphasized by Divergent <br> Scenario Development <br> Method |
| Unified under Future-Directed Counterfactual Reasoning (as Stages I, II, and III) | | |
参见 Noel Hendrickson,《反事实推理:分析师、战略家和决策者的基本指南》(宾夕法尼亚州卡莱尔:陆军战争学院,2008 年),以及“应用反事实推理”,收录于 Newton Howard Smith 和 Ammar Quasatiby 编辑的《反恐中的数学模型》(纽约:Springer,2009 年),第 249-262 页。
参见 CIA,分析局,《分析技巧入门:改进情报分析的结构化分析技术》(CIA:谢尔曼·肯特学院,2005 年);Randolph H. Pherson,《分析工具与技术手册》(Pherson Associates,2008 年);Richards J. Heuer Jr. 和 Randy Pherson,《情报分析的结构化分析技术》(千橡市,CA:CQ 出版社,2010 年)。请注意,尽管目的相似,但最终为“收敛性情景开发”提供的步骤与这些方法有显著不同(参见第 24 章的讨论)。
1. The Need to Maintain US Trade and Aid:
The US is a major Latin American trading
partner and source of foreign aid, which both
provide strong external incentive for countries
to fight against the drug trade.| 1. The Need to Maintain US Trade and Aid: |
| :--- |
| The US is a major Latin American trading |
| partner and source of foreign aid, which both |
| provide strong external incentive for countries |
| to fight against the drug trade. |
1. Drug Money Can "Do Lots of Good":
There is an enormous amount of money
generated by drug trafficking that goes into
the legitimate economy and that can be
(perceived to be) helping to improve it.| 1. Drug Money Can "Do Lots of Good": |
| :--- |
| There is an enormous amount of money |
| generated by drug trafficking that goes into |
| the legitimate economy and that can be |
| (perceived to be) helping to improve it. |
2. 公众对卡特尔的不满:公共暴力引发了对卡特尔的恐惧,通常也导致公众对他们的强烈不满。
2. Public Resentment of the Cartels: The
public violence creates fear of the cartels,
and usually strong public resentment of them.| 2. Public Resentment of the Cartels: The |
| :--- |
| public violence creates fear of the cartels, |
| and usually strong public resentment of them. |
2. 缺乏可行的替代方案:拉丁美洲农业多年来一直在衰退,财富分配的平等性较低。
2. Lack of Viable Alternatives: Latin American
agricultural industries have been declining
for many years, and the equality of wealth
distribution is low.| 2. Lack of Viable Alternatives: Latin American |
| :--- |
| agricultural industries have been declining |
| for many years, and the equality of wealth |
| distribution is low. |
3. Opposition from the Roman Catholic
Church: Latin America is dominantly
Catholic, which provides another major
international external push against the drug
trade.| 3. Opposition from the Roman Catholic |
| :--- |
| Church: Latin America is dominantly |
| Catholic, which provides another major |
| international external push against the drug |
| trade. |
3. Drug Trafficking Need Not "Hurt" the
Public: Theoretically, there is a distinction
between the violence of the government vs.
cartels, or cartels vs. cartels, and violence
directly against everyday citizens and
businesses.| 3. Drug Trafficking Need Not "Hurt" the |
| :--- |
| Public: Theoretically, there is a distinction |
| between the violence of the government vs. |
| cartels, or cartels vs. cartels, and violence |
| directly against everyday citizens and |
| businesses. |
1: Rise of the EU and BRIC Countries: US becomes a less significant source of trade and aid
relative to the EU, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (Weakens Need to Maintain US Trade and
Aid).| 1: Rise of the EU and BRIC Countries: US becomes a less significant source of trade and aid |
| :--- |
| relative to the EU, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (Weakens Need to Maintain US Trade and |
| Aid). |
2: Rise in Anti-Americanism: Public interprets violence as something from the "War on Drugs"
that the US imposes on the Latin American governments; cartels become almost "antiheroes"
(Weakens Public Resentment of Cartels).| 2: Rise in Anti-Americanism: Public interprets violence as something from the "War on Drugs" |
| :--- |
| that the US imposes on the Latin American governments; cartels become almost "antiheroes" |
| (Weakens Public Resentment of Cartels). |
3: Decline in Catholicism: Roman Catholicism's slow decline accelerates as its followers
splinter quickly without being replaced by anything as internationally unified and strong
(Weakens Opposition from Roman Catholic Church).| 3: Decline in Catholicism: Roman Catholicism's slow decline accelerates as its followers |
| :--- |
| splinter quickly without being replaced by anything as internationally unified and strong |
| (Weakens Opposition from Roman Catholic Church). |
4: Economic Boom: Drug trafficking money makes its way more into the general Latin
American economy and becomes part of a very substantial economic boom (Strengthens
Drug Money Can "Do Lots of Good"; Lack of Viable Alternatives).| 4: Economic Boom: Drug trafficking money makes its way more into the general Latin |
| :--- |
| American economy and becomes part of a very substantial economic boom (Strengthens |
| Drug Money Can "Do Lots of Good"; Lack of Viable Alternatives). |
5: 暴力失控:暴力可能失去控制(强化毒品交易不必“伤害”公众)。
5: Overwhelmed by Violence: Violence could spiral out of control (Strengthens Drug
Trafficking Need Not "Hurt" the Public).| 5: Overwhelmed by Violence: Violence could spiral out of control (Strengthens Drug |
| :--- |
| Trafficking Need Not "Hurt" the Public). |
第 4 步:推导潜在背景故事
首次收敛情景 反美情绪上升与暴力失控
First Convergent Scenario
Rise in Anti-Americanism and
Overwhelmed by Violence| First Convergent Scenario |
| :--- |
| Rise in Anti-Americanism and |
| Overwhelmed by Violence |
第二融合情景:经济繁荣
Second Convergent Scenario:
Economic Boom| Second Convergent Scenario: |
| :--- |
| Economic Boom |
第三次趋同情景:欧盟和金砖国家崛起与天主教的衰落
Third Convergent Scenario
Rise of the EU and BRIC
Countries and Decline in
Catholicism| Third Convergent Scenario |
| :--- |
| Rise of the EU and BRIC |
| Countries and Decline in |
| Catholicism |
Step 1: What Is Working Against It: Step 2: What Is Working For It:
"1. The Need to Maintain US Trade and Aid:
The US is a major Latin American trading
partner and source of foreign aid, which both
provide strong external incentive for countries
to fight against the drug trade." "1. Drug Money Can "Do Lots of Good":
There is an enormous amount of money
generated by drug trafficking that goes into
the legitimate economy and that can be
(perceived to be) helping to improve it."
"2. Public Resentment of the Cartels: The
public violence creates fear of the cartels,
and usually strong public resentment of them." "2. Lack of Viable Alternatives: Latin American
agricultural industries have been declining
for many years, and the equality of wealth
distribution is low."
"3. Opposition from the Roman Catholic
Church: Latin America is dominantly
Catholic, which provides another major
international external push against the drug
trade." "3. Drug Trafficking Need Not "Hurt" the
Public: Theoretically, there is a distinction
between the violence of the government vs.
cartels, or cartels vs. cartels, and violence
directly against everyday citizens and
businesses."
Step 3: How It Could Change: Possible Triggering Events
"1: Rise of the EU and BRIC Countries: US becomes a less significant source of trade and aid
relative to the EU, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (Weakens Need to Maintain US Trade and
Aid)."
"2: Rise in Anti-Americanism: Public interprets violence as something from the "War on Drugs"
that the US imposes on the Latin American governments; cartels become almost "antiheroes"
(Weakens Public Resentment of Cartels)."
"3: Decline in Catholicism: Roman Catholicism's slow decline accelerates as its followers
splinter quickly without being replaced by anything as internationally unified and strong
(Weakens Opposition from Roman Catholic Church)."
"4: Economic Boom: Drug trafficking money makes its way more into the general Latin
American economy and becomes part of a very substantial economic boom (Strengthens
Drug Money Can "Do Lots of Good"; Lack of Viable Alternatives)."
"5: Overwhelmed by Violence: Violence could spiral out of control (Strengthens Drug
Trafficking Need Not "Hurt" the Public)."
