Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters
自然灾害、人民的脆弱性与灾难

Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis
本·威斯纳、皮尔斯·布莱基、特里·坎农和伊恩·戴维斯

Also available as a printed book see title verso for ISBN details
也可作为印刷书籍获取，详见书名页的 ISBN 信息

AT RISK《风险》

The term ‘natural disaster’ is often used to refer to natural events such as earthquakes, hurricanes or floods. However, the phrase ‘natural disaster’ suggests an uncritical acceptance of a deeply engrained ideological and cultural myth. At Risk questions this myth and argues that extreme natural events are not disasters until a vulnerable group of people is exposed.
“自然灾害”一词通常用来指代地震、飓风或洪水等自然事件。然而，“自然灾害”这一短语暗示了对一种根深蒂固的意识形态和文化神话的不加批判的接受。《风险》质疑这一神话，并认为极端自然事件在脆弱群体暴露之前并不是灾害。

At Risk focuses on what makes people vulnerable. Often this means analysing the links between poverty and vulnerability. But it is also important to take account of different social groups that suffer more in extreme events, including women, children, the frail and elderly, ethnic minorities, illegal immigrants, refugees and people with disabilities. Vulnerability has also been increased by global environmental change and economic globalisation-it is an irony of the ‘risk society’ that efforts to provide ‘security’ often create new risks. Fifty years of deforestation in Honduras and Nicaragua opened up the land for the export of beef, coffee, bananas and cotton. It enriched the few, but endangered the many when hurricane Mitch struck these areas in 1998. Rainfall sent denuded hillsides sliding down on villages and towns.
《风险》关注的是使人们脆弱的因素。这通常意味着分析贫困与脆弱性之间的联系。但同样重要的是考虑在极端事件中遭受更多影响的不同社会群体，包括女性、儿童、虚弱和老年人、少数民族、非法移民、难民和残疾人。全球环境变化和经济全球化也加剧了脆弱性——在“风险社会”中，提供“安全”的努力往往会创造新的风险，这是一种讽刺。洪都拉斯和尼加拉瓜五十年的森林砍伐为牛肉、咖啡、香蕉和棉花的出口打开了土地。这使少数人富裕，但在 1998 年飓风米切尔袭击这些地区时却危及了许多人。降雨使光秃的山坡滑向村庄和城镇。

The new edition of At Risk confronts a further ten years of ever more expensive and deadly disasters since it was first published and discusses disaster not as an aberration, but as a signal failure of mainstream ‘development’. Two analytical models are provided as tools for understanding vulnerability. One links remote and distant ‘root causes’ to ‘unsafe conditions’ in a ‘progression of vulnerability’. The other uses the concepts of ‘access’ and ‘livelihood’ to understand why some households are more vulnerable than others. The book then concludes with strategies to create a safer world.
《风险》新版本面对自首次出版以来的十年中日益昂贵和致命的灾难，讨论灾难不仅仅是一个异常现象，而是主流“发展”的信号性失败。提供了两个分析模型作为理解脆弱性的工具。一个模型将遥远和深层的“根本原因”与“脆弱性进程”中的“危险条件”联系起来。另一个模型使用“获取”和“生计”的概念来理解为什么某些家庭比其他家庭更脆弱。书中最后总结了创造一个更安全世界的策略。

Ben Wisner is Visiting Research Fellow at the Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and at the Benfield Greig Hazards Research Centre, University College London, and Affiliate Researcher with the Environmental Studies Program at Oberlin College, Ohio. Piers Blaikie is Professorial Fellow, School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia. Terry Cannon is Reader in Development Studies in the School of Humanities and at the Natural Resources Institute, both at the University of Greenwich. Ian Davis is Visiting Professor, Cranfield University Disaster Management Centre.
本·威斯纳是伦敦经济学院发展研究所的访问研究员，以及伦敦大学学院本菲尔德·格里格灾害研究中心的研究员，同时也是俄亥俄州奥伯林学院环境研究项目的附属研究员。皮尔斯·布莱基是东安格利亚大学发展研究学院的教授研究员。特里·坎农是格林威治大学人文学科与自然资源研究所的开发研究讲师。伊恩·戴维斯是克兰菲尔德大学灾害管理中心的访问教授。

An excellent overview of the different human responses to natural hazards, dispelling the belief that little can be done to avoid the tragedies associated with natural hazards.
对人类对自然灾害的不同反应进行了出色的概述，驳斥了人们认为对自然灾害相关悲剧无能为力的看法。

Gareth Jones, Senior Lecturer in Geography, University of Strathclyde
加雷斯·琼斯，斯特拉斯克莱德大学地理学高级讲师

Paradoxically in today’s world safety coexists with risk. Chronic threats, novel risks and dangerous trends ranging from new viruses to global warming crowd in on us. At Risk offers a rational analysis of the disasters and hazards that concern us.
矛盾的是，在当今世界，安全与风险共存。慢性威胁、新风险以及从新病毒到全球变暖的危险趋势不断逼近我们。《风险》提供了对我们所关心的灾难和危害的理性分析。

Allen Perry, Senior Lecturer in Geography, University of Wales Swansea
艾伦·佩里，威尔士斯旺西大学地理学高级讲师

At Risk has become a classic of disasters literature. Its key argument, that the analysis of disasters should not be segregated from everyday life, is an important lesson for students, researchers and practitioners.
《风险》已成为灾难文学的经典。其关键论点是，灾难分析不应与日常生活分开，这对学生、研究人员和从业者来说是一个重要的教训。

Dr Maureen Fordham, Senior Lecturer in Disaster Management,
毛琳·福德汉博士，灾难管理高级讲师，

University of Northumbria
诺桑比亚大学

AT RISK《风险》

Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters
自然灾害、人民的脆弱性与灾难

Second edition第二版

Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon and Ian Davis
本·威斯纳、皮尔斯·布莱基、特里·坎农和伊恩·戴维斯

LONDON AND NEW YORK
伦敦和纽约

First published 1994首次出版于 1994 年
by Routledge由劳特利奇出版
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
伦敦新费特巷 11 号，邮政编码 EC4P 4EE
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge
同时在美国和加拿大由劳特利奇出版
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001
纽约，西 35 街 29 号，邮政编码 10001
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.
Routledge 是泰勒与弗朗西斯集团的一个品牌。本版于 2005 年在泰勒与弗朗西斯电子图书馆出版。

To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.
要购买您自己的这本书或泰勒与弗朗西斯或 Routledge 数千本电子书的任何一本，请访问 www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk。

© 2004 Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon and Ian Davis
© 2004 Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon 和 Ian Davis

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
版权所有。未经出版商书面许可，本书的任何部分不得以任何形式或通过任何已知或今后发明的电子、机械或其他手段进行重印、复制或利用，包括复印和录音，或在任何信息存储或检索系统中使用。

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
英国图书馆出版数据编目
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
本书的目录记录可从英国图书馆获得
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
国会图书馆出版数据编目
At risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters/Ben
风险：自然灾害、人民的脆弱性与灾难/本杰明·威斯纳
Wisner…[et al].—2nd ed.p. cm.
威斯纳…[等]—第二版，页码 cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
包含参考文献和索引。

Natural disasters. I. Wisner, Benjamin.
自然灾害。I. 本杰明·威斯纳。

GB5014.A82 2003
363.34-dc21

2003009175

ISBN 0-203-42876-5 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-42876-5 主电子书 ISBN

ISBN 0-203-43924-4 (Adobe e-Reader Format)
ISBN 0-203-43924-4 (Adobe 电子阅读器格式)
ISBN 0-415-25215-6 (hbk)
ISBN 0-415-25215-6（精装）
ISBN 0-415-25216-4 (pbk)
ISBN 0-415-25216-4（平装）

CONTENTS目录

List of illustrations … vi
插图列表 … vi
Foreword: The Great Wave … viii
前言：大浪 … viii
Preface to 2004 edition … xi
2004 年版前言 … xi
Preface to 1994 edition … xiii
1994 年版前言 … xiii
List of abbreviations and acronyms … xv
缩略语和首字母缩略词列表 … xv
PART I Framework and theory
第一部分框架与理论
1 The challenge of disasters and our approach … 3 ...
2 The Disaster Pressure and Release model … 45 ...
3 Access to resources and coping in adversity … 79 ...
PART II Vulnerability and hazard types ...
4 Famine and natural hazards … 113
4 饥荒和自然灾害 … 113
5 Biological hazards … 145
5 生物危害 … 145
6 Floods … 174
6 洪水 … 174
7 Coastal storms … 210
7 海岸风暴 … 210
8 Earthquakes and volcanoes … 237
8 地震和火山 … 237
PART III Towards a safer environment
第三部分朝向更安全的环境
9 Towards a safer environment … 279
9 朝向更安全的环境 … 279
Bibliography … 329参考文献 … 329
Index … 395索引 … 395

ILLUSTRATIONS插图

Figures图表

1.1 The social causation of disasters … 8
1.1 灾害的社会成因 … 8
2.1 Pressure and Release (PAR) model: the progression of vulnerability … 47
2.1 压力与释放（PAR）模型：脆弱性的进展 … 47
2.2 Numbers of great natural disasters 1950-1999 … 57
2.2 1950-1999 年重大自然灾害的数量 … 57
2.3 Economic and insured losses (with trends) for 1950-1999 … 57
1950-1999 年的经济损失和保险损失（趋势）……57
3.1 The Access model in outline … 81
Access 模型概述……81
3.2 Access to resources: 'normal life’ … 89
资源获取：‘正常生活’……89
3.3 The Access model in the transition to disaster … 94
3.3 灾难过渡中的获取模型…… 94
4.1 Pressure and Release (PAR) model: famine in southern Sudan … 133
4.1 压力与释放（PAR）模型：南苏丹的饥荒…… 133
4.2a ‘Normal life’ before a famine … 134
4.2a 饥荒前的“正常生活”…… 134
4.2b From normal to famine conditions … 136
4.2b 从正常到饥荒条件……136
5.1 ‘Pressures’ that result in disasters: the Irish Potato Famine, 1845-1848 … 155
5.1 导致灾难的“压力”：爱尔兰大饥荒，1845-1848……155
5.2 Access to resources to maintain livelihoods: the impact of AIDS … 165
5.2 维持生计的资源获取：艾滋病的影响……165
5.3 Household coping mechanisms in the face of AIDS … 166
5.3 面对艾滋病的家庭应对机制……166
6.1 ‘Pressures’ that result in disasters: flood hazards … 188
6.1 导致灾害的“压力”：洪水危害……188
6.2 Major rivers and distributaries of Bangladesh region, showing extent … 198 of flooding in September 1988
6.2 孟加拉地区主要河流及其支流，显示 1988 年 9 月洪水的范围……198
6.3 'Pressures’ that result in disasters: Bangladesh floods, 1987 and 1988 … 202
6.3 导致灾害的“压力”：1987 年和 1988 年孟加拉洪水……202
7.1 New Orleans: hurricane evacuation worries … 215
7.1 新奥尔良：飓风撤离的担忧……215
7.2 Explanation for deaths caused in Andhra Pradesh cyclone of 1977 … 220
1977 年安得拉邦气旋造成死亡的解释……220
7.3 ‘Pressures’ that result in disasters: Divi Taluk, Krishna Delta, Andhra … 221 Pradesh cyclone of 1977
导致灾难的‘压力’：1977 年安得拉邦克里希纳三角洲 Divi Taluk 的气旋……221
7.4 The ‘release’ of pressures to reduce disasters: the Mozambique … 224 cyclone of 1979
减少灾难的“压力”释放：1979 年莫桑比克气旋……224
7.5 The release of ‘pressures’ to reduce disasters: Bangladesh cyclone risk … 229
减少灾难的“压力”释放：孟加拉国气旋风险……229
8.1 Distribution of damage during the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City … 245 relative to the lake bed
1985 年墨西哥城地震期间损害的分布……相对于湖床 245
8.2 ‘Pressures’ that result in disasters: Mexico City earthquake, 19 … 246 September 1985
导致灾难的“压力”：1985 年 9 月 19 日墨西哥城地震 246
8.3 Access, vulnerability and recovery from the Mexico City earthquake … 249
访问、脆弱性和从墨西哥城地震中的恢复……249
8.4 The release of ‘pressures’ to reduce disasters: the situation following … 250 the recovery of Mexico City from the earthquake of 19 September 1985
释放“压力”以减少灾难：1985 年 9 月 19 日墨西哥城地震后的恢复情况……250
8.5 Zones of greatest damage in Kobe, 1995 … 253
1995 年神户的最大损害区域……253
9.1 Hazard, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment Matrix … 290
危害、脆弱性和能力评估矩阵……290
9.2 Cartoon figures used in local discussions by CRDN to contrast … 291 vulnerability and conventional approaches
CRDN 在地方讨论中使用的卡通人物，以对比……脆弱性和传统方法 291
9.3 Flip-chart example of community discussions … 293
社区讨论的翻转图示例……293
9.4 The release of ‘pressures’ to reduce disasters: progression of safety … 300
释放“压力”以减少灾害：安全进展……300
9.5 Stages in the development of a safety culture … 324
9.5 安全文化发展的阶段 … 324

Tables表格

1.1 Hazard types and their contribution to deaths, 1900-1999 … 3
1.1 危害类型及其对死亡的贡献，1900-1999……3
1.2 Deaths during disasters, listed by cause, 1900-1999 … 4
1.2 灾难期间的死亡，按原因列出，1900-1999 年 … 4
1.3 Level of human development and disaster impacts … 23
1.3 人类发展水平与灾难影响 … 23
2.1 Largest cities in hazard areas … 65
2.1 危害区域内最大的城市 … 65
3.1 Time periods for components of the Access model … 96
3.1 访问模型各组成部分的时间段 … 96
7.1 Most intense cyclones in north Indian ocean, 1970-2000 … 226
7.1 1970-2000 年北印度洋最强烈的气旋 … 226
9.1 Types of information required for risk assessment, including … 297 vulnerability, capacity and exposure to hazards
9.1 风险评估所需的信息类型，包括 … 297 脆弱性、能力和对灾害的暴露

FOREWORD前言

The Great Wave大浪

The cover of our book reproduces a very well-known image. In 1830 Katsushika Hokusai created a woodblock which was to become the most famous Japanese work of art in the West and a major influence on nineteenth-century impressionist painters. This is commonly called The Great Wave, a simplified version of the Japanese title: In the Hollow of a Wave off the Coast of Kanagawa. The picture is one of the greatest depictions of a vulnerable situation in the history of art, and it conveniently contains the key elements associated with reducing vulnerability that forms the substance of this book.

^{1}

我们书的封面再现了一幅非常著名的图像。1830 年，葛饰北斋创作了一幅木刻版画，这幅作品成为了西方最著名的日本艺术作品，并对 19 世纪的印象派画家产生了重大影响。这幅作品通常被称为《大浪》，是日本标题“神奈川冲浪里”的简化版本。这幅画是艺术史上对脆弱情境的最伟大描绘之一，并且恰好包含了与减少脆弱性相关的关键元素，这些元素构成了本书的实质。

^{1}

Element 1: disaster元素 1：灾难

The first element is inferred, not depicted. This is a disaster in which the boats are smashed and the fishermen drowned. However, rather than create this image, the artist is concerned to portray the struggle of people whose livelihoods and property are ‘at risk’.
第一个元素是推断而非描绘。这是一场灾难，船只被击毁，渔民溺水。然而，艺术家并不想创造这个图像，而是关注描绘那些生计和财产“处于危险”中的人们的挣扎。

Element 2: hazards元素 2：危害

The second element is the portrayal of two hazards, both very well known in Japan. Firstly, a storm or a tsunami.

^{2}

Secondly, in the background Hokusai has reproduced the classic volcanic form of Mount Fuji. The image of Fuji has deep symbolic and religious significance in Japan, and volcanic eruptions are also a hazard.
第二个元素是对两种危害的描绘，这两种危害在日本都非常知名。首先是风暴或海啸。

^{2}

其次，在背景中，北斋再现了富士山经典的火山形态。富士山的形象在日本具有深刻的象征和宗教意义，火山喷发也是一种危害。

Element 3: vulnerability
元素 3：脆弱性

The third element concerns vulnerability to storm conditions. This is expressed in three closely linked ways. The first is the ‘social vulnerability’ of the fishermen; the second is the ‘economic vulnerability’ of their livelihoods; third, the viewer can imagine the
第三个元素涉及对风暴条件的脆弱性。这通过三种紧密相关的方式表达。第一是渔民的“社会脆弱性”；第二是他们生计的“经济脆弱性”；第三，观众可以想象到
‘physical vulnerability’ of their boats and fishing nets. The viewer cannot see the wives, children and extended families back on shore. The loss of a fishing boat or a net will have an impact on their well-being and livelihoods. However, the contributions by those on shore to economic and social life may also help to buffer any such loss. Social networks may assist in repairing a boat or replacing a net. Social arrangements may provide for widows and orphaned children. Farming and other economic activities may supplement income from fishing. In addition, one cannot see in the painting the moneylender or the fish wholesaler who may take advantage of a disaster at sea to profit at the fishermen’s expense.
他们的船只和渔网的“物理脆弱性”。观众无法看到岸上的妻子、孩子和大家庭。失去一艘渔船或一张渔网将对他们的福祉和生计产生影响。然而，岸上人们对经济和社会生活的贡献也可能有助于缓冲这种损失。社会网络可能会帮助修理船只或更换渔网。社会安排可能会为寡妇和孤儿提供支持。农业和其他经济活动可能会补充渔业收入。此外，画中看不到的放贷人或鱼类批发商可能会利用海上的灾难来从渔民的损失中获利。

Element 4: capacity and resilience
元素 4：能力和韧性

The final element relates to capacity and resilience, sometimes called ‘coping mechanisms’ or ‘capacity’. This dynamic human capacity can be observed in two ways: one appears to be non-structural whilst the other is structural. Put in more precise terms, one approach depicts a pattern of behaviour while the other shows adaptive design.
最后一个元素与能力和韧性有关，有时称为“应对机制”或“能力”。这种动态的人类能力可以通过两种方式观察到：一种似乎是非结构性的，而另一种是结构性的。更准确地说，一种方法描绘了一种行为模式，而另一种则展示了适应性设计。

The first concerns the skills of the fishermen. Clearly the helmsman in each boat is making certain that each boat is facing directly into the great wave, rather than lying in an exposed position parallel with the wave crest. In storm conditions this is standard maritime practice to avoid a giant wave breaking over boats and smashing them to pieces. If the viewer looks carefully at the it is also possible to see a further adaptation to the storm threat. The oarsmen appear to have interwoven their oars into a lattice, perhaps to prevent them being smashed by the giant wave, or as a device to form a ‘sea anchor’ extending on each side of the boat to maintain them at a right angle to the waves. The fishermen are bent over in a crouched position to protect their faces from the impact of the waves.
第一个问题涉及渔民的技能。显然，每艘船的舵手都在确保船只正对着巨浪，而不是处于与波峰平行的暴露位置。在风暴条件下，这是避免巨浪冲击船只并将其摧毁的标准海事做法。如果观察者仔细看，还可以看到对风暴威胁的进一步适应。划手似乎将他们的桨交织成一个格子，可能是为了防止被巨浪击碎，或者作为一种装置，在船的两侧形成“海锚”，以保持船只与波浪成直角。渔民们弯腰以蹲伏的姿势保护他们的面部免受波浪冲击的影响。

The second adaptation to note may be in the design of the boats. The curved bow may well have been an adaptation to the wave conditions ‘off the Coast of Kanagawa’. Traditionally the design of boats has made good use of the ‘strength-gain’ achieved from using curved planes and forms.
第二个需要注意的适应可能在于船只的设计。弯曲的船头可能是对“神奈川县海岸”波浪条件的适应。传统上，船只的设计充分利用了使用弯曲平面和形状所获得的“强度增益”。

Element 5: culture元素 5：文化

Hokusai’s great work of art is a reminder of the awareness of such hazards in Japan as well as the way in which all households, groups and societies cope with and adapt to such threats to their everyday lives and livelihoods. This reality has received wide expression in art, poetry and music. And in traditional architecture there have been extensive adaptations to seismic risks and fire threats. However, cultures are never static, and whilst there may have been a cultural awareness of storms and storm protection in Japan in
葛饰北斋的伟大艺术作品提醒人们注意日本面临的各种危险，以及所有家庭、团体和社会如何应对和适应这些威胁日常生活和生计的方式。这一现实在艺术、诗歌和音乐中得到了广泛的表达。在传统建筑中，对地震风险和火灾威胁进行了广泛的适应。然而，文化从来不是静态的，尽管在 1830 年日本可能对风暴和风暴保护有一定的文化意识，但这种知识可能已经丧失，并需要重新获得。如今，渔民不必在先进的卫星预警系统和气象雷达可以警告风暴即将来临时出海。

1830, this knowledge may have been lost and may be in need of renewal. Today fishermen need not go out to sea when advanced satellite warning systems and weather radar can warn that storms are imminent.
1830 年，这种知识可能已经丧失，并需要重新获得。如今，渔民不必在先进的卫星预警系统和气象雷达可以警告风暴即将来临时出海。

Notes注释

1 Another view of the picture is available at http://www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/auth/hokusai/.
1 该图片的另一个视图可在 http://www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/auth/hokusai/ 获取。
2 Tsunami is the Japanese name for a ‘harbour wave’, a great wave generated by an undersea earthquake or subterranean landslide. It seems that it is unclear whether Hokusai intended to portray a tsunami, or simply a storm, although many interpreters have assumed it is a tsunami.
2 海啸是日语中“港湾波”的名称，是由海底地震或地下滑坡引发的巨大波浪。似乎尚不清楚北斋是否意图描绘海啸，还是仅仅是风暴，尽管许多解读者认为这是海啸。

PREFACE TO THE 2004 EDITION
2004 年版前言

The world, and the authors, are 15 years older since a book called At Risk was first discussed. We are happy that the first edition has been widely used, translated into Spanish

^{1}

, and generally been well received. We are less happy about some of the likely reasons for the growing popularity of the notion of vulnerability. One concern is that the term is being used indiscriminately, in a similar manner to ‘sustainability’. It is in danger of becoming a catch-all term, with its analytical power and significance diminished. But the term is also becoming more popular as a simple reflection of the growth in people’s vulnerability: it is increasing, and more people want to know why. During the past 15 years millions more people have been affected by disasters triggered by natural hazards. These millions are at risk in part because of global economic and political processes that were only becoming recognised in 1988. Looking back, the era in which we first collaborated seems antediluvian. The flood of post-Cold War economic globalisation, the wars and tensions generated by the break up of the Cold War political order, and growing impacts of global environmental change have all contributed to vulnerability. Thinking about all these changes, it was clear we needed to revise our book.
自从一本名为《At Risk》的书首次被讨论以来，世界和作者们已经过去了 15 年。我们很高兴第一版得到了广泛使用，翻译成西班牙语

^{1}

，并且总体上反响良好。我们对脆弱性这一概念日益流行的一些可能原因感到不太高兴。一个担忧是，这个术语被不加区分地使用，类似于“可持续性”。它有成为一个包罗万象的术语的危险，从而削弱其分析能力和重要性。但这个术语也因简单反映人们脆弱性增长而变得更加流行：脆弱性在增加，越来越多的人想知道原因。在过去的 15 年里，数百万更多的人受到自然灾害引发的灾难的影响。这些数百万人的风险部分是由于全球经济和政治进程，这些进程在 1988 年才开始被认识。回首往昔，我们首次合作的时代似乎显得古老。后冷战经济全球化的浪潮、冷战政治秩序解体所引发的战争和紧张局势，以及全球环境变化的日益影响，都导致了脆弱性。考虑到所有这些变化，我们显然需要修订我们的书。

Time has brought changes in our lives as well. Three of us are now retired from fulltime teaching. Davis, Visiting Professor at Cranfield University, retired from the Cranfield Disaster Management Centre and continues to make contributions on postdisaster shelter and risk reduction activities. Blaikie has retired from his post at the School of Development Studies (University of East Anglia) and continues to consult and to publish research on resource management in Africa and South Asia. Wisner retired from his position as Director of International Studies and Professor of Geography (California State University, Long Beach) and works as a researcher with the Crisis States Programme of the Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics, as well as consulting for international agencies and NGOs. Cannon is still at the University of Greenwich, where he is Reader in Development Studies in the School of Humanities, and also carries out research and consultancy for the Natural Resource Institute, also at University of Greenwich, London.
时间也给我们的生活带来了变化。我们三人现在都已从全职教学中退休。戴维斯是克兰菲尔德大学的访问教授，已从克兰菲尔德灾害管理中心退休，并继续在灾后庇护和风险减少活动中做出贡献。布莱基已从东安格利亚大学发展研究学院的职位退休，并继续在非洲和南亚的资源管理方面进行咨询和发表研究。威斯纳已从加利福尼亚州立大学长滩分校国际研究主任和地理教授的职位退休，现作为伦敦经济学院发展研究所危机国家项目的研究员工作，同时为国际机构和非政府组织提供咨询。坎农仍在格林威治大学担任人文学科发展研究的讲师，并为格林威治大学自然资源研究所进行研究和咨询。

The first edition was conceived at the same time that the seeds were sown of what was to become the 1990-1999 UN International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (UNIDNDR). At Risk was published in the middle of that decade. The second edition comes well after the end of the IDNDR. Lives lost to disasters, and the economic costs of disasters, increased steadily during that period. How could so much international attention be devoted to a subject with so little to show for it? This question haunts us because we know and respect many of the people who worked tirelessly during the IDNDR. Why is vulnerability increasing despite the best efforts of many scientists, policy makers, administrators and activists? We hope that our second edition will help to answer this question.
第一版的构思与 1990-1999 年联合国自然灾害减灾国际十年（UNIDNDR）种下的种子同时进行。《At Risk》在那个十年的中期出版。第二版的出版时间远在 IDNDR 结束之后。在此期间，因灾害而失去的生命和灾害的经济成本稳步增加。为什么如此多的国际关注会集中在一个几乎没有成效的主题上？这个问题困扰着我们，因为我们认识并尊重许多在 IDNDR 期间不懈努力的人。尽管许多科学家、政策制定者、管理者和活动家付出了最大的努力，脆弱性为何仍在增加？我们希望我们的第二版能够帮助回答这个问题。

As before, yet so much more so, we are indebted to such an enormous number of people we cannot possibly name them all. So we hope they will know that they are included when we express our immense gratitude to many of the same people we thanked the first time and now number, together with many new ones, among the friends, colleagues, publishers, students, conference participants, members of NGOs, and government and UN officials that helped us. We must also thank Kim Allen and Carol Baker for precise and helpful editorial suggestions, and Angela Allwright for the art and science she lavished on many of our illustrations. Also as before, we are particularly grateful to our families for their patience with the ups and downs of our common project over these last three years.
和以前一样，但更加如此，我们要感谢如此众多的人，以至于我们无法一一列举他们的名字。因此，我们希望他们知道，当我们对许多与第一次感谢的同样的人表达我们巨大的感激时，他们也被包括在内，这些人现在与许多新朋友、同事、出版商、学生、会议参与者、非政府组织成员以及帮助我们的政府和联合国官员一起。我们还必须感谢金·艾伦和卡罗尔·贝克提供的准确而有帮助的编辑建议，以及安吉拉·奥尔赖特为我们的许多插图所倾注的艺术和科学。同样如往常一样，我们特别感谢我们的家人，在过去三年中对我们共同项目的起伏给予的耐心。

Royalties from this edition are being donated to three groups that are all active in promoting vulnerability reduction approaches to disaster reduction in developing countries: La RED in Latin America, Peri Peri in southern Africa and Duryog Nivaran in South Asia (for more details, see Chapter 1, note 39).
本版的版税将捐赠给三个在发展中国家推动减灾脆弱性减少方法的活跃团体：拉美的 La RED、南非的 Peri Peri 和南亚的 Duryog Nivaran（更多细节见第 1 章，第 39 条注释）。

April 20032003 年 4 月

Note注释

1 (P.Blaikie, T.Cannon, I.Davis and B.Wisner, 1996. Vulnerabilidad, el entorno social, político y económico de los desastres, La RED/IT Development Group, Peru.
1（P.Blaikie, T.Cannon, I.Davis 和 B.Wisner，1996 年。《脆弱性：灾害的社会、政治和经济环境》，La RED/IT Development Group，秘鲁。）
Available for download on the internet at: ...
http://www.desenredando.org/public/libros/1996/vesped/)

PREFACE TO THE 1994 EDITION ...

Long before they met each other, the four authors encountered many of the hazards discussed in this book as they worked and visited in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They shared a dissatisfaction with then prevailing views that disasters were ‘natural’ in a straightforward way. They shared an admiration for the ability of ordinary people to ‘cope’ with poverty and even calamities, and this perspective has strongly influenced the book. ...

The authors brought to this project complementary skills and expertise. Blaikie had written on the socio-economic background to land degradation

^{1}

and poverty in Nepal,

^{2}

and more recently on the AIDS epidemic in Africa.

^{3}

Cannon has incorporated teaching on hazards into his work for many years, and is active in the Famine Commission of the International Geographical Union. He has edited a collection of studies of famine

^{4}

and published extensively on development and environmental problems in China. Davis had spent many years studying shelter following disasters

^{5}

and the growth of disaster vulnerability with rapid urbanisation;

^{6}

he also brought to the project years of practical work in training government officials in disaster mitigation. Wisner had been concerned with rural physical and social planning since the mid-1960s. This took the form of landuse studies,

^{7}

research on drought coping,

^{8}

and work on rural energy

^{9}

and health care delivery.

^{10}

As the project began he was about to draw these themes together in a systematic study of ‘basic needs’ approaches to development in Africa.

^{11}

...

This book has taken a long time to complete, with all the complications of multiple authorship, and the added difficulty that the four were for much of the time in three different countries. We met about six times for several days, and progressed from sketched outlines to substantial drafts at each meeting. Much paper and many electrons and floppy disks sailed back and forth among us. A great deal of ideological baggage was stripped away as a consensus view of hazards, vulnerability and disasters emerged. We provided crash courses for each other in areas of our own expertise. The result is a fully co-authored book, although we are aware that some idiosyncrasies of style and variations in point of view may still be visible here and there. ...

The process had lots to recommend it, even if speed is not one of them. Yet the book has managed to appear midpoint in the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). It arrives in the context of this decade (with its overemphasis on technology and hazard management), in the hope that it will establish the vital importance of understanding vulnerability in the context of its political, social and economic origins. The book reasserts the significance of the human factor in disasters. It tries to move beyond technocratic management to a notion of disaster mitigation that is rooted in the potential that humans have to unite, to persevere, to understand what afflicts them, and to take common action. ...

While the book was being written, there has been growing awareness of vulnerability ...
to disasters, and of the range of causal factors. We welcome this groundswell of changing awareness, and appreciate the insights of many other contributors to the analysis of disasters. There are so many people to thank for their encouragement and help in the production of this book that it would be impossible to compile a list that did not offend by erroneously omitting some. So if all those people, including those affected by disaster, friends, colleagues, publishers, students, conference participants, members of NGOs, government and UN officials, will forgive us for not including their names, let us express our thanks to them in this way. In particular we must also thank our families for their patience, for enabling our meetings and providing a great deal of help and moral support. ...

Notes ...

1 Blaikie (1985b); Blaikie and Brookfield (1987). ...
2 Blaikie et al. (1977, 1983). ...
3 Barnett and Blaikie (1992). ...
4 Bohle et al. (1991). ...
5 Davis (1978). ...
6 Davis (1986, 1987). ...
7 O’Keefe and Wisner (1977). ...
8 Wisner (1978b, 1980). ...
9 Wisner et al. (1987); Wisner (1987b). ...
10 Wisner (1976a, 1988b, 1992a); Packard et al. (1989). ...
11 Wisner (1988a). ...

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...

$	Indicates US dollars unless otherwise stated ...
BFAP	Bangladesh Flood Action Plan ...
CPRs ...	Common Property Resources ...
CRED	Centre for Research in the Epidemiology of ...
	Disasters (Louvain) ...
DFID	Department For International Development (UK ...
	foreign aid ministry) ...
ENSO	El Niño Southern Oscillation ...
FAD	Food Availability Decline ...
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation ...
FCDI	Flood Control Drainage and Irrigation ...
FED	Food Entitlement Decline ...
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Authority (USA) ...
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System ...
G7/G8 ...	Group of 7 (now Group of 8) major economic ...
	powers ...
GM	Genetically Modified ...
GoB ...	Government of Bangladesh ...
HDI	Human Development Index ...
HEP	Hydro-Electric Power ...
HIPCs ...	Highly Indebted Poor Countries ...
HYV	High Yielding Varieties (of food grain plants) ...
IDNDR	International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction ...
IDP	Internally Displaced Person ...
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute ...
IFRC	(Washington DC) ...
IMF	International Federation of Red Cross and Red ...
ISDR	Crescent Societies (Geneva) ...
LDCs ...	International Monetary Fund ...
MDCs ...	Less Developed Countries ...
MSF	More Developed Countries ...
	Médecins Sans Frontieres ...

NGO	Non-Government Organisation ...
OAS	Organisation of American States ...
OFDA	(US) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance ...
PAHO	Pan American Health Organisation ...
PAR	Pressure and Release (model) ...
PRC	People's Republic of China ...
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican ...
	National Resistance) ...
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme ...
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme ...
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme ...
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund ...
UN OCHA ...	United Nations Office for the Coordination of ...
	Humanitarian Affairs ...
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social ...
USAID	Development ...
WFP	United States Agency for International Development ...
WHO	World Food Programme ...
	World Health Organisation ...

Part I FRAMEWORK AND THEORY ...

1
THE CHALLENGE OF DISASTERS AND OUR APPROACH ...

In at the deep end ...

Disasters, especially those that seem principally to be caused by natural hazards, are not the greatest threat to humanity. Despite the lethal reputation of earthquakes, epidemics and famine, a much greater proportion of the world’s population find their lives shortened by events that often go unnoticed: violent conflict, illnesses, and hunger-events that pass for normal existence in many parts of the world, especially (but not only) in less developed countries (LDCs).

^{1}

Occasionally earthquakes have killed hundreds of thousands, and very occasionally floods, famines or epidemics have taken millions of lives at a time. But to focus on these (in the understandably humanitarian way that outsiders do in response to such tragedies) is to ignore the millions who are not killed in such events, but who nevertheless face grave risks. Many more lives are lost in violent conflict and to the preventable outcome of disease and hunger (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2).

^{2}

Such is the daily and unexceptional tragedy of those whose deaths are through ‘natural’ causes, but who, under different economic and political circumstances, should have lived longer and enjoyed a better quality of life.

^{3}

...

Table 1.1 Hazard types and their contribution to deaths, 1900-1999 ...

Hazard type in rank order ...	Percentage of deaths ...
Slow onset: ...
Famines—drought ...	86.9
Rapid onset: ...
Floods ...	9.2
Earthquakes and tsunami ...	2.2
Storms ...	1.5
Volcanic eruptions ...	0.1
Landslides ...	$< 0.1$
Avalanches ...	Negligible ...
Wildfires ...	Negligible ...

Source: CRED at www.cred.be/emdat ...

Table 1.2 Deaths during disasters, listed by cause, 1900-1999 ...

...

Numbers killed

(millions)

Percentage of deaths ...

Cause of death [a] ...

270.7

62.4

Political violence ...

70.0

16.1

Slow-onset disaster [b] ...

10.7

2.3

Rapid-onset disaster ...

50.7

11.6

Epidemics ...

32.0

7.6

Road, rail, air and industrial ...

434.1

100

accidents ...

TOTAL

However, we feel this book is justified, despite this rather artificial separation between people at risk from natural hazards and the many dangers inherent in ‘normal’ life. Analysing disasters themselves also allows us to show why they should not be segregated from everyday living, and to show how the risks involved in disasters must be connected with the vulnerability created for many people through their normal existence. It seeks the connections between the risks people face and the reasons for their vulnerability to hazards. It is therefore trying to show how disasters can be perceived within the broader patterns of society, and indeed how analysing them in this way may provide a much more fruitful way of building policies, that can help to reduce disasters and mitigate hazards, while at the same time improving living standards and opportunities more generally. ...

The crucial point about understanding why disasters happen is that it is not only natural events that cause them. They are also the product of social, political and economic environments (as distinct from the natural environment), because of the way these structure the lives of different groups of people (see Box 1.1).

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There is a danger in treating disasters as something peculiar, as events that deserve their own special focus. It is to risk separating ‘natural’ disasters from the social frameworks that influence how ...
hazards affect people, thereby putting too much emphasis on the natural hazards themselves, and not nearly enough on the surrounding social environment.

^{5}

...

Many aspects of the social environment are easily recognised: people live in adverse economic situations that oblige them to inhabit regions and places that are affected by natural hazards, be they the flood plains of rivers, the slopes of volcanoes or earthquake zones. However, there are many other less obvious political and economic factors that underlie the impact of hazards. These involve the manner in which assets, income and access to other resources, such as knowledge and information, are distributed between different social groups, and various forms of discrimination that occur in the allocation of welfare and social protection (including relief and resources for recovery). It is these elements that link our analysis of disasters that are supposedly caused mainly by natural hazards to broader patterns in society. These two aspects-the natural and the socialcannot be separated from each other: to do so invites a failure to understand the additional burden of natural hazards, and it is unhelpful in both understanding disasters and doing something to prevent or mitigate them. ...

Disasters are a complex mix of natural hazards and human action. For example, in many regions wars are inextricably linked with famine and disease, including the spread of HIV-AIDS. Wars (and post-war disruption) have sometimes coincided with drought, and this has made it more difficult for people to cope (e.g. in Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia and El Salvador). For many people, a disaster is not a single, discrete event. All over the world, but especially in LDCs, vulnerable people often suffer repeated, multiple, mutually reinforcing, and sometimes simultaneous shocks to their families, their settlements and their livelihoods. These repeated shocks erode whatever attempts have been made to accumulate resources and savings. Disasters are a brake on economic and human development at the household level (when livestock, crops, homes and tools are repeatedly destroyed) and at the national level when roads, bridges, hospitals, schools and other facilities are damaged. The pattern of such frequent stresses, brought on by a wide variety of ‘natural’ trigger mechanisms, has often been complicated by human actionboth by efforts to palliate the effects of disaster and by the social causation of vulnerability. ...

During the 1980s and 1990s, war in Africa, the post-war displacement of people and the destruction of infrastructure made the rebuilding of lives already shattered by drought virtually impossible. In the early years of the twenty-first century conflict in central and west Africa (Zaire/Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone) has displaced millions of people who are at risk from hunger, malaria, cholera and meningitis.

^{6}

The deep indebtedness of many LDCs has made the cost of reconstruction and the transition from rehabilitation to development unattainable. Rapid urbanisation is putting increased numbers of people at risk, as shown by the terrible toll from the earthquake in Gujarat, India (2001) and mudslides in Caracas, Venezuela (1999). ...

Box 1.1: Naturalness versus the ‘social causation’ of disasters ...

When disasters happen, popular and media interpretations tend to focus on their naturalness, as in the phrase ‘natural disaster’. The natural hazards that trigger a disaster tend to appear overwhelming. Headlines and popular book titles often say things like 'Nature on the Rampage’ (de Blij 1994), and visually the physical processes dominate our attention and show human achievements destroyed, apparently by natural forces. There have been numerous television documentaries in Europe, North America and Japan which supposedly examine the causes of disasters, all of which stress the impact of nature. Much of the ‘hard’ science analysis of disasters is couched in terms that imply that natural processes are the primary target of research. The 1990s was the UN International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction (our italics). ...

The diagram shown in Figure 1.1 illustrates why this is a very partial and inadequate way of understanding the disasters that are associated with (triggered by) natural hazards. At the top of Figure 1.1, Boxes 1 and 2, the natural environment presents humankind with a range of opportunities (resources for production, places to live and work and carry out livelihoods [Box 3]) as well as a range of potential hazards (Box 4). Human livelihoods are often earned in locations that combine opportunities with hazards. For example, flood plains provide ‘cheap’ flat land for businesses and housing; the slopes of volcanoes are generally very fertile for agriculture; poor people can only afford to live in slum settlements in unsafe ravines and on low-lying land within and around the cities where they have to work. In other words, the spatial variety of nature provides different types of environmental opportunity and hazard (Box 2)—some places are more at risk of earthquakes, floods, etc. than others. ...

But crucially, humans are not equally able to access the resources and opportunities; nor are they equally exposed to the hazards. Whether or not people have enough land to farm, or adequate access to water, or a decent home, are determined by social factors (including economic and political processes). And these same social processes also have a very significant role in determining who is most at risk from hazards: where people live and work, and in what kind of buildings, their level of hazard protection, preparedness, information, wealth and health have nothing to do with nature as such, but are attributes of society (Box 5). So people’s exposure to risk differs according to their class (which affects their income, how they live and where), whether they are male or female, what their ethnicity is, what age group they belong to, whether they are disabled or not, their immigration status, and so forth (Box 6). ...

Abstract ...

Thus it can be seen that disaster risk is a combination of the factors that determine the potential for people to be exposed to particular types of natural hazard. But it also depends fundamentally on how social systems and their associated power relations impact on different social groups (through their class, gender, ethnicity, etc.) (Box 7). In other words, to understand disasters we must not only know about the types of hazards that might affect people, but also the different levels of vulnerability of different groups of people. This vulnerability is determined by social systems and power, not by natural forces. It needs to be understood in the context of political and economic systems that operate on national and even international scales (Box 8): it is these which decide how groups of people vary in relation to health, income, building safety, location of work and home, and so on. ...

In disasters, a geophysical or biological event is implicated in some way as a trigger event or a link in a chain of causes. Yet, even where such natural hazards appear to be directly linked to loss of life and damage to property, there are social factors involved that cause peoples’ vulnerability and can be traced back sometimes to quite ‘remote’ root and general causes. This vulnerability is generated by social, economic and political processes that influence how hazards affect people in varying ways and with differing intensities. ...

This book is focused mainly on redressing the balance in assessing the ‘causes’ of such disasters away from the dominant view that natural processes are the most significant. But we are also concerned about what happens even when it is admitted that social and economic factors are the most crucial. There is often a reluctance to deal with such factors because it is politically expedient (i.e. less difficult for those in power) to address the technical factors that deal with natural hazards. Changing social and economic factors usually means altering the way that power operates in a society. Radical policies are often required, many facing powerful political opposition. For example, such policies might include land reform, enforcement of building codes and land-use restrictions, greater investment in public health, provision of a clean water supply and improved transportation to isolated and poor regions of a country. ...

The relative contribution of geophysical and biological processes on the one hand, and social, economic and political processes on the other, varies from disaster to disaster. Furthermore, human activities can modify physical and biological events, sometimes many miles away (e.g. deforestation contributing to flooding downstream) or many years later (e.g. the introduction of a new seed or animal, or the substitution of one form of architecture for another, less safe, one). The time dimension is extremely important in another way. Social, economic and political processes are themselves often modified by a disaster in ways that make some people more vulnerable to an ...

Figure 1.1 The social causation of disasters ...
extreme event in the future. Placing the genesis of disaster in a longer time frame therefore brings up issues of intergenerational equity, an ethical question raised in the debates around the meaning of ‘sustainable’ development (Adams 2001). The ‘natural’ and the ‘human’ are, therefore, so inextricably bound together in almost all disaster situations, especially when viewed in an enlarged time and space framework, that disasters cannot be understood to be ‘natural’ in any straightforward way. ...

This is not to deny that natural events can occur in which the natural component ...
dominates and there is little place for differential social vulnerability to the disaster other than the fact that humans are in the wrong place at the wrong time. But such simple ‘accidents’ are rare. In 1986 a cloud of carbon dioxide gas bubbled up from Lake Nyos in Cameroon, spread out into the surrounding villages and killed 1,700 people in their sleep. In the balance of human and natural influences, this event was clearly at the ‘natural’ end of the spectrum of causation. The area was a long-settled, rich agricultural area. There were no apparent social differences in its impacts, and both rich and poor suffered equally. 7 ...

One example of a natural event with an explicitly inequitable social impact is the major earthquake of 1976 in Guatemala. The physical shaking of the ground was a natural event, as was the Cameroon gas cloud. However, slum dwellers in Guatemala City and many Mayan Indians living in impoverished towns and hamlets suffered the highest mortality. The homes of the middle class were better protected and more safely sited, and recovery was easier for them. The Guatemalan poor were caught up in a vicious circle in which lack of access to means of social and self-protection made them more vulnerable to the next disaster. The social component was so apparent that a journalist called the event a ‘class-quake’. ...

It is no surprise that poor people in Guatemala live in flimsier houses on steeper slopes than the rich and that they are therefore more vulnerable to earthquakes. But what kind of social ‘fact’ is differential vulnerability in a case such as this? Above all, we think this case involves historical facts. Referring to a long history of political violence and injustice in the country, Plant (1978) believed Guatemala to be a ‘permanent disaster’. The years of social, economic and political relations among the different groups in Guatemala and elsewhere have led some to argue that such histories ‘prefigure’ disaster (Hewitt 1983a). In Guatemala, after the 1976 earthquake, the situation deteriorated, with years of civil war and genocide against the rural Mayan majority that only ended in 1996. During this period, hundreds of thousands of Mayans were herded into new settlements by government soldiers, while others took refuge in remote, forested mountains and still others fled to refugee camps in Mexico. These population movements often saw marginal people forced into marginal, dangerous places. ...

This book attempts to deal with such histories and to uncover the deeply rooted character of vulnerability rather than taking the physical hazards as the starting point, thereby allowing us to plan for, mitigate and perhaps prevent disaster by tackling all its causes. The book also builds a method for analysing the actual processes which occur when a natural trigger affects vulnerable people adversely. ...

Conventional views of disaster ...

Most work on disasters emphasises the ‘trigger’ role of geo-tectonics, climate or biological factors arising in nature (recent examples include Bryant 1991; Alexander 1993; Tobin and Montz 1997; K.Smith 2001). Others focus on the human response, psychosocial and physical trauma, economic, legal and political consequences (Dynes et al. 1987; Lindell and Perry 1992; Oliver-Smith 1996; Platt et al. 1999). Both these sets of literature assume that disasters are departures from ‘normal’ social functioning, and that ...
recovery means a return to normal. ...
This book differs considerably from such treatments of disaster, and arises from an alternative approach that emerged in the last thirty years. This approach does not deny the significance of natural hazards as trigger events, but puts the main emphasis on the various ways in which social systems operate to generate disasters by making people vulnerable. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the vulnerability approach to disasters began with a rejection of the assumption that disasters are ‘caused’ in any simple way by external natural events, and a revision of the assumption that disasters are ‘normal’. Emel and Peet (1989), Oliver-Smith (1986a) and Hewitt (1983a) review these reflections on causality and ‘normality’. A competing vulnerability framework arose from the experience of research in situations where ‘normal’ daily life was itself difficult to distinguish from disaster. This work related to earlier notions of ‘marginality’ that emerged in studies in Bangladesh, Nepal, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Chad, Mali, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Kenya and Tanzania.

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...

Until the emergence of the idea of vulnerability to explain disasters, there was a range of prevailing views, none of which dealt with the issue of how society creates the conditions in which people face hazards differently. One approach was unapologetically naturalist (sometimes termed physicalist), in which all blame is apportioned to ‘the violent forces of nature’ or ‘nature on the rampage’ (Frazier 1979; Maybury 1986; Ebert 1993; de Blij 1994). Other views of ‘man [sic] and nature’ (e.g. Burton et al. 1978; Whittow 1980) involved a more subtle environmental determinism, in which the limits of human rationality and consequent misperception of nature lead to tragic misjudgements in our interactions with it (Pelling 2001). ‘Bounded rationality’ was seen to lead the human animal again and again to rebuild on the ruins of settlements destroyed by flood, storm, landslide and earthquake. ...

According to such views, it is the pressure of population growth and lack of ‘modernisation’ of the economy and other institutions that drive human conquest of an unforgiving nature. This approach usually took a ‘stages of economic growth’ model for granted (Rostow 1991). Thus, ‘industrial’ societies had typical patterns of loss from, and protection against, nature’s extremes, while ‘folk’ (usually agrarian) societies had others, and ‘mixed’ societies showed characteristics in between (Burton et al. 1978, 1993).

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It was assumed that ‘progress’ and ‘modernisation’ were taking place, and that ‘folk’ and ‘mixed’ societies would become ‘industrial’, and that we would all eventually enjoy the relatively secure life of ‘post-industrial’ society. ...

The 1970s saw increasing attempts to use ‘political economy’ to counter modernisation theory and its triumphalist outlook, and ‘political ecology’ to combat increasingly subtle forms of environmental determinism.

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These approaches also had serious flaws, though their analyses were moving in directions closer to our own than the conventional views. ...

Now we try to reintroduce the ‘human factor’ into disaster studies with greater precision, while avoiding the dangers of an equally deterministic approach rooted in the political economy alone. We avoid notions of vulnerability that do no more than identify it with ‘poverty’ in general or some specific characteristic such as ‘crowded conditions’, ‘unstable hillside agriculture’ or ‘traditional rain-fed farming technology’.

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We also reject those definitions of vulnerability that focus exclusively on the ability of a system to cope with risk or loss.

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These positions are an advance on environmental determinism ...
but lack an explanation of how one gets from very widespread conditions such as ‘poverty’ to very particular vulnerabilities that link the political economy to the actual hazards that people face. ...

What is vulnerability? ...

The basic idea and some variations ...

We have already used the term vulnerability a number of times. It has a commonplace meaning: being prone to or susceptible to damage or injury. Our book is an attempt to refine this common-sense meaning in relation to natural hazards. To begin, we offer a simple working definition. By vulnerability we mean the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process). It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone’s life, livelihood, property and other assets are put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event (or series or ‘cascade’ of such events) in nature and in society. ...

Some groups are more prone to damage, loss and suffering in the context of differing hazards. Key variables explaining variations of impact include class (which includes differences in wealth), occupation, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability and health status, age and immigration status (whether ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’), and the nature and extent of social networks. The concept of vulnerability clearly involves varying magnitudes: some people experience higher levels than others. But we use the term to mean those who are more at risk: when we talk of vulnerable people, it is clear that we mean those who are at the ‘worse’ end of the spectrum. When used in this sense, the implied opposite of being vulnerable is sometimes indicated by our use of the term ‘secure’.

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Other authors complement the discussions of vulnerability with the notion of ‘capacity’-the ability of a group or household to resist a hazard’s harmful effects and to recover easily (Anderson and Woodrow 1998; Eade 1998; IFRC 1999b; Wisner 2003a). ...

It should also be clear that our definition of vulnerability has a time dimension built into it: vulnerability can be measured in terms of the damage to future livelihoods, and not just as what happens to life and property at the time of the hazard event. Vulnerable groups are also those that also find it hardest to reconstruct their livelihoods following disaster, and this in turn makes them more vulnerable to the effects of subsequent hazard events. The word ‘livelihood’ is important in the definition. We mean by this the command an individual, family or other social group has over an income and/or bundles of resources that can be used or exchanged to satisfy its needs. This may involve information, cultural knowledge, social networks and legal rights as well as tools, land or other physical resources.

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Later we develop this livelihood aspect of vulnerability in an ‘Access model’. The Access model analyses the ability of people to deal with the impact of the hazards they face in terms of what level of access they have (or do not have) to the resources needed for their livelihoods before and after a hazard’s impact (see Chapter 3).

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...

Our focus on vulnerable people leads us to give secondary consideration to natural ...
events as determinants of disasters. Normally, vulnerability is closely correlated with socio-economic position (assuming that this incorporates race, gender, age, etc.). Although we make a number of distinctions that show it to be too simplistic to explain all disasters, in general the poor suffer more from hazards than do the rich. Although vulnerability cannot be read directly off from poverty, the two are often very highly correlated. The key point is that even a straightforward analysis on the basis of poverty and wealth as determinants of vulnerability illustrates the significance we want to attach to social forms of disaster explanation. For example, heavy rainfall may wash away the homes in wealthy hillside residential areas of California, such as Topanga Canyon (in greater Los Angeles) or the Oakland-Berkeley hills (near San Francisco), just as it does those of the poor in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) or Caracas (Venezuela).

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...
There are three important differences, however, between the vulnerability of the rich and the poor in such cases. Firstly, few rich people are affected if we compare the number of victims of landslides in various cities around the world. Money can buy design and engineering that minimises (but of course does not eliminate) the frequency of such events for the rich, even if they are living on an exposed slope. ...

Secondly, living in the hazardous canyon environment is a choice made by some of the rich in California, but not by the poor Brazilian or Philippine job seekers who live in hillside slums or on the edge of waste dumps.

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Without entering the psychological or philosophical definitions of ‘voluntary’ versus ‘involuntary’ risk taking (see Sjöberg 1987; Adams 1995; Caplan 2000), it should be clear that slum dwellers’ occupancy of hillsides is less voluntary than that of the corporate executive who lives in Topanga Canyon ‘for the view’. The urban poor use their location as the base for organising livelihood activities (e.g. casual labour, street trading, crafts, crime, prostitution). If the structure of urban land ownership and rent means that the closest they can get to economic opportunities is a hillside slum, people will locate there almost regardless of the landslide risk (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989; Fernandes and Varley 1998). This, we will argue, is a situation in which neither ‘voluntary choice’ models nor the notion of ‘bounded rationality’ (Burton et al. 1993:61-65) are applicable. ...

Thirdly, the consequences of a landslide for the rich are far less severe than for the surviving poor. The homes and possessions of the rich are usually insured, and they can more easily find alternative shelter and continue with income-earning activities after the hazard impact. They often also have reserves and credit. The poor, by contrast, frequently have their entire stock of capital (home, clothing, tools for artisan handicraft production, etc.) assembled at the site of the disaster. They have few if any cash reserves and are generally not considered creditworthy (despite the rapid development of ‘micro-credit’ schemes in a number of countries-see Chapter 9). Moreover, as emphasised above, the location of a residence itself is a livelihood resource for the urban poor. In places where workers have to commute to work over distances similar to those habitually covered by the middle class, transport can absorb a large proportion of the budget for a low-income household. The poor self-employed or casually employed underclass finds such transport expenses onerous. It is therefore not surprising that large numbers of working-class Mexicans affected by the 1985 earthquake refused to be relocated to the outskirts of Mexico City (Robinson et al. 1986; Poniatowska 1998; da Cruz 1993; Olson et al. 1999; Olson 2000; see also Chapter 8). ...

Multiple meanings of 'vulnerable' ...

Just before and since the publication of the first edition of At Risk, there has been a very welcome increase in the writing about vulnerability (Wilches-Chaux 1992a; Jeggle and Stephenson 1994; Davis 1994; Buckle et al. 1998/99; Buckle et al. 2000; Currey 2002). In this revised edition we happily take on board much of what has been added. There are at least four streams of recent work we should acknowledge. ...

Firstly, some recent studies give more emphasis to people’s ‘capacity’ to protect themselves rather than just the ‘vulnerability’ that limits them. Earlier work (including, to some degree, our own) tended to focus most attention on the social, economic and political processes that make people Vulnerable’. Understandably, it was necessary to use terminology that emphasised the problem that is generated by social processes-if people’s capabilities were all working properly then there would be few disasters. This kind of analysis is essential, but it tends to emphasise people’s weaknesses and limitations, and is in danger of showing people as passive and incapable of bringing about change. There is a need to register the other side of the coin: people do possess significant capabilities as well. Perhaps because of the influence of public health and social work professions, ‘socially vulnerable groups’ tended to be treated as ‘special needs groups’. This approach can reduce people to being passive recipients, even ‘victims’ (Hewitt 1997:167), and individuals without relationships. Usually, almost everyone has some capacity for self-protection and group action: the processes that generate ‘vulnerability’ are countered by people’s capacities to resist, avoid, adapt to those processes, and to use their abilities for creating security, either before a disaster occurs or during its aftermath. ...

Secondly, there is now more interest in trying to quantify vulnerability as a tool of planning and policy making (Gupta et al. 1996; Davidson et al. 1997, 2000; Hill and Cutter 2001; UNDP 2003; Yarnal et al. 2002; Gheorghe 2003). With this has come debates about the correct balance between quantitative and qualitative data, and a deeper question concerning whether it is actually possible to quantify vulnerability. These efforts have been promoted by international agencies such as the Organization of American States (NOAA and OAS 2002), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2003), DFID (Cannon et al. 2003), Emergency Management Australia (Buckle et al. 2001) and a large group of institutions led by FAO (FAO/IWAG 1998; UN-ACC 2000; WFP n.d.). ...

Thirdly, an increasing number of authors remind us of the cultural, psychosocial and subjective impacts of disasters. Definitions of vulnerability, including our own, usually include the notion of a potential for 'ill-being’ (often expressed as an objectively assessed statistical probability) multiplied by the magnitude of the combined impacts of a particular trigger event. Thus, the conversion of risk is turned into a common metric, which enables different hazards to be compared (Rosa 1998), and this is the main analytical route taken by this book. Disaster impact is measured by a range of etic (external) and objectively verifiable indicators, such as mortality, morbidity, damage to property and physical assets, reduction in savings and so on. ...

While certainly necessary, these indicators are not sufficient, and we are aware that they tend to under-emphasise the cultural, the psychosomatic and subjective aspects of ...
disaster impact (Perry and Mushkatel 1986; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Johns 1999; Tuan 1979). Contemporary livelihood analysis must take conventional impact measures further to include notions of resilience and sensitivity, social capital and collective action. This conceptualisation of the drawing down of different ‘capitals’ and the conversion of one to another offers a more holistic view of well-being and decision making, particularly under conditions of ‘normal’ life, and this is a contemporary development of disaster theory which we elaborate on at length in Chapter 3. However, even this approach tends to make many untested and simplistic assumptions about preferences, choices and values, particularly under conditions of acute stress and extraordinary circumstances. The disaster event itself alters both capabilities and preferences, in the short term (e.g. grieving, trauma, acute deprivation, sleep, shelter, child care and other intimate relations, with implications for making decisions and carrying them out) and in the longer term (alterations in the access qualifications required to satisfy preferences, the rules of collective action). It provides a shock to expectations that in turn are shaped by people’s social constructions of the likelihood of a disaster event (Beck 1992). The individual, household, kinship network and larger collectivities may develop implicit or explicit strategies to manage risk, which themselves constitute an important element in well-being and provide the basis for action when vulnerability is made a reality by the disaster event itself. ...
Fourthly, overlapping with the previous point, there is a movement away from simple taxonomies or checklists of ‘vulnerable groups’ to a concern with ‘vulnerable situations’, which people move into and out of over time. ‘Vulnerability’, as we use the word, refers only to people, not to buildings (susceptible, unsafe), economies (fragile), nor unstable slopes (hazardous) or regions of the earth’s surface (hazard-prone).

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Typically, social characteristics such as gender, age, health status and disability, ethnicity or race or nationality, caste or religion, and socio-economic status are the focus of attention.

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Special interest non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have produced detailed checklists to take account of the particular needs and vulnerabilities of such groups as elderly people or unaccompanied children, both in vulnerability/capacity assessments as well as post-disaster needs assessments (see Chapter 9). These post-disaster tools are very useful as aides mémories for busy administrators and case workers in the chaotic situation of a refugee camp or large-scale disaster such as the earthquakes in Gujarat (2001) or north-western Turkey (1999). For example, religion and caste had to be taken into account as they had an impact on the distribution of relief in Gujarat, where there were fears by aid workers that Muslims and Dalits (untouchables) were not receiving an equitable share (Harding 2001).

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...

But the use of post-disaster checklists does not in itself help one to understand why and how those characteristics have come to be associated with a higher probability of injury, death, livelihood disruption and greater difficulty in recovery. The checklists now widely used by international agencies and NGOs are based on some combination of the agency’s own empirical observations and the results of a growing number of post-disaster studies and audits, many of them by sociologists. However, the empirical discovery of an association or correlation does not explain the process that gave rise to the association. For example, the finding that domestic violence against women increased after hurricane Andrew has to be understood in process terms. It is not female gender itself that marks ...
vulnerability, but gender in a specific situation. These gender relations between women and men were played out in the context of the growth boom of south Florida in the 1980s and early 1990s, weak regulation of the building industry, downsizing and restructuring that left many working-class men anxious about future employment. Such male anxieties and frustration were acted out as domestic violence following the hurricane (Peacock et al. 2001). ...

In contrast, the process of pre-disaster vulnerability/capacity assessment is undertaken in a more reflective state of mind, without the urgency of a typical disaster situation. Thus, within these contexts it is possible to investigate causal factors as well as the symptoms, assuming that political leaders permit such probing analysis. ...

Many vulnerability situations are temporary, and change as life stages do (marriage, child bearing, old age) or with changes in occupation, immigration status or residence. For example, one study found that there were large numbers of low-income, young, immigrant, non-English-speaking, single mothers living in an area bordering San Pedro harbour (part of greater Los Angeles). This specific geographical location has a higher probability than other parts of San Pedro (or surrounding areas) for cargo explosions, liquefaction and amplified shaking because of soil factors in an earthquake, and exposure to a toxic plume from refinery fires (Wisner et al. 1999). The concatenation of income, age, immigration status, language and single parenthood significantly shifts the meaning of ‘gender’ as a simple category or box-to-tick in a taxonomy of vulnerability. Only two miles away from San Pedro, other women live in mansions overlooking the Pacific Ocean from the heights of Rancho Palos Verde. They share the socially constructed identity of ‘woman’ with these young Guatemalan single mothers, but in most other respects, they inhabit a separate universe (Wisner 1999; Wisner et al. 1999). ...

Risk society? ...

There is a large and growing literature on risk that we acknowledge but do not directly engage with in this book. The main reason is that it focuses primarily on technological hazards facing the more developed, industrial countries and the condition of late modernity in which they find themselves. In contrast, we direct most of our attention to risk as experienced and interpreted in less developed countries. One influential author writing about risk during the 1980s and 1990s is Ulrich Beck. His books Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity? (1992) and Ecological Politics in the Age of Risk (1995), amongst a number of others, have been profoundly influential. In these publications he seeks the ‘root causes’ of environmental crisis just as we in this book look for the ‘root causes’ of vulnerability to disaster. Beck (like many other researchers) finds those roots in the rampant consumerism of contemporary rich societies. But also (and this is of more interest to disaster studies) in two forms of social control of the consequences of overconsumption. One is ‘ecological modernisation’, by which the technicians of the ‘risk society’ attempt to ‘fix’ environmental problems without ever addressing root causes. The other is a form of amnesia or denial of environmental problems that he terms ‘organized irresponsibility’ (Beck quoted in Goldblatt 1999:379). ...

Beck maintains that the more developed world is in a transitional state between industrial society and ‘risk society’: with so much wealth also come risks. With an ...
increasingly complex and technologically driven society come new threats: 'hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself (Beck 1992:21). Many of these are treated by more affluent societies with a high degree of ambivalence, since a number of risks can no longer be directly experienced in a sensory manner (touched, seen or smelt as in the case of industrial society). Instead, there are risks of nuclear radiation, carcinogens in foodstuffs, toxicity from pesticides and risks associated with lifestyle. In addition, there is a background level of anxiety from a bewildering number of often illdefined risks, some of them involving lifestyle and others involving incalculable horrors of unknown statistical probability, such as nuclear war or, we might add, since 11 September 2001, terrorist attack. Castel goes further to argue that modernity is involved in ‘a grandiose technocratic rationalizing dream of absolute control of the accidental…an absolute reign of calculative reason’ (Castel 1991:289, quoted in Lupton 1999:7). ...

Thus, industrial, affluent society is increasingly protected against the uncertainties faced in LDCs through the application of technology and higher levels of income. Yet it is none the less increasingly preoccupied with incalculable and diffuse risks, which have somehow eluded all the advances of science and medicine. Others have noted a correlation between the emergence of ‘environmental’ concerns (e.g. with the quality of water and air) and increased affluence of the middle class in the USA and Europe (Hays 1987). In addition, more discrete and dramatic ‘surprises’ continue to occur in more developed countries, such as the unanticipated scale of the devastation of Kobe by the Great Hanshin earthquake in Japan in 1995 (despite all of Japan’s scientific and engineering prowess); the contamination of a large area following the explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in 1986; the outbreak of BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or ‘mad-cow disease’) in Britain in 2001; or the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and the outbreak of SARS in 2003. This cultural environment of risk, it will be clear to the reader, overlaps with but is different from the concerns we address in this book. ...

Beck considers the ways in which people in highly developed societies involve themselves in ‘reflexive modernity’, an institutionalised activity and state of mind involving constant monitoring and reflection upon and (according to Jacobs 1998) confrontation with these risks-whether they objectively exist or not. In particular, reflexive modernisation of risk can involve consideration of risks at the global level, an awareness that is a major incentive for international co-operation and practice, and leads to the globalisation of the meaning of risk. Thus transferred to the global scale, new concepts have been constructed and initiatives undertaken to ‘manage’ risk: for example, ‘conserving biodiversity’, ‘reversing global warming’ and ‘disaster reduction’ are forms of ecological modernisation conducted by the combined technocracy of rich, consuming nations (Sachs 1999). By extension, international efforts to ‘manage’ aspects of the impacts of hurricanes, droughts and volcanoes on behalf of poor, former colonial countries could also be considered a form of ecological modernisation. However, the fatal flaw in ecological modernisation is that it never deals with root causes. It is therefore never-ending and self-perpetuating. Later, we will return to several classic cases of this sort, such as the ‘management’ of the volcanic eruption in Montserrat (see Chapter 8). ...

Beck’s work and the discussions it has stimulated are important and do, in some ways, overlap with our approach (Giddens 1990; Jacobs 1998; Lupton 1999). However it is ...
rather remote from the dynamics of hazard, vulnerability and risk in LDCs that is our principle focus in this book. Nevertheless, there is another use of Beck’s notion of reflexive modernisation that we find much closer to our purposes of the analysis of disasters in LDCs. While it can lead to perpetual anxiety and the self-defeating approach of ecological modernisation discussed above, reflexive modernisation can result in more focused political demands on authorities to address what we could call the ‘root causes’ of vulnerability. This pressure from below on authorities and corporations is that of citizens organised into what Beck calls an ‘ecological democracy’ (Beck 1995, 1998; Beck et al. 1994). Agreeing in large part with Beck’s views, we place considerable emphasis on lay people, citizen groups and the vulnerable themselves as an important target audience of this book. Giddens (1992) has elaborated on the insights of Beck by exploring the relationship between ‘risk’ and ‘trust’. Used in a different context, we also find that trust between, for example, citizen-based organisations and municipal governments, is critical in mobilising human resources for mitigating disaster loss and reducing vulnerability (Wisner 2002a) (see also Part III).

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...

Deconstructive approaches ...

The writings on risk, as in other subjects in social science, are distributed along a continuum of epistemological positions (Stallings 1997). At one end, there is a realist approach that takes risk as an objective hazard that exists and can be measured independently of social and cultural processes. Theories and methods associated with this epistemology are techno-scientific, statistical and actuarial. Moving across the continuum, there are what could be termed ‘weak constructionist’ approaches, where risk is an objective hazard but is always mediated through social and cultural processes (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999). Finally, there is the strong constructionist approach, where nothing is a risk in itself but is a contingent product of historically, socially and politically created ‘ways of seeing’ (Lupton 1999:35). This book broadly takes a realist, and at times a weak constructionist, approach to risk. Many of the concerns and anxieties about which Beck and Giddens write so persuasively are a product of a late modern society in the more developed countries (MDCs), while the risks faced by many in developing countries are different. That is not to say that culturally constructed risks are any less apparent in LDCs. It is rather that they do not have the luxury of indulging in the anxieties found in MDCs, but instead face famine, flood, biological hazards, high winds and earthquakes-without the protection offered (to some) by affluent, industrial countries. ...

We part company with strong social constructionist approaches because we believe they do not lead, in any direct way, to an improvement in practice-either in disaster prevention or in post-disaster management. Therefore, for example, we acknowledge Bankoff’s (2001) approach to famine as interesting but not useful from our perspective. He considers the historical roots of the discursive framework within which hazards are presented, and how that might reflect particular cultural values to do with the way in which certain regions of the world are usually imagined.

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characterises modernist approaches to disasters, risk and vulnerability as a historically constructed neo-colonial discourse which denigrates large regions of the world as ‘tropical’ (the unhealthy and ...
dangerous ‘other’), poverty-stricken and disaster-prone (ibid.). Although this view is accurate, we feel it is difficult to use it to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of disasters and improvement of relief and reconstruction. We acknowledge it but leave it to one side. ...

As noted above, the origins of the vulnerability approach we take in this book can be located in the 1970s when authors began to question the ‘naturalness’ of ‘natural disaster’ (O’Keefe et al. 1976). To that extent we have already been where Bankoff would ask us to go, and we now wish to provide more precise advice on linkages that transmit root causes into very specific unsafe conditions. Indeed, deconstructive critique is not new within geography and environmental studies, where for some time authors have pointed out that ‘land degradation’ and other environmental management categories come loaded with the assumptions and biases of the observer (Adams 2001; Leach and Mearns 1996; Gadgil and Guha 1995). The critique of structuralist, determinist methods is also well established within development studies (Crush 1995; Escobar 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997) and has already had some influence on students of disaster. ...

There is, however, a heuristic aspect of such a post-structural critique of disaster discourse that we believe provides a valuable caution and corrective (Mustafa 2001). It could be argued that notions such as ‘disaster management cycle’, and terms such as 'relief, ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘recovery’ are technical constructs imposed on different cultural, economic, political and gender realities (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Enarson and Morrow 2001). Such constructs fail to comprehend the lived reality of disaster and, to that extent, can fail to engage the co-operation of local people. ...

Vulnerability and normal daily life ...

We argue in this book that feasible and informed practice in reducing disaster risk as well as a better theoretical understanding of disasters are possible only if one places the phenomenon of disaster ‘in the mainstream’ of policy and practice. Hewitt made this point twenty years ago when he wrote of how disasters had been mentally exiled to an ‘archipelago’ of exceptionalism (Hewitt 1983b). Agreeing wholeheartedly with Hewitt, we show how ‘normal’ historical processes contribute to the causation of disasters. We also show how ‘normal’ pressures in global, regional and national systems of economic, social and political power contribute to creating vulnerability to disaster. The material conditions of daily life, what one might call ‘normal life’, also underlie or, as Hewitt put it, ‘prefigure’ disasters (ibid.: 27). These material conditions are, above all, biological in the sense of our access to food, water and the air we breathe. We treat these material underpinnings of existence in some detail in Chapters 3 to 5 . The Access model presented in Chapter 3 provides insight into how such material conditions of daily or normal life change with circumstances. It shows how major stress, such as an extreme natural event, can reverberate through a household’s livelihood system, playing havoc with its ability to meet its needs, and, moreover, its ability to recover and protect itself against other, perhaps unrelated, stresses and crises at a later time. ...

Changes since the first edition ...

Nearly a decade has passed since the first edition of At Risk was completed. It has been ten years of very great change and, in some ways, unfortunate continuity. Much theoretical, practical and institutional work has been done on disaster ‘vulnerability’. An entire United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) has passed (1990-1999). The language of major development agencies and banks has changed. Yet more and more costly and deadly disasters continue to occur. ...

The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) ...

Not long after the publication of At Risk, in May 1994, the IDNDR held its mid-decade conference in Yokohama, Japan. This was an important watershed (see Chapter 9). Dissatisfaction emerged with the top-down, technocratic approach to disasters that had characterised the first half of the decade’s activities. The resulting ‘Yokohama Message’ contained much that parallels the arguments we made in the first edition of At Risk. In particular, two prerequisites for disaster risk reduction are emphasised: ...

1 …[A] clear understanding of the cultural and organizational characteristics of each society as well as of its behavior and interactions with the physical and natural environment. ...

2 …[T]he mobilization of non-governmental organizations and participation of local communities. ...
(Ingleton 1999:320) ...
The ‘Yokohama Message’ warned of the danger of 'meagre results of an extraordinary opportunity given to the United Nations and its Member States’ during the first half of the IDNDR. ...

During the second half of the IDNDR considerable efforts were made to involve NGOs and communities. A popular magazine, Stop Disasters, was published. Annual themes for 'World Disaster Day’ included social issues, for example a focus on women in disasters. Perhaps the most important development was a turn toward cities during the last three years of the IDNDR. This began with an international electronic conference in 1996 that reached out to many practitioners and NGOs, as well as academics and government officials (IDNDR 1996). An ambitious pilot programme for urban earthquake risk assessment and mitigation was run from 1997 to 2000. This 'Risk Assessment Tools for Diagnosis of Urban Areas Against Seismic Disasters’ programme (mercifully known by the short acronym RADIUS) involved a core of nine medium-sized cities in different parts of the world, with a total of 84 cities as observers participating in various ways.

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...

RADIUS displayed the mark of the ‘Yokohama Message’ very clearly, because work in the nine core cities involved a broad cross-section of sectors, citizens and scientific disciplines. It was focused on mitigation of loss, and it used accessible technologies. RADIUS began in each city with a study of earthquake hazard and vulnerability, and progressed through the development of city-wide action plans that, once again, involved many diverse sectors and institutions. ...

Urban growth and the growth of urban concerns ...

The IDNDR’s urban turn reflected a judgement that rapid progress in reducing loss of life could be made by focusing on cities. Indeed, another major change since the first publication of At Risk is the speed with which the world’s population is rapidly becoming urban.

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The IDNDR’s focus on cities was also co-ordinated to provide a contribution to ‘Habitat II’, a major world conference on urban settlements held in Istanbul, Turkey in 1997 (twenty years after Habitat I). How should we explain the decision to focus IDNDR activity on earthquake risk reduction in cities, as opposed to any one of other possible urban hazards (e.g. flood, storms, volcanic eruptions)? Part of the explanation is found in the origins of the IDNDR. Earthquake engineers were very prominent in its creation and remained influential. Also important was the fact that two costly earthquakes had recently surprised authorities and experts alike in the USA (Northridge, California in 1994, costing

$ 35

billion) and Japan (Kobe in 1995, with losses of over

$ 147

billion). ...

Changes in earth care ...

The language of ‘sustainable development’ had entered development studies and policy documents from the late 1980s, with the publication of Our Common Future (WCED 1987). The ‘Earth Summit’ was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, near the start of the IDNDR. Since then, at least on paper, disaster risk reduction has been included as an element of many of the national and local efforts to implement Agenda 21, the Rio Summit’s plan of action. However, the processes undermining any positive moves to make concrete such diplomatic consensus were soon in evidence after the Summit. In 1998, hurricane Mitch struck several Central American countries and made it obvious that it was underlying processes of land degradation and de-vegetation that made people vulnerable (see Chapter 7). The death toll from this hurricane is estimated to have been 27,000 people, most of these in Honduras and Nicaragua. The majority of these deaths were from floods and landslides that could have been prevented if so much of these countries had not been stripped of their forest cover. ...

In 2002, the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development reaffirmed the place of disaster risk reduction within its notion of ‘sustainable development’. In the run up to the Johannesburg Summit, ten years after the Rio Summit, the third Global Environmental Outlook report by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP 2002) included a substantial chapter on disasters (see Chapter 9 below). It noted some uneven progress in reducing disaster risk, mostly concentrated in the richer countries. But, on balance, it considered the significance of what it called a ‘vulnerability gap’, ‘which is widening within society, between countries and across regions with the disadvantaged more at risk to environmental change and disasters’ (ibid.: 297). ...

Since the original publication of At Risk, the science of global climate change has improved, while the political consensus behind the Kyoto Treaty25 (on reducing greenhouse gas emissions) has made only slow progress, largely because of US opposition).

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It appears that the severe impact of hurricane Andrew (which devastated much of Miami in 1992) and the huge floods in the Mississippi basin the following year have not convinced the Bush administration of the possible connection between ...
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. This is despite strong advocacy for ‘sustainable development’ by prominent US disaster researchers (Mileti 1999; Burby 1998). Perhaps another dose of rough weather from the next El Niño cycle will wake up the US government to the need for a ‘war on wasteful consumption’ to parallel its ‘war on terrorism’. ...

In the run up to the Johannesburg summit numerous authors and institutions have revisited the connections between land use and disaster. They recalled the lessons of hurricanes Mitch (1998) and Andrew (1992), the Mississippi floods (1993) and floods throughout many parts of Europe during the 1990s, as well as almost annual huge floods in China. Deforestation and other kinds of land-use problems have been implicated in all of these disasters (Gardner 2002; Burby 1998). They also wrote of the wildfires in Indonesia, the USA, Australia, Mexico and Brazil. They reminded us of the great loss of lives in the flooding and mudslides in Venezuela in 1999, Algeria and Brazil in 2001, and a deadly landslide triggered by an earthquake in El Salvador, also in 2001 (Abramovitz 2001; ISDR 2002a; Wisner 2001f, 2001c). In all these cases, better land-use planning and enforcement could have prevented the extreme natural event becoming a disaster. We are also reminded that a population displaced by a large-scale dam is not likely to understand the hazards of the terrain, climate and ecosystem in the area in which they are resettled. It will be harder for them to protect themselves against natural hazards that are new to them (World Commission on Dams 2000b). ...

The emergence of the 'precautionary principle' ...

Natural scientists from many disciplines have begun to discuss the problems of uncertainty in their analysis of various natural phenomena (Handmer et al. 2001). In situations where human actions may be causing catastrophic harm to natural systems on a global scale, a prudent ‘precautionary science’ is needed. This may apply especially to situations where the probability of a catastrophic outcome may be low but the magnitude of the catastrophe very large (Johnston and Simmonds 1991; O’Brien 2000). A more conventional and optimistic view is that it is possible to ‘manage the planet’ if there is sufficient knowledge of all the interactions in such large-scale physical systems as the atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere, asthenosphere

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and biosphere (Clark 1989). Such a technocratic and managerial approach has received increasing criticism over the past ten years. Our book will also challenge this latter line of thinking. Our effort is necessary in part because faith in simple technological fixes is still pervasive. As Zimmerman (1995:175) notes: 'Too many of us blithely assume that we need not deal with the base causes of our environmental problems because soon-to-be-discovered technological solutions will make those problems obsolete’. ...

Critiques of economic globalisation ...

Another major change since this book first appeared is the increase in public and academic opposition to aspects of economic globalisation (including the street protests of Seattle and Genoa) (Hardt and Negri 2000; Sklair 2001; Wisner 2000a, 2001a; Pelling 2003a; Hines 2000; Monbiot 2003). In the first edition of this book, we dealt with the ...
impact of such neo-liberal economic policies as ‘structural adjustment’ as a dynamic pressure leading to vulnerability. In the 1980s there was evidence that cutbacks in public expenditure on health and social protection were undermining the resilience of poor people to natural hazards. Since then the critique of neo-liberalism has been broadened to include the ideology of free trade and the institutions of economic globalisation such as the World Trade Organisation. In this new edition we recognise fully the role of economic globalisation as a ‘dynamic pressure’ affecting vulnerability to disasters (see Chapter 2). The scale of globalisation is enormous. As Friedman puts it: ...

[G]lobalization is not simply a trend or a fad but is, rather, an international system. It is the system that has now replaced the Cold War system, and, like the Cold War system, globalization has its own rules and logic that today directly or indirectly influence the politics, environment, geopolitics and economics of virtually every country in the world. ...

(2000:ix) ...
Starting in 2000 (in Porto Alegre, Brazil), the World Social Forum meets annually to act as a counterpoint to the business and governmental elite who meet at the World Economic Conference. The 2003 World Social Forum attracted 100,000 delegates (Wainwright 2003). Positive proposals are emerging for ‘another globalisation’ that is not based on dogmatic neoliberal formulae for ‘structural adjustment’ of economies and ‘free trade’. With widespread support by citizens’ groups, churches and NGOs having caused governments to accept the notion of reducing the international debt of the least-developed nations, proposals such as a ‘Tobin Tax’ on international financial transactions may no longer be seen as Utopian or fringe ideas.

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In the face of rapidly accelerating privatisation of water supplies, others have begun to argue that as a basic need and human right, water should not be considered a commodity among other commodities.

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Our concern about control of water supplies by multinational corporations is especially about whether ‘the market’ is sufficient to guarantee resilience of water, drainage and sanitation systems in the face of natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods and storms; and if not, who bears the losses and costs? ...

Academic support for the critique of blind belief in economic growth as the predominant goal of development has been building up since the UNDP began to publish its Human Development Report (HDR) in 1990. Its Human Development Index (HDI) measures equity, health and education, and not just economic activity. In 1995 the HDR added gender-specific measures, and in 1997 two separate measures of human poverty: one for more developed countries and one for the less developed. Other international institutions have responded to the reintroduction of social and other human goals into the development discourse (UNRISD 2000). In 2001 the World Bank devoted two chapters to poverty and disaster vulnerability in its World Development Report (the annual publication which had tended to give priority to economic growth and which, to some extent, the Human Development Report was designed to counter) (World Bank 2001; however, compare Cammack 2002).
自 1990 年联合国开发计划署开始发布《人类发展报告》（HDR）以来，针对盲目相信经济增长作为发展主要目标的批评的学术支持不断增加。其人类发展指数（HDI）衡量的是公平、健康和教育，而不仅仅是经济活动。1995 年，HDR 增加了性别特定的指标，1997 年则增加了两项人类贫困的独立指标：一个针对发达国家，一个针对不发达国家。其他国际机构也对将社会和其他人类目标重新引入发展话语作出了回应（UNRISD 2000）。2001 年，世界银行在其《世界发展报告》中专门用两章讨论贫困和灾害脆弱性（该年度出版物往往优先考虑经济增长，而《人类发展报告》在某种程度上旨在对此进行反驳）（世界银行 2001；然而，比较 Cammack 2002）。

In its World Disasters Report 2001, the International Red Cross presented data from the UNDP and Centre for Research in the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) that
在其 2001 年《世界灾害报告》中，国际红十字会提供了来自联合国开发计划署和灾害流行病学研究中心（CRED）的数据，
compares the impacts of extreme natural events on countries with high, medium, and low scores on the HDI (IFRC 2001a: 162-165). They looked at data for 2,557 disasters triggered by natural events between 1991 and 2000. Half of these disasters took place in countries with medium HDI, but two-thirds of the deaths occurred in countries with low HDI. Only 2 per cent of the deaths were recorded in the countries with a high HDI. When tabulating deaths and monetary losses per disaster, the relationship with HDI is even clearer (Table 1.3).
比较了极端自然事件对人类发展指数（HDI）高、中、低分数国家的影响（IFRC 2001a: 162-165）。他们研究了 1991 年至 2000 年间由自然事件引发的 2,557 起灾害的数据。这些灾害中有一半发生在 HDI 中等的国家，但三分之二的死亡发生在 HDI 低的国家。只有 2%的死亡记录在 HDI 高的国家。当对每次灾害的死亡人数和经济损失进行统计时，与 HDI 的关系更加明显（表 1.3）。

UNDP took this analytical work even further in 2002 by commissioning the quantitative study of more than 200 possible indicators of disaster risk vulnerability and producing a vulnerability index for use in its World
联合国开发计划署（UNDP）在 2002 年进一步推进了这一分析工作，委托对 200 多个可能的灾害风险脆弱性指标进行定量研究，并制作了一个用于其世界脆弱性指数。

Table 1.3 Level of human development and disaster impacts
表 1.3 人类发展水平与灾害影响

	Deaths per disaster每次灾难的死亡人数	Loss per disaster ($ millions) 每次灾难的损失（百万美元）
Low HDI低人类发展指数	1,052	79
Medium HDI中等人类发展指数	145	209
High HDI高人类发展指数	23	636
Source: based on IFRC (2001a:162, 164) 来源：基于国际红十字与红新月联合会（2001a:162, 164）

Note:注：
HDI is Human Development Index (see text for explanation).
HDI 是人类发展指数（详见文本解释）。

Vulnerability Report. The worldwide results (for the years 1980-1999) are striking (UNDP 2003). The HDI again turns out to be the best predictor of deaths triggered by extreme natural events.
脆弱性报告。全球范围内的结果（1980-1999 年）令人震惊（联合国开发计划署 2003）。人类发展指数再次被证明是预测极端自然事件引发死亡的最佳指标。

Changes in human development and well-being
人类发展和福祉的变化

In parts of the world (especially in many African countries), the improvements in access to education, health care and the greater longevity achieved in the 1960s and 1970s continued to decline in the 1990s (UNDP 2003b). We noted this trend in the first edition of At Risk, and argued that the programmes for managing international debt imposed on many of these countries by the World Bank and IMF had increased people’s vulnerability to disaster. Despite reformulating, renaming and giving a ‘human face’ to these 'structural adjustment programmes’ (SAPs) during the 1990s, the effects have continued.
在世界的某些地区（尤其是许多非洲国家），1960 年代和 1970 年代在教育、医疗保健和更长寿命方面的改善在 1990 年代继续下降（联合国开发计划署 2003b）。我们在《风险》第一版中注意到了这一趋势，并认为世界银行和国际货币基金组织对许多国家施加的国际债务管理方案增加了人们对灾难的脆弱性。尽管在 1990 年代对这些“结构调整计划”（SAPs）进行了重新制定、重新命名并赋予了“人性化”的面貌，但其影响依然持续。

Gardner (2002:10) observed that health officials in the 1970s believed that the era of infectious disease was about to come to an end worldwide. However, today we find that ‘20 familiar infectious diseases-including tuberculosis, malaria, and cholera-[have] reemerged or spread…and at least 30 previously unknown deadly diseases-from HIV to hepatitis C and Ebola-[have] surfaced’ (ibid.: 10-11). HIV-AIDS deaths have grown from 500,000 worldwide in 1990 to nearly 3 million in 2000 (Barnett and Whiteside 2001). Most of the deaths from HIV-AIDS occur in the LDCs (the distribution is similar to that presented above for disaster deaths), and four-fifths of these are in sub-Saharan
加德纳（2002:10）观察到，1970 年代的卫生官员认为传染病时代即将全球结束。然而，今天我们发现“20 种熟悉的传染病——包括结核病、疟疾和霍乱——[已经]重新出现或传播……而至少有 30 种以前未知的致命疾病——从 HIV 到丙型肝炎和埃博拉——[已经]浮现”（同上：10-11）。HIV-AIDS 的死亡人数从 1990 年的 50 万人增长到 2000 年的近 300 万人（巴尼特和怀特赛德 2001）。大多数 HIV-AIDS 的死亡发生在最不发达国家（其分布与上述灾难死亡的分布相似），其中四分之三发生在撒哈拉以南非洲。

Africa (ibid.: 12). At the end of 1999, there were 34 million people living with HIV, of whom 25 million ( 74 per cent) lived in sub-Saharan Africa ( 1 million of them children). Over 12 million children had been orphaned by HIV-AIDS. The magnitude of this disaster dwarfs anything else we take up in this book, and the numbers are staggering. HIV-AIDS in Africa represents great complexity in its long-term consequences for production, social relations and vulnerability to future crises, including the effects of global climate change (see Chapters 2 and 5 on this series of interlinked problems, and Chapter 5 in particular for more on Africa and African HIV-AIDS). Although in 1998 the UNDP was able to conclude that, on average, health had improved in the previous 30 years (UNDP 1998:21-23), in many African countries this was certainly not the case.
非洲（同上：12）。到 1999 年底，全球有 3400 万人感染 HIV，其中 2500 万人（74%）生活在撒哈拉以南非洲（其中 100 万人是儿童）。超过 1200 万儿童因 HIV-AIDS 而成为孤儿。这场灾难的规模远超本书中讨论的任何其他问题，数字令人震惊。非洲的 HIV-AIDS 在其对生产、社会关系和未来危机脆弱性的长期影响方面具有极大的复杂性，包括全球气候变化的影响（参见本系列相互关联问题的第 2 章和第 5 章，特别是第 5 章中关于非洲和非洲 HIV-AIDS 的更多内容）。尽管在 1998 年，联合国开发计划署能够得出结论，过去 30 年间健康状况平均有所改善（UNDP 1998：21-23），但在许多非洲国家，这显然并非如此。

War and humanitarian relief
战争与人道主义救援

Since the first publication of At Risk, dozens of violent conflicts have broken out and many civilians have been killed, maimed (especially by land mines), injured, deliberately mutilated, starved, occasionally enslaved and displaced by the belligerent parties. So great has been the need for humanitarian relief in these conflict and post-conflict situations that some ‘normal’ development assistance has been diverted, and opportunities for self-generated development delayed or destroyed, further worsening the position of marginal and vulnerable populations in the longer term. Furthermore, there has been confusion among development NGOs about how to act in regard to:

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自《风险》首次出版以来，数十起暴力冲突爆发，许多平民被杀、被残害（尤其是地雷）、受伤、故意 mutilated、饥饿、偶尔被奴役以及被交战各方驱逐。在这些冲突和后冲突情况下，对人道主义救援的需求如此之大，以至于一些“正常”的发展援助被转移，自我生成发展的机会被延迟或摧毁，进一步恶化了边缘和脆弱人群的长期处境。此外，发展非政府组织在如何处理以下问题上存在困惑：

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civilian/military relations during 'complex’ emergencies;
在“复杂”紧急情况下的平民/军事关系；
relations with war lords, local elites and the army;
与战争领主、地方精英和军队的关系；
ways to move from relief to recovery, and to development;
从救援到恢复，再到发展的方式；
internationally acceptable standards of assistance;
国际公认的援助标准；
mobilisation of international support for relief.
动员国际支持以提供救援。

Conflicts have continued to exacerbate natural extreme events such as drought in Afghanistan (2002; see Christian Aid 2002; World Food Programme 2002c) and the volcanic eruption in eastern Congo (2002). However, since the mid-1990s, the possible role of ‘disaster diplomacy’ in peace making has also been noted, and at least a dozen ‘windows’ for conflict resolution that opened during a natural hazard event have been documented.

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冲突持续加剧了阿富汗的自然极端事件，如干旱（2002 年；见基督教救助组织 2002 年；世界粮食计划署 2002c）和刚果东部的火山爆发（2002 年）。然而，自 1990 年代中期以来，“灾难外交”在和平建设中的可能作用也得到了关注，至少有十几个在自然灾害事件期间开启的冲突解决“窗口”已被记录。

Violent conflict interacts with natural hazards in a wide variety of ways:
暴力冲突以多种方式与自然灾害相互作用：

It is often one of the main causes of social vulnerability.
这通常是社会脆弱性的主要原因之一。
Displacement of large numbers of people in war and other violent conflicts can lead to new risks (exposure to disease, unfamiliar hazards in new rural or urban environments) (US Committee for Refugees 2002).
战争和其他暴力冲突中大量人员的流离失所可能导致新的风险（暴露于疾病、新的农村或城市环境中的不熟悉危险）（美国难民委员会 2002）。
Socially vulnerable groups in extreme natural events are often also vulnerable to abuse (injury, death, rape, forced labour) during violent conflict.
在极端自然事件中，社会脆弱群体在暴力冲突期间往往也容易遭受虐待（受伤、死亡、强奸、强迫劳动）。
Violent conflict can interfere with the provision of relief and recovery assistance.
暴力冲突可能干扰救援和恢复援助的提供。
Participatory methods meant to empower and engage socially vulnerable groups may be difficult or impossible during violent conflicts.
旨在赋权和参与社会脆弱群体的参与式方法在暴力冲突期间可能会变得困难或不可能。
The application of existing knowledge for the mitigation of risk from extreme natural events is often difficult or impossible during violent conflict.
在暴力冲突期间，利用现有知识来减轻极端自然事件的风险往往是困难或不可能的。
Violent conflict often diverts national and international financial and human resources that could be used for the mitigation of risk away from extreme natural events (Brandt 1986; Stewart 2000).
暴力冲突常常使国家和国际的财务及人力资源转移，无法用于减轻极端自然事件的风险（Brandt 1986; Stewart 2000）。
Conflict sometimes destroys infrastructure, which may then intensify natural hazards (e.g. irrigation systems, dams, levees) or compromises warnings and evacuations (e.g. land mines on roads).
冲突有时会破坏基础设施，这可能会加剧自然灾害（例如灌溉系统、坝、堤防）或妨碍警报和撤离（例如道路上的地雷）。
The failure of sustainable development can result in conflict over resources that can lead to violent confrontation.
可持续发展的失败可能导致资源冲突，从而引发暴力对抗。
Violent confrontations often wreak havoc on vegetation, land and water, and this undermines sustainable development.
暴力对抗往往对植被、土地和水源造成严重破坏，这削弱了可持续发展。
Some economic development strategies and policies can lead to marginalisation and exclusion, and hence the creation of social vulnerability to extreme natural events, and may simultaneously provoke social unrest, e.g. food riots (Walton and Seddon 1994).
一些经济发展战略和政策可能导致边缘化和排斥，从而造成对极端自然事件的社会脆弱性，并可能同时引发社会动荡，例如食品骚乱（Walton 和 Seddon 1994）。

Media and policy selectivity
媒体和政策的选择性

Another change since the first edition of our book is a growing concern about the highly selective treatment of disasters by the Western media, their tendency to overlook significant disasters, and a general decline in interest in the rest of the world. Even when such disasters are noticed, there is little follow up. Typically the most underreported humanitarian crises listed by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) for 2001 tend to be slow onset, long-term disasters, most often linked to war or post-war situations. We attempt to redress this balance in this edition of the book. Below is a list of ‘missing’ crises according to MSF (2001), some of which are dealt with in subsequent chapters:

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我们书籍第一版以来的另一个变化是，西方媒体对灾难的高度选择性报道引发了越来越多的关注，他们倾向于忽视重大灾难，以及对世界其他地区的兴趣普遍下降。即使这些灾难被注意到，后续报道也很少。通常，国际救援组织（MSF）在 2001 年列出的最少报道的人道主义危机往往是缓慢发生的长期灾难，通常与战争或战后情况有关。我们试图在本版书中纠正这种失衡。以下是根据 MSF（2001）列出的“缺失”危机的一览表，其中一些在后续章节中进行了讨论：

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Malaria epidemic in Burundi: 3 million cases in a population of 6.5 million because of the severe spatial dislocation and displacement of people due to war since 1993.
布隆迪的疟疾疫情：由于自 1993 年以来战争导致的严重空间错位和人员流离失所，人口 650 万中有 300 万例。
Precarious situation of Chechnyan refugees in Ingushetia, where mafia-like business groups control the flow of food and other survival goods to the refugees (Agence FrancePress 2002d).
在英古什的车臣难民的脆弱处境，黑手党式的商业集团控制着向难民提供食品和其他生存物资的流动（法新社 2002d）。
North Korean famine refugees in People’s Republic of China (PRC): brutality against hundreds of thousands of Koreans fleeing across the remote border with PRC.
在中华人民共和国（PRC）中的朝鲜饥荒难民：数十万逃离与 PRC 接壤的偏远边境的韩国人遭受的残酷对待。
Rural violence and urban marginalisation in Colombia: 2 million people have become internally displaced in Colombia since 1985; 300,000 alone in 2000. Rural health services have been destroyed. In urban areas these displaced persons live in very dangerous places. This is a recipe for increasing exposure to flood, landslide, earthquake and epidemic disease.
哥伦比亚的农村暴力与城市边缘化：自 1985 年以来，哥伦比亚已有 200 万人内部流离失所；仅在 2000 年就有 30 万人。农村卫生服务已被摧毁。在城市地区，这些流离失所者生活在非常危险的地方。这是增加洪水、滑坡、地震和流行病暴露风险的根源。
Breakdown of health care services in the Democratic Republic of Congo: MSF estimates that there are 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Congo. The volcanic eruption in the east added to this number (see Chapter 8). Camp environments are hazardous in many ways, as is isolated survival on the margins of the ongoing conflicts (see Chapter 5). ...
Continuing violence in Somalia: Despite inter-clan peace talks in Djibouti and other diplomatic initiatives, war lords continue to dominate Somalia. People there are exposed to drought, flood, cyclones and even earthquakes. Without a viable state, their vulnerability to these natural hazards will remain high. ...

20 years of war in Sri Lanka: 60,000 people have died in 20 years of war, and there are hundreds of thousands of IDPs. During 2001 there was both drought and flood in various parts of the country, and the conflict hampers mitigation of these hazards, response to their impacts, and recovery-as noted in Chapter 2. ...
Many displaced people in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Senegal, Nigeria and Angola have all been affected by severe internal, organised violence. In all these countries the result is to exacerbate vulnerability to ‘normal’ hazards such as flooding (e.g. Senegal in 2001), drought and outbreaks of human epidemic and animal epizootic disease (see Chapters 5 and 6). ...
Refugees and displaced people worldwide: MSF estimates that in 2001 there were 22 million refugees in the world (who had taken refuge across a national border) and another 20-25 million IDPs. Even before additional risk factors associated with gender, class, ethnicity, age, disability, etc. are taken into account, the very fact of being a refugee or internally displaced raises a person’s vulnerability to some natural hazards.
全球的难民和流离失所者：无国界医生组织估计，2001 年全球有 2200 万难民（已越过国界寻求庇护）和另外 2000 万至 2500 万内部流离失所者。即使在未考虑与性别、阶级、种族、年龄、残疾等相关的额外风险因素的情况下，仅仅是作为难民或内部流离失所者的事实就会提高一个人对某些自然灾害的脆弱性。
Neglected diseases: MSF concludes its list of the top ten underreported humanitarian crises with an account of chronic diseases of the poor that had not made the headlines in the same way that HIV-AIDS has done. These include tuberculosis, malaria, human sleeping sickness (of which there are African and Latin American varieties) and Kala Azar (visceral leishmaniasis).

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All four of these chronic, debilitating and potentially lethal conditions are linked to living conditions and there is considerable disease-agent resistance to available medication. Debilitation and disability mean that people have less time to invest in protecting themselves from other hazards by, for example, constructing or maintaining terraces, fire and wind breaks, farm or community wood lots, or carrying out irrigation works (see Chapter 5 and other chapters in Part II).
被忽视的疾病：无国界医生总结了十大被低估的人道主义危机，其中包括未像艾滋病那样引起广泛关注的贫困慢性疾病。这些疾病包括结核病、疟疾、人类睡眠病（有非洲和拉丁美洲的变种）和卡拉阿扎尔（内脏利什曼病）。

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这四种慢性、削弱身体和潜在致命的疾病与生活条件密切相关，并且对现有药物存在相当大的病原体抗药性。身体虚弱和残疾意味着人们在保护自己免受其他危险方面投入的时间更少，例如，修建或维护梯田、防火和防风设施、农场或社区林地，或进行灌溉工程（见第 5 章和第二部分的其他章节）。

Convergence and critique
收敛与批评

Convergence收敛

During the 1990s there has certainly been a convergence of thinking-and to a limited degree, practice-concerning natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. The IDNDR put vulnerability squarely on the development agenda. Work by many institutions on urban disasters in particular helped to focus and clarify our view of vulnerability: its causes, effects and remedies. A decade-long attempt to implement Agenda 21-the programme of action following the Earth Summit-provided many illustrations of the strengths and weaknesses of sustainable development, a very slippery, ambiguous concept. Finally, the notion of human development and its measurement using the HDI has offered new opportunities for planners and scholars to place disaster risk reduction in the mainstream. The evidence indicates that high levels of death and disruption of livelihoods by disasters are closely associated with low scores on the HDI at the national level. Whilst much of the analysis of At Risk is focused on the level of the household, neighbourhood or rural community, our understanding of vulnerability is consistent with these new results.
在 1990 年代，关于自然灾害、人们的脆弱性和灾难的思考——在一定程度上也包括实践——确实出现了趋同。国际自然灾害减灾十年（IDNDR）将脆弱性明确纳入发展议程。许多机构在城市灾害方面的工作特别有助于聚焦和澄清我们对脆弱性的看法：其原因、影响和补救措施。实施《21 世纪议程》的十年努力——即地球峰会后的行动计划——提供了可持续发展这一非常滑动、模糊概念的优缺点的许多例证。最后，人类发展及其通过人类发展指数（HDI）进行测量的概念为规划者和学者提供了将灾害风险减少纳入主流的新机会。证据表明，灾害造成的高死亡率和生计中断与国家层面上低 HDI 得分密切相关。尽管《风险分析》的大部分分析集中在家庭、邻里或农村社区层面，但我们对脆弱性的理解与这些新结果是一致的。

Critique批评

Commentary on At Risk has, on the whole, been positive. Some reviewers have suggested that we need to link more closely the two models presented in Chapters 2 and 3 and to use them more consistently in the chapters that make up Part II. Others have suggested ways to make the book more readable. Some have questioned whether we make enough allowance for human and social factors such as creativity and innovation (Haghebaert 2001, 2002). There have also been questions about whether we have ‘thrown the baby out with the bath water’ by not concentrating enough on the potential for actually affecting the natural and geophysical 'triggers’ of hazards (Lavell 2001; Turner et. al. 2003). Haghebaert (2001) also wonders if our focus on ‘root causes’ distracts us from the less ambitious, but none the less life-saving, efforts of the state in providing safety. We have read this advice carefully and, where we concurred with it, applied it in the revision process.
对《风险》一书的评论总体上是积极的。一些评论者建议我们需要更紧密地将第二章和第三章中提出的两个模型联系起来，并在构成第二部分的章节中更一致地使用它们。还有人提出了使书籍更易读的方法。一些人质疑我们是否充分考虑了人类和社会因素，如创造力和创新（Haghebaert 2001, 2002）。也有人质疑我们是否在没有足够关注实际影响自然和地球物理“触发因素”的潜力的情况下，“把婴儿和洗澡水一起倒掉”（Lavell 2001; Turner et. al. 2003）。Haghebaert（2001）还质疑我们对“根本原因”的关注是否使我们忽视了国家在提供安全方面的那些不那么雄心勃勃但同样拯救生命的努力。我们认真阅读了这些建议，并在修订过程中对我们认同的部分进行了应用。

A less approving critique involves what some see as the political implications of our approach. Some feel that our focus on root causes and social relations is of no practical use, and amounts to a call for social revolution. Smith (1996:51) states that work such as ours, belonging to what he calls the ‘structuralist school’, ‘can be criticized for rather stridently expressed views which, at worse, simply call for overall social revolution’.
一种不太赞同的批评涉及一些人所认为的我们方法的政治含义。一些人认为我们对根本原因和社会关系的关注没有实际用处，实际上是在呼吁社会革命。史密斯（1996:51）指出，像我们这样的工作，属于他所称的“结构主义学派”，可以被批评为表达了相当激烈的观点，最糟糕的情况是，简单地呼吁全面的社会革命。

Others take the opposite tack and believe we have abandoned the political struggle for justice in an unequal world. For example, Middleton and O’Keefe (1998) assert that we neglect political causes of disaster vulnerability on the national and international scale; that we limit ourselves in this way because of our desire to address multiple audiences, especially practitioners; and that we therefore rely exclusively on small-scale, incremental changes and improvement as solutions. Accusing us of sending a message ‘of self-defeating counsel of prudence’ (ibid.: 145), Middleton and O’Keefe write:
其他人则采取相反的态度，认为我们已经放弃了在不平等世界中争取正义的政治斗争。例如，米德尔顿和奥基夫（1998）断言，我们忽视了国家和国际层面上灾难脆弱性的政治原因；我们之所以这样限制自己，是因为我们希望面对多个受众，特别是从业者；因此，我们完全依赖小规模的渐进性变化和改进作为解决方案。米德尔顿和奥基夫指责我们传达了一种“自我挫败的谨慎建议”（同上：145），写道：

…At Risk stops short of tackling the larger complex in which the world’s poor are so vulnerable, (p. 11)
…《风险》未能解决世界贫困者如此脆弱的更大复杂问题，（第 11 页）
…confining their examinations to unquestionably important detail, the authors add the fateful words that they do so in order not to oversimplify and not to produce 'a theory that is of little use to managers, planners, and policymakers’, (p. 11)
…将他们的研究限制在无可争议的重要细节上，作者补充了命运般的话语，称他们这样做是为了不至于过于简化，也不至于产生“对管理者、规划者和政策制定者几乎没有用的理论”，（第 11 页）
[The authors of At Risk] feel that sufficient attention to the smaller details will eventually force changes in the macro-economic and social conditions leading to the problems, (p. 162)
[《风险》一书的作者] 认为，充分关注较小的细节最终将迫使宏观经济和社会条件发生变化，从而导致问题的出现，（第 162 页）

We do not propose to occupy a great deal of space giving a detailed defense of the first edition, but to focus on those criticisms which lead, however intentioned by the critics, to potential improvements to this edition. At the outset it must be said that Middleton and O’Keefe set out to write a very different sort of book from At Risk. Theirs is more focused on the political aspects, especially the politics of complex emergencies. They lay little claim to build theory; their main claim is to be ‘radical’. Their book exposes rather than explains. One of the purposes of such a trenchant criticism of At Risk might have been to push aside an established book which occupied the central ground at the time, by
我们并不打算占用大量篇幅对第一版进行详细辩护，而是专注于那些批评意见，这些批评虽然出于批评者的良好意图，却可能导致本版的潜在改进。首先必须指出的是，米德尔顿和奥基夫的写作目标与《风险》一书截然不同。他们的书更关注政治方面，尤其是复杂紧急情况的政治。他们并不声称要建立理论；他们的主要主张是“激进”。他们的书更多的是揭露而非解释。对《风险》的如此尖锐批评的目的之一可能是为了推翻一本在当时占据中心地位的既定书籍，
differentiating the two different approaches. The issue of our preoccupation with detail at the expense of ‘tackling the larger picture’ is one way of excusing any author (including themselves) of taking the trouble to analyse in detail different approaches and theories of disasters. The Pressure and Release (PAR) model and the Household Access model, originally presented in the first edition of At Risk and re-introduced in an improved format in this edition, are not inconsequential details but tools that allow a carefully crafted explanation of disasters at different levels.
区分这两种不同的方法。我们对细节的过度关注以至于忽视“处理更大局面”的问题，是为任何作者（包括他们自己）找借口，不愿意费心详细分析不同的灾难方法和理论。压力与释放（PAR）模型和家庭获取模型，最初在《风险》中首次提出，并在本版中以改进的格式重新引入，并不是无关紧要的细节，而是允许对不同层次的灾难进行精心阐释的工具。

As the reader will soon see, Chapter 2 begins with ‘root causes’ that are truly global in scope and deeply rooted in history. In our schema we first break down ‘root causes’ into processes that are driven by ideology and that produce, reproduce and sustain political and economic systems. Secondly, we separate these into factors that distribute access within societies to power, structures and resources. In the schematic presentation of the model outlined in Chapter 2, we explain in the first edition that our intent is to show in detail how ‘war, foreign debt and structural adjustment, export promotion, mining, hydropower development, and deforestation work through to localities’ (p. 24 of 1st edn).
正如读者很快会看到的，第二章以“根本原因”开始，这些原因在全球范围内具有真正的广泛性，并深深植根于历史中。在我们的框架中，我们首先将“根本原因”分解为由意识形态驱动的过程，这些过程产生、再生产并维持政治和经济系统。其次，我们将这些因素分开，分为在社会中分配权力、结构和资源的因素。在第二章中概述的模型的示意图中，我们在第一版中解释我们的意图是详细展示“战争、外债和结构调整、出口促进、采矿、水电开发和森林砍伐如何影响地方”（第一版第 24 页）。

True to our intention, in the first edition we took up, inter alia, the role of IMF structural adjustment programmes in undermining health in Nigeria and Zimbabwe (p. l 14), the role of international aid agencies in promoting a ‘tech-fix’ solution to flooding in Bangladesh (pp. 138-143), the role that absentee land ownership plays in raising the stakes in coastal disaster risk (p. 153) and the part played by inflation in Mexico in the lead up to its earthquake disaster of 1985 (pp. 174-181). In the face of this evidence, how can our critics claim that we have ‘a distaste for the large political issues’? All of these examples fit precisely that class of processes which Middleton and O’Keefe claim falls outside the scope of At Risk: the macro-economic and the political.
忠于我们的意图，在第一版中，我们讨论了国际货币基金组织结构调整计划在破坏尼日利亚和津巴布韦健康方面的作用（第 14 页），国际援助机构在促进孟加拉国洪水的“技术解决方案”方面的作用（第 138-143 页），缺席土地所有权在提高沿海灾害风险中的作用（第 153 页），以及 1985 年墨西哥地震灾难前通货膨胀所发挥的作用（第 174-181 页）。面对这些证据，我们的批评者如何能声称我们对“大政治问题”有“厌恶”？所有这些例子恰好符合米德尔顿和奥基夫所声称的超出《风险》范围的那类过程：宏观经济和政治。

These critics claim that the combination of our two models (outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 ) is capable of producing no more than the following tautology:
这些批评者声称，我们的两个模型（在第 2 章和第 3 章中概述）的结合最多只能产生以下同义反复：

People are vulnerable because they are poor and lack resources, and because they are poor and lack resources, they are vulnerable.
人们脆弱是因为他们贫穷且缺乏资源，而因为他们贫穷且缺乏资源，他们又脆弱。
(Ibid.: 12)（同上：第 12 页）
They mock this ‘triumph of reason’ but are kind enough to put it down not to our stupidity, but (returning to their favourite theme) to the fact that we are trapped in a 'fault in the logic of [our] models’ (p. 12). This is an important source of misinterpretation. Poverty is not synonymous with vulnerability. The terms both imply relationships, but in the case of poverty it is relations with others in society which reproduces this state, while vulnerability implies causal relations with both society and also the physical environment at particular times. What Middleton and O’Keefe term circular reasoning is nothing of the kind. Our analysis often reveals the kind of vicious circle already mentioned earlier. Each time a disaster takes place, those most vulnerable are likely to be made even more vulnerable to the next extreme occurrence or stress.

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Middleton and O’Keefe point out such vicious circles themselves in a number of their own case studies. Whether called the ‘ratchet effect’, ‘underdevelopment trap’ or ‘marginalisation’, this phenomenon is well established in the theoretical and empirical literature of development studies (Chambers 1983; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). A vicious circle is not a tautology.
他们嘲笑这种“理性的胜利”，但好心地将其归因于我们并非愚蠢，而是（回到他们最喜欢的主题）我们被困在“[我们]模型逻辑中的缺陷”（第 12 页）。这是一个重要的误解来源。贫困并不等同于脆弱。这两个术语都暗示了关系，但在贫困的情况下，是与社会中他人的关系再生产了这种状态，而脆弱则暗示了与社会以及在特定时间的物理环境之间的因果关系。米德尔顿和奥基夫所称的循环推理根本不是这种情况。我们的分析常常揭示出之前提到的那种恶性循环。每当发生灾难时，最脆弱的人群往往会变得更加脆弱，以应对下一个极端事件或压力。

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米德尔顿和奥基夫在他们的一些案例研究中指出了这种恶性循环。无论称之为“棘轮效应”、“欠发达陷阱”还是“边缘化”，这一现象在发展研究的理论和实证文献中都得到了充分的证明（查姆伯斯 1983；布莱基和布鲁克菲尔德 1987）。恶性循环并不是同义反复。

Audiences观众

This book will inevitably first come to the attention of academics and students in higher education whose work interests them in disasters, development and LDCs. We hope it will appeal to anthropologists, economists, sociologists, political scientists, geographers and others in social science. We also hope that the book will be read by engineers and natural scientists: physical geographers, geologists, oceanographers, seismologists, volcanologists, geomorphologists, hydrologists and climatologists.
这本书不可避免地首先引起高等教育中对灾难、发展和最不发达国家（LDCs）感兴趣的学者和学生的注意。我们希望它能吸引人类学家、经济学家、社会学家、政治科学家、地理学家以及其他社会科学领域的人士。我们也希望这本书能被工程师和自然科学家阅读：物理地理学家、地质学家、海洋学家、地震学家、火山学家、地貌学家、水文学家和气候学家。

Because we see this book as being useful for action as well as study, we want to identify other groups we hope will use this book. Normally, the discussion about a book’s supposed readership is found in the preface, where it seems neutral and less significant. We would rather discuss our potential readers here, in relation to their own role in the social processes involved in making people vulnerable to hazards and in reducing vulnerability. By doing so we may assist in doing something to intervene in those processes to reduce that vulnerability. Such groups may include professionals involved in disaster work as an essential element in their day-to-day activity (e.g. public health workers, architects, engineers, agronomists, urban planners, civil servants, business executives, bankers and investors, community activists and politicians).
因为我们认为这本书对行动和学习都有用，所以我们希望识别出其他可能会使用这本书的群体。通常，关于一本书的预期读者的讨论出现在前言中，那里显得中立且不那么重要。我们更愿意在这里讨论我们的潜在读者，关注他们在使人们易受危害和减少脆弱性这一社会过程中的角色。通过这样做，我们可能有助于干预这些过程，以减少脆弱性。这些群体可能包括在灾害工作中作为日常活动的重要组成部分的专业人士（例如公共卫生工作者、建筑师、工程师、农学家、城市规划师、政府公务员、企业高管、银行家和投资者、社区活动家和政治家）。

The sociologist C.Wright Mills once wrote that there are three audiences for social analysis: those with power who are aware of the consequences of their acts on others; those with power who are unaware of the consequences; and the powerless who suffer those consequences (Mills 1959). In a similar way, we identify three other broad audiences for this book. There are, firstly, those with power who create vulnerability, sometimes without being aware of their actions. Secondly, we address those with power who are attempting to do something about hazards, but may be unable to make their work effective enough because of a failure to incorporate vulnerability analysis. Thirdly, we write for those who are operating at the grassroots level, who suffer the consequences of disasters, or who are working with people to reduce their vulnerability and increase their power.
社会学家 C. Wright Mills 曾写道，社会分析有三种受众：那些意识到自己行为对他人后果的有权者；那些对后果毫不知情的有权者；以及遭受这些后果的无权者（Mills 1959）。以类似的方式，我们为本书确定了另外三种广泛的受众。首先是那些创造脆弱性的有权者，有时他们并未意识到自己的行为。其次，我们关注那些试图解决危害的有权者，但由于未能纳入脆弱性分析，可能无法使他们的工作有效。第三，我们为那些在基层工作的人写作，他们遭受灾难的后果，或与人们合作以减少脆弱性并增强他们的权力。

The first is the group that creates and maintains the vulnerable condition of others. Such groups include major owners of resources at international, national and local levels (whose activities have significant effects on how and where other people live), foreign agribusiness firms, investment bankers, civil engineering contractors and land speculators. In some cases they may be unaware of the consequences their decisions have for the vulnerability of others.
第一个群体是创造和维持他人脆弱状况的群体。这些群体包括在国际、国家和地方层面上拥有资源的主要所有者（他们的活动对其他人生活的方式和地点产生重大影响）、外国农业企业、投资银行家、土木工程承包商和土地投机者。在某些情况下，他们可能并未意识到自己的决策对他人脆弱性的影响。

The second audience is extremely broad, and consists of those who attempt to address and to reduce the impact of natural hazards. It includes a variety of levels in government, and people with a range of interests in government activity, whose normal work is not specifically aimed at disasters as such. However, in almost every country, governments and other bodies have assumed some sort of responsibility for dealing with disasters, and this often involves measures to mitigate hazards.
第二个受众非常广泛，包括那些试图应对和减少自然灾害影响的人。它包括政府的各个层面，以及对政府活动有各种兴趣的人，他们的正常工作并不专门针对灾难。然而，在几乎每个国家，政府和其他机构都承担了一定的责任来应对灾难，这通常涉及减轻灾害的措施。

At the apex of political power, leaders will take decisions on disasters, possibly on the advice of their senior civil servants. At this policy formulation level, directives are developed on economic, financial or political grounds, and will involve decisions
在政治权力的顶峰，领导者将根据高级公务员的建议对灾难做出决策。在这一政策制定层面上，经济、金融或政治方面的指令被制定，并将涉及决策
affecting planning, agriculture, water resources, health, etc. The implementation stage will not necessarily address vulnerable conditions in relation to hazards, and indeed some policies may increase vulnerability. We hope to demonstrate that it is not enough simply to deal with the hazard threat, so that policies will be designed to reduce vulnerability and therefore disasters. There is considerable opportunity to improve policy making and implementation at national, sub-national, and especially at municipal levels in many countries in these early years of the twenty-first century because of the emphasis given by the World Bank and other influential bodies to the question of ‘good governance’.
影响规划、农业、水资源、健康等。实施阶段不一定会解决与危险相关的脆弱条件，实际上某些政策可能会增加脆弱性。我们希望证明，仅仅应对危险威胁是不够的，因此政策将被设计为减少脆弱性，从而减少灾害。在 21 世纪的早期，许多国家在国家、次国家，尤其是市级层面上有很大的机会改善政策制定和实施，因为世界银行和其他有影响力的机构对“良好治理”问题给予了重视。

The implementation of policy extends beyond government ministries and agencies. Many voluntary agencies that have provided relief for disasters now see the need to address the pre-disaster conditions which give rise to patterns of repeated disaster and people’s failure to cope. The Red Cross system is an example, and for ten years now it has published a World Disasters Report which (although not official policy) conveys a great deal of information and analysis on root causes and dynamic pressures.

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Following an initiative by the Swedish Red Cross (Hagman 1984), many voluntary bodies have attempted to redefine their roles in terms of ‘preventing’ disasters rather than just alleviating their effects. We hope our book helps to enhance their future contribution.

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政策的实施超越了政府部门和机构。许多提供灾难救助的志愿机构现在意识到需要解决导致重复灾难模式和人们无法应对的灾前条件。红十字会系统就是一个例子，十年来它发布的《世界灾难报告》虽然不是官方政策，但传达了大量关于根本原因和动态压力的信息和分析。

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在瑞典红十字会（Hagman 1984）的倡议下，许多志愿机构试图重新定义其角色，侧重于“预防”灾难，而不仅仅是减轻其影响。我们希望我们的书能帮助增强他们未来的贡献。

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It is also possible to find representatives of the commercial sector among those involved with vulnerability who might be in a position to introduce mitigation measures. For example, a typical international civil engineering firm may include in its portfolio the design of large-scale engineering projects, such as high dams and flood defences that frequently exacerbate downstream flood hazards and thus increase vulnerability. But the same engineers may also create cyclone-resistant structures. Another example can be found in the logging industry, which can both increase risk (falling into the first category listed above) or it can work to reduce risk through measures such as selective cutting and replanting (Poore 1989; Fire Globe 2003). The same can be said of large-scale commercial agriculture and the mining industry, and parastatal firms such as electrical utilities (or their recently privatised descendants), for example in river basin management, including the construction and maintenance of dams. The construction industry can also, through its practices, either increase or decrease risk. A common perception that may motivate this second wide audience is that it is cheaper in the long run (in economic, social and political senses of the word) to prevent or mitigate disasters than to fund recovery (Anderson 1990). This is certainly the point of view of the World Bank, where its Disaster Management Facility has done the maths and shown without doubt that prevention is less costly than recovery (Gilbert and Kreimer 1999; Freeman et al. 2002). Now a consortium of banks and development agencies exists to promote prevention in the commercial as well as public sector-the ProVention consortium.

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在与脆弱性相关的人员中，也可能找到商业部门的代表，他们可能有能力引入减缓措施。例如，典型的国际土木工程公司可能在其投资组合中包括大型工程项目的设计，如高坝和防洪设施，这些设施常常加剧下游的洪水风险，从而增加脆弱性。但同样的工程师也可能设计抗旋风结构。另一个例子可以在伐木行业中找到，该行业既可以增加风险（属于上述第一类），也可以通过选择性砍伐和再植等措施来降低风险（Poore 1989；Fire Globe 2003）。大型商业农业和采矿业也可以如此，国有企业如电力公司（或其最近私有化的后代），例如在流域管理中，包括大坝的建设和维护。建筑行业也可以通过其实践来增加或减少风险。一种普遍的看法可能促使第二个广泛受众的产生，即从长远来看（在经济、社会和政治的意义上），预防或减轻灾害比资助恢复更便宜（Anderson 1990）。这无疑是世界银行的观点，其灾害管理设施已经进行了计算，并毫无疑问地表明，预防的成本低于恢复的成本（Gilbert and Kreimer 1999；Freeman et al. 2002）。现在，存在一个银行和发展机构的财团，旨在促进商业和公共部门的预防——ProVention 财团。

The third group of readers are those who are vulnerable, or who at grassroots level are trying to deal with the processes that create vulnerability. We hope this book will assist organisers and activists who are part of grassroots struggles to improve livelihoods, for instance in the face of land deals and projects conceived by outsiders. Such locally organised pressure groups have proliferated rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s. They are now recognised as a major force for social change in general and disaster mitigation in particular (Anderson and Woodrow 1998; Twigg and Bhatt 1998; Fernando and Fernando 1997; Pirotte et al. 1999; Maskrey 1989).

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This audience includes members of
第三组读者是那些脆弱群体，或者在基层层面上试图应对造成脆弱性的过程的人。我们希望这本书能帮助那些参与基层斗争以改善生计的组织者和活动家，例如在面对外部人士构思的土地交易和项目时。这种地方组织的压力团体在 1980 年代和 1990 年代迅速增加。它们现在被认为是社会变革的主要力量，尤其是在灾害减缓方面（Anderson and Woodrow 1998; Twigg and Bhatt 1998; Fernando and Fernando 1997; Pirotte et al. 1999; Maskrey 1989）。

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这个受众包括成员
regional NGOs and networks devoted to action research in partnership with vulnerable groups of people. The three groups to which we have donated the royalties from this edition of At Risk are part of this audience: La RED in Latin America, Peri Peri in southern Africa and Duryog Nivaran in South Asia.

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致力于与脆弱群体合作的行动研究的区域非政府组织和网络。我们将本版《风险》一书的版税捐赠给的三个团体就是这个受众的一部分：拉丁美洲的 La RED，南非的 Peri Peri 和南亚的 Duryog Nivaran。

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Scope and plan of the book
书籍的范围和计划

Chapters 2 and 3 set out the perspective of our book in detail. They describe how our view of disasters differs from the conventional wisdom, and also where they coincide. It is plainly wrong to ignore the role of hazards themselves in generating disasters, and the framework we are suggesting does not do so. Likewise, we are not suggesting that vulnerability is always the result of exploitation or inequality (just as it is not equivalent to poverty). It is integrally linked with the hazard events to which people are exposed. We also want to acknowledge that there are limits to this type of analysis. It is not always possible to know what the hazards affecting a group of people might be, and public awareness of long-return period hazards may be lacking. For instance, Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines erupted in 1991, but had been dormant for 600 years.
第二章和第三章详细阐述了我们书籍的视角。它们描述了我们对灾难的看法与传统智慧的不同之处，以及它们的重合之处。忽视灾害本身在产生灾难中的作用显然是错误的，而我们所建议的框架并没有这样做。同样，我们并不是在暗示脆弱性总是剥削或不平等的结果（就像它并不等同于贫困一样）。脆弱性与人们所面临的灾害事件密切相关。我们还想承认这种分析有其局限性。并不总是能够知道影响一群人的灾害可能是什么，公众对长期回归周期灾害的认识可能不足。例如，菲律宾的皮纳图博火山在 1991 年喷发，但在此之前已经沉睡了 600 年。

Chapter 2 introduces a simple model of the way in which ‘underlying factors’ and root causes embedded in everyday life give rise to ‘dynamic pressures’ affecting particular groups, leading to specifically ‘unsafe conditions’. When these underlying factors and root causes coincide in space and time with a hazardous natural event or process, we think of the people whose characteristics have been shaped by such underlying factors and root causes as ‘vulnerable’ to the hazard and ‘at risk to disaster’. This will be referred to as the ‘Pressure and Release’ (PAR) model, since it is first used to show the pressure from both hazard and unsafe conditions that leads to disaster, and then how changes in vulnerability can release people from being at risk.

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第二章介绍了一个简单模型，说明日常生活中嵌入的“潜在因素”和根本原因如何产生影响特定群体的“动态压力”，导致特定的“安全隐患”。当这些潜在因素和根本原因在空间和时间上与危险的自然事件或过程重合时，我们认为那些特征受到这些潜在因素和根本原因影响的人是对危险“脆弱”的，并且“面临灾难风险”。这将被称为“压力与释放”（PAR）模型，因为它首先用于展示来自危险和不安全条件的压力如何导致灾难，然后展示脆弱性的变化如何使人们摆脱风险。

We consider that certain characteristics of groups and individuals have a great deal to do with determining their vulnerability to hazards. Some of these, such as socioeconomic class, ethnicity and caste membership have featured in analyses since the 1970s. Others, especially gender and age, are more recent research categories, and have developed in part because of the influence of social movements such as feminism.

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For example, in a classic example of the importance of gender, Vaughan (1987:119-147) uses the oral evidence provided in women’s songs and stories in Malawi to reconstruct a women’s history of the 1949 famine that is strikingly different from the men’s account:
我们认为，群体和个体的某些特征与其对危险的脆弱性有很大关系。其中一些特征，如社会经济阶层、种族和种姓成员身份，自 1970 年代以来就出现在分析中。其他特征，尤其是性别和年龄，是较新的研究类别，部分是由于社会运动（如女权主义）的影响而发展起来的。

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例如，在性别重要性的经典案例中，沃恩（1987:119-147）利用马拉维女性的歌曲和故事中提供的口头证据，重建了 1949 年饥荒的女性历史，这与男性的叙述截然不同：
[Women], along with the very old and very young, were more likely than men to end up relying on government handouts… [W]omen stress how frequently they were abandoned by men, how harrowing it was to be left responsible for their suffering and dying children, how they became sterile, and how they were humiliated by the feeding system.
[女性]，连同年长者和幼儿，比男性更有可能依赖政府救济……[女性]强调她们被男性抛弃的频率，承担自己受苦和垂死孩子的责任是多么痛苦，她们如何变得不育，以及她们如何被喂养系统所羞辱。
(Ibid.: 123)（同上：123）
During the 1990s a large amount of work on gender and disaster yielded much more valuable evidence of this kind (Fernando and Fernando 1997; Enarson and Morrow 2001).

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Others have emphasised the special needs, lack of status and access, and hence
在 1990 年代，关于性别与灾难的大量研究提供了更多此类有价值的证据（Fernando 和 Fernando 1997；Enarson 和 Morrow 2001）。

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其他人强调了脆弱老年人，尤其是寡妇的特殊需求、缺乏地位和获取资源的困难，因此
special vulnerability of the frail elderly, especially widows (Guillette 1991; Feierman 1985; Wilson and Ramphele 1989:170-185).
脆弱老年人，尤其是寡妇的特殊脆弱性（Guillette 1991；Feierman 1985；Wilson 和 Ramphele 1989:170-185）。

Daily life comprises a set of activities in space and time during which physical hazards, social relations and individual choice become integrated as patterns of vulnerability.

