Mental Causation  心理因果

Questions about the existence and nature of mental causation are prominent in contemporary discussions of the mind and human agency. Originally, the problem of mental causation was that of understanding how an immaterial mind, a soul, could interact with the body. Most philosophers nowadays repudiate souls, but the problem of mental causation has not gone away. Instead, focus has shifted to mental properties. How could mental properties be causally relevant to bodily behavior? How could something mental be a cause qua mental? After looking at the traditional Problem of Interaction, we survey several versions of the property-based problem along with potential solutions.
心智因果關係的存在及其性質是當代有關心智與人類行動的重要討論題目。最初,心智因果關係的問題在於理解一個不可觸的心靈或靈魂如何與身體互動。如今,大多數哲學家否定靈魂的存在,但心智因果關係的問題仍未得到解決。注意力轉移到心智屬性。心智屬性如何對身體行為產生因果影響?某種心智如何可作為原因而存在?在檢視傳統互動問題後,我們分析幾種基於屬性的問題及其潛在解決方案。

• 1. Preliminaries  初步工作
  • 1.1 The Importance of Mental Causation
    心理因果的重要性
  • 1.2 Is This an Empirical Issue?
    這是一個經驗問題嗎?
• 2. The Problem of Interaction
  互動的問題
  • 2.1 What is the Mind-Body Nexus?
    身心連結
  • 2.2 The Pairing Problem
    配對問題
  • 2.3 Conservation Laws  2.3 保護法則
  • 2.4 The Completeness of the Physical
    完整性的物理
• 3. The Ascent to Properties
  三.物業的上升
• 4. Problem I: Property Dualism
  問題 I：屬性二元論
• 5. Problem II: Anomalous Monism
  异常单元论
  • 5.1 The Argument for Anomalous Monism
    唯異論
  • 5.2 The Charge of Epiphenomenalism
    表象現象論的指控
  • 5.3 Counterfactual Dependence
    5.3 反事實依賴
  • 5.4 Lawful Sufficiency  合法充足
  • 5.5 The Ascent to Properties Reconsidered
    重新考慮的產權上升
• 6. Problem III: Exclusion
  第三個問題：排除
  • 6.1 Functionalism and Multiple Realizability
    功能主義和多重實現性
  • 6.2 The Exclusion Problem
    排除問題
  • 6.3 Autonomy Solutions  自主解決方案
  • 6.4 Inheritance Solutions
    6.4 繼承解決方案
  • 6.5 Identity Solutions  身份解決方案
  • 6.6 Necessary Effects: A Deeper Problem for Functionalism?
    必要的影響:功能主義的深層問題?
• 7. Problem IV: Externalism
  第七題：外在主義
  • 7.1 How Could Content Make a Causal Difference?
    內容如何產生因果影響?
  • 7.2 Intrinsic Causal Surrogates
    內在因果替代
  • 7.3 Reasons as Structuring Causes
    7.3 原因作為結構原因
  • 7.4 Broad Behavior  7.4 廣泛行為
  • 7.5 The Appeal to Explanatory Practice
    7.5 訴求解釋性實踐
• 8. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind
  形而上學和心靈哲學
• Bibliography  參考書目
• Academic Tools  學術工具
• Other Internet Resources
  其他網路資源
• Related Entries  相關條目

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1. Preliminaries  初步工作

1.1 The Importance of Mental Causation
心理因果的重要性

Mental causation—the mind’s causal interaction with the world, and in particular, its influence on behavior—is central to our conception of ourselves as agents. Mind–world interaction is taken for granted in everyday experience and in scientific practice. The pain you feel when you sprain your ankle causes you to open the freezer in search of an ice pack. An intention to go to the cinema leads you to get into your car. Psychologists tell us that mental images enable us to navigate our surroundings intelligently. Economists explain fluctuations in financial markets by citing traders’ beliefs about the price of oil next month. In each case, a mental occurrence appears to produce a series of complex and coordinated bodily motions that subsequently have additional downstream effects in the physical world. Instances of apparent mental causation are so common that they often go unremarked, but they are central to the commonsense picture we have of ourselves. It’s not surprising, then, that questions about the nature and possibility of mental causation arise in a variety of philosophical contexts.
精神因果關係——心智與世界的因果互動,尤其是它對行為的影響——是我們自身行動者角色概念的核心。心智與世界的互動在日常經驗和科學實踐中是理所當然的。當你扭傷腳踝時感到的疼痛會導致你打開冰箱尋找冰敷包。想要去看電影的意圖會讓你進入汽車。心理學家告訴我們,心智映像使我們能夠智慧地導航我們的周圍環境。經濟學家解釋金融市場的波動,是由於交易者對下個月油價的信念。在每一種情況下,一種心理活動似乎都會產生一系列複雜協調的身體運動,這些運動隨後會在物理世界產生更多的下游影響。表面上的心智因果關係如此普遍,以至於常常不被注意,但它們卻是我們對自身的常識性認識的核心。因此,關於心智因果關係的本質和可能性的問題自然會在各種哲學語境中出現。

Ontology: Suppose you accept the “Eleatic Principle” that power is the mark of being: to exist is to have causal powers (Armstrong 1978, pp. 45–6; Oddie 1982). It’s plausible to think that if the mental has any causal powers at all, it can affect the physical world. Without such powers, the mental faces ontological embarrassment, even elimination.
存在論：假設您接受「埃雷亞原則」，即權力是存在的標誌：存在就是擁有因果能力(Armstrong 1978,第 45-46 頁;Oddie 1982)。如果心智確實擁有任何因果能力,那麼它就能影響物理世界,這是可信的。如果沒有這種能力,心智就會面臨存在論的困尷,甚至被淘汰。

Metaphysics: Mental causation is “at the heart of the mind-body problem” (Shoemaker 2001, p. 74), often figuring explicitly in how the problem is formulated (Mackie 1979; Campbell 1984; Crane 1999). To ask how mind and body are related just is, in part, to ask how they could possibly affect one another.
形上學:精神因果作為"頭腦-身體問題的核心"(Shoemaker 2001, 第 74 頁),經常明確出現在問題的表述中(Mackie 1979; Campbell 1984; Crane 1999)。探討頭腦和身體如何關聯,就等同於部分探討它們如何相互影響。

Moral psychology: Agency of the sort required for free will and moral responsibility appears to require mental causation. If your behavior is not caused by your mind’s activities—its deliberations, decisions, and the like—what sense would it make to hold you responsible for what your body does? You would appear to be scarcely more than a passive observer of your body’s activities. We would then need to abandon what Strawson (1962) calls our “reactive attitudes”, the moral attitudes and feelings (e.g., gratitude, resentment) so central to our interpersonal lives.
道德心理學：自由意志和道德責任所需的主體性似乎需要心理因果關係。如果你的行為不是由你心智的活動（如思慮、決定等）所引起，那麼要如何認定你對你身體的行為負責呢？你似乎不過是對你身體活動的一個被動觀察者。我們就不得不放棄斯特朗森（1962）所說的「反應性態度」，這些對我們人際生活如此重要的道德態度和情感（如感激、憤怒等）。

Action theory: It is widely believed that psychological explanation hinges on the possibility of mental causation. If your mind and its states, such as your beliefs and desires, were causally isolated from your bodily behavior, then what goes on in your mind could not explain what you do (Davidson 1963; Mele 1992; for dissent, see “noncausalists” such as Ginet 1990; Sehon 2005; Tanney 2013; and see the essays in D’Oro 2013). These observations about agency suggest a more basic conceptual point: if minds did not influence behavior, in what sense would anyone truly act? Sounds would be made, but no one would mean anything by them. Bodies would move, but no one would thereby do anything (Malcolm 1968; Horgan 2007).
行動理論: 人們廣泛認為心理解釋取決於心理因果的可能性。如果你的心智及其狀態,如你的信念和欲望,與你的身體行為是因果孤立的,那麼你心中所發生的事情就不能解釋你所做的事情(Davidson 1963; Mele 1992;對此持反對意見的有「非因果論者」,如 Ginet 1990; Sehon 2005; Tanney 2013;以及 D'Oro 2013 中的論文)。這些關於主動性的觀察提出了一個更基本的概念性觀點:如果心智不影響行為,那麼任何人都不會真正行動?會發出聲音,但沒有人會有任何意義。身體會移動,但沒有人會因此做任何事情(Malcolm 1968; Horgan 2007)。

Although each of the above points could be contested, collectively they create pressure to address the problem of mental causation—problem or problems: as will become clear, there is more than one way in which puzzles about the mind’s causal efficacy can arise.
雖然上述每一點都可能受到爭議,但總之它們共同造成了解決心理因果問題的壓力——問題或問題:正如將變得清晰的那樣,有多種方式可能引發關於心智因果效力的困惑。

1.2 Is This an Empirical Issue?
這是一個經驗問題嗎?

At least since Hume, philosophers have assumed that causal questions are largely empirical. We look to science to tell us, for example, the moon’s role in causing the tides, or smoking’s contribution to lung cancer: these are not considered philosophical questions. It might seem equally obvious that the mind’s causal role in producing behavior is also a matter for science to settle. So is it in fact the case that working scientists, and in particular, psychologists, find it necessary to appeal to distinctively mental phenomena to account for behavior? Is there evidence in neuroscience that mental states and processes figure in the production of actions?
自少於休謨以來,哲學家們已假設因果問題在很大程度上是經驗性的。我們尋求科學告訴我們,例如月球在引起潮汐中的作用,或吸煙對肺癌的貢獻:這些並非被視為哲學問題。同樣顯而易見的是,心智在產生行為方面的因果作用也是科學要解決的問題。那麼,實際上工作的科學家,特別是心理學家,是否認為有必要訴諸特有的心理現象來解釋行為?神經科學是否有證據表明心理狀態和過程在行為產生中起作用?

Although most psychologists would without hesitation accept the causal interaction of minds and bodies, a small but growing number of empirical researchers have insisted that the evidence supports some version of epiphenomenalism, the thesis that mental states, while caused by physical happenings, exert no efficacy in return. Wegner, a psychologist, contends that accumulated empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports epiphenomenalism, at least with respect to conscious willing (Wegner 2002, 2004). He draws on influential work by Libet (1985, 2001, 2004) and others to argue that conscious intending is itself a product of nonconscious processes that do the real causal work, so that free will is “an illusion”. If Wegner and his colleagues are right, these results could have ancillary implications for the physical efficacy of mental states generally. (Note, that some dualists (e.g. Lowe 2006; Gibb 2013) have appealed to the same work by Libet to defend their own non-traditional models of psychophysical causation).
儘管大多數心理學家毫不猶豫地接受心靈和身體之間的因果互動,但越來越多的實證研究人員堅持,證據支持某種形式的附隨現象論,即心理狀態雖然由物理事件引起,但並不能反過來產生任何作用。心理學家韋格納認為,累積的實證證據顯示附隨現象論是正確的,至少在有意識意志方面是如此(韋格納,2002 年,2004 年)。他引用了利邦(1985 年,2001 年,2004 年)等人的重要研究,認為有意識的意向本身是無意識過程的產物,因此自由意志只是"一種幻覺"。如果韋格納及其同事是正確的,這些結果可能會對心理狀態在整體上的物理效力產生附帶影響。(需要注意的是,有些雙元論者(如洛威,2006 年;吉布,2013 年)也引用了利邦的同樣研究,為他們自己非傳統的心理物理因果模型辯護)。

Because this research has received extensive treatment in recent work on free will, we will not consider it further, but instead refer interested readers to the sources cited above and to Mele 2014 for critical discussion and references. Here we simply note that traditional and contemporary attempts to assess the efficacy of mental states have run up against philosophical difficulties as well, difficulties that tend to overshadow the experimental evidence accumulated thus far. In this sense, the efficacy of mind is quite unlike that of, say, the moon or smoking. This will, we hope, become clear in the discussion to follow.
由於這項研究在近期有關自由意志的著作中已有廣泛討論,我們不會再深入探討,而是建議有興趣的讀者參閱上述引用的資料以及 Mele 2014 年的批評性討論和參考文獻。在此我們僅指出,評估心理狀態功效的傳統和當代嘗試,同樣也遇到了哲學上的困難,這些困難往往掩蓋了迄今為止積累的實驗證據。從這個意義上說,心智的功效完全不同於月球或吸煙等,這一點希望在後續的討論中會變得更加清晰。

2. The Problem of Interaction
互動的問題

Some historians (e.g., Matson 1966; King 2007) say the mind-body problem is relatively recent, the most important source being Descartes’s “real distinction” between mind and body. That said, you can find topics closely related to mental causation in, for example, Plato’s Phaedo and Aristotle’s De Anima, and it might turn out that many features of the contemporary debate are present in some form or other in pre-modern texts (Caston 1997). Skirting such historical questions, we begin with Descartes, who, for better or worse, set the agenda for modern discussions of mental causation. The cluster of causal problems arising from the Cartesian conception of mind is The Problem of Interaction.
有些歷史學家（如 Matson 1966；King 2007）認為心身問題相當新穎,最重要的源頭是笛卡爾的「實在區別」概念,將心與身體分開。話雖如此,你能在柏拉圖的《斐多篇》及亞里士多德的《心靈論》中找到與心靈因果相關的話題,並且可能發現現代辯論的許多特徵在前現代文獻中也有所呈現（Caston 1997）。避開此類歷史問題,我們從笛卡爾開始,他或好或壞地奠定了現代心靈因果討論的基調。由笛卡爾心靈觀所衍生的因果問題集合就是互動問題。

2.1 What is the Mind-Body Nexus?
身心連結

According to Descartes, minds and bodies are distinct kinds of thing, or, in the technical terminology of the day, distinct kinds of substance. Bodies, he held, are spatially extended substances, incapable of feeling or thought; minds, in contrast, are unextended, thinking, feeling substances: souls. (We use “soul” with no theological implications to designate minds considered in the Cartesian way as immaterial substances.) Despite recognizing these deep differences, Descartes accepted the common belief that mind and body causally interact: “Everyone feels that he is a single person with both body and thought so related by nature that the thought can move the body and feel the things which happen to it” (in Cottingham et al. 1991, p. 228). But if minds and bodies are so radically different, it is not easy to see how they could interact. Descartes was well aware of the difficulty. Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia puts it forcefully to him in a 1643 letter, pressing Descartes to tell her
根據笛卡爾的說法,心靈和身體是截然不同的事物,或者按照當時的專業術語,是不同種類的實體。他認為,身體是具有空間延伸的實體,無法感受或思考;而心靈則是非延伸的、思考和感受的實體:靈魂。(我們在無神學含義的情況下使用「靈魂」一詞,是為了按照笛卡爾的方式來指稱心靈作為非物質實體。)儘管認識到這些深刻的差異,但笛卡爾接受了普遍的信念,即心靈和身體之間存在因果互動:「每個人都感覺自己是一個擁有身體和思維的單一個體,它們在本質上如此相關,以至於思維可以移動身體,並感受發生在身體上的事物」(引自 Cottingham 等人,1991 年,第 228 頁)。但是,如果心靈和身體如此根本不同,就很難看出它們如何能互相作用。笛卡爾非常清楚這個困難。1643 年,波希米亞的伊麗莎白公主在給他的信中,強烈要求笛卡爾告訴她

how the human soul can determine the movement of the animal spirits in the body so as to perform voluntary acts—being as it is merely a conscious substance. For the determination of movement seems always to come about from the moving body’s being propelled—to depend on the kind of impulse it gets from what sets it in motion, or again, on the nature and shape of this latter thing’s surface. Now the first two conditions involve contact, and the third involves that the impelling thing has extension; but you utterly exclude extension from your notion of soul, and contact seems to me incompatible with a thing’s being immaterial (in Anscombe and Geach 1954, pp. 274–5).
人類靈魂如何能決定身體動物精神的運動,以便進行自願行為——作為僅僅是一種意識物質。因為運動的決定似乎總是來自被推動物體的運動——取決於它從推動它的東西那裡獲得的衝動類型,或者再次,取決於這後者事物表面的性質和形狀。現在,前兩個條件涉及接觸,第三個條件涉及推動事物具有延伸性;但是你完全排除了靈魂概念中的延伸性,而接觸似乎與事物的無形性不相容。

Elisabeth is expressing the prevailing mechanistic view as to how causation of bodies works: it must involve the cause’s impelling the body, where this requires contact between cause and effect. Since a soul could never come into contact with a body—souls have no spatial location—an immaterial soul could never impel, and so could never causally interact with, a body.
艾麗莎白正在表達主導的機械論觀點,即身體的因果關係必須涉及導致因的推動作用,而這需要因與果之間的接觸。由於靈魂不可能與身體接觸 — 靈魂沒有空間位置 — 所以無物質性靈魂不可能推動,也無法與身體因果互動。

Elisabeth’s worries might seem quaint and outdated. Causal relations countenanced by contemporary physics can take several forms, not all of which are of the push-pull variety. Why shouldn’t soul–body interaction simply be included as another sort of “non-mechanistic” causation (Richardson 1982)? But Elisabeth’s objection is in fact just one version of a more general worry about soul–body interaction, a worry that rests on the following thesis about causation:
伊莉莎白的擔憂可能看起來古怪和過時。當代物理學所承認的因果關係可以採取多種形式,並非全部都屬於推拉的類型。為什麼靈魂-身體交互作用不能被簡單地納入另一種"非機械性"因果的範疇呢(Richardson 1982)? 但事實上,伊莉莎白的反對只是一種更廣泛擔憂靈魂-身體交互作用的版本,這種擔憂建基於以下有關因果關係的命題:

• (CN)  中國 Any causal relation requires a nexus, some interface by means of which cause and effect are connected.
  任何因果關係都需要一個聯結點,一個讓因與果得以連結的介面。

Elisabeth presumes that when an effect is bodily motion, the required nexus is spatial contact. But even if she is wrong about this (Garber 1983), (CN) nevertheless poses problems for the dualist: if contact is not the mind–body nexus, what is?
艾麗莎貝思假設當效果是肉體運動時,所需的關係是空間接觸。但即使她對此有所錯誤(Garber 1983)，(CN)仍然為二元論者帶來問題:如果接觸不是心靈 - 身體關係,那是什麼?