Step 4: Derive Potential Backstories "First Convergent Scenario
Rise in Anti-Americanism and
Overwhelmed by Violence"
"Second Convergent Scenario:
Economic Boom" "Third Convergent Scenario
Rise of the EU and BRIC
Countries and Decline in
Catholicism"| Step 1: What Is Working Against It: | Step 2: What Is Working For It: |
| :--- | :--- |
| 1. The Need to Maintain US Trade and Aid: <br> The US is a major Latin American trading <br> partner and source of foreign aid, which both <br> provide strong external incentive for countries <br> to fight against the drug trade. | 1. Drug Money Can "Do Lots of Good": <br> There is an enormous amount of money <br> generated by drug trafficking that goes into <br> the legitimate economy and that can be <br> (perceived to be) helping to improve it. |
| 2. Public Resentment of the Cartels: The <br> public violence creates fear of the cartels, <br> and usually strong public resentment of them. | 2. Lack of Viable Alternatives: Latin American <br> agricultural industries have been declining <br> for many years, and the equality of wealth <br> distribution is low. |
| 3. Opposition from the Roman Catholic <br> Church: Latin America is dominantly <br> Catholic, which provides another major <br> international external push against the drug <br> trade. | 3. Drug Trafficking Need Not "Hurt" the <br> Public: Theoretically, there is a distinction <br> between the violence of the government vs. <br> cartels, or cartels vs. cartels, and violence <br> directly against everyday citizens and <br> businesses. |
| Step 3: How It Could Change: Possible Triggering Events | |
| 1: Rise of the EU and BRIC Countries: US becomes a less significant source of trade and aid <br> relative to the EU, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (Weakens Need to Maintain US Trade and <br> Aid). | |
| 2: Rise in Anti-Americanism: Public interprets violence as something from the "War on Drugs" <br> that the US imposes on the Latin American governments; cartels become almost "antiheroes" <br> (Weakens Public Resentment of Cartels). | |
| 3: Decline in Catholicism: Roman Catholicism's slow decline accelerates as its followers <br> splinter quickly without being replaced by anything as internationally unified and strong <br> (Weakens Opposition from Roman Catholic Church). | |
| 4: Economic Boom: Drug trafficking money makes its way more into the general Latin <br> American economy and becomes part of a very substantial economic boom (Strengthens <br> Drug Money Can "Do Lots of Good"; Lack of Viable Alternatives). | |
| 5: Overwhelmed by Violence: Violence could spiral out of control (Strengthens Drug <br> Trafficking Need Not "Hurt" the Public). | |
| Step 4: Derive Potential Backstories | First Convergent Scenario <br> Rise in Anti-Americanism and <br> Overwhelmed by Violence |
| Second Convergent Scenario: <br> Economic Boom | Third Convergent Scenario <br> Rise of the EU and BRIC <br> Countries and Decline in <br> Catholicism |
表 24.2 提供了一些示例,展示了这些场景下相关叙述可能的样子。
表 24.2 收敛式情景开发叙事示例
第一次趋同情景:“投降” 反美情绪高涨与暴力失控
First Convergent Scenario:
"Capitulation"
Rise in Anti-
Americanism and Overwhelmed by Violence| First Convergent Scenario: |
| :--- |
| "Capitulation" |
| Rise in Anti- |
| Americanism and Overwhelmed by Violence |
第二种趋同情景:“腐败”经济繁荣
Second Convergent Scenario:
"Corruption"
Economic Boom| Second Convergent Scenario: |
| :--- |
| "Corruption" |
| Economic Boom |
第三种趋同情景:“妥协”欧盟与金砖国家崛起与天主教衰落
Third Convergent Scenario:
"Compromise" Rise of the EU and BRIC Countries and Decline in Catholicism| Third Convergent Scenario: |
| :--- |
| "Compromise" Rise of the EU and BRIC Countries and Decline in Catholicism |
"First Convergent Scenario:
"Capitulation"
Rise in Anti-
Americanism and Overwhelmed by Violence" "Second Convergent Scenario:
"Corruption"
Economic Boom" "Third Convergent Scenario:
"Compromise" Rise of the EU and BRIC Countries and Decline in Catholicism"
"Beginning": How the Main Factors (Start to) Change The US continues as a top trading partner, experiences high demand for narcotics, and pressures LATAM governments to fight drug trafficking. LATAM financial sector improves and becomes a desirable business location for US companies, which increases pressure to fight traffickers. Unfortunately, the increase leads to (Triggering Event) even greater violence as strong cartels fight other cartels that have been weakened by the government, then absorb their infrastructure, and become stronger and emboldened to fight harder. Many LATAM governments continue the "War on Drugs," but cartels continue to pump their profits into associated LATAM economies, and the financial sector experiences continued growth. With few alternatives, politicians try to encourage the "bright spots" through fewer regulations and interference, which enables more drug money to enter it. Governments assuage US concerns by moving against select leaders among traffickers. This leads to (Triggering Event) a full-blown financial market boom that ripples through the region. The LATAM financial sector and general economy continues to improve. Despite anticorruption attempts, drug money continues into the legitimate economy. General culture becomes less sensitized and demographic changes help (Triggering Event) the Roman Catholic Church to lose ground to other religious groups, who fail to form the kind of unified voice that the Catholic Church once did.
""Middle": How
Those Changes Affect the Other Factors" Hopes of a better future are dashed by the massive increase in violence, and US aid only accelerates it further. The improved economy gives LATAM a greater sense of national pride. US becomes viewed more as a source of problems and anti- The LATAM public is swept up in the unprecedented economic boom and simply chooses not to pay attention to the increasing interconnections with drug traffickers. Drug violence decreases as most of the focus of the "War on Drugs" China, Brazil, and the EU see that their economic survival means they cannot allow the US to "monopolize" LATAM (Triggering Event) and become dramatically more invested to make the US (comparatively) less important than it once was. Their| | First Convergent Scenario: <br> "Capitulation" <br> Rise in Anti- <br> Americanism and Overwhelmed by Violence | Second Convergent Scenario: <br> "Corruption" <br> Economic Boom | Third Convergent Scenario: <br> "Compromise" Rise of the EU and BRIC Countries and Decline in Catholicism |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| "Beginning": How the Main Factors (Start to) Change | The US continues as a top trading partner, experiences high demand for narcotics, and pressures LATAM governments to fight drug trafficking. LATAM financial sector improves and becomes a desirable business location for US companies, which increases pressure to fight traffickers. Unfortunately, the increase leads to (Triggering Event) even greater violence as strong cartels fight other cartels that have been weakened by the government, then absorb their infrastructure, and become stronger and emboldened to fight harder. | Many LATAM governments continue the "War on Drugs," but cartels continue to pump their profits into associated LATAM economies, and the financial sector experiences continued growth. With few alternatives, politicians try to encourage the "bright spots" through fewer regulations and interference, which enables more drug money to enter it. Governments assuage US concerns by moving against select leaders among traffickers. This leads to (Triggering Event) a full-blown financial market boom that ripples through the region. | The LATAM financial sector and general economy continues to improve. Despite anticorruption attempts, drug money continues into the legitimate economy. General culture becomes less sensitized and demographic changes help (Triggering Event) the Roman Catholic Church to lose ground to other religious groups, who fail to form the kind of unified voice that the Catholic Church once did. |
| "Middle": How <br> Those Changes Affect the Other Factors | Hopes of a better future are dashed by the massive increase in violence, and US aid only accelerates it further. The improved economy gives LATAM a greater sense of national pride. US becomes viewed more as a source of problems and anti- | The LATAM public is swept up in the unprecedented economic boom and simply chooses not to pay attention to the increasing interconnections with drug traffickers. Drug violence decreases as most of the focus of the "War on Drugs" | China, Brazil, and the EU see that their economic survival means they cannot allow the US to "monopolize" LATAM (Triggering Event) and become dramatically more invested to make the US (comparatively) less important than it once was. Their |
moves to simply targeting specific leaders. With
LATAM's long history of modest toleration of political corruption, more politicians become indirectly supported by trafficking money, and some states move closer and closer to being de facto protectors of the drug trade.| moves to simply targeting specific leaders. With |
| :--- |
| LATAM's long history of modest toleration of political corruption, more politicians become indirectly supported by trafficking money, and some states move closer and closer to being de facto protectors of the drug trade. |
First Convergent Scenario: "Capitulation" Rise in AntiAmericanism and Overwhelmed by Violence Second Convergent Scenario: "Corruption" Economic Boom Third Convergent Scenario: "Compromise" Rise of the EU and BRIC Countries and Decline in Catholicism
Americanism rises. The public turns (Triggering Event) their resentment away from the cartels to the US as the real source of the problem and officials (out of selfpreservation) pull back from the "War on Drugs." Cartels work with local officials to prevent other types of crime, and countries forge more ties with them to put more resources into the economy. "moves to simply targeting specific leaders. With
LATAM's long history of modest toleration of political corruption, more politicians become indirectly supported by trafficking money, and some states move closer and closer to being de facto protectors of the drug trade." decreased emphasis on counternarcotics, combined with the importance of having LATAM be safe for international business, encourages the government not to incite further violence by striking out against the cartels.