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These patterns are guided by the socio-economic and personal characteristics of the people involved. Here are found, sometimes (but not always), the effects of gender,

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age,

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physical disability,

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religion,

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caste

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or ethnicity,

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as well as class. All of these may play a role, in addition to poverty, class or socio-economic status. Although we include class in our analysis, we fully recognise the role of this wide range of social relations and do not dwell exclusively on class relations.
日常生活由一系列在时间和空间中进行的活动组成，在这些活动中，物理危害、社会关系和个人选择作为脆弱性的模式相互融合。

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这些模式受到参与者的社会经济和个人特征的指导。在这里，有时（但并不总是）可以发现性别

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、年龄

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、身体残疾

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、宗教

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、种姓

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或民族

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的影响，以及阶级。所有这些因素可能在贫困、阶级或社会经济地位之外发挥作用。尽管我们在分析中包括了阶级，但我们充分认识到这一广泛的社会关系的作用，并不单纯关注阶级关系。

Chapter 3 adds to our alternative framework by focusing on patterns of access to livelihood resources. We expand the discussion there of ‘underlying factors and root causes’, identified in Chapter 2. In doing so we seek to shift the focus of our analytical method further in the social direction, without oversimplifying or producing a theory that is of little use to managers, planners and policy makers.
第三章通过关注生计资源的获取模式，丰富了我们的替代框架。我们在此扩展了第二章中提到的“潜在因素和根本原因”的讨论。在此过程中，我们力求将分析方法的重点进一步向社会方向转移，而不至于过于简化或产生对管理者、规划者和政策制定者几乎没有用处的理论。

Part I concludes with a discussion of coping. We believe that too little attention has been given to the strategies and actions of vulnerable people themselves. In large part their ‘normal’ life is evidently (at least to outsiders) a continual struggle in which their conditions may resemble a disaster. People become braced to cope with extreme natural events through the stress of making ends meet, in avoiding the daily hazards of work and home, and of evading the predations of the more powerful. They form support networks, develop multiple sources of livelihood access and ‘resist’ official encroachments on livelihood systems in a variety of ways (Scott 1985, 1990, 1998). People learn rather cynically, yet realistically, not to rely on services provided by authorities (Robinson et al. 1986; O’Riordon 1986; Maskrey 1989; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999). Our discussion of ‘coping’ will neither romanticise the self-protective behaviour of ordinary people, nor dismiss it.

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第一部分以应对的讨论结束。我们认为，脆弱群体自身的策略和行动受到的关注太少。在很大程度上，他们的“正常”生活显然（至少对外人而言）是一场持续的斗争，他们的处境可能类似于灾难。人们通过应对生计压力、避免工作和家庭的日常危险，以及躲避更强大者的掠夺，逐渐适应极端自然事件。他们形成支持网络，发展多种生计来源，并以多种方式“抵抗”官方对生计系统的侵占（Scott 1985, 1990, 1998）。人们以一种相当愤世嫉俗但又现实的方式学会了不依赖当局提供的服务（Robinson et al. 1986; O’Riordon 1986; Maskrey 1989; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999）。我们对“应对”的讨论既不会浪漫化普通人的自我保护行为，也不会轻视它。

Having set out our alternative framework in Part I (Chapters 1-3), Part II presents case material organised by hazard type-those linked with drought, biological hazards, flood and landslide, cyclone, earthquake and volcano (Chapters 4-8). In each chapter we follow a similar method in tracing the causes of vulnerability, making use of both PAR and Access models. It may appear to contradict our approach to deal with disasters through different natural hazard types. However, we have deliberately chosen to do this because users of this book may themselves be concerned with particular hazards, or may find it difficult to accept our approach without seeing it interpreted more concretely in the context of nature.
在第一部分（第 1-3 章）中，我们提出了替代框架，第二部分则按灾害类型组织案例材料——与干旱、生物危害、洪水和滑坡、气旋、地震和火山相关的灾害（第 4-8 章）。在每一章中，我们采用类似的方法追踪脆弱性的原因，利用 PAR 和 Access 模型。虽然这似乎与我们通过不同自然灾害类型处理灾害的方法相矛盾，但我们故意选择这样做，因为本书的用户可能会关注特定的灾害，或者在没有看到其在自然背景下更具体的解释时，可能会难以接受我们的方法。

Part III (Chapter 9) draws out lessons for recovery and for preventive action. We provide a holistic view of recovery and review the mixed history of narrow relief and reconstruction efforts, paying special attention to whether and how ‘dynamic pressures’ and ‘root causes’ of disaster vulnerability can be addressed during what has been called the ‘window of opportunity’ for policy change created by disasters. We end the book with a series of objectives that link human development and vulnerability reduction, emphasising issues of governance and livelihood resilience and local capacity that have begun to be accepted as desiderata in mainstream development circles.
第三部分（第九章）总结了恢复和预防行动的经验教训。我们提供了一个全面的恢复视角，并回顾了狭义救助和重建努力的复杂历史，特别关注在灾难所创造的政策变革“机会窗口”期间，如何以及是否能够解决灾难脆弱性的“动态压力”和“根本原因”。我们以一系列目标结束本书，这些目标将人类发展与脆弱性减少联系起来，强调治理、生活韧性和地方能力等问题，这些问题已开始被主流发展界接受为理想目标。

Limits and assumptions限制和假设

Limitations of scale规模的局限性

There are logical grounds for limiting our book to certain sorts of disaster. Disasters cannot, of course, be neatly categorised either by type or scale. At one extreme, it seems that there have been five mass extinctions over the last 400 million years in which up to half of the life forms on the planet disappeared (Wilson 1989:111). The best known of these is the disappearance of the dinosaurs. The scale of such disasters (and even the use of the term is perhaps inappropriate) is clearly so many orders of magnitude greater than those with which we are concerned that we exclude them. Such events are beyond the present scale of human systems.
限制我们书籍讨论某些类型灾难的逻辑依据是显而易见的。灾难当然无法按类型或规模进行简单分类。在一个极端情况下，似乎在过去的 4 亿年中发生了五次大规模灭绝，导致地球上多达一半的生命形式消失（Wilson 1989:111）。其中最著名的是恐龙的消失。这类灾难的规模（甚至使用这个术语可能都不合适）显然比我们所关注的灾难大得多，因此我们将其排除在外。这些事件超出了当前人类系统的规模。

More recently, there have been two or three occasions when a large proportion of the human inhabitants of this planet died with apparently little distinction in regard to the relative risk of different social groups. Many millions died during the pandemics of bubonic and pneumonic plague known as the Plague of Justinian (AD541-93) and the Black Death (1348-1353). More recently the influenza virus that swept the world during and after the First World War killed 22 million in less than two years (1918-1919). This was approximately four times the total of military casualties during that war. The demographic and socio-economic consequences of the first two events had epochal significance. The current HIV-AIDS pandemic could equal them in its widespread socioeconomic consequences unless a vaccine is found or sexual practices change. Despite the great significance of biological disasters, we shall address such events only tangentially (see Chapter 5), in part to illustrate the limits of the vulnerability approach. Catastrophic epidemics may be limiting cases that shed light on ‘normal’ disease disasters, such as outbreaks of cholera and malaria in Latin America and Africa, meningitis and Ebola in Africa, or plague in India.
最近，有两三次事件导致地球上大量人类居民死亡，似乎在不同社会群体的相对风险方面没有明显区别。在被称为贾斯丁尼亚瘟疫（公元 541-593 年）和黑死病（1348-1353 年）的疫情中，数百万生命丧失。更近一些，第一次世界大战期间及其后席卷全球的流感病毒在不到两年的时间里造成了 2200 万人的死亡（1918-1919 年）。这大约是该战争期间军事伤亡总数的四倍。前两次事件的人口和社会经济后果具有划时代的意义。当前的 HIV-AIDS 大流行在其广泛的社会经济后果上可能与之相当，除非找到疫苗或改变性行为。尽管生物灾难具有重大意义，我们将仅在旁敲侧击中讨论此类事件（见第 5 章），部分原因是为了说明脆弱性方法的局限性。灾难性流行病可能是限制性案例，能够揭示“正常”疾病灾害的情况，例如拉丁美洲和非洲的霍乱和疟疾暴发、非洲的脑膜炎和埃博拉，或印度的瘟疫。

Nuclear war is another type of disaster that we do not consider because it is produced directly by humans, although some research on the ‘nuclear winter’ has been inspired by threats from natural events such as massive volcanic explosions or asteroid impacts. There is also considerable climatological, astrophysical and palaeontological work on mass extinctions which links some of these to severe interference with received solar radiation. Atmospheric phenomena of a similar scale of magnitude, such as global warming, will be treated as part of the more remote ‘dynamic pressures’ of the PAR model, shaping patterns of vulnerability. We also consider war itself (in its non-nuclear form) to be a significant ‘root cause’ of disaster and will address it several times throughout the text.
核战争是另一种我们不考虑的灾难，因为它是直接由人类造成的，尽管一些关于“核冬天”的研究受到自然事件威胁的启发，例如大规模火山爆发或小行星撞击。还有大量气候学、天体物理学和古生物学的研究涉及大规模灭绝现象，并将其中一些与接收到的太阳辐射的严重干扰联系起来。类似规模的气象现象，如全球变暖，将被视为 PAR 模型中更遥远的“动态压力”的一部分，塑造脆弱性的模式。我们还认为战争本身（以非核形式）是灾难的重要“根本原因”，并将在文本中多次提及。

We devote only a little attention to what might be called ‘social hazards’, especially to terrorism. The events of 11 September 2001 in New York City have caused disaster researchers to reflect upon the lessons that twenty-first century terrorism might have for their own work on other kinds of hazards (and vice versa). If the official US position is correct-that the attack on the World Trade Center constituted the beginning of a war (the ‘war on terrorism’) -then, in fact, such a disaster is not new.

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Millions of civilian lives have been lost in wars during the twentieth century (Hewitt 1994, 1997). An
我们对所谓的“社会危害”，尤其是恐怖主义，仅给予了很少的关注。2001 年 9 月 11 日在纽约市发生的事件使灾难研究者反思 21 世纪的恐怖主义可能对他们在其他类型危害方面的工作所带来的教训（反之亦然）。如果美国官方立场是正确的——即对世界贸易中心的袭击构成了一场战争的开始（“反恐战争”）——那么，实际上，这样的灾难并不新鲜。

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在 20 世纪的战争中，数百万平民生命已经丧失（Hewitt 1994, 1997）。一个
alternative position is that the attack was not an act of war but a crime (albeit with a large number of victims). If this alternative view is correct, then there are also precedents, such as the gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In either case, our book cannot expand to include such disasters, and we might simply offer the observation that those seeking to understand such ‘acts of war’ or ‘crimes’ should, as we do, look for root causes and not for quick (including massive military) fixes.
另一种观点是，这次袭击不是战争行为，而是一种犯罪（尽管造成了大量受害者）。如果这种替代观点是正确的，那么也有先例，例如 1995 年东京地铁的毒气袭击和俄克拉荷马城穆拉联邦大楼的爆炸。在这两种情况下，我们的书无法扩展到包括这些灾难，我们可能只是提出观察，认为那些试图理解这种“战争行为”或“犯罪”的人，应该像我们一样，寻找根本原因，而不是寻求快速（包括大规模军事）解决方案。

Technological hazards技术性危害

Vulnerability assessment is also relevant to analysing disasters resulting from technological hazards. However, we restrict the scope of this book and exclude technological hazards, for the simple reason that they are not natural in origin. One of our purposes in this book is to deal with natural hazards, because of the inadequacy of explanations of disasters that blame nature. Our aim is to demonstrate the social processes that, through people’s vulnerability, generate human causation of disasters from natural hazards. So there is little point in looking at specifically human-created hazards.
脆弱性评估对于分析由技术性危害引发的灾难也很相关。然而，我们限制了本书的范围，排除了技术性危害，原因很简单，因为它们不是自然起源的。本书的一个目的在于处理自然危害，因为将灾难归咎于自然的解释是不充分的。我们的目标是展示社会过程，通过人们的脆弱性，产生自然危害导致的灾难的人为原因。因此，专门研究人类创造的危害是没有意义的。

Failure of technology, such as that which occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear facility in Ukraine in 1986 and the chemical factory at Bhopal, India in 1984, massive oil and toxic spills and the dumping of nuclear waste in polar regions (UNEP 2002:297), fall outside the scope of our book because they are chiefly failures of techno-social systems.

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Later, there will be some tangential discussion of the Bhopal disaster, which involved explosions and the release of toxins from a fertiliser and chemical factory. The same locational factors responsible for generating hillside slums already mentioned in other countries led to dense squatter settlement around the plant. Such a case is at the limits of our type of analysis, and overlaps with a related literature concerning technology and society (Perrow 1984; Weir 1987; Piller 1991) and environmental justice (see below).
技术的失败，例如 1986 年乌克兰切尔诺贝利核电站和 1984 年印度博帕尔的化工厂发生的事件、大规模的石油和有毒物质泄漏以及在极地地区倾倒核废料（UNEP 2002:297），超出了我们书籍的范围，因为它们主要是技术社会系统的失败。

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后面将对博帕尔灾难进行一些间接讨论，该灾难涉及化肥和化工厂的爆炸及毒素释放。导致其他国家提到的山坡贫民窟形成的相同地理因素，导致了工厂周围的密集非法定居点。这种情况处于我们分析类型的边界，并与有关技术与社会（Perrow 1984；Weir 1987；Piller 1991）及环境正义的相关文献重叠（见下文）。

What happens to poor and other vulnerable people who find themselves in the path of rapid industrialisation, de-industrialisation, industrial deregulation or the importation of toxic waste is clearly of concern to us. But it is not a central issue in this book. Some overlap with a critical appraisal of technological risk and what Beck calls ‘ecological modernisation’ will nevertheless occur in the chapters that follow. Flooding caused by the failure of a dam is a good example (Chapter 6). The web of cause and effect in the connections between society, nature and technology is often impossible to disentangle (Abramovitz 2001).
贫困和其他脆弱群体在快速工业化、去工业化、工业放松管制或有毒废物进口的过程中所面临的情况显然引起了我们的关注。但这并不是本书的核心问题。尽管如此，后续章节中仍会与对技术风险的批判性评估以及贝克所称的“生态现代化”有所重叠。由于大坝失效引发的洪水就是一个很好的例子（第六章）。社会、自然和技术之间的因果关系网络往往难以理清（Abramovitz 2001）。

Another point of similarity between our approach to natural hazards and studies of technological and more pervasive environmental risks is a concern with bottom-up, grassroots activism. The environmental justice movement has grown rapidly since its origins in the study of racial disparities in the location of US hazardous waste facilities during the late 1980s (Bullard 1990; Hofrichter 1993; Shiva 1994; Heiman 1996; Johnston 1997; Faber 1998).

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One question, to which we will return in Part III, is whether a similar worldwide movement is possible through which citizens assert their human right to protection from avoidable harm in extreme natural events.

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我们对自然灾害的研究与对技术和更普遍环境风险的研究之间的另一个相似之处是对自下而上的草根行动主义的关注。自 1980 年代末期以来，环境正义运动自其起源于对美国危险废物设施位置的种族差异研究以来迅速发展（Bullard 1990; Hofrichter 1993; Shiva 1994; Heiman 1996; Johnston 1997; Faber 1998）。

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一个问题，我们将在第三部分中回到这个问题，即是否可能通过类似的全球运动，使公民主张他们在极端自然事件中免受可避免伤害的保护的人权。

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We will be concerned with the impact of technology on vulnerability, particularly
我们将关注技术对脆弱性的影响，特别是
technology in its apparently simplest and benign forms.

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For example, a new road may link a previously isolated rural community with sources of food that may reduce vulnerability in times of drought. That same road may also lead away able-bodied youth in search of urban income, reducing the labour available to maintain traditional earth and stone works constructed to prevent erosion, or to build or repair houses adequately to withstand earthquake. The result may be a reduction of crop yield during drought years because of additional soil loss or deaths from an earthquake which otherwise would be preventable.
技术在其表面上最简单和无害的形式中。

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例如，一条新道路可能将一个之前孤立的农村社区与食品来源连接起来，从而在干旱时期减少脆弱性。然而，这条道路也可能导致有能力的年轻人前往城市寻找收入，从而减少可用于维护传统的土石工程（这些工程是为了防止侵蚀而建造的）或建造或修理足以抵御地震的房屋的劳动力。结果可能是在干旱年份由于额外的土壤流失而导致作物产量减少，或者因地震而导致的本可以预防的死亡。

The same road may introduce mobile clinics that immunise children against lifethreatening diseases, or it may provide the channel through which ‘urban’ diseases such as tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases arrive via the men who have gone to work in city, mine or plantation. It may also provoke landslides that kill people or reduce the available arable land. All these contradictory effects of technological change are possible. The same may be said of the introduction of new water or energy sources, new seed varieties, construction of a dam or a new reinforced concrete building.
同样的道路可能引入移动诊所，为儿童接种免疫以防止危及生命的疾病，或者它可能提供一个渠道，通过这个渠道，像结核病和性传播疾病这样的“城市”疾病通过去城市、矿山或种植园工作的男性传播。它还可能引发山体滑坡，造成人员伤亡或减少可耕地面积。所有这些技术变革的矛盾效应都是可能的。新水源或能源的引入、新种子品种、坝的建设或新的钢筋混凝土建筑也可以说是如此。

There are several ways in which such questions of technological change arise in relation to disaster vulnerability. One of the most frequent responses to disaster by outsiders is the provision of various technologies to the affected site during relief and rehabilitation activities. These include temporary housing, food supplies, alternative water supplies and sanitation facilities, seeds and tools to re-establish economic activities. In all such cases, the new or temporary technology may play a role in increasing or decreasing the vulnerability of a particular social group to a future hazard event. The controversy over the use of genetically modified maize when offering famine relief in southern Africa in 2002 is a dramatic example. 56
在与灾害脆弱性相关的技术变革问题中，有几种方式会出现此类问题。外部对灾害的最常见反应之一是在救援和恢复活动期间向受影响地区提供各种技术。这些技术包括临时住房、食品供应、替代水源和卫生设施、种子和工具，以重新建立经济活动。在所有这些情况下，新技术或临时技术可能在增加或减少特定社会群体对未来灾害事件的脆弱性方面发挥作用。2002 年在南非提供饥荒救助时使用转基因玉米的争议就是一个戏剧性的例子。56

Development planners sometimes introduce technology at the so-called ‘leading edge’ of whatever version of rapid, systemic change they define as ‘development’. This may be irrigation technology in the form of a large dam that displaces thousands of families in what economists call ‘the short run’. It might take the form of low-income housing or the development of an industrial complex. Such development initiatives can have a series of unintended, unforeseen consequences.
发展规划者有时会在他们定义为“发展”的快速系统变革的所谓“前沿”引入技术。这可能是以大型水坝的形式出现的灌溉技术，导致数千个家庭被迫迁移，经济学家称之为“短期内”。它也可能表现为低收入住房或工业综合体的发展。这类发展倡议可能会产生一系列意想不到的、未预见的后果。

The people displaced following the flooding behind a large dam may not benefit from resettlement in the areas that are fed by the irrigation water. If they are included among settlers, they may end up at the bottom of the water distribution system, where water is scarce.

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Women on such new schemes may lose conventional rights to land on which they used to grow food for their families (Rogers 1980) or their knowledge and skills may be rendered ‘obsolete’ (Shiva 1989). Nutritional levels among children may fall, paradoxically, as cash income from the marketed product of irrigation increases (Bryceson 1989).
在大型水坝后方洪水淹没后被迫迁移的人们可能无法从灌溉水源所供给的地区的重新安置中受益。如果他们被纳入定居者之中，他们可能最终位于水分配系统的底部，那里水资源稀缺。

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在这些新计划中，女性可能会失去她们曾经用来为家庭种植食物的土地的传统权利（Rogers 1980），或者她们的知识和技能可能会被视为“过时”（Shiva 1989）。尽管灌溉产品的现金收入增加，儿童的营养水平可能会反而下降（Bryceson 1989）。

The introduction of technology can modify and shift patterns of vulnerability to hazards. For example, the Green Revolution varieties of grain have shifted the risk of drought and flood from an emergent class of ‘modern’ farmers to the increasing number of landless and land-poor peasants. These latter have become more vulnerable because they are denied access to ‘commons’ that formerly provided livelihood resources and because they are highly dependent on wages earned in farm labour to purchase food and other necessities (Jodha 1991; Chambers et al. 1990; Shiva 1991). They are also
技术的引入可以改变和转变对灾害的脆弱性模式。例如，绿色革命的粮食品种将干旱和洪水的风险从一类新兴的“现代”农民转移到了越来越多的无地和贫地农民身上。这些后者变得更加脆弱，因为他们被剥夺了以前提供生计资源的“公地”的使用权，并且他们高度依赖于在农场劳动中获得的工资来购买食物和其他必需品（Jodha 1991；Chambers 等 1990；Shiva 1991）。他们也
vulnerable because they now depend for food and other basic necessities on wages from farm employment that can be interrupted by flood, hail, drought or outbreaks of pests and disease (Drèze and Sen 1989; see Chapter 4).
脆弱，因为他们现在依赖于农场就业的工资来获取食物和其他基本必需品，而这些工资可能会因洪水、冰雹、干旱或害虫和疾病的爆发而中断（Drèze 和 Sen 1989；见第 4 章）。

The change in technology brought about by the Green Revolution has affected the resource-poor in rural areas because the pre-existing social and economic structure has not been able to distribute benefits properly, and this has led to a realignment of assets and income. The losers may consequently be subject to new hazards. For example, in order to find somewhere to farm, they may migrate into low-lying coastal land that is exposed to storms (see Chapter 7). They may have little choice but to live in poorly constructed housing as urban squatters. In Bhuj, Gujarat (India) many thousands of such people died in the earthquake of February 2001.

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The literature on development is full of studies of such unintended consequences.

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This book will focus on such technological developments and their consequences where they can be seen to impinge on people’s vulnerability to extremes of nature, or where they affect the ability of groups to sustain their livelihoods in the aftermath of environmental extremes.
绿色革命带来的技术变革影响了农村地区的资源贫乏者，因为现有的社会和经济结构未能妥善分配利益，这导致了资产和收入的重新调整。因此，失败者可能会面临新的风险。例如，为了寻找耕作的地方，他们可能会迁移到易受风暴影响的低洼沿海地区（见第 7 章）。他们可能别无选择，只能作为城市的占用者住在建筑质量差的房屋中。在印度古吉拉特邦的布胡杰，2001 年 2 月的地震中，许多这样的人员遇难。

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发展文献中充满了此类意外后果的研究。

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本书将重点关注这些技术发展及其后果，特别是当它们影响人们对自然极端事件的脆弱性，或影响群体在环境极端事件后维持生计的能力时。

Notes注释

1 We use the term LDC for 'less developed country’ (including such extremes as ‘least developed’ and ‘highly indebted, least developed’) in keeping with UN practice. LDCs are contrasted to 'more developed’ countries (MDCs). In the first edition we used the term ‘Third World’ to refer to LDCs, but that term has a history. It connotes the historical process (usually one form of colonialism or another) by which a country was impoverished or ‘underdeveloped’ (as a transitive verb). We still find merit in this view, and our ‘Pressure and Release’ model often has processes set in motion during the colonial past as ‘root causes’ of vulnerability However, the term 'Third World’ also carries overtones of the logic of the Cold War, during which period there existed two opposing ‘worlds’ and a third, nonaligned world. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of its constituent republics (which are now independent), and even some central and eastern European countries that were part of the Soviet bloc, are now clearly seen to be ‘less developed’ and have many people who share vulnerabilities in common with inhabitants of countries previously designated Third World. Since the first publication of this book, the changes that began in 1989 have so reshaped the geopolitical map that use of the term Third World may be confusing.
我们使用“LDC”一词来指代“欠发达国家”（包括“最不发达”和“高度负债的最不发达”国家），这与联合国的做法一致。LDC 与“更发达”国家（MDC）形成对比。在第一版中，我们使用“第三世界”一词来指代 LDC，但这个术语有其历史背景。它暗示了一个国家被贫困化或“欠发达”（作为及物动词）的历史过程（通常是某种形式的殖民主义）。我们仍然认为这种观点有其价值，我们的“压力与释放”模型通常将殖民过去中启动的过程视为脆弱性的“根本原因”。然而，“第三世界”一词也带有冷战逻辑的色彩，在那个时期存在两个对立的“世界”和一个不结盟的世界。但随着苏联的解体，许多其组成共和国（现在已独立）以及一些曾属于苏联集团的中东欧国家，现在明显被视为“欠发达”，并且有许多人与以前被称为第三世界国家的居民共享脆弱性。自本书首次出版以来，1989 年开始的变化已经深刻地重塑了地缘政治地图，以至于使用“第三世界”这一术语可能会引起混淆。
2 We used diverse sources in estimating these numbers, which, especially for the earlier part of the century and for specific kinds of conflicts, must be considered only the roughest approximations. For estimates of deaths due to war and political violence we are most grateful to Professor Kenneth Hewitt, Wilfred Laurier University, Canada, for time spent in personal communication with Ian Davis during July 2002. Hewitt’s book, Regions of Risk (1997), and an earlier 1994 article, were also helpful sources as well as Sivard (2001) and White (1999). Drought/famine death statistics are based on the authors’ approximate calculations that expand on the official reports that are regarded as gross underestimates, since entire famines,
我们在估算这些数字时使用了多种来源，尤其是对于世纪早期和特定类型的冲突，这些数字只能被视为粗略的近似值。对于因战争和政治暴力导致的死亡估计，我们非常感谢加拿大威尔弗里德·劳里埃大学的肯尼斯·休伊特教授，他在 2002 年 7 月与伊恩·戴维斯的个人沟通中花费了时间。休伊特的著作《风险地区》（1997 年）以及 1994 年的一篇早期文章也是有帮助的来源，还有西瓦德（2001 年）和怀特（1999 年）。干旱/饥荒死亡统计数据基于作者的近似计算，这些计算扩展了被视为严重低估的官方报告，因为整个饥荒，
such as the 'Great Leap Forward Famine’ in China (1958-1961), which may have killed 30 million people (Yang 1996; Becker 1996; Heilig 1999), are omitted from official databases. Discussions were held between Ian Davis and researchers at the CRED, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels and the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in July 2002, who confirmed that they are only able to document statistics that governments provide to them. Famine is treated at length in Chapter 4. For other disaster mortality statistics we relied on the database maintained by CRED and OFDA called EM-DAT (available at www.cred.be/emdat, which we accessed for this purpose on 11 July 2002). For a critical note on the reliability of disaster statistics, including those for drought and famine, see Chapter 2, Box 2.3. Traffic accident statistics came from the World Disasters Report 1998 (IFRC 1998:20-31). Estimates of deaths due to HIV-AIDS came from Barnett and Whiteside (2001). For more on HIV-AIDS, see Chapter 5.
例如中国的“大跃进饥荒”（1958-1961），可能导致 3000 万人死亡（杨 1996；贝克尔 1996；海利格 1999），在官方数据库中被省略。2002 年 7 月，伊恩·戴维斯与布鲁塞尔的鲁汶天主教大学 CRED 的研究人员以及美国外国灾害援助办公室（OFDA）进行了讨论，他们确认他们只能记录政府提供给他们的统计数据。饥荒在第四章中进行了详细讨论。对于其他灾害死亡统计数据，我们依赖于 CRED 和 OFDA 维护的数据库 EM-DAT（可在 www.cred.be/emdat 上获取，我们于 2002 年 7 月 11 日访问了该网站）。有关灾害统计数据可靠性的批判性说明，包括干旱和饥荒的统计数据，请参见第二章，框 2.3。交通事故统计数据来自 1998 年世界灾害报告（国际红十字会 1998：20-31）。由于 HIV-AIDS 导致的死亡估计来自巴尼特和怀特赛德（2001）。有关 HIV-AIDS 的更多信息，请参见第五章。
3 For example, the World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that 12 million children under five die each year (mostly in LDCs) from easily preventable illnesses such as diarrhoea, measles and malaria (Mihill 1996; Boseley 1999). This is ten times as many as the average deaths from natural hazards in an entire decade (see Chapter 5).
例如，世界卫生组织（WHO）估计，每年有 1200 万名五岁以下儿童因易于预防的疾病（如腹泻、麻疹和疟疾）而死亡（主要发生在最不发达国家）。这个数字是整个十年内因自然灾害平均死亡人数的十倍（见第 5 章）。
4 In our usage, ‘social’ refers to human-created systems, and so includes economic and political processes. For brevity, from here on when we refer to ‘social framework’ or ‘social environment’, we normally mean to include political and economic factors as well.
在我们的用法中，“社会”指的是人类创造的系统，因此包括经济和政治过程。为简便起见，从现在开始，当我们提到“社会框架”或“社会环境”时，通常也意味着包括政治和经济因素。
5 Hewitt (1983b) referred to the segregation of disasters from the normal functioning of society and policy making as creating a ‘disaster archipelago’. He maintained and elaborated on this position in subsequent work (Hewitt 1997).
休伊特（Hewitt 1983b）将灾难与社会正常运作和政策制定的隔离称为“灾难群岛”。他在后续的研究中维持并详细阐述了这一观点（Hewitt 1997）。
6 In April 2003, the International Rescue Committee reported that as many as 4.7 million people in the Republic of Congo had perished as the result of the combination of injuries sustained in the conflict, starvation and disease. Although there is a margin of error of 1.6 million lives in this estimate, the conflict in the Congo has, according to the report ‘claimed far more lives than any other conflict since the second world war’ (Astill and Chevallot 2003:7).
2003 年 4 月，国际救援委员会报告称，刚果共和国多达 470 万人因冲突中受到的伤害、饥饿和疾病而丧生。尽管这一估计存在 160 万人的误差范围，但根据报告，“刚果的冲突造成的死亡人数远超过自第二次世界大战以来的任何其他冲突”（Astill 和 Chevallot 2003:7）。
7 Baxter and Kapila (1989); in recent years there have been attempts to prevent this happening again, with projects that have placed pipes in the lake which attempt to trap the carbon dioxide gas and vent it safely to the atmosphere (Jones 2001, 2003). For further background on the lake Nyos disaster, see Chapter 8, note 7.
Baxter 和 Kapila（1989）；近年来，已经有尝试防止这种情况再次发生的项目，这些项目在湖中放置了管道，试图捕捉二氧化碳气体并安全地排放到大气中（Jones 2001, 2003）。有关尼奥斯湖灾难的更多背景，请参见第 8 章，第 7 条注释。
8 A major watershed for relief agencies was the year 1970, when enormous disasters in Peru, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and Biafra (Nigeria) coincided. A new theory of disasters that focused on the vulnerability of ‘marginal’ groups was suggested by subsequent reflections on these events, plus the Sahel famine (1967-1973) and drought elsewhere in Africa, erosion in Nepal, an earthquake in Guatemala (1976) and a hurricane affecting Honduras (1976) (Meillassoux 1973, 1974; Baird et al. 1975; Blaikie et al. 1977; Davis 1978; Jacobs 1987).
1970 年是救援机构的一个重大转折点，当年秘鲁、东巴基斯坦（现为孟加拉国）和比亚法拉（尼日利亚）发生了巨大的灾难。这些事件以及萨赫尔地区的饥荒（1967-1973 年）和非洲其他地区的干旱、尼泊尔的侵蚀、危地马拉的地震（1976 年）和影响洪都拉斯的飓风（1976 年）引发了对灾难的新理论，重点关注“边缘”群体的脆弱性（Meillassoux 1973, 1974; Baird et al. 1975; Blaikie et al. 1977; Davis 1978; Jacobs 1987）。
9 In the second edition of the 1978 book The Environment as Hazard, the authors have made no fundamental change to their ‘stages of development’ model (Burton et al. 1993).
在 1978 年出版的《环境作为危险》第二版中，作者对其“发展阶段”模型没有做出根本性的改变（Burton et al. 1993）。

10 On the response of ‘political economy’ and ‘political ecology’ to both ‘modernisation theory’ and ‘environmental determinism’ see Meillassoux (1974); Baird et al. (1975); Wisner et al. (1977); Jeffrey (1980, 1982); Susman et al. (1983); Watts (1983b); Bush (1985); Spitz (1976). Work during this period was heavily influenced by Latin American dependency theory. For a summary of more recent rebuttals, see Adams (2001: chs 7 and 9).
关于“政治经济学”和“政治生态学”对“现代化理论”和“环境决定论”的回应，参见 Meillassoux（1974 年）；Baird et al.（1975 年）；Wisner et al.（1977 年）；Jeffrey（1980 年，1982 年）；Susman et al.（1983 年）；Watts（1983b）；Bush（1985 年）；Spitz（1976 年）。这一时期的研究受到拉丁美洲依赖理论的强烈影响。有关更近期反驳的总结，参见 Adams（2001 年：第 7 章和第 9 章）。
11 For examples of the use of a too-general notion of vulnerability, see Anderson and Woodrow (1998); Parry and Carter (1987); Cuny (1983); Davis (1978). In such cases it is essential to specify the mechanisms by which one gets from generally widespread conditions (e.g. ‘poverty’ or ‘crowded conditions’) to particular vulnerabilities (e.g. loss due to mudslide, cyclone, earthquake, famine). ...
12 Such functionalist views of social system coping include work by sociologists and others influenced by Parsons and Durkheim—Mileti et al. (1975); Timmerman (1981); Pellanda (1981); Drabek (1986); Lewis (1987)—and also the work of selfdefined ‘sustainability scientists’ who have emerged particularly as work on ‘adaptation’ to global climate change has been funded (Kasperson and Kasperson 2000). While there is some valuable work from these points of view, on the whole we believe that one has to be more specific. People cope, not disembodied systems (see Chapter 3). ...
13 Since publication of the first edition of our book, development policy has become more concerned with wider notions of ‘human security’ that encompass reduced vulnerability to disaster as well as social protection from economic crisis and respect for people’s human rights in war and violent conflict (see UNDP 1994a). ...
14 Readers who are familiar with the Sustainable Livelihoods approach of the Department for International Development (the UK foreign aid ministry) will see a parallel here with the five types of capital commonly used in that frameworknatural (mainly land, forests, water sources); physical (infrastructure and production resources); financial; human (e.g. education level); and social (e.g. networks and family connections). See Chambers (1995b); Carney (1998); Moser (1998); Rakodi (1999); Sanderson (2000). ...

15 The World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission) linked the concept of livelihood to the ability of people to protect the environment, and stated that the goal of development should be ‘sustainable livelihood security’ (WCED 1987). In our view, vulnerability to hazards is likely to increase when livelihoods are pursued at the expense of environmental stability (Abramovitz 2001). So it is not a solution to vulnerability if people seek to increase their access to livelihood resources for short-term gains, even if it is necessary to cope with the immediate impact of hazards. We develop a more accurate view of livelihoods in relation to disasters in Chapters 3 and 4. ...
16 In 1991 and 1992 there were torrential rains and mudslides in southern California affecting two counties (Ventura and Los Angeles) where 10 million people live. Also in 1991 there was a fire storm that killed twenty-five people and left thousands homeless in the middle income, suburban hills above Oakland and Berkeley in northern California. This fire left the denuded, steep hills subject to landslides. During this same period there were a number of mudslides in Rio de Janeiro and ...

Belo Horizonte in the industrial south of Brazil. More recently, in 1999, flash floods and landslides killed 30,000 poor urban residents on the extreme periphery of greater Caracas who lived in the coastal hills (IFRC 2001b: 82; Dartmouth College 1999; see also Chapter 6). ...
17 During a rainy night in 2000, a 100 m high pile of solid waste collapsed on hundreds of poor people in Payatas, to the north-east of Manila, the capital of the Philippines. They were permanent residents, some of perhaps 2,000 that make their living by sifting the rubbish and selling scrap metal and other recyclable items. Seven hundred people were confirmed killed or reported missing (Luna 2001; Westfall 2001). ...
18 As we write this second edition we acknowledge the fact that the term ‘vulnerable’ and ‘vulnerability’ are widely used in many disciplines and professions involved with disaster risk reduction. Somewhat quixotically, we believed in the early 1990s that we could reverse this linguistic trend. By now it is so well entrenched that we have put down our lance and sit under a tree with Sancho Panza enjoying the wine and landscape. However, for the sake of clarity, in our book at least we will maintain the convention of reserving the adjective ‘vulnerable’ for people. ...
19 Morrow (1999:10) writes of the urban context of Miami, Florida, in the USA and provides a checklist which identifies the following categories: (1) residents of group living facilities, (2) elderly, particularly frail elderly, (3) physically or mentally disabled, (4) renters, (5) poor households, (6) women-headed households, (7) ethnic minorities (by language), (8) recent residents/immigrants/ migrants, (9) large households, (10) large concentrations of children/youth, (11) the homeless, (12) tourists and transients (homeless people). ...
20 It is additionally tragic that a year after the earthquake in Gujarat hatred between the two groups led to attacks by Hindus and Muslims on each others’ communities (especially in the capital Ahmedabad), with the loss of perhaps 2,000 (mostly Muslim) lives (Harding 2002). ...
21 There is further discussion of the concept of the ‘risk society’ in Chapter 5. ...
22 We have no doubt that stereotypes and images, especially those arising in colonial relations, have profoundly influenced the way that LDCs are viewed today and the kinds of policies that are produced (Blaut 1993; Said 1988; Arnold 1999). We question only whether this kind of analysis is sufficient to provide a purchase on the nexus of economic and political relationships that constitute the root causes of disaster vulnerability. ...
23 See http://www.geohaz.org/radius.html. ...
24 In 2000, 47 per cent of the world’s population was defined as urban, up from 38 per cent in 1990. In 1950 the world’s urban population was only 30 per cent of the total (United Nations 1999:2; WorldWatch Institute 1998:33-34); see also Chapter 2, where urbanisation is discussed as a ‘dynamic pressure’. ...
25 At the Johannesburg Summit in September 2002, Russia and Canada announced that they would sign the Kyoto Accord, thus bringing the number of signatories up to the required number for it to come into force. The USA, however, still refused to sign. ...
26 On the science behind the study of global climate change, see Chapters 2, 4, 5 and ...
7. Even the controversial author of The Skeptical Environmentalist, Bjorn Lomborg (2001), admits that warming of the atmosphere has taken place, but argues that the rate of change is toward the lower rather than higher range suggested by studies by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. For critiques of Lomborg and his answers, see http://www.lomborg.org. ...
27 This is the layer of the earth’s mantle upon which the lithospheric plates sit. Convection currents in the asthenosphere allow heated material to rise, while cool material sinks, leading to movement of the plates. Understanding of biogeochemical cycling and plate tectonics (including earthquakes and volcanoes) would require study of the asthenosphere as well as the more accessible lithosphere. ...
28 Tobin has proposed a tax on international financial transfers in order to reduce the flows which are simply used to exploit price differentials (e.g. of currencies) for private benefit. For information see ATTAC, a worldwide network of citizens’ organisations lobbying for this tax: http://attac.org/indexen/ and search on ‘Tobin’. ...
29 See Petrella (2001); Barlow and Clarke (2002). The World Bank estimates that private water industry revenue approached

$ 800

billion in 2000; 15 per cent of the water supplies in the USA have been privatised, 88 per cent of UK supplies and 73 per cent of water systems in France (Rothfeder 2001:102; Petrella 2001:72). African, Asian and Latin American municipal water systems are also being privatised rapidly, often at the insistence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a condition of its loans, either as direct sales of municipal assets or, more commonly, long-term concessions, leases or management contracts. Large multinational corporations are the major bidders, including Vivendi, Suez Lyonnaise, Bectel-United Utilities, ENRON-Azurix, Bouygues-SAUR and RWEThames Water. Under new management, water prices have increased, putting more pressure on the livelihood systems of the poor (see Chapter 3). This has sometimes caused violent protests, as in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000 (Rothfeder 2001:107114). Although the terms of contracts are becoming more precise and incorporating details as regards minimum standards and protection for the poor, municipalities are often working with limited information, technical and legal capacity against some of the largest corporations in the world (Lee 1999:140-183). ...
30 See Middleton and O’Keefe (1998); Anderson (1999); Pirotte et al. (1999); Cuny and Hill (1999); Sphere Project (2000); Vaux (2001). ...
31 See Disaster Diplomacy, the website at Cambridge University maintained by Ilan ...
Kelman since 2001: http://www.arct.cam.ac.uk/disasterdiplomacy/ ...
32 The list for 2001 is sadly similar to those compiled by MSF for previous years (as, alas, is the list for 2003). In 2000 their list included displaced persons due to war in Angola, Chechnya, Indonesia, Burma (minority Rohingya Muslims who had fled across the border to Bangladesh), Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan (not much of a story until 11 September 2001), Sierra Leone and Colombia (see MSFUSA 2001). ...
In 1999 the list included conflict, displacement, and acute vulnerability to environmentally linked disease on the part of hundreds of thousands of people running from conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Burundi and Somalia. In addition, MSF list a little-known ...
severe outbreak of cholera in Mozambique (December 1998 to mid-May 1999) that infected 62,263 people and killed 2,063 (see MSF-USA 1999) ...
33 Kala Azar is caused by infestation by a protozoan transmitted by the bite of the sand fly. It causes fever, weight loss, swelling of the spleen and liver and anaemia. Untreated, it is almost always fatal. See World Health Organisation fact sheet: www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact116.html. ...
34 We take up this critique again in more detail in Chapter 3. ...
35 The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has its world headquarters in Geneva and member societies in many countries that are involved in hospitals, primary health care, training for public health, safety and emergency response. It is a federation of 178 national societies. ...
36 Early self-critical evaluations by voluntary agencies included one by a broad coalition that supported ‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’ (Minear 1991) and the group 'USA for Africa’ (Scott and Mpanya 1991). More recent appraisals have been collected by Action Against Hunger (1999, 2001), Anderson (1999), Pirotte et al. (1999) and Vaux (2001). ...

37 For details go to http://www.proventionconsortium.org/. ...
38 On NGOs (private voluntary organisations, popular development organisations, development support organisations, etc.) see Conroy and Litvinoff (1988); Holloway (1989); During (1989); Wellard and Copestake (1993); Bebbington and Thiele (1993); Farrington and Lewis (1993); Riddell et al. (1995); Christoplos (2001). ...

39 The Network for Social Science Research for Disaster Reduction Latin America, headquartered in Panama City, Panama (La RED): www.desenredando.org/;Peri Peri, whose base is in Cape Town, South Africa: www.egs.uct.ac.za/dimp/; Duryog Nivaran, centred in Colombo, Sri Lanka: www.adpc.ait.ac.th/duryog/duryog.html. ...
40 This view has much in common with other attempts to reconcile an analysis of structural constraints on people’s lives with an appreciation of the individual’s agency and freedom (Mitchell 1990; Palm 1990; Kirby 1990a; Hewitt 1997; Alexander 2000; Wisner 2003a; Pelling 2003b). ...
41 The women’s movement makes an enormous contribution to our understanding of vulnerability, environmental degradation and the possibilities for restoration, peace making and ‘healing’. This often requires redefining what is meant by such terms as 'development’ and 'progress’. See Sen and Grown (1987); Momsen and Townsend (1987); Dankelman and Davidson (1988); Shiva (1989); Tinker (1990); Cliff (1991); Keller-Herzog (1996); WEDO (2002); Kerr (2002); on women and the politics of ‘development’ and vulnerability, as well as eco-feminist philosophers, see Merchant (1989) and Biehl (1991). ...

42 See also the Gender and Disaster Network website: http://online.northumbria.ac.uk/geography_research/gdn/. ...
43 Accounts of disaster that try to balance macro- and micro-perspectives include Hewitt (1983a); Oliver-Smith (1986b); R.Kent (1987); Maskrey (1989); Kirby (1990a, 1990b); Palm (1990); Hewitt (1997); Tobin and Montz (1997); Alexander (2000). ...

44 Studies emphasising the role of gender in structuring vulnerability include Jiggins (1986); Schroeder (1987); M.Ali (1987); Rivers (1982); Vaughan (1987); Drèze and ...

At Risk 42 ...

Sen (1989:55-59); Sen (1988, 1990); Agarwal (1990); Phillips (1990); Kerner and Cook (1991); O’Brien and Gruenbaum (1991); Walker (1994); Wiest et al. (1994); Cutter (1995); Fothergill (1996, 1999); Fernando and Fernando (1997); Fordham (1998, 1999, 2003); Morrow and Phillips (1999); Stehlik et al. (2000); Enarson and Morrow (2001); UN Economic and Social Department and ISDR (2001) and Cannon (2002). ...
45 The very young are highly vulnerable to nutritional and other health stresses during and after disasters and are vulnerable to emotional disturbance in the post-disaster period (Chen 1973; UNICEF 1989, 1999:25-6; Goodfield 1991; Cutter 1995; La RED 1998; Harris 1998; Jabry 2003). Jabry (2003) states that ‘an estimated 77 million children under 15 , on average, had their lives disrupted by a natural disaster or an armed conflict, each year, between 1991 and 2000’. The old are often more vulnerable to extremes of heat and cold, are less mobile, and are therefore less capable of evacuation, and may have medical conditions that are complicated by injury or stress (Bell et al. 1978; Melnick and Logue 1985; O’Riordon 1986:281; Tanida 1996; Klinenberg 2002; Help Age International 2000), and are particularly vulnerable to recurrent disasters (Guillette 1991). The elderly can also suffer serious psychological harm following disasters (Bolin and Klenow 1983; Ticehurst et al. 1996). Widows in many parts of the world are especially vulnerable, as in southern Africa (Wilson and Ramphele 1989:177-178; Murray 1981), and east Africa (Feierman 1985) or in the USA (Childers 1999). ...
46 Disabilities such as blindness, mental retardation, somatic hereditary defects and post-traumatic injury (such as spinal cord injuries) affect hundreds of millions of people worldwide (Noble 1981). People with disabilities have specific increased vulnerabilities in the face of hazards due to their impaired mobility or interruption of the special attention to their hygiene and continuous health care needs in disasters (UNDRO 1982b; Parr 1987, 1997; Tierney et al. 1988; Kailes 1996; Wallrich 1998; Wisner 2003c); they may also have particular needs when it comes to warnings and evacuation (Van Wilkligen 2001; Norman 2002, 2003). ...
47 The role of religion has not been as well studied, but consider recent events. The Burmese fleeing into Bangladesh during 1992 were a Muslim minority in their home country. The 400,000 people forced to leave squatter settlements around the city of Khartoum for an uncertain future in ‘resettlement camps’ in the desert were mostly a Christian or animist minority, refugees from war in the south, in the predominantly Muslim north of Sudan. ...
48 The role of caste has been most fully explored in studies of famine in India (see Chapter 4); however there is also a suggestion that caste-based locational segregation homes in rural and urban India may have a bearing on vulnerability to riverine flood and cyclone (see Chapters 6 and 7). The Burakumin ‘caste’ in Japan is also subject to discrimination and may have suffered disproportionately in the Kobe earthquake (see Chapter 8). ...
49 Ethnicity and race emerge as an important factors in explaining vulnerability in studies by Regan (1983); Franke (1984); Perry and Mushkatel (1986); Bolin and Bolton (1986); Winchester (1986, 1992); Rubin and Palm (1987); Laird (1992); Miller and Simile (1992); Johnston and Schulte (1992); Bolton et al. (1993); Bolin ...
and Stanford (1998b); Fothergill et al. (1999); Steinberg (2000). ...
50 Perception, experience and discourse about risk are never straightforward. For example, perceptions of risk are sometimes deeply rooted in cultural understandings of ritual purity and danger (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) and claims of suffering (or their absence) can sometimes be gambits in games over local political power (Richards 1983; Laird 1992; Steinberg 2000: ch. 1). ...
51 We do not disregard or underestimate the intellectual challenge of dealing with the complexities and uncertainties vividly brought to mind by the attack on the World Trade Center. There are some who think that an enormously complex system such as a mega-city cannot possibly be fully understood, and hence cannot be protected properly (Mitchell 1999b; cf. Homer-Dixon 2001; Rubin 2000). Perrow (1984) put forward that argument some years ago regarding even ‘simpler’ systems such as single large jet aircraft or a nuclear power station-a view that was possibly reconfirmed by the ‘surprising’ destruction of the US space shuttle Columbia in early 2003. It also may be that when one adds the additional level of complexity and uncertainty of a global economy and the relations and histories that constitute ‘international relations’ among 191 nations, it is impossible to predict the consequences of actions. For example, in a case that falls more within the scope of our book, there was a deadly mudslide in Algiers in 2001 (Wisner 2001b). A key factor was heavy rain, to be sure. However, in addition, in their own ‘war on terrorism’ the Algerian authorities had cut and burned the forest on the mountain above Algiers and blocked up the storm water drainage system. Both actions were taken to deny ‘terrorists’ a hiding place. Both official acts exacerbated the flood. ...
52 Such technological hazards are discussed by other authors, including Ziegler et al. (1983); Perrow (1984); Weir (1987); Kirby (1990c); Shrivastava (1992); Button (1992); Jasanoff (1994); Dinham and Sarangi (2002). ...

53 A gateway to web sites dealing with environmental justice is: www.ejrc.cau.edu/. ...
54 See discussions and debates about the relationship between disaster and human rights: http://online.northumbria.ac.uk/geography_research/radix/. ...
55 For example, it is hard to disentangle risks associated with construction technologies (Chapter 8) or agricultural innovations (Chapter 4) with such hazards as earthquake and famine. ...
56 The USA offered Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi genetically modified maize as part of the international response to a famine in the region that affected 15 million people (see Chapter 4). These countries refused the maize because it was unmilled, and their scientific advisers were concerned that if planted (and not eaten), there might be contamination of local varieties of maize (a staple in the region) with unforeseen, but potentially grave, consequences for the future. ...
57 The social and ecological consequences of building high dams worldwide have been systematically reviewed by the World Commission on Dams (2000c). ...
58 There seems to be uncertainty in the figures for the number who died. The UK Disasters Emergency Committee report (DEC 2001a) accepts an official figure of 20,000 deaths as being accurate. ...
59 The unintended consequences of ‘development’ are documented by Trainer (1989); Shiva (1989); Wisner (1988a); Lipton and Longhurst (1989); Johnston (1994, 1997); ...

Adams (2001: ch. 8). Special note should be taken of a ‘classic’ early paper on disease and development by Hughes and Hunter (1970) and the contrast with the role of other kinds of ‘development’ in restoring the health of communities (Wisner 1976a). ...
\title{ ...
2
\title{ ...
2
THE DISASTER PRESSURE AND RELEASE MODEL ...
}

The nature of vulnerability ...

Two models ...

In evaluating disaster risk, the social production of vulnerability needs to be considered with at least the same degree of importance that is devoted to understanding and addressing natural hazards. Expressed schematically, our view is that the risk faced by people must be seen as a cross-cutting combination of vulnerability and hazard. Disasters are a result of the interaction of both; there cannot be a disaster if there are hazards but vulnerability is (theoretically) nil, or if there is a vulnerable population but no hazard event.

^{1}

...
'Hazard’ refers to the natural events that may affect different places singly or in combination (coastlines, hillsides, earthquake faults, savannahs, rainforests, etc.) at different times (season of the year, time of day, over return periods of different duration). The hazard has varying degrees of intensity and severity.

^{2}

Although our knowledge of physical causal mechanisms is incomplete, some long accumulations of records (for example of hurricanes, earthquakes, snow avalanches or droughts) allows us to specify the statistical likelihood of many hazards in time and space. But such knowledge, while necessary, is far from sufficient for calculating the actual level of risk. ...

What we are arguing is that the risk of disaster is a compound function of the natural hazard and the number of people, characterised by their varying degrees of vulnerability to that specific hazard, who occupy the space and time of exposure to the hazard event. There are three elements here: risk (disaster), vulnerability, and hazard, whose relations we find it convenient to schematise in a pseudo-equation:
我们所争论的是，灾难风险是自然危险与人数的复合函数，这些人以其对特定危险的不同脆弱性占据了暴露于危险事件的空间和时间。这里有三个要素：风险（灾难）、脆弱性和危险，我们发现将它们的关系以伪方程的形式进行示意是方便的：

R = H \times V .

Alexander (2000:13) distinguished between risk and vulnerability, noting that ‘vulnerability refers to the potential for casualty, destruction, damage, disruption or other form of loss in a particular element: risk combines this with the probable level of loss to be expected from a predictable magnitude of hazard (which can be considered as the manifestation of the agent that produces the loss).’
亚历山大（2000:13）区分了风险和脆弱性，指出“脆弱性指的是在特定元素中发生伤亡、破坏、损害、干扰或其他形式损失的潜力：风险则将此与可预期的损失水平结合起来，该损失水平是由可预测的危害的大小所决定的（可以视为造成损失的因素的表现）。”

A disaster occurs when a significant number of vulnerable people experience a hazard and suffer severe damage and/or disruption of their livelihood system in such a way that recovery is unlikely without external aid.

^{3}

By ‘recovery’ we mean the psychological and physical recovery of the victims, and the replacement of physical resources and the social
当大量脆弱人群遭遇危害并遭受严重损害和/或生计系统的干扰，以至于在没有外部援助的情况下恢复不太可能时，就会发生灾难。我们所说的“恢复”是指受害者的心理和身体恢复，以及物质资源和使用这些资源所需的社会关系的替代（见第 9 章）。
relations required to use them (see Chapter 9).
关系（见第 9 章）。
In order to understand risk in terms of our vulnerability analysis in specific hazard situations, this book uses two related models of disaster. The Pressure and Release model (PAR model) is introduced in this chapter as a simple tool for showing how disasters occur when natural hazards affect vulnerable people. Their vulnerability is rooted in social processes and underlying causes which may ultimately be quite remote from the disaster event itself.
为了理解在特定灾害情况下我们脆弱性分析中的风险，本书使用了两个相关的灾害模型。本章介绍了压力与释放模型（PAR 模型），作为一个简单的工具，展示了当自然灾害影响脆弱人群时灾害是如何发生的。他们的脆弱性根植于社会过程和潜在原因，这些原因最终可能与灾害事件本身相距甚远。

The basis for the PAR idea is that a disaster is the intersection of two opposing forces: those processes generating vulnerability on one side, and the natural hazard event (or sometimes a slowly unfolding natural process) on the other. The image resembles a nutcracker, with increasing pressure on people arising from either side-from their vulnerability and from the impact (and severity) of the hazard for those people. The ‘release’ idea is incorporated to conceptualise the reduction of disaster: to relieve the pressure, vulnerability has to be reduced. This chapter focuses on the pressure aspect of the PAR model, and the discussion of conditions for creating release are left mainly for Part III.
PAR 理念的基础是，灾害是两种对立力量的交汇：一方面是产生脆弱性的过程，另一方面是自然灾害事件（有时是缓慢展开的自然过程）。这个形象类似于一个开坚果器，来自两侧的压力不断增加——来自他们的脆弱性和对这些人造成的灾害影响（及其严重性）。‘释放’的概念被纳入以概念化灾害的减少：要减轻压力，必须减少脆弱性。本章重点讨论 PAR 模型的压力方面，而关于创造释放条件的讨论主要留待第三部分。

A second model, referred to as the ‘Access model’, is discussed in Chapter 3. In effect it is an expanded analysis of the principal factors in the PAR model that relate to human vulnerability and exposure to physical hazard, and focuses on the process by which the natural event impacts upon people and their responses. It is a more magnified analysis of how vulnerability is initially generated by economic, social and political processes, and what then happens as a disaster unfolds. The point of application of this second model is indicated on Figure 2.1 by means of a magnifying glass. Later in the book, the Access model indicates more specifically and in more detail how conditions need to change to reduce vulnerability and thereby improve protection and the capacity for recovery. It complements the PAR model, and unites the two sides of the PAR diagram in a detailed process model.
第二个模型被称为“接入模型”，在第三章中进行了讨论。实际上，它是对 PAR 模型中与人类脆弱性和对物理危害的暴露相关的主要因素的扩展分析，重点关注自然事件如何影响人们及其反应的过程。这是对脆弱性如何最初由经济、社会和政治过程生成的更详细分析，以及灾难展开时会发生什么。该第二模型的应用点在图 2.1 中通过放大镜表示。书中后面的部分，接入模型更具体、更详细地指示了需要如何改变条件以减少脆弱性，从而改善保护和恢复能力。它补充了 PAR 模型，并在详细的过程模型中将 PAR 图的两个方面结合在一起。

The PAR model might suggest (in its image of two separate sides in the diagram) that the hazard event is isolated and distinct from the conditions which create vulnerability. As will be seen in the Access model described in
PAR 模型可能暗示（在其图示中两个独立的侧面）危害事件是与造成脆弱性的条件隔离和不同的。正如在接入模型中所看到的那样，
Chapter 3, hazard events themselves also change the set of resources available to households (e.g. through the destruction of crops or land by floods), and alter the patterns of recoverability of different groups of people. Hazards sometimes intensify some people’s vulnerability, and the incorporation of this insight improves upon those interpretations that see disasters simply as the result of natural events detached from social systems. Conversely, Part II will also show that economic and political circumstances, and the specific situations affecting particular livelihood opportunities, often force or encourage people to engage in practices that worsen the impact of hazards. Such desperate measures, taken in order to survive in the short term, include rapid deforestation, farming inappropriately and speculatively on steep slopes which had hitherto been avoided, overgrazing, living on flood plains (Abramovitz 2001) or subdividing an already crowded apartment.
第三章，灾害事件本身也改变了家庭可用资源的集合（例如，通过洪水对作物或土地的破坏），并改变了不同群体的恢复模式。灾害有时会加剧某些人的脆弱性，而将这一见解纳入考虑可以改善那些将灾难视为与社会系统脱离的自然事件结果的解释。相反，第二部分还将展示经济和政治环境，以及影响特定生计机会的具体情况，常常迫使或鼓励人们采取加剧灾害影响的做法。这些为了短期生存而采取的绝望措施包括快速砍伐森林、不当和投机性地在之前避免的陡坡上耕作、过度放牧、居住在洪泛平原（Abramovitz 2001）或将已经拥挤的公寓进行分割。

Figure 2.1 Pressure and Release(PAR) model: the progression of vulnerability
图 2.1 压力与释放（PAR）模型：脆弱性的进展

Cause and effect in the Disaster Pressure model
灾害压力模型中的因果关系

The following section anticipates Part II, where the chain of explanation of disasters will be related to a series of different types of hazard.
以下部分预示着第二部分，其中灾难的解释链将与一系列不同类型的危害相关联。

The chain of explanation
解释链

Figure 2.1 illustrates the PAR model,

^{4}

and is based on the idea that an explanation of disasters requires us to trace the connections that link the impact of a hazard on people with a series of social factors and processes that generate vulnerability.

^{5}

The explanation of vulnerability has three sets of links that connect the disaster to processes that are located at decreasing levels of specificity from the people impacted upon by a disaster. The most distant of these are root causes which are an interrelated set of widespread and general processes within a society and the world economy. They are ‘distant’ in one, two or all of the following senses: spatially distant (arising in a distant centre of economic or political power), temporally distant (in past history), and finally, distant in the sense of being so profoundly bound up with cultural assumptions, ideology, beliefs and social relations in the actual lived existence of the people concerned that they are ‘invisible’ and ‘taken for granted’.
图 2.1 说明了 PAR 模型，

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并基于这样的观点：对灾难的解释要求我们追踪将危害对人们的影响与一系列社会因素和过程联系起来，这些因素和过程产生了脆弱性。

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脆弱性的解释有三组联系，将灾难与位于从受灾人群到社会过程的不同特定程度的过程连接起来。其中最远的是根本原因，它们是社会和世界经济中相互关联的一组广泛和普遍的过程。它们在以下一种、两种或所有意义上都是“遥远的”：空间上遥远（源于遥远的经济或政治权力中心）、时间上遥远（在过去的历史中），最后，在与相关人群的实际生活存在中深深交织的文化假设、意识形态、信仰和社会关系的意义上，它们是“看不见的”和“理所当然的”。

The most important root causes that give rise to vulnerability (and which reproduce vulnerability over time) are economic, demographic and political processes. These affect the allocation and distribution of resources, among different groups of people. They are a function of economic, social, and political structures, and also legal definitions and
导致脆弱性的最重要根本原因（并且随着时间的推移再生产脆弱性）是经济、人口和政治过程。这些因素影响资源在不同群体之间的分配和分布。它们是经济、社会和政治结构的函数，同时也受到法律定义和
enforcement of rights, gender relations and other elements of the ideological order.
权利的执行、性别关系以及意识形态秩序的其他元素的影响。
Root causes are also connected with the function (or dysfunction) of the state, and ultimately the nature of the control exercised by the police and military, and with good governance, the rule of law and the capabilities of the administration. Military force sometimes has its own impact as an underlying cause of disasters such as famine, especially in prolonged, so-called low-intensity warfare (Clay and Holcomb 1985; Hansen 1987; Leaning 2000) or where denial of food to a civilian population is actually used as a weapon (Article 19 1990; de Waal 1997; Action Against Hunger 1999). The effects of past wars sometimes linger for a very long time, so we feel it appropriate to include them in the category of root causes of vulnerability, while in the next section current wars will appear as a ‘dynamic pressure’. Examples are all too common and include Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Congo, where long drawn-out war and famine have coincided, often exacerbated by an extreme natural event such as drought. Long civil wars may also undermine the ability of central or local governments to prevent or mitigate hazard events. They can also erode the trust between government and citizen that is required for prevention and mitigation to be effective. Here, examples may include Burma, Cambodia, El Salvador and Guatemala. We will return to war as a factor in disaster vulnerability later in this chapter. Wars, of course, are thankfully finite, but militarism and the use of armed force to control a domestic population is a long-standing practice.
根本原因还与国家的功能（或功能失调）相关，最终与警察和军队施加的控制性质、良好治理、法治以及行政能力有关。军事力量有时作为饥荒等灾难的潜在原因产生影响，尤其是在长期的所谓低强度战争中（Clay 和 Holcomb 1985；Hansen 1987；Leaning 2000），或者当对平民人口的食物封锁实际上被用作武器时（Article 19 1990；de Waal 1997；Action Against Hunger 1999）。过去战争的影响有时会持续很长时间，因此我们认为将其纳入脆弱性根本原因的类别是合适的，而在下一节中，当前战争将作为“动态压力”出现。这样的例子屡见不鲜，包括阿富汗、索马里、苏丹、埃塞俄比亚、乍得、利比里亚、安哥拉、莫桑比克、塞拉利昂和刚果，这些地方长期的战争与饥荒相互交织，往往因极端自然事件如干旱而加剧。长期的内战也可能削弱中央或地方政府预防或减轻灾害事件的能力。它们还可能侵蚀政府与公民之间的信任，而这种信任对于有效的预防和减缓是必需的。在这里，例子可能包括缅甸、柬埔寨、萨尔瓦多和危地马拉。我们将在本章后面回到战争作为灾害脆弱性因素的讨论。战争当然是有限的，但军国主义和使用武力控制国内人口是一种长期存在的做法。

Root causes reflect the exercise and distribution of power in a society. People who are economically marginal (such as urban squatters) or who live in environmentally ‘marginal’ environments (isolated, arid or semi-arid, flood-prone coastal or forest ecosystems; steep, flood-prone urban locations) tend also to be of marginal importance to those who hold economic and political power (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987:21-23; Wisner 1976b, 1978b, 1980). This creates three often mutually reinforcing sources of vulnerability. Firstly, if people only have access to livelihoods and resources that are insecure and unrewarding, their activities are likely to generate higher levels of vulnerability. Secondly, they are likely to be a low priority for government interventions intended to deal with hazard mitigation. Thirdly, people who are economically and politically marginal are more likely to stop trusting their own methods for self-protection, and to lose confidence in their own local knowledge. Even if they still have confidence in their own abilities, the ‘raw materials’ needed or the labour time required may have disappeared as a result of their economic and political marginality and low or uncertain access to resources.
根本原因反映了一个社会中权力的行使和分配。经济边缘化的人群（如城市占用者）或生活在环境“边缘”环境中的人群（孤立、干旱或半干旱、易洪水的沿海或森林生态系统；陡峭、易洪水的城市地点）往往对那些掌握经济和政治权力的人来说也显得不重要（Blaikie and Brookfield 1987:21-23; Wisner 1976b, 1978b, 1980）。这造成了三种往往相互强化的脆弱性来源。首先，如果人们只能获得不安全且没有回报的生计和资源，他们的活动可能会产生更高水平的脆弱性。其次，他们可能在政府旨在应对灾害减缓的干预措施中优先级较低。第三，经济和政治边缘化的人群更可能停止信任自己用于自我保护的方法，并对自己当地的知识失去信心。即使他们仍然对自己的能力充满信心，但由于经济和政治的边缘化以及对资源的低或不确定的获取，所需的“原材料”或劳动时间可能已经消失。

Dynamic pressures are processes and activities that ‘translate’ the effects of root causes both temporally and spatially into unsafe conditions.

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These are more contemporary or immediate, conjunctural manifestations of general underlying economic, social and political patterns. For example, capitalism is an economic and ideological system that is at least 500 years old, while neo-liberalism is the particular form that capitalist relations have taken since the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the 1980s neoliberal structural adjustment policies were imposed on many less developed countries (LDCs). Some may have benefited, particularly in south-east Asia where they were able to apply these policies in ways that suited their national circumstances (Stiglitz 2002). But in many others, structural adjustment policies are widely regarded as being
动态压力是将根本原因的影响在时间和空间上“转化”为不安全条件的过程和活动。这些是更为当代或直接的、偶发的表现，反映了一般的经济、社会和政治模式。例如，资本主义是一种至少已有 500 年历史的经济和意识形态体系，而新自由主义是自 20 世纪 70 年代末和 80 年代初以来资本主义关系所采取的特定形式。在 1980 年代，新自由主义结构调整政策被强加于许多欠发达国家（LDCs）。一些国家可能受益，特别是在东南亚，他们能够以适合自己国家情况的方式实施这些政策（斯蒂格利茨 2002）。但在许多其他国家，结构调整政策被广泛认为是
responsible for the decline of health and education services which in our parlance suggests they are a root cause of vulnerability.
负责健康和教育服务的下降，这在我们的术语中表明它们是脆弱性的根本原因。

Dynamic pressures channel the root causes into particular forms of unsafe conditions that then have to be considered in relation to the different types of hazards facing people. These dynamic pressures include epidemic disease, rapid urbanisation, current (as opposed to past) wars and other violent conflicts, foreign debt and certain structural adjustment programmes. Also on the list of dynamic pressures is export promotion, which in some circumstances can undermine food security. It can, for example, encourage mining that destroys local habitats and pollutes water and soil, hydro-electric power development that floods valuable agricultural lands without compensating those affected, and deforestation that can destroy the habitats of forest dwellers, damage farming systems that use the forest for nutrient transfers to agricultural land, and downstream can cause problems such as flooding or the silting of rivers and irrigation canals. It is important to note that these pressures are not labelled ‘bad’ and vulnerabilityinducing per se. There is a tendency in neo-populist and ‘radical’ development writing to damn these pressures indiscriminately, without examining their particular historical and spatial specificities. In short, PAR needs thorough research that is locally- and historically based.
动态压力将根本原因转化为特定形式的不安全条件，这些条件必须与人们面临的不同类型的危害相关联。这些动态压力包括流行病、快速城市化、当前（与过去相对）战争和其他暴力冲突、外债以及某些结构调整计划。动态压力的清单中还包括出口促进，在某些情况下可能会破坏粮食安全。例如，它可能会鼓励采矿，破坏当地栖息地并污染水和土壤，水电开发淹没有价值的农业用地而不对受影响者进行补偿，以及森林砍伐，这可能会破坏森林居民的栖息地，损害利用森林向农业用地转移养分的农业系统，并且下游可能会导致洪水或河流和灌溉渠的淤积等问题。重要的是要注意，这些压力并不被标记为“坏的”或本质上导致脆弱性。在新民粹主义和“激进”发展写作中，存在一种倾向，毫无区别地谴责这些压力，而不考察它们特定的历史和空间特性。简而言之，参与式行动研究需要基于地方和历史的深入研究。

The ways in which these dynamic pressures operate to channel root causes into unsafe conditions lead us to specify how the pressures play themselves out ‘on the ground’, in a strong spatial and temporal sense. This will allow micro-mapping of unsafe conditions affecting households differentially (e.g. wealthy ones, or in distinction, those lacking crucial access to material and human resources) and subsequently groups across households (women, children, the aged, disabled, marginalised ethnic groups, etc.).
这些动态压力如何运作以将根本原因引导至不安全条件，促使我们具体说明这些压力在“地面”上如何表现，具有强烈的空间和时间意义。这将允许对影响家庭的不安全条件进行微观映射，差异化地影响不同的家庭（例如，富裕家庭，或相对而言，缺乏重要物质和人力资源的家庭），以及随后影响家庭中的群体（女性、儿童、老年人、残疾人、边缘化的民族群体等）。

This process can be illustrated clearly by examples of endemic disease and malnutrition. People’s basic health and nutritional status relates strongly to their ability to survive disruptions to their livelihood system and is an important measure of their ‘resilience’ in the face of external shock.

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People who are undernourished and sick succumb sooner in times of famine than those who were previously well-nourished and healthy. There is an important relationship between nutrition and disease, which is often evident after a hazard impact (especially when people are forced to seek refuge and come into close contact with one another). Chronically malnourished people have weaker immune systems and contract illnesses such as measles or dysentery more easily (see Chapter 5). Age is also a significant factor in people’s resilience, with children and the frail elderly likely to suffer much more from hunger and hazards such as extreme heat and cold.

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这个过程可以通过地方性疾病和营养不良的例子清楚地说明。人们的基本健康和营养状况与他们在生计系统遭受干扰时的生存能力密切相关，并且是他们在面对外部冲击时“韧性”的重要衡量标准。

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在饥荒时期，营养不良和生病的人比那些之前营养良好和健康的人更容易屈服。营养与疾病之间存在重要关系，这在灾害影响后往往显而易见（尤其是当人们被迫寻求庇护并彼此密切接触时）。长期营养不良的人免疫系统较弱，更容易感染麻疹或痢疾等疾病（见第 5 章）。年龄也是影响人们韧性的一个重要因素，儿童和虚弱的老年人更可能在饥饿和极端高温、低温等灾害中遭受更大的痛苦。

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Rural-urban migration is another dynamic pressure that arises in many LDCs in response to the economic and social inequalities inherent in root causes. Such migration may follow the loss of land used by poor farmers and pastoralists, discriminatory pricing of crops produced in small quantities by poor farmers and by proletarianisation of the peasantry. Out-migration may lead to the erosion of local knowledge that might serve to prevent disasters and a loss of the skills required for coping in the aftermath of a disaster. An example is given in Box 2.1 below.
农村-城市迁移是许多最不发达国家中因根本原因固有的经济和社会不平等而产生的另一种动态压力。这种迁移可能发生在贫困农民和牧民失去土地之后，以及由于贫困农民生产的小规模作物的歧视性定价和农民的无产阶级化。外迁可能导致当地知识的流失，这些知识本可以帮助防止灾害，并失去应对灾害后果所需的技能。下面的框 2.1 中给出了一个例子。

Unsafe conditions are the specific forms in which the vulnerability of a population is expressed in time and space in conjunction with a hazard. Examples include people
不安全的条件是人口脆弱性在时间和空间中与危险相结合的具体表现形式。例子包括人们
having to live in hazardous locations, being unable to afford safe buildings, lacking effective protection by the state (for instance in terms of effective building codes), having to engage in dangerous livelihoods (such as ocean fishing in small boats, wildlife poaching, prostitution with its attendant health risks, small-scale gold mining in the Amazon and eastern Africa, or small-scale forestry), or having minimal food entitlements, or entitlements that are prone to rapid and severe disruption.

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Also, unsafe conditions are dependent upon the initial level of well-being of the people, and how this level varies between regions, micro-regions, households and individuals. It is important to consider the pattern of access to tangible resources (e.g. cash, shelter, food stocks, agricultural equipment) and intangible resources (networks of support, knowledge regarding survival and sources of assistance, morale and the ability to function in a crisis) (Cannon 2000a). These aspects of unsafe conditions serve as a bridge between PAR and the Access model discussed in the next chapter.
生活在危险地区、无法负担安全建筑、缺乏国家有效保护（例如有效的建筑规范）、不得不从事危险生计（如在小船上进行海洋捕鱼、野生动物偷猎、伴随健康风险的卖淫、在亚马逊和东非的小规模金矿开采或小规模林业），或食品权利极少，或权利容易迅速和严重中断。

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此外，不安全的条件依赖于人们的初始福祉水平，以及这一水平在不同地区、微观区域、家庭和个人之间的差异。考虑可触及资源（例如现金、住所、食品储备、农业设备）和无形资源（支持网络、生存知识和援助来源、士气以及在危机中运作的能力）的获取模式是重要的（Cannon 2000a）。这些不安全条件的方面在下一章讨论的 PAR 与获取模型之间架起了一座桥梁。

We propose the following terminology when dealing with unsafe conditions. People, as should be apparent already, are vulnerable and live in or work under unsafe conditions (‘unsafe’ can refer to locations of work or habitation, wherever people spend their daily lives). As we said in Chapter 1, and it bears repeating, we avoid using the word vulnerable in regard to livelihoods, buildings, settlement locations or infrastructure, and instead use terms such as ‘fragile’, ‘unsafe’, ‘hazardous’ or their synonyms.
我们在处理不安全条件时提出以下术语。人们，显然，处于脆弱状态，生活或工作在不安全的条件下（“不安全”可以指工作或居住地点，即人们日常生活的地方）。正如我们在第一章中所说的，并且值得重申，我们避免在谈及生计、建筑、定居地点或基础设施时使用“脆弱”一词，而是使用“脆弱”、“不安全”、“危险”或其同义词等术语。

While all of these are components of people’s vulnerability, a building should be regarded as unsafe, rather than vulnerable; a settlement’s location is hazardous, not vulnerable. In this way, we retain the term vulnerability for people only. The reason for this is straightforward: already the term vulnerability (and its associate, vulnerability analysis) has been appropriated for use in such a wide range of situations that (like ‘sustainability’) it is in danger of losing its significance in relation to people and hazards. If ‘vulnerability’ becomes a catch-all term for any aspect of conditions related to disasters, then it will lose its analytical capacity. Moreover, it will lose the focus about which we are very explicit-that it is the vulnerability of people that is crucial to understanding disasters and disaster preparedness. It is, of course, absolutely right to be concerned about the condition of buildings, the places where people have to live, crop yields and variability and so on. But if policy is directed at these alone, it is in danger of being compartmentalised (e.g. into issues of building codes, or land-use planning, or production-oriented agricultural programmes).
虽然这些都是人们脆弱性的组成部分，但建筑物应被视为不安全，而不是脆弱；一个定居点的位置是危险的，而不是脆弱。通过这种方式，我们将“脆弱性”一词仅保留给人类。原因很简单：脆弱性（及其相关的脆弱性分析）这一术语已经被广泛应用于各种情况中，以至于（像“可持续性”一样）它有失去与人类和危险相关的意义的风险。如果“脆弱性”成为与灾难相关的任何条件的统称，那么它将失去其分析能力。此外，它将失去我们非常明确的关注点——人类的脆弱性对于理解灾难和灾难准备至关重要。当然，关注建筑物的状况、人们必须生活的地方、作物产量及其变异性等是绝对正确的。但如果政策仅仅针对这些，它就有可能被划分为不同的部分（例如，建筑规范、土地使用规划或以生产为导向的农业项目）。

No single element, particularly the technical (and seemingly a-political) determinants of people’s vulnerability, should be taken in isolation from the entire range of factors and processes that constitute this situation. The other danger is that a focus on the ‘hardware’ aspects of vulnerability will distract from the attention that needs to be given to the political and economic determinants of vulnerability: most people are vulnerable because they have inadequate livelihoods, which are not resilient in the face of shocks, and they are often poor. They are poor because they suffer specific relations of exploitation, unequal bargaining and discrimination within the political economy, and there may also be historical reasons why their homes and sources of livelihood are located in resourcepoor areas.
任何单一因素，特别是人们脆弱性的技术（看似非政治的）决定因素，都不应孤立于构成这种情况的所有因素和过程之外。另一个危险是，过于关注脆弱性的“硬件”方面会分散对脆弱性的政治和经济决定因素的关注：大多数人之所以脆弱，是因为他们的生计不足，在面对冲击时缺乏韧性，并且他们往往生活在贫困中。他们之所以贫困，是因为在政治经济中遭受特定的剥削关系、不平等的谈判和歧视，并且可能还有历史原因导致他们的家园和生计来源位于资源匮乏的地区。

In other words, in many cases reducing vulnerability is about dealing with the awkward issue of poverty in society. That is why there needs to be a clear link between
换句话说，在许多情况下，减少脆弱性就是处理社会中贫困这一棘手问题。这就是为什么需要在两者之间建立明确的联系。
disaster preparedness, vulnerability reduction and the process of development itself (the improvement of peoples’ livelihoods, welfare and opportunities). This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, where the vulnerability that arises from unsafe conditions intersects with a physical hazard (trigger event) to create a disaster, but is itself only explained by an analysis of the dynamic processes and root causes which generate the unsafe conditions.
灾害准备、脆弱性减少以及发展过程本身（改善人们的生计、福利和机会）。这在图 2.1 中得到了说明，其中，由不安全条件引发的脆弱性与物理危害（触发事件）相交，形成灾害，但其本身仅通过对产生不安全条件的动态过程和根本原因的分析来解释。

It is important to note that, throughout the causal chain of explanation from root causes to unsafe conditions, we do not imply by the phrase ‘cause and effect’ that single causes give rise to single effects. In their study of land degradation, Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) refer to such causal sequences as ‘cascades’. There are many ways in which dynamic processes (some unique to particular societies, some nearly universal because of the pervasive influence of global forces) channel root causes into unsafe conditions and to specific time-space convergence with a natural hazard. This can be illustrated in the outcome of floods in Bangladesh (see Box 2.1) and landslide and earthquake impacts in part of north Pakistan (Box 2.2).
重要的是要注意，在从根本原因到不安全条件的因果链解释中，我们并不意味着“因果关系”这一短语暗示单一原因导致单一结果。在对土地退化的研究中，Blaikie 和 Brookfield（1987）将这种因果序列称为“级联”。动态过程（一些特定于特定社会，一些由于全球力量的普遍影响而几乎是普遍的）以多种方式将根本原因引导到不安全条件，并与自然灾害在特定的时间-空间交汇中相结合。这可以通过孟加拉国的洪水结果（见框 2.1）以及巴基斯坦北部部分地区的滑坡和地震影响（框 2.2）来说明。

Box 2.1: Landless squatters in Dhaka
案例 2.1：达卡的无地占用者

Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, is situated in the flood plain of a major river, the Buriganga, a tributary of an even larger river, the Meghna (see Figure 6.2). To the north-west is a large zone of lowlying, flood-prone land in the vicinity of Nagor Konda. Here, squatter settlements grew rapidly in the 1980s as they did in many areas around the capital (Shaker 1987). This area had been densely settled, particularly since 1970, mostly by poor landless families from the south and east of the country (Rashid 1977).
达卡是孟加拉国的首都，位于一条主要河流的洪泛平原上，布里甘嘎河是更大河流梅格纳河的支流（见图 6.2）。西北方向是一个低洼的洪水易发区，靠近纳戈尔孔达。在 1980 年代，这里迅速发展了许多占用者定居点，正如首都周边的许多地区一样（Shaker 1987）。自 1970 年以来，这个地区人口密集，主要是来自国家南部和东部的贫困无地家庭（Rashid 1977）。

The former landless people who inhabit this depression are there because of its proximity to Dhaka’s vegetable market. Already the chain of explanation of their vulnerability can be seen at work: rural people who are landless have few alternatives, and many seek the economic opportunity provided by the urban vegetable market. But this means living in an unsafe location. As newcomers, and extremely poor, the squatters in these low-lying areas had no access to the structures of power that control marketing. They also had insecure title to land in the depression, and therefore no access to credit to allow them to increase their productivity and compete with better-established market gardeners (A.Ali 1987). This situation meant that they had to grow rice rather than vegetables on their land, and thus the poor were forced into low-income pursuits.
居住在这个洼地的前无地人群之所以在此，是因为它靠近达卡的蔬菜市场。已经可以看到他们脆弱性的解释链条在发挥作用：无地的农村人几乎没有其他选择，许多人寻求城市蔬菜市场提供的经济机会。但这意味着生活在一个不安全的地方。作为新来者，且极为贫困，这些低洼地区的占地者无法接触到控制市场的权力结构。他们在洼地的土地上也没有安全的所有权，因此无法获得信贷来提高他们的生产力，并与更有实力的市场园丁竞争（A.Ali 1987）。这种情况意味着他们不得不在土地上种植稻米而不是蔬菜，因此穷人被迫从事低收入的工作。

On the eve of the massive floods of August 1988 (see Chapter 6), this relatively powerless group with few assets was living in an economically marginal situation close to the city, on low-lying land prone to flooding. Their children were frequently malnourished and chronically ill. This is precisely how the dynamic pressures arising out of landlessness and economic
在 1988 年 8 月大洪水来临前夕（见第六章），这个相对无权、资产稀少的群体生活在靠近城市的经济边缘地带，位于易受洪水影响的低洼土地上。他们的孩子经常营养不良且长期生病。这正是由于无地和经济边缘化所产生的动态压力被转化为一种特定形式的脆弱性：在 1988 年洪水后缺乏抵抗腹泻疾病和饥饿的能力。
marginalisation are channelled into a particular form of vulnerability: a lack of resistance to diarrhoeal disease and hunger following the flooding in 1988. Factors involving power, access, location, livelihood and biology come together to create a particular situation of unsafe conditions and enhanced vulnerability. These social, economic and political causes constitute one side of the pressure model. The other-the floods themselves during August 1988-constitutes the trigger event whose impact on vulnerable people created the disaster. ...

Box 2.2: Karakoram and house collapse ...
This case comes from an interdisciplinary study of housing safety in the Karakoram area of northern Pakistan (Davis 1984b; D’Souza 1984). We follow the chain of explanation that links vulnerability to the specific physical trigger that creates a disaster in reverse, starting with ‘unsafe conditions’. The PAR model may be constructed equally well in either direction of causality, starting with unsafe conditions and working from the specific to the general or vice versa (see, for example, Blaikie’s (1989) causal chain of land degradation from the specific site characteristics to more distant causes arising from the global political economy). ...

The research team carefully examined local dwellings and settlement patterns within the context of a rural economy. They found that the communities were at risk from a wide range of hazards. In this region ...
traditional dwellings were built with stone masonry walls. A series of timber bands were set at regular intervals in the height of each wall in order to hold the stones together, and the complex timber roofs were constructed with a very heavy covering of earth to provide much-needed insulation.
传统住房是用石砌墙建造的。每面墙的高度定期设置了一系列木带，以将石头固定在一起，复杂的木屋顶则用厚厚的土层覆盖，以提供急需的绝缘。

These traditional dwellings were built until around the 1960s or early 1970s, and provided some protection against earthquakes. But, subsequently, local building patterns changed in favour of concrete construction. The new houses were intended to be reinforced, but in reality they were built without any real understanding of how to connect steel to concrete or roofs to walls. The siting of most buildings was equally dangerous, since to avoid reducing their meagre land-holdings (all available flat land was used for agriculture), many houses were built on exceedingly steep slopes, putting them at risk from landslides.
这些传统住宅建造至 1960 年代或 1970 年代初，并提供了一定的抗震保护。然而，随后当地的建筑模式转向了混凝土结构。新建的房屋本应加固，但实际上它们在连接钢材与混凝土或屋顶与墙壁方面缺乏真正的理解。大多数建筑的选址同样危险，因为为了避免减少他们微薄的土地所有权（所有可用的平坦土地都用于农业），许多房屋建在极陡的坡上，使其面临滑坡的风险。

The result was an extremely hazardous situation, with a number of factors together producing these unsafe conditions, including reduced concern about building safety and the diversion of money intended for dwellings to fulfil everyday needs. There was also a lack of knowledge of both concrete
结果是一个极其危险的情况，多个因素共同导致了这些不安全的条件，包括对建筑安全的关注减少以及原本用于住房的资金被转用于满足日常需求。此外，对混凝土的知识也存在缺乏。
construction and aseismic (shock-proof) construction techniques, a shortage of skills and a change in the availability of building materials.
建筑和抗震（防震）建筑技术、技能短缺以及建筑材料供应的变化。

In turn, some of these factors (especially the lack of both skills and materials) could be directly attributed to ‘dynamic pressures’. Firstly, the shortage of timber for building and other purposes in the region had arisen because of deforestation, mostly due to illegal felling and corrupt practice (Blaikie and Sadeque 2000). In addition, population growth over a long period undoubtedly increased the demand for fuelwood in such a cold climate and for building materials. This led to a rapid increase in tree-cutting and forest clearing to create additional fields for cultivation.
这些因素（尤其是技能和材料的缺乏）可以直接归因于“动态压力”。首先，该地区建筑和其他用途的木材短缺是由于森林砍伐，主要是由于非法伐木和腐败行为（Blaikie and Sadeque 2000）。此外，长期的人口增长无疑增加了在如此寒冷气候中对燃料木材和建筑材料的需求。这导致了树木砍伐和森林清理的快速增加，以创造额外的耕作田地。

Secondly, there was a serious shortage of skilled carpenters and masons, so buildings were constructed and maintained by farmers and labourers who freely admitted that they knew very little about the task. In trying to piece together the reasons for the absence of knowledgeable builders another dynamic pressure emerged. During the 1970s the Chinese government had built the Karakoram Highway, a major access road into the area. This linked China with the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. The road was built for political and strategic reasons, but it was also intended to bring ‘development’ to the remote Northern Areas. Risk was ‘imported’ via the highway to the extent that heavy (unsafe) concrete buildings were developed and considered 'modern’
其次，熟练的木匠和石匠严重短缺，因此建筑是由农民和工人建造和维护的，他们坦言对这项工作知之甚少。在试图拼凑缺乏知识型建筑工人的原因时，出现了另一种动态压力。在 1970 年代，中国政府修建了喀喇昆仑公路，这是一条通往该地区的主要通道。它将中国与巴基斯坦首都伊斯兰堡连接起来。这条公路是出于政治和战略原因修建的，但它也旨在为偏远的北部地区带来“发展”。风险通过公路“输入”，以至于开发了重型（不安全的）混凝土建筑，并被视为“现代”。
and their use increased (Coburn et al. 1984). The road also allowed a migration of carpenters out of the area to Karachi, Islamabad and even to the Gulf region (where earnings were twenty times higher). As so often happens, while the road was being used to bring in medical and educational resources, it also enabled loggers to enter the region for the first time and they had removed vast quantities of timber, a process that continues today in spite of logging bans imposed by government. It is likely that the resulting deforestation contributes to soil erosion and slope instability, which increases on-site hazards when earthquakes occur.
他们的使用增加了（Coburn 等，1984 年）。这条道路还使得木匠迁移到卡拉奇、伊斯兰堡甚至海湾地区（那里收入高出二十倍）。正如常常发生的那样，在这条道路被用来引入医疗和教育资源的同时，它也使得伐木工人首次进入该地区，他们移走了大量木材，这一过程至今仍在继续，尽管政府已实施了伐木禁令。由此造成的森林砍伐可能导致土壤侵蚀和坡度不稳定，这在地震发生时增加了现场的危险。

Furthermore, the Pakistani government encouraged their workforce to emigrate so as to attract the foreign currency remittances sent for family support by the workers abroad. This was a policy designed to boost the country’s balance of payments deficit.

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In this way we are led from proximate and specific cause to more remote ‘root causes’. The net result was that the families were left to live in dangerous homes, often with a depleted and de-skilled labour force due to out-migration.
此外，巴基斯坦政府鼓励其劳动力移民，以吸引海外工人为家庭支持而寄回的外汇汇款。这是一项旨在改善国家国际收支赤字的政策。

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通过这种方式，我们从近因和具体原因引导到更远的“根本原因”。最终结果是，家庭被迫生活在危险的房屋中，往往由于外迁而导致劳动力减少和技能下降。

Time and the chain of explanation
时间与解释链

Our two models function in a variety of time scales (see the section on time in Chapter 3).
我们的两个模型在多种时间尺度上运作（见第 3 章关于时间的部分）。

Root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions are all subject to change, and in many cases the processes involved are probably changing faster than they have done previously. The changes in building techniques and materials in Pakistan were rapid (see Box 2.2), as were the processes of out-migration and deforestation. This affected communities that had changed little for many years. Even large-scale processes, such as population growth, are rapid by comparison with changes in, say, values and beliefs or legal structures. For example, during the 1970s Kenya had an annual population increase of 4.2 per cent, giving a doubling time of 16 years. This rapid population growth was, at that time, one of the factors channelling the root causes of vulnerability into unsafe conditions during years that saw great suffering by vulnerable groups during droughts (Wisner 1988a). However, by 1995 the growth rate had fallen to 2.9 per cent (UNDP 1998:177) In other words, even something such as population dynamics can change rapidly.
根本原因、动态压力和不安全条件都可能发生变化，在许多情况下，相关过程的变化速度可能比以往更快。巴基斯坦的建筑技术和材料的变化迅速（见框 2.2），外迁和森林砍伐的过程也是如此。这影响了许多年来变化不大的社区。即使是大规模的过程，如人口增长，与价值观、信仰或法律结构的变化相比也是迅速的。例如，在 1970 年代，肯尼亚的年人口增长率为 4.2%，使得人口翻倍的时间为 16 年。这一快速的人口增长在当时是将脆弱性根本原因引导至不安全条件的因素之一，在干旱期间，脆弱群体经历了巨大的痛苦（Wisner 1988a）。然而，到 1995 年，增长率已降至 2.9%（UNDP 1998:177）。换句话说，即使是人口动态这样的事物也可以迅速变化。

We should add, however, that we are not invoking a neo-Malthusian explanation for the impact of rapid population growth as a dynamic pressure leading to increased vulnerability. It is only when rapid population growth is combined with other dynamic conditions (such as rapid urbanisation, the need to adapt to rapid agricultural intensification in areas of low resource potential, or incompetent economic management) that very rapid population growth can exacerbate vulnerability (see below).
然而，我们应该补充的是，我们并没有引用新马尔萨斯主义的解释来说明快速人口增长作为一种动态压力导致脆弱性增加的影响。只有当快速人口增长与其他动态条件（如快速城市化、在资源潜力低的地区适应快速农业集约化的需要或无能的经济管理）相结合时，快速的人口增长才会加剧脆弱性（见下文）。

The location of settlements and livelihoods can change even more rapidly. For example, between 1973 and 1976 about half of the then 12 million rural inhabitants of Tanzania were variously encouraged or coerced into nucleated villages (Coulson 1982). This completely altered settlement patterns and the resource basis of the affected people’s livelihoods over a period of only three years.

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Other instances of such disruptions are common as a result of war. Four million people, one-third of the Mozambican population, were forced by the civil war there in the 1980s and 1990s to flee to refugee camps in Zimbabwe and Malawi, while many lived as internally displaced persons (IDPs) near a few of Mozambique’s major towns. The impact of such disruptions of access on the vulnerability of these peoples to drought and other hazards has not been studied; nor has the effect of such population movements on the environment, and thus on the creation of future hazards via land degradation (Black 1998).
定居点和生计的位置变化可能更加迅速。例如，在 1973 年至 1976 年间，坦桑尼亚当时 1200 万农村居民中的大约一半被各种方式鼓励或强迫迁入集中村落（Coulson 1982）。这在短短三年内完全改变了定居模式和受影响人群生计的资源基础。

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由于战争，这种干扰的其他实例也很常见。在 1980 年代和 1990 年代，莫桑比克内战迫使 400 万人，即莫桑比克人口的三分之一，逃往津巴布韦和马拉维的难民营，而许多人则作为国内流离失所者（IDPs）生活在莫桑比克几个主要城镇附近。这种获取途径的干扰对这些人群在干旱和其他灾害面前的脆弱性影响尚未得到研究；而这种人口迁移对环境的影响，以及因此对未来通过土地退化产生的灾害的影响，也尚未得到研究（Black 1998）。

Root causes often shift because of disputed power and claims to resources (financial, physical and informational) as well as identities (Platt et al. 1999; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Caplan 2000), and vulnerability may therefore change as a result. The converse is also true. Mass suffering due to disaster may contribute to the overthrow of elites and lead to dramatic realignments of power. It can be argued that the cyclone and storm surge in East Pakistan in 1970 contributed to the development of the Bangladesh independence movement, and that governments in Niger and Ethiopia were overthrown as a result of their incompetent and malign behaviour in the 1970s Sahel famine. The revolutionary movement in Nicaragua from 1974 to 1979 derived some of its impetus from the effects of the Managua earthquake of 1972. Hurricane Mitch (1998) did not cause the overthrow of the national governments in the affected countries, but it did contribute to a widespread reassertion of local, municipal political power in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and a significant increase in the political assertiveness of citizen-based groups. We take up the counter-intuitive notion of disaster as opportunity in Chapter 9.
根本原因往往因权力争夺和对资源（财务、物理和信息）以及身份的主张而发生变化（Platt et al. 1999; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Caplan 2000），因此脆弱性可能会因此而改变。反之亦然。由于灾难造成的大规模痛苦可能促成精英的推翻，并导致权力的剧烈重组。可以说，1970 年东巴基斯坦的气旋和风暴潮促成了孟加拉国独立运动的发展，而尼日尔和埃塞俄比亚的政府则因其在 1970 年代萨赫勒饥荒中的无能和恶劣行为而被推翻。1974 年至 1979 年尼加拉瓜的革命运动部分源于 1972 年马那瓜地震的影响。飓风米奇（1998）并没有导致受影响国家的国家政府被推翻，但确实促成了尼加拉瓜和萨尔瓦多地方、市政政治权力的广泛重新确立，以及公民团体政治主张的显著增强。我们在第九章中探讨了将灾难视为机会的反直觉观念。

Limits to our knowledge
我们知识的局限性

Vulnerability can be assessed reasonably precisely for a specific group of people living and working at a specific time and place, and the ‘unsafe conditions’ that contribute to it have been the subject of a great deal of research reviewed in this book. In much of the world, detailed knowledge has been obtained about which sites might be affected in a landslide, which buildings will survive or collapse in an earthquake and why, or about the outcomes of drought in terms of food production and possible shortfalls. Similarly, dynamic pressures and root causes are reasonably well understood in many situations, although treatments may be highly polemical-indeed they are always political. However, as we move up the chain of explanation from unsafe conditions to root causes, the linkages (and therefore the level of precision in disaster explanation) become less definite. In analysing the linkages between root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions, it becomes increasingly difficult to have reliable evidence for causal connections, especially as we go further back in the chain of explanation.

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脆弱性可以相对精确地评估特定时间和地点生活和工作的特定人群，而导致脆弱性的“安全条件”已成为本书中大量研究的主题。在世界许多地方，已经获得了关于哪些地点可能受到滑坡影响、哪些建筑将在地震中幸存或倒塌及其原因，或关于干旱对粮食生产和可能短缺的结果的详细知识。同样，在许多情况下，动态压力和根本原因也相对较为清楚，尽管处理方法可能高度争议——实际上，它们总是政治性的。然而，随着我们从不安全条件上升到根本原因，联系（因此灾难解释的精确程度）变得不那么明确。在分析根本原因、动态压力和不安全条件之间的联系时，获得因果关系的可靠证据变得越来越困难，尤其是当我们在解释链中向后追溯时。

The uncertainties and gaps in knowledge concerning how vulnerability is demonstrably and causally linked to underlying causes or pressures have some quite serious implications.

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The first is that the links can be dismissed as polemic and ideology, particularly by those who treat disasters as a technical issue alone. However, these uncertainties explain in part why policy makers and other important actors at the international and national levels have caused or allowed unsafe conditions to arise and allowed them to persist. At best, lack of understanding and uncertainties are likely to result in policy makers and decision takers, restricted by the scarce resources at their disposal, addressing immediate pressures and unsafe conditions while neglecting both the social causes of vulnerability as well as the more distant root causes.
关于脆弱性如何明显且因果地与潜在原因或压力相关的知识的不确定性和空白具有相当严重的影响。

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首先，这些联系可能会被视为争论和意识形态，特别是对于那些仅将灾难视为技术问题的人。然而，这些不确定性在一定程度上解释了为什么国际和国家层面的政策制定者及其他重要参与者导致或允许不安全条件的出现并使其持续存在。充其量，缺乏理解和不确定性可能导致政策制定者和决策者在有限的资源约束下，关注于立即的压力和不安全条件，而忽视了脆弱性的社会原因以及更远的根本原因。

Yet these gaps exist mainly because of a failure to ask the right sort of questions. It is imperative to accept that reducing vulnerability involves something very different from simply dealing with hazards by attempts to control nature (engineering measures and ‘public works’) or emergency preparedness, prediction or relief, important though these are. However, most government agencies charged with such responsibilities as ‘environment’, ‘health and welfare’ and ‘public safety’ generally still deal with disasters as though they are equivalent to the natural hazards that trigger them; the principal object is the hazard, and the range of underlying reasons for the dangerous situation may be regarded as peripheral, or even irrelevant and immaterial. The factors involved in linking root causes and dynamic processes to vulnerability are seen as too diffuse or deep-rooted to address. Those who suggest they are crucial may be labelled as unrealistic or overpolitical.

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As Cannon (2000a:48) puts it, ‘[V]ulnerability analysis is avoided as being “irrelevant to science” or “too difficult to get involved in”.’
然而，这些差距主要存在于未能提出正确类型的问题。必须接受，减少脆弱性涉及的内容与仅仅通过控制自然（工程措施和“公共工程”）或应急准备、预测或救助来处理危害是截然不同的，尽管这些措施都很重要。然而，大多数负责“环境”、“健康与福利”和“公共安全”等职责的政府机构通常仍然将灾害视为与触发它们的自然危害等同；主要对象是危害，而导致危险情况的各种根本原因可能被视为边缘的，甚至是无关紧要和不重要的。将根本原因和动态过程与脆弱性联系起来的因素被认为过于分散或根深蒂固，难以解决。那些认为这些因素至关重要的人可能会被贴上不切实际或过于政治化的标签。正如 Cannon（2000a:48）所说，“脆弱性分析被视为‘与科学无关’或‘太难以参与’而被避免。”

Our view is that there is little long-term value in confining attention mainly or exclusively to hazards, in isolation from vulnerability and its causes. Problems will recur again and again in different and increasingly costly forms unless the underlying causes are tackled. This perspective does not deny the importance of technical or planning measures to reduce physical risks. It simply insists on a concern for a deeper level of analysis which places moves to mitigate hazards within a comprehensive understanding
我们的观点是，单独或专门关注危险而忽视脆弱性及其原因，几乎没有长期价值。除非解决根本原因，否则问题将以不同且日益昂贵的形式反复出现。这种观点并不否认技术或规划措施在减少物理风险方面的重要性。它只是坚持关注更深层次的分析，将减轻危险的措施置于全面理解之中。
of the vulnerabilities they are supposed to reduce. In this way, efforts to mitigate hazards will be appropriate and will emerge within the supportive environment for implementation provided by the affected people themselves. Disaster research and policy must therefore account for the connections in society that cause vulnerability, as well as for the hazards themselves.
这些措施旨在减少的脆弱性。通过这种方式，减轻危险的努力将是适当的，并将在受影响人群提供的支持性环境中产生。因此，灾害研究和政策必须考虑导致脆弱性的社会联系，以及危险本身。

Global trends and dynamic pressures
全球趋势和动态压力

Although there is still a serious lack of analysis of the linkages between vulnerability and major global processes, it is encouraging that during the last ten years many more authors and institutions have begun asking such questions. For example, it is now possible to identify more precisely how urbanisation increases hazard impact (Mitchell 1999a; Fernandez 1999; Velasquez et al. 1999) (see below).
尽管对脆弱性与主要全球过程之间联系的分析仍然严重不足，但令人鼓舞的是，在过去十年中，越来越多的作者和机构开始提出此类问题。例如，现在可以更准确地识别城市化如何增加灾害影响（Mitchell 1999a；Fernandez 1999；Velasquez et al. 1999）（见下文）。

There is a general consensus in research on disasters that the number of natural hazard events (earthquakes, eruptions, floods or cyclones) has not increased in recent decades.

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If this is true, then we need to look at the social factors that increase vulnerability (including, but not only, rising population) to explain the apparent increases in the number of disasters (as opposed to hazard events) in terms of the value of losses and the numbers of victims.
在灾害研究中，普遍共识是自然灾害事件（地震、喷发、洪水或气旋）的数量在最近几十年并没有增加。如果这是真的，那么我们需要关注增加脆弱性的社会因素（包括但不限于人口增长），以解释灾害数量（与灾害事件相对）在损失价值和受害者人数方面的明显增加。

Figure 2.2 shows the number of great disasters during the second half of the twentieth century. Some of the increase may be a result of better reporting and improved communications, or the incentive for governments to declare a disaster in an attempt to win foreign aid. But the rising trend seems to be too rapid for these explanations alone (see Box 2.3 below).
图 2.2 显示了 20 世纪下半叶重大灾害的数量。部分增加可能是由于报告更为准确和通讯改善，或者是政府为了争取外国援助而宣布灾害的动机。但这一上升趋势似乎过于迅速，单靠这些解释无法说明（见下文框 2.3）。

Disasters are also becoming more expensive. Economic losses, and especially the share composed of insured losses, are increasing (Figure 2.3).
灾害的经济成本也在增加。经济损失，尤其是保险损失的比例正在上升（图 2.3）。

At this stage, it is important to review in very broad terms how certain of these various dynamic pressures contribute to the increase in disasters. We have chosen seven global processes for further attention: population change, urbanisation, war, global economic pressures (especially foreign debt), natural resource degradation, global environmental change and adverse agrarian trends. These processes are not independent of each other. They are intricately connected in a series of mutually influencing relationships that obscure causes and consequences. Also, it should be remembered that some of these processes appear both as root causes and dynamic pressures: for example, past urbanisation and past war may set up patterns that influence vulnerability hundreds of years later (the decision by the Spanish in 1521 to locate what became Mexico City on the bed of a lake they had drained once their Aztec opponents were conquered; the Second World War that resulted in a new map of Europe). In these cases urbanisation and war can be considered root causes. However, recent or current urban growth and violent conflict should be seen as dynamic pressures.
在这个阶段，重要的是从非常广泛的角度回顾这些各种动态压力如何促成灾难的增加。我们选择了七个全球性过程进行进一步关注：人口变化、城市化、战争、全球经济压力（特别是外债）、自然资源退化、全球环境变化和不利的农业趋势。这些过程并不是相互独立的。它们在一系列相互影响的关系中错综复杂地联系在一起，模糊了因果关系。此外，还应记住，这些过程中的一些既是根本原因也是动态压力：例如，过去的城市化和过去的战争可能会形成影响数百年后脆弱性的模式（例如，西班牙人在 1521 年决定将后来成为墨西哥城的地点设在他们在征服阿兹特克对手后排干的湖床上；第二次世界大战导致了欧洲的新地图）。在这些情况下，城市化和战争可以被视为根本原因。然而，近期或当前的城市增长和暴力冲突应被视为动态压力。

Figure 2.2 Numbers of great natural 1950-1999
图 2.2 1950-1999 年重大自然灾害的数量
Note: The chart shows each year the number of events defined as a great natural catastophes, devided up by type of event
注：该图表显示每年被定义为重大自然灾害的事件数量，按事件类型划分
Source: Munich Re. 2000. Great natural catastrophes—long-term statistics. Available online at
来源：慕尼黑再保险公司。2000 年。重大自然灾害——长期统计数据。在线获取
http://www.munichre.com./pdf/pm_2000_02_29_anhang3_e.pdf
Adapted by kind permission of Munich Re
经慕尼黑再保险公司的友好许可改编

Figure 2.3 Economic and insure losses (with trends) for 1950-1999
图 2.3 1950-1999 年的经济和保险损失（趋势）
Note: The chart presents the economic losses and insured losses-adjusted to 1999 values. The trend curves illustrate the alarming increasing in catastrophic losses at the turn of the century.
注：该图表展示了调整为 1999 年价值的经济损失和保险损失。趋势曲线显示了世纪之交灾难性损失的惊人增加。
Source: Munich Re. 2000. Great natural catastophes-long-term statistics. Available on line at
来源：慕尼黑再保险公司。2000 年。重大自然灾害长期统计数据。可在线获取
http://www.munichre.com./pdf/pm_2000_02_29_anhang3_e.pdf

Box 2.3: Problems with disaster statistics
案例 2.3：灾害统计数据的问题

Where do disaster statistics come from?
灾害统计数据来自哪里？

As with world-wide health and population statistics, disaster statistics are reported by governments to United Nations agencies. These ‘official’ numbers are supplemented and cross-checked by some groups using the reports of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and journalists. The preeminent of such institutions is the Centre for the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) in Belgium (http://www.cred.be). Large reinsurance companies such as Munich Re and Swiss Re also compile international statistics on disasters. The World Bank and some of the UN regional economic commissions, such as the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), have conducted studies of disaster loss and costs. Regional banks such as the Inter American Development Bank (IADB) and Asian Development Bank also study disaster statistics, but from the point of view of economic loss. The World Health Organisation (WHO) and Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) do not maintain permanent registers of death, injury and post-disaster health consequences, but they do, on occasion, analyse and interpret such numbers.
与全球健康和人口统计数据一样，灾害统计数据由各国政府向联合国机构报告。这些“官方”数字由一些团体使用非政府组织（NGO）和记者的报告进行补充和交叉核对。其中最重要的机构是位于比利时的灾害流行病学中心（CRED）（http://www.cred.be）。大型再保险公司如慕尼黑再保险和瑞士再保险也编制国际灾害统计数据。世界银行和一些联合国区域经济委员会，如拉丁美洲经济委员会（ECLA），也进行了灾害损失和成本的研究。区域性银行如美洲开发银行（IADB）和亚洲开发银行也从经济损失的角度研究灾害统计数据。世界卫生组织（WHO）和泛美卫生组织（PAHO）并不维护死亡、受伤和灾后健康后果的永久登记，但他们偶尔会分析和解释这些数字。

How good are disaster statistics?
灾难统计数据有多好？
Like all numbers, disaster statistics are as good or bad as the methods used to collect them. Also disaster statistics have other specific weaknesses. Firstly, despite a large academic literature on the subject, there are no universally agreed definitions of the word 'disaster’ (Quarantelli 1998) or other critical terms. One of the imprecise statistics often used by governments and aid organisations is the number of people ‘affected’ by a disaster. Since definitions of what it is to be ‘affected’ can vary so much, we do not use the number ‘affected’ at all in our book. ‘Injury’ is also a term that can have many meanings (Shoaf 2002; Benson 2002). The term ‘death’, too, can be problematic. For example, in the USA the death toll of the Northridge earthquake varies from 33 to 150+ depending on who defines what an earthquake-related death is: 33 died of direct or indirect earthquake injuries, 57 were defined by the LA County Coroner as dying of causes either directly or indirectly related to the earthquake; FEMA paid death benefits to survivors of more than 150 (Shoaf 2002).
像所有数字一样，灾难统计数据的好坏取决于收集这些数据的方法。此外，灾难统计数据还有其他特定的弱点。首先，尽管在这个主题上有大量的学术文献，但对“灾难”一词（Quarantelli 1998）或其他关键术语并没有普遍认可的定义。政府和援助组织常用的一个不精确的统计数据是“受灾人数”。由于“受灾”的定义差异很大，我们在书中根本不使用“受灾”这个数字。“伤害”也是一个可以有多种含义的术语（Shoaf 2002；Benson 2002）。而“死亡”这个术语也可能存在问题。例如，在美国，诺斯里奇地震的死亡人数根据定义地震相关死亡的标准不同而变化，从 33 人到 150 人以上不等：33 人死于直接或间接的地震伤害，57 人被洛杉矶县验尸官定义为因与地震直接或间接相关的原因而死亡；FEMA 向超过 150 名幸存者支付了死亡赔偿金（Shoaf 2002）。

Also, many extreme events that take only a few lives and affect only a local economy go completely unreported. This is an issue that a regional network of disaster researchers in Latin America have recognised by producing free, bilingual (English and Spanish) accounting software to be used to keep track of these ‘small’ disasters that could well have a highly erosive effect on development (http://www.desmventar.org/desinventar.html). We recommend it highly.
此外，许多只造成少数生命损失并仅影响地方经济的极端事件完全没有被报道。这是拉丁美洲一个地区性灾害研究网络所认识到的问题，他们开发了免费的双语（英语和西班牙语）记账软件，用于跟踪这些可能对发展产生高度侵蚀性影响的“微小”灾害（http://www.desmventar.org/desinventar.html）。我们强烈推荐它。

Abstract摘要

Secondly, there may be deficiencies in the reporting system itself. Many injuries may go unreported or simply are not recorded by health workers who are too busy because of the volume of care demanded in an emergency. In some countries, or regions of a country, even in ‘normal’ times there may be poor coverage of vital statistics, with many births and deaths going unrecorded. This could happen in isolated rural areas as well as densely populated squatter settlements in cities. So, some people may die in an extreme natural event whose lives were not even officially recognised as existing. Others are never found, and are ‘missing’, but are never recorded as ‘dead’, even after a considerable period of time. There is also wide historical variability in disaster data. Davidson observes (2002), ‘This is because of changes in the methods of reporting, the number of people in an affected place, systems and facilities for storing records. This all makes efforts to track historical trends in disasters even more problematic than trying to account for impacts in a single event today. Plus, of course, most records are short compared to the return period of events.’ Thirdly, there can be political pressures either to overstate or to understate casualties. If a government wishes to ‘talk up’ the level of relief assistance, it might exaggerate the lives lost, homes destroyed, people injured. On the other hand, if a government believes it will be criticised by its citizens for not protecting them, there may be a tendency to understate the impacts of a disaster, or to remain silent about it altogether (some examples of politically expedient silences about famine are given in Chapter 4). However, in fairness, it is very difficult to collect data on losses and damage in a timely way when undergoing the stress of the disaster itself, especially if a country has limited transport and communications. The sheer difficulty of drawing up reliable estimates should therefore be considered a fourth reason why disaster statistics should be handled with care.
其次，报告系统本身可能存在缺陷。许多伤害可能未被报告，或者由于急救需求量大，卫生工作者忙于工作而未被记录。在某些国家或国家的某些地区，即使在“正常”时期，重要统计数据的覆盖率也可能很差，许多出生和死亡未被记录。这种情况可能发生在偏远的农村地区，也可能发生在城市中人口稠密的贫民区。因此，一些人在极端自然事件中可能会死去，但他们的生命甚至没有被官方承认。其他人则从未被找到，处于“失踪”状态，但即使经过相当长的时间也未被记录为“死亡”。灾害数据也存在广泛的历史变异性。戴维森（Davidson）观察到（2002 年）：“这与报告方法的变化、受影响地区的人数、记录存储系统和设施有关。这一切使得追踪历史灾害趋势的努力比试图解释今天单一事件的影响更具挑战性。” 此外，当然，大多数记录与事件的回归周期相比是短暂的。第三，可能会有政治压力，导致对伤亡人数的夸大或低估。如果一个政府希望“提升”救援援助的水平，它可能会夸大失去的生命、被毁的房屋和受伤的人数。另一方面，如果一个政府认为会因未能保护公民而受到批评，可能会倾向于低估灾难的影响，或者对此保持沉默（关于饥荒的政治上方便的沉默的一些例子在第四章中给出）。然而，公平地说，在经历灾难本身的压力时，及时收集损失和损害的数据是非常困难的，尤其是当一个国家的交通和通信有限时。因此，制定可靠估计的困难程度应被视为灾难统计数据需要谨慎处理的第四个原因。

Finally, when it comes to economic loss and long-term effects on development, the problem is even murkier (Benson 2003). The longer term 'knock on’ effects of a disaster are conceptually difficult to model, and in most cases governments are not set up to study them (Benson and Clay 1998). Davidson (2002) puts the problem this way: '[W]ith economic effects it’s difficult to assess which changes are caused by the disaster and which would have happened anyway. That is, there’s always the problem that it’s easier to compare before and after the disaster, but what we really should be comparing is with and without the disaster’.
最后，当涉及到经济损失和对发展的长期影响时，问题变得更加模糊（Benson 2003）。灾难的长期“连锁”效应在概念上难以建模，在大多数情况下，政府并没有设立专门的机构来研究这些效应（Benson 和 Clay 1998）。Davidson（2002）这样描述这个问题：“在经济效应方面，很难评估哪些变化是由灾难引起的，哪些变化本来就会发生。也就是说，总是存在这样的问题：比较灾难前后的情况更容易，但我们真正应该比较的是有灾难和没有灾难的情况。”

Population change人口变化

During 2000 the world population passed the six billion mark, yet only 100 years ago it was under two billion. Despite this impressive growth, the predictions of even more rapid population growth forecast in the 1970s by the Club of Rome have not materialised. In fact, there is now evidence that birth rates and total fertility rates (the number of children
在 2000 年，世界人口超过了六十亿，而仅仅一百年前，它还不到二十亿。尽管这种增长令人印象深刻，但 1970 年代罗马俱乐部预测的更快速的人口增长并没有实现。事实上，现在有证据表明，出生率和总生育率（孩子的数量）正在下降。
a woman gives birth to) are declining in India, Indonesia, Iran, Brazil, Mexico and elsewhere (Naik et al. 2003). The UN prediction of two billion more people in the next 25 years, making a total of 8.2 billion by the year 2025, may be too high, and it is even possible that the world’s population will stabilise at around nine billion by mid-century (ibid.).
在印度、印度尼西亚、伊朗、巴西、墨西哥等地，女性生育率正在下降（Naik et al. 2003）。联合国预测未来 25 年将增加 20 亿人口，到 2025 年总人口将达到 82 亿，这一预测可能过高，甚至有可能到本世纪中叶，世界人口将在约 90 亿左右稳定（同上）。

Nevertheless, one thing is certain: populations in many LDCs will continue to grow90 per cent of population growth over the next few decades is predicted to occur within developing countries, many of which are subject to frequent extreme natural events (United Nations 2002c; Population Reference Bureau 2002). It is difficult to object to the idea that population growth is a significant global pressure contributing to increasing vulnerability, and yet the linkages remain uncharted except in rather simplistic terms (e.g. there are more people, therefore some have to live in dangerous places). There are difficulties in trying to explain demographic change more carefully. For instance, there is considerable debate about whether population growth is a cause or a consequence of poverty in LDCs (where, for instance, children are needed to provide labour and security). It is more likely a complex interaction of both.
然而，有一点是确定的：许多最不发达国家的人口将继续增长。预计在未来几十年内，90%的人口增长将发生在发展中国家，其中许多国家经常遭受极端自然事件的影响（联合国 2002c；人口参考局 2002）。很难反对这样一种观点：人口增长是导致脆弱性增加的重要全球压力，然而，除了相对简单的表述（例如，人口增多，因此一些人不得不生活在危险的地方）外，这种联系仍然没有被详细探讨。试图更仔细地解释人口变化存在困难。例如，关于人口增长是最不发达国家贫困的原因还是结果存在相当大的争论（例如，在这些国家，儿童被需要来提供劳动力和安全）。更可能的是，这两者之间存在复杂的相互作用。

So we still need an analysis of the consequences of growth in numbers. This requires a better understanding of the linkage of population growth to disasters, and of any causality involved (Clarke 1989; Dyson 1996). Demographic processes themselves are largely a reflection of people’s (women’s and men’s) responses to the opportunities and uncertainties presented to them by broader economic processes. Some of the implications of population expansion relative to disaster risks can more easily be related to different age groups (see Box 2.4). Therefore we would not want to accept an overly-simplistic linking of population growth with vulnerability that suggests more people suffer more disasters simply because there are more of them in dangerous places. It is also necessary to explain why people put themselves at risk. This is a process not explained by the increase in numbers alone, but by the differential access to incomes and resources in society.
因此，我们仍然需要对人口增长的后果进行分析。这需要更好地理解人口增长与灾害之间的联系，以及其中涉及的因果关系（Clarke 1989; Dyson 1996）。人口过程本身在很大程度上反映了人们（女性和男性）对更广泛经济过程所带来的机会和不确定性的反应。相对于灾害风险，人口扩张的一些影响可以更容易地与不同年龄组相关联（见框 2.4）。因此，我们不想接受将人口增长与脆弱性过于简单地联系在一起的观点，这种观点暗示更多的人在危险地区遭受更多的灾害，仅仅因为他们在危险地区的人数更多。还需要解释为什么人们会让自己处于风险之中。这一过程并不是仅仅通过人数的增加来解释的，而是通过社会中收入和资源的差异性获取来解释的。

The apparently illogical behaviour of people who seem to have too many children in hazardous places can be seen to be more logical (if no less risky) in the context of the Access model used in Chapter 3. Is it significant that rapid population growth occurs in some countries with a long record of disasters? It is difficult to be certain about how to equate a rise in the number of vulnerable people with population growth: if population increases because people are poor, then in effect rising vulnerability is still a product of poverty and not of population growth.
在第三章使用的接入模型的背景下，似乎在危险地区有太多孩子的人们的表面上不合逻辑的行为可以被视为更合逻辑（尽管风险不减）。在一些有着长期灾难记录的国家，快速的人口增长是否具有重要意义？如何将脆弱人口的增加与人口增长等同起来是很难确定的：如果人口因贫困而增加，那么实际上，脆弱性的上升仍然是贫困的产物，而不是人口增长的结果。

As a dynamic pressure, population growth does not seem to us as important as change and age structure (see Box 2.4). In southern Africa as a result of the HIV-AIDS epidemic life expectancy and growth rates are falling, not increasing. This instability in population change is causing severe dislocation in the rural economy and complicating recovery from the drought of 2001-2002.
作为一种动态压力，人口增长在我们看来并不如变化和年龄结构重要（见框 2.4）。由于 HIV-AIDS 流行，南部非洲的预期寿命和增长率正在下降，而不是上升。这种人口变化的不稳定性正在导致农村经济的严重混乱，并使 2001-2002 年干旱后的恢复变得复杂。

Box 2.4: Age structure and vulnerabilities
框 2.4：年龄结构与脆弱性

In Chapter 1 we reviewed studies which show that in some situations the young and the elderly are more vulnerable to the impacts of natural hazards. At the macro-scale, then, one indication of vulnerability may be provided by statistics on the age structure of national populations. How many and what proportion in a given population are children or elderly? On average, how many children and elderly people does each productive adult have to support (referred to as the ‘dependency ratio’)?
在第一章中，我们回顾了研究，这些研究表明在某些情况下，年轻人和老年人对自然灾害的影响更为脆弱。因此，在宏观层面上，脆弱性的一个指标可能是国家人口年龄结构的统计数据。在特定人口中，有多少人和什么比例是儿童或老年人？平均而言，每个生产性成年人需要支持多少儿童和老年人（称为“抚养比”）？

In many developing countries as much as 50 per cent of the total population is under 15 years of age (compared with 20 per cent in industrialised countries). Although a high proportion of these children and teenagers engage in productive economic activity, it will be increasingly difficult to cater for their basic needs since a relatively small percentage of the adult population has to carry the responsibility for feeding, clothing, housing and educating them. Under the political and economic conditions that create poverty, some households simply cannot support their children. These young people have no option other than to become ‘street children’, forced to fend for themselves in hostile urban environments where they are even more vulnerable (Ennew and Milne 1989; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989). Another implication of such an age structure is the need to focus on the critical importance of making all school buildings resistant to hazards (Wisner 2003d; Spence 2003; OAS/USDE 2000).
在许多发展中国家，约有 50%的总人口年龄在 15 岁以下（与工业化国家的 20%相比）。尽管这些儿童和青少年中有很大比例参与生产性经济活动，但由于相对较小比例的成年人口需要承担养活、穿衣、住房和教育他们的责任，满足他们的基本需求将变得越来越困难。在造成贫困的政治和经济条件下，一些家庭根本无法支持他们的孩子。这些年轻人别无选择，只能成为“街头儿童”，被迫在敌对的城市环境中自谋生路，他们在这种环境中更加脆弱（Ennew 和 Milne 1989；Hardoy 和 Satterthwaite 1989）。这种年龄结构的另一个含义是需要关注使所有学校建筑抵御灾害的重要性（Wisner 2003d；Spence 2003；OAS/USDE 2000）。

At the other end of the age spectrum there is also a growing challenge posed by the ageing populations of Japan, North America and Europe. Studies of disaster casualties have indicated that the young and the old are often most at risk. They are, for example, less mobile (capable of evacuation), more dependent, have less resistance to disease, and often command fewer resources. Increasing casualties in disasters can be anticipated in this age group. The implication is that specific risk-reduction policies will be needed to focus on the protection of the elderly (ICIHI 1988:16; World Bank 1994). Also, as a population ages there is a smaller proportion of younger adults working and providing payments into social security systems. Social protection in various forms (pensions, health care, etc.) may deteriorate, thus increasing the vulnerability of the elderly.
在年龄谱的另一端，日本、北美和欧洲的老龄化人口也带来了日益严峻的挑战。灾难伤亡的研究表明，年轻人和老年人往往是最容易受到威胁的群体。例如，他们的流动性较差（疏散能力），更依赖他人，抵抗疾病的能力较弱，且通常拥有的资源较少。在这一年龄组中，灾难造成的伤亡人数可能会增加。这意味着需要制定特定的风险减少政策，以重点保护老年人（ICIHI 1988:16；世界银行 1994）。此外，随着人口老龄化，参与工作并向社会保障系统缴纳费用的年轻成年人比例减少。各种形式的社会保护（养老金、医疗保健等）可能会恶化，从而增加老年人的脆弱性。

In southern Africa, the impact of HIV-AIDS has meant that some rural areas have lost many of their younger adults. The productivity of agriculture has suffered, as has the ability of households to engage in the variety of activities traditionally associated with coping with hazards such as drought (de Waal 2001, 2002).
在南部非洲，艾滋病病毒-艾滋病的影响意味着一些农村地区失去了许多年轻成年人。农业生产力受到影响，家庭参与应对干旱等灾害的各种传统活动的能力也受到影响（de Waal 2001, 2002）。

Bangladesh had a population of 118 million in 1995 and a land area of only 144,836 sq. km. (UNDP 1998). Land shortage is often assumed to be a result of this ratio. But it is really a problem for the poor and powerless, created by inequality in access and ownership, a factor in many forms of vulnerability described in Part II. Of the population, 85 per cent depend on agriculture, and between 40 and 60 per cent own no land (Hartmann 1995; Boyce 1987). The landless and those with little land depend on wage labour and various non-farm activities to make a living. Being labour-intensive, this kind of livelihood strategy encourages large families whose members can work from an early age.
1995 年，孟加拉国的人口为 1.18 亿，土地面积仅为 144,836 平方公里（联合国开发计划署 1998 年）。土地短缺通常被认为是这一比例的结果。但这实际上是一个贫困和无权者的问题，由于获取和拥有的不平等而产生，这是第二部分中描述的多种脆弱性因素之一。在人口中，85%依赖农业，40%到 60%的人没有土地（哈特曼 1995 年；博伊斯 1987 年）。无地者和土地少的人依靠工资劳动和各种非农活动谋生。这种以劳动为密集型的生计策略鼓励大家庭的形成，其成员可以从小就开始工作。

In Chapter 3 we show that livelihood strategies are the key to understanding the way people 'cope’ with hazards. Unequal access to land and the resulting poverty and vulnerability of families is one of the factors that drives population growth (Hartmann and Standing 1989). Vulnerability can be the result. Brammer has noted:
在第三章中，我们展示了生计策略是理解人们如何“应对”危害的关键。对土地的不平等获取以及由此导致的家庭贫困和脆弱性是推动人口增长的因素之一（哈特曼和斯坦丁 1989 年）。脆弱性可能是其结果。布拉默指出：

Growing population pressure has increased the number of landless families, … increased the rate of rural-urban migration and forced increased numbers of people to seek living space and subsistence on disaster-prone land within and alongside major rivers and in the Meghna estuary.
不断增长的人口压力增加了无地家庭的数量，……增加了农村向城市迁移的速度，并迫使越来越多的人在主要河流及梅格纳河口的灾害易发土地上寻求生活空间和生计。

We would add that highly skewed land and income distribution has created many landless and land-poor households who migrate and seek a living space in hazardous locations. ‘Population pressure’ is, in our view, an effect, and not a cause, in this situation. The consequence of highly unequal access to land is that more and more hazardous land is being settled. This is particularly true of the low-lying islands (known locally as char) that emerge as a result of silt deposition in the river estuaries of the delta regions. This poses severe risks to the occupants from both cyclones and river flooding (see Chapters 6 and 7).
我们还要补充的是，极度不均的土地和收入分配造成了许多无地和贫地家庭，他们迁移并在危险地点寻求生活空间。在我们看来，“人口压力”是这种情况的结果，而不是原因。土地获取极不平等的后果是越来越多的危险土地被占据。这在因沉积物沉积而形成的低洼岛屿（当地称为 char）中尤为明显，这些岛屿出现在三角洲地区的河口。对于居住者来说，这对他们构成了来自气旋和河流洪水的严重风险（见第 6 章和第 7 章）。

Whereas this situation is often considered hopeless from a ‘technical’ point of view, there are a range of social solutions that would both reduce the desire for large families and reduce disaster vulnerability. These solutions could include radical land reform, the empowerment of women, and the provision of adequate public services (e.g. health, communications, education). China, Sri Lanka and Kerala State in India have all reduced population growth in this way (Hartmann 1995:289-304; Franke and Chasin 1989).
尽管从“技术”角度来看，这种情况常常被认为是无望的，但有一系列社会解决方案可以同时减少对大家庭的渴望和降低灾害脆弱性。这些解决方案可能包括激进的土地改革、女性赋权以及提供足够的公共服务（例如，健康、通讯、教育）。中国、斯里兰卡和印度的喀拉拉邦都以这种方式减少了人口增长（Hartmann 1995:289-304；Franke 和 Chasin 1989）。

Whilst Bangladesh might be considered an extreme case, it is hard to define the precise relationship between rural population density and well-being, ill-being or vulnerability (Cassen 1994). In other cases there is clear evidence that higher population density has triggered rural development that includes soil and water conservation measures, as in the Close Settled Zone of Kano, northern Nigeria, and Machakos District of Kenya (Adams 2001:193-197).
虽然孟加拉国可能被视为一个极端案例，但很难明确农村人口密度与福祉、非福祉或脆弱性之间的确切关系（卡森 1994 年）。在其他情况下，有明确证据表明，较高的人口密度引发了农村发展，包括土壤和水资源保护措施，例如在尼日利亚北部的密集定居区和肯尼亚的马查科斯区（亚当斯 2001 年：193-197）。

Urbanisation城市化

Urbanisation is a major factor in the growth of vulnerability, particularly of low-income families living within squatter settlements.