One line of thought appeals to the transference theory of causality. Here the idea is that identity—the persistence of something from cause to effect—provides the needed link. If something in a soul could become present in a body, this could bridge the immaterial and material. Descartes himself appears to accept such a theory, declaring in the Third Meditation that there could be nothing in an effect not present in its total efficient cause (Descartes 1642/1996, p. 28). But now the problem reasserts itself: if, as the substance dualist insists, bodies and minds are radically different, they have no properties in common. According to Descartes, a body’s properties are modes of extension, ways of being extended, while a soul’s properties are modes of something quite different, thought or consciousness. If causation involved transference, a Cartesian soul could not interact with a body (but see Hart 1988; Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1991).
單一線索理論吸引因果遷移論。此處的想法是,身份 - 從因到果的持續性 - 提供所需的聯繫。如果靈魂中的某些東西可以出現在身體中,這可以連接非物質和物質。笛卡爾本人似乎接受了這樣一種理論,在《第三次冥想》中宣稱,效果中不可能存在任何沒有出現在其總體有效原因中的東西(笛卡爾 1642/1996 年,第 28 頁)。但現在問題卻又出現了:如果正如物質二元論者堅持的那樣,身體和心靈是截然不同的,它們沒有任何共同的屬性。根據笛卡爾的說法,一個物體的屬性是延伸的模式,是延伸的方式,而靈魂的屬性是完全不同的東西的模式,即思想或意識。如果因果關係涉及轉移,笛卡爾的靈魂就無法與身體互動(但請參見 Hart 1988 年;霍夫曼和羅森克朗茨 1991 年)。

Does a dualist need to accept (CN), however? The notion of a causal nexus has come under criticism, often from philosophers working in the Humean tradition (Blackburn 1990). More generally, (CN) and kindred principles might be thought to rest on a conception of causality that is now obsolete, finding no place in modern physics (for further discussion, see the metaphysics of causation, §2). But the next three versions of the problem can arise even for those who reject the need for a causal nexus.
二元論者必須接受(CN)嗎?因果關係的概念受到批評,通常來自胡梅因主義傳統的哲學家(布萊克本 1990)。更一般而言,(CN)及其相關原則可能被認為建基於一種已經過時的因果性概念,在現代物理學中已無位置(更多討論,見因果論的形而上學,§2)。但即使對那些拒絕因果關係需求的人來說,問題的下三個版本也可能出現。

2.2 The Pairing Problem
配對問題

A second version of the Problem of Interaction is the “Pairing Problem” (Kim 1973, 2005; Sosa 1984; Foster 1991, ch. 6). Imagine two exactly similar minds M₁ and M₂ and the bodies B₁ and B₂ to which they are “attached”, that is, the bodies with which they directly interact. In virtue of what is M₁ causally paired with B₁, and M₂ with B₂?
交互問題的第二個版本是"配對問題"(金 1973 年、2005 年;索薩 1984 年;福斯特 1991 年,第 6 章)。想像兩個完全相似的心智 M ₁ 和 M ₂ 以及它們"附著"的身體 B ₁ 和 B ₂ ,即它們直接互動的身體。是什麼使得 M ₁ 因果上與 B ₁ 配對,而 M ₂ 則與 B ₂ 配對?

This is not the epistemological question of how we could know that these are the pairings (although this is troublesome, too). The question, rather, is metaphysical: in virtue of what are these the pairings? If minds were, like bodies, located in space, causal pairing could be achieved by the relative spatial locations of the substances (Bailey et al. 2011). Particular minds might be inside or “inhabit” particular bodies. But if minds are non-spatial souls, relative spatial location is unavailable to fill the pairing role. And since M₁ and M₂ are, by hypothesis, exactly similar, we cannot appeal to the different intrinsic properties that they might possess.
這不是我們如何知道這些是配對的認識論問題(儘管這也是棘手的)。這個問題實際上是形而上學的:這些配對是由於什麼而存在的?如果心靈像身體一樣位於空間,因果配對可以通過物質的相對空間位置來實現(Bailey et al. 2011)。特定的心靈可能在特定的身體內部或"居住"在特定的身體中。但是,如果心靈是非空間性的靈魂,相對空間位置就無法擔任配對角色。而且,由於 M ₁ 和 M ₂ 在假設上是完全相似的,我們無法訴諸它們可能擁有的不同內在屬性。

In reply, a dualist could appeal to “individualistic” powers (Unger 2006, pp. 242–59; Foster 1991, pp. 167–8). Powers are standardly thought of as powers to interact with some type of object. A key has the power to open this lock, but only by virtue of having the power to open any lock of this kind, the power to open any intrinsically comparable lock. Individualistic powers, in contrast, are powers possessed by an object to affect or be affected by a particular object. Think of a key with the power to open this lock, but without the power to open any intrinsically indiscernible lock. Likewise, a soul could have the power to interact with a particular body and no other. As the key example suggests, however, it is by no means obvious that powers could be individualistic in this sense (but see Audi 2011).
就此回應,一元論者可能會訴諸於「個體主義性」的力量(Unger 2006, pp. 242–59; Foster 1991, pp. 167–8)。一般而言,力量被視為與某類型對象互動的能力。一把鑰匙有開啟此鎖的力量,但只因它具有開啟此類鎖的能力,即開啟任何內在可比較的鎖的能力。相反,個體主義性的力量是指一個對象拥有影響或被影響特定對象的能力。例如,一把鑰匙僅有開啟此鎖的力量,而沒有開啟任何內在無差異的鎖的能力。同樣地,靈魂也可能只有與特定身體互動的能力,而無法與其他身體互動。然而,正如鑰匙的例子所暗示的,力量可以是如此個體主義性並非顯而易見(但參見 Audi 2011)。

2.3 Conservation Laws  2.3 保護法則

A third version of the Problem of Interaction appeals to conservation laws. The leading idea is simple: Soul–body interaction would have to change the amount of energy in the physical universe. When souls act, new energy would appear in, say, the brain. When souls are acted upon, some quantity of energy in the brain would vanish. But either scenario would contravene established conservation laws, which permit only the conversion and redistribution of energy (or mass–energy) within the physical universe, not its addition or subtraction.
互動問題的第三種版本訴諸於保守定律。主導的思想很簡單:靈魂-身體互動將不得不改變物理宇宙中能量的數量。當靈魂行動時,新的能量會出現在例如大腦中。當靈魂受到影響時,大腦中的某些能量會消失。但任何情況下都會違反既定的保守定律,這些定律只允許能量(或質能)在物理宇宙中轉換和重新分配,而非添加或減去。

This version of the problem has dogged dualism since the scientific revolution (Lowe 1992; Papineau 2000), and a number of contemporary philosophers present conservation as a major obstacle for dualists (Fodor 1981; Dennett 1991, p. 35; Heil 2012, p. 26; Papineau 2000). That said, turning the leading idea into a compelling argument has proven difficult. First, the conservation laws do not dictate what kinds of energy exist, only that they must operate conservatively. Hence, if sui generis mental energy existed, as long as it operated conservatively, this would be consistent with the conservation laws. Appealing to this fact, Hart (1988) advances a substance dualism and, combining it with a transference theory of causation (§2.1), argues that psychophysical causation consists in the transfer of such psychic energy. (For arguments against the existence of sui generis mental energy, see Papineau 2000). Secondly, what is needed is a conservation law weak enough to have been confirmed by physical science, but strong enough to preclude soul–body interaction. Averill and Keating (1981) consider a number of candidate “laws” and argue that none meets both criteria. Thirdly, it’s not clear in any case that a soul would have to add energy to (or receive it from) the brain in order to interact with it. Broad (1925, pp. 103–9) suggests a soul could act merely by redistributing the brain’s energy without changing its quantity. Furthermore, Lowe (2000) and Gibb (2013) both advance dualist models of psychophysical causation according to which the mental does not affect the brain either by affecting the amount of energy in it or by redistributing it. (For more recent discussion of these and other complexities, see Montero 2006; Koksvik 2007; Gibb 2010.)
這個問題的此版本自科學革命以來一直困擾著二元論(Lowe 1992; Papineau 2000),並且當代許多哲學家認為保守主義是二元論者面臨的主要障礙(Fodor 1981; Dennett 1991, p. 35; Heil 2012, p. 26; Papineau 2000)。那麼說,將這一主導思想轉化為一個令人信服的論點卻證明非常困難。首先,保守定律並不規定存在什麼樣的能量,只規定它們必須以保守方式運作。因此,如果存在著獨特的精神能量,只要其以保守方式運作,這就與保守定律一致。援引這一事實,Hart (1988)提出了一種物質二元論,並將之與因果轉移理論結合(§2.1),論證心理物理性因果關係在於這種精神能量的轉移。(關於獨特精神能量的存在,見 Papineau 2000)。其次,所需要的是一個足夠微弱,能夠得到物理科學確認,但又足夠強大到能排除靈魂-身體交互作用的保守定律。Averill 和 Keating (1981)考慮了一些候選的"定律",並認為沒有一個同時符合這兩個條件。第三,在任何情況下,靈魂都不必向大腦增加能量(或從中獲取能量)才能與之互動。Broad (1925, pp. 103-9)建議,靈魂可僅通過重新分配大腦的能量而不改變其數量來發揮作用。此外,Lowe (2000)和 Gibb (2013)都提出了心理物理性因果關係的二元論模型,其中心理並不影響大腦的能量數量或其重新分配。(關於這些與其他複雜性的更多近期討論,見 Montero 2006; Koksvik 2007; Gibb 2010。)

2.4 The Completeness of the Physical
完整性的物理

A fourth version of the Problem of Interaction is related to the third, but, because it is more prominent in the contemporary literature, especially in some of the “property-based” problems we examine below, we will develop this last version at greater length. The first premise is:
交互問題的第四版與第三版相關聯,但由於它在當代文獻中更為突出,尤其是我們在下文中檢查的一些"基於屬性"的問題,我們將更詳細地闡述這最後一個版本。第一個前提是:

The Completeness of the Physical: Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause.
物質的完整性：每個物理效果都有一個充分的物理原因。

When you trace the causal history of any physical effect—that is, of anything physical that has a cause—you will never need to appeal to anything non-physical. The physical universe contains within itself the resources for a full causal explanation of any of its (caused) elements, and in this sense is “complete”. The point applies, then, to whatever might occur to or within our bodies. Any instance of bodily behavior has a sufficient physical cause, which itself has a sufficient physical cause, and so on. In tracing the causal history of what we do, we need never appeal to anything non-physical.
任何物理效果的因果歷史溯源——也就是任何有因而產生的物理事物——你都不需要求助於任何非物理性的東西。物理宇宙本身包含了對其(被造成的)任何元素進行完整因果解釋所需的資源,在這個意義上是"完整的"。因此,這一點適用於可能發生於或在我們身體內部的任何事物。任何身體行為都有充分的物理原因,而這些物理原因本身又有充分的物理原因,如此往復。在追溯我們所作所為的因果歷史時,我們從不需要訴諸任何非物理性的東西。

This principle appears frequently in the mental causation literature under a number of labels: most common are variations of Completeness of the Physical (Crane 1995, 2001; Papineau 1993, 2000; O’Connor and Churchill 2010) or Physical Closure (Crane 1992; Baker 1993; Melnyk 2003; Kim 2005). We’ll call it Completeness for short.
物理全面性

Labels aside, several versions of the premise appear in the literature, and they can differ in strength. Note that the principle as formulated says nothing about whether the non-physical can affect the physical; a strengthened version prohibits this. (Closure is sometimes reserved for this stronger principle: LePore and Loewer 1987; Kim 1998, p. 40; Marcus 2005; compare Strong Causal Closure in Montero 2003.) An even more ambitious version blocks the non-physical from being cause or effect; such is suggested in Davidson’s work (see §5.1 and McLaughlin 1989, who uses Physical Comprehensiveness for this thesis.) As for weaker versions, Completeness could be limited to physical effects within the human body without affecting its relevance to the current topic. Note also that the principle is apparently committed to deterministic physical causation; a weakened version permits probabilistic causes. (For complications with such a weakening, see Montero 2003, and for other challenges with formulating Completeness, Lowe 2000; Gibb 2015.)
標籤一旁,這個前提的幾個版本出現在文獻中,它們在強度上可能有所不同。請注意,所提出的原則並未說明非物理實體是否可以影響物理實體;加強版本禁止此情況發生。(封閉性有時被保留給這個更強大的原則:LePore 和 Loewer 1987;Kim 1998,第 40 頁;Marcus 2005;比較 Montero 2003 中的強因果封閉性。)一個更雄心勃勃的版本阻止非物理實體作為原因或結果;這點在 Davidson 的作品中有所暗示(參見§5.1 和 McLaughlin 1989,後者將其稱為物理全面性)。至於更弱的版本,完整性可能僅限於人體內的物理影響,而不會影響其對現有主題的相關性。還要注意的是,這個原則明顯致力於決定性的物理因果關係;一個削弱版本允許機率性原因。(對於這種削弱的複雜性,參見 Montero 2003,至於其他制定完整性的挑戰,參見 Lowe 2000;Gibb 2015.)

For simplicity, we stay with the principle as formulated at the outset. Why think that it’s true? Perhaps it is a conceptual truth: for an effect to be physical is, at least in part, for it to have a physical cause. This defense turns on the proper analysis of the concept physical, itself the subject of a contentious literature (see physicalism). Here we simply note that the principle does not seem analytic; it appears to be a substantive, empirical claim about the causal structure of the universe. (For more on the conceptual defense, see Crane 1991; Papineau 1991, 1993, §1.9; Lowe 1996, p. 56.)
為簡單起見,我們堅持最初提出的原則。為什麼認為它是真實的?也許這是一個概念性的真理:物理效果必須至少部分由物理原因導致。這種辯護依賴於對物理概念本身的適當分析,這也是一個有爭議的文學主題(見物理主義)。我們只是注意到這個原則並不看起來是分析性的;它似乎是一個關於宇宙因果結構的實質性、經驗性主張。(更多關於概念性辯護,請參見 Crane 1991;Papineau 1991, 1993, §1.9;Lowe 1996, p. 56.)

It’s natural, then, to look to science for a defense, and especially physics (or physiology). Appeals to “current physical theory” (Antony and Levine 1997, p. 100), “the development of the sciences” (LePore and Loewer 1987, p. 630), and “physics textbooks” (Melnyk 2003, p. 289) are common, but what exactly in physical science supports the premise? An appeal to the conservation laws (2.3) might be thought to generate one such argument. Another argument is the no-gap argument. (See, for example Melnyk 2003, pp. 288–90; Papineau 1993, pp. 31–32). Physics has been hugely successful in identifying the causes of various kinds of physical event. To do so physicists have only needed to appeal to physical events. Not once have they had to appeal to sui generis mental events. Without doubt the causal account that physics provides of physical events contains gaps. But the crucial point is that is highly unlikely that physics will ever need to appeal to sui generis mental causes to fill these gaps—or so proponents of the no-gap argument claim. A similar no-gap argument can be presented at the level of neurophysiology. (See, for example, Melnyk 2003, p.187).
這是當然的,因此我們應該求助於科學,特別是物理學(或生理學)來尋求辯護。對"當前物理理論"(Antony and Levine 1997, p. 100)、"科學的發展"(LePore and Loewer 1987, p. 630)和"物理教科書"(Melnyk 2003, p. 289)的呼籲很常見,但在物理科學中到底有什麼支持這一前提?人們可能認為,保守定律(2.3)的呼籲可以產生這樣的論點。另一個論點是無缺口論點。(見 Melnyk 2003, pp. 288–90;Papineau 1993, pp. 31–32)。物理學在確定各種物理事件的原因方面取得了巨大成功。為此,物理學家只需要訴諸於物理事件。他們從未不得不訴諸於獨一無二的心理事件。毫無疑問,物理學提供的物理事件的因果解釋中存在著缺口。但關鍵的是,物理學很不可能需要訴諸於獨一無二的心理原因來填補這些缺口——這是無缺口論點的支持者的說法。在神經生理學層面也可以提出類似的無缺口論點。(見 Melnyk 2003, p.187)。

We will look at challenges to Completeness in a moment, but note for now that the premise by itself does not preclude the efficacy of souls. Even if every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, some physical effects might have non-physical causes as well. This latest version of the Problem of Interaction thus requires a second premise:
我們將在稍後討論完整性的挑戰,但現在請注意,前提本身並不排除靈魂的效力。即使每個物理效果都有充分的物理原因,某些物理效果也可能有非物理的原因。因此,互動問題的最新版本需要第二個前提:

No Overdetermination: There is no systematic overdetermination of physical effects.
沒有過度決定:沒有系統性的物理效果過度決定。