"End": Plausible Consequences of the Changes As counternarcotics operations decrease and violence dies down, the public and politicians leave the cartels alone, who in turn do their best to avoid generating negative publicity through open violence. Ultimately, while there is no full official legitimatization of the drug trade, the legitimate and illicit economies become so interwoven that no one really bothers to try to separate them anymore. Some view the traffickers as a positive force, but most simply choose not to think about them at all. Willful ignorance becomes the "new normal." Over time, LATAM becomes much more neutral with respect to the drug trade. The public settles on the idea that the traffickers are "here to stay" and a kind of détente evolves. Each side only acts openly against each other when one goes beyond their current state. Officially they are still opposed and acted against when they "go too far," but practically they are protected from international intervention (at least in Latin America) and allowed to operate.| | First Convergent Scenario: "Capitulation" Rise in AntiAmericanism and Overwhelmed by Violence | Second Convergent Scenario: "Corruption" Economic Boom | Third Convergent Scenario: "Compromise" Rise of the EU and BRIC Countries and Decline in Catholicism |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| | Americanism rises. The public turns (Triggering Event) their resentment away from the cartels to the US as the real source of the problem and officials (out of selfpreservation) pull back from the "War on Drugs." Cartels work with local officials to prevent other types of crime, and countries forge more ties with them to put more resources into the economy. | moves to simply targeting specific leaders. With <br> LATAM's long history of modest toleration of political corruption, more politicians become indirectly supported by trafficking money, and some states move closer and closer to being de facto protectors of the drug trade. | decreased emphasis on counternarcotics, combined with the importance of having LATAM be safe for international business, encourages the government not to incite further violence by striking out against the cartels. |
| "End": Plausible Consequences of the Changes | As counternarcotics operations decrease and violence dies down, the public and politicians leave the cartels alone, who in turn do their best to avoid generating negative publicity through open violence. | Ultimately, while there is no full official legitimatization of the drug trade, the legitimate and illicit economies become so interwoven that no one really bothers to try to separate them anymore. Some view the traffickers as a positive force, but most simply choose not to think about them at all. Willful ignorance becomes the "new normal." | Over time, LATAM becomes much more neutral with respect to the drug trade. The public settles on the idea that the traffickers are "here to stay" and a kind of détente evolves. Each side only acts openly against each other when one goes beyond their current state. Officially they are still opposed and acted against when they "go too far," but practically they are protected from international intervention (at least in Latin America) and allowed to operate. |
First Convergent
Scenario:
"Capitulation"
Rise in Anti-
Americanism and
Overwhelmed
by Violence| First Convergent |
| :---: |
| Scenario: |
| "Capitulation" |
| Rise in Anti- |
| Americanism and |
| Overwhelmed |
| by Violence |
Third Convergent
Scenario:
Compromise"
Rise of the EU and
BRIC Countries
and Decline in
Catholicism| Third Convergent |
| :---: |
| Scenario: |
| Compromise" |
| Rise of the EU and |
| BRIC Countries |
| and Decline in |
| Catholicism |
初始概率:触发事件的可能性有多大?
Initial Probability:
How Close to Likely
Are the Triggering
Events?| Initial Probability: |
| :--- |
| How Close to Likely |
| Are the Triggering |
| Events? |
第二名
第三名
第一名
Unity:场景中有多少个触发事件?
Unity:
How Many
Triggering Events
Does the Scenario
Have?| Unity: |
| :--- |
| How Many |
| Triggering Events |
| Does the Scenario |
| Have? |
第二名(并列)
第一名
第二名(并列)
紧迫性:在情景中可能性发生的速度有多快?
Imminence:
How Quickly Does
the Possibility
Happen in the
Scenario?| Imminence: |
| :--- |
| How Quickly Does |
| the Possibility |
| Happen in the |
| Scenario? |
第一名
第二名
第三名
最终排名:综合考虑,该情景的总体可信度如何?
Final Rank: Overall
How Plausible Is the
Scenario (All Things
Considered)?| Final Rank: Overall |
| :--- |
| How Plausible Is the |
| Scenario (All Things |
| Considered)? |
第二名
第三名
第一名
"First Convergent
Scenario:
"Capitulation"
Rise in Anti-
Americanism and
Overwhelmed
by Violence" "Second Convergent
Scenario:
"Corruption"
Economic Boom" "Third Convergent
Scenario:
Compromise"
Rise of the EU and
BRIC Countries
and Decline in
Catholicism"
"Initial Probability:
How Close to Likely
Are the Triggering
Events?" 2nd Place 3rd Place 1st Place
"Unity:
How Many
Triggering Events
Does the Scenario
Have?" 2nd Place (Tie) 1st Place 2nd Place (Tie)
"Imminence:
How Quickly Does
the Possibility
Happen in the
Scenario?" 1st Place 2nd Place 3rd Place
"Final Rank: Overall
How Plausible Is the
Scenario (All Things
Considered)?" 2nd Place 3rd Place 1st Place| | First Convergent <br> Scenario: <br> "Capitulation" <br> Rise in Anti- <br> Americanism and <br> Overwhelmed <br> by Violence | Second Convergent <br> Scenario: <br> "Corruption" <br> Economic Boom | Third Convergent <br> Scenario: <br> Compromise" <br> Rise of the EU and <br> BRIC Countries <br> and Decline in <br> Catholicism |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Initial Probability: <br> How Close to Likely <br> Are the Triggering <br> Events? | 2nd Place | 3rd Place | 1st Place |
| Unity: <br> How Many <br> Triggering Events <br> Does the Scenario <br> Have? | 2nd Place (Tie) | 1st Place | 2nd Place (Tie) |
| Imminence: <br> How Quickly Does <br> the Possibility <br> Happen in the <br> Scenario? | 1st Place | 2nd Place | 3rd Place |
| Final Rank: Overall <br> How Plausible Is the <br> Scenario (All Things <br> Considered)? | 2nd Place | 3rd Place | 1st Place |
New "Threats":
Strategic partner gone; US forces nearer; greater risk of broader instability for other partners (Syria) New "Opportunities": Create new partners; claim precedent set (by US) to justify its own preemptive invasions under the right circumstances| New "Threats": |
| :--- |
| Strategic partner gone; US forces nearer; greater risk of broader instability for other partners (Syria) New "Opportunities": Create new partners; claim precedent set (by US) to justify its own preemptive invasions under the right circumstances |
*Iran might try harder to influence Iraq *Iran might become more suspicious of US/ coalition
*Iran might feel greater need for WMDs (to deter invasion)| *Iran might try harder to influence Iraq *Iran might become more suspicious of US/ coalition |
| :--- |
| *Iran might feel greater need for WMDs (to deter invasion) |
*Will Iran continue or reverse late 1990s trend of openness toward US/coalition countries?
*Will Iran restrain or accelerate nuclear program?
*Will Iran maintain or expand its interventions in neighboring countries?| *Will Iran continue or reverse late 1990s trend of openness toward US/coalition countries? |
| :--- |
| *Will Iran restrain or accelerate nuclear program? |
| *Will Iran maintain or expand its interventions in neighboring countries? |
*Will al-Qaeda remain where it is or seek out new bases of operation?
*Will al-Qaeda maintain or shift its focus to attack the West in Iraq? *Will al-Qaeda be equally or more attractive to potential sources of recruits?| *Will al-Qaeda remain where it is or seek out new bases of operation? |
| :--- |
| *Will al-Qaeda maintain or shift its focus to attack the West in Iraq? *Will al-Qaeda be equally or more attractive to potential sources of recruits? |
Step 1. Underlying Driving Change Saddam and his allies have been removed from power in Iraq, and US/ coalition forces will be in Iraq (in some form) long term.
Step 2. Agents That Define the Broader Context Iran Russia al-Qaeda
Step 3. New Environment for Agents New "Threats": Old adversary removed; other (more powerful) adversary now next door; leaders suspected of pursuing WMDs removed from power New "Opportunities": Influence a large Shia population; have a "say" regarding its neighbor "New "Threats":
Strategic partner gone; US forces nearer; greater risk of broader instability for other partners (Syria) New "Opportunities": Create new partners; claim precedent set (by US) to justify its own preemptive invasions under the right circumstances" New "Threats": More US/coalition forces in region (easier to move against al-Qaeda) New "Opportunities": More US/coalition forces accessible as targets; large disenfranchised Sunni population (possible recruits); propaganda from US/coalition invasion/presence in Islamic country
Step 4. How Agents Might Act Differently "*Iran might try harder to influence Iraq *Iran might become more suspicious of US/ coalition
*Iran might feel greater need for WMDs (to deter invasion)" *Russia might become concerned about a shrinking sphere of influence *Russia might feel less obligation to gain international support for own military actions *al-Qaeda might feel the need to seek out new bases of operation *al-Qaeda might target Iraq itself
Step 5. New Uncertainties That Are Generated (Possible Unintended Consequences) "*Will Iran continue or reverse late 1990s trend of openness toward US/coalition countries?
*Will Iran restrain or accelerate nuclear program?
*Will Iran maintain or expand its interventions in neighboring countries?" *Will Russia be modest or more assertive of its intentions internationally? *Will Russia feel the same or feel less need for international consensus? *Will Russia equally or more actively protect partners in the region? "*Will al-Qaeda remain where it is or seek out new bases of operation?
*Will al-Qaeda maintain or shift its focus to attack the West in Iraq? *Will al-Qaeda be equally or more attractive to potential sources of recruits?"| Step 1. Underlying Driving Change | Saddam and his allies have been removed from power in Iraq, and US/ coalition forces will be in Iraq (in some form) long term. | | |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Step 2. Agents That Define the Broader Context | Iran | Russia | al-Qaeda |
| Step 3. New Environment for Agents | New "Threats": Old adversary removed; other (more powerful) adversary now next door; leaders suspected of pursuing WMDs removed from power New "Opportunities": Influence a large Shia population; have a "say" regarding its neighbor | New "Threats": <br> Strategic partner gone; US forces nearer; greater risk of broader instability for other partners (Syria) New "Opportunities": Create new partners; claim precedent set (by US) to justify its own preemptive invasions under the right circumstances | New "Threats": More US/coalition forces in region (easier to move against al-Qaeda) New "Opportunities": More US/coalition forces accessible as targets; large disenfranchised Sunni population (possible recruits); propaganda from US/coalition invasion/presence in Islamic country |
| Step 4. How Agents Might Act Differently | *Iran might try harder to influence Iraq *Iran might become more suspicious of US/ coalition <br> *Iran might feel greater need for WMDs (to deter invasion) | *Russia might become concerned about a shrinking sphere of influence *Russia might feel less obligation to gain international support for own military actions | *al-Qaeda might feel the need to seek out new bases of operation *al-Qaeda might target Iraq itself |
| Step 5. New Uncertainties That Are Generated (Possible Unintended Consequences) | *Will Iran continue or reverse late 1990s trend of openness toward US/coalition countries? <br> *Will Iran restrain or accelerate nuclear program? <br> *Will Iran maintain or expand its interventions in neighboring countries? | *Will Russia be modest or more assertive of its intentions internationally? *Will Russia feel the same or feel less need for international consensus? *Will Russia equally or more actively protect partners in the region? | *Will al-Qaeda remain where it is or seek out new bases of operation? <br> *Will al-Qaeda maintain or shift its focus to attack the West in Iraq? *Will al-Qaeda be equally or more attractive to potential sources of recruits? |
如果分析师采用发散情景开发法,他们会选择用特定类型的问题来引导思考。首先,他们决定总体上提出“这种变化可能何时何地发生?”的问题,并进行未来探索。也许他们的客户直接询问在没有驻军的地区有哪些新兴威胁,或从某地区撤军对稳定有何影响,又或者他们的军队需要准备应对哪些类型的长期挑战。另一方面,客户可能通过指派一项战略评估任务间接提出未来探索的问题,而这项评估理想情况下至少需要先进行未来探索。除非分析师已经评估了该地区可能出现哪些可信威胁(即回答了未来探索的问题),否则他们无法评估客户应对该地区新兴威胁的选项(即回答战略评估问题“客户如何应对 ItI t ?”)。
第一步:确定情景的起点及其因果背景:根据客户所面临的关键问题,决定是探索无任何限制的总体未来(例如,主题 X 的未来是什么?)还是假设特定变化发生后的具体未来(例如,如果 Y 发生,主题 X 的未来是什么?)。基于该决策,确定将用于估计的因果变量的适当来源。
a. 无任何限制的总体未来(单独使用发散情景开发时):因果背景是当前影响主题的各种力量。它们就是因果变量。
b. 假设特定变化发生时的具体未来(当使用发散情景开发作为未来导向反事实推理的第三阶段时):因果背景将更加稳健,并包括:(1) 当前影响该主题的因果力量;(2) 未来变化如何“形成”的具体描述,从当前某些因果力量的变化开始(即应用收敛情景开发的结果);以及(3) 该变化如何与更广泛背景下的其他因果力量相互作用(即应用涟漪效应分析的结果)。所有这些都将成为因果变量。
Step 2: Identify Starting Point and the Causal Background Factors and
What Factors Are Relevant to Client's Interests| Step 2: Identify Starting Point and the Causal Background Factors and |
| :--- |
| What Factors Are Relevant to Client's Interests |
"Step 2: Identify Starting Point and the Causal Background Factors and
What Factors Are Relevant to Client's Interests" "Step 3:
Uncertainty,
Significance,"| Step 2: Identify Starting Point and the Causal Background Factors and <br> What Factors Are Relevant to Client's Interests | Step 3: <br> Uncertainty, <br> Significance, |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
With lack of confidence in the central government and ethnic and regional differences inflamed, the ANSF experiences significant desertions and defeats.
Taliban forces progress toward the capital, while a few glimmers of hope remain in the natural resource market. Seeing that the Taliban is gaining power, and with no unified approach to counter them, the central government tries to integrate the Taliban into the state.| With lack of confidence in the central government and ethnic and regional differences inflamed, the ANSF experiences significant desertions and defeats. |
| :--- |
| Taliban forces progress toward the capital, while a few glimmers of hope remain in the natural resource market. Seeing that the Taliban is gaining power, and with no unified approach to counter them, the central government tries to integrate the Taliban into the state. |
"Scenario 3:
Fractured State
"Fragmentistan"
Narrow Economic
Development;
ANSF Isolated
Effectiveness;
Nominal Taliban
Support from Pakistan" "Scenario 4: Police
State "Fortress Kabul"
Narrow Economic
Development; ANSF
Trans-Regional
Effectiveness;
Nominal Taliban
Support from Pakistan" "Scenario 6: Reformed State "Taliban 2.0"
Broader Economic
Development;
ANSF Isolated Effectiveness;
Substantive Taliban Support from Pakistan"
"Beginning": How the Main Factors (Start to) Change Ethnic and tribal loyalties remain a priority, and local leaders continue to do what seems to help their immediate area. This strains the ANSF as members struggle between loyalty to their tribe and loyalty to it. The divisions exacerbate the government's low functionality, and no overall leadership emerges for the natural resource market. Opportunities remain for Afghanistan's rich natural resources, and China and India help develop it. But ethnic and tribal loyalties prevent overall consensus on how to proceed. The central government manages a few profitable relationships, but without broad Afghan support. Regional leaders continue to hedge their loyalties to Kabul, which make it even less effective. Opportunities emerge in the natural resource market and some segments develop pieces of it, but no unified approach results. At the same time, Pakistan increases its support for the Taliban, creating a stronger insurgency.
""Middle": How
Those Changes
Affect the Other
Factors" The Taliban makes enough progress in some regions that Pakistan feels no need to support them further. The opium trade expands, and Russia and Iran remain focused on countering it and do little to help the overall economic or security situation improve. Regional leaders progressively operate with more and more autonomy, which only leads to more prioritization of ethnic, tribal, and regional factors in decision making that further weakens the ANSF, and it evolves to be primarily a protector of the central government in Kabul rather than a national force. Divisions lead to more defections from the ANSF, and the force fails to be effective outside of Kabul. The economic connections bring in new resources but they are put to maintaining the ANSF to protect the country's capital and economic endeavors. The Taliban manages to take control of more regions even without much support from Pakistan, and the central government uses its new resources to strengthen its grip on the capital and its small economic engine. "With lack of confidence in the central government and ethnic and regional differences inflamed, the ANSF experiences significant desertions and defeats.
Taliban forces progress toward the capital, while a few glimmers of hope remain in the natural resource market. Seeing that the Taliban is gaining power, and with no unified approach to counter them, the central government tries to integrate the Taliban into the state."| | Scenario 3: <br> Fractured State <br> "Fragmentistan" <br> Narrow Economic <br> Development; <br> ANSF Isolated <br> Effectiveness; <br> Nominal Taliban <br> Support from Pakistan | Scenario 4: Police <br> State "Fortress Kabul" <br> Narrow Economic <br> Development; ANSF <br> Trans-Regional <br> Effectiveness; <br> Nominal Taliban <br> Support from Pakistan | Scenario 6: Reformed State "Taliban 2.0" <br> Broader Economic <br> Development; <br> ANSF Isolated Effectiveness; <br> Substantive Taliban Support from Pakistan |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| "Beginning": How the Main Factors (Start to) Change | Ethnic and tribal loyalties remain a priority, and local leaders continue to do what seems to help their immediate area. This strains the ANSF as members struggle between loyalty to their tribe and loyalty to it. The divisions exacerbate the government's low functionality, and no overall leadership emerges for the natural resource market. | Opportunities remain for Afghanistan's rich natural resources, and China and India help develop it. But ethnic and tribal loyalties prevent overall consensus on how to proceed. The central government manages a few profitable relationships, but without broad Afghan support. | Regional leaders continue to hedge their loyalties to Kabul, which make it even less effective. Opportunities emerge in the natural resource market and some segments develop pieces of it, but no unified approach results. At the same time, Pakistan increases its support for the Taliban, creating a stronger insurgency. |
| "Middle": How <br> Those Changes <br> Affect the Other <br> Factors | The Taliban makes enough progress in some regions that Pakistan feels no need to support them further. The opium trade expands, and Russia and Iran remain focused on countering it and do little to help the overall economic or security situation improve. Regional leaders progressively operate with more and more autonomy, which only leads to more prioritization of ethnic, tribal, and regional factors in decision making that further weakens the ANSF, and it evolves to be primarily a protector of the central government in Kabul rather than a national force. | Divisions lead to more defections from the ANSF, and the force fails to be effective outside of Kabul. The economic connections bring in new resources but they are put to maintaining the ANSF to protect the country's capital and economic endeavors. The Taliban manages to take control of more regions even without much support from Pakistan, and the central government uses its new resources to strengthen its grip on the capital and its small economic engine. | With lack of confidence in the central government and ethnic and regional differences inflamed, the ANSF experiences significant desertions and defeats. <br> Taliban forces progress toward the capital, while a few glimmers of hope remain in the natural resource market. Seeing that the Taliban is gaining power, and with no unified approach to counter them, the central government tries to integrate the Taliban into the state. |
"End": Plausible Consequences of the Changes The various competing regional players become more hostile to one another and some become aligned with the Taliban, others with the opium trade, and others with themselves or the central government. Afghanistan descends into a fractured state with some of the components engaged in a fight with one another for control of the whole and others trying to avoid conflict and to "go it alone." The country evolves into a centralized area with a very robust security apparatus, fueled by (and seeking to protect) its natural resource market. From there, this new ANSF begins to expand its influence more broadly in the country in terms of intelligence gathering and counterinsurgency, primarily to protect its central government and infrastructure. It slowly evolves into a more effective force overall, although its focus remains narrow. The Taliban moves quickly to take control and to develop the natural resource market as a way to show its potential to be more efficient than its predecessor, and China and India work to take advantage of the opportunities. Using intimidation, the Taliban coerces enough internal agreements to get the process moving and begin a new "economic engine" fueled by this market into the overall economy. The Taliban emphasizes economic development to preserve its longterm security. As such, it is far less supportive of terrorism than its prior incarnations.| "End": Plausible Consequences of the Changes | The various competing regional players become more hostile to one another and some become aligned with the Taliban, others with the opium trade, and others with themselves or the central government. Afghanistan descends into a fractured state with some of the components engaged in a fight with one another for control of the whole and others trying to avoid conflict and to "go it alone." | The country evolves into a centralized area with a very robust security apparatus, fueled by (and seeking to protect) its natural resource market. From there, this new ANSF begins to expand its influence more broadly in the country in terms of intelligence gathering and counterinsurgency, primarily to protect its central government and infrastructure. It slowly evolves into a more effective force overall, although its focus remains narrow. | The Taliban moves quickly to take control and to develop the natural resource market as a way to show its potential to be more efficient than its predecessor, and China and India work to take advantage of the opportunities. Using intimidation, the Taliban coerces enough internal agreements to get the process moving and begin a new "economic engine" fueled by this market into the overall economy. The Taliban emphasizes economic development to preserve its longterm security. As such, it is far less supportive of terrorism than its prior incarnations. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
{:[" N "],[" Z "],[(0)/(0)],[" N "],[" N "]:}\begin{aligned} & \text { N } \\ & \text { Z } \\ & \frac{0}{0} \\ & \text { N } \\ & \text { N } \end{aligned}
https://cdn.mathpix.com/cropped/2025_02_24_452ab6fce6dfa6f20380g-292.jpg?height=238&width=45&top_left_y=707&top_left_x=430 https://cdn.mathpix.com/cropped/2025_02_24_452ab6fce6dfa6f20380g-292.jpg?height=192&width=53&top_left_y=546&top_left_x=969 " N
Z
(0)/(0)
N
N " https://cdn.mathpix.com/cropped/2025_02_24_452ab6fce6dfa6f20380g-292.jpg?height=238&width=41&top_left_y=545&top_left_x=1158 https://cdn.mathpix.com/cropped/2025_02_24_452ab6fce6dfa6f20380g-292.jpg?height=199&width=53&top_left_y=545&top_left_x=1252 https://cdn.mathpix.com/cropped/2025_02_24_452ab6fce6dfa6f20380g-292.jpg?height=220&width=51&top_left_y=545&top_left_x=1333 https://cdn.mathpix.com/cropped/2025_02_24_452ab6fce6dfa6f20380g-292.jpg?height=240&width=53&top_left_y=545&top_left_x=1420 " v
-
0^(1)
tilde(0)^(∼)
0^(∼)" https://cdn.mathpix.com/cropped/2025_02_24_452ab6fce6dfa6f20380g-292.jpg?height=238&width=49&top_left_y=545&top_left_x=1601
i. Taliban Remains a Threat to Central Afghan Government YES YES YES YES YES YES
ii. Central Government Lacks Widespread Public Confidence YES YES YeS YES YES
iii. Afghanistan Is Not a Sponsor for Global Terror YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
https://cdn.mathpix.com/cropped/2025_02_24_452ab6fce6dfa6f20380g-292.jpg?height=144&width=50&top_left_y=1387&top_left_x=433 a. Major Government Talks with Taliban to Join NO NO NO NO NO
b. Major Opium Crackdown by Government NO NO NO
c. ANSF Loses around Kabul NO NO NO NO
d. Strongly Increased Overall Resentment of Pakistan NO NO NO NO NO
e. Increased Opium Money Enters the Broader Economy NO NO NO
f. Continued Military Victories by Both ANSF & Taliban NO NO NO NO NO
g. Government Forms Strong Economic Partnerships NO NO NO
Combination That Makes Scenario the Most Plausible One ab ade ef fg bde cg bce bcf|  | |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { N } \\ & \text { Z } \\ & \frac{0}{0} \\ & \text { N } \\ & \text { N } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { v } \\ & \text { - } \\ & \stackrel{1}{0} \\ & \stackrel{\sim}{\tilde{0}} \\ & \stackrel{\sim}{0} \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| | i. Taliban Remains a Threat to Central Afghan Government | | | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | ii. Central Government Lacks Widespread Public Confidence | | | YES | YES | | YeS | YES | YES |
| | iii. Afghanistan Is Not a Sponsor for Global Terror | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | | YES |
|  | a. Major Government Talks with Taliban to Join | | | NO | NO | NO | | NO | NO |
| | b. Major Opium Crackdown by Government | | NO | NO | | | NO | | |
| | c. ANSF Loses around Kabul | NO | NO | | NO | NO | | | |
| | d. Strongly Increased Overall Resentment of Pakistan | | | NO | NO | | NO | NO | NO |
| | e. Increased Opium Money Enters the Broader Economy | NO | | | NO | | | | NO |
| | f. Continued Military Victories by Both ANSF & Taliban | NO | NO | | | NO | NO | NO | |
| | g. Government Forms Strong Economic Partnerships | | | NO | | | | NO | NO |
| | Combination That Makes Scenario the Most Plausible One | ab | ade | ef | fg | bde | cg | bce | bcf |
注释
可识别情节的核心重要性是这类方法的一个关键特征,这一点常被忽视。参见 Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World (New York: Doubleday, 1991)。
将指标视为有助于排除替代方案的想法,是 Pherson 和 Heuer 在此类方法研究中的重要贡献。参见 Richards J. Heuer Jr.和 Randy Pherson 的《Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis》(千橡市,CA:CQ 出版社,2010 年)。
本示例旨在为情景开发的应用提供一个原创性的说明;然而,它确实从其他对该特定案例采用此类方法的应用中汲取了一些灵感。特别是,最终选择将巴基斯坦的角色作为情景驱动因素之一,部分受到了 Michael Semple 在“阿富汗:未来情景”(cidob.org;https://www.cidob.org/end/content/download/37182/591731/file/NOVEMBER_2013_MICHAEL+SEMPLE.pdf)中的启发。当然,此示例并非旨在支持那些总体结论;它仅是从其部分推理中获得了一些局部灵感。
当代理做出决策时,其反思过程的结果是意图执行特定行动以实现特定结果。这一意图可概念化为一种心理指令,即因为相信执行 AA 有助于促成结果 OO ,并且渴望实现结果 OO ,所以去做 AA 。代理认为执行 AA 有助于促成结果 OO 的信念,可被概念化为对 OO 由 AA 引起的可能性(其“概率”)的评估,而代理对实现结果 OO 的渴望,则可被概念化为代理对 OO 对其整体价值(其“效用”)的评估。理性决策理论提出,只要代理是理性的,其执行 AA 的意图强度将等同于 AA 的“期望效用”: AA 结果的效用乘以它们由 AA 引起的概率。换言之,理性决策者是那些其决策追求最大化其期望效用的人。 ^(8){ }^{8}
Remain Officially Neutral but Speak in
Favor of One's Values (That Are Shared
by Desirable Candidate)| Remain Officially Neutral but Speak in |
| :--- |
| Favor of One's Values (That Are Shared |
| by Desirable Candidate) |
Remain Officially Neutral but Speak in
Favor of One's Values (That Are Shared
by Desirable Candidate)| Remain Officially Neutral but Speak in |
| :--- |
| Favor of One's Values (That Are Shared |
| by Desirable Candidate) |
Remain Officially Neutral but Speak in
Favor of One's Values (That Are Shared
by Desirable Candidate)
Minimax Strategy| Remain Officially Neutral but Speak in |
| :--- |
| Favor of One's Values (That Are Shared |
| by Desirable Candidate) |
| Minimax Strategy |
Risk
Using the Probabilities and Desirability of Possible Outcomes to Estimate the Optimal Decision| Risk |
| :--- |
| Using the Probabilities and Desirability of Possible Outcomes to Estimate the Optimal Decision |
无知/单边不确定性 利用可能结果的合意性来强调可能决策的重要性
博弈论/多边不确定性 探讨参与者之间对彼此选项假设的相互影响
Game Theory/
Multilateral
Uncertainty
Exploring the Interplay between the Assumptions the Involved Actors Have about Each Other's Options| Game Theory/ |
| :--- |
| Multilateral |
| Uncertainty |
| Exploring the Interplay between the Assumptions the Involved Actors Have about Each Other's Options |
描述方法的摘要
策略评估是计算哪个决策具有最佳可估计回报
战略评估正在探索可能后果的回报(本身)以确定最佳选择
战略评估是评估多个参与者对彼此决策及可能收益的影响
驱动方法的情感
认识论上乐观的:可能结果的概率是可知的
Epistemologically
Optimistic:
The probabilities of possible outcomes are knowable| Epistemologically |
| :--- |
| Optimistic: |
| The probabilities of possible outcomes are knowable |
认识论上的悲观主义:可能结果的概率是不可知的
Epistemologically Pessimistic:
The probabilities of possible outcomes are not knowable| Epistemologically Pessimistic: |
| :--- |
| The probabilities of possible outcomes are not knowable |
认识论上的中间状态:可能结果的概率不可知,但取决于其他行为者的可知行动
Epistemologically In Between:
The probabilities of possible outcomes are not knowable but depend on other actors' knowable actions| Epistemologically In Between: |
| :--- |
| The probabilities of possible outcomes are not knowable but depend on other actors' knowable actions |
定义方法的主题
代理的决策、后果、概率及(基数)效用从某一视角来看
代理的决策、后果以及(序数)效用的单一视角
一个代理的决策,另一个代理的决策,以及从两个(或更多)视角的(序数)效用
指导方法的标准
预期效用
从一个参与者的视角看可能的效用
两位(或更多)行动者视角下的潜在效用
源自该方法的重大理念
环境稳定性和后果的可预测性对 Strategy Assessment 至关重要
考虑可能的后果本身对战略评估至关重要
其他代理的期望对策略评估的影响至关重要
"Risk
Using the Probabilities and Desirability of Possible Outcomes to Estimate the Optimal Decision" Ignorance/ Unilateral Uncertainty Using the Desirability of Possible Outcomes to Highlight the Significance of Possible Decisions "Game Theory/
Multilateral
Uncertainty
Exploring the Interplay between the Assumptions the Involved Actors Have about Each Other's Options"
Summary That Describes the Approach Strategy Assessment is calculating which decision has the best estimable payoff Strategy Assessment is exploring the payoffs of possible consequences (in themselves) to identify the best choice Strategy Assessment is evaluating the effect that multiple actors have on each other's decision making and possible payoffs
Sensibility That Drives the Approach "Epistemologically
Optimistic:
The probabilities of possible outcomes are knowable" "Epistemologically Pessimistic:
The probabilities of possible outcomes are not knowable" "Epistemologically In Between:
The probabilities of possible outcomes are not knowable but depend on other actors' knowable actions"
Subject That Defines the Approach Decisions of an agent, consequences, probabilities, and (cardinal) utilities from one perspective Decisions of an agent, consequences, and (ordinal) utilities from one perspective Decisions of an agent, decisions of another agent, and (ordinal) utilities from two (or more) perspectives
Standard That Directs the Approach Expected Utilities Possible Utilities from One Actor's Perspective Possible Utilities from Two (or More) Actors' Perspectives
Significant Idea That Derives from the Approach Environmental stability and the predictability of consequences is important to Strategy Assessment Consideration of possible consequences in and of themselves is important to Strategy Assessment The impact of other agent's expectations is important to Strategy Assessment| | Risk <br> Using the Probabilities and Desirability of Possible Outcomes to Estimate the Optimal Decision | Ignorance/ Unilateral Uncertainty Using the Desirability of Possible Outcomes to Highlight the Significance of Possible Decisions | Game Theory/ <br> Multilateral <br> Uncertainty <br> Exploring the Interplay between the Assumptions the Involved Actors Have about Each Other's Options |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Summary That Describes the Approach | Strategy Assessment is calculating which decision has the best estimable payoff | Strategy Assessment is exploring the payoffs of possible consequences (in themselves) to identify the best choice | Strategy Assessment is evaluating the effect that multiple actors have on each other's decision making and possible payoffs |
| Sensibility That Drives the Approach | Epistemologically <br> Optimistic: <br> The probabilities of possible outcomes are knowable | Epistemologically Pessimistic: <br> The probabilities of possible outcomes are not knowable | Epistemologically In Between: <br> The probabilities of possible outcomes are not knowable but depend on other actors' knowable actions |
| Subject That Defines the Approach | Decisions of an agent, consequences, probabilities, and (cardinal) utilities from one perspective | Decisions of an agent, consequences, and (ordinal) utilities from one perspective | Decisions of an agent, decisions of another agent, and (ordinal) utilities from two (or more) perspectives |
| Standard That Directs the Approach | Expected Utilities | Possible Utilities from One Actor's Perspective | Possible Utilities from Two (or More) Actors' Perspectives |
| Significant Idea That Derives from the Approach | Environmental stability and the predictability of consequences is important to Strategy Assessment | Consideration of possible consequences in and of themselves is important to Strategy Assessment | The impact of other agent's expectations is important to Strategy Assessment |
注释
关于这一非常复杂(且不幸被误解)领域的一些一般性介绍,可参阅 Richard Jeffrey 的《决策逻辑》(芝加哥:芝加哥大学出版社,1983 年);Michael D. Resnik 的《选择:决策理论导论》(明尼阿波利斯:明尼苏达大学出版社,1987 年);以及由 Peter Gärdenfors 和 Nils-Eric Shalin 编辑的《决策、概率与效用:精选读本》(纽约:剑桥大学出版社,1988 年)。
Relationship of the
Background to Possible
Decisions| Relationship of the |
| :--- |
| Background to Possible |
| Decisions |
结果与可能决策的关系
Relationship of the
Outcomes to Possible
Decisions| Relationship of the |
| :--- |
| Outcomes to Possible |
| Decisions |
竞争对手与可能决策的关系
Relationship of Competitors
to Possible Decisions| Relationship of Competitors |
| :--- |
| to Possible Decisions |
询问“未来可能的背景如何影响客户对其的应对方式?”
Asks "How Do Possible
Future Contexts Affect
How the Client Can
Respond to It?"| Asks "How Do Possible |
| :--- |
| Future Contexts Affect |
| How the Client Can |
| Respond to It?" |
询问“可能的后果如何影响客户应对它的方式?”
Asks "How Do Possible
Consequences Affect
How the Client Can
Respond to It?"| Asks "How Do Possible |
| :--- |
| Consequences Affect |
| How the Client Can |
| Respond to It?" |
询问“其他参与者的期望如何影响客户对其的回应?”
Asks "How Do the
Expectations of Other Actors
Affect How the Client Can
Respond to It?"| Asks "How Do the |
| :--- |
| Expectations of Other Actors |
| Affect How the Client Can |
| Respond to It?" |
描述在不同未来背景下可能决策的重要性
Describes Significance of
Possible Decisions Given
Different Possible Future
Contexts| Describes Significance of |
| :--- |
| Possible Decisions Given |
| Different Possible Future |
| Contexts |
描述在不确定决策结果下可能决策的重要性
Describes Significance
of Possible Decisions
Given Uncertain Decision
Outcomes| Describes Significance |
| :--- |
| of Possible Decisions |
| Given Uncertain Decision |
| Outcomes |
描述每个代理对其他代理的假设下可能决策的重要性
Describes Significance of
Possible Decisions Given
Each Agent's Assumptions
about the Other Agents| Describes Significance of |
| :--- |
| Possible Decisions Given |
| Each Agent's Assumptions |
| about the Other Agents |
最少先决知识;认识论上悲观的
Least Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Pessimistic| Least Prerequisite |
| :--- |
| Knowledge; |
| Epistemologically Pessimistic |
Most Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Optimistic| Most Prerequisite |
| :--- |
| Knowledge; |
| Epistemologically Optimistic |
通过战略相关性检查方法强调
Emphasized by Strategic
Relevance Check Method| Emphasized by Strategic |
| :--- |
| Relevance Check Method |
通过决策重要性比较法强调
Emphasized by Decision
Significance Comparison
Method| Emphasized by Decision |
| :--- |
| Significance Comparison |
| Method |
通过期望影响分析方法强调
Emphasized by Expectations
Impact Analysis Method| Emphasized by Expectations |
| :--- |
| Impact Analysis Method |
Environment Dimension Effect Dimension Expectation Dimension
"Relationship of the
Background to Possible
Decisions" "Relationship of the
Outcomes to Possible
Decisions" "Relationship of Competitors
to Possible Decisions"
"Asks "How Do Possible
Future Contexts Affect
How the Client Can
Respond to It?"" "Asks "How Do Possible
Consequences Affect
How the Client Can
Respond to It?"" "Asks "How Do the
Expectations of Other Actors
Affect How the Client Can
Respond to It?""
"Describes Significance of
Possible Decisions Given
Different Possible Future
Contexts" "Describes Significance
of Possible Decisions
Given Uncertain Decision
Outcomes" "Describes Significance of
Possible Decisions Given
Each Agent's Assumptions
about the Other Agents"
"Least Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Pessimistic" "In-Between Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Moderate" "Most Prerequisite
Knowledge;
Epistemologically Optimistic"
"Emphasized by Strategic
Relevance Check Method" "Emphasized by Decision
Significance Comparison
Method" "Emphasized by Expectations
Impact Analysis Method"| Environment Dimension | Effect Dimension | Expectation Dimension |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Relationship of the <br> Background to Possible <br> Decisions | Relationship of the <br> Outcomes to Possible <br> Decisions | Relationship of Competitors <br> to Possible Decisions |
| Asks "How Do Possible <br> Future Contexts Affect <br> How the Client Can <br> Respond to It?" | Asks "How Do Possible <br> Consequences Affect <br> How the Client Can <br> Respond to It?" | Asks "How Do the <br> Expectations of Other Actors <br> Affect How the Client Can <br> Respond to It?" |
| Describes Significance of <br> Possible Decisions Given <br> Different Possible Future <br> Contexts | Describes Significance <br> of Possible Decisions <br> Given Uncertain Decision <br> Outcomes | Describes Significance of <br> Possible Decisions Given <br> Each Agent's Assumptions <br> about the Other Agents |
| Least Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Pessimistic | In-Between Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Moderate | Most Prerequisite <br> Knowledge; <br> Epistemologically Optimistic |
| Emphasized by Strategic <br> Relevance Check Method | Emphasized by Decision <br> Significance Comparison <br> Method | Emphasized by Expectations <br> Impact Analysis Method |
"Regional Predators"
(e.g., Aggression between Former Soviet States)| "Regional Predators" |
| :--- |
| (e.g., Aggression between Former Soviet States) |
“颠覆性组织”(例如,Latin American Drug Traffickers, Middle East Terrorists)
“自然之怒”(例如,疾病传播、自然灾害、重大气候变化)
n (0)/(5)\frac{0}{5}ini n
最具决定性的挑战及其结果
在欧洲、拉丁美洲和中东,军事而非经济对等的反制影响
东亚和非洲经济平等但(尚未)军事平等的反向影响
国家间(或国家内部)的反暴力并非军事对等(即维护人权)
反制地区团体影响力及其向本土或盟友扩散的潜力(即推广价值观)
防止疾病传播或自然事件破坏稳定并造成毁灭性影响(即避免人道主义灾难)
con
所需的最重要能力
在可预测的地点威慑或反击常规军事攻击;在其他地方通过代理人战争来对抗影响力
威慑或反击可预测地点的常规军事攻击;保护国内外经济资产
在准敌对(且半预测)地区的“维和”;对他人的常规军事防御
在最初并不欢迎(且未预料到)的地点进行“国家建设”;不同特种部队和基础设施支持
在最初欢迎(且出乎意料的)地区进行“国家建设”;专业技能(科学)和基础设施支持
永
评估策略的局限性
限制少
适度限制:保护经济资产
Moderate in Limitations:
Protecting Economic Assets| Moderate in Limitations: |
| :--- |
| Protecting Economic Assets |
适度限制:军事胜利后的秩序维护
高度限制:强制多功能性;支持“状态”
局限性高:专业技能;支持“状态”
Environment Type Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Current "Status Quo" Environment Plausible New "Moderately Changed" Environment 1 Plausible New "Moderately Changed" Environment 2 Plausible New "Radically Changed" Environment 1 Plausible New "Radically Changed" Environment 2
Primary Competitor or Adversary "Rival Military Superpower" (e.g., Russia/USSR) ""China Rising" (e.g.,
"Aggressive" China)" ""Regional Predators"
(e.g., Aggression between Former Soviet States)" "Disruptive Organizations" (e.g., Latin American Drug Traffickers, Middle East Terrorists) "Wrath of Nature" (e.g., Disease Spread, Natural Disasters, Major Climate Change)
n (0)/(5) in Most Defining Challenges That Result Counter influence of a military but not economic equal in Europe, Latin America, and Middle East Counter influence of an economic but not (yet) military equal in East Asia and Africa Counter violence between (or within) nations not a military equal (i.e., uphold human rights) Counter regional influence of groups and potential to spread to homeland or allies (i.e., promote values) Counter spread of disease or impact of natural events that destabilize and destroy (i.e., avoid humanitarian catastrophes)
con Most Significant Capabilities Required Deter or counter conventional military attack in predictable locations; fight proxy wars to counter influence elsewhere Deter or counter conventional military attack in predictable locations; protect economic assets at home and abroad "Peacekeeping" in semihostile (and semipredicted) locations; conventional military defense of others "Nation-building" in initially unwelcoming (and unpredicted) locations; varying special forces and infrastructure support "Nation-building" in initially welcoming (and unpredicted) locations; specialized skills (scientific) and infrastructure support
永 Limitations of Evaluated Strategy Low in Limitations "Moderate in Limitations:
Protecting Economic Assets" Moderate in Limitations: Maintaining Order after Military Victory High in Limitations: Force Versatility; Supporting a "State" High in Limitations: Specialized Skills; Supporting a "State"| | Environment Type | Step 2 | Step 3 | | Step 4 | |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| | | Current "Status Quo" Environment | Plausible New "Moderately Changed" Environment 1 | Plausible New "Moderately Changed" Environment 2 | Plausible New "Radically Changed" Environment 1 | Plausible New "Radically Changed" Environment 2 |
| | Primary Competitor or Adversary | "Rival Military Superpower" (e.g., Russia/USSR) | "China Rising" (e.g., <br> "Aggressive" China) | "Regional Predators" <br> (e.g., Aggression between Former Soviet States) | "Disruptive Organizations" (e.g., Latin American Drug Traffickers, Middle East Terrorists) | "Wrath of Nature" (e.g., Disease Spread, Natural Disasters, Major Climate Change) |
| n $\frac{0}{5}$ $i n$ | Most Defining Challenges That Result | Counter influence of a military but not economic equal in Europe, Latin America, and Middle East | Counter influence of an economic but not (yet) military equal in East Asia and Africa | Counter violence between (or within) nations not a military equal (i.e., uphold human rights) | Counter regional influence of groups and potential to spread to homeland or allies (i.e., promote values) | Counter spread of disease or impact of natural events that destabilize and destroy (i.e., avoid humanitarian catastrophes) |
| con | Most Significant Capabilities Required | Deter or counter conventional military attack in predictable locations; fight proxy wars to counter influence elsewhere | Deter or counter conventional military attack in predictable locations; protect economic assets at home and abroad | "Peacekeeping" in semihostile (and semipredicted) locations; conventional military defense of others | "Nation-building" in initially unwelcoming (and unpredicted) locations; varying special forces and infrastructure support | "Nation-building" in initially welcoming (and unpredicted) locations; specialized skills (scientific) and infrastructure support |
| 永 | Limitations of Evaluated Strategy | Low in Limitations | Moderate in Limitations: <br> Protecting Economic Assets | Moderate in Limitations: Maintaining Order after Military Victory | High in Limitations: Force Versatility; Supporting a "State" | High in Limitations: Specialized Skills; Supporting a "State" |
第一步:关键不确定性的可能结果:伊拉克已重启其大规模杀伤性武器计划 vs 伊拉克未重启其大规模杀伤性武器计划
Step 1: Key Uncertainty's Possible Outcomes:
Iraq HAS Restarted Its WMD Programs versus Iraq HAS NOT Restarted Its WMD Programs| Step 1: Key Uncertainty's Possible Outcomes: |
| :--- |
| Iraq HAS Restarted Its WMD Programs versus Iraq HAS NOT Restarted Its WMD Programs |
第二步:选项
Step 2:
Options| Step 2: |
| :--- |
| Options |
第三步:如何将其解读为优势选项?
第 4 步:如何将其解释为最大最小化选项?
Step 4: How Might It Be Interpreted as
a Maximin Option?| Step 4: How Might It Be Interpreted as |
| :--- |
| a Maximin Option? |
第 5 步:如何将其解读为极大极大选项?
第 6 步:如何将其解释为极小极大选项?
更严格的制裁(全面检查,威胁迫在眉睫)
Tighter Sanctions
(Thorough Inspections with Imminent Threat)| Tighter Sanctions |
| :--- |
| (Thorough Inspections with Imminent Threat) |
"Step 1: Key Uncertainty's Possible Outcomes:
Iraq HAS Restarted Its WMD Programs versus Iraq HAS NOT Restarted Its WMD Programs"
"Step 2:
Options" Step 3: How Might It Be Interpreted as a Dominant Option? "Step 4: How Might It Be Interpreted as
a Maximin Option?" Step 5: How Might It Be Interpreted as a Maximax Option? Step 6: How Might It Be Interpreted as a Minimax Option?
"Tighter Sanctions
(Thorough Inspections with Imminent Threat)" No matter what, US/allied military actions remain only out of self or other defense in response to a direct attack (they keep the legal/ethical "high ground"). Even if Iraq has WMDs and remains in power, then at least it does so in strict violation of sanctions and international will united against it, and further action against it is easily justified. If Iraq has no WMDs and sanctions were used, then sanctions will be finally shown useful/effective (albeit with imminent threats) creating a stronger tool for international influence. If Iraq has WMDs and sanctions were used, while Direct Regime Change did not occur, still a strong basis exists to act against him.
Indirect Regime Change (Air Campaign & Support of Coup Attempt) No matter what, Iraq's potential WMD sites will have been destroyed (from the air campaign), and most US/ allied military assets remain uncommitted (to preserve future "flexibility"). Even if Iraq did not have WMDs and a coup is attempted, then at least its capacity for developing them is destroyed (from air campaign) without US/allied land invasion/occupation. If Iraq has WMDs and coup is attempted (air campaign against likely WMD sites), then a dangerous threat will have been averted without land invasion and occupation by US/allied forces. If Iraq did not have WMDs and a coup is attempted, while the most "justifiable" Sanctions were not taken, still there was no land invasion and Iraq's capacity for WMDs is destroyed.
Direct Regime Change (Land Invasion & Occupation) No matter what, Saddam's regime will have been removed from power and a friendly regime will be seriously attempted under US and allied influence. Even if Iraq did not have WMDs and there was no real basis for invasion, then at least Saddam is gone, and the region will get a serious attempt at a democratic country. If Iraq has WMDs and there is a land invasion/occupation, then the action will have proven "justified," removed a threat, created plausible regional ally, and sent a strong message about WMD development. If Iraq did not have WMDs and there was an invasion, while the most "justifiable" Sanctions were not taken, still Saddam is gone and the region will get a serious attempt at democracy.| Step 1: Key Uncertainty's Possible Outcomes: <br> Iraq HAS Restarted Its WMD Programs versus Iraq HAS NOT Restarted Its WMD Programs | | | | |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Step 2: <br> Options | Step 3: How Might It Be Interpreted as a Dominant Option? | Step 4: How Might It Be Interpreted as <br> a Maximin Option? | Step 5: How Might It Be Interpreted as a Maximax Option? | Step 6: How Might It Be Interpreted as a Minimax Option? |
| Tighter Sanctions <br> (Thorough Inspections with Imminent Threat) | No matter what, US/allied military actions remain only out of self or other defense in response to a direct attack (they keep the legal/ethical "high ground"). | Even if Iraq has WMDs and remains in power, then at least it does so in strict violation of sanctions and international will united against it, and further action against it is easily justified. | If Iraq has no WMDs and sanctions were used, then sanctions will be finally shown useful/effective (albeit with imminent threats) creating a stronger tool for international influence. | If Iraq has WMDs and sanctions were used, while Direct Regime Change did not occur, still a strong basis exists to act against him. |
| Indirect Regime Change (Air Campaign & Support of Coup Attempt) | No matter what, Iraq's potential WMD sites will have been destroyed (from the air campaign), and most US/ allied military assets remain uncommitted (to preserve future "flexibility"). | Even if Iraq did not have WMDs and a coup is attempted, then at least its capacity for developing them is destroyed (from air campaign) without US/allied land invasion/occupation. | If Iraq has WMDs and coup is attempted (air campaign against likely WMD sites), then a dangerous threat will have been averted without land invasion and occupation by US/allied forces. | If Iraq did not have WMDs and a coup is attempted, while the most "justifiable" Sanctions were not taken, still there was no land invasion and Iraq's capacity for WMDs is destroyed. |
| Direct Regime Change (Land Invasion & Occupation) | No matter what, Saddam's regime will have been removed from power and a friendly regime will be seriously attempted under US and allied influence. | Even if Iraq did not have WMDs and there was no real basis for invasion, then at least Saddam is gone, and the region will get a serious attempt at a democratic country. | If Iraq has WMDs and there is a land invasion/occupation, then the action will have proven "justified," removed a threat, created plausible regional ally, and sent a strong message about WMD development. | If Iraq did not have WMDs and there was an invasion, while the most "justifiable" Sanctions were not taken, still Saddam is gone and the region will get a serious attempt at democracy. |
Soviet Expectations of
the Consequences of
Their Choosing to
"Remove Missiles"| Soviet Expectations of |
| :---: |
| the Consequences of |
| Their Choosing to |
| "Remove Missiles" |
苏联对选择“保留导弹”后果的预期
Soviet Expectations of
the Consequences of
Their Choosing to
"Maintain Missiles"| Soviet Expectations of |
| :---: |
| the Consequences of |
| Their Choosing to |
| "Maintain Missiles" |
后果预期的范围
Range of Expectations
of Consequences| Range of Expectations |
| :--- |
| of Consequences |