^{16}

The urbanisation process results in land pressure as migrants from outside move into already overcrowded cities, so that the new
城市化是脆弱性增长的一个主要因素，特别是对于生活在贫民窟的低收入家庭。

^{16}

城市化过程导致土地压力，因为外来移民涌入已经过度拥挤的城市，因此新来者几乎没有其他选择，只能占用不安全的土地，建造不安全的居所或在不安全的环境中工作（Havlick 1986）。
arrivals have little alternative other than to occupy unsafe land, construct unsafe habitations or work in unsafe environments (Havlick 1986). But the risks from natural hazards are only a part of the dangers these people face in squatter settlements. There are often the far greater and more pressing ‘normal’ risks of malnutrition and poor health (Richards and Thomson 1984; Pryer and Crook 1988; Cairncross et al. 1990a; Wisnerl997).
新移民几乎没有其他选择，只能占据不安全的土地，建造不安全的居所或在不安全的环境中工作（Havlick 1986）。然而，自然灾害带来的风险只是这些人在贫民窟面临的危险的一部分。通常还有更大、更紧迫的“正常”风险，如营养不良和健康状况不佳（Richards 和 Thomson 1984；Pryer 和 Crook 1988；Cairncross 等 1990a；Wisner 1997）。

Hewitt examined the literature on earthquake impacts and found that urbanisation was closely related to damage to once-new multi-storey constructions and in the concentrated poor housing of squatter settlements.
Hewitt 研究了地震影响的文献，发现城市化与曾经崭新的多层建筑的损坏以及贫民窟集中贫困住房的损坏密切相关。
[W]here older sections of cities are run-down, often they have become slums that modernisation passes by. Here, even once solid buildings are weakened by neglect and decay to become death traps in relatively moderate earthquakes.
[W]当城市的老旧部分破败不堪时，往往已经变成了现代化所忽视的贫民窟。在这里，即使曾经坚固的建筑也因被忽视和腐朽而变得脆弱，在相对温和的地震中成为死亡陷阱。
(1981/1982:21-22)
This situation was typified in the earthquake that severely affected decaying inner-city tenements in Mexico City in 1985 (Cuny 1987) and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
这种情况在 1985 年严重影响墨西哥城衰败的市中心公寓的地震中得到了体现（Cuny 1987），并在第 8 章中进行了更详细的讨论。

Maskrey has argued that the inhabitants of such critical areas:
马斯克里曾指出，这些关键地区的居民：
would not choose to live there if they had any alternative, nor do they deliberately neglect the maintenance of their overcrowded and deteriorated tenements. For them it is the best-of-the-worst of a number of disaster-prone scenarios such as having nowhere to live, having no way of earning a living and having nothing to eat.
如果有其他选择，他们不会选择住在那里，也并非故意忽视对拥挤和恶化的公寓的维护。对他们来说，这是在多个灾难易发场景中最坏中的最好，比如没有地方居住、没有谋生的方式和没有食物可吃。

Slum residents often incur greater risks from natural hazards (flood, landslide and mudslide) as a result of having to live in very closely-built structures which can disturb natural land drainage patterns and water-courses (see Chapters 6 and 8). One example was the loss of life in flash flooding and mudslides in the outlying coastal, hillside suburbs of Caracas, Venezuela in 1999. Thirty thousand people died and 100,000 were displaced by this disaster in the densely populated coastal hills where 40 per cent of Venezuela’s population of about 24 million is concentrated into less than 2 per cent of the national land area (IFRC 2001b:82-85; Gunson 2000). Another tragic case, in 2001, was a mass movement of compacted garbage at an open-air solid waste dump that was triggered by heavy rainfall. This dump on the north-eastern edge of Manila is called Payatas, where 2,000 people lived in shacks, working as informal material recyclers700 were killed (Westfall 2001).
贫民窟居民由于不得不生活在非常密集的建筑结构中，常常面临更大的自然灾害风险（洪水、滑坡和泥石流），这会干扰自然的土地排水模式和水流（见第 6 章和第 8 章）。一个例子是 1999 年在委内瑞拉加拉加斯的沿海丘陵郊区发生的闪电洪水和泥石流造成的生命损失。三万人在这场灾难中遇难，10 万人被迫迁移，发生在这个人口密集的沿海丘陵地区，委内瑞拉约 2400 万人口的 40%集中在不到 2%的国土面积上（IFRC 2001b:82-85；Gunson 2000）。另一个悲惨的案例发生在 2001 年，是由于强降雨引发的开放式固体废物垃圾场的压实垃圾大规模移动。这个位于马尼拉东北边缘的垃圾场叫做 Payatas，那里有 2000 人住在简陋的棚屋中，作为非正式的材料回收者，700 人遇难（Westfall 2001）。

The rate of informal or unplanned urban growth can rapidly put large numbers of people at risk, as the example of Quito, Ecuador shows. Since the last destructive earthquake affecting Quito in 1949, the city has grown from 50,000 inhabitants to 1.3 million (1997). Many people have settled on steep slopes, where the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (1997) describes how 53 ravines have been filled in so that sewage or water pipes can cross them, or in order to build roads or houses. The vulnerability of the people living under such conditions is very high.
非正式或无计划的城市增长速度可能迅速使大量人们面临风险，厄瓜多尔基多的例子便是明证。自 1949 年基多遭受毁灭性地震以来，这座城市的人口从 50,000 人增长到 130 万（1997 年）。许多人定居在陡峭的山坡上，瑞典救援服务局（1997 年）描述了 53 条沟壑被填平，以便污水或水管能够穿过，或者为了修建道路或房屋。在这种条件下生活的人们的脆弱性非常高。

Currently nearly half of all humanity lives in cities-a proportion projected to be 60 per cent by 2030 (United Nations 1999:2). Since a significant proportion of this urban population is poor and lives in informal urban settlements, the challenges of urbanisation are likely to grow, and with them the opportunities for disaster reduction. The most recent revision of the World Urbanisation Prospects makes several extremely important points related to this. In the period 2000-2030:
目前，几乎一半的人类生活在城市中——预计到 2030 年这一比例将达到 60%（联合国 1999 年：2）。由于这一城市人口中有相当大一部分是贫困人口，生活在非正式城市定居点中，因此城市化带来的挑战可能会增加，随之而来的是减少灾害的机会。世界城市化前景的最新修订对此提出了几个极为重要的观点。在 2000 年至 2030 年期间：

virtually all the population growth in the world will be concentrated in urban areas (UN 1999:2);
几乎所有的全球人口增长将集中在城市地区（联合国 1999 年：2）；
most of the increase will be absorbed by urban areas of the less developed regions (UN 1999:2);
大部分增长将被欠发达地区的城市所吸收（联合国 1999:2）；
the proportion currently living in small cities is considerably greater than in large cities, although it is growing at a slower pace: in 2000, 29 per cent of the world population lived in cities of less than one million, while by 2015 this percentage is likely to grow only to 31 per cent (UN 1999:6).
目前生活在小城市中的比例远高于大城市，尽管其增长速度较慢：在 2000 年，全球 29%的人口生活在不到一百万的城市中，而到 2015 年这一比例预计仅增长到 31%（联合国 1999:6）。

Thus, cities of all sizes are growing, but the very largest urban regions, those over 10 million, are of particular concern. There have been primate cities and metropoli for centuries; however, the new urban regions with more than 10 million inhabitants, the ‘mega-cities’, are relatively recent. The average size of the world’s largest 100 cities increased from 2.1 million in 1950 to 5.1 million in 1990. In developing countries, the number of cities with over one million people jumped six-fold between 1950 and 1995. In the year 2000, worldwide, the number of cities larger than five million was 41 , and the UN believes this number will rise to 59 by 2015. This will add another 14 million people to the streets and homes of large cities (accounting for 21 per cent of the world’s urban growth) (UN 1999).
因此，各种规模的城市都在增长，但特别关注的是那些超过 1000 万的特大城市。几个世纪以来一直存在着主要城市和大都市；然而，拥有超过 1000 万居民的新城市区域，即“特大城市”，则相对较新。世界上最大的 100 个城市的平均规模从 1950 年的 210 万增加到 1990 年的 510 万。在发展中国家，1950 年至 1995 年间，拥有超过 100 万人口的城市数量增加了六倍。到 2000 年，全球超过 500 万的城市数量为 41 个，联合国认为这一数字到 2015 年将上升到 59 个。这将使大城市的街道和住宅增加 1400 万人口（占全球城市增长的 21%）（联合国 1999 年）。

In the year 2000 there were 19 cities with more than 10 million residents, a number believed likely to increase to 23 by 2015. Of these, fifteen are in LDCs, and they are all prone to natural hazards of one kind or another (see Table 2.1 for similar rankings as of 1996). Eight of these large urban regions are within moderate-to-high seismic risk zones. These cities contain large numbers of buildings of variable quality, many of them poorly constructed or badly maintained. Since the vast majority of deaths and injuries from earthquakes result from building collapse, the vulnerability of people living or working in such structures is bound to be high. Among the list of 23 cities projected by the UN to be of ‘mega-city’ size by 2015, 19 will be in LDCs. The four additions to the list are Hyderabad (India), with a history of destructive floods and Tianjin (China) together with Istanbul and Bangkok.
在 2000 年，有 19 个城市的居民超过 1000 万，预计到 2015 年这一数字可能增加到 23 个。其中十五个位于最不发达国家（LDCs），它们都容易受到某种自然灾害的影响（见表 2.1，1996 年的类似排名）。这八个大型城市区域位于中等至高震灾风险区。这些城市包含大量质量不一的建筑，其中许多建筑结构不良或维护不善。由于绝大多数因地震造成的死亡和伤害是由于建筑物倒塌引起的，因此居住或工作在这些建筑中的人们的脆弱性必然很高。在联合国预计到 2015 年将达到“特大城市”规模的 23 个城市中，有 19 个将位于最不发达国家。新增的四个城市是印度的海得拉巴（Hyderabad），该地区有破坏性洪水的历史，以及中国的天津（Tianjin）、伊斯坦布尔（Istanbul）和曼谷（Bangkok）。

In 2015, if these projections hold up, nine of the largest cities among the LDCs will have a combined population of 148 million people (about the total population of Russia, more than twice the population of Great Britain). Of these, Mexico City and Istanbul are probably at greatest risk (see Chapter 8).
2015 年，如果这些预测成立，最不发达国家中最大的九个城市的总人口将达到 1.48 亿人（大约是俄罗斯的总人口，是英国人口的两倍多）。其中，墨西哥城和伊斯坦布尔可能面临最大的风险（见第 8 章）。

Not only are mega-cities at risk, but smaller cities as well, such as the small coffee marketing centre Armenia in Colombia or Bhuj in Gujarat, India-both severely damaged by earthquakes. Another example is Goma, a city of 500,000 people in eastern Congo. It was cut in half and 40 per cent destroyed by an eruption of the nearby Nyiragongo volcano in January 2002. The vulnerability of the inhabitants was very high
不仅是特大城市面临风险，较小的城市也同样如此，例如哥伦比亚的小咖啡营销中心阿尔梅尼亚或印度古吉拉特邦的布胡杰，这两个城市都遭受了严重的地震破坏。另一个例子是刚果东部的戈马，这座城市有 50 万人口。2002 年 1 月，附近的尼拉贡戈火山喷发将其一分为二，40%的地区被摧毁。居民的脆弱性非常高。
because of a history of conflict in this region that had drained their financial reserves and destroyed the local economy and because there was hardly any municipal governance provided by the rebel force that controlled the city in defiance of the national government in Kinshasa. Without a functioning city government, there was no warning of the eruption, no organised evacuation and no shelter plan (Wisner 2002b; see also Chapter 8).
由于该地区的冲突历史耗尽了他们的财政储备并摧毁了当地经济，加之叛军控制该市而几乎没有提供任何市政治理，导致居民几乎没有得到任何警告，火山喷发时没有组织的撤离和避难计划（Wisner 2002b；另见第 8 章）。

The urbanisation process not only magnifies the dangers of hazard events; it is in itself partly a consequence of a desperate migrant response to rural disasters. There is evidence from Delhi, Khartoum and Dhaka ...

Table 2.1 Largest cities in hazard areas (ranked by population in 1996) ...

City/conurbation

Population 1996

(millions)

...

Projected population

20 15 (millions)

Hazard(s) to which

exposed

...

Tokyo-Yokohama ...

27.2

28.9 Earthquake, cyclone ...

Mexico City ...

16.9

19.2

Earthquake, flood,

landslide

...

São Paolo ...

16.8

20.3 Landslide, flood ...

New York ...

16.4

17.6 Winter storm, cyclone ...

Mumbai/Bombay ...

15.7

26.2 Earthquake, flood ...

Shanghai ...

13.7

18.0 Flood; typhoon ...

Los Angeles ...

12.6

14.2 Earthquake; landslide, ...

12.1

17.3 Cyclone, flood ...

Calcutta ...

11.9

13.9 Flood ...

Buenos Aires ...

11.4

15.6 Earthquake ...

Beijing ...

10.9

24.6 Flood ...

Lagos ...

10.6

10.6 Earthquake, cyclone ...

Osaka ...

10.3

11.9 Landslide, flood ...

10.3

16.9 Flood, heat and cold ...

Rio de Janeiro ...

10.1

19.4 Earthquake, flood ...

Delhi ...

9.9

14.4 Flood, earthquake ...

Karachi ...

9.6

14.7 Flood, cyclone ...

Cairo-Giza ...

9.0

19.5 Flood, cyclone ...

Manila ...

8.8

13.9 Earthquake, volcano ...

Dhaka ...

Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. http://www.un.org/esa/population/pubsarchive/urb/furb.htm ...
(Bangladesh) that rural families who have become destitute as a result of droughts or floods have moved to these cities in search of food and work. Shakur studied the urbanisation process in Dhaka. His household surveys revealed that:
（孟加拉国）由于干旱或洪水而变得贫困的农村家庭已迁移到这些城市寻求食物和工作。Shakur 研究了达卡的城市化过程。他的家庭调查显示：
the overwhelming majority of Dhaka squatters are rural destitutes who migrated to the city mainly in response to poor economic conditions (37 per cent) (particularly landlessness) or were driven by the natural disasters ( 25.7 per cent) (floods, cyclones and famines).
达卡的绝大多数占地者是因经济条件恶劣（37%）（特别是失去土地）或因自然灾害（25.7%）（洪水、飓风和饥荒）而迁移到城市的农村贫困者。

In a related way, cities have provided safe refuges in Africa and Central America from civil wars and rural warlordism, thus accelerating urban growth. For example, during the last few years of the civil war in Angola, tens of thousands of IDPs risked malaria and other diseases, living in swampy conditions on the edges of Luanda, capital of Angola.
以相关的方式，城市为非洲和中美洲提供了从内战和农村军阀主义中安全避难所，从而加速了城市增长。例如，在安哥拉内战的最后几年，成千上万的国内流离失所者冒着疟疾和其他疾病的风险，生活在安哥拉首都罗安达边缘的沼泽条件下。

War as a dynamic pressure
战争作为一种动态压力

There will unfortunately have to be frequent mention of war in the case study chapters in Part II. In 1985 van der Wusten (1985) counted more than 120 wars since the end of the Second World War. Another source that took a narrower definition than van der Wusten gives the total for the twentieth century to be 165 wars that have claimed 180 million lives (White 1999). Whether the definition used is narrow or broad, violent conflicts have had disastrous consequences in their own right for the people caught up in them, and they have also influenced vulnerability to extreme climatic and geological processes (Wisner 2002c). On a regional and local scale, war has disrupted and degraded the environment, for instance, in Vietnam and the Gulf (SIPRI 1976; Kemp 1991; Seager 1992; Austin and Bruch 2000). Bomb craters, burning of forest or wetlands or poisoning with herbicide (SIPRI 1980; Westing 1984a, 1984b, 1985) can either trigger extreme events (such as landslides) or remove people’s protection from extremes (such as coastal mangroves as a screen against high winds). Unexploded mines deny people access to arable land, thus reducing food security. Rural people in Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Eritrea and Cambodia have lost limbs trying to farm in heavily mined areas.
不幸的是，在第二部分的案例研究章节中将不得不频繁提及战争。1985 年，范德·乌斯滕（van der Wusten）统计自第二次世界大战结束以来发生的战争超过 120 场。另一个采用比范德·乌斯滕更狭义定义的来源则指出，20 世纪的战争总数为 165 场，造成 1.8 亿人丧生（怀特 1999）。无论使用的定义是狭义还是广义，暴力冲突对卷入其中的人们造成了灾难性的后果，同时也影响了对极端气候和地质过程的脆弱性（威斯纳 2002c）。在区域和地方层面，战争破坏和退化了环境，例如在越南和海湾地区（斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所 1976；肯普 1991；西格 1992；奥斯丁和布鲁赫 2000）。炸弹弹坑、森林或湿地的燃烧或使用除草剂造成的污染（斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所 1980；韦斯廷 1984a, 1984b, 1985）可能会引发极端事件（如山体滑坡），或剥夺人们抵御极端天气的保护（如沿海红树林作为抵御强风的屏障）。未爆炸的地雷使人们无法进入可耕地，从而降低了粮食安全。阿富汗、安哥拉、莫桑比克、厄立特里亚和柬埔寨的农村居民在尝试在重度布雷区耕作时失去了肢体。

The economic impact of war, especially so-called ‘low intensity’ or ‘counterinsurgency’ warfare, is very high for isolated rural households, who may often be highly vulnerable to begin with (Stewart and Fitzgerald 2000). Contending forces ebb and flow over such peasant lands, extracting rations or tribute, making life insecure. The influx of refugees following war in a neighbouring territory can have an immediate and dramatic influence on vulnerability by suddenly raising the population density (Hansen and OliverSmith 1982; Jacobson 1988). Demands on local services and infrastructure increases, fuelwood and water needs must be met, sometimes with damaging consequences for the
战争的经济影响，尤其是所谓的“低强度”或“反叛乱”战争，对孤立的农村家庭来说非常高，这些家庭往往本身就非常脆弱（Stewart and Fitzgerald 2000）。交战双方在这些农民土地上起伏不定，抽取口粮或贡品，使生活变得不安全。邻近地区战争后涌入的难民可以通过突然提高人口密度，对脆弱性产生直接而剧烈的影响（Hansen and OliverSmith 1982；Jacobson 1988）。对当地服务和基础设施的需求增加，燃料和水的需求必须得到满足，有时会对环境造成破坏性的后果。
local environment (Black 1998). This local population pressure can also increase disaster vulnerability.
地方环境（Black 1998）。这种地方人口压力也可能增加灾害脆弱性。

As we pointed out in Chapter 1, the interlinkages between conflict and disaster are numerous and complex. The case of the 50 years of civil war in Colombia illustrates such complexities; 2.1 million Colombians were internally displaced at the end of 2000. Many have sought refuge on the edges of cities, where they live in conditions that make them highly vulnerable to shack fires, earthquakes, landslides, floods and epidemic disease, not to mention violence, sexual abuse, hunger, unemployment and despair. Ninety per cent of these people have been displaced by violent conflict. The majority are children, AfroColombians and poor women. Only 20 per cent of these IDPs have received any aid from the Colombian state, and even that has been ‘minimal and short term’ (Lopez 2001:7). This example shows how violent conflict can affect some of the particular social and demographic groups we have already identified as being highly vulnerable to extreme natural events. It shows, too, how violent conflict increases the pressure of unplanned urbanisation.
正如我们在第一章中指出的，冲突与灾难之间的相互联系是众多且复杂的。哥伦比亚长达 50 年的内战案例说明了这种复杂性；到 2000 年底，220 万哥伦比亚人被迫流离失所。许多人在城市边缘寻求庇护，生活在使他们高度易受火灾、地震、山体滑坡、洪水和流行病影响的条件下，更不用说暴力、性虐待、饥饿、失业和绝望。90% 的这些人是因暴力冲突而流离失所。大多数是儿童、非洲裔哥伦比亚人和贫困女性。只有 20%的这些内部流离失所者得到了哥伦比亚国家的任何援助，即便如此也只是“微不足道且短期的”（Lopez 2001:7）。这个例子表明，暴力冲突如何影响我们已经识别出的某些特别社会和人口群体，这些群体在极端自然事件中高度脆弱。它还表明，暴力冲突如何加大了非计划城市化的压力。

Finally, in Colombia the connection between violent conflict, environmental degradation, loss of livelihood and vulnerability are vividly clear. Part of the enormously complex civil war in Colombia includes aerial spraying of pesticide onto coca crops (part of the US ‘War on Drugs’). From August 2000 to May 2001 alone there were 1,158 reports of damage to human health, food crops, livestock and the environment (Lopez 2001:8). Where food crop areas are located near to small plots of coca plants, a household’s food has also been destroyed, as have grazing animals including horses, cattle, sheep, goats, rabbits, tortoises and fowl (Lopez 2001).
最后，在哥伦比亚，暴力冲突、环境退化、生计丧失和脆弱性之间的联系显而易见。哥伦比亚复杂的内战的一部分包括对可可作物的航空喷洒农药（这是美国“禁毒战争”的一部分）。仅在 2000 年 8 月至 2001 年 5 月期间，就有 1,158 起对人类健康、粮食作物、牲畜和环境的损害报告（Lopez 2001:8）。当粮食作物区域靠近小块可可植物时，家庭的粮食也遭到破坏，放牧的动物，包括马、牛、羊、山羊、兔子、乌龟和家禽也受到影响（Lopez 2001）。

The manufacturer (Monsanto) of the main fumigation ingredient, Roundup, advises against aerial spraying and recommends that grazing animals do not enter areas where it has been applied for two weeks. Yet the US and Colombian military spray it directly onto small farmers, crops and livestock. In addition, the manufacturer advises against using Roundup near bodies of water because of potential harm to aquatic life. During 20002001 spraying was intense in the Putumayo region of Colombia, on the edge of the Amazonian basin. It is a region with intricate waterways and strong currents. Thus unintentional contamination, far from the coca-growing targets, is almost certain (Lopez 2001). In response to the aerial spraying some small farmers have abandoned the land and have joined the urban displaced persons discussed earlier. Others have gone even deeper into the rainforest where they hope they can farm in peace. In this way, the agricultural frontier is being extended, with accompanying deforestation and long-term reduction of biodiversity and forest cover. This, too, contributes in the long run to increased vulnerability to extreme natural events.
主要熏蒸成分 Roundup 的制造商（孟山都）建议不要进行空中喷洒，并建议放牧动物在施用后两周内不要进入施药区域。然而，美国和哥伦比亚军方却直接将其喷洒在小农户、作物和牲畜上。此外，制造商还建议在水体附近不要使用 Roundup，因为可能对水生生物造成伤害。在 2000 年至 2001 年期间，哥伦比亚普图马约地区的喷洒非常频繁，该地区位于亚马逊盆地的边缘。这里是一个水道复杂、流速强劲的地区。因此，远离可可种植目标的意外污染几乎是必然的（洛佩斯 2001）。作为对空中喷洒的回应，一些小农户已经放弃了土地，加入了之前讨论的城市流离失所者。其他人则更深入雨林，希望能够安静地耕作。通过这种方式，农业边界正在扩展，伴随着森林砍伐和生物多样性及森林覆盖率的长期减少。这也在长远上增加了对极端自然事件的脆弱性。

Global economic pressures
全球经济压力

A further global pressure on vulnerability to disasters involves the workings of the world economy (Castells 1996; Stiglitz 2002; Cavanagh et al. 2002). Since the Second World War the global economic order has changed rapidly. In particular, the pattern of financial relationships between the industrialised MDCs and LDCs has altered following decolonisation. Globally, prices are falling for the agricultural and mineral exports on
对于脆弱性面临的进一步全球压力涉及世界经济的运作（Castells 1996; Stiglitz 2002; Cavanagh et al. 2002）。自第二次世界大战以来，全球经济秩序迅速变化。特别是，工业化的发达国家（MDCs）与发展中国家（LDCs）之间的金融关系模式在去殖民化后发生了变化。全球范围内，发展中国家传统上依赖的农业和矿产出口价格正在下降。
which LDCs have traditionally had to depend.
发展中国家传统上必须依赖的农业和矿产出口价格正在下降。
Meanwhile, the prices LDCs have to pay for their imported energy and technology have increased. This has created circumstances in which many LDCs face great difficulty in maintaining their balance of payments. In addition, the oil price rises of 1973 and 1979 led many countries to incur foreign debts. These were transformed into repayment crises, especially in light of rapid increases in interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In many African countries, debt servicing alone (i.e. payments of interest and charges) amounts to

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per cent of export earnings (George 1988; Onimode 1989; ROAPE 1990; Africa World Press 1997). The flow of financial aid into Africa (net of debt payment and repatriated profits) has declined steadily (Cheru 1989; Adedeji 1991; Mengisteab and Logan 1995; Mkandawire and Soludo 1999), and in some cases is exceeded by debt and interest repayments. In 1998, 31 of 48 African countries paid debt service in excess of 50 per cent of their GNP (TransAfrica Forum 2003). Foreign debt amounted to a very high percentage of annual GDP (gross domestic product) in many Latin American countries in 1985:107 per cent in Bolivia, 99 per cent in Chile, 80 per cent in Uruguay, 77 per cent in Venezuela and 73 per cent in Peru. The Latin American average was 60 per cent of GDP (Branford and Kucinski 1988:9). This percentage fell to 40 in the period 1996-2000, but this is still a significant burden (IMF 2002:63).
与此同时，最不发达国家（LDCs）为其进口能源和技术所支付的价格已上升。这造成了许多最不发达国家在维持其国际收支平衡方面面临巨大困难的情况。此外，1973 年和 1979 年的油价上涨使许多国家产生了外债。这些外债转变为偿债危机，尤其是在 1970 年代末和 1980 年代初利率迅速上升的背景下。在许多非洲国家，仅债务服务（即利息和费用的支付）就占出口收入的

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百分比（George 1988；Onimode 1989；ROAPE 1990；Africa World Press 1997）。流入非洲的财政援助（扣除债务支付和汇回利润后）稳步下降（Cheru 1989；Adedeji 1991；Mengisteab 和 Logan 1995；Mkandawire 和 Soludo 1999），在某些情况下，债务和利息偿还甚至超过了这一流入。1998 年，48 个非洲国家中有 31 个的债务服务支付超过其国民生产总值（GNP）的 50%（TransAfrica Forum 2003）。 1985 年，许多拉丁美洲国家的外债占年国内生产总值（GDP）的比例非常高：玻利维亚为 107%，智利为 99%，乌拉圭为 80%，委内瑞拉为 77%，秘鲁为 73%。拉丁美洲的平均水平为 GDP 的 60%（Branford 和 Kucinski 1988:9）。这一比例在 1996-2000 年期间降至 40，但这仍然是一个显著的负担（IMF 2002:63）。

The outcome of this pressure was to intensify the need to export at any cost. At the national level, this world economic situation added pressure to exploit natural resources to the fullest extent possible to maximise exports. As discussed below, such a ‘growth mentality’ has resulted in degraded forests and soil that increase vulnerability to disasters (Tierney 1992; Mander and Goldsmith 1996; Burbach et al. 1997; UNRISD 2000).
这种压力的结果是加剧了以任何代价出口的需求。在国家层面，这种世界经济形势增加了对自然资源的最大限度开发的压力，以最大化出口。如下面所讨论的，这种“增长心态”导致了森林和土壤的退化，增加了对灾害的脆弱性（Tierney 1992；Mander 和 Goldsmith 1996；Burbach 等 1997；UNRISD 2000）。

Since the 1980s many indebted countries have agreed to structural adjustment policies (including IMF ‘stabilisation’ and World Bank ‘restructuring’ policies), or initiated their own programmes that involve cutting public spending and a number of other measures discussed below. As a result, services such as education, health and sanitation are often reduced and state-owned enterprises privatised (both these measures leading to unemployment), while food subsidies are reduced. The early effects of these policies on welfare were analysed in studies by Cornia et al. (1987) and Onimode (1989), among others, but there was little discussion of the effect of such programmes on disaster vulnerability.

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As a result of such studies, various ‘safety nets’ and other modifications of the structural adjustment policy design were built in, as described by Stewart (1987) and Haq and Kirdar (1987).
自 1980 年代以来，许多负债国家同意实施结构调整政策（包括国际货币基金组织的“稳定”政策和世界银行的“重组”政策），或启动了涉及削减公共支出及其他一些措施的自有计划。结果，教育、健康和卫生等服务往往被削减，国有企业被私有化（这两项措施都导致了失业），同时食品补贴也被减少。Cornia 等人（1987 年）和 Onimode（1989 年）等人的研究分析了这些政策对福利的早期影响，但对这些项目对灾害脆弱性的影响讨论较少。

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由于这些研究，Stewart（1987 年）和 Haq 与 Kirdar（1987 年）所描述的各种“安全网”和结构调整政策设计的其他修改被纳入其中。

There is still controversy over whether these modifications were sufficient to protect vulnerable people and fragile environments. Because there have been a number of different phases of these programmes, with different impacts across time and between different countries, it is more difficult to make an evidence-based case for the impact of structural adjustment policies on vulnerability in a particular country. However, the fundamental characteristics of these programmes have remained, though the targets and means to reach them have changed.
关于这些修改是否足以保护脆弱人群和脆弱环境仍然存在争议。由于这些项目经历了多个不同的阶段，且在不同国家和时间段内产生了不同的影响，因此更难以基于证据的方式论证结构调整政策对特定国家脆弱性的影响。然而，这些项目的基本特征仍然存在，尽管目标和实现目标的手段发生了变化。

The structural adjustment policies objective was to reduce the debt burden of the poorest countries by inducing them to export their way to economic growth and freedom from crippling debts (Panos Institute 2002:6). Such policies first insisted on privatisation of the economy and a rolling back of the state’s control of sectors such as health, water
结构调整政策的目标是通过促使最贫困国家出口以实现经济增长和摆脱沉重债务，从而减轻其债务负担（Panos Institute 2002:6）。这些政策首先要求对经济进行私有化，并逐步削弱国家对健康、水等领域的控制。
and electricity supply, marketing and transportation. Secondly, capital market liberalisation was imposed, and any outflows of foreign capital which had invested in the newly privatised sectors had to be persuaded back by raising interest rates (sometimes to 60-80 per cent), with ensuing financial volatility. Thirdly, market-based pricing was insisted upon, which, for consumers, meant greatly increased prices for public utilities and some basic food staples which had hitherto been subsidised by the state. The result was social unrest in many countries during the 1980s. Lastly, conditions for free trade and the dismantling of barriers to foreign investment took place.
以及电力供应、市场营销和运输。其次，实施了资本市场自由化，任何投资于新私有化部门的外资流出必须通过提高利率（有时达到 60-80%）来劝说其回流，导致金融波动。第三，坚决要求市场定价，这对消费者而言意味着公共事业和一些此前由国家补贴的基本食品价格大幅上涨。结果是在 1980 年代许多国家出现了社会动荡。最后，实施了自由贸易的条件和拆除对外资投资的壁垒。

Despite the controversy surrounding the short- and long-term effectiveness and side effects of these IMF and World Bank policies, it is now widely recognised that these measures did not produce the desired effects and were particularly onerous for the poor (Rich 1994). Oxfam International estimated that the IMF-imposed cuts (in countries where structural adjustment policies had been implemented) had resulted in 29,000 deaths from malaria and had increased the number of untreated cases of tuberculosis by 90,000 (Brecher 1999). Health care, nutrition of the poorest, investment in human capital through education, all declined. Public infrastructure was neglected and public works programmes (upon which the poorest relied most heavily for safety and for employment) were cut back. Safety regulations at work and pollution standards were reduced to attract foreign investors, further increasing vulnerability. Wage levels were pared down in order to win export orders and attract investments by multinational corporations. This price war between the poorest countries has been described as ‘a race to the bottom’ (Madeley 1999). Child labour increased in sweatshops.
尽管围绕这些国际货币基金组织和世界银行政策的短期和长期有效性及副作用存在争议，但现在普遍认为这些措施未能产生预期效果，并且对贫困人口尤其沉重（Rich 1994）。乐施会国际估计，国际货币基金组织施加的削减（在实施结构调整政策的国家）导致了 29,000 人死于疟疾，并使未治疗的结核病病例增加了 90,000 例（Brecher 1999）。医疗保健、最贫困人群的营养、通过教育对人力资本的投资均有所下降。公共基础设施被忽视，公共工程项目（最贫困人群最依赖其保障安全和就业）被削减。为了吸引外国投资者，工作场所的安全法规和污染标准被降低，进一步增加了脆弱性。为了赢得出口订单和吸引跨国公司的投资，工资水平被压低。这种最贫困国家之间的价格战被形容为“向底部的竞赛”（Madeley 1999）。童工在血汗工厂中增加。

A new initiative for assisting Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) was introduced in 1996 by the IMF. In 1999 an ‘enhanced initiative’ was introduced to decrease their debt to manageable and sustainable levels, and increased the number of eligible countries from 29 to 36 ( 22 of which were in Africa). A new condition was introduced for countries to comply with, which required them to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Policy (PRSP). Although this exercise was supposed to be directed by national governments and shaped by wide-spread civic participation, it is claimed that this has not been the case. None the less, the enforced focus on poverty by the IMF and the World Bank cannot be detrimental to vulnerability, although whether it makes any long-term difference is open to question. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2000/2001 has a whole chapter devoted to ‘Managing Economic Crises and Natural Disasters’ (World Bank 2001), and there is an analysis of the impacts of natural disasters and their impact upon the poor. Prevention and mitigation measures are suggested which look quite similar in some respects to those we suggest in Chapter 9.
1996 年，国际货币基金组织（IMF）推出了一项旨在协助高度负债贫困国家（HIPCs）的新倡议。1999 年，推出了一项“增强倡议”，旨在将这些国家的债务降低到可管理和可持续的水平，并将符合条件的国家数量从 29 个增加到 36 个（其中 22 个在非洲）。为国家设定了一项新条件，要求它们制定贫困减轻战略政策（PRSP）。尽管这一过程应该由国家政府主导，并通过广泛的公民参与来形成，但有人声称情况并非如此。尽管如此，国际货币基金组织和世界银行对贫困的强制关注不应对脆弱性产生负面影响，尽管这是否会带来任何长期变化仍然存在疑问。世界银行的《2000/2001 年世界发展报告》有整整一章专门讨论“管理经济危机和自然灾害”（世界银行 2001），并分析了自然灾害的影响及其对贫困者的影响。建议的预防和缓解措施在某些方面与我们在第 9 章中建议的措施相似。

However, our main scepticism concerns whether these PRSPs will ever be implemented. There have been long delays in their acceptance because of the difficulties in complying with complex and stringent conditions (especially over privatisation). To the extent that what is known as the ‘decision point’ or acceptance of the PRSP is hard to reach, debt relief and the implementation of the programme has been delayed. Furthermore, many of the PSRPs do not have clear policies to reduce poverty, and many of the more radical zmeasures which would help (for example, improvement of labour rights, minimum wages, safety at work and land reform) seem to have been omitted (Marshall and Woodroffe 2001). Instead other, rather vaguer directions have developed
然而，我们主要的怀疑在于这些贫困减轻战略计划（PRSPs）是否会真正实施。由于难以遵守复杂而严格的条件（尤其是关于私有化的条件），它们的接受经历了长时间的延迟。在所谓的“决策点”或 PRSP 的接受难以达到的程度上，债务减免和项目的实施也被推迟。此外，许多 PRSP 并没有明确的减贫政策，而许多更激进的措施（例如改善劳动权利、最低工资、工作安全和土地改革）似乎被遗漏了（Marshall 和 Woodroffe 2001）。相反，其他一些相对模糊的方向逐渐形成。
such as good governance, careful monitoring, addressing corruption, improving access to education and health services (Panos Institute 2002). However, optimists point to encouraging rhetoric and real efforts to identify positive poverty-reducing policies, while pessimists see the latest reincarnation of structural adjustment policies as plus ça change…
例如良好治理、仔细监测、打击腐败、改善教育和医疗服务的获取（Panos Institute 2002）。然而，乐观主义者指出鼓舞人心的言辞和真正努力识别积极的减贫政策，而悲观主义者则认为最新的结构调整政策的再现不过是“变化不变”……

In this debate, much of the discussion has been of global pressures on poverty rather than vulnerability, and as our book emphasises, poverty is not synonymous with vulnerability, although the two conditions are often highly correlated. It is difficult to provide hard evidence of such a relationship between structural adjustment policies and vulnerability, although it is much clearer regarding poverty. However, the majority of the deteriorating conditions in the living standards of the poor, as outlined here, can reasonably be assumed also to affect vulnerability adversely, and as such constitute a global pressure.
在这场辩论中，讨论的重点主要是全球对贫困的压力，而不是脆弱性。正如我们的书中强调的，贫困并不等同于脆弱性，尽管这两种情况通常高度相关。虽然很难提供结构调整政策与脆弱性之间关系的确凿证据，但关于贫困的关系则要清晰得多。然而，这里概述的贫困人口生活水平恶化的主要情况，可以合理地假设也会对脆弱性产生不利影响，因此构成了一种全球压力。

In some cases, however, it is possible to demonstrate clear links between vulnerability and the operation of the global economy, as exemplified by a case from Jamaica during the 1980s and 1990s (Ford 1989). In the 1980s, the government of Jamaica intervened in the financial sector to try and reduce inflation and stimulate production because of its large foreign debt. This policy was intended to attract foreign capital seeking high interest rates. Interest rates went up to over 20 per cent, and home mortgage rates ran between 14 and 25 per cent. These financial changes took place in a situation where the government enforced rent control and levied an import duty on construction material. As a result of this combination of policies, new residential construction declined rapidly.
然而，在某些情况下，可以清楚地证明脆弱性与全球经济运作之间的联系，正如 1980 年代和 1990 年代牙买加的一个案例所示（Ford 1989）。在 1980 年代，牙买加政府干预金融部门，试图减少通货膨胀并刺激生产，因为其外债庞大。该政策旨在吸引寻求高利率的外国资本。利率上升至超过 20%，而住房抵押贷款利率在 14%到 25%之间。这些金融变化发生在政府实施租金管制并对建筑材料征收进口税的情况下。由于这些政策的组合，新住宅建设迅速下降。

Thus, the global economy-acting as a dynamic pressure-worked its way through to specific unsafe conditions in Jamaica. According to Ford there was an immediate increase in vulnerability of a significant proportion of the urban population to hurricanes and earthquakes. This results from the fact that property owners faced with such high mortgage interest rates and little hope of recouping this by increasing their rents (due to the rent restrictions) simply ignored maintenance (Ford 1989). Hurricane Gilbert damaged more than 100,000 low-income homes in 1988, producing costs of $558 million. More than 28,000 homes of the poor were either completely destroyed or had severe damage to roofs and structure (Government of Jamaica 2003).
因此，全球经济作为一种动态压力，导致牙买加出现了特定的不安全条件。根据福特的说法，城市人口中相当大比例的脆弱性立即增加，面临飓风和地震的威胁。这是因为面临如此高的抵押贷款利率且几乎没有通过提高租金（由于租金限制）来弥补损失的希望，房产所有者干脆忽视了维护（福特 1989）。1988 年，飓风吉尔伯特损坏了超过 100,000 套低收入住房，造成了 5.58 亿美元的损失。超过 28,000 套贫困家庭的住房要么完全被毁，要么屋顶和结构严重受损（牙买加政府 2003）。

In the early 1990s, external debt was more than 80 per cent of GDP. By 1997 that ratio had fallen to below 50 per cent (Government of Jamaica 2002). For instance, in 1989, service on external debt amounted to nearly one-third of export income; while by 1999 that had been reduced to 17 per cent (Jamaica at a Glance 1999). Nevertheless, interest rates continued to climb. The average lending rate reached a peak of 54 per cent in 1997. Although the lending rate declined gradually to 26 per cent in 2002 (PSOJ 2002), the pressure on new residential construction and maintenance of old structures described by Ford continued. Low-income housing would therefore still seem to be susceptible to the next big direct hit by a hurricane. The experience of Jamaica during the past 20 years illustrates the linkages that exist between the global economy, national economic policies and vulnerability. The impact of ‘structural adjustment’ on vulnerability went far beyond the issue of building maintenance. Because of the high cost of finance, builders tried to keep the cost of construction as low as possible so some small profit could be made. Again, safety suffered.
在 1990 年代初期，外债占 GDP 的比例超过 80%。到 1997 年，这一比例已降至 50%以下（牙买加政府 2002）。例如，在 1989 年，外债服务费用占出口收入的近三分之一；而到 1999 年，这一比例已降至 17%（牙买加概况 1999）。尽管如此，利率仍然持续上升。1997 年，平均贷款利率达到了 54%的峰值。尽管贷款利率在 2002 年逐渐降至 26%（PSOJ 2002），但福特所描述的新住宅建设和旧建筑维护的压力依然存在。因此，低收入住房似乎仍然容易受到下一次飓风的重大直接冲击。过去 20 年牙买加的经历说明了全球经济、国家经济政策与脆弱性之间的联系。“结构调整”对脆弱性的影响远远超出了建筑维护的问题。由于融资成本高，建筑商试图将建设成本控制在尽可能低的水平，以便获得一些小利润。安全性再次受到影响。

Health and education budgets suffered cuts under Jamaica’s structural adjustment policies. Even more crucial is the fact that the government’s own programmes to introduce preparedness or mitigation measures were also cut as a result of the economic constraints. It would be difficult to determine whether the severe damage to Jamaica from hurricanes Gilbert in 1988 and Hugo in 1989 were made worse by the economic policies described above, but such potential connections are clearly possible. An additional irony in the Jamaican situation is that part of the foreign debt burden that caused the government to launch its structural adjustment policy was due to loans used to pay for previous hurricane damage (see Chapter 7).
牙买加的结构调整政策导致健康和教育预算遭到削减。更为关键的是，政府自身用于引入准备或减缓措施的项目也因经济限制而被削减。很难确定 1988 年吉尔伯特飓风和 1989 年雨果飓风对牙买加造成的严重损害是否因上述经济政策而加剧，但这种潜在的联系显然是可能的。牙买加情况的另一个讽刺是，导致政府启动结构调整政策的部分外债负担是由于用于支付之前飓风损害的贷款（见第七章）。

In the years preceeding hurricanes Gilbert and Hugo, an estimated 50,000 children under four years old suffered from malnutrition in Jamaica (Oxfam 1988). More than one-third of the labour force earned less than

£ 5

(

$ 7.50

) per week, while four times this sum was needed to feed an average family. In Chapter 5 we argue that such a weak nutritional (and therefore health) status of a population contributes to other forms of vulnerability in the long run. If the Jamaican debt burden has had a negative impact on the poor, it is affecting an already impoverished people, a considerable proportion of whom are vulnerable to local hazards.
在飓风吉尔伯特和雨果来临的前几年，估计有 50,000 名四岁以下的儿童在牙买加遭受营养不良（Oxfam 1988）。超过三分之一的劳动力每周收入低于

£ 5

（

$ 7.50

），而养活一个普通家庭所需的金额是这个数额的四倍。在第五章中，我们认为，人口的这种脆弱营养（因此也是健康）状态在长期内会导致其他形式的脆弱性。如果牙买加的债务负担对穷人产生了负面影响，那么它正在影响一个已经贫困的人群，其中相当一部分人对当地的危险非常脆弱。

Adverse agrarian trends and livelihood diversification
不利的农业趋势和生计多样化

It is becoming increasingly clear that sustainable livelihoods cannot be supported by natural resource-based activities (primarily agriculture) in many parts of the world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, there has been a reduction in the farming component of livelihoods, such that agriculture may provide only 50 per cent of family income, even in very rural areas (Reardon 1997; Bryceson 1999). This process has also acted as a ‘dynamic pressure’ affecting vulnerability both positively and negatively. Some of the pressures which have driven this adaptation are the following:
越来越明显的是，在世界许多地区，特别是在撒哈拉以南非洲，基于自然资源的活动（主要是农业）无法支持可持续生计。因此，生计中的农业成分有所减少，以至于即使在非常偏远的地区，农业也可能仅提供家庭收入的 50%。这一过程也作为一种“动态压力”，对脆弱性产生了正面和负面的影响。推动这种适应的压力包括以下几点：

Population growth without a concomitant increase in agricultural production, leading to the sub-division of land holdings and falling food security through local food production.
人口增长而农业生产未能同步增加，导致土地持有的细分和通过地方食品生产的食品安全下降。
Adverse environmental change, including global climate change (long-term desiccation, 'unseasonable’ drought, or exceptional rainfall-see below).
不利的环境变化，包括全球气候变化（长期干旱、“不合时宜”的干旱或异常降雨——见下文）。
A decline in agricultural markets relative to non-farm wage levels.
相对于非农工资水平，农业市场的下降。
Rises in agricultural input costs due to the removal of subsidies following structural adjustment policies (see above).
由于结构调整政策（见上文）取消补贴，农业投入成本上升。
A general decline in access to rural public services due to economic mismanagement, protracted civil war and cost recovery programmes, and (again) under structural adjustment policies (Ellis 2000).
由于经济管理不善、长期内战和成本回收计划，以及（再次）在结构调整政策下，农村公共服务的获取普遍下降（Ellis 2000）。

Some critics of structural adjustment policies argue that they have seriously undermined rural livelihoods and increased the risks of destitution and famine, but this is very difficult to verify without reliable longitudinal studies. According to Ellis (2001), a minority of authors such as Booth et al. (1993) have come to the opposite conclusion, namely that structural adjustment policies have enabled a positive diversification of livelihoods, with beneficial reductions in household risks.
一些对结构调整政策的批评者认为，这些政策严重削弱了农村生计，并增加了贫困和饥荒的风险，但在没有可靠的纵向研究的情况下，这一点很难验证。根据 Ellis（2001）的说法，少数作者如 Booth 等（1993）得出了相反的结论，即结构调整政策促进了生计的积极多样化，并有效降低了家庭风险。

There is also a growing literature on the decision-making aspects of diversification and the socio-economic characteristics of different households undertaking diversification. In poorer households, the decision to diversify may be driven by acute food insecurity and risk aversion, where agricultural yields are declining and their variability increasing. Increasing food security through the generation of cash from non-agricultural activities is one clear possibility. In better-off households, investments in education and other human capital has an effective, albeit longer term, benefit (Dercon and Krishnon 1996).
关于多样化的决策方面以及进行多样化的不同家庭的社会经济特征的文献也在不断增加。在较贫困的家庭中，进行多样化的决策可能是由于严重的食品不安全和风险厌恶，农业产量下降且其变异性增加。通过非农业活动产生现金来提高食品安全是一个明确的可能性。在较富裕的家庭中，教育和其他人力资本的投资具有有效的，尽管是长期的好处（Dercon and Krishnon 1996）。

There are, however, marked gender, age and class differences (younger males migrating with a concomitant increase in the burden on the elderly and all women who have to stay at home). Resulting labour shortages on the farm are also a factor and intensify the feminisation of agricultural labour. For example, in Nepal the migration of significant numbers of people from the Middle Hills to the lower terai and to India resulted in remittances of cash which improved the food security of most households and brought the opportunity to change agricultural technology (Blaikie and Coppard 1998). The impacts of these pressures and adaptations on vulnerability are clearly diverse and often complex. Remaining a 'local’ member of common pool management institutions becomes important, and temporary absence (particularly of males) may lead to a dispossession of rights and increasing insecurity.
然而，性别、年龄和阶级差异明显（年轻男性迁移，同时增加了老年人和所有必须留在家中的女性的负担）。农场上出现的劳动力短缺也是一个因素，并加剧了农业劳动的女性化。例如，在尼泊尔，大量人口从中部山区迁移到下特赖和印度，导致了现金汇款，这改善了大多数家庭的粮食安全，并带来了改变农业技术的机会（Blaikie 和 Coppard 1998）。这些压力和适应对脆弱性的影响显然是多样的，且往往复杂。作为共同池管理机构的“地方”成员变得重要，暂时缺席（尤其是男性）可能导致权利的剥夺和不安全感的增加。

Natural resource degradation
自然资源退化

Another significant global dynamic pressure is destruction of forest, soil, wetlands and water sources. This is often closely linked with the debt question, since land degradation may result from national policies favouring export production, although this is difficult to prove since ceteris paribus conditions seldom exist and the policy effect is difficult to identify (Mearns 1991). In order to service debt, new lands have been cleared (e.g. in Brazil, the Philippines, Indonesia and many African countries) for ranching or commercial cropping, although there are usually other domestic factors at play here too. Coastal areas have been drained and mangrove forests cut in order to accommodate the expansion of tourist hotels and other foreign installations that offer the hope of hard currency earnings. Likewise, much forest has been destroyed by the timber industry in Asia and Africa, where uncontrolled cutting of high-value exportable hardwoods is another way debtor governments can pay.

^{18}

另一个重要的全球动态压力是森林、土壤、湿地和水源的破坏。这通常与债务问题密切相关，因为土地退化可能是由于国家政策偏向出口生产所导致，尽管这很难证明，因为在其他条件不变的情况下，这种情况很少存在，政策效果也难以识别（Mearns 1991）。为了偿还债务，新土地被开垦（例如在巴西、菲律宾、印度尼西亚和许多非洲国家）用于牧场或商业种植，尽管这里通常还有其他国内因素在起作用。沿海地区被排水，红树林被砍伐，以容纳旅游酒店和其他外国设施的扩张，这些设施提供了获得外汇收入的希望。同样，亚洲和非洲的木材工业也破坏了大量森林，未受控制的高价值可出口硬木的砍伐是债务国政府偿还债务的另一种方式。

The connection between land degradation and unsafe conditions can be quite significant (Pryor 1982; Cuny 1983; Abramovitz 2001; ISDR 2002a; UNEP 2002). Deforestation, soil erosion and the mismanagement of water resources can increase hazard intensity or frequency in the long run. The connection between deforestation and slope stability, erosion and the risk of drought, and other issues, will be discussed at various points in Part II of this book. Loss of biodiversity can also affect patterns of vulnerability, and in Chapter 5 we will inquire into the link between the extinction of wild genes (sometimes called ‘genetic erosion’) and vulnerability to plant pests and diseases.
土地退化与不安全条件之间的联系可能相当显著（Pryor 1982; Cuny 1983; Abramovitz 2001; ISDR 2002a; UNEP 2002）。森林砍伐、土壤侵蚀和水资源管理不当可能在长期内增加灾害的强度或频率。本书第二部分的多个点将讨论森林砍伐与坡度稳定性、侵蚀、干旱风险及其他问题之间的联系。生物多样性的丧失也可能影响脆弱性模式，在第五章中，我们将探讨野生基因灭绝（有时称为“基因侵蚀”）与植物害虫和疾病脆弱性之间的联系。

Deforestation, wetland destruction, over-fishing and destruction of coral reefs all contribute to genetic erosion, leading to the loss of many species, known and unknown (UNEP 2002). The physical growth of cities has caused the destruction of much coastal
森林砍伐、湿地破坏、过度捕捞和珊瑚礁破坏都导致了基因侵蚀，导致许多已知和未知物种的丧失（UNEP 2002）。城市的物理扩张造成了大量沿海地区的破坏。
wetland. Swamps are drained for living space, for urban-fringe gardening, for fish ponds or salt works. Mangroves are cut for building material. Chapter 7 will emphasise the importance of these wetlands as buffers against coastal storms (Maltby 1986; H.John Heinz Center 2000). The growing demand for wood and charcoal in some south Asian and African cities means that fuels are being produced at ever-increasing distances, causing loss of vegetation (Leach and Mearns 1989). In other cities the demand for electricity is satisfied by more and more dams (often large-scale). These dams flood vast areas of forest and other lands, forcibly displacing the inhabitants (Little and Horowitz 1987; World Commission on Dams 2000b). Persons displaced by mega-projects of this sort (and others such as mining and oil extraction) often become more vulnerable to natural hazards because of their unfamiliarity with the environments to which they have been moved. Social and economic dislocation can also play a part in the vulnerability of people displaced in this manner (Watts and Peluso 2001; IIED 2002).
湿地。沼泽被排干以腾出生活空间、城市边缘园艺、鱼塘或盐场。红树林被砍伐作为建筑材料。第七章将强调这些湿地作为抵御沿海风暴的缓冲区的重要性（Maltby 1986；H.John Heinz Center 2000）。一些南亚和非洲城市对木材和木炭的日益增长的需求意味着燃料的生产距离越来越远，导致植被的丧失（Leach and Mearns 1989）。在其他城市，电力的需求通过越来越多的水坝（通常是大规模的）来满足。这些水坝淹没了广阔的森林和其他土地，强行迫使居民迁移（Little and Horowitz 1987；世界大坝委员会 2000b）。被这种大型项目（以及采矿和石油开采等其他项目）迫使迁移的人，因对新环境的不熟悉，往往变得更容易受到自然灾害的影响。社会和经济的动荡也可能在这种方式下被迫迁移的人们的脆弱性中发挥作用（Watts and Peluso 2001；IIED 2002）。

Another important aspect of loss of species and genetic variation is the changes in cropping systems and especially the increasing tendency for farmers to use fewer varieties of crops. Modernisation is accompanied by dietary change, with imported and processed food items replacing traditional varieties of grain, legumes, fruits and vegetables. Farmers grow a more limited number of commercial crop varieties and the traditional ones die out (Juma 1989). When biological hazards strike, there may be no resistant varieties (genetic ancestors of the affected crops) on which to fall back. The Irish ‘Potato Famine’ of 1845-1848 is a classic example. Irish peasants simply did not have access to (or knowledge of) the South American tubers that might have been imported to improve the disease resistance of the existing land race, which was derived from a very narrow genetic base (see Chapter 5). The destruction of habitats is wiping out the wild ancestors of many crops altogether. In the 1970s farmers in the USA were able to get hold of other seed sources when maize (corn) blight halved the yield of monocropped hybrids on which they had become reliant. In the future the insurance of older varieties of maize may not be available if they have become extinct (Fowler and Mooney 1990; Cooper et al. 1992).
物种和遗传变异丧失的另一个重要方面是作物系统的变化，尤其是农民使用更少作物品种的趋势日益明显。现代化伴随着饮食的变化，进口和加工食品逐渐取代了传统的谷物、豆类、水果和蔬菜品种。农民种植的商业作物品种数量更加有限，传统品种逐渐消亡（Juma 1989）。当生物危害发生时，可能没有抗病品种（受影响作物的遗传祖先）可供依赖。1845-1848 年的爱尔兰“马铃薯饥荒”就是一个经典例子。爱尔兰农民根本无法获得（或不了解）可能被引入以提高现有地方品种抗病能力的南美块茎，而这些地方品种的遗传基础非常狭窄（见第 5 章）。栖息地的破坏正在彻底消灭许多作物的野生祖先。在 1970 年代，美国的农民在玉米（玉米）枯萎病使他们依赖的单一作物杂交种的产量减半时，能够获得其他种子来源。在未来，如果老品种的玉米已经灭绝，可能无法获得其保险（Fowler 和 Mooney 1990；Cooper 等 1992）。

The increasing use of genetically modified (GM) crops is highly controversial, and part of the debate bears directly on disaster vulnerability. The proponents of GM crops believe that in the future new varieties of disease and pest-resistant food crops, and those with other properties such as high levels of the precursors of vitamin A (so-called ‘golden rice’), could significantly increase food security worldwide and help to wipe out nutritional deficiencies (Royal Society of London et al. 2000). Another example is the development of crops with a gene for salt tolerance added from mangroves that would allow food production on degraded lands. Opponents advise extreme caution in disseminating seed of this kind because of the fear of contaminating existing varietiesespecially those that have been bred in conventional ways by generations of small farmers in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia and the Pacific.
转基因（GM）作物的日益使用备受争议，部分争论直接与灾害脆弱性相关。转基因作物的支持者认为，未来新型抗病虫害的食品作物品种，以及具有其他特性如高水平维生素 A 前体（所谓的“金米”），可能会显著提高全球食品安全，并有助于消除营养缺乏症（伦敦皇家学会等 2000）。另一个例子是开发从红树林中添加盐耐受基因的作物，这将允许在退化土地上进行食品生产。反对者则建议在传播这种种子的过程中要极为谨慎，因为担心会污染现有品种，尤其是那些由非洲、拉丁美洲以及亚洲和太平洋部分地区的小农户通过传统方式培育的品种。

Recalling unanticipated and negative social and ecological side effects of the widespread use of so-called Green Revolution seeds from the 1960s onward, critics are concerned that premature release could destroy the existing stock of well-adapted staple grains and other food crops before a similar array of ‘down-side’ effects become evident. By then, critics believe, it might be too late to turn back. These anxieties were in the
回忆起自 1960 年代以来广泛使用的所谓绿色革命种子的意想不到的负面社会和生态副作用，批评者担心，过早的释放可能会在类似的“负面”效应显现之前摧毁现有的适应性良好的主食谷物和其他农作物。到那时，批评者认为，可能为时已晚，无法回头。这些焦虑在
minds of the scientific advisers to the governments of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi when, during a severe food shortage in southern Africa in 2002, they counselled their governments to reject the donation of GM maize from the USA. An additional line of criticism comes from those who believe that hunger, and in particular famine, is not caused by a shortage of food but by the distribution of food (see Chapter 4).
2002 年南非发生严重粮食短缺时，津巴布韦、赞比亚和马拉维政府的科学顾问心中萦绕着。当时，他们建议各自政府拒绝接受来自美国的转基因玉米捐赠。另一个批评的观点来自那些认为饥饿，特别是饥荒，并不是由于食物短缺造成的，而是由于食物分配不均（见第 4 章）。

Global environmental change
全球环境变化

There is by now little doubt that changes in the interacting systems of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, and biosphere have resulted in the build-up of 'greenhouse gases’ (Liverman 1989; Watson et al. 1998; 1999). The dangers are that the changes will increase the intensity and frequency of climatic hazards and enlarge those areas affected by them (McGuire et al. 2002). It is not possible to blame the ‘greenhouse effect’ in a definitive way for the powerful hurricanes Gilbert, Joan and Hugo (1988 and 1989), Andrew (1992), Mitch (1998) or Georges (2000), or the record storms in Europe in the winter of 1989-1990, or the Australian floods of 1990 onwards. But global climatic change provoked by warming is predicted to increase the number and intensity of storms and cyclones and to amplify the variations in precipitation over much of the earth’s surface.
目前几乎没有疑问，气候、 hydrosphere 和 biosphere 的相互作用系统的变化导致了“温室气体”的积累（Liverman 1989; Watson et al. 1998; 1999）。危险在于，这些变化将增加气候灾害的强度和频率，并扩大受其影响的区域（McGuire et al. 2002）。无法明确将“温室效应”归咎于强烈的飓风吉尔伯特、琼、雨果（1988 和 1989）、安德鲁（1992）、米切尔（1998）或乔治（2000），或 1989-1990 年冬季欧洲的创纪录风暴，或 1990 年以后的澳大利亚洪水。但由于变暖引发的全球气候变化预计将增加风暴和气旋的数量和强度，并加剧地球表面大部分地区降水的变化。

The impact on livelihoods could be immense (especially for farming and fishing peoples), in addition to the dangers from any intensification of the hazards (Downing et al. 2001). Considerable work over the past ten years on the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) suggests that these cycles of exceptionally wet and exceptionally dry weather, associated with periods of warming of surface water in the Pacific, may be increasing in frequency. El Niño and La Niña episodes were associated in the 1980s and 1990s with failure of the monsoon in South Asia, spiking incidence of malaria and dengue, floods and landslides in the Andes, and wildfires in Australia (Glantz 2001; 2002).
对生计的影响可能是巨大的（尤其是对农业和渔业人民），此外还存在任何危害加剧的危险（Downing et al. 2001）。过去十年对厄尔尼诺南方涛动（ENSO）的大量研究表明，这些与太平洋表面水温升高相关的极端湿润和极端干燥天气周期，可能正在增加频率。厄尔尼诺和拉尼娜事件在 1980 年代和 1990 年代与南亚季风的失败、疟疾和登革热的激增、安第斯山脉的洪水和滑坡以及澳大利亚的野火相关（Glantz 2001; 2002）。

Rising sea-level due to global warming is another dynamic pressure that will increase vulnerability. One result could be the destruction of livelihoods of six million farm workers living in the fertile delta regions of India (Watson et al. 1998). Low-lying areas of many islands, as well as the flood-prone delta regions of Bangladesh, India and Guyana are particularly at risk of a sealevel rise (Brammer 1989). In the Pacific, Tuvalu and Tonga may become uninhabitable (Lewis 1989; Wells and Edwards 1989; Pelling and Uitto 2002), and coral atolls which are home to many people in the Pacific and Indian oceans would experience submergence or destruction by storms. Low-lying parts of coastal cities are also at risk (O’Neill 1990 and see Chapter 7).
由于全球变暖导致的海平面上升是另一种动态压力，将增加脆弱性。其结果可能是印度肥沃三角洲地区六百万农民生计的破坏（Watson et al. 1998）。许多岛屿的低洼地区，以及孟加拉国、印度和圭亚那的易洪水三角洲地区，特别面临海平面上升的风险（Brammer 1989）。在太平洋，图瓦卢和汤加可能变得不适宜居住（Lewis 1989；Wells and Edwards 1989；Pelling and Uitto 2002），而珊瑚环礁是太平洋和印度洋中许多人居住的地方，将经历淹没或被风暴摧毁。沿海城市的低洼部分也面临风险（O’Neill 1990，见第 7 章）。

Uses of the PAR model
PAR 模型的用途

Since the first edition of At Risk, in addition to academic and policy applications (e.g. Watanabe 2002; Turner et al. 2003; Haque 1997) several NGOs have made use of the PAR (or ‘crunch’) model as the basis for community-based self-study of vulnerability and capability. In most of these pilot projects, communities and groups adopt the concept of vulnerability to inquire into their own exposure to damage and loss (Wisner 2003a).
自《风险》第一版以来，除了学术和政策应用（例如，Watanabe 2002；Turner 等 2003；Haque 1997），一些非政府组织已将 PAR（或“压缩”）模型作为社区自我研究脆弱性和能力的基础。在这些试点项目中，社区和团体采用脆弱性概念来探讨他们自身对损害和损失的暴露（Wisner 2003a）。

The concept of vulnerability thus becomes a tool in the struggle for resources that are allocated politically. In some parts of Latin America and southern Africa such community-based vulnerability assessment has become quite elaborate, utilising a range of techniques to map and make inventories, seasonal calendars and disaster chronologies.

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Pilot projects have shown that lay people in citizen-based groups are capable of participating in environmental assessments that involve technology not previously accessible to them, such as geographical information systems (Pickles 1995; Levin and Weiner 1997; Liverman et al. 1998; Maskrey 1998).
因此，脆弱性概念成为争夺政治分配资源的工具。在拉丁美洲和南部非洲的某些地区，这种基于社区的脆弱性评估变得相当复杂，利用一系列技术进行制图和清单编制、季节性日历和灾害年表。试点项目表明，公民团体中的普通人能够参与涉及他们之前无法接触的技术的环境评估，例如地理信息系统（Pickles 1995；Levin 和 Weiner 1997；Liverman 等 1998；Maskrey 1998）。

In these applications of our PAR model and others like it, the community defines its own vulnerabilities and capabilities, not outsiders. They also decide what risks are acceptable to them and which are not. As Morrow remarks:
在我们 PAR 模型及其他类似应用中，社区定义自己的脆弱性和能力，而不是外部人士。他们还决定哪些风险对他们是可接受的，哪些不是。正如莫罗所言：

The proposed identification and targeting of at-risk groups does not imply helplessness or lack of agency on their part… Just because neighbourhoods have been disenfranchised in the past does not mean they are unwilling or unable to be an important part of the process. There are many notable examples of grassroots action on the part of poor, elderly and/or minority communities…, and of women making a difference in post-disaster decisions and outcomes… Planners and managers who make full use of citizen expertise and energy will more effectively improve safety and survival chances of their communities.
提议识别和针对高风险群体并不意味着他们无助或缺乏主动性……仅仅因为社区在过去被剥夺了权利，并不意味着他们不愿意或无法成为这一过程的重要部分。贫困、老年和/或少数族裔社区的草根行动有许多显著的例子……以及女性在灾后决策和结果中发挥的作用……充分利用公民专业知识和能量的规划者和管理者将更有效地提高其社区的安全性和生存机会。

The employment of the concept of vulnerability as a tool in and by the community also involves a thorough analysis with and by the residents of their own resources and capacities. This is the ‘other side’ of the vulnerability coin. It is in the hands of local people that the logic of their situation, the phenomenology of their living with risks, forces them to be aware of and to discuss their strengths and capacities, as well as their weaknesses and needs (Wisner 1988a; Anderson and Woodrow 1998).

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社区中使用脆弱性概念作为工具的过程还涉及对居民自身资源和能力的深入分析。这是脆弱性这一硬币的“另一面”。在当地人手中，他们的处境逻辑、与风险共存的现象学迫使他们意识到并讨论自己的优势和能力，以及他们的弱点和需求（Wisner 1988a；Anderson 和 Woodrow 1998）。

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Notes注释

1 ‘Risk’ may still exist, however, since in the absence of an actual extreme natural event, natural process capable of generating such events may continue. The only point we are making here is that given a specific extreme natural event (e.g. an actual hurricane or landslide), if there is little or no vulnerability, there will be no disaster.
1 然而，“风险”仍然可能存在，因为在没有实际极端自然事件的情况下，可能会继续存在能够产生此类事件的自然过程。我们在这里要表达的唯一观点是，考虑到特定的极端自然事件（例如，实际的飓风或滑坡），如果几乎没有或没有脆弱性，就不会发生灾难。
2 Good detailed discussion of the physical processes and extreme events themselves (the ‘hazards’) are available in Alexander (1993), Tobin and Montz (1997) and Smith (2000) as well as US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 1997) and Organisation of American States (OAS 1991).
2 关于物理过程和极端事件本身（“危害”）的详细讨论可以在 Alexander（1993）、Tobin 和 Montz（1997）以及 Smith（2000）中找到，以及美国联邦应急管理局（FEMA 1997）和美洲国家组织（OAS 1991）中。
3 There are many definitions of ‘disaster’, ‘emergency’, ‘catastrophe’, etc. We adopt our own, which shares much with the most common definitions in use. For more on questions of definition, see Oliver-Smith (1999b) and Quarantelli (1995, 1998).
“灾难”、“紧急情况”、“大灾难”等有许多定义。我们采用自己的定义，这与目前使用的最常见定义有很多相似之处。有关定义问题的更多信息，请参见 Oliver-Smith（1999b）和 Quarantelli（1995, 1998）。
4 For the sake of convenience, we will sometimes present the PAR model as a specific variation on Figure 2.1 in diagrammatic form, and sometimes in non-diagrammatic,
为了方便起见，我们有时会将 PAR 模型以图示形式呈现为图 2.1 的特定变体，有时则以非图示形式呈现。
list form. Such a list reads from top to bottom, beginning with ‘root causes’, proceeding through ‘dynamic pressures’, etc. For example, see the PAR lists for the Montserrat volcanic eruption or Kobe earthquake in Chapter 8.
列表形式。这样的列表从上到下阅读，首先是“根本原因”，然后是“动态压力”等。例如，请参见第 8 章中 Montserrat 火山喷发或神户地震的 PAR 列表。
5 This way of organising proximate and ultimate causes has been used elsewhere (e.g. in explaining land degradation by Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Blaikie 1985a, 1985b, 1989).
这种组织近因和远因的方式在其他地方也被使用（例如，Blaikie 和 Brookfield（1987）解释土地退化时；Blaikie（1985a，1985b，1989））。
6 Readers of the first edition of At Risk noticed that there is some ambiguity or overlap between processes we call 'root causes’ and those we term ‘dynamic pressures’. That is true, because a factor that can be considered a ‘root cause’ in one set of circumstances may be more of a ‘dynamic pressure’ under different conditions.
第一版《风险》中有读者注意到我们所称的“根本原因”和我们所称的“动态压力”之间存在一些模糊或重叠。这是正确的，因为在某些情况下可以被视为“根本原因”的因素在不同条件下可能更像是“动态压力”。
7 Smith (1992:25) defines resilience as ‘The measure of the rate of recovery from a stressful experience, reflecting the social capacity to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a hazardous event’.
史密斯（1992:25）将韧性定义为“从压力经历中恢复的速度的衡量，反映了社会吸收和恢复危险事件发生的能力”。
8 For example, in May 2002, unusually hot, dry winds from the north pushed temperatures up in eastern and central India. More than a thousand people died from heat stress and dehydration, among whom were many children and the frail elderly (Kriner 2002). By January of the same year, temperatures had dropped to just above freezing in northern India, and at least another thousand people died of exposure and hypothermia (Rajalakshmi 2003). Klinenberg (2002) describes a heat wave in Chicago in 1995 that killed more than 700 persons, many of whom were lowincome, elderly women.
例如，在 2002 年 5 月，来自北方的异常炎热、干燥的风使印度东部和中部的气温上升。超过一千人因热应激和脱水而死，其中包括许多儿童和虚弱的老年人（克里纳 2002）。在同年 1 月，印度北部的气温降至刚刚高于冰点，至少还有一千人因暴露和低体温而死（拉贾拉克什米 2003）。克林伯格（2002）描述了 1995 年芝加哥的一次热浪，导致超过 700 人死亡，其中许多是低收入的老年女性。
9 ‘Entitlement’ is a term for the access that people have to food from the sale of their labour, their own food producing activity, or via social networks, or some political claim on state resources (including moral claims on international food aid). Economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen introduced the term in a rigorous way in his 1981 book, Poverty and Famines (see Chapter 4).
“权利”是指人们通过劳动销售、自己的食品生产活动、社交网络或对国家资源的某种政治要求（包括对国际食品援助的道德要求）获得食物的途径。经济学家、诺贝尔奖获得者阿马蒂亚·森在其 1981 年出版的《贫困与饥荒》一书中以严谨的方式引入了这一术语（见第 4 章）。
10 In 1988 Pakistan had the second highest balance of payments deficit in the world at billion.
1988 年，巴基斯坦的国际收支赤字在全球排名第二，达到数十亿。
11 This ‘villagisation’ policy in Tanzania had been intended to have a positive impact on livelihoods, by increasing the size of settlements so they could form the basis for providing health and educational services. It was also intended to create better economies of scale in agriculture and co-operatives for producers and marketing (Coulson 1982). Subsequent research has suggested that such radical, often forced, resettlement seriously disrupted patterns of coping with natural hazards such as flooding in the Rufiji river delta (Hoag 2002).
坦桑尼亚的“村庄化”政策旨在通过扩大定居点的规模来对生计产生积极影响，以便为提供健康和教育服务奠定基础。该政策还旨在为农业和生产者及市场的合作社创造更好的规模经济（Coulson 1982）。后续研究表明，这种激进的、往往是强制的重新安置严重扰乱了应对自然灾害（如鲁菲吉河三角洲的洪水）的模式（Hoag 2002）。
12 We would argue that the difficulty in providing direct evidence of the linkages between unsafe conditions, dynamic processes and root causes does not undermine this method of ‘explaining’ vulnerability. Quite clearly, if it is accepted that vulnerability is a function of socio-economic processes and not just the characteristics of the hazard itself, then there must be a chain of explanation for that vulnerability which can be traced back to root causes. This is no different from explaining any other social phenomenon: a ‘housing shortage’ in London cannot simply be explained by saying that there are not enough houses being built or too few people with enough cash: there are ‘dynamic processes’ and ‘root causes’ to be taken into account, even if there are political differences as to what these are in any
我们认为，提供不安全条件、动态过程和根本原因之间联系的直接证据的困难并不削弱这种“解释”脆弱性的方式。显然，如果接受脆弱性是社会经济过程的一个函数，而不仅仅是危害本身的特征，那么就必须有一个可以追溯到根本原因的脆弱性解释链。这与解释任何其他社会现象并无不同：伦敦的“住房短缺”不能仅仅通过说没有足够的房屋在建或没有足够现金的人来解释：必须考虑“动态过程”和“根本原因”，即使在这些问题上存在政治分歧。
given problem. Dovers et al. (2001) discuss the varieties of ignorance and uncertainty in environmental policy making in very much the same terms we do.
Dovers 等人（2001）以与我们非常相似的术语讨论了环境政策制定中的各种无知和不确定性。
13 Here we focus on the political consequences of uncertainty. However we also recognise and certainly do not underestimate the philosophical consequences of opting for a meso-level theoretical position that spans such widely different scales of time and space (historical and global affecting present and local). In brief, we do not believe that historical events and well-established social structures ‘cause’ unsafe conditions in any rigid, deterministic way. There is an interplay of structure and human agency. In much social science, as Abbott (2001:98) puts it so nicely, ‘action and contingency disappear into the magician’s hat of variable-based causality, where they hide during the analysis, only to be reproduced with a flourish in the article’s closing paragraphs’. We attempt to do justice to human action and agency-even, or especially, that of people who at first (viewed from the outside) appear as very weak and powerless-as well as contingency. That is one of the reasons why we have two models and complement the PAR model in this chapter with a model of household action (coping in adversity) in Chapter 3.
13 在这里，我们关注不确定性的政治后果。然而，我们也认识到，并且绝对不低估选择一个跨越如此广泛的时间和空间尺度（历史和全球影响现在和地方）的中观理论立场所带来的哲学后果。简而言之，我们不认为历史事件和成熟的社会结构以任何僵化、决定论的方式“导致”不安全的条件。结构与人类能动性之间存在相互作用。在许多社会科学中，正如阿博特（Abbott，2001:98）所恰当地指出的，“行动和偶然性消失在基于变量的因果关系的魔术师的帽子里，在分析过程中隐藏，最终在文章的结尾段落中华丽地重现”。我们试图公正地对待人类的行动和能动性——甚至，或者特别是，那些在最初（从外部视角看）似乎非常弱小和无力的人——以及偶然性。这也是我们在本章中有两个模型的原因之一，并在第三章中用家庭行动模型（在逆境中的应对）补充 PAR 模型。
14 See, for example, Bryant (1991:7-8), who labels those who might want to consider social processes as ‘Marxist’ as a way of dismissing them.
14 例如，布莱恩特（1991:7-8）指出，那些可能想要考虑社会过程的人被标记为“马克思主义者”，以此来驳斥他们。
15 During the decade of the 1990s growing precision in the international study of global climate change now suggests that an increase in the frequency of intense storms could be one result of the warming of the atmosphere. This work emphasises that what one is dealing with is increasing variability in the ocean-atmosphere system, with complex results. One of these seems to be more frequent El Niño events. If correct, this research points to more floods and storms as extreme natural events. See McGuire et al. (2002).
15 在 1990 年代，国际对全球气候变化的研究日益精确，现在表明，强烈风暴频率的增加可能是大气变暖的一个结果。这项工作强调，所面临的是海洋-大气系统中日益增加的变异性，结果复杂。其中之一似乎是厄尔尼诺事件的频率增加。如果正确的话，这项研究指向更多的洪水和风暴作为极端自然事件。参见麦圭尔等（2002）。
16 See Maskrey and Romero (1983); Davis (1987); Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989:146-221); Fernandes and Varley (1998); Mitchell (1999a); Fernandez (1999); Wisner (2002a) and Pelling (2003b).
16 参见马斯克雷和罗梅罗（1983）；戴维斯（1987）；哈多伊和萨特韦特（1989:146-221）；费尔南德斯和瓦利（1998）；米切尔（1999a）；费尔南德斯（1999）；威斯纳（2002a）和佩林（2003b）。
17 Related problems of environmental degradation have been raised. In a paper for a meeting of CIDIE (Committee of International Development Institutions on the Environment), hosted by the World Bank, Hansen noted that for a number of reasons structural adjustment policies
17 相关的环境退化问题已被提出。在世界银行主办的国际发展机构环境委员会（CIDIE）会议上，汉森指出，由于多种原因，结构调整政策
often lead to a deterioration of the situation for those with the least resources to adapt to the changed economic circumstances. To the extent that poverty in many regions of the world is the primary cause for environmental degradation, increased poverty caused by structural adjustment policies can lead to further environmental damage.
通常会导致那些最缺乏资源以适应变化的经济环境的人们的处境恶化。在世界许多地区，贫困是环境退化的主要原因，结构调整政策导致的贫困加剧可能会导致进一步的环境破坏。
(1988:7)
18 It is clear that many of these damaging activities pre-date the debt crisis. The argument is that the response of governments and entrepreneurs to the priority for exports has intensified them. However, it is possible that the intensification of deforestation, for example, does not earn foreign exchange for the government to repay debt. In some circumstances individuals and enterprises control foreign
很明显，这些有害活动的发生早于债务危机。论点是，政府和企业对出口优先权的反应加剧了这些活动。然而，举例来说，森林砍伐的加剧可能并没有为政府偿还债务赚取外汇。在某些情况下，个人和企业控制外汇并将其转移出国（“资本外逃”），而对经济没有任何好处。还有一个严重的后果是：减轻债务负担可能并不会缓解森林或其他资源的破坏，因为造成破坏的动机并不总是为了应对国家的经济问题（见 Little 和 Horowitz 1987；Faber 1993；Gadgil 和 Guha 1995）。
earnings and siphon them off out of the country (‘capital flight’) without any benefit to the economy. There is also a serious corollary of this: that reduction of the debt burden may not alleviate the destruction of forests or other resources, since the motivation for damage is not always to service the economic problems of the nation (see Little and Horowitz 1987; Faber 1993; Gadgil and Guha 1995).
这还有一个严重的后果：减轻债务负担可能并不会缓解森林或其他资源的破坏，因为造成破坏的动机并不总是为了应对国家的经济问题（见 Little 和 Horowitz 1987；Faber 1993；Gadgil 和 Guha 1995）。
19 Wisner et al. (1979); Cuny (1983); Maskrey (1989); Wisner et al. (1991); Geilfus (1997); Soto (1998); von Kotze and Holloway (1996); Anderson and Woodrow (1998); Carrasco and Garibay (2000); Plummer (2000); Turcios et al. (2000); Chiappe and Fernandez (2001); Wilches-Chaux and Wilches-Chaux (2001).
20 See an interesting discussion of ‘poverty as capability deprivation’ in Sen (2000:87-110) and more on capability deprivation in Chapter 3.
20 请参见 Sen（2000:87-110）中关于“贫困作为能力剥夺”的有趣讨论，以及第 3 章中关于能力剥夺的更多内容。

3 ACCESS TO RESOURCES AND COPING IN ADVERSITY
资源获取与逆境应对

Access to resources-an introduction
资源获取——导言

In the last chapter, we argued that disasters occur as the result of the impact of hazards on vulnerable people. We suggest two frameworks for explaining this relationship between natural events and the social processes that generate unsafe conditions. The first is the Pressure and Release (PAR) model, which shows in diagrammatic terms how the causes of vulnerability can be traced back from unsafe conditions, through economic and social (‘dynamic’) pressures, to underlying root causes. PAR is an organising framework outlining a hierarchy of causal factors that together constitute the pre-conditions for a disaster. We can also describe this as a pathway, ‘progression of vulnerability’ or ‘chain of causation’. It is a sequence of factors and processes that leads us from the disaster event and its proximate causes back to ever more distant factors and processes that initially may seem to have little to do with causing the disaster. The ‘Release’ aspect arises from the realisation that to release the pressure that causes disasters, the entire chain of causation needs to be addressed right back to the root causes, and not just the proximate causes or triggers of the hazard itself or the unsafe conditions of vulnerability.
在最后一章中，我们论证了灾害的发生是由于危险对脆弱人群的影响。我们提出了两个框架来解释自然事件与产生不安全条件的社会过程之间的关系。第一个是压力与释放（PAR）模型，它以图示的方式展示了脆弱性的原因如何从不安全条件追溯，通过经济和社会（“动态”）压力，回到根本原因。PAR 是一个组织框架，概述了一系列因果因素的层次，这些因素共同构成了灾害的前提条件。我们也可以将其描述为一条路径，“脆弱性的进程”或“因果链”。这是一个因素和过程的序列，它将我们从灾害事件及其直接原因引导回到那些最初似乎与造成灾害关系不大的更远因素和过程。 “释放”方面源于意识到，要释放导致灾难的压力，必须从根本原因入手，解决整个因果链，而不仅仅是危险本身的近因或触发因素，或脆弱性的不安全条件。

But the PAR model does not provide a detailed and theoretically informed analysis of the precise interactions of environment and society at the ‘pressure point’, at the point where and when the disaster starts to unfold. Firstly, any analysis of a disaster must explain differential vulnerability to, and the impacts of, a disaster-why wealthier people often suffer less, and why women and children may face different (and sometimes more damaging) outcomes than men and adults. Particular groups, defined by ethnicity, class, occupation, location of work or domicile may suffer differentially from others. In these senses, the Access model focuses on the precise detail of what happens at the pressure point between the natural event and longer-term social processes, and, to signify this in visual terms, a magnifying glass is drawn on the PAR model (Figure 2.1).
但是，PAR 模型并没有提供对环境和社会在“压力点”上精确互动的详细和理论性分析，即灾难开始展开的时刻和地点。首先，任何对灾难的分析都必须解释对灾难的差异性脆弱性及其影响——为什么富裕的人往往遭受的损失较少，以及为什么女性和儿童可能面临与男性和成年人不同（有时更具破坏性）的结果。特定群体，按种族、阶级、职业、工作地点或居住地定义，可能会与其他群体遭受不同程度的影响。在这些意义上，Access 模型关注自然事件与长期社会过程之间的压力点上发生的具体细节，并且为了在视觉上表示这一点，PAR 模型上绘制了一个放大镜（图 2.1）。

Secondly, the PAR framework is essentially static, and without a series of iterations through the trajectory of a disaster, it cannot suggest nor account for change, either before the onset of a disaster, and more importantly, during and after it. In addition to the PAR model, what is required is a detailed account of ‘normal life’ before the disaster. We need a complementary model that details the progression of vulnerability to (and through) the pressure point and through the unfolding of the disaster. It must also show how normal life becomes abnormal, and how and when disjunctures between the normal and the exceptional take place. To achieve this, in this chapter we present the Access model, which deals with the amount of ‘access’ that people have to the capabilities, assets and livelihood opportunities that will enable them (or not) to reduce their vulnerability and
其次，PAR 框架本质上是静态的，如果没有通过灾难轨迹的一系列迭代，它无法建议或考虑变化，无论是在灾难发生之前，更重要的是，在灾难发生期间和之后。除了 PAR 模型之外，还需要对灾难发生前的“正常生活”进行详细描述。我们需要一个补充模型，详细说明脆弱性在压力点的进展以及灾难的展开过程。它还必须展示正常生活如何变得不正常，以及正常与例外之间的断裂如何以及何时发生。为了实现这一点，在本章中我们提出了“获取”模型，该模型处理人们获得能力、资产和生计机会的“获取”程度，这将使他们能够（或无法）减少他们的脆弱性并
avoid disaster.避免灾难。

The purpose of the Access model
获取模型的目的是

The Access model is designed to understand complex and varied sets of social and environmental events and longer-term processes that may be associated with a specific event that is called a disaster. A disaster may be described and labelled according to the natural hazard that triggered it (for example, drought impacting upon vulnerable people leading to famine, or an earthquake impacting on unsafe buildings leading to destruction of life and property). Indeed, the chapter headings of Part II of this book adopt this categorisation, as we have responded to much received wisdom in order to undermine this type of approach. Much of the literature on disasters relates to each type of natural event trigger, and is specific to famines, biological hazards, floods, severe coastal storms and so on. On the other hand, there are generally shared characteristics in the way that vulnerability is generated, how the trigger event and the unfolding of the disaster has its impact, and various responses by different actors, both local, national and international. It is these that the PAR model—and now the Access model-seek to address.
访问模型旨在理解复杂多样的社会和环境事件及与特定事件（称为灾难）相关的长期过程。灾难可以根据引发它的自然灾害进行描述和标记（例如，干旱影响脆弱人群导致饥荒，或地震影响不安全建筑导致生命和财产的毁灭）。实际上，本书第二部分的章节标题采用了这种分类，因为我们回应了许多传统智慧，以削弱这种类型的方法。关于灾难的文献大多与每种自然事件触发因素相关，并且特定于饥荒、生物危害、洪水、严重沿海风暴等。另一方面，在脆弱性生成的方式、触发事件及灾难展开的影响，以及不同参与者（包括地方、国家和国际）的各种反应方面，通常存在共同特征。正是这些特征，PAR 模型——现在的访问模型——试图解决。

In Figure 2.1 the reader will have noticed the magnifying glass in the diagrammatic representation of the PAR model. This is intended as a visual metaphor for the location of the Access model in the wider explanatory framework: the place within the PAR approach where it magnifies and clarifies the explanation of a disaster. The magnifying glass metaphor is appropriate since the Access model sets out to explain at a micro-level the establishment and trajectory of vulnerability and its variation between individuals and households. It deals with the impact of a disaster as it unfolds, the role and agency of people involved, what the impacts are on them, how they cope, develop recovery strategies and interact with other actors (e.g. humanitarian aid agencies, the police, the landlord and so on).
在图 2.1 中，读者会注意到 PAR 模型的图示中有一个放大镜。这是作为一个视觉隐喻，表示 Access 模型在更广泛的解释框架中的位置：在 PAR 方法中，它放大并澄清了对灾难的解释。放大镜隐喻是合适的，因为 Access 模型旨在从微观层面解释脆弱性的建立及其在个人和家庭之间的变化。它处理灾难发生时的影响、相关人员的角色和行动、对他们的影响、他们如何应对、发展恢复策略以及与其他参与者（例如人道主义援助机构、警察、房东等）的互动。

We first introduce the outline structure of the model, in which boxes are labelled in summary fashion but remain, if not ‘black boxes’, still somewhat opaque. Then later in the chapter each box will be opened up and explained in detail. There is a risk in this that some repetition will irritate the reader. However, it is hoped that clarity as well as detail can be captured by dealing first with the overall structure and then the more theoretically informed and detailed aspects sequentially. The Access model picks up the state of ‘normal life’ and explains how people earn a livelihood with differential access to material, social and political resources.

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This model is shown in Figure 3.1 and can be identified in summary form in Box 1
我们首先介绍模型的轮廓结构，其中框以概括的方式标记，但如果不是“黑箱”，仍然有些不透明。然后在本章后面，每个框将被打开并详细解释。这其中存在一些重复可能会让读者感到烦恼的风险。然而，希望通过首先处理整体结构，然后顺序处理更具理论性和详细的方面，能够同时捕捉到清晰性和细节。Access 模型捕捉到“正常生活”的状态，并解释人们如何在对物质、社会和政治资源的差异性获取中谋生。

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该模型在图 3.1 中显示，并可以在框 1 中以概括形式识别。

The outline has eight boxes, each representing a set of closely related ideas, an event or distinct process. They are linked by arrows which denote cause and effect linkages. Although the linkages are shown by arrows (from cause to effect), they also iterate, and effects can also shape causes at a later period of time. In the briefest terms, hazards (Box 3) have specific time and space characteristics (Box 4), which can-and in this depiction do—result in a ‘trigger event’ (Box 5, for example an earthquake, a tropical storm or a
该大纲有八个框，每个框代表一组紧密相关的想法、事件或独特的过程。它们通过箭头相连，表示因果关系。尽管这些联系通过箭头（从原因到结果）显示，但它们也是循环的，结果在后期也可以影响原因。简而言之，危险（框 3）具有特定的时间和空间特征（框 4），这些特征可以——并且在此图示中确实——导致“触发事件”（框 5，例如地震、热带风暴或其他）。

Figure 3.1 The Access model in outline
图 3.1 访问模型大纲
serious drought). Households earn their livelihoods in normal times (Box 1), and are subject to unsafe conditions (Box 2) and the political economy in which they all live is also shaped by social relations and structures of domination (Boxes la and 1b). The trigger event occurs and impacts upon social relations and structures of domination and upon households themselves (Box 6). The heavy black arrow is depicted as bursting through an outer layer, called ‘social protection’ (which, as will be explained below, is both individual, collective and public), and as impacting on different households in a process termed ‘transition to disaster’ (Box 6). Subsequent iterations of unfolding impacts and human responses occur through time (Box 7). Box 8 asks the question ‘To the next disaster?’, and indicates altered conditions of vulnerability, social protection and actions for preventing future disasters.
严重干旱）。家庭在正常情况下谋生（框 1），并面临不安全的条件（框 2），他们所生活的政治经济也受到社会关系和统治结构的影响（框 1a 和 1b）。触发事件发生并影响社会关系和统治结构以及家庭本身（框 6）。重黑箭头被描绘为穿透一个外层，称为“社会保护”（如下面将解释的那样，它既包括个人、集体和公共），并影响不同的家庭，这一过程被称为“向灾难过渡”（框 6）。随后的影响和人类反应的迭代随着时间的推移而发生（框 7）。框 8 提出了“下一个灾难？”的问题，并指出了脆弱性、社会保护和预防未来灾难的行动的变化条件。

The model stylises the process of earning a living as a set of decisions made at the
该模型将谋生的过程简化为一系列决策。
household level (as will be described below when this process in Box 1 is opened up and explained in Figures 3.2 and Figure 3.3), individual decisions are always made in a political-economic environment, and this is indicated by two boxes (1a and 1b) labelled ‘social relations’ and ‘structures of domination’. Thus, life in normal times is characterised by repeated decisions about how to obtain a livelihood, decisions which are made every season in an agricultural setting (for example, a cropping strategy, investment in new inputs or agricultural equipment) and sometimes irregularly and more frequently in an urban setting (for example, changing the nature of employment, starting up a small shop or handicraft enterprise).
家庭层面（如下面将描述的，当框 1 中的这一过程被展开并在图 3.2 和图 3.3 中解释时），个人决策总是在一个政治经济环境中做出，这由两个框（1a 和 1b）标记为“社会关系”和“统治结构”所指示。因此，正常时期的生活特征是关于如何获得生计的反复决策，这些决策在农业环境中每个季节都会做出（例如，作物策略、对新投入或农业设备的投资），而在城市环境中有时不规律且更频繁（例如，改变就业性质、开设小商店或手工业企业）。

The iterative character of a livelihood is suggested by repeated cycles of livelihood decisions, each on one sheet, arranged in the diagram behind each other and labelled ’ t 1 ', ‘t2’, indicating subsequent iterations of decision making year by year. There is also an outer border to the household livelihood box called ‘social protection’. This symbolises the presence (or absence) of hazard precautions and preparedness that is provided by the state and local collective action. It is the local expression of the more generalised 'unsafe (or safe) conditions’ (shown here as Box 2, derived from the PAR model). This links the broader scale of disaster causes to the microcosm of normal life. The resources which define the quality of social protection at household level are varied in scope and may include flood protection embankments, concrete storm shelters, enforcement of building regulations as well as community coping mechanisms, self-help and communal charity. These are discussed below in more detail. It is also worth specifying how to choose the 'households’ in the box. This matter (essentially one of scope and sample) must be defined by the local people and the researcher, planner or development professional according to their focus. This can be defined spatially (for example, an area threatened by a specific and severe natural hazard, a particular village or a quarter in a city), or defined by ethnic group, class or other characteristic which may render the chosen group of households more vulnerable.
生计的迭代特征通过生计决策的重复循环得以体现，每个决策都在一张纸上，按顺序排列在图表的后面，并标记为't1'、't2'，表示逐年决策的后续迭代。家庭生计框的外部边界被称为“社会保护”。这象征着国家和地方集体行动提供的风险预防和准备的存在（或缺失）。这是对更普遍的“（不安全或安全）条件”的地方性表达（在这里显示为框 2，源自 PAR 模型）。这将灾害原因的更广泛规模与正常生活的微观世界联系起来。定义家庭层面社会保护质量的资源范围多样，可能包括防洪堤、混凝土风暴避难所、建筑法规的执行，以及社区应对机制、自助和社区慈善。这些将在下面更详细地讨论。还值得具体说明如何选择框中的“家庭”。这个问题（本质上是范围和样本的问题）必须由当地人以及研究人员、规划者或发展专业人士根据他们的关注点来定义。这可以在空间上定义（例如，受到特定和严重自然灾害威胁的区域、特定村庄或城市中的一个街区），也可以根据民族、阶级或其他特征来定义，这些特征可能使所选择的家庭群体更加脆弱。

Let us now turn out attention to the potential hazard in Box 3 in the top left-hand corner of the diagram. The arrow-shaped box should be recognisable from the PAR framework, and introduces the specific hazard(s). The time and place characteristics of the hazard (where, how often, when) are examined in more detail and illustrated in Box 4, labelled ‘nature of the hazard’. The scene is now set for the disaster process to start, following the hazard strike (stylised as ‘the trigger event’, in Box 5). It must be noted here that some disasters occur without a clear-cut, single, natural hazard trigger, nor perhaps with an identifiable event in the political economy. Instead, there are multiple contributing events which together constitute a ‘complex emergency’, which then unfolds in all its intractable complexity over a long period of time. An example is the situation in 2001-2003 in Zimbabwe, which has gone from a country producing a surplus of food into one facing bankruptcy and impending famine, in a complex mix of drought and political conflict.

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现在让我们关注图表左上角框 3 中的潜在危害。箭头形状的框应该可以从 PAR 框架中识别出来，并引入具体的危害。危害的时间和地点特征（在哪里，多久一次，何时）将在框 4 中更详细地审查，并标记为“危害的性质”。灾难过程的开始场景已经设定，紧随危害发生（在框 5 中被简化为“触发事件”）。在这里必须指出的是，一些灾难发生时并没有明确的、单一的自然危害触发，或许也没有在政治经济中可识别的事件。相反，有多个共同发生的事件构成了“复杂紧急情况”，然后在漫长的时间内以其难以处理的复杂性展开。一个例子是 2001-2003 年津巴布韦的情况，该国从一个食品过剩的国家变成了一个面临破产和即将发生饥荒的国家，复杂地交织着干旱和政治冲突。

The example to be used here involves a disaster that is triggered by a definite hazard event. It is a composite event, but not an unusual one, involving high winds, coastal storms, intense rainfall, landslides, flooding of urban and rural areas, contaminated water supplies and so on, and will be described in more detail later on. This event now attacks ‘normal life’, and the first round of impacts are shown in Box 6. Some of the immediate
这里使用的例子涉及由明确的危险事件引发的灾难。这是一个复合事件，但并不罕见，涉及强风、沿海风暴、强降雨、滑坡、城市和农村地区的洪水、受污染的水源等，稍后将更详细地描述。这个事件现在袭击“正常生活”，第一轮影响如框 6 所示。一些直接后果通过现有的安全措施进行调节或偏转，而其他影响则穿透这些安全措施（由“影响箭头”穿透外部保护屏障所示），并以不同程度的严重性影响不同的家庭。危险事件还改变了现有的社会关系以及统治结构，后续将更详细地解释这些过程。
consequences are mediated or deflected by the safety measures in place, while other impacts penetrate these safety measures (depicted by the ‘impact arrow’ striking through the outer protective barrier) and fall upon different households with varying degrees of severity. The hazard event also alters existing social relations as well as structures of domination, as the more detailed explanation of these processes will show.
这些后果通过现有的安全措施进行调节或偏转，而其他影响则穿透这些安全措施（由“影响箭头”穿透外部保护屏障所示），并以不同程度的严重性影响不同的家庭。危险事件还改变了现有的社会关系以及统治结构，后续将更详细地解释这些过程。

Within the microcosm of households, adaptations, coping strategies and access to safety become urgent as a potential disaster starts to overtake what is no longer ‘normal life’. This is the transition from normal life in Box 1 to transitions from the first round of impacts in Box 6, labelled ‘transition to disaster’. Thereafter, there may be interventions into the ‘microcosm’ of households from the outside, such as disaster relief, or in contradistinction, a continuation of, for example, military activity and the disruption of relief supplies. Then, in subsequent iterations, the disaster unfolds in a series of ‘time sheets’ labelled ‘disaster as process’ in Box 7. The process of recovery, and return to normal life (or, in some cases, to a more vulnerable life, waiting, as it were, for the next disaster) is suggested in Box 8 and is examined in Chapter 9.
在家庭这个微观世界中，适应、应对策略和安全获取变得紧迫，因为潜在的灾难开始取代不再是“正常生活”的状态。这是从框 1 中的正常生活到框 6 中标记为“向灾难过渡”的第一次影响的过渡。此后，可能会有来自外部对家庭“微观世界”的干预，例如灾难救助，或者相反，例如军事活动的持续和救援物资的中断。然后，在后续的迭代中，灾难在框 7 中标记为“灾难作为过程”的一系列“时间表”中展开。恢复的过程，以及回归正常生活（或者在某些情况下，回归到更脆弱的生活，仿佛在等待下一个灾难）在框 8 中有所暗示，并在第 9 章中进行了探讨。

Access in more detail
更详细的获取方式

The PAR model, which forms a ‘chain of explanation’, is an analytical tool, subject to a number of inadequacies which we have tried to illustrate. One of its weaknesses is that the generation of vulnerability is not adequately integrated with the way in which hazards themselves affect people; it is a static model. It exaggerates the separation of the hazard from social processes in order to emphasise the social causation of disasters. In reality, nature forms a part of the social framework of society, as is most evident in the use of natural resources for economic activity. Hazards are also intertwined with human systems in affecting the pattern of assets and livelihoods among people (for instance, affecting land distribution and ownership after floods).
PAR 模型形成了一个“解释链”，是一种分析工具，但存在一些不足之处，我们已尝试加以说明。它的一个弱点是脆弱性的生成与危害本身对人们的影响之间没有得到充分整合；它是一个静态模型。它夸大了危害与社会过程之间的分离，以强调灾害的社会成因。实际上，自然是社会框架的一部分，这在自然资源用于经济活动中最为明显。危害也与人类系统交织在一起，影响着人们的资产和生计模式（例如，洪水后影响土地分配和所有权）。

To avoid false separation of hazards from social system, we have proposed a second dynamic framework called the ‘Access’ model. This focuses on the way unsafe conditions arise in relation to the economic and political processes that allocate assets, income and other resources in a society. But it also allows us to integrate nature in the explanation of hazard impacts, because we can include nature itself, including its ‘extremes’ (as they are experienced by people with different characteristics, in the workings of social processes and social change). In short, we can show how social systems create the conditions in which hazards have a differential impact on various societies and different groups within society. Nature itself constitutes a part of the resources that are allocated by social processes, and under these conditions people become more or less vulnerable to hazard impacts. In this chapter, the concept of ‘access’ to resources is explored in a more formal way, and the model within which it can be understood is developed fully.
为了避免将危险与社会系统错误分离，我们提出了一个名为“Access”的第二个动态框架。该框架关注不安全条件如何与经济和政治过程相关联，这些过程在社会中分配资产、收入和其他资源。但它也使我们能够在解释危险影响时整合自然，因为我们可以包括自然本身，包括其“极端”（因为不同特征的人在社会过程和社会变迁的运作中所经历的）。简而言之，我们可以展示社会系统如何创造条件，使得危险对不同社会和社会内部不同群体产生差异化影响。自然本身构成了由社会过程分配的资源的一部分，在这些条件下，人们对危险影响的脆弱性会有所不同。在本章中，“获取”资源的概念以更正式的方式进行探讨，并充分发展了可以理解该概念的模型。

The notion of access can be illustrated using a narrative taken from the work of Winchester (1986, 1992), which analysed the impact of tropical cyclones in coastal Andhra Pradesh (south-east India) (see also Chapter 7).

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Cyclones in the Bay of Bengal periodically move across the coast and strike low-lying ground in Andhra Pradesh. They sometimes cause serious loss of life and property, and disrupt agriculture for months or
访问的概念可以通过温彻斯特（1986 年，1992 年）的研究中的叙述来说明，该研究分析了热带气旋对安得拉邦沿海地区（印度东南部）的影响（另见第 7 章）。孟加拉湾的气旋定期穿越海岸，袭击安得拉邦的低洼地区。它们有时会造成严重的人员和财产损失，并在几个月甚至几年后扰乱农业。
even years afterwards. The damage is done by very high winds, often causing a stormsurge, followed by prolonged torrential rain. Let us compare how the cyclone affects a wealthy and a poor family living only a 100 m apart.
这种损害是由非常强的风造成的，通常会引发风暴潮，随后是持续的暴雨。让我们比较一下气旋如何影响仅相距 100 米的富裕家庭和贫困家庭。

The wealthy household has six members, with a brick house, six draught cattle and over a hectare of prime paddy land. The (male) head of household owns a small grain business for which he runs a truck. The poor family has a thatch and pole house, one draught ox and a calf, a quarter of a hectare of poor, non-irrigated land and sharecropping rights for another quarter hectare. The family consists of husband and wife, both of whom have to work as agricultural labourers for part of the year, and children aged five and two. The cyclone strikes, but the wealthy farmer has received warning on his radio and leaves the area with his valuables and family in the truck. The storm surge partly destroys his house, and the roof is taken off by the wind. Three cattle are drowned and his fields are flooded, their crops destroyed. The youngest child of the poor family is drowned, and they lose their house completely. Both their animals also drown, and their fields are also flooded and the crop ruined.
富裕家庭有六口人，住在一栋砖房里，拥有六头耕牛和超过一公顷的优质稻田。家庭的（男性）户主经营着一家小型粮食生意，并开着一辆卡车。贫困家庭住在茅草和木柱搭建的房子里，拥有一头耕牛和一只小牛，四分之一公顷的贫瘠非灌溉土地，以及另一块四分之一公顷的分租权。这个家庭由夫妻组成，他们两人都必须在一年中的一部分时间里作为农业劳工工作，还有五岁和两岁的孩子。飓风来袭，但富裕的农民通过收音机收到了警报，带着贵重物品和家人乘卡车离开了该地区。风暴潮部分摧毁了他的房子，屋顶被风刮走。三头牛淹死了，他的田地被淹没，作物被毁。贫困家庭最小的孩子淹死了，他们的房子完全被毁。他们的动物也淹死了，田地也被淹没，作物也被毁。

The wealthy family returns and uses their savings from agriculture and trade to rebuild the house within a week. They replace the cattle and are able to plough and replant their fields after the flood has receded. The poor family, although having lost less in monetary and resource terms, have no savings with which to replace their house (although it would cost less than 5 per cent of the cost of the house of the rich family). The poor family have to borrow money for essential shelter from a private moneylender at exorbitant rates of interest. They cannot afford to replace their ox (essential for ploughing) but eventually manage to buy a calf. In the meantime they have to hire bullocks for ploughing their field, which they do too late, since many others are in the same position and draught animals are in short supply. As a result, the family suffers a hungry period eight months after the cyclone.
富裕家庭在一周内利用农业和贸易的积蓄重建房屋。他们更换了牛，并在洪水退去后能够耕作和重新种植田地。虽然贫困家庭在金钱和资源方面损失较少，但他们没有积蓄来更换房屋（尽管这笔费用不到富裕家庭房屋成本的 5%）。贫困家庭不得不向私人放贷人借钱以支付基本的住所，利率高得离谱。他们无法负担更换牛（耕作必需），但最终设法购买了一只小牛。与此同时，他们不得不雇用牛来耕作田地，但由于许多人处于同样的境地，耕作动物供不应求，他们的耕作时间也太晚。因此，这个家庭在飓风过后八个月经历了一段饥饿期。

Although this story suggests a generalised negative association between wealth and damage, such a result is not automatic. In this area, in some locations that are less protected from tidal surge and are more hazardous to all social classes, higher mortality can occur across the local population, irrespective of the wealth of household. But this example serves to illustrate how access to resources varies between households and the significance this has for potential loss and rate of recovery. Those with better access to information, cash, rights to the means of production, tools and equipment, and the social networks to mobilise resources from outside the household, are less vulnerable to hazards, and may be in a position to avoid disaster. Their losses are frequently greater in absolute terms, since they may have more to lose in terms of monetary value, but they are generally able to recover more quickly. After a famine poor and disadvantaged households can recover but may compromise their resilience to the next famine (Rahmato 1988). In our illustration above, the seeds of further hardship, maybe starvation, have been sown for the household with poor access to resources, but this is not so for the other family.
尽管这个故事暗示了财富与损失之间的一般负面关联，但这样的结果并不是自动的。在这个领域，在一些对潮汐涌浪保护较少且对所有社会阶层更具危险性的地方，较高的死亡率可能会出现在当地人口中，而与家庭的财富无关。但这个例子说明了家庭之间资源获取的差异及其对潜在损失和恢复速度的重要性。那些能够更好地获取信息、现金、生产资料的权利、工具和设备，以及能够动员外部资源的社会网络的人，面对灾害的脆弱性较小，可能能够避免灾难。他们的损失在绝对值上通常更大，因为他们在货币价值上可能有更多的损失，但他们通常能够更快地恢复。在饥荒之后，贫困和弱势家庭可以恢复，但可能会妥协他们对下次饥荒的韧性（Rahmato 1988）。在我们上面的例子中，资源获取困难的家庭可能已经播下了进一步困境，甚至饥荒的种子，但对于另一个家庭来说情况并非如此。

This example helps to demonstrate the arguments of the first two chapters that variations in level of vulnerability to hazards are central in differentiating the severity of impact of a disaster on different groups of people. In general, rich people (and urban people of all wealth categories) almost never starve. Some avoid hazards completely and
这个例子有助于展示前两章的论点，即对灾害的脆弱性水平的变化在区分灾害对不同人群影响的严重性方面是至关重要的。一般来说，富人（以及所有财富类别的城市人）几乎从不挨饿。有些人完全避免了灾害。
many recover more quickly from events that are disastrous for others. However, a major explanatory factor in the creation (and distribution of impacts) of disasters is the pattern of wealth and power, because these act as major determinants of the level of vulnerability across a range of people. We therefore need to understand how this distribution is structured in normal life before a disaster, explaining in detail the differential progression of vulnerability through the triggers of natural and other events into disasters. The idea of ‘access’ (to resources of all kinds, material, social and political) is central to this task.
许多人在对其他人来说灾难性的事件中恢复得更快。然而，灾难影响的产生（和分配）的一个主要解释因素是财富和权力的模式，因为这些是决定不同人群脆弱性水平的主要因素。因此，我们需要理解在灾难发生之前，这种分配在正常生活中是如何构建的，详细解释脆弱性如何通过自然和其他事件的触发因素逐步加剧，最终导致灾难。“获取”（各种资源，包括物质、社会和政治资源）的概念在这一任务中至关重要。

Access involves the ability of an individual, family, group, class or community to use resources which are directly required to secure a livelihood in normal, pre-disaster times, and their ability to adapt to new and threatening situations. Access to such resources is always based on social and economic relations, including the social relations of production, gender, ethnicity, status and age, meaning that rights and obligations are not distributed equally among all people. Therefore, it is essential that assets and the patterns of access to them remain central to this project and do not become detached from the underlying political economy which shapes them. For example, private property rights confer upon the owners of buildings and land their ability to control the uses to which they are put. This provides the conditions for the generation of surpluses of cash and food, and collateral for loans-all of which may become crucial in times of disaster. A careful analysis of political economy tends to blur the distinction between access and resources, because access can be understood to be the most critical resource of all (Bebbington and Perrault 1999).
获取涉及个人、家庭、群体、阶级或社区使用资源的能力，这些资源在正常的、灾前的时期是直接用于保障生计的，并且他们适应新出现的威胁情况的能力。对这些资源的获取始终基于社会和经济关系，包括生产的社会关系、性别、民族、地位和年龄，这意味着权利和义务并不是在所有人之间平等分配的。因此，资产及其获取模式在这个项目中至关重要，不能与塑造它们的基础政治经济脱节。例如，私有财产权赋予建筑物和土地的所有者控制其使用方式的能力。这为现金和食品的盈余产生提供了条件，以及贷款的抵押品——所有这些在灾难时期可能变得至关重要。对政治经济的仔细分析往往模糊了获取与资源之间的区别，因为获取可以被理解为所有资源中最关键的资源（Bebbington 和 Perrault 1999）。

In this Access model, the political economy is modelled in two related systems. The first is called social relations (Figure 3.1, Box 1a) and encompasses the flows of goods, money and surplus between different actors (for example, merchants, urban rentiers, capitalist producers of food, rural and urban households involved in various relations of production and endowed with a particular range and quality of access to resources, called an access profile [see below]). The second system is termed structures of domination (Figure 3.1, Box 1b), and refers to the politics of relations between people at different levels. These include relations within the household, between men and women, children and adults, seniors and juniors. These relations shape, and are shaped by, existing rights, obligations and expectations that exist within the household and which affect the allocation of work and rewards (particularly crucial in terms of shock and stress). The structures of domination also include the wider family and kinship ties of reciprocity and obligation at a more extended (and usually less intensive) level, and those between classes that are defined economically (such as employer and worker, patron and client) and between members of different ethnic groups.
在这个访问模型中，政治经济被建模为两个相关的系统。第一个被称为社会关系（图 3.1，框 1a），涵盖了不同参与者之间商品、货币和剩余的流动（例如，商人、城市租金者、食品的资本主义生产者、参与各种生产关系的农村和城市家庭，并拥有特定范围和质量的资源获取，称为获取配置 [见下文]）。第二个系统被称为统治结构（图 3.1，框 1b），指的是不同层级之间人际关系的政治。这些关系包括家庭内部的关系、男性与女性、儿童与成年人、老年人与年轻人之间的关系。这些关系塑造并受到家庭内部现有权利、义务和期望的影响，这些权利、义务和期望影响着工作和奖励的分配（在冲击和压力方面尤为关键）。统治结构还包括更广泛的家庭和亲属之间的互惠和义务关系，这些关系在更广泛（通常强度较低）的层面上存在，以及在经济上定义的阶级之间的关系（如雇主与工人、赞助人与客户）和不同民族群体成员之间的关系。

Finally, the structures of domination involve, at the most extended and highest level, relations between individual citizens and the state. These are multifarious and become crucial in times of shocks and stress. They involve issues of law and order and how these are exercised-with partiality and personal discretion, with particular degrees of intensity and efficiency, with differing degrees of coercion, or sometimes with violence. Relations at this level usually involve standards of governance and the capabilities of the civil service and the police. For example, as Chapter 8 will illustrate, the building codes and bylaws which are applied to the physical planning of a city may be called into question by an earthquake. The degree of administrative competence in disaster preparedness, as
最后，支配结构在最广泛和最高层面上涉及个体公民与国家之间的关系。这些关系多种多样，在冲击和压力时期变得至关重要。它们涉及法律和秩序的问题，以及这些问题如何被执行——带有偏见和个人裁量，具有不同程度的强度和效率，伴随不同程度的强制，或有时伴随暴力。在这个层面上的关系通常涉及治理标准以及公务员和警察的能力。例如，正如第八章将说明的那样，适用于城市物理规划的建筑规范和章程可能会因地震而受到质疑。灾难准备中的行政能力程度，作为
well as in disaster relief and recovery, is of great importance. Finally, the state (with its army, police force, and semi-official and sometimes encouraged vigilante groups) may be involved in civil war, systematic persecution or ethnic cleansing, in which case the resolution of what is known as a ‘complex emergency’ can become virtually intractable, and the state may block or divert international humanitarian assistance altogether (see Chapter 4 on famines).
在灾难救助和恢复方面，具有重要意义。最后，国家（及其军队、警察部队和半官方、有时被鼓励的义务警察团体）可能卷入内战、系统性迫害或种族清洗，在这种情况下，解决所谓的“复杂紧急情况”几乎变得无解，国家可能完全阻止或转移国际人道主义援助（见第四章关于饥荒的内容）。

Structures of domination may draw on dominant and shared ideologies, world views and beliefs for their legitimacy. Such ideologies and world views are often the ‘root causes’ of vulnerability and are present at the extreme left-hand side of the PAR model. This is one of many points of connection between our two models. The influence of ideology can be seen in the ways that different groups of people perceive risk. Earlier narrow, positivist comparative studies of ‘the psychology of risk perception’ were baffled by what it labelled ‘fatalism’ in the face of hazards such as drought in Nigeria (Dupree and Roder 1974). It is critically important for international and national initiatives to understand risk cultures in different contexts so as to be able to improve ‘risk awareness’, and we shall return to this in Chapter 9.
支配结构可能依赖于主导和共享的意识形态、世界观和信仰来获得其合法性。这些意识形态和世界观通常是脆弱性的“根本原因”，并且存在于 PAR 模型的极左侧。这是我们两个模型之间许多联系点之一。意识形态的影响可以在不同群体对风险的感知方式中看到。早期狭隘的实证比较研究“风险感知的心理学”对其所标记的在尼日利亚干旱等危害面前的“宿命论”感到困惑（Dupree 和 Roder 1974）。国际和国家倡议理解不同背景下的风险文化至关重要，以便能够提高“风险意识”，我们将在第 9 章中对此进行讨论。

New thinking since 1994
自 1994 年以来的新思维

Since the introduction of the Access model in the first edition of At Risk, there have been a number of other developments in this field and also some (mostly) constructive criticism of the model. The most important parallel innovation is the advent of the ‘sustainable livelihoods (SL) approach’ to development. This appeared in preliminary form in Chambers and Conway (1992) and was promoted by the UK aid ministry (Department for International Development) in Carney (1998), and by others including Drinkwater and McEwan (1994), Leach et al. (1997), Moser (1998), Scoones (1998) and Bellington (1999). This SL approach is very similar to the Access model in the first edition of At Risk, and earlier versions of the household Access model on which it was based (Blaikie et al. 1977; Blaikie 1985b).
自从《风险》第一版中引入了访问模型以来，该领域发生了一些其他发展，并且对该模型也有一些（主要是）建设性的批评。最重要的平行创新是“可持续生计（SL）发展方法”的出现。该方法在 Chambers 和 Conway（1992）中以初步形式出现，并在 Carney（1998）中由英国援助部（国际发展部）推广，其他包括 Drinkwater 和 McEwan（1994）、Leach 等（1997）、Moser（1998）、Scoones（1998）和 Bellington（1999）等人也进行了推广。这个 SL 方法与《风险》第一版中的访问模型非常相似，并且与其基础上的早期家庭访问模型（Blaikie 等，1977；Blaikie，1985b）也非常相似。

A livelihood:生计：
comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable [when it can] cope and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihoods for the next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at local and global levels in the long and short term.
包括维持生计所需的能力、资产和活动：生计是可持续的[当它能够]应对和恢复压力和冲击，维持或增强其能力和资产，并为下一代提供可持续的生计；并且在短期和长期内为地方和全球的其他生计带来净收益。
(Chambers and Conway 1992:7-8)
（Chambers 和 Conway 1992:7-8）
The SL approach was not developed specifically for the analysis of disasters, but more generally for a wide range of (usually agrarian) policies. None the less, it is implied that the occurrence of a disaster (or in livelihood terminology by ‘shock’ or ‘stress’) implies non-sustainability of the affected livelihoods. While the occurrence of a disaster is certainly evidence of non-sustainability, it cannot be treated as conclusive evidence. After all, disasters can be prevented or palliated, and recovery achieved, without necessarily reducing the reproduction of sustainable livelihoods. ...

Livelihood analysis seeks to explain how a person obtains a livelihood by drawing upon and combining five types of ‘capital’, which are similar to the assets that are involved in our Access model: ...

1 human capital (skills, knowledge, health and energy); ...
2 social capital (networks, groups, institutions); ...
3 physical capital (infrastructure, technology and equipment);
3 物质资本（基础设施、技术和设备）;
4 financial capital (savings, credit);
4 财务资本（储蓄、信贷）;
5 natural capital (natural resources, land, water, fauna and flora).
5 种自然资本（自然资源、土地、水、动植物）。
In some ways, the addition of the idea of ‘capitals’ being drawn down, built up or substituted is illuminating, and is handled in our original Access model in a different way (which the reader will be able to identify below). However, because the original Access model is so similar to the livelihood approach, as it was later developed, the authors decided not to adopt the livelihoods terminology, but to acknowledge it and its contribution separately, and to build upon it wherever it offers new insights.
在某种程度上，增加“资本”被消耗、积累或替代的概念是有启发性的，并且在我们原始的 Access 模型中以不同的方式处理（读者可以在下面识别）。然而，由于原始的 Access 模型与后来的生计方法非常相似，作者决定不采用生计术语，而是单独承认它及其贡献，并在其提供新见解的地方加以构建。

It is worth emphasising that the Access model is essentially dynamic, and iterates through time to provide a precise understanding of how people are impacted by a hazard event and their trajectories through that event. It is a micro-level, disaggregated model which is shaped by (and shapes) overarching political processes at different levels (from the form of international intervention, the nature of the state, downwards). The Access model remains in this edition an economistic model, which can be as precise, deterministic and quantitative as the user wishes. The political-economic realm is acknowledged to be profoundly important but is not modelled directly, though its structural ‘scaffolding’ within which households take decisions has to be identified. The root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions which the PAR framework deals with are treated as qualitative inputs into the Access model and have to be specified in more detail through the dynamic operation of structures of domination and social relations.
值得强调的是，Access 模型本质上是动态的，并通过时间迭代，以提供对人们如何受到灾害事件影响及其在该事件中的轨迹的准确理解。它是一个微观层面的、分解的模型，受到（并塑造）不同层次的总体政治过程的影响（从国际干预的形式、国家的性质，到更低层次）。在本版中，Access 模型仍然是一个经济学模型，可以根据用户的需求变得精确、确定性和定量。政治经济领域被认为是极其重要的，但并未直接建模，尽管必须识别出家庭做出决策的结构性“支架”。PAR 框架所处理的根本原因、动态压力和不安全条件被视为 Access 模型的定性输入，必须通过支配结构和社会关系的动态运作进行更详细的说明。

Haghebaert (2001, cf. 2002) has made some constructive criticisms of the Access model. These are as follows: (1) the version of the model used in the first edition 'appears to be more designed to analyse general livelihood processes than to investigate specific disaster related processes’ and issues of safety are not well defined; (2) non-tangible assets, such as creativity, experience and inventiveness (in short, human agency) are under-emphasised; and (3) the framework does not link up with political and socioeconomic processes. Access to safety is important, and this has been strengthened in this version. Safety is partly a matter of what Cannon (2000a) has called ‘social protection’ and ‘self-protection’. Social protection against hazards is (or should be) provided by entities that operate on levels above the household, especially the state, or community, or through collective action, while self-protection is provided by and for the household (to the extent that its assets make this possible, or its attitude makes it willing to do so; there may well also be an intra-household variation in self-protection between men and women, children and adults, and older and younger adults).
Haghebaert（2001，参见 2002）对 Access 模型提出了一些建设性的批评，具体如下：（1）第一版中使用的模型版本“似乎更倾向于分析一般生计过程，而不是调查特定的灾害相关过程”，安全问题定义不明确；（2）无形资产，如创造力、经验和创造性（简而言之，人类能动性）被低估；（3）该框架未能与政治和社会经济过程相连接。安全的获取是重要的，这在本版本中得到了加强。安全在一定程度上是 Cannon（2000a）所称的“社会保护”和“自我保护”的问题。针对危害的社会保护是（或应该是）由在家庭之上运作的实体提供的，特别是国家、社区或通过集体行动，而自我保护则由家庭提供（在其资产使其能够这样做的程度上，或其态度使其愿意这样做；在家庭内部，男性和女性、儿童和成人、老年人和年轻人之间的自我保护可能也会存在差异）。

Households can to some extent ‘buy’ safety (e.g. strengthening their house, locating on a plot safe from rising floods, using drought-resistant seeds). Later in this chapter we refer to this self-protection also as ‘individually generated safety’. Other aspects of
家庭在一定程度上可以“购买”安全（例如，加强房屋、选择位于安全地块以避免洪水、使用抗旱种子）。在本章后面，我们将这种自我保护称为“个体生成的安全”。其他方面的
safety—social protection—are possible only at a level above that of the household. They are a function of both non-monetary social relations (for example, mutual aid in a community, neighbourhood, or among extended kin: the equivalent of ‘social capital’ in the sustainable livelihood approach), and the provision of preventive measures by government and other institutions. The social protection component of safety is determined by the structures of domination: they are a function of the relationship between the members of the household as ‘citizens’ with ‘rights’, ‘claims’ and ‘entitlements’ in relation to the state (and civil society, which allows social networks to operate). The last mentioned extends to the citizens’ ‘right to know’ (e.g. awareness of risks, warning systems) as well as enforcement of codes and standards, provision and maintenance of lifeline infrastructure, strategic, staple food reserves, etc.
安全—社会保护—只有在家庭之上的层面上才是可能的。它们是非货币社会关系的一个函数（例如，社区、邻里或扩展亲属之间的互助：在可持续生计方法中相当于“社会资本”），以及政府和其他机构提供的预防措施。安全的社会保护组成部分由统治结构决定：它们是家庭成员作为“公民”与国家（以及允许社会网络运作的公民社会）之间的“权利”、“要求”和“权利”关系的一个函数。最后提到的扩展到公民的“知情权”（例如，风险意识、警报系统）以及对规范和标准的执行、生命线基础设施的提供和维护、战略性主食储备等。

The other two points made by Haghebaert (2001) are more difficult to accommodate. Firstly, our Access model is economistic, implicitly quantitative and structuralist, and, we maintain, there are considerable advantages because of this. It isolates important economic and political economic processes of normal life. It is very difficult to model, predict or find regularities in agency or inventiveness. Coping mechanisms in the face of disasters are discussed later on in this chapter, but these can usually be described in a qualitative manner only. Indeed, Part III of this book picks up this aspect and suggests ways of strengthening, rather than hampering and undermining, local ingenuity. In this sense, the Access model was never designed, nor made claims, to explain all things about all disasters to all people. In similar vein, the political is also unpredictable, although the PAR framework, plus the analysis of structures of domination and social relations all specify the importance of the political, which qualify at different points the iterations of daily life and their outcomes. The Access model in isolation does not directly incorporate political factors, but used with the PAR model, which is much less precise but more holistic, both together provide a satisfactory analytical link with political and socioeconomic processes.
Haghebaert（2001）提出的另外两个观点更难以适应。首先，我们的 Access 模型是经济主义的，隐含地是定量和结构主义的，我们认为，这带来了相当大的优势。它孤立了正常生活中重要的经济和政治经济过程。建模、预测或发现代理或创造力的规律非常困难。应对灾难的机制将在本章后面讨论，但这些通常只能以定性方式描述。实际上，本书的第三部分关注这一方面，并提出加强而不是妨碍和破坏地方创造力的方法。从这个意义上说，Access 模型从未被设计或声称能够解释所有人对所有灾难的所有事物。同样，政治也是不可预测的，尽管 PAR 框架以及对统治结构和社会关系的分析都明确指出政治的重要性，这在不同的时刻限定了日常生活的迭代及其结果。单独的接入模型并未直接纳入政治因素，但与 PAR 模型结合使用，后者虽然不够精确但更具整体性，两者共同提供了与政治和社会经济过程的令人满意的分析联系。

'Normal life'-the formal Access model
“正常生活”——正式的接入模型

Let us now turn to the central model, called the Access model. The following explanation will 'unpack’ Box 1 of Figure 3.1. We will assume that the people we are concerned with in analysing vulnerability are members of economic decision-making units. These units can sometimes be called ‘households’, or ‘hearth-holds’ (Ekejuiba 1984; Guyer and Peters 1984), that is, those who share common eating arrangements which coincide with production units. Admittedly, there are cases where it is difficult to distinguish households at all.

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There are squatter camps where remnants and fragments of households live together under one roof. There are ‘hot bedders’, or very poor immigrants who sequentially share a single bed, one sleeping there at night and working the day shift, and the next slipping into the warm bed before working the following night shift. There are hostels for short-stay workers and street populations which may not have much to do with the conventional household at all-indeed, some (abused children, battered wives, orphans living with distant relatives) may be refugees from the household.
现在让我们转向中心模型，称为访问模型。以下解释将“解读”图 3.1 的框 1。我们将假设在分析脆弱性时，我们所关注的人是经济决策单位的成员。这些单位有时可以称为“家庭”或“炉边单位”（Ekejuiba 1984；Guyer 和 Peters 1984），即那些共享与生产单位重合的共同饮食安排的人。诚然，有些情况下很难区分家庭。

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有些占地营地，家庭的残余和碎片共同生活在一个屋檐下。有“热床者”，或非常贫困的移民，他们依次共享一张床，一个人在晚上睡觉并上白班，另一个人在工作前滑入温暖的床中，准备上夜班。还有短期工人和街头人群的宿舍，这些人可能与传统家庭没有太多关系——实际上，一些（被虐待的儿童、受虐的妻子、与远亲同住的孤儿）可能是家庭的难民。

All these people may also be as vulnerable to hazards as those living in-and, in terms
所有这些人可能在面对危险时与那些生活在——以及在某种程度上
of expectations, obligations and rights-part of a household. However, such examples apart, it is usually possible to identify units that share labour and other inputs and consume meals together under one roof (or compound). We shall label these units 'households’, each having a range or profile of resources and assets that represents their particular access level (the boxes numbered 2a in Figure 3.2). Also, each individual has an initial ‘state of well-being’, primarily defined by physical abilities to withstand shocks, prolonged periods of stress and deprivation specific to the particular disaster being addressed. At later stages in the disaster process, well-being will be affected and is likely to be shifted negatively from the initial conditions, as subsequent discussion will show. Each individual in a household has a collective claim which may be termed as access to resources.
期望、义务和权利的组成部分，属于一个家庭。然而，撇开这些例子，通常可以识别出共享劳动和其他投入并在一个屋檐下（或院落）共同用餐的单位。我们将这些单位称为“家庭”，每个家庭都有一系列或特征的资源和资产，代表其特定的获取水平（图 3.2 中标记为 2a 的框）。此外，每个个体都有一个初始的“幸福状态”，主要由抵御冲击、长期压力和特定于所处理灾难的剥夺的身体能力来定义。在灾难过程的后期，幸福感将受到影响，并可能从初始条件中向负面转移，后续讨论将表明这一点。家庭中的每个个体都有一个集体权利，可以称之为对资源的获取。

Access to resources may include land of various qualities, livestock, tools and equipment, capital and stock, reserves of food, jewellery, as well as labour-power and specialist knowledge and skills (Figure 3.2, Box 2b). Nonmaterial ‘resources’ are also essential, such as knowledge and skills, the
对资源的获取可能包括各种质量的土地、牲畜、工具和设备、资本和存货、食品储备、珠宝，以及劳动力和专业知识与技能（图 3.2，框 2b）。非物质的“资源”同样至关重要，例如知识和技能，

Figure 3.2 Access to resources: 'normal life’
图 3.2 资源获取：‘正常生活’
structural position occupied in a society such as gender, or membership of a particular tribe or caste (which can either enable or exclude a person from networks of support, facilitate or prevent access to resources and their utilisation). These are personal attributes (social and human capital in terms of the SL approach) and not material resources. Access to material resources is secured through rights (e.g. property rights,
在社会中所占据的结构性位置，例如性别，或特定部落或种姓的成员身份（这可能使一个人能够或排除在支持网络之外，促进或阻碍对资源及其利用的获取）。这些是个人属性（在 SL 方法中指社会和人力资本），而不是物质资源。对物质资源的获取是通过权利获得的（例如，财产权，
rights accruing to women in marriage, as well as others sanctioned by law or custom) or sometimes criminality. Rights may change, of course, particularly after the shock of disaster, so that the physical resource may still exist, but some individuals may no longer have access to it, or others have greater access in post-disaster periods.
婚姻中女性的权利，以及法律或习俗所认可的其他权利）或有时是通过犯罪。权利可能会发生变化，特别是在灾难冲击之后，因此物理资源可能仍然存在，但某些个体可能不再能够获取，或者在灾后时期其他人获得了更大的获取权。

Each household makes choices, within constraints, to take up one or more livelihoods or income opportunities (Box 3a). In rural areas, most of these will be the growing of different crops, or pasturing animals, while in urban areas there will probably exist a wide range of opportunities including petty-trading, working in a factory, casual labour and domestic work.

