CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: ONE HUNDRED DAYS OF PRESIDENT TRUMP'S EXECUTIVE ORDERS 當前發展：特朗普總統的行政命令一百天
I. Introduction 一. 介紹
President Trump signed more executive orders in his first one hundred days than any other president since Harry S. Truman. ^(1){ }^{1} Every president, save the ill-fated William Henry Harrison, has used executive orders as a policymaking tool. ^(2){ }^{2} While the use of executive orders is common, the speed with which President Trump is employing them is fairly uncommon. Since President Reagan’s time in office, the average number of executive orders issued per year hovered around fifty or fewer. ^(3){ }^{3} If the president continues to issue executive orders at his current rate, he will average out at ninety-six per year. ^(4){ }^{4} In contrast, President Obama averaged thirty-five executive orders per year. ^(5){ }^{5} While conservatives (including Mr. Trump) criticized President Obama for excessive use of executive orders, ^(6){ }^{6} President Trump’s use of executive **434* 434 orders has not elicited a similar outcry from his colleagues on the right. ^(7){ }^{7} Indeed, the White House touted the President’s high number of executive orders as an indication of how much he has accomplished in his first 100 days in office. ^(8){ }^{8} 特朗普總統在他上任的前一百天簽署的行政命令比自哈里·S·杜魯門以來的任何其他總統都要多。除了命運多舛的威廉·亨利·哈里森，所有總統都將行政命令作為政策制定的工具。雖然使用行政命令是很常見的，但特朗普總統使用它們的速度相當不尋常。自里根總統任期以來，每年發出的行政命令平均數量約在五十個或更少。如果總統繼續以目前的速度發出行政命令，他每年將平均發出九十六個。相比之下，奧巴馬總統每年平均發出三十五個行政命令。雖然保守派（包括特朗普先生）批評奧巴馬總統過度使用行政命令，但特朗普總統的行政命令使用並未引起他右派同僚的類似抗議。事實上，白宮將總統高數量的行政命令宣傳為他在上任前一百天內所取得成就的指標。
Executive orders are of limited use and oftentimes have little practical effect. ^(9){ }^{9} The orders on immigration run the gamut of effectiveness–some are mere puffery; others are hugely impactful. This article offers a broad overview of the most consequential immigration executive orders and discusses the efforts used to combat them. 行政命令的用途有限，往往實際效果不大。移民相關的命令效果各異——有些只是空談；而另一些則影響深遠。本文提供了最具影響力的移民行政命令的廣泛概述，並討論了用來對抗這些命令的努力。
II. Executive Order: "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States" II. 總統令：「加強美國內部的公共安全」
The executive order “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States” (“EO-13768”) has the stated purpose of enhancing enforcement of immigration law within the United States. ^(10){ }^{10} EO-13768 called for a change in immigration enforcement priorities, a call for funding restrictions on “sanctuary cities” and a revitalization of the Secure Communities program, and provisions that directly impact the privacy rights of immigrants in the United States. ^(11){ }^{11} 行政命令「加強美國內部公共安全」（「EO-13768」）的明確目的是加強在美國境內的移民法執行。EO-13768 要求改變移民執法的優先事項，呼籲對「庇護城市」的資金限制，以及重振安全社區計劃，並包含直接影響在美國移民隱私權的條款。
A. Enforcement Priorities A. 執法優先事項
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)'s previous enforcement priorities were laid out in a 2014 memorandum written by DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, which listed three groups of enforcement priorities in descending order of importance: Priority 1 was foreign nationals who constituted “threats to national security, border security, and public safety”; ^(12){ }^{12} Priority 2 constituted foreign nationals classified as “misdemeanants and new immigration *435 violators”; ^(13){ }^{13} Priority 3 was foreign nationals with “other immigration violations” (those with final removal orders issued on or after January 1, 2014). ^(14){ }^{14} These groups were prioritized for removal because the administration recognized the impossibility of deporting all removable foreign nationals in the United States, and it wished to use its limited enforcement resources wisely. ^(15){ }^{15} 國土安全部（“DHS”）之前的執法優先事項在 2014 年由 DHS 部長傑赫·約翰遜撰寫的備忘錄中列出，該備忘錄按重要性降序列出了三組執法優先事項：優先事項 1 是構成“對國家安全、邊界安全和公共安全威脅”的外國國民；優先事項 2 是被分類為“輕罪犯和新移民違規者”的外國國民；優先事項 3 是有“其他移民違規行為”的外國國民（那些在 2014 年 1 月 1 日或之後發出最終驅逐令的外國國民）。這些群體被優先考慮驅逐，因為政府認識到驅逐所有可驅逐的外國國民在美國是不可能的，並希望明智地利用其有限的執法資源。