This principle enjoys wide support in the literature. It is said that postulating systematic overdetermination in this context is “absurd” (Kim 1993a, p. 281), one of the “nonstarters” in the mental causation debate (Kim 1998, p. 65). But why? Perhaps it just looks like bad engineering (Schiffer 1987, p. 148). Or maybe the problem is that it would involve an “intolerable coincidence” (Melnyk 2003, p. 291): every time you act, there are two independent causal processes—one from your brain, another from your soul—converging on the same effect.
這一原則在文獻中廣受支持。據說在此背景下假設系統性過度決定是"荒謬的"(金,1993a,第 281 頁),是心智因果論爭議中的"非開端"(金,1998,第 65 頁)。但為什麼呢?也許這只是看起來像是糟糕的工程(舒法,1987,第 148 頁)。或者問題是它會涉及一個"難以容忍的巧合"(梅尼克,2003,第 291 頁):每次你行動時,都有兩個獨立的因果過程 - 一個來自你的大腦,另一個來自你的靈魂 - 會匯聚到同一個結果。

With the two premises now in place, the Problem of Interaction in our final version is straightforward. Assume for reductio that our souls routinely cause behavior. By Completeness, such effects also have sufficient physical causes, so behavior is systematically overdetermined. But this contradicts No Overdetermination. The dualist’s options would then seem to be severely limited. One is to embrace epiphenomenalism, a doctrine on which the mental, while caused by the physical, exerts no “downward” causal influence in return. A more radical option, parallelism, depicts bodies and souls as running in tandem, with no causal influence in either direction.
假設我們的靈魂通常導致行為。根據完整性,這種影響也有充分的物理原因,因此行為系統地被過度確定。但這與無過度確定性相矛盾。二元論者的選擇似乎受到嚴重限制。一種是接受表象現象論,即心理現象雖然由物理現象導致,但不會產生任何"向下"的因果影響。一個更激進的選擇是平行論,描繪身體和靈魂並行運行,彼此間無任何因果影響。

The two premises can, however, be challenged. Start with Completeness. Baker (1993), not herself a Cartesian dualist, argues that if the principle threatens to undermine our ordinary (and scientific) explanatory practices—many of which cite the mental—it’s Completeness that has to go. Entrenched explanatory practices trump any abstract metaphysical principles with which they might conflict (see also §§6.3, 7.5). Others argue that physical science, far from supporting the principle, may in fact undermine it. Hendry (2006) finds indications of “downward causation” in chemistry, while Stapp (2005) culls evidence from contemporary physics suggesting that there are, contrary to Completeness, causal gaps in the physical world, gaps filled in by the mental (see also Sturgeon 1998; Davies 2006). Emergentists in general deny the principle, either on scientific grounds or by appeal to our conscious experiences of agency (see emergent properties, esp. §4). And although the death of emergentism has been declared more than once on empirical grounds (McLaughlin 1992; Papineau 2000), the view continues to attract philosophers and scientists. (See Wilson 2021 and the contributions to Clayton and Davies 2006; Bedau and Humphreys 2008; Macdonald and Macdonald 2010; Paoletti and Orilia 2017; and Gibb, Hendry and Lancaster 2019.)
兩個前提確實可以被質疑。從完整性開始。Baker(1993)並非笛卡爾二元論者,但她認為如果這一原則威脅到我們的日常(和科學)解釋實踐 - 許多實踐都引述了心理因素 - 那麼必須放棄完整性。根深蒂固的解釋實踐比任何抽象的形而上學原則更加重要(同見第 6.3 節,第 7.5 節)。其他人認為,物理科學並非支持這一原則,事實上可能會削弱它。Hendry(2006)在化學中發現了"下行因果"的跡象,而 Stapp(2005)從當代物理學中收集證據,表明與完整性相反,物理世界存在因果空白,這些空白由心理因素填補(同見 Sturgeon 1998;Davies 2006)。新興論者一般否定這一原則,或基於科學理由,或訴諸我們對能動性的有意識體驗(見"新興屬性",尤其是第 4 節)。雖然新興論的死亡已經在經驗基礎上宣告過一次又一次(McLaughlin 1992;Papineau 2000),但這一觀點仍然吸引著哲學家和科學家(見 Wilson 2021 以及 Clayton 和 Davies 2006;Bedau 和 Humphreys 2008;Macdonald 和 Macdonald 2010;Paoletti 和 Orilia 2017;以及 Gibb, Hendry 和 Lancaster 2019 中的貢獻)。

No Overdetermination has been targeted as well. Mills (1996), for example, defends mental–physical overdetermination as the most plausible route for the dualist to take. Overdetermination is plausible, the reasoning goes, if for any behavioral effect B, both a non-physical (mental) cause M and physical cause P satisfy the following counterfactual conditionals (among others):
不過度決定已經作為目標。例如,Mills (1996)維護精神-肉體過度決定為二元論者最可能採取的道路。如果對於任何行為效應 B,非物理(精神)原因 M 和物理原因 P 都滿足以下反事實條件(在其他條件中), 那麼過度決定是可信的,

1. If M had occurred in the absence of P, B would still have occurred.
   如果 M 在沒有 P 的情況下發生,B 仍然會發生。
2. If P had occurred in the absence of M, B would still have occurred.
   如果 P 在沒有 M 的情況下發生,B 仍會發生。

If the dualist can reasonably claim that (1) and (2) are true, this will make a strong prima facie case for overdetermination. Along different lines, Lowe (2003) presents a model of dualist interaction on which, owing to systematic mind–body dependencies, overdetermination is not the intolerable coincidence worrying opponents of dualism. And more generally, the ban on systematic overdetermination has come under increased scrutiny in the context of the Exclusion Problem, to be discussed in §6.
如果二元論者能合理地宣稱(1)和(2)是真的,這將為過度決定提供強有力的初步依據。從不同的角度來看,Lowe(2003)提出了一種二元論互動模型,由於系統的心靈-身體依賴關係,過度決定並非令反對二元論的人擔心的不可容忍的巧合。更普遍地說,在排斥問題的背景下,對系統性過度決定的禁令受到了越來越多的審查,將在第 6 節討論。

3. The Ascent to Properties
三.物業的上升

Cartesian dualism has fallen out of favor among philosophers and cognitive scientists. There are, to be sure, non-Cartesian forms of substance dualism that might have the resources to confront the Problem of Interaction in its various guises (Hasker 1999; Lowe 2006). But the dominant view today would appear to be that if the mind is a substance at all, it is a physical substance—the brain, for instance. This sort of “substance monism” is in fact a consequence of the more general token identity theory: every concrete mental particular (token) is physical. We will assume token identity in what follows: minds, mental events, and any other mental “objects” are physical (see the mind/brain identity theory).
笛卡爾二元論已不再受哲學家和認知科學家的青睞。確實存在一些非笛卡爾形式的實體二元論,可能有資源來解決交互作用的問題(Hasker 1999; Lowe 2006)。但現今的主流觀點似乎是,如果心靈是一種實體,它就是一種物質實體,即大腦。這種"實體一元論"實際上是更普遍的型別 identity 理論的結果:每一個具體的心理特徵(型別)都是物質的。我們在下文中將假設型別 identity:心靈、心理事件以及任何其他心理"對象"都是物質的(見心靈/大腦 identity 理論)。

What becomes of the Problem of Interaction on such a view? It would seem to dissolve. While causation between brain and body is complex, even to the point of being empirically inscrutable, it does not pose the same problems as soul–body interaction. There are no special philosophical problems with brain–body interaction, nor is there anything especially odd or worrisome about an event in your brain causing, say, your arm to go up. Any philosophical questions here belong to the metaphysics of causation generally and have no special application to mental causation.
在這樣的觀點下,互動的問題會有什麼後果?它似乎會消失。雖然腦與身體之間的因果關係很複雜,甚至到了經驗上難以捉摸的地步,但它並不會產生與靈魂-身體互動相同的問題。對於腦-身體的互動,沒有特殊的哲學問題,也沒有什麼奇怪或令人擔憂的事,比如說你的大腦事件導致你的手臂抬起。這裡的任何哲學問題都屬於因果關係的形而上學,並沒有特別適用於心理因果關係。

Nevertheless, philosophical worries about mental causation persist. Theoretical and commonsensical considerations leading us to think the mind or mental events cause behavior should also make us think that they do so as mental, i.e., in virtue of their mental properties. Properties figure in causal relations (Kim 1973; Mackie 1974, ch. 10; Armstrong 1989, pp. 28–9; Ehring 1997). Drop a square paperweight into soft clay and it will produce an impression. The shape of the impression can be traced to the shape of the paperweight, the depth of the impression to the mass of the paperweight. Here shape and mass are “causally relevant” or “causally efficacious” properties. In particular, they are relevant to certain properties of the impression. By contrast, other properties of the paperweight, such as its color or value, appear to be irrelevant to producing this kind of impression. Or consider a soprano who sings a high note, thereby shattering a glass. The sound, we can suppose, has a meaning—a semantic property—but it is the sound’s acoustic properties that are operative in producing the shattering; the semantic properties play no causal role, at least not with respect to this effect (Dretske 1989).
然而,關於心理因果的哲學擔憂仍然存在。導致我們認為心智或心理事件引起行為的理論和常識性考慮,也應該使我們認為它們是以心理方式,即因其心理特性而如此作用。特性參與因果關係(Kim 1973; Mackie 1974, ch. 10; Armstrong 1989, pp. 28–9; Ehring 1997)。將一個方形的重物放入軟質黏土中,它會產生一個印痕。印痕的形狀可以追溯到重物的形狀,印痕的深度則可追溯到重物的質量。這裡,形狀和質量是"因果相關"或"因果有效"的特性。尤其是,它們與某些印痕特性相關。相反,重物的其他特性,如其顏色或價值,似乎與產生這種印痕無關。或者考慮一位女高音歌手唱一個高音,從而打碎了一個玻璃杯。我們可以假設,聲音有一定意義-一種語義特性-但是,在產生這種破碎作用中起作用的是聲音的聲學特性;語義特性並不發揮任何因果作用,至少不是針對這種效果(Dretske 1989)。

By themselves, these observations pose no special problem for the philosopher of mind. While the notion of a causally relevant property calls for analysis (Horgan 1989; Dardis 1993; Braun 1995), there is no reason at the outset for a token-identity theorist to be especially concerned about the efficacy of mental properties. Gus smiles because of the way his food tastes, that phenomenal property; Lilian walks to school along a particular route because of what she believes, that representational property. Assuming the mind is something physical, why should a mind’s causing behavior in virtue of its mental properties be any more puzzling than a paperweight’s causing a square impression in virtue of its shape?
這些觀察本身並不會為心智哲學家造成特殊問題。儘管因果相關屬性的概念需要分析(Horgan 1989;Dardis 1993;Braun 1995),對於重要性基於心理屬性的理論者來說,並無特別的顧慮。喬因為他的食物味道而微笑,那種感官屬性;莉莉安因為她的信念而沿特定路線走到學校,那種表現屬性。假設心靈是某種物質,為什麼心靈基於其心理屬性而引起行為,會比重物基於其形狀引起方形印記更令人費解呢?

Recent philosophical work on mental properties has revealed that matters are not so simple, however. Mental properties are alleged to have, not just one, but up to four features that make their efficacy philosophically puzzling, no less problematic than mind–body interaction is for the Cartesian dualist. These features will be discussed in the following sections. Each feature makes it appear as though mental properties, or some important family of them, are irrelevant to the production of behavior. The threat is a form of epiphenomenalism: even if minds and mental events are causes, they are not causes as (or qua) mental.
近年來,關於心理屬性的哲學著作已揭示,情況並非如此簡單。心理屬性被指稱擁有不僅一種,而是多達四種特徵,使得其功效在哲學上令人費解,不亞於笛卡爾二元論的心-身交互作用。以下各節將討論這些特徵。每一個特徵都顯示,心理屬性或其重要的某些類型,對行為的產生似乎毫無關聯。這種威脅形式為表象現象論:即使心智和心理事件是原因,其原因性也不是以「心理」的方式存在。

4. Problem I: Property Dualism
問題 I：屬性二元論

This “new epiphenomenalism” (Campbell 1984, ch. 7) immediately confronts a particularly strong version of property dualism, one insisting that mental properties are sui generis, perhaps dependent on, but in no way reducible to the dispositional and structural properties recognized by the physical sciences. Some property dualists accord this status only to a certain class of mental property, namely qualia, the “what it’s like” features of conscious experience. Other property dualists, including some emergentists, are willing to extend the thesis to all mental properties.
這"新表徵現象主義"(坎貝爾 1984 年,第 7 章)立即面對一個特別強大的屬性二元論版本,堅持心理屬性是 sui generis, 可能依賴於但絕不可還原為物理科學所認識的處置性和結構性屬性。一些屬性二元論者只賦予某類心理屬性,即感覺質,意識經驗的"感受如何"特徵,這一地位。其他屬性二元論者,包括一些出現論者,願意將這一論點推及所有心理屬性。

Suppose that this robust form of property dualism is true. Can mental substances or events cause what they do qua mental, in virtue of their mental properties? The arguments against soul–body interaction, now couched in terms of properties, could enter again here. For example, if you were worried about the mind–body nexus for souls (§2.1), it seems you should also wonder how non-physical properties can find any traction in the physical world. Similarly, Completeness (§2.4) seems to lose none of its attractiveness when formulated explicitly in terms of properties. You could add to the principle a clause stipulating that a “sufficient physical cause” is one that’s sufficient in virtue of its physical properties (see also §5.4). Bring in No Overdetermination, and the efficacy of mental properties is again threatened. The arguments here and the responses to it are structurally similar to those in §2, so we will not pursue further this version of the property-based problem. (Property dualism also faces the Exclusion Problem, to be discussed in §6.)
即使此種堅韌的實體雙元論為真,精神實體或事件能否因其精神特性而造成其所造成的?反對靈魂-身體交互作用的論點,現在以特性的術語表述,也可能在此處浮現。例如,如果你擔心靈魂的身心關聯(2.1 節),也似乎應該猶疑非物理特性如何能在物理世界中獲得任何立足之地。同樣地,完整性(2.4 節)在明確以特性表述時,其吸引力似乎也絲毫未減。你可以在該原則中加入一個條款,規定"充分的物理原因"是指憑藉其物理特性而足以造成某事的原因(見 5.4 節)。引入沒有過度決定,精神特性的效能再次受到威脅。這裡的論點及其回應在結構上與 2 節類似,因此我們不會進一步探討這個基於特性的問題。(屬性雙元論也面臨排斥問題,將在 6 節討論。)

5. Problem II: Anomalous Monism
异常单元论

Another version of the property-based problem of mental causation can be traced to Davidson’s influential paper, “Mental Events” (Davidson 1970). There Davidson defends an account of the mind–body relation he calls “anomalous monism”, a view that at first appears to save mental causation, but in the end might deny efficacy to mental properties.
心理因果的財產性問題的另一個版本可以追溯到戴維森的有影響力的論文《心理事件》(戴維森 1970 年)。在該論文中,戴維森捍衛了他所稱的「異常單元論」,這是一種在表面上似乎拯救了心理因果,但最終可能否認了心理屬性的功效的觀點。

5.1 The Argument for Anomalous Monism
唯異論

At the core of anomalous monism are three principles:
異常獨尊論的核心包含三項原則:

According to Davidson, the apparent tension among these principles gives rise to the mind–body problem. Most of us unquestioningly assent to the first principle. The second is more controversial, although Davidson provides little argument for it. Here we just note that it’s not as strong as it seems, for “strict” is not synonymous with “deterministic”. A strict law is exceptionless, but could be either deterministic or probabilistic.
根據戴維森的觀點,這些原則之間的表面緊張關係導致了心靈-身體問題。我們大多數人無疑接受第一個原則。第二個原則更具有爭議性,儘管戴維森對此提供了很少的論證。在這裡,我們只是注意到它並沒有看起來那麼強大,因為"嚴格的"並不等同於"決定論的"。一個嚴格的定律是沒有例外的,但可以是決定論的或概率論的。

The third principle is the most contested of the three. It rules out strict laws in psychology; in particular—and most importantly for present concerns—it rules out strict psychophysical laws, that is, laws connecting the mental and physical. According to Davidson, application conditions for mental predicates feature a rationality constraint absent from the application conditions for physical predicates. In ascribing beliefs to others, for instance, we employ a principle of charity that counsels us to make these believers as rational as possible. But this normative constraint has, as Davidson puts it, “no echo” in the physical realm. In this regard, mental and physical predicates are misaligned in a way that precludes strict psychophysical laws.
第三原則是三個原則中最有爭議的。它排除了嚴格的心理學定律;特別是 - 對當前關注最重要的是 - 它排除了嚴格的心理-物理定律,也就是說連接心理和物理的定律。根據戴維森,心理學斷語的應用條件包含著一個理性約束,而物理學斷語的應用條件卻不包含。例如,我們歸因他人信念時,會採用一個善意原則,努力將這些信徒塑造成盡可能理性的。但是,這種規範性約束"在物理領域中是沒有回聲的"。在這方面,心理學斷語和物理學斷語是不一致的,這就排除了嚴格的心理-物理定律。