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Each income opportunity has a set of access qualifications (Box 3b). This is defined as a set of resources and social attributes (skills, membership of a particular tribe or caste, gender, age) which are required in order to take up an income opportunity (Box 3a). The notion bears a close resemblance to Sen’s idea of capability and to the livelihood lexicon of the five capitals. Here, access qualification describes a more precise and specific facility for a particular income-earning opportunity.
每个家庭在约束条件下做出选择，以获取一种或多种生计或收入机会（框 3a）。在农村地区，这些机会大多数是种植不同的作物或放牧动物，而在城市地区，可能会存在包括小额交易、在工厂工作、临时劳动和家务工作在内的广泛机会。

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每个收入机会都有一套准入资格（框 3b）。这被定义为获取收入机会所需的一组资源和社会属性（技能、特定部落或种姓的成员资格、性别、年龄）（框 3a）。这一概念与森的能力理论以及五种资本的生计词汇有着密切的相似性。在这里，准入资格描述了特定收入机会的更精确和具体的条件。

Some income opportunities have high access qualifications such as considerable capital, rare skills or costly physical infrastructure, and therefore bar most people from taking them up. As a result, they typically provide the highest returns. Others are much less demanding (e.g. casual labouring, which requires only an able-bodied person available at the point of employment), and these are usually over-subscribed and poorly paid. Each income opportunity has a payoff in terms of physical product, money or other services, and eventually in health and well-being (as well as affecting the initial or baseline state of well-being before the disaster).
一些收入机会具有较高的准入资格，例如可观的资本、稀有的技能或昂贵的物理基础设施，因此大多数人无法参与。因此，它们通常提供最高的回报。其他机会的要求则低得多（例如，临时劳动，仅需要在雇佣时有一名身体健康的人），这些机会通常供不应求且报酬较低。每个收入机会在物质产品、金钱或其他服务方面都有回报，最终影响健康和福祉（以及在灾难发生之前影响初始或基线的福祉状态）。

In rural areas, payoffs are often determined by crop or animal yields multiplied by market price. Both yield and price may be particularly prone to large and adverse fluctuations. The mechanisms which set payoffs (the behaviour of markets in particular) for income opportunities of different households or groups or households (e.g. for agricultural food producers, labourers, artisans, fishermen, unskilled industrial workers, and so on) are of crucial importance. The labour market for casual, part-time and unskilled workers in urban areas also shows fluctuations, as do the conditions that determine the profitability of ‘informal’ activities such as street vending (where harassment and bribes by the police can be as unpredictable as the weather).
在农村地区，收益通常由作物或动物产量乘以市场价格决定。产量和价格都可能特别容易受到大幅度和不利波动的影响。决定不同家庭或家庭群体（例如农业食品生产者、劳工、工匠、渔民、非熟练工业工人等）收入机会的收益机制（特别是市场行为）至关重要。城市地区临时、兼职和非熟练工人的劳动市场也显示出波动，决定“非正式”活动（如街头小贩）盈利能力的条件同样如此（警察的骚扰和贿赂可能和天气一样不可预测）。

Access to all the resources that each individual or household possesses can collectively be called its access profile (see Box 2 b ). This is the level of access to resources and therefore to income opportunities, with some having a much wider choice of options than others (Box 5). Those who possess access qualifications for a large number of income opportunities have a wide choice and can choose those with high payoffs or low risks. Their flexibility also allows them choice in securing a livelihood under generally adverse conditions, to command considerable resources and have reserves of food. Such a household can be said to have a good-resource profile. On the other hand, those whose access profiles are limited usually have little choice in income opportunities, and have to seek the most over-subscribed and lowest paying options, and subsequently have the least flexibility during adverse conditions. Those with a limited access profile often have to combine a number of income opportunities at different times of year as some may provide a livelihood for only part of the year, be only seasonally available or be unreliable because other people are competing for a limited number of employment
每个个体或家庭所拥有的所有资源的获取可以统称为其获取档案（见框 2 b）。这代表了对资源的获取水平，因此也代表了对收入机会的获取水平，有些人拥有的选择范围远比其他人广泛（框 5）。那些拥有大量收入机会获取资格的人有广泛的选择，可以选择高回报或低风险的机会。他们的灵活性也使他们能够在通常不利的条件下选择谋生方式，掌握相当的资源并拥有食物储备。这样的家庭可以说拥有良好的资源档案。另一方面，那些获取档案有限的人通常在收入机会方面选择不多，不得不寻求最被追捧且最低支付的选项，因此在不利条件下的灵活性最小。访问权限有限的人通常需要在一年中的不同时间结合多种收入机会，因为有些机会可能只在一年中的一部分时间内提供生计，或者仅在季节性可用，或者由于其他人竞争有限的就业机会而不可靠。
opportunities.机会。
Each individual or household therefore makes choices, typically during key decisionmaking times in the agricultural calendar, or more irregularly under urban situations. The resulting bundle of income opportunities (both in kind and in cash), together with the satisfaction of such needs as water and shelter, can be said to constitute a ‘livelihood’ (Box 6), which is the sum of the payoffs of the household’s constituent income opportunities.
因此，每个个体或家庭在农业日历的关键决策时刻，或在城市环境下更不规律地做出选择。由此产生的收入机会组合（包括实物和现金），以及满足水和住所等需求的能力，可以被称为“生计”（框 6），它是家庭各组成收入机会的收益总和。

Some households structure their income opportunities in such a way as to avert the risk of threatening events such as drought, flood, loss of employment, failure of food crops or serious illness. They also employ survival strategies and coping mechanisms once a threatening event has occurred, although this usually involves an element of physical or institutional preparation. Grain must be stored and cattle numbers increased in good years to protect the reproductive capacity of the herd in bad years. A network of obligations and rights are also built up in the form of institutions (called social capital) that deal with these events and aim to prevent them from becoming disasters. These become crucial in the transition to disaster and are described in greater detail below.
一些家庭以某种方式构建他们的收入机会，以避免干旱、洪水、失业、粮食作物失败或严重疾病等威胁事件的风险。他们还在威胁事件发生后采取生存策略和应对机制，尽管这通常涉及一定的物理或制度准备。在丰年时，必须储存粮食并增加牲畜数量，以保护在恶年时群体的繁殖能力。还建立了一系列以制度（称为社会资本）形式存在的义务和权利网络，以应对这些事件，并旨在防止它们演变为灾难。这些在向灾难过渡时变得至关重要，下面将更详细地描述。

The flows of income then enter the household as a range of goods and cash: wages, grain, remittances from absent household members, profits from commerce or business, and so on. A household budget can be constructed in which expenditures and income are listed, and the account accumulates, is in equilibrium or runs into deficit (Box 7). On this basis, decisions are made about how to cope with deficits, save or invest any surpluses, and what forms of consumption should occur, including ‘one-off’ arrangements for marrying adolescent offspring, festivals, investing in social capital, having babies, migrating (see Box 8, 'decisions’). If in surplus, the household may decide to invest and improve its access to resources in the future. If the account is in deficit, consumption will have to be reduced, assets disposed of, or the household will have to postpone equity and possibly increase the deficit in the long term by arranging a consumption loan (which may be inadequate in the short and/or longer term). A more detailed representation of the household budget is given in the case of famine in Chapter 4. The outcome of these decisions will result in a change in the access profile of each household in the next period (Box 9). These will in aggregate alter the flows of surplus between groups and households and may alter the social relations between groups (Box 1), so that in the next round the households are in a different set of relations to each other and larger scale structures, and enter Box 2b with different access profiles.
收入流随后以各种商品和现金的形式进入家庭：工资、粮食、缺席家庭成员的汇款、商业或企业的利润等。可以构建一个家庭预算，其中列出了支出和收入，账户会累积、保持平衡或出现赤字（见框 7）。在此基础上，家庭会做出关于如何应对赤字、储蓄或投资任何盈余以及应采取何种消费形式的决策，包括为未成年子女的婚姻、节日、投资社会资本、生育、迁移等安排“一次性”支出（见框 8，“决策”）。如果有盈余，家庭可能会决定投资并改善未来获取资源的能力。如果账户出现赤字，消费将不得不减少，资产需要处置，或者家庭将不得不推迟权益，可能通过安排消费贷款在长期内增加赤字（这在短期和/或长期内可能不足）。在第四章中，饥荒情况下的家庭预算有更详细的描述。这些决策的结果将在下一个时期导致每个家庭的获取特征发生变化（框 9）。这些变化将整体上改变群体和家庭之间的盈余流动，并可能改变群体之间的社会关系（框 1），以至于在下一轮中，家庭之间以及与更大规模结构之间的关系发生变化，并以不同的获取特征进入框 2b。

Households and access in a political economy
家庭与政治经济中的获取

The outline of the ‘household model’ above may seem to some an overly mechanistic and economistic treatment of access to resources. We need to include further discussion of ‘the rules of the game of the political economy’ or social transactions, and specifically of rights and social expectations which may give people access to resources. The dominant relations of production and flows of surpluses provide the main explanation of access to resources. Changes in the political economy at the level of ‘root causes’ in the PAR model are slow moving but can, as a result of revolution or major realignment in the balance of class forces, lead to fundamental shifts in access to resources and the character
上述“家庭模型”的轮廓在某些人看来可能是对资源获取的过于机械和经济主义的处理。我们需要进一步讨论“政治经济的游戏规则”或社会交易，特别是权利和社会期望，这些可能使人们获得资源。生产的主导关系和盈余流动提供了获取资源的主要解释。在 PAR 模型中，政治经济在“根本原因”层面的变化是缓慢的，但由于革命或阶级力量平衡的重大重组，可能导致获取资源和灾难特征的根本性转变。
of disasters.灾难的特征。
What is of more immediate and specific importance are the structures of domination and social relations at the local level (Boxes 1 and 4 in Figure 3.2), or the ‘rules of the political economic game’ for the microcosm of households selected in this model. Between individuals within a household, these involve the allocation of food, who eats first, who will have to absorb consumption cut-backs in times of dearth or who receives medical treatment. Gender politics within the household are of great importance here, and show how inadequate it is to treat the household as a homogeneous unit. As Rivers (1982) and Cutler

(1984, 1985)

amongst others have pointed out, women and children sometimes bear the brunt of disasters because of the power of male members of the household to allocate food while in refugee camps.

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更为直接和具体的重要性在于地方层面的统治结构和社会关系（见图 3.2 中的框 1 和框 4），或者说在该模型中选择的家庭微观环境中的“政治经济游戏规则”。在家庭内部，涉及到食物的分配、谁先吃、在匮乏时期谁将不得不承担消费削减，或谁接受医疗治疗。家庭内部的性别政治在这里非常重要，显示出将家庭视为一个同质单位是多么不充分。正如 Rivers（1982）和 Cutler 等人所指出的，女性和儿童有时会因为家庭男性成员在难民营中分配食物的权力而承受灾难的重担。

Among family and kin, an important aspect of resource allocation is embodied in a range of expectations and obligations involving shelter, gifts, loans and employment. Often these linkages reflect and reproduce the structures of domination of households and society in general. Between classes and groups, transactions include patron-client relations, taboos, untouchability, gender division of labour outside the home, sharecropper-landlord relations, and rules about property and theft, amongst many others.

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在家庭和亲属之间，资源分配的一个重要方面体现在一系列关于住所、礼物、贷款和就业的期望和义务中。这些联系往往反映并再生产家庭和社会整体的统治结构。在阶级和群体之间，交易包括庇护人-客户关系、禁忌、不可接触性、家庭外的性别劳动分工、佃农-地主关系，以及关于财产和盗窃的规则等许多其他内容。

Many of these transactions, we shall see, form an important basis for mutual help or individual survival in times of crisis, and therefore can be looked upon as additional elements in an individual’s or household’s access profile. However, the rules governing these transactions change (often very quickly) in the face of social upheaval such as war, famine or pandemic. Usually, this means a reduction in obligations and therefore in ‘income opportunities’ for the receivers of goods and services, and an increase in disposable income for those who forgo these obligations. In a few circumstances, new opportunities can open up. For example, upon occasions of extreme famishment, theft may be sanctioned, grain stores may be broken into and obligatory redistribution mechanisms from rich to poor set in motion.
许多这些交易，正如我们将看到的，构成了在危机时期相互帮助或个人生存的重要基础，因此可以被视为个人或家庭获取资源的额外元素。然而，支配这些交易的规则在社会动荡（如战争、饥荒或疫情）面前会发生变化（通常非常迅速）。通常，这意味着对接受商品和服务者的义务减少，因此“收入机会”也随之减少，而那些放弃这些义务的人则可获得更多的可支配收入。在少数情况下，新的机会可能会出现。例如，在极端饥荒的情况下，盗窃可能被允许，粮食储备可能被打破，并启动从富人到穷人的强制再分配机制。

Markets are another set of social transactions that allocate resources on the basis of price. Their behaviour is crucial in the relative worth of people’s resources, and in governing their household budgets. There is a good deal of research into the behaviour of markets, particularly preceding and during famines. The prices of essential goods and services often rise after sudden disasters when the immediately available food, shelter, clothing and medical supplies are destroyed and transport to bring in replacement supplies is disrupted. The behaviour of traders in essential commodities is crucial, as Chapter 4 will show. These rapid changes in the rules of resource allocation brings us to the issue of the time dimension in disasters.

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市场是另一种社会交易，基于价格分配资源。它们的行为对人们资源的相对价值以及管理家庭预算至关重要。关于市场行为的研究相当丰富，特别是在饥荒发生前和期间。基本商品和服务的价格在突发灾害后往往会上涨，因为立即可用的食物、住所、衣物和医疗用品被摧毁，而运输替代供应的途径也受到干扰。基本商品交易者的行为至关重要，正如第 4 章所示。这些资源分配规则的快速变化使我们关注灾害中的时间维度问题。

Access to common property resources (CPRs) is also of great importance to household livelihood and vulnerability. At various times, in various broader social and economic settings, a wide range of physical resources may have been excluded from private or state ownership and now exist as common pool resources. These resources might include trees, pasture, ground or surface water, wildlife, marine resources, famine foods and arable land, depending on the region and its history. In some places a proportion of these may be set aside for common management and use by a group larger than the household. Rules governing access to CPRs are highly localised and complex (Jodha 1991) and will be
共同财产资源（CPRs）的获取对家庭生计和脆弱性也至关重要。在不同的时间和更广泛的社会经济背景下，各种物理资源可能被排除在私人或国家所有权之外，而现在作为共同池资源存在。这些资源可能包括树木、牧场、地下水或地表水、野生动物、海洋资源、饥荒食品和可耕地，具体取决于地区及其历史。在某些地方，这些资源的一部分可能被划拨用于由超过家庭的群体共同管理和使用。关于 CPRs 获取的规则高度地方化且复杂（Jodha 1991），并将在本书第二部分描述的许多情况下得到体现。
observed in many situations described in Part II of this book. Less is known about the rules governing the use of the urban equivalent of rural CPRs; however, it is clear that scavengers, recy-clers and the poor who actually live at or near urban solid waste facilities in many countries follow complex rules of access.
关于城市等同于农村 CPRs 的使用规则了解较少；然而，很明显，在许多国家，实际生活在城市固体废物处理设施附近的拾荒者、回收者和贫困人群遵循复杂的获取规则。

Research on famine has led to the development of other concepts related to the idea of access. Most notable is Sen (1981), whose concept of ‘entitlements’ in relation to food and hunger has an affinity with the notion of access. This involves the set of resources or livelihood opportunities that may be used to produce food or procure it through various forms of exchange. His formulation is similar to the concept of access in many ways, though it is more specific; his ideas are discussed more fully in Chapter 4.
对饥荒的研究导致了与获取概念相关的其他概念的发展。最显著的是 Sen（1981），他关于“权利”与食物和饥饿的关系的概念与获取的概念有相似之处。这涉及到一组资源或生计机会，可以用来生产食物或通过各种形式的交换来获取食物。他的表述在许多方面与获取的概念相似，尽管它更为具体；他的思想在第 4 章中有更全面的讨论。

Transitions from 'normal life' to disaster
从“正常生活”到灾难的过渡

The outline structure of the Access model, and the details of ‘normal life’, are summarised in Figure 3.3 using a sample of households pursuing their livelihoods in conditions of unequal safety and livelihood opportunities. It remains to fill out the detail of the model in order to trace the transition of ‘normal life’ to disaster. Figure 3.3 repeats the structure of the model in Figure 3.1, but specifies the processes and events in more detail which appear only in summary form in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
获取模型的轮廓结构以及“正常生活”的细节在图 3.3 中进行了总结，使用了一组在不平等的安全和生计机会条件下追求生计的家庭样本。接下来需要填充模型的细节，以追踪“正常生活”到灾难的过渡。图 3.3 重复了图 3.1 中的模型结构，但更详细地指定了在图 3.1 和图 3.2 中仅以摘要形式出现的过程和事件。

Time-space positioning of hazards
危害的时间-空间定位

Turning attention to the hazard itself, Figure 3.3 depicts some key characteristics of the hazard, or multiple hazards, that threaten a particular area. A hazard has a time-space geography, involving the probabilities of events of significant magnitude to cause potential damage of differing magnitudes over geographical space. In Box 4a, a tide table shows the dates, timings and height above data for high tides and Spring tides, the probabilities of
将注意力转向危险本身，图 3.3 描绘了威胁特定区域的危险或多重危险的一些关键特征。危险具有时间-空间地理特征，涉及在地理空间上发生具有显著规模的事件的概率，以造成不同规模的潜在损害。在框 4a 中，潮汐表显示了高潮和春潮的日期、时间和高度数据的情况，以及发生的概率。
tropical cyclones and associated rainfall intensities. Each of these hazards also incorporates a spatial dimension. In the hypothetical case of a tropical cyclone (see real cases discussed in Chapter 7), a number of linked threats are implied:
热带气旋及其相关降雨强度。这些危害都包含空间维度。在假设的热带气旋案例中（参见第 7 章讨论的真实案例），暗示了一系列相关的威胁：

fresh-water flooding from inundation of low-lying areas;
低洼地区的淡水洪水淹没；
fresh-water flooding following the breaking of river banks;
河岸决口后发生的淡水洪水；
sea surges and damage to coastal settlements, fishing boats and equipment;
海浪涌动及对沿海定居点、渔船和设备的损害；
mudslides and landslides following exceptionally heavy rainfall;
在异常强降雨后发生的泥石流和滑坡；
high winds causing structural damage to buildings and property, and injury to humans and livestock;
强风造成建筑物和财产的结构性损害，以及对人类和牲畜的伤害；
salinisation of fresh-water supplies for humans and livestock.
人类和牲畜淡水供应的盐碱化。

These are shown in simplified pictorial form, and constitute part of the basis of conventional hazard assessment.
这些以简化的图示形式展示，并构成传统危险评估的基础部分。

Below the details of the hazard threat in Figure 3.3, ‘normal life’ and inbuilt vulnerabilities continue (already described and shown in Box 1). As Figure 3.3 suggests (‘time passes and then…’ between Boxes 4 and 5), a hazard event occurs (dramatised in pictorial form in Box 5) and the various potential threats outlined in the list above
在图 3.3 中，‘正常生活’和内在脆弱性继续存在（已在框 1 中描述并展示）。正如图 3.3 所示（‘时间流逝，然后……’在框 4 和框 5 之间），发生了一个危险事件（在框 5 中以图示形式戏剧化），以及上述列表中概述的各种潜在威胁。
materialise. The immediate impact can be explained largely by asking the question ‘Who was where, when?’ At the moment of impact of the event, people were to be found in coordinates of time-space as might be expected from their pursuit of ‘normal life’. If the event occurred suddenly at night, most people would have been in bed and would have been slower to take avoidance action than during daylight hours. If the storm occurred during a season when fish stocks are to be found offshore, rather than inshore, then fishers will have been exposed to even more serious threat, as it would have been harder to find shelter inshore before the worst of the storm. If wood cutters and charcoal burners choose an income opportunity that takes them to mangrove swamps during a season when there is a high probability of coastal storms, then they occupy, as part of their livelihood strategy, a particular time-space co-ordinate that carries a higher risk.
物质化。事件的直接影响在很大程度上可以通过问“谁在何时何地？”来解释。在事件发生的瞬间，人们的时间-空间坐标与他们追求“正常生活”的预期相符。如果事件在夜间突然发生，大多数人会在床上，采取避险行动的速度会比白天慢。如果风暴发生在鱼类资源主要在海上而非近岸的季节，那么渔民将面临更严重的威胁，因为在风暴最严重之前，找到近岸的避难所会更加困难。如果木材砍伐者和炭烧者选择在高概率沿海风暴的季节前往红树林沼泽的收入机会，那么他们作为生计策略的一部分，所占据的特定时间-空间坐标就会带来更高的风险。

A similar urban situation was seen on a night in 2000 when heavy rain brought a mountain of solid waste sliding down on the houses of rag pickers and scavengers who lived at the Payatas landfill on the north-east edge of Manila. Their livelihoods had a specific space-time structure that put these people in harm’s way (see Chapter 6).
2000 年的一个夜晚，类似的城市情况出现了，当大雨导致一堆固体废物滑落到位于马尼拉东北边缘的 Payatas 垃圾填埋场的拾荒者和垃圾清理工的房屋上。他们的生计具有特定的时空结构，使这些人处于危险之中（见第六章）。

Figure 3.3 The Access model in the transition to disaster
图 3.3 灾难过渡中的接入模型

Time and disasters时间与灾难

Leaving aside the time-space element and focusing on the time dimension alone, time is ‘of the essence’ in an understanding of disasters. So far, time has only been treated in the sense that the framework of ‘normal life’ permits the succession of events in a process to be analysed, allowing for people’s decision-making actions (such as the timing of activities like planting crops, selling assets, migrating, and so on). The importance of time in understanding disasters lies in the frequency of the event, when the disaster
撇开时空元素，单独关注时间维度，时间在理解灾难中是“至关重要的”。到目前为止，时间仅在“正常生活”框架允许事件过程的连续性分析的意义上被处理，从而允许人们的决策行为（例如，活动的时机，如种植作物、出售资产、迁移等）。理解灾难中时间的重要性在于事件的频率，即灾难发生的时间。
occurs (time of day, season) and in the stages of the impact of the disaster after the hazard has occurred.
发生（时间、季节）以及灾害发生后影响的各个阶段。

It may be said that disasters do not happen, they unfold. Our characterisation here chooses a hazard event that has a rapid onset (as do others, for example, tsunami, bush or forest fire, earthquake or some floods, and that accurately could be labelled a ‘trigger’). However, in the case of ‘slow-maturing’ or slow-onset disasters such as famine, the even slower HIV-AIDS pandemic or climate change, processes which can unfold over a period as much as

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years or more, this dramatic, time-dependent characterisation is less inappropriate. However, even in sudden-onset cases, the pre-conditions for disasters (‘root causes’ and ‘dynamic pressures’ in terms of our PAR model) may have been forming over a long period. Indeed, Oliver-Smith (1994) treats the Peruvian earthquake of 1970 as having ‘root causes’ that reach back 500 years to the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire and the ensuing decay of Inca methods of coping with environmental risk. Our treatment of the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City in Chapter 8 follows a similar historical, time-based narrative.
可以说，灾难并不是发生，而是展开。我们在这里的特征选择了一个快速发生的危害事件（其他事件也是如此，例如海啸、灌木或森林火灾、地震或某些洪水，这些事件可以准确地被标记为“触发器”）。然而，在“缓慢成熟”或缓慢发生的灾难情况下，例如饥荒、甚至更缓慢的艾滋病大流行或气候变化，这些过程可能在长达

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年或更长的时间内展开，这种戏剧性的、时间依赖的特征化就显得不那么合适。然而，即使在突然发生的情况下，灾难的前提条件（在我们的 PAR 模型中称为“根本原因”和“动态压力”）可能已经形成了很长一段时间。实际上，Oliver-Smith（1994）将 1970 年的秘鲁地震视为具有“根本原因”，其追溯至 500 年前西班牙征服印加帝国及随之而来的印加应对环境风险方法的衰退。我们在第 8 章中对 1985 年墨西哥城地震的处理遵循了类似的历史、基于时间的叙述。

It is therefore important to give a ‘temporal frame’ to our Access model and transition to disaster, so that the impact of its timing can be understood. The timing (and spatial expression) of hazards has therefore to be superimposed upon the ‘temporal frame’ of people earning their livelihoods and living out their daily lives. Thus, as we have said, for the shortest time frame, the time of day or night of the onset of a sudden hazard can be important. Ninety per cent of all people killed in earthquakes while occupying buildings die at night. The day of the week (particularly market days, rest, festival or holy days) is also relevant in terms of possible concentrations of people in space and time.
因此，为我们的访问模型和灾难过渡提供一个“时间框架”是重要的，以便理解其时机的影响。因此，危险的时机（和空间表现）必须叠加在人民谋生和日常生活的“时间框架”之上。因此，正如我们所说，对于最短的时间框架，突发危险发生的白天或夜晚的时间可能是重要的。在地震中，90%在建筑物内遇难的人是在夜间死亡的。星期几（特别是市场日、休息日、节日或宗教日）在空间和时间上可能的人群集中也相关。

Seasonality is one of the most important rural time factors. Chambers (1983; Chambers et al. 1981) has highlighted the impact of seasonally on health, nutrition and people’s capacity for hard work in the ‘normal’ annual cycle. The coincidence of a sudden hazard with the ‘hungry’ season (usually the wet season before crops have matured and are ready for consumption) when labour demands are highest, food reserves lowest and some major diseases most prevalent can produce a much more severe disaster impact. The build-up of famines may have a seasonal element, in that crop failures (or a number of successive failures) are sometimes involved. Food prices as well as wage rates for agricultural work have important seasonal dimensions that other factors can exacerbate and combine to precipitate famine (see Chapter 4).
季节性是农村时间因素中最重要的之一。Chambers（1983；Chambers et al. 1981）强调了季节性对健康、营养和人们在“正常”年度周期中辛勤工作的能力的影响。突发灾害与“饥饿”季节（通常是作物尚未成熟、准备消费的湿季）重合时，劳动需求最高、食品储备最低以及一些主要疾病最为流行，可能会导致更为严重的灾害影响。饥荒的积累可能具有季节性因素，因为作物失败（或多次连续失败）有时会涉及其中。食品价格以及农业工作的工资水平具有重要的季节性维度，其他因素可能会加剧并结合在一起引发饥荒（见第 4 章）。

The stages of the impact of a disaster after the hazard strikes are fundamental. The various elements in the vulnerability framework (class relations; household access profiles; income opportunities; household budget; and structures of domination and resource allocation) each iterate at a different speed. Table 3.1 summarises typical time periods of change and gives some examples.
灾害发生后影响的各个阶段是基础性的。脆弱性框架中的各个要素（阶级关系；家庭获取资料的情况；收入机会；家庭预算；以及统治结构和资源分配）各自以不同的速度迭代。表 3.1 总结了典型的变化时间段并给出了一些例子。

There is a fundamental difference in time between sudden disasters and slowdeveloping disasters such as famine or pandemics (in which the most acute distress may extend over a period of months and years). In terms of their mortality and damage to homes and livelihoods, the onset of some
突发性灾害与缓慢发展的灾害（如饥荒或流行病，其中最严重的困境可能持续数月甚至数年）之间存在根本的时间差异。在其对死亡率和家庭及生计的损害方面，某些灾害的发生

Table 3.1 Time periods for components of the Access model
表 3.1 访问模型各组成部分的时间段

Component of the access framework 访问框架的组成部分	Typical time period of change after disaster 灾后变化的典型时间周期	Examples示例
Class relations阶级关系	Months or years月或年	Nicaragua (1972)尼加拉瓜（1972）
Class relations阶级关系		Portugal (1755)葡萄牙 (1755)
Change in political regime 政治体制的变化		Ethiopia (1974)埃塞俄比亚 (1974)
Household access profile 家庭接入状况分析	Sudden, immediate impact 突发的、立即的影响	Loss of life and house 生命和房屋的损失
	Weeks数周	Sale of livestock, jewellery 家畜和珠宝的销售
	Weeks or months周或月	Other assets sold其他出售的资产
Income opportunities收入机会	Sudden if urban employment is disrupted 如果城市就业受到干扰则突然出现	Rural employment collapses due to drought, flood 由于干旱和洪水，农村就业崩溃
Income opportunities收入机会	Usually over months ...	Taboo foods accepted ...
Household budget ...	Immediate impact in suddenonset hazards ...	Cuts in consumption; reallocation by age, gende: ...
Household budget ...	Months ...	Food price rises and famine ...
Structures of domination ...	Immediate impact in sudden disasters ...	Sharecroppers refuse to give up landlords’ share ...
Structures of domination ...	Months or years, with episodic food shortages and high prices ...	Famine ...

sudden disasters can be measured in seconds or minutes in terms of earthquakes, in hours or a few days for floods. Affected populations may rearrange their accepted pattern of responsibilities and rights and combine into completely unfamiliar groupings, when strangers, refugees, those temporarily taking shelter, the traumatised and longer-term displaced turn up in a new social environment after a trigger hazard event. On the other hand, slow-onset disasters require careful analysis of social adaptation, the emergence of new rules of inclusion and exclusion regarding networks of support and changing access qualifications for new and existing income opportunities. ...

Post-event transition to disaster
事件后的灾难过渡

Returning to the time- and space-bound narrative of a disaster outlined in Figure 3.3, the hazard event has other quick acting and profound impacts on the practice of ‘normal life’. Box 6 is labelled ‘transition to disaster’ and identifies the trajectory to ‘abnormal’ life. The households in this diagram are represented by individual men, women and children, and some are shown to have suffered injury, become disabled or died (crossed out, in
回到图 3.3 中概述的时间和空间限制的灾难叙事，灾害事件对“正常生活”的实践产生了其他快速而深远的影响。框 6 标记为“灾难过渡”，并确定了通往“非正常”生活的轨迹。该图中的家庭由个别男性、女性和儿童表示，其中一些被显示为受伤、残疾或死亡（划掉）。
pictorial terms). Household access profiles are suddenly and profoundly altered. Paid employment may cease, and with it access to cash with which to purchase food, medical care, repair shelters or productive equipment such as ploughs, acquire livestock for ploughing and fishing equipment. Land may be inundated; brick factories remain under water; regular customers for haircuts, sweets and petty services in cities and small towns have their minds on other matters and have few funds available to spend on non-essential services. The access qualifications for many income opportunities are raised, sometimes to infinity -they simply are not viable choices any more. Thus the income opportunities chosen by different households in the period immediately after the event are usually drastically reduced for most (although for a few, such as merchants and the wholesalers of essential supplies, they are increased greatly).
家庭的获取状况突然且深刻地改变。带薪就业可能会停止，随之而来的是用于购买食物、医疗护理、修理住所或生产设备（如犁）、获取用于耕作的牲畜和捕鱼设备的现金的缺乏。土地可能被淹没；砖厂仍然在水下；城市和小镇的理发、糖果和小服务的常客们心思在其他事情上，几乎没有可用于非必要服务的资金。许多收入机会的获取资格被提高，有时甚至到达无穷大——这些选择不再可行。因此，在事件发生后不久，不同家庭所选择的收入机会通常大幅减少（尽管对于一些人，如商人和必需品的批发商来说，这些机会大大增加）。

The outcomes of these straitened circumstances, for the majority, are not (yet) disastrous. However, they feed back in an iterative manner to subsequent decisions and the asset profiles and access qualifications on which they are based (shown by the circular arrows, labelled ‘feedback’ in Box 6). There are still a wide range of adaptive strategies, both individual and community-based, coping mechanisms and outside interventions that can avert or palliate the transition to disaster for some or most people.
在这些困境的结果中，对于大多数人来说，尚未（还）造成灾难。然而，它们以迭代的方式反馈到后续决策以及基于这些决策的资产配置和准入资格上（如框 6 中标记为“反馈”的圆形箭头所示）。仍然存在广泛的适应策略，包括个人和社区基础的应对机制以及外部干预，这些都可以避免或缓解一些或大多数人向灾难过渡的情况。

There are other important aspects of post-event crisis which are not reached by the Access model and which must be mentioned here. Crisis ill-being is increasingly being recognised as a common experience in the wake of disasters, and a concept of vulnerability must incorporate notions of ill-being. Definitions of vulnerability usually include a potential for ill-being (often expressed as an objectively assessed statistical probability, as in this model) multiplied by the magnitude of the combined impacts of a particular trigger event. Thus, the conversion of risk into ill-being is turned into a common metric, which enables different hazards to be compared (Rosa 1998), but brushes out the cultural, psychosomatic and subjective constructions of disaster impact, and little work has yet been done on how these experiences map into post-crisis situations of chronic ill-being.
在事件后危机的其他重要方面并未被 Access 模型涵盖，这里必须提及。危机的不适感越来越被认作为灾后常见的经历，而脆弱性的概念必须包含不适感的概念。脆弱性的定义通常包括不适感的潜力（通常以客观评估的统计概率表示，如本模型所示）乘以特定触发事件的综合影响的大小。因此，将风险转化为不适感被转化为一个共同的度量，这使得不同的危害可以进行比较（Rosa 1998），但忽略了灾害影响的文化、心理生理和主观构建，关于这些经历如何映射到慢性不适的后危机情境中的研究仍然很少。

The disaster event itself alters capabilities and preferences both in the short term (e.g. grieving, trauma, acute deprivation) and also in the longer term, since the aftermath of a disaster sees a reappraisal of previous individual and collective commitments, the strength and nature of trust, and the intensity and diversity of social networks including rules of membership. Thus extreme events are frequently written into the history of social relations and well-being. It is important to complement the economistic and quantitative aspects of our Access model with an understanding of the ways in which the disaster event was experienced by different people, and how it altered their sense of well-being and their strategies to reconstitute that well-being in a new, post-disaster world.
灾难事件本身在短期内（例如，悲伤、创伤、急性剥夺）和长期内都会改变能力和偏好，因为灾难的后果会重新评估之前的个人和集体承诺、信任的强度和性质，以及社会网络的强度和多样性，包括成员资格的规则。因此，极端事件常常被写入社会关系和福祉的历史中。重要的是要将我们访问模型的经济学和定量方面与对不同人群如何经历灾难事件的理解相结合，以及它如何改变他们的福祉感和在新的灾后世界中重建这种福祉的策略。

Access, transition and safety
访问、过渡与安全

As the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrated, vulnerability is a measure of a person’s or group’s exposure to the effects of a natural hazard, including the degree to which they can recover from the impact of that event. Thus, it is only possible to develop a quantitative measure of vulnerability in terms of a probability that a hazard of particular intensity, frequency and duration will occur. These variable characteristics of the hazard
正如第 1 章和第 2 章的讨论所示，脆弱性是衡量个人或群体暴露于自然灾害影响的程度，包括他们从该事件影响中恢复的能力。因此，只有在特定强度、频率和持续时间的灾害发生的概率方面，才能开发出脆弱性的定量测量。这些灾害的可变特征
will affect the degree of loss within a household or group, in relation to their level of vulnerability to various specific hazards of differing intensities.
将影响家庭或群体的损失程度，与他们对不同强度的各种特定灾害的脆弱性水平相关。

Thus, vulnerability is a hypothetical and predictive term, which can only be ‘proved’ by observing the impact of the event when, and if, it occurs. By constructing the household Access model for the people affected we can understand the causes and symptoms of vulnerability. This requires analysing the political-economic structures that produce the households’ access profile, income opportunities and payoffs (these structures are labelled ‘social relations’ and ‘structures of domination’ in the framework). This implies that the question ‘Vulnerable to what?’ is answerable only in the context of an actual and specific hazard. This raises an important point. Different people will be vulnerable in differing degrees to different hazards, although there may well be households which, if they are vulnerable to one type of hazard, are likely to be vulnerable to others too. Typically, such people will have a poor access profile with little choice and flexibility in times of post-disaster stress.
因此，脆弱性是一个假设性和预测性的术语，只有在事件发生时及其影响被观察到时才能“证明”。通过为受影响的人构建家庭获取模型，我们可以理解脆弱性的原因和症状。这需要分析产生家庭获取特征、收入机会和收益的政治经济结构（这些结构在框架中被称为“社会关系”和“统治结构”）。这意味着“脆弱于什么？”这个问题只有在实际和特定的危害背景下才能得到回答。这提出了一个重要的观点。不同的人对不同的危害会有不同程度的脆弱，尽管可能会有一些家庭，如果它们对一种类型的危害脆弱，那么它们也可能对其他类型的危害脆弱。通常，这些人会在灾后压力时期拥有较差的获取特征，选择和灵活性很少。

None the less, in the following chapters, it is necessary to specify to what hazards people are vulnerable. Figure 3.3 identified a tropical storm, but the content of a disaster narrative as it unfolds will differ in many important ways even in the same location and with the same political economy with each different hazard. In other words, the conventional aspects of natural hazards (and the ways in which they are treated and monitored) are still essential, particularly the time-space and other technical issues of the hazard in question. In the case of earthquakes, for example, the indicators of vulnerability (‘unsafe conditions’) will concern housing materials, building standards, skills regarding aspects of building safety, income level, available spare time and the ability to keep habitations in good repair, type of tenure (owner-occupier or rented accommodation in urban areas), location of dwelling relative to zones of seismic activity, ground stability and degree of support networks which could be mobilised after the event (see Chapter 8). Alternatively, in the case of drought, the set of indicators of vulnerability will be quite different, and will concern food entitlement profiles, physical access to markets and market behaviour, and the prospects of earning enough money to buy food or the possibility of exchanging other goods for food. The time-space patterns of households in their ‘normal life’ will be as important as in the earthquake case, but will be related to the spatial structure of markets and to crop or pastoral production.
尽管如此，在接下来的章节中，有必要具体说明人们易受哪些危害。图 3.3 识别了一场热带风暴，但即使在相同地点和相同政治经济条件下，不同危害的灾难叙述内容在许多重要方面也会有所不同。换句话说，自然灾害的常规方面（以及它们的处理和监测方式）仍然至关重要，特别是与所讨论的危害相关的时间-空间和其他技术问题。例如，在地震的情况下，脆弱性指标（“不安全条件”）将涉及住房材料、建筑标准、建筑安全方面的技能、收入水平、可支配时间以及保持居住环境良好状态的能力、居住权类型（业主自住或城市地区的租赁住房）、住所相对于地震活动区的位置、地面稳定性以及在事件发生后可以动员的支持网络的程度（见第 8 章）。另一方面，在干旱的情况下，脆弱性指标的集合将大相径庭，涉及食品权利状况、市场的物理接入和市场行为，以及赚取足够金钱购买食品的前景或用其他商品交换食品的可能性。家庭在其“正常生活”中的时间-空间模式将与地震案例一样重要，但将与市场的空间结构以及作物或牧业生产相关联。

Much of the discussion so far has focused on the vulnerability of households earning a living under normal and transitional conditions, and some passing mention has been made of access to safety (or ‘social protection’ in Figure 3.1) depicted in Figure 3.3 as the protective barrier surrounding individual households’ daily lives (Boxes 1 and 6). This barrier-when it is properly in place-may be considered as access to safe conditions that apply to all households collectively.
到目前为止，讨论的重点主要集中在在正常和过渡条件下谋生的家庭的脆弱性上，并且对安全（或图 3.1 中的“社会保护”）的接入进行了简要提及，如图 3.3 所示，作为围绕个别家庭日常生活的保护屏障（框 1 和框 6）。当这个屏障适当地建立时，可以视为所有家庭共同适用的安全条件的接入。

Many of the conditions of vulnerability are shaped by individual households. Their decisions about income opportunities (or ignorance of risk) may place them in dangerous time-space co-ordinates, facilitating further choice, building reserves, etc., as we have described. These may be considered as individually generated access to safety (selfprotection), or as its reciprocal, individually generated vulnerability. However, there are other elements of collectively generated access to safety, and these link the individual household to its surrounding social relations, structures of domination and so on to the
许多脆弱性的条件是由个别家庭所塑造的。他们关于收入机会的决策（或对风险的无知）可能使他们处于危险的时间-空间坐标中，从而促进进一步的选择、建立储备等，正如我们所描述的。这些可以被视为个体生成的安全获取（自我保护），或其相对的，个体生成的脆弱性。然而，还有其他集体生成的安全获取的要素，这些要素将个别家庭与其周围的社会关系、统治结构等联系起来。
generation of unsafe conditions from the PAR framework, which refer to the provision of resources from the community or the state. Some of the large-scale, more generalised state provisions have been discussed in the progression of vulnerability of the PAR model (usually, a lack of appropriate training, relevant skills, press freedom, good governance), leading to unsafe conditions (unprotected buildings and infrastructure, suppression of information which could lead to relief measures). However, the focus on the specific and the micro-level in the Access model requires that access to safety is treated in a more detailed and dynamic way in the ‘transition to disaster’.
从 PAR 框架生成的不安全条件，指的是来自社区或国家的资源提供。一些大规模、更加普遍的国家提供已在 PAR 模型的脆弱性进程中讨论过（通常是缺乏适当的培训、相关技能、新闻自由、良好治理），导致不安全条件（未受保护的建筑和基础设施、压制可能导致救助措施的信息）。然而，Access 模型对具体和微观层面的关注要求在“向灾难过渡”中以更详细和动态的方式处理安全的获取。

A large part of this access to safety can be understood in terms of self-generated access, known as coping mechanisms, which are discussed below. Others, which are usually provided by outside institutions, are discussed in a subsequent section.
这种安全获取的很大一部分可以通过自我生成的获取来理解，称为应对机制，下面将讨论。其他通常由外部机构提供的内容将在后续部分讨论。

Coping and access to safety
应对与安全获取

The Access model provides a dynamic framework of socio-economic change, in which people of different identities (gender, age, seniority, class, caste, ethnic group) avail themselves of the means of securing their livelihoods and maintaining their expectations in life. The model implicitly, rather than explicitly, allows for people to develop strategies to try to achieve these ends. In this sense, the economic and social means to secure their livelihoods are not ‘handed down’ to them in an economistic and deterministic manner. People must not be assumed to be passive recipients of a profile of opportunities, hedged about by constraints of the political economy of which they are a part.
访问模型提供了一个动态的社会经济变革框架，在这个框架中，不同身份（性别、年龄、资历、阶级、种姓、民族）的个人利用各种手段来保障生计和维持生活期望。该模型隐含地，而非明确地，允许人们制定策略以尝试实现这些目标。从这个意义上说，保障生计的经济和社会手段并不是以经济主义和决定论的方式“传递”给他们的。人们不应被假定为机会轮廓的被动接受者，而是受到他们所处的政治经济约束的影响。

On the contrary, the pattern of access in any society is subject to (and the result of) agency, decision making under externally created constraints, struggles over resources and also co-operation. The pattern of access is the outcome of those decisions, cooperation and struggles by people of different gender, age, class, and so on. They are a part of daily life and are pursued with ingenuity and resourcefulness. In adverse or disastrous times people are stimulated by circumstances of threat, desperation and loss. As Rahmato (1988) put it, the measures which rural Ethiopian people have taken to enable them to live through the privations of the past two decades indicate ingenuity, strength of character, an effective use of natural resources and communalism.
相反，任何社会的获取模式都受到（并且是）在外部创造的约束下的代理、决策、资源争夺以及合作的影响。获取模式是不同性别、年龄、阶级等人们的决策、合作和斗争的结果。它们是日常生活的一部分，并以独创性和机智追求。在不利或灾难时期，人们受到威胁、绝望和失落的环境刺激。正如 Rahmato（1988）所言，埃塞俄比亚农村人民为使自己能够度过过去二十年的困苦而采取的措施表明了他们的独创性、坚韧的性格、有效利用自然资源和社区主义。

It has been said that official perceptions of ‘disaster victims’ usually underestimate their resources and resourcefulness (Chapter 9). Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that indicators of vulnerability based on the measurement of resources are the more easily recognised by outside institutions. They are also more enduring and part of the observable socio-economic structure, while people’s struggles and strategies to cope with adverse circumstances, particularly acute ones, are more ephemeral and change quickly (Corbett 1988). Therefore, they remain unnoticed and understudied. It is the purpose of this section to focus on these strategies. Without a proper understanding of them, policy makers are more likely to make stereotyped responses in both preventive measures of vulnerability reduction and relief work. Further, misdirected relief efforts may undermine rather than assist affected people in their attempts to help themselves towards recovery.
有人说，官方对“灾难受害者”的看法通常低估了他们的资源和应变能力（第 9 章）。这可能是因为基于资源测量的脆弱性指标更容易被外部机构识别。它们也更持久，是可观察的社会经济结构的一部分，而人们应对不利环境（特别是急性环境）的斗争和策略则更为短暂，变化迅速（Corbett 1988）。因此，它们常常被忽视且研究不足。本节的目的是关注这些策略。如果没有对它们的正确理解，政策制定者更可能在脆弱性减少的预防措施和救援工作中做出刻板的反应。此外，错误导向的救援努力可能会削弱而不是帮助受影响的人们在自我恢复的过程中。

Coping defined ...

Coping is the manner in which people act within the limits of existing resources and range of expectations to achieve various ends. In general this involves no more than ‘managing resources’, but usually it means how it is done in unusual, abnormal and adverse situations. Thus coping can include defence mechanisms, active ways of solving problems and methods for handling stress (Murphy and Moriarty 1976). 'Resources’ in this book have been defined as the physical and social means of gaining a livelihood and access to safety. Resources include labour power, or as Chambers (1989:4) aptly puts it, able-bodiedness, or the ability to use labour power effectively. The more that poor people rely on physical work, the higher the potential costs of physical disability and ill health (see Chapter 5). ...

Resources also include land, tools, seed for crops, livestock, draught animals, cash, jewellery, other items of value which can be sold, storable food stocks as well as skills. In order for tangible resources to be mobilised, people must be entitled to command them, and this may be achieved in many ways. These include using the market, the exercise of rights, calling upon obligations (from other household members, kin, patrons, friends, from the general public by appeals to moral duty, as in alms-giving), through theft or even violence. ...

In many cases specialised knowledge is required for certain resources, for instance in finding wild foods or using timber for rebuilding, knowing the moisture capacity of certain soils, the likelihood of finding wage labour in a distant city or plantation, or finding water sources. This knowledge is similar to that which supports ‘normal’ rural or urban life, and is passed from generation to generation. However the ‘ethnoscience’ essential for some coping behaviour can disappear with disuse or be rendered useless by rapid change (O’Keefe and Wisner 1975).

^{9}

We return to this point below. ...

Often it is assumed that the objective of coping strategies is survival in the face of adverse events. While this is indeed common, it masks other important purposes. These may be examined using Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of human needs. Such a hierarchy involves identifying distinct levels of needs, with each level incorporating and depending on the satisfaction of needs below them in the hierarchy. The need for self-realisation, involving the giving and receiving of love, affection and respect might be said to be the highest in the hierarchy. A lower one, on which the former is founded, may be an acceptable standard of living. Lower ones still may include adequate shelter and food for healthy survival, whilst other needs near the bottom of the hierarchy will include minimum security from violence and starvation. Reviewing 20 years of work since Maslow, Doyal and Gough (1991) conclude that a 'core’ of basic human needs can be identified, and that failure to satisfy these means that other needs cannot be met (see also Wisner 1988a).
通常人们认为应对策略的目标是在逆境中生存。虽然这确实很常见，但掩盖了其他重要目的。这些目的可以通过马斯洛（1970）的需求层次理论进行考察。这样的层次涉及识别不同的需求层次，每个层次都包含并依赖于其下层次需求的满足。自我实现的需求，包括给予和接受爱、情感和尊重，可以说是层次中最高的一个。一个较低的层次，前者建立在其基础上，可能是一个可接受的生活标准。更低的层次可能包括足够的住所和食物以维持健康生存，而层次底部的其他需求将包括对暴力和饥饿的最低安全保障。回顾马斯洛以来的 20 年工作，Doyal 和 Gough（1991）得出结论，能够识别出“核心”的基本人类需求，未能满足这些需求意味着其他需求无法得到满足（另见 Wisner 1988a）。

In adverse circumstances, a retreat to the defence of needs that are lower in the hierarchy implies the temporary denial of those needs higher up. For example, the experience of extreme poverty can cause a loss of self-respect and self-regard (de Waal 1989a). However, it is important not to oversimplify and over-generalise the expectations and priorities in the lives of vulnerable people or those affected by a disaster. OliverSmith (1986b) has described very complex motives and ideals among survivors of a dire
在不利的情况下，退回到较低层次需求的防御意味着暂时否认那些更高层次的需求。例如，极端贫困的经历可能导致自尊和自我价值感的丧失（de Waal 1989a）。然而，重要的是不要过于简单化和泛化脆弱人群或受灾者生活中的期望和优先事项。Oliver Smith（1986b）描述了在极端困境幸存者中非常复杂的动机和理想。
earthquake tragedy. Scott (1990:7) reminds us of that ‘slights to human dignity’ can fester and emerge in surprising demonstrations of ‘resistance’ against authority. This is certainly relevant for disaster relief and recovery (Chapter 9). Jodha (1991) surveyed people’s own criteria for well-being (in this case a list of no fewer than 38) in Gujarat, which attest to a complex set of priorities. Raphael (1986) analysed the psychological trauma of disasters and the adjustments made to loss, grief and the impacts of dislocation (see above for our brief discussion of ill-being and non-measurable aspects of the impact of disasters). Coping in the face of adverse circumstances may, therefore, be seen as a series of adaptive strategies to preserve needs as high up the hierarchy as possible in the face of threat.
地震悲剧。Scott（1990:7）提醒我们，“对人类尊严的轻视”可能会滋生并以令人惊讶的“抵抗”形式对抗权威。这对于灾后救援和恢复（第 9 章）无疑是相关的。Jodha（1991）调查了人们对幸福的标准（在这种情况下，列出了不少于 38 条）在古吉拉特邦，这证明了一套复杂的优先事项。Raphael（1986）分析了灾难的心理创伤以及对损失、悲伤和流离失所影响的调整（请参见上文我们对不幸福和灾难影响的非可测量方面的简要讨论）。因此，在逆境中应对可能被视为一系列适应性策略，以在面临威胁时尽可能高地保持需求的层级。

However it is common that what may be broadly termed ‘disasters’ force a retreat down the hierarchy. For example, it may become necessary to engage in demeaning activities (and therefore to lose respect) in order to secure a minimum food supply. Certain activities may be proscribed or discouraged by membership of a social group, caste or by gender. During the drought of 1971-1973, members of the Reddy caste in Medak District, India were reduced to selling vegetables to earn a living, an occupation that was considered below their dignity (Rao 1974); while women not of the shoemaker caste were found making shoes during the 1966-1967 Bihar drought (Singh 1975, quoted in Agarwal 1990). Despite the mutual economic and emotional support that it provides, families may break up to allow its individual members to survive. The survival of the individual in the short term may be the only attainable need and objective of coping.
然而，通常情况下，广义上被称为“灾难”的事件会迫使人们在等级体系中退步。例如，为了确保最低限度的食物供应，可能需要参与贬低的活动（因此失去尊重）。某些活动可能会因社会团体、种姓或性别的成员身份而被禁止或不鼓励。在 1971-1973 年的干旱期间，印度梅达克区的雷迪种姓成员被迫出售蔬菜以谋生，这一职业被认为低于他们的尊严（Rao 1974）；而在 1966-1967 年比哈尔干旱期间，非鞋匠种姓的女性被发现制作鞋子（Singh 1975，引用自 Agarwal 1990）。尽管家庭提供了相互的经济和情感支持，但家庭可能会解散，以便其个体成员能够生存。在短期内，个体的生存可能是应对中唯一可实现的需求和目标。

Famine may be unique or at least extreme among disasters in often provoking social tension and breakdown of this kind. For many years, Quarantelli and his sociology colleagues have studied community responses to disasters such as earthquakes and floods. They find that emergent organisation is much more common than social chaos, and that altruism and stoicism are more common than selfishness and panic (Quarantelli and Dynes 1972, 1977; Quarantelli 1978, 1984; Dynes et al. 1987).
饥荒可能在灾难中是独特的，或至少是极端的，因为它常常引发社会紧张和崩溃。多年来，奎伦特利及其社会学同事们研究了社区对地震和洪水等灾难的反应。他们发现，紧急组织比社会混乱更为常见，而利他主义和坚忍比自私和恐慌更为普遍（奎伦特利和戴恩斯 1972, 1977; 奎伦特利 1978, 1984; 戴恩斯等 1987）。

Types of coping strategies
应对策略的类型

Crisis events occur from time to time in people’s lives, as well as in the lives of whole communities and societies, in which case they are often called disasters. Such events call for the mobilisation of resources at various levels to cope with their impact. When people know an event may occur in the future because it has happened in the past, they often set up ways of coping with it (Douglas 1985). We return to these coping strategies as a reference point for building the policies we recommend in Chapter 9, especially in our discussion of the Fifth and Sixth Risk Reduction Objectives.
危机事件时常发生在个人的生活中，也发生在整个社区和社会的生活中，这种情况下它们通常被称为灾难。这类事件需要在各个层面动员资源以应对其影响。当人们知道某个事件可能在未来发生，因为它在过去发生过时，他们通常会建立应对机制（道格拉斯 1985）。我们将这些应对策略作为参考点，以构建我们在第 9 章中推荐的政策，特别是在讨论第五和第六个风险减少目标时。

Such coping strategies depend on the assumption that the event itself will follow a familiar pattern, and that people’s earlier actions will be a reasonable guide for similar events. Most disasters have such precedents, particularly in hazardous physical and social environments. However, some hazards have such a long return period that the precedents are imperfectly registered. There are also others which are unprecedented, such as the HIV-AIDS pandemic, and which therefore have no familiar pattern. If this is the case then coping strategies may not apply, and the decision framework (consisting of the social, economic and natural environments) will not be relevant.
这种应对策略依赖于事件本身将遵循一个熟悉的模式的假设，并且人们早期的行动将是类似事件的合理指导。大多数灾害都有这样的先例，特别是在危险的物理和社会环境中。然而，一些危险的回归周期如此之长，以至于先例的记录并不完美。还有一些是前所未有的，例如 HIV-AIDS 大流行，因此没有熟悉的模式。如果是这种情况，那么应对策略可能不适用，决策框架（包括社会、经济和自然环境）将不相关。

The assumptions on which people make their decisions therefore rest on the knowledge that, sooner or later, a particular risk will occur of which people have some experience of how to cope. On the other hand, people do not like conditions of uncertainty where there are no known and familiar ways (such as explicit systems of rights and obligations, providing safety nets and support groups) of coping with a particular event. Thus the unprecedented or unknown event creates a situation of uncertainty. The HIV-AIDS pandemic in certain areas of Africa, or calamities of exceptional severity (for example, what is known in Bengali as mananthor, or ‘epoch-ending’ famines), are cases in point.
因此，人们做出决策的假设基于这样的知识：迟早会发生某种特定风险，而人们对如何应对这种风险有一定的经验。另一方面，人们不喜欢不确定的条件，在这些条件下没有已知和熟悉的应对方式（例如，明确的权利和义务体系、提供安全网和支持小组）来应对特定事件。因此，前所未有或未知的事件会造成不确定性。非洲某些地区的 HIV-AIDS 大流行，或极端严重的灾难（例如，在孟加拉语中称为 mananthor 或“时代终结”饥荒）就是典型案例。

Almost all coping strategies for adverse events which are perceived to have precedents consist of actions before, during and after the event. Each type of coping strategy is discussed and illustrated below.
几乎所有被认为有先例的负面事件的应对策略都包括事件发生前、发生时和发生后的行动。下面将讨论和说明每种类型的应对策略。

Preventive strategies预防策略

These are attempts to avoid the disaster happening at all, which are called preventive action elsewhere in this book. Many require successful political mobilisation at the level of the state. This is often easier in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, when public awareness is high and the political payoff for government action is significant. But preventive action at the individual and small group level is also important. It may involve avoiding dangerous time-spaces (such as fishing offshore in small open craft during the storm season), avoiding concentrations of disease vectors (e.g. malaria mosquito, tsetse fly) that have variability by season and/or altitude and choosing residence locations that are less exposed to wind, flood or mass movement of the earth.
这些是避免灾难发生的尝试，在本书的其他地方称为预防措施。许多措施需要在国家层面上成功的政治动员。这在灾难发生后的直接后果中往往更容易，当时公众意识高涨，政府行动的政治回报显著。但在个人和小组层面的预防措施同样重要。这可能涉及避免危险的时间和空间（例如，在风暴季节期间在小型开放船只上进行海上捕鱼），避免疾病媒介的集中（例如，疟疾蚊子、采采蝇），这些媒介的分布因季节和/或海拔而异，并选择那些暴露于风、洪水或土壤大规模移动较少的居住地点。

Impact-minimising strategies
减少影响的策略

These are referred to elsewhere as ‘mitigation’, especially where they are the object of government policy. These strategies seek to minimise loss and facilitate recovery. The range of these strategies is enormous and varies significantly between people with different patterns of access. However, two generalisations may be made. Firstly, the objective of many strategies is to secure needs quite low down the hierarchy, particularly if the risk is perceived to be damaging and probable. It may be preferable to improve access to a minimum level of food, shelter and physical security rather than increase income. This further underscores the important distinction between poverty and vulnerability made earlier.
这些在其他地方被称为“减缓”，特别是在它们成为政府政策的对象时。这些策略旨在最小化损失并促进恢复。这些策略的范围非常广泛，并且在不同的获取模式的人之间差异显著。然而，可以做出两个概括。首先，许多策略的目标是确保在层级较低的位置满足需求，特别是当风险被认为是有害且可能时。改善对最低水平的食物、住所和人身安全的获取可能比增加收入更为可取。这进一步强调了之前所做的贫困与脆弱性之间的重要区别。

Secondly, maintaining command of these needs in a socially and/or environmentally risky situation usually implies diversification of access to resources. Under the terms of the Access model, this involves broadening the access profile and seeking new income opportunities. This can be attempted in agricultural and pastoral production by setting up non-agricultural income sources and by strengthening or multiplying social support networks.
其次，在社会和/或环境风险情况下维持对这些需求的控制通常意味着资源获取的多样化。根据获取模型的定义，这涉及到拓宽获取档案并寻求新的收入机会。这可以通过建立非农业收入来源以及加强或增加社会支持网络来在农业和牧业生产中进行尝试。

For those rural people who have access to land, a store of grain or other staple food is a
对于那些有土地的农村人来说，储存粮食或其他主食是
most important buffer against expected seasonal shortages, as well as more prolonged periods of hardship. An accumulation of small stock and chickens is another defensive strategy (Watts 1983a). Pastoralists may follow a strategy of increasing their herd size in years of good rains and grass availability (when calf birth rates rise and mortality falls), in order to maintain the herd size in the inevitable bad years with high mortality (Dahl and Hjort 1976; Thébaud 1988; Odegi-Awuondo 1990).
应对预期季节性短缺以及更长时间困难时期的最重要缓冲。积累小量的存货和鸡也是另一种防御策略（Watts 1983a）。牧民可能会在降雨和草料充足的好年景中增加其牲畜数量（当小牛出生率上升而死亡率下降时），以便在不可避免的高死亡率的坏年中维持牲畜数量（Dahl 和 Hjort 1976；Thébaud 1988；Odegi-Awuondo 1990）。

Diversifying production多样化生产

Farming people are often regarded as being risk-averse (in the sense of avoiding chances in cultivation that may bring higher rewards but with greater exposure to dangers).

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Usually their production involves mixed cropping, intercropping, the cultivation of nonstaple root crops and use of kitchen gardens. This strategy often results in a ‘normal surplus’ in good years since it is planned on the basis of meeting subsistence needs even in bad (but not the worst conceivable) years (Allan 1965; Wisner 1978b; Porter 1979).
农民通常被视为风险厌恶者（即避免在耕作中冒险，以免带来更高的回报但也面临更大的风险）。他们的生产通常涉及混作、间作、非主食根作物的种植以及使用厨房花园。这种策略通常会在丰收年产生“正常盈余”，因为它是基于满足生存需求的计划，即使在糟糕（但不是最糟糕的可想象）年份也是如此（Allan 1965; Wisner 1978b; Porter 1979）。

Planting a greater variety of crops has many advantages apart from providing the best chance of an optimum yield under all variations of weather, plant diseases and pest attack. It represents one of the most impor-tant precautionary strategies for coping with food shortages (Klee 1980; Altieri 1987; Wilken 1988). Diversification strategies often make use of environmental variations, including farming at different altitudes, on different soils or utilising diverse ecosystems on the slopes of mountains.
种植更多种类的作物除了在各种天气、植物疾病和害虫攻击下提供最佳产量的机会外，还有许多其他优点。这代表了应对粮食短缺的最重要的预防策略之一（Klee 1980; Altieri 1987; Wilken 1988）。多样化策略通常利用环境变化，包括在不同海拔、不同土壤上耕作或利用山坡上的多样生态系统。

Diversifying income sources
多样化收入来源

The entirely self-provisioning rural household is an ideal type, and is very rare in the world today. Even the most isolated people in the Amazon rainforest, the Andes or the Himalayas engage in production for sale. In addition, the remittance of income from wage earners who have moved to distant cities, mining camps or plantations is very important to rural livelihoods in many parts of the world. This is sometimes graphically demonstrated by the economic disruption and hardship caused when crises interrupt such systems, as with the hundreds of thousands of guest workers from Egypt, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines who were obliged to leave Iraq in 1991 as a result of war.
完全自给自足的农村家庭是一种理想类型，在当今世界中非常罕见。即使是亚马逊雨林、安第斯山脉或喜马拉雅山脉中最孤立的人群也参与生产以供销售。此外，来自远离城市、矿区或种植园的工资收入者的汇款对世界许多地区的农村生计非常重要。当危机中断这些系统时，经济的破坏和困境有时会通过生动的例子表现出来，例如 1991 年因战争而被迫离开伊拉克的数十万来自埃及、孟加拉国、尼泊尔和菲律宾的外籍工人。

Non-farm income becomes even more important following disasters that temporarily disrupt farm and livestock production. Crafts, extractive enterprises such as charcoal making, honey and gum arabic collection have often been noted in studies of drought coping in Africa. Brewing beer is also an important source of income, especially for women, and drought reduction of the grain ingredients can affect their income and nutrition (Kerner and Cook 1991; Murray 1981; Mbithi and Wisner 1973). For urban dwellers a series of ‘sidelines’, sometimes illegal or quasi-legal (such as hawking on the streets without a licence, waste recycling, pilfering, looting ruined and abandoned shops and buildings), may become a temporary mainstay of post-disaster life. Both production and income diversification strategies can be effective as coping mechanisms in the short run, while they undermine the basis of livelihood in the long run. Cannon (1991) discusses de-vegetation of the landscape in order to provide fodder for livestock in a drought. Charcoal production as an income source is another example. Both can lead to
非农收入在灾后变得更加重要，因为灾害会暂时中断农作物和牲畜的生产。手工艺、提取性企业如木炭制造、蜂蜜和阿拉伯胶的采集在非洲的干旱应对研究中常被提及。酿造啤酒也是一种重要的收入来源，尤其是对女性而言，粮食成分的干旱减少可能会影响她们的收入和营养（Kerner 和 Cook 1991；Murray 1981；Mbithi 和 Wisner 1973）。对于城市居民来说，一系列“副业”，有时是非法或准合法的（例如在街上无证叫卖、废物回收、偷窃、掠夺被毁坏和废弃的商店及建筑物），可能成为灾后生活的临时支柱。生产和收入多样化策略在短期内可以作为应对机制有效，但从长远来看，它们会削弱生计的基础。Cannon（1991）讨论了在干旱期间为牲畜提供饲料而导致的景观去植被化。木炭生产作为收入来源是另一个例子。两者都可能导致
long-term erosion and desertification (A. Grainger 1990; O’Brien and Gruenbaum 1991).
长期的侵蚀和沙漠化（A. Grainger 1990；O’Brien 和 Gruenbaum 1991）。

These include a wide variety of rights and obligations between members of the same household (e.g. wives and husbands, children and parents), with the extended family and with other wider groups with a shared identity such as clan, tribe and caste. Parents may try to make a strategic choice of marriage partner for their daughter or son into a comparatively wealthy family. This may increase their ability to call on resources in difficult times (Caldwell et al. 1986).
这些包括同一家庭成员之间（例如，妻子和丈夫、孩子和父母）以及与大家庭和其他具有共同身份的更广泛群体（如宗族、部落和种姓）之间的各种权利和义务。父母可能会为女儿或儿子选择一个相对富裕家庭的婚姻伴侣，以此来增加他们在困难时期调用资源的能力（Caldwell 等，1986 年）。

Within the household and family, successfully securing resources in potentially disastrous times depends upon the implicit bargaining strength of its members and of their 'fall-back’ position (Agarwal 1990:343), or ‘break-down’ position as Sen (1988, 1990) terms it, if co-operation in this bargaining process should fail. Women tend to lose these conflicts for scarce resources and are affected by who eats first, the share of available food and the lack of access to cash earned by other family members (e.g. cash from casual male labour). The range of resources controlled by women, and the employment opportunities open to them, tends to be more limited.

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The disintegration of the family and abandonment of women, children and old people is the expression of the breakdown of such obligations.

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在家庭和家务中，在潜在灾难时期成功获取资源依赖于其成员的隐性谈判能力及其“后备”位置（Agarwal 1990:343），或者如 Sen（1988, 1990）所称的“崩溃”位置，如果在这一谈判过程中合作失败。女性往往在争夺稀缺资源的冲突中处于劣势，受到谁先吃、可用食物的分配以及缺乏其他家庭成员（例如，来自临时男性劳动力的现金）所赚取的现金的影响。女性控制的资源范围以及她们可获得的就业机会往往更为有限。

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家庭的解体和对女性、儿童及老年人的遗弃是这种义务崩溃的表现。

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There are other forms of support based mainly on non-economic relations. Some writers term these the ‘moral economy’ (Scott 1976); examples are between patrons and clients, or between rich and poor in times of hardship. These offer a minimum subsistence and a margin of security and constitute what Scott calls ‘a subsistence ethic’, based on the norm of reciprocity-but at a price of the reproduction and even the deepening of inequality. Examples are legion, but it is widely reported that such obligations are being eroded.

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还有其他主要基于非经济关系的支持形式。一些作者称这些为“道德经济”（Scott 1976）；例如，赞助人与客户之间，或在困境时期富人与穷人之间。这些提供了最低的生存保障和一定的安全边际，并构成了 Scott 所称的“生存伦理”，基于互惠的规范——但代价是再生产甚至加深不平等。例子不胜枚举，但广泛报道这些义务正在被侵蚀。

On the other hand, Caldwell et al. (1986:667) state that, at least for the elderly in a period of extreme food scarcity in south India, ‘the support system still worked well’. But it can also be argued that the continued existence of such support systems is responsible for the retention of people in the countryside and for discouraging them from abandoning such local systems. In other cases these obligations of the wealthy are still upheld. For example, a case study in Nepal found that the wealthy were prevailed on not to reduce daily wages for agricultural work, nor to sell grain outside the village at a profit, and to secure a loan from shopkeepers in the nearby bazaar for re-lending to the most needy villagers (Prindle 1979). In another village that is tribal (the village in the previous example being multi-caste), there was an expectation of gifts in times of hardship combined with a powerful ethic of equality, with surpluses being shared. Although reported to be in a state of subtle change, this system was still largely operational.
另一方面，Caldwell 等人（1986:667）指出，至少对于南印度在极端食物匮乏时期的老年人来说，“支持系统仍然运作良好”。但也可以认为，这种支持系统的持续存在使得人们留在乡村，并且不鼓励他们放弃这些地方系统。在其他情况下，富人的这些义务仍然得到遵守。例如，尼泊尔的一项案例研究发现，富人被要求不降低农业工作的日薪，也不以盈利的方式在村外出售粮食，并从附近集市的店主那里获得贷款，以便转贷给最需要帮助的村民（Prindle 1979）。在另一个部落村庄（前一个例子中的村庄是多种姓氏的），在困难时期有赠礼的期望，并结合强烈的平等伦理，剩余物资被分享。尽管据报道处于微妙变化的状态，但该系统仍然在很大程度上运作。

There are also wider obligations for the whole community to assist and provide for those facing acute adversity. These include alms, for example the giving of a grain tithe in some Muslim societies (Longhurst 1986:30). Meskel is a form of community redistribution in parts of Ethiopia, where credit is given to the needy to celebrate the festival of this name, thereby enabling them to acquire food. Neighbourly assistance, such as rescuing trapped individuals from collapsed buildings and rendering medical
整个社区也有更广泛的义务来帮助和支持那些面临严重困境的人。这些义务包括施舍，例如在一些穆斯林社会中给予谷物十分之一（Longhurst 1986:30）。Meskel 是埃塞俄比亚部分地区的一种社区再分配形式，给予有需要的人信贷以庆祝这个名字的节日，从而使他们能够获得食物。邻里援助，例如从倒塌的建筑中救出被困人员和提供医疗援助，都是其他例子。
assistance, are other examples. These are ‘claims’ as Swift (1989) calls them, alongside the other two broad categories of assets (‘investments’, both human and productive, and 'stores’ of food, money and ‘stores of real value’ such as jewellery).
这些是 Swift（1989）所称的“索求”，以及其他两大类资产（“投资”，包括人力和生产性投资，以及“储备”，如食品、金钱和“实物价值储备”，例如珠宝）。

It is probable that throughout the LDCs such networks and moral obligations are in decline. In some areas more exploitative systems are superseding the ‘moral economy’ of the peasant, where a low-level safety net against starvation and complete destitution operated in some form, albeit a highly exploitative one. Instead, even these safety networks tend to break down. This may involve the provision of food on credit at usurious rates of interest, which exacerbate the ‘ratchet effect’ and increase the vulnerability of deprived groups in the longer term (Chambers 1983). Unfortunately, given the demise of traditional systems, there is rarely any growth of state-run social security alternatives.
在所有发展中国家，这种网络和道德义务可能正在衰退。在某些地区，更具剥削性的系统正在取代农民的“道德经济”，在某种形式上，曾经存在着一种低水平的安全网，以防止饥饿和完全的贫困，尽管这种安全网是高度剥削性的。相反，即使是这些安全网络也往往会崩溃。这可能涉及以高利贷利率提供赊账食品，这加剧了“棘轮效应”，并在长期内增加了贫困群体的脆弱性（Chambers 1983）。不幸的是，考虑到传统系统的衰退，国家主办的社会保障替代方案几乎没有增长。

Post-event coping strategies
事件后的应对策略

When there is a potential food shortage and possible famine, the period during which stress develops can be long, allowing for a succession of strategies. A number of studies have found similar sequences.

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It is clear that a sequence of adaptations in consumption patterns is made very early when shortfalls in food are anticipated. These include the substitution of lower quality and wild foods (or ‘famine foods’) for more expensive staples. Here the significance of common property resources for allowing access to these is important.

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Wild foods also feature as famine foods in almost all parts of Africa (de Waal 1989b; McGlothlen et al.1986).
当潜在的食品短缺和可能的饥荒出现时，压力发展的时间可能很长，从而允许一系列策略的实施。许多研究发现了类似的序列。

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很明显，当预期到食品短缺时，消费模式的适应序列会很早就形成。这些包括用质量较低的野生食品（或“饥荒食品”）替代更昂贵的主食。在这里，公共财产资源在允许获取这些食品方面的重要性不容忽视。

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野生食品几乎在非洲的所有地区都作为饥荒食品出现（de Waal 1989b; McGlothlen et al.1986）。

The next step involves calling on resources from others (usually family and kin) that can be obtained without threatening future security. This usually involves reciprocal social interactions, and avoids usurious rates of interest, therefore preserving the longerterm access position of the individual or household. At the same stage, sources of household income other than the dominant one may be tapped, such as wage labour, petty commodity production or artisanal work. Sale of easily disposable items that do not undermine future productive capacity (e.g. small stock) may also take place. As the food crisis deepens, loans from money lenders and sale of important assets such as oxen for ploughing, agricultural implements and livestock may have to be arranged. Finally, when all the preceding strategies have failed to maintain minimum food levels, migration of the whole household to roadsides, towns and possible sources of food often ensues.
下一步涉及调用他人的资源（通常是家庭和亲属），这些资源可以在不威胁未来安全的情况下获得。这通常涉及互惠的社会互动，并避免高利贷，因此保护了个人或家庭的长期获取位置。在同一阶段，除了主要收入来源外，还可以利用其他家庭收入来源，例如工资劳动、小商品生产或手工业。出售不影响未来生产能力的易于处置物品（例如小牲畜）也可能发生。随着食品危机的加深，可能需要安排向放贷人借款和出售重要资产，如耕作用的牛、农业工具和牲畜。最后，当所有前述策略未能维持最低食品水平时，整个家庭往往会迁移到路边、城镇和可能的食品来源。

Coping and vulnerability analysis
应对与脆弱性分析

Coping strategies are often complex and involve a number of sequenced mechanisms for obtaining resources in times of adversity and disaster. They grow out of a recognition of the risk of an event occurring and of established patterns of response. They seek not just survival, but also the maintenance of other human needs such as the receiving of respect, dignity and the maintenance of family, household and community cohesion. Outsiders are often surprised by strategies that do not seem to try to maintain an adequate food intake for a household (or perhaps different amounts for various members), but which instead are aimed at preserving the means for continuing the household’s livelihood after the
应对策略通常是复杂的，涉及在逆境和灾难时期获取资源的一系列顺序机制。它们源于对事件发生风险的认识以及既定的反应模式。它们不仅寻求生存，还寻求维持其他人类需求，如获得尊重、尊严以及维护家庭、家庭和社区的凝聚力。外部人士常常对那些似乎没有试图维持家庭足够食物摄入（或可能为不同成员提供不同数量）的策略感到惊讶，而这些策略实际上旨在保护继续维持家庭生计的手段。
difficult period has passed.

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Many of these strategies have been highly resilient to social and economic changes and are reported to be functioning still throughout the world.
许多这些策略在社会和经济变化中表现出高度的韧性，并且据报道在全球范围内仍然有效。

Throughout this book we try to signal the ways in which the ‘people’s science’ or indigenous technical knowledge that provides the basis for much coping behaviour, and patterns of coping themselves, interact with ‘official’ attempts at disaster prevention and mitigation. Sometimes a sensitive administration or a non-governmental organisation has been able to build on such foundations. Many examples are provided by Maskrey (1989) and Anderson and Woodrow (1998) and others, and we will return to these in Chapter

9 .^{17}

More often than not, however, ‘official’ relief and recovery practice pays little heed to what the ordinary people do. The result is wasted resources, squandered opportunities and a further erosion of vernacular coping skills.
在本书中，我们试图指出“人民科学”或土著技术知识如何与“官方”灾害预防和减轻的尝试相互作用，这些知识为许多应对行为及其模式提供了基础。有时，敏感的行政机构或非政府组织能够在这样的基础上进行建设。Maskrey（1989 年）和 Anderson 与 Woodrow（1998 年）等人提供了许多例子，我们将在第

9 .^{17}

章中回到这些例子。然而，更多时候，“官方”的救助和恢复实践对普通人所做的事情几乎不予关注。结果是资源浪费、机会错失以及地方应对技能的进一步侵蚀。

Coping and transition to disaster
应对与灾难过渡

Coping strategies have been discussed at length in this chapter, and will receive more detailed attention in later chapters. Considerable importance is attached to coping since it points clearly to people’s agency, ingenuity and abilities to help themselves individually and collectively. It suggests that outside agencies must understand these strategies, otherwise external humanitarian interventions will undermine them, creating aid dependency and all manner of unintended and detrimental outcomes. However, the term ‘coping’ is not without problems, and can serve to hide a situation in which people are destitute or even dying. As Seaman et al. (1993:27) wrote, ‘in current development jargon, Africans do not starve, they “cope”’. Coping in disaster transition and abnormal times also implies a graduated rack of dearth, difficulty, destitution and maybe, ultimately, death. To return to the final stages of our Access model as illustrated in Figure 3.3, coping is managing under stress, but coping is in essence a strategy reactive to events beyond the immediate control of the individual, household or ‘community’. As circumstances deteriorate, these may prove insufficient. As will be seen in the case study of famine in the next chapter, informal support systems among the Dinka communities of south-western Sudan were well developed but they fell apart under extreme pressure. They could not resist the cumulative onslaught over a long period of war, drought, enslavement and displacement. Thus communal coping strategies broke down-and the event became known locally as the 'famine of breaking relationships’ (cok dakrua) (Deng 1999).
应对策略在本章中已被详细讨论，并将在后续章节中得到更深入的关注。应对的重要性不容忽视，因为它清楚地指向人们的能动性、创造力和帮助自己以及集体的能力。这表明外部机构必须理解这些策略，否则外部人道主义干预将削弱它们，导致对援助的依赖以及各种意想不到和有害的结果。然而，“应对”一词并非没有问题，它可能掩盖人们处于贫困甚至濒临死亡的情况。正如 Seaman 等人（1993:27）所写，“在当前的发展行话中，非洲人并不是在挨饿，他们是在‘应对’。”在灾难过渡和异常时期的应对也暗示着一种逐渐加剧的匮乏、困难、贫困，甚至最终可能导致死亡。回到我们在图 3.3 中所示的 Access 模型的最后阶段，应对是在压力下的管理，但应对本质上是一种对超出个人、家庭或“社区”直接控制的事件的反应策略。随着情况的恶化，这些策略可能会显得不足。在下一章关于饥荒的案例研究中可以看到，南苏丹丁卡社区之间的非正式支持系统发展良好，但在极端压力下崩溃了。它们无法抵御长期战争、干旱、奴役和流离失所的累积冲击。因此，社区应对策略崩溃——这一事件在当地被称为“关系破裂的饥荒”（cok dakrua）（邓 1999）。

Thereafter, unless outside assistance and disaster preparedness have not already averted the transition, the transition continues in an iterative and descending manner (Box 7, ‘reaction, coping, adaptation, intervention… disaster as process’). The Access model continues to operate but under such dislocating conditions that many of the recognisable patterns of decision making, with associated rules of choice, allocation of work and rewards, break down completely. The mechanistic and predictable process of earning a livelihood, and also the structural conditions of normal life as shaping the initial conditions of vulnerability, become less operational, and less valuable as a way of understanding ‘disaster as process’. As Niehof (2001) has noted, there is an important paradigm gap between the analysis of rural development in stable situations and those of disaster situations. The transition from ‘normal life’ to disaster here in the Access model
此后，除非外部援助和灾害准备工作已经避免了过渡，否则过渡将以迭代和下降的方式继续进行（框 7，“反应、应对、适应、干预……灾害作为过程”）。访问模型继续运作，但在如此破坏性的条件下，许多可识别的决策模式及其相关的选择规则、工作分配和奖励完全崩溃。谋生的机械化和可预测的过程，以及作为脆弱性初始条件的正常生活的结构性条件，变得不再可操作，并且作为理解“灾害作为过程”的方式也变得不那么有价值。正如 Niehof（2001）所指出的，稳定情况下的农村发展分析与灾害情况下的分析之间存在重要的范式差距。在访问模型中，从“正常生活”到灾害的过渡
demonstrates both this discontinuity as a disaster unfolds, but also a bridge between them. The Access model demonstrates well that conditions of vulnerability start with and are explained by the political economy of ‘normal life’-that coping and access to safety also develop out of normal life. Niehof explicitly suggests that disasters linger and shape future ‘normal life’ for a more or less vulnerable future. The iteration of disaster as process to Box 8, the final one shown in Figure 3.3, asks the question ‘To the next disaster?’, a topic which is examined in Chapter 9.
这表明了灾难展开时的这种不连续性，同时也构成了它们之间的桥梁。访问模型很好地表明，脆弱性的条件始于“正常生活”的政治经济，并由此解释——应对和获得安全也源于正常生活。尼霍夫明确指出，灾难会持续存在并塑造未来的“正常生活”，以致于未来的脆弱性程度有所不同。灾难作为过程的迭代到达了图 3.3 中展示的最后一个框 8，提出了“下一个灾难？”的问题，这一主题将在第 9 章中探讨。

The Access model as a research framework
访问模型作为研究框架

The formal access framework has so far been presented as an explanatory and organisational device. It is not a theory, although theories of disaster can and should be inserted into, and therefore be allowed to shape, the general framework, as happens in subsequent chapters. For example, in Chapter 4 competing theories of famine are seen to deal with different parts of the framework.

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It draws attention to the socio-economic relations that cause disasters or maps their outcomes. While it focuses on those at risk of disasters, it also includes the relations they have with others that keep them in that unfortunate state, independently from any disaster. It also allows for people’s response to what is often a rapidly changing situation, either by coping or by more active and permanent efforts to change those relations.
正式的访问框架迄今为止被呈现为一种解释性和组织性工具。它不是一个理论，尽管灾难理论可以并且应该被纳入，并因此被允许塑造一般框架，正如后续章节中所发生的那样。例如，在第四章中，竞争的饥荒理论被视为处理框架的不同部分。

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它引起了对导致灾难的社会经济关系的关注，或描绘了它们的结果。虽然它关注于面临灾难风险的人群，但也包括他们与其他人之间的关系，这些关系使他们保持在这种不幸的状态中，与任何灾难无关。它还允许人们对通常快速变化的情况作出反应，既可以通过应对，也可以通过更积极和持久的努力来改变这些关系。

The access framework therefore does not explicitly include national policies or world systems in the way that the PAR model does, although the impact of national and international actions can and should be incorporated in the model. Land reform, food policy, famine relief, food-for-work programmes, rural reconstruction programmes and laws governing urban property are all initiated exogenously to the Access model but their impacts in shaping access profiles, access qualifications, payoffs and a range of income opportunities should be incorporated into the modelling of the disaster process.
因此，访问框架并没有像 PAR 模型那样明确包含国家政策或世界体系，尽管国家和国际行动的影响可以并且应该被纳入模型中。土地改革、食品政策、饥荒救助、以食物换劳动的项目、农村重建项目以及城市财产管理的法律都是外部于访问模型发起的，但它们在塑造访问特征、访问资格、收益和一系列收入机会方面的影响应该被纳入灾难过程的建模中。

As a research framework, therefore, access is useful in charting impacts of policy, for identifying vulnerable populations and for predicting the probable outcomes of extreme natural events. However, the data requirements for using the framework as a research design are very large. After all, it provides a general outline of the material conditions of life for a population, and most aspects of society can potentially be included. Yet we believe that in use the number of factors to be incorporated would be restricted, because, in use, the framework would be informed by theory and a priori assumptions. This would lead to the ability to choose the most significant factors and permit selectivity in the use of the framework. The framework provides a dynamic and moving 'map’ of a disaster. Readers will choose which aspect they need to visit, and will bring to it the theories they need.
因此，作为一个研究框架，获取信息在绘制政策影响、识别脆弱群体以及预测极端自然事件的可能结果方面是有用的。然而，使用该框架作为研究设计的数据需求非常庞大。毕竟，它提供了一个关于某一人群生活物质条件的总体轮廓，社会的多数方面都可能被纳入其中。然而，我们认为在实际使用中，纳入的因素数量会受到限制，因为在使用过程中，该框架将受到理论和先验假设的影响。这将导致能够选择最重要的因素，并允许在使用框架时进行选择。该框架提供了一个动态和不断变化的灾难“地图”。读者将选择他们需要访问的方面，并带来他们所需的理论。

Some of the main criteria for making the choices for readers of different structural and functional positions can be suggested. Firstly, the researcher’s emphasis on certain theories and priorities will determine what has to be modelled in detail. For example, if gender relations are empirically an important element in disaster impact and policy, then the individual rather than the household would be the unit of study and the main focus. If a researcher believes that a supply-side theory of famine requires attention, then those income opportunities available in crop production would be emphasised with reference to
可以提出一些主要标准，以便为不同结构和功能位置的读者做出选择。首先，研究者对某些理论和优先事项的强调将决定需要详细建模的内容。例如，如果性别关系在灾害影响和政策中实证上是一个重要因素，那么研究的单位将是个体而不是家庭，主要焦点也将放在个体上。如果研究者认为饥荒的供给侧理论需要关注，那么在作物生产中可获得的收入机会将被强调，并参考
drought or pest attack, along with other determinants of supply (e.g. the transport network).
干旱或虫害，以及其他供给决定因素（例如，运输网络）。

Secondly, the scale of the investigation will also be determined in part by choice of theory. Individual, household, class or village, region and nation are not so much alternative objects of analysis, but rather a series of conceptual limits that nest inside each other (like Russian dolls or Chinese boxes), the smaller-scale enclosed by the next highest level and given context by it. None the less, the study will have to choose the major spatial frame appropriate to its purposes. If a seismic zone, a farming system or an administrative area is chosen as the principal scale of the study, other scales can be sketched in through secondary data, rapid rural appraisal and key informants.
其次，调查的规模在一定程度上也将由理论选择决定。个体、家庭、阶级或村庄、地区和国家并不是替代的分析对象，而是一系列相互嵌套的概念界限（如俄罗斯套娃或中国盒子），较小的规模被下一个更高层次所包围，并由其提供背景。然而，研究仍然需要选择适合其目的的主要空间框架。如果选择地震带、农业系统或行政区域作为研究的主要规模，可以通过次级数据、快速农村评估和关键知情人来勾勒出其他规模。

Thirdly, the framework is principally an ‘externalist’ (or etic) approach, in that it imposes the researcher’s own interpretation and perception of vulnerability, hazard and risk-or at least the researcher’s interpretation of local people’s interpretations. Those experiencing a disaster and other actors, such as aid professionals, members of the civil service in a country facing a disaster, have their own interpretations. As Chapter 4 will show, for example, ‘famine’ is perceived in a variety of ways which differ significantly between the world media, aid or relief agencies (de Waal 1987). Likewise in the urban context, residents in Alexandra Township, in metropolitan Johannesburg, put flash flooding far down their list of concerns, frustrating attempts by a professor of hydrology to ‘solve’ the flood problem (Wisner 1997). There are many hazards which outsiders could never even imagine without intensive discussion and understanding of the society involved. The collection and study of indigenous interpretations of extreme events and processes can enrich and perhaps alter the framework.
第三，该框架主要是一种“外部主义”（或外部视角）的方法，因为它强加了研究者对脆弱性、危害和风险的自身解释和感知——或者至少是研究者对当地人解释的解释。经历灾难的人和其他参与者，如援助专业人员、在面临灾难的国家中的公务员，拥有自己的解释。例如，第四章将展示，“饥荒”在世界媒体、援助或救济机构（de Waal 1987）之间的感知方式差异显著。同样，在城市环境中，约翰内斯堡大都市的亚历山大镇的居民将突发洪水列在他们关注的事项中较低的位置，这使得一位水文学教授试图“解决”洪水问题的努力受挫（Wisner 1997）。许多危害是外部人士在没有深入讨论和理解相关社会的情况下根本无法想象的。对极端事件和过程的本土解释的收集和研究可以丰富并可能改变该框架。

Fourthly, most studies do not examine vulnerability for its own sake, but assist in the prevention or mitigation of disasters. Therefore, many variables mentioned here in the general framework will simply not apply to particular hazards or in particular situations. The Access model is used as a predictive and organising device for this book. Only parts of it, at the discretion of the researcher or policy maker, will be relevant in each case.
第四， most studies do not examine vulnerability for its own sake, but assist in the prevention or mitigation of disasters. 因此，这里提到的许多变量在特定的危害或特定情况下将不适用。访问模型被用作本书的预测和组织工具。只有在研究者或政策制定者的裁量下，部分内容在每种情况下才会相关。

Notes注释

1 Hewitt (1983a) sees the potential for disaster ‘prefigured’ in ‘normal life’; while Wisner (1993) refers to ‘daily life’. We use the two phrases interchangeably.
1 Hewitt (1983a) 认为灾难的潜力在“正常生活”中“预示”出来；而 Wisner (1993) 则提到“日常生活”。我们将这两个短语交替使用。
2 See RADIX web site page on 2002 southern African food emergencies (RADIX 2002).
2 请参见 RADIX 网站上关于 2002 年南部非洲食品紧急情况的页面 (RADIX 2002)。

3 This type of hazard, and the Andhra Pradesh case, is dealt with at greater length in Chapter 7. Winchester’s work

(1986, 1992)

is a valuable and rare example of a study of the actual operation of ideas of vulnerability in the analysis of a suddenonset disaster.
这种类型的危害，以及安得拉邦的案例，在第七章中有更详细的讨论。温彻斯特的工作

(1986, 1992)

是一个宝贵而罕见的例子，展示了在突发灾害分析中脆弱性概念的实际运作。
4 For example, Richards (1986) likens the farming venture undertaken by the Mende of Sierra Leone with a ship, with a crew hired and paid off at each point during the voyage. Each voyage takes place over a catenary soil profile and through an agricultural calendar (i.e. through both space and time), involving the labour of women in some areas, senior women in others, men for certain agricultural
例如，理查兹（1986）将塞拉利昂门德人进行的农业冒险比作一艘船，船员在航程的每个阶段被雇佣并支付报酬。每次航行都发生在一个链状土壤剖面上，并通过农业日历（即在空间和时间上）进行，涉及某些地区女性的劳动，其他地区的高级女性，以及某些农业活动中的男性。
activities, and it is only at one particular point in the agricultural calendar that anything approaching a ‘farm household’ appears at all. In cases where larger units are significant, such as production brigades in China from the 1950s-1980s, the household may not be an appropriate unit for all aspects of analysing access. The household may control some of its consumption, and small plots of land for production, but most resources and the accumulated surplus is outside their control.
只有在农业日历的某个特定时点，才会出现接近“农户”的情况。在较大单位显著的情况下，例如 1950 年代至 1980 年代中国的生产大队，家庭可能并不是分析获取的所有方面的适当单位。家庭可能控制其部分消费和小块生产土地，但大多数资源和积累的盈余则在其控制之外。
5 For simplicity we refer to income opportunities, although a better term is probably livelihood, which implies the content of supporting life without the assumption that this is done through access to a cash 'income’. Livelihoods may include activities of self-provisioning (subsistence farming, fishing or pastoralism) in which cash may play an insignificant part.
为了简单起见，我们称之为收入机会，尽管更好的术语可能是生计，这意味着支持生活的内容，而不假设这是通过获得现金“收入”来实现的。生计可能包括自给自足的活动（如自给农业、捕鱼或牧羊），在这些活动中，现金可能扮演着微不足道的角色。
6 It is the female children who tend to be withdrawn from school when illness with HIV-AIDS removes principal wage or food earners from Ugandan families (Barnett and Blaikie 1992).
当感染 HIV-AIDS 的疾病使乌干达家庭的主要工资或食物收入者失去时，女童往往会被迫辍学（Barnett 和 Blaikie 1992）。
7 The role of structures of domination in defining untouchability are highlighted in the bias in relief and recovery against outcaste victims of the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat (India). Also, in the Kobe (Japan) earthquake (1995) there were high losses suffered by the Burakumin (‘untouchables’), whose traditional occupation of shoe making (which involves the use of flammable materials) and their densely populated and dilapidated housing resulted in severe fire damage and high mortality (see Chapter 8).
在定义不可接触性方面，统治结构的作用在 2001 年印度古吉拉特邦地震中对贱民受害者的救助和恢复偏见中得到了强调。此外，在 1995 年日本神户地震中，部落民（“不可接触者”）遭受了巨大的损失，他们的传统职业是制鞋（涉及易燃材料的使用），以及他们人口稠密和破旧的住房导致了严重的火灾损失和高死亡率（见第 8 章）。

8 The ‘rules of the game’ can shift very rapidly, as in the new regimes that accompany the establishment of colonial rule or the sudden establishment of private ownership of land (or, conversely, by sudden collectivisation of land as in the Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s). O’Keefe and Wisner (1975) show how changes to the ‘rules of the game’ rendered ineffective a number of indigenous African mechanisms for coping with drought, resulting in increased potential for famine during the colonial period.
“游戏规则”可以非常迅速地发生变化，例如伴随殖民统治的建立或土地私有制的突然建立（或者，相反，如 1920 年代和 1930 年代乌克兰的土地突然集体化）。O’Keefe 和 Wisner（1975）展示了“游戏规则”的变化如何使许多土著非洲应对干旱的机制失效，从而在殖民时期增加了饥荒的潜在风险。
9 ‘Ethnoscience’ is the term often used for vernacular, local knowledge of the physical environment. Some have used the terms 'people’s science’ (Wisner et al. 1977), 'folk science’, 'folk ecology’ (Richards 1975, 1985), 'écologie populaire’, 'people’s knowledge’ (Rau 1991) and ‘indigenous knowledge’ (Brokensha et al. 1980). Within environmental design and architecture the term ‘community design’ is common (Wisner et al. 1991). We will use the term ‘local knowledge’, connoting a broader knowledge base that includes social relations and not just taxonomy, mechanics, chemistry, etc. For a critical review of the use and misuse of local knowledge by outside development agents, see Wisner (1988a: 256-262).
“民族科学”是一个常用于描述对物理环境的地方性、民间知识的术语。有些人使用“人民科学”（Wisner et al. 1977）、“民间科学”、“民间生态学”（Richards 1975, 1985）、“生态学流派”、“人民知识”（Rau 1991）和“土著知识”（Brokensha et al. 1980）等术语。在环境设计和建筑领域，“社区设计”这一术语是常见的（Wisner et al. 1991）。我们将使用“地方知识”这一术语，意指一个更广泛的知识基础，包括社会关系，而不仅仅是分类法、机械学、化学等。有关外部发展代理人对地方知识的使用和误用的批判性回顾，请参见 Wisner（1988a: 256-262）。
10 Models of the risk-averse farmer abound: see Ellis (1988) for a review.
风险厌恶型农民的模型层出不穷：请参见 Ellis（1988）的综述。
11 On women’s access to resources, see Rogers (1980); Dey (1981); Agarwal (1986); Vaughan (1987); Sen and Grown (1987); Carney (1988); Wisner (1988a: 179-186); Shiva (1989); Downs et al. (1991); Schoepf (1992).
关于女性获取资源的情况，请参见 Rogers（1980）；Dey（1981）；Agarwal（1986）；Vaughan（1987）；Sen 和 Grown（1987）；Carney（1988）；Wisner（1988a: 179-186）；Shiva（1989）；Downs 等（1991）；Schoepf（1992）。
12 Examples are given by Cutler (1984); Greenough (1982), writing on the 1943-1944
例子由 Cutler（1984）；Greenough（1982）提供，讨论 1943-1944 年。
Bengal famine; and Vaughan (1987) on Nyasaland in 1949.
孟加拉饥荒；以及 Vaughan（1987）关于 1949 年尼亚萨兰的研究。
13 For south Asia see Agarwal (1990:367); Fernandes and Menon (1987). On Kenya 1971-1976, see Wisner (1980); Downing et al. (1989).
对于南亚，见 Agarwal（1990:367）；Fernandes 和 Menon（1987）。关于 1971-1976 年肯尼亚，见 Wisner（1980）；Downing 等人（1989）。

14 Corbett (1988) has reviewed four major studies of coping mechanisms in the face of famine: these are of northern Nigeria, 1973-1974 (Watts 1983a); Red Sea Province, Sudan, 1984 (Cutler 1986); Wollo Province, Ethiopia, 1984-1985 (Rahmato 1988); and Darfur, Sudan, 1984 (de Waal 1987). Brown (1991) presents another detailed account of the coping sequence in Chad, as do O’Brien and Gruenbaum (1991) from two contrasting sites in Sudan. Agarwal (1990) has also reviewed accounts of coping strategies in south Asia.
Corbett（1988）回顾了四项关于应对饥荒机制的主要研究：这些研究分别是 1973-1974 年北尼日利亚（Watts 1983a）；1984 年苏丹红海省（Cutler 1986）；1984-1985 年埃塞俄比亚沃洛省（Rahmato 1988）；以及 1984 年苏丹达尔富尔（de Waal 1987）。Brown（1991）提供了乍得应对序列的另一详细描述，O’Brien 和 Gruenbaum（1991）也从苏丹两个对比地点进行了研究。Agarwal（1990）还回顾了南亚应对策略的相关记录。
15 This is true even in more densely populated regions such as south Asia. On common property resources in Asia, see Blaikie et al. (1985); Agarwal (1990); Chambers et al. (1990).
即使在南亚等人口密集的地区，这一点也是成立的。关于亚洲的公共财产资源，见 Blaikie 等人（1985）；Agarwal（1990）；Chambers 等人（1990）。
16 This is especially true in drought onset, when it is impossible to know how long reduced or interrupted rainfall will persist and the initial coping strategy is to preserve the basis for continued existence at normal levels afterwards. See Cannon (1991) for a review of these approaches.
16 这在干旱开始时尤其如此，此时无法知道减少或中断降雨将持续多久，初始应对策略是保留正常水平下继续生存的基础。有关这些方法的回顾，请参见 Cannon（1991）。

17 For other examples of disaster relief, prevention and mitigation in which vernacular coping and innovations from the outside are combined, see Wijkman and Timberlake (1984:104-143); Timberlake (1988); Harrison (1987); Maskrey (1989); Anderson and Woodrow (1998); A. Grainger (1990:276-321); Harley (1990); Pradervand (1989); Rau (1991:145-205); Eade and Williams (1995).
17 有关灾害救助、预防和减轻的其他例子，其中结合了地方应对和外部创新，请参见 Wijkman 和 Timberlake（1984:104-143）；Timberlake（1988）；Harrison（1987）；Maskrey（1989）；Anderson 和 Woodrow（1998）；A. Grainger（1990:276-321）；Harley（1990）；Pradervand（1989）；Rau（1991:145-205）；Eade 和 Williams（1995）。
18 These competing theories of famine causation discussed in Chapter 4 include Sen (1981) and Ravallion (1987), who emphasise the behaviour of markets and their impact on the population, Rangasami

(1985, 1986)

and Firth

(1959)

, who deal with the structures of domination and the time-space aspects of disasters, and Hellden (1984) who studies the impact of drought upon famine in Ethiopia.
18 第四章讨论的这些竞争性饥荒成因理论包括 Sen（1981）和 Ravallion（1987），他们强调市场行为及其对人口的影响，Rangasami

(1985, 1986)

和 Firth

(1959)

，他们处理统治结构和灾害的时间-空间方面，以及 Hellden（1984），他研究干旱对埃塞俄比亚饥荒的影响。

Part II VULNERABILITY AND HAZARD TYPES
第二部分脆弱性与危险类型

4
FAMINE AND NATURAL HAZARDS
饥荒与自然灾害

Introduction引言

Of all disasters, famine is perhaps the most damaging. There have been more references to its occurrence historically than any other type of disaster, and throughout history the state has been involved with famine far more closely than with earthquake, flood, tsunami, storm surges and other types of disaster.

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Generally the number of people affected has been far greater in famines, and its social and political impact on the affairs of state and rulers has been more profound. Also, behind each case of excess mortality from famine there lies a much wider net of destitution, displacement and impoverishment that may endure for many years after the acute symptoms of famine have subsided.
在所有灾难中，饥荒或许是最具破坏性的。历史上对其发生的提及比其他任何类型的灾难都要多，历史上国家与饥荒的关系也远比与地震、洪水、海啸、风暴潮及其他类型的灾难更为密切。通常，受饥荒影响的人数远远超过其他灾难，其对国家事务和统治者的社会和政治影响也更为深远。此外，在每一起因饥荒导致的过度死亡背后，往往隐藏着更广泛的贫困、流离失所和贫困化的网络，这种状况可能在饥荒的急性症状消退后仍会持续多年。

The worst recorded earthquake disaster caused the deaths of about 240,000 people in 1976 at Tangshan (China), but in the twentieth century alone it is dwarfed by famines that have frequently caused the deaths of more than a million people. For example, 1.5 million perished in the famine of 1974 in Bangladesh, and between 900,000 and 2.4 million in North Korea between 1995 and 1999 (Noland et al. 1999). In the Chinese 'Great Leap Forward’ famine of 1958-1961, the death toll is estimated at between 14 and 26 million (Kane 1988), or between 30 and 33 million (Becker 1996), and possibly as high as 40 million (Article 19 1990:18). In some cases, mortality statistics are unreliable, and the cause of death is disputed (e.g. between bubonic plague and starvation in Europe in the 1340s, and between deaths due to fighting or the slaughter of civilians, and the famine associated with war, e.g. Biafra 1968-1970). However, the scale of mortality dwarfs that of all other disasters. No other type of disaster has caused as many deaths as famine (in the order of 70 million deaths in the twentieth century: Devereux 2000), although it is not surprising that estimates vary greatly.
记录在案的最严重地震灾难发生在 1976 年唐山（中国），造成约 240,000 人死亡，但仅在 20 世纪，它的死亡人数与频繁导致超过一百万人死亡的饥荒相比显得微不足道。例如，1974 年孟加拉国的饥荒中有 150 万人遇难，1995 年至 1999 年间，朝鲜的死亡人数在 900,000 到 240 万之间（Noland et al. 1999）。在中国 1958-1961 年的“大跃进”饥荒中，死亡人数估计在 1400 万到 2600 万之间（Kane 1988），或在 3000 万到 3300 万之间（Becker 1996），甚至可能高达 4000 万（Article 19 1990:18）。在某些情况下，死亡统计数据不可靠，死亡原因存在争议（例如，1340 年代欧洲的黑死病与饥荒之间的争论，以及与战争相关的死亡（如平民屠杀）与饥荒之间的争论，例如比亚法拉 1968-1970 年）。然而，死亡人数的规模远远超过其他所有灾难。没有其他类型的灾难造成如此多的死亡，饥荒在 20 世纪造成约 7000 万人的死亡（Devereux 2000），尽管估计数字差异很大并不令人惊讶。

Today, famines still occur, although the affected regions are substantially different to those of the past. Famine is now unlikely in south, east and south-east Asia (the exceptions being North Korea from the mid-1990s up to the time of writing in early 2003, and Cambodia in the 1970s), but are more common and widespread in Africa, for reasons discussed below. Acute food emergencies, if not formally defined as ‘famines’, have also begun to affect parts of the world where they have not been seen before, such as Central America in 2001. ...

The causes of famines have changed too, although people die in the same appalling ways. Starvation is a pre-occupation of many people in Africa, and is alive in the consciousness of many millions of others who have witnessed famine within living memory (e.g. in southern Nigeria, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Bangladesh, Cambodia and China). It is also a vivid reminder of oppression and imperial callousness (Davis 2000). And famines can remain as emblematic political events for nationalist movements many years after their occurrence, as with the Ukraine (which suffered appalling famine under ...

Soviet control in the 1930s: Dando 1980) and Ireland (which endured the loss of over a million people under British rule in the 1840s: Regan 1983). ...

Famines and their causes ...

Part I of this book questioned the simplistic perception that disasters are ‘natural’. Some preliminary arguments were developed to show the need for ‘social’ (in its widest sense, including political, economic and cultural) reasons being given much greater prominence in understanding how disasters are caused. Most popular ideas of famine as expressed in the media still tend to blame drought and other ‘exceptional’ natural events (e.g. floods or epidemics in human or bovine populations). There is more than a grain of truth in this belief. Throughout this book, we emphasise the role of climate change, which has accentuated the magnitude and frequency of hazardous events. Yet even here, anthropogenic causes of climate change, and the social environment which shapes vulnerability, show how disasters are linked to human action rather than capricious nature.

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...

Famine, although often linked with drought, flood or epidemics, can also occur without a well-defined ‘trigger’ event in nature at all, but instead as a result of war or conscious attempts to use food as a weapon (which may become a device for ‘ethnic cleansing’).

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While this second edition still attempts to reduce disasters by examining the links between ‘nature’ and ‘society’ in the explanation of disasters, it also reflects new debates and (unfortunately) new experiences. ...

The year 1983 saw a significant coherent critique of the notion that disasters are to be explained primarily through natural factors. The main target of this critique (Interpretations of Calamity, edited by Hewitt 1983a) was the idea that if disasters (particularly famines) were attributed to natural causes, then they could be explained in terms of exceptional events and not as ‘normal’ or day-to-day social processes.

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Famines could be attributed instead to unprecedented, unnatural and unexpected events, and therefore appear to be quite separate from normal life. In this framework, sudden natural phenomena, or even slow-onset drought, could provide the explanation because they constitute the new, decisive and therefore principal cause. In Hewitt’s view (ibid.: 9-24), the explanation of disasters should rest more fully on a social analysis of the processes which create the conditions under which ‘exceptional’ natural events can act as the ‘trigger’ for a disaster. ...

This analysis focused on the social processes of impoverishment and exploitation which expose people to hazards (make them vulnerable) as a normal and continuing part of life. An explanation of disasters in terms of natural events invites technological solutions (rather than social ones) to the containment of floods, the design of earthquakeresistant buildings and the introduction of more productive technology in agriculture. When this approach demonstrably fails (as it sometimes does), it is perceived to be beyond the powers of technology or, even more culpably, beyond the powers of human agency to prevent famine, allowing the cause to be once again thrown back into the lap of 'exceptional’ and ‘unprecedented’ events-with the result that no blame can therefore attach to anyone. ...

Hewitt (ibid.: 12-14) argues that a previous generation of academics and practitioners virtually ostracised those who sought explanations of disaster that went deeper than the impact of the natural hazard. Given the dominance of science and technology in the modern era, the authors of any analysis of causes that did not suggest that hazards could be modified, palliated or avoided altogether by the application of technology (e.g. satellite early warning systems and reinforced concrete) were exiled from mainstream social explanations. ...

Today, twenty years after Hewitt’s book, the primacy of natural hazards in explaining the causes of famine has to be questioned with even more vigour, in the light of subsequent events and theoretical developments. There are two issues: firstly, natural hazards (especially drought, but also sometimes flood and other sudden-onset ‘natural causes’) are much less capable of acting as triggers for famine: the connection has been undermined by improved national and international humanitarian responses, better preparedness and the political will which can enable this type of progress to be made. There is now a growing and encouraging record of averted famines, as in Bangladesh (1979 and 1984), Botswana and Kenya (1984) and southern Africa (1991-1993) (Devereux 2000). ...

Unfortunately this is not the case everywhere, especially in Africa, where even as this chapter is being written there is famine in Malawi, Zimbabwe and neighbouring countries, and a likely famine in Ethiopia. Many of the famines in Africa in the past 30 years have been attributed to a combination of natural triggers (mostly drought) and civil strife and war. The current crises in southern Africa and the Horn are being partially blamed on drought, while there are also crucial political and economic factors involved in generating vulnerability as well. ...

The second reason is not so much a shift in the circumstances and location of famines (and potential famine) as changing attitudes about their causes. Devereux (2000, 2001) argues that famines have become more complex, and there is certainly some evidence for this. There is also much more information available about them, through historical research on past events, and reports and analysis from early warning and monitoring systems. With more information, and the means to broadcast it, conspiracies of silence about a famine are more difficult to maintain. There will always be politically engineered silences about famine, sometimes enforced through censorship, and at other times through carefully managed discourses where silences are unnoticed (Article 19 1990, 1993; de Waal 1999). For example, the drought-triggered famine of 1984-1985 in the Sudan had little cause other than the failure of Nimeiri’s government to acknowledge the existence of a food crisis. It was an embarrassment and distraction, the existence of which Nimeiri consciously denied, causing the death of about a quarter of a million people (de Waal 1997:91). Also, closed and totalitarian societies tend to collect information through the eyes of party officials who have their own categories and statistical collection techniques. This has led to incorrect information about food security and food stocks, the silencing of the voices of the hungry, and a dearth of information about the true state of the disaster reaching the outside world (e.g. the famine of North Korea since 1995, and the Great Leap Forward famine in China, 1958-1962—see below). ...

Despite these important silences (to which we will return later), the amount of information available about famine has increased enormously, and more detailed ...
information can lead to seemingly greater complexity. Lastly, ‘the belated recognition by observers that famines are more complex and openended than they had previously thought’ (Devereux 2000:4) is explained by the increasing occurrence of protracted complex emergencies associated with hunger, in which many factors are interwoven. These include a breakdown in social order, prolonged conflict, large numbers of displaced persons, disruption of agriculture and food production, of marketing and the supply of food, and political deadlock between armies or administrations with de facto control of food movements, and of organisations that are in a position to supply and deliver relief measures. It is this nexus of factors, involving a greatly increased number of actors (particularly at the international level), which gives the impression of increased complexity. It may be worth pausing to consider whether the famines of 30 or more years ago were any less complex, or any less political than they are today, or whether it is simply that the politics and structures which shaped the famine situation were often unreported and that the voices of the starving (and already dead) were never heard. When the facts of these events are disinterred by painstaking research (e.g. the classic work by Watts [1983a] in northern Nigeria, and the reports of past famines in M.Davis’s Late Victorian Holocausts, 2000), the explanation of famine matches in complexity any contemporary ‘complex emergency’. ...

Box 4.1: Famine in Malawi, 2002 ...
Ninety per cent of Malawi’s 11 million population live by subsistence agriculture in the countryside. This country, like all of southern Africa, suffered its third year of drought in 2002 in some parts of the country, while others were still recovering from floods that happened in 2001. Malawi is landlocked, highly indebted and among the least developed countries by UN standards. There were early warnings by aid organisations of a famine that might match the scale of Ethiopia’s tragedy in 1984, or an earlier famine that elderly Malawians remember from 1948. Piecing together reports from agencies working in rural areas, as many as 10,000 people, mostly the weak (children, the aged, people living with AIDS), may have died by May 2002. The World Food Programme (WFP) estimated that up to three million were at risk, that 70 per cent of the population was affected

^{5}

and that Malawi would require 600,000 tonnes of food by the end of 2002. ...

HIV-AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhoea and an epidemic of cholera further weakened the population up to and during 2002, intensifying the health consequences of hunger. The 2002 cholera epidemic is the worst in the history of Malawi, with 32,968 cases reported and 980 deaths by 7 April 2002.

^{6}

In June 2002, bubonic plague appeared among the population already weakened by hunger.

^{7}

Many AIDS orphans and those living with HIV already had poor nutrition even before this current crisis.

^{8}

Where farmers have been successful in growing some maize and protecting it from animal or human thieves, hunger has forced them to harvest it before it is mature. It is ...
also clear that vulnerability varies considerably according to social factors. The UN reported that '[s]tudies have shown that smallholders with less than one hectare of land, estate workers and tenants, low income urban dwellers, female-headed households and children suffer from chronic food insecurity. They also found that the majority of the poorest people in Malawi are women and that female-headed households-which make up 34 per cent of households—shoulder the greater burden of poverty’ (OCHA 2002c). ...

Chronic food insecurity for such groups has a long history in the country. Expropriation of small holdings by large estates, and the forbidding (under the 1968 Special Crops Act) of smallholders from growing valuable export crops such as tea and tobacco, were followed by worsening access to fertiliser, agricultural extension services and credit during the period 19871994 (Cross 2002). A severe drought in 1992, a doubling of inflation, a 40 per cent decline in the maize crop, and a drawing down of strategic reserves further worsened the conditions for rural producers. The Customary Land Use Survey undertaken in 1994/1995 revealed a dire situation of high vulnerability to food shortages and the danger of famine (Green 1996). Given these ...
very adverse circumstances, it is surprising that the World Bank continued with neo-liberal policies, aimed at market liberalisation. ...

In colonial times, Malawi exported labour to the South African mines, men who were highly prized as ‘tropicals’ (who could tolerate the heat in the deepest mine shafts) and who remitted income back home. Now Malawi’s main exports are agricultural products. Its government has attempted to implement a World Bank structural adjustment package aimed at reducing government expenditure. But much of the rural population remains isolated, without basic services and at the mercy of an uncontrolled market through which the price of maize (the staple food crop) has increased by 400 per cent.

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This puts the purchase of food beyond the reach of most of the hungry, who have to sell off assets (including bicycles, livestock and even the roof timbers of their houses in ‘distress sales’) in order to survive. ...

The government stands accused of failure to intervene to control the staple food price, to import food in a timely manner and to maintain a strategic reserve against such contingencies. This arguably transformed a food shortage into famine. The significance of strategic reserves in this has been especially controversial, particularly as the government was required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 'to privatise its agricultural development and marketing corporationwhich maintained a central stock of grain and regulated prices’ (Burgo and Stewart 2002). A recent report from the UK NGO World Development Movement provides a severe indictment of mismanagement and the pursuit of self-interest by various interest groups: ...

The decision to sell Malawi’s grain reserves followed advice from the IMF to reduce operational costs and the level of buffer stocks held from 167,000 Metric Tonnes (MT) to 60,000 MT, in order to repay a South African bank for a commercial loan of US

$ 300

million, incurred by the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA), when it was established as a quasi-independent agency [ABSA Bank]. The IMF further advised that the maize be exported to neighboring countries, in disregard of the impending food crisis in Malawi.[4]

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...

In the event, and evidently in clear defiance of the IMF, the Malawi Government sold almost all of the 167,000 MT reserve, much of it on local markets, to private traders, the new agents of the partially liberalised grain market. Traders stockpiled it and later profiteered from hunger. Since then, all parties to the gross mismanagement of the country’s food security policy have traded accusations and refused to take responsibility for their failures. ...
(Owusu and Ng’ambi 2002:14-15). ...

A report from the news agency Reuters gives some indication of the resulting infighting and accusations of blame (Kotch 2002). ...

When drought on this scale last affected southern Africa in 1991-1993, there was a rare moment in which co-operation among all the affected countries (including South Africa) enabled food aid to be used in a remarkably efficient way.

^{11}

Although at that time some 13 million people needed emergency food, this daunting logistical mission was accomplished.

^{12}

During the recovery period in the early 1990s numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs) developed projects to build drought coping capacity. The transport infrastructure, communications and political co-operation of the neighbouring countries at that time seemed a good example of the kind of regional resilience that development can provide in the face of disaster. ...

This time around, countries in central and southern Africa are in the grip of an even more serious epidemic of HIV-AIDS, electoral democracy is under severe pressure in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, and local state institutions are very weak.

^{13}

In Zimbabwe there is civil unrest associated with the expropriation of white-owned commercial farms and a disputed presidential election in 2002. Angola is just emerging from decades of civil war, and Zambia still hosts many hundreds of thousands of Angolan war refugees, who need to be fed. ...

Perhaps because of concerns with the Malawi government’s capacity and accountability, donor response to the appeal for food was weaker than it was in 1991-1993. The WFP was already feeding 2.6 million people in southern Africa in March 2002 when it appealed for

$ 69

million for this emergency. By the end of April it had received pledges of only

$ 3

million,

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and by June 2002 it estimated that it had to feed millions of people in the region: 3 million ...
in Malawi, 6 million in Zimbabwe, 2.5 million in Zambia, 1 million in Angola, nearly half a million in Mozambique and 144,000 in Lesotho.

^{15}

...

Explanations of famine ...

Theories of famine can be considered in terms of four main strands. The first may be called neo-Malthusian, and is focused on the potential famine-inducing consequences of rapid population growth outstripping the limits of global and regional food production. The second relates to environmental limitations on food output, principally through drought. More recently it has involved considering the disruption of production and its uncertainty and variability as a result of global climate change. If the Malthusianism is ‘demand’-oriented and centred on population supposedly outstripping production, the environmental approach is on the ‘supply’ side and looks primarily at supposed natural ‘causes’ which reduce the capacity of natural resources to provide adequate or reliable food supplies. The third strand is dominated by economics, where famine is seen as being caused by a fall in the aggregate supply of food, imperfect markets which fail to supply food, or by the failure of people to generate effective demand to purchase the food that they need. The fourth strand centres on the political and human rights aspects of famine and on the emerging complexities of contemporary famines. Let us take each of these in turn, and review their complementarities and contradictions. ...

Neo-Malthusian explanations ...

Malthusian and neo-Malthusian explanations of famine have a long history (since Thomas Malthus’s original essay on the subject in 1798), an extended period of dominance and a more recent (but long) history of vigorous refutation.

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Devereux (1993:46) quotes a view which illustrates the crudest form of neo-Malthusianism expressed by the US Secretary of Agriculture in 1946: ‘Some people are going to have to starve… We’re in the position of a family that owns a litter of puppies; we’ve got to decide which ones to drown’. Leaving aside the violence perpetrated by this remark, it succinctly illustrates the kind of politics which can flow from neo-Malthusianism. Other crude forms of neo-Malthusianism, such as Hardin’s controversial essays ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) and ‘Living on a Lifeboat’ (1974), need not be given a full treatment here. Refutations have been based on both empirical and ideological grounds. Part of the empirical ground for refuting the link between famine and ‘over-population’ is based on the fact that the population of Bangladesh, China and India have greatly increased since earlier famines (supposedly caused themselves by rapid population growth). Since its last famine in 1974, the population of Bangladesh has almost doubled (from 70 to 125 million) and yet, arguably, it is more secure from the threat of famine now than at that time. ...

There are well-established demographic arguments that predict a stabilisation of the world’s population growth through the fertility transition. There is also no clear association (let alone a proven causal link) between rapid population growth and slow ...
economic growth (see Cassen 1994; Kiessling and Landberg 1994; Sen et al. 1994 for a theoretical discussion). Also, as Osmani (1996) has pointed out, famines do little to check population growth in the long run (birth rates soon recover and compensate for losses), and so fail to provide the ‘natural’ checks on population growth that Malthus predicted. Even the demographic impact of China’s famine of the late 1950s and early 1960s (which involved a period during which population declined at a rate of about 1.4 per cent per annum) was recovered from within 15 years (Field 1993). ...

There are also ideological objections to the neo-Malthusian case, which demonstrate that its political implications are unhelpful at the very least, and may also damage the prospects of preventing famine in the short and longer term. Simply put, objections to the theory are that it: (1) blames the most vulnerable for breeding uncontrollably and bringing famine on their own heads; (2) diverts attention from the global and structural causes of vulnerability to famine, which have much more to do with the restructuring of global capitalism than with overpopulation; (3) makes it appear that nothing can be done because the processes involve unavoidable and inevitable structural causes that are beyond the capacity of any political commitment and organising action; and (4) de-links the ethical and humanitarian imperatives (what should be done) from famine. In spite of these counter arguments, neo-Malthusianism persists, as for example in Brown (1995, 1996) and Ryan et al. (1999). Yet it would be foolish to be complacent about the implications of continuing high rates of population growth on food security in some regions of the world. ...

There may be a number of indirect ‘neo-Malthusian’ impacts of population growth on food production which have intuitive appeal but are also undermined by convincing counter-arguments. These indirect impacts of rapid population growth and ‘pressure upon resources’ occur in fragile and easily degraded environments. In these, food supplies may be disrupted by natural hazards that have been aggravated by human action. An example would be the reduction in the moisture-retention capacities of soil due to over-cultivation or overgrazing, such that a dry period becomes a drought. Human-aggravated drought leads to a downturn in food availability and increased variability of annual output. Some of the evidence that environmental degradation has negative consequences for food supply in the longer term is credible. 17 ...

But it is intellectually hazardous to link the development of famine conditions, back through unsafe conditions and economic and social pressures, to ‘root causes’ such as population growth. Any number of intervening processes and events may serve to modify or nullify the longer-term effects of environmental degradation and population pressure. We must understand that there can be human adaptation to the risk of famine, the use of compensating livelihood strategies and coping mechanisms when faced with hardship, and the application of tested measures to avert famine. All of these can, and should, stand between the dismal connection between population pressure-induced environmental degradation and famine, even though there are instances where a credible link between environmental degradation and reductions in the supply and yield variability of food can be made. ...

Environmental 'supply-side' explanations ...

There is a long tradition of blaming drought (and sometimes floods) as a significant cause of famine. Of the major famine disasters in the past 30 years (e.g. in the Sahel zone of west Africa, in Sudan and Ethiopia and in northeast Brazil), many have been explained principally in the popular media as being caused by drought. In recent years, global climate change has emerged as an additional factor in explanations of the reduction or disruption of food output, especially in relation to drought (Downing 1992). It is becoming a major focus in understanding the possible increase of extreme events, in which natural hazards are magnified in intensity and frequency. Yet it is almost certain that the reasons for this climate change are rooted in human activities generating increased levels of ‘greenhouse gases’ in the atmosphere. ...

There are also major climatic oscillations such as the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) which appears every three to seven years or so, and lasts

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months. The severity and timing of ENSO may also be associated with longer-term climate change, although there is uncertainty about the strength and nature of this relationship, and whether or not ENSO is driven by global warming (McGuire et al. 2002; Glantz 2001). The ENSO events also involve El Niño’s counterpart, La Niña, which is characterised by an exaggerated ‘return to normal’ from El Niño, and includes, for example, excessive rainfall returning to areas stricken by El Niño-related drought. ...

It is highly likely that these oscillations have been occurring for a very long time. Davis’s account of Late Victorian Holocausts (2000) offers persuasive evidence that El Niño was associated with devastating droughts in northern China in 1875-1876; in Brazil, India and Morocco between 1877 and 1878; and in Russia, Korea and Ethiopia from 1888 to 1889 . These acted as triggers for huge famines, which he argues were worsened as they combined with the emerging Victorian global economy in which the poverty-stricken were ‘ground to bits’. Deliberate policies of colonial officers, heavy taxation of poor rural populations in newly conquered colonies and the exigencies of the marketplace (a version of neo-liberalism) turned ENSO events into disasters. Victorian colonialism ignored opportunities to reduce them, and mitigation by local rulers was no longer possible as it had been in the past (e.g. in China and in independent Ethiopia in 1899). Davis’s book contains lessons for current global leaders who preside over policies which resemble those of the late nineteenth century. ...

The implications of longer-term, more general, climate change (often referred to as global warming) are discussed in general terms in Chapter 2. They include increased frequency and severity of tropical cyclones, with storm damage, landslides and flooding, raised sea levels and coastal inundation, and the shift of epizootics and epidemics to new locations. In relation to famine, climate change principally acts as a trigger through drought, the shifting of the timing of rainfall and its seasonal patterns (e.g. the Asian monsoon), floods which disrupt the production and distribution of food and the possible spread of disease to humans, livestock and crops. All of these increased risks are almost certainly caused by human action (in relation to greenhouse gases) and relate to social vulnerability and to the pre-existing ‘normal’ level of hazards. But with climate change, human action is responsible for both the generation of peoples’ vulnerability and the increased level of hazard. ...

Economic theories of famine ...

Since the 1980s, academic literature on the explanation of famine has shifted from giving prominence to natural events towards an emphasis on the social causes and economic processes involved. Amartya Sen, perhaps the most influential writer of famine in the twentieth century, claims that both Marx and Adam Smith directed attention to the social causes of famine (Sen 1981:13). This suggests that such explanations go beyond a simple divide between the political ‘left’ and ‘right’. In a series of seminal writings in the 1980s, Sen focused on specific factors which (in the language of our Pressure and Release, or PAR, model) channel root causes into unsafe conditions and thereby to the ‘point of pressure’. These specific causes at the ‘point of pressure’ require much more rigorous analysis than more general and under-theorised root causes because they must describe why specific people, at a particular place and time, cannot eat enough food to survive. ...

There are three main (and largely competing) economic explanations of famine, based on different sets of causal mechanisms. The first, which Sen seeks to identify as only one (and in his view, overstated) cause of famine, is termed Food Availability Decline (often abbreviated to FAD). This mechanism is simple and based on common sense. It tends to invoke natural triggers of famine (e.g. drought, flood, locusts) which directly cause crop failure, or heightened mortality of livestock, or both. This in turn reduces the aggregate amount of food available, so that famine is caused by there not being enough food to go around, and is termed a ‘supply-side’ explanation of famine. To identify drought or other natural events as the immediate cause of crop failure, and therefore of a decline in food supply, seems a common-sense deduction. ...

The major problem with such a simple causal connection between a fall in the aggregate food supply and a famine is the assumption that food availability is shared equitably among the population, and that its members have no source of food other than their own production. Both assumptions are usually unwarranted. While many explanations of famines start with a trigger event such as flood or drought, there are usually difficult anomalies between the relative severity of the famine and the decline in food supply in both space and time. For example, Currey (1981) uses cartographic data for the Bangladesh famine of 1974 to show that the spatial distribution of the number of famine deaths did not closely correlate with those areas of below average production of food staples. Indeed, Sen (1981:92) claims that 1974 was ‘a local peak year in terms of total output and per capita output of rice’. Likewise, Kumar (1987) shows that the number of districts reporting normal, above normal and below normal aggregate crop production for 1972-1973 in Ethiopia did not correspond well with the spatial distribution of famine-related mortality. He also states that the evidence points to a fall in food production after the main impact of the famine had been felt (ibid.: 13). Similar difficulties of finding precise and causal links that match, spatially and temporarily, famine mortality and a fall in aggregate food production confront almost every case of famine for which reasonable production and mortality data exist. ...

The conclusion to be drawn is that natural events may be implicated as a trigger to famine, but that the actual factors involved in reducing how much certain groups of people are able to eat are only very indirectly related to a drop in output. It may be much more strongly connected to economic factors (e.g. a relatively small drop in output can ...
trigger a disproportionate increase in prices for those who need to purchase food). If falling aggregate food supply makes people more prone to famine, it is not because there is not enough to eat but because social processes are determining that those who need whatever food is available are unable to get it. The actual processes that translate the decline in output to peoples’ hunger are not causal but parallel. ...

We must also keep in mind that famine may occur with no natural trigger involved at all. The most significant cases are the ‘policy famines’ (which result from the imposition of government policies or political interference in food production conditions) that occurred under forcible collectivisation in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the Great Leap Forward famine in China and the current famine in North Korea. These have been responsible for the deaths of many millions of people, far more than others triggered by natural hazards. ...

There are two types of case which are crucial in demonstrating the inadequacy of FAD-type explanations. The first is where famines occur without any significant natural trigger, so that food availability does decline and people are prevented from getting enough to eat, although the causes are often directly political. The second is those cases where drought is supposedly causing hunger and perhaps famine while at the same time the country concerned has produced food which is being exported. Cannon gives several examples of countries experiencing famine, or with large numbers of malnourished people (including India in recent years), that have exported food: ...

Over the four years 1999 to 2002, Ethiopia considered itself to have a surplus in national food production. In very controversial circumstances, Sudan has a number of times sought to sell foodgrain, including an attempt in 1992 to export sorghum to the European Union (EU) for use as animal feed, at the same time its government was requesting food aid. ...
(Cannon 2003:46)

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...
Such situations provide support for our emphasis on the need for ‘sustainable livelihoods’ and access to resources and entitlements for every-body, not for simplistic explanations that look mainly at natural factors or the supposed problem of population. In India the problem of hunger today is not one of famine of but widespread malnutrition amongst millions of people within an economy that has the capacity to export food to others who can afford to buy it. ...

For farmer households, hunger arises not only from an inability to purchase food, but mainly from the lack of resources to grow it (especially land and water), or from the reduction of production by the impact of natural hazards (especially drought or irregular rainfall). An analysis of famine in Ethiopia in the 1980s by Diriba (1991) has amply shown how long-term decline in cereal production per household and per hectare (as a result of population growth, land shortage, lack of economic development and environmental degradation) has made self-provisioning very difficult for many households.

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Even during ‘normal years’, most households had to buy food or rely on aid to make up shortfalls in household production. Thus a long-term supply-side problem undoubtedly existed. However, it was the onerous taxation imposed by the state and the lack of alternative income-earning opportunities outside subsistence agriculture that made ...
any enforced entry into the food market very risky for the majority. Thus, a decline in aggregate food supply within an area is an important factor, but, as always, the lack of alternative means of purchasing food turns this long-term decline into a potentially disastrous situation virtually every year. Goyder and Goyder (1988) and Kebbede (1992) agree that excessive taxation by the Ethiopian state has tended to push many marginal peasant producers over the edge, particularly when combined with other adverse conditions. ...

The second type of explanatory mechanism of famine is also on the supply side, but concerns the operation of markets, which in times of hunger may be unable to meet the demand for food by a set of people, even though effective demand (backed by the ability to purchase) exists (Seaman and Holt 1980). In other words, a functioning market which should be capable of supplying the food that is in demand is not able to operate. For example, Cutler (1984) and Devereux and Hay (1986) point to market failure as a major mechanism responsible for famine in Tigray and Wollo in the 1970s, where the market was not well developed, transport was poor and expensive and the proportion of food bought or sold in the household was very small. Poor transport is often put forward as one of the major reasons for this failure. Emerging from this is a related argument that modern transport can integrate markets and enable food to reach the areas where it is required. Conversely, some writers (e.g. Copans 1983) attribute a dangerous decline in self-provisioning to the spread of commercialisation, which is often aided by expansion of rail and road systems. Drèze considered the Indian situation under British rule in relation to the expansion of the railways: ...

The fact that the expansion of the railways resulted in a greater tendency towards uniformity of prices there can be little doubt… One may also generally expect a reduction of price disparities to reflect greater food movements towards famine-affected areas, and to result in an improvement of the food entitlements of vulnerable sections of the population in these regions. However, it is easy to think of counter-examples of which two are particularly important. ...

(Drèze 1988:19) ...
The first of these counter-examples is that price equalisation also went on at the international level, with large-scale exports of grain from India during famine periods. The second is that the equalisation of prices brought about by the introduction of railways is not the same as the equalisation of real wages or food entitlements. Thus there could be an area which exported grain but which also was a low wage area, with the result that labourers (who were unable to grow food for themselves) were unable to afford to purchase grain. Strictly speaking this is not a market failure, but an example of how an efficient, price-equalising market could precipitate a famine. In fact it is this situation that typifies the chronic malnutrition of the poor in India today, where hungry people watch as food passes them by; this type of analysis of markets is often as relevant in everyday life as it is in the ‘exceptional’ famine. ...

Other factors may impede the transfer of food from surplus to deficit areas, even when prices are higher in the latter and normally expected to become more equalised. For example Clay argues: ...

If Bangladesh is regarded as a fully integrated production system with smooth inter-district flows of commodities, then there is no production problem. But to the extent that there are frictions and difficulties in moving commodities between districts, regional losses of production can have severe effects on food prices, intensifying the effects of loss of production, income and employment. ...
(Clay 1985:203) ...
Thus the problem is seen not as a fall in aggregate regional food production (as a FAD explanation would claim) but a market failure which is not enabling the satisfaction of effective demand. Also, the anticipation of a food shortage can lead to speculation and hoarding. It is possible that hoarding may be desirable given the expectation of future scarcity, though in many cases it is used by a minority of traders to influence current prices rather than to smooth out future price rises. In some cases, a lack of information about demand may also prevent the market mechanism from satisfying effective demand. For example, Ravallion (1985) found evidence for a systematic rise in rice prices during 1972-1975 in Bangladesh, caused by inaccurate and pessimistic information in the press about food prospects. This led both traders and better-off consumers to hoard, causing further price rises. So according to this view, it is not a decline in food production which causes famine (after all, it could be imported), but that the market has failed to receive the correct signals to distribute food to where a demand exists. ...

The third economic mechanism of famine involves the decline of people’s entitlement to food. In 1981 Sen brought together a number of disparate sources to provide a significant advance in the debate on famines. This was centred on the notion of entitlement failures, or food entitlement decline (FED), which involves a range of factors that include entitlements to production resources, the selling of labour for wages or selling produce for cash. The notion was challenging because it suggested that famines can be caused by the failure of a range of entitlements which had little connection with the overall aggregate availability of food. His work was provoked in part by his need to understand how starvation could occur when there is food available, as happened in the famine he witnessed as a boy in Bengal in 1943. He identified other famines in which there was no aggregate shortage of food, including several in different parts of Ethiopia in the 1970s (Sen 1981). ...

The argument here is that famine is a result of the lack of purchasing power, which itself may be caused by the failure of some groups of people’s ‘entitlements’ to wages, or their inability to engage in other forms of exchange (e.g. trade) which normally enable them to satisfy their food needs. This is hunger caused by a reduction in people’s effective demand (or ‘pull failure’), rather than market failure (or ‘response failure’ as Sen [1985] terms it), or FAD. People may need to purchase food but lack the necessary cash or other exchangeable resources to purchase it. This approach distinguishes between aggregate availability or supply of food and an individual’s access to, or ownership of, food. ...

People obtain food through five different types of ‘entitlement relationships’ in privateownership market economies. These are adapted from Sen (1981:2) and Drèze and Sen (1989:10): ...

1 production-based entitlement, which is the right to own the food produced using one’s
1 基于生产的权利，即使用个人或雇佣资源生产的食物的所有权；
own or hired resources;
自己或雇佣的资源；
2 trade-based entitlement, which describes the rights associated with ownership when they are transferred through commodity exchange;
贸易基础的权利，这描述了在商品交换中转移时与所有权相关的权利；
3 own-labour entitlement, which is the trade-based and production-based entitlements derived from selling labour power;
自有劳动权利，这是通过出售劳动能力所衍生的贸易基础和生产基础的权利；
4 inheritance and transfer entitlement, which is the right to own what is given by others (e.g. gifts) and transfers by the state, e.g. pensions;
继承和转让权利，这是拥有他人给予的东西（例如礼物）和国家转让（例如养老金）的权利；

5 extended entitlements, which are entitlements that exist outside legal rights (e.g. of ownership) and are based on legitimacy and expectations of access to resources.
扩展权利，这些权利存在于法律权利（例如所有权）之外，基于合法性和对资源获取的期望。

Thus, entitlements are either 'owned’ by a person (described by Sen as the person’s ‘endowment’) or can be exchanged by that person for other commodities (termed ‘exchange entitlement’). People are vulnerable to starvation if their endowment does not contain adequate food or the resources to produce food, and their capacity to exchange labour or other goods and services cannot be converted into sufficient food. This can occur without a decline in aggregate food supply, and without any disruption or malfunction of the market. Such events were possible in India even after the introduction of railways and their tendency to equalise prices for food staples.
因此，权利要么是由一个人“拥有”（塞恩称之为个人的“赋予”），要么可以被该人用来交换其他商品（称为“交换权利”）。如果一个人的赋予中没有足够的食物或生产食物的资源，并且他们交换劳动或其他商品和服务的能力无法转化为足够的食物，那么他们就容易面临饥饿。这种情况可能发生在总食品供应没有下降的情况下，也可能在市场没有任何干扰或故障的情况下发生。即使在引入铁路并使食品主食价格趋于平等之后，这种情况在印度也是可能的。

With shifts in entitlements a person can suffer a fall in endowments (such as crop failure, or livestock deaths), a fall in exchange entitlements (in which food prices rise, wage income drops, or demand for one’s own production falls so that the terms of trade with the market for food shifts against the individual) or a combination of these factors. Analysing exchange entitlements, as an additional mechanism for a person’s failure to obtain enough food, permits explanation of famine occurring in situations where there is food available. This was the situation in the Irish famine of 1845-1848, and that in the Ukraine of 1930 (during which the Soviet government commandeered grain from there to be exported to other parts of the Soviet Union). However, academic debate became sidetracked (and, as is usual in these circumstances, heated) over whether Sen was claiming that there could never be a FAD-induced famine (Rangasami 1985; Bowbrick 1986). The passage of time and a certain weariness with arcane debates (carried out in well-fed university environments) seem to have left onlookers with the impression that Sen had not intended to mean that FAD could never be a contributory factor in famine.
随着权利的变化，一个人可能会遭受赋予的减少（例如作物歉收或牲畜死亡）、交换权利的下降（在这种情况下，食品价格上涨、工资收入下降，或对自身生产的需求下降，从而导致与市场食品的交易条件对个人不利）或这些因素的组合。分析交换权利作为个人未能获得足够食物的额外机制，可以解释在有食物可用的情况下发生饥荒的原因。这正是 1845-1848 年爱尔兰饥荒和 1930 年乌克兰的情况（在此期间，苏联政府从那里征用粮食以出口到苏联其他地区）。然而，学术辩论偏离了主题（而且，正如在这种情况下通常发生的那样，变得激烈），关于森是否声称绝不会出现由 FAD 引起的饥荒（Rangasami 1985；Bowbrick 1986）。时间的流逝和对晦涩辩论的某种厌倦（在丰盈的大学环境中进行）似乎给旁观者留下了这样的印象：森并不打算意味着 FAD 永远不会是饥荒的一个促成因素。

The analysis of food entitlements decline (FED) was undoubtedly a great advance on theories of food availability decline (FAD), for a number of reasons. Firstly, FED acknowledges the importance of changes in purchasing power. Secondly, it disaggregates regional food production and availability, and follows the process by which food is distributed to individuals. It permits analysis of intra-household food allocation, although this is less well studied (Shepherd 1988). It explains why the rich never die in a famine, and shows indeed how some classes can become better-off while others die. Thirdly, it involves the regional, national and world economy in the analysis and draws attention to the possible prevention of famines by food import. In general terms it is an active model—governments can intervene to rescue endowment or entitlement failures, but are also scrutinised in terms of their contribution to causing the problem in the first place.
食品权利下降（FED）的分析无疑是对食品可用性下降（FAD）理论的重大进展，原因有很多。首先，FED 承认购买力变化的重要性。其次，它对区域食品生产和可用性进行了细分，并跟踪食品分配给个人的过程。它允许对家庭内部食品分配进行分析，尽管这一领域的研究较少（Shepherd 1988）。它解释了为什么富人在饥荒中从未死亡，并确实展示了某些阶层如何在其他阶层死亡的情况下变得更加富裕。第三，它在分析中涉及区域、国家和世界经济，并引起人们对通过食品进口可能预防饥荒的关注。一般而言，它是一个积极的模型——政府可以干预以挽救赋权或权利的失败，但也会因其在问题产生中的贡献而受到审查。

Food entitlements decline (FED) also exposes the shortcoming of the FAD hypothesis. Firstly, FAD deals only with supply factors while FED claims to deal with both supply and demand (and can therefore address the impact of rising prices of food staples).
食物权利下降（FED）也暴露了 FAD 假说的缺陷。首先，FAD 仅处理供给因素，而 FED 声称处理供给和需求（因此可以解决食品主食价格上涨的影响）。

Secondly, FAD cannot deal with disaggregated populations and explain why some people starve while their neighbours do not. This point is well illustrated by a story from the 1970s Sahel famine recorded by Mamdani (1985). A fat man is reported to have said to a thin man: ‘You should be ashamed of yourself. If someone visiting the country saw you before anyone else, he would think there was a famine here’. Replied the thin man: ‘And if he saw you next, he would know the reason for the famine!’. Thirdly, the FAD hypothesis is ill-equipped to identify the social causes of vulnerability and poverty other than in general terms of factors such as low agricultural productivity, backward technology or perhaps environmental degradation, which do not lead to any analysis of the underlying social and political determinants.
其次，FAD 无法处理分散的人口，并解释为什么有些人挨饿而他们的邻居却没有。这个观点通过 Mamdani（1985）记录的 1970 年代萨赫尔饥荒的故事得到了很好的说明。一个胖子据说对一个瘦子说：“你应该为自己感到羞愧。如果有人在这个国家访问时先看到你，他会认为这里发生了饥荒。”瘦子回答：“如果他接下来看到你，他就会知道饥荒的原因！”第三，FAD 假说在识别脆弱性和贫困的社会原因方面能力不足，除了在农业生产力低下、技术落后或环境退化等一般因素的层面上，这些因素并没有导致对潜在社会和政治决定因素的分析。

On the other hand, there have also been criticisms of the FED approach, and particularly the way in which Sen has sought to defend it. Firstly, there is the scale and boundary problem. If the analysis is stretched to include a big enough area, of course there is enough food to avert a famine in any one part of it, and thus there is no aggregate food shortage. Secondly, some famines clearly have had their origins in FAD, whether it be because the government of the day engineered it, or because they neglected the warnings. Differences of opinion concerning the causes of the Wollo and Tigray famine of 1973-1974 in Ethiopia focused on food prices and market failure. Did prices rise and was it in the context of effective demand? Or did they not appreciably increase, in which case there would be support for Sen’s ‘pull failure’ (‘demand-side failure’) hypothesis? The argument here revolved around ‘price ripples’ (or uneven spatial and temporal variations of prices which tended to arise in an area where there were serious food shortages), where effective demand was not met by supply because of high transportation costs and either a failure of information to reach traders or their unwillingness to risk distributing small lots of grain to scattered markets. These market imperfections in the presence of effective demand caused people to migrate in search of food, and this resulted in price rises in a series of ripples, corresponding to the movement of people away from the area, which brought with them an increase in effective demand.
另一方面，FED 方法也受到了一些批评，特别是 Sen 为其辩护的方式。首先，存在规模和边界问题。如果分析的范围扩大到足够大的区域，当然可以避免该区域任何一部分的饥荒，因此没有整体的食品短缺。其次，一些饥荒显然源于 FAD，无论是因为当时的政府故意造成，还是因为他们忽视了警告。关于 1973-1974 年埃塞俄比亚沃洛和提格雷饥荒原因的意见分歧集中在食品价格和市场失灵上。价格是否上涨，并且是在有效需求的背景下？还是没有显著增加，在这种情况下将支持 Sen 的“拉动失灵”（“需求侧失灵”）假说？这里的论点围绕“价格涟漪”（或价格在严重食品短缺地区出现的不均匀空间和时间变化），在这种情况下，由于高运输成本以及信息未能传达到交易者或他们不愿意冒险将小批量粮食分配到分散市场，导致有效需求未能得到供应。这些市场缺陷在有效需求存在的情况下，导致人们迁移寻找食物，从而引发了一系列涟漪式的价格上涨， corresponded to 人们离开该地区的移动，带来了有效需求的增加。

Clearly, many famines have been preceded by FAD, and, although it may be incorrect (or arbitrary) to identify FAD as an ultimate or even the most important cause, it is an inescapable fact that a fall in the amount of locally produced food (because of war, drought or longer-term environmental decline) challenges the ability of people to find alternative sources. Sen’s notion of FED initially tended to perceive endowments and entitlements as static and given. In this sense, this rather technical, economic approach to the causes of famine cannot explain why, in political-economic terms, entitlements fail. These structural reasons lie in the normal daily lives of vulnerable people. Also, there are political reasons why governments decline to take (or deliberately withhold) action to avoid or at least alleviate the collapse of entitlements to food, and it is to these that we turn next.
显然，许多饥荒都是由粮食可得性下降（FAD）所引发的，尽管将 FAD 视为最终或最重要原因可能是不正确的（或任意的），但不可否认的是，因战争、干旱或长期环境恶化而导致的本地食品生产量下降，确实挑战了人们寻找替代来源的能力。森的粮食可得性理论（FED）最初倾向于将赋予和权利视为静态和既定的。从这个意义上说，这种相对技术性、经济学的方法无法解释为什么在政治经济学的层面上，权利会失败。这些结构性原因根植于脆弱人群的日常生活中。此外，政府拒绝采取（或故意不采取）行动以避免或至少减轻对食品权利的崩溃的原因也有政治方面的考虑，接下来我们将讨论这些原因。

Complex emergencies, policy famines and human rights ...

The previous section claimed that the FED model and its entitlements approach has released famine studies from some significant theoretical and ideological constraints. It ...
seems generally to have played a politically progressive role, because it exposed the ways in which entitlements and their failure are socially determined and are not a result of ‘acts of God’ and therefore unpredictable and unforeseen (and all the other descriptions in Hewitt’s [1983b] ‘disaster archipelago’ we discussed in Chapters 1 and 2). However, some would claim that this economistic approach is too technocratic and conservative (Watts 1991; Devereux 1987). If famine is defined in terms of a failure of food systems (and not of displacement, dispossession and death), it becomes legitimate to limit the analysis to ‘policy recommendations’ in terms of technical tinkering (such as liberalising agricultural policies and the integration of markets), and to blame famine on poorly performing economies, ‘weak’ states or ‘policy failure’ rather than on deliberate actions (Devereux 2000). In some cases too, there is the suggestion that famines in Africa have occurred because of ‘incompetent’ governments failing to follow the neo-liberal policies of the IMF and World Bank (von Braun et al. 1998), in spite of evidence that these policies have probably increased the vulnerability of those who are already poor. ...

That famine is a human rights issue arises from the premise that they are preventable (Kent 2003; FAO 2001). If this is coupled with the assumption that there is (or should be) a ‘political contract’ that safeguards citizens (between governments and their people, and between the international agencies and human beings, irrespective of their nationality), then a famine means that something avoidable has not been prevented properly

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. If that contract is not honoured, then there is a breach of human rights, and a ‘famine crime’ (de Waal 1997, 1991) has been committed. The political conditions (the right to free speech, free circulation of information, the upholding of minority rights and accountability to an electorate) which favour such a contract are found in democratic regimes rather than totalitarian ones (ibid., 1999, 2000). While this generalisation is broadly verifiable, there are some counter-examples which lead us (as in most discussions about famine) to the view that famines have multiple causes, and to explanations that are highly contextual. Still, the lack of political conditions for an anti-famine contract revolve around antidemocratic tendencies that abrogate any existing democratic rights, thereby hindering timely and effective action to prevent famine, and can therefore be said to involve a famine crime.

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...

Many African nations have failed to provide an anti-famine contract. Democratically elected governments have yet to gain legitimacy, and instead there is often reliance on ethnic and regional coalitions; there is a lack of information and absence of debate about anti-famine policy; human rights activism is weak, and there is often urban bias at the expense of rural food producers (in Chapter 9 we elaborate on such questions of ‘governance’). Of course, the crime does not stop with these national governments. Other governments and international organisations are also at fault, sometimes turning a blind eye to regimes which are hostile to the West, or responding too late to crises. In some instances, the aid encounter associated with famine relief has led to demoralisation, dependency and the shifting of blame from national to international shoulders (de Waal 1997). There are other more acute reasons, which both magnify the root causes and dynamic pressures listed above and create more of their own: armed conflicts.
许多非洲国家未能提供反饥荒合同。民主选举产生的政府尚未获得合法性，反而常常依赖于民族和地区联盟；缺乏关于反饥荒政策的信息和辩论；人权活动薄弱，且往往存在城市偏见，损害农村食品生产者的利益（在第九章中我们将详细阐述这些“治理”问题）。当然，罪恶并不仅限于这些国家政府。其他政府和国际组织也有责任，有时对敌视西方的政权视而不见，或对危机反应过晚。在某些情况下，与饥荒救助相关的援助接触导致了士气低落、依赖性和将责任从国家转移到国际的现象（de Waal 1997）。还有其他更为严重的原因，这些原因不仅放大了上述根本原因和动态压力，还创造了更多自身的问题：武装冲突。

Leftwich and Harvie (1986) and Mafeje (1987) point to the disruptive effects of armed conflict on production and distribution of food. Ethiopia (1984 and 1990), Angola, Chad, the Sudan (throughout the 1990s), Mozambique (1984 and after) and Bangladesh (1974)
Leftwich 和 Harvie (1986) 以及 Mafeje (1987) 指出武装冲突对食品生产和分配的破坏性影响。埃塞俄比亚（1984 年和 1990 年）、安哥拉、乍得、苏丹（整个 1990 年代）、莫桑比克（1984 年及以后）和孟加拉国（1974 年）都是有充分文献记录的例子。
are all well-documented examples. War tends to reduce both the area sown and to reduce the labour available for field preparation and harvesting. Occupying armies commandeer food and deliberately burn crops in rebel-held areas. Normal trading patterns are disrupted so that both FAD and FED can occur. The authorities often refuse safe passage to relief workers where hunger or even famine serve to put pressure on their opponents (Keen 1994; Macrae and Zwi 1994; Minear 1991; Messer 1991; Smith 1990; UNICEF 1989; Shindo 1985).
战争往往会减少播种面积，并减少可用于田间准备和收割的劳动力。占领军征用食品，并故意焚烧叛军控制区的作物。正常的贸易模式被打乱，以至于可能发生食品短缺和饥荒。当地当局常常拒绝给予救援工作者安全通行，尤其是在饥饿甚至饥荒的情况下，这会对他们的对手施加压力（Keen 1994；Macrae 和 Zwi 1994；Minear 1991；Messer 1991；Smith 1990；联合国儿童基金会 1989；Shindo 1985）。

Armed conflict disrupts food production (farmers become soldiers and do not plant crops), armies feed off the land and requisition food, shoot at aid convoys and eat from lorries food destined for starving civilians; soldiers burn granaries, bomb houses, burn crops and lay mines to prevent cultivation. Significant areas-often of the best landhave been mined in many countries engaged in war or civil war in the last 30 years, especially Eritrea, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola. Armies disrupt the flow of food (including food aid) from elsewhere; blockade provinces; refuse donors access to war-affected areas-in 1988 the Sudanese government blocked famine relief to Kordofan, where 7 per cent of the displaced people died every week (Devereux 2001:137).
武装冲突破坏了粮食生产（农民变成士兵，不再种植作物），军队掠夺土地并征用粮食，向救援车队开火，抢夺运往饥饿平民的食品；士兵焚烧粮仓，轰炸房屋，焚烧作物，并布置地雷以阻止耕作。在过去 30 年中，许多参与战争或内战的国家，尤其是厄立特里亚、埃塞俄比亚、柬埔寨、阿富汗和安哥拉，大片地区——通常是最肥沃的土地——已被布雷。军队破坏了来自其他地方的粮食（包括粮食援助）的流动；封锁省份；拒绝捐助者进入受战争影响的地区——1988 年，苏丹政府封锁了对科尔多凡的饥荒救助，那里每周有 7%的流离失所者死亡（Devereux 2001:137）。

Refugees create cross-border tensions, and under-resourced refugee camps find it hard to cope with large numbers of displaced persons whose entitlements to food have virtually disappeared. There are military-commercial alliances where fortunes are made from protection rackets and profits from the illegal sale of looted goods, famine relief and medical supplies…the list goes on. The anti-famine contract and issues of human rights seem fragile in the face of the onslaught of war, and the reader may wonder how far the debates have come from the technical jousting of academic debating chambers where FAD, market imperfections and FED are discussed. It would be a mistake to dismiss these debates as arcane and irrelevant, since the whole issue of food security, food marketing and safety nets is rooted in theories such as these. But we also need to approach famine from the perspective of the holistic analysis of complex emergencies. This enables the political nature of famines to be identified and builds up a framework of experience on how to deal with famine and how to avoid the same problems in the future. Also, the dissemination of information about complex emergencies furthers the ends of activists by showing that famines may sometimes be promoted deliberately, but are always preventable, in addition to identifying the perpetrators of famine crimes.
难民造成跨境紧张局势，而资源不足的难民营难以应对大量失去家园的人，他们的食品权利几乎消失。存在军事商业联盟，从保护勒索和非法销售掠夺物品、饥荒救助和医疗用品中获利……这份清单还在继续。反饥荒合同和人权问题在战争的冲击面前显得脆弱，读者可能会想，关于这些问题的辩论与学术辩论厅中讨论的 FAD、市场失灵和 FED 的技术争论相距多远。将这些辩论视为深奥且无关紧要是一个错误，因为食品安全、食品营销和安全网的整个问题根植于这样的理论中。但我们也需要从复杂紧急情况的整体分析的角度来审视饥荒。这使得饥荒的政治性质得以识别，并建立起应对饥荒以及如何避免未来同样问题的经验框架。此外，关于复杂紧急情况的信息传播促进了活动家的目标，表明饥荒有时可能是故意促成的，但总是可以预防的，同时也识别了饥荒犯罪的肇事者。

The political character of some famines is much more evident in those that are directly a result of government policy, although they can vary considerably in the types of policies involved (Eide et al. 1984; Bread for the World 1991). These ‘policy famines’ could be considered a variant of FED, as they are dominated by shifts in people’s entitlements that result from government interventions (or the deliberate decision not to intervene). Although they may sometimes be associated with natural hazards as triggers (as with the potato blight in the Irish famine), it appears that without the disruptive and damaging effects of the policy, the hazard itself is unlikely to have precipitated a disaster. Sen’s early work on famine in 1981 analyses the Bengal famine of 1942 (at the time Bengal was united, and is today divided into Bangladesh, and West Bengal, a state of India). He demonstrated that there was no serious food shortage in the region, but that an estimated 1.5 to 3 million people starved because of disrupted access to work and own
一些饥荒的政治特征在那些直接由政府政策导致的饥荒中更加明显，尽管涉及的政策类型可能有很大差异（Eide et al. 1984; Bread for the World 1991）。这些“政策饥荒”可以被视为 FED 的一种变体，因为它们主要受到政府干预（或故意不干预）所导致的人民权利变化的影响。尽管它们有时可能与自然灾害作为触发因素相关（如爱尔兰饥荒中的马铃薯疫病），但似乎如果没有政策的破坏性和损害性影响，灾害本身不太可能引发灾难。Sen 在 1981 年对饥荒的早期研究分析了 1942 年的孟加拉饥荒（当时孟加拉是统一的，如今分为孟加拉国和印度的西孟加拉邦）。他证明该地区并没有严重的食品短缺，但估计有 150 万到 300 万人因工作和自我生产的途径被打断而饿死，主要是由于英国政府的战时政策。
production, mainly as a result of the wartime policies of the British government.
生产，主要是由于英国政府的战时政策。
Policy famines may have been responsible for more deaths in the twentieth century than the total for all other famines. For instance, the famine associated with the forced Soviet collectivisation of agriculture in the Ukraine in 1932-1933 is variously estimated to have killed between six and eight million (of a population of about 32 million).

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In China, the introduction of rural People’s Communes in 1958 led to a disruption of farm production (and, as in the Ukraine, the slaughter of livestock to prevent them from being taken over) for several years. Production was further compromised by extraction of labour for rapid rural industrialisation - the policy known as the Great Leap Forward. As local officials sought to satisfy the political objectives of the leadership, the real condition of the people in the countryside was concealed so that extractions for the urban population continued and harvests were declared good. The mortality figures are again highly contentious, and (as with the Soviet Union) information was withheld for many years. But it is generally accepted (since the mid-1980s by the Chinese authorities also) that at least 13 million people died, while some estimates suggest the total was 30 million or even more (Jowett 1990; Kane 1988; Yang 1996). Forced urban to rural displacement in Cambodia amounted to genocide (Kiljunen 1984).
政策饥荒可能导致了二十世纪比其他所有饥荒更多的死亡。例如，1932-1933 年与苏联在乌克兰强制集体化农业相关的饥荒，估计造成了六百万到八百万人的死亡（当时人口约为三千二百万）。在中国，1958 年农村人民公社的引入导致了农作生产的中断（与乌克兰一样，为了防止牲畜被征用而屠宰牲畜）持续了数年。由于快速农村工业化的政策——大跃进，劳动力的抽取进一步损害了生产。当地官员为了满足领导层的政治目标，掩盖了农村人民的真实状况，以便继续为城市人口抽取资源，并宣称丰收。死亡人数的数据再次存在很大争议，且（与苏联一样）信息被隐瞒了许多年。但自 1980 年代中期以来（中国当局也如此），普遍认为至少有 1300 万人死亡，而一些估计则认为总数达到 3000 万甚至更多（Jowett 1990；Kane 1988；Yang 1996）。在柬埔寨，强迫城市到农村的迁移构成了种族灭绝（Kiljunen 1984）。

There may also be ‘policy famines’ that result from inappropriate state interventions or deliberate absence of response. When the potato crop in Ireland failed because of the blight, the British government adhered to a laissez-faire policy of first no, and then limited, intervention. Limited food aid was eventually imported from the USA (in fact maize that could not be milled in Ireland) with no real reduction of misery. While there was mass starvation of the peasantry, cattle and wheat continued to be exported to Britain (Woodham-Smith 1962).
也可能出现“政策饥荒”，这是由于不当的国家干预或故意缺乏反应所导致的。当爱尔兰的土豆作物因疫病而失败时，英国政府坚持采取放任政策，最初不进行干预，随后进行有限的干预。最终从美国进口了有限的食品援助（实际上是无法在爱尔兰磨粉的玉米），但并没有真正减轻痛苦。在农民大规模饥荒的同时，牛和小麦仍然被出口到英国（伍德汉姆-史密斯 1962）。

Causes, pressures, unsafe conditions and famine
原因、压力、不安全条件和饥荒

This brief review of theories of famine indicates that even though they may have intellectual or ideological appeal, no single theory is dominant or capable of excluding the others. While each theory may have certain advantages over others (e.g. by being more pro-active or offering insights into public and political action), each famine in fact requires a unique explanation. In some cases, a hazard such as drought will impact upon vulnerable people and the ‘best’ explanation may be dominated by FAD or market failure approaches (in terms of hypothesis formation and empirical verification). In other situations, it may be chronic insecurity, the nature of the state and politics that will dominate, and the hazard trigger will either not exist or be unimportant. There are political considerations in the choice of explanation, which are governed both by ideological and discipline-based pre-dispositions, as well as by the nature of the famine itself. In most famines there will be an array of factors, and a narrative of the unfolding of the famine. For example, an Oxfam publicity booklet illustrates the problem of finding an explanation for one of the many famines in the Sudan, proposing the following reasons:
这篇关于饥荒理论的简要回顾表明，尽管这些理论可能具有智力或意识形态上的吸引力，但没有单一的理论是主导的或能够排除其他理论的。虽然每种理论在某些方面可能相对于其他理论具有一定的优势（例如，更具前瞻性或提供对公共和政治行动的见解），但每次饥荒实际上都需要独特的解释。在某些情况下，像干旱这样的灾害会影响脆弱人群，而“最佳”解释可能会被 FAD 或市场失灵的方法主导（在假设形成和实证验证方面）。在其他情况下，可能是长期的不安全、国家和政治的性质将占主导地位，而灾害触发因素要么不存在，要么不重要。在选择解释时存在政治考量，这些考量既受意识形态和学科基础的倾向影响，也受饥荒本身性质的影响。在大多数饥荒中，会有一系列因素，以及饥荒展开的叙述。例如，乐施会的一本宣传小册子说明了寻找苏丹众多饥荒之一的解释的问题，提出了以下原因：

The people who died did not do so because the rains failed in 1984. Despite hard work and calculation, they died because they could not grow enough food
死去的人并不是因为 1984 年降雨失败而死的。尽管努力工作和计算，他们死去是因为无法种植足够的食物
and were too poor to buy what they needed.
并且太穷而无法购买所需的东西。

There follows a brief description of some of the factors which combined to bring about a situation of ‘not enough food’ and ‘too poor to buy’. These included drought, unsuitable technologies for providing water for humans and livestock, population pressure and a fragile ecosystem, deforestation and a fuel crisis, chronic uncertainties over land tenure, lack of credit, and monopolistic and monopsonistic power of merchants in rural areas. This booklet and other more academic literature (e.g. Shepherd 1988; Maxwell 1991; de Waal 1989b, 1997; de Waal and Amin 1986) provide further evidence of the importance of other larger scale and more deep-rooted causes. Curtis et al. (1988) add low income, poor import capacity and the disruption of the war to Oxfam’s list (cf: Crossette 1992). Walker (1989) cites the over-cultivation of fragile sandy soils (qoz) in the worst affected areas of Sudan, along with drought, loss of access to land through expropriation by absentee merchants and landlords and widespread reliance on unreliable waged employment and thus on the market to buy food in situations of sky-rocketing prices. So far, FAD (with an environmental add-on factor), FED, market imperfections and the effects of war have all been suggested.
以下是导致“食物不足”和“贫穷到买不起食物”情况的一些因素的简要描述。这些因素包括干旱、为人类和牲畜提供水的技术不适宜、人口压力和脆弱的生态系统、森林砍伐和燃料危机、土地使用权的长期不确定性、缺乏信贷，以及农村地区商人的垄断和单买方权力。本小册子和其他更学术的文献（例如，Shepherd 1988；Maxwell 1991；de Waal 1989b, 1997；de Waal 和 Amin 1986）提供了其他更大规模和更根本原因的重要性进一步证据。Curtis 等（1988）在 Oxfam 的清单中增加了低收入、较差的进口能力和战争造成的破坏（参见：Crossette 1992）。Walker（1989）提到在苏丹受影响最严重地区的脆弱沙土（qoz）过度耕作，以及干旱、因缺席商人和地主的征用而失去土地的机会，以及在价格飞涨的情况下对不可靠的工资就业和市场购买食物的广泛依赖。到目前为止，已经提出了 FAD（带有环境附加因素）、FED、市场缺陷和战争的影响。

A later famine in the Sudan in 1998 (described by Deng 1999) is reviewed here using the PAR model (Figure 4.1). It illustrates both the organising power of the model, as well as the problem of allocating different factors (which interact dynamically) to the three levels (Root Causes, Dynamic Pressures, Unsafe Conditions) in the chain of explanation. Perhaps PAR can best be used as an aid for structuring a specific but theoretically informed narrative of a famine. The narrative has to be temporally and spatially situated, and so maps are used here. These signify root causes (shown in a general map of administrative regions), dynamic pressures (showing two examples: the civil war, and cattle raiding) and unsafe conditions (losses and disruptions of assets and livelihoods). However, the unfolding of (especially political) events through time, including war, armed incursions and so on, does not occur in a predictable way, as do seasonal shortages of food or secular declines in self-provisioning. Therefore the famine ‘crunch’ (between drought hazard on the right and the unsafe conditions) packs its destructive power both as a result of unique slow-onset factors (which are also tainted by history), but also as a result of sudden-onset, unpredictable events, which themselves modify, cancel out or magnify certain unsafe conditions or dynamic pressures.
这里回顾了 1998 年苏丹的后期饥荒（由邓 1999 年描述），使用了 PAR 模型（图 4.1）。它展示了模型的组织能力，以及将不同因素（动态互动）分配到解释链中的三个层次（根本原因、动态压力、不安全条件）的问题。也许 PAR 可以最好地作为构建一个特定但理论上知情的饥荒叙事的辅助工具。叙事必须在时间和空间上定位，因此这里使用了地图。这些地图标示了根本原因（在行政区域的一般地图中显示）、动态压力（显示两个例子：内战和牲畜掠夺）和不安全条件（资产和生计的损失与中断）。然而，尤其是政治事件的展开，包括战争、武装入侵等，并不会像季节性食物短缺或世俗性自给自足的下降那样以可预测的方式发生。因此，饥荒“危机”（在右侧的干旱风险与不安全条件之间）其破坏力的来源既是独特的缓慢发生因素（这些因素也受到历史的影响），也是突发的、不可预测的事件，这些事件本身会改变、抵消或放大某些不安全条件或动态压力。

This brings us to the second point about explanations of famine. If there are many combinations of factors and mechanisms that bring about famine, then each famine is unique. The task of building theories of famine is particularly difficult because of the complexity of each specific case. It will probably involve not only an understanding of the existing system of production, but also the distribution of food in terms of access to land and inputs as well as the operation of the market, the determination of prices and the behaviour of traders in food staples (Cannon 2003). Government policies with regard to food production and distribution and in famine relief itself may also have a profound effect. Then there is always a series of contextual events peculiar to each famine, a ‘sequence of events’ (Alamgir 1981), or using Currey’s (1984) terminology, a ‘concatenation’.
这使我们进入关于饥荒解释的第二个要点。如果导致饥荒的因素和机制有很多组合，那么每次饥荒都是独特的。建立饥荒理论的任务特别困难，因为每个具体案例的复杂性。这可能不仅涉及对现有生产系统的理解，还包括在土地和投入的获取方面的食品分配，以及市场的运作、价格的确定和粮食主食交易者的行为（Cannon 2003）。政府在食品生产和分配以及饥荒救助方面的政策也可能产生深远的影响。此外，每次饥荒总是有一系列特有的背景事件，即“事件序列”（Alamgir 1981），或者使用 Currey（1984）的术语，称为“串联”。

Therefore, the narrative of each event will be an important element in the explanation of particular famines, and at all times it is advisable to maintain a flexible analytical approach. For example, Silent Violence (Watts 1983a) is a book of over 600 pages which traces the changing contexts of famine in northern Nigeria. His research design is like a set of Chinese boxes or Russian dolls in which the local level of explanation is dependent on an understanding of the regional, national and international levels. So each instance of famine is a ‘concatenation’ involving factors that are related to each other by continuous changes in social relations of production, climatic fluctuations and the like. In this way, the impacts of changes in the political economy, or of climatic change, are linked to larger-scale and broader processes which can be characterised as root causes and dynamic pressures, as illustrated in the chain of explanation of the PAR model. 23
因此，每个事件的叙述将是解释特定饥荒的重要元素，并且在任何时候都建议保持灵活的分析方法。例如，《无声的暴力》（Watts 1983a）是一本超过 600 页的书，追踪了尼日利亚北部饥荒的变化背景。他的研究设计就像一组中国盒子或俄罗斯娃娃，其中地方层面的解释依赖于对区域、国家和国际层面的理解。因此，每一次饥荒都是一个“串联”，涉及到通过生产社会关系的持续变化、气候波动等相互关联的因素。通过这种方式，政治经济变化或气候变化的影响与更大规模和更广泛的过程相联系，这些过程可以被描述为根本原因和动态压力，如 PAR 模型的解释链所示。23

Returning to Deng’s (1999) description of the 1998 famine in southern Sudan, we see elements of FAD, FED, price ripple effects, complex emergency (including protracted war, systematic and sometimes gratuitous violence and genocide) and a natural hazard (an unusual distribution of rainfall in 1997). One forceful conclusion to this account is that the causes of the famine were political, with long historical roots. The causes have their origins in a particular development of the (Sudanese) state from pre-colonial times, which continued through the colonial period (that unified diverse ethnic and religious groups into one country). The long-established practices of extracting tribute from weaker groups through enslavement, raiding and more organised war and destruction was perpetuated, except that by the late twentieth century it involved using aircraft, tanks and a motorised army. Donors were excluded from the war zone and thus inadequate information systems probably led to a failure to predict the crisis. The role of the natural hazard in this case probably cannot be described as a ‘trigger’ since the whole process would have detonated sooner or later anyway without the occurrence of unusual weather conditions. The result? Between 70,000 and 100,000 deaths.
回到邓（1999）对 1998 年南苏丹饥荒的描述，我们看到了 FAD、FED、价格涟漪效应、复杂紧急情况（包括持久战争、系统性和有时是无端的暴力和种族灭绝）以及自然灾害（1997 年降雨分布异常）的元素。对此事件的一个有力结论是，饥荒的原因是政治性的，具有深厚的历史根源。这些原因源于（苏丹）国家在殖民前时期的特定发展，这一发展在殖民时期继续（将不同的民族和宗教群体统一为一个国家）。通过奴役、袭击以及更有组织的战争和破坏从弱势群体中提取贡品的长期做法得以延续，直到 20 世纪末，这一做法涉及使用飞机、坦克和机械化军队。捐助者被排除在战争区域之外，因此不充分的信息系统可能导致未能预测危机。在这种情况下，自然灾害的作用可能无法被描述为“触发因素”，因为整个过程无论如何都会在不发生异常天气条件的情况下早晚引发。结果？死亡人数在 70,000 到 100,000 之间。

Access and famines访问与饥荒

A more specific and detailed development of the generalised Access model described in the last chapter, but here specifying the development of famine, is shown in Figures 4.2a and 4.2 b . It is an explanatory model of ‘normal life’ before the operation of the more dynamic and acute processes of the PAR model, which potentially can lead to famine conditions.
在上一章中描述的概括性访问模型的更具体和详细的发展，但在这里指定饥荒的发展，如图 4.2a 和 4.2b 所示。这是一个关于“正常生活”的解释模型，在 PAR 模型的更动态和急性过程发生之前，这些过程可能导致饥荒条件。

In Figure 4.2a, Box 1 shows the broad political economy (social relations and flows of surplus) and provides a context in which individuals and households earn their livelihood. At the international level, certain aspects of the world economy impinge in an indirect manner on food consumption. For example, national foreign exchange reserves affect a country’s ability to import grain to avert possible famines. The long-term decline in world food stocks from the 1970s onwards, combined with the entry of the then Soviet Union into the world market, has affected the ability of some countries with low foreign exchange reserves to import or hold adequate stocks of grain. At the national level, the nature of the state itself is extremely important. There must exist an ability and willingness to implement policies that reduce the impact of famine, and to having the
在图 4.2a 中，框 1 展示了广泛的政治经济（社会关系和剩余流动），并提供了一个背景，使个人和家庭能够谋生。在国际层面，世界经济的某些方面以间接的方式影响食品消费。例如，国家外汇储备影响一个国家进口粮食以避免可能的饥荒的能力。从 1970 年代开始，世界粮食库存的长期下降，加上当时苏联进入世界市场，影响了一些外汇储备低的国家进口或保持足够粮食库存的能力。在国家层面，国家本身的性质极为重要。必须具备实施减少饥荒影响的政策的能力和意愿，并具备避免饥荒和应对复杂紧急情况的政治意愿。
political will to avert famine and respond to complex emergencies.
政治意愿以避免饥荒并应对复杂的紧急情况。
Box 1 also provides a caricatured and simplified diagram of the political economy of civil society, focusing on the social relations of production in the rural household. Other classes such as merchants, moneylenders and landlords are usually important groups in a famine, although they seldom suffer the effects of it (on the contrary, they sometimes profit enormously from it). The social relations of production are important basic determinants of the distribution of access to the means of growing food or the income with which to buy it.
框 1 还提供了一个夸张和简化的公民社会政治经济学图示，重点关注农村家庭的生产社会关系。在饥荒中，商人、放贷人和地主等其他阶级通常是重要群体，尽管他们很少遭受饥荒的影响（相反，他们有时会从中获得巨额利润）。生产的社会关系是决定获取粮食生产手段或购买粮食收入分配的重要基本因素。

Figure 4.1 Pressure and Release (PAR) model: famine in southern Sudan Source of maps: www.reliefweb.int./w/map.nsf/home
图 4.1 压力与释放（PAR）模型：南苏丹的饥荒地图来源：www.reliefweb.int./w/map.nsf/home

The individuals in households (Box 2) are therefore put in the context of the wider society and an illustrative sample of their assets and resources is listed here. The physical assets (similar, but not exactly equivalent to Sen’s endowments) usually include access to land, seed, agricultural implements, etc. Other assets are social and refer to the membership of a tribe, segmented group or family as well as to rights to assistance in the form of loans, employment, food, etc. (and correspond to the social and human capital of the livelihoods approach mentioned in Chapter 3). As such, they are defined more widely than Sen’s entitlements, and include various forms of expectations (or ‘claims’ as in Shepherd 1988) and the ability to mobilise resources commanded by others, such as labour and food in the form of gifts. In the livelihood literature, this would be described as social capital (Pelling 2002).
因此，家庭中的个体（框 2）被置于更广泛的社会背景中，并在此列出了他们资产和资源的示例。物质资产（类似但不完全等同于森的赋予）通常包括对土地、种子、农业工具等的获取。其他资产是社会资产，指的是部落、分段群体或家庭的成员资格，以及以贷款、就业、食物等形式获得援助的权利（与第 3 章提到的生计方法中的社会和人力资本相对应）。因此，它们的定义比森的权利更广泛，包括各种形式的期望（或如谢泼德 1988 年所称的“索赔”）以及动员他人掌控的资源的能力，例如以礼物形式的劳动力和食物。在生计文献中，这被描述为社会资本（佩林 2002 年）。

Figure

4.2 a

‘Normal life’ before a famine
饥荒前的“正常生活”图

4.2 a

In Box 2 the first column shows men, women and children in pictorial form. It is important to distinguish between people of different gender and status within the household—something which Sen has taken up in later writings (1988, 1990). Sometimes 'older sisters will serve food to younger brothers… and female etiquette may demand that women take less food and eat more slowly in the presence of the men and of guests’ (Rahmato 1988:237). Some survival strategies prioritise food intake (and ultimately survival) of men over women and adults over children and old people. It is important to establish whether these habits persist in times of actual famine. According to Rahmato they do not, but others report that there can be a considerable struggle between men and women over food resources during times of stress (Goheen 1991; Kerner and Cook 1991; Schoepf and Schoepf 1990). There is considerable evidence that females are more resilient than men to reductions in food intake. But there are some notable exceptions, as in China in the Great Leap Forward famine, where female children typically died first (Becker 1996:3), or in the Ethiopian famine of 1972-1975, where girls under five years of age suffered much higher mortality than boys (Mariam 1986). Usually though, male mortality rates rise more than those for females.
在框 2 中，第一列以图示形式展示了男性、女性和儿童。区分家庭中不同性别和地位的人是重要的——这是 Sen 在后来的著作中提到的（1988 年，1990 年）。有时“姐姐会给弟弟们端食物……而女性的礼仪可能要求女性在男性和客人面前少吃并慢慢吃”（Rahmato 1988:237）。一些生存策略优先考虑男性的食物摄入（最终是生存）而非女性，以及成年人而非儿童和老年人。重要的是要确定这些习惯在实际饥荒时期是否仍然存在。根据 Rahmato 的说法，它们并不存在，但其他人报告称，在压力时期，男性和女性之间可能会在食物资源上发生相当大的争斗（Goheen 1991；Kerner 和 Cook 1991；Schoepf 和 Schoepf 1990）。有大量证据表明，女性对食物摄入减少的适应能力比男性更强。但也有一些显著的例外，例如在中国的大跃进饥荒中，女童通常是首先死亡的（Becker 1996:3），或者在 1972-1975 年的埃塞俄比亚饥荒中，五岁以下的女孩的死亡率远高于男孩（Mariam 1986）。不过，通常情况下，男性的死亡率上升幅度大于女性。

Each of the people represented pictorially consumes a certain amount and type of food during ‘normal’ times. This provides nutrients that are absorbed and utilised by the body to the degree allowed by that person’s state of health. Thus health and nutrition interact, and the resulting baseline nutritional status influences the ability of that person to survive food and health emergencies (see Chapter 5). ‘Normal’ food intake also influences the working capacity and productivity of household members as they utilise available resources.
每个以图示方式呈现的人在“正常”时期消耗一定数量和类型的食物。这些食物提供的营养被身体吸收并利用，程度取决于该人的健康状况。因此，健康与营养相互作用，最终的基础营养状况影响该人应对食品和健康紧急情况的能力（见第 5 章）。 “正常”的食物摄入也影响家庭成员的工作能力和生产力，因为他们利用可用资源。

Each household shown in Box 2 has a range of resources and assets at a point in time.
案例 2 中展示的每个家庭在某一时点都有一系列资源和资产。

The household then reviews a range of income opportunities, each with its access qualifications and payoffs as described in the general Access model (Box 3). This outcome reflects the contested interests within the household (between women and men, perhaps between generations, and between siblings). The idea of the household possessing a 'joint utility function’ which subsumes individual (and often contested) utilities between males, females, children and the elderly within a household has recently been criticised. The payoff is a function of the relations of production, the technology used in production, current prices, when the output enters the market, rainfall, fertility of the soil, etc.
家庭随后审查一系列收入机会，每个机会都有其准入资格和收益，如一般准入模型（框 3）所述。这个结果反映了家庭内部的利益冲突（可能在女性与男性之间、代际之间以及兄弟姐妹之间）。家庭拥有一个“联合效用函数”的概念，该函数包含了家庭内男性、女性、儿童和老年人之间的个体（且常常是有争议的）效用，最近受到批评。收益是生产关系、生产中使用的技术、当前价格、产出进入市场的时间、降雨量、土壤肥力等的函数。

Box 4 shows structures of domination and allocation of resources, and are the economic, social and political expressions of the class and gender relations described in Box 1. These structures operate in different and complex ways: at the individual level within the household (usually revolving around gender and age but also genealogy); within family and kin; and between classes and groups (e.g. patron-client relations). It is also important to take account of the gender division of labour, and of expectations regarding crops and property, particularly those that normally safeguard private property (or which sanction theft under abnormal conditions). Finally, the state provides a broad framework in which rural households have to pay taxes, and are subjected to law and order (which may be exercised in favour of particular groups). The state may also engage in systematic abuse and harassment of some groups, especially on the basis of ethnicity and/or political allegiance. The structures of domination and allocation in any specific case have a major part to play in setting the payoffs for different income opportunities, and determine the level of people’s access qualifications.
框 4 展示了支配和资源分配的结构，以及框 1 中描述的阶级和性别关系的经济、社会和政治表现。这些结构以不同且复杂的方式运作：在家庭的个体层面（通常围绕性别和年龄，但也包括家谱）；在家庭和亲属之间；以及在阶级和群体之间（例如，庇护-客户关系）。考虑性别分工以及对作物和财产的期望也很重要，特别是那些通常保护私有财产的期望（或在异常情况下制裁盗窃的期望）。最后，国家提供了一个广泛的框架，农村家庭必须缴纳税款，并受到法律和秩序的约束（这可能有利于特定群体）。国家也可能对某些群体进行系统性的虐待和骚扰，特别是基于民族和/或政治忠诚。任何特定案例中的支配和分配结构在设定不同收入机会的回报方面发挥着重要作用，并决定人们的获取资格水平。

Each household possesses a particular package of endowments and entitlements (some as rights and expectations for future realisation). This determines the condition of the household budget, at the point in time outlined in Box 7. Here it is important to specify different foodstuffs and cash as it flows through the budget. This box has been added to the generalised Access model in order to trace the household’s access to food. Apart from this, the reader will recognise this as the familiar model of a rural economy in normal times, corresponding to the model outlined in Figure 3.2.
每个家庭拥有特定的资源和权利包（其中一些是对未来实现的权利和期望）。这决定了家庭预算在第 7 框中所述的时间点的状况。在这里，重要的是要具体说明不同的食品和现金如何在预算中流动。这个框已被添加到一般化的获取模型中，以追踪家庭对食品的获取。除此之外，读者会将其识别为正常时期农村经济的熟悉模型，对应于图 3.2 中概述的模型。

Figure 4.2 b shows the progression from unsafe conditions to a famine, as the process iterates through time to explain the slide from ‘normal times’ (together with unsafe conditions) into famine conditions (the ‘disaster’, in the more general terms of Chapter 3). For whatever reason (following trigger events or the combination of factors which activate unsafe conditions), a period of food shortages starts. Figure 4.2b illustrates the multiple changes in the access status of different households.
图 4.2b 展示了从不安全状况到饥荒的进程，随着时间的推移，该过程解释了从“正常时期”（连同不安全状况）滑向饥荒状况（在第 3 章的更一般术语中称为“灾难”）。无论出于何种原因（跟随触发事件或激活不安全状况的因素组合），食品短缺的时期开始。图 4.2b 说明了不同家庭获取状态的多重变化。

The components shown in Boxes 1 to 6, which had hitherto been changing relatively slowly over a matter of years or even decades, now start to change rapidly. Survival or coping strategies are put into action, usually in a sequence beginning with those that have least long-term impact on assets (Box 8). This may involve first protecting current food
在框 1 到 6 中显示的组件，之前在数年甚至数十年内变化相对缓慢，现在开始迅速变化。生存或应对策略被付诸实施，通常按照从对资产影响最小的策略开始的顺序（框 8）。这可能首先涉及保护当前的食物消费，但不危及未来的食物摄入。然而，当条件恶化时，可能会采取更激进的策略，这会削弱未来获取食物的能力。与此同时，应对策略可能允许在短期内动员新的资源。对于那些在正常情况下获取能力较差的家庭，其家庭预算受到影响，一些家庭的食物储备减少。当那些没有生产食物能力的人必须通过购买来维持生计时，市场关系也变得至关重要。上述关于粮食市场运作的经济辩论在这里是相关的。此外，“饥荒的人类学”也变得重要，特别是社会的规则和制度在非常时期能够适应的程度（Rangasami 1986）。

Figure

4.2 b

From normal to famine conditions
图

4.2 b

从正常到饥荒条件
consumption but without endangering future food intake. But when conditions deteriorate, more radical strategies may be adopted that do undermine future access to food. In the meantime, coping strategies may allow the mobilisation of new resources in the short term. The household budget for those with a less well-developed access profile in normal times suffers, and food stocks in some households run down. Market relations also becomes crucial when those without the means of producing food have to support themselves through purchases. The economic debates about the operation of the market for food grains outlined above are relevant here. Also the ‘anthropology of famine’ becomes significant, especially how much the rules and institutions of society can adapt in abnormal times (Rangasami 1986).
消费，但不危及未来的食物摄入。然而，当条件恶化时，可能会采取更激进的策略，这会削弱未来获取食物的能力。与此同时，应对策略可能允许在短期内动员新的资源。对于那些在正常情况下获取能力较差的家庭，其家庭预算受到影响，一些家庭的食物储备减少。当那些没有生产食物能力的人必须通过购买来维持生计时，市场关系也变得至关重要。上述关于粮食市场运作的经济辩论在这里是相关的。此外，“饥荒的人类学”也变得重要，特别是社会的规则和制度在非常时期能够适应的程度（Rangasami 1986）。

For some authors, societal breakdown is both a marker and cause of famine (Alamgir 1980; Currey 1978; Cutler 1985). In the following example, however, Rangasami describes Firth’s (1959) analysis of the Tikopia famine in Polynesia, arguing that there was no major ‘societal breakdown’:
对于一些作者来说，社会崩溃既是饥荒的标志也是原因（Alamgir 1980; Currey 1978; Cutler 1985）。然而，在以下例子中，Rangasami 描述了 Firth（1959）对波利尼西亚 Tikopia 饥荒的分析，认为并没有发生重大“社会崩溃”：

The skeleton of the social order was preserved though attenuated in content. He [Firth] offers interesting insights into famine: what the famine did was to reveal the solidarity of the elementary family. Even at the height of the famine, it appeared that within the elementary family full sharing of food continued to be the norm.
社会秩序的骨架虽然内容上有所削弱，但仍然得以保留。他[Firth]对饥荒提供了有趣的见解：饥荒所做的就是揭示了基本家庭的团结。即使在饥荒最严重的时候，基本家庭内部的食物共享仍然是常态。
(Rangasami 1986:1597)（Rangasami 1986:1597）
In other cases (as in the famine of southern Sudan, outlined earlier in Figure 4.1), Boxes 9 and 10 (Figure 4.2b) refer to changes in the ability of the individual and the household
在其他情况下（如前面图 4.1 中概述的南苏丹饥荒），框 9 和框 10（图 4.2b）提到了个人和家庭能力的变化。
to continue to cope effectively with stress and to avail themselves of food by whatever means. If food intake falls for long enough, the capability of people to look for and perform work becomes impaired (Box 9). If food shortages persist, morbidity and, later, mortality increases (Box 10). After some months of severe food shortage, the stock of assets and resources of a household may be seriously impaired. Assets may have been disposed of to purchase food: perhaps cattle are sold, some land mortgaged, the seed corn eaten. Members of the household may themselves be sick (or have died), so that their capacity to earn through work is reduced.
继续有效应对压力，并通过各种方式获取食物。如果食物摄入量长时间下降，人们寻找和从事工作的能力将受到影响（框 9）。如果食物短缺持续，发病率和随后死亡率将增加（框 10）。在经历几个月的严重食物短缺后，家庭的资产和资源可能会受到严重损害。资产可能已被处置以购买食物：例如，可能出售牲畜，抵押一些土地，甚至吃掉种子玉米。家庭成员可能自己生病（或已去世），从而降低了他们通过工作赚取收入的能力。

Class relations and the associated structures of domination and allocation (Boxes 1 & 4) may also shift rapidly as a result of famine. While many households suffer, some merchants and moneylenders can amass fortunes by selling grain at inflated prices, foreclosing on mortgages (especially for land) and outstanding debts. Some may also gain bonded labour in return for food.
餐级关系及其相关的统治和分配结构（框 1 和框 4）也可能因饥荒而迅速变化。虽然许多家庭遭受痛苦，但一些商人和放贷人可以通过以高价出售粮食、收回抵押贷款（尤其是土地）和未偿债务来积累财富。有些人还可能以食物换取契约劳动。

This approach to famine analyses its structures and processes in relation to ways of making a living in normal times. Even normal times have inherent unsafe conditions, but the risks from these are distributed differently between households. It is an iterative approach in which ‘external’ shocks and triggers (such as drought or war) have an impact on the structures and processes of political economy. Once again, these changes in the political economy can affect individuals and households differently. However, some external interventions may help people to survive, and these are illustrated in the next section.
这种对饥荒的分析方法考察了其结构和过程与正常时期生计方式之间的关系。即使在正常时期，也存在固有的不安全条件，但这些风险在家庭之间的分布是不同的。这是一种迭代的方法，其中“外部”冲击和触发因素（如干旱或战争）对政治经济的结构和过程产生影响。这些政治经济的变化再次可能对个人和家庭产生不同的影响。然而，一些外部干预可能有助于人们生存，下一节将对此进行说明。

Policy政策

Policy options can be examined in relation to the ‘chain of explanation’ which accounts for famine. This chain involves analysing the mechanisms which produce vulnerability by tracing back from the immediate and local causes (in space and time) to the less direct, longer-term and structural reasons (underlying dynamic pressures and root causes). The chain of explanation is paralleled by the PAR model) presented in Chapter 2, in which the root causes are linked to the more direct pressures that create vulnerability. When these overlie particularly adverse local conditions, the impact of a hazard event may act as a trigger for disaster.
政策选项可以通过与解释饥荒的“解释链”进行关联来进行审查。这个链条涉及分析产生脆弱性的机制，通过从直接和局部的原因（在空间和时间上）追溯到不那么直接的、长期的和结构性的原因（潜在的动态压力和根本原因）。解释链与第 2 章中提出的 PAR 模型相对应，其中根本原因与造成脆弱性的更直接压力相联系。当这些压力叠加在特别不利的地方条件上时，灾害事件的影响可能会成为灾难的触发因素。

Policy actions must address issues at the level that can be affected and altered. For example, the colonial history of the Sudan and the nature of the post-colonial state cannot be re-written. Instead, responsible outside agents may have to deal with how to ensure relief gets through war zones, how international agencies protect refugee camps from occupying armies or bands of insurrectionist troops, and so on. While an integrated explanation of a disaster may be intellectually fulfilling, a policy has to locate itself at the level it can make a significant impact. There must be effectiveness in the short run at least-human lives often depend on it. Yet the opposite pitfall also awaits the policy maker. As Kent warns:
政策行动必须解决可以受到影响和改变的问题。例如，苏丹的殖民历史和后殖民国家的性质无法被重写。相反，负责任的外部代理可能必须处理如何确保救援物资通过战区，国际机构如何保护难民营免受占领军或叛乱部队的侵扰，等等。虽然对灾难的综合解释在智力上可能令人满意，但政策必须定位在能够产生显著影响的层面上。至少在短期内必须有效——人类生命往往依赖于此。然而，政策制定者也面临着相反的陷阱。正如肯特所警告的：

By dealing with disasters as isolated phenomena, we lose a sense of the real causes of vulnerability. Conceptually, it is a way of avoiding the full
通过将灾难视为孤立现象，我们失去了对脆弱性真实原因的认识。从概念上讲，这是一种避免全面理解的方式。
implications of the causes and solutions to disasters. One need not address the global inter-relationships between international trade, currency fluctuations, geo-political and commercial interests and a flooded delta in Bangladesh. In practical terms, by isolating disaster phenomena, one can demonstrate goodwill and test one’s technological solutions without being ‘mouse trapped’ into more long-term commitments.
灾难的原因和解决方案的影响。无需讨论国际贸易、货币波动、地缘政治和商业利益与孟加拉国洪水三角洲之间的全球相互关系。从实际角度来看，通过孤立灾难现象，可以展示善意并测试自己的技术解决方案，而不必被“鼠夹”困住，承担更多的长期承诺。
(R.C.Kent 1987a:174-175).
（R.C.肯特 1987a:174-175）。

For each link in the chain of explanation of a famine there are a range of policy measures. At the international and national levels, achieving aggregate food security has been an important policy goal. The food security debate of the 1980s was heavily influenced by the work of Sen, and a number of plans emerged (especially among NGOs) that focused on access to food (through entitlements). But neo-liberalism was much more significant in driving policy, mainly through the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These dominated the debate, and seriously curtailed scope for other forms of action.

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But by the mid-1980s the dangerous implications of structural adjustment for food security and longer-term entitlement protection had become clear to many. Food security approaches continued their fitful career on the international stage from the 1990s up to the present time (Devereux and Maxwell 2001).
在饥荒解释链中的每一个环节都有一系列政策措施。在国际和国家层面，实现整体粮食安全一直是一个重要的政策目标。1980 年代的粮食安全辩论受到森的研究的重大影响，出现了一些计划（特别是在非政府组织中），这些计划专注于通过权利获取食物。然而，新自由主义在推动政策方面更为重要，主要通过结构调整计划（SAPs）。这些计划主导了辩论，并严重限制了其他行动形式的空间。

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但到 1980 年代中期，结构调整对粮食安全和长期权利保护的危险影响已为许多人所认识。从 1990 年代到现在，粮食安全方法在国际舞台上的发展仍然起伏不定（Devereux 和 Maxwell 2001）。

In the 1990s, significant changes in both the global political scene and thinking about famine once again shifted attention. The World Bank gave greater priority to poverty rather than food security issues. Also, the character of famine itself changed in terms of location and causes, with a shift from Asia to Africa, and from natural hazards to war and political instability. Where drought did occur and could potentially have caused hunger, it seemed that famines were more or less successfully averted. Attention therefore was directed to the management of complex emergencies in the short term, and diverted to more strategic issues.

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在 1990 年代，全球政治局势和对饥荒的思考发生了重大变化，再次转移了人们的关注。世界银行将贫困问题置于比粮食安全问题更高的优先级。此外，饥荒本身的特征在地点和原因上发生了变化，从亚洲转向非洲，从自然灾害转向战争和政治不稳定。在发生干旱并可能导致饥饿的地方，似乎饥荒在或多或少上得到了成功的避免。因此，注意力转向了短期内复杂紧急情况的管理，并转向了更具战略性的问题。

The Declaration and Plan of Action (FAO 1996) was a sort of balancing act between neo-Malthusian concerns of global food shortages, food self-sufficiency and human rights issues, which were now enshrined for the first time.

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What this continuing flurry of grand international meetings and wish-lists actually means is open to discussion. To some extent, such rhetoric is important. It may not predict or explain famine, and therefore does little to reduce or prevent it, but it is a weapon that can be used to shape debates and stimulate more general international action.
《宣言和行动计划》（FAO 1996）在全球粮食短缺、新马尔萨斯主义的担忧、粮食自给自足和人权问题之间进行了一种平衡，这些问题首次被确立。

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这种持续的国际会议和愿望清单的热潮实际上意味着什么仍然有待讨论。在某种程度上，这种言辞是重要的。它可能无法预测或解释饥荒，因此对减少或预防饥荒几乎没有帮助，但它是一种可以用来塑造辩论和刺激更广泛国际行动的武器。

Early warning systems预警系统

Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) are tools that have been developed particularly since the famines in the Sahel during the 1970s (although they can be traced back to nineteenth-century Indian Famine Codes). Information about present and future access to food is an essential, though not sufficient, resource in the prevention of famine. Even if early warning systems can provide useful information, it may never be used. Government structures are often poorly linked to those that produce the information. Data do not necessarily inform policy, and emergencies (rather than longerterm prevention measures) dominate the political concerns of most governments whose peoples are threatened by
饥荒预警系统（FEWS）是自 1970 年代萨赫尔地区的饥荒以来特别开发的工具（尽管可以追溯到 19 世纪的印度饥荒法典）。关于当前和未来食品获取的信息是预防饥荒的一个重要但不足的资源。即使预警系统能够提供有用的信息，这些信息也可能永远不会被使用。政府结构通常与产生信息的机构联系不紧密。数据不一定能影响政策，而紧急情况（而非长期预防措施）主导了大多数面临威胁的国家的政治关注。
famine (Buchanan-Smith and Davies 1995). Institutional weaknesses in national and international policies can also allow famine conditions to emerge, in spite of adequate information. Complex emergencies (particularly involving war), and practical difficulties such as inadequate port facilities, poor or disrupted and damaged transport facilities such as roads and railways, can all contribute to famine even when there is adequate knowledge of the pre-conditions.
尽管有足够的信息，国家和国际政策中的制度性弱点也可能导致饥荒条件的出现。复杂的紧急情况（特别是涉及战争的情况）以及诸如港口设施不足、交通设施不良或受损（如道路和铁路）等实际困难，都可能在充分了解前提条件的情况下导致饥荒的发生。

FEWS are tools that enable the measurement of a range of factors that affect people’s food status (Hervio 1987; McIntire 1987; Downing 1991). There are many (some analysts think far too many) different approaches to such systems. For example, there are about forty FEWS developed for use in Africa, with at least six rival systems in Mali alone. There is the FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System developed in the 1970s, which predicted crop yields by estimating biomass from satellite imagery. New technologies such as satellite imagery, the internet, computer networking and established reporting systems have transformed the production and potential for dissemination of information. But it is not clear how far they will remain useful in relation to the shifting pattern of famines.
FEWS 是能够测量影响人们食品状况的一系列因素的工具（Hervio 1987; McIntire 1987; Downing 1991）。对于这样的系统，有许多（一些分析师认为太多了）不同的方法。例如，非洲开发了大约四十个 FEWS，仅在马里就有至少六个竞争系统。还有联合国粮农组织在 1970 年代开发的全球信息与预警系统，该系统通过从卫星图像估算生物量来预测作物产量。卫星图像、互联网、计算机网络和既有报告系统等新技术已经改变了信息的生产和传播潜力。但尚不清楚它们在与饥荒变化模式相关的情况下能保持多大程度的有效性。

Warning systems such as these that focus on the supply-side suffer from the same problems as the FAD theories which underpin them. While useful, they cannot identify who actually will have access to food in sufficient quantity, and who will fail to do so. Such FEWS have a similar and inadequate intellectual ancestry as the food security programmes discussed above. Others work on the principle of a food balance sheet, where food production minus food needs equals imports plus food aid. This type of warning system, operating at the national level, fails to incorporate the essential element of access, and so has limited explanatory value. More sophisticated systems have since been developed, although the practicality of collecting the data needed for an ideal system is doubtful (Nichols 1988). Various types of indicators of famine have also been used as additional warnings (Cutler 1985). While some of these systems have become competent in predicting drought, they cannot warn of changing political situations, particularly in complex emergencies. Devereux suggests a number of improvements (Devereux 2001:211-212). Most are linked directly to the directions suggested by both the PAR and Access models. These include: (1) broadening the focus from extreme events to food systems; (2) addressing chronic food insecurity and a failure of access to food; (3) improving information about market access to food, including the sale and purchase of food crops by the vulnerable; and (4) increasing the role of participatory food security assessments, in spite of scaling-up and consistency problems (see the following sections).
像这样的侧重于供给侧的预警系统存在与其基础的 FAD 理论相同的问题。虽然有用，但它们无法识别谁实际上能够获得足够数量的食物，以及谁将无法做到这一点。这类 FEWS 与上述讨论的粮食安全项目有着相似且不足的智力渊源。其他系统则基于食品平衡表的原则，即食品生产减去食品需求等于进口加上食品援助。这种在国家层面运作的预警系统未能纳入获取这一基本要素，因此其解释价值有限。此后，已经开发出更复杂的系统，尽管收集理想系统所需数据的可行性仍然存疑（Nichols 1988）。各种类型的饥荒指标也被用作额外的预警（Cutler 1985）。虽然其中一些系统在预测干旱方面变得相当成熟，但它们无法预警政治局势的变化，特别是在复杂的紧急情况下。Devereux 提出了一些改进建议（Devereux 2001:211-212）。大多数与 PAR 和 Access 模型所建议的方向直接相关。这些包括：（1）将重点从极端事件扩展到食品系统；（2）解决慢性食品不安全和获取食品的失败；（3）改善关于食品市场准入的信息，包括脆弱群体的食品作物的销售和购买；以及（4）尽管存在规模扩大和一致性问题，增加参与性食品安全评估的作用（见以下章节）。

Strengthening livelihood systems
加强生计系统

Moving to less direct measures for preventing famine, the strengthening of rural livelihoods is an obvious policy requirement. ‘Sustainable livelihoods’ is indeed the emblematic intellectual tool to guide policies with which the present British government hopes to halve world poverty by 2015. Of course, these measures have objectives that are not directly concerned with famine prevention, but have broader development and environmental objectives. Swift and Hamilton (2001) claim that a livelihoods approach
转向减少直接防止饥荒的措施，加强农村生计显然是一个政策要求。“可持续生计”确实是指导政策的标志性智力工具，现任英国政府希望通过该工具在 2015 年前将全球贫困减半。当然，这些措施的目标并不直接与防止饥荒有关，而是具有更广泛的发展和环境目标。Swift 和 Hamilton（2001）声称生计方法
(which follows our Access model in most important respects) allows a much more holistic view of food security issues. Livelihood diversification (especially involving urban-rural links, remittances and artisan activity) is an important process which is rapidly increasing in most areas of the developing world (Ellis 2000). It also draws attention away from a narrow ‘food first’ approach to a much broader spectrum of policy issues which address access to income opportunities in all sectors. This is taken up again in Chapter 9.
（在我们访问模型的大多数重要方面上）允许对粮食安全问题有更全面的看法。生计多样化（特别是涉及城乡联系、汇款和手工艺活动）是一个重要的过程，在发展中国家的大多数地区迅速增加（Ellis 2000）。它还将注意力从狭隘的“粮食优先”方法转向更广泛的政策问题，涉及各个部门的收入机会获取。这在第 9 章中再次提到。

Response to famine from the grassroots level
自下而上的对饥荒的响应

Most of the policy options discussed so far are ‘top down’. Complementary and sometimes conflicting responses to the trigger events that may bring famine can also be seen at the grassroots level. In addition to household- and community-level coping, discussed in Chapter 3, various NGOs have attempted many of the interventions just discussed ‘from the bottom up’. Organisations close to grassroots (e.g. Save the Children Fund) are well placed to provide certain kinds of information for early warning systems to complement the coarse data provided by satellite. These systems are run by local people, who compile information on food and livestock prices and the sale of assets by households, among other indicators of a potential food emergency (York 1985; Cutler 1984; Beerlandt and Huysman 1999; SIDS 2003a, 2003b).
到目前为止讨论的大多数政策选项都是“自上而下”的。对可能导致饥荒的触发事件的补充和有时相互冲突的反应也可以在基层层面看到。除了第 3 章讨论的家庭和社区层面的应对外，各种非政府组织也尝试了许多刚才讨论的“自下而上”的干预措施。接近基层的组织（例如，救助儿童基金会）在为早期预警系统提供某些类型的信息方面处于有利位置，以补充卫星提供的粗略数据。这些系统由当地人运行，他们编制有关食品和牲畜价格以及家庭资产出售等潜在食品紧急情况的其他指标的信息（York 1985；Cutler 1984；Beerlandt 和 Huysman 1999；SIDS 2003a, 2003b）。

Many NGOs have found themselves providing famine relief, sometimes on behalf of the government or international donors, sometimes independently in isolated areas that do not receive official assistance. Some NGOs have tried to administer food relief in ways that strengthen local livelihoods in the long run (Scott 1987; Slim and Mitchell 1990). For instance, Operation Hunger in South Africa supported people in the so-called Bantustans who faced widespread hunger during the drought of 1991-1993. They supported women’s irrigated gardening groups as well as providing conventional mass feeding.
许多非政府组织发现自己在提供饥荒救助，有时是代表政府或国际捐助者，有时是在没有官方援助的偏远地区独立行动。一些非政府组织试图以增强当地生计的方式来管理食品救助（Scott 1987；Slim 和 Mitchell 1990）。例如，南非的饥饿行动支持在 1991-1993 年干旱期间面临广泛饥饿的所谓班图斯坦的人们。他们支持女性灌溉园艺小组，并提供传统的大规模喂养。

Other grassroots initiatives aim to support livelihoods. For example, in Burkina Faso and other Sahelian countries, the Federation of Village Development (naam) Groups sponsored grain storage on a co-operative basis. This releases farmers from the cycle of indebtedness caused by having to sell at a low price every year to a trader, followed by purchase of grain from that same trader at a higher price later during the 'hungry season’ (Adamson 1982; Uemura n.d.; Six-S n.d.; Woodrow 1989). The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh serves a similar function, providing credit for the ‘non-creditworthy’ in order to start up income-generating activities (see Chapter 9). Earlier we argued that failure of exchange entitlements are generally more important than decline in output as an explanation of famine. This suggests that extra income would be especially important in preventing famine, and that such schemes are capable of altering the pattern of access, enabling people to improve long-term entitlements and thereby reducing the risk of them facing famine.
其他基层倡议旨在支持生计。例如，在布基纳法索和其他萨赫勒国家，村庄发展联合会（naam）组织以合作的方式赞助粮食储存。这使农民摆脱了每年不得不以低价将粮食出售给商人，然后在“饥饿季节”期间以更高的价格从同一商人那里购买粮食所造成的债务循环（Adamson 1982; Uemura n.d.; Six-S n.d.; Woodrow 1989）。孟加拉国的格莱珉银行发挥着类似的作用，为“无信贷资格者”提供信贷，以启动创收活动（见第 9 章）。我们早先论证过，交换权利的失败通常比产出下降更重要，作为饥荒的解释。这表明，额外收入在防止饥荒方面尤其重要，而此类计划能够改变获取模式，使人们改善长期权利，从而降低他们面临饥荒的风险。

Many other efforts to strengthen livelihoods have been directed towards rural people vulnerable to drought. One of the most interesting of these was undertaken by the British charity War on Want in Mauritania following the Sahel drought and famine 1967-1973. Rather than spend all the funds collected during the crisis on immediate relief, they
许多其他加强生计的努力已针对易受干旱影响的农村人群。其中最有趣的一个是在 1967-1973 年萨赫尔干旱和饥荒后，由英国慈善机构“反对饥饿战争”在毛里塔尼亚开展的。与其将危机期间收集的所有资金用于紧急救助，他们
launched a thorough study of the existing livelihood system of the people living in the Guidimaka region of Mauritania bordering the Senegal river (Bradley et al. 1977). On the basis of this study they proposed a long-term development programme centred on and controlled by village associations. The programme featured low-cost improvements of existing agricultural practices, which already included very sophisticated flood-retreat agriculture and careful livestock management. They attempted to diversify the livelihood system through the addition of fruit trees and craft industries. Theirs was one of the first programmes to introduce small bunds (embankments) to increase the infiltration of scarce rainfall into the soil-an innovation that was later widely promoted throughout the Sahel (Twose 1985; Harrison 1987; Murwira et al. 2000).
对毛里塔尼亚吉迪马卡地区靠近塞内加尔河的居民现有生计系统进行了全面研究（Bradley et al. 1977）。基于这项研究，他们提出了一个以村庄协会为中心并由其控制的长期发展计划。该计划的特点是对现有农业实践进行低成本改进，这些实践已经包括非常复杂的洪水退却农业和精心的畜牧管理。他们试图通过增加果树和手工业来多样化生计系统。他们的计划是最早引入小堤坝（堤防）以增加稀缺降雨渗入土壤的项目之一——这一创新后来在整个萨赫勒地区得到了广泛推广（Twose 1985；Harrison 1987；Murwira et al. 2000）。

Conclusion结论

The causes of famine are too complex and varied for single theories to claim universal applicability, although the protagonists of some have done so, to the detriment of our understanding. The arcane debate in the hallowed groves of academe concerning FAD (food availability decline) versus FED (food entitlement decline) is a case in point. There is no single theory of famine but a number of theories of circumscribed relevance and ability to predict. In addition, it might be argued that some theories or propositions about famine are more politically helpful than others. For example, de Waal’s notion of famine crimes throws a spotlight on the issue of who should bear responsibility, as in his view all famines are preventable. On the other hand, the FAD context may be helpful in understanding the processes which lead to some famines. But it still grants a significant role to ‘extreme’ natural events, which focuses attention on unpredictable nature. This means that it can avoid the analysis of how the history of vulnerability (involving impoverishment, marginalisation, persecution, dispossession and ethnic cleansing, etc.) operates to provide the context for the trigger event. The iterative access model allows a number of theories to operate, but under conditions relevant to each particular famine. Analysing famine in this way makes it possible to evolve a more flexible analytical method for explaining them, which in turn may assist the policy response to be more politically aware, relevant and flexible.
饥荒的原因过于复杂多样，单一理论无法声称具有普遍适用性，尽管某些理论的倡导者确实如此主张，这对我们的理解造成了损害。在学术界神圣的殿堂中，关于 FAD（食品可用性下降）与 FED（食品权利下降）的晦涩辩论就是一个例子。没有单一的饥荒理论，而是一些具有有限相关性和预测能力的理论。此外，可以认为某些关于饥荒的理论或命题在政治上比其他理论更有帮助。例如，德·瓦尔（de Waal）关于饥荒罪行的概念突出了谁应承担责任的问题，因为在他看来，所有饥荒都是可以预防的。另一方面，FAD 背景可能有助于理解导致某些饥荒的过程。但它仍然赋予“极端”自然事件重要角色，关注不可预测的自然。这意味着它可能会避免分析脆弱性历史（涉及贫困、边缘化、迫害、剥夺和种族清洗等）如何运作，以提供触发事件的背景。迭代访问模型允许多种理论在与每个特定饥荒相关的条件下运作。以这种方式分析饥荒使得能够发展出一种更灵活的分析方法来解释它们，这反过来可能有助于政策响应更加政治敏感、相关和灵活。

Notes注释

1 There is an enormous literature on hunger in history, including an overview of the evidence in pre-history (Cohen 1977). Recorded history is traced by De Castro (1977/1952), Sorokin (1975), Pankhurst (1974) and Arnold (1988); for the GrecoRoman world see Garnsey (1988); for ancient China, Mallory (1926). There is also a thorough interdisciplinary view edited by Newman (1990).
1 关于历史上饥饿的文献非常庞大，包括对史前证据的概述（Cohen 1977）。记录的历史由 De Castro（1977/1952）、Sorokin（1975）、Pankhurst（1974）和 Arnold（1988）追溯；关于古希腊罗马世界，请参见 Garnsey（1988）；关于古代中国，请参见 Mallory（1926）。还有由 Newman（1990）编辑的全面跨学科视角。
2 Reviews of the natural and physical science of drought can be found in collections edited by Wilhite and Easterling (1987) and Wilhite (2000).
关于干旱的自然和物理科学的综述可以在 Wilhite 和 Easterling（1987）以及 Wilhite（2000）编辑的文集中找到。
3 As we observed in Chapters 1 and 2, war, and violent conflict more generally, have many links with disaster. The war in Iraq diverted some policy makers’ attention
正如我们在第一章和第二章中观察到的，战争和更广泛的暴力冲突与灾难有许多联系。伊拉克的战争分散了部分政策制定者的注意力。
away from the food crisis in southern Africa, and by April 2003 the WFP was $1 billion short in its funds needed for humanitarian operations in Africa (including southern Africa). In all, 40 million Africans were at risk, and the WFP executive director, James Morris, told the UN Security Council: ‘As much as I don’t like it, I cannot escape the thought that we have a double standard’ (Carroll 2003:1).
离南非的粮食危机，到了 2003 年 4 月，世界粮食计划署在其在非洲（包括南非）的人道主义行动所需资金上短缺了 10 亿美元。总共有 4000 万非洲人面临风险，世界粮食计划署执行主任詹姆斯·莫里斯对联合国安全理事会表示：“尽管我不喜欢这样，但我无法逃避这样的想法：我们有双重标准。”（卡罗尔 2003:1）
4 There were antecedents, especially in a critical understanding of hunger and famine: e.g. Gini and De Castro (1928). De Castro contributed more than half a century of famine studies that deviated from conventional wisdom by emphasising social relations. A Brazilian medical doctor and geographer, De Castro began documenting chronic under-nutrition and what we would today call ‘vulnerability’ in Latin America in the 1920s. In the early days of the United Nations he served the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in its nutrition division, but became disenchanted by international efforts to prevent famine. There is a bibliography of De Castro’s major writing on famine and critical review in Wisner (1982); his bestknown works include Geopolitics of Hunger (1977/1952) and Death in the Northeast (1966).
4 先前有一些研究，特别是在对饥饿和饥荒的批判性理解方面：例如，吉尼和德卡斯特罗（1928 年）。德卡斯特罗在饥荒研究方面贡献了超过半个世纪的研究，偏离了传统智慧，强调社会关系。这位巴西医学博士和地理学家在 1920 年代开始记录拉丁美洲的慢性营养不良和我们今天所称的“脆弱性”。在联合国早期，他在粮食及农业组织（FAO）的营养部门工作，但对国际防止饥荒的努力感到失望。德卡斯特罗关于饥荒的主要著作和批判性评论的书目见于威斯纳（1982 年）；他最著名的作品包括《饥饿的地缘政治》（1977/1952 年）和《东北的死亡》（1966 年）。
5 Data from World Food Programme (2002a); for regional context see MacGregor (2002), FAO (2002b).
5 数据来自世界粮食计划署（2002a）；有关区域背景，请参见麦格雷戈（2002 年），粮农组织（2002b）。

6 Data from WHO (2002).
6 数据来自世界卫生组织（2002 年）。
7 Data from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA 2002e).
7 数据来自联合国人道主义事务协调办公室（OCHA 2002e 年）。
8 Data from International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC 2002d).
国际红十字与红新月联合会（IFRC 2002d）的数据。
9 Data from World Food Programme (2002b). ...
10 The following endnote appears in the original as note 4: ...
Local estimates wrongly suggested that last year’s maize shortfall of 600,000 MT could be partly offset by an increase in crop and tuber production. This resulted in complacency within the Malawi Government and the donor community. Nevertheless, the IMF and World Bank generate their own independent information data-which makes it all the more surprising that they and the European Commission (authors of the report that formed the basis of the IMF advice) could also get it so wrong. As early as July 2001, The Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), a USAID funded project, had noted the worrying signs. By September 2001, private traders were stockpiling maize to enable them to sell at higher prices later. The national maize stocks had run down to only

15, 000 MT

. Official warnings about serious food shortages circulated in October 2001, with reports from Save the Children (UK) and World Vision. A food security assessment conducted by the EU and the World Food Programme also reported that up to 25 per cent of households in 35 'food insecure extension planning areas’ required relief assistance. ...
(Owusu and Ng’ambi 2002:49) ...
11 Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC), facilitated ...
this logistical feat. SADCC was created in 1980 by Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Tanzania and Namibia to provide a common front against apartheid South Africa. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has joined the group, which renamed itself the Southern African Development Community (SADC). On their common food policy, see Morgan (1988); Prah (1988); Rau (1991:125-128); Wisner (1992a). See also SADC’s Food Security Unit: http://www.sadc-fanr.org.zw/ ...
12 Ninety per cent of the famine deaths during this period were in Mozambique and Angola, where civil wars had weakened the population and made transportation difficult (Green 1994:44-45). ...
13 However, in an act reminiscent of the solidarity shown in 1991, neighbouring Tanzania did donate 2,000 tonnes of maize to Malawi (Agence France-Presse 2002e). ...
14 Agence France-Presse (2002f). ...
15 See Economist (2002a); FAO (2002). ...
16 Neo-Malthusianism is the term used for the significant resurrection of Malthus’s ideas mainly in the period since the Second World War, when the colonial powers (and the USA) were confronting the independence of the emerging Third World. No longer directly responsible for their colonial dependents, Malthusian ideas resurfaced in the West as a means of blaming the people of the ex-colonies for the potential disruption of Western wealth, and as a way to explain the problems of the developing countries and their poverty. ...
17 For a general review and critical treatment of the ‘pressure on resources’ thesis, see Blaikie and Brookfield (1987). ...
18 Drèze (1988:19) says that exports from India were common during famines in the nineteenth century. ...
19 ‘The underlying cause of famine is crop failure which undermines incomes of the already poor’ (Mellor and Gavian 1987:539). Platteau (1988) emphasises the importance of declining aggregate food production in Africa, but attributes it more to backward agricultural technology and pricing policies, as do many other authors. For the alternative emphasis, especially on the influence of government policy (e.g. pricing, credit, marketing, infrastructure, research and development) on African food production, see Bates (1981); Berry (1984); Glantz (1987); Raikes (1988); Akong’a (1988); Wisner (1988a); Odhiambo et al. (1988); Cheru (1989); Bernstein (1990); Achebe et al. (1990); Rau (1991) and Wisner (1992a, 1992b). ...
20 One could also argue in relation to landslides, earthquakes, etc. that people have a human right to protection from avoidable harm; see Wisner (200 le) and Chapter 9. ...
21 There is a more direct breach of contract when governments ignore the food needs of people by claiming there is no shortage, and when they deliberately withhold food from the hungry in order to punish them or force them into submission. Examples of this have been seen in recent civil conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. It has also occurred with international aid and the withholding of food aid by those who hold surpluses in order to achieve political goals (Cannon 2003). ...
22 Seventy years after the event, the Ukraine famine remains highly controversial, with heated disputes about its causes, and arguments about how many died. It is a ...
highly politicised debate: some protagonists are sympathetic to the original communist cause (and suggest that high mortality figures are exaggerated right-wing propaganda); others are pro-Ukrainian nationalists who tend to maximise the numbers of deaths in order to blame both Russian domination and Soviet oppression. Some sources argue that many deaths were caused by epidemics, especially of typhus, and were not necessarily the result of hunger. A range of these arguments can be found easily by entering the terms ‘Ukraine’, ‘famine’ and ‘1930s’ into an internet search engine such as Google. ...
23 Additional discussion of northern Nigeria is provided by Mortimore (1989). Similar treatments of famine’s ‘chain of explanation’ are provided for Malawi by Vaughan (1987), for Kenya in 1971 by Wisner (1978b, 1980, 1988a), for Kenya in 1984 by Downing et al. (1989), for Ethiopia by Mariam (1986), Lemma 1985, and Kebbede (1992). Many authors have sought out ‘root causes’ of famine in Africa. For instance, Meillassoux

(1973, 1974)

and Copans

(1975, 1983)

are typical of the analysis at the time of famine in the west African Sahel region. Franke and Chasin (1980) reviewed and summarised much of the French literature of the period. Elsewhere in Africa, Wisner and Mbithi (1974), Wisner (1975, 1977, 1980) had much the same thing to say about famine in east Africa, while Bondestam (1974) and Kloos (1982) elaborated a ‘political economy’ explanation for the Awash Valley (in Ethiopia), and Hussein (1976) extended the analysis to Ethiopia as a whole. Similar analysis of the role of class relations in undermining traditional drought coping methods and in causing environmental destruction (which made the land more prone to the effect of drought) also appeared for southern Africa (Cliffe and Moorsom 1979; cf. Wilmsen 1989). ...
24 The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) has produced an excellent research review of SAPs and their generally harmful effects on food security (SAPRIN action). See also Cannon 2003. ...
25 In dealing with the humanitarian crises of the 1990s, much attention was given to emergency feeding on a very large scale. The worldwide work of the WFP grew considerably. Much has been learned by field administrators and government officials over the last two decades. There is a body of experience on the management of famine refugee camps (Harrell-Bond 1986), provision of food aid (Drèze and Sen 1989), and early warning systems (Walker 1989; Borton 1994). See also Borton (1988) for an excellent review of recent British experiences in organising famine and emergency relief. On making food aid more effective, see Singer, Wood and Jennings (1987); Scott (1987); Cohen and Lewis (1987); Hopkins (1987) and Raikes (1988). Jackson (1982) and Crow (1990) are more critical of the aid process, especially the provision of food aid. R.C.Kent (1987) has summarised a large body of increasingly critical commentary on relief aid in many forms. ...
26 The document is available at: ...
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm

5
BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS ...

Introduction引言

Human health, daily life and vulnerability
人类健康、日常生活与脆弱性

In Part I we introduced the notion of ‘vulnerability’ and its relations to a set of processes involving access to resources in the maintenance of livelihoods. In Chapter 4 (in Part II) we began to apply these concepts, and suggested that famine is seldom caused by extreme climatic conditions (such as drought) alone, and that a severe decline in food consumption which might be expected to result from a drought may either not occur at all, or may not be the prime cause of a disastrous famine. What is of prime importance is people’s vulnerability, brought about by long-term or sudden disruptions to their access to resources of all kinds, both material and non-material, and people’s ability to use them in the successful pursuit of a livelihood. In a similar way, biological hazards may be both a trigger to a disaster and exacerbate its consequences, or follow on from other socioeconomic root causes and unsafe conditions, once the disaster process is under way.
在第一部分中，我们介绍了“脆弱性”的概念及其与一系列涉及获取资源以维持生计的过程的关系。在第二部分的第四章中，我们开始应用这些概念，并建议饥荒很少仅由极端气候条件（如干旱）引起，而是可能由于干旱而预期的食品消费严重下降可能根本不会发生，或者可能不是灾难性饥荒的主要原因。最重要的是人们的脆弱性，这种脆弱性是由于长期或突发的对各种资源（包括物质和非物质资源）获取的干扰所造成的，以及人们在成功追求生计时使用这些资源的能力。以类似的方式，生物危害可能既是灾难的触发因素，也可能加剧其后果，或者在灾难过程开始后，源于其他社会经济根本原因和不安全条件。

The present chapter focuses on hazards that originate in the life processes and conditions of other living things that affect humans and their livelihoods and assets. On the macro-scale, humans and their built environments are often surrounded by vegetation. Forests, for example, can provide protection from high winds and a reserve of survival food as a buffer against famine. However, they can also burn catastrophically.

^{1}

Macrofauna (organisms visible to the naked eye) can be beneficial to humans, but some animals, such as rats, some birds and also insects, can damage crops or stored food. On the microbiological scale, minute organisms can also benefit or harm humans with ‘biological disasters’ that can affect both people (epidemics) and their animals or crops (epizootics, explosive plant disease and pest infestations).
本章重点讨论源于其他生物的生命过程和条件的危害，这些危害影响人类及其生计和资产。在宏观层面上，人类及其建成环境通常被植被所包围。例如，森林可以提供抵御强风的保护和作为饥荒缓冲的生存食物储备。然而，它们也可能发生灾难性火灾。

^{1}

大型动物（肉眼可见的生物）对人类可能是有益的，但一些动物，如老鼠、某些鸟类以及昆虫，可能会损害农作物或储存的食物。在微生物学层面上，微小的生物也可以通过“生物灾害”对人类造成益处或伤害，这些灾害可能影响人类（流行病）及其动物或农作物（动物疫病、爆发性植物病和害虫侵扰）。

In Part I of this book we emphasised how the conditions of daily life, to a large extent, account for the vulnerability of individuals, households and social groups. Daily life is, above all, biological, so it is important to recall this theme of the ‘everyday’ or the 'normal’ (Lefebvre 1991; Wisner 1993; Harvey 1996). We all eat, breathe and drink water. We are one type of organism among other living things. However much our 'embodiment’ (Weiss and Haber 1999; Kruks 2002) may be culturally or socially ‘constructed’ and interpreted, our existence and our daily lives revolve around the care and use of bodies.
在本书的第一部分中，我们强调了日常生活的条件在很大程度上解释了个人、家庭和社会群体的脆弱性。日常生活首先是生物性的，因此回顾“日常”或“正常”的主题是重要的（Lefebvre 1991；Wisner 1993；Harvey 1996）。我们都吃、呼吸和饮水。我们是众多生物中的一种。然而，无论我们的“具身性”（Weiss 和 Haber 1999；Kruks 2002）在多大程度上是文化或社会“构建”的和解释的，我们的存在和日常生活都围绕着对身体的照顾和使用展开。

The emergence of the ‘risk society’ (see Chapter 1) was predicated on the growing complexity of modern technologies. It also relates to the view that science had become increasingly necessary to inform the public and public policy, and yet remained inadequate for that task. In richer countries, biological risks are increasingly connected in people’s minds with very large, sometimes unimaginable risks (such as a major nuclear
“风险社会”的出现（见第一章）是基于现代技术日益复杂的基础。它还与科学在告知公众和公共政策方面变得越来越必要的观点相关，但在这方面仍然显得不足。在富裕国家，生物风险在公众心中越来越与非常大、甚至难以想象的风险（例如重大核事故）相联系。
accident), or with risks that seem even to threaten our biological identity (maybe this is one reason why there has been so much controversy over the patenting of life forms and the buying and selling of human body parts; see Andrews and Nelkin 2001).
事故），或者与似乎甚至威胁我们生物身份的风险（也许这就是为什么对生命形式的专利和人体部件的买卖存在如此多争议的原因之一；见 Andrews 和 Nelkin 2001）。

The fact of our embodiment and biological dependency has also meant that development studies has turned to health as one of the main indicators of ‘human development’, as in the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) which includes measures of health. The World Health Organisation (WHO) prefers to measure the average number of DALYs (Disability Adjusted Life Years) lived by a population group, and not simply the simple life expectancy.

^{2}

Philosophers Doyal and Gough (1991) propose a theory of human need in which health and autonomy are the basic elements.

^{3}

我们的具身性和生物依赖性意味着，发展研究将健康视为“人类发展”的主要指标之一，如联合国开发计划署（UNDP）人类发展指数（HDI）所包含的健康指标。世界卫生组织（WHO）更倾向于衡量一个人口群体所经历的平均残疾调整生命年（DALYs），而不仅仅是简单的预期寿命。

^{2}

哲学家 Doyal 和 Gough（1991）提出了一种人类需求理论，其中健康和自主性是基本要素。

^{3}

Under the ‘magnifying glass’ of the ordinary daily life of people in Chapter 2, we saw a series of ‘unsafe conditions’ lying dormant, to be activated by the trigger of an extreme natural event. ‘Normal’ health status is clearly among these conditions of daily life. Although planning and policy making require us to step back and generalise, it is important that we remember also the fine-grained detail of the biological in daily life, ‘the visceral, mortal and, above all, interconnected rhythms of living people, animals, plants and places’ (Whatmore 1999:159).
在第二章中，普通日常生活的“放大镜”下，我们看到了潜伏的一系列“安全隐患”，这些隐患将在极端自然事件的触发下被激活。“正常”的健康状态显然是这些日常生活条件之一。尽管规划和政策制定要求我们退后一步并进行概括，但重要的是我们也要记住日常生活中生物学的细微细节，“生动的、致命的，最重要的是，生活的人、动物、植物和地方之间相互联系的节奏”（Whatmore 1999:159）。

What are biological hazards?
什么是生物危害？

Biological hazards include micro-organisms such as those responsible for epidemic human disease, ‘epidemics’ (epizootics) such as rinderpest, foot/hoof and mouth and swine fever that affect livestock, and diseases of plants (especially crops). Insects (mosquitoes, rats, lice, fleas) and other animals (dioch birds, locusts, army worms, grasshoppers) can transmit disease or can destroy crops.
生物危害包括微生物，例如那些导致人类流行病的微生物，以及影响家畜的“流行病”（动物疫情），如牛瘟、口蹄疫和猪瘟，以及植物（尤其是农作物）的疾病。昆虫（蚊子、老鼠、虱子、跳蚤）和其他动物（如鸟类、蝗虫、军虫、蚂蚱）可以传播疾病或破坏农作物。

To varying degrees, humans have developed social (as well as biological) resistance to such hazards. Human culture has also developed ways of tolerating crop and animal losses up to certain levels. Indeed, people may be ambivalent towards certain pests (the grasshoppers in south-east Nigeria that constitute the major crop hazard are seen as a food source by women and children) (Richards 1985). Elaborate adjustments of technosocial systems have developed in the face of diseases of plants and animals, and of crop losses due to pests and vermin (Mascarenhas 1971) and post-harvest losses (Bates 1986). In most cases the existence of a ‘normal surplus’ is enough simply to absorb such losses. That is, during ‘normal’ times people’s subsistence systems tend to overproduce beyond subsistence needs to ensure that needs will still be met in all but the very worst times (Allan 1965; Porter 1979). What has been common practice among peasant farmers and pastoralists for centuries has recently been rediscovered in the context of European and North American agriculture as ‘integrated pest management’. A degree of loss is tolerated until it exceeds the marginal cost of action against the pest (Altieri 1987).
在人类的不同程度上，已经发展出对这些危害的社会（以及生物）抵抗力。人类文化也发展出了一些方法，以容忍作物和动物损失达到一定水平。实际上，人们可能对某些害虫持矛盾态度（在尼日利亚东南部，作为主要作物危害的蝗虫被妇女和儿童视为食物来源）（Richards 1985）。在面对植物和动物疾病，以及由于害虫和有害动物造成的作物损失（Mascarenhas 1971）和收获后损失（Bates 1986）时，复杂的技术社会系统调整已经发展起来。在大多数情况下，存在“正常盈余”就足以吸收这些损失。也就是说，在“正常”时期，人们的生计系统往往会超出生计需求进行过度生产，以确保在除最糟糕的时期外，需求仍然能够得到满足（Allan 1965；Porter 1979）。几个世纪以来，农民和牧民之间的共同做法最近在欧洲和北美农业的背景下被重新发现为“综合害虫管理”。在损失程度被容忍的范围内，直到其超过对抗害虫的边际成本为止（Altieri 1987）。

Apart from specialised public health writing, the disaster literature has tended to neglect biological hazards.

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Epidemics and other biological hazards were also excluded from the programme of the UN International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). With increased public awareness of the potential for biological terrorism and awareness of high-profile epidemics such as HIV-AIDS and SARS,

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both specialist and
除了专业的公共卫生写作外，灾害文献往往忽视生物危害。

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疫情和其他生物危害也被排除在联合国自然灾害减灾国际十年（IDNDR）的计划之外。随着公众对生物恐怖主义潜在风险的认识以及对 HIV-AIDS 和 SARS 等高知名度疫情的关注，

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专业和
more general writing on the subject is increasing. However, an understanding of biological hazards has even wider application to the field of disaster management. It permits better comprehension of how health problems contribute to people’s vulnerability to other hazards, and also allows understanding of the health impacts of other hazards, for example where floods expose people to new health risks.
更一般的相关写作正在增加。然而，对生物危害的理解在灾害管理领域的应用更为广泛。它有助于更好地理解健康问题如何使人们对其他危害的脆弱性加剧，同时也有助于理解其他危害的健康影响，例如洪水使人们面临新的健康风险。

In this chapter, biological hazards are understood in several ways. They can be seen to be partly independent of and prior to other types of hazards (that is, they develop into, contribute to, or exacerbate vulnerability leading to disasters). The HIV-AIDS pandemic in southern Africa, discussed later, is such an example. There are also biological hazards that result from disastrous events. War and drought can lead to malnutrition and famine conditions, and these, in turn, make outbreaks of disease more likely and reduce resistance to these diseases, leading to much higher rates of morbidity and mortality and precipitating a more rapid and profound descent from ‘normal life’, as explained in Chapters 3 and 4. Finally, biological hazards can act as the trigger of disasters in their own right, as with serious pest infestations, the potato fungal blight in the Irish famine of 1845-1848 (see below), the worldwide influenza pandemic of 1917-1919 or the outbreak of a previously unknown virus responsible for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003.
在本章中，生物危害有多种理解方式。它们可以被视为在某种程度上独立于其他类型的危害（即，它们发展成、促进或加剧导致灾难的脆弱性）。南非的 HIV-AIDS 大流行就是一个这样的例子。还有一些生物危害是由灾难事件引起的。战争和干旱可以导致营养不良和饥荒，这反过来又使疾病爆发的可能性增加，并降低对这些疾病的抵抗力，导致更高的发病率和死亡率，并加速从“正常生活”中更快速和深刻的下降，如第 3 章和第 4 章所解释的。最后，生物危害本身也可以作为灾难的触发因素，例如严重的害虫侵扰、1845-1848 年爱尔兰饥荒中的马铃薯真菌病、1917-1919 年的全球流感大流行或 2003 年导致严重急性呼吸综合症（SARS）爆发的未知病毒。

Limitations to our treatment of biological hazards
我们对生物危害的处理限制

In Chapter 1 we cautioned that differential vulnerability may not be a major determinant of the distribution of impact for all disasters, or if it is, then it is sometimes in latent and complex forms for which there may be no clearcut policy responses. Differential vulnerability across populations (which is usually also variable across space and time) is relevant in most disasters. But there may be ‘limiting cases’, where vulnerability resulting from social processes are of little significance for the outcome of the disaster. In such cases, the issue of how a hazard’s impact is distributed among a particular population would be irrelevant. The Black Death in fourteenth-century Europe may have been such a case.
在第一章中，我们警告说，差异性脆弱性可能不是所有灾害影响分布的主要决定因素，或者即使是，它有时也以潜在和复杂的形式存在，可能没有明确的政策响应。不同人群之间的差异性脆弱性（通常在空间和时间上也会有所变化）在大多数灾害中都是相关的。但可能存在“极限案例”，在这些案例中，社会过程导致的脆弱性对灾害结果的影响微乎其微。在这种情况下，危险影响在特定人群中的分布问题将变得无关紧要。十四世纪欧洲的黑死病可能就是这样一个案例。

In the past, a disease outbreak over a large area, affecting a high proportion of the population, may not have respected the social class or other differential characteristics of the population. These pandemics contrast strongly with more limited disease outbreaks (e.g. plague in London in the mid-1660s or yellow fever in Memphis, Tennessee in the

1870 s^{6}

) when the wealthier residents escaped into the countryside to wait out the epidemics. In the present situation, with HIV-AIDS in developing countries, infection is clearly determined by social factors, including gender attitudes and sexual practice, social class, geographical location and access to costly medical care. The extension of life and the likelihood of dying are socially determined: a relatively high mortality or reduced life span are concentrated among people too poor to afford therapeutic drugs or in countries which have a poorly developed distribution system of health care.

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This chapter will explore such limits to the applicability of ‘vulnerability’ as a concept in relation to biological disasters. Severe and widespread plagues, pestilence and infestations, as well as biological terrorism, serve as an extreme test of the vulnerability concept.
在过去，影响大面积人口的疾病爆发可能并不尊重社会阶层或其他人口的差异特征。这些大流行病与更有限的疾病爆发（例如 1660 年代中期伦敦的瘟疫或田纳西州孟菲斯的黄热病）形成了鲜明对比，当时富裕的居民逃往乡村以躲避疫情。在当前情况下，发展中国家的 HIV-AIDS 感染显然受到社会因素的影响，包括性别态度和性行为、社会阶层、地理位置以及获得昂贵医疗护理的机会。生命的延续和死亡的可能性是社会决定的：相对较高的死亡率或缩短的寿命集中在那些太贫困而无法负担治疗药物的人群中，或在那些医疗保健分配系统不发达的国家。

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本章将探讨“脆弱性”作为一个概念在生物灾害相关性方面的适用性限制。严重且广泛的瘟疫、疫病和虫害，以及生物恐怖主义，作为对脆弱性概念的极端考验。

Bujra, in judging the appropriateness of the 'risk society’ (see Chapter 1) framework
Bujra 在评判“风险社会”（见第一章）框架的适用性时
for understanding HIV-AIDS in Africa, also explores that boundary.
也探讨了这一界限，以理解非洲的 HIV-AIDS。
Whilst the patterns of transmission and spread of AIDS in Africa may be linked to the changes wrought by capitalist penetration, the disease itself is not a product of ‘science’, that is, equivalent to pollution, toxicity, the nuclear threat or genetic engineering.
尽管非洲艾滋病的传播和扩散模式可能与资本主义渗透所带来的变化有关，但该疾病本身并不是“科学”的产物，也就是说，不等同于污染、毒性、核威胁或基因工程。
(Bujra 2000:62)（Bujra 2000:62）
But what of the case of arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh? There, an estimated 77 million people are suffering chronic arsenic poisoning because an ambitious, donor-funded welldigging project in the 1980s failed to test groundwater for this substance.

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The project has become an enormous controversy involving UNICEF and the British Geological Survey (BGS), the agency involved that failed to test the water for arsenic.

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This is a case of how ‘science’, in the form of humanitarian and ‘top down’ projects in less developed countries (LDCs), can have unforeseen consequences for human health, just as ‘science’ in industrial countries has created ‘diseases of modernity’.
但是孟加拉国的砷中毒案例又如何呢？在那里，估计有 7700 万人因 1980 年代一个雄心勃勃的、由捐助者资助的井钻项目未能检测地下水中的这种物质而遭受慢性砷中毒。

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该项目已成为一个巨大的争议，涉及联合国儿童基金会和英国地质调查局（BGS），该机构未能检测水中的砷。

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这是一个关于“科学”在欠发达国家（LDCs）以人道主义和“自上而下”项目形式所带来的对人类健康的意想不到后果的案例，就像“科学”在工业国家创造了“现代病”一样。

We also exclude from treatment in this chapter the threat of biological terrorism. The ‘science’ devoted to building military stockpiles and technologies of dispersion during the Cold War can be credited with creating this hazard.

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The anthrax spores sent in the US mail that killed several people and became infamous for shutting down the US Congressional office buildings in 2001 had their origins in US Army laboratories. This risk is a classic example of the construction of the ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992). Although it could be argued that in this case it was predominantly black, working-class postal employees who were more vulnerable to harm from letters containing anthrax, it is more complex than that. We have to set the subject of bio-terror aside due to these complications and to limits on the size of this book.
我们在本章中也排除了生物恐怖主义的威胁。冷战期间用于建立军事储备和扩散技术的“科学”可以被认为是造成这一危害的原因。

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2001 年通过美国邮政发送的炭疽孢子导致几人死亡，并因关闭美国国会办公大楼而声名显赫，其起源于美国陆军实验室。这一风险是“风险社会”构建的经典例子（Beck 1992）。尽管可以说在这种情况下，主要是黑人、工人阶级的邮政员工更容易受到含有炭疽的信件的伤害，但事情比这更复杂。由于这些复杂性以及本书的篇幅限制，我们必须将生物恐怖主义这一主题搁置。

However, in one important respect the concern about biological terrorism and other forms of domestic attack in the USA, and elsewhere, has a direct bearing on our book. Firstly, budget priorities in the US have been diverted from routine public health activities (occupational health, environmental health) and extra money (

$ 6

billion) provided for laboratory identification of terror pathogens and rapid communication of information about outbreaks. The running-down of ‘routine’ public health activities is possibly a much greater risk than missing the start of an epidemic created by terrorists (Stolberg 2002a:A20). Although a counter-argument has been made, namely that the rapid response to the SARS epidemic of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and its improved links with state and municipal health authorities are the result of enhancements of the public health system brought about by investments in preparedness for biological terrorism (Goldstein 2003).
然而，在一个重要方面，对美国及其他地方生物恐怖主义和其他形式国内攻击的担忧与我们的书有直接关系。首先，美国的预算优先事项已从常规公共卫生活动（职业健康、环境健康）转移，额外提供了（

$ 6

十亿）用于实验室识别恐怖病原体和快速传播疫情信息。常规公共卫生活动的削弱可能比错过由恐怖分子引发的流行病的开始更具风险（Stolberg 2002a:A20）。尽管有反驳的论点，即美国疾病控制与预防中心对 SARS 疫情的快速反应及其与州和市卫生当局的改善联系是由于对生物恐怖主义准备投资所带来的公共卫生系统的增强（Goldstein 2003）。

The inward-looking American preoccupation with ‘homeland security’ may also cause reductions in foreign aid in the fight against ‘natural’ biological hazards that far outweigh the risks from bio-terrorism. When UN Secretary General Kofi Annan requested more funding from the US President for the global campaign against HIV-AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, the response was that the needs of the war against terrorism came first and limited the ability of the US to contribute.

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It must be said that public health expenditure in any country is determined by many complex political and economic factors. However,
美国对“本土安全”的内向关注可能导致在对抗“自然”生物危害方面减少对外援助，而这些危害远远超过生物恐怖主义的风险。当联合国秘书长科菲·安南向美国总统请求更多资金以支持全球抗击艾滋病、结核病和疟疾的运动时，回应是反恐战争的需求优先，限制了美国的贡献能力。必须指出的是，任何国家的公共卫生支出都受到许多复杂的政治和经济因素的影响。然而，
in already poor countries with large numbers of vulnerable people, reductions in statefinanced health care often greatly increase the level of biological risks. The result is likely to be increased morbidity, disability and mortality, and the deepening of vulnerability over time.
在已经贫困的国家中，脆弱人群数量庞大，国家资助的医疗保健减少往往会大大增加生物风险的水平。结果可能导致发病率、残疾和死亡率的增加，以及脆弱性的加深。

The US decision to ignore the 1997 Kyoto Treaty on global climate change and to introduce, instead, a system of voluntary increases in energy efficiency based on tax incentives may also have a large impact on biological hazards worldwide. Whatever effect the US faith in market-based solutions, it cannot possibly reduce its carbon emissions to the 1990 level by 2010, which is the Kyoto goal. Current international scientific consensus is that even if this goal were reached, profound changes in the distribution of agro-ecological zones, disease vector habitats and extreme climate hazards will occur. All of these changes will bring with them health consequences (as well as interconnected social, economic and political consequences) for millions of people.

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美国决定忽视 1997 年关于全球气候变化的京都议定书，而是引入基于税收激励的自愿提高能源效率的系统，这可能对全球生物危害产生重大影响。无论美国对市场解决方案的信心如何，它都不可能在 2010 年前将碳排放量减少到 1990 年的水平，这是京都议定书的目标。目前国际科学界的共识是，即使实现了这一目标，农业生态区、疾病传播媒介栖息地和极端气候危害的分布也将发生深刻变化。所有这些变化将给数百万人带来健康后果（以及相互关联的社会、经济和政治后果）。

Biological links with other hazards
生物与其他危害的联系

Many other hazards such as floods, drought and tropical cyclones can have potentially severe biological and epidemiological consequences as secondary effects (Noji 1997; de Boer and Dubouloz 2000). Therefore this chapter shares some concerns with other chapters in Part II. For instance, flooding in LDCs is commonly followed by epidemics of diarrhoea due to contamination of drinking water. Volcanic eruptions are often followed by outbreaks of respiratory problems due to the ash fall and emission of gases (Baxter 1997). There is no doubt that people who survive the immediate impact of some hazards can then suffer additionally from a consequent health crisis.
许多其他危险，如洪水、干旱和热带气旋，可能会作为次要影响产生严重的生物和流行病学后果（Noji 1997；de Boer 和 Dubouloz 2000）。因此，本章与第二部分的其他章节有一些共同的关注点。例如，发展中国家的洪水通常会导致饮用水污染，从而引发腹泻疫情。火山喷发后，常常会因灰烬降落和气体排放而出现呼吸问题的爆发（Baxter 1997）。毫无疑问，幸存于某些危险的直接影响的人们，随后可能会遭受随之而来的健康危机。

Conversely, vulnerability to the impacts of many hazards (e.g. drought, heat waves, severe winter storms) is increased in populations with chronically bad health. Hence an understanding of disease helps us grasp the implications of access (to adequate resources and livelihoods) in understanding the full impact of flood, drought and other extreme natural events. A vivid and tragic example of this can be seen in events in a remote part of Afghanistan in 2002. Despite a pledge of some

$ 4.5

billion to rebuild the country, life in the villages in the so-called ‘hunger belt’ is unlikely to change soon. Four years of the impact of drought, exacerbated by war and isolation, meant that tuberculosis as well as starvation was rampant. In the words of an eye witness:
相反，许多灾害（例如干旱、热浪、严重冬季风暴）的影响对健康状况长期不佳的人群的脆弱性有所增加。因此，了解疾病有助于我们理解获取（足够资源和生计）的影响，从而全面理解洪水、干旱和其他极端自然事件的影响。2002 年在阿富汗一个偏远地区发生的事件就是一个生动而悲惨的例子。尽管承诺拨款

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十亿重建国家，但在所谓的“饥饿带”中的村庄生活不太可能很快改变。四年的干旱影响，加上战争和孤立，使得结核病和饥饿肆虐。目击者的话是：

Here, as in nearly all the 380-odd villages of Jawand, hunger and disease ravage the population, culling babies, women, and the elderly. The living stagger on, coughing their lungs and their lives out with tuberculosis. People are so weakened by hunger that even flu can kill.
在 Jawand 的 380 多个村庄中，饥饿和疾病肆虐着人口，婴儿、女性和老年人遭到淘汰。幸存者们咳嗽着，咳出他们的肺和生命，结核病肆虐。人们因饥饿而虚弱，连流感都能致命。
(Goldenberg 2002:3)

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（Goldenberg 2002:3）

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There has been a protracted debate on the causes of death during famines, and recently this has focused more on the role of disease. Until the 1980s deaths were assumed to be caused mainly by starvation. More recent studies argue that hunger reduces people’s resistance to disease, and often dysentery and gastro-enteritis are the cause of death. This view was questioned by de Waal (1989b), who suggested that higher mortality was
在饥荒期间死亡原因的讨论已经持续了很长时间，最近的焦点更多地放在了疾病的作用上。在 1980 年代之前，人们普遍认为死亡主要是由于饥饿造成的。最近的研究认为，饥饿降低了人们对疾病的抵抗力，通常痢疾和肠胃炎是导致死亡的原因。这个观点被德瓦尔（1989b）质疑，他认为更高的死亡率是由于感染暴露的增加，尤其是在流离失所者和难民的营地中。
caused rather by increased exposure to infection, especially in camps for displaced persons and refugees. Indeed, in some Sudanese refugee camps in 1985 de Waal found no correlation between wealth and mortality. The rich had the money to buy food, but perished along with their poorer neighbours because of similar levels of exposure to biological hazards.
确实，在 1985 年一些苏丹难民营中，德瓦尔发现财富与死亡率之间没有相关性。富人有钱可以买食物，但由于暴露于生物危害的程度相似，他们与贫穷的邻居一起死去。

Although the crisis was a result of conflict and not drought/famine, de Waal’s point about crowded camps and exposure to disease agents is supported by what happened when large numbers of people fled the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Refugees numbering 800,000 were accommodated in camps near Goma (eastern Zaire, now Congo). There was an epidemic of cholera (a water- and food-borne disease) during the first month of the exodus from Rwanda which may have killed as many as 30,000 people in the Goma camps (Borton et al. 1996).

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Undoubtedly there has been a degree of generalisation from one type of famine to another. It seems reasonable to take account of the varying conditions of each famine, and to understand the linkages between mortality and undernutrition, malnutrition, resistance to disease and exposure to disease.
尽管危机是由于冲突而非干旱/饥荒造成的，但德瓦尔关于拥挤营地和暴露于疾病因子的观点得到了 1994 年大量人们逃离卢旺达种族灭绝时发生的事件的支持。大约 80 万难民被安置在靠近戈马（东扎伊尔，现在的刚果）的营地。在从卢旺达撤离的第一个月，戈马营地爆发了霍乱（由水和食物传播的疾病），可能导致多达 30,000 人死亡（Borton et al. 1996）。毫无疑问，从一种饥荒类型到另一种饥荒类型存在一定程度的概括。考虑到每种饥荒的不同条件，并理解死亡率与营养不良、抵抗疾病和暴露于疾病之间的联系似乎是合理的。

It is not just in large-scale famine relief and war-time refuges for displaced civilians that density and sanitary conditions can compromise health. In other, smaller evacuations of people from approaching cyclones or likely volcanic eruptions there have also been cases of poor hygiene and health hazards. In some of these cases, the consequences of the hazard itself may be insignificant compared with those of removal to shelters or camps, in which there are opportunities for the increased spread of communicable disease and where sanitation is usually rudimentary (PAHO 1982:3-12; Simmonds et al. 1983:125165; Médecins Sans Frontières 1997).
不仅在大规模的饥荒救助和战争时期对流离失所的平民的庇护所中，密度和卫生条件可能会影响健康。在其他一些较小规模的撤离中，例如因即将来临的气旋或可能的火山喷发而撤离的人群中，也出现了卫生条件差和健康危害的案例。在这些案例中，危害本身的后果可能与撤离到庇护所或营地的后果相比微不足道，因为在这些地方，传染病传播的机会增加，卫生条件通常也很简陋（PAHO 1982:3-12；Simmonds et al. 1983:125165；无国界医生 1997）。

In extreme cases of the destruction of infrastructure in cities there may be significant water and sanitation hazards. Examples include the volcanic eruption near Goma in 2002 and the earthquake in the Indian state of Gujarat (2001) (see Chapter 8 for more detailed discussion of both occurrences). After both of these events, the survivors were deprived of adequate water and sanitation, and there were outbreaks of cholera. Other extreme events (floods, tropical cyclones, tsunamis) are more likely to lead to increased waterand vector-borne diseases such as typhoid, cholera, leptospirosis and typhus, malaria and encephalitis.

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In such situations environmental engineering and surveillance are generally advised rather than mass immunisation (Woodruff et al. 1990; PAHO 1982:1321, 53-60, 2000b:47-9; see Chapter 6:220-221).
在城市基础设施严重破坏的极端情况下，可能会出现显著的水和卫生危害。例子包括 2002 年在戈马附近的火山爆发和 2001 年印度古吉拉特邦的地震（有关这两次事件的更详细讨论，请参见第 8 章）。在这两次事件之后，幸存者缺乏足够的水和卫生设施，并且发生了霍乱疫情。其他极端事件（洪水、热带气旋、海啸）更可能导致水源和媒介传播疾病的增加，如伤寒、霍乱、钩端螺旋体病、斑疹伤寒、疟疾和脑炎。在这种情况下，通常建议进行环境工程和监测，而不是大规模免疫接种（Woodruff et al. 1990; PAHO 1982:1321, 53-60, 2000b:47-9; 请参见第 6 章:220-221）。

In other hazard events, it is likely that moderate earthquakes, landslides and tornadoes have few serious secondary epidemiological threats.

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In fact, the disease consequences of natural hazard events such as moderate earthquakes have often been overestimated or misinterpreted (Cuny 1983:44-49). The mass burial of victims of moderate earthquakes is still common, despite repeated statements by the WHO and other health authorities that corpses do not present an acute public health risk.
在其他灾害事件中，适度的地震、滑坡和龙卷风很可能没有严重的次生流行病威胁。

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实际上，自然灾害事件（如适度地震）造成的疾病后果往往被高估或误解（Cuny 1983:44-49）。尽管世界卫生组织和其他卫生当局多次声明尸体并不构成急性公共卫生风险，但适度地震的受害者大规模埋葬仍然很常见。

Livelihoods, resources and disease
生计、资源和疾病

As with the other hazards treated in this book, understanding normal daily life tells us important things that may be hidden by an extreme situation such as a cholera outbreak in
与本书中讨论的其他灾害一样，理解正常的日常生活可以告诉我们一些在极端情况下（如霍乱爆发）可能被掩盖的重要信息。
a refugee camp. The Access model developed in Chapter 3 can be applied to the way in which normal ‘access to health’ is affected by social, economic and political processes.
在难民营中。第 3 章中开发的接入模型可以应用于正常“健康接入”如何受到社会、经济和政治过程的影响。

The role of access
访问的角色

The Access model in Figure 3.2 (p. 99) shows the factors and processes that determine household and individual livelihood resources and income opportunities (Boxes 1 to 4). Households have differential access to production resources such as land, labour, tools, knowledge, skill, livestock and to social networks and employment opportunities with which to provide a livelihood (Box 2b). ‘Health’ (nutritional level, housing and sanitation, health care, etc.) and well-being are a function of this ‘livelihood’-the more secure and adequate the livelihood, the lower the level of the health component of vulnerability. Well-being and health are attained both by accessing adequate public services (if they are not privatised), and by using household income and assets to provide adequate nutrition, and to treat illness or injury (Boxes 2b and 7).
图 3.2（第 99 页）中的访问模型展示了决定家庭和个人生计资源及收入机会的因素和过程（框 1 至 4）。家庭对生产资源的获取存在差异，例如土地、劳动力、工具、知识、技能、牲畜，以及社会网络和就业机会，这些都是提供生计的基础（框 2b）。“健康”（营养水平、住房和卫生、医疗保健等）和福祉是这一“生计”的函数——生计越安全和充足，脆弱性中健康成分的水平就越低。福祉和健康的获得既依赖于获取足够的公共服务（如果没有被私有化），也依赖于利用家庭收入和资产提供足够的营养，以及治疗疾病或伤害（框 2b 和 7）。

Some of the livelihood activities may in themselves be hazardous in terms of health. Pesticides may be applied by people without adequate protection such as gloves, mask or boots. Many ‘development’ projects, including irrigation schemes, have associated health risks, including malaria and schistosomiasis (bilharzia) (Hughes and Hunter 1970; Wisner 1976a; Bradley 1977; Spielman and D’Antonio 2001:172-8). Migrants may expose other family members to disease when they return home (see the classic studies by Forde [1972] on contact with tsetse flies, Prothero [1965] on anopheline mosquitoes) or sources of infection not found at home.

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In this way, access to resources that are meant to sustain family health may be achieved only at the cost of exposing them to other risks.
一些生计活动本身可能在健康方面是有害的。农药可能会被没有足够保护措施（如手套、口罩或靴子）的人使用。许多“发展”项目，包括灌溉计划，都伴随着健康风险，包括疟疾和血吸虫病（巴尔哈齐）(Hughes 和 Hunter 1970; Wisner 1976a; Bradley 1977; Spielman 和 D’Antonio 2001:172-8)。移民在回家时可能会将其他家庭成员暴露于疾病中（参见 Forde [1972] 关于与采采蝇接触的经典研究，Prothero [1965] 关于按蚊的研究）或家中没有的感染源。

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通过这种方式，获得旨在维持家庭健康的资源可能只能以暴露于其他风险为代价。
‘Normal’ levels of morbidity and mortality are influenced by these processes. The household’s reproductive fertility is determined by a complex chain of cultural, psychological and physiological events (Boxes 8 and 9), which in turn influence the health of individual members of the household through the sharing of food, the ante-natal health of children and the wellbeing of mothers after childbirth.
“正常”的发病率和死亡率受到这些过程的影响。家庭的生育能力由一系列复杂的文化、心理和生理事件决定（见框 8 和框 9），而这些事件又通过食物共享、儿童的产前健康以及母亲在分娩后的健康状况影响家庭中个体成员的健康。

Even the condition of ‘normality’ (often not ‘healthy’) can potentially contribute to biological disaster in three ways. Firstly, there may be sudden changes in class relations or structures of domination (Boxes 1 and 4) that reduce access to the resources essential to maintain even minimum ‘normal’ levels of health. Expropriation of land is an example of such change. Secondly, a breakdown in law and order may disrupt access to resources, increase the uncertainty of future income or propel people into headlong flight. When displaced people come into contact with disease vectors or agents new to them, widespread mortality can occur (Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982). In these examples, biological disaster occurs as a sequel to social disruptions such as war, pogroms, dispossession and famine. One needs only to think, in the early twenty-first century, of the suffering endured by the displaced people of Colombia, Congo, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq, to mention just a few of the most severe conflicts.
即使是“正常”状态（通常并非“健康”）也可能通过三种方式导致生物灾难。首先，阶级关系或统治结构可能会发生突变（见框 1 和框 4），从而减少获取维持最低“正常”健康水平所必需资源的机会。土地的征用就是这种变化的一个例子。其次，法律和秩序的崩溃可能会干扰资源的获取，增加未来收入的不确定性，或迫使人们仓皇逃离。当流离失所的人接触到对他们来说新的疾病媒介或病原体时，可能会发生广泛的死亡（Hansen 和 Oliver-Smith 1982）。在这些例子中，生物灾难是社会动荡（如战争、屠杀、剥夺和饥荒）的后果。只需想想在 21 世纪初，哥伦比亚、刚果、布隆迪、安哥拉、苏丹、阿富汗和伊拉克等地流离失所者所承受的痛苦，就可以提到一些最严重的冲突。

A third set of issues in the disruption of normality involves the breakdown in animal health, which can result in a deterioration in human health. In such cases a ‘vicious cycle’ of vulnerability is apparent. For instance, in the late 1970s an epizootic of foot/hoof and
一组与正常状态中断相关的问题涉及动物健康的恶化，这可能导致人类健康的下降。在这种情况下，脆弱性的“恶性循环”显而易见。例如，在 1970 年代末，发生了一次蹄病的流行。
mouth disease among cattle of the pastoral Maasai in Kenya led the government to prohibit the sale of Maasai animals (because of a fear that Kenyan beef would be banned from European markets). The quarantine disrupted livelihoods, and income with which to buy food was severely curtailed. The consequence was increased human morbidity and mortality (Campbell 1987). The Maasai’s increased vulnerability thus arose from a sudden decline in nutrition originally triggered by a biological hazard which affected their main source of livelihood and the economic shock of government policy, further complicated by endemic tuberculosis and measles. This series of events is a good example of the role of ‘food entitlement decline’ (FED) rather than 'food availability decline’ (FAD) as the main cause of hunger (see Chapter 4). The chain of causation of the Maasai crisis has root causes that include the historic loss of two-thirds of their grazing lands under British colonial rule and their isolation and neglect during colonial and post-colonial periods. Dynamic pressures include the lack of diversified income opportunities for pastoral people in contemporary Kenya, and the country’s acute external debt crisis that led to the national government’s urgent desire to maintain its share of the European market for beef.
肯尼亚牧民马赛人牛只口腔疾病导致政府禁止出售马赛动物（因为担心肯尼亚牛肉会被禁止进入欧洲市场）。检疫措施扰乱了生计，购买食物的收入大幅减少。结果是人类发病率和死亡率增加（Campbell 1987）。马赛人脆弱性的增加因此源于营养的突然下降，这最初是由影响他们主要生计来源的生物危害引发的，加上政府政策带来的经济冲击，进一步被地方性结核病和麻疹所复杂化。这一系列事件很好地说明了“食品权利下降”（FED）而非“食品可得性下降”（FAD）作为饥饿主要原因的角色（见第 4 章）。马赛危机的因果链条的根本原因包括在英国殖民统治下失去三分之二的放牧土地的历史，以及在殖民和后殖民时期的孤立和忽视。动态压力包括当代肯尼亚牧民缺乏多样化收入机会，以及该国严重的外债危机，这导致国家政府迫切希望维持其在欧洲牛肉市场的份额。

Vulnerability-creating processes
造成脆弱性的过程

Since vulnerability analysis should be useful to planners and other development workers, we need to specify as carefully as possible how causal chains of social and economic actions may affect people’s vulnerability, and the role of biological hazards in exacerbating this. We do so by discussing how these causal chains manifest themselves in different social and natural environments.
由于脆弱性分析应对规划者和其他发展工作者有用，我们需要尽可能仔细地指定社会和经济行动的因果链如何影响人们的脆弱性，以及生物危害在加剧这一点中的作用。我们通过讨论这些因果链如何在不同的社会和自然环境中表现出来来实现这一点。

The micro-environment微环境

Diet, shelter, sanitation and water supply work together at the household level to determine vulnerability to biological disaster. The synergism linking disease resistance and nutrition has already been mentioned. During the drought in the Sahel (1967-1973), most of the 100,000 lives lost were due to the interaction of starvation and measles in children (Morris and Sheets 1974). Baseline nutrition as a factor in famine has already been mentioned in Chapter 4 and is discussed earlier in this chapter. Previously wellnourished populations (such as the Dutch in the latter months of the Second World War) are able to survive famine conditions that would kill many more people from less wellnourished groups.

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饮食、住所、卫生和水供应在家庭层面共同决定了对生物灾害的脆弱性。疾病抵抗力与营养之间的协同作用已经提到过。在萨赫勒地区的干旱期间（1967-1973），失去的 100,000 条生命中，大多数是由于儿童饥饿与麻疹的相互作用（Morris and Sheets 1974）。作为饥荒因素的基础营养在第 4 章中已经提到，并在本章前面进行了讨论。以前营养良好的群体（如第二次世界大战后期的荷兰人）能够在饥荒条件下生存，而这些条件会导致营养较差的群体中更多人死亡。

Vulnerability may be specifically affected by the type and location of housing. Location, especially in urban areas, is constrained by law (such as zoning legislation), land prices, distance to livelihoods and availability of building materials. There are a million or so living as inhabitants of Cairo’s ‘City of the Dead’ (originally a cemetery) (Rodenbeck 2000) and thousands who inhabit the garbage dumps of Manila, Guatemala City and other cities in LDCs. They did not choose these locations on account of their pleasantness, but for the resources and income opportunities they make possible. But this also determines the quality of housing, water and sanitation. In later chapters we show
脆弱性可能会受到住房类型和位置的具体影响。位置，尤其是在城市地区，受到法律（如分区立法）、土地价格、与生计的距离以及建筑材料的可用性等因素的限制。大约有一百万居民生活在开罗的“死亡之城”（最初是一个墓地）（Rodenbeck 2000），还有成千上万的人居住在马尼拉、危地马拉城和其他发展中国家的垃圾场。他们并不是因为这些地方的宜居性而选择这些位置，而是因为这些地方提供的资源和收入机会。但这也决定了住房、水和卫生设施的质量。在后面的章节中，我们将展示
how some groups of people are constrained in their locational decisions within a specific urban political ecology, so increasing their vulnerability to mudslides, floods, storms and earthquakes. Biological hazards are clearly worsened by various social and economic factors, especially those affecting housing type and location.
一些人群在特定城市政治生态中受到位置决策的限制，从而增加了他们对泥石流、洪水、风暴和地震的脆弱性。生物危害显然受到各种社会和经济因素的加剧，尤其是那些影响住房类型和位置的因素。

Migration and biological hazards
迁移与生物危害

The impact of migration on people also plays an important role in determining vulnerability (Earickson and Meade 2000). Roundy (1983) has shown that movements of Ethiopians, even over short distances, can introduce people to health threats if a large change in altitude or a shift to another ecosystem is involved. Seasonal wage migration of highland dwellers to the coasts of Central and Andean South America produces similar effects. Long-distance migrants can become victims of malaria, sleeping sickness and other diseases. Migrant workers are also a significant factor in spreading HIV-AIDS (see below).
迁移对人们的影响在确定脆弱性方面也起着重要作用（Earickson 和 Meade 2000）。Roundy（1983）已经表明，埃塞俄比亚人的迁移，即使是短距离的移动，如果涉及到海拔的巨大变化或转移到另一个生态系统，也可能使人们面临健康威胁。高地居民季节性迁移到中美洲和安第斯南美的海岸产生类似的影响。长途迁移者可能成为疟疾、昏睡病和其他疾病的受害者。 migrant workers 也是传播 HIV-AIDS 的一个重要因素（见下文）。

When whole families migrate to very different environments (willingly or with various degrees of state coercion), severe health problems have been recorded. Migrants from the North-east and South of Brazil suffered high morbidity and mortality in newly settled Amazonian habitats (Schmink and Wood 1992). Migrants from the northern parts of Ethiopia who moved to the south-west (usually under powerful state coercion) also suffered greatly (Kebbede 1992; Clay et al. 1988). Similarly, in the 1920s Soviet settlers in Siberia endured a range of viral diseases that were transmitted via the wild rodent population (Pavlovsky n.d.). Longitudinal studies have revealed that several decades after being resettled from the valley flooded for the Kariba dam on the Zambia/Zimbabwe border, people were still suffering measurable health consequences (Scudder 1980, 1989; cf. Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982). Forced displacement has had even more severe health consequences than migration.

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当整个家庭迁移到非常不同的环境中（无论是自愿还是在不同程度的国家强制下），都记录了严重的健康问题。来自巴西东北部和南部的移民在新定居的亚马逊栖息地中遭受了高发病率和死亡率（Schmink and Wood 1992）。从埃塞俄比亚北部迁移到西南部的移民（通常是在强大的国家强制下）也遭受了巨大的痛苦（Kebbede 1992；Clay et al. 1988）。同样，在 1920 年代，定居在西伯利亚的苏联移民遭受了一系列通过野生啮齿动物传播的病毒性疾病（Pavlovsky n.d.）。纵向研究表明，在从赞比亚/津巴布韦边界的卡里巴大坝淹没的山谷重新安置数十年后，人们仍然遭受可测量的健康后果（Scudder 1980, 1989；参见 Hansen 和 Oliver-Smith 1982）。强迫迁移的健康后果比迁移更为严重。

All such displacements have resulted in significant levels of epidemic disease. Even the best-run refugee camps have problems with sanitation (Khan and Shahidullah 1982; PAHO 1982, 2000b; Morris et al. 1982; Harrell-Bond 1986; Médecins Sans Frontières 1997; Wisner and Adams 2003). Besides the cholera epidemic in the Rwandan refugee camps mentioned earlier, outbreaks of epidemic diarrhoeal disease have occurred in Latin American camps (Isaza et al. 1980) and elsewhere in Africa (Rivers et al. 1974) as well as Asia (Anton et al. 1981; Temcharoen et al. 1979). Crowding produces ideal conditions for the spread of air-borne infections and other diseases transmitted by personal contact. Until it was controlled, smallpox could spread rapidly through non-immunised refugee populations (Mazumder and Chakrabarty 1973; McNeil 1979). Higher population densities also make the transmission of malaria easier, especially where there is drug resistance (Reacher et al. 1980) or acute nutritional stress (Murray et al. 1978).
所有这些流离失所导致了显著的流行病水平。即使是管理最好的难民营也存在卫生问题（Khan 和 Shahidullah 1982；PAHO 1982, 2000b；Morris 等 1982；Harrell-Bond 1986；无国界医生 1997；Wisner 和 Adams 2003）。除了前面提到的卢旺达难民营的霍乱疫情外，拉丁美洲的难民营（Isaza 等 1980）和非洲其他地区（Rivers 等 1974）以及亚洲（Anton 等 1981；Temcharoen 等 1979）也发生了流行性腹泻疾病的暴发。人群拥挤为空气传播感染和其他通过个人接触传播的疾病创造了理想条件。在得到控制之前，天花可以在未接种疫苗的难民人群中迅速传播（Mazumder 和 Chakrabarty 1973；McNeil 1979）。更高的人口密度也使疟疾的传播变得更容易，尤其是在存在药物抗性（Reacher 等 1980）或急性营养压力（Murray 等 1978）的情况下。

Regional physical environment
区域物理环境

Soil erosion, desertification and alkalinisation have been labelled ‘pervasive’ or ‘slowonset’ hazards (Pryor 1982; Blaikie 1985b). Degradation of environments can so reduce livelihood resources that people suffer increased vulnerability to a number of hazards,
土壤侵蚀、沙漠化和碱化被标记为“普遍”或“缓慢发生”的危害（Pryor 1982；Blaikie 1985b）。环境的退化可能会减少生计资源，使人们对多种危害的脆弱性增加，
including biological ones. But it can also affect vulnerability in other ways, by reducing or damaging the earth’s genetic materials. Air- or water-borne industrial pollution can also have this effect. As well as rendering fisheries and farmland barren, it can cause the death of trees, wildlife and mangroves (Eckholm 1976; Maltby 1986), thus reducing livelihood resources and at the same time damaging biodiversity.
包括生物危害。但它也可以通过减少或损害地球的遗传材料以其他方式影响脆弱性。空气或水传播的工业污染也可能产生这种影响。除了使渔业和农田变得贫瘠外，它还可能导致树木、野生动物和红树林的死亡（Eckholm 1976；Maltby 1986），从而减少生计资源，同时破坏生物多样性。

There has been much discussion of worldwide threats to biodiversity (E.O.Wilson 1988, 1989; Juma 1989; Fowler and Mooney 1990). Efforts to protect genetic resources include the Convention on Biodiversity which was agreed as part of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the Seed Treaty, agreed at FAO headquarters in 2001, and an appeal by NGOs from 50 countries to establish a worldwide ‘genetic commons’.

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In the long run, declining biodiversity could provoke or at least amplify biological disasters, especially as the wild ancestors of our food crops are lost or abandoned. Since roughly one-quarter of all pharmaceutical products have plant or animal origins, diminished biodiversity could undermine the scope of therapy in the face of new diseases. Depletion of regional genetic resources has already contributed (as ‘trigger’) to disasters, and should be considered a pervasive hazard, as illustrated by the Irish potato famine (Box 5.1).
关于全球生物多样性威胁的讨论已经很多（E.O.Wilson 1988, 1989; Juma 1989; Fowler and Mooney 1990）。保护遗传资源的努力包括 1992 年在里约地球峰会上达成的生物多样性公约、2001 年在粮农组织总部达成的种子条约，以及来自 50 个国家的非政府组织呼吁建立全球“遗传公地”。

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从长远来看，生物多样性的下降可能引发或至少加剧生物灾难，尤其是当我们食物作物的野生祖先被丢弃或消失时。由于大约四分之一的药品来源于植物或动物，生物多样性的减少可能会在面对新疾病时削弱治疗的范围。区域遗传资源的枯竭已经作为“触发因素”导致了灾难，应该被视为一种普遍的危害，正如爱尔兰大饥荒所示（框 5.1）。

Box 5.1: The Irish Potato Famine, 1845-1848
框 5.1：爱尔兰大饥荒，1845-1848 年

This disaster, like all others, involved unsafe conditions with origins in history.

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The reliance of the impoverished rural population of Ireland for 90 per cent of their food energy on potatoes meant that these people were highly vulnerable to the blight caused by the organism Phytophora infestans. The potatoes used by the Irish peasantry were all descended from a few hundred tubers brought from the Andes in the early 1600s. By the 1840s the potato gene pool in Ireland was extremely homogeneous, and thus vulnerable to widespread damage by disease. Genetic diversity would have conferred at least some protection, by increasing the chance that some potato varieties were resistant to blight.
这场灾难，像所有其他灾难一样，涉及到历史根源的安全隐患。

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爱尔兰贫困农村人口对土豆的食物能量依赖达 90%，这使得这些人对由真菌引起的疫病高度脆弱。爱尔兰农民所使用的土豆均源自于 17 世纪初从安第斯山脉带来的几百个块茎。到 1840 年代，爱尔兰的土豆基因库极为单一，因此容易受到疾病的广泛损害。遗传多样性本可以提供至少一些保护，因为它增加了某些土豆品种对疫病具有抗性的机会。

The root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions at work in this biological disaster are illustrated in Figure 5.1, a version of the Pressure and Release (PAR) model.
该生物灾难的根本原因、动态压力和工作中的不安全条件在图 5.1 中得到了说明，这是压力与释放（PAR）模型的一个版本。

The root causes can be traced back to the 1650s, when Cromwell’s conquest of Ireland began systematic discrimination against the Catholic peasant majority. Firstly, a large number were forced to resettle in the west of the country. Two centuries later this had produced a population distribution in western Ireland with high rural densities and small farms. It also encouraged reliance on potatoes because they could yield up to 2.5 tons per acre. The Penal Laws (1695) reinforced this pattern by making it illegal for most Catholics to own land. By then, English absentee landlords had been granted ownership of most of the land in Ireland. Protected by the Corn Laws, landlords profited from the export of grain and meat to England without facing any competition from cheaper foreign imports.
根本原因可以追溯到 1650 年代，当时克伦威尔征服爱尔兰开始对天主教农民多数进行系统性歧视。首先，大量人被迫迁移到国家的西部。两个世纪后，这导致了爱尔兰西部人口分布的高农村密度和小农场。它还鼓励人们依赖土豆，因为土豆每英亩可产量高达 2.5 吨。《惩罚法》（1695 年）通过使大多数天主教徒拥有土地变得非法，进一步强化了这一模式。到那时，英国的缺席地主已被授予爱尔兰大部分土地的所有权。在《谷物法》的保护下，地主从向英格兰出口谷物和肉类中获利，而不必面对来自更便宜的外国进口的竞争。

Contributing pressures that provided the background for specific vulnerability effects included the increase of the Irish Catholic population. In the many non-blighted years the potato had provided increased dietary energy, leading to higher child survival rates. The pressure remained to produce large families both to work the land and, above all, to seek paid employment in England and America (a part of the wage would be remitted to the rural home in Ireland). Population growth exacerbated pressure on land, particularly in the west, and maintained the trend towards very small farms. Export of grain and other food to England further reinforced a reliance on potatoes by the majority. Ireland’s economic dependence on England produced additional pressure on subsistence potato farming because the resulting low rate of domestic (Irish) saving meant that few non-farm jobs were available locally as an alternative.
造成特定脆弱性影响的压力因素包括爱尔兰天主教人口的增加。在许多没有灾害的年份，土豆提供了更多的饮食能量，导致儿童存活率提高。人们仍然面临着生育大家庭的压力，既是为了耕作土地，尤其是为了在英格兰和美国寻找有偿工作（部分工资会汇回爱尔兰的农村家中）。人口增长加剧了对土地的压力，特别是在西部，并维持了向非常小型农场的趋势。向英格兰出口谷物和其他食品进一步加深了大多数人对土豆的依赖。爱尔兰对英格兰的经济依赖对自给自足的土豆种植产生了额外压力，因为由此导致的国内（爱尔兰）储蓄率低，意味着当地几乎没有非农工作作为替代选择。

Specific vulnerability effects included a diet heavily dependent on potatoes, with reports that an adult would consume up to six kilograms a day, an amount that would provide 6,000 Kcal (Aykroyd 1974:32). At
特定的脆弱性影响包括饮食严重依赖土豆，有报告称一个成年人每天会消耗多达六公斤的土豆，这一数量可以提供 6000 千卡（Aykroyd 1974:32）。在

Figure 5.1 'Pressures’ that result in disaters: the Erish Potato Famine 19451948
图 5.1 导致灾难的“压力”：1945-1948 年埃里什土豆饥荒
the time that the ‘Great Starvation’ became fully manifest, one-half of the Irish population was dependent on the potato (Regan 1983:114). Besides a hog, fattened on kitchen scraps for sale to meet taxes and other monetary expenses, potatoes and peat to burn for heat were the mainstays of the peasant economy. Vulnerability was further exacerbated by the low wages paid by English landlords, making the purchase of alternative foods very difficult.
在“伟大饥荒”完全显现的时期，爱尔兰人口的一半依赖于土豆（Regan 1983:114）。除了为支付税款和其他货币开支而用厨房剩饭喂养的猪之外，土豆和用来取暖的泥炭是农民经济的主要支柱。由于英格兰地主支付的工资低，脆弱性进一步加剧，使得购买替代食品变得非常困难。

Because of the Corn Laws (which forbade the import of cheaper grains from the New World), prices for alternative foodstuffs such as grain were always high, and of course very much higher during the famine. Crowding, poor housing and sanitation added to vulnerability by undermining people’s health status, making them less resistant to the physiological effects of hunger and cold.
由于玉米法（禁止从新世界进口更便宜的谷物），替代食品如谷物的价格始终很高，当然在饥荒期间更是高得多。拥挤、糟糕的住房和卫生条件通过削弱人们的健康状况增加了脆弱性，使他们对饥饿和寒冷的生理影响抵抗力降低。

Figure 5.1 shows that the physical hazard side must include not only the disease agent Phytophora infestans, but also the exceptionally warm weather in 1845 that triggered the explosion of blight, and the unusually cold winter weather of 1846-1847. The cold is said to have killed many who had been weakened by hunger during the previous year. Such sequential impacts of different hazards-drought followed by flood, tornado followed by flood, earthquake followed by freezing weather-are often the triggers of serious disasters.
图 5.1 显示，物理危害方面不仅必须包括病原体 Phytophora infestans，还包括 1845 年引发疫病爆发的异常温暖天气，以及 1846-1847 年异常寒冷的冬季天气。据说寒冷导致许多在前一年因饥饿而虚弱的人死亡。这种不同危害的连续影响——干旱后接洪水，龙卷风后接洪水，地震后接寒冷天气——往往是严重灾害的诱因。

Widespread rotting of the primary food crop following blight intensified the chronic hunger into famine. In addition there was a series of contributory political and economic events, including prolonged debates in the British parliament on what the scope and nature of relief should be, and predatory pricing and lending by Irish merchants (Middleton and O’Keefe 1998, citing Poirteir 1995 and Whelan 1996). The impact of this biological hazard on the vulnerable was the death of at least 1.5 million between 1845 and 1848, and the forced emigration of another 1.5 million.

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The 1881 census revealed an Irish population still three million people fewer than the pre-famine total. The political fallout from this disaster has had impacts that last to this day.
主要粮食作物在疫病加剧后普遍腐烂，使得长期饥饿演变为饥荒。此外，还发生了一系列政治和经济事件，包括英国议会关于救助范围和性质的长期辩论，以及爱尔兰商人的掠夺性定价和放贷（Middleton 和 O’Keefe 1998，引用 Poirteir 1995 和 Whelan 1996）。这一生物危害对脆弱群体的影响是 1845 年至 1848 年间至少 150 万人死亡，另有 150 万人被迫移民。

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1881 年的人口普查显示，爱尔兰人口仍比饥荒前减少了三百万人。这场灾难的政治后果至今仍有影响。

Pressures affecting defences against biological hazards
影响生物危害防御的压力

To understand how occasional biological disasters occur, it is clear that we need to analyse many factors that may increase people’s vulnerability to the impact of diseases of humans, plants and animals, or to infestations of pests. In addition we need to evaluate environmentally damaging processes that diminish the availability of genetic material, thereby undermining food sources and medicinal repositories. We can consider these in terms of genetic, environmental and cultural defences that represent examples of the coping mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3 in terms specific to biological hazards.
要理解偶发的生物灾害是如何发生的，显然我们需要分析许多可能增加人们对人类、植物和动物疾病或害虫侵扰影响的脆弱性的因素。此外，我们还需要评估那些对环境造成损害的过程，这些过程减少了遗传材料的可用性，从而削弱了食物来源和药用资源。我们可以从遗传、环境和文化防御的角度考虑这些问题，这些防御代表了在第三章中讨论的应对机制的例子，具体针对生物危害。

Genetic defences遗传防御

Genetic polymorphism (diversity within a species) confers a degree of resilience in a population of plants, animals or humans (Anderson and May 1982; Ruffié 1987; McKeown 1988; Ewald 1993). These benefits can be defeated in a number of ways. Firstly, an unknown, new and virulent organism can be introduced to an existing biological community and do a great deal of damage, as with the great loss of life due to smallpox when it was introduced into the New World.

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Similarly, pigs (hogs), horses,
遗传多态性（物种内的多样性）赋予植物、动物或人类群体一定程度的韧性（Anderson 和 May 1982；Ruffié 1987；McKeown 1988；Ewald 1993）。这些好处可以通过多种方式被削弱。首先，一种未知的新型致病生物可以被引入到现有的生物群落中，并造成巨大的损害，就像天花引入新世界时造成的巨大生命损失一样。

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同样，猪（家猪）、马，
cattle and the black rat thrived after they were taken to the New World, and pushed competitors out of ecological niches (Crosby 1991, 1986). In East Africa, zebu cattle (Bos indicus) had no resistance to the disease rinderpest that was carried by donkeys used by German colonial military convoys. The resulting mortality among cattle was as high as 90 per cent. Their hapless owners were weakened by the economic stress of losing so many animals. The people were also suffering social disruption due to German and British colonial land occupation and attempts to tax rural populations and limit their movements. They had to confront new disease organisms brought from West Africa: guinea worm and jiggers. The resulting mortality was probably one of the major reasons for the collapse of militant resistance to colonialism in the region (Kjekshus 1977; Maddox et al. 1996).
在被带到新世界后，牛和黑鼠繁荣发展，并将竞争者挤出生态位（Crosby 1991, 1986）。在东非，泽布牛（Bos indicus）对德国殖民军队车队所携带的疫病——牛瘟没有抵抗力。牛只的死亡率高达 90%。它们不幸的主人因失去如此多的动物而承受经济压力。人们还因德国和英国殖民者的土地占领以及对农村人口征税和限制其流动而遭受社会动荡。他们不得不面对从西非带来的新病原体：丝虫和跳蚤。由此导致的死亡率可能是该地区对殖民主义的激进抵抗崩溃的主要原因之一（Kjekshus 1977; Maddox et al. 1996）。

Even when there is some resistance to a disease agent in a population, sufficient time may have elapsed since the last outbreak to produce a large number of non-immune individuals. European history is punctuated with catastrophic epidemics of bubonic plague (transmitted by fleas living on rats) even though it was endemic for very long periods of time.

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In addition to a non-immune population of sufficient size, wellestablished and busy communications networks are necessary to channel the infection and support such epidemics. Thus, the Plague of Justinian apparently originated in Egypt and spread along trade routes. These routes were very busy with soldiers and refugees of the wars then being fought to regain parts of the Roman Empire lost to the Vandals and Ostrogoths. Bubonic plague appeared in Byzantium (capital of the Eastern Roman Empire), in AD542, and by the end of that century this city had lost half its population. Following a second route along the Mediterranean, plague appeared in France in AD543. Depopulation was so great that much land fell idle, taxes were not paid and estates were widely replaced in the seventh century by a pattern of small freeholders (Russell 1968).
即使在一个群体中对疾病因子存在一定的抵抗，距离上一次疫情爆发的时间可能已经过去了足够长的时间，以至于产生大量非免疫个体。欧洲历史上充满了黑死病的灾难性流行（由生活在老鼠身上的跳蚤传播），尽管它在很长一段时间内是地方性流行病。除了足够规模的非免疫人群外，成熟且繁忙的通讯网络也是传播感染和支持此类流行病所必需的。因此，贾斯丁尼安瘟疫显然起源于埃及，并沿着贸易路线传播。这些路线当时有大量士兵和难民在为夺回被汪达尔人和东哥特人占领的罗马帝国部分领土而进行的战争而忙碌。公元 542 年，黑死病出现在拜占庭（东罗马帝国的首都），到那个世纪末，这座城市失去了半数人口。沿着地中海的第二条路线，瘟疫于公元 543 年出现在法国。人口减少如此严重，以至于许多土地闲置，税收未能缴纳，庄园在七世纪被广泛替代为小型自由农户的模式（Russell 1968）。

A sudden and severe economic loss of crops through disease or pests can be avoided for a time by the heavy use of protective agro-chemicals, which many LDCs have to import, with negative impacts on their foreign exchange. But pests and diseases often develop resistance to the chemical agent, and competing or beneficial organisms may be killed. This produces the well-known pesticide ‘treadmill’ of resistance and resurgence of the pest (Debach 1974; Altieri 1987). For example, the cultivation of cotton in the vast irrigated Gezira scheme in Sudan began in the 1920s. In the early 1950s the crop was sprayed with pesticides once or twice a year. By the early 1980s, cotton was sprayed nineteen times during the growing season in order to control a growing number of pests. Widespread use of agro-chemicals (especially DDT to combat malarial mosquitoes) has produced pesticide-resistant mosquitoes and malaria is resurgent in many parts of the world.

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通过重度使用保护性农业化学品，可以在一段时间内避免因疾病或害虫造成的突发和严重的经济损失，许多发展中国家不得不进口这些化学品，这对它们的外汇产生了负面影响。但害虫和疾病往往会对化学剂产生抗药性，竞争性或有益的生物可能会被杀死。这产生了众所周知的农药“跑步机”现象，即抗药性和害虫的复发（Debach 1974；Altieri 1987）。例如，苏丹广阔的灌溉吉兹拉计划中的棉花种植始于 1920 年代。在 1950 年代初，作物每年喷洒一次或两次农药。到 1980 年代初，棉花在生长季节喷洒了十九次，以控制日益增多的害虫。农业化学品（尤其是用于对抗疟疾蚊子的 DDT）的广泛使用导致了抗药性蚊子的出现，疟疾在世界许多地方重新抬头。

The expansion of export crops into forest, fallow land and plots previously devoted to subsistence crops has caused the extinction of many local varieties of legumes and other food crops, as well as many gatherable forest products (Juma 1989). These genetic resources are lost to future generations who use them to increase diversity and strengthen livelihoods and to reduce disaster vulnerability. The urban market for red kidney beans in Kenya caused farmers to stop using many indigenous varieties of legume and concentrate on Phaseolus vulgaris because they needed cash. The potential for a collapse in cash incomes through pest and disease infestations of a much narrower genetically based range
出口作物扩展到森林、休耕地和以前用于自给自足作物的地块，导致许多地方豆类和其他粮食作物的地方品种灭绝，以及许多可采集的森林产品的消失（Juma 1989）。这些遗传资源对未来几代人来说是失去的，他们利用这些资源来增加多样性、增强生计并减少灾害脆弱性。肯尼亚红腰豆的城市市场使农民停止使用许多本土豆类品种，转而集中种植普通菜豆，因为他们需要现金。通过害虫和疾病对更窄的基因基础范围的影响，现金收入崩溃的潜力是显而易见的。
of crops are clear.
作物的崩溃潜力是显而易见的。

Environmental and cultural defences
环境和文化防御

A very important environmental defence against catastrophic disease and infestation is dispersed settlement. Rapid urbanisation is also associated with increased vulnerability to epidemics in cities. This seems to be true whether urban growth is the result of rural insecurity (as during the decline of Rome and the early Middle Ages) or due to the rise of capitalism (from the fifteenth century), or because of rural depression and relative wage differentials between town and country during the last 50 years.
一种非常重要的环境防御措施，以应对灾难性疾病和虫害，就是分散居住。快速城市化也与城市中对流行病的脆弱性增加相关。这似乎无论是由于农村不安全（如在罗马衰落和早期中世纪期间）、资本主义的兴起（从十五世纪开始），还是由于过去 50 年间乡村萧条和城乡相对工资差异的影响，都是如此。

Potable water and sanitation systems are also a factor. There was probably little significant difference in sanitation between rich and poor in Europe until the nineteenth century.

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Today, in cities of the LDCs, the more affluent enjoy indoor plumbing while the relatively poor are lucky if they have a communal water standpipe within a few hundred metres of their front door (Feachem et al. 1978; Agarwal et al. 1989; Cairncross et al. 1990a; McGranahan et al. 2001). Many mega-cities (e.g. Calcutta, Lagos, Mexico City) have sanitation systems based on drains and water mains that are at least 100 years old. Some, such as Howrah (a city of two million lying across the Hooghly River from Calcutta), until quite recently had no sewers at all (KMDA 2003; Wright 1997).
饮用水和卫生系统也是一个因素。在十九世纪之前，欧洲的富人和穷人在卫生条件上可能没有显著差异。

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今天，在最不发达国家的城市中，富裕的人享有室内管道，而相对贫困的人如果能在几百米内找到一个公共水龙头就算幸运了（Feachem et al. 1978; Agarwal et al. 1989; Cairncross et al. 1990a; McGranahan et al. 2001）。许多特大城市（例如，加尔各答、拉各斯、墨西哥城）的卫生系统基于至少有 100 年历史的排水和水管。一些城市，如霍拉（一个位于加尔各答对岸、人口两百万的城市），直到最近都没有下水道（KMDA 2003; Wright 1997）。

Different classes of people were also more or less able to get access to safe havens and flee from the Black Death. While it was not guaranteed protection, escape to country houses from affected cities was an option enjoyed only by the rich (Ziegler 1970). The spatial organisation of residence in the mega-cities of Africa, Asia and Latin America is likewise significant in producing differential vulnerability to disease.
不同阶层的人在获得安全避难所和逃离黑死病方面的能力也有所不同。虽然这并不保证保护，但从受影响的城市逃往乡村别墅的选择仅限于富人（Ziegler 1970）。非洲、亚洲和拉丁美洲特大城市的居住空间组织同样在产生对疾病的差异性脆弱性方面具有重要意义。

The dangers are increased with declining budgets for maintenance of even minimal urban infrastructure in many countries. Reduced public expenditure is often due to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank insistence on austerity programmes in the face of foreign debt (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989; Cairncross et al. 1990a). In Chapter 2 we introduced this as one of the major ‘dynamic pressures’ that create ‘unsafe conditions’. This pressure is made worse where the municipal organisation of waste management cannot recover more than a small fraction of the cost of sanitation services. One study in Africa found that the best waste management system (Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire) recovered 30 per cent of its costs, while the rate was less than 5 per cent in Ibadan (Nigeria), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Johannesburg (South Africa) (Onibokun 1999).
在许多国家，随着城市基础设施维护预算的减少，危险性增加。公共支出的减少通常是由于国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行在面对外债时坚持实施紧缩政策（Hardoy 和 Satterthwaite 1989；Cairncross 等 1990a）。在第二章中，我们将其介绍为造成“安全条件不安全”的主要“动态压力”之一。当市政废物管理组织无法收回卫生服务成本的更多部分时，这种压力会加剧。一项在非洲的研究发现，最佳的废物管理系统（科特迪瓦阿比让）回收了 30%的成本，而尼日利亚伊巴丹、坦桑尼亚达累斯萨拉姆和南非约翰内斯堡的回收率则低于 5%（Onibokun 1999）。

We discussed earlier the diverse ways in which people tolerate crop and livestock losses. One of the most important of these is to combine, if possible, an assortment of livelihood activities (see the section on ‘coping’ in Chapter 3). Poor farmers not only try to grow a variety of crops, usually intercropped, but they may engage in a variety of nonfarm activities, including trade, craft production and services, fishing, small-scale mining and forestry, etc., in an effort to diversify their livelihood portfolios (Chambers 1983; Guyer 1981; Wisner 1988a; Ellis 2000).

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Current ‘development’ efforts often incorporate rural households into commodity production in a manner that reduces the diversity of rural livelihood opportunities and increases the risk of sudden biological hazards (Bernstein 1977, 1990; Wisner 1988a:187-197; Bryceson 1999).
我们之前讨论了人们以多种方式应对作物和牲畜损失。其中最重要的一种方式是尽可能结合多种生计活动（参见第 3 章中关于“应对”的部分）。贫困农民不仅尝试种植多种作物，通常是间作的，还可能参与多种非农活动，包括贸易、手工业生产和服务、捕鱼、小规模采矿和林业等，以努力多样化他们的生计组合（Chambers 1983；Guyer 1981；Wisner 1988a；Ellis 2000）。当前的“发展”努力往往将农村家庭纳入商品生产，这种方式减少了农村生计机会的多样性，并增加了突发生物危害的风险（Bernstein 1977, 1990；Wisner 1988a:187-197；Bryceson 1999）。

Root causes and pressures
根本原因和压力

Biological hazards and vulnerability in Africa
非洲的生物危害和脆弱性

In the PAR model, ‘root causes’ of vulnerability are often found in global economic and political processes, while ‘dynamic pressures’ are to be found in the structure of particular societies. This section examines some of the linkages between people’s vulnerability to biological hazards and the political and economic root causes and pressures that explain such vulnerability. The illustrations are drawn from Africa, and a case study of HIV-AIDS is given in Box 5.2.
在 PAR 模型中，脆弱性的“根本原因”通常存在于全球经济和政治过程之中，而“动态压力”则存在于特定社会的结构中。本节考察了人们对生物危害的脆弱性与解释这种脆弱性的政治和经济根本原因及压力之间的一些联系。插图来自非洲，并在框 5.2 中给出了艾滋病的案例研究。

Since the era of independence in the 1960s, which prompted such high expectations for the people of most sub-Saharan African countries, the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse have ridden over nearly every part of the continent. War and famine have affected many of these countries during the decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and have interacted in numerous ways with the other two biblical threats, disease and pestilence.

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Many of the more than 100 armed conflicts in the world (1989-2000) took place in Africa (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001). During this period a possible 40 million people have been displaced. The resulting disruption of livelihoods and resort to refugee camps have contributed to high levels of civilian deaths. In early 2002, nearly one-third of the entire population of Angola was internally displaced, and about 300,000 people were threatened by famine and disease.

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Internally displaced persons (IDPs) who flee into the forest and isolated rangeland margins are vulnerable to such deadly diseases as Ebola virus and meningitis. With the rainy season can come devastating epidemics of pneumonia, diarrhoea and measles. Meanwhile drought, flood and cyclone may affect an already weakened population that has also had to cope, perhaps, with locusts, army worms, Sudan dioch birds or livestock diseases. Cholera, measles, tuberculosis, meningitis and, above all, HIV-AIDS may also take their toll (Timberlake 1988; Wisner 1992a; Mekendamp et al. 1999; Barnett and Whiteside 2001).
自 1960 年代独立时代以来，这一时期给大多数撒哈拉以南非洲国家的人民带来了如此高的期望，四骑士几乎骑遍了整个大陆。在 1970 年代、1980 年代和 1990 年代的几十年里，战争和饥荒影响了许多国家，并与其他两个圣经威胁——疾病和瘟疫以多种方式相互作用。

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在 1989 年至 2000 年间，全球超过 100 场武装冲突中，许多发生在非洲（Wallensteen 和 Sollenberg 2001）。在此期间，可能有 4000 万人被迫流离失所。生计的破坏和对难民营的依赖导致了高水平的平民死亡。2002 年初，安哥拉近三分之一的总人口处于内部流离失所状态，约有 30 万人面临饥荒和疾病的威胁。

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逃入森林和偏远牧场边缘的内部流离失所者（IDPs）易受到埃博拉病毒和脑膜炎等致命疾病的威胁。雨季的到来可能会带来毁灭性的肺炎、腹泻和麻疹疫情。与此同时，干旱、洪水和气旋可能会影响已经脆弱的人口，这些人群还可能不得不应对蝗虫、军虫、苏丹杜鹃鸟或牲畜疾病。霍乱、麻疹、结核病、脑膜炎，尤其是艾滋病也可能造成损失（Timberlake 1988；Wisner 1992a；Mekendamp 等 1999；Barnett 和 Whiteside 2001）。

The broader context of these tragedies is a failure of social and economic development (Wisner 1988a; Seidman and Anang 1992; Toulmin and Wisner 2003). Many African nations lost ground during the 1980s compared to their position in the 1960s or 1970s in terms of infrastructure development (including water supply; see Thompson et al. 2002), services and per capita productivity (Cornia et al. 1987; Whitaker 1988; Rau 1991; Cheru 2002). Mamdani (2002; UNDP 2003b) reminds us that:
这些悲剧的更广泛背景是社会和经济发展的失败（Wisner 1988a；Seidman 和 Anang 1992；Toulmin 和 Wisner 2003）。与 1960 年代或 1970 年代相比，许多非洲国家在 1980 年代的基础设施发展（包括供水；见 Thompson 等 2002）、服务和人均生产力方面失去了优势（Cornia 等 1987；Whitaker 1988；Rau 1991；Cheru 2002）。Mamdani（2002；UNDP 2003b）提醒我们：
[t]he first two decades of independence were decades of moderate progress. Between 1967 and 1980 more than a dozen African countries registered a growth rate of

6 %

. This included not only mineral-rich countries such as Gabon, Congo, Nigeria and Botswana but also countries such as Egypt, Kenya and Ivory Coast.
[t]独立的前二十年是适度进步的年代。在 1967 年至 1980 年间，超过十个非洲国家的增长率超过了

6 %

。这不仅包括加蓬、刚果、尼日利亚和博茨瓦纳等矿产资源丰富的国家，还包括埃及、肯尼亚和象牙海岸等国家。

Foreign indebtedness in Africa is also very high when compared with the ability to service debt (George 1988; Onimode 1989; Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). Dependency on foreign aid is as high as it has ever been, and despite much campaigning and paper
与偿还债务的能力相比，非洲的外债也非常高（George 1988；Onimode 1989；Mkandawire 和 Soludo 1999）。对外援助的依赖程度达到了历史最高水平，尽管进行了大量的宣传和书面承诺
commitments to debt relief for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), there has actually been very little debt cancelled (Hanlon 1996; Cheru 2002) (see also Chapter 2, section on ‘Global economic pressures’).
对高度负债贫困国家（HIPCs）的债务减免，实际上被取消的债务非常少（Hanlon 1996；Cheru 2002）（另见第 2 章“全球经济压力”部分）。

African governments have cut their health budgets due to reduced export revenues (world market prices for many LDC exports fell consistently from the 1970s) and financial austerity programmes mandated by the IMF and World Bank (Wisner 1992a). Maintenance of infrastructure, procurement of medicines, training and plans to improve primary health care have all suffered. Lack of road maintenance and shortage of foreign exchange to import fuel and spare parts for vehicles has meant that mobile services to isolated villages have been interrupted. Such services had in the past been effective in both providing an early warning of famine and epidemic disease hazards, as well as a contribution to their treatment, or at least palliation (see Box 4.1 on Malawi in Chapter 4).
非洲政府因出口收入减少（许多最不发达国家的出口的世界市场价格自 1970 年代以来持续下跌）和国际货币基金组织及世界银行要求的财政紧缩计划而削减了健康预算（Wisner 1992a）。基础设施的维护、药品采购、培训以及改善初级卫生保健的计划都受到了影响。道路维护不足和外汇短缺导致无法进口燃料和车辆备件，意味着对偏远村庄的流动服务中断。这些服务在过去有效地提供了饥荒和流行病风险的早期预警，并对其治疗或至少缓解做出了贡献（见第 4 章中关于马拉维的框 4.1）。

Nigeria provides a useful illustration of the links back from unsafe conditions, through dynamic pressures to root causes. The petroleum boom of the 1970s weakened agricultural and other rural livelihoods in Nigeria, especially in terms of self-provisioning (Watts 1986). Economic crisis in the 1980s eroded the purchasing power of cash wages and many people lost employment. The decreasing resilience of livelihoods to these shocks was structured by long-standing gender, ethnic, religious and class biases. Ruralurban differences in access to health care and income differences between classes had always been great. The IMF Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) increased both of these differences (Nafziger 1988:123-124; Wisner 1992a:152). Women have very heavy work burdens and poor health. In the north, maternal mortality (an index of both health care and ‘normal’ health) was 1,500 per 100,000, compared with 150 in Zimbabwe and 5 in Europe (Wisner 1992a:161).
尼日利亚提供了一个有用的例证，说明了从不安全的条件，通过动态压力到根本原因的联系。1970 年代的石油繁荣削弱了尼日利亚的农业和其他农村生计，特别是在自给自足方面（Watts 1986）。1980 年代的经济危机侵蚀了现金工资的购买力，许多人失去了就业。生计对这些冲击的抵御能力下降是由长期存在的性别、民族、宗教和阶级偏见所结构化的。农村与城市在医疗保健的获取和阶级之间的收入差异一直很大。国际货币基金组织的结构调整计划（SAP）加大了这两种差异（Nafziger 1988:123-124; Wisner 1992a:152）。女性的工作负担非常沉重，健康状况较差。在北部，母亲死亡率（既是医疗保健和“正常”健康的指标）为每 10 万人 1,500，而津巴布韦为 150，欧洲为 5（Wisner 1992a:161）。

In 1991, half of world deaths from cholera

(7, 200)

occurred in Nigeria. Ten years later, cholera was still endemic, and a serious outbreak with more than 2,000 cases occurred in the northern Nigerian state of Kano (WHO 2001b). The deteriorating health care system combined with increasing individual vulnerability required only the presence of the cholera organism (the biophysical ‘hazard’) for a disaster to occur. The spread of cholera reflected spatial structures (infrastructure, patterns of urbanisation) and spatial process (frequency of public markets, festivals, etc.) (cf. Stock 1976).
1991 年，全球因霍乱导致的死亡人数中有一半发生在尼日利亚。十年后，霍乱仍然是地方性流行病，尼日利亚北部的卡诺州发生了超过 2000 例的严重疫情（世卫组织 2001b）。日益恶化的医疗保健系统与个体脆弱性的增加，仅需霍乱病原体的存在（生物物理“危害”）就足以导致灾难的发生。霍乱的传播反映了空间结构（基础设施、城市化模式）和空间过程（公共市场、节日等的频率）（参见 Stock 1976）。

Box 5.2: HIV-AIDS in Africa
案例 5.2：非洲的 HIV-AIDS

HIV-AIDS is a disease of the immune system caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). People may be infected (HIV-positive) for many years before full AIDS (acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome) develops, and they may be unaware of their status. The disease is transmitted through sexual intercourse, or by blood from an infected person being introduced into another through shared syringes or use of contaminated blood products (including transfusions). Mothers can also pass on the virus to their unborn children. Inadequate precautions when sterilising needles and surgical
HIV-AIDS 是一种由人类免疫缺陷病毒（HIV）引起的免疫系统疾病。人们可能在完全发展为艾滋病（获得性免疫缺陷综合症）之前感染（HIV 阳性）多年，并且可能对自己的状态毫不知情。该疾病通过性交传播，或通过感染者的血液通过共用注射器或使用受污染的血液制品（包括输血）引入到他人身上。母亲也可以将病毒传给未出生的孩子。在消毒针头和外科器械时缺乏足够的预防措施。
instruments, as well as when screening blood from blood donor services, all increase the risk of contracting HIV-AIDS by means other than sexual intercourse. For these reasons, people in countries with poor medical infrastructure are at greater risk of contracting HIV-AIDS.
仪器，以及在筛查血液时来自献血服务的血液，都会通过非性行为的方式增加感染 HIV-AIDS 的风险。因此，医疗基础设施薄弱的国家的人们感染 HIV-AIDS 的风险更大。

There are a number of co-factors which are thought to be associated with increased rates of transmission of HIV-AIDS through sex. These include genital sores, other active sexually transmitted diseases and cervical erosion. They are responsible in part for higher rates of infection, since the virus enters the body more easily through lesions or unhealed wounds. Poor medical facilities mean that these conditions
有许多共同因素被认为与通过性传播 HIV-AIDS 的传播率增加有关。这些因素包括生殖器溃疡、其他活跃的性传播疾病和宫颈侵蚀。它们在一定程度上导致感染率更高，因为病毒更容易通过损伤或未愈合的伤口进入体内。医疗设施不足意味着这些病症
remain untreated and increase the rates of infection of HIV-AIDS. Once an individual becomes HIV-positive, the progress of the disease is profoundly affected by the pre-existing status of the immune system. Those with a damaged or stressed immune system may develop symptoms from opportunistic infections earlier than they otherwise would (Packard and Epstein 1987). ...

These were precisely the epidemiological conditions in Uganda and elsewhere in eastern and central Africa when the HIV-AIDS epidemic began in the late 1970s and 1980s. Endemic malaria, filariasis, war and refugee movements had affected Uganda and neighbouring parts of Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire (now Congo). Some of these areas had also been affected by human trypanosomiasis (Langlands 1968; Forde 1972; Wisner 1976a). Disrupted livelihoods, especially in Uganda (caused by a wide variety of factors including inept and dictatorial rule, the collapse of most of the trading networks following the expulsion of Asians, civil war and a war with Tanzania), had resulted in reduced levels of general health, including parasitic diseases such as malaria which stress the immune system. Typically one-third or more of the children suffered chronic malnutrition (UNICEF 1985; Wisner 1988a). Very little has changed. In spite of a remarkable recovery in the economic fortunes of Uganda, in 2002 half the population of Uganda still lacked access to safe water, and only about 30 per cent had access to adequate sanitation (OCHA 2002d). ...

Using a vulnerability framework to analyse the early days of the African HIV-AIDS pandemic reveals a number of social shifts that encouraged the spread of HIV-AIDS. War, economic crisis and upheaval of family life in Uganda led to a greater spatial mixing of populations and a relaxation in men’s sexual control over women. Magendo (smuggling) was rife and involved the movement of illicit goods from Mombasa, via Lake Victoria, to Rwanda and Zaire (now Congo). Roving bands of traders, often armed, were away from home for months at a time. Spare cash was spent on casual sex. Indeed, both smuggling along roads and across Lake Victoria, together with legal motorised traffic, gave rise to overnight stopovers and hotels, and a rise
使用脆弱性框架分析非洲 HIV-AIDS 大流行的早期阶段揭示了一些促进 HIV-AIDS 传播的社会变迁。乌干达的战争、经济危机和家庭生活的动荡导致了人口的更大空间混合以及男性对女性性控制的放松。走私（Magendo）猖獗，涉及从蒙巴萨通过维多利亚湖向卢旺达和扎伊尔（现为刚果）运输非法货物。流动的商队，通常携带武器，常常在外待数月。闲钱被用于偶然的性交易。实际上，沿道路和维多利亚湖的走私，以及合法的机动车交通，催生了过夜停留和酒店的兴起。
in prostitution. Many women had a precarious economic existence, often being de facto barred from owning or renting land. Thus marriage or temporary liaisons with men provided the only ‘meal-ticket’. Selling beer and occasional prostitution offered ready cash in an economic climate that offered little in the way of permanent and independent livelihoods for unattached women. Unfortunately, these assertions, however well supported by hearsay and observation, are quite difficult
在卖淫行业中，许多女性的经济状况岌岌可危，往往实际上被禁止拥有或租赁土地。因此，婚姻或与男性的临时关系成为了唯一的“生计”。出售啤酒和偶尔的卖淫在经济环境中提供了现成的现金，而这种环境对未婚女性提供的永久和独立生计几乎没有帮助。不幸的是，这些说法虽然有传闻和观察的支持，但通过详细的社会学研究来证实却相当困难。
to corroborate through detailed sociological study (Barnett and Blaikie 1992, 1994).
通过详细的社会学研究来证实这些说法是相当困难的（Barnett 和 Blaikie 1992, 1994）。

The unstable economic conditions of the 1970s and 1980s added to women’s deteriorating economic security, and this may have led to the spread of the virus. However, economic insecurity alone is not a sufficient factor to explain the cause of the HIV-AIDS pandemic. Every society develops an HIV-AIDS epidemic that reflects the sexual practices of its population. Behind the structuring of this pattern of sexual practice lie relations of gender inequality (Barnett and Blaikie 1992).
1970 年代和 1980 年代的不稳定经济条件加剧了女性的经济安全恶化，这可能导致了病毒的传播。然而，单靠经济不安全并不足以解释艾滋病疫情的原因。每个社会都会发展出反映其人口性行为的艾滋病疫情。在这种性行为模式的结构背后是性别不平等的关系（Barnett 和 Blaikie 1992）。

In the 1990s, however, the rate of increase of HIV infection began to decrease in Uganda due to vigorous health education campaigns and condom distribution. But by the beginning of the twenty-first century, many parts of eastern, central and southern Africa were affected (UN Economic Commission on Africa 2001). The centre of the epidemic had shifted to southern Africa, where one in four adults in Botswana and Zimbabwe are thought to be infected. In another ten African countries 1 in 10 adults carry the HIV virus.

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The World Development Report for 2000/2001 reflected upon this situation:
然而，在 1990 年代，由于积极的健康教育活动和安全套分发，乌干达的 HIV 感染增长率开始下降。但到 21 世纪初，东部、中部和南部非洲的许多地区受到影响（联合国非洲经济委员会 2001 年）。疫情的中心已转移到南部非洲，在博茨瓦纳和津巴布韦，估计每四个成年人中就有一个感染。在另外十个非洲国家中，每十个成年人中就有一个携带 HIV 病毒。

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2000/2001 年世界发展报告对此情况进行了反思：

The effect on life expectancy will be devastating. Had AIDS not affected these countries, life expectancy would have reached 64 years by 2010-15. Instead, it will have regressed to 47 years, reversing the gains of the past 30 years. The impact on child mortality is also enormous. In Zambia and Zimbabwe 25 per cent more infants are dying than would have without HIV.
对寿命的影响将是毁灭性的。如果艾滋病没有影响这些国家，预计到 2010-2015 年，寿命将达到 64 岁。相反，寿命将回落到 47 岁，逆转过去 30 年的成就。对儿童死亡率的影响也非常巨大。在赞比亚和津巴布韦，婴儿死亡率比没有 HIV 的情况下高出 25%。
(World Bank 2001:139)（世界银行 2001 年：139）
Although varying in detail because of differences in local sexual practices, HIV-AIDS transmission in the 1990s in southern Africa depended on many of the same socio-economic and spatial processes as it had during the 1980s in eastern and central Africa. Long-distance labour migration was deeply rooted in the economic history of southern Africa (Murray 1981; First 1983). Hundreds of thousands of men had been leaving rural homes in the surrounding countries to work in South African mines and factories. They lived in all male hostels. They visited prostitutes. They carried the virus home
尽管由于地方性性行为的差异而在细节上有所不同，但 1990 年代南部非洲的 HIV-AIDS 传播依然依赖于与 1980 年代东部和中部非洲相同的许多社会经济和空间过程。长途劳工迁移深深植根于南部非洲的经济历史中（Murray 1981；First 1983）。成千上万的男性离开周边国家的农村家园，前往南非的矿山和工厂工作。他们住在全男性的宿舍里，拜访妓女，并将病毒带回家中。
with them to Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
与他们一起带回博茨瓦纳、莱索托、斯威士兰、纳米比亚、赞比亚、马拉维、莫桑比克和津巴布韦。

In 2001 and 2002 there were debates, campaigns and law suits over monopoly pricing of the anti-retroviral drugs that can prolong the life of those living with HIV-AIDS. People in LDCs (especially in Africa where the largest number of sufferers live) cannot afford these drugs.
在 2001 年和 2002 年，关于抗逆转录病毒药物的垄断定价引发了辩论、运动和诉讼，这些药物可以延长 HIV-AIDS 患者的生命。发展中国家（尤其是非洲，那里有最多的患者）的人们无法负担这些药物。

In a landmark case in South Africa, the major international pharmaceutical companies agreed to let poor countries import or manufacture less expensive generic equivalents of these patented drugs. However, in a tragic twist, South African President Thabo Mbeki blocked their use, even that of a drug, Nevirapine, that can prevent the infection crossing from mothers to infants (AIDS ACTION 2001). In 2002 some provincial health departments in South Africa began to distribute the drug in defiance of the central government, and former president and elder statesman Nelson Mandela criticised Mbeki for his irrational position (Economist 2002b). In 2003, the South African government was finally forced by legal action taken by the NGO, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), to provide medication to pregnant women living with HIVAIDS. However, as of early May 2003, the government was still refusing to provide the anti-retroviral drugs that would prolong the lives of five million South Africans who are infected-this despite the fact that the annual cost of treatment had fallen to less than

$ 2, 000

per patient, from over

$ 10, 000

, due to the availability of generic drugs. With a death rate of 600 per day, this biological disaster is the moral equivalent of the crash of two large airliners or a catastrophic flood every day (Thompson 2003).
在南非的一起具有里程碑意义的案件中，主要国际制药公司同意让贫穷国家进口或生产这些专利药物的更便宜的仿制药。然而，在一个悲惨的转折中，南非总统塔博·姆贝基阻止了它们的使用，甚至包括一种可以防止母亲将感染传播给婴儿的药物——奈韦拉平（AIDS ACTION 2001）。2002 年，南非的一些省级卫生部门开始无视中央政府分发该药物，前总统和资深政治家纳尔逊·曼德拉批评姆贝基的非理性立场（Economist 2002b）。2003 年，南非政府最终被非政府组织治疗行动运动（TAC）提起的法律诉讼迫使提供药物给生活在 HIV/AIDS 中的孕妇。然而，截至 2003 年 5 月初，政府仍拒绝提供可以延长五百万名感染南非人的生命的抗逆转录病毒药物——尽管由于仿制药的可用性，治疗的年费用已降至每位患者不到

$ 2, 000

，而之前超过

$ 10, 000

。每天死亡率为 600，这场生物灾难在道德上相当于每天发生两架大型客机坠毁或一次灾难性的洪水（汤普森 2003）。

The UN AIDS Programme compares HIV-AIDS in Africa to war: ‘HIV is deadlier than war itself: in 1998, 200000 Africans died in war but more than 2 million died of AIDS. AIDS has become a full blown development crisis’ (UNAIDS 2000:21). Barnett and Whiteside are even more vehement about the disastrous consequences for human development. They argue that despite the large number of studies, the impact of HIV-AIDS is still underestimated:
联合国艾滋病规划署将非洲的艾滋病毒-艾滋病与战争进行比较：“艾滋病毒比战争本身更致命：1998 年，20 万非洲人在战争中死亡，但超过 200 万人死于艾滋病。艾滋病已成为一个全面发展的危机”（UNAIDS 2000:21）。巴尼特和怀特赛德对人类发展的灾难性后果更是强烈反对。他们认为，尽管有大量研究，艾滋病毒-艾滋病的影响仍然被低估：

It is our contention that serious though HIV-AIDS is for those indicators that can measure its impact they do not really show the full effects of this disease. There are a number of reasons for this.
我们认为，尽管艾滋病毒-艾滋病对那些可以衡量其影响的指标来说是严重的，但这些指标并没有真正显示出这种疾病的全部影响。这有几个原因。

The indicators are based on the demographic event of death! The problem with AIDS is that death is preceded by a period of long, debilitating and unpleasant illness. This is not picked up in these indicators.
这些指标是基于死亡这一人口事件！艾滋病的问题在于，死亡之前会经历一段漫长、虚弱和不愉快的疾病期。这在这些指标中并没有被反映出来。
The complexity of the disease is such that it may have unexpected impacts. For example we believe that enrolment in primary education is likely to decrease because parents cannot afford to send their
该疾病的复杂性使其可能产生意想不到的影响。例如，我们认为由于父母无法负担送孩子上学的费用，或者他们需要孩子在家中劳动，或者教师生病去世，因此可能会导致小学教育的入学率下降。
children to school, or they need the child labour at home, or the teachers have been sick and died so there is no school.
孩子们无法上学，或者他们需要孩子在家中劳动，或者教师生病去世，因此没有学校可上。

One of the most significant features of AIDS is its link with poverty and the fact that it pushes households and individuals into a downward cycle.
艾滋病最显著的特征之一是它与贫困的联系，以及它将家庭和个人推入恶性循环的事实。
(Barnett and Whiteside 2001:7-8)
（Barnett 和 Whiteside 2001:7-8）

Some aspects of this ‘downward cycle’ can be illustrated by using our Access’ model, as in Figure 5.2. Household labour power, livelihood options, remitted income, household income levels, purchases and levels of welfare will all be affected (FAO n.d.; Barnett and Blaikie 1989; Collins and Rau 2000; de Waal 2002). In the diagram, Box 2 now has a new input derived from the selective mortality of adults, which reduces the number of active people in households. The sick need nursing, and resources are used up in caring and for medicine. This, combined with the reduced labour force, means that less food can be grown and earning opportunities are fewer (Box 3). In some areas, the deaths of parents has led to a crisis in caring for orphans, with displaced and assetless children growing up in a world in which their livelihoods are disrupted. This shows another side to the AIDS disaster that goes far beyond its medical effects. The implications of HIV-AIDS for a reduction in livelihoods are suggested in Box 3, bringing about radical choices to safeguard a minimum income, and care for the chronically ill and dying (Box 5). A sample of the impacts upon the household budget are shown in Box 7.
这种“下行循环”的某些方面可以通过使用我们的访问模型来说明，如图 5.2 所示。家庭劳动力、生活选择、汇款收入、家庭收入水平、消费和福利水平都将受到影响（FAO n.d.; Barnett 和 Blaikie 1989; Collins 和 Rau 2000; de Waal 2002）。在图中，框 2 现在有一个新的输入，源自成年人的选择性死亡，这减少了家庭中活跃人数。生病的人需要护理，资源在照顾和药物上被消耗。这与减少的劳动力相结合，意味着可以种植的食物更少，赚钱的机会也更少（框 3）。在某些地区，父母的去世导致了照顾孤儿的危机，失去家园和资产的孩子在一个生活被打乱的世界中成长。这显示了艾滋病灾难的另一个方面，远远超出了其医疗影响。HIV-AIDS 对生计减少的影响在框 3 中有所暗示，带来了保护最低收入和照顾慢性病患者及临终者的激进选择（框 5）。框 7 展示了对家庭预算的影响样本。

While Figure 5.2 identifies the critical pressure points which the disease brings to bear on livelihoods, Figure 5.3 charts some of the coping responses and indicates some of the ways in which outside agencies may be able to assist and palliate the economics and social impacts. Figure 5.3 is reproduced and redrawn from Barnett and Blaikie

(1992, 1994)

and reports empirical data on household coping mechanisms in the face of HIV-AIDS, and also outlines in further detail responses to the impact of the disease on individual family members.
虽然图 5.2 识别了疾病对生计施加的关键压力点，但图 5.3 绘制了一些应对反应，并指出外部机构可能能够协助和缓解经济和社会影响的一些方式。图 5.3 是从 Barnett 和 Blaikie

(1992, 1994)

复制和重绘的，报告了在面对 HIV-AIDS 时家庭应对机制的实证数据，并进一步详细概述了对疾病对个别家庭成员影响的反应。

The UN FAO has identified the impact of HIV-AIDS on rural production as a major threat to food security (FAO n.d; IFRC 2000c: 56-57). Yamano et al. (2002) found that in Kenyan households which suffered the death of the adult household head, crop production fell by 60 per cent.

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In Chapter 4 we showed that the food emergency in Malawi in 2002 was due, in part, to the high incidence of HIV-AIDS in the population.
联合国粮农组织已将 HIV-AIDS 对农村生产的影响确定为对粮食安全的主要威胁（FAO n.d; IFRC 2000c: 56-57）。Yamano 等（2002）发现，在遭受成年户主去世的肯尼亚家庭中，作物生产下降了 60%。

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在第 4 章中，我们展示了 2002 年马拉维的粮食紧急情况部分是由于该人群中 HIV-AIDS 的高发病率。

De Waal believes that the HIV-AIDS pandemic will ‘change Africa as we know it’,

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There will be profound economic effects, for example South Africa’s economy will be 22 per cent smaller in 2010 than it would have been without HIV-AIDS (de Waal 2001). He believes that an ‘AIDS related national crisis’ will 'fasten onto the weak points of governance or socio-
德·瓦尔认为，HIV-AIDS 大流行将“改变我们所知的非洲”，

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例如，南非的经济在 2010 年将比没有 HIV-AIDS 时小 22%（德·瓦尔 2001）。他认为，“与艾滋病相关的国家危机”将“紧紧抓住治理或社会关系中已经存在的薄弱环节”，并产生深刻的社会和政治变化，以及经济变化（同上：3）。
political relations that already occur in society’ and produce profound social and political changes, as well as economic ones (ibid.: 3). This view is compatible with our PAR model, if HIV-AIDS is considered the ‘root cause’ in the 1980s and 1990s, the effects of which will ripple through into the future, transmitted and shaped by ‘dynamic pressures’ such as war, weak governance, corruption and indebtedness.
这种观点与我们的 PAR 模型相符，如果将 HIV-AIDS 视为 1980 年代和 1990 年代的“根本原因”，其影响将波及未来，并受到战争、薄弱治理、腐败和负债等“动态压力”的传递和塑造。

Figure 5.2 Access to resources to maintain livelihoods: the impact of AIDS
图 5.2 维持生计的资源获取：艾滋病的影响

Figure 5.3 Household coping mechanism in the face of AIDS
图 5.3 面对艾滋病的家庭应对机制
Source: Adapted from Barnett and Bhaikie (1992)
来源：改编自 Barnett 和 Bhaikie（1992）

Steps towards risk reduction
风险减少的步骤

Earlier successes早期的成功

Successful campaigns against certain illnesses have been recorded that have operated both from ‘the top down’ as well as ‘from the bottom up’. Control of yaws just after the Second World War and the more recent eradication of smallpox were successes in largescale biomedical administration. The disease agents and mode of transmission in both cases were straightforward. Treatment with penicillin in the first case,

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vaccination in the second, were uncomplicated, and follow-up was not necessary. No insect vectors with complicated life cycles were involved.
针对某些疾病的成功运动已经被记录下来，这些运动既有“自上而下”的方式，也有“自下而上”的方式。第二次世界大战后对疥疮的控制以及最近对天花的根除都是大规模生物医学管理的成功案例。这两种情况下的病原体和传播方式都很简单。第一种情况下用青霉素治疗，第二种情况下接种疫苗，都是简单的，且不需要后续跟进。没有涉及复杂生命周期的昆虫媒介。

UNICEF is currently in the midst of a more ambitious worldwide effort to immunise all children against tuberculosis, tetanus, measles, diphtheria, pertussis and polio. Some of the vaccines (measles, for instance) must be kept cool until injected, and so require a ‘cold chain’ of refrigerated facilities in storage and transport. Others require follow-up immunisation (polio, for instance). There is some debate as to whether malnourished children with depressed immune systems can form antibodies in response to immunisation in some cases. (This did not affect the anti-smallpox campaign because the immune reaction against live cowpox antigen is universally strong.) Another partial ‘top down’ success against a biological hazard involves locusts in Africa and the Middle East. Aerial surveillance (conditional on international agreements with regard to air space) and massive aerial spraying of locust breeding sites with insecticide, seem to have been
联合国儿童基金会目前正在进行一项更为雄心勃勃的全球努力，旨在为所有儿童接种结核病、破伤风、麻疹、白喉、百日咳和脊髓灰质炎疫苗。其中一些疫苗（例如麻疹）必须在注射前保持冷却，因此需要在储存和运输过程中维持“冷链”设施。其他疫苗则需要后续免疫接种（例如脊髓灰质炎）。关于营养不良且免疫系统受抑制的儿童在某些情况下是否能够对免疫接种产生抗体存在一些争论。（这并未影响抗天花运动，因为对活牛痘抗原的免疫反应普遍较强。）另一个针对生物危害的部分“自上而下”的成功案例涉及非洲和中东的蝗虫。空中监视（依赖于国际空域协议）和对蝗虫繁殖地进行大规模喷洒杀虫剂似乎已经取得了成效。
moderately successful.

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On the other hand, the biggest increase in human longevity came as the result of improved food supply, housing and sanitation in nineteenth-century Europe and North America, and not through biomedical intervention at all (McKeown 1988). In other words, human development is intimately bound up with disaster risk reduction and vice versa, a general conclusion to which we will return in Chapter 9.
适度成功。

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另一方面，人类寿命的最大增长是由于 19 世纪欧洲和北美改善了食品供应、住房和卫生条件，而不是通过生物医学干预（McKeown 1988）。换句话说，人类发展与灾害风险减少密切相关，反之亦然，这是我们将在第 9 章中回归的一个普遍结论。

A number of the potential health disasters facing us are not suited to the ‘top down’ approach. HIV-AIDS, cholera, plague, malaria, as well as other complex biological threats such as deforestation, desertification and the loss of species, cannot be tackled by ‘top down’ problem solving alone. The development of broad policy measures on a country or regional basis is essential as a framework for intervention in areas of public health, public education, work in schools with pupils and teachers, and so on. However, this is not enough. In addition, detailed knowledge of highly variable social and environmental situations is needed to address local problems. This can be provided by responsive, community-based, flexible ‘action research’ and interaction between governments, NGOs and community-based organisations. In Chapter 4 we saw that civil society has a role to play in famine early warning systems; in the same way, a wide variety of people, including teachers, community leaders and prostitutes, can become HIV-AIDS educators (Schoepf 1992), and villagers can serve as water and sanitation engineers (White 1981; Wright 1997). Using a network of volunteer counsellors, Uganda’s AIDS Information Centre and other AIDS-focused NGOs have made a good deal of progress and stand as an example for other African countries (IFRC 2000c:6566).
我们面临的许多潜在健康灾难并不适合“自上而下”的方法。HIV-AIDS、霍乱、瘟疫、疟疾，以及其他复杂的生物威胁，如森林砍伐、沙漠化和物种丧失，不能仅靠“自上而下”的问题解决来应对。制定国家或地区层面的广泛政策措施是干预公共卫生、公共教育、与学生和教师的学校工作等领域的必要框架。然而，这还不够。此外，需要对高度变化的社会和环境情况有详细的了解，以解决地方问题。这可以通过响应性、社区基础、灵活的“行动研究”以及政府、非政府组织和社区组织之间的互动来提供。在第 4 章中，我们看到公民社会在饥荒预警系统中发挥着作用；同样，各种各样的人，包括教师、社区领袖和妓女，可以成为 HIV-AIDS 教育者（Schoepf 1992），而村民可以担任水和卫生工程师（White 1981；Wright 1997）。利用志愿顾问网络，乌干达的艾滋病信息中心和其他专注于艾滋病的非政府组织取得了相当大的进展，并成为其他非洲国家的榜样（IFRC 2000c:6566）。

The experience of the ‘bottom up’ success of some LDCs in the implementation of primary health care (PHC) is possibly more relevant than ‘top down’ successes. From the 1960s to the early 1980s, China was able to improve health significantly through health education campaigns and by mobilising labour for the improvement of water supplies, drainage, sanitation and housing. Schistosomiasis, sexually transmitted diseases and tuberculosis were reduced significantly (Horn 1965; Sidel and Sidel 1982). Unfortunately much of this rural social infrastructure in China has disappeared during the past decade, which is one of the reasons why the Chinese authorities are alarmed by the prospect that SARS might escape the cities and become established in the countryside (Pomfret 2003).
一些最不发达国家在实施初级卫生保健（PHC）方面的“自下而上”成功经验可能比“自上而下”的成功更为相关。从 20 世纪 60 年代到 80 年代初，中国通过健康教育活动和动员劳动力改善水源、排水、卫生和住房，显著提高了健康水平。血吸虫病、性传播疾病和结核病显著减少（Horn 1965; Sidel and Sidel 1982）。不幸的是，在过去十年中，中国的许多农村社会基础设施已经消失，这也是中国当局对 SARS 可能逃离城市并在乡村扎根的前景感到担忧的原因之一（Pomfret 2003）。

Also in the 1960s and 1970s much progress was made in establishing a PHC network in several African countries including Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau (Wisner 1976a, 1992a). In Cuba also there has been notable success in preventing dengue fever outbreaks through the use of neighbourhood Committees for the Defence of the Revolution which have carried out case finding and environmental management at the micro-level-seeking out and removing mosquito breeding sites (Susman 2001). Later, in Chapter 9, we will argue that the knowledge and skill of local people are often neglected in planning to mitigate loss and to prevent disasters. Participatory and inclusive planning has already been used in the field of public health for some time (PAHO 1994; Macaulay et al. 1999), and should be used more widely by disaster planners.
在 1960 年代和 1970 年代，多个非洲国家，包括苏丹、坦桑尼亚、肯尼亚、莫桑比克和几内亚比绍，建立初级卫生保健网络方面取得了很大进展（Wisner 1976a, 1992a）。在古巴，通过利用革命防卫邻里委员会，成功地预防了登革热疫情的爆发，这些委员会在微观层面上进行了病例发现和环境管理，寻找并消除蚊子滋生地（Susman 2001）。稍后在第 9 章中，我们将论证当地人民的知识和技能在减轻损失和预防灾害的规划中常常被忽视。参与性和包容性规划在公共卫生领域已经使用了一段时间（PAHO 1994; Macaulay et al. 1999），并应被灾害规划者更广泛地使用。

Policy directions政策方向

The first steps toward reducing the risk of biological disaster should be the extension and strengthening of PHC networks. This was the goal of the WHO’S campaign 'Health for All by the Year 2000’ (Wisner 1988b, 1992a). Left purely to ‘market forces’, health services are not accessible to the poor. In fact, observing the distribution of care in the UK more than 30 years ago, Hart (1971) proposed an ‘inverse care law’ which states that the greater the need for care, the less that is provided. NGOs, especially grassroots people’s development associations, can improve access to health care in a variety of ways, even for the poorest households (Packard et al. 1989; Cairncross et al. 1990b). The effects of such work in promoting safer conditions (reducing vulnerability) can be traced in several of the boxes in our Access model shown in Figure 3.1.

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Dr John Lindsay, a medical officer with the government of Manitoba, Canada, goes even further by arguing that the means and the ends of population health policy are identical with those of disaster risk mitigation (Lindsay 2002).
减少生物灾害风险的第一步应是扩展和加强初级卫生保健网络。这是世界卫生组织“到 2000 年人人享有健康”运动的目标（Wisner 1988b, 1992a）。如果完全依赖“市场力量”，卫生服务对贫困人群并不可及。事实上，观察到 30 多年前英国的护理分布，Hart（1971）提出了“逆护理法则”，即对护理需求越大，提供的护理越少。非政府组织，特别是基层人民发展协会，可以通过多种方式改善最贫困家庭的医疗保健获取（Packard et al. 1989; Cairncross et al. 1990b）。这种促进安全条件（减少脆弱性）工作的效果可以在我们在图 3.1 中展示的获取模型的几个框中追踪到。

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加拿大曼尼托巴省的医疗官员约翰·林赛博士进一步论证，人口健康政策的手段和目的与灾害风险减缓的手段和目的是相同的（Lindsay 2002）。

Second, a large effort should be put into meeting the Millennium Goal of providing improved access to water supply and sanitation to some 800 million people by the year 2015. In this chapter the close connection between routine or ‘normal’ access to such essential services and resilience in the face of the health consequences of disaster has been pointed out several times, as well as the obvious point that vulnerability to such biological hazards as cholera is reduced when water and sanitation are improved.
其次，应大力努力实现千年发展目标，即到 2015 年为约 8 亿人提供改善的水供应和卫生设施。在本章中，多次指出了常规或“正常”获取这些基本服务与在灾害健康后果面前的韧性之间的密切联系，以及一个显而易见的观点，即改善水和卫生设施可以减少对霍乱等生物危害的脆弱性。

Third, vulnerable groups should receive special help in improving their nutritional status. Good nutrition provides resilience. But the steps needed to improve nutrition may involve measures that are difficult to implement. Land reform, rural credit to women, access to livelihoods in the urban ‘informal’ sector, food pricing policy, targeted nutritional supplementation and urban gardening have all proven effective in providing improved nutritional status.

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第三，脆弱群体应获得特别帮助，以改善其营养状况。良好的营养提供韧性。但改善营养所需的措施可能涉及难以实施的步骤。土地改革、向女性提供农村信贷、获取城市“非正式”部门的生计、食品定价政策、针对性的营养补充和城市园艺等措施都已被证明在改善营养状况方面有效。

Fourth, agricultural research and extension should greatly increase resources devoted to genetic diversity, identifying and preserving local genetic diversity and resource management techniques. Integrated pest management (IPM) and integrated vector management (IVM) should substitute for the import-intensive agro-chemical approach to plant and animal hygiene. However, there are strong pressures, both commercial (from seed companies and the manufacturers of pesticides and herbicides) and bureaucratic (science-led agencies chasing targets, quotas for innovation adopters), which work against this strategy. Also, it cannot become an exclusive strategy, but one in which risks of reducing biodiversity and adopting modern techniques of agriculture and conservation are more carefully researched and understood.
第四，农业研究和推广应大幅增加用于遗传多样性的资源，识别和保护地方遗传多样性及资源管理技术。综合害虫管理（IPM）和综合媒介管理（IVM）应取代对植物和动物卫生的进口密集型农业化学品方法。然而，来自种子公司和农药、除草剂制造商的商业压力，以及追求目标、创新采用者配额的科学主导机构的官僚压力，均对这一战略产生了强大阻力。此外，这不能成为一种排他性的战略，而应是一种更仔细研究和理解减少生物多样性风险及采用现代农业和保护技术的战略。

Lastly, health education and agricultural extension should pay much more attention to the real constraints on people’s lives. In this way, the ‘messages’ of educators will be more relevant, and the ‘educators’ should be more open to what they can learn from civil society (Barth-Eide 1978; Kent 1988; Turner and Ingle 1985; Wisner 1987a).
最后，健康教育和农业推广应更加关注人们生活中的实际制约因素。通过这种方式，教育者的“信息”将更具相关性，而“教育者”应更加开放，倾听他们可以从公民社会中学到的东西（Barth-Eide 1978；Kent 1988；Turner 和 Ingle 1985；Wisner 1987a）。

Precautionary science预防性科学

During the last two centuries, biodiversity has suffered irreparable damage. Consumption
在过去两个世纪中，生物多样性遭受了不可逆转的损害。消费
of fossil fuels has begun to change the earth’s climate, with a whole series of consequences for food security and health. Destruction of the ozone layer in the atmosphere could produce a significant rise in new cases of skin cancer (Benedick 1991:21; CIESIN 2003). The effect of additional ultra-violet radiation on phytoplankton, zooplankton and other life forms at the bottom of the earth’s food chain is not known. In addition, large doses of ultra-violet radiation may harm the immune systems of higher animals, including humans. Such a possibility brings us around full circle, as this chapter began with a discussion of human biological adaptation and immunity.
化石燃料开始改变地球的气候，这对粮食安全和健康产生了一系列后果。大气中臭氧层的破坏可能导致皮肤癌新病例的显著增加（Benedick 1991:21; CIESIN 2003）。额外的紫外线辐射对浮游植物、浮游动物以及地球食物链底部其他生命形式的影响尚不清楚。此外，大剂量的紫外线辐射可能会损害包括人类在内的高等动物的免疫系统。这种可能性使我们回到了起点，因为本章开始时讨论了人类的生物适应和免疫力。

In view of the massive changes urban-industrial civilisation has brought about in a short span of time, the current enthusiasm for biotechnology should be reconsidered carefully. A healthy scepticism and cautious attitude would seem appropriate before the next round of humankind’s heroic environmental modification goes too far. No one foresaw the health consequences of releasing tens of thousands of newly synthesised chemicals into the environment until Rachel Carson wrote Silent Spring (1962). What will the deliberate release (and accidental escape) of genetically engineered life forms do? There are certainly some beneficial uses of recombinant DNA technology in medicine and agriculture. But who should decide which applications are worth the environmental risks (Walgate 1990; Harremoes et al. 2002)? If we have learned anything about human health since Hippocrates wrote Airs, Waters and Places approximately 2,400 years ago, it is that each person’s health is inseparable from the health of others and the health of the environment. A reduction in vulnerability to biological hazard will therefore require both social justice (to ensure the health of others) and technological humility (to restore the health of the environment).
鉴于城市工业文明在短时间内带来的巨大变化，目前对生物技术的热情应当仔细重新考虑。在人类下一轮英雄式的环境改造过于激进之前，保持健康的怀疑态度和谨慎的态度似乎是合适的。直到瑞秋·卡森撰写《寂静的春天》（1962 年），没有人预见到将成千上万种新合成化学物质释放到环境中会带来的健康后果。故意释放（和意外逃逸）基因工程生命形式会造成什么影响？在医学和农业中，重组 DNA 技术确实有一些有益的应用。但谁应该决定哪些应用值得冒环境风险（Walgate 1990；Harremoes 等，2002）？如果我们从希波克拉底大约 2400 年前撰写的《空气、水和地方》中学到任何关于人类健康的知识，那就是每个人的健康与他人的健康和环境的健康是不可分割的。因此，减少对生物危害的脆弱性需要社会公正（以确保他人的健康）和技术谦逊（以恢复环境的健康）。

Notes注释

1 During the 1990s there were serious wildfires on the urban-wildland interface affecting Cape Town, Sydney, Los Angeles and San Diego. Large forest fires occurred often as well in Brazil, Mexico, the US and the south of France. Most memorable, perhaps, and an event with significant health consequences, was the series of fires in Indonesia in 1997. Tens of millions of people were affected by the resulting air pollution in many downwind countries including Malaysia, Singapore, as well as parts of Thailand and the Philippines, and elsewhere in Indonesia (Brauer and Hisham-Hashim 1998). In 1871 a forest fire in Peshtigo, Wisconsin, in the US, killed more than 2,200 people who lived in the midst of a large area devoted to the timber industry (Foote 1997:101; Gess and Lutz 2002).
1 在 1990 年代，城市与野生环境交界处发生了严重的野火，影响了开普敦、悉尼、洛杉矶和圣地亚哥。巴西、墨西哥、美国和法国南部也经常发生大规模森林火灾。或许最令人难忘的是 1997 年印度尼西亚的一系列火灾，这一事件对健康产生了重大影响。数千万人的健康受到影响，尤其是在包括马来西亚、新加坡、泰国和菲律宾部分地区以及印度尼西亚其他地方的下风国家（Brauer 和 Hisham-Hashim 1998）。1871 年，美国威斯康星州的佩什蒂戈发生了一场森林火灾，导致超过 2200 人遇难，他们生活在一个大面积的木材工业区内（Foote 1997:101; Gess 和 Lutz 2002）。
2 WHO http://www.who.int/msa/mnh/ems/dalys/intro.htm.
2 世界卫生组织 http://www.who.int/msa/mnh/ems/dalys/intro.htm。
3 The literature on human needs is large and diverse. Some believe that ‘need discourse’ is politically and ideologically manipulated, and that it does not make sense to assert the existence of universal, ‘basic’ human needs (Sopher 1981). Others assert that some needs are not only real and universal, but imply the human right to their satisfaction (Bay 1988), a view that is opposed by Streeten (1984). Nobel Laureate Sen links rights and needs: The exercise of basic political rights makes it more likely not only that there would be a policy response to economic
人类需求的文献庞大而多样。一些人认为“需求话语”受到政治和意识形态的操控，声称普遍的“基本”人类需求的存在没有意义（Sopher 1981）。另一些人则主张某些需求不仅是真实和普遍的，而且暗示了满足这些需求的人的权利（Bay 1988），这一观点受到 Streeten（1984）的反对。诺贝尔奖得主 Sen 将权利与需求联系起来：基本政治权利的行使不仅使得对经济需求的政策响应更有可能，而且“经济需求”的概念化——包括理解——本身可能需要行使这样的权利（2000:153）。
needs, but also that the conceptualization-including comprehension-of “economic needs” itself may require the exercise of such rights’ (2000:153).
关于灾害流行病学，参见 Chen（1973）；de Ville 和 Lechat（1976）；PAHO（1982, 2000b）；UNDRO（1982a）；Seaman 等（1984）；Alexander（1985）；Sapir 和 Lechat（1986）；WHO（1990）；Noji（1997）；Wisner 和 Adams（2003）。
4 On the epidemiology of disasters, see Chen (1973); de Ville and Lechat (1976); PAHO (1982, 2000b); UNDRO (1982a); Seaman et al. (1984); Alexander (1985); Sapir and Lechat (1986); WHO (1990); Noji (1997); Wisner and Adams (2003).
关于灾害流行病学，参见 Chen（1973）；de Ville 和 Lechat（1976）；PAHO（1982, 2000b）；UNDRO（1982a）；Seaman 等（1984）；Alexander（1985）；Sapir 和 Lechat（1986）；WHO（1990）；Noji（1997）；Wisner 和 Adams（2003）。
5 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, a highly infectious viral disease that first appeared in southern China in November 2002, and was declared a worldwide threat in March 2003. By 9 May 2003 there were 7,000 cases worldwide with 500 deaths (WHO 2003). SARS was officially contained by July 2003.
5 严重急性呼吸综合症是一种高度传染性的病毒性疾病，首次出现在 2002 年 11 月的中国南方，并于 2003 年 3 月被宣布为全球威胁。到 2003 年 5 月 9 日，全球已有 7000 例病例，500 人死亡（世界卫生组织 2003 年）。SARS 在 2003 年 7 月正式得到控制。
6 Yellow fever outbreaks were common in Memphis and other US cities in the nineteenth century. See Yellow Fever Collection (2003).
6 在 19 世纪，黄热病疫情在孟菲斯和其他美国城市很常见。请参见黄热病文献（2003 年）。
7 South Africa is also experiencing socially determined mortality for a different reason, as the government has opposed drug treatments, for ideological rather than financial reasons. As this book goes to press some provincial governors have defied national policy and are providing HIV-AIDS medication to expectant mothers, and there are discussions that might lead to a change in national policy. A factory or mine worker whose employer provides HIV-AIDS medication (so that the workforce does not die off) is less vulnerable than an urban worker who does not have such access to treatment.
7 南非也因不同原因经历社会决定的死亡率，因为政府出于意识形态而非经济原因反对药物治疗。在本书印刷时，一些省长已经违抗国家政策，向孕妇提供 HIV-AIDS 药物，并且正在进行可能导致国家政策改变的讨论。雇主提供 HIV-AIDS 药物的工厂或矿工（以防止劳动力死亡）比没有这种治疗机会的城市工人更不易受到影响。
8 West Bengal and Bangladesh Arsenic Crisis Information Centre http://bicn.com/acic/
8 西孟加拉邦和孟加拉国砷危机信息中心 http://bicn.com/acic/
9 The BGS may be sued for being negligent in failing to test for arsenic (Clark 2001).
BGS 可能因未能检测砷而被起诉（Clark 2001）。
An internet search on the terms BGS and arsenic will provide a great deal of material on the controversy, including statements from critics of UNICEF and the BGS, and responses from those organisations, e.g. UNICEF at http://www.unicef.org/arsenic/
在 BGS 和砷的相关术语上进行互联网搜索将提供大量关于争议的材料，包括对联合国儿童基金会和 BGS 的批评者的声明，以及这些组织的回应，例如联合国儿童基金会在 http://www.unicef.org/arsenic/上的内容。
10 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention bioterrorism site http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
美国疾病控制与预防中心生物恐怖主义网站 http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
11 US Secretary of Health and Human Services testifying to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee said: ‘[U]nder the circumstances that we are facing right now, I think [

$ 200

million toward the UN goal of $7-10 billion] is a tremendously generous contribution’. Stolberg [2002b] comments that ‘under the circumstances’ is an apparent reference to the war on terrorism.
美国卫生与公共服务部部长在美国参议院外交关系委员会作证时表示：“在我们目前面临的情况下，我认为[

$ 200

百万美元用于联合国目标的 70-100 亿美元]是一个极其慷慨的贡献。”Stolberg [2002b]评论说，“在这种情况下”显然是指对恐怖主义的战争。
12 On global climate change and human health, see McMichaels et al. (1996); Watson et al. (1999); Houghton et al. (2001); McCarthy et al. (2001); Glantz (2001); World Bank (2002).
关于全球气候变化与人类健康，参见 McMichaels 等（1996）；Watson 等（1999）；Houghton 等（2001）；McCarthy 等（2001）；Glantz（2001）；世界银行（2002）。
13 A frightening and regrettable urban mirror image of this situation seemed to be developing at the time of writing in Iraq under US occupation. On 8 May 2003, the WHO gave notice of cases of cholera in Basra and warned of the possibility of a large epidemic. The population’s baseline health and nutritional situation is poor, and the water and sanitation infrastructure was not yet functioning properly due to damage sustained during the first and second Gulf Wars as well as years of sanctions (Wright 2003).
在撰写时，伊拉克在美国占领下似乎正在发展出一种令人恐惧和遗憾的城市镜像。2003 年 5 月 8 日，世界卫生组织通报了巴士拉的霍乱病例，并警告可能发生大规模疫情。该地区人口的基本健康和营养状况较差，水和卫生基础设施由于在第一次和第二次海湾战争中遭受的损害以及多年的制裁，尚未正常运作（Wright 2003）。
14 The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported a crude mortality rate (CMR) among refugees in Goma in July 1994 of 34-54 per 10,000 per day. Normally, the expected CMR in an LDC is below 0.5 per 10,000 per day. Much of
美国疾病控制与预防中心报告称，1994 年 7 月在戈马的难民中，粗死亡率（CMR）为每天每万名难民 34-54 人。通常，最不发达国家的预期粗死亡率低于每天每万名难民 0.5 人。大部分
the excess mortality is explained by epidemic cholera. See:
超额死亡率可归因于霍乱疫情。参见：
http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00052860.htm
15 For example, after hurricane Mitch (1998) PAHO (1999) summarised its health impacts as follows
例如，在飓风米切尔（1998 年）之后，泛美卫生组织（1999 年）总结了其健康影响如下

Cholera…jumped from a total of 2,836 cases in 1998, before Hurricane Mitch, to 3,544 cases in the nine weeks after Mitch, with the average number of weekly cases rocketing from 16.4 cases to 78.7 cases. After Mitch, 708 leptospirosis cases were reported, while only one case was reported in 1998 before the hurricane struck. Malaria jumped from an average of 433 cases a week per country before Mitch to 642 cases, a 48 percent increase, with Belize reporting the lowest ( 27 cases a week) and Guatemala the highest (1,528 malaria cases per week). Dengue also rose after Mitch struck Central America, from an average of 141 cases a week to 162 cases a week per country.
霍乱……在 1998 年飓风米切尔之前的总病例为 2,836 例，而在米切尔之后的九周内病例增加到 3,544 例，平均每周病例从 16.4 例激增至 78.7 例。米切尔之后报告了 708 例钩端螺旋体病病例，而在 1998 年飓风来袭之前仅报告了一例。疟疾的平均每周病例从米切尔之前每个国家的 433 例增加到 642 例，增幅为 48%，伯利兹报告的最低（每周 27 例），而危地马拉则报告最高（每周 1,528 例疟疾病例）。登革热在米切尔袭击中美洲后也有所上升，从每个国家平均每周 141 例增加到 162 例。

16 Mental health consequences, on the other hand, can be long lasting and may accompany any disaster or other trauma; see, for example, WHO (1997). In this book we deal with mental health only insofar as it affects well-being with regard to household access and livelihoods as presented in Chapter 3. This is, admittedly, another self-imposed limitation, and is not meant to suggest that people in LDCs (the focus of most of our case studies) suffer any less from grief and other longer lasting post-traumatic stress. We simply cannot accommodate a review of this large and growing literature. For an introduction one might consult Gerrity and Flynn (1997).
16 心理健康的后果可能是长期的，并可能伴随任何灾难或其他创伤；例如，参见世界卫生组织（1997）。在本书中，我们仅在心理健康影响家庭获取和生计的福祉的范围内进行讨论，如第三章所述。这无疑是我们自我设定的另一个限制，并不意味着发展中国家（我们大多数案例研究的重点）的人们在悲痛和其他长期的创伤后应激反应方面遭受的痛苦较少。我们只是无法容纳对这一庞大且不断增长的文献的回顾。有关介绍，可以参考 Gerrity 和 Flynn（1997）。

17 Here we would include exposure of the migrant to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs)—possibly including HIV-AIDS—and tuberculosis. These are known to have been spread to rural areas that provide contract labour to the South African mines (de Beer 1986; Packard 1989). The spread of HIV infection from urban centres to villages is also documented (Barnett and Blaikie 1992; Collins and Rau 2000).
17 在这里，我们将包括移民接触性传播疾病（STDs）——可能包括 HIV-AIDS——和结核病。这些疾病已知已传播到为南非矿山提供合同劳动力的农村地区（de Beer 1986；Packard 1989）。HIV 感染从城市中心传播到村庄的情况也有记录（Barnett 和 Blaikie 1992；Collins 和 Rau 2000）。

18 Dutch agricultural production fell by a half from 1938 to 1944/1945 due to war disruption. Nevertheless the Nazis first thoroughly integrated the Dutch economy into their war efforts, exporting large quantities of food to Germany. Then, as a reprisal for the Dutch railroad strike, they cut off all imports of food, fuel and electricity into the Netherlands during the last eight months of the war. Finally, the occupiers intentionally flooded 8 per cent of the country to impede the Allied advance, further weakening agricultural production. The result was famine, with urban rations as low as 500 Kcal in January 1945 (one-third of adult subsistence level). Twenty soup kitchens were run by Amsterdam city officials, feeding up to 160,000 people daily. People subsisted on beet-sugar and food obtained from the black market, where a loaf of bread could cost

$ 27

. In view of the severity of the famine it is remarkable that only 15-18,000 Dutch perished out of a population of about 9 million (Mass 1970; Warmbrunn 1972).
由于战争干扰，荷兰农业生产在 1938 年至 1944/1945 年间下降了一半。然而，纳粹首先将荷兰经济彻底融入他们的战争努力中，向德国出口大量食品。随后，作为对荷兰铁路罢工的报复，他们在战争最后八个月内切断了所有对荷兰的食品、燃料和电力进口。最后，侵略者故意淹没了 8%的国土，以阻碍盟军的推进，进一步削弱了农业生产。结果是饥荒，1945 年 1 月城市的配给低至 500 卡路里（相当于成年人的生存水平的三分之一）。阿姆斯特丹市官员运营了 20 个施粥所，每天为多达 160,000 人提供食物。人们靠甜菜糖和从黑市获得的食物维持生计，面包的价格可能高达

$ 27

。考虑到饥荒的严重性，令人惊讶的是，在大约 900 万人口中，只有 15,000 至 18,000 名荷兰人死于饥荒（Mass 1970; Warmbrunn 1972）。
19 Some information on health crises is given in Chen (1973) for the Bangladesh war
关于健康危机的一些信息在陈（1973）中提供，涉及孟加拉国战争
of 1970, and in CIMADE (1986), Kibreab (1985) and Rekacewicz (2000) on refugees in Africa.
1970 年，以及在 CIMADE（1986）、Kibreab（1985）和 Rekacewicz（2000）中关于非洲难民的讨论。
20 FAO (2002a); World Social Forum (2002).
FAO（2002a）；世界社会论坛（2002）。
21 General discussions of the Irish Potato Famine and its causes include Walford (1879); Woodham-Smith (1962); O’Brien and O’Brien (1972); Aykroyd (1974); Sen (1981); Regan (1983).
关于爱尔兰大饥荒及其原因的一般讨论包括 Walford（1879）；Woodham-Smith（1962）；O’Brien 和 O’Brien（1972）；Aykroyd（1974）；Sen（1981）；Regan（1983）。

22 In 1998, the 150th anniversary of the Irish famine, descendants of the survivors who immigrated to the US established a Famine Institute in Boston that raises money to respond to other food emergencies in the world, beginning with aid to post-hurricane Mitch Nicaragua (see Chapter 7). The institute also supports research into the causes and prevention of famine, and has provided donations to CONCERN, the largest relief and development non-governmental organisation in Eire, as well as to the University College Cork’s International Famine Centre. See: http://www.boston.com/famine/irishmore.stm
1998 年是爱尔兰大饥荒的 150 周年，幸存者的后代在波士顿建立了一个饥荒研究所，筹集资金以应对世界其他地区的食品紧急情况，首个项目是向飓风米切尔后尼加拉瓜提供援助（见第 7 章）。该研究所还支持对饥荒原因和预防的研究，并向爱尔兰最大的救援和发展非政府组织 CONCERN 以及科克大学国际饥荒中心提供了捐款。网址：http://www.boston.com/famine/irishmore.stm
23 The impact often equalled or surpassed that of the Black Death in Europe. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, wrote in 1781 of the Indians of the Powhatan confederacy in Virginia:
其影响往往与欧洲的黑死病相当或超过。例如，托马斯·杰斐逊在 1781 年写道关于弗吉尼亚州波瓦坦联盟的印第安人：

What would be the melancholy sequel of their history, may however be augured from the census of 1669; by which we discover that the tribes therein enumerated were, in the space of 62 years, reduced to about one-third of their former numbers. Spirituous liquors, the small-pox, war, and an abridgement of territory, to a people who lived principally on the spontaneous productions of nature, had committed terrible havoc among them.
然而，从 1669 年的普查中可以预见他们历史的忧郁续篇；通过这项普查，我们发现，在 62 年的时间里，所列举的部落人数减少到原来的约三分之一。烈性酒、小痘、战争以及对一个主要依靠自然自发产物生活的民族的领土缩减，给他们造成了可怕的破坏。
(Quoted in Peterson 1977:135)
（引用自彼得森 1977:135）
McNeil (1979) also records the devastating impact of smallpox in 1530-1531 on the Indian ability to withstand the military invasion of the conquistadors.
麦克尼尔（1979）还记录了 1530-1531 年小痘对印第安人抵御征服者军事入侵能力的毁灭性影响。
24 Major pandemics of bubonic plague occurred in the mid-sixth to mid-seventh centuries (Plague of Justinian and its aftermath in England and Ireland), the latter half of the fourteenth century (Black Death) and the mid-seventeenth to mideighteenth centuries, including the Great Plague of London in 1665 (Marks and Beatty 1976).
24 次主要的黑死病大流行发生在六世纪中叶到七世纪中叶（尤斯丁尼亚 plague 及其在英格兰和爱尔兰的后果）、十四世纪后半期（黑死病）以及十七世纪中叶到十八世纪中叶，包括 1665 年的伦敦大瘟疫（马克斯和比蒂 1976）。
25 On the resurgence and persistence of malaria, see Chapin and Wasserstrom (1981); Sharma and Mehrotra (1986); Learmonth (1988:208-211); Matthiessen (1992); Malaria Foundation International (1999); Spielman and D’Antonio (2001:141-178); Whitfield (2002).
关于疟疾的复苏和持续性，参见 Chapin 和 Wasserstrom（1981）；Sharma 和 Mehrotra（1986）；Learmonth（1988:208-211）；Matthiessen（1992）；国际疟疾基金会（1999）；Spielman 和 D’Antonio（2001:141-178）；Whitfield（2002）。
26 Extensive sewer systems were first dug in Hamburg in 1844-1888 and in London in 1854-1865. The association between cholera and water used for drinking and cooking was suggested only in 1849 by Dr John Snow (Read 1970).
汉堡在 1844-1888 年和伦敦在 1854-1865 年首次挖掘了广泛的下水道系统。霍乱与饮用和烹饪用水之间的关联仅在 1849 年由约翰·斯诺博士提出（Read 1970）。
27 The intense concentration on potato cultivation in Ireland was an anomaly compared with accounts of peasant farming in other parts of Europe during the same period (Shanin 1971). ...
28 By the mid-1980s more than four million people had died directly or indirectly in violent conflict in Africa since the era of independence began in 1958. The largest ...
losses were: more than two million in Biafra (Nigeria), 600,000 in Ethiopia, 550,000 in Uganda, 500,000 in Mozambique, 300,000 in Sudan and more than 100,000 each in Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda and Angola (Barnaby 1988). This was, of course, before the complete breakdown of the state in Somalia from 1991 onwards, the genocide in Rwanda and deaths from cholera in refugee camps (1994-1996), the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the horrific wars in Zaire/Congo in the late 1990s and civil wars in West Africa. In addition, conflict continued into the twenty-first century in Angola and Sudan. Therefore, an educated guess might put the total number of lives lost by 2002 at double Barnaby’s earlier estimate: 8 million. ...
29 The global IDP Project at http://www.idpproject.org/weekly_news/weekly_news.htm#4 has information on Angola and IDPs worldwide. ...
30 See also Balter (1998), Cohen (2000a, 2000b). ...
31 This figure was derived from a two-year study of 1,422 households. The study also found that grain production was more affected by the death of an adult female head of household, while a male death had a greater effect on ‘cash’ crops. In addition this research revealed that it was very difficult for households to recover from the death of an adult, and that the result of such a loss was often loss of assets such as goats, and a decrease in the overall size of the household. Both these effects could well be part of the household ‘coping’ strategy discussed in Chapter 3. ...
32 See also Africa Justice web site at http://www.justiceafrica.org/ ...
33 The reader may be less familiar with yaws than with smallpox. Yaws is a skin and bone disease caused by a bacterium similar to that responsible for syphilis, and is thus one of a family of non-venereal treponematoses (diseases caused by Treponema spp.). Until the early 1950s yaws was a very widespread tropical disease causing much disability and even death. The WHO began treating it with penicillin in the 1950s, treating over 50 million cases in 46 countries. The response to a single dose of the antibiotic was curative, and today yaws is of minor importance. See: http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIHAVSIHOOD/9339/23810.html
读者可能对耶尔斯病的了解不如对天花的了解。耶尔斯病是一种由与梅毒相似的细菌引起的皮肤和骨骼疾病，因此属于非性传播的梅毒病（由梅毒螺旋体引起的疾病）的一类。直到 20 世纪 50 年代初，耶尔斯病是一种非常普遍的热带疾病，导致了大量的残疾甚至死亡。世界卫生组织在 20 世纪 50 年代开始用青霉素治疗耶尔斯病，在 46 个国家治疗了超过 5000 万例。对单剂抗生素的反应是治愈性的，如今耶尔斯病的重要性已大大降低。请参见：http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIHAVSIHOOD/9339/23810.html
34 Of course there is the question of what these large quantities of insecticide may do in the environment, but in general this book cannot deal with the enormous area of technological hazards.
当然，关于这些大量杀虫剂在环境中可能造成的影响也是一个问题，但一般来说，本书无法处理技术危害这一广泛领域。
35 Some NGOs have challenged PHC as ‘not cost effective’. This challenge arises out of the debate that has accompanied a retreat from ‘basic needs’ as a fundamental goal (Wisner 1988b; Newell 1988). Some, including the World Bank, have questioned the whole idea of publicly financed health care. Privatisation schemes of various kinds grew up in many countries during the 1980s and 1990s. The long-term impact of such privatisation of essential services, as well as of lifeline infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation and drainage, has not yet been studied systematically.
35 一些非政府组织质疑初级卫生保健的“成本效益”。这一质疑源于对“基本需求”作为根本目标的退却所伴随的辩论（Wisner 1988b；Newell 1988）。包括世界银行在内的一些人质疑公共融资医疗保健的整个理念。在 1980 年代和 1990 年代，许多国家出现了各种形式的私有化方案。对基本服务的这种私有化，以及对水供应、卫生和排水等生命线基础设施的长期影响，尚未进行系统研究。
36 The literature on policies for improving nutrition includes Pinstrup-Anderson (1985); Cornia et al. (1987); Pinstrup-Anderson (1988); Hall et al. (1996); Neefjes (2000); Francis (2000).
36 改善营养的政策文献包括 Pinstrup-Anderson (1985)；Cornia 等 (1987)；Pinstrup-Anderson (1988)；Hall 等 (1996)；Neefjes (2000)；Francis (2000)。

6 FLOODS洪水

Introduction引言

Flood disasters, challenges and changes in thinking
洪水灾害、挑战与思维变化

The past decade has been a very significant period in relation to floods around the world, for several reasons.

^{1}

Firstly, some of the most extensive, damaging and costly floods have occurred in developed, wealthy countries: for example, in 1993 in the Mississippi basin (including its major tributaries, the Missouri and Red River) and on the Rhine and its tributaries; in 1998 and 2000 in England; in 1990 in Australia, where an area twice the size of Texas was under water; and in parts of eastern and central Europe in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and worst of all in 2002. While these countries have never been exempt from floods, the severity of these disasters seemed to shock not only the victims, but also governments, planners and insurers. It was as if wealth, infrastructure and order were being unfairly challenged by nature, in societies that considered themselves immune or robust, unlike the less developed countries (LDCs).
过去十年在全球范围内与洪水相关的时期非常重要，原因有几个。首先，一些最广泛、最具破坏性和最昂贵的洪水发生在发达的富裕国家：例如，1993 年在密西西比河流域（包括其主要支流密苏里河和红河）以及在莱茵河及其支流；1998 年和 2000 年在英格兰；1990 年在澳大利亚，那里有一个面积是德克萨斯州两倍的地区被淹没；以及在 1997 年、1998 年、1999 年、2000 年和最严重的 2002 年，东欧和中欧的部分地区。虽然这些国家从未免于洪水，但这些灾难的严重性似乎震惊了不仅是受害者，还有政府、规划者和保险公司。就好像财富、基础设施和秩序在这些自认为免疫或强大的社会中被自然不公正地挑战，而这些社会与较不发达国家（LDCs）不同。

Secondly, flooding in LDCs has appeared to be increasingly frequent and serious, to the extent that supposedly 100-year floods were occurring almost yearly in Bangladesh and China, and severe floods afflicted south-east Asia over several years (especially 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2000) and Africa, including Mozambique and Malawi (2000), Ethiopia and Somalia (1997). Thirdly, such floods (rightly or wrongly) have become increasingly associated with climate change: the popular and media perception has been of an increased frequency of floods and storms supposedly resulting from global warming. This general outlook has been linked to a more specific belief that the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is increasing in frequency and intensity as a part of climate change. Indeed, such is the popular adoption of El Niño as a climate change phenomenon that it has become a part of television weather forecast in the USA and Europe in the past ten years.

^{2}

This perception has developed alongside increased scientific understanding of ENSO, which has shown it to be not only a regional phenomenon of the Pacific, but part of a system that circumscribes the world, with patterns of drought-desiccation alternating with floods and storms (Glantz 2001, 2002).

^{3}

其次，发展中国家的洪水似乎变得越来越频繁和严重，以至于据说 100 年一遇的洪水几乎每年在孟加拉国和中国发生，而东南亚在数年内遭受了严重洪水（特别是 1996 年、1998 年、1999 年和 2000 年），非洲也受到影响，包括莫桑比克和马拉维（2000 年）、埃塞俄比亚和索马里（1997 年）。第三，这些洪水（无论是对是错）越来越多地与气候变化相关联：公众和媒体的看法是，洪水和风暴的发生频率因全球变暖而增加。这种普遍的看法与一个更具体的信念相联系，即厄尔尼诺南方涛动（ENSO）作为气候变化的一部分，其频率和强度正在增加。实际上，厄尔尼诺作为气候变化现象的普遍接受程度，使其在过去十年中成为美国和欧洲电视天气预报的一部分。

^{2}

这种认知伴随着对厄尔尼诺-南方涛动（ENSO）科学理解的加深而发展，显示它不仅是太平洋的区域现象，而是一个环绕全球的系统，干旱与洪水、风暴交替出现的模式（Glantz 2001, 2002）。

^{3}

Fourthly, the significant impact of floods on wealthy countries (which often had histories of engineering works intended to prevent floods) meant that a new debate opened up (allied loosely to environmentalism and the Green Movement) which permitted new thinking about the need to allow rivers to run unconstrained by earthworks, embankments, artificial levees, concrete and walls. Instead, a parallel popular
第四，洪水对富裕国家的重大影响（这些国家通常有防洪工程的历史）意味着一个新的辩论开始出现（与环境主义和绿色运动松散相关），这使得人们开始重新思考允许河流不受土方工程、堤坝、人工堤岸、混凝土和墙壁的限制而自由流动的必要性。相反，出现了一种平行的公众意识
consciousness arose that rivers should be allowed to flow freely in their valleys, enabling the flood plains to be restored to exactly that: flood plains (Smith 2000).
认为河流应该在其河谷中自由流动，使洪泛区得以恢复为真正的洪泛区（Smith 2000）。

This shift in thinking also affected the types of policies that developed countries could advocate in LDCs. It has become difficult to advocate engineering solutions to the Bangladesh flood problem, as had been proposed in the 1989 Bangladesh Flood Action Plan (BFAP) (Box 6.3). Crucial to this shift in thinking was also a growing sense that flood disasters are caused by people and not just water. The media and popular conceptions of floods shifted significantly to suggestions that the disasters were happening because people and buildings were in the wrong places on flood-prone land. This ties up neatly with the notion that rivers should remain untamed and that people should beat an organised retreat to higher and more appropriate land. The policy fits with the recognition of the needs of nature and the inappropriate behaviour of people.
这种思维的转变也影响了发达国家在最不发达国家（LDCs）中可以倡导的政策类型。倡导工程解决方案来应对孟加拉国洪水问题变得困难，这在 1989 年孟加拉国洪水行动计划（BFAP）中曾被提议（见框 6.3）。这种思维转变的关键在于人们越来越意识到洪水灾害是由人造成的，而不仅仅是水。媒体和公众对洪水的看法显著转变，认为灾害发生是因为人和建筑物位于易洪水地区的不当位置。这与河流应保持自然状态以及人们应有序撤退到更高、更合适的土地的观念紧密相连。该政策符合对自然需求的认识以及人类不当行为的认知。

Despite all this new thinking and increased awareness of floods, we should not lose sight of the fact that floods have long been considered to affect more people and cause more economic losses than any other hazard (although the data often fail to separate out those floods associated with tropical cyclones; see note 1). Parker (2000:5) cites data that suggest floods were the most common type of disaster trigger in the second half of the twentieth century. The reinsurance company Munich Re has reported that for most years in the late 1990s the largest share of economic losses from all natural hazards were due to floods (Munich Re 1997, 1998), and that 55 per cent of deaths in the period 1986-1995 were caused by flooding, making it the leading cause of disaster mortality in that period (IFRC 1999a:5).
尽管有了这些新的思考和对洪水的认识增加，我们仍然不应忽视这样一个事实：洪水长期以来被认为影响的人数和造成的经济损失超过任何其他灾害（尽管数据往往未能区分与热带气旋相关的洪水；见注释 1）。Parker（2000:5）引用的数据表明，洪水是二十世纪下半叶最常见的灾害触发因素。再保险公司慕尼黑再保险公司报告称，在 1990 年代后期的大多数年份中，所有自然灾害造成的经济损失中，洪水占据了最大的份额（慕尼黑再保险 1997, 1998），并且在 1986-1995 年期间，55%的死亡是由洪水造成的，使其成为该期间灾害死亡的主要原因（国际红十字与红新月联合会 1999a:5）。

Yet in many parts of the world, floods are also a normal and an essential component of agricultural and ecological systems, because they provide the basis for the regeneration of crops, plant and aquatic life, and of livelihoods derived from them. In surveys of people who live and cope with floods in Bangladesh, a majority of villagers generally disapprove of attempts to stop floods entirely (Leaf 1997; Haque 1997:303-304). Floods there are even given different names to allow a distinction to be made between those that are beneficial and those that are destructive. This ambiguous character of floods is important, and is discussed later in the context of flood control measures (since it is difficult to control destructive flooding without also preventing beneficial flooding). If there really is a shift towards allowing rivers to be restored to their ‘natural’ flow regimes, then the corollary is that the benefits of floods will be reinstated. Paradoxically, floods are also likely to affect areas that at other times are prone to drought. Even in Bangladesh, farming in the winter months requires irrigation in much of the country.
然而，在世界许多地方，洪水也是农业和生态系统的正常且重要组成部分，因为它们为作物、植物和水生生物的再生以及由此衍生的生计提供了基础。在对生活在孟加拉国并应对洪水的居民的调查中，大多数村民通常反对完全阻止洪水的尝试（Leaf 1997; Haque 1997:303-304）。那里甚至给洪水赋予了不同的名称，以便区分有益的洪水和破坏性的洪水。洪水的这种模糊特性很重要，并将在洪水控制措施的背景下进行讨论（因为在不防止有益洪水的情况下，很难控制破坏性洪水）。如果确实有向允许河流恢复到其“自然”流动状态的转变，那么相应的就是洪水的好处将会恢复。矛盾的是，洪水也可能影响在其他时候容易发生干旱的地区。即使在孟加拉国，冬季的农业在全国大部分地区也需要灌溉。

The enormous floods in developed countries over the last decade caused relatively few deaths but tens of billions of dollars of damage, much of it uninsured losses. Along with the damage from water itself (and sewage) came health hazards from contamination by chemical leaks, fuel and other pollutants leaking from damaged industrial plants, and enormous amounts of garbage and debris. These floods had a significant impact on flood policies, not only for Europe and North America, but also for other parts of the world, such as Bangladesh (see Box 6.3). In particular, they severely reduced the trust in conventional ‘engineered’ flood control measures. This is evidenced in a commentary on the US floods in Engineering News Record:
在过去十年中，发达国家的巨大洪水造成的死亡人数相对较少，但损失达数百亿美元，其中大部分是未投保的损失。除了水本身（和污水）造成的损害外，还伴随着来自受损工业厂房的化学泄漏、燃料和其他污染物的污染所带来的健康危害，以及大量的垃圾和碎片。这些洪水对洪水政策产生了重大影响，不仅对欧洲和北美，也对世界其他地区，如孟加拉国（见框 6.3）。特别是，它们严重削弱了人们对传统“工程”洪水控制措施的信任。这在《工程新闻记录》对美国洪水的评论中得到了证实：

In large measure, these increases in flood damages have been self-inflicted. Development of our flood plains has continued as a result of engineering hubris, disaster-denial mentality and a willingness to pursue short-term profit in the face of long-term risk. Integral to this problem has been an unhealthy over-reliance on levees too close to rivers and 100-year flood-plain zoning.
在很大程度上，这些洪水损失的增加是自我造成的。由于工程自负其责、灾难否认心态以及在长期风险面前追求短期利润的意愿，我们的洪泛区开发持续进行。这个问题的核心是对靠近河流的堤坝和 100 年洪泛区分区的过度依赖。
(Mount 1998:59)（Mount 1998:59）
The collapse of confidence in engineered flood prevention has allowed an increased interest in a 'living with floods’ approach to emerge, which also recognises that rivers, their banks and flood plains, provide valuable ‘ecological services’ (which can include the absorption of some flood water). This shift in outlook led to an acceptance of the need to understand the function of rivers and their flow regimes in relation to the wider environment, and a new interest in the idea of returning rivers to their ‘natural’ state. This approach is coupled with a wider interest in river ‘restoration’, which (especially in the USA) has led to the dismantling of dams, and the renewal of flood regimes through planned release from dams (e.g. as has happened on the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon). Underlying this shift in thinking is a general acceptance that rivers and their floods have considerable benefits that have been lost through damming and flood control.
对工程化洪水防治信心的崩溃使得“与洪水共生”方法的兴趣增加，这种方法也承认河流、河岸和洪泛区提供了宝贵的“生态服务”（这可以包括对部分洪水的吸收）。这种观点的转变导致了对理解河流及其流动模式与更广泛环境之间关系的必要性的接受，以及对将河流恢复到其“自然”状态的新兴趣。这种方法与对河流“恢复”的更广泛兴趣相结合，这在美国尤其导致了水坝的拆除，以及通过计划性释放水坝的水来恢复洪水模式（例如，科罗拉多河在大峡谷的情况）。这种思维转变的基础是普遍接受河流及其洪水具有相当大的好处，而这些好处在水坝和洪水控制中被丧失。

Although we understand all too well the damage floods do, we have not, until recently, understood very well the many beneficial aspects of flooding. Floods are critical for maintaining and restoring many of the important services provided to humans by riparian ecosystems. Among other things, flooding provides critical habitat for fish, waterfowl and wildlife, and helps maintain high levels of plant and animal diversity. Floodwaters also replenish agricultural soils with nutrients and transport sediment that is necessary to maintain downstream delta and coastal areas. Indeed, recent attempts in the United States to restore riverine ecosystems have increasingly turned to ‘managed’ floods-the manipulation of water flows from dams and other impoundments-to achieve the benefits of flooding (Haeuber and Michener 1998:74).
尽管我们非常清楚洪水造成的损害，但直到最近，我们对洪水的许多有益方面了解得并不充分。洪水对于维持和恢复河岸生态系统为人类提供的许多重要服务至关重要。洪水提供了鱼类、水鸟和野生动物的重要栖息地，并有助于维持高水平的植物和动物多样性。洪水还为农业土壤补充养分，并运输维持下游三角洲和沿海地区所需的沉积物。事实上，美国最近恢复河流生态系统的尝试越来越多地转向“管理”洪水——通过调节水库和其他蓄水设施的水流，以实现洪水的益处（Haeuber and Michener 1998:74）。

These complex ecological relationships are clear in the case of the lower Mississippi. Before elaborate flood control systems were built, the city of New Orleans was partly protected from coastal storms by marshes and barrier islands (Figure 7.1). However, after decades of coastal erosion without the replenishment of the silt provided in the past by those floods, the ‘natural defences’ for the city are disappearing. Given this , coupled with the low-lying topography of much of the city and its demographic growth, a very large hurricane-flood disaster is possible-one that could kill up to 45,000 people (Nordheimer 2002: D1&D4; see also Chapter 7).
这些复杂的生态关系在下密西西比河的案例中表现得尤为明显。在建造复杂的洪水控制系统之前，新奥尔良市部分受到沼泽和障碍岛的保护，免受沿海风暴的侵袭（见图 7.1）。然而，经过数十年的沿海侵蚀，未能补充过去洪水带来的淤泥，这座城市的“自然防御”正在消失。考虑到这一点，加上城市大部分地区的低洼地形和人口增长，发生一次可能导致多达 45,000 人遇难的大型飓风洪水灾难是可能的（Nordheimer 2002: D1&D4；另见第 7 章）。

The new attitude to rivers and floods has also meant a wider acceptance that flood plains might be inappropriate locations for some human economic activity. Policies are therefore being explored for the withdrawal of some economic functions, along with the removal of flood control measures. The floods in the USA even raised doubts about the viability of some flood prevention measures, and it is worth quoting Mount again at length:
对河流和洪水的新态度也意味着更广泛地接受洪泛区可能不适合某些人类经济活动。因此，正在探索撤回某些经济功能的政策，以及移除洪水控制措施。美国的洪水甚至引发了对某些洪水预防措施可行性的怀疑，值得再次引用 Mount 的长篇论述：

Most of the flooding that occurred last year [1997] was associated with
去年[1997]发生的大部分洪水与
structural failure of levees, rather than with over-topping. In most cases, levees failed due to prolonged high flood stages associated with unusually large runoff in a system divorced from its ancestral flood plain. Other failures resulted from poor levee maintenance. Floods in 1997 in California’s Central Valley revealed a disorganized and underfunded maintenance and inspection system, and a significant number of orphaned levees. But several spectacular failures also occurred on levees that were well-engineered, well-maintained, recently inspected and operating within design capacity. It’s easy, but politically and economically naive, to state that the silver-bullet solution to preventing levee failures is to simply do a better job of design and maintenance. It’s more difficult to acknowledge the most worrisome aspect of levees: No matter how rigorous the engineering and maintenance, even the best levees will fail occasionally.
堤坝的结构性失效，而不是溢流。在大多数情况下，堤坝因与其祖传洪泛区脱离的系统中与异常大径流相关的长期高洪水阶段而失效。其他失效则是由于堤坝维护不善。1997 年加利福尼亚中央谷地的洪水揭示了一个无序且资金不足的维护和检查系统，以及大量孤立的堤坝。但也发生了几起壮观的失效，发生在那些设计良好、维护得当、最近检查过并在设计容量内运行的堤坝上。说要防止堤坝失效的灵丹妙药就是简单地做好设计和维护，虽然容易，但在政治和经济上都是天真的。更难以承认的是堤坝最令人担忧的方面：无论工程和维护多么严格，即使是最好的堤坝也会偶尔失效。
(Mount 1998:59)（Mount 1998:59）
The implications of this for poor countries (where maintenance is an even greater problem than for the wealthy USA, and reliance on levees puts millions of people, and not just property at risk) are clearly serious.
这对贫穷国家的影响（在这些国家，维护问题比富裕的美国更为严重，依赖堤坝使数百万人而不仅仅是财产面临风险）显然是严重的。

However, this awareness of the significance of the flood plain does not mean that pressure for use of its 'cheap’ flat land has diminished everywhere. In the UK, the severe housing shortage in some regions, coupled with a reduction in the planning powers of local authorities (initiated under Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major, and not redressed under Blair), has led to increasing use of flood plains for housing development. In Britain, insured flood losses have risen enormously in the past decade, with unprecedented flooding almost every year. The insurance industry is now withdrawing its cover from such areas. Often the people buying houses are unaware that they will not be able to get cover, while others are having insurance renewals refused (Crichton 2001:188; Blackstock 2002).
然而，对洪泛区重要性的认识并不意味着对其“便宜”平坦土地的使用压力在各地都减弱。在英国，某些地区严重的住房短缺，加上地方当局的规划权力减少（这一变化始于撒切尔和梅杰首相时期，在布莱尔执政期间并未得到纠正），导致洪泛区越来越多地被用于住房开发。在英国，过去十年中，投保的洪水损失急剧上升，几乎每年都有前所未有的洪水。保险行业现在正在撤回对这些地区的保险覆盖。购房者往往不知道他们将无法获得保险，而其他人则面临保险续保被拒的情况（Crichton 2001:188; Blackstock 2002）。

Floods as known risks
已知风险的洪水

Because of their repetitive behaviour patterns, most types of floods are 'known risks’ (White 1942). Riverine floods are of course normally restricted to flood plains, where events over thousands of years have deposited silt and levelled the land so that it is good for agriculture and cheap for modern construction. Flash floods also occur in the hilly upper reaches of river basins, when heavy rain over a limited area drains rapidly into a main channel. This makes warnings and avoidance difficult, although areas at risk of such sudden events are themselves predictable, so that with given rainfall conditions warnings should be possible. Floods affect some low-lying inland areas as a result of rainfall, and some coastlines are liable both to rain flooding and sea invasion (especially under storm surge or unusual tidal conditions). Coastal areas are also at risk of tsunami, the waves triggered by earthquakes, volcanoes or undersea landslides that can cross oceans at

800 km / h

and rise to enormous heights (often 10 m and sometimes up to 30 m ) when striking the shore (see Chapter 8).
由于其重复的行为模式，大多数类型的洪水被认为是“已知风险”（White 1942）。河流洪水通常限制在洪泛区，在那里，数千年的事件沉积了淤泥并平整了土地，使其适合农业并且现代建筑成本低廉。突发洪水也发生在河流流域的丘陵上游，当有限区域内的强降雨迅速排入主河道时。这使得预警和避免变得困难，尽管面临这种突发事件的区域本身是可预测的，因此在特定降雨条件下，发出警报是可能的。洪水还会影响一些低洼的内陆地区，部分海岸线则容易受到降雨洪水和海水侵袭（尤其是在风暴潮或异常潮汐条件下）。沿海地区也面临海啸的风险，海啸是由地震、火山或海底滑坡引发的波浪，这些波浪可以以

800 km / h

的速度穿越海洋，并在撞击海岸时升至巨大的高度（通常为 10 米，有时可达 30 米）（见第 8 章）。

As a result of earlier events, and by conforming to predictable patterns, the places affected by flood hazards are generally known. This means that both self and social protection measures should be possible for most types of flood hazards. However, this basic ‘expectedness’ is complicated by the wide ranges of intensity and duration of floods that can affect the same area at different times, and variation in return periods (the average number of years between floods of a given magnitude recurring). This makes some people gamble against self-protection, on the basis that, over time, the risks are outweighed by the costs of protection. The social protection offered by those who advocate ‘technical-fix’ engineering interventions are usually costly, and often conflict with the benefits of floods.
由于早期事件的影响，并遵循可预测的模式，受洪水危害影响的地方通常是已知的。这意味着对于大多数类型的洪水危害，自我保护和社会保护措施都是可能的。然而，这种基本的“可预期性”被洪水在不同时间对同一地区的强度和持续时间的广泛变化，以及重现周期（特定规模洪水再次发生的平均年数）的变化所复杂化。这使得一些人基于时间的推移，认为风险被保护成本所抵消，从而选择冒险不进行自我保护。那些倡导“技术修复”工程干预的社会保护通常成本高昂，并且常常与洪水的好处相冲突。

Self- and social-protection measures to prepare for floods are made all the more complex and contradictory by the gains that floods provide. Agriculture benefits from the use of flood-plain alluvium (usually with more fertile soil and better moisture retention). The floods themselves provide a form of natural irrigation. As the waters recede, people in many parts of the world practise flood-retreat agriculture, sowing their seeds in the wet soil. In Bangladesh, the regular annual floods that affect much of the country help to restore the soil’s fertility with a new layer of productive silt. This process is essential to life and livelihoods, and supports the dense population of farmers and fishers. Here, the absence of the flood may be considered a drought (Schmuck-Widmann 1996, 2001; Paul 1984). On the char (the silt islands that litter the channels of the main rivers), inundation is also welcomed by the inhabitants as a means of cleansing the land of pests, especially rats (ibid.). Less often considered are the enhanced fishing opportunities derived from the nutrient-rich waters brought to ponds, lakes and rivers by freshwater inundation.
为应对洪水而采取的自我和社会保护措施因洪水带来的收益而变得更加复杂和矛盾。农业受益于洪泛区的冲积土（通常土壤更肥沃，保水能力更强）。洪水本身提供了一种自然灌溉的形式。随着水位的下降，世界许多地方的人们实践洪水退去农业，在湿润的土壤中播种。在孟加拉国，定期的年度洪水影响着该国的大部分地区，帮助恢复土壤的肥力，形成一层新的富饶淤泥。这个过程对生活和生计至关重要，并支持着密集的农民和渔民人口。在这里，洪水的缺失可能被视为干旱（Schmuck-Widmann 1996, 2001; Paul 1984）。在沙洲（散布在主要河流通道中的淤泥岛）上，居民们也欢迎洪水作为清除土地害虫，特别是老鼠的一种手段（同上）。更少被考虑的是，由淡水淹没带来的营养丰富的水域为池塘、湖泊和河流提供的增强捕鱼机会。

Areas that are at risk of floods have attracted farming communities and towns for thousands of years, as well as industrial and commercial development in the past two hundred, precisely because of flood-associated benefits. For centuries people have engaged in complex (and sometimes disastrous) ‘trade-offs’ between coping with floods and using these benefits. But in many countries, those people who have few alternative livelihoods or low income are forced to put themselves at risk because they have no option but to try and survive in flood-prone locations. In effect, vulnerability to floods is determined by their position in society, not by the existence of the flood hazard.
易受洪水影响的地区吸引了数千年来的农业社区和城镇，以及过去两百年的工业和商业发展，正是因为与洪水相关的好处。几个世纪以来，人们在应对洪水和利用这些好处之间进行了复杂（有时是灾难性的）“权衡”。但在许多国家，那些几乎没有替代生计或收入低的人被迫将自己置于风险之中，因为他们别无选择，只能在易受洪水影响的地区努力生存。实际上，易受洪水影响的脆弱性是由他们在社会中的地位决定的，而不是由洪水灾害的存在决定的。

The paradox of flood control
洪水控制的悖论

Floods may also be associated with dams, and not simply their catastrophic collapse. Dams can be specifically designed to help reduce flood risk, but be inadequate or inappropriate for the task, or provide a false sense of security (see Box 6.1 for examples in China). The most tragic examples are of dams built to inadequate standards or capacities (or on unsafe sites) which suddenly fail and release a flash flood. Ironically, such dams may have been built to control floods. In other circumstances, managers of dams that are designed to control flooding (usually in addition to generating hydroelectric power [HEP]) have inappropriately released water from reservoirs. This is done to protect the dam from being damaged by high water or overspill, with the result that this water has exacerbated downstream floods.
洪水也可能与大坝有关，而不仅仅是它们的灾难性崩溃。大坝可以专门设计以帮助减少洪水风险，但可能不够充分或不适合这一任务，或者提供一种虚假的安全感（见框 6.1 中的中国实例）。最悲惨的例子是那些按照不充分的标准或容量（或建在不安全地点）建造的大坝，它们突然失效并释放出洪水。具有讽刺意味的是，这些大坝可能是为了控制洪水而建造的。在其他情况下，旨在控制洪水的大坝管理者（通常还包括发电）不当地从水库中释放水。这是为了保护大坝免受高水位或溢出的损害，结果导致这些水加剧了下游的洪水。

There have been many dam failures in industrialised countries as well as LDCs. For
在工业化国家和发展中国家都发生过许多大坝失效事件。
instance, in 1975 the Grand Teton dam in Idaho (USA) failed, causing $2 billion worth of damage in a number of downstream towns. Fourteen people died, a low number in the circumstances thanks to a timely warning and an evacuation, but 8,000 homes were destroyed along with 350 businesses (US-BR 2003; Christensen 2002).

^{4}

One estimate suggests that 'on average ten significant dam failures have occurred somewhere in the world each decade, in addition to damaging near-failures’ (Veltrop 1990:10; cf: Le Moigne et al. 1990).
例如，1975 年美国爱达荷州的大提顿水坝发生了故障，造成了 20 亿美元的损失，影响了多个下游城镇。在这种情况下，尽管有及时的警告和撤离，死亡人数仅为 14 人，算是较低的数字，但 8000 所房屋和 350 家企业被毁（US-BR 2003；Christensen 2002）。

^{4}

一项估计表明，“平均每十年在世界某地发生十起重大水坝故障，此外还有损害性的近故障”（Veltrop 1990:10；参见：Le Moigne et al. 1990）。

Pearce (2001) provides a catalogue of dam overtopping, failures and collapses, and instances of harmful releases of water from dams when their reservoirs were full. In a number of cases he offers evidence that existing floods were made much worse by such releases (for instance in Central America during hurricane Mitch in 1998).

^{5}

Dam failures are often associated with periods of heavy rainfall and runoff that exceed design expectations. Probably the worst examples of dam failures and subsequent deaths are from China, where the official China Daily newspaper has admitted that 322 dams have failed since 1949 (Pearce 2001:5). The worst case was the 1975 collapse of the Banqiao dam in Henan province after a typhoon deposited more than 1.5 m rainfall in three days. The disaster was covered up for many years, and the total number of deaths is a controversial issue. Senior Chinese scientists who oppose the Three Gorges dam (and therefore use the Banqiao collapse as evidence of the risks of the new dam) have claimed that 230,000 people died; an official figure circulated internally gives 86,000 (Human Rights Watch 1995; see also Yi 1998). More recently, a China Daily (21 February 2002) article reported the death toll as 20,000 (see also World Commission on Dams 2000a:7). But the dangers of dam collapse are significant even in rich countries such as the USA, where official reports have shown that a high percentage of dams are unsafe (McCully 1996:126).
Pearce (2001) 提供了一个关于大坝溢流、故障和倒塌的目录，以及在水库满时大坝有害排水的实例。在一些案例中，他提供了证据表明，现有洪水因这些排水而变得更加严重（例如在 1998 年米契飓风期间的中美洲）。

^{5}

大坝故障通常与超过设计预期的强降雨和径流时期相关。大坝故障及其后果造成的死亡案例中，最严重的例子来自中国，官方的《中国日报》承认自 1949 年以来已有 322 座大坝发生故障（Pearce 2001:5）。最严重的案例是 1975 年河南省的板桥大坝在台风带来超过 1.5 米降雨的三天后倒塌。该灾难被掩盖了多年，死亡总人数是一个有争议的问题。反对三峡大坝的中国高级科学家（因此将板桥倒塌作为新大坝风险的证据）声称有 230,000 人死亡；而内部流传的官方数字为 86,000（人权观察 1995；另见 Yi 1998）。最近，《中国日报》（2002 年 2 月 21 日）的一篇文章报道死亡人数为 20,000（另见世界大坝委员会 2000a:7）。但即使在美国等富裕国家，大坝崩溃的危险也很大，官方报告显示，许多大坝存在安全隐患（McCully 1996:126）。

It is also worth recognising that some dams shift the flood water problem elsewhere, as with the Ganges’s peak flows which are diverted through Bangladesh by India’s Farakka Barrage (Monan 1989:27). Other dams built for HEP and irrigation (or even flood control) result in permanent flooding, often of inhabited areas, as with the large dams on the Narmada in India, which will mean the forcible displacement of a million people, and the Three Gorges (Sanxia) dam on the Yangtze which requires the expulsion of 1.5 million people (Human Rights Watch 1995; Dai Qing 1998). The Three Gorges dam is specifically claimed to be primarily for flood protection (although it is also a major generator of HEP, and is also intended for irrigation and improved river transport). However, after the extreme 1998 floods in the Yangtze valley (see Box 6.1), there has been no published report on how the dam would have prevented or reduced the damage.
值得注意的是，一些大坝将洪水问题转移到其他地方，例如印度的法拉卡水坝将恒河的洪峰流量引导至孟加拉国（Monan 1989:27）。其他为水电和灌溉（甚至洪水控制）而建的大坝导致永久性淹水，通常是居民区，如印度的纳尔马达大坝，这将意味着迫使一百万人迁移，以及长江上的三峡大坝，这需要驱逐 150 万人（人权观察 1995；戴青 1998）。三峡大坝被特别声称主要是为了防洪（尽管它也是一个主要的水电发电站，并且还旨在用于灌溉和改善河流运输）。然而，在 1998 年长江流域的极端洪水之后（见框 6.1），没有发布关于该大坝如何防止或减少损害的报告。

The reservoirs created by dams eventually silt up so that the dam becomes ineffective for power generation, irrigation or flood control, while the submerged land cannot be recovered. There is considerable controversy over the rates of silting, and design capacity and duration have often been very optimistic compared with actual performance. In many cases, a life span of forty years or less is normal for a reservoir. This seems a relatively short period in which to enjoy the supposed benefits, given the enormous financial costs, the high level of borrowing (and the resulting strains on the economy) and the disruption of millions of people’s lives. The controversies in the winning of contracts for dams, and the irregularities in working out the ratio of benefits to costs, are well known (Pearce
由大坝创造的水库最终会淤积，使得大坝在发电、灌溉或防洪方面失去效用，而被淹没的土地无法恢复。关于淤积速率存在相当大的争议，设计容量和使用寿命往往与实际表现相比过于乐观。在许多情况下，水库的正常使用寿命为四十年或更短。考虑到巨大的财务成本、高水平的借贷（以及由此对经济造成的压力）以及对数百万人的生活造成的干扰，这似乎是一个相对较短的享受所谓好处的时期。关于大坝合同的争夺和利益与成本比率的计算不规范的争议众所周知（Pearce）。

1992; McCully 2001), and do little to disprove the view that dams are being built more for the benefit of the contractors and politicians than people.
1992; McCully 2001)，并且几乎没有反驳大坝建设更多是为了承包商和政治家的利益而非人民的观点。

Box 6.1: Floods in China, 1998
框 6.1：1998 年中国洪水

The year 1998 brought serious floods to most countries in east and south-east Asia. The rainfall in many countries was much above average, and was linked to an intense El Niño. In China meteorologists were aware of the ENSO event unfolding, and in late 1997 predicted that there would be severe rainfall the following spring and summer. There were attempts to prepare in response to these warnings, in addition to conventional and long-standing flood defence systems that have been in use for hundreds of years. But warnings could not have prepared China for the extent and duration of the floods. They affected all but one province, including the oilfields of Daqing in the north-east to Xinjiang in the far north-west. In all, it was claimed that around 240 million people were affected, equivalent to almost the entire population of the USA. Of these, 14 million were forced to abandon their homes, and official figures claimed 11 million hectares of cropland was ‘destroyed’ (although it is unclear what this meant) (Disaster Relief 1998a). The estimated costs of the damage had reached

$ 24

billion before the end of August.
1998 年给东南亚大多数国家带来了严重的洪水。许多国家的降雨量远高于平均水平，这与强烈的厄尔尼诺现象有关。在中国，气象学家意识到 ENSO 事件正在展开，并在 1997 年底预测次年春夏将会有严重降雨。除了使用了数百年的传统和长期的防洪系统外，还尝试根据这些警告进行准备。但这些警告并未能让中国为洪水的范围和持续时间做好准备。洪水影响了除一个省以外的所有省份，从东北的大庆油田到西北的新疆。总的来说，声称大约有 2.4 亿人受到影响，相当于几乎整个美国的人口。其中，1400 万人被迫离开家园，官方数据显示有 1100 万公顷的农田被“毁坏”（尽管这意味着什么尚不清楚）（灾害救助 1998a）。预计到 8 月底，损失的估计成本已达到

$ 24

十亿。

The worst hit region was the Yangtze basin, and especially the middle reaches where a number of rivers converge with the Yangtze. This area is a low-lying plain with myriad waterways and lakes that itself received record amounts of rainfall. The city of Jingdezhen recorded 16 inches ( 406 mm ) during a 10-day period in July, after having received 9 inches ( 229 mm ) in just one day in June (NCDC 1998). Floods in this region are common, and have killed many thousands over the last century. In 1954 an estimated 30,000 perished, many drowning as dikes and protective measures failed. In 1931 floods and subsequent hunger and disease killed as many as 3.7 million along the Yangtze (Clark 1982). The 1998 event was considered as serious in its extent and the damage it caused as 1954, but the actual rainfall and peak river flows were lower. The number of deaths was a fraction, although the official death toll of around 4,000 is believed by some observers to be much lower than the real figure. One report suggested that 20,000 were missing from Jiujiang, a city of over 4 million in Jiangxi Province, swept away when a dike collapsed on the Yangtze (Disaster Relief 1998b).
受灾最严重的地区是长江流域，尤其是中游地区，许多河流在此与长江汇合。该地区是一个低洼平原，拥有无数水道和湖泊，降雨量创下纪录。景德镇市在 7 月份的 10 天内记录了 16 英寸（406 毫米）的降雨，而在 6 月份仅一天内就降下了 9 英寸（229 毫米）（NCDC 1998）。该地区的洪水很常见，在过去一个世纪中造成了数千人死亡。1954 年，估计有 30,000 人遇难，许多人因堤坝和防护措施失效而溺水。1931 年，洪水及随后的饥荒和疾病导致长江沿岸多达 370 万人死亡（Clark 1982）。1998 年的事件在其范围和造成的损害上被认为与 1954 年同样严重，但实际降雨量和河流峰值流量较低。死亡人数仅为一小部分，尽管官方的死亡人数约为 4,000，但一些观察者认为这一数字远低于实际情况。一份报告指出，来自江西省一个超过 400 万人口的城市九江的 20,000 人失踪，他们在长江堤坝崩溃时被冲走（Disaster Relief 1998b）。

The 1998 disaster was worse in terms of extent and damage mainly as a result of human activity over the nearly fifty years since 1954. Environmental damage and mismanagement have exacerbated the impacts of rainfall and river flooding, reducing the effectiveness of precautionary measures. In particular, the river basin has lost much of its capacity to absorb and store flood waters in lakes and detention basins because of the pressure on peasant households that have lost the
1998 年的灾难在范围和损害方面更为严重，主要是由于自 1954 年以来近五十年的人为活动。环境破坏和管理不善加剧了降雨和河流洪水的影响，降低了预防措施的有效性。特别是，由于对失去生计的农民家庭的压力，河流流域失去了大量吸收和储存洪水的能力，湖泊和滞留池的容量大幅下降。
livelihood options once provided by communal farms to find land to settle and farm. As a result, while a massive (and in many ways effective) civil defence exercise went into action during the floods, it was having to cope with a situation that was not amenable to short-term solutions. The flood precautions and responses-the ‘hardware’ and the civil defence responsewere structurally flawed and inadequate because of the build-up of failures in human and environmental management. In particular, civil defence measures that involve the expulsion of people from their homes and land, with no serious alternatives being provided, are not an effective way of reducing vulnerability (Disaster Relief 1998c).
生计选择一度由集体农场提供，但现在必须寻找土地定居和耕作。因此，尽管在洪水期间进行了一次大规模（在许多方面有效的）民防演习，但它不得不应对一个不适合短期解决方案的局面。洪水预防和应对措施——“硬件”和民防响应——由于人类和环境管理的失败积累而在结构上存在缺陷和不足。特别是，涉及将人们驱逐出家园和土地的民防措施，未提供严肃的替代方案，并不是减少脆弱性的有效方式（灾害救助 1998c）。

The main human factors which increased the vulnerability of the population include deforestation, inappropriate precautions and settlements encroaching into flood protection zones. Most of these problems are consequences of central government policies since the Communist Party came to power in 1949 (and so include both central planning up to 1979 and subsequent ‘market socialism’). Since 1985 it is estimated that forest cover in the upper Yangtze basin has fallen by 30 per cent (BBC 1999). In the aftermath of the 1998 disaster, Chinese officials up to the highest level cited deforestation as the major cause of the disaster, and an immediate ban was imposed on logging. It was claimed that a million workers in the industry would be ‘relocated’, and programmes of reforestation put into effect urgently (ibid.). Part of the problem is that a lot of the logging has been carried out by local governments, which in effect ‘mine’ the environment to raise local revenues and satisfy local leaders’ aspirations-both for personal gain and local development (Cannon 2000a). Reforesting means not only losing out on earnings, but incurring expenses; the transition is going to be difficult.
增加人口脆弱性的主要人类因素包括森林砍伐、不当的预防措施以及定居点侵占防洪保护区。这些问题大多数是自 1949 年共产党执政以来中央政府政策的结果（因此包括 1979 年前的中央计划和随后的“市场社会主义”）。自 1985 年以来，估计长江上游流域的森林覆盖率下降了 30%（BBC 1999）。在 1998 年灾难发生后，中国官员甚至最高层都将森林砍伐视为灾难的主要原因，并立即对伐木实施禁令。有人声称，行业内有一百万名工人将被“安置”，并紧急实施植树造林计划（同上）。问题的一部分在于，许多伐木活动是由地方政府进行的，实际上是“开采”环境以提高地方收入，满足地方领导人的个人利益和地方发展的愿望（Cannon 2000a）。植树造林不仅意味着失去收入，还会产生费用；这一过渡将会很困难。

The effect of deforestation is to speed up the runoff in the catchment areas and alter the flow regime of the Yangtze and other rivers so that peak rainfall is not retained and arrives in the stream flow in higher crests. Deforested slopes are also more quickly eroded, and the downstream silting of river beds (and detention basins) has increased rapidly, so that river channels can hold less water (Brush et al. 1989). In many places rivers already run several metres above the level of the surrounding countryside, as the embankments containing the channels have been raised higher and higher over many decades. This highlights the second type of human-induced problem: inappropriate control measures. China’s main riverine flood defences are embankments that run the length of the rivers, along with diversion basins and lakes. In many cases these embankments run close to the channel, and there is a continuous need to
森林砍伐的影响是加速集水区的径流，并改变长江及其他河流的流动模式，使得峰值降雨无法被保留，并以更高的波峰进入河流。砍伐森林的坡面也更容易被侵蚀，河床（和滞留池）的下游淤积迅速增加，以至于河道能够容纳的水量减少（Brush et al. 1989）。在许多地方，河流的水位已经高于周围乡村几米，因为包围河道的堤坝在几十年间不断被抬高。这突显了第二种人为引起的问题：不当的控制措施。中国主要的河流洪水防御是沿河而建的堤坝，以及分流池和湖泊。在许多情况下，这些堤坝靠近河道，且需要不断地
maintain the flow capacity by raising them to compensate for the silt deposited on the channel bottom.
通过抬高堤坝来维持流量，以补偿沉积在河道底部的淤泥。

This policy is costly in terms of labour and requires careful and constant
该政策在劳动力方面成本高昂，需要仔细和持续的关注。
maintenance of the banks. During heavy rain and high flows, hundreds of thousands of local people and army personnel have to be posted along the banks to ensure that waterlogged and weakened portions are reinforced, and breaches quickly repaired (in 1998 this included sinking large barges in some gaps and using bags of rice and soya to swell and block others).
河堤的维护。在大雨和高水位期间，数十万当地居民和军队人员必须沿河堤驻守，以确保水浸和弱化的部分得到加固，并迅速修复缺口（在 1998 年，这包括在一些缺口处沉入大型驳船，并使用大米和大豆袋来膨胀和堵塞其他缺口）。

A key issue is that the dikes create potentially catastrophic disasters both for those who take refuge on them, and for those who are not evacuated from land likely to be inundated when one fails. However, their existence creates a sense of security and stability, so encouraging the growth of settlements and economic activities in sites along the river valleys which would be at risk of catastrophic dike failure. Continuing to raise them higher and higher increases this danger, and makes maintenance and repair all the more imperative. Unfortunately, under the economic reforms of the past 20 years or so, the incentives for local people to engage in maintenance are reduced, and the desire of local governments to invest in them has declined. There are other activities that bring profit and revenue so, at the same time, local governments have powerful incentives to build in inappropriate places, and to defy or avoid central government planning guidelines for land use.
一个关键问题是，堤坝可能会对那些在上面避难的人和那些未被疏散的、可能在堤坝失效时被淹没的土地上的人造成潜在的灾难。然而，它们的存在创造了一种安全感和稳定感，从而鼓励在河谷沿岸的地点发展定居点和经济活动，这些地方面临着堤坝失效的灾难性风险。不断将堤坝抬高增加了这种危险，并使维护和修理变得更加迫切。不幸的是，在过去 20 年左右的经济改革下，地方居民参与维护的激励减少，地方政府对其投资的意愿也下降。还有其他活动可以带来利润和收入，因此，地方政府在不适当的地方建设的激励非常强大，并且会违抗或规避中央政府的土地使用规划指导方针。

One potential way to improve matters is to restore and expand the lakes, diversion basins and wetlands that have been relied on for hundreds of years as flood retention measures. These flood protection resources have suffered considerable reduction in number, size and effectiveness in recent decades. Silting has reduced their capacity; some lakes that could previously absorb peak flows have been drained and lost to this function. The number of lakes in Hubei Province alone (in the middle reaches of the Yangtze) has been reduced from 1,332 in the 1950s to 843 in the 1980s (Washington Post 1998). These lakes, along with other retention basins (areas set aside for flood waters diverted from the main river channels), have been encroached on for farmland and settlement by farmers desiring better land and livelihood opportunities under the ‘go-it-alone’ ethos of the economic reforms. However, since the 1998 floods, the government has acted to remove people from such areas, and claims to have removed 1.8 million (out of a target of 2.45 million by early 2002) (CND 2002). While this may improve flood preparedness, it has in effect meant that millions of (mainly) farming families have lost their livelihoods and are highly likely to become impoverished.
改善情况的一个潜在方法是恢复和扩展那些作为洪水滞留措施而依赖了数百年的湖泊、分流池和湿地。这些洪水保护资源在最近几十年中数量、规模和有效性都遭受了显著减少。淤积减少了它们的容量；一些以前能够吸收峰值流量的湖泊已经被排干，失去了这一功能。仅湖北省（长江中游）湖泊的数量就从 1950 年代的 1,332 个减少到 1980 年代的 843 个（华盛顿邮报 1998）。这些湖泊以及其他滞留池（为从主要河道分流的洪水而设立的区域）被农民侵占，用于耕地和定居，以寻求更好的土地和生计机会，体现了经济改革下的“独立自主”精神。然而，自 1998 年洪水以来，政府已采取行动将人们从这些地区迁出，并声称已移除 180 万人（目标是到 2002 年初移除 245 万人）（CND 2002）。虽然这可能改善洪水应对能力，但实际上意味着数百万（主要是）农民家庭失去了生计，并且极有可能陷入贫困。

Dongting Lake, one of the largest of the flood basins, has been squatted over the past 50 years by hundreds of thousands of people desperate for farmland. It has shrunk from 4,350 sq km in 1949 to 2,820 sq km in 1980 (US Embassy 1998). Attempts to remove the people and restore such basins to their flood function are fraught with difficulty. Higher-level authorities evict the people, but the local authorities are unwilling to take responsibility for this ‘unofficial’ population. Since 1998 almost half a million people have been
洞庭湖是最大的洪水盆地之一，在过去 50 年中被数十万人为了获得农田而非法占用。它的面积从 1949 年的 4350 平方公里缩减到 1980 年的 2820 平方公里（美国驻华大使馆 1998 年）。试图驱逐这些人并恢复盆地的洪水功能面临重重困难。上级当局驱逐居民，但地方当局不愿对这一“非官方”人口承担责任。自 1998 年以来，近 50 万人已被
removed from around Poyang lake in Jianxi province, and embankments breached to return it to its natural size (Gittings 2002). This is the uncomfortable downside of letting rivers return to their natural flow regime.
从江西省鄱阳湖周围移除，并破坏堤坝以使其恢复到自然大小（Gittings 2002）。这就是让河流恢复自然流动模式的不便之处。

To substitute for the loss of conventional retention areas, deliberate breaches had to be made in the dikes along the Yangtze in 1998, and the affected people forcibly removed from their land and villages (another reason for the army and police presence). To protect Wuhan, a key industrial city of seven million inhabitants, levees were to be breached to flood farmland in Jianli county. The 50,000 people resisted forcible removal (Disaster Relief 1998c). In the most significant reported case, 330,000 people were to be moved from an area in central Hubei province, although in the end this was not necessary. Those forced from their homes by floods were unable to move back for over a month.
为了替代传统蓄水区的损失，1998 年不得不在长江沿岸故意破坏堤坝，并强行将受影响的人们从他们的土地和村庄中迁走（这是军队和警察存在的另一个原因）。为了保护武汉这个拥有七百万居民的关键工业城市，计划破坏堤坝以淹没监利县的农田。5 万人抵制强制迁移（灾害救助 1998c）。在最重要的报告案例中，33 万人将被迁出湖北省中部的一个地区，尽管最终这并没有成为必要。因洪水被迫离开家园的人们在一个多月内无法返回。

Silting is a factor common to both river bed accumulation and reduced effectiveness of flood retention. But it is too simple to blame deforestation for the flood problem, and it can become a visible but misleading target for policy. Deforestation may be a significant factor in the flooding, but the causal link has been widely accepted in recent decades in many parts of the world as a rather simplistic way of bringing human interference into the picture. It is likely that it is only one factor, and possibly not even the main cause. If so, even successful reforestation will not necessarily solve the flood problem. It is all too clear that there were severe, disastrous floods in China long before the most serious deforestation of the past 20 years during economic liberalisation. The farmers who want land to cultivate are twice victims: of the floods themselves, and of the official attempts to reduce flood disasters by removing them from the flood plain. What needs to be addressed is the vulnerability of rural people in the free-for-all commercialised economy, not just deforestation.
淤积是河床积累和洪水滞留效果降低的共同因素。但将洪水问题归咎于森林砍伐过于简单，这可能成为政策的一个明显但误导性的目标。森林砍伐可能是洪水的一个重要因素，但在过去几十年中，许多地区普遍接受的因果关系被视为将人类干预纳入考虑的相当简单的方法。很可能这只是一个因素，甚至可能不是主要原因。如果是这样，即使成功的再造林也不一定能解决洪水问题。显然，在过去 20 年经济自由化期间最严重的森林砍伐之前，中国就发生过严重的灾难性洪水。希望获得耕地的农民是双重受害者：既是洪水本身的受害者，也是官方通过将他们从洪泛区移除来减少洪水灾害的尝试的受害者。需要解决的是在自由竞争的商业化经济中农村人群的脆弱性，而不仅仅是森林砍伐。

Another key issue in regard to Yangtze flooding is the role of the highly controversial Three Gorges dam (Edmonds 2000), promoted officially as a flood control measure. However, much of the flood problem on the Yangtze is downstream of the Three Gorges dam in low-lying terrain that is subject to rainfall inundation and riverine floods on the
关于长江洪水的另一个关键问题是备受争议的三峡大坝的作用（Edmonds 2000），官方宣传其为防洪措施。然而，长江的洪水问题大部分发生在三峡大坝下游的低洼地带，这里容易受到降雨淹没和河流洪水的影响。
tributaries that enter the Yangtze below the dam. The dam’s functions are contradictory: to maximise HEP requires the dam operators to keep the reservoir as full as possible, while flood protection needs it to be left partly empty in anticipation of summer rains. Practice in other countries, including in the Mozambique floods of 2000 (Pearce 2001), demonstrates that dam operators are often reluctant (or even forbidden) to release water in preparation for possible flood peaks, and only release water in desperation when they fear damage to the dam from the incoming water. Another problem is that the Three Gorges reservoir includes mountains and steep slopes and
进入长江的支流在大坝下游。大坝的功能是矛盾的：最大化水电发电（HEP）要求大坝操作员尽可能保持水库满，而防洪则需要在夏季降雨来临之前将水库部分放空。其他国家的实践，包括 2000 年莫桑比克洪水（Pearce 2001），表明大坝操作员通常不愿意（甚至被禁止）在可能的洪峰来临之前释放水，只有在担心来水会对大坝造成损害时才会绝望地释放水。另一个问题是三峡水库包括山脉和陡坡，
myriad tributaries, some with their own rocky gorges. Some Chinese scientists have expressed grave concern in a public warning about the dangers of landslides affecting people, especially some of those resettled on riverbanks and hillsides around the reservoir (Pearce 2002b). Such landslides might be triggered by earthquakes, by rainfall or by settlement of unsuitable land. Any major slide into the reservoir would trigger an enormous wave (in effect a local tsunami) which could overtop or damage the dam.
无数支流，其中一些有自己的岩石峡谷。一些中国科学家在公开警告中对滑坡对人们的危害表示严重关切，尤其是对那些在水库周围河岸和山坡上重新安置的人（Pearce 2002b）。这样的滑坡可能会因地震、降雨或不适宜土地的沉降而触发。任何大规模的滑坡进入水库都会引发巨大的波浪（实际上是一种局部海啸），可能会淹没或损坏大坝。

Natural dams自然坝

There is another source of floods-the collapse of ‘natural dams’. These dams are formed by landslides blocking a valley, or glaciers holding back lakes, creating a reservoir of water that can race down a valley when the natural blockage is eroded or melts. Because the subsequent flow is rapid, it creates a flash flood (similar to a dam failure) which is difficult for people to escape. Yet in many cases such natural dams are detected, and preventive measures are possible. A flood of this type occurred in 2000 after a landslide (which happened in April and was reportedly the largest ever in Asia at 60 m high) blocked the river Tsangpo in Tibet (which becomes the Brahmaputra in India and Bangladesh). The dam burst in July, and the resulting flood surge downstream into northeast India left perhaps 2,000 people dead or missing, and 50,000 people homeless in one of the poorest and most remote parts of India (Indian Express 2000). The lack of any warning for this entirely predictable event arose partly from a lack of proper communication between the Chinese and Indian authorities, and demonstrates that (as with the Farakka Barrage) international politics and mistrust can generate vulnerability factors affecting ordinary people.
还有另一种洪水来源——“自然坝”的崩溃。这些坝是由山体滑坡阻塞山谷或冰川阻挡湖泊形成的，形成了一个水库，当自然阻塞被侵蚀或融化时，水可以迅速流下山谷。由于随后的水流迅速，它会造成闪电洪水（类似于大坝失效），人们很难逃脱。然而，在许多情况下，这种自然坝是可以被检测到的，并且可以采取预防措施。2000 年，发生了一次这种类型的洪水，因山体滑坡（发生在四月， reportedly 是亚洲有史以来最大的，高达 60 米）阻塞了西藏的藏布江（在印度和孟加拉国成为布拉马普特拉河）。大坝在七月崩溃，导致的洪水涌入印度东北部，造成大约 2000 人死亡或失踪，5 万人无家可归，发生在印度最贫困和最偏远的地区之一（印度快报 2000）。这一完全可预测事件缺乏任何警告，部分原因在于中印当局之间缺乏适当的沟通，这表明（如同法拉卡大坝一样）国际政治和不信任可以产生影响普通人的脆弱因素。

Flash floods such as these, and those associated with glacier dams and outburst floods, are likely to increase with climate change (Pearce 2002c). Snow- and ice-covered mountain slopes are becoming more unstable with rising temperatures, leading to a possible increase in the frequency of avalanches and landslides that can create natural dams. More rapid melting of glaciers may increase the number of outburst hazards from impounded water. In the Himalayas, local people, governments and a number of NGOs are working on projects to prevent devastation of villagers by attempting to siphon water out of dangerous lakes.

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像这样的闪电洪水，以及与冰川坝和突发洪水相关的洪水，可能会随着气候变化而增加（Pearce 2002c）。随着气温上升，覆盖雪和冰的山坡变得更加不稳定，可能导致雪崩和滑坡的频率增加，从而形成自然坝。冰川的更快速融化可能会增加被蓄水引发的突发灾害的数量。在喜马拉雅山脉，当地居民、政府和一些非政府组织正在开展项目，试图通过抽取危险湖泊中的水来防止对村民的破坏。

In central Asia there is serious concern about the risk from Lake Sarez in Tajikistan. This 60 km lake was formed after an enormous landslide in 1911 created a natural dam which is 600 m high and 4 km across. If it collapses-it has already been damaged by frequent earthquakes in the region-a flash flood wave of an estimated 150 m initial height will devastate the homes and lives of up to five million people downstream (IFRC 1999a:39). A warning system was set up (but only in 1984) by the Soviet Union, but it is regarded as very poor, and in any case alert procedures and evacuation plans are inadequate. The anticipated disaster will not only affect Tajikistan, but also parts of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Co-ordination and cooperation between these now independent countries is much more difficult than under the Soviet regime, and has made it difficult for foreign assistance to be organised. Rivalry and suspicion between
中亚地区对塔吉克斯坦的萨雷兹湖的风险表示严重关注。这个 60 公里长的湖泊是在 1911 年一次巨大的山体滑坡后形成的，形成了一个高达 600 米、宽 4 公里的天然坝。如果它崩溃——它已经因该地区频繁的地震而受到损害——预计初始高度为 150 米的洪水波将摧毁下游多达五百万人的家园和生活（国际红十字会 1999a:39）。苏联在 1984 年设立了一个警报系统，但被认为非常差劲，无论如何，警报程序和疏散计划都不够充分。预期的灾难不仅会影响塔吉克斯坦，还会波及阿富汗、乌兹别克斯坦和土库曼斯坦的部分地区。这些现在独立的国家之间的协调与合作比苏联时期困难得多，这使得外国援助的组织变得困难。政府之间的竞争和猜疑并没有改善制定应对大坝崩溃的策略（通过警报系统或加固大坝）或实施通过虹吸管或渠道减少水量的措施的机会。
some of the governments does not improve the chances of strategies being drawn up to plan for the dam’s collapse (through warning systems or by strengthening the dam) or of implementing measures to reduce the amount of water through siphons or channels.
一些政府之间的竞争并没有改善制定应对大坝崩溃的策略（通过警报系统或加固大坝）或实施通过虹吸管或渠道减少水量的措施的机会。

Another political source of vulnerability is associated with a debris dam which impounded a lake in the crater of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines.

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This crater was enlarged by the eruption of 1991, and was filled with rainwater. On one side it was held in place by a natural dam of mud and loose debris, and if this failed it would have sent an avalanche of water, mud and rubble into the towns below. In 2000 local people and Oxfam highlighted the risk of this debris collapsing and releasing the lake in such a flash flood (Marchant 2001; Aglionby 2001). There was a suggestion to dig a channel through the blockage, or set up a siphon to drain water harmlessly from the lake. But there was delay, confusion and reluctance on the part of some of the authorities to take appropriate action before the water reached the rim (ibid.). Fortunately a catastrophic collapse did not happen, and the lake level was successfully lowered by engineering means in 2002 (Punongbayan 2002, 2003).
另一个政治脆弱性的来源与一个拦截了菲律宾皮纳图博山火山口湖泊的碎石坝有关。

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这个火山口在 1991 年的喷发中被扩大，并被雨水填满。一侧由天然的泥土和松散碎石的堤坝支撑，如果这个堤坝失效，将会把水、泥和碎石的雪崩冲向下面的城镇。2000 年，当地居民和乐施会强调了这个碎石坝崩溃并在突发洪水中释放湖水的风险（Marchant 2001；Aglionby 2001）。有人建议挖掘一条通道穿过阻塞，或设置一个虹吸管以无害地排放湖水。但在水位达到边缘之前，一些当局在采取适当行动方面存在延误、混乱和不情愿（同上）。幸运的是，灾难性的崩溃并没有发生，湖水水平在 2002 年通过工程手段成功降低（Punongbayan 2002, 2003）。

Flash floods and landslides
突发洪水和山体滑坡

Typically, flash floods are small-scale events, but often with a high mortality rate. By their very nature it is often difficult to give a timely warning of flash floods, although possible danger areas should be relatively easy to identify. Extreme events with long or unknown return periods are understandably difficult to anticipate. But for many upland or hilly regions of the world, where there is the risk of flash floods with much shorter return periods, precautions ought to be possible.

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When warnings are not given, the numbers of casualties can be high. The force of the flow of water and the debris carried in it can be extremely damaging to homes and to farmland, and it is common for thousands of people to be displaced from their ruined settlements for months. Recent events include the deaths of 156 in Nepal and Tibet (August 1998); and in the space of just one month (August 1999), 40 dead in Vietnam, 63 killed in a suburb of Khartoum (Sudan) and 77 dead and 120,000 displaced in Chenzhou, China.

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通常，山洪是小规模事件，但往往伴随着高死亡率。由于其本质，及时发出山洪警报往往很困难，尽管可能的危险区域应该相对容易识别。具有较长或未知重现周期的极端事件显然难以预测。但对于世界上许多高地或丘陵地区，存在重现周期较短的山洪风险，采取预防措施应该是可能的。当没有发出警报时，伤亡人数可能会很高。水流的力量及其携带的碎片对房屋和农田可能造成极大的破坏，数千人常常因其被毁的定居点而流离失所数月。最近的事件包括 1998 年 8 月在尼泊尔和西藏造成 156 人死亡；以及在短短一个月内（1999 年 8 月），越南 40 人遇难，喀土穆（苏丹）一个郊区 63 人遇难，中国郴州 77 人遇难，12 万人流离失所。

Heavy rainfall and flash floods are often associated with landslides, which are frequent events in hilly and mountainous areas around the world. Usually the numbers killed are regarded as insignificant, and therefore such events do not normally reach the media but, as with flash floods, total mortality due to landslides is much higher annually than from some other disaster triggers. However some landslides can have enormous impact, such as the one in 1920 in Gansu province (China), when 200,000 were reported killed (USGS 2003). Much more recently, a whole series of flash floods and associated mudslides and landslides affected Venezuela in December 1999, leaving an estimated 30,000 dead (many people were buried or washed away, and so there is no accurate mortality figure), and around 400,000 homeless (Wieczorek et al. 2001:2; BBC NEWS 1999; PAHO 2002a). In general, landslides are thought to have relatively low casualty statistics in comparison with other hazards. Red Cross data for the decade 1991-2000 suggests that ‘only’ 10,000 people were killed in 173 landslides (IFRC 2000a, 2001b). However, the data are misleading, since landslides often occur as a secondary consequence of another type of hazard, such as flooding (as in the Venezuela disaster already mentioned), storms
强降雨和山洪常常与滑坡相关，这在全球的丘陵和山区是频繁发生的事件。通常，遇难人数被认为微不足道，因此此类事件通常不会进入媒体报道，但与山洪一样，滑坡造成的年总死亡人数远高于一些其他灾害触发因素。然而，一些滑坡可能会产生巨大的影响，例如 1920 年在甘肃省（中国）发生的滑坡，报告称有 200,000 人遇难（USGS 2003）。更近期的例子是 1999 年 12 月，一系列山洪和相关的泥石流及滑坡影响了委内瑞拉，估计造成 30,000 人遇难（许多人被埋或冲走，因此没有准确的死亡人数），以及约 400,000 人无家可归（Wieczorek et al. 2001:2; BBC NEWS 1999; PAHO 2002a）。一般来说，与其他灾害相比，滑坡的伤亡统计被认为相对较低。国际红十字会在 1991-2000 年十年间的数据表明，在 173 起滑坡中“仅”有 10,000 人遇难（IFRC 2000a, 2001b）。然而，这些数据具有误导性，因为滑坡通常是另一种灾害（如前面提到的委内瑞拉灾难）引发的次要后果，例如洪水、风暴。
or as a result of an earthquake. So landslide casualties are often added to the total of deaths and injuries attributable to these other events, while those specifically linked to landslides are probably under-reported.
或者是地震的结果。因此，滑坡造成的伤亡通常会被计入这些其他事件的总死亡和受伤人数，而与滑坡直接相关的伤亡人数可能被低估。

Landslides involve material that can vary considerably in its character, including rock, debris, mud, soil, snow, ice or several of these in combination (Alexander 1989:157). Alexander includes landslides that are generated by a wide variety of ‘agents’: the failure of a coal-mining waste tip in Aberfan village (Wales) in 1966 (triggered by heavy rain); a volcanic eruption in Colombia (Nevado del Ruiz) in 1985 which set off a lahar (mud and debris landslide) which is estimated to have killed 23,000 people (see Chapter 8); an earthquake in Peru (Mt Huascaran); or flooding in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). Applying vulnerability analysis to the case of landslides, we need to move beyond the physical hazard to inquire about human activities that might act as ‘triggers’ for the physical event. We must also understand the ‘mechanism’ that translates exposure to the risk differently for various categories of people. Differential ability to recover after a landslide is also important since it can cause people to be more exposed to future hazards, as we have seen in previous chapters.
滑坡涉及的材料在特性上可能有很大差异，包括岩石、碎石、泥土、土壤、雪、冰或这些材料的组合（亚历山大 1989:157）。亚历山大包括了由多种“因素”引发的滑坡：1966 年威尔士阿伯凡村的煤矿废料堆的崩塌（由大雨引发）；1985 年哥伦比亚（鲁伊斯火山）的火山喷发引发的泥石流（泥和碎石滑坡），估计造成 23000 人死亡（见第 8 章）；秘鲁（瓦斯卡兰山）的地震；或巴西里约热内卢的洪水。将脆弱性分析应用于滑坡案例时，我们需要超越物理危害，探讨可能作为物理事件“触发因素”的人类活动。我们还必须理解“机制”，即不同类别的人对风险的暴露如何产生不同的影响。滑坡后恢复能力的差异也很重要，因为这可能使人们在未来的危害中更加暴露，正如我们在前几章中所看到的那样。

Consider four typical examples of landslides that took place between 1985 and 1988:
考虑 1985 年至 1988 年间发生的四个典型滑坡案例：

Mameyes, near Ponce (Puerto Rico), 8 October 1985, killing 180, 260 homes destroyed (Wisner 1985; Doerner 1985).
1985 年 10 月 8 日，波多黎各庞塞附近的马梅耶斯，造成 180 人遇难，260 栋房屋被毁（Wisner 1985；Doerner 1985）。
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), February 1988, where 277 were killed, 735 injured and more than 22,000 displaced in shanty towns (Allen 1994; Byrne 1988; Margolis 1988; Michaels 1988; Munasinghe et al. 1991:28-31).
1988 年 2 月，巴西里约热内卢，造成 277 人遇难，735 人受伤，超过 22,000 人流离失所（Allen 1994；Byrne 1988；Margolis 1988；Michaels 1988；Munasinghe 等，1991：28-31）。
Catak (Turkey), 23 June 1988, killing approximately 75 (Gurdilek 1988).
1988 年 6 月 23 日，土耳其卡塔克，约 75 人遇难（Gurdilek 1988）。
Hat Yai (Thailand) in November 1988, killing 400 (Economist 1989; Nuguid 1990; West 1989).
1988 年 11 月，泰国合艾，造成 400 人遇难（Economist 1989；Nuguid 1990；West 1989）。

The analysis of the likely causes (or ‘root causes’ and ‘dynamic pressures’ in terms of the PAR model outlined in Chapter 2) of these landslides shows a number of interesting similarities. The first commonly cited cause is deforestation. In Thailand there was an outcry against logging following landslides there. West notes that this protest:
对这些滑坡可能原因（或根据第二章中概述的 PAR 模型的“根本原因”和“动态压力”）的分析显示出许多有趣的相似之处。第一个常被提及的原因是森林砍伐。在泰国，滑坡发生后，公众对伐木活动发出了强烈抗议。韦斯特指出，这种抗议：
did not come from bearded ecologists and trendy ‘green’ politicians, but from the local farmers and townspeople, those in fact, who had suffered. The anger comes from below, and is aimed especially at the greedy loggers, frequently Chinese businessmen in partnership with senior officials in the police and army.
并不是来自有胡子的生态学家和时髦的“绿色”政治家，而是来自当地的农民和城镇居民，实际上就是那些遭受影响的人。愤怒来自底层，特别针对那些贪婪的伐木工人，通常是与警方和军队高级官员合作的中国商人。
(West 1989:18)（韦斯特 1989:18）
The Prime Minister of Thailand visited the site of the disaster and announced that logging operations would be banned. Forty years ago, 70 per cent of the country was covered by forests, but by 1989 this had dropped to just 12 per cent (Economist 1989).
泰国总理访问了灾难现场，并宣布将禁止伐木作业。四十年前，70%的国家被森林覆盖，但到 1989 年，这一比例已降至仅 12%（经济学人 1989）。

In Rio, the authorities were criticised for not taking effective action to tackle the problems of the denuded hills where all the favelas (squatter settlements) had been constructed. These housed a million of the eight million people in the city. There had been extensive deforestation in these areas to make way for dwellings as well as to providing fuelwood. Socio-economic factors are an obvious ‘pressure’ that both forces
在里约，政府因未采取有效措施解决所有贫民窟（非法定居点）建造的光秃山丘问题而受到批评。这些贫民窟容纳了城市中八百万人口中的一百万。在这些地区，广泛的森林砍伐是为了腾出居住空间以及提供燃料木材。社会经济因素显然是两者施加的“压力”。
squatters to inhabit unsafe locations and forces them to cut vegetation for fuel or building materials, since alternatives are too expensive (Allen 1994; Smyth and Royle 2000). ...

Road building of poor quality or in the wrong location is also commonly mentioned as a cause. Turkish authorities commented that the roads in Catak should have been cut into the contours, rather than running parallel with them. Frequently, roads are cut into steep slopes with minimal understanding of the geomorphology of the setting, and can interrupt drainage patterns. The actual ‘cut and fill technique’ of road building on steep slopes can contribute to landslide risk (Smith 1992:165). ...

Environmental damage to sub-soil stability is also frequently cited as a cause. Changes in the water table can occur due to leaking tube wells, stand pipes and septic tanks, and appear to have been a contributory cause to the landslides in Puerto Rico and Rio de Janeiro. Unsafe, unauthorised building on dangerously steep slopes is very often cited as a cause of landslide disasters. The location of squatter settlements themselves may have been a contributory cause to the landslides in Puerto Rico and in Rio. Many cities also lack warning systems for predicting water flow and arranging the evacuation of communities at risk. This also appears to have contributed to the landslide disasters in the aforementioned places. There had been extensive rain for a number of days prior to the mudslides, but no monitoring or planning for such contingencies. ...

Disastrous outcomes for vulnerable people ...

The chain of causation of flood disasters is shown in an adapted PAR diagram (Figure 6.1). Unsafe conditions in floods may be a combination of factors involving the physical environment, the local economy and the performance of public actions and institutions. In the physical environment, people with high levels of vulnerability will include those who are unable to protect themselves. They may be unable to afford a house site on raised, safer land, or a house with inadequate construction quality. Inadequate action by public institutions may mean that social protection is lacking in flood protection measures or warning systems. ...

Specific dynamic pressures that lead to these vulnerable conditions will include class relations and income distribution (affecting assets, livelihood opportunities, level of selfprotection). Gender relations may be highly significant in some cases, e.g. where women are more likely to be undernourished and less resilient in the aftermath of flooding. The type of state, and its willingness to act impartially on behalf of all its citizens, is likely to influence the distribution of assets and livelihood opportunities, as well as the scope and efficiency of social protection measures. In the sections below, and in the boxed case studies, examples of factors and processes influencing the different levels of that chain are explored in relation to particular countries and flood disasters. ...

Figure 6.1 ‘Pressures’ that results in disasters: flood hazards ...

Mortality, morbidity and injury ...

As we have seen in this chapter, there are many types of primary flood hazards, including riverine and rainfall, flash floods and dam collapses, plus those produced by tropical cyclones (see Chapter 7), and secondary hazards produced by associated land- and mudslides. Floods and their associated impacts are not only one of the most widespread of natural hazards; they also lead to the greatest loss of life, immediately through drowning and fatal injury and later through illness and sometimes famine. It is difficult with the available data to separate the impacts of different types of floods. However, although deaths associated with cyclones have sometimes been very high (in Bangladesh possibly 300,000 in 1970 and over 138,000 in 1991, and an estimated 10,000 in Orissa, India in 1999), other types of floods are far more frequent and widespread, and range in scale from those in small watersheds to some which cover large areas of an entire country. A few single events have been responsible for millions of deaths: for instance an estimated 2 million in the Huanghe (Yellow) River flood in China, 1887 (Smith 2000). However, rainfall floods and slow-onset river inundation of flood plains generally result in lower direct casualties. These are less likely to be a result of drowning and are due more often to building collapse (people may remain in upper storeys or on roofs), other injuries and snake bites. The risks of disease and malnutrition are also increased by slowonset (and slow-retreat) floods, with the effects lasting months or even years. ...

As with other disasters, there is a tendency for events that cause the most deaths and damage to receive the most attention (both in the media, and more seriously in terms of international relief efforts). But as well as the large-scale events, it is essential to consider the myriad small and medium disasters. Not only do these add up to an impact which globally may well exceed the major events, but they may affect the same people and places repeatedly. And as we have seen above, mortality from flash floods-usually regarded as small events-probably exceeds deaths from slower-onset river floods in ...
most years. The ‘hidden’ problem of these smaller floods is considered in Box 6.2. ...

Box 6.2: ‘Small’ floods—a hidden problem ...
Researchers and activists in the Latin American network La RED argue that not enough attention is given to small and medium-sized disasters. These events are far more common than the dramatic ‘super cyclones’ or ‘catastrophic earthquakes’ that win media attention. Such ‘small’ disasters are a frequent experience for excluded, marginal groups (Lavell 1994), and their economic, social and human costs accumulate.

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...

A number of floods in early 2002 in Bolivia, Indonesia and Senegal demonstrate the policy challenge of small disasters. On 19 February, La Paz (Bolivia) experienced an unusually intense rain and hail storm, ...
at the rate of

41 mm / h

. Although the storm lasted just 45 minutes, flood waters up to 2 m high surged through the streets. Urban drainage was unable to cope, especially in low-income sections of the city. The resulting flash floods killed 63 people, another 13 were listed as missing, 146 were injured and 5,000 displaced. Thirty-two schools were damaged; 126 homes were damaged and 28 destroyed (OCHA 2002b). Some might say that no city in a semi-arid climate (average rainfall 540 mm per year) should or could be prepared for such an unusual event. But this kind of urban flash flooding is very well known in the region. It is also known that generally the lower the rainfall the more variable it is, with greater potential intensity during precipitation. A week later, there were other floods in Bolivia, at Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, that affected 1,300 families (OCHA 2002a). On 5 March, some 150 km from La Paz, flooding on the Yara affected 100 families and displaced 225 people (World Vision 2002c). As Lavell and his colleagues in La RED suggest, wherever one looks, there are many ‘smaller’ or ‘minor’ events that disrupt lives and livelihoods. ...

In Jakarta (Indonesia) torrential rain fell for five days in January 2002. Twenty-nine of Jakarta’s 37 districts were affected, with hundreds of thousands of residents displaced and suffering loss of property and interrupted livelihoods. Twenty-two persons were killed. Meanwhile, there were floods elsewhere in Indonesia, including north and east Java, where floods and landslides killed 75 people (Agence France-Presse 2002a). Flooding in Indonesia at the beginning of 2002 killed at least 150 people and destroyed or damaged

$ 177

million worth of infrastructure: roads, school buildings, dikes and drainage works. In Jakarta 100,000 homes were damaged (Agence France-Presse 2002b). ...

Beyond the aggregate losses there are further complexities. For example, Indonesia’s Mental Guidance and Social Affairs Agency found that infant ...
food was generally not available in the shelters set up for flood victims, putting 20,000 of 26,000 flood-victim babies at risk of malnutrition (World Vision 2002b). Recalling the discussion in Chapter 5, the reader will not be surprised that the flooding was followed by coughs, skin rashes and diarrhoea. The City Health Department reported that 18,000 of 384,256 flood victims in Jakarta were suffering from diarrhoea, and that eight infants died from dehydration due to chronic diarrhoea (World Vision 2002a). ...

This example underscores the vulnerability of people in rapidlygrowing cities in a period of economic stringency. The Indonesian economy was among those most badly affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Many of the canals and floodgates used for flood control in Jakarta are very old, dating from the Dutch colonial period. ...

Indonesian environmentalists said that the cause of the floods was not the rainfall by itself, but 'uncontrolled development of green spaces and of natural water catchment areas, along with broken or refuse-choked drains’ (Agence France-Presse 2002a). ...

Finally, there is an example from Senegal in the same month. The International Red Cross described the situation as follows: ...

Heavy off-season rains swept through Senegal between 9-11 January, killing 28 people and affecting over 100,000 others. The situation was made worse by an unusual cold spell with temperatures plunging from 40 to 16 degrees Celsius. A damage assessment carried out by government authorities and the Senegalese Red Cross revealed that an estimated 105,471 head of livestock had perished while heavy rains demolished 13,993 homes, washing away another 581 hectares of crops. Approximately 1,537 tons of rice was also destroyed. ...
(IFRC 2002c) ...
On the scale of the great floods in Mozambique (see Chapter 7), Bangladesh or China, this was not a major disaster. But our approach suggests that many hundreds of small and medium-sized disasters can have the same long-term impacts on livelihoods and well-being as a large event, especially where rural households are already stressed by chronic disease, poverty and isolation. The key point about a disaster is not its scale, but the impact of a hazard of whatever intensity on a vulnerable population. If disasters are defined only in terms of the large events that warrant media coverage or outside assistance, we are almost certainly missing a larger affected population whose disasters are hardly ever noticed by outsiders. The boundary between disaster and everyday life can be very thin, as vulnerable people are at risk from normality as well as the exceptional. ...

Flood waters bring increased risk of diseases such as cholera and dysentery, arising from sewage contamination of drinking water (see Chapter 5). There may be rapid growth in the incidence of malaria and yellow fever because of the multiplication of insect vectors in the stagnant water which remains ponded after a flood. In some regions (this is common in Bangladesh and India), water is held back by raised structures such as roads and railways, and these cause local floods that are sometimes severe.

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Stagnant water may be trapped in such places for months. These structures should have ducts and culverts that permit the return flow of water back to river channels, but often these are inadequate or badly maintained. In some floods, they may also be blocked by silt. In Bangladesh, plastic bags were banned in 2002 because they frequently block urban drainage conduits. But there has been fierce opposition from the businesses that profit from making them. An environmental campaigner has received death threats as a result of his 13-year campaign to have the bags outlawed (Mahmud 2002). ...

Respiratory illnesses often become more prevalent in the aftermath of slow-onset floods, and take a toll, especially among very young children, babies and the elderly. Illness or injuries caused in the flood are important factors that increase existing vulnerability and extend it to new groups of people (see Chapter 5). The sick and injured usually cannot work, and a family’s loss of their labour, especially during attempts to recover after a hazard event, can be a significant element of the disaster. ...

There are few studies of what actually happens to people after floods strike. A survey was conducted in Bangladesh after the 1998 floods (see Box 6.3). People were asked whether they had experienced diarrhoea, respiratory illness or fever in the previous two weeks. All flood-affected people suffered more than those in the non-flooded control group. On average, 31 per cent of flood-affected people were ill, with rates for those exposed to very severe flooding as high as 40 per cent (del Ninno et al. 2001:73). However, it is worth noting that 23 per cent of the non-flooded people were also ill, suggesting that there is prevalent and pervasive illness throughout much of the rural population under ‘normal’ conditions. ...

Such health problems were highlighted in studies of floods on the west coast of South America brought about by El Niño in 1982-1983. In that southern summer, El Niño struck badly, principally affecting Peru and Ecuador. In parts of Peru a state of emergency was declared: rainfall in the first six months of 1983 was many times more than the total rainfall of the previous ten years (Gueri et al. 1986). Mortality caused directly by floods does not seem to have been high, but disease and health problems were made much worse, and people’s livelihoods suffered enormously as will be seen later. In Ecuador, faced with the failure of the waters to subside, many rural people fled to towns and cities, more optimistic about conditions there. They brought malaria infection with them, leading to the reinfection of urban areas previously cleared of the disease. The floods greatly increased the number of cases of malaria anyway. Despite a massive increase in insecticide sprayings, the number of cases rose in 1983 and 1984 to levels ten to twenty times (depending on location) those of previous years (Cedeno 1986). In neighbouring north Peru, a study of government health centres showed morbidity rates up by 75 per cent for respiratory and 150 per cent for gastro-intestinal illnesses in the first six months of 1983 (compared with the same period the previous year) (Gueri et al. 1986). These illnesses led to a large increase in deaths: 6,327 compared with 3,226 for ...
the same period (the centres surveyed covered a population of 630,000 ). ...

Livelihood disruption ...

While death, illness and disablement lead to a reduced capacity for work in affected families, there are other impacts on people’s livelihoods that make some more vulnerable and yet which enrich others. Not all groups in flood areas are necessarily disaster victims. The impact on different social and economic groups may be more or less severe. In floods it is of course true that much property (including livestock) is damaged, destroyed or swept away. But even flooded land or remaining animals can be sold by a destitute farming family to buy food, despite the low prices arising from many others making such ‘distress sales’ at the same time. So there are beneficiaries of the disaster who can accumulate land or other assets at depressed prices. Others may benefit from selling food stocks at higher prices. Still others may have saleable goods or services on which they can thrive, perhaps trading in drinking water by virtue of owning a boat in which to carry it around. ...

Flood impact therefore must also be understood in terms of the disruption and destruction it can cause to livelihoods, and the changes in the access profiles of affected people (see Chapter 3). Losing or being forced to sell land and other assets as a result of floods may shift people into poverty or worsen their existing poverty. The loss of assets or ability to work, of land and animals, or suffering due to injury and illness, may still be affecting people when another flood arrives a year later, and possibly even for years afterwards. A recent IFPRI study of the 1998 floods in Bangladesh gives rare details of these effects from household surveys (del Ninno et al. 2001: xvi-xviii, Chs 4 and 5). Any deaths from illness or injury which occur after a time-lag are unlikely to be linked officially with the flood, so mortality data are often underestimated. As with famine and biological disasters, our Access model (Chapter 3) indicates how vulnerability to future floods (or other hazards) can be increased by the longer-term impacts of floods on household assets, labour power and social networks. ...

Each household’s ‘bundle’ of property and assets (including land and animals for farmers, or boats and nets for fishers) and economic links to others, may be lost, enhanced, disrupted or reinforced in a number of permutations. This sort of disaggregated approach to the impact of hazards shows that although it is possible for a large majority of people to be made worse off, floods may not be a disaster for everyone. The existing social and economic system involves ‘rules’ and patterns which govern how a particular flood hazard makes its impact on existing patterns of vulnerability, moving some people down in terms of assets, others sideways, and leaving a few with enhanced endowments and livelihoods. ...

Even where a flood disaster does not create hunger, the impact of the deluge on many people’s livelihoods causes at least medium-term disruption and will entail hunger for some groups of people. Follow-up studies of such impacts are extremely rare (or fairly crude, e.g. the evaluations done by governments and aid agencies to determine food aid needs in flood-affected areas). The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) study provides evidence that people in lower income groups reduce their food intake considerably, and that overall consumption goes down (ibid.: 56-63). This study found ...
that Bangladeshi food markets had been reformed as a result of liberalisation policies in the decade preceding the floods, and are now mainly operated by the private sector. This, combined with government action and food aid, seems to have ensured that there was no significant increase in food prices at the time of the floods. IFPRI claims that, as a result, serious hunger was averted because a food price rise like that which caused famine in 1974 was avoided. It is difficult to know if this success can be replicated at other times or in other places. Normally food prices rise after floods, and may lead to hunger for some people even when adequate food supplies exist (ibid.; Sen 1981; Crow 1984). Our discussion of Sen’s theory of exchange entitlements (of FAD versus FED) in Chapter 4 explained why this is a possible outcome. ...

The majority of people in poor countries are unlikely to be insured. The loss of the home is a major setback to the family’s livelihood, not because it is necessary for earning a living (although it often is), but because providing a replacement places an excessive burden on limited finances. The cost is to be measured not simply in terms of cash outlay, but frequently includes lost time that would otherwise be used in direct livelihoodearning activities. As well as the building, many simple household items may also need replacing, such as cooking pots and water vessels. Uninsured people with no savings lose twice in a flood disaster: they lose the goods which are essential to life and they lose the time which they have to spend working to replace them. Having reserves or insurance means being able to return quicker to normal livelihood activities. ...

There are other losses which may directly disrupt household livelihood. Standing crops are a loss for the farmers who own them (and for the poorer families this is perhaps the most serious aspect of flooding). In many areas of the world, there is an unhappy coincidence of the season in which floods are most likely and the time when crops are ripening for harvest. An added ‘ratchet effect’ arises because this pre-harvest season is also often the ‘hungry season’ when household food stores and income are low and the physiological reserves of people are depleted (Chambers et al. 1981). Crops in some parts of the world are well adapted to expected levels of flood. For instance, thousands of indigenous varieties of rice have been developed in south and south-east Asia. They include the floating varieties which are planted in many areas to be grown alongside floods. It is estimated that over 15,000 varieties of rice suited to all types of conditions have been developed by farmers in Bangladesh (Shore 1999). But even these will succumb to inundation under some circumstances, along with non-adapted crops. ...

Large land-owners do not need labourers when their fields are flooded. This consequent loss of paid employment may be disastrous for families that rely for a large part of their livelihood on such income-earning opportunities. This was one of the main causes of hardship and hunger in Bangladesh following the 1974 floods, when millions of people found that falling incomes and rising prices meant they could not buy food (Sen 1981; Clay 1985). Estimates of those who starved to death at that time range from the official total of 26,000 up to 100,000 in just one district (Sen 1981:134). ...

The length of time that water remains on the land can also affect the subsequent normal planting, or the planting of a ‘catch crop’ aimed at recovering some of the losses. Paradoxically, it often happens that the overall annual harvest in countries affected (even by serious floods) is not lower, and is sometimes higher than normal. While heavy rainfall brings floods to some areas, in others it increases yield. Even in flooded areas, the ...
soil retains more moisture that can be taken up in plant growth later during the dry season. In Bangladesh, the cereal output in both 1987 and 1988 (years of serious floods) was almost identical to that of 1986 (at around 24 million tonnes), and in 1989 increased to 27 million tonnes. In 1998, with floods regarded as being even worse than those of the 1980s, Bangladesh produced 31.58 million tonnes (up 2 million from 1997), and the following year output was 36.5 million tonnes.

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The same was true of China: in the major flood year of 1998, production was 458.4 million tonnes, up 13 million from the previous year. In 1999, output was down by only 3 million tonnes. ...

These figures are perhaps rather surprising, but of course are only relevant at the aggregate national level. At the other end of the scale, a household whose water buffalo has died in a flood, or which for other reasons cannot take advantage of these moist soil conditions, will not be able to plant in a timely way and ‘catch up’. Animals may be swept away and drowned or injured, and their loss to those families which use livestock produce for subsistence or sale is comparable to the loss of those reliant on crops. Animals are often the main source of draught power and transport for significant sectors of the rural population in many poor countries. In Sikander’s (1983) study of floods from that period in Pakistan, the surveyed villagers reported losses of 35 per cent among their animals. ...

Flooded rivers are part of a physical process whereby land is destroyed by erosion, and recreated in areas where silt is deposited as the sediment-laden waters are slowed down. Flooded rivers are by definition flowing beyond their usual banks. Their route across the countryside, if unconstrained by human interventions, will be via new channels through the lowest-lying land. New channels carved in this way are often miles away from their previous course. People who lose land in this process are unlikely to have access to other land to replace it. Yet others may find that fortuitously the river has abandoned a channel near them, making it possible in time to colonise that land. However, it is more likely that the powerful and already better-off households will gain control of such new land, as has been shown in Bangladesh (Elahi 1989; Rogge and Elahi 1989). ...

Land is ‘lost’ in other ways too. Depending on the speed of the flood waters, in some places the soil itself may be carried away. Generally though, as flood waters spread out across the land, they slow to a pace at which they can no longer carry their suspended load of silt and sand. This sediment is then deposited on top of the earth. In some regions the sediment usually has a beneficial effect, replenishing minerals which improve fertility. In such cases the silt deposition is benign, but this is not always so. The size of deposited particles may be much larger, and may cover extensive areas with infertile sand or gravel that inhibits plant growth. When the Kosi River floods in north Bihar (north India), it also normally deposits a layer of sand over agricultural land, rendering it useless for up to 50 years (Lyngdoh 1988). The mineral content of the sediment may also be too saline or alkaline, rendering the ground toxic to plants. Depending on the combination of these different factors, the land left behind can be enriched and newly fertilised by the layer of deposited silt, or made more barren and less productive. Flash floods in Rajasthan (west India) are likely to produce the latter situation (Seth et al. 1981), in a region which usually has to face problems of drought rather than inundation. ...

In Bangladesh it is more likely that flooded land is enriched by a new layer of silt cast on it by the floods. Further downstream in Bangladesh, the waters of the Ganges and ...

Brahmaputra arrive at the Bay of Bengal laden with silt, are stilled by the sea and add new material which expands the delta. This new land, often in the form of islands called char in the middle of the many channels of this complex river system, is quickly occupied by poor and landless peasants from elsewhere, who otherwise have no means of subsistence (Schmuck-Widmann 1996; Zaman 1991). Their precarious existence on the edge of this watery boundary-zone is discussed in Chapter 7. ...

Box 6.3: Bangladesh—reducing vulnerability to floods is not the same as stopping floods ...

Bangladesh attracted much international concern to ‘solve its flood problem’ when it experienced a supposed ‘100-year flood’ in 1987, followed by another—even worse-in 1988 (British Overseas Development 1990; Parker 1992; Westcoat 1992; Hossain et al. 1992; Brammer 1990a). A decade later, in 1998, the country endured floods that were considered the worst ever. As in 1988 they covered around 60 per cent of the country, but although in general the waters were no deeper, they lasted two months longer, destroying more of the summer harvest and delaying opportunities for replanting and recovery. ...

What happened in the intervening decade, during which costly studies had been undertaken to find solutions to ‘the flood problem’? Whose definition of the problem had been listened to, and what changes had occurred in understanding how flooding in the country should be perceived? And why did a significant foreign donor-supported initiative-BFAP—not provide a comprehensive solution? ...

In 1988 the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) in co-operation with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), plus official teams from Japan, France and the United States, began studies of the ‘flood problem’ which cost around

$ 200

million (Brammer 2000; for a summary of the plan, see World Bank 1990:25-30). These studies differed considerably in their prescriptions for dealing with the hazard, ranging from a capital-intensive ‘high-tech’ intervention (France) to a version of a ‘living-with-floods’ approach. The World Bank took on the co-ordination of foreign and GoB proposals. It produced the Bangladesh Flood Action Plan (BFAP) in conjunction with the GoB, which amalgamates some of the ideas from the various other studies (World Bank 1990). Initial budgets of

$ 146

million went into 26 studies, with some capital going into the repair of existing projects. The World Bank in effect became a broker between the different interests represented in the G7 and the GoB, trying to keep on board all potential donors, and mediating between the different flood plan proposals. This was a difficult task, since many of the BFAP components conflicted with each other (both in terms of ...
their technical requirements and their objectives). Also, some proposals were of very doubtful financial viability, and if judged by normal World Bank auditing criteria would not be approved (see Boyce 1990:422-423). ...

A further problem was that the so-called action plan was really a series of studies, some of them designed to research the possibilities of various approaches to flood control (Brammer 2000), but was not a complete set of projects to solve flooding. And while it is certain that major interest groups in the GoB strongly favoured an approach that would ‘stop’ flooding (Leaf 1997), the BFAP was not the means by which that could be directly achieved. Moreover, after some of the studies had been underway for a few years, the immense and extremely costly 1993 floods on the Mississippi, Red River and Missouri in the USA severely undermined confidence in (or the appropriateness of) the river training (engineering) methods being proposed by powerful interest groups for Bangladesh. ...

The key issue in regard to the ‘flood problem’ is what type of approach is favoured and implemented. One model calls for high ...
levels of investment in large-scale engineering works that will supposedly contain the rivers between high embankments. Such embankment methods for containing rivers in spate were not new for Bangladesh, and they have been recorded for over 200 years (Brammer 2000). However, the BFAP claimed that this ‘river training’ approach would also help by promoting agriculture in protected enclosed areas (like polders), for which dry-season irrigation could be provided. Proponents of the plan believed it to be flexible and not an overly ‘technical fix’ (e.g. Brammer 1993, 2000). Yet there were widespread and serious criticisms emerging from many in Bangladesh, including affected people in the countryside, academics and engineers, and NGOs (Brammer 2000 provides a summary of the main objections). Some Bangladeshi organisations and experts considered the approach to be top down, and insensitive to the causes of vulnerability (Adnan 1993; Farooque 1993; Leaf 1997). ...

As a result of the extraordinary coincidence of two very exceptional floods in 1987 and 1988, it seems that an excuse had been found to try to end all floods, including those that most rural people consider to be beneficial and essential. This point is crucial, since for the majority of the rural population in most years there is no ‘flood problem’; indeed, when there is no flooding, it is considered to be a disastrous ‘drought’. It is highly unlikely that many among the rural population would be willing to give up the normal annual summer flooding which has enormous value (mainly for agriculture and fisheries) in order to reap dubious and costly benefits of schemes which stop floods altogether. As Leaf says of the claims that flood protection would improve agriculture (in his discussion of the Flood Response Study in which he participated as part of the BFAP): ...
[T]he implication was that such benefits [of improved farming] might eventually outweigh the costs. However, there are many reasons to doubt this. The existing agricultural system in Bangladesh is closely adapted to the cycle of inundations and is unquestionably productive, supporting one of the highest rural population densities in the world. No rain-fed system and few irrigation systems could achieve as much. ...
(Leaf 1997:181) ...
The BFAP failed to take adequate account of the fact that flood prevention will produce its own set of victims: those who are going to be made worse off by the proposed projects. It is even possible that more people will suffer longer-term damage to their livelihoods ...
as a result of the flood prevention projects than the number who suffer during flooding. Leaf states that: ...
[T]he clear historical pattern in Bangladesh has been that the construction of flood control projects has consistently resulted in an immediate net decline in production in the project areas, evidently because of poor advance information and the lack of co-ordination between agencies. This has typically extended five to seven years, until farmers can discover and make the necessary compensating adjustments. ...
(Ibid.: 196-197) ...
The principal ‘hard’ projects for flood prevention suggested in the BFAP can be summarised as the repair, consolidation or construction of high embankments along the length of the main rivers (Ganges, Brahmaputra, Meghna: see Figure 6.2), combined with protection of land for High Yielding Varieties (HYV), 'Green Revolution’ agriculture. In addition, some new or improved antistorm surge bunds were to be constructed or repaired on low land at the mouths of the delta distributaries. These are designed to protect farmland from saltwater incursion during cyclones (but were not located in the worst-hit areas of the 1991 cyclone, on the east coast). The ‘soft’ components include the development and improvement of flood warning systems. (Summaries of the projects are to be found in Boyce 1990; Brammer 1990b, 2000; Dalal-Clayton 1990). ...

The basic conception of the BFAP was that water would be contained and moved downstream between large, long embankments, despite the fact that there is little knowledge of the consequences downstream (including possible flooding in other areas). The newly protected ‘HYV lands’ behind these ...
banks were to be separated into ‘compartments’, surrounded by their own embankments. It was proposed that these compartments could be deliberately allowed to flood, in a version of the concept of ‘living-with-floods’. The idea is that water can be controlled to allow optimum levels for irrigation in the wet season, but with the ability to keep out flood peaks. Some such Flood Control Drainage and Irrigation (FCDI) projects have been in operation for more than a decade, but have neither solved poverty nor even removed all vulnerability to flooding. ...

The issue of land tenure and the distribution of the assets and income generated by such schemes was not to be dealt with within the projects. Even if such FCDI schemes were to work properly and increase agricultural output, the social factors which prevent poor ...

Figure 6.2 Major rivers and distributaries of Bangladesh region, showing extent of flooding in September 1988 ...
people from receiving adequate nutrition were not addressed. Increased output is not a sufficient nor a necessary condition for solving hunger, and there is no guarantee that better production under flood prevention will actually help, since the problem of hunger is not a lack of food, but the ...
inability of people either to grow their own (land and asset poverty) or to buy it (income poverty) (see Chapter 4 and BRAG 1983a, 1983b; Hartmann and Boyce 1983). ...

Supporters argued that the BFAP was not monolithic and could be adapted to the most appropriate policies, in sympathy with the needs of the people. Critics argued that alternatives which might work better and be much cheaper were being ignored, and that the existing knowledge of many Bangladeshi and international NGOs was not being properly considered. To understand the gap between these perspectives, we need to see how they fit into existing power systems. Disaster reduction is not isolated from other aspects of life in Bangladesh. It operates in a hierarchy which connects the vulnerable and poor in the villages to national and international interests. It involves either ignoring or failing to understand the factors which generate people’s vulnerability to floods. The existing distribution of power, income and assets is a major component of that vulnerability. Numerous NGOs and people’s organisations in Bangladesh are concerned that the proposed projects (and even the pilot studies) reflect both a continuation of existing processes of generating vulnerability, and a failure to deal with the needs of the majority (Chowdhury 1991; Adnan 1993; Farooque 1993). One British member of the panel of experts advising the plan conceded that consultation and public participation 'is not an easy task in a strongly hierarchical society, and it would be unrealistic to expect overnight success’ (Brammer 1993:9). ...

Two interlinked factors were involved in setting the BFAP on its course towards a ‘tech-fix’ approach, factors which are unlikely to change very significantly. The first is the availability of the technical fix itself, as a set of expensive methods involving major engineering works. It reinforces the benefits of the power system for those already in control, both in Bangladesh and internationally. Because it involves large-scale engineering contracts, foreign donors or lenders get back a very substantial share of the spending, through consultancy fees and the purchase of equipment. Likewise, politicians and others in the local elite benefit from kickbacks on the contracts, consultancy and brokerage fees for the donor agencies in arranging local projects. Other ways of doing things are not nearly so attractive to either group because they would involve less spending. The only study in the BFAP which really sought to find ...
out what vulnerable people themselves wanted was strongly opposed by some GoB officials at the highest level because it showed that the technical fix was neither wanted nor needed (Leaf 1997). ...

Secondly, a preference for the tech-fix approach is also linked to the desire of local elites to protect their own land and property, especially in towns and cities, and in areas of existing Green Revolution projects. One researcher recorded the following opinion: ...
‘Some would argue’, says Dalal-Clayton, that the flood plan amounts to 'a political response to the clamour for flood protection from wealthier, influential, urban-based groups…a great many people who presently live along the main rivers and on islands in the river channels will be exposed to increased risks from flooding. ...
(Quoted in Pearce 1991:40) ...
The national priority is to raise agricultural production (without asset or income redistribution). Paradoxically, the worst floods (e.g. in 1987 and 1988) led to the largest harvests, as moisture remained in the soil in the dry season and non-flooded areas received more rain. The Flood Response Study found that the areas with the worst rice production included non-flooded areas (Leaf 1997). But the real problem for those who focus on raising output is that both low-rainfall monsoons in summer and the normally dry winters lead to low yields, except in areas with irrigation. It is extremely difficult to calculate, but it is conceivable that the losses from low water availability in winter, and from summers with poor rainfall, are greater than those which accompany floods. In a sense the need is more to deal with water shortages and drought control than to prevent floods. Flood projects tend to benefit middle peasants and wealthier land owners. It is to be expected that new projects created under the ‘flood protection’ works will benefit the same interest groups. Poorer farmers and the landless may derive some benefit through higher demands for labour and a general rise in output, but this seems to be a secondary consideration in the prospective designs. Similar FCDI projects already exist, for example around Chandpur, south-east of Dhaka. Some sections of the poor, including those vulnerable to floods, benefit from the protection in this area. ...

The issue is whether it is the best way to protect the vulnerable, and whether the impact of protection and flood prevention on other groups will be less beneficial. In rural areas, many of those already vulnerable to flooding may not be relocated safely when embankments are built. The impact on transfer of water by the river-training ...
measures is also unpredictable, and it is possible that other areas will become more prone to flooding. In addition, it is likely that asset and income positions, and livelihood opportunities (especially of those who depend on common property resources), will deteriorate. There is widespread concern that flood protection works may eliminate the ponds that remain after floods and in which fish and shrimps spawn. These ‘common property’ fisheries are of immense value to poor people, both for nutrition and as a source of income for those who catch and sell on to others. It has been estimated that inland fisheries account for 77 per cent of the national harvest (Boyce 1990:423). ...

The prevention of flooding may also seriously diminish the renewal of soil fertility by the effects of inundation, resultant decomposition of plant residues and an associated bloom of nitrogen-fixing algae (Brammer 1990b:164). There is a further potential and significant loss of ‘free’ groundwater replenishment. In place of the natural recharging of the water table by normal floods, the impact of compartmentalised agriculture will be to require expensive pumping from rivers and channels to provide for both winter and summer agriculture. ...

Maintenance of extensive and large flood control constructions (like those suggested by the BFAP) would be both difficult and expensive. Commentators on the BFAP pointed out that past experience of repairs to embankments shows that the tech-fix is unworkable. This is an important argument, because any failure of a major embankment will have appalling consequences, especially as river beds are likely to rise above the level of the surrounding countryside when they become deposition zones for river silt. Even the impact on the compartmentalised FCDI agriculture could be serious if the banks fail. One similar FCDI scheme in existence at MeghnaDhonagoda (to the north of the Chandpur project mentioned above) suffered serious losses in 1987 because of a breached embankment (Thompson and Penning-Rowsell 1994:6). Another likely maintenance problem, widely observed with existing flood prevention banks, is blocked drainage conduits preventing the return to rivers of impounded flood and rainwater. Roads and railways are normally elevated on embankments to avoid inundation, but these structures commonly cause flooding by not allowing proper return drainage. ...

Alternatives to the plan: a people’s needs-based approach? ...
The BFAP was intended to diagnose problems and seek appropriate solutions. But there was widespread concern both in the country and outside that it would automatically prescribe a ‘tech-fix’ approach, a ...
fear that Leaf (1997) highlights in the conflicts that arose from the Flood Response Plan with which he was involved (and which was the only component of the BFAP that actually discussed with affected people their wants and needs with regard to the floods). The main criticisms concern the costs involved (in relation to the uncertainties of the claimed benefits), the uncertainties of success, the increased dangers of failure (a breached embankment may cause a worse disaster than a bad ‘natural’ flood), the ignoring of alternatives and the failure to deal with the problem by first finding out how the majority of affected people themselves define it. It is also essential to calculate the impacts on the poor and vulnerable (for example, through taxation) of any increased financial burdens the country may face as a result of the borrowing required for construction projects. ...

The emphasis of the USAID report (see Rogers et al. 1989) was on ...
managing the flood, or living with flood, rather than attempting expensive prevention. This approach was undoubtedly influenced by the many Bangladeshi scientists, social scientists and NGOs that advocated modified 'living with flood’ strategies. The Flood Response Study found that affected people had their own priorities for flooding, and very little interest in stopping floods altogether. What is really crucial to understanding the problem is to ascertain what causes people to be vulnerable to the negative aspects of flooding-and especially to ‘extreme’ floods which are disastrous for someand therefore to assess what measures can reduce vulnerability. These may be far removed from the need to prevent floods through measures the costs of which the poor will have to bear disproportionately anyway. Figure 6.3 maps out some of these components of vulnerability, and it is there that the beginnings of river and rainfall flood disaster avoidance should be found.
管理洪水或与洪水共存，而不是试图进行昂贵的预防。这种方法无疑受到了许多孟加拉国科学家、社会科学家和非政府组织的影响，他们倡导修改后的“与洪水共存”策略。洪水应对研究发现，受影响的人对洪水有自己的优先考虑，而对完全阻止洪水的兴趣很小。理解问题的关键在于确定是什么导致人们对洪水的负面影响，尤其是对一些人来说灾难性的“极端”洪水的脆弱性，因此评估哪些措施可以减少脆弱性。这些措施可能与通过需要贫困人口不成比例地承担成本的措施来预防洪水的需求相去甚远。图 6.3 描绘了脆弱性的某些组成部分，而河流和降雨洪灾避免的开端应该在这里找到。

To protect people and their homes, there needs to be investment in flood shelters (including elevated schools and health centres) and raised house sites. To ensure their health (and thereby indirectly their livelihoods) there needs to be elevated or protected drinking water sources and primary health care (some authorities also advocate safe flood-proof latrines). To protect their livelihoods there needs to be access to land, replacements for land lost through erosion, compensation for losses of animals and other production assets. Where necessary, there must, of course, also be flood prevention measures, but based on an assessment of what is actually needed to reduce vulnerability rather than some grand design which supposedly prevents all flooding without considering who benefits and who loses, who pays for it and whether it is needed anyway.
为了保护人们及其家园，需要投资于防洪避难所（包括高架学校和卫生中心）和抬高的房屋场地。为了确保他们的健康（从而间接保障他们的生计），需要有抬高或保护的饮用水源和初级医疗保健（一些当局还提倡安全的防洪厕所）。为了保护他们的生计，需要有土地的获取、因侵蚀而失去土地的替代方案、对动物和其他生产资产损失的赔偿。当然，在必要时，还必须采取防洪措施，但应基于对实际需要减少脆弱性的评估，而不是某种声称可以防止所有洪水的宏大设计，而不考虑谁受益、谁受损、谁为此付费以及是否真的需要这些措施。

Figure 6.3 ‘Pressures’ that results in disasters: Bangladesh floods, 1987 and 1988
图 6.3 导致灾难的“压力”：孟加拉国洪水，1987 年和 1988 年

In 1991 tens of thousands died as the immediate consequence of flooding
1991 年，数万人因洪水而立即死亡
brought about by a tropical cyclone on the south-east coast of Bangladesh (see Chapter 7). By contrast, the worst-ever river and rainfall floods of 1987, 1988 and 1998 reportedly each caused less than 2,000 immediate deaths (Brammer 1993; World Bank 1990:40; del Ninno et al. 2001). Although one component of the BFAP deals with cyclone protection, at the time it seemed extraordinary that there appeared to be much less concern for measures which provide coastal villagers with effective cyclone shelters and other forms of protection. While the desire to reduce the harmful effects of floods is laudable, and tens of millions of people endured intense suffering in 1987, 1988 and 1998, few lives were lost, and the hardship remains for many of the poor during non-flood years. Basic vulnerability issues need to be addressed not through prevention of floods, but through changes in the processes that create the unsafe conditions.
由孟加拉国东南海岸的热带气旋引发（见第七章）。相比之下，1987 年、1988 年和 1998 年发生的历史上最严重的河流和降雨洪水据报道每次造成的直接死亡人数均少于 2000 人（Brammer 1993；世界银行 1990:40；del Ninno et al. 2001）。尽管 BFAP 的一个组成部分涉及气旋保护，但当时似乎对为沿海村民提供有效的气旋避难所和其他保护措施的关注远远不足。虽然减少洪水的有害影响是值得赞扬的，1987 年、1988 年和 1998 年有数千万人民遭受了严重痛苦，但失去的生命却很少，许多贫困人口在非洪水年份仍然面临困境。基本脆弱性问题需要通过改变造成不安全条件的过程来解决，而不是通过防止洪水。

Water itself is an important part of the resource or livelihood rights of many people likely to be affected by floods. Rivers are crucial for livelihoods based not just in agriculture but also on transport, trading and fishing. River channel shifting may disrupt these livelihoods too, creating havoc among whole sections of a population.
水本身是许多可能受到洪水影响的人的资源或生计权利的重要组成部分。河流对生计至关重要，不仅在农业方面，还涉及运输、贸易和渔业。河道的变化可能会扰乱这些生计，给整个群体带来混乱。

In some circumstances, the normal flood regime of a river is used to good advantage by farmers. On some rivers ‘flood-retreat’ agriculture (also known as recession agriculture) is practised, where the receding waters reveal moist soil primed for planting with food crops. This was the case on the Nile before the irrigation schemes fed from the Aswan dam were installed. Such a system has existed for centuries on many rivers in Africa, including the Senegal on its route through Mali, Mauritania and Senegal in west Africa, as well as in south Asia. Livelihoods based on farming and fishing (in the ponds which remain as the flood goes down) are severely undermined when ‘development’ projects attempt to control such a river. For example, a dam has been constructed at Manantali on the upper Senegal, mainly for the generation of HEP and to regulate the river’s flow to permit year-round barge traffic up to Kayes in Mali. It was also intended to irrigate farmland, but for large-scale projects that will grow crops which local people do not eat. This will not compensate those who lose out in the transfer of resources and loss of natural floods in the valley. Another of the costs of such a project is that the new regulated river flow will not allow traditional flood-retreat agriculture to take place (Horowitz 1989; Horowitz and Salem-Murdoch 1990). Similar losses to small-scale traditional irrigation were the result of damming a river to the south of Kano (Nigeria) so that large-scale irrigated wheat production could supply urban bakeries (Andrae and Beckman 1985).

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在某些情况下，农民利用河流的正常洪水规律获得了良好的收益。在一些河流上，实行“洪水退去”农业（也称为退潮农业），在洪水退去时，露出的湿润土壤适合种植粮食作物。这在阿斯旺大坝灌溉方案实施之前的尼罗河上就是如此。这种系统在非洲许多河流上存在了几个世纪，包括在西非的马里、毛里塔尼亚和塞内加尔流经的塞内加尔河，以及南亚。当“发展”项目试图控制这样的河流时，基于农业和渔业（在洪水退去后留下的池塘中的渔业）的生计受到严重破坏。例如，在上塞内加尔的马南塔利建造了一座大坝，主要用于发电和调节河流流量，以允许全年驳船交通到达马里的凯耶斯。它还旨在灌溉农田，但用于大规模项目种植当地人不吃的作物。这将无法补偿在资源转移和自然洪水消失中受到损失的人们。这样一个项目的另一个成本是新的调节河流将不允许传统的洪水退却农业进行（Horowitz 1989; Horowitz 和 Salem-Murdoch 1990）。在尼日利亚卡诺南部，因修建大坝以便进行大规模灌溉小麦生产以供应城市面包店，导致小规模传统灌溉的类似损失（Andrae 和 Beckman 1985）。

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Box 6.4: Flooding and deforestation-the causation controversy
案例 6.4：洪水与森林砍伐——因果关系争议
There is a widespread assumption by those concerned about flooding that it may be increased (in frequency and/or intensity) as a result of land in the
关注洪水的人普遍认为，洪水的发生可能会因土地的变化而增加（频率和/或强度）。
rainfall catchment being cleared of vegetation and forest cover. This causation is frequently mentioned in relation to floods in China (after the severe 1998 floods, the government banned all logging in several provinces in the catchment basins of the Yangtze), in Bangladesh and north India (in relation to deforestation in the foothills of the Himalayas) and Thailand (where the government has also supposedly banned logging to stop floods). In this chapter, we have also mentioned the problem of deforestation, especially in relation to landslides (where there may be a much more immediate connection between cause and effect). But although the link between deforestation and flooding has become almost general knowledge and is widely taken for granted, it may vary in its significance from place to place and river to river: the issues are extremely complex. The most significant challenge to the simple idea of causation comes from work on the Himalayas in relation to flooding in Bangladesh. Since the issue is of considerable relevance to flooding, it is discussed here briefly.
降雨集水区被清除植被和森林覆盖。这种因果关系在中国（在 1998 年严重洪灾后，政府禁止在长江流域的几个省份进行伐木）、孟加拉国和北印度（与喜马拉雅山脚下的森林砍伐有关）以及泰国（政府也据说禁止伐木以防止洪水）中经常被提及。在本章中，我们也提到了森林砍伐的问题，特别是与滑坡相关的问题（在这种情况下，因果关系可能更加直接）。但是，尽管森林砍伐与洪水之间的联系几乎成为常识，并被广泛视为理所当然，但其重要性可能因地点和河流而异：这些问题极其复杂。对简单因果关系的最显著挑战来自于与孟加拉国洪水相关的喜马拉雅山的研究。由于这一问题与洪水有着相当大的相关性，因此在此简要讨论。

There are many causes of deforestation and de-vegetation of river catchments, and it is potentially misleading to put them all together as if they were similar. There are also significant differences in the effects of different patterns of land-use and associated deforestation. In some upland or sloping land areas, logging for timber is practised by national and foreign companies and by governments, and is often considered to lead to more rapid rainfall runoff, silting of rivers and, sometimes, landslides (which also block rivers with debris and sediment). Associated roads may be constructed inappropriately, causing slope instability and vegetation loss. Land shortage in upland areas may increase the rate of deforestation, as people clear more land for agriculture, or damage trees for fuel and fodder. The people who do this may be new arrivals who clear new areas, or local people who have to expand their cultivated area or reduce the fallow period in upland swidden (slash and burn) agriculture.
森林砍伐和河流集水区植被减少的原因有很多，将它们全部归为相似的情况可能会产生误导。不同的土地利用模式及其相关的森林砍伐在影响上也存在显著差异。在一些高地或坡地地区，国家和外国公司以及政府进行木材采伐，这通常被认为会导致更快速的降雨径流、河流淤积，有时还会引发滑坡（这也会用碎片和沉积物堵塞河流）。相关的道路可能不当建设，导致坡度不稳定和植被损失。高地地区的土地短缺可能会增加森林砍伐的速度，因为人们清理更多土地用于农业，或损坏树木作为燃料和饲料。进行这些活动的人可能是清理新区域的新移民，或是必须扩大耕种面积或缩短高地刀耕火种农业休耕期的当地人。

These factors may all generate local flooding (through stream-damming) and increase the sediment load of rivers, contributing to a rise in the level of river beds downstream and increased flood hazard. However there are disputes among scientists about the significance of the different factors in this process, especially concerning the Himalayas (Thompson and Warburton 1988). One disagreement is about whether or not there has been an increased incidence of flooding during recent decades when, it is supposed, rapid deforestation has occurred. Some argue that the evidence for a strong connection between deforestation
这些因素可能都会导致局部洪水（通过河流阻塞）并增加河流的沉积物负荷，从而导致下游河床水位上升和洪水风险增加。然而，科学家们对这一过程中的不同因素的重要性存在争议，特别是关于喜马拉雅山脉（Thompson and Warburton 1988）。一个争论是关于在最近几十年中，是否确实发生了洪水事件增加的情况，假设在此期间发生了快速的森林砍伐。一些人认为，关于森林砍伐与洪水之间存在强烈联系的证据并不充分。
and increased flooding is uncertain, and that hydrological data do not demonstrate that good vegetative cover in large river basins is necessarily a factor in preventing rapid runoff of storm water (Ross 1984:224-225).
增加的洪水情况是不确定的，水文数据并未表明大河流域良好的植被覆盖必然是防止暴雨水快速径流的因素（Ross 1984:224-225）。

Others suggest that flooding of equivalent severity and frequency to current
其他人建议，洪水的严重程度和频率与当前相当。
times has been apparent in river basins for centuries, long before recent increases in deforestation. For example, discussing the situation in Sichuan province, Ross presents arguments by one Chinese engineer that ‘historical records show a high incidence of flooding even before modern increases in population and logging’ (ibid.: 223). Ives and Messerli (1989) argue likewise for the Himalayas, that there is no convincing evidence of an increase in runoff during the preceding forty years, despite the supposed increased incidence of flood disasters. The rivers of the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin have been contributing immense amounts of sediment to the Ganges plain and Bengal delta for thousands of years, owing to climatic and tectonic factors in the mass wasting of Himalayan slopes, rather than recent human action. They ascribe the common perception of an increase in flood disasters not to greater amounts of water in the drainage system, but to human systems having put more people in more risk-prone places.
在河流流域，洪水的发生已经显而易见了几个世纪，早于最近的森林砍伐增加。例如，在讨论四川省的情况时，罗斯引用了一位中国工程师的论点，称“历史记录显示，即使在现代人口和伐木增加之前，洪水的发生率也很高”（同上：223）。艾夫斯和梅塞里（1989）同样对喜马拉雅山提出论点，认为在过去四十年中，尽管洪灾发生的频率有所增加，但并没有令人信服的证据表明径流有所增加。恒河-布拉马普特拉流域的河流在过去几千年中向恒河平原和孟加拉三角洲输送了大量沉积物，这主要是由于气候和构造因素导致喜马拉雅山坡的质量侵蚀，而不是最近的人类活动。他们将洪灾增加的普遍看法归因于人类系统将更多的人置于更易受风险的地方，而不是排水系统中水量的增加。

The significance of this controversy for a discussion of vulnerability to floods is two-fold. Firstly, if we are to accept that vulnerability is a condition deriving from economic and social systems, it is not certain whether the deforestation process should be included as a significant contributor to rising vulnerability. Secondly, arising from this, reducing vulnerability in areas that are downstream of significant deforestation may not necessarily be achieved by reducing that deforestation (or by reforestation). There may be other very good reasons to reduce such damage, but a reduction in flooding may not occur.
这场争论对洪水脆弱性讨论的重要性有两个方面。首先，如果我们接受脆弱性是源于经济和社会系统的条件，那么不确定森林砍伐过程是否应被视为导致脆弱性上升的重要因素。其次，由此产生的，在重要森林砍伐下游地区减少脆弱性可能并不一定通过减少森林砍伐（或通过再造林）来实现。可能还有其他非常好的理由来减少这种损害，但洪水的减少可能不会发生。

The key issue is that after the ground has become saturated by sufficient rainfall, it does not really matter how much vegetation there is covering it, since that water will flow and potentially cause flooding anyway. There may be an issue of silting and the reduced flow capacity of rivers resulting from the deposition of more silt after slopes become denuded and barren, but even here it is difficult to ascribe the shares in the amount of silt deposited from deforestation as compared with natural wasting processes (at least in the technically active mountains of the Pacific rim). In short, it may be harmful to the livelihoods of already poor, vulnerable people if they are blamed for downstream flooding. There may be other very good reasons to reduce deforestation (especially by logging enterprises where local people are displaced and impoverished anyway), but the inappropriate blaming of deforestation for supposed increases in floods may divert attention from the need to develop other policies to reduce peoples’ vulnerability to floods.
关键问题在于，在地面因足够的降雨而饱和后，覆盖在其上的植被多少并不重要，因为这些水会流动并可能导致洪水。可能会出现沉积物问题，以及由于坡面变得光秃和荒芜而导致河流流量能力降低的情况，但即便如此，很难将由于森林砍伐而沉积的泥沙量与自然侵蚀过程进行比较（至少在太平洋沿岸的技术活跃山区）。简而言之，如果已经贫困、脆弱的人们被指责为下游洪水的原因，这可能会对他们的生计造成伤害。减少森林砍伐（尤其是那些使当地人被迫迁移并陷入贫困的伐木企业）可能有其他非常好的理由，但不当指责森林砍伐导致洪水增加可能会转移人们对制定其他政策以减少人们对洪水脆弱性的需求的关注。

Summary: floods and vulnerability
摘要：洪水与脆弱性

Flood hazards have a variable impact on people according to vulnerability patterns generated by the socio-economic system in which they live. Class relations and other structures of domination are crucial for explaining vulnerability to floods as they
洪水灾害对人们的影响因其所处的社会经济系统所产生的脆弱性模式而异。阶级关系和其他统治结构对于解释对洪水的脆弱性至关重要，因为它们
determine levels of ownership and control over assets and livelihood opportunities that may already be inadequate to providing basic needs for the household (Pelling 1997, 1999). So the initial ‘pre-hazard’ conditions of people are largely determined by patterns of vulnerability that result from the economic and social system in which they exist.
决定了对资产和生计机会的拥有和控制程度，而这些可能已经不足以满足家庭的基本需求（Pelling 1997, 1999）。因此，人们的初始“灾前”条件在很大程度上是由他们所处的经济和社会系统所导致的脆弱性模式决定的。

Our Access model explains many specific mechanisms that turn flood hazards into disaster. These include the location of homes (and their proneness to inundation) and the structure and type of housing and workplaces (and their resistance to floods). Both of these are a function of household income, legal or social limitations on land-use, availability or cost of building materials, and the location of livelihood activities. The Access model also describes the daily and yearly pattern of work and other activities, which in turn interact with the temporal patterns of flood hazard occurrence. These variables not only affect the risk of death and injury but also the potential for the destruction of assets, and of livelihood opportunities. All these can be summarised in the PAR model for floods, which shows how the more remote root causes of flood vulnerability are translated into unsafe conditions (see Figure 6.3). As we shall also see in the case of coastal storms (Chapter 7), distant pressures and factors from the past can influence vulnerability to flooding.
我们的获取模型解释了许多将洪水灾害转化为灾难的具体机制。这些机制包括房屋的位置（及其易受淹没的程度）以及住房和工作场所的结构和类型（及其抵御洪水的能力）。这两者都与家庭收入、土地使用的法律或社会限制、建筑材料的可用性或成本以及生计活动的位置有关。获取模型还描述了工作和其他活动的日常和年度模式，这反过来又与洪水灾害发生的时间模式相互作用。这些变量不仅影响死亡和受伤的风险，还影响资产的破坏和生计机会的潜力。所有这些可以在洪水的 PAR 模型中总结，该模型显示了洪水脆弱性的更远根本原因如何转化为不安全的条件（见图 6.3）。正如我们在海岸风暴的案例中（第 7 章）所看到的，来自过去的遥远压力和因素可以影响洪水的脆弱性。

Ethnic divisions are often superimposed on class patterns, and may become the dominant factor determining vulnerability. This can be seen in differential access to, or possession of, resources, or inequalities of participation in different livelihoods, according to imposed racial or ethnic distinctions. However, very few studies of flood disasters seem to take up the issue of ethnicity as a vulnerability factor. One very significant case is that of the Venezuela floods/landslides of 1999 (see above), when Afro-Venezuelans were disproportionately affected. Another example comes from the exceptional flooding around Alice Springs in central Australia in 1985. Aboriginal people did not receive flood warnings and lived in flimsy accommodation on low-lying land. The radio broadcasts that alerted the white people were not on channels which were customarily used by the Aborigines (Keen et al. 1988).
民族分裂往往叠加在阶级模式之上，并可能成为决定脆弱性的主导因素。这可以通过对资源的不同获取或拥有情况，或根据强加的种族或民族区分在不同生计中的参与不平等来体现。然而，很少有关于洪灾的研究似乎将民族性作为脆弱性因素进行探讨。一个非常重要的案例是 1999 年委内瑞拉的洪水/滑坡（见上文），当时非洲裔委内瑞拉人受到的不成比例影响。另一个例子来自 1985 年澳大利亚中部艾丽斯斯普林斯周围的特大洪水。土著人没有收到洪水警报，居住在低洼地区的简陋住所中。警告白人的广播并不是土著人通常使用的频道（Keen et al. 1988）。

It is also crucial to understand the differential vulnerability which is dependent on gender. There is usually inequality between women and men in their ownership and access to resources. Economic and cultural systems are generally male-dominated, and allocate power and resources in favour of men. Even the effort put into disaster recovery may be disproportionately carried by women, who in most ‘normal’ situations have to work harder in paid and unpaid work than men. In addition, women may be more prone to post-flood disease, largely as a result of their poorer initial well-being (nutritional condition and physical susceptibility). Men’s and women’s time and place patterns of daily and seasonal activities also differ, and this may produce inequalities in their exposure to flood hazards. To the extent that young children are more likely to be with women than men, this also affects their relative vulnerability.
了解依赖于性别的差异脆弱性也至关重要。女性和男性在资源的拥有和获取上通常存在不平等。经济和文化体系通常以男性为主导，并将权力和资源分配给男性。即使在灾后恢复中所付出的努力，往往也由女性承担得更多，因为在大多数“正常”情况下，女性在有偿和无偿工作中往往比男性更努力。此外，女性可能更容易受到洪水后疾病的影响，这在很大程度上是由于她们初始健康状况较差（营养状况和身体易感性）。男性和女性在日常和季节性活动中的时间和地点模式也有所不同，这可能导致她们在洪水灾害暴露方面的不平等。在一定程度上，幼儿更可能与女性在一起，这也影响了她们的相对脆弱性。

Flood prevention and mitigation
洪水防治与减灾

Precautionary measures and policies for dealing with floods are aimed at modifying or predicting the hazard involved in triggering disasters, rather than at other causes of
应对洪水的预防措施和政策旨在修改或预测引发灾害的危险，而不是其他原因导致的脆弱性。
vulnerability. The measures include strategies intended to reduce the intensity of the hazard, the mitigation of flood effects, prediction and preparedness. Policies need to go beyond these aspect and look at the implications of vulnerability analysis in the development of different means of disaster avoidance.
这些措施包括旨在减少危险强度、减轻洪水影响、预测和准备的策略。政策需要超越这些方面，关注脆弱性分析在不同灾害规避手段发展中的影响。

Local-level mitigation地方级减灾

Local-level, indigenous responses include people’s own strategies for dealing with flood risks. These entail a combination of self-protection and social protection by communities or NGOs. These responses have been developed by people in many places, often over hundreds of years, especially where people have had to colonise and cultivate new lands in flood plains. In some regions, for instance in parts of rural India and Bangladesh, houses are usually built on artificial mounds that raise them above normal flood levels. But this is not always possible for all people. For instance, in the Gangetic plain of north India, villages in flood-prone areas often have higher ground at their centres. The more substantially built houses of the wealthier groups are often near these village centres. Poorer classes, including the lower castes and untouchables, are to be found mainly round the edges of the settlements, on low-lying sites.

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地方层面的土著应对措施包括人们应对洪水风险的自我策略。这些措施涉及社区或非政府组织的自我保护和社会保护的结合。这些应对措施是由许多地方的人们发展而来的，通常经过数百年，尤其是在那些人们不得不殖民和开垦洪泛平原的新土地的地方。例如，在印度和孟加拉国的某些农村地区，房屋通常建在人工土堆上，以使其高于正常的洪水水位。但并非所有人都能做到这一点。例如，在印度北部的恒河平原，洪水易发地区的村庄通常在中心有较高的地势。富裕群体建造的更坚固的房屋通常靠近这些村庄中心。较贫困的阶层，包括低种姓和不可接触者，主要分布在定居点的边缘，位于低洼地带。

Precautions against riverine flood hazards often involve attempts to prevent them, through measures that modify the stream flow by using embankments, barrages, dams, retention basins and other engineering installations. These nearly always involve a high level of technical (and therefore capital) investment. Such attempts at ‘social protection’ (that is, measures carried out by institutions within society at levels above that of the household) are increasingly being called into question as inappropriate (as discussed above), and sometimes seem to be carried out for the benefit of the higher-level institutions (including the contractors, politicians and other interest groups) rather than (or as well as) the people who are affected by floods. Dams and barrages constructed for flood prevention are often controversial. A problem of preventive projects is that they can induce a false sense of security, leading people to settle in supposedly protected areas that may be completely devastated if the construction measures fail.
防范河流洪水灾害的措施通常涉及通过使用堤坝、闸门、大坝、蓄水池和其他工程设施来修改水流，以防止洪水的发生。这些措施几乎总是需要高水平的技术（因此也是资本）投资。这种“社会保护”的尝试（即由社会内部高于家庭层面的机构实施的措施）正日益受到质疑，被认为是不适当的（如上所述），有时似乎是为了更高层次机构（包括承包商、政治家和其他利益集团）的利益，而不仅仅是为了受洪水影响的人们。为防洪而建造的大坝和闸门常常引发争议。预防项目的问题在于，它们可能会导致一种虚假的安全感，使人们在所谓的保护区定居，而如果建设措施失败，这些地区可能会遭受完全的破坏。

Channel control methods in developing countries often involve employing thousands of workers along lengthy stretches of river. The most common approach is to constrain river channels within artificial embankments or dikes (river training), or to use dikes (called bunds in some countries) to prevent the river from spilling into its natural flood plain. In addition, embankments may be used to encircle areas or places (e.g. ring bunds around towns, cities or heritage sites) which are deemed to need special protection. Such methods have a long history in some parts of the world, including India and China. In China the channel of the Yellow River (Huanghe) has been repeatedly enclosed within dikes for much of its course across the North China Plain for hundreds of years. As a result it now flows for some of its journey in impounded channels 5 m above the level of the surrounding countryside. It is a policy that requires massive expenditure, and the dikes must constantly be raised higher and higher. Breaches of these dikes are akin to a
发展中国家的河道控制方法通常涉及在漫长的河流沿岸雇佣成千上万的工人。最常见的方法是将河道限制在人工堤坝或堤防内（河道整治），或者使用堤防（在某些国家称为围堤）来防止河水溢出其自然洪泛区。此外，堤坝还可以用于环绕被认为需要特别保护的区域或地点（例如，环绕城镇、城市或遗产地的环形围堤）。这种方法在世界某些地区有着悠久的历史，包括印度和中国。在中国，黄河的河道在其穿越华北平原的大部分过程中，已经被反复围堤数百年。因此，它在部分旅程中流经高出周围乡村 5 米的封闭河道。这是一项需要巨额支出的政策，堤坝必须不断提高。堤坝的决口类似于
dam bursting and can devastate settlements and farmland across extensive areas of the surrounding flood plain.
大坝决口，可能会对周围洪泛区的大面积定居点和农田造成毁灭性影响。

Other channel control methods are used (often in conjunction with river training) to provide emergency storage for flood water (called detention or retention basins). These may be existing lakes which adjoin the river channel, or artificial depressions or naturally low-lying areas. The embankment between river and lake can be breached deliberately, and water from the peak flow is then stored to prevent the river reaching danger levels further downstream. Such basins have been crucial to flood management in China for decades, but as discussed in Box 6.1, various economic pressures have led people to settle there, and they no longer function as a means of flood prevention.
其他渠道控制方法（通常与河流整治结合使用）用于为洪水提供应急储存（称为滞留或蓄水池）。这些可能是与河道相邻的现有湖泊，或人工凹陷或自然低洼地区。河流与湖泊之间的堤坝可以被故意冲破，峰值流量的水随后被储存，以防止河流在下游达到危险水平。这些蓄水池在中国的洪水管理中发挥了关键作用已有数十年，但正如 6.1 框中所讨论的，各种经济压力导致人们在此定居，它们不再作为洪水预防的手段。

Where there are known river flood hazards, land-zoning measures can be effective in preventing disaster by literally avoiding the flood, or giving priority in land-use on floodprone areas to certain types of users. But it is common (especially in the cities of developing countries) for many people to evade such restrictions because they are forced by high rents elsewhere to seek such ‘free’ land to use for housing. Similar economic pressures force the poor to squat in shanty towns, often on unstable hill slopes which can collapse in heavy rain.
在已知的河流洪水危险地区，土地规划措施可以有效地通过字面上避免洪水，或在洪水易发地区优先考虑某些类型的使用者来防止灾害。但在发展中国家的城市中，许多人常常逃避这些限制，因为他们被迫因其他地方的高租金而寻求这种“免费”土地用于住房。类似的经济压力迫使穷人在贫民窟中占据土地，通常是在不稳定的山坡上，这些山坡在大雨中可能会崩塌。

Flood mitigation and preparedness
洪水缓解与准备

Mitigation policies can save lives and protect property even though the flood itself cannot be prevented, contained or avoided. The most conventional of such preparatory methods is a flood warning system, the effectiveness of which has been shown in a range of countries. The value of warnings depends greatly on their timeliness (people are very reluctant to leave their dwellings and assets unguarded, and so delay evacuation until the last possible moment) and accuracy (this affects their credibility), the lead-time available to permit preparedness and evacuation and the effectiveness of the message delivery system (Zschau and Kueppers 2002; see also Chapter 7).
尽管洪水本身无法被预防、控制或避免，但减灾政策可以拯救生命并保护财产。这类准备方法中最常见的是洪水预警系统，其有效性已在多个国家得到验证。预警的价值在很大程度上取决于其及时性（人们非常不愿意让自己的住所和财产处于无保护状态，因此会将撤离推迟到最后一刻）和准确性（这影响其可信度），以及为准备和撤离提供的提前时间和信息传递系统的有效性（Zschau 和 Kueppers 2002；另见第 7 章）。

Notes注释

1 In this chapter we concentrate on river and rainfall flooding, with some reference to inundation associated with tropical storms when relevant. Although tropical storms (especially cyclones or hurricanes) are associated with floods in disaster research and policy, they are often treated separately from other types of floods because they also cause damage through high winds (and saltwater incursions on coasts). We have therefore dealt with tropical storms separately in Chapter 7 to mirror this common distinction. As we have stressed, the focus on particular hazards in this book is to reflect common usage, even though we consider that it is people’s vulnerability which is the key focus.
在本章中，我们集中讨论河流和降雨引发的洪水，并在相关时提及与热带风暴相关的淹水。尽管热带风暴（尤其是气旋或飓风）在灾害研究和政策中与洪水相关，但由于它们还通过强风（以及沿海的盐水入侵）造成损害，因此通常与其他类型的洪水分开处理。因此，我们在第七章中单独讨论了热带风暴，以反映这一常见的区分。正如我们所强调的，本书对特定灾害的关注是为了反映常用的说法，尽管我们认为人们的脆弱性才是关键焦点。
2 The British supermarket Sainsbury’s displayed a notice in its vegetable section in Autumn 1998 that said: ‘Because of the effects of El Niño in Peru, we are unable to supply asparagus’.
1998 年秋季，英国超市 Sainsbury's 在其蔬菜区张贴了一则通知，内容为：“由于厄尔尼诺在秘鲁的影响，我们无法供应芦笋。”
3 As yet, modelling efforts have not revealed precise connections between climate
到目前为止，建模工作尚未揭示气候之间的精确联系
change and ENSO, but research continues into these complexities (McGuire et al. 2002).
气候变化与厄尔尼诺现象，但对这些复杂性的研究仍在继续（McGuire et al. 2002）。

4 By contrast, a dam failure in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, in 1889 killed 2,000 people and is credited with having ushered in the modern period of national flood control in the USA (Foote 1997).
相比之下，1889 年在宾夕法尼亚州约翰斯敦发生的水坝失效导致 2000 人遇难，并被认为开启了美国国家洪水控制的现代时期（Foote 1997）。
5 In the Mozambique floods of 2000, there was some release of water from dams that may have made the floods worse downstream (Christie and Hanlon 2001:112-117; see Chapter 7).
2000 年莫桑比克洪水中，水坝释放了一些水，这可能使下游的洪水更加严重（Christie 和 Hanlon 2001:112-117；见第 7 章）。
6 Examples include projects in Nepal on the Imja glacier lake as well as the country’s largest lake, Tsho Rolpa. Information from NepalNet at:
示例包括尼泊尔在 Imja 冰川湖以及该国最大的湖泊 Tsho Rolpa 的项目。来自 NepalNet 的信息在：
www.panasia.org.sg/nepanet/water/khumbu.htm, and Bridges: Rowaling Project at http://namche.net/ooo/bn-tsho-rolpa-c.html
www.panasia.org.sg/nepanet/water/khumbu.htm，以及 Bridges: Rowaling Project 在 http://namche.net/ooo/bn-tsho-rolpa-c.html
7 This is a good example of how a supposedly sudden impact hazard can continue to have potentially devastating effects years afterwards. As well as the threat from this lake, there have been many casualties since the eruption as lahars have swept down the volcano’s slopes (see also Chapter 8).
这是一个很好的例子，说明一个看似突发的冲击危险如何在多年后继续产生潜在的毁灭性影响。除了这个湖泊的威胁，自火山喷发以来，已经有许多伤亡，因为泥石流冲下火山坡（另见第 8 章）。
8 Cannon became aware of the potential for warnings when on holiday in Corsica. Relaxing by a river in the hills with several hundred other tourists, all were saved from drowning by the local fire brigade, which travelled up the valley to evacuate the riverside. Aware of heavy storms over the upper catchments in the mountains above, Cannon had predicted the flood, but the experience of the fire brigade in knowing the local patterns and moving people out was vital in ensuring people’s safety. Within fifteen minutes, a flash flood with a 5 m wave filled the canyon where everyone had been enjoying themselves.
卡农在科西嘉度假时意识到了发出警告的潜力。在与几百名其他游客一起在山中的河边放松时，当地消防队赶到山谷，疏散了河边的人们，避免了溺水。卡农意识到上方山脉的上游地区有强烈的暴风雨，预测到了洪水，但消防队在了解当地模式和疏散人群方面的经验对于确保人们的安全至关重要。在十五分钟内，一场 5 米高的闪电洪水填满了大家曾经享受的峡谷。
9 Flash Flood Lab, n.d, http://www.cira.colostate.edu/fHab/recentff.htm
闪电洪水实验室，未注明日期，http://www.cira.colostate.edu/fHab/recentff.htm
10 La RED and others have developed an accounting system for compiling information on such ‘small’ disasters from local records, provincial news media and oral history. The system is known as DESINVENTAR, and has been used in Guatemala, Ecuador, E1 Salvador, Peru, Colombia, Panama, Argentina, Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras. It is available on the internet at http://www.desinventar.org/desinventar.html (in English and Spanish).
10 La RED 和其他组织开发了一种会计系统，用于从地方记录、省级新闻媒体和口述历史中汇编有关这些“小”灾害的信息。该系统被称为 DESINVENTAR，已在危地马拉、厄瓜多尔、萨尔瓦多、秘鲁、哥伦比亚、巴拿马、阿根廷、墨西哥、哥斯达黎加、尼加拉瓜和洪都拉斯使用。它可以在互联网上访问，网址为 http://www.desinventar.org/desinventar.html（提供英语和西班牙语版本）。
11 Leaf (1997) found that the respondents in his survey were often very concerned about the impact of existing and possible new structures on creating these floods. Where they prevent rain runoff entering rivers they actually create floods where none would otherwise exist.
11 Leaf（1997）发现，他调查中的受访者通常非常关心现有和可能的新结构对造成这些洪水的影响。当这些结构阻止雨水径流进入河流时，实际上会在原本不会存在洪水的地方造成洪水。
12 All output figures from FAO website database at http://apps.fao.org/page/collections?subset=agriculture
12 所有输出数据来自 FAO 网站数据库，网址为 http://apps.fao.org/page/collections?subset=agriculture
13 Other examples of losses of previous agriculture and fishing resources in African rivers with flood-recession capability are given in Fiselier (1990) and Scudder (1989).
13 Fiselier（1990）和 Scudder（1989）提供了非洲河流中洪水退潮能力的农业和渔业资源损失的其他例子。

14 Field observations by Cannon in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, north India, in 1976 and 1979.
1976 年和 1979 年，卡农在印度北部的哈里亚纳邦和北方邦进行了 14 次实地观察。

7
COASTAL STORMS7 个沿海风暴

Introduction引言

People have lived along coasts since antiquity. The most recent phase of colonial expansion (since the middle of the nineteenth century) and the establishment of a world market have greatly increased the numbers of urban settlements, plantations, ports and naval bases and other centres of population in coastal areas. More recently, tourism and the global expansion of export-oriented industries have added to the attraction of coastal locations. The 1999 Hangzhou Declaration of representatives of large coastal cities noted the following:
自古以来，人们就生活在海岸沿线。最近的殖民扩张阶段（自 19 世纪中叶以来）以及世界市场的建立大大增加了沿海地区城市定居点、种植园、港口、海军基地和其他人口中心的数量。近年来，旅游业和以出口为导向的产业的全球扩张进一步增强了沿海地区的吸引力。1999 年，来自大型沿海城市的代表在杭州宣言中指出：

More than half of the world’s population…lives in coastal areas and is expected to develop uninterruptedly in the following decades.
世界上超过一半的人口……生活在沿海地区，并预计在未来几十年内将持续发展。
This process has been associated with population growth and tourist pressure increase…
这一过程与人口增长和旅游压力增加有关……
Coastal mega-cities (cities with eight million inhabitants or more) have increased in number in such a way as to become the key component of coastal areas.
沿海特大城市（人口超过八百万的城市）的数量增加，已成为沿海地区的关键组成部分。
Small coastal cities (three to eight million inhabitants) are also proliferating.
小型沿海城市（人口在三百万到八百万之间）也在不断增加。
The most populated mega-cities are located in the developing world, and this spatial process is expected to accelerate in the twenty-first century.
人口最多的特大城市位于发展中国家，这一空间过程预计将在 21 世纪加速。
Coastal urbanisation has increased coastal erosion, and the rise of new resource uses have produced increasingly complicated coastal use patterns.
沿海城市化加剧了海岸侵蚀，而新资源使用的兴起产生了日益复杂的沿海使用模式。
Coastal cities have become key spatial elements of globalisation processes.
沿海城市已成为全球化过程中的关键空间要素。
These spatial processes…have provoked acceleration in human pressure on the local ecosystems and natural resources.
这些空间过程……加速了人类对当地生态系统和自然资源的压力。

Several of the fastest growing cities, all projected to have 20-30 million inhabitants each by the year 2025, have long histories of exposure to severe tropical storms. These include Karachi, Jakarta, Calcutta and Dhaka (Davis 1986:279), as well as several coastal Chinese cities including Shanghai and Hong Kong,

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Manila, Tokyo, Miami, New Orleans and Darwin.
几个快速增长的城市预计到 2025 年每个城市将拥有 2000 万到 3000 万居民，这些城市都有长期遭受严重热带风暴的历史。这些城市包括卡拉奇、雅加达、加尔各答和达卡（Davis 1986:279），以及包括上海和香港在内的几个中国沿海城市，

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马尼拉、东京、迈阿密、新奥尔良和达尔文。

The ‘attractiveness’ of coastal location is often taken for granted. For instance, Griggs and Gilchrist (1983:274) review numerous high-risk situations on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts of the USA and conclude that ‘people want to live in the sun and be able to look at the ocean; realtors and developers want to make money, and local governments want more tax dollars’ (cf: Dean 1999:92-119). Burton, Kates and White (1978:4-17) emphasise the attractiveness of rich alluvial soils in the case of coastal Bangladesh, a factor that is significant in many other regions.
沿海位置的“吸引力”常常被视为理所当然。例如，Griggs 和 Gilchrist（1983:274）回顾了美国墨 Gulf 和大西洋沿岸的众多高风险情况，并得出结论：“人们想要生活在阳光下，能够看到海洋；房地产商和开发商想要赚钱，地方政府希望获得更多的税收”（参见：Dean 1999:92-119）。Burton、Kates 和 White（1978:4-17）强调了孟加拉国沿海地区富饶冲积土壤的吸引力，这在许多其他地区也是一个重要因素。

In this chapter we examine the reasons why people inhabit coasts and the implications
在本章中，我们将探讨人们为何居住在海岸以及其影响。
for their vulnerability in the face of hazards.

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In seeking the causes of vulnerability to cyclones, typhoons and hurricanes (these being different regional names for the same meteorological phenomenon), common assumptions why people live in coastal regions need to be investigated more specifically. Cyclonic storms do not affect all coasts equally (White 1974; Southern 1978). Furthermore, where such storms are frequent, not all people suffer equally. In instances where people suffer from coastal storms, not all people are able to reconstruct their lives rapidly or equally well. Such differences in vulnerability can be seen in the case of storms affecting more developed countries (MDCs) such as Australia, Japan and the USA as well as less developed countries (LDCs) such as Fiji, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Bangladesh and the Philippines. For every ‘voluntary’ resident in a high-risk coastal location (those seeking ‘sun and surf’, for instance) there are very many who have no alternative because their livelihoods are tied to jobs in oil refineries or export enclaves, to jobs in the service sector spun off from the tourist trade, to jobs on fishing boats or to employment on coastal farms and plantations.
对于他们在面对危险时的脆弱性。

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在寻找对气旋、台风和飓风的脆弱性原因时（这些是同一气象现象的不同地区名称），需要更具体地调查人们为何生活在沿海地区的常见假设。气旋风暴并不平等地影响所有海岸（White 1974; Southern 1978）。此外，在这些风暴频繁发生的地方，并不是所有人都受到同等程度的影响。在人们遭受沿海风暴的情况下，并不是所有人都能够迅速或同样好地重建他们的生活。这种脆弱性的差异可以在影响更发达国家（MDCs）如澳大利亚、日本和美国以及影响较不发达国家（LDCs）如斐济、莫桑比克、尼加拉瓜、孟加拉国和菲律宾的风暴案例中看到。对于每一个在高风险沿海地区的“自愿”居民（例如那些寻求“阳光和冲浪”的人），有很多人没有其他选择，因为他们的生计与石油精炼厂或出口区的工作、与旅游业相关的服务行业的工作、渔船上的工作或沿海农场和种植园的就业紧密相连。

Patterns of death and damage due to these storms and the ability of people to reconstruct their livelihoods show variation according to national wealth, history and sociopolitical organisation. Recovery following hurricanes in the Caribbean in 1988 and 1989 demonstrated such contrasts. Nicaragua mobilised a nationwide effort to help victims of hurricane Joan on that country’s Atlantic coast (Nicaraguan Ecumenical Group 1988). In part, this was an opportunity for the Sandinista government to build support among sections of the people that had not benefited substantially from the 1979 revolution, and in some cases had supported the opposition Contras.
由于这些风暴造成的死亡和损失模式以及人们重建生计的能力，因国家财富、历史和社会政治组织而有所不同。1988 年和 1989 年加勒比海的飓风后的恢复显示了这种对比。尼加拉瓜动员了全国范围的努力来帮助该国大西洋沿岸飓风琼的受害者（尼加拉瓜生态团体 1988 年）。在某种程度上，这为桑地诺政府提供了一个机会，以在那些未能从 1979 年革命中实质受益的人民中建立支持，甚至在某些情况下支持反对派的康特拉。

By contrast, relief efforts in Jamaica following hurricane Gilbert in 1988 were rife with partisan politics and corruption; so much so that mismanagement was one of the factors that led to a change of government in the elections that followed. In the USA, the major obstacle to relief and reconstruction on the South Carolina coast following hurricane Hugo in 1989 was bureaucratic blindness to the needs of low-income people who lacked insurance and other support systems (Miller and Simile 1992). Many of these marginal people, who may never recover from hurricane Hugo, are African Americans. Two decades earlier, when hurricane Camille devastated the Mississippi delta, the US Senate investigated charges that relief assistance had been racially biased (Popkin 1990:124). Similar problems have been identified by Laird (1992) among poor, Spanish-speaking people near the epicentre of the 1989 earthquake in northern California, and by Bolin and Stanford (1998a, 1998b) in a study of the recovery by Hispanics after the Northridge earthquake in southern California in 1994 (see Chapter 8).
相比之下，1988 年吉尔伯特飓风后在牙买加的救援工作充斥着党派政治和腐败，以至于管理不善成为导致随后的选举中政府更迭的因素之一。在美国，1989 年胡戈飓风后南卡罗来纳州沿海地区救援和重建的主要障碍是官僚对缺乏保险和其他支持系统的低收入人群需求的盲目无视（Miller and Simile 1992）。这些边缘人群中的许多人可能永远无法从胡戈飓风中恢复过来，他们是非裔美国人。二十年前，当卡米尔飓风摧毁密西西比三角洲时，美国参议院调查了救援援助存在种族偏见的指控（Popkin 1990:124）。Laird（1992）在 1989 年加利福尼亚北部地震震中附近的贫困西班牙语人群中发现了类似的问题，Bolin 和 Stanford（1998a, 1998b）在 1994 年南加州诺斯里奇地震后对西班牙裔的恢复研究中也指出了这些问题（见第 8 章）。

The extraordinary differences in mortality from similar physical events should alert planners, citizen activists and development agencies to significant differences in preparedness, response and vulnerability. Australia suffered two very similar cyclones shortly after the catastrophic 1970 storm in the Bay of Bengal that killed at least 300,000 in Bangladesh (Carter 1987:490). Yet the death toll in Australia was less than 100 (Stark and Walker 1979; Western and Milne 1979), and this is not simply because of the lower population densities.
类似的自然事件导致的死亡率差异应引起规划者、公民活动家和发展机构的警觉，表明在准备、响应和脆弱性方面存在显著差异。澳大利亚在 1970 年孟加拉湾的灾难性风暴后不久遭遇了两场非常相似的气旋，该风暴导致孟加拉国至少有 300,000 人遇难（Carter 1987:490）。然而，澳大利亚的死亡人数不到 100 人（Stark and Walker 1979; Western and Milne 1979），这并不仅仅是因为人口密度较低。

Sociopolitical organisation can be as significant as national wealth in disaster preparedness. For example, in 1971 North Vietnam survived a combination of coastal storm surge and torrential rain in the Red River delta that could have cost as many lives
社会政治组织在灾害准备中可能与国家财富同样重要。例如，在 1971 年，北越在红河三角洲经历了沿海风暴潮和倾盆大雨的组合，这可能导致与 1970 年孟加拉国相同数量的生命损失。
as in Bangladesh in 1970. But only a few hundred lives were lost in North Vietnam, largely because of highly efficient war-time village-level organisation that allowed rapid evacuation and provision of first aid (Wisner 1978a).
但北越仅损失了几百条生命，这在很大程度上得益于高效的战时村级组织，使得快速撤离和提供急救成为可能（Wisner 1978a）。

Again, in 1974, when cyclonic storms delivered equivalent amounts of rain and wind in two parts of the world, 49 were killed in Darwin, Australia (Western and Milne 1979:488) and 8,000 in Honduras (CIIR 1975:1; Pulwarty and Riebsame 1997:195-196). The major difference seems to have been the pattern of rural land ownership in Honduras, where 63 per cent of the farmers had access to only 6 per cent of the arable land (CIIR 1975:13). Large-scale beef ranches and banana plantations had displaced peasants over several decades into isolated valleys and steep hillside farms. Here they received little warning and were at risk from mudslides that accompanied the hurricane’s rainfall. Deforestation by these peasants seeking to carve out subsistence farms had made the hillsides unstable. In the northern town of Choloma, 2,300 people were killed when a dam created by landslides into a nearby river burst, sending masses of black mud into the streets (ibid.: 3).
再次，在 1974 年，当气旋风暴在世界两个地区带来了相等的降雨和风力时，澳大利亚达尔文有 49 人遇难（Western and Milne 1979:488），洪都拉斯有 8,000 人遇难（CIIR 1975:1; Pulwarty and Riebsame 1997:195-196）。主要的区别似乎在于洪都拉斯的农村土地所有权模式，63%的农民仅能使用 6%的可耕地（CIIR 1975:13）。大规模的牛肉牧场和香蕉种植园在数十年间将农民驱逐到偏远的山谷和陡峭的山坡农场。在这里，他们几乎没有收到警告，并且面临着伴随飓风降雨而来的泥石流风险。这些农民为了开垦生存农场而导致的森林砍伐使得山坡变得不稳定。在北部城镇 Choloma，当一个因滑坡而形成的水坝溃坝时，2,300 人遇难，黑色泥浆涌入街道（同上：3）。

Hurricane Mitch brought similar death and destruction in 1998, for much the same reasons. Honduras was again badly affected, and again it was the poor, living on steep slopes and on flood plains, who died; in Nicaragua, landslides and flooding killed more than 3,000 people (Comfort et al. 1999). By contrast, in 2001 hurricane Michelle traversed Cuba across its most populated region. Although considerable economic damage was done, only five people perished. One has to ask ‘What did Cuba do right?’, and indeed, this chapter takes up that question (Wisner 2001c).
1998 年，米切尔飓风带来了类似的死亡和破坏，原因大致相同。洪都拉斯再次受到严重影响，再次是生活在陡坡和洪泛区的贫困人群遭受了死亡；在尼加拉瓜，山体滑坡和洪水导致超过 3000 人遇难（Comfort 等，1999）。相比之下，2001 年米歇尔飓风穿越古巴最人口稠密的地区。尽管造成了相当大的经济损失，但只有五人遇难。人们不得不问“古巴做对了什么？”，实际上，本章将探讨这个问题（Wisner 2001c）。

The physical hazard物理危害

The tropical cyclone is one of the most powerful atmospheric phenomena.

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A fully developed hurricane releases energy equivalent to many Hiroshima-sized atom bombs (Cuny 1983; Milne 1986:71; Alvarez 1999; Gray 2000). These storms arise during the summer over the oceans in a belt north and south of the Equator. In addition to the wind damage and flooding caused by cyclones, there are a wide variety of possible physical effects involving a web of social and natural linkages. Water piled up by wind against coasts along shallow ocean shelves is called a storm surge. When these occur at high tide, they can reach up to 6 m in height. The extreme low pressure that is characteristic of these storms also adds to the height of storm surges because the ocean surface is actually lifted up to

1 cm /

millibar reduction in air pressure (McGuire et al. 2002:60). Storm surges accounted for many of the dead in such infamous cyclones as those that affected Bangladesh in 1970 and 1991, the Indian coastal states of Andhra Pradesh in 1977 and Orissa in 1999, and the Indian state of Gujarat along its coast facing the Arabian sea in 1998.
热带气旋是最强大的大气现象之一。

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完全发展的飓风释放的能量相当于许多广岛大小的原子弹（Cuny 1983; Milne 1986:71; Alvarez 1999; Gray 2000）。这些风暴在夏季出现在赤道南北的海洋带上。除了气旋造成的风害和洪水外，还有各种可能的物理影响，涉及社会和自然联系的网络。风在沿浅海架的海岸上堆积的水称为风暴潮。当这些发生在高潮时，水位可以达到 6 米的高度。这些风暴特有的极低气压也增加了风暴潮的高度，因为海洋表面实际上被抬升到

1 cm /

毫巴的气压降低（McGuire et al. 2002:60）。风暴潮造成了许多在 1970 年和 1991 年影响孟加拉国、1977 年影响印度安得拉邦、1999 年影响奥里萨邦以及 1998 年影响印度古吉拉特邦沿阿拉伯海海岸的臭名昭著的气旋中的死亡。

Wind and wave action have immediate impacts, but the effects of the erosion and saltwater incursion can handicap an economy for months or even years (Campbell 1984). Damage to roads, telecommunications and power facilities can have both short-and longterm effects, complicating relief efforts and the challenge of economic recovery. Even in areas remote from the coast, associated heavy rainfall can provoke mudslides and other
风和波浪的作用有直接影响，但侵蚀和盐水入侵的影响可能会使经济在数月甚至数年内受到制约（Campbell 1984）。道路、电信和电力设施的损坏可能会产生短期和长期的影响，复杂化救援工作和经济复苏的挑战。即使在远离海岸的地区，相关的强降雨也可能引发泥石流和其他大规模移动现象。
mass movements such as the one associated with hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua. In 1998 up to 2 m of rainfall from that storm fell over a six-day period, triggering the partial collapse of the summit crater of Las Casitas volcano. This unleashed a landslide 16 km long and up to 8 km wide that killed over 2,000 people and destroyed ten villages and the town of Posoltega (McGuire et al. 2002:78; IFRC 1999a:45). Later in this chapter we will discuss the differential vulnerability of various social groups to these kinds of physical damage. ...

Tropical storms are seasonal yet highly unpredictable. Year-to-year severity and frequency of storms may be related to factors working at the global atmospheric level, such as ocean temperature and current changes, including some correlation with El Niño and La Niña cycles (McGuire et al. 2002:45-48). As we noted in Chapters 2 and 4, global climate change is characterised above all by increasing variability (Adger 1999). It is a distinct possibility that the severity of cyclones (hurricanes and typhoons) will increase as the atmosphere continues to warm. Having weighed up all of the uncertainties and difficulties of modelling cyclonogenesis within the context of models of global climate change (challenging in their own right), McGuire, Mason and Kilburn conclude that ‘it seems possible that a warmer world will experience hurricanes of a somewhat greater average intensity’ (McGuire et al. 2002:48). This is also the conclusion of a large USbased team of scientists (Easterling et al. 2000; cf: Wilson and Rachman 1989). ...

There is additional uncertainty because the direction, speed and growth dynamics of such storms have not yet been fully understood, despite attempts at computer modeling. Accurate and timely knowledge of the track, and thus the specific point of landfall, is the most vital information needed to provide effective warnings, and although there has been progress in this area of meteorology, there are still gaps (Elsberry 2002). As a result, warnings broadcast over the media sometimes result in needless evacuations, making it more difficult to convince the public on later occasions. For instance, in the years following the devastating 1970 cyclone in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan), many warningssome of them false-were issued over the radio. Some authors claim that the losses in the 1985 cyclone might have been lower if the public had been less cynical about broadcast warnings (Milne 1986:73-74). On the other hand, millions of people did respond to warnings of the great cyclone that hit Bangladesh in 1991, and a timely warning and response saved many lives in cyclonic storms affecting Tonga, Mauritius

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and Cuba during 2001. ...

Patterns of vulnerability ...

Coastal locations were frequently the first point of contact between indigenous people and colonial powers. These footholds, established from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries (first in Latin America and Asia, later in Africa) often grew into major urban centres. Livelihoods all along the new corridors of administration and extraction became dependent on the needs of the coloniser (e.g. the market for labour power, groundnuts, cotton, beef) (Franke and Chasin 1980). Squatter urbanisation began around the newly established coastal cities (Hardoy and Sattertwaite 1989). Migration to coastal cities has become commonplace in the post-colonial world. For example, many millions of Chinese ...
have moved to coastal cities that have been integrated into the global economy within the past 20 years (Eckholm 2003). Within the more general process of urban growth we identified in Chapter 2 as a ‘dynamic pressure’, it is specifically the growth of coastal cities in the tropics and sub-tropics that constitutes the background to increased vulnerability to these powerful storms (International Centre 1989). ...

Much of this urban population lives in crowded areas, many residing in low-lying, flood-prone areas, in flimsy housing and with a lack of infrastructure. The millions who have caused these former colonial cities to swell into today’s coastal mega-cities are part of the patterns of extractive, export-oriented economic activity established a century or more ago. ...

Contemporary coastal settlement and the cyclone hazard ...

In both wealthy countries, such as Australia and the USA, and in the poorest former colonies such as Bangladesh, Mozambique and Jamaica, there are large towns and cities on hurricane-prone coasts. Potential economic losses are a function of this pattern of urbanisation. ...

Hurricane Andrew, a storm that hit the US city of Miami in 1992 caused

$ 30

billion in losses (Munich Re 2002). Hurricane Gilbert (1988) travelled directly over Kingston, capital of Jamaica, and traversed the full length of that island. The death toll was 45 and damage was estimated at

$ 1

billion (Barker and Miller 1990). 5 Cyclone Tracy (1974) destroyed 50-60 per cent of the houses in Darwin (Australia) and did A

$ 3.2

billion damage to the city (Wilkie and Neal 1979:473). If it had struck the coast just 100 km either side of that city, the losses would have been negligible (Stark and Walker 1979:191). There have been near misses that highlight the potential damage. In 1969 hurricane Camille missed the major US city of New Orleans by about 100 km . Even so, 262 people died and losses totalled

$ 1.4

billion (Petak and Atkisson 1982:332). Given its coastal situation and its location between a large lake and the Mississippi River, a direct hit on New Orleans would cost hundreds of billions of dollars and probably take thousands of lives (Figure 7.1) (see Chapter 6:204). ...

Rural areas in the tropics may contain capital-intensive plantations and other agroindustrial facilities. Jamaica lost 30 per cent of its sugar acreage, 54 per cent of its coffee and more than 90 per cent of its bananas and cocoa to hurricane Gilbert. This deprived Jamaica of more than

$ 27

million in exports in 1988/1989 alone (Barker and Miller 1990:111). Mozambique lost two cashew processing factories during the cyclone that struck in 1979, in addition to many thousands of economically important trees (coconut and cashew) (Wisner 1979). ...

In countries with high rural population densities and considerable inequalities in income and access to land, rural concentrations of people in the high-risk coastal zones can be very great (for example in the Philippines, parts of Indonesia, the Sundarbans and islands such as Sandwip in Bangladesh, and India). In these cases, as we show in detail below, local or even distant pressure on land forces the poor to remove protective vegetation, destroying buffer zones and increasing their vulnerability to storms. ...

EVACUATION WORRIES ...

There are three main routes out of the city, all of them problematic ...

Figure 7.1 New Orleans: hurricane evacuation worries Source: Adapted from an article by Jon Nordheimer, New York Times, 30 April 2002 ...

But there are also vulnerable groups in richer countries such as the USA. Since the 1960s there are coastal Florida counties that have consistently grown by at least 50 per cent each decade. A significant proportion of the newcomers to the coast of Florida are older retired people (Graff and Wiseman 1978).

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During hurricane Agnes in 1972 it was realised that the elderly require special assistance during evacuations (Briggs 1973:134). Retirement homes, tourist and recreational centres have grown rapidly near and even quite literally on these coasts. It has been predicted that an extreme Camille-sized hurricane hitting the major Florida recreation and retirement centre of Dade County (near Miami) would destroy an estimated 18 per cent of the structures directly on the coast, and up to 7 per cent as far away as 100 miles (Cochrane 1975:19). When hurricane Andrew passed through southern Dade county in 1992 these calculations proved to be underestimates. Post disaster surveys found that the low-income population, including retirees, as well as women, African Americans, Haitians and Hispanics experienced the most difficulty recovering (Peacock et al. 1997). ...

Skilled workers in the USA are sold the ‘American dream’ of retirement in the sun, in ...
cheaply-built properties in high-risk locations. This is another facet of vulnerability created by corporate production, sales and investment strategies (Steinberg 2000). This local business activity has similar results to the activities of US corporations in many parts of the world such as the Philippines, where their acquisition of land for growing pineapple, banana and other export commodities increased the land pressure on the local people. The small farmers who are dispossessed are thus forced to live in dangerous urban coastal locations through the actions (direct or indirect) of a transnational corporation (Boyce 1992). The skilled working class and middle class in the USA are tempted into similarly hazardous zones on the other side of the globe as the value extracted abroad passes through the financial circuits of the system in the form of coastal land development. ...

Small island nations finding themselves in the path of frequent tropical storms should be considered special cases. Their population growth rates have often been lower than in other exposed areas. Yet the ravages of a tropical storm can encompass an entire island and its people (Lewis 1981, 1984a, 1984b, 1999), and the effect of global warming on the frequency and power of storms, and sea level rise, magnify the risk (Lewis 1989, 1990). Increasing their vulnerability, these islands also tend to rely on one or two main export crops, or on tourism, as an economic base, and they have fewer reserves for recovery (Pelling and Uitto 2002). For instance, in 1989, hurricane Hugo destroyed 85 per cent of the housing on the Caribbean island of St Croix, and in 1972, hurricane Bebe left 20 per cent of Fiji’s population homeless. The economy of such islands is based on a small number of tree crops such as bananas and nutmeg in many Caribbean islands and coconuts in Oceania (Shakow and O’Keefe 1981). The small-scale fishing sector is often also seriously damaged, and although more easily replaced than a coconut plantation, a poor fisher may find it very difficult to replace a lost boat or equipment. Access to credit may speed recovery, but a vicious spiral of indebtedness can result.

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...

Coastal livelihoods ...

People’s livelihoods have already been mentioned in the preceding chapters. In most rural coastal areas, the political economy of access to resources is complex and fragmented. Even where large landowners, companies or the state have rights to coastal plantations or fisheries, various kinds of formal and informal, legal and illegal access may be available to workers, the seasonally employed and neighbouring poor people. Small-scale fishing tends to be controlled by those who own boats and who employ a large percentage of fishers, as in the coastal waters of north-eastern Brazil, Sri Lanka and Andhra Pradesh (India). There is a trend toward concentration of ownership, the effects of which can be seen in US coastal fisheries, where (as with the ‘family farm’ in the US) high interest rates and changing production technology have put pressure on small, selfemployed units. The latter tend to underinsure their equipment due to cash-flow pressures and are highly vulnerable to the economic effects of production being interrupted by a hurricane. ...

Coastal land and marine resources worldwide increasingly tend to be under the control of absentee interests. This is true of both LDCs and MDCs An economic calculus applied from a distance often leads to landuse decisions that put people and the sustainability of ...
local ecosystems at risk. This is the case where remote financial interests continue to drive speculative residential development in Florida. The effect of similarly ‘distanced’ economic rationality can be seen in Haiti and coastal Kenya. There, urban commercial interests encourage conversion of timber from the remaining mangrove wetlands to charcoal for sale as urban fuel (World Resources Institute 1986:146-149). In Jamaica, there has been a proposal to mine large portions of coastal wetlands for peat as a substitute for imported energy (Maltby 1986:135-144). Such a process would remove vegetative barriers that anchor soil and absorb some of the force of storm winds and waves. In the case of Jamaica it has been predicted that illegal cannabis production would be displaced from the Nigril Morass (wetland) to mountains further east. Deforestation of those mountains by cannabis producers would increase storm runoff and erosion (Maltby 1985) and could put the growers at risk from mudslides during severe storms.

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...

It is useful to distinguish between patterns of livelihood in the immediate vicinity of large coastal cities and those in more remote coastal areas. In the former case, vulnerable rural people may have relatives and livelihood options open to them in the city as a refuge when a storm hits. But the disruptive influence of the city over the immediate rural coastal area (e.g. loss of access to resources because of tourism, industrial pollution or commercial market gardening) has to be weighed against the advantages of a possible urban ‘fall back’ position. ...

The petty-commodity producer and semi-subsistence farmer in many tropical coastal areas utilises a variety of complementary livelihood options. Examples include ‘community forest’ farming in Sri Lanka and the combination of fishing and farming in Fiji and other parts of the world. However, these multiple options have been undermined by government and commercial encouragement of monocropping, the growing importance of waged employment and competition for resources with absentee commercial interests. Thus in coastal India, Thailand and the Philippines small-scale fishing for domestic consumption is declining due to competition with, and overfishing by, commercial trawlers in the same coastal waters (G.Kent 1987). In some areas it has been noted that the diversity of locally adapted food crops, including those most hurricane resistant, has decreased (Campbell 1984; Pacific Islands Development Program n.d.). ...

The livelihood systems of the rural poor in exposed coastal areas are heavily influenced by spatial and temporal constraints and opportunities. There is not only a connection between seasonality and rural poverty (Chambers et al. 1981; Chambers 1983), but vulnerability has its own temporal rhythms (as noted in Chapter 3). The timing of certain farming operations is critical to yields, and the plants and animals themselves are more vulnerable to damage from flooding or wind at some times than at others. ...

Fishing is also seasonal, and this can sometimes lead to complex risk calculations. If fish yields are better at greater distances from the shore during the hurricane season, where should the ‘rational’ fisher place nets? The fisher has a greater chance of saving the nets within the usual storm warning time if they are set closer to shore, but will catch more by gambling on the more distant fishery (Davenport 1960; Gould 1969). In fact, over-fishing by commercial competitors may be forcing small-scale fishers to go further out to sea even during the stormy season, thus adding to the risk of fishing as a livelihood option. ...

Waged work is also more readily available in certain seasons (planting, harvest, the run of a particular kind of fish, for example). Typically, the harvest season sees large numbers of rural poor engaged in temporary work in fields and plantations. Tropical storms striking at this time of the year may mean large economic losses for the owners and drastic reduction in income to workers who can no longer find employment. There is a parallel here with drought; in many cases it not only denies the small farmer or herder their subsistence, but it also deprives them and the rural landless of employment on larger farms (see Chapter 4). Riverine flooding in Bangladesh denies the landless and land-poor employment in the rice and jute fields of the more prosperous (Currey 1984; Clay 1985; see also Chapter 6). ...

We can summarise the relationship of vulnerability, livelihood and cyclones by applying the Access model in relation to hurricanes (as in Figure 3.2). Depending on their level of vulnerability, households will experience storm impacts differently on their assets and livelihoods (Boxes 2b and 6). Family members die and are injured, but more so among the poorer social groups. According to one account of the 1977 Andhra Pradesh cyclone, 75 per cent of the 8,000 deaths were in small farming, fishing or marginal farming families (Winchester 1986). In Bangladesh in 1991 the wealthy survived in houses constructed of concrete-blocks (Khan 1991). ...

Loss of labour power in poorer households makes it harder for them to recover economically. Illness arising after a cyclone, or that was already affecting the poor and malnourished, can only mean lower productivity. The poorest households may also use a high proportion of their funds on health care when it could have gone towards recovery of assets (Winchester 1992:120 and 184). ...

Assets are also lost. The wealthy lose more in absolute terms, but less in relation to their total property. In particular, farm buildings, livestock and perennial (tree) crops are lost, as well as the standing annual crop. Saltwater flooding of fields may further complicate recovery (Campbell 1984). All of this modifies the household’s income opportunities (Box 3a). They may be able to add a quick ‘catch crop’ if seed and other inputs are available, but otherwise tree crops may be missing from their list of options for some years. On the plus side, income from waged labour in reconstruction may be available as a new option for some households. ...

Social relations and structures of domination (Boxes 1 and 4) influence the new array of livelihood options. Poorer households will not be able to pay off loans or meet rent and other obligations. Credit provided by government and other sources may not be so easily obtained by the poorer social groups. This was true in Winchester’s longitudinal study in Andhra Pradesh. Ten years after banks opened branches in the cyclone-affected area, the small farmers, landless and fishers still resorted to traditional money lenders (Winchester 1992:120).

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Indebtedness and dependency will tend to reinforce the allocation of social power, and hence the structures of domination. In this, the storm Access model differs somewhat from that applicable to a disaster such as famine. In cases of famine, the legitimacy of structures of domination have sometimes been called into question by the majority of the population. ...

The household budget (Box 7) is radically changed. Indeed, for a period during relief and recovery the poorest households may have lost everything and not have any money, and will be dependent largely on social networks and aid from outside (as in Bangladesh ...
following cyclones in 1970, 1985 and 1991, the cyclones in Andhra Pradesh in 1977, Orissa in 1999, and hurricane Mitch in 1998). If aid is adequate, malnutrition and disease should be avoided, but there is a chance that a weakened population can fall prey to epidemic disease owing to poor sanitary conditions, especially when there is a lack of safe drinking water (see Chapters 5 and 6). ...

Large cyclones are common on India’s eastern coastline. In 1864 an enormous storm surge killed an estimated 30-35,000 people. Since then, severe cyclones have occurred in 1927 and 1949, with two in 1969 (Cohen and Raghavulu 1979:9). What made the 1977 situation unusual was the coincidence of the cyclone with a high tide. The storm also made a sudden change of course that confused meteorological forecasting and meant there was no warning.

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The worst-hit population lived in Divi Taluk, which lies at the mouth of the Krishna river between its two branches and the Bay of Bengal. Winchester (1986) mapped the deaths and found a high correlation between percentage deaths and the height of the storm surge (Figure 7.2). But his detailed analysis of topography showed that even within this relatively flat, alluvial delta, there were higher sites that were more secure from the storm surge (which was

3 - 7 m

in height). For the most part, the wealthy farmers and petty officials who lived on these sites in pucca (‘good’) concrete houses survived. The rest of the community lacked public shelters of this quality, and those buildings perceived as safe (schools, temples, administrative headquarters) were located in low-lying sites. ...

Ten years later, when a cyclone hit this same area in 1987, cyclone shelters had been built, and although some people were excluded because of caste differences and overcrowding, most people were able to take refuge and thus survive (Winchester 1992:121). However, after both the 1977 and 1987 cyclones the poorer social groups found themselves in a weaker position in terms of rebuilding their livelihood systems, and their recovery was very difficult. They lost tools, draft animals, milk cows and labour power. ...

Why do people expose themselves to such risks? The reasons are illustrated by the ‘Pressure’ model for the cyclone shown in Figure 7.3. The pressures leading to vulnerability included land hunger and the desire by low-caste farm labourers and fishing folk to live near their employment. Roads and transport in and out of this administrative area (taluk) were ...

10km Divisions ...

Meroled rood in 1977 ...

－ーーーーーーー ...

Figure 7．2 Explanation for deaths caused in Andhra Pradesh cyclone of 1977 ...
poor，so labourers could not easily commute to work from higher land further inland．

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Finally，the root causes of these pressures included the caste system，land tenure and the nature of government．These three deeply embedded systems combined to allocate most resources to the wealthy farmers and petty officials．They also denied the area adequate investment in public shelters，all－weather transport to inland areas and rural development assistance for the poorer social groups that might enable them to find livelihood options that did not demand residence in exposed sites

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...

Figure 7.3 'Pressures’ that results in disasters: Divi Taluk, Krishna Delta, Andra Pradesh cyclone of 1977 ...

Some lessons do seem to have been learned since then. Reddy (1991) reports that in May 1990 there was a remarkable example of successful evacuation of more than 500 villages as a result also of a better warning system and improvements in practical arrangements made by the government. The process involved more than 2,000 evacuation teams and more than a thousand temporary relief camps. In all, 650,000 people were evacuated from the path of the cyclone, and the number of casualties was much lower than in the same area in 1977. ...

It is a shame that there is such variability in state capacity and political will in various Indian states, for the lessons of Andhra Pradesh do not seem to have been applied in neighbouring Orissa. In October 1999, two cyclones made landfall, the second one very powerful. It is considered to be the worst tropical cyclone in Indian meteorological history, with sustained winds of

160 mph (256 km / h)

that peaked at

223 mph (359 km / h)

. This storm drenched the coastal plains with torrential rainfall for a full 24 hours and 30 ft ( 9 m ) high storm surges inundated much low-lying land. At least 10,000 people died. A million hectares of cropland were lost under saltwater, and farmers lost more than 400,000 head of livestock-vital for their income, nutrition and traction power (Kriner 2000; Government of India 1999). The World Health Organisation’s New Delhi office estimated that 15 million people were affected out of the state’s population of 35 million (WHO 2001a). ...

Pre-cyclone conditions in Orissa were much like those Winchester found in Andhra Pradesh: 90 per cent rural and 60 per cent of the population living below the Indian poverty line (WHO 2001a). Recovery efforts there have been slow and characterised by much criticism of the state government, which was in fact voted out of office. ...

Case studies ...

Less densely populated coasts ...

Mozambique has a coastline of more than 2,000 km along the Indian Ocean, all of it subject to tropical storms including some of cyclone force. The colonial pattern of urbanisation was highly centralised, and Lourenço Marques (present day Maputo), the capital on the coast in the extreme south, dominated all other centres. Thus very long stretches of coast and the surrounding hinterlands were, and remain today, relatively remote from the three major coastal cities (Maputo, Quelimane, Beira), except for small administrative towns with few economic or social functions. These are connected by very poor roads. ...

Livelihoods on these more remote stretches of coast revolve around small-scale fishing, subsistence farming, limited livestock herding, remittance of wages from South Africa, income from limited sale of cashews, cotton, groundnuts and food crops, and casual employment in sugar and coconut plantations. The most important agro-industries in the coastal zone are coconut, cashew processing and sugar cane, but these industries declined dramatically during 20 years of civil war and 25 years of a centralised, command economy. ...

After independence, some state farms were developed that concentrated on basic food crops (maize, rice, potatoes), sunflower and cotton. Wages in plantations were low, and much lower than migrant wages in South Africa. However, since Mozambican independence South Africa cut back on the numbers of Mozambican men it allowed in to work there. Furthermore, producer prices for crops sold to the government were kept low and, more importantly, commodities for purchase in the countryside have become increasingly scarce and expensive since the early 1980s. As a result of all these factors, much of the activity of the people in these more remote zones is focused on their own needs. There is limited local trade and barter, but little on the national market. ...

During the period of recovery following a peace agreement in 1992 some limited market activity began again in Mozambique’s coastal hinterland, but this has been slow as fully one-third of the total national population had been uprooted from their farms and fishing grounds by the war (United Nations 1995). In addition, although donor-imposed economic policies have replaced Mozambique’s central planning, there is still little consideration of the impact of the export-oriented policy and large-scale development projects on the livelihoods and conditions of ordinary Mozambicans (Hanlon 1991, 1996). Mozambique faces even more serious challenges to its development in this postwar and post-socialist situation (Ferraz and Munslow 1999). ...

The shift from socialist to capitalist policies in Mozambique allows a comparison of the state’s response to three cyclones: one in 1979 (before the war), one in 1984 (at the height of the war and the disruption caused by sabotage and terrorism) and another in 2000 (after some years of peace, but with the end of socialism). In 1979 the central and northern coast was battered by a cyclone that destroyed two of three cashew processing factories and uprooted 50,000 cashew trees (Wisner 1979:304). At the time cashews were a major agricultural export. Apart from the cost of repairing these processing facilities, ...
losses to the cotton and maize crops and to the system of feeder roads amounted to $5 million. ...

Loss of life, however, was negligible. The impact of floods in 1976, 1977 and 1978 (the first three years of independence) made the government accelerate its programme of planned, voluntary resettlement in communal villages. The policy concentrated on people living in flood-prone locations (ibid.: 202, Wisner 1984). As many as 500,000 people had been successfully resettled in more secure locations, many of whom were safe in 1979 as a result. Fortunately, there was also considerable foreign assistance already available in the country because of a drought that had affected some parts of the country for four years. Feeding camps had also been set up to respond to the needs of the internally displaced population seeking refuge from the initial phase of attacks by RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana; a South African-backed group of mercenaries and disaffected Mozambicans which launched a war of destabilisation on the government). Thus the existing aid and relief infrastructure was able to help storm victims immediately. ...

In 1979, the government response to the cyclone also showed the optimism and energy of a newly independent nation, and relief was organised swiftly. The president and cabinet ministers toured the affected areas within days, and a nationwide collection of donations came from factories and schools, with ‘nation-building’ as the positive message to overcome the tragedy. The cashew industry was rebuilt; peasants were rehoused in a massive effort to accelerate the programme of communal villages in the affected areas; public health and nutritional standards were maintained; and livelihoods were rebuilt. Here we provide a ‘Release’ version of the PAR model (Figure 7.4), which is designed to show how hazard vulnerability can be reduced. It is a counterpart to the ‘Pressure’ model applied to the Andhra cyclone (see above). ...

In 1984, by contrast, cyclone Daimone slammed into the Mozambican coast when the people and government had been trying to cope with drought for two years, while also dealing with increasing sabotage and massacres by RENAMO. The storm itself was similar to the one in 1979, and the cashew and coconut industries suffered again. It also flooded the largest sugar plantation in the country, Sena Sugar Estates, whose system of protective dikes had fallen into disrepair. The government’s difficulty in responding in 1984 compared with the success of 1979 can be explained by a number of factors. By 1983-1984 RENAMO attacks were responsible for numerous communication breakdowns, making response to the cyclone more difficult. Also, economic disruption by RENAMO in the 1980s had been so great that the government had fewer resources with which to respond.

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...

Four cyclones made landfall in Mozambique between February and April, 2000. Rainfall from these storms was added to above average rain that had been falling since October 1999. There was widespread flooding of rural and urban areas in the south and centre of the country. About 800 people died or were reported missing. Ten per cent of the country’s cultivated land and 100,000 hectares of subsistence and commercial crops were affected, as were 4.5 million persons, and the estimated loss to the country was nearly

$ 700

million (Martin et al. 2001; Agence France-Presse 2000). ...

The government and people had learned many lessons from earlier cyclones such as those in 1979 and 1984. There had been early warning of possible flooding as early as September 1999, and the government acti- ...

Figure 7.4 The 'release’ of pressures to reduce disasters: the Mozambique cyclone of 1779 ...
vated its disaster management plans (Christie and Hanlon 2001). However, the successive cyclones and the sheer scale of the flooding overcame dikes protecting such cities as Chokwe, and caused the response and relief system to spread itself thinly. Nevertheless, the death toll was low considering the power of these storms and magnitude of the flooding. ...

It seems to us that 20 years after the cyclone that is represented in the ‘Release’ model (Figure 7.4), much that had accounted for the earlier ‘release’ of pressure was still in place. In particular, the growth of an efficient national disaster planning bureaucracy and the growth of local development non-governmental organisations (NGOs) should be added to Figure 7.4. There is also evidence of acute awareness by Mozambican policy makers of hazard vulnerability as a key element in poverty reduction. The Mozambican Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2001-05 specifically deals with natural hazards and notes that they ‘constitute an obstacle to a definitive break with certain degrees and patterns of poverty’ (cited in World Bank 2002:27).
我们认为，在代表“释放”模型的气旋发生 20 年后（图 7.4），早期“释放”压力的许多因素仍然存在。特别是，国家灾害规划机构的高效增长和地方发展非政府组织（NGO）的增长应当被添加到图 7.4 中。此外，莫桑比克政策制定者对危险脆弱性的敏锐意识被视为减贫的关键因素。莫桑比克 2001-05 年绝对贫困减少行动计划专门处理自然灾害，并指出这些灾害“构成了与某些程度和模式的贫困彻底脱离的障碍”（引用自世界银行 2002:27）。

On the other hand, a troubling sign for future preparedness and mitigation is the polarisation of rich and poor that has accompanied the adoption of a neo-liberal model of development in the country (Hanlon 1996). Mozambique’s experience suggests that the vulnerability of much of the population may have been increased by the privatisation of public services (health care, water and sanitation, public works) and the emphasis on export production.
另一方面，未来的准备和减灾的一个令人担忧的迹象是，伴随着该国采纳新自由主义发展模式而出现的富人和穷人之间的两极分化（Hanlon 1996）。莫桑比克的经验表明，公共服务（医疗保健、水和卫生、公共工程）的私有化以及对出口生产的重视可能增加了大部分人口的脆弱性。

Earlier in this chapter we noted that social mobilisation of the kind seen in Mozambique in 1979 had also been effective in saving lives in Vietnam and Cuba (Wisner 1978a, 2001c). Maskrey (1989:79-86) reviews what he calls community-based mitigation programmes. He discusses other positive cases, including the response to floods in western Nicaragua in 1982 by neighbourhood 'committees for Sandinista defence’ (citing Bommer 1985). We will return to the issue of community-based
本章早些时候我们提到，1979 年在莫桑比克看到的社会动员在越南和古巴也有效地挽救了生命（Wisner 1978a, 2001c）。Maskrey（1989:79-86）回顾了他所称的基于社区的减灾项目。他讨论了其他积极的案例，包括 1982 年尼加拉瓜西部的洪水应对，由邻里“桑地诺防卫委员会”进行（引用 Bommer 1985）。我们将在本章稍后再次讨论基于社区的减灾问题。
mitigation later in this chapter, when we take up a case study from Cuba, and again in Chapter 9.
本章稍后我们将讨论古巴的一个案例研究，关于减灾的问题，以及在第 9 章中再次提及。

Nicaragua faced a challenge similar to that of Mozambique in 1988, when hurricane Joan virtually destroyed Bluefields, the largest city on the Atlantic. Eighty per cent of the buildings and infrastructure were destroyed, as well as 95 per cent of all structures on nearby Corn Island. The storm flooded land for hundreds of miles along Nicaragua’s river border with Costa Rica. This affected important beef-producing areas and caused flooding and landslides due to torrential rains in the rich coffee-producing central mountains. Losses were estimated to have been more than those of the 1972 earthquake (Nicaraguan Ecumenical Group 1988).
尼加拉瓜面临的挑战与 1988 年的莫桑比克类似，当时飓风琼几乎摧毁了大西洋沿岸最大的城市布卢菲尔德。80%的建筑和基础设施被毁，附近的科恩岛上 95%的建筑也遭到破坏。风暴淹没了尼加拉瓜与哥斯达黎加的河流边界数百英里的土地。这影响了重要的牛肉生产地区，并因丰沛的降雨导致了洪水和山体滑坡，尤其是在富饶的咖啡生产中心山区。损失估计超过了 1972 年地震的损失（尼加拉瓜生态团体 1988 年）。

Until the revolution in 1979, the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua had never been developed as part of the country. The population was a mixture of indigenous people and migrants from the Caribbean islands. English was more common than Spanish, population density was low and livelihoods centred around fishing and extraction of products from the rainforest that covers much of the region (Ballard 1984).
在 1979 年革命之前，尼加拉瓜的加勒比海岸从未作为国家的一部分得到开发。该地区的人口由土著居民和来自加勒比海岛屿的移民组成。英语的使用比西班牙语更为普遍，人口密度低，生计主要依赖于捕鱼和从覆盖该地区大部分的热带雨林中提取产品（巴拉德 1984 年）。

The hurricane came at a time when Nicaragua’s left-wing Sandinista government was being forced to fight a war against the Contras (right-wing rebels who were armed and encouraged by the USA). But unlike Mozambique in 1984, the war was shifting in favour of the government, and it was possible to mobilise the nation and provide considerable aid for the stricken region. It was a fall in the world market price of coffee (by about 30 per cent) in 1989 that ultimately did more harm to the national economy, already weakened by a trade embargo imposed by the USA and the long war against the Contras. The dual economic shock of hurricane Joan and the crash of coffee prices were important in turning voters against the Sandinistas and eventually led to a change in government. Remembering the ‘global pressures’ introduced in Chapter 2, we can reflect that even though production losses due to the hurricane were very large, the politics and economics of US opposition to the Nicaraguan government did more damage to the economy.
飓风来袭时，尼加拉瓜的左翼桑迪尼斯塔政府正被迫与康特拉（受到美国武装和鼓励的右翼叛军）进行战争。但与 1984 年的莫桑比克不同，战争的形势开始向政府倾斜，动员全国并为受灾地区提供大量援助成为可能。1989 年，全球咖啡市场价格下跌（约 30%）最终对已经因美国实施的贸易禁运和与康特拉的长期战争而疲弱的国家经济造成了更大的伤害。飓风琼和咖啡价格崩溃的双重经济冲击在使选民反对桑迪尼斯塔方面起到了重要作用，并最终导致了政府的更替。回想第二章中提到的“全球压力”，我们可以反思，尽管飓风造成的生产损失非常巨大，但美国对尼加拉瓜政府的反对所带来的政治和经济影响对经济造成的伤害更大。

Later in this chapter we will look at hurricane Mitch, which devastated Nicaragua (and Honduras) in 1998. By then Nicaragua had abandoned any vestiges of socialism. Bowing to the demands of the World Bank, it had drastically cut public investment in health care, road and bridge maintenance, drainage and local government. Since many elected municipal governments were in the control of pro-Sandinista officials, the national government had systematically tried to isolate and starve them of resources. The result (perhaps a cautionary tale for Mozambique, which seems to have set off on a parallel neo-liberal path) was that the hurricane Mitch disaster was worse than it should have been, with more than 3,000 deaths (Comfort et al. 1999; Buvinic et al. 1999).
在本章后面，我们将讨论 1998 年摧毁尼加拉瓜（和洪都拉斯）的米切飓风。到那时，尼加拉瓜已经放弃了任何社会主义的残余。为了满足世界银行的要求，它大幅削减了公共卫生、道路和桥梁维护、排水和地方政府的投资。由于许多当选的市政府由亲桑地诺派官员控制，国家政府系统性地试图孤立并剥夺他们的资源。结果（也许对莫桑比克来说是一个警示故事，因为它似乎走上了一条类似的新自由主义道路）是米切飓风灾难的后果比应有的更糟，造成了超过 3000 人死亡（Comfort 等，1999；Buvinic 等，1999）。

Rural hinterlands农村腹地

Although high winds at the coast and storm surges are dramatic manifestations of the tropical cyclone’s destructive power, intense rainfall in the hinterland is also a major hazard. Hurricane Mitch, a storm that killed 27,000 people,

^{14}

produced rainfall of this kind when it stalled over Honduras and Nicaragua and dropped as much as four feet of rain in as many days. This intense precipitation falling on steep, deforested slopes caused an estimated one million landslides in the two countries (Lavell 2002). The largest of
尽管沿海的强风和风暴潮是热带气旋破坏力的戏剧性表现，但内陆的强降雨也是一个主要的危险。飓风米切尔，这场导致 27,000 人遇难的风暴，在停滞于洪都拉斯和尼加拉瓜时产生了这种降雨，并在短短几天内降下了多达四英尺的雨水。这种在陡峭的、被砍伐的山坡上降落的强降水导致这两个国家估计发生了约一百万次滑坡（Lavell 2002）。最大的滑坡发生在
these occurred when Las Casitas volcano sent mud and debris sliding down to bury more than 2,000 people in ten villages and the town of Posoltega in Nicaragua (IFRC 1999a:45; McGuire et al. 2002:78). In both Nicaragua and Honduras, much forest cover had been lost since 1950 as commercial crops (coffee, bananas, sugar, cotton), beef ranching and timber extraction grew (Comfort et al.1999). Successive waves of expansion of these commercial activities left small farmers expropriated and forced them further toward the agricultural frontier, where they cleared land for subsistence crops, often on steep slopes (Wisner 2000b).
拉斯卡西塔斯火山将泥浆和碎片滑下，掩埋了尼加拉瓜十个村庄和波索尔特加镇的 2000 多人（IFRC 1999a:45; McGuire et al. 2002:78）。自 1950 年以来，尼加拉瓜和洪都拉斯的森林覆盖率大幅下降，因为商业作物（咖啡、香蕉、糖、棉花）、牛肉养殖和木材采伐不断增长（Comfort et al.1999）。这些商业活动的连续扩张使小农被征用，迫使他们进一步向农业边界迁移，在那里他们清理土地种植自给作物，通常是在陡峭的山坡上（Wisner 2000b）。

In the case of Honduras, forest cover had decreased from 63 per cent in 1960 to 37 per cent in 1998. The hills around Choluteca had been denuded during the 1990s by the timber industry, cattle ranchers, the establishment of export plantations and by small farmers. It was in this zone that some of the deadliest floods took place (IFRC 1999a: 47) By contrast with the Himalaya case (Box 6.4), here the role of deforestation is very clear.
在洪都拉斯的情况下，森林覆盖率从 1960 年的 63%下降到 1998 年的 37%。在 1990 年代，周围的丘陵因木材工业、牛牧场、出口种植园的建立以及小农的活动而遭到破坏。正是在这个区域发生了一些最致命的洪水（国际红十字会 1999a：47）。与喜马拉雅案例（框 6.4）相比，这里森林砍伐的作用非常明显。

Densely populated coasts
人口稠密的海岸

India印度

Many lives have been lost in the coastal zone of south Asia (Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). Table 7.1 lists the most intense tropical cyclones in this region from 1970 to 2000.
在南亚的沿海地区（斯里兰卡、印度、巴基斯坦和孟加拉国）已经失去了许多生命。表 7.1 列出了 1970 年至 2000 年间该地区最强烈的热带气旋。

Returning briefly to a case we discussed earlier in this chapter, the cyclone that hit the Indian coastal state of Andhra Pradesh in 1977 exemplifies some of the complex interactions between the physical hazard and human vulnerability (Winchester 1986, 1992). The storm surge killed between 8 and 12,000 people (accounts vary), with a gigantic storm surge that raised a mass of water between 9 and 20 ft high ( 3 to 6 m ), 50 miles wide and 15 miles deep (Cohen and Raghavulu 1979:1). Who were the people killed? Winchester (1986:184) shows death rates of between 23 and 27 per cent for small farmers, fishers and marginal farmers, and only 3 to 4 per cent for large farmers and petty officials. The ability to evacuate by road, the type
回到本章早些时候讨论的一个案例，1977 年袭击印度沿海州安得拉邦的气旋 exemplifies 一些物理危害与人类脆弱性之间复杂的相互作用（Winchester 1986, 1992）。风暴潮造成了 8,000 到 12,000 人（不同的说法）的死亡，巨大的风暴潮将水面抬升至 9 到 20 英尺（3 到 6 米）高，宽 50 英里，深 15 英里（Cohen and Raghavulu 1979:1）。遇难者是谁？Winchester（1986:184）显示小农、渔民和边缘农民的死亡率在 23%到 27%之间，而大农和小官员的死亡率仅为 3%到 4%。通过公路撤离的能力，类型

Table 7.1 Most intense cyclones in north Indian ocean, 1970-2000
表 7.1 1970-2000 年北印度洋最强气旋

Date日期	Location位置	Deaths死亡人数
1970	Bangladesh孟加拉国	300,000
1971	Orissa, India印度奥里萨邦	10,000
1977	Andhra Pradesh, India印度安得拉邦	8,547
1978	Sri Lanka斯里兰卡	1,000
1988	Indo-Bangladesh border印度-孟加拉国边界	8,000
1990	Andhra Pradesh, India印度安得拉邦	967
1991	Bangladesh孟加拉国	138,882

1998	Gujarat, India印度古吉拉特邦	3,000
1999	Sind, Pakistan巴基斯坦信德省	454
1999	Orissa, India印度奥里萨邦	9,887

Source: India Meteorological Department, New Delhi.
来源：印度气象局，新德里。
http://agricoop.nic.in/statistics/history.htm
and strength of house, and small variations in topography within villages, were reasons why the wealthier farmers and petty officials survived to a much greater degree. In fact the wealthier lost more property (housing, stalls, cattle, carts and standing crops) than the poor, but lost a smaller proportion of their total property. They and the petty officials were able to evacuate and take their valuables because they had access to motor vehicles.
房屋的坚固程度以及村庄内地形的小变化，是富裕农民和小官员能够在很大程度上幸存下来的原因。事实上，富裕者损失的财产（住房、摊位、牲畜、马车和待收割的农作物）比穷人更多，但他们损失的总财产比例较小。他们和小官员能够撤离并带走他们的贵重物品，因为他们可以使用机动车辆。

Another major aspect of differential vulnerability was the capacity of different households to recover from repeated shocks. Winchester (ibid.: 228) investigated rates of economic recovery from the 1977 cyclone among six occupational groups up to 1981. After four years large farmers, who had lost most, recovered more quickly and ended up better off. Small farmers recovered more slowly and were also somewhat better off. Petty officials were more prosperous in 1981. By contrast, marginal farmers, fisher people and landless labourers barely regained pre-cyclone levels of prosperity. Repeating his study of the same sample of different socio-economic groups again ten years after the cyclone, Winchester concluded:
另一个主要的差异脆弱性方面是不同家庭从反复冲击中恢复的能力。温彻斯特（同上：228）调查了 1977 年气旋后六个职业群体的经济恢复率，直到 1981 年。经过四年，大农户在损失最多的情况下恢复得更快，最终状况更好。小农户恢复得较慢，状况也有所改善。小官员在 1981 年更为富裕。相比之下，边缘农民、渔民和无地劳动者几乎没有恢复到气旋前的繁荣水平。温彻斯特在气旋后十年再次对同一样本的不同社会经济群体进行了研究，得出结论：
[T]here had been a return to the status quo of 1977 manifested mainly by a decline in wage-labour opportunities resulting from the alternative land uses and increase in minimally labour intensive cash-crop activities. The economic and spatial marginalisation of the landless and small and marginal farmers appeared to have continued…[because of] the influx of entrepreneurs taking over the previously uncultivable land (i.e., common grazing and forestry land) for cash crops (fish farms and coconut plantations).
1977 年的现状回归主要表现为由于替代土地利用和劳动强度较低的经济作物活动增加，工资劳动机会的减少。无地者以及小型和边缘农民的经济和空间边缘化似乎仍在继续……[因为]企业家涌入，接管了以前不可耕种的土地（即公共放牧和林地）用于经济作物（鱼场和椰子种植园）。
(Winchester 1992:119)（温彻斯特 1992:119）
Physical reconstruction of shelter cut deeply into the limited resources of all but the wealthiest groups. Winchester (1986) criticises credit facilities, suggesting that government plans for building more secure housing were likely to make matters worse by emphasising concrete block construction that the poor could not afford, rather than more feasible lower-cost improvements.
住房的物理重建严重消耗了除最富裕群体外的所有人的有限资源。温彻斯特（1986）批评信贷设施，认为政府计划建造更安全住房可能会使问题更糟，因为强调混凝土块建筑的做法是穷人无法负担的，而不是更可行的低成本改进。

Bangladesh孟加拉国

Bangladesh unfortunately is also very familiar with severe cyclones (Islam 1974; C.Haque 1997). The storm that struck the coast in 1970 brought a surge that coincided with high tides. Many thousands of poor migrants were sleeping in the fields they had come to harvest in coastal areas. Most at risk were those in fields on low-lying silt islands (char) in the gigantic delta of the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers (see Figure 6.2).
不幸的是，孟加拉国对严重的气旋也非常熟悉（Islam 1974; C.Haque 1997）。1970 年袭击海岸的风暴带来了与高潮同时发生的潮水。成千上万的贫困移民在他们来到沿海地区收割的田野里睡觉。最危险的是那些在恒河和布拉马普特拉河巨大三角洲的低洼淤泥岛（char）上的田野里的人（见图 6.2）。

Mortality was estimated at 600,000-700,000 by Burton et al. (1978) and 300,000 by Carter (1987). The country also suffered great losses to severe storms in 1961, 1963 and 1965. The 1963 cyclone swept the coast from Cox’s Bazaar to Feni, killing 80,000; while the death toll in 1965 was 18,000 (Hanson 1967:12-18). In 1985 another killed 10,000 people, destroyed 17,000 homes and damaged a further 122,000 , swept away some 140,000 cattle and destroyed 500,000 acres of rice and jute (Milne 1986:74). Another large cyclone hit Bangladesh in December 1988, displacing millions of people only months after the largest riverine floods ever recorded (see Chapter 6).
根据 Burton 等人（1978）的估计，死亡人数为 600,000-700,000，而 Carter（1987）则估计为 300,000。该国在 1961 年、1963 年和 1965 年也遭受了严重风暴的重大损失。1963 年的气旋从考克斯巴扎尔扫到费尼，造成 80,000 人死亡；而 1965 年的死亡人数为 18,000（Hanson 1967:12-18）。1985 年，另一次气旋造成 10,000 人死亡，摧毁了 17,000 所房屋，损坏了另外 122,000 所房屋，冲走了约 140,000 头牛，摧毁了 500,000 英亩的稻米和黄麻（Milne 1986:74）。1988 年 12 月，另一个大型气旋袭击了孟加拉国，仅在有史以来记录的最大河流洪水发生几个月后，就使数百万人流离失所（见第 6 章）。

On 30 April 1991 a cyclone larger than the one in 1970 crossed the coast near Chittagong and killed tens of thousands of people (Haque and Blair 1992). Residents of islands were most vulnerable, along with coastal dwellers from Cox’s Bazaar north to opposite Sandwip Island. At least half of the 10,000 people on Sandwip Island were killed. While the magnitude of the human loss and destruction in 1991 is hard to imagine, it is considerably less than the toll in 1970. Since then, thousands of Red Crescent volunteers with radios have been trained to listen for and to spread evacuation warnings (Fazlul n.d.). The government had spent

$ 3

million to improve its warning system since 1985 (Mahmud 1988), and many hundreds of thousands of people did make it to safety. Likewise, public storm shelters built since 1970 fared well, although the problem lies in there being only 302 of them: 10,000 such shelters (costing $5,000 each) are needed to protect the exposed population. Public works programmes have also systematically been building embankments, but these are generally too low to protect against the greatest cyclones. Raising embankments to the required height of

18 - 25 ft (6 - 8 m)

costs

$ 25, 000

for each

100 ft (30 m)

in length (Kristof 1991).
1991 年 4 月 30 日，一场比 1970 年更大的气旋袭击了吉大港附近的海岸，造成数万人死亡（Haque 和 Blair 1992）。岛屿居民最为脆弱，沿海居民从考克斯巴扎尔北部到对面的桑迪普岛也受到影响。桑迪普岛上至少有一半的 1 万人遇难。虽然 1991 年的人员损失和破坏程度难以想象，但与 1970 年的损失相比，仍然要少得多。从那时起，成千上万的红新月志愿者接受了培训，配备无线电，负责监听和传播撤离警报（Fazlul n.d.）。自 1985 年以来，政府已花费

$ 3

百万改善其警报系统（Mahmud 1988），并且有数十万人成功避难。同样，自 1970 年以来建造的公共避风所表现良好，尽管问题在于仅有 302 个：需要 10,000 个这样的避风所（每个成本 5,000 美元）来保护暴露的人口。公共工程项目也在系统性地修建堤坝，但这些堤坝通常过低，无法抵御最强的气旋。将堤坝抬升到所需的高度

18 - 25 ft (6 - 8 m)

，每

100 ft (30 m)

的长度成本为

$ 25, 000

（Kristof 1991）。

Such engineering efforts are aimed mainly at achieving improved safety for those at risk in the face of the hazard itself, and to some extent at modifying the intensity of the wind in specific places. But although welcome and supported (or even initiated) at the grassroots level, they are inadequate compared with the numbers of people who need protection. Nothing is being done further back in the links that create those unsafe conditions. The pressures and root causes (which are very similar to those shown in Figure 6.3) are not being addressed (see Figure 7.5). Without the political will and significant changes in the national and international factors that affect Bangladesh, efforts at the local level are likely to remain inadequate.
这样的工程努力主要旨在提高面临危险的人群的安全性，并在一定程度上修改特定地点的风强度。尽管在基层层面受到欢迎和支持（甚至发起），但与需要保护的人数相比，这些努力显得不足。对于造成这些不安全条件的更深层次的压力和根本原因（与图 6.3 中所示的非常相似）并没有得到解决（见图 7.5）。如果没有政治意愿和对影响孟加拉国的国家和国际因素的重大改变，地方层面的努力可能仍然不足。

The Philippines菲律宾

The Philippines is a nation of more than 7,000 islands which are home to some 76.5 million people (NSO 2003). Much of it is at risk from tropical cyclones (Delica 2002:41), with the capital, Manila (11 million people), and the heavily populated island of Luzon to the north frequently affected. Within one week in October 1989, the Philippines was hit twice by typhoons (Angela and Dan), killing 159 people and leaving 429,000 homeless (Newman 1989). Similar suffering was recorded nearly every year during the 1980s. For instance, in 1988 there were also two typhoons (Ruby and Skip) that caused
菲律宾是一个由超过 7000 个岛屿组成的国家，居住着约 7650 万人（国家统计局 2003）。大部分地区面临热带气旋的风险（Delica 2002:41），首都马尼拉（1100 万人）和北部人口稠密的吕宋岛经常受到影响。在 1989 年 10 月的一周内，菲律宾遭遇了两次台风（安吉拉和丹），造成 159 人死亡，429,000 人无家可归（Newman 1989）。在 1980 年代，几乎每年都记录到类似的苦难。例如，1988 年也发生了两次台风（露比和斯基普），造成了

Figure 7.5 The release of 'pressures’ to reduce disasters: Bangladesh cyclone risk
图 7.5 减少灾害的“压力”释放：孟加拉国气旋风险
extensive flooding in central Luzon and made 200,000 people homeless on Leyte Island.
中吕宋地区发生了大规模洪水，使莱特岛上 20 万人无家可归。
The cascade of mutually reinforcing causes for the people’s vulnerability in the Philippines begins with land hunger, which is a result of highly unequal land tenure. Despite a nominal commitment to land reform by a succession of governments, the land shortage of poorer people has changed little (Collins 1989; Boyce 1992; Putzel 1992, 2000). Landlessness leads to a desperate search for livelihood alternatives in the growing cities, where migrants live in poorly constructed squatter settlements (some of them on stilts at the water’s edge), in low-lying flood plains and on wasteland, rubbish dumps and on steep slopes. These are the areas where urban land owners cannot command high rents and where commercial alternatives to shanty development are not profitable.
菲律宾人民脆弱性的相互强化原因的级联始于土地饥渴，这源于高度不平等的土地占有。尽管一系列政府名义上承诺进行土地改革，但贫困人群的土地短缺几乎没有改变（Collins 1989; Boyce 1992; Putzel 1992, 2000）。无地状态导致在不断增长的城市中对生计替代品的绝望寻找，移民们生活在建造简陋的棚户区（其中一些位于水边的高脚屋）、低洼的洪泛区、荒地、垃圾场和陡坡上。这些地区的城市土地所有者无法收取高租金，棚户区开发的商业替代方案也不具盈利性。

In 1981, 1.7 million people in greater Manila lived in 415 slum colonies, amounting to 23 per cent of the city’s then 7.5 million inhabitants (Ramos-Jimenez et al. 1986:11-13). These slum dwellers were highly vulnerable to the impacts of wind and flooding due to typhoons. Twenty years on, the situation has not changed very much, and in 2002 an estimated 30 per cent of a much larger Manila (the city having grown from 7.5 million in 1981 to 11 million) were living in slums (Wisner 2002a).
1981 年，大马尼拉地区有 170 万人生活在 415 个贫民窟中，占当时该市 750 万居民的 23%（Ramos-Jimenez et al. 1986:11-13）。这些贫民窟居民对台风造成的风和洪水影响高度脆弱。二十年后，情况并没有太大变化，2002 年，估计在一个更大的马尼拉（该市从 1981 年的 750 万增长到 1100 万）中，有 30%的人生活在贫民窟中（Wisner 2002a）。

In parts of rural coastal Philippines, economic development involved entrepreneurs seeking out raw materials and sites for fish farming and industrial salt production, destroying mangroves in the process (World Resources Institute 1986:146-150). Land pressure also meant that small farmers and indigenous people such as the Palaw’ans (who live on one of the more isolated islands to the west of the archipelago) retreat further into steeper mountain areas. They are forced to do this as government-sponsored migrants and companies take over land at lower elevations for rice farming (Lopez 1987). Clearing land and attempting to farm on such slopes puts these people at risk from the same typhoons that wash away the urban squatter’s home. Torrential rains cause landslides such as the one reported in 1988 (Union News 1988). The resulting erosion caused silting
在菲律宾沿海的部分农村地区，经济发展涉及企业家寻找原材料和鱼类养殖及工业盐生产的场所，在此过程中破坏了红树林（世界资源研究所 1986:146-150）。土地压力也意味着小农和土著人民，如居住在群岛西部较为偏远岛屿上的帕劳人，被迫向更陡峭的山区撤退。他们被迫这样做，因为政府资助的移民和公司占领了低海拔地区的土地用于水稻种植（洛佩斯 1987）。在这样的坡地上清理土地并尝试耕作使这些人面临与冲走城市贫民窟房屋的台风相同的风险。暴雨导致了 1988 年报道的山体滑坡（联合新闻 1988）。由此造成的侵蚀导致了下游河流的淤积
of rivers downstream, adding to the potential for flooding at coastal locations, including the sites of urban slums.
，增加了沿海地区，包括城市贫民窟地点的洪水潜在风险。

Mexico墨西哥

On the other side of the Pacific, the Mexican tourist centre of Acapulco was hit by hurricane Pauline in 1997, and the patterns of vulnerability were abundantly clear. Not a single tourist was killed, but more than 100 of the low-wage service workers who lived in the ravines above the beach resorts died, and 5,000 lost their homes (Puente 1999). Many cities and towns along the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of Mexico and Central America have grown rapidly as centres for beach-oriented tourism. In most of these sites the stark discrepancy between living conditions of the tourism service population and the tourists is bound to produce other, similar tragedies.
在太平洋的另一边，1997 年墨西哥旅游中心阿卡普尔科遭遇了保利娜飓风，脆弱性模式显而易见。没有一名游客遇难，但超过 100 名生活在海滩度假区上方山谷中的低薪服务工人死亡，5000 人失去了家园（Puente 1999）。墨西哥和中美洲的太平洋和加勒比海沿岸的许多城市和城镇迅速发展成为以海滩为导向的旅游中心。在这些地方，旅游服务人群的生活条件与游客之间的明显差异必然会导致其他类似的悲剧。

Islands and small island states
岛屿和小岛屿国家

Those people living and earning their livelihoods on islands, including small island states, are particularly vulnerable to tropical cyclones, and, more generally, to climate change (Pelling and Uitto 2002).
生活和以岛屿为生的人们，包括小岛屿国家，特别容易受到热带气旋的影响，更普遍地说，他们对气候变化也特别脆弱（Pelling 和 Uitto 2002）。

Fiji斐济

Fiji lost approximately 30 per cent of its agricultural production capacity in 1985 when four hurricanes swept these 361 islands over two months. Tree crops suffered losses of up to 80 per cent, and sugar cane production was heavily affected, reducing employment. In addition, food crops and livestock losses were high (Chung 1987). Fields growing subsistence crops were flooded with brackish water. Those root crops that had proved more resistant to storm damage over previous decades had declined in popularity due to rises in income and the purchase of store-bought food.

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1985 年，斐济在两个月内遭遇四场飓风，导致其农业生产能力损失约 30%。树木作物的损失高达 80%，甘蔗生产受到严重影响，导致就业减少。此外，粮食作物和牲畜的损失也很高（Chung 1987）。种植自给作物的田地被咸水淹没。那些在过去几十年中对风暴损害表现出更强抵抗力的根茎作物，由于收入增加和购买商店食品而逐渐失去人气。

Recovery from the 1985 hurricane raised many questions about the dependency of the island on a single export crop and the dependence of the people on imported food (Campbell 1984; Pacific Islands Development Program n.d.). Despite appeals for ‘modern recovery measures [that] should merge…with traditional and time-proven practices’ (Chung 1987:48), there is little evidence that things are moving in this direction. Fiji has continued to suffer damaging cyclones (most recently in 1993, 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2003); however, patterns of personal and social protection do not seem to have improved.
从 1985 年飓风的恢复引发了许多关于该岛对单一出口作物的依赖以及人们对进口食品的依赖的问题（Campbell 1984；太平洋岛国发展计划 n.d.）。尽管有人呼吁“现代恢复措施应与传统和经过时间验证的做法相结合”（Chung 1987:48），但几乎没有证据表明事情朝这个方向发展。斐济继续遭受破坏性的气旋（最近发生在 1993 年、1997 年、1998 年、2002 年和 2003 年）；然而，个人和社会保护的模式似乎没有改善。

Cuba古巴

Cuba is an island nation that has experienced many hurricanes. In the past death tolls were considerably higher, but more recently the number of people killed has decreased dramatically, although economic losses are still high. As a result, the relationship between deaths and economic losses in Cuba is similar to that in richer countries.
古巴是一个经历了许多飓风的岛国。过去的死亡人数相对较高，但最近被杀人数显著减少，尽管经济损失仍然很高。因此，古巴的死亡人数与经济损失之间的关系与富裕国家相似。

In 2001, hurricane Michelle made a direct hit on Cuba. Hurricane Michelle was a
2001 年，飓风米歇尔直接袭击了古巴。飓风米歇尔是一个
dangerous category 3 storm (on the five-point Saffir-Simpson scale). It made landfall at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba’s southern coast with winds of

216 km / hr

. The storm travelled north across the island, where it eventually caused heavy damage to homes (22,400 damaged; 2,800 destroyed), agriculture, industry and infrastructure in much of the western half of the island, including Havana.

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This was the worst hurricane to hit Cuba since 1944. In all, however, only five deaths were reported. By contrast, when Michelle passed across Central America, 10 people were killed and 26 listed as missing (Cawthorne 2001:2). Previously we have discussed the terrible loss of life in Central America during hurricane Mitch. How did Cuba save lives?
危险的三级风暴（在五级萨菲尔-辛普森等级中）。它在古巴南海岸的猪湾登陆，风速达到

216 km / hr

。风暴向北穿过岛屿，最终对岛屿西部大部分地区，包括哈瓦那，造成了严重的房屋损坏（22,400 处受损；2,800 处被毁），农业、工业和基础设施也受到影响。

^{16}

这是自 1944 年以来袭击古巴的最严重飓风。然而，总共只报告了五人死亡。相比之下，当米歇尔经过中美洲时，造成 10 人死亡，26 人失踪（Cawthorne 2001:2）。之前我们讨论了飓风米切造成的中美洲惨重人员伤亡。古巴是如何拯救生命的？

The most important factor seems to have been a timely evacuation. Roughly 700,000 people were evacuated out of Cuba’s 11 million population.

^{17}

This was quite a feat given Cuba’s dilapidated fleet of vehicles, fuel shortage and poor roads. It was possible only because of:
最重要的因素似乎是及时的撤离。大约 70 万人从古巴 1100 万人口中撤离。

^{17}

鉴于古巴破旧的车辆队伍、燃料短缺和糟糕的道路，这实属不易。这仅仅是因为：

advance preparations, training and planning;
提前准备、培训和规划；
a cadre of local personnel;
一批地方人员；
confidence in warnings on the part of the population;
民众对警报的信心；
co-operation with the Cuban Red Cross.
与古巴红十字会的合作。

In addition, the electricity was turned off in Havana to avoid deaths or injuries from electrocution, as were the tap water supplies in anticipation of possible contamination. Reports say that Havana’s population was advised to store water and food, and that on the whole they complied. The population at large in Havana also participated in clearing debris from the streets that could have become dangerous in strong winds, and was involved in tying down loose roofing.

^{18}

Cuban state television broadcasts included references to the 1932 hurricane that had killed more than 3,000 people (Cawthorne2001).

^{19}

此外，为了避免因触电而导致的死亡或受伤，哈瓦那的电力被切断，供水系统也被关闭，以防可能的污染。报告称，哈瓦那的人口被建议储存水和食物，整体上他们都遵守了。哈瓦那的大众也参与了清理街道上的碎片，以防在强风中变得危险，并参与固定松动的屋顶。

^{18}

古巴国家电视台的广播提到了 1932 年造成 3000 多人死亡的飓风（Cawthorne2001）。

^{19}

These preparations also illustrate:
这些准备工作也说明了：

an effective risk communication system;
一个有效的风险沟通系统；
the use of the memory of past disasters being actively encouraged by the authorities;
当局积极鼓励利用对过去灾难的记忆；
neighbourhood-based organisations capable of mobilising labour; $^{20}$
能够动员劳动力的社区基础组织； $^{20}$
trust on the part of the general population.
广大民众的信任。

Havana is a large city of two million inhabitants, with a long history of deaths due to passing hurricanes. In 1844 some 500 people lost their lives there. In 1866 the death toll in the city was 600, and in 1944 there were 330 fatalities and 269 collapsed buildings.

^{21}

However, 2001 was not the first time that preparations and emergency response have saved lives in Cuba. In 1996 some historic buildings were destroyed by hurricane Lili, but no one died (Longshore 2000:81).
哈瓦那是一个拥有两百万居民的大城市，历史上因飓风造成的死亡人数众多。1844 年，约有 500 人在那里丧生。1866 年，城市的死亡人数为 600，而在 1944 年，有 330 人遇难，269 栋建筑倒塌。

^{21}

然而，2001 年并不是古巴首次因准备和应急响应而拯救生命。1996 年，飓风莉莉摧毁了一些历史建筑，但没有人遇难（Longshore 2000:81）。

Policy response政策响应

Coastal storms demonstrate the dynamics of vulnerability discussed in other chapters: the intimate link between vulnerability and livelihood strategies, and the complex and shifting pattern of differential class, ethnicity, caste, gender and age-specific
沿海风暴展示了其他章节中讨论的脆弱性动态：脆弱性与生计策略之间的密切联系，以及与阶级、种族、种姓、性别和年龄特定的复杂和变化的模式。
vulnerability. Severe storms also demonstrate vulnerability in more specific ways. Unprotected, poor-quality urbanisation is basic to creating vulnerability to wind, flood and mudslide hazards associated with severe storms. The relationship between town and countryside can exacerbate the hazard when coastal vegetation is removed or disturbed. The role of economic dependency in creating vulnerability emerged clearly from the case studies of islands dependent on one or a small number of export crops. We have also seen the negative role of absentee landlords in both urban and rural settings.
严重风暴还以更具体的方式展示了脆弱性。缺乏保护的低质量城市化是造成对与严重风暴相关的风、洪水和泥石流灾害的脆弱性的基本原因。当沿海植被被移除或干扰时，城镇与乡村之间的关系可能会加剧这种危害。经济依赖在造成脆弱性方面的作用在依赖一种或少数几种出口作物的岛屿案例研究中清晰地显现出来。我们还看到，缺席地主在城市和农村环境中都发挥了负面作用。

There are, in short, many things that donors and national policy makers can do to reduce vulnerability to storms-and which will simultaneously reduce other risksproviding better access to livelihood resources, establishing better governance and social protection, engaging more vigorously in comprehensive urban and regional planning. We return to these more general policy changes in Chapter 9.
简而言之，捐助者和国家政策制定者可以做很多事情来减少对风暴的脆弱性，同时也会减少其他风险，例如提供更好的生计资源获取、建立更好的治理和社会保护、更加积极地参与全面的城市和区域规划。我们将在第 9 章中回到这些更一般的政策变化。

There are also some very specific, more focused policies and actions that have shown promise in reducing vulnerability to storms. Warning systems can be developed (Lee and Davis 1998; Zschau and Kueppers 2002) and will be effective if there is state capacity to ensure that people trust the authorities, that they receive the message and that communities then know what to do. In 2001 the low death tolls for storms in Cuba, Tonga and Mauritius showed the value of early warnings and preparedness. Unfortunately, some of the most vulnerable people may not hear or believe such warnings (Twigg 2002).
还有一些非常具体、更加针对性的政策和行动，已经显示出在减少对风暴的脆弱性方面的潜力。可以开发预警系统（Lee 和 Davis 1998；Zschau 和 Kueppers 2002），如果国家有能力确保人们信任当局、接收到信息，并且社区知道该怎么做，这些系统将会有效。2001 年，古巴、汤加和毛里求斯的风暴死亡人数较低，显示了提前预警和准备的价值。不幸的是，一些最脆弱的人可能听不到或不相信这样的警告（Twigg 2002）。

A striking example of this weakness is provided by the cyclone that struck the western coast of Gujarat in June 1998, affecting extremely poor, isolated people who make their living producing salt (Disaster Relief 1998d; Kalsi and Gupta 2002).

^{22}

Some 3,000 people lost their lives, 200,000 houses were damaged and the economy suffered losses of

$ 700

million. However, there had been reasonably accurate identification and tracking of this storm for five days. The problem seems to have been that cyclones are much less frequent on this western coast of India than they are in the east. People were therefore much less familiar with them, and preparedness was also insufficient. Some labourers and isolated low-income workers such as those who worked in the salt pans either did not receive, did not believe or did not understand the warning (Kalsi and Gupta 2002). There also seems to be a connection between the failure of the warning system and what we would call ‘root causes’ and ‘dynamic pressures’ in the terminology of the vulnerability approach:
一个显著的例子是 1998 年 6 月袭击古吉拉特邦西海岸的气旋，这次气旋影响了以生产盐为生的极度贫困、孤立的人们（灾难救助 1998d；Kalsi 和 Gupta 2002）。大约有 3000 人失去了生命，20 万所房屋受损，经济损失达

$ 700

百万。然而，在这场风暴发生前的五天内，气象部门对其进行了相对准确的识别和追踪。问题似乎在于，气旋在印度西海岸的发生频率远低于东海岸。因此，人们对气旋的了解较少，准备工作也不足。一些劳工和孤立的低收入工人，例如在盐田工作的工人，要么没有收到警报，要么不相信警报，或者不理解警报（Kalsi 和 Gupta 2002）。警报系统的失败似乎与我们在脆弱性方法的术语中所称的“根本原因”和“动态压力”之间存在联系：

Due to privatisation of ports and the development of coastal areas for commercial and tourism interests, the fisherfolk have been involuntarily displaced from their places of residence to areas that are viewed as more disaster-prone. These fisherfolk were affected by a storm surge (up to 3 m high) and entire settlements were washed away. Being new to areas where they had been displaced, and without good communication lines, they were highly vulnerable ...
(Kalsi and Gupta 2002:202). ...
Another possible policy response is the construction of coastal shelters and meeting points. These have undoubtedly proved effective in saving lives, but more are needed, ...
and access needs to be guaranteed for all those affected. In a study cited earlier there was evidence that people in Andhra Pradesh had been excluded from shelters because of their caste. Winchester’s consecutive studies of Andhra Pradesh disasters also showed that the major infrastructure improvements, and the new economic opportunities and credit facilities made available after the 1977 cyclone, went to the rich and to entrepreneurs who were attracted from the outside. ...

Severe storms underline the futility of adopting only engineering-based and administrative approaches: these are necessary but not sufficient. The threat of storm hazard must be placed in the context of ‘normal’ development policy. This was clear in the case of Andhra Pradesh, and Winchester concludes: ...

As long as technical experts perceive the solution to vulnerability in terms of technical adjustments in isolation from political realities, then solutions will only treat symptoms and not causes, and spirals of dependency and expectation will inevitably be created which in time may create their own political cyclones. ...
(Winchester 1992:194) ...
In the case of Andhra Pradesh, roads and means of transportation, alternative livelihood possibilities, availability of credit and affordable health care were highlighted as crucial factors in reducing vulnerability. These are elements of sustainable human development, and are not specifically policies for dealing with disasters. Giving hurricane preparedness in high-risk zones a role as part of mainstream development can also be as straightforward as building community shelters as multiple-purpose structures (e.g. schools or community centres), as some NGOs are doing now in Bangladesh (Sattaur 1991; Schmuck-Widmann 2002; cf: Ullah 1988). ...

Drought, river flood and epidemic disease hazards raise similar issues of more general development policy (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6), especially as global warming may intensify all these hazards and spread their impact to new areas. When considering such hazards, it is essential that the livelihood strategies of all the different social groups affected are understood in some detail. Social profiling in this way is an essential complement to hazard mapping. ...

Since the coping patterns of ordinary people strongly influence the level of loss suffered, their chances of recovery, as well as their survival, it is essential that evaluation of vulnerability to hurricanes includes detailed accounts of how people cope. The striking differences in recovery rate seen in the case of groups affected by the Andhra cyclone can be avoided if aid is provided in appropriate form to the most vulnerable. This requires an understanding of their coping mechanisms as well as their needs. ...

As emphasised so often in this book, there is no substitute for painstaking work with the survivors as co-designers and co-directors of the recovery process (Maskrey 1989; Lewis 1999). In this way, it is more likely that vulner-ability to the next coastal storm will be reduced. Since rebuilding of houses, other structures and facilities is usually involved in storm recovery, many of these same lessons will be seen in the next chapter, which deals with earthquakes; we will take up the question of recovery in Chapter 9. ...

Notes ...

1 China’s 3,000 km coast line has experienced 319 typhoons and storm surges between 1915 and 1999, which have killed 82, 551 people (Longshore 2000:69). These numbers include the approximately 60,000 people who died in just one event in 1922. Hong Kong experienced deadly storms in 1841, 1906 (at least 10,000 killed), 1925, 1947 (more than 2,000 deaths), 1957, 1960, 1964 (twice), 1971 and 1995. The southern port of Canton (Guangzhou) had 37,000 reported fatalities in a storm in 1862. Shanghai suffered typhoons in 1926 and 1949 (when most of the city was destroyed). In 1927, a storm hitting the central coastal port of Kwangtuang claimed 5,000 lives (Longshore 2000:69-73). ...
2 We should also note that, as with floods and some volcanic impacts, there are positive attributes of cyclones for some societies. They can redistribute moisture to drought-prone areas and are looked on as a positive reduction of drought risk in the Philippines. In Mauritius, the authorities regard cyclones as vital to the islands’ ecosystem, although of course there are significant dangers involved as well. ...
3 Destructive windstorms include tropical and extra-tropical cyclones, tornadoes, derechos (severe downdraughts of wind within a thunderstorm), dust storms and large thunderstorms with associated wind, hail and lightning (McGuire et al. 2002: Ch. 2). We focus our attention here on tropical cyclones because of their deadly and physically destructive impact on the coasts of many LDCs. Extra-tropical cyclones can also be destructive of lives and property. For instance, in 1953 the wind and storm surge associated with a cyclone claimed 2,000 lives in Netherlands and England (ibid.: 60). Tornadoes are created during intense thunderstorms, and some also have been deadly, killing several hundred people at a time; examples are those that struck in the USA in 1974, the Soviet Union in 1984 and Bangladesh in 1996 (ibid.: 48). A vulnerability approach is well suited to the analysis of tornadoes in the USA, since such a large proportion of their victims are low-income people living in flimsy mobile homes (‘manufactured housing’) (Steinberg 2000:228, endnote 24, found that in 1981-1997, 35 per cent of the 296 tornado deaths in the USA were people living in such accommodation. ...
4 The islands comprising Mauritius have been the focus of attempts to improve tropical cyclone warning and preparedness, and this seems to have paid off in recent years, except that there are still disparities in the coverage of warning systems between richer and poorer islands, and the needs of some low-income groups such as fishers have not yet been taken into account fully (Vaghjee and Lee Man Yan 2002; Parker and Budgen 1998:1.52). ...
5 It is important to note that the valuations of such economic losses may have little relationship with the real losses to livelihood and assets of different types of people. Moreover, comparisons between countries do not take into account the fact that in a poor country the monetary value of damaged property may be lower, and yet represent a much greater loss in terms of the values of local people. ...
6 In 1990 there were 12 coastal counties in Florida with more than 24 per cent of their populations aged 65 years or more and eight coastal countries with more than 7 per ...
cent aged 85 years or more (FREAC 2001a, 2001b). ...
7 Such indebtedness to procure boats is a problem facing many small-scale fishing communities, not just those on small islands. Chambers (1983) and Winchester

(1986, 1992)

have assessed this problem in south India. ...
8 In part because of growing awareness of this destructive chain of events and, more importantly, the growing importance of tourist income to the Jamaican economy, the peatlands of Jamaica were not, in fact, developed. By comparison with other nations in the region, Jamaica’s peat energy potential is actually quite small. Measured in thousands of hectares, the World Energy Council (2003: Table 8.1) shows Jamaica as possessing 12, while Costa Rica has 37, Haiti 48, Belize 90, Nicaragua 371, Honduras 453 and Cuba 658. Nevertheless, future economic and policy changes could see the rebirth of interest in mangrove and coastal peat areas in fragile ecosystems in Jamaica and elsewhere. ...
9 Such empirical results cast some doubt on the future of ‘micro-credit’ as a way of financing household-level self-protection, which seems to be the vision of the World Bank and the ProVention Consortium: http://www.proventionconsortium.org/ ...
10 On the complexities of forecasting, see Jan-Hwa (1998) and Holland (2000). ...
11 After the 1977 cyclone, the government employed one-quarter of the male workforce of the area in public works. This included considerable road repairs and upgrading. However, in 1986 bus transportation was privatised, and the bus companies decided they would use only properly surfaced roads. The net effect was that transportation was not improved and the ability to evacuate this hazardous zone remained problematic (Winchester 1992:120). ...
12 The Andhra cyclone has been analysed in considerable detail in Winchester (1992); much of this information is derived from his previous work (Winchester 1986, 1990). Also see Chapter 3:103-110. ...

13 Attacks by RENAMO began in 1979 and grew steadily until by 19885.9 million people had been displaced and were dependent on food aid from a population of 13 million (Kruks and Wisner 1989:166; D’Souza 1988). ...
14 The official figure used by the national governments of the affected countries was 9,000 (Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America 1999), however Gass (2002) provides detailed data from Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador that alone total 26,919 (even without data from Guatemala and Belize) when one adds official deaths and ‘disappeared’ or ‘missing’ together. The vast majority of deaths occurred in Honduras and Nicaragua. ...
15 Ironically, Fiji also suffers from drought, and the 1997 drought caused losses of $175 million; $18 million worth of food and water had to be distributed (World Bank 2002:15). These costs were added to a decade of storm losses in Fiji, where cyclones cost

$ 0.8

billion during the 1990s (ibid.). ...
16 Cuban Civil Defense authorities reported 'about 30 factories, 45 livestock and agricultural installations’ destroyed and 'over 80 hospitals and clinics’ damaged, according to the Deutsche Presse Agentur 2002 (accessed on ReliefWeb). On the positive side, more than three-quarters of a million animals were herded to higher ground (OCHA 2001). ...
17 Another report mentions ‘nearly a million’ evacuees (Deutsche Presse Agentur ...
2002).

18 OCHA Situation Report No. 7 (2001) and Reuters (Cawthorne 2001:2-3) (accessed on ReliefWeb). ...
19 Cuba’s communication of risks has been described as being very effective. ...
Nevertheless, in a recent review, the Cuban authorities themselves note that they need to do a better job of educating people at all levels of society (Glantz 2001:37). ...
20 Paul Susman, Bucknell University, has argued (in an unpublished study) that the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution played an important role in reducing dengue fever outbreaks because they were able to mobilise labour for highly localised, house-by-house monitoring and control of mosquito breeding sites. As a result of this, as well as prompt case finding and treatment, Cuba has the lowest prevalence of dengue in the Caribbean and Central America (personal communication; susman@bucknell.edu). ...
21 Longshore (2000:79-81); in Havana 1,550 buildings are reported to have been damaged, 26 schools and 10 day care centers (OCHA 2001:1). ...
22 Assessments of other warning systems considered to be generally affective, such as those in Mauritius, China, the Philippines and Vietnam, have all included the caveat that there are still problems reaching isolated or ‘marginal’ populations (see Parker and Budgen 1998:1.10; Wills et al. 1998: esp. 4.50). ...

8
EARTHQUAKES AND VOLCANOES ...

Introduction ...

In this chapter attention is centred on earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. These are highly energetic natural events that occur irrespective and independently of social action and any modification of the environment. We mention the significance of human action in relation to these natural trigger events in order to highlight not the insignificance of humanity in relation to these geological processes, but to underscore the fact that human action and inaction can nevertheless impact upon the outcomes of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. ...

To illustrate this fact, we begin by comparing two hazard events which occurred 100 years apart. The first was on the island of Martinique (in the Caribbean), the second affected the city of Catas in the southern coastal region of Peru. At the most general level of root causes, there are familiar processes involved in determining unsafe conditions: the interests of the powerful, bureaucratic incompetence and ignorance. However, in the example of Catas, evacuation orders were given and there was some evidence of lessons having been learnt from experience. ...

The first eruption was in 1902, when an irresponsible and opportunistic political leader refused to order the evacuation of Martinique because of an impending election (in which he expected to benefit), despite the immediate threat of a volcanic eruption on the island. The consequence was the worst loss of life in a volcanic eruption in the entire twentieth century. One hundred years later, our second example relates to seismic hazard mapping in Peru, in the aftermath of an earthquake that led to an evacuation order to relocate a community, supposedly for their protection. But was public safety the reason for the order, or was there another motive to remove the community-of the discovery of oil on their land? ...

During the twentieth century around 98,000 people were reportedly killed in volcanic eruptions (CRED 2002). More than a third of this total occurred in just one event: the catastrophic 1902 eruption of Mount Pelée in Martinique (Caribbean), when the entire population of 29,000 in the town of St Pierre was killed in less than two minutes (Scarth 1997:138-141). This disaster is often blamed on the ferocity of the volcanic explosion and the blast of superheated gases (estimated at

700 - 1, 200^{\circ} Celsius)

which struck the town. However, the massive loss of life is an early example of politically induced vulnerability. Three months before the eruption nauseous smells, similar to hydrogen sulphide, were experienced in St Pierre. Sixteen days before the eruption, animals began to die on the slopes of the Mount Pelée volcano due to gas emissions; then three days before there was a major pyroclastic flow, with associated ash falls. Despite this mounting evidence of an impending eruption, the Governor issued soothing messages and suggestions for an evacuation were rejected (Ferguson 2002:14-19). ...
[I]t seems that there were political motives for this ill-informed optimism. Elections were due on 9 May and the Governor was determined that they should proceed smoothly. A mass evacuation of St. Pierre would have created an enormous administrative headache, and both the leading political parties were adamant that their supporters would not leave and surrender their votes. Was there a conspiracy to down-play the possibility of a disaster? It appears more likely that ignorance lay behind official inaction. ...
(Frampton 1998:59) ...
The Governor’s refusal to order an evacuation became his own death warrant, as when the volcano exploded on 8 May he and his family perished with the rest of the townspeople (Bishop 1998:58; Zebroski 2002). ...

During the twentieth century 1.87 million people are estimated to have been killed in earthquakes. Thus for every person killed in a volcanic eruption, 19 have died in earthquakes (CRED 2002). We tend only to know about the large-scale earthquake disasters reported in the media. However, there are many small events in which tens or hundreds of people die, with hardly a mention in international news coverage. One such event involved the indirect deaths from an earthquake of 8.1 Richter that occurred on 23 June 2001 in the area of Arequipa and La Punta (southern coastal region of Peru). A hundred people died, half of them drowned, as a tsunami hit their villages. In the subsequent months the authorities (with funding partly from United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]) decided to map the seismic hazard in the area. One of the areas being mapped was the village of Catas, where three died and 63 of 71 families lost their homes in the earthquake. In 2002, most of the survivors lived on official welfare provision, occupying tents and being fed by a charity food kitchen. To make matters worse, the wells were contaminated by salt as a result of the earthquake and all water had to be transported into the area by road. ...

The seismic hazard mapping team advised the villagers to relocate, since the water table had risen as a result of the earthquake to just 70 cm below the ground surface, posing a threat of severe ground shaking in future earthquakes. Having identified the area as a ‘high-risk zone’ the municipality refused to carry out repairs in Catas, and earmarked new safer land for the relocation of the community. However the villagers were told they would need to pay

$ 40, 000

for the land, which they could not afford. Therefore they found themselves stranded ‘between the devil and the deep blue sea’: highly vulnerable, dependent on external welfare, living in tents without the money to move and with no government support for essential repairs. The head of the village committee, Fernando Herrera, was suspicious as to why his village had been the only one scheduled for relocation on account of the seismic risk. He suspected that there was another motive for the proposed relocation: 'The real trouble is the survey people found oil here, that is what they told us, and many people here think that is why the authorities want us to go’ (quoted in Pearce 2002a:34). ...

These contrasting examples of official action in response to different hazards, with completely opposite scales of impact, in different geographical regions, and separated by a century, have at least one feature in common. They are reminders that people are not only at risk from earthquakes and volcanic eruptions; they are also at risk from the action, ...
or inaction, of politicians. And especially from those leaders with agendas other than the safety of the public they are supposed to serve. This theme of political vulnerability will recur as one of many levels of public exposure to earthquakes and volcanoes that are described in this chapter in a series of case studies. ...

Almost two million people killed by earthquakes in the last century represents a bleak death toll. Yet for all their dramatic impact, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions do not remotely match the scale of casualties that result from droughts and floods (Sapir and Lechat 1986; CRED 2002), and of the millions of earthquakes that take place every year, few are actually deadly (Hays 1990). About half of all earthquake deaths have occurred in China (Noji 1997:136), which also suffered the most devastating single event (the 1976 Tangshan earthquake) which resulted in between 242,000 (Coburn and Spence 1993) and 290,000 (Munich Re 1999) deaths. ...

Determinants of vulnerability to earthquakes ...

Understanding the vulnerability of people to an earthquake in a particular area, both ex ante (potential) and ex post (what happens after the initial shock and in the process of recovery), involves two related tasks, outlined in the Access model given in Chapter 3. Broadly, these are to understand the space- and time-related characteristics of the earthquake, which is ‘crosstabulated’ with the socio-economic characteristics of the population at risk. The space-time characteristics of the earthquake are then traced to the space-time characteristics of human activities, which help to explain ‘who was where when’ as the earthquake struck, and how they were affected by it. Thereafter, the structure of access to resources, and the capability of applying knowledge to the seeking out and utilisation of these resources, is crucial for the recovery of affected people after the earthquake. ...

The location of the earthquake has to be specified using a number of different scales. It is self-evident that its location is of prime importance. The probability of earthquakes can be mapped for the large scale and seismic belts (with higher chances of both the severity and number of events) can be identified. Secondly, at the meso-scale location is of great importance. In eastern Turkey, for example, villages and small towns are located on the sites of springs, which themselves occur along fault lines and are therefore more susceptible to earthquakes. Finally, the greatest share of mortality and loss of property from earthquakes occur as a result of damage to, and collapse of, buildings and from falling masonry. Therefore the micro-geography of the settlement and its cross-tabulation with the spatial configuration of the earthquake (and the characteristics of underlying rocks and soils) are of prime importance. ...

The temporal characteristics of earthquakes are also crucial. Firstly, the frequency of earthquake events over months, years, decades or longer is important, since it can condition the level of risk awareness (for institutions such as the state, as well as for civil society and individuals). For instance, this affects whether people and institutions adapt their building design and city planning to take account of memories of earthquake in the past. Secondly, the occurrence of the earthquake by time of year and day of the week can be critical. There are festivals, market days and national holidays that concentrate large numbers of people in particular places on specific dates. Also the season is important. For ...
example, in the harsh winter conditions of the Armenia earthquake of 1988 few survived, while in warmer climates or seasons, trapped people stand a greater chance of surviving until rescued (Noji 1997:148). Finally, the time of impact is of critical importance. If the earthquake occurs at night (as in both the 1976 Guatemala and 1993 Latur (India) earthquakes), casualties are always higher. People are likely to sleep through the foreshocks that in daytime can provide sufficient warning to escape from buildings. Also, when lying flat in bed inside a building, people are much more exposed to injury from falling debris (Alexander 1985). ...

Characteristics of buildings and unsafe structures also have a strong influence on vulnerability to earthquake hazard (Cuny 1983; Coburn and Spence 2002). It is clear that many communities in seismic areas, particularly in LDCs, have many dangerous structures that will collapse under extreme seismic forces (French 1989). Over 95 per cent of all deaths in earthquakes result from building failures (Alexander 1985). Many fewer deaths and injuries are caused by the secondary impact of an earthquake, such as induced landslide, fire or drowning from a tsunami (Seaman et al. 1984:10-11; Noji 1997:155-157) (see Chapter 6:105). ...

Since buildings are such a critical factor in seismic risk, concerned officials need simply to look very hard at the elements that relate to building safety, with specific consideration given to the shape, siting, building materials and constructional details of buildings, to find answers to three vital questions. Firstly, where are buildings likely to fail? Secondly, and perhaps even more significantly, what are the root causes of this dangerous situation? Thirdly, what action can be taken to reduce this underlying pressure? If the first question is tackled while the second is ignored, then the lives and property of the population will remain at risk even though certain individual buildings are made safe, since symptoms (unsafe building design) will have been addressed rather than the root causes (Noji 1997:156-157). ...

Protective measures include structural and non-structural regulations and, in more general terms, policies that officials have taken, in advance of any disaster, to reduce seismic risks. What has been done, where, how, why, by whom and for whose benefit? Actions will include detailed seismic risk assessment, enforcement of land-use planning controls, building safety codes, developing a detailed disaster plan, having an effective search and rescue capacity, etc. This subject is addressed in detail in Chapter 9. After the earthquake, relief measures become important in determining the recovery of different people from the event. These measures relate to the types of injury sustained, the availability of medical assistance and the timing of whether, or when, a person is able to receive medical attention, and are all critical factors in the vulnerability of persons to earthquake impact (WHO 1997). ...

Access to resources in normal life and transition to disaster ...

Throughout this book it will be clear that political economy causes people to be differentiated by degrees of vulnerability. In the case of earthquakes, housing design, quality of building and the degree of maintenance are of crucial importance. In turn, these characteristics are shaped by the pattern of ownership of buildings, the level of rents and the distribution of income among urban dwellers, which interact to determine where ...
people live and the degree of hazard associated with those locations. Later in this chapter a study of the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City will be used to illustrate the social construction of vulnerability, its spatial variation throughout the city, the importance of class, occupation, and physical type and ownership of residence (and the political conditions under which municipal building regulations were applied or circumvented). Overall, there is an urban ecology which is expressed in terms of access to resources before and after an earthquake. ...

Earthquakes can be viewed with the help of our Pressure and Release (PAR) model, as well as by seeking out information on vulnerability factors that derive from our Access model. Both models will be illustrated in the following case studies. The PAR model investigates the root causes and dynamic pressures that lead to unsafe conditions. In order to investigate these conditions of vulnerability with respect to earthquakes, we use a comparative analysis of four widely differing earthquake-related disasters that have occurred in the past quarter of a century: Guatemala (1976), Mexico City (1985), Kobe, Japan (1995) and Gujarat, India (2001). ...

Classic case studies: Guatemala and Mexico ...

The complexity of the social, political, economic and technical factors we have so far introduced were made apparent by two very destructive earthquakes: in Guatemala in 1976 and Mexico City in 1985. Both events have shaped subsequent international policies of seismic risk reduction. ...

The Guatemala earthquake, 02:58 hours, 4 February 1976 ...

This earthquake proved to be a crucial experience (both negative and positive) for many agencies involved in disaster assistance. Some major ‘aid blunders’ were committed and some innovative ideas in educating small builders in the construction of earthquakeresistant (aseismic) houses were pioneered in its aftermath (Cuny 1983:164-193). The disaster also focused attention on the vulnerability of the urban and rural poor to exploitation by landlords. It also highlighted the difficulties of certain aid agencies, which pursued assistance policies they probably now regret, or accept as important 'learning experiences’. ...

The earthquake killed 22,000 people living in unsafe housing in the rural highlands of Guatemala as well as within dangerous squatter settlements in Guatemala City. It left the upper and middle classes virtually unscathed. This was the first major earthquake widely recognised as having such a markedly selective impact, hence its common designation by people on the street as a ‘class-quake’. ...

Vulnerability variations can be clearly detected in the Guatemalan case. Firstly, there was a strong ethnic as well as a class factor at work. The high-land rural people who died were not only poor, but were indigenous Mayans. The dead in Guatemala City (some 1,200 people) and the 90,000 made homeless were almost exclusively concentrated in the city’s slums (Latin America 1976). Secondly, it was exceedingly difficult for both the indigenous Mayans and urban squatters to obtain post-disaster assistance from the ...

government. ...

The socio-economic forces that led to so many people living in unsafe conditions, and the political forces that controlled post-disaster aid, mirrored Guatemalan society at large (Plant 1978; EPOCA 1990). What makes Guatemala unusual is the high degree of awareness of these social weaknesses on the part of a large proportion of the population, so that post-disaster relief and rehabilitation became a political battleground. In the words of a contemporary journalist: ...

In this well-known fault zone the houses of the rich have been built to costly anti-earthquake specifications. Most of the poorest housing, on the other hand, is in the ravines or gorges which are highly susceptible to landslides whenever earth movements occur. The city received proportionately little aid largely because it is governed by the most radical opposition tolerated in Guatemala, the Frente Unido de la Revolution, a social democratic coalition. Its leader Manual Colon Arguetta, was wounded by unknown gunmen on 29 March, the latest victim of a wave of terror attacks that has claimed 40 lives since the earthquake. One city official, Rolando Andrade Peña, was shot down two weeks after the earthquake after suggesting that homeless people should be encouraged to rebuild on unoccupied private land. ...

(Latin America 1976:115) ...
In 1989, 13 years after the earthquake, one of the present authors visited Guatemala City to determine whether the people were any less vulnerable than they had been in 1976. In many ways there seemed to be more positive signs. While there were still houses on the steep slopes, they were certainly not as crowded or precarious. Many of the urban poor who lost their homes yet managed to survive immediately vacated the most dangerous slopes for flat or gently sloping sites a short distance away. This illegal ‘invasion’ had taken place from the day of the earthquake, and ever since the barrio has been known as ‘4th of February’. When survivors first ‘invaded’ safer sites, there were a large numbers of visiting newsmen in the city to report on the disaster and the authorities had to turn a blind eye to the influx of displaced families. Eventually (perhaps due to the sheer force of numbers linked to sustained political pressure), the occupiers were granted legal titles to the land by the government. ...

However there is no evidence that the builders of these houses had any knowledge of earthquake-resistant construction. So, although their sites are safer from earthquakeinduced landslides, flash floods and eviction orders, their dwellings remain as dangerous. In fact, the risk of their houses collapsing may have increased significantly. When they were illegally sited they were generally built from lightweight materials, including corrugated iron sheet roofing. But when they were legalised many families began to build using heavy materials such as reinforced concrete that is potentially more harmful. ...

Oxfam America was one of the many NGOs closely involved in the reconstruction programmes based on co-operative activity. In 1982 they published an account of the reign of terror that ensued, including a series of interviews with local leaders. ...
[T]he earthquake tore open many holes in the social fabric which had already been stretched thin. The rich and those in power came out richer and the poor ...
came out poorer, and differences and inequalities became more visible. More protest led to more repression to contain the forces of change. Those in power do not want to share the wealth…I think this region has become the target for increased repression and violence against the population…[since] many people in this area were very active in reconstruction efforts after the earthquake. ...
(Quoted in Davis and Hodson 1982:15) ...
Miculax and Schramm wrote a case study of the long-term consequences of one of the Housing Education programmes in 1989, 13 years after the earthquake: ...

Abstract ...

A terribly unfortunate negative consequence of these improvements in community organisation should be noted. During the Violence’ (la violencia) of the 1980’s, individuals who had developed their personal capacities during the post-disaster relief project were seen as ‘troublemakers’. Many were killed by the army and others sought exile in neighbouring countries. ...

(Quoted in Anderson and Woodrow 1989:237) ...
Thus in Guatemala ‘political vulnerability’ expanded as a direct consequence of community development and leadership training specifically intended to reduce vulnerability to economic factors or seismic hazards. ...

The Mexico City earthquake, 07:00 hours, 19 September 1985 ...

The impact of this disaster was very different to that in Guatemala. While there are millions of people living in the ‘informal settlements’ of Mexico City, in conditions very similar to the steep ravines of Guatemala City, they were not the main victims of this earthquake. Those who suffered in Mexico City were not the poorest residents, and this case reminds us that vulnerability is not synonymous with poverty, although the two are often strongly associated. We will need to analyse the situation in several ways in order to understand all the relationships that determined vulnerability in this complicated case. ...

Within greater Mexico City, a mega-city with perhaps 18 - 20 million residents, the long-suffering population has learned to cope with a host of natural and technological hazards. Earthquake remains a major threat and was the trigger for the disaster that led to as many as 17,000 deaths in 1985. Yet this is not the highest risk on Mexico’s political agenda: in the 1990s it was air pollution, and in the early years of the twenty-first century traffic, a dispute over a new airport, water supply and drainage. ...

Historical influences on the physical environment ...

The seismic hazards facing Mexico City can be mapped with some accuracy in terms of their frequency, severity of impact, damage patterns, type of ground motion and location in relation to topography and soil conditions. ...

However, even such physical factors can be affected by human intervention. Tobriner has written an account of the way Mexico City has developed over the past six centuries on a site that could hardly be more dangerous. Over this period it has been at risk from floods, soil shrinkage, volcanic activity and earthquake impact. He observes that it is ‘one ...
of the great ironies of urban history that Mexico City, perhaps the largest city in the world, stands on one of the planet’s most unstable soils’ (Tobriner 1988:469-479). Figure 8.1 shows the relationship between building damage and the bed of the old Lake Texcoco, with its legacy of these dangerous conditions. The explanation of why this occurred is rooted in the history of the site from the thirteenth century, when the Aztecs made it their capital, Tenochtitlan. As Oliver-Smith points out in his account of the ‘500 hundred year earthquake’ in Peru, the root causes of vulnerability sometimes lie in the very remote past.

^{1}

When the Spanish arrived they found it a well-adapted settlement. But conquest and its symbolic needs required them to destroy it and substitute a new city that required the draining of Lake Texcoco. ...

However the site of Tenochtitlan suffered from four natural hazards: volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, drought and severe flooding. The historic centre of Mexico City now sits on a lake bed, with an alluvial subsoil up to 60 m deep. In the 1985 earthquake this soil behaved like a liquid, with massive ground shaking causing damage almost exclusively within the area of the original lake bed. This is the tragic legacy of a major city set on an unstable site that has its roots in the power of Aztec kings and colonial rulers a full four and a half centuries ago. In Figure 8.2, this preconditioning factor is depicted as a ‘root cause’ of vulnerability. ...

In the years following the 1985 disaster the government of Mexico City took a bold decision to stop any future high-rise buildings from being constructed in the part of the city situated over the old lake bed, based on the evidence from the 1985 severe amplification of earthquake shaking in this area (Adams and Spence 1999:54). There are, however, many remaining buildings at risk in this unstable zone. ...

Buildings at risk ...

In an assessment of the exposure of buildings to seismic risk, a survey was made of about 20,000 buildings in the historic centre. Seventeen factors were considered in the survey, including such matters as levels of maintenance, the shape of buildings, the ‘hammer effect’ of one building knocking into another during an earthquake, building height and type of construction (Aysan et al. 1989). A large number of these buildings could collapse in any future large earthquake. ...

10 Km Divisions ...

4 %

of buildings heorvily damoged ...

3 %

of buildings hecvily damoged ...

2 %

of buildings heavily damoged ...

Figure 8.1 Distribution of damage during the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City relative to the lake bed ...
Source: Adapted from Aysan et al. (1989) and Coburn and Spence (1993), p. 211, (2002), p. 256, Figure 7.12 ...

Figure 8.2 'Pressures’ that result in disasters: Mexico City earthquake, 19 September 1985 ...

Detailed analysis of earthquake damage has revealed that the primary factors causing damage to buildings related to their siting and their height. It was found that on sites within the lake bed, rigid structures (such as stone masonry buildings) generally performed better than flexible ones (such as reinforced concrete structures). The height of the building was an even more significant factor in creating vulnerability for people living in, or in close proximity to, dangerous buildings. Medium- to high-rise buildings between 6 and 20 stories were worst affected, with particularly severe damage occurring to buildings between 9 and 11 stories high. At this height they were prone to resonate in harmony with the low frequency waves that emanated from the epicentre 230 miles away (Degg 1989). ...

One major factor that has still to be considered in mapping seismic risk concerns the age of reinforced concrete buildings. Those erected between 1925 and 1942 were built to very high standards. Then, from 1942 to 1964 quality fell, the result of a building boom and a consequent lack of supervision of construction methods. After 1964, seismic codes were applied and the quality improved (Ambraseys 1988). ...

A very serious characteristic of the 1985 disaster was the destruction and damage to public buildings, including those with high and constant levels of occupancy such as hotels and hospitals. Five hospitals collapsed and 22 were seriously damaged, which resulted in a 28 per cent loss of public hospital capacity at precisely the time when it was most needed- 1,619 people lost their lives in the collapse of just six buildings (Kreimer and Echeverria 1991). ...

In addition to the failure of large high-rises, another group of buildings suffered severe damage, but this was not as well publicised. These were smaller structures, with high levels of occupancy, of mixed commercial and domestic use. Analysis of casualty statistics indicates the rather obvious fact that during day-time earthquakes people manage to escape from low-rise buildings more easily than from high-rise ones (Aysan et ...
al. 1989). In the Mexico City case it is possible to see some relationship between underlying causes and unsafe conditions in the older tenements, where there had been a failure to maintain what tend to be severely overcrowded buildings. In some instances there was evidence of a failure to supervise building construction adequately. The question of the level of building maintenance relates to patterns of ownership and occupation as well as to the role of the state in enforcing maintenance standards. These issues provide a link with the next layer of the study, that of human vulnerability. ...

People at risk ...

The discussion above involves issues that are well-established subjects for those who engage in the physical mapping of hazards. In contrast to physical hazard mapping, human vulnerability analysis focuses on social patterns and institutions (termed 'social relations’ and ‘structures of domination’ in the Access model, Figure 3.1), society-wide and intra-household social relations, and economic activity (gender and age relations are particularly important as noted earlier), and the psychology of risk. ...

Given the distribution in time and space of the earthquake event (hazard) itself and the distribution just described of historically remote ‘causes’ and unsafe buildings, what specific mechanisms were at work in 1985 that placed certain people in those unsafe buildings at the critical moment? These include density of population (a function of location factors such as site of employment, land prices and rents); the ownership of buildings relative to their maintenance; patterns of building use (seen in terms of both space and time); people’s own perception of risk; cultural values such as a desire to remain in one’s natal neighbourhood; and the existence of local institutions that could play a key role in post-disaster recovery. ...

The local economy at risk ...

The effect of the earthquake can be considered in two overlapping ways: the destruction of property and the impact on lives. In the Mexico City earthquake, two distinct categories of buildings collapsed or were damaged. Both were both constructed on alluvial soils that formed the bed of a long-vanished lake. The first category involved people who died or were injured in high-rise buildings, including a hotel and a number of hospitals. These casualties came from all levels of Mexican society. In contrast, the second group was the predominately low-income residents of nineteenth-century low-rise tenements. As we pointed out in Part I, we are concerned to define and to underscore the relevance and practicability of vulnerability analysis by pointing out how it often must go beyond simple criteria such as income and status. The losses in the first category included some victims who would not be considered vulnerable in terms of their income. However, vulnerability is closely related to the low-income status of tenement residents. ...

The earthquake occurred at 07:00 hours on 19 September 1985 when most people were on their way to work. For those on foot, the hazard was falling masonry crashing onto pavements, but for the thousands inside metro trains or motor vehicles the immediate environment was protective. Estimates of the number killed range from 5,000 to 17,000. The vast majority of those who died were inside medium- to high-rise buildings, in the ...
central area of the city. Some 12,700 buildings were affected, 65 per cent of which were residential. The housing for 180,000 people was damaged, and 50,000 needed temporary accommodation (Kreimer and Echeverria 1991). Since the damage affected some highinvestment buildings, the financial losses were enormous, estimated at

$ 4

billion (ibid.). The reinsurance industry at that time assessed the earthquake as one of the three most disastrous of this century, the others being the San Francisco and Tokyo earthquakes of 1906 and 1923 respectively (Degg 1989). ...

Such financial loss dwarfs the dollar value of dislocated livelihoods. Yet for those who relied on work in the 1,200 small industrial workshops destroyed, the cost was great. Once more it is clear that issues of recovery and rehabilitation cannot be separated from the profile of vulnerability. Are those workers still unemployed, or have they found an alternative? Did the earthquake begin a spiral into poverty for those households? The number of casualties varied in relation to their location (i.e. in a building on the alluvial soils) and height of the building. The timing of the earthquake was even more critical in determining the number who died or were injured. Had it occurred just three hours earlier, when people were asleep, there would have been much higher casualties (but the same property losses). ...

An annotated Access model of this earthquake is provided in Figure 8.3, which graphically summarises the commentary above, and provides a holistic and causally coherent explanatory model of the earthquake. ...

Starting in the top left-hand corner of the Access model, the earthquake is mapped in space and time. The proportion of damaged buildings (Box B), along with the distribution of different types of building with a varying resistance to collapse (Box C), together constitute the main determinants of damage. Box A shows the severity and timing of previous earthquakes of the twentieth century (the 1985 quake was the most severe since 1908). The decline in their frequency may have affected people’s attitude to the need to prepare for them. Box D shows the distribution of damaged buildings in relation to the sub-soil of the drained lake of Lake Texcoco. The ‘net susceptibility’ to earthquakes (in terms of building design to resist earthquakes) is illustrated in three different zones in Box D, while the actual impact of the earthquake (in terms of the percentage of buildings damaged) is shown in Box E (a simplified version of Figure 8.1), to the right of the zigzag line that represents the disaster. One of the key questions was ‘who was where when?’. As the quake occurred at 0700 many people were going to work, and fortunately not asleep in buildings which subsequently collapsed. Also, the spatial structure and urban ecology of the city shaped the pattern of commuting to work and of travel and location of different groups of people. Many areas were characterised by very high residential densities which put large numbers at high risk during an earthquake, and this contributed to the very high death toll. ...

The impact of the earthquake on social relations (Box F) and structures of domination (Box G) was significant both immediately and subsequently, but probably much less so than for an earthquake in a rural area. It occurred in the capital city itself, which, as a classic example of a primate city, dominated the rest of the country politically, economically and demographically. The key social relations determining earthquake risk were technical, political and financial: these all had a role in shaping of the construction of public and private buildings. As will be seen later in the Access model, these were ...
modified by public action, although they were not radically altered. Also, ...

Figure 8.3 Access, vulnerability and recovery from the Mexico City earthquake ...
Mexico City is highly inegalitarian, with very poorly maintained and high-density residential areas. Hyperinflation meant that in properties with fixed rents, landlords’ incomes had become virtually worthless; they therefore neglected maintenance, particularly in the historic city centre. Squatter settlements, ‘hot bedding’ (multiple occupation of a single bed in shifts) and general overcrowding were (and still are) commonplace. ...

The impacts on three stereotypical households are illustrated in Box H (the preearthquake situation) and Box I (after the earthquake). The first household is a tenant in a highly damage-prone tenement, whose main income is as an office cleaner; the second, a small business owner living in a privately owned apartment in a high-rise building; the third lives in a squatter settlement; while the fourth is not really a ‘household’ at all but a ‘hot bedder’ in very cheap and overcrowded accommodation. In all cases, there was a lack of individual and community preparedness in the event of a disaster. The impacts included mortality and temporary disruption of livelihoods (office cleaning and casual and unskilled work stopped in the cases of the poorer households). However, as Box I shows, the longer-term impacts on livelihoods were by no means universally adverse, and some job opportunities increased. Moving from Box I to Box J the model shifts from the post-disaster situation and recovery to the pre-disaster conditions of the next disaster. Box J shows the notional situation of households 1, 2 and 3 in 2003, and what has (and has not) happened in their living conditions. Box K then summarises the official measures which were taken to reduce vulnerability, which in turn affect the initial ‘unsafe conditions’ that form the basis for the next iteration of the model, and for future disasters. Figure 8.4 is an attempt to identify the factors which could be adopted by the Mexican authorities to release the pressures that have created unsafe conditions in Mexico City in ...
the past (Coburn and Spence 1993:130; Gomez 1991:56-57; Echeverria 1991:60-1). The model addresses vulnerability indirectly and directly. Indirect measures include reducing the size of Mexico City. Urbanisation is addressed by improving rural economic opportunities, lessening the migration to the city, and by decentralising some of the federal government’s functions (and hence employment opportunities) to other cities in Mexico. In this way one of the most important dynamic pressures that translates root causes into unsafe conditions is relieved. ...

In addition, unsafe conditions are addressed directly by improved aseismic building codes and their enforcement, strengthening existing structures, and reducing the densities in certain weaker structures by changing patterns of use. These steps, none of them unthinkable in contemporary Mexico-although some more difficult politically and more expensive than others-complement a programme of improved disaster preparedness planning. However, by the mid-1990s, a mere 10 years after this major disaster, a marked decline in ‘political will’ was already evident, with concerns for seismic safety having been displaced from the political agenda by other more ...

Figure 8.4 The release of ‘pressures’ to reduce disasters: the situation following the recovery of Mexico City from the of earthquake, 19 September 1985 ...
pressing political and environmental problems.

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In the early years of the twenty-first century, Mexico City was governed for the first time by officials from a party in opposition to the PRI that had dominated national and local politics for nearly 80 years. However, despite some changes in rhetoric and considerable improvements in hazard mapping, engineering knowledge and communication technology, Mexico’s huge megacity may not be any better prepared for its next earthquake (Puente 1999). ...

Recent case studies ...

We have selected two additional case studies from the many disasters which have occurred since Mexico: the Kobe and Gujarat earthquakes. The choice was not easy, since other earthquake disasters also raise important issues and bring insights to the analysis of social vulnerability (Davidson et al. 2000; Yamakazi et al. 1996). One such example is the 1994 Northridge earthquake in a suburb of Los Angeles. This was one of the costliest disasters in the history of the USA and resulted in 681,000 people applying for financial assistance. Despite the record physical and financial losses, only 57 people died, a testimony to the effectiveness of seismic risk-reduction measures in California in protecting lives (Bolin and Stanford 1998a, 1998b). Other useful data derived from the Northridge case concern how difficult it was for low-income Hispanic people to gain access to the resources needed for recovery (Bolin and Stanford 1998b). We will not treat this case in depth in this chapter however, but will return to it when we address the question of recovery in Chapter 9. ...

Another such example is the Latur (India) earthquake of 1993. This raises the point that primary victims can be the wealthier people, who in this case were highly vulnerable because they lived in non-reinforced heavy masonry dwellings whilst the majority of the rural poor occupied safer, lightweight structures (IFRC 1994:123). ...

Other lessons can be learnt from the experience of Turkey, where the people suffered two devastating earthquakes in 1999 that resulted in the highest death toll in any earthquake in Turkey since 1939. In this case the principle lessons concern the acute hazardousness of the building stock in the rapidly urbanising cities, as well as inadequate emergency management by the authorities (IFRC 2000b:26-27; ISDR 2001). Finally, the 2001 El Salvador earthquake reveals extensive data concerning the ‘root causes’ for our PAR model. These involve the economic and political marginality of the victims as well as the role of environmental degradation and the long-term legacy of the civil war in creating vulnerability (Wisner 2001f). ...

Despite the obvious value of a more detailed examination of any of these examples, or of others important because of scale and the wide significance of the issues raised, we have chosen here to include as new case studies the earthquake disasters in Kobe (1995) and Gujarat (2001). ...

The Kobe earthquake, 05:46 hours, 17 January 1995 ...

The Kobe (Japan) earthquake is of great importance because it exposed complacency and a false sense of preparedness in the minds, policies and practices of public officials. For many in the field it was an important lesson about the world’s seismic zones: before this disaster, officials in many highly-developed urban environments regarded major earthquakes as a problem mainly for developing societies, and assumed that their own seismic protection measures would minimise their losses. How could an earthquake of 7.2 Richter scale, occurring in a prosperous city in the second largest economy in the world, kill 6,279 persons, injure 34,900 and destroy or damage 136,000 buildings? In the end, 310,000 persons lost their homes, and there were financial losses of

$ 147

billion (not ...
including the economic effects from loss of lives, business interruption and loss of production). This made it the most severe economic loss for any disaster in world history. It came as a very big surprise for planners and policy makers: if this could happen in Kobe, what could be expected elsewhere (Mitchell 1999b:1; Swiss Re 1995; EQE 1995a)? ...

This critical question, which has been asked repeatedly since January 1995, concerns the fragility of urban systems and infrastructure in spite of the existence and enforcement of disaster planning and building codes. How secure could other similar cities beTokyo, Vancouver, San Francisco, Lisbon, Wellington and other major conurbations in the seismic zones of wealthy countries? In Kobe, vulnerability was clearly evident in four critical areas: social, physical, economic and in governmental disaster protection measures. ...

The disaster revealed important information concerning the creation of particular patterns of social vulnerability, with those over 60 accounting for 58 per cent of all deaths. Females were also at greater risk, constituting 59.3 per cent of deaths, with more killed in every age group.

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Although temporary housing was provided in a lavish and efficient manner, there is evidence of deep social distress on the part of the elderly population of lonely and possibly traumatised people. One citizen group claims that 2,900 deaths were attributable either to suicide or neglect within temporary housing (Bishop 1998:50). ...

However, there was another key vulnerability factor that failed to surface in official reporting by the government; it was also ignored in most NGO reports. In Kobe (as in Japan’s other major cities) there is a minority underclass that is particularly vulnerable. It is subject to official neglect and economic deprivation (its workers receive lower wages, and enjoy fewer rights). This minority is composed of Korean-Japanese workers and foreign workers (legal or illegal migrants from the Philippines, North Korea and China). Within the most severely affected wards of Kobe City there were 130,000 foreign and migrant workers. Most were paid low wages in small businesses that were damaged or destroyed by the earthquake (IFRC 1996). This closure of so many such businesses made recovery even more difficult for them. ...

In addition, concentrated in the Osaka and Kobe regions, there is a group of people known as the Burakumin (‘village people’) who are ethnically and genealogically Japanese but who have been discriminated against for centuries. Their status, and the treatment they receive, resembles that of the outcastes in India: the Dalits or ‘untouchables’. 4 Ancestors of the Buraku had been low-caste butchers and leather workers, but centuries later the associations with ‘unclean’ professions of the medieval caste system have persisted (Laidlaw 2001). Some Japanese parents even hire specialist investigation firms to make sure a prospective son- or daughter-in-law has no Buraku ancestors. Laidlaw (2002) has noted the effect of this social stigma and economic deprivation on their vulnerability in earlier disasters: ...

The Buraku were generally situated on river banks, mountainsides and undesirable areas. Because of this they were the first to suffer during natural ...
disasters, and also the most likely to be subject to heavy damage. ...
In Kobe City there was a concentration of Buraku in Nagata Ward, one of the poorest in the city, where they were employed in leather dyeing industries and in plastic shoe manufacture (Velasquez 1995; Ukai 1996). It was here that the most devastating fires occurred after the earthquake (EQE 1995b). In Nagata Ward alone there were 919 deaths, 15,521 collapsed houses and 4,759 burned houses (Kobe City 1995). The other two wards with the highest numbers of deaths, Nada (933) and Higashi Nada

(1, 471)

, also have concentrations of Burakumin, as can be seen by the presence of Buraku cultural centres in Figure 8.5. More than half the deaths (53 per cent) in this earthquake and the subsequent fires took place in these three wards. The intensity and rapid spread of the fire was due to the presence of inflammable chemicals used in dyeing and shoe making, in combination with the concentration of sub-standard timber buildings. Laidlaw (2002) writes of these three wards: ...

Figure 8.5 Zones of greatest damage in Kobe, 1995 Source: Adapted from Rinpokan Renraku Kyogikai (1995) ...

The entire wards themselves were not actually Buraku areas, but there were indeed Buraku areas within them. The Buraku areas also appeared to be in the areas that suffered the most damage, which was probably partly due to the fact that Buraku housing, on average, is sub-standard when compared to non-Buraku housing and was therefore more likely to collapse. ...

Unsafe dwellings ...

As often noted in this chapter, the vulnerability of people to earthquakes is inseparable from the stability of the buildings they occupy. The carefully documented statistics of damage and casualties in Kobe provides further convincing evidence. Of the victims, 86 per cent died in their homes; 73 per cent of these deaths were due to suffocation or being crushed when 54,949 buildings collapsed, while 9 per cent died from burns (a further 7,061 buildings were destroyed by post-earthquake fires). In addition to those destroyed, approximately 88,000 buildings were damaged. The majority of the buildings that collapsed were two-storey wooden dwellings with heavy tiled roofs (IFRC1996:69; Nagle 1998:19, Adams and Spence 1999:53) ...

Professor Murosaki, (Kobe University Architecture Department) has described the dangers of these wooden dwellings in relation to a major gap in higher education syllabuses on earthquake engineering: ...

There is something seriously wrong with the way we approach earthquake engineering. About 100 universities in Japan teach earthquake engineering and architecture, but I know of only one or two that teach anything about wooden house design. Yet 80 per cent of Japanese people live in wooden houses. We teach our students how to build office blocks and hotels, where the prestige and money is. Maybe we will see some change now but I am not hopeful. ...
(Quoted in IFRC 1996:69) ...
Most of these wooden-framed houses were built as part of a rapid reconstruction programme after the Second World War, when the pressure for cheap, rapid construction caused standards to suffer and meant inadequate earthquake-resistance measures. They also incorporated a design fault of very heavy tiled roofs, a highly undesirable feature given the severe horizontal shaking common during earthquakes (Swiss Re 1995). ...

Similar ill-conceived recovery actions after other disasters have shown how they can inadvertently sow the seeds of the next. After the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, rubble from the clearing up was used as landfill in the bay to expand the city.

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This unstable reclaimed land was built on by opportunistic developers who capitalised on the demand for housing after the earthquake. Most of the damage to dwellings in the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989 occurred because of severe ground-shaking of these unstable soils (Hewitt 1997:216). Much of Yokohama has also been built on landfill from debris following the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, and experts predict severe damage in these areas when the next Tokyo Bay earthquake occurs. ...

In Kobe a surprising 85 per cent of all schools were damaged. Had the earthquake occurred three hours later, when the children were inside the school buildings, the ...
earthquake impact would have been devastating, with the probable loss of a large number of children. ...

Economic vulnerability ...

The Kobe earthquake resulted in larger financial and economic losses than any disaster in world history, and only 7 per cent of house owners or businesses had earthquake damage insurance cover. Its economic impact was felt throughout Japan and across the world. The viability and reliability of the ‘just-in time’ system of logistical delivery to industry and commerce was thrown into question by the interruption in the supply of computer and automobile parts as a result of the collapse of key road and rail networks in Kobe (Munich Re 1999). ...

Livelihoods were lost or severely disrupted as a result of damage to key economic assets. For example, almost all the container berths and wharves in Japan’s largest container port were unusable (Kobe was the sixth-largest cargo port in the world). By 2002, seven years after the disaster, Kobe’s port facilities have been completely rebuilt, but trade was reduced by more than 20 per cent because of the disruption of the disaster and the time taken to reconstruct the port facilities. As already noted, the manufacture of plastic shoes has ceased, with 80 per cent of the factories damaged, mainly in Nagata Ward where the fires were extensive (Nagle 1998:20). ...

The failure of disaster preparedness measures ...

The earthquake exposed major gaps in the overall system of disaster mitigation, preparedness and emergency management in both central and local government. These included the omission or inadequacy of the following vital protection measures: building codes, public awareness of seismic risk, preparedness systems, detailed disaster plans, emergency operating procedures, information management systems, damage and needs assessment, physical provision for emergency management (such as fire-fighting), communications and staff competencies (Tierney and Goltz 1997; Heath 1995). It is important to summarise other telling observations by Tierney and Goltz (1997). ...

Kobe municipality was incapable of doing a rapid impact assessment: only 20 per cent of municipal employees were available to work after the earthquake, the city’s emergency radio system was down, the phones were down, ground transportation was impossible. ...
Lacking accurate field information the Prime Minister’s office was slow to make an assessment. ...
There was no plan for a disaster of this scale, especially no plan for coping with so many homeless people or, very soon, so many volunteers. ...
There was little planning for links between municipalities; each had planned in isolation. ...
There was a false sense of safety because of the engineering used in buildings and infrastructure. ...
By comparison, the Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles in 1994 was a small event, and the USA should not feel complacent. A large earthquake in the Oakland area ...
(across the bay from San Francisco) or Memphis or Charleston (South Carolina) could produce similar levels of damage; furthermore, the USA has not seen this kind of damage since 1906 in San Francisco-even hurricane Andrew in 1991 did not cause the equivalent level of damage to Miami. ...

Even though a disaster of this scale would have stretched the capacity of the bestprepared city, these failures came as a profound shock to Japanese citizens who believed that they had a secure system in place that would protect them in the event of an earthquake. Tatou Takayama, commentator for the Japanese newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, wrote: ...

The response to the earthquake of what many call the faceless and gigantic bureaucracy that controls Japan was dictated by territorialism, passivism and the inclination to follow precedent in times of emergency. ...
(Quoted in Frampton et al. 1998:56-57) ...
The processes by which vulnerability was generated in Kobe are summarised in Box 8.1, which follows similar headings to those used in the PAR model. ...

Box 8.1: Progression of vulnerability-the Kobe earthquake ...

ROOT CAUSES ...

Prejudice towards ethnic minorities and social groups. ...
Unequal distribution of economic power. ...
Belief in modernisation and science. ...

DYNAMIC PRESSURES ...

Lack of: ...

awareness of the severity of earthquake risk due to absence of a major earthquake in Japan since 1923; ...
awareness that the Kobe region was as vulnerable to earthquakes as other regions of Japan; ...
interest by Japanese earthquake engineers and architects in developing safety for non-engineered wooden structures (due to lack of financial returns); ...
earthquake resistance in poor quality housing built cheaply and quickly during reconstruction following damage sustained during the Second World War; ...
equitable policies and practices towards the Korean minority and the Buraku communities resulting in their poverty and sub-standard living conditions. ...

Macro-forces: ...

Japanese economic strength acting as a powerful magnet for work opportunities resulting in urbanisation due to extensive work opportunities in Kobe industries and port facilities; ...
an ageing population ...

UNSAFE CONDITIONS ...

Physical environment: ...

unsafe, non-engineered dwellings due to design faults and lack of maintenance; ...
unsafe lifeline resources (bridges, hospitals, schools, basic services); ...
severely overcrowded high-density urban areas in certain city wards; ...
unsafe infrastructure due to lack of knowledge concerning certain engineering practices in relation to seismic loading. ...

Local economy: ...

unsafe conditions in leather and plastic shoe factories; ...
little use of home owners’ insurance. ...

Social relations: ...

lack of mobility of elderly persons hampering escape from buildings during earthquake ground-shaking ...
poverty and sub-standard living conditions for the Korean minority and the Buraku communities. ...

Public actions and institutions: ...

lack of effective disaster planning; ...
lack of co-ordinated action; ...
lack of disaster preparedness at all levels. ...

HAZARDS ...

Primary impact: ...

earthquake ground-shaking. ...

Secondary impact: ...

Community resilience ...

In contrast to manifest governmental weaknesses exposed by the disaster, the earthquake revealed the strength of social mechanisms and institutional capacities. The authorities registered 342,000 evacuees in 1,153 evacuation centres on the day of peak occupancy (23 January). The vast majority of these centres were schools. Interviewing five of the headmasters who received this influx, all regarded it as their responsibility as ‘community leaders’ to open their doors to the crowds of frightened, disoriented and predominately elderly people seeking shelter (Davis 2001). One likened his role to that of a benevolent priest in a Latin American disaster setting, stating that in Japanese society the teacher had similar social prestige to that of priests in countries where there were strong religious affiliations, and that with this position came far-reaching community responsibilities which all Japanese teachers readily accepted. ...

One important feature of this use of the schools was the role of the temporary residents, who continued to occupy the schools when (within two weeks) the children returned. Many were able to assist in managing the centres as well as supporting the teaching of children (and adults). This period when the buildings served the dual functions of school and shelter persisted for about three months, until temporary housing had been constructed (Tokuyama 1995; Sugiman 2003; Atsumi and Suzuki 2003). ...

Further evidence of solidarity was seen in the spontaneous response of more than 630,000 volunteers who descended on Kobe from all over Japan, along with many Japanese students who took leave of absence from their studies in the USA and elsewhere to come and provide support. Throughout Japan, schools sent teachers to assist in the evacuation centres, sharing both welfare and teaching responsibilities, thus requiring colleagues in their normal schools to cover their teaching responsibilities (Tierney and Goltz 1997). ...

Many of the people made homeless left Kobe voluntarily to find shelter with friends or family in Osaka and elsewhere. The number is unknown, but is likely to be in the region of 100,000 (or about a third of all those made homeless). This vital ‘coping mechanism’, which took place without any support from the authorities, spread the responsibility of caring for displaced families throughout the country and thus provided considerable relief for an already over-stretched government (Davis 2001). ...

Gujarat earthquake, 08:45 hours, 26 January 2001 ...

This earthquake has been described as the most damaging in India since that of Calcutta in 1737 (in which 300,000 were killed). It measured 6.9 Richter scale (about 30 times more powerful than the Latur earthquake of 1993 that registered 6.4) and affected a very large area and about 30 per cent of the state’s population (of 50 million). Gujarat is located in a Zone V, the most serious seismic classification for India; however, this risk had largely been ignored since the last significant earthquake was in 1956 and thus a rather distant memory. The only earthquake of comparable power to that of 2001 ...
occurred in 1819, and is believed to have been about 7.7 Richter. It caused 2,000 deaths in the Rann of Kutch (north Gujarat) which was a largely uninhabited salt marsh at that time (UNDP 2001a). ...

Gujarat has recently had a troubled disaster history, with a severe cyclone in 1998 causing 3,000 deaths and widespread property damage on its coast (see Chapter 7). It has also suffered a four-year drought, starting in 1997, during which the Government of Gujarat spent

$ 128

million in drought relief works in Kutch. In 2001 the rains returned to give much needed relief to the rural communities, but this was compounded later by the earthquake devastation (UNDP 2001a; Wisner 2001g). ...

The disaster resulted in the deaths of 20,000 people (DEC 2001a, 2001b) and hundreds of thousands of injured. Unlike many previous Indian disasters that have caused most suffering to the landless and marginalised poor, the victims in this earthquake were drawn from all strata of society. Like a volcanic eruption which indiscriminately affects all within its range, there were extensive casualties around the epicentre (near the town of Bhuj), without regard to whether people were rich, middle class or poor, high or low caste. However, with regard to the recovery programme the normal post-disaster pattern prevailed, as the rich knew how to operate the system to their advantage. This has resulted in social polarisation with regard to the options presented to villages either for relocation or financial compensation. ...

Rohit Jigyasu, a planning student undertaking field study in Gujarat, noted in 2001 that in response to these options: ...
[t]he socially and economically powerful castes got together and purchased their own land and, in this way, decided to get relocated; while the weaker groups were left with no option but to stay back. This is happening in nearly all the villages. In many cases, a single village has got split into as many as 4 parts, at safe distance to each other. This is very serious as physical segregation will further deepen the polarisation. ...
(Jigyasu 2001) ...
He then observed that in many cases due to ‘good political connections the powerful castes have even managed to attract infrastructure and investment, while the poor and the marginalised are now left as “abandoned hamlets” devoid of even basic facilities’. ...

Unsafe buildings ...

Over 1.2 million homes were affected in the disaster. This total included 150,000 houses that were subsequently demolished and 750,000 that needed repairs. The historic town of Bhuj required total reconstruction, and three villages required major reconstruction efforts. Critical 'lifelines’, or facilities and structures which were particularly important in dealing with the emergency, fared badly. Three hospitals and 5,000 health units were damaged or destroyed. In addition more than 50,000 school rooms were either damaged ...
or destroyed, including 992 primary schools that collapsed completely (one killing 37 children; another collapsed later as a result of damage and killed 400 children) (GDMSA 2002). In Ahmedabad (the state capital and a city of 4.5 million) it was the urban middle class who suffered, especially those living in the 86 apartment buildings that collapsed (Rutten and Engelshoven 2001). ...

In urban areas there had been growth of cheap, three- to four-storey apartment buildings where construction quality was poor, with insufficient and incorrectly placed steel reinforcements, and adulterated cement. However, the primary building failures in Gujarat occurred when non-engineered dwellings collapsed in large numbers, frequently killing or injuring their occupants. A local engineer involved in a disaster recovery NGO in Ahmedabad argues that housing must bear the brunt for destruction and damage, especially the non-engineered housing that people construct themselves, generally with the help of the local building artisans and with very little technological support from outside (Desai 2002). ...

Economic vulnerability ...

Over 10,000 small and medium-sized industrial units went out of production with the consequent loss of 50,000 jobs. The direct losses have been assessed to be

$ 3, 222

million, plus indirect losses of

$ 641

million (due to the closure of businesses) (GDMSA 2002). ...

Despite the fact that Gujarat is one of the four wealthiest states in India, it contains underclasses of very poor industrial and agricultural workers who are unlikely to earn more than 11,000 rupees (

$ 250

) per annum. For their families, formal building codes and their enforcement, or land-use planning controls, are of minimal significance (IFRC 2001c; Humanitarian Initiatives et al. 2001; Wisner 2001g). ...

The overall patterns of vulnerability are summarised in Box 8.2, which again is designed with headings that parallel those in the PAR model.

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...

Box 8.2: Progression of vulnerability-the Gujarat earthquake ...

ROOT CAUSES ...

Caste system. ...
History of conflict between Hindu and Muslim. ...
Lack of ethical standards and accountability in public authorities and in the building industry. ...
Aspiration to ‘modernise’ housing (use of heavier concrete block). ...

DYNAMIC PRESSURES ...

Lack of: ...

building code enforcement; ...
effective land-use planning; ...
earthquake awareness in local populations; ...
understanding or interest in non-engineered building within the engineering profession; ...
awareness of earthquake risk in general public and government due to long return period of earthquake incidence in Gujarat; ...
governmental commitment to effective disaster planning; ...
resilience in many rural communities due to the four-year drought. ...

Macro-forces: ...

migrant workers come to Gujarat for work; ...
agricultural modernisation produces landless people who seek work in cities; ...
rapid urbanisation; ...
rapid industrialisation. ...

UNSAFE CONDITIONS ...

Physical environment: ...

building code violations; ...
inadequate land-use planning; ...
low quality of building construction; ...
lack of seismic resistance in non-engineered construction; ...
lack of supervision of building construction; ...
poor building maintenance; ...
ageing building stock in towns and cities; ...
unsafe ‘lifeline facilities’: schools, medical buildings, etc. ...

Local economy: ...

lack of insurance protection; ...
unsafe industrial buildings and facilities. ...

Social relations: ...

low-caste groups particularly vulnerable; ...
low-caste and Muslim groups often excluded from relief and recovery resources. ...

Public actions and institutions: ...

lack of effective disaster plans; ...

• lack of Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs);
- lack of co-ordinated action;
- lack of search and rescue capacity.
HAZARDS
Primary impact:
- ground shaking.
Secondary impact:
- fires.

Community resilience ...

The government has been severely criticised for its failure to deliver immediate support to the surviving population. India has all the professional skills and skilled human resources needed for disaster management, and many of these resources were rapidly deployed by many people on a voluntary basis. There was a remarkable response from Indian society, from the survivors themselves, from other parts of India and from many in the Gujarati communities of Europe and North America. ...

Volcanoes are vents in the crust of the earth through which molten rock is extruded as lava or ejected as ash or coarser debris, sometimes accompanied by steam and hot (often poisonous) gases (Davis and Gupta 1991:29; Winchester 2003). Other hazards associated with eruptions are earthquakes, tsunamis and mud-and rockslides (which can often occur years afterwards). Volcanic eruptions endanger any person living within the high-risk zone whether rich or poor, landowner or landless farm labourer, man or woman, old or young, member of ethnic minority or majority. As Tomblin has commented: ...

Eruptions differ from most other major causes of disaster such as earthquakes, hurricanes and floods, in that they cause virtually total destruction of life and property within relatively small areas which can be easily delineated. ...
(Tombin 1987:17) ...
Poisonous gas emissions do not differentiate between social groups.

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But even where these are not the main threat, income levels, the quality of house construction and the type of occupation all seem to have little bearing on people’s differential capacity to resist the volcanic arsenal of hot gas emissions, blast impact, lava flows, projectiles, volcanic mudslides (lahars) and the deposit of ash. ...

It can be argued that wealthy people have more access to knowledge, which can ...
include an awareness of volcanic risk, and that they are able to respond to warnings of (and have better transport for) evacuation in the event of an eruption. But there is growing evidence that poor people living near active volcanoes are also aware of the risks. Once they observe signs of volcanic activity they are just as likely to follow evacuation orders as their rich neighbours (Kuester and Forsyth 1985; Tayag n.d.; Zarco 1985). ...

Also, although volcanoes are a hazard, in the longer term some of their products can be beneficial. Extremely fertile soils result from the weathering of volcanic ashes and pyroclastic materials. Farmers often obtain bumper harvests as a result of a mild sprinkling of volcanic ash on their fields (Wood 1986:130). In 1992, Cerro Negro erupted near Leon in Nicaragua. A thick layer of volcanic ash was deposited, with gloomy forecasts that the agriculture would be interrupted for years. However, within ten months farmers were already enjoying good crops from the fertile soils mixed with volcanic ash (Baxter 1993).

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...

Such blessings undoubtedly constitute an extremely powerful economic attraction to settle on slopes of volcanoes. It is often suggested that people inhabiting high-risk zones are gamblers by nature, who take big risks to achieve uncertain benefits. But it does not appear to take families very long to decide to face the risk of an eruption, with a return period of perhaps 45 years, in return for economic opportunities that are realised every day. Paradoxically, effective disaster preparedness, with its expectations of good warning and evacuation by the authorities, only adds to the appeal. ...

The Nevado del Ruiz eruption, 15:15 hours, Colombia, 13 November 1985 ...

This case study returns to the issue of volcanic warnings and evacuations with which we introduced this chapter. It concerns the second most deadly eruption of the twentieth century - the eruption of Nevado del Ruiz in Colombia in 1985, with the loss of 23,000 lives (Wood 1986; United Nations 1985). The town of Armero was built on debris from earlier eruptions in 1595 (when 600 were killed) and 1845 (when 1,000 died) (Bishop 1998:60). The 1985 eruption occurred at 15:15 hours, and two hours later the residents of the town of Armero (population 29,000) noticed that fine dust was falling. At 17:30, the National Geology and Mining Institute is reported to have advised that the area at risk should be evacuated. By 19:30 the Red Cross attempted to carry out such an evacuation. But perhaps on account of a very heavy thunderstorm, or the lack of evacuation drills, few agreed to leave their homes. At 21:05 a strong earth tremor occurred, followed by a rain of hot pumice and ash. As a result, part of the ice cap of the

5, 400 m

high volcano melted and caused the river Guali to overflow. This in turn caused a natural dam to burst, releasing a torrent that travelled at speeds estimated at

70 km / h (42.5 m / h)

, and a massive mudflow enveloped the town of Armero (Tomblin 1985; Siegel and Witham 1991; Parker 1989:160-167; Bruce 2001). ...

Within the town one of the few survivors, Rosa Maria Henoa, described how at about 23:35 hours: ...
first there were earth tremors, the air suddenly smelt of sulphur, then there was a horrible rumbling that seemed to come from deep inside the earth. Then the ...
avalanche rolled into town with a moaning sound like some kind of monster… Houses below us started cracking under the advance of the river of mud. ...
(Quoted in UNDRO 1985:5) ...
What transpired in those minutes is a horrific story of people attempting to drive away from the wall of roasting mud, stones and water. Some died in the chaos as terrified people tried to climb aboard moving vehicles (Sigurdson and Carey 1986; Davis 1988; Parker 1989; Siegel and Witham 1991). ...

In the early months of 1988, a group of lawyers inserted a notice in the local press of the city of Manizales, and in the small towns of Guayabal and Lerida. These are close to Armero, and housed some of the 3,000 survivors. There was little point in pinning any notices in Armero since the town had become a vast deserted ‘cemetery’ where as many as 23,000 people are buried in the mud that killed them. The lawyers invited anyone who had suffered injury, or the loss of relatives or property in these volcanic mudslides to contact them if they wanted to sue the government for gross negligence in not warning or evacuating them in time. ...

In response 750 claims were filed, amounting to a total of approximately

$ 80

million. The claim hinged on the government’s alleged negligence in failing to develop effective preparedness planning (including evacuation procedures) to enable the population to escape falling debris and mudslides. These are known hazards that have occurred after previous volcanic eruptions in the region. ...

It was anticipated that government lawyers would argue that the residents were aware of the risks in choosing to occupy what is a hazardous yet highly fertile area. By the time the case reached the court in Tolima, the number of claimants had risen to about a thousand. They sued the Ministry of Mines and Energy, since the geological service (which had responsibility for the issuing of volcanic warnings) was attached to this ministry. Government lawyers argued that the ‘ordering of evacuations’ was not one of the designated functions of the ministry. But as proof of governmental concern they produced evidence that Civil Defence had conducted a ‘door-to-door’ campaign to warn people to evacuate during the early stages of the eruption. Three volcanologists were asked as expert witnesses whether the scale, location and timing of the mudflow could have been accurately forecast, and since they said no, the government was cleared of responsibility (Wilches-Chaux 1992b). ...

The Nevada del Ruiz disaster was a catalyst that had a dramatic impact on the development of disaster protection in Colombia. An effective government preparedness system at central and provincial level was created, which includes detailed warning and evacuation systems. However, whilst preparedness planning exists on paper, in practice economic priorities can easily override safety. For example, the very active Galeras volcano erupted in January 1993, and the nearby town of Pasto was at risk.

^{9}

In 1992 and 1993 the government Disaster Preparedness Agency wanted to issue warnings to the public, but the local authorities refused to act on them. Their refusal stemmed from the economic consequences of a warning given several years previously, which provoked an immediate financial crisis in the locality when credits and loans were closed and investors withdrew (Wilches-Chaux 1993). ...

Montserrat volcanic eruptions 1995-1998 $^{10}$ ...

Having described in outline the two most severe volcanic eruptions of the last century in terms of lives lost, we now turn to two more recent volcanic eruptions. The Montserrat (Caribbean) eruption was selected on account of lessons to be learnt from its long-term impact that stretches from 1995 until 2003. The Goma (eastern Congo) eruption of 2002 was chosen as a tragic example of a disaster that was piled on top of others: genocide and an ongoing bitter civil war. ...

Geography and vulnerability ...

Montserrat is a small island country in the Lesser Antilles (Caribbean), measuring 16 km . north-south and 11 km . east-west, 102 sq . km . in total (roughly half the size of Washington DC). It is part of an arc of volcanic islands that includes St Kitts and Nevis, Guadeloupe, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent and Martinique (see above on the eruption of Mount Pelée in 1902). Montserrat is a British Dependent Territory, the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), with a resident Governor who represents the Queen. Britain therefore has responsibility for the well-being of Montserrat’s citizens, including their protection and assistance in times of emergency. The island is dominated by the 915 m volcanic peak of Soufriere Hills. However, before 1995 the population of about 10,500 did not regard the volcanic threat as serious. There were no records of an eruption, although volcanologists believe that there had been one in the mid-sixteenth century. Thus, the population had to adapt to life with an active volcano, which was active for three years from 1995. Although the eruptions ended in 1998, at the time of writing (in 2002) normality had yet to return and some communities who evacuated their homes had had to live in sub-standard temporary housing for a full seven years ...

Volcanoes can be seen as great levellers, potentially deadly to all life and all people, rich or poor, who are within reach of their destructive power. But in the case of Montserrat there were exceptions. Firstly, some people who had insufficient resources or employment re-entered the official danger zone in order to continue farming, and 19 of these people were killed in a sudden eruption. Secondly, not everyone had equal access to alternative livelihoods during the period of eruptions. Many with better education and foreign connections were able to emigrate. Those who could not stayed in temporary housing on the northern part of the island, including 40 elderly persons. Florence Dailey was in charge of two shelters provided for this group, and has described how some of them had been abandoned by their children long before the eruption. Others lived on their own within the exclusion zone without any support, and there was a third group who refused to leave the island when their children left as they felt too old or frail. Later, a few chose to join their evacuated families when a flight to the UK was arranged by the government. This vulnerable community of the elderly were initially distressed, having to ...
live in converted schoolrooms without privacy. They later came to accept the situation, and have now been accommodated in permanent sheltered accommodation (Dailey 2002). ...

Unsafe conditions ...

The size of the island complicates risk-reduction measures. Clay et al. (1999: vol. 1:8) state that ‘the smallness of Montserrat raises a special problem of diseconomies of scale’. Wadge et al. have also commented on the special problems associated with the small size of the island: ...
[T]he size of Montserrat has been a key factor in the crisis. Had the eruption taken place on a smaller island, total evacuation would have been