In contrast, while EO-13768 lists a new set of enforcement priorities, it does not prioritize them in any order–and they are far broader. The new priorities for removal are foreign nationals who fall under the inadmissibility categories; ^(16){ }^{16} foreign nationals who were “convicted of any criminal offense” or charged with any unresolved criminal offense; foreign nationals who committed an act for which they could be criminally charged; foreign nationals who “have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in connection with any official matter or application before a government agency,” or who “have abused any program related to receipt of public benefits”; those who are subject to a final removal order; or foreign nationals who “pose a risk to public safety or national security” based on the “judgment of an immigration officer.” ^(17){ }^{17} The breadth of these priorities is staggering, and huge swaths of people are now at the top of the priority list–people who before were not a priority. 相較之下，雖然 EO-13768 列出了一套新的執法優先事項，但並未按任何順序對其進行優先排序，且範圍更廣。新的移除優先事項包括：屬於不合格類別的外國國籍人士；曾因任何刑事罪被定罪或被指控有任何未解決刑事罪的外國國籍人士；曾犯下可能被刑事起訴的行為的外國國籍人士；在與政府機構的任何官方事務或申請中“參與詐騙或故意虛假陳述”的外國國籍人士，或“濫用任何與公共福利相關的計劃”的外國國籍人士；那些受到最終驅逐令的人；或根據“移民官的判斷”被認為“對公共安全或國家安全構成風險”的外國國籍人士。這些優先事項的範圍令人震驚，現在大量人群已經成為優先考慮的對象——這些人之前並不被視為優先事項。
EO-13768 also prioritizes foreign nationals described in 8 U.S.C. §1225\S 1225 without specifying a section number. ^(18){ }^{18} This provision discusses the inspection of applicants for admission, expedited removal for inadmissible foreign nationals, and hearing referrals. ^(19){ }^{19} It is unclear which foreign nationals in this section are meant to be prioritized, but given that the section refers to all applicants for admission, this potential typo is a matter of some concern. ^(20){ }^{20} EO-13768 也優先考慮 8 U.S.C. §1225\S 1225 中描述的外國國籍人士，但未具體說明章節號碼。 ^(18){ }^{18} 此條款討論了入境申請者的檢查、對不合格外國國籍人士的快速驅逐以及聽證轉介。 ^(19){ }^{19} 不清楚本條款中哪些外國國籍人士應被優先考慮，但鑑於該條款提及所有入境申請者，這一潛在的錯誤令人擔憂。 ^(20){ }^{20}
The President has broad discretion to set immigration enforcement policies, so a facial legal challenge of the priorities would likely be unsuccessful. ^(21){ }^{21} However, the sheer numbers of deportations likely under the new **436* 436 priorities will massively strain the immigration system. ^(22){ }^{22} Deportations of the scale implicated by the new priorities would take unprecedented amounts of time, money and manpower: a 2015 study estimated that the cost of deporting of the more than 11 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. would conservatively be between $400\$ 400 and $600\$ 600 billion, and that it would take about twenty years. ^(23){ }^{23} 總統在設定移民執法政策方面擁有廣泛的裁量權，因此對這些優先事項的表面法律挑戰可能不會成功。然而，根據新的優先事項，驅逐出境的數量將會對移民系統造成巨大的壓力。根據新的優先事項，驅逐出境的規模將需要前所未有的時間、金錢和人力：2015 年的一項研究估計，驅逐美國超過 1100 萬名無證移民的成本保守估計在數十億到數百億之間，並且這將需要大約二十年的時間。
The strain on the systems these priorities would cause may be their own undoing. Professor and acclaimed civil rights attorney Michelle Alexander popularized the idea of “crashing the justice system”: organizing criminal defendants to take their cases to trial, rather than pleading out. ^(24){ }^{24} Because the criminal justice system does not have the capacity to handle the amount of trials that would ensue, this would cause a crisis that would bring criminal justice reform to the forefront of the national conversation. ^(25){ }^{25} Likewise, if deportations commence on the scale contemplated by the new priorities and a significant number of deportees exercise their right to a hearing, the immigration court system will almost certainly “crash” and the president will be forced to reevaluate these priorities. 這些優先事項所造成的系統壓力可能會成為它們自己的 undoing。教授及著名的民權律師米歇爾·亞歷山大普及了“崩潰司法系統”的概念：組織刑事被告將案件提交審判，而不是認罪。由於刑事司法系統沒有能力處理隨之而來的大量審判，這將引發一場危機，將刑事司法改革推向全國對話的前沿。同樣，如果驅逐的規模如新優先事項所考慮的那樣開始，並且大量被驅逐者行使他們的聽證權利，移民法庭系統幾乎肯定會“崩潰”，總統將被迫重新評估這些優先事項。
Additionally, without a hierarchy of priorities, EO-13768 indicates that undocumented students are just as much an enforcement priority as convicted felons. ^(26){ }^{26} The February 2017 immigration raids demonstrated this new policy: of the 675 immigrants rounded up, about half had traffic violations or no convictions. ^(27){ }^{27} Despite the president’s insistence that he wanted to focus on serious criminals, only 12%12 \% of the detainees were convicted of homicide or assault. ^(28){ }^{28} If raids continue with these results, public outcry will undoubtedly increase, which would hopefully put pressure on the administration to change its policies. 此外，根據 EO-13768，沒有優先順序的情況下，無證學生與被定罪的重罪犯一樣都是執法的優先對象。2017 年 2 月的移民突襲顯示了這一新政策：在被拘留的 675 名移民中，大約一半有交通違規或沒有定罪。儘管總統堅持他想專注於嚴重罪犯，但只有部分被拘留者被定罪為謀殺或襲擊。如果突襲繼續出現這些結果，公眾的抗議無疑會增加，這希望能對政府施加壓力以改變其政策。
*437 B. Sanctuary Cities *437 B. 聖域城市
Section 9 of EO- 13768 relates to "sanctuary jurisdictions, defined as "jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. [§] 1373."29 Section 1373 forbids state and local governments from prohibiting government entities and officials from communicating individuals’ immigration statuses to DHS. ^(30){ }^{30} Under §9\S 9, the Attorney General and the DHS Secretary are empowered to ensure that sanctuary jurisdictions "are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes. ^(31){ }^{31} The government has not yet determined what it means to "willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.,321373 ., 32 EO-13768 的第 9 節與“庇護管轄區”有關，定義為“故意拒絕遵守 8 U.S.C. [§] 1373 的管轄區。”第 1373 節禁止州和地方政府禁止政府實體和官員向國土安全部（DHS）通報個人的移民身份。根據該條款，司法部長和國土安全部部長有權確保庇護管轄區“無資格獲得聯邦撥款，除非被認為對執法目的必要。”政府尚未確定“故意拒絕遵守 8 U.S.C. §”的具體含義。
Section 9(a) is currently subject to a temporary injunction issued in the case of San Francisco v. Trump. ^(33){ }^{33} In this case, the cities of San Francisco and Santa Clara challenged §9(\S 9( a ) as being facially unconstitutional, arguing that the provision is a violation of separation of powers because it attempts to employ spending powers reserved for the Legislature; that it is overbroad, coercive, and a violation of the Tenth Amendment; that it is a violation of the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment both because it is void for vagueness and because it removes jurisdiction’s federal funding without procedural due process. ^(34){ }^{34} The government ignored the constitutional issues, arguing that the counties lacked standing; and that despite its language, §\S 9(a) does not change existing law. ^(35){ }^{35} The government argued that §9\S 9 (a) only applies to three federal grants that were already conditioned on compliance with §1373.^(36)\S 1373 .{ }^{36} This led the judge to describe §9\S 9 (a) as an "ominous, misleading, and ultimately toothless threat. ^(37){ }^{37} He was unconvinced by the government’s argument, citing to the language of the Order, as well as statements made by members of the Administration, and ultimately granted the preliminary injunction. ^(38){ }^{38} 第 9(a)條目前受到舊金山訴特朗普案的臨時禁令約束。在此案中，舊金山和聖克拉拉市挑戰第 9(a)條，認為該條文在表面上違憲，主張該條款違反了權力分立，因為它試圖使用保留給立法機構的支出權力；它過於寬泛、具脅迫性，並違反了第十修正案；它違反了第五修正案中的正當程序條款，因為它因模糊而無效，並且在沒有程序正當程序的情況下剝奪了管轄權的聯邦資金。政府忽視了憲法問題，辯稱各縣缺乏訴訟資格；並且儘管其措辭如此，第 9(a)條並未改變現有法律。政府辯稱第 9(a)條僅適用於三項已經以遵守為條件的聯邦補助金。這使法官將第 9(a)條形容為一種「不祥、誤導且最終無效的威脅」。 ^(37){ }^{37} 他對政府的論點不以為然，引用了命令的語言以及行政部門成員所作的陳述，最終批准了初步禁令。 ^(38){ }^{38}
Section 9(b) offers an avenue for insight into which jurisdictions would meet the classification of a “sanctuary jurisdiction.” This section directs DHS to release Declined Detainer Outcome Reports (“reports”): lists of jurisdictions that decline to comply with detainer requests (Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) requests to local jurisdictions to detain individuals ICE plans to take into custody) and crimes committed by foreign **438* 438 nationals in those jurisdictions. ^(39){ }^{39} Presumably, the federal government considers the jurisdictions in the reports to be “sanctuary jurisdictions.” 第 9(b)節提供了一個洞察哪些司法管轄區符合“庇護司法管轄區”分類的途徑。本節指示國土安全部發布拒絕拘留結果報告（“報告”）：列出拒絕遵守拘留請求的司法管轄區（移民和海關執法局（“ICE”）向地方司法管轄區請求拘留 ICE 計劃拘留的個體）以及在這些司法管轄區內外國國籍人士所犯的罪行。顯然，聯邦政府認為報告中的司法管轄區是“庇護司法管轄區”。
After publishing two weeks’ worth of the reports, ICE suspended their publication due to complaints of inaccuracies. ^(40){ }^{40} Given the errors, ICE indicated that it would reevaluate its “reporting methodologies” prior to publishing any further reports. ^(41){ }^{41} 在發布了兩週的報告後，ICE 因為收到不準確的投訴而暫停了報告的發布。 ^(40){ }^{40} 鑑於這些錯誤，ICE 表示將在發布任何進一步的報告之前重新評估其“報告方法”。 ^(41){ }^{41}
Additionally, §10\S 10 reinstates the Secure Communities program. ^(42){ }^{42} Secure Communities was aimed at creating informationsharing partnerships between local jurisdictions and the federal government, transmitting immigration and biometric data of arrestees from the local jurisdictions to the federal government in order to to increase immigration enforcement against removable individuals. ^(43){ }^{43} This program was highly controversial: it had a disparate impact on Hispanics, which led to a lack of trust in the police so that witnesses and victims of crimes did not report crimes for fear of deportation. ^(44){ }^{44} Additionally, the program did not adhere to its goal of detaining and deporting of “dangerous criminal aliens”-about half of the individuals detained via Secure Communities had no criminal history at all, and only 8%8 \% had committed aggravated felonies. ^(45){ }^{45} The program also presented due process problems, as only about 52%52 \% of Secure Communities deportees had hearings in front of immigration judges. ^(46){ }^{46} Finally, the program had no effect on reducing the rate of violent crime in the United States. ^(47){ }^{47} 此外， §10\S 10 恢復了安全社區計劃。 ^(42){ }^{42} 安全社區旨在建立地方管轄區與聯邦政府之間的信息共享夥伴關係，將被逮捕者的移民和生物識別數據從地方管轄區傳送到聯邦政府，以增強對可驅逐個體的移民執法。 ^(43){ }^{43} 這個計劃引起了很大的爭議：它對西班牙裔人群產生了不成比例的影響，導致對警方缺乏信任，使得犯罪的目擊者和受害者因害怕被驅逐而不報案。 ^(44){ }^{44} 此外，該計劃未能實現拘留和驅逐“危險犯罪外國人”的目標——約一半通過安全社區被拘留的個體根本沒有犯罪記錄，只有 8%8 \% 曾犯下加重罪。 ^(45){ }^{45} 該計劃還存在正當程序問題，因為只有約 52%52 \% 的安全社區被驅逐者在移民法官面前進行了聽證。 ^(46){ }^{46} 最後，該計劃對減少美國的暴力犯罪率沒有任何影響。 ^(47){ }^{47}
This program was previously abandoned due to its vast unpopularity and ineffectiveness. ^(48){ }^{48} Additionally, when the program began, states opted in via Memoranda of Agreement (“MOAs”). ^(49){ }^{49} The MOAs would have terminated when Secure Communities was discarded, so states will be able to choose **439* 439 whether to opt in, giving them the ability to undercut the effectiveness of the program. 這個計劃之前因為其極大的不受歡迎和無效而被放棄。 ^(48){ }^{48} 此外，當該計劃開始時，各州是通過協議備忘錄（“MOAs”）選擇參加的。 ^(49){ }^{49} 當安全社區被廢除時，這些 MOAs 將會終止，因此各州將能夠選擇 **439* 439 是否參加，這使他們能夠削弱該計劃的有效性。
C. Privacy Issues C. 隱私問題
Sections 13 and 14 of EO-13768 pose potential constitutional issues. Section 13 creates the Office for Victims of Crimes Committed by Removable Aliens (also known as the Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement Office, or “VOICE”). ^(50){ }^{50} Victims of crime are encouraged to report crimes to the office to receive “services,” including obtaining information about the immigration status of the alleged offender and their custody status; and getting questions about “immigration enforcement efforts” answered. ^(51){ }^{51} Several studies have shown that immigrants are actually less likely to commit crimes than U.S. citizens. ^(52){ }^{52} The administration indicated VOICE is necessary because previous DHS policy extended Privacy Act protections to immigrants EO-13768 的第 13 和第 14 條可能存在潛在的憲法問題。第 13 條創建了可驅逐外國人犯罪受害者辦公室（也稱為移民犯罪受害者參與辦公室，或“VOICE”）。受害者被鼓勵向該辦公室報告犯罪，以獲得“服務”，包括獲取有關被指控罪犯的移民身份和拘留狀態的信息；以及回答有關“移民執法行動”的問題。幾項研究顯示，移民實際上比美國公民更不容易犯罪。政府表示，VOICE 是必要的，因為之前的國土安全部政策將隱私法的保護擴展到移民。
not covered by the Act’s provisions. ^(53){ }^{53} To combat this, §14\S 14 directs agencies to “ensure that their privacy policies exclude persons who are not United States citizens or lawful permanent residents.” 54 不在該法案的條款範圍內。 ^(53){ }^{53} 為了應對這一點， §14\S 14 指示機構“確保他們的隱私政策不包括非美國公民或合法永久居民。”54
While VOICE is not currently subject to any legal challenges, Americans have taken it upon themselves to call the office to report crimes by aliens of the extraterrestrial variety. ^(55){ }^{55} An ICE official voiced their displeasure with this, indicating that the calls made it harder for legitimate callers to access services provided by VOICE. ^(56){ }^{56} Regardless, it is unclear if VOICE provides much benefit given the low rates of crimes committed by immigrants. 雖然 VOICE 目前並未面臨任何法律挑戰，但美國人已主動致電辦公室舉報外星人犯罪。 ^(55){ }^{55} 一名 ICE 官員對此表示不滿，指出這些電話使合法來電者更難獲得 VOICE 提供的服務。 ^(56){ }^{56} 無論如何，考慮到移民犯罪率低，VOICE 是否提供實質好處仍不明朗。
III. Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements III. 邊境安全與移民執法改善
Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements (“EO-13767”) calls for the building of a border wall, increasing deportation resources, ending the “catch and release” program, and expanding expedited *440 removal. ^(57){ }^{57} 邊境安全與移民執法改善（“EO-13767”）呼籲建設邊境牆、增加驅逐資源、終止“捕捉與釋放”計劃，以及擴大快速*440 驅逐。
A. Wall A. 牆
Section 4 directs DHS to take the steps to plan, design, and build a wall on the southern border. ^(58){ }^{58} Building a wall and making Mexico pay for it was a huge feature of Trump’s campaign, but it presents several issues, including legality, feasibility, and environmental concerns. ^(59){ }^{59} The wall would likely cut through private property along the border, inviting eminent domain lawsuits. ^(60){ }^{60} Landowners generally lose such lawsuits, but they add time and money to the daunting task of building a 2,000mile wall. ^(61){ }^{61} Despite §4\S 4, however, the only way the wall will be built is if Congress (not Mexico) agrees to pay an estimated $21.6\$ 21.6 billion for it–even the initial $1.5\$ 1.5 billion President Trump requested in the recent spending bill negotiations was a sticking point. ^(62){ }^{62} In the final spending agreement, the wall was not funded. ^(63){ }^{63} Democrats and Republicans are uneasy about the wall, and if they remain united in opposition, it cannot be built. 第 4 節指示國土安全部採取措施規劃、設計和建造南部邊界的圍牆。 ^(58){ }^{58} 建造圍牆並讓墨西哥為此付費是特朗普競選活動的一個重要特點，但這帶來了幾個問題，包括合法性、可行性和環境問題。 ^(59){ }^{59} 圍牆可能會穿過邊界沿線的私人財產，招致徵用權訴訟。 ^(60){ }^{60} 土地擁有者通常在這類訴訟中敗訴，但這會增加建造 2000 英里圍牆的艱巨任務所需的時間和金錢。 ^(61){ }^{61} 然而，儘管 §4\S 4 ，圍牆能否建成的唯一途徑是國會（而不是墨西哥）同意支付估計的 $21.6\$ 21.6 十億美元——即使是特朗普在最近的撥款法案談判中要求的最初 $1.5\$ 1.5 十億美元也成為了爭議點。 ^(62){ }^{62} 在最終的撥款協議中，圍牆並未獲得資金。 ^(63){ }^{63} 民主黨和共和黨對圍牆感到不安，如果他們在反對上保持團結，則無法建造圍牆。
B. Deportation Resources B. 驅逐資源
Section 5 calls for increasing the number of detention centers, asylum officers, and immigration judges along the southern border. ^(64){ }^{64} There are innumerable problems with immigration detention centers, ^(65){ }^{65} but the Supreme Court has given the government more leeway because of the legal fiction that immigration detention is “civil,” rather than criminal, which makes challenges to this provision unlikely to succeed. ^(66){ }^{66} 第五節呼籲增加南部邊界的拘留中心、庇護官和移民法官的數量。 ^(64){ }^{64} 移民拘留中心存在無數問題， ^(65){ }^{65} 但最高法院因為法律上的虛構，認為移民拘留是“民事”而非刑事的，這使得對此條款的挑戰不太可能成功。 ^(66){ }^{66}
*441 C. Catch and Release and Expedited Removal *441 C. 捕捉與釋放及快速驅逐
Expedited removal allows immigration officers to deport undocumented individuals within 100 miles of the border if they are caught within two weeks of arrival and cannot prove two years of continuous physical presence in the U.S. ^(72){ }^{72} Foreign nationals subject to expedited removal do not have the right to a hearing in front of an immigration judge. ^(73){ }^{73} EO-13767 expands 加速驅逐允許移民官員在距離邊界 100 英里內驅逐無證件人士，如果他們在抵達後兩週內被捕且無法證明在美國有兩年的持續實體居留。 ^(72){ }^{72} 受加速驅逐影響的外國國籍人士沒有權利在移民法官面前進行聽證。 ^(73){ }^{73} EO-13767 擴展
expedited removal eligibility to undocumented immigrants throughout the United States. ^(74){ }^{74} Courts have held that expedited removal proceedings are unreviewable, so success in challenging the expansion would be difficult. ^(75){ }^{75} 加速驅逐的資格適用於全美國的無證移民。 ^(74){ }^{74} 法院已裁定，加速驅逐程序不可審查，因此挑戰擴大範圍的成功將是困難的。 ^(75){ }^{75}
IV. Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States IV. 保護國家免受外國恐怖分子進入美國
Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States (“EO-13780”) suspends the approval of visas for individuals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for ninety days (§2), suspends the US Refugee Admissions Program (“USRAP”) for 120 days ( §6(a)\S 6(\mathrm{a}) ), and lowers the refugee cap to 50,000 ( §6(b)\S 6(\mathrm{~b}) ). ^(76){ }^{76} This is likely the most controversial order, replacing a previous, similar order after the first was quickly enjoined by several courts. ^(77){ }^{77} After the first ban, protests erupted in cities and **442* 442 airports around the nation. ^(78){ }^{78} Lawsuits and temporary injunctions/restraining orders quickly followed the release of both executive orders. ^(79){ }^{79} A judge in Hawai’i granted a nationwide Temporary Restraining Order on Section 2 and Section 6 after plaintiffs claimed it violated the Establishment Clause, the Due Process Clause (both substantive and procedural due process), the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. ^(80){ }^{80} A Maryland judge responded to Plaintiffs’ claims that §2\S 2 and §6\S 6 violated the same provisions, as well as the Refugee Act, by enjoining only §2(c)\S 2(c), because their arguments that the refugee ban raised Establishment Clause concerns were insufficiently developed. ^(81){ }^{81} A Virginia judge did find that the order was legal, but this was negated when the Fourth Circuit upheld the Maryland injunction. ^(82){ }^{82} 保護國家免受外國恐怖分子進入美國（“EO-13780”）暫停來自伊朗、利比亞、索馬利亞、蘇丹、敘利亞和也門的個人簽證批准，為期九十天（§2），暫停美國難民接納計劃（“USRAP”）為期 120 天（ §6(a)\S 6(\mathrm{a}) ），並將難民上限降低至 50,000 人（ §6(b)\S 6(\mathrm{~b}) ）。 ^(76){ }^{76} 這可能是最具爭議的命令，取代了之前的類似命令，因為第一個命令迅速被幾個法院禁令。 ^(77){ }^{77} 在第一次禁令後，全國各地的城市和 **442* 442 機場爆發了抗議活動。 ^(78){ }^{78} 針對這兩項行政命令的發布，隨即出現了訴訟和臨時禁令/限制令。 ^(79){ }^{79} 夏威夷的一名法官在原告聲稱該命令違反了建立條款、正當程序條款（包括實質和程序正當程序）、移民和國籍法、宗教自由恢復法和行政程序法後，對第 2 條和第 6 條頒發了全國性的臨時限制令。 馬里蘭州的一位法官對原告聲稱 §2\S 2 和 §6\S 6 違反相同條款以及難民法的指控作出了回應，僅對 §2(c)\S 2(c) 發出禁令，因為他們關於難民禁令引發建立條款問題的論點發展不足。維吉尼亞州的一位法官確實認為該命令是合法的，但當第四巡迴法院支持馬里蘭州的禁令時，這一判決被推翻。 ^(82){ }^{82}
For both Hawai’i and Maryland district court judges, a key convincing aspect of Plaintiffs’ arguments were that the President’s statements and those of his advisors demonstrated that EO-13780 was based on animus against Muslims. ^(83){ }^{83} Trump called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.” ^(84)He{ }^{84} \mathrm{He} told the press that he would use “territory instead of Muslim” to get around constitutional issues, ^(85){ }^{85} and his advisor confirmed that he was asked to make the “Muslim ban” legal. ^(86){ }^{86} Another advisor said that EO-13780 had “the same basic policy outcome” as the **443* 443 previous order. ^(87){ }^{87} 對於夏威夷和馬里蘭州的地區法院法官來說，原告論點的一個關鍵說服因素是總統的聲明及其顧問的言論顯示，行政命令 13780 是基於對穆斯林的敵意。特朗普呼籲“完全和徹底地停止穆斯林進入美國。”他告訴媒體，他將使用“領土而不是穆斯林”來繞過憲法問題，他的顧問確認他被要求使“穆斯林禁令”合法化。另一位顧問表示，行政命令 13780 與之前的命令“有相同的基本政策結果”。
In Hawai’i, the government argued EO-13780 was not motivated by religious animus because it only excluded individuals from “a small fraction of the world’s 50 Muslim-majority nations”–an argument the judge found to be “fundamentally flawed.” 88 In Maryland, they argued that Trump’s statements could not be considered because they were made before he became a government official and before formal decisions on the order had been made, which the judge rejected. ^(89){ }^{89} 在夏威夷，政府辯稱 EO-13780 並非出於宗教敵意，因為它僅排除了來自「世界 50 個穆斯林為主的國家中的一小部分」的個人——這一論點被法官認為是「根本有缺陷的」。在馬里蘭州，他們辯稱特朗普的言論不能被考慮，因為這些言論是在他成為政府官員之前以及在對該命令做出正式決定之前發表的，法官駁回了這一論點。
In both cases, the government argued that EO-13780 was facially neutral, prompting both judges to apply the “Lemon test” from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). ^(90){ }^{90} The Lemon test requires that facially neutral government actions must (1) have a secular primary purpose; (2) not have “primary effect” that “advances or inhibits religion”; and (3) not excessively entangle the government with religion. ^(91){ }^{91} The judges found that EO- 13780 would likely not satisfy the test. ^(92){ }^{92} Both judges also expressed doubts about the national security justifications of EO-13780. ^(93){ }^{93} The administration has appealed both orders to the Ninth and Fourth Circuits. ^(94){ }^{94} The Ninth Circuit already ruled against the previous order, and when the court declined to rehear the case en banc, only five of the twenty-five judges in the circuit joined a dissent saying they would have ruled differently. ^(95){ }^{95} 在這兩個案例中，政府辯稱 EO-13780 在表面上是中立的，促使兩位法官應用《檸檬測試》（Lemon test），該測試源自於 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)。檸檬測試要求表面中立的政府行動必須（1）具有世俗的主要目的；（2）不具有“主要效果”來“促進或抑制宗教”；以及（3）不過度使政府與宗教糾纏在一起。法官們發現 EO-13780 可能不會滿足該測試。兩位法官也對 EO-13780 的國家安全理由表示懷疑。政府已向第九和第四巡迴法院上訴這兩項命令。第九巡迴法院已經對之前的命令作出裁決，當法院拒絕全體法官重新審理此案時，只有二十五位法官中的五位加入了不同意見，表示他們會有不同的裁決。
V. Buy American and Hire American ^(96){ }^{96} V. 購買美國貨和雇用美國人 ^(96){ }^{96}
The President’s most recent executive order is Buy American and Hire American (“EO-13788”). ^(97){ }^{97} It calls for new rules and reforms to the H-1B visa program to ensure that visas are “awarded to the most-skilled or highest-paid petition beneficiaries.” ^(98){ }^{98} H-1Bs are temporary work visas that allow companies to hire skilled foreign nationals. ^(99){ }^{99} At present, EO-13788*444 itself does nothing, so potential challenges will depend on the changes the administration presents in the future. ^(100){ }^{100} The administration’s 總統最近的行政命令是《購買美國貨和雇用美國人》（“EO-13788”）。 ^(97){ }^{97} 它要求對 H-1B 簽證計劃進行新的規則和改革，以確保簽證“頒發給最有技能或薪資最高的申請受益人”。 ^(98){ }^{98} H-1B 簽證是臨時工作簽證，允許公司雇用技術熟練的外國國籍人士。 ^(99){ }^{99} 目前，EO-13788*444 本身並沒有任何實質性行動，因此潛在的挑戰將取決於政府未來提出的變更。 ^(100){ }^{100} 政府的
other actions have affected H-1B\mathrm{H}-1 \mathrm{~B} visas: it temporarily suspended the H-1B\mathrm{H}-1 \mathrm{~B} premium processing services on April 3, increasing petition-processing times. ^(101){ }^{101} Additionally, the number of H-1B\mathrm{H}-1 \mathrm{~B} visa petitions filed subject to the 85,000 -cap dropped by about 15%15 \% this year. ^(102){ }^{102} 其他行動影響了 H-1B\mathrm{H}-1 \mathrm{~B} 簽證：它於 4 月 3 日暫時停止了 H-1B\mathrm{H}-1 \mathrm{~B} 加急處理服務，導致申請處理時間增加。此外，根據 85,000 名額提交的 H-1B\mathrm{H}-1 \mathrm{~B} 簽證申請數量今年下降了約 15%15 \% 。 ^(102){ }^{102}
VI. Conclusion 六. 結論
Executive orders are an important tool in any president’s arsenal, regardless of their ideology. In an era of historic congressional unproductivity, the executive’s ability to respond to domestic issues must be preserved. Protesting orders simply by calling them “executive overreach” could be considered hypocritical for anyone who supported President Obama’s more sweeping measures, like his Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program, or his order raising the minimum wage for federal contractors. 行政命令是任何總統工具箱中重要的工具，無論其意識形態如何。在歷史上國會無法產出成果的時代，行政部門應對國內問題的能力必須得到保護。僅僅因為將命令稱為「行政過度干預」而抗議，對於任何支持奧巴馬總統更大範圍措施的人來說，可能被視為虛偽，例如他的童年抵遏行動（“DACA”）計劃或他提高聯邦承包商最低工資的命令。
The responses to the executive orders above demonstrate how people can defend President Obama’s use of executive authority while zealously opposing President Trump’s. President Obama’s more controversial measures, such as DACA and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (“DAPA”) were executive actions rather than executive orders. ^(103){ }^{103} Instead of simply signing an order to create these policies, he directed agencies to create new regulations or guidance pursuant to his wishes. ^(104){ }^{104} These executive actions did not always withstand judicial scrutiny, but they had strong legal foundations. For instance, compare the creation of DAPA to the travel ban orders. To support the legality of DAPA, the President requested an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) and the Department of Justice. ^(105){ }^{105} He received thirty-three pages of well-researched analysis showing a legal basis for **445* 445 exercising prosecutorial discretion on behalf of undocumented parents of Americans. ^(106){ }^{106} In comparison, in support of the Travel Ban, President Trump received an OLC memo that was barely longer than a page, which said that the order was reviewed and “approved with respect to form and legality,” citing only to some the of INA sections listed in the order. ^(107){ }^{107} 對上述行政命令的回應顯示，人們如何能夠捍衛奧巴馬總統使用行政權限的做法，同時熱烈反對特朗普總統的做法。奧巴馬總統的更具爭議性的措施，如 DACA 和美國人父母的延遲遣返行動（“DAPA”），是行政行動而非行政命令。 ^(103){ }^{103} 他並不是簡單地簽署命令來創建這些政策，而是指示各機構根據他的意願制定新的規範或指導方針。 ^(104){ }^{104} 這些行政行動並不總是能夠經受住司法審查，但它們有著堅實的法律基礎。例如，將 DAPA 的創建與旅行禁令命令進行比較。為了支持 DAPA 的合法性，總統向法律顧問辦公室（“OLC”）和司法部請求意見。 ^(105){ }^{105} 他收到了三十三頁的深入分析，顯示出在代表美國無證父母行使檢察裁量權的法律基礎。 **445* 445^(106){ }^{106} 相較之下，為支持旅行禁令，特朗普總統收到了一份僅略長於一頁的法律顧問辦公室備忘錄，該備忘錄指出該命令已被審查並“在形式和合法性方面獲得批准”，僅引用了命令中列出的一些移民和國籍法條款。 ^(107){ }^{107}
This seeming lack of preparedness and planning is a common thread throughout the executive orders. The successful challenges to the orders have hinged on this haphazardness. Executive overreach may factor into the calculus, but in the challenges detailed above, it is not the main concern. If opponents to these policies continue using these tactics, and challenge clear violations of the law, the likelihood for success is high. After all, the problems with many of these orders is not that the president does not have the power to enforce what they contain, but that no one does. 這種表面上的缺乏準備和規劃是所有行政命令中的共同主題。對這些命令的成功挑戰正是基於這種隨意性。行政權力的過度行使可能會影響計算，但在上述挑戰中，這並不是主要關注點。如果反對這些政策的人繼續使用這些戰術，並挑戰明顯違法的行為，成功的可能性是很高的。畢竟，這些命令的問題不在於總統沒有權力執行其內容，而在於沒有人有這種權力。
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf. This included terrorists or suspected terrorists, individuals apprehended at the border or port of entry, and convicted gang members and felons. 來自國土安全部部長 Jeh Charles Johnson 的備忘錄，發送給美國移民和海關執法局代理局長 Thomas S. Winkowski、美國海關和邊境保護局局長 R. Gil Kerlikowske、美國公民及移民服務局局長 Leon Rodriguez，以及政策代理助理部長 Alan D. Bersin（2014 年 11 月 20 日），https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf。這包括恐怖分子或疑似恐怖分子、在邊界或入境口岸被捕的個人，以及被定罪的幫派成員和罪犯。
Id. at 3-4. This included foreign nationals convicted of three or more misdemeanors, or a single “significant misdemeanor,” foreign nationals apprehended after unlawful entry without proof of continuous residence prior to January 1, 2014, and those judged to have “significantly abused the visa or visa waiver programs.” 此包括被判定犯有三項或以上輕罪的外國國籍人士，或單一“重大輕罪”的外國國籍人士，在 2014 年 1 月 1 日之前非法入境後被拘留且無法證明持續居住的外國國籍人士，以及被判定“重大濫用簽證或簽證豁免計劃”的人士。
Id. at 4 . 同上，頁 4。
Id. at 2 . 同上，頁 2。
EO-13768 §5\S 5 (citing to 8 USC §1182\S 1182 (a)(3)). The categories include individuals were reasonably believed to have entered the United States to conduct unlawful activities like espionage or the overthrow of the government; who were or are engaged in terrorist activities, those whose admission would have adverse foreign policy effects, totalitarians or Nazis, and child soldier recruiters. EO-13768 §5\S 5 （引用 8 USC §1182\S 1182 （a）（3））。這些類別包括被合理認為已進入美國從事非法活動的人，如間諜活動或推翻政府；從事恐怖活動的人，入境會對外國政策產生不利影響的人，極權主義者或納粹分子，以及招募童兵的人。 17 Id17 I d. at §5(a)-(g)\S 5(\mathrm{a})-(\mathrm{g}). 17 Id17 I d 。在 §5(a)-(g)\S 5(\mathrm{a})-(\mathrm{g}) 。
See, e.g., Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power, but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation”); see also, Tal Kopan, Trump’s Executive Orders Dramatically Expand Power of Immigration Officers, CNN Politics (Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-immigration-detention-deportations-enforcement/ ("[Immigration advisor to Presidents Obama, Clinton, and George H.W. Bush Steven] Legomsky and Cornell law professor Stephen Yale-Loehr said the enforcement provisions likely couldn’t be challenged in court simply for how they are written, as undocumented immigrants are eligible to be detained and deported under the law."). 參見，例如，Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (“排除外國人是主權的基本行為。這一權利不僅源於立法權，還固有於執行權以控制國家的外交事務”); 另見，Tal Kopan, 特朗普的行政命令大幅擴大移民官員的權力, CNN 政治 (2017 年 1 月 28 日), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-immigration-detention-deportations-enforcement/ (“[奧巴馬、克林頓和喬治·H·W·布什總統的移民顧問史蒂文] Legomsky 和康奈爾法學院教授斯蒂芬·耶爾-洛赫表示，執法條款可能無法僅因其寫作方式在法庭上受到挑戰，因為根據法律，無證移民有資格被拘留和驅逐。”)。
Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, New York Times, Mar. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/ opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html. 米歇爾·亞歷山大，《上法庭：衝擊司法系統》，《紐約時報》，2012 年 3 月 10 日，http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/ opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html。 IdI d.
Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 11-2, Santa Clara v. Trump, 17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2017). 被告對原告的初步禁令動議的反對意見，見於聖克拉拉訴特朗普案，17-cv-00574-WHO（加州北區，2017 年 3 月 9 日）。
Santa Clara v. Trump, 17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (order granting preliminary injunction). 聖克拉拉訴特朗普，17-cv-00574-WHO（加州北區，2017 年 4 月 25 日）（批准初步禁令的命令）。
Id. at 2 . 同上，頁 2。
Id. 同上。
Id. at 14 . 同上，頁 14。
Id. at 16,23-24,4916,23-24,49. 在 16,23-24,4916,23-24,49 。
Aarti Kohli, et. al., Secure Communities by the Numbers: An Analysis of Demographics and Due Process 2-3, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy (Oct. 2011), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf. Aarti Kohli 等人，《按數字看安全社區：人口統計與正當程序的分析》2-3 頁，厄爾·華倫首席法官法律與社會政策研究所（2011 年 10 月），https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf。
Id. at 3,8 . 同上，頁 3,8。
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Megan Mack, Officer, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and Phillip A. McNamara, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf. 來自國土安全部部長 Jeh Charles Johnson 的備忘錄，致美國移民和海關執法局代理局長 Thomas S. Winkowski、民權和公民自由辦公室官員 Megan Mack，以及國際事務代理助理部長 Phillip A. McNamara（2014 年 11 月 20 日），https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf。
Kohli et al., supra note 54 , at 3 . Kohli 等人，前引註 54，第 3 頁。
EO- 13768§1313768 \S 13.
51 Memorandum from John Kelly, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Thomas D. Homan, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Lori Scialabba, Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Joseph B. Maher, Acting General Counsel, Dimple Shah, Acting Assistant Secretary for 51 份來自國土安全部部長約翰·凱利的備忘錄，致美國海關和邊境保護局代理局長凱文·麥卡利南、美國移民和海關執法局代理局長托馬斯·霍曼、美國公民及移民服務局代理局長洛里·斯基亞拉巴、美國移民局代理總法律顧問約瑟夫·B·馬赫、代理助理部長丁普爾·沙的備忘錄。
International Affairs, and Chip Fulghum, Acting Undersecretary for Management at 4-5, (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf. 國際事務，及管理署代理副秘書長 Chip Fulghum 於 4-5，（2017 年 2 月 20 日），https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf。
Rafael Bernal, Reports find that immigrants commit less crime than US-born citizens, The Hill (Mar. 19, 2017), http://thehill.com/ latino/324607-reports-find-that-immigrants-commit-less-crime-than-us-born-citizens. 拉斐爾·伯納爾，報告發現移民犯罪率低於美國出生的公民，《山丘》（2017 年 3 月 19 日），http://thehill.com/ latino/324607-reports-find-that-immigrants-commit-less-crime-than-us-born-citizens。
Id. at 4. The Privacy Act applies to individuals, which it defines as “a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 5 USCS § 552a. 該法第 4 條。隱私法適用於個人，定義為「美國公民或合法獲准永久居留的外國人。」5 USCS § 552a。
EO- 13768 § 14 . EO- 13768 § 14 。
James Doubek, People Are Reporting Criminal (Space) Aliens To New ICE Hotline, NPR (Apr. 29, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/ thetwo-way/2017/04/29/526155130/people-are-reporting-c