Now the second two principles seem to rule out the first. If causation requires strict laws, and there are no strict psychophysical laws, how can the mental be causally efficacious? But Davidson notes there is a way to save the first principle: as long as every mental event is physical, the first principle is compatible with the other two. In this way, the three principles entail event monism. At the same time, Davidson’s view entails type dualism, for the anomalism of the mental (the third principle) precludes identities between mental and physical types. Most philosophers find it natural to say that types are properties, so Davidson is sometimes described as a property dualist, a convenient label for the time being (but see §5.5).
現在第二個原則似乎排除第一個原則。如果因果關係需要嚴格的法則,而沒有嚴格的心理物理學法則,心理如何能有因果效果?但戴維森指出,有一種方法可以保存第一個原則:只要每個心理事件都是物理的,第一個原則就與其他兩個原則相容。通過這種方式,這三個原則導致事件論。同時,戴維森的觀點導致類型二元論,因為心理的異常主義(第三個原則)排除了心理和物理類型之間的同一性。大多數哲學家認為,類型就是屬性,所以戴維森有時被描述為一個屬性二元論者,這個方便的標籤暫時適用(但見第 5.5 節)。

5.2 The Charge of Epiphenomenalism
表象現象論的指控

Davidson’s property dualism, and the principle that lies behind it, have led to a serious charge: anomalous monism robs mental properties of any causal significance.
戴維森的物性二元論以及隱含其中的原則,已經遭受嚴重指控:異常單一論剝奪了心理屬性的任何因果意義。

Suppose Gus decides to illuminate the room and subsequently flips a switch, thereby turning on the light. In this case we have a cause that, if Davidson is right, could be given both a mental and a physical description, and an effect that has a physical description. If this means that the cause has a mental property (in virtue of which it satisfies a mental description) and a physical property (in virtue of which it satisfies a physical description), we are faced with a further question. Granting that the event with the mental property is the event with a physical property, why should we think that the mental property had anything at all to do with the event’s physical effect? Davidson’s second two principles appear to block such relevance. If all causal relations are subsumed under strict laws, and if there are no strict psychophysical laws, then any instance of mind–body causation is subsumed only by physical laws. But then it looks as though only a mental event’s physical properties are relevant to what it causes. The mental properties (or mental types) are causally irrelevant (see, e.g., Stoutland 1980; Honderich 1982; Sosa 1984; a review of this literature is in McLaughlin 1989).
蓋勒斯決定照明房間並繼而操作開關,進而打開燈光。在這種情況下,我們有一個原因,如果戴維森是正確的,可以給予心理和物理描述,以及具有物理描述的效果。如果這意味著該原因具有心理屬性(由於滿足心理描述)和物理屬性(由於滿足物理描述),我們面臨著進一步的問題。承認具有心理屬性的事件就是具有物理屬性的事件,為什麼我們應該認為心理屬性與事件的物理效果毫無關係?戴維森的第二和第三原則似乎阻止了這種相關性。如果所有因果關係都歸納為嚴格的定律,並且如果沒有嚴格的心理物理定律,那麼任何心理-身體因果關係都只能歸納為物理定律。但是,這看起來只有一個事件的物理屬性與它所造成的原因相關。心理屬性(或心理類型)對於它造成的結果是沒有因果關係的。

5.3 Counterfactual Dependence
5.3 反事實依賴

LePore and Loewer (1987) look to counterfactuals to answer this charge (see also Horgan 1989; LePore and Loewer 1989; Block 1990; Loewer 2007). The central idea is that anomalous monism permits physical effects to depend counterfactually on mental properties. And such dependence secures an important kind of causal relevance for the mental, the sort that LePore and Loewer call “bringing about”. On their view, a’s being F brings about b’s being G when the following conditions are met:
勒波爾和羅爾（1987）尋求對反事實來回答這一指控（也請參閱霍根 1989 年; 勒波爾和羅爾 1989 年; 區塊 1990 年; 羅爾 2007 年）。核心思想是,非正常單一論允許物理效應在反事實上依賴於心理屬性。這種依賴性確保了心理層面的一種重要因果相關性,勒波爾和羅爾稱之為"產生"。根據他們的觀點,當滿足以下條件時,a 的 F 會產生 b 的 G:

1. a causes b.  導致 b 的 a。
2. a is F and b is G.
   甲是 F,乙是 G。
3. If a had not been F, b would not have been G.
   如果 a 不是 F,b 就不會是 G。
4. a’s being F and b’s being G are logically and metaphysically independent.
   一個'a'的為'F'和一個'b'的為'G'在邏輯上和形而上學上是互相獨立的。

Now suppose a mental event, such as a decision to turn on the light, causes Gus to move his finger, thereby flipping the light switch. Here the crucial counterfactual is: If the cause had not been a decision to turn on the light, the effect would not have been a switch-flipping. This is plausible, as are similar counterfactuals in a wide range of cases. But are such counterfactuals compatible with anomalous monism? LePore and Loewer say Yes: while Davidson prohibits strict laws connecting mental and physical properties, he apparently leaves room for non-strict laws. Such laws are enough to ground or “support” counterfactuals. Consider, by analogy, the properties of being a match-striking and being a match-lighting. If there is a law connecting such properties, it is evidently non-strict: striking causes lighting only ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, we can assert with confidence, after a given lighting, that if the match had not been struck, it wouldn’t have lit. Non-strict psychophysical laws would similarly appear to ground counterfactuals connecting mental and behavioral properties.
假設有一個心理事件,例如決定打開燈,導致蓋斯移動手指,從而打開了開關。關鍵的反事實為:如果原因不是決定打開燈,那麼結果就不會是打開開關。這在很多情況下是合理的。但是,這種反事實是否與異常單元論相容?LePore 和 Loewer 說是的:雖然戴維森禁止嚴格的法則將心理和物理屬性聯繫起來,但他似乎留下了非嚴格法則的空間。這樣的法則足以支持反事實。例如,擦火柴和點燃火柴的屬性。如果有一個聯繫這些屬性的法則,顯然它是非嚴格的:擦火柴只會在其他條件不變的情況下引起點燃。然而,我們可以相當自信地斷言,在一次點燃後,如果火柴沒有被擦過,它就不會點燃。同樣的,非嚴格的身心律法似乎也能支持連接心理和行為屬性的反事實。

This counterfactual defense is attractive for a number of reasons. It captures a sense in which mental properties make a difference to behavior, but in a way that’s apparently compatible with anomalous monism. It respects our causal intuitions about a wide range of cases. And it fits well with the more general counterfactual theory of causation, which many philosophers have found independently plausible. Moreover, Davidson himself seems sympathetic to the defense (Davidson 1993; but see §5.5).
這種反事實性防禦在多方面都頗為吸引人。它捕捉了心理屬性如何影響行為的一些意義,但又與異常一元論相容。它尊重我們對大量案例的因果直覺。它也與因果事件的更一般的反事實理論吻合,許多哲學家都認為這個理論本身很有說服力。此外,戴維森本人似乎也對這種防禦持同情態度(戴維森 1993;但見§5.5)。

In spite of these advantages, a worry is that the pertinent counterfactuals don’t after all ensure causal relevance, and in this sense don’t vindicate anomalous monism. This objection can take the form of direct counterexamples (Braun 1995; Garrett 1999), but here we look at a broader concern.
儘管這些優勢,一個擔憂是相關的反事實根本沒有確保因果相關性,在這個意義上不能證明異常單一論。這種反對可以採取直接反例的形式(Braun 1995;Garrett 1999),但在這裡我們看一個更廣泛的問題。

When a counterfactual is true, there should be something in the world that makes it true. Even granting that, if the cause had not had its mental property, the effect would not have had its behavioral property, in virtue of what is this true? This truthmaker, not the counterfactual itself, is what matters in determining whether a property is causally relevant. And the worry is that once we look at the truthmakers in the mental case, the threat of epiphenomenalism crops up again. Although the effect counterfactually depends on the mental property, this is only because the mental property depends on a physical property doing the real work. The mental property looks like a freeloader (Kim 1998, pp. 70–3, 2007; compare Crane 2008 on a similar issue).
當一個假設性陳述為真時,世界上應該存在某些使其成為真的事物。即便認可這一點,如果原因沒有其心理特性,效果就不會有其行為特性,是因為什麼而使此為真?這個真值製造者,而不是假設性陳述本身,才是關鍵在決定某特性是否有因果相關性。而令人擔心的是,一旦我們看看心理情況下的真值製造者,附加現象的威脅又再次出現。雖然效果在假設性上依賴於心理特性,但這只是因為心理特性依賴於物理特性在做真正的工作。心理特性看起來像是寄生物(金 1998,70-3 頁; 2007 年;比較克蘭 2008 年提出的類似問題)。

LePore and Loewer discuss a version of this worry. Condition (3), an objector might say, is too crude to test for causal relevance, for the counterfactual holds only because removing F from a also removes some other property F* of a, and it’s the absence of F* that’s responsible for b’s not being G. A better counterfactual test evaluates the effect’s status given that a is not F and all of a’s other properties—or at least all that are potential causal rivals to F—are held fixed. If b is not G in that case, only then can we credit F with causal relevance. But mental properties fail this more refined test. Consider again Gus’s decision to turn on the light, and remove its mental property, this time holding fixed its physical properties. It seems clear that he would still flip the switch. After all, the physical properties of the cause figure in an exceptionless law according to Davidson. It looks as if the physical properties of your decision “screen off” the mental property, making the latter irrelevant.
勒波爾和勞厄討論了這個擔憂的一個版本。反對者可能會說,條件(3)太粗糙,無法測試因果相關性,因為反事實成立僅是因為從'a'中移除'F'也同時移除了'a'的另一個性質'F*',而'b'不為'G'的原因是缺乏'F*'。一個更好的反事實測試是評估在'a'不為'F'且'a'的所有其他性質(或至少是可能與'F'競爭的所有性質)保持不變的情況下,效果的地位。在這種情況下,如果'b'不為'G',那麼我們才能將'F'歸因於因果相關性。但心理性質無法通過這種更精細的測試。再次考慮古斯打開燈的決定,移除其心理性質,同時保持其物理性質不變。顯然,他仍會翻動開關。畢竟,根據戴維森的理論,因果事件的物理性質符合一個例外的法則。看來,你決定的物理性質"掩蓋"了心理性質,使後者無關緊要。

LePore and Loewer concede that mental properties are screened off by physical properties. But they argue that this more refined test is too demanding, for it would also mean that the physical properties of a mental cause are irrelevant. Note in particular that the decision’s mental properties screen off its physical properties: if the cause had lacked its physical properties yet had still been a decision to turn on the light, it would have caused Gus to flip the switch (ceteris paribus: here a hedged law, which anomalous monism permits, is in play). Screening off thus goes both ways, and since few would want to deny causal relevance to the physical properties, we should not let screening off impugn the significance of mental properties either.
勒波爾和洛爾承認心理屬性被物理屬性篩除。但是他們認為這種更精細的測試過於嚴格,因為它也意味著心理原因的物理屬性是無關的。尤其要注意,決定的心理屬性篩除其物理屬性:如果原因缺乏其物理屬性,但仍然是一個打開燈的決定,那麼它仍會導致古斯翻動開關(其他條件相同:這裡使用了異常唯物主義允許的有條件律)。篩除是雙向的,因為很少有人會否認物理屬性的因果相關性,我們不應該讓篩除貶低心理屬性的意義。

Antony (1991) replies that there is no symmetry here, at least not given anomalous monism. While the decision’s physical properties screen off its mental properties, the reverse doesn’t hold. Suppose again that the cause had lacked its physical properties but had still been a decision to turn on the light. On anomalous monism, Antony argues, there’s no saying what Gus’s decision would have caused, for mental properties, being anomalous, place no constraints on the causal structure of the world. (See also Leiter and Miller 1994.)
安東尼(1991)回覆說,這裡沒有對稱性,至少不是在給定的異常單元論下。雖然判斷的物理特性遮蔽了其心理特性,但反之則不成立。假設再次,那個原因缺乏其物理特性,但仍然是一個決定開啟燈光。在異常單元論下,安東尼認為,無法說明古斯的決定會造成什麼,因為心理特性作為異常現象,不對世界的因果結構施加任何限制。(見利特和米勒 1994 年)

The freeloader problem arises in a variety of contexts in the mental causation literature, not just in discussions of anomalous monism. It will return under a number of guises in what follows.
無賴問題在心智因果文獻中出現於多種情境,不僅限於討論異常中性論。它會在後續的內容中以多種面貌重現。

5.4 Lawful Sufficiency  合法充足

Fodor (1989) apparently agrees that counterfactuals capture a kind of causal relevance, but he argues that LePore and Loewer have settled for too little. On Fodor’s view, mental properties can be relevant to behavior in a stronger sense in which they are sufficient for their effects and in this way “make a difference”. Fodor spells out sufficiency in terms of laws: a property makes a difference if “it’s a property in virtue of the instantiation of which the occurrence of one event is nomologically sufficient for the occurrence of another” (Fodor 1989, p. 65, note omitted).
福多(1989)似乎同意反事實語句捕捉一種因果關係的重要性,但他認為 LePore 和 Loewer 的論點還不夠深入。在福多的觀點中,心理特性可以以更強的方式與行為相關,即它們對其效果是充足的,從而"產生差異"。福多將充足性闡述為定律:一個特性如果"依靠它的實現,一個事件的發生在法則上就足以導致另一個事件的發生",那麼它就是一個產生差異的特性(福多 1989,第 65 頁,註腳省略)。

Might such an account save anomalous monism from the charge of epiphenomenalism? On the face of it, it cannot, for as we’ve noted, mental properties on Davidson’s view appear only in hedged laws, laws that include an implicit ceteris paribus rider. Consider a candidate psychological law:
心理性質在達維森的觀點中似乎只出現在有保留條件的法則中,這些法則包含一個潛在的其他因素平等條件的附加說明。考慮一個候選心理學法則:

• (L) If an agent, a, wants x, believes x is obtainable by doing y, and judges y best, all things considered, then a forms the intention to y and subsequently y’s on the basis of this intention, ceteris paribus.
  如果一名代理人 a 想要 x,相信通過做 y 來獲得 x 是可行的,且在所有考慮之下判斷 y 最佳,那麼 a 就會形成意向去做 y,並隨後基於這一意向實施 y,其他條件不變。

The ceteris paribus clause here would seem to block the mental properties in question from being causally sufficient for the behavioral effect. But perhaps not: according to (L), the mental properties are sufficient for the behavioral effect when the ceteris paribus conditions are satisfied. And this sort of causal sufficiency, Fodor argues, is all anyone could reasonably want for mental properties.
當其他條件不變的前提下,這裡似乎會阻擋涉及心理特性的問題成為行為效果的因果充分條件。但或許不是:根據(L),當滿足當其他條件不變的條件時,心理特性就足以導致行為效果。Fodor 認為,這種因果充分性,就是任何人合理要求的心理特性。

But can Davidson help himself to such an account? Davidson appears to think so (1993, p. 10), as does McLaughlin (1989), who also appeals to hedged laws. Fodor, however, doubts his account is compatible with anomalous monism; such doubts are developed by Antony (1991) and Kim (1993b). The question turns largely on Davidson’s reasons for thinking the mental is anomalous, and on whether these reasons permit him to appeal to hedged laws in the way the laws account requires.
但是戴維森能否幫助自己獲得這樣的賬戶?戴維森似乎認為是這樣的(1993 年,第 10 頁),麥克勞克林(1989 年)也是這樣認為的,他也援引到有條件的法律。但是福多爾對他的賬戶與偶然的孤立主義是否相容存有疑問;這些疑問由安東尼(1991 年)和金(1993b)發展而來。這個問題很大程度上取決於戴維森認為心理異常的理由,以及這些理由是否允許他以法律賬戶所要求的方式援引到有條件的法律。

Supposing anomalous monism is compatible with Fodor’s account, you might still wonder whether nomological sufficiency is enough for causal relevance. An account of causal relevance in terms of laws is natural given the tight connections between laws and properties (see laws of nature, §3). But those sympathetic to Fodor’s position might still ask (as Fodor himself does) what the causal mechanism is in mental–physical interactions. For example, it could turn out that the reason psychophysical laws such as (L) hold is that mental properties are themselves grounded in more basic, physical properties, and that only the latter do genuine causal work: mental properties again look like freeloaders (§5.3), merely piggybacking on the real bearers of causal powers (LePore and Loewer 1989; Block 1990; Leiter and Miller 1994; Marras 2003).
假設異常單一論與福多爾的理論相容,你可能仍會疑惑是否范式充足性就足以滿足因果相關性。以法律概念解釋因果相關性很自然,因為法律與性質之間有密切聯繫(見自然法則,§3)。但支持福多爾立場的人可能還是會問(福多爾本人也這樣問)心理-物理交互作用的因果機制是什麼。例如,可能會發現心理物理學法則(如(L))成立的原因是心理性質本身根源於更基本的物理性質,只有後者才真正發揮因果作用:心理性質再次看起來像是搭便車的(§5.3),只是依附於真正擁有因果力量的事物(LePore 和 Loewer 1989;Block 1990;Leiter 和 Miller 1994;Marras 2003)。

5.5 The Ascent to Properties Reconsidered
重新考慮的產權上升

Davidson replies to his critics in “Thinking Causes” (Davidson 1993). In that paper he sometimes speaks favorably of “causally efficacious” properties, and he helps himself to both hedged laws and counterfactuals to secure the efficacy of mental properties. But his considered position appears less conciliatory. He clearly denies a crucial assumption of his critics, namely, that causes do their causing in virtue of their properties. When an event causes something, it doesn’t do so qua this or that: it just causes what it does, full stop. Were this so, none of the property-based problems discussed here could get off the ground (Crane 1995; Campbell 1997; Gibb 2006).
戴維森在〈思維導因〉(戴維森,1993)一文中回應他的批評者。在該文中,他有時贊同「因果有效」性質的看法,並利用既定的法則和反事實條件來確保心理性質的有效性。但他的最終立場似乎較為不妥協。他明確否認了批評者的一個關鍵假設,即因果事件的導因是由於其性質。當一個事件導致某事時,它並非以某個特定性質來導因,而是直接導致其後果。若真如此,本文討論的那些基於性質的問題就根本無從產生(克蘭,1995;坎貝爾,1997;吉布,2006)。

Such a response seems to miss the point (Kim 1993b; McLaughlin 1993; Sosa 1993). All parties in this dispute agree that mental events can cause physical events. The difficulty is to understand how they could do so in virtue of their mental (rather than their physical) properties, how they could have physical effects qua mental. The principle of the Nomological Character of Causation (§5.1) apparently requires that, when one event causes another, it does so in solely virtue of its physical properties.
這樣的回應似乎錯失了要點(金 1993b;麥克勞克林 1993;索薩 1993)。在這一爭論中,所有各方都同意,心理事件可以引起物理事件。問題在於如何理解它們如何因其心理(而非物理)屬性而造成如此,如何可以以心理屬性的方式產生物理影響。因果關係之法則的原則(§5.1)顯然要求,當一個事件引起另一個事件時,它是純粹因其物理屬性而產生的。

But Davidson is part of a nominalist tradition that rejects properties, at least as his critics conceive of them. Davidson instead formulates anomalous monism in terms of predicates and descriptions. An event is mental if it answers to a mental predicate (that is, it can be picked out using a mental description), physical if it answers to a physical predicate (it can be referred to using a physical description). Davidson’s critics assume that if an event answers to both sorts of predicate, it includes a mental property and a physical property. But Davidson thinks about the mental–physical distinction as merely a difference in description, not as the expression of an ontological divide between kinds of property. For Davidson, then, it makes no more sense to ask whether an event had a particular effect in virtue of being mental or in virtue of being physical than it would to ask whether its effect stemmed from its being described in English or in German. (For further discussion, see Heil 2009.)
但戴維森是一個唯名論傳統的一部分,該傳統拒絕屬性,至少在他的批評家看來是如此。戴維森反而用謂語和描述來表述異常單一論。一個事件是心理的,如果它符合心理謂語(即,可以用心理描述來確定),物理的,如果它符合物理謂語(可以用物理描述來指稱)。戴維森的批評家假設,如果一個事件符合這兩種謂語,它就包含了一個心理屬性和一個物理屬性。但戴維森認為心理-物理的區別只是一種描述上的差異,而不是表示存在論上的鴻溝。因此,對戴維森來說,問一個事件的效果是由於它是心理的還是由於它是物理的,就像問它的效果是由於用英語還是德語描述一樣,都是沒有意義的。

6. Problem III: Exclusion
第三個問題：排除

While reflection on property dualism or anomalous monism can lead to our next property-based problem, another route is by way of the doctrine of non-reductive physicalism. Like the property dualist, the non-reductive physicalist holds that mental properties are not physical. But unlike the property dualist, the non-reductive physicalist insists on a strong dependence of the mental on the physical: mental properties are “realized” or “constituted” by physical properties. This strong tie between the mental and physical is the subject of a large contemporary literature, some of which we touch on below.
當反思財產二元論或異常單一論會導致我們的下一個基於財產的問題時，另一條路徑是通過非還原物理主義的教義。與財產二元論者一樣,非還原物理主義者認為心理特性不是物理的。但與財產二元論者不同,非還原物理主義者堅持心理與物理之間有強烈依賴關係:心理特性是由物理特性"實現"或"構成"的。這種心理與物理之間的緊密聯繫是當代大量文獻的主題,我們在下面稍作觸及。

6.1 Functionalism and Multiple Realizability
功能主義和多重實現性

Non-reductive physicalism in its current form grew out of functionalism, according to which mental properties are functional properties. To be in pain, for example, is a matter of being in a state with a certain causal profile, a state that’s caused by tissue damage, and causes certain overt responses (moans, attempts to repair the damage) as well as other mental states (e.g., beliefs that one is in pain). But, argue functionalists, it is most unlikely that we could identify a single kind of physical state playing this role in every actual and possible case of pain. Human beings differ in endless tiny physiological ways: your neurological states, including states you go into when you are in pain, probably differ subtly from another person’s. Human beings’ neurological states, in turn, differ from those of a cat or a dog, and perhaps dramatically from states of an octopus. You might even imagine encountering aliens with vastly different biologies, but to which you would unhesitatingly ascribe pains.
非還原式物理主義在當前形式下已超越功能主義,其中心思想是心理屬性是功能性屬性。以疼痛為例,它是指處於某種因果關係的狀態,此狀態由組織損傷引起,並導致某些明顯的反應(呻吟、修復損傷的行為)以及其他心理狀態(例如相信自己在疼痛)。但功能主義者認為,我們幾乎不可能在所有實際和可能的疼痛情況下都找到單一種物理狀態在起作用。人類在無數細微的生理方式上都存在差異:你的神經狀態,包括在疼痛時進入的狀態,可能與他人略有不同。人類的神經狀態也不同於貓狗,可能與章魚有著天壤之別。甚至可以想像遇到擁有完全不同生物學的外星人,但我們仍會毫不猶豫地認為他們感受到疼痛。

Here we arrive at a core thesis of functionalism: states of mind are “multiply realizable”. The property of being in pain can be realized in a wide variety of physical (and perhaps non-physical) systems. A creature is in pain in virtue of being in a state with the right sort of causal profile, some sort of neurological state, say. But the property of being in pain cannot be identified with this neurological state, because creatures of other kinds can be in pain in virtue of being in vastly different physical conditions. Functionalists often put this point by saying that mental properties are “higher-level” properties, properties possessed by objects by virtue of their possession of appropriate “lower-level” properties, their realizers.
功能主義的核心論點是：心智狀態是"多重實現化"的。疼痛狀態可以在各種不同的物理(或非物理)系統中實現。一個生物之所以感到疼痛,是因為它處於具有適當因果特徵的某種狀態,比如某種神經生理狀態。但是疼痛狀態不能與這種神經生理狀態劃等號,因為其他類型的生物也可能因處於截然不同的物理狀態而感到疼痛。功能主義者常說,心智屬性是"高階"屬性,即生物由於具有適當的"低階"屬性(即其實現者)而擁有的屬性。

6.2 The Exclusion Problem
排除問題

Now, however, we are again confronted with the threat of epiphenomenalism. If mental properties are not physical, how could they make a causal difference? Whenever any mental (functional) property M is instantiated, it will be realized by some particular physical property P. This physical property is unproblematically relevant to producing various behavioral effects. But then what causal work is left for M to do? It seems to be causally idle, “excluded” by the work of P.
現在,然而,我們再次面臨著表象現象主義的威脅。如果心理屬性不是物理的,它們怎麼能產生因果影響?每當任何心理(功能)屬性 M 被實例化時,它都會由某個特定的物理屬性 P 實現。這個物理屬性與產生各種行為效果是相關的。但是,M 還有什麼因果作用要做?它似乎是因果上的閒置的,被 P 的作用所"排斥"。

This version of the problem of mental causation has appeared in various guises. Much of the contemporary literature is inspired by Malcolm 1968, especially as refined in Kim 1989, 1993c, 1998, 2005. Whatever its precise formulation (cp. Shapiro and Sober 2007; O’Connor and Churchill 2010; historical perspective is in Patterson 2005), the Exclusion Problem has clear affinities with the other problems we’ve looked at so far. Consider our claim that the realizing property P must play a role in producing a particular behavioral effect. This would seem to be justified either by an appeal to Completeness (§2.4) or to Davidson’s doctrine (§5.1) that causal relations must fall under strict (and so physical) laws. Moreover, the argument’s depiction of P and M as competing for causal relevance—one must exclude the other—would seem to require a principle such as No Overdetermination (§2.4). And the fundamental worry that P might exclude M looks exactly like the freeloader problem that badgers mainstream attempts to save anomalous monism (§§5.3–4).
這個心理因果問題的版本以各種面貌出現過。當代文獻大多受到 1968 年 Malcolm 的啟發,尤其是 1989 年、1993 年 c、1998 年和 2005 年 Kim 的論述。不論其確切的表述方式為何(參見 Shapiro 和 Sober 2007;O'Connor 和 Churchill 2010;Patterson 2005 中的歷史視角),排斥問題與我們迄今所探討的其他問題都有明顯聯繫。我們主張實現屬性 P 必須在產生特定行為效果中扮演角色,這種主張似乎可以訴諸於完全性(第 2.4 節)或戴維森學說(第 5.1 節)的原則,即因果關係必須符合嚴格(物理)定律。再者,P 和 M 在因果相關性上相互競爭,必須排斥彼此的論述,似乎需要依賴「不重複決定」(第 2.4 節)原則。而 P 可能排斥 M 這一根本擔憂,正好與試圖拯救異常論唯物論主流嘗試中的搭便車問題(第 5.3-5.4 節)如出一轍。

In spite of these similarities, the Exclusion Problem is in one important respect unique: unlike the problems we’ve looked at so far, exclusion worries generalize to a wide range of phenomena outside of the mental. Any properties, mental or otherwise, that are multiply realizable in physical systems are threatened with causal irrelevance. (For discussion of this and related issues, see Kim 1998, pp. 77–87; Noordhof 1999; Bontly 2001; Gillett and Rives 2001; Block 2003; Walter 2008.)
儘管存在這些相似性,排斥問題在一個重要的方面是獨特的:與我們到目前為止所看到的問題不同,排斥使人擔心會推廣到心智之外的廣泛現象。任何屬性,無論是心智還是其他,如果在物理系統中都可以多樣實現,都會面臨因果無關性的威脅。(關於這個問題及相關問題的討論,請參見 Kim 1998,第 77-87 頁;Noordhof 1999;Bontly 2001;Gillett and Rives 2001;Block 2003;Walter 2008。)

Some philosophers (e.g., Fodor 1989; Baker 1993; Shapiro 2010) take this general nature of the problem to be an encouraging sign. We happily accept biological, or meteorological, or geological properties as causally significant despite their being distinct from their physical realizers. Why then imagine that exclusion threatens the efficacy of mental properties? Others turn this argument around, insisting that the alleged efficacy of biological and other “special science” properties is by no means sacrosanct (Antony 1995). Causal powers we attribute to them must respect what our best metaphysics tells us. And in any case, the central issue is not so much whether mental properties (and the rest) are causally relevant to the production of physical effects, but how they could be (Kim 1998, pp. 61–2, 78–9; Antony and Levine 1997, p. 96; McLaughlin 2006). Even if the Exclusion Problem, because it generalizes, does not tempt us to embrace epiphenomenalism, it presses on us a responsibility to explain how mental properties could play a causal role given that they appear to be screened off by their physical realizers.
某些哲學家(例如, Fodor 1989; Baker 1993; Shapiro 2010)認為這種普遍性質是一個令人鼓舞的跡象。我們欣然接受生物、氣象或地質屬性的因果重要性,儘管它們與其物理實現者不同。那麼,為什麼要想像這種排斥會威脅精神屬性的效力呢?其他人則將這一論點翻轉過來,堅持所謂的生物和其他"特殊科學"屬性的效力決非神聖不可(Antony 1995)。我們賦予它們的因果力必須尊重我們最好的形而上學告訴我們的。無論如何,關鍵問題不在於精神屬性(以及其他)是否對物理效果的產生具有因果相關性,而在於它們如何可能具有因果相關性(Kim 1998, pp. 61–2, 78–9; Antony and Levine 1997, p. 96; McLaughlin 2006)。即使排斥問題因其普遍性而不誘使我們接受作為附庸現象,但它仍迫使我們有責任解釋精神屬性如何能發揮因果作用,因為它們似乎被其物理實現者所遮蔽。

The Exclusion Problem is the subject of a large and still-growing literature. In the next few sub-sections, we look at some of the main lines of response, dividing them into three broad categories.
排斥問題是一個廣泛而持續增長的題目。在接下來的幾個小節中,我們將探討一些主要的應對方式,將它們分為三大類。

6.3 Autonomy Solutions  自主解決方案

The Exclusion Problem presents us with a picture on which higher-level mental properties compete with their lower-level physical realizers. Physical properties are unproblematically relevant in the production of behavior, and so mental properties must either find a way to do the work that their realizers are already doing or face exclusion. But some philosophers would insist that this picture is deeply misleading: mental properties enjoy causal relevance in their own right and are not threatened by exclusion from physical properties.
排斥問題給我們展示了一幅高層次心智特性與其較低階物理實現者競爭的畫面。物理特性在行為產生中是無可爭議的相關因素,因此心智特性要麼要設法完成其實現者已在做的工作,要麼就面臨被排斥的命運。但有些哲學家堅持這幅畫面是嚴重誤導的:心智特性本身擁有因果相關性,並不受到來自物理特性的排斥威脅。

This “autonomy solution” (Jackson 1996, §2) can take a variety of forms. One version starts by observing that psychological explanations—and more generally, explanations in the special sciences—are in an important sense independent of physical explanations. Psychological explanations typically abstract away from details of lower-level implementation, appealing instead to their own distinctive kinds and laws. Explanations in the special sciences can thus proceed independently of those in the lower-level physical sciences. If the structure of the causal order reflects these explanatory practices, mental properties need not be threatened by exclusion. Mental and physical causes can peacefully coexist. (Variations on this theme appear in Dennett 1973; Baker 1993; Van Gulick 1993; Garrett 1998; Hardcastle 1998; Marcus 2001; Menzies 2003; Raymont 2003; Ross and Spurrett 2004; Woodward 2008; Zhong 2014; see also §7.5.)
這"自主解決方案"(Jackson 1996 年，第 2 節)可以採取各種形式。一個版本是從觀察到,心理學解釋 - 更廣泛地說,特殊科學中的解釋 - 在重要方面獨立於物理學解釋。心理學解釋通常從較低層次的實現細節中抽離開來,而是呼籲它們自己的特色類型和定律。因此,特殊科學的解釋可以獨立於較低層次物理科學的解釋而進行。如果因果秩序的結構反映了這些解釋實踐,那麼心理性質就不會受到排斥的威脅。心理和物理原因可以和平共存。(此主題的變體見於 Dennett 1973 年;Baker 1993 年;Van Gulick 1993 年;Garrett 1998 年;Hardcastle 1998 年;Marcus 2001 年;Menzies 2003 年;Raymont 2003 年;Ross 和 Spurrett 2004 年;Woodward 2008 年;鍾 2014 年;另見第 7.5 節。)

This appeal to explanation can naturally lead to (though it does not entail) another autonomy solution, the dual explanandum strategy. The Exclusion Problem presents a mental (functional) property M and its physical realizer P as competing to be causally relevant to the same effect, namely a bit of behavior. But M might not be threatened with exclusion if M and P are causally relevant to different properties of the effect. Return for a moment to the paperweight example from §3. The shape of the paperweight is relevant, not to the impression simpliciter, but to the impression’s shape. In general, a causally relevant property is relevant to some particular property of the effect (Horgan 1989). Perhaps, then, M and P do not causally compete because they are parts of separate, autonomous causal lines to different properties of the effect.
這一呼籲對解釋可自然引領至（但並不必然蘊含）另一自主解決方案：雙重說明策略。排斥問題提出了一心智（功能）性質 M 及其物理實現者 P，將之視為競爭性地對同一效果（即行為的一部分）具有因果相關性。然而，若 M 和 P 分別與效果的不同性質具有因果相關性，M 便不會受到排斥的威脅。讓我們再次回到第三節中的重物掌握器例子。重物掌握器的形狀與其印象的簡單性無關，而是與印象的形狀相關。一般而言，一個具有因果相關性的性質乃與效果的某特定性質相關（Horgan 1989）。因此，也許 M 和 P 並不存在因果競爭，因為它們分別屬於對效果的不同性質的分離自主因果系列的一部分。

Consider one way this might work. Behavioral properties, just like mental properties, appear to be multiply realizable. For example, there is more than one way to hail a cab, many different physical realizations of this kind of behavior. Now suppose a belief causes you to hail a cab. In accordance with Completeness, some physical property P of the belief is sufficient for your behavior. But strictly speaking, P is relevant only to the particular way in which you hailed the cab, the particular physical realization of your hailing. What, then, is responsible for your behavior’s higher-level property of simply being a cab-hailing? It’s natural to suppose that it’s a higher-level property of your belief, namely, some mental property, such as the belief’s representational content. (For proposals along these lines, see Yablo 1992; Thomasson 1998; Marras 1998; Crisp and Warfield 2001; Gibbons 2006; Schlosser 2009; see also §§7.3–4.)
考慮這種方式可能如何運作。行為特性就像心理特性一樣,似乎可以多樣實現。例如,有多種方式來攔出租車,有許多不同的物理實現形式。現在假設一種信念導致你攔出租車。根據完整性,信念的某些物理性質 P 足以構成你的行為。但嚴格來說,P 只與你攔車的特定方式,你的攔車行為的特定物理實現相關。那麼,是什麼造成你的行為具有更高層次的攔車特性呢?很自然地,可以假定這是你信念的一種更高層次的特性,即某種心理特性,例如信念的表徵內容。(對於這些建議,請參見 Yablo 1992;Thomasson 1998;Marras 1998;Crisp 和 Warfield 2001;Gibbons 2006;Schlosser 2009;另請參見§§7.3–4。)

A strength of autonomy solutions is that they secure a causal role for mental properties without running afoul of Completeness, as the physical realization of behavior is always matched with some physical properties of its cause. But do autonomy solutions respect No Overdetermination? Here matters are not as straightforward. Autonomy solutions present us with two properties, P and M, each sufficient for the behavioral effect. It might seem as if the dual explanandum strategy avoids this awkwardness, since P and M are relevant to different properties of the effect. But even here, overdetermination threatens, as the effect’s behavioral property is produced twice: directly by M, and indirectly by P, which produces the behavioral property’s physical realizer, which itself necessitates the behavioral property.
自主性解決方案的一個優勢是,它們為心理屬性確保了因果作用,而不會違背完整性,因為行為的物理實現始終與其原因的某些物理屬性相匹配。但是,自主性解決方案是否尊重沒有過度決定性?這個問題並不簡單。自主性解決方案給我們提供了兩個屬性,P 和 M,每個都足以導致行為效果。表面上看,雙重解釋策略可以避免這種尷尬,因為 P 和 M 與效果的不同屬性有關。但即便在這種情況下,過度決定性也可能出現,因為行為屬性是被直接由 M 產生的,間接由 P 產生的,後者產生了行為屬性的物理實現者,而這本身就必然導致了行為屬性。

Proponents of autonomy solutions might grant these points but claim that such “overdetermination” is innocuous, far from the “intolerable coincidence” threatening Cartesian dualist accounts of mental causation (§2.4), for the two causal lines present are not independent. (The nature of overdetermination has itself become the subject of a literature inspired, in part, by the Exclusion Problem. See, e.g., Funkhouser 2002; Bennett 2003; Sider 2003; Walter 2008; Carey 2011; Bernstein 2016; Kroedel 2019.)
自主性解決方案的支持者可能會承認這些觀點,但卻聲稱這種"過度決定"是無害的,與威脅笛卡爾二元論者關於心理因果學說(§2.4)的"不可容忍的巧合"完全無關,因為這兩個因果路線並非獨立存在。(過度決定的性質本身已成為一個文獻主題,部分受到排斥問題的啟發。請參見,例如,Funkhouser 2002; Bennett 2003; Sider 2003; Walter 2008; Carey 2011; Bernstein 2016; Kroedel 2019。)

6.4 Inheritance Solutions
6.4 繼承解決方案

Autonomy solutions can make it appear that the causal powers of mental properties “float free” of their physical realizers, bringing to mind the doctrine of parallelism (for replies, see Thomasson 1998; Marcus 2001, §3.3). Some non-reductive physicalists have accordingly looked to tie the causal powers of mental properties more closely to those of their physical realizers. The idea is that mental properties are so intimately related to their realizers that the former “inherit” the causal powers of the latter. The relation between levels is not one of rivalry, such that the physical might exclude the mental, but one of cooperation. Nor, moreover, does there seem to be any threat of overdetermination, since the mental works through the physical. (Compare the metaphor of “transparency” in Jackson 1996.)
自主權解決方案可能使精神特性的因果力量"自由浮動"於其物理實現者之外,喚起平行論的教義(見 Thomasson 1998;Marcus 2001,§3.3)。因此,一些非還原性唯物論者試圖將精神特性的因果力量更密切地系於其物理實現者。這一想法是,精神特性與其實現者如此密切相關,前者"繼承"後者的因果力量。層次之間的關係並非競爭性,使得物理可能排斥精神,而是合作性的。此外,也並無過度決定的威脅,因為精神通過物理運作(參見 Jackson 1996 中的"透明性"隱喻)。

On some versions of the inheritance solution, what the higher-level mental property derives from its physical realizer is some weaker or “lower-grade” form of causal relevance. For example, Jackson and Pettit (1988, 1990) distinguish the robust “causal efficacy” of physical properties from the weaker “causal relevance” of higher-level properties. Causal relevance in this sense is an explanatory notion: as one might put it, behavior is produced at the physical level, but by being realized in the physical, mental properties inherit an explanatory relevance they wouldn’t have otherwise. An advantage of such a view is that it accords a derived form of relevance to mental properties, but in a way that respects both the priority of physical causation embodied in Completeness as well as the principle of No Overdetermination. (For similar views, see Kim 1984; Levine 2001, §1.5; Segal 2009. Those who appeal to the counterfactual dependence of behavior on the mental [§5.3] might also fall into this category. For an answer to the charge that counterfactual dependence is “causation lite”, see Loewer 2007, Menzies 2007.)
根據繼承解決方案的某些版本,高層次心理屬性從其物理實現派生出的是較弱或"低等級"形式的因果相關性。例如,傑克遜和佩蒂特(1988,1990)將物理屬性的強大"因果效力"與高層次屬性的較弱"因果相關性"加以區分。在這種意義上,因果相關性是一種解釋性概念:可以說,行為是在物理層面產生的,但通過在物理層面實現,心理屬性繼承了一種解釋性相關性,否則它們是沒有的。這種觀點的一個優勢是,它賦予了心理屬性一種派生形式的相關性,但以一種既尊重完整性所體現的物理因果優先性,也尊重無過度決定原則的方式。

If such a weakening seems to amount to epiphenomenalism, you might look for an inheritance solution on which mental properties are efficacious in the same sense that their physical realizers are (compare the “homogeneity assumption” in Crane 1995). How can this be done without violating No Overdetermination? Well, suppose that a mental property is, in spite of being distinct from its physical realizer, immanent in this realizer; M, that is, is somehow nothing over and above P. In that case, any causal work done by P is, in a straightforward way, inherited by M. Overdetermination is avoided because M’s work is included in P’s.
如果這種削弱似乎構成了表象論,您可能會尋找一種繼承解決方案,在這種方案中,心理屬性的作用與其物理實現者的作用是相同的(參見 Crane 1995 中的"同質性假設")。如何在不違反無重複決定的情況下實現這一點?假設一個心理屬性雖然與其物理實現者有所不同,但是內在於此實現者;也就是說,M 實際上就是 P。在這種情況下,P 所做的任何因果工作都會直接由 M 繼承。由於 M 的工作被包含在 P 中,因此避免了重複決定。

The metaphysical details of such a picture matter. Otherwise, “immanence”, “nothing over and above”, and the like will turn into mere labels for that psychophysical relation, we know not what, that solves the Exclusion Problem. Accordingly, several promising lines of inquiry have been pursued. Mental and physical properties are said to be related by, for example, the determinable–determinate relation (Yablo 1992; critics include Ehring 1996; Worley 1997; Funkhouser 2006), constitution (Pereboom 2002; critics include Ney 2007; Heil 2011), metaphysical necessitation (Bennett 2003, 2008), physical explicability (Antony 1991), physical implementation (Marras 2003), and grounding (Kroedel and Schulz 2016).
形上學性質的細節事關重要。否則,"內在性"、"沒有其他"等將僅是我們所不知的那種心理-物理關係的標籤,卻可解決排斥問題。因此,已有一些前景看好的研究線索被探索。心理性質和物理性質據說通過例如可變量-確定因數關係(Yablo 1992;批評者包括 Ehring 1996; Worley 1997; Funkhouser 2006)、構成(Pereboom 2002;批評者包括 Ney 2007; Heil 2011)、形上學必然性(Bennett 2003, 2008)、物理可解釋性(Antony 1991)、物理實現(Marras 2003)和基礎(Kroedel and Schulz 2016)等方式相關聯。

You might ask why any of these relations should secure the desired solution. One thought is that if mental properties are immanent in their physical realizers, the causal powers of a mental property are included among those of its realizer. Consider again mental property M and one of its realizers in a given instance, P. Plausibly, M’s powers are included in P’s. Both properties, for example, have the power to cause a certain kind of behavior, but because of its greater “specificity”, P has in addition to this powers that M lacks. Now in general we don’t think that wholes causally compete with, or are excluded by, their parts. When Gus steps on Lilian’s toe, his foot’s causing Lilian discomfort doesn’t exclude Gus’s causing her discomfort. Both Gus and his foot coexist as causes, without competition and, we might add, without overdetermination. A similar point could be made about properties: if the causal powers of M are included in those bestowed by P, then P’s causal relevance to behavior, far from excluding M’s, includes it. (Approaches along these lines have been developed in Antony 1999; Shoemaker 2001, 2007; Wilson 1999, 2011; Clapp 2001; critical discussions include Heil 1999, 2011; McLaughlin 2007; Kim 2010; Ney 2010; Audi 2012.)
您可能會問為什麼這些關係應該確保所需的解決方案。一個想法是,如果心理屬性是內在於其物理實現者的話,心理屬性的因果力量包括在其實現者的之中。再次考慮心理屬性 M 及其在某一實例中的一個實現者 P。很可能,M 的力量包括在 P 的之中。例如,兩種屬性都有造成某種行為的力量,但由於 P 的"特殊性"較大,它除了這些力量外還有 M 所缺乏的其他力量。一般而言,我們不認為整體在因果上與其部分競爭或被排除。當古斯踩到莉莉安的腳趾時,他的腳造成莉莉安不適,並不排除古斯造成她不適。古斯及其腳共存為原因,沒有競爭,我們也可能補充說,沒有過度決定。關於屬性也可以做出類似的論點:如果 M 的因果力量包括在 P 所賦予的力量之中,那麼 P 對行為的因果相關性,不僅不排除 M 的,反而包括了它。(沿這些路線發展的方法見於 Antony 1999; Shoemaker 2001, 2007; Wilson 1999, 2011; Clapp 2001;批評性討論見 Heil 1999, 2011; McLaughlin 2007; Kim 2010; Ney 2010; Audi 2012。)

6.5 Identity Solutions  身份解決方案

Autonomy and inheritance solutions grant at least this much to the Exclusion Problem: mental and physical properties are numerically distinct, however intimately they are otherwise related. But a third sort of strategy tries to undermine the argument at exactly this point: any mental property just is its physical realizer. If M=P, there’s no question of one’s excluding the other, nor is there any mystery of how M can work through P, for M and P are one and the same.
自主權和繼承解決方案至少給予排除問題如下: 精神和物理屬性在數量上是不同的,無論它們在其他方面有多密切的關係。但第三種策略試圖在這一點上削弱這個論點: 任何心理屬性都只是它的物理實現者。如果 M = P,就沒有一個排斥另一個的問題,也沒有 M 如何通過 P 運作的任何神秘,因為 M 和 P 是同一件事。

This sort of psychophysical property identity would seem to be blocked by the multiple realizability argument sketched earlier. But that argument, in spite of its wide appeal, has come under attack from several directions (see multiple realizability, §2). For example, some (Kim 1992; Lewis 1994; Jackson 1995; Heil 2003) take the argument to show, not that mental properties are distinct from their physical realizers, but that what we thought was one kind of mental property is actually many. Pains realized by different physical properties, in spite of having the same name (“pain”), are different, though similar, mental properties. There is no such property as pain simpliciter, only pain-for-this-physical-structure and pain-for-that-physical structure. Once such “structure-specific” identities are allowed, we can say that M (now just, say, pain-for-human beings) is identical with P, M’s “realizer” in human beings (replies include Fodor 1997; Block 1997; Marras 2003; Moore and Campbell 2010).
此種心理物理性質同一性看似被先前描述的多重可實現性論證所阻礙。但是，儘管該論證深受歡迎，它仍受到從多個方向的攻擊(參見多重可實現性,§2)。例如，有些人(金 1992 年;路易斯 1994 年;傑克遜 1995 年;海爾 2003 年)認為該論證表明,心理屬性並非與其物理實現者不同,而是我們原以為是單一種類的心理屬性實際上是多種。不同物理屬性所實現的疼痛,儘管具有相同的名稱("疼痛"),但仍是不同的,雖然相似的心理屬性。沒有所謂的單純疼痛性質,只有為此物理結構而產生的疼痛,以及為那物理結構而產生的疼痛。一旦允許這種"結構特定"的同一性,我們就可以說 M(現在僅是,比如說,人類而產生的疼痛)與 P(人類中 M 的"實現者")是同一的(反駁包括福多爾 1997 年;布洛克 1997 年;馬拉斯 2003 年;摩爾和坎貝爾 2010 年)。

This solution comes at a price: it forces us to abandon the belief that pain is a single, natural kind. There is, however, a way to preserve this doctrine while pursuing a strategy that’s otherwise similar to the one just sketched. The essential idea is that “property” as we’ve used the term so far is ambiguous. A property could be what characterizes an object (event), or what unifies several objects as a “one across many”. Now suppose the characterizing properties are tropes: particularized properties, unique to each object. And suppose the unifying properties are something else—call these “types”. If the mental “properties” that are causally relevant to behavior are tropes, and the mental “properties” mentioned in the multiple realizability argument are types, there’s no reason to think that this argument rules out psychophysical property-identities in any way that leads to exclusion worries. The M-trope and the P-trope are one and the same trope falling under two types, mental and physical. This proposal allows for a single type pain shared by diverse creatures; it’s just that this type is not the same sort of entity (a trope) that’s efficacious in the production of behavior (Heil 1992; Robb 1997; Heil and Robb 2003; what appears to be a similar view is defended by Macdonald and Macdonald 1986, 1995a; see also Whittle 2007.)
這個解決方案需要付出代價:它迫使我們放棄痛苦是單一、自然種類的信念。然而,有一種方法可以在採取與剛才概述的策略類似的方法時保留這一理論。關鍵的想法是,到目前為止我們使用術語"性質"有歧義。性質可以是描述事物(事件)的特徵,也可以是將多個事物統一為"同一事物"的東西。現在假設描述性質是特殊性質,即每個事物都有其獨特的性質。假設統一性質是其他東西——稱之為"類型"。如果對行為有因果關係的心理"性質"是特殊性質,而在多重實現論證中提及的心理"性質"是類型,那麼這一論證並不能以任何方式排斥心理-物理性質同一性。M 特殊性質和 P 特殊性質是同一個特殊性質,隸屬於兩種類型,即心理類型和物理類型。這一提議允許不同生物共享單一種類的痛苦;只是這種類型不是在行為產生過程中有效的實體(特殊性質)(Heil 1992; Robb 1997; Heil 和 Robb 2003;Macdonald 和 Macdonald 1986, 1995a 似乎有類似的觀點;另見 Whittle 2007)。

One worry about this proposal is that it appears to raise the Exclusion Problem all over again, this time at the level of properties (tropes). If a single property is both mental and physical, Completeness and No Overdetermination force us to say that it’s efficacious only qua physical, not qua mental. (For this and other criticisms, see Noordhof 1998; Raymont 2001; Gibb 2004; Macdonald and Macdonald 2006; Alward 2008; Maurin 2008; see Robb 2013 for some replies.)
對於此提議的一個擔憂是,它似乎將排斥問題再次提升到屬性(範疇)的層面。如果單一屬性同時具有心理和物理特性,完整性和無重複性將要求我們說它只具有物理效能,而非心理效能。(關於此等批評,見 Noordhof 1998; Raymont 2001; Gibb 2004; Macdonald 和 Macdonald 2006; Alward 2008; Maurin 2008;有關回應,見 Robb 2013。)

6.6 Necessary Effects: A Deeper Problem for Functionalism?
必要的影響:功能主義的深層問題?

Functionalism, along with any non-reductive theory of mind, faces the problem just discussed. But even if exclusionary worries are finessed, functionalism faces an additional and possibly more fundamental problem.
功能主義,連同任何非還原論的心智理論,都面臨著剛剛討論過的問題。但即使排斥性擔憂已得到解決,功能主義也面臨著另一個可能更為根本的問題。

As we noted earlier, functionalism characterizes states of mind causally. To be in a given mental state is to be in a state with the right sort of causal profile, a state bearing the right sorts of relation to other states. Think of functional states as nodes in a network of states, the identity of which depends on the relations they bear to other nodes, and think of the realizers as occupants of these nodes. All there is to a node is the potential causal relations it bears to other nodes (not so for the occupants, which have intrinsic properties). Suppose, then, that F and G are functional properties—nodes in this network—and that all there is to something’s being F is its being a G-causer. The resulting generalization, “Fs cause Gs”, is no doubt true, but it is vacuous, equivalent to the generalization that G-causers cause Gs.
根據 functionalism 論點,心智狀態是由因果關係所特徵。一個心理狀態可以被認為是在一個特定的因果關係網路中的一個節點,其特徵取決於與其他節點的關係。節點本身只有潛在的因果關係,而不是固有的性質。因此,如果 F 和 G 是功能性質,那麼「F 導致 G」的概括只是說「G 的因素導致 G」,這是一種空泛的說法。

This appears to strip functional properties of their causal efficacy. Why? One line of thought appeals to Hume’s celebrated doctrine that there can be no necessary connections between distinct existences. A mental property and its would-be effect are distinct, yet functionalism entails that they enjoy a necessary connection. On the Humean doctrine, such a connection could not be causal. Another, closely related, version of the problem requires that causal relations be subsumed by empirical laws. But there are no such laws available for functional properties if all of the relevant generalizations are analytic and vacuous. (The foregoing argument in either version threatens to generalize to all dispositional properties: see dispositions, §6. For the problem aimed at functionalism in particular, see Block 1990; Rupert 2006; functionalism, §5.2.)
這似乎剝奪了事物因果效能的功能性特性。為什麼?一種論點訴諸於休謨著名的學說,即不同存在之間沒有必然聯繫。心理屬性及其預期效果是不同的,然而功能主義卻說它們享有必然聯繫。根據休謨學說,這種聯繫不可能是因果的。另一個密切相關的問題版本要求因果關係被實證定律所涵蓋。但是,如果所有相關概括都是分析的和空洞的,功能性屬性就沒有這樣的定律。(無論哪個版本的上述論點都可能普遍化到所有處置性屬性:見處置性,§6。針對功能主義的問題,參見 Block 1990; Rupert 2006;功能主義,§5.2。)

This argument echoes the logical connection argument advanced in the 1950’s and 60’s against causal accounts of action (e.g., Melden 1961, pp. 52–3). Given that reasons (desires, intentions) are not logically distinct from the actions they rationalize, reasons could not cause actions. In response, Davidson (1963) noted that logical connections hold among predicates or descriptions of events, not among events themselves. A cause could be described in various ways, some of which will involve the effect: consider “the cause of the fire caused the fire”. This is hardly informative, but it’s not thereby false. And of course the statement, far from precluding a causal relation, explicitly asserts it. That said, if the claim is true, it should be possible to identify the cause of the fire independently of reference to the effect—as “the match’s igniting”, for instance. In defense of his own causal theory of action, Davidson argued that such a re-description of mental causes is always available, at least in principle (see §5.1).
這個論點呼應了 1950 年代和 60 年代對行動的因果解釋提出的邏輯連結論點(如，Melden 1961, pp. 52–3)。鑒於理由(慾望、意圖)與它們所合理化的行動在邏輯上並不區別,理由就不可能造成行動。為此,Davidson(1963)指出,邏輯連結存在於述詞或事件描述之間,而非事件本身之間。一個原因可以用不同方式描述,其中一些會涉及結果:比如"導致大火的原因引發了大火"。這並不具有任何信息量,但也不因此就是錯誤的。當然,這種陳述不僅沒有排斥因果關係,反而明確地肯定了它。也就是說,如果這個主張是真的,就應該能夠在不涉及結果的情況下確定大火的原因,比如"火柴點燃"。為了支持自己的行動因果理論,Davidson 辯稱,至少原則上,總能找到心理原因的這種重新描述(見§5.1)。

But Davidson’s saving move appears not to be available for the functionalist, for in the case of functional states and properties, no such independent descriptions are available, as the nature of a functional property is exhausted by its place in the causal network.
但是對於功能主義者來說,戴維森的拯救措施似乎並不可用,因為在功能狀態和性質的情況下,沒有這樣的獨立描述可用,因為功能性質的本質完全由其在因果網絡中的位置決定。

The functionalist has a number of options available, some of them mirroring solutions to the Exclusion Problem (Rupert 2006 provides a critical survey). For example, a functionalist could settle for a weaker, explanatory role for functional properties, leaving causal efficacy to the realizers of functional states (§6.4; see, e.g., Segal 2009; compare Roth and Cummins 2014). Or a functionalist might identify states of mind with their realizers (§6.5); indeed, some of the early functionalists were identity theorists (Lewis 1966, 1994; Armstrong 1968/1993). This would permit the sort of re-description that the more mainstream version of functionalism apparently blocks. A third option is to look for non-vacuous, empirical generalizations subsuming functional properties (Antony and Levine 1997). Yet a fourth option rejects the Humean doctrine, permitting necessary connections between a causally efficacious property and its effect. Such a proposal would find a home in the more general “causal theory of properties” defended by Shoemaker (1980, 1998) and others.
功能主義者有多種選擇可用,其中一些反映了對排斥問題的解決方案(Rupert 2006 提供了一項批評性的調查)。例如,功能主義者可以接受功能特性在解釋上的更弱的角色,將因果效力留給功能狀態的實現者(§6.4;參見 Segal 2009;比較 Roth 和 Cummins 2014)。或者,功能主義者可以將心智狀態與其實現者劃等號(§6.5);事實上,早期的功能主義者中有些是認同理論者(Lewis 1966, 1994; Armstrong 1968/1993)。這將允許那種功能主義的主流版本所禁止的重新描述。第三個選項是尋找非空洞的、經驗性的概括,涵蓋功能特性(Antony 和 Levine 1997)。然而,第四個選項拒絕休謨主義,允許在因果有效的屬性及其效果之間存在必然聯繫。這種提案將在 Shoemaker(1980, 1998)及其他人所辯護的更廣泛的"屬性因果論"中找到依歸。

7. Problem IV: Externalism
第七題：外在主義

Our final version of the property-based problem is restricted to intentional mental properties, that is, properties in virtue of which some mental states—propositional attitudes, perceptual experiences, mental images, and so on—are about something, properties in virtue of which mental states have representational content. We assume here that externalism is true, so that the contents of representational states of mind depend, not merely on intrinsic features of those states, but on relations, in particular, on the causal, social, and historical relations agents bear to their surroundings. In the simplest case, Lilian is thinking about water (H₂O) because she stands in the right sorts of causal relation to water. The key move here is to reject the idea that meaningful objects or states owe their meaning to their intrinsic make-up alone.
以此為依據,我們最終版本的基於性質的問題僅限於有意識的心理性質,即一些心理狀態——命題態度、感知經驗、心像等——所關涉的性質,這些性質使心理狀態具有代表內容。我們在此假定外在主義是正確的,因此代表性心理狀態的內容取決於這些狀態的外在關係,而不僅取決於這些狀態本身的內在特徵,尤其是行為者與其環境之間的因果關係、社會關係和歷史關係。在最簡單的情況下,莉莉安之所以思考水(H ₂ O),是因為她與水之間存在恰當的因果關係。關鍵的轉變在於,棄絕了具有意義的對象或狀態僅憑其內在組成就能獲得意義的觀點。

7.1 How Could Content Make a Causal Difference?
內容如何產生因果影響?

The causally problematic feature for externalism is this contextual or relational component of representational mental states. Suppose that our mental representations are physical structures in the brain. Now suppose with the externalist that the content of these representations is determined, not just by our intrinsic features, but by context as well. Lilian (or Lilian’s brain) represents a tree in the quad by going into state T. But T represents a tree in the quad, not by virtue of T’s (or, for that matter, Lilian’s) intrinsic makeup, but by virtue of T’s (and by extension Lilian’s) standing in the right kind of relation to the tree. The very same kind of state in a different context (in the brain of someone in different circumstances) might represent something very different—or nothing at all.
原因論存在主義者的這個情景性或關係性的心理表徵狀態成分,是一個有問題的特徵。假設我們的心理表徵是大腦中的物理結構。現在,讓我們假設,根據外在主義的觀點,這些表徵的內容不僅由我們的內在特徵決定,也由情境決定。利莉安(或利莉安的大腦)通過進入狀態 T 來表徵四方的一棵樹。但 T 之所以表徵四方的一棵樹,不是因為 T 本身(或利莉安本身)的固有特徵,而是因為 T(以及由此擴展的利莉安)與那棵樹之間存在某種正確的關係。在不同情境下(在不同處境中某人的大腦中),完全相同的狀態可能表徵完全不同的事物 — 甚至什麼也不表徵。

Now if the content of Lilian’s thought that there is a tree in the quad is “broad”, if the significance of her thought depends on factors outside Lilian’s body, then it is indeed hard to see how this content could figure in a causal account of her actions, including Lilian’s expressing her belief that there is a tree in the quad by uttering the sentence, “There is a tree in the quad”. This is bad news for any attempt to explain why we do what we do by reference to the contents of our thoughts.
莉莉安認為校園裡有一棵樹的想法內容是「廣泛」的,如果她的想法的意義取決於莉莉安身體外部的因素,那麼很難看出這種內容如何能在她的行動的因果解釋中發揮作用,包括莉莉安表達她相信校園裡有一棵樹的信念,通過說出「校園裡有一棵樹」這個句子。這對任何試圖通過參考我們的想法內容來解釋我們為什麼這樣做的企圖來說,都是壞消息。

Consider an analogy (Dretske 1998). Gus inserts a quarter into a vending machine. The coin has a range of intrinsic qualities common to quarters, but its being a quarter does not depend solely on these intrinsic qualities: a quarter’s intrinsic qualities would be shared by a decent counterfeit. The coin’s being a quarter depends on its having the right sort of history: it was produced in a United States mint. This is something the vending machine cares nothing about. The machine reacts only to the coin’s intrinsic features. You might put this by saying that the coin affects the machine, not qua quarter, but only qua possessor of a particular kind of intrinsic makeup. (Vending machines are built to take advantage of the contingent fact that objects with this intrinsic makeup are almost always quarters.)
考慮一個比喻(Dretske 1998)。古斯將一枚四分之一美元硬幣放入自動售貨機。硬幣有許多與四分之一美元硬幣相共同的固有品質,但它之所以成為四分之一美元硬幣並不完全取決於這些固有品質:一枚不錯的仿造品也會擁有同樣的固有品質。硬幣之所以成為四分之一美元硬幣,取決於它的歷史:它是在美國造幣廠生產的。這對自動售貨機來說毫無關係。機器只對硬幣的固有特徵做出反應。可以說,硬幣影響機器,不是因為它是四分之一美元硬幣,而是因為它具有某種特定類型的固有特徵。(自動售貨機被設計為利用這一偶然事實,即擁有這種固有特徵的物品幾乎總是四分之一美元硬幣。)

The worry is that we apparently operate, in important respects, as vending machines do. We respond to incoming stimuli solely in virtue of our intrinsic makeup and the intrinsic character of the stimuli. But if our thoughts possess their content in virtue of our standing in complicated environmental–social–historical relations to our surroundings, it is hard to see how such contents could make a causal difference in our psychological economy, how they could figure in the production of behavior. Thoughts have contents, but these contents could have no direct influence on the operation of mental mechanisms (Stich 1978; Kim 1982; Fodor 1980, 1987, ch. 2, 1991; Jackson and Pettit 1988).
我們顯然在重要方面以自動販賣機的方式運作。我們只根據內在特質及刺激的內在特性而作出反應。但如果我們的思想因與周圍環境-社會-歷史關係而產生內容,那麼這些內容如何在我們的心理經濟中產生因果影響,如何在行為產生中發揮作用,都是難以理解的。思想有內容,但這些內容可能對精神機制的運作沒有直接影響。

7.2 Intrinsic Causal Surrogates
內在因果替代

One general line of response notes that whenever we explain a bit of behavior by appeal to extrinsic content, there is a local, intrinsic property available as a “causal surrogate” to produce the behavior (Crane and Mellor 1990). Such a surrogate may be neurophysiological or, as on computationalist views, a complex of “formal” or “syntactic” properties of internal representations. Now by itself, this point seems just to highlight the problem: if intrinsic surrogates are always needed, all the more reason to reject the efficacy of content. Some have indeed drawn such a lesson, concluding either that content has no role to play in an explanatory psychology (Stich 1978, 1983), or perhaps that psychological explanations appealing to content were never causal to begin with (Owens 1993; see also the noncausalists cited in §1.1).
一般的回應筆記指出,每當我們通過外在內容來解釋某些行為時,就存在一個局部的、內在的性質作為"因果替代品"來產生該行為(Crane 和 Mellor 1990)。這種替代品可能是神經生理學的,或者如計算主義觀點所述,是內部表徵的"形式"或"語法"屬性的複雜體。現在,僅從這一點來看,這似乎只是突顯了問題:如果總是需要內在的替代品,那麼拒絕內容的效力就更有理由了。有人確實得出了這樣的教訓,結論要么是內容在解釋性心理學中沒有任何作用(Stich 1978,1983),要么是訴諸內容的心理學解釋從未真正涉及因果(Owens 1993;另見§1.1 中提及的非因果論者)。

But this might be too hasty. Far from precluding the causal efficacy of content, the surrogates might in fact play a role in ensuring it. Note that while Lilian’s intrinsic properties don’t guarantee the contents of her beliefs, her intrinsic properties are, in her environment, reliably correlated with these contents—so reliably, in fact, that content, in spite of being extrinsic, enters into the counterfactuals or laws often thought to ground causal efficacy. It seems clear, after all, that if Lilian had not believed there was water in front of her, she would not have extended her hand. This counterfactual could be secured by the fact that Lilian’s believing “There’s water in front of me” covaries with some internal state of her brain, but the counterfactual, for all that, is still true. A similar point could be made using (hedged) laws connecting content with behavior. The terrain here in any case is similar to that explored earlier in §§5.3–4, though the extrinsic nature of content introduces its own complexities. (On the counterfactuals, see Mele 1992, ch. 2; Yablo 1997; on the laws, see Braun 1991; Fodor 1995.)
但這可能太草率了。遠離排除內容的因果效力,代理人實際上可能在確保它發揮作用中發揮作用。請注意,儘管莉莉安的內在性質並不能保證她的信念內容,但在她的環境中,她的內在性質與這些內容高度相關——事實上,這種相關性如此之高,以至於內容儘管是外部的,但仍然會進入人們通常認為構成因果效力的反事實條件或規律。畢竟,顯而易見的是,如果莉莉安沒有相信前面有水,她就不會伸手。這種反事實可以由莉莉安相信「前面有水」與她大腦內某種狀態的相關性來確保,但無論如何,這種反事實仍然是真實的。可以使用(加以限定的)將內容與行為連接起來的規律來提出類似的論點。這裡的領域與前面§5.3–4 探討的領域相似,雖然內容的外在性質引入了自身的一些複雜性。(關於反事實,見 Mele 1992,第 2 章;Yablo 1997;關於規律,見 Braun 1991;Fodor 1995。)

There’s a more direct way that the intrinsic surrogates might secure the efficacy of content: perhaps the surrogate properties are content, or rather a kind of content. Distinguish narrow from broad content. Think of narrow content as the content of a representational state of mind minus its “broad” components. Consider Lilian (or Lilian’s brain) and an intrinsically indiscernible brain in a vat wired to a supercomputer. Grant that Lilian and the envatted brain entertain intrinsically indiscernible thoughts with utterly different representational contents. Now imagine that we could abstract a common element from the contents of Lilian’s and the brain’s intrinsically indiscernible thoughts. This element is their narrow content. Because narrow content is something all intrinsic duplicates must have in common, the hope is that such content could be the very intrinsic properties that produce behavior.
有一種更直接的方式,內在代理者可以確保內容的效力:也許代理屬性就是內容,或者是一種內容。區分狹義內容和廣義內容。將狹義內容視為思維表徵狀態的內容,減去其"廣義"成分。考慮莉莉安(或莉莉安的大腦)和一個與之本質上無法區分的浸泡在超級計算機中的大腦。假設莉莉安和被浸泡的大腦有著本質上無法區分的思想,但其表徵內容完全不同。現在想象我們能夠從莉莉安和大腦本質上無法區分的思想中提取出一個共同的元素。這個元素就是它們的狹義內容。因為狹義內容是所有本質複製品必須共有的東西,所以希望這種內容就是產生行為的那些本質屬性。

The notion of narrow content might raise suspicion, however. Return to the vending machine. The quarter Gus inserts in the machine has a particular value owing to relations it bears to outside goings-on: it was minted in the Denver mint. A counterfeit placed in the machine could have the very same intrinsic makeup as the quarter, but it would lack the quarter’s value. It looks as though it is the quarter’s intrinsic makeup, not its value, that matters to the operation of the machine. Now imagine someone arguing that a quarter and an intrinsically indiscernible slug do in fact share a kind of value: narrow value. Because narrow value accompanies an object’s intrinsic qualities, we need not regard narrow value as epiphenomenal. But what could narrow value be? Whatever it is, could it in any way resemble value ordinarily conceived—broad value? Narrow value looks like a phony category posited ad hoc to accommodate an otherwise embarrassing difficulty. Nevertheless, some philosophers remain optimistic about the prospects of a viable internalist account of content, one that would allow fully fledged thoughts to have a role in the production of behavior. (For references and further discussion, see narrow mental content.)
狹隘內容的概念可能會引起懷疑。回到自動販賣機。蓋斯放入機器的四分之一美元因外部發生的事件而擁有特定的價值:它是在丹佛造幣廠鑄造的。放入機器的假造幣與四分之一美元具有完全相同的本質成分,但卻缺乏四分之一美元的價值。看來是四分之一美元的本質成分,而非其價值,對機器的運作產生影響。現在想像有人辯稱,四分之一美元與本質上無差異的代幣確實共享一種價值:狹隘價值。由於狹隘價值伴隨著物件的本質特徵,我們無需將其視為表象。但狹隘價值究竟是什麼?無論它是什麼,是否能在某種程度上類似於通常認為的廣泛價值?狹隘價值看起來像是為了應對令人尷尬的困難而設置的虛假範疇。儘管如此,一些哲學家仍對內在主義內容理論的前景保持樂觀,這種理論會允許完全發展的思想在行為產生中起作用。

7.3 Reasons as Structuring Causes
7.3 原因作為結構原因

Another, much different, attempt to preserve a causal role for content can be found in Dretske 1988, 1989, 1993. So far we’ve assumed that a behavioral event is distinct from the mental event that causes it. On Dretske’s view, however, behavior is a process that includes, as a component, its mental cause. When mental event a causes bodily movement b, the behavior in this case is not b itself, but the process of a’s causing b. When Lilian raises her hand because she wants to get the teacher’s attention and she believes that raising her hand will accomplish this end, her behavior is not her hand’s going up, but the process of this belief-desire pair’s causing her hand to go up.
德雷茨克 1988 年、1989 年和 1993 年的論點是保留內容的因果作用。到目前為止,我們一直假設行為事件與導致它的心理事件是不同的。然而,根據德雷茨克的觀點,行為是一個包含其精神原因作為組成部分的過程。當心理事件 a 導致肢體運動 b 時,在這種情況下,行為不是 b 本身,而是 a 導致 b 的過程。當利利安舉手是因為她想引起老師的注意,並相信舉手能達到這一目的時,她的行為不是手臂上升,而是這對信念-欲望對導致她的手上升的過程。

Dretske grants that when mental event a initiates (“triggers”) a process ending in bodily movement b, a does so solely in virtue of its intrinsic makeup. Nevertheless, a’s relational, intentional properties have a causal role, for they can be relevant to the fact that a causes b. Reasons are “structuring causes” of behavior: it’s because of what a indicates that it was “recruited” during the learning process as a cause of b. (Indication here is a matter of reliable co-variation.) It’s because, for example, Lilian’s belief indicates what it does—raising one’s hand (in these circumstances) is a way to get the teacher’s attention—that it was (together with the relevant desire) recruited as a cause of her hand-raising. Relational, intentional mental properties thus become causally relevant to behavior, because they are relevant to structuring the very causal processes that, on Dretske’s view, constitute instances of behavior.
德雷斯克承認,當心理事件 a 啟動("觸發")一個以肢體運動 b 結束的過程時,a 純粹是由於其內在組成而這樣做。然而,a 的關係性和有意圖的屬性具有因果作用,因為它們可能與 a 導致 b 的事實相關。理由是行為的"結構原因":正是由於 a 所指示的內容,它才在學習過程中被"招募"作為 b 的原因。(這裡的指示是可靠共變的問題。)正是因為,例如,莉莉安的信念指示了它所指示的內容——在這種情況下舉手是一種獲得老師注意力的方式——它才(連同相關的欲望)被招募作為她舉手的原因。因此,關係性、有意圖的心理屬性成為行為的因果相關,因為它們與構建構成行為實例的因果過程本身相關。

Dretske’s proposed solution quickly produced a number of responses (e.g., Smith 1990; Block 1990; Baker 1991; Horgan 1991; Kim 1991; Mele 1991). One question is whether relational, intentional properties in fact play a causal role in the structuring (or “wiring”) of causal processes in the brain. Even during the learning process, the states of Lilian’s brain would seem to be sensitive only to local, intrinsic features of one another, features that screen off external goings-on. Dretske might be able to avoid such screening-off by appealing to the counterfactual dependence of behavior-structuring on these goings-on. His view would then stand or fall with the success of counterfactual theories of causal relevance (§5.3). A second question is whether intentional states, even if they were relevant in the way Dretske says they are, deliver the kind of causal relevance we want. When Lilian raises her hand, the structuring of the relevant processes in her brain has already occurred. If intentional properties are relevant at all, then, they are apparently relevant only to what happened in the past during the learning process. But we normally regard mental properties as causally relevant to what’s going on here and now, the very time when Lilian (or anyone) acts (but cf. Allen 1995; Dretske replies to critics in his 1991, esp. pp. 210–7; for a more recent discussion see Hofmann and Schulte 2014).
德雷斯克提出的解決方案很快產生了許多回應(例如,史密斯 1990; 布洛克 1990; 貝克 1991; 何根 1991; 金 1991; 梅勒 1991)。其中一個問題是,關係性和意向性屬性是否實際上在大腦中的因果過程結構(或"接線")中扮演著因果角色。即使在學習過程中,莉莉安大腦的狀態似乎只對彼此的局部內在特徵敏感,這些特徵阻隔了外部的發生。德雷斯克可能能夠通過訴諸這些發生對行為結構的事實依存來避免這種阻隔。他的觀點將取決於事實依存理論在因果相關性方面的成功(第 5.3 節)。第二個問題是,即使意向性狀態如德雷斯克所說那樣相關,它們也無法提供我們想要的那種因果相關性。當莉莉安舉手時,相關過程在大腦中的結構已經發生。因此,如果意向性特徵有任何相關性,那麼它們顯然只與過去學習過程中發生的事情相關。但是我們通常認為心理特性與正在發生的事情,也就是莉莉安(或任何人)正在採取行動的當下具有因果相關性(但參見艾倫 1995; 德雷斯克在 1991 年回應批評者,特別是 pp. 210-7; 關於更近期的討論,請參見 Hofmann 和 Schulte 2014)。

7.4 Broad Behavior  7.4 廣泛行為

Dretske’s proposal is a version of the dual explanandum strategy (§6.3). The idea is that physical and mental properties are causally responsible for different effects. For Dretske, the (triggering) physical properties are responsible for bodily motions, while the (structuring) mental properties are responsible for behavior.
德瑞斯克的提議是雙重解釋對象策略(§6.3)的一個版本。其想法是,物理和心智屬性對不同的效果具有因果責任。對於德瑞斯克而言,(引發的)物理屬性負責肢體運動,而(結構的)心智屬性則負責行為。

Another version of this strategy begins with a point also made in §6.3, namely that to question a property’s causal relevance is really to question its relevance to some property of the effect. The form of our central causal question, that is, is whether a mental cause qua F causes a behavioral effect qua G. Now when F is an intentional mental property, what G is the object of our question? One possibility is that it is a behavioral property that, like the mental property, is itself “broad” (see, e.g., Enc 1995).
這個策略的另一個版本始於第 6.3 節中提出的一個觀點,即質疑某個性質的因果相關性,實際上就是在質疑它與某個效果性質的相關性。也就是說,我們的中心因果問題的形式是,一個作為 F 的心理因由是否導致一個作為 G 的行為效果。現在當 F 是一個刻意的心理性質時,G 究竟是我們問題的對象?一種可能性是,它是一個行為性質,就像心理性質一樣,"廣泛"(見 Enc 1995)。

Consider a simple example: Suppose Lilian believes that a glass in front of her contains water, and this belief (together with her desires) causes her to reach for the glass. Her behavior is an instance of trying to get water, and it’s the instantiation of this property (and not, say, the property of being a certain kind of bodily motion) that we’re wondering about when we ask whether the intentional property of her belief is causally relevant. (If our interest lay solely in explaining a particular bodily motion, we would rest content with a non-psychological, purely physiological explanation.) But now the answer seems straightforward. For what makes Lilian’s behavior a trying for water is that it’s caused by a belief whose content concerns water. Once we realize that the behavioral property of the effect is itself broad, its connection to the intentional mental property seems clear.
考慮利利安相信前方的玻璃容器裡裝著水,這種信念(連同她的慾望)導致她伸手去拿那個玻璃杯。她的行為是想要取水的一個實例,我們想探討的就是這個屬性(而非特定的身體運動)的實現是否對她的信念的意圖性屬性有因果關係。如果我們只想解釋某個特定的身體動作,單純的生理學解釋就足夠了。但現在答案似乎很明確,因為造成利利安行為成為想取水的原因,是因為這行為由一個內容關於水的信念所導致。一旦我們意識到效果的行為屬性本身是廣泛的,它與意圖性心理屬性的聯繫就變得很清楚。

This is not to say that the physical properties of Lilian’s belief do no work: it’s just that they are responsible for a different property of the effect, for instance, the property of being a forward arm-movement. The intentional properties of her belief are relevant to the effect qua (broad) behavior; the physical properties are relevant to the effect qua (narrow) bodily motion. And as we noted earlier (§6.3), such a solution can be employed in response to the Exclusion Problem as well. If a mental property and its physical realizer are relevant to different properties of the effect, they need not compete causally.
這不是說莉莉安信念的物理特性不發揮作用:而是它們負責效果的不同特性,例如向前移動手臂的特性。她信念的意向性特性與(廣泛)行為的效果相關;物理特性與(狹義)身體運動的效果相關。正如我們先前提到的(§6.3),此類解決方案也可用於應對排斥問題。若心理特性及其物理實現體皆與效果的不同特性相關,它們則無需在因果上競爭。

Because it promises to solve two outstanding problems of mental causation, this approach is potentially quite powerful. (For discussion, see Fodor 1991; Burge 1995.) One question to raise here, however, is whether the fact that some behavior can be described broadly makes the intentional mental property of its cause relevant. The undeniable conceptual connections between mental and behavioral descriptions might point to a kind of explanatory relevance, but it’s a further question whether causal connections grounding these explanations involve broad properties. Those motivated by the original epiphenomenalist arguments will worry that narrow, physical properties are really doing all the work here: the apparent relevance of the broad properties is an illusion created by the way we, in describing and explaining behavior, conceptualize both cause and effect (see Owens 1993). This point leads to a fourth, related response to the problem.
因為它承諾解決兩個突出的心理因果關係問題,這種方法可能非常強大。(討論請見 Fodor 1991;Burge 1995。)然而,這裡要提出的一個問題是,某些行為可以被廣泛描述的事實是否使其原因的有意識心理屬性相關。心理和行為描述之間不可否認的概念聯繫可能指向一種解釋相關性,但關於這些解釋的因果聯繫是否涉及廣泛屬性,這是一個進一步的問題。那些受原始表象論論點驅使的人將擔心,狹隘的物理屬性才是真正在起作用:廣泛屬性的表面相關性是我們在描述和解釋行為時概念化因果關係的方式創造的錯覺(見 Owens 1993)。這一點導致對這一問題的第四種相關回應。

7.5 The Appeal to Explanatory Practice
7.5 訴求解釋性實踐

Some theorists would challenge the distinction—implicit in the foregoing discussion—between explanation and causation. Our concept of causality, they would insist, is bound up with the concept of explanation: causally relevant properties are those that figure in our best causal explanations (Segal and Sober 1991; Wilson 1992; Burge 1993; Raymont 2001; §6.3). We find out what causal relations amount to by starting with clear cases of causal explanation. Given that we (and the cognitive scientists) routinely explain physical events by citing mental causes (and mental events by invoking physical causes), questioning whether real causal relations answer to these explanations is to succumb to the kind of metaphysical hubris that gives metaphysics a bad name.
一些理論家會質疑——隱含在前述討論中——解釋與因果關係之間的區別。他們會堅持,我們對因果關係的概念,是與解釋概念相關聯的:因果相關的性質,就是那些出現在我們最佳因果解釋中的性質(Segal and Sober 1991;Wilson 1992;Burge 1993;Raymont 2001;§6.3)。我們從明確的因果解釋案例開始,才能發現什麼是因果關係。鑑於我們(以及認知科學家)慣常通過引用心理原因來解釋物理事件(並以物理原因來解釋心理事件),質疑這些解釋是否對應於真實的因果關係,就等同於屈服於那種有損於形而上學的狂妄。

This appeal to explanatory practice has the potential to answer in one fell swoop all four of the property-based problems we’ve considered.
這呼籲解釋性實踐有潛力一次性解決我們考慮過的所有四個基於財產的問題。

Doubtless our understanding of the notions of causality and causal relevance depends importantly on our grasp of causal explanations. But there are at least two areas of concern about the explanatory strategy (compare Kim 1998, pp. 60–7). First, you might wonder whether the strategy addresses the right question. Earlier, we pointed out that the central question of mental causation is not so much whether mental properties are causally relevant but how they could be, given some alleged feature of mental properties (in the case at issue here, the feature is their being relational properties). The explanatory strategy would at best seem to be addressing only the “whether” question, not the “how” question. Second, even when restricted to the “whether” question, the strategy rests on a conflation of what appears to be an epistemological notion (explanation) with metaphysical notions (causation and causal relevance). A full evaluation of the view would thus require a deeper look into how the two are related.
對無疑,我們對因果性和因果相關性概念的理解,在很大程度上取決於我們對因果解釋的把握。但是,關於解釋策略,至少有兩個值得關注的領域(參見 Kim 1998, pp. 60–7)。首先,您可能會質疑這一策略是否針對了正確的問題。早前,我們指出,心智因果性的核心問題,並非心理性質是否具有因果相關性,而是它們如何能夠具有因果相關性,鑑於心理性質的某些所謂特徵(在這個案例中,指的是它們是關係性質)。解釋策略最多只能解決"是否"的問題,而無法解決"如何"的問題。其次,即使將討論局限於"是否"的問題,這一策略也存在將表面上的認識論概念(解釋)與形而上學概念(因果和因果相關性)混淆的問題。對這一觀點的全面評估,因此需要更深入地探討這兩者之間的關係。

8. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind
形而上學和心靈哲學

We have been treating the problem of mental causation as though it were a problem in applied metaphysics. Perhaps this approach is wrong-headed. Perhaps the problem really falls under the purview of the philosophy of science. What if we began with a look at actual scientific practice (as suggested in §§6.3, 7.5) and determined what exactly science requires for acceptable causal explanation? An examination of established special sciences reveals that the very features (multiple realizability, higher-level and “broad” properties, for instance) metaphysically inclined philosophers regard as posing apparently insuperable difficulties for mental causation, are routinely invoked in causal explanations in those sciences. This suggests that, rather than let a priori conceptions of causation (or properties, or causal powers) lead us to regard mental causation with suspicion, we should reason in the other direction: revise our conception of causation to fit our actual scientific beliefs and practices. If the metaphysicians were right about causation, no science would be possible beyond basic physics (biological properties, for instance, would lack causal efficacy).
我們一直將心理因果的問題視為應用形而上學的問題。也許這種方式有錯誤。也許這個問題真正屬於科學哲學的範疇。如果我們從實際的科學實踐(如§§6.3、7.5 所示)出發,並確定科學對可接受的因果解釋需要什麼呢?對確立的特殊科學的檢查表明,哲學傾向者視為給心理因果帶來無法克服的障礙的特徵(多重可實現性、更高水平和"廣泛"的性質等),實際上都在這些科學的因果解釋中得到了援引。這表明,我們不應該讓對因果關係(或性質、因果力量)的先驗概念,使我們對心理因果心懷懷疑,而應該採取相反的方向進行推理:修改我們對因果關係的概念,使其符合我們實際的科學信念和實踐。如果形而上學家們對因果關係是正確的,那麼除了基本物理學以外,任何科學都不可能存在。

This is one way to go. Another way is to take a step backward and ask which features of our conception of the mental, features we commonly take for granted, might be the source of our difficulties. Eliminativists aside, all parties evidently agree that “realism about the mental” requires that mental predicates figuring in causal accounts of behavior designate distinctively mental properties. If we aim to honor psychology (and the other special sciences), our job is to show how these properties could be causally relevant to physical goings-on. Suppose, in contrast, that you took the goal to be, not the preservation of mental properties, but the preservation of mental truths. In that case we would seek an account of the mind that provides plausible truthmakers for psychological and psycho-physical claims, including claims concerning mental causation.
這是一種方式。另一種方式是退一步,問我們對心智的概念中,哪些我們通常視為理所當然的特徵,可能是我們困難的根源。除了消除主義者外,所有人顯然都同意,「對心智的現實主義」要求,出現在行為因果解釋中的心智述詞,指涉獨特的心智屬性。如果我們的目標是尊重心理學(和其他特殊科學),我們的任務就是展示這些屬性如何對物理事件產生因果影響。相反,假如您把目標設為保留心智真理,而非保留心智屬性,那麼我們就需要提出一種心靈理論,為心理學和心理-物理主張(包括關於心智因果的主張)提供可信的真實性基礎。

One possibility is that truthmakers for psychological truths include irreducibly mental properties. This is not the only possibility, however. Another is that psychological assertions are made true by physical states and properties, states and properties answering to predicates belonging to physics and chemistry. A view of this kind (which is close to Davidson’s as spelled out in §5 and to the identity solutions discussed in §6.5) would endeavor to resolve the problem of mental causation, not by tinkering with the causal concept, but by rejecting the idea that mental and physical properties are distinct kinds of property. All parties agree that mental predicates and descriptions differ from physical predicates and descriptions. Application conditions for mental terms and physical terms diverge in ways that preclude definitional reduction of the one to the other. Perhaps it is a mistake, however, to move from this linguistic fact to a substantive ontological thesis: mental and physical predicates designate properties belonging to distinct families of properties.
一個可能性是心理真理的真實詮釋包括不可還原的心理屬性。這並非唯一可能性,另一個可能性是心理主張由物理狀態和屬性作為真實,這些狀態和屬性符合物理學和化學的詞語。這種觀點 (接近於第 5 節論述的戴維森的觀點和第 6.5 節討論的同一性解決方案) 會努力解決心智因果問題,不是通過改變因果概念,而是通過拒絕心理和物理屬性是不同種類屬性的想法。所有各方都同意心理詞語和描述有別於物理詞語和描述。心理術語和物理術語的應用條件在某種程度上排斥了相互之間的定義性還原。然而,或許從這個語言事實得出實體論命題是個錯誤:心理和物理詞語指稱屬於不同屬性家族的屬性。

Whether anything like this could be made to work is an open question. To the extent that you regard the current state of play as unsatisfying, however, it is perhaps a question worth pursuing.
不論是否能夠如此運作,這都是一個值得探討的問題。不過,如果您認為目前的狀況令人不滿意,那麼這個問題可能值得繼續追究。

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Related Entries  相關條目

action | anomalous monism | causation: counterfactual theories of | causation: the metaphysics of | Davidson, Donald | dualism | emergent properties | epiphenomenalism | externalism about the mind | free will | functionalism | mental content: narrow | mind/brain identity theory | multiple realizability | physicalism | properties | tropes
行動 | 異常孤立論 | 因果關係:假設性因果理論 | 因果關係:形而上學 | 戴維森,唐納 | 二元論 | 浮現屬性 | 表象無效論 | 心智外在主義 | 自由意志 | 功能主義 | 心智內容:狹隘 | 心靈/大腦同一論 | 多重實現性 | 物質主義 | 屬性 | 質素

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We are grateful to the editors for helpful advice on preparing this entry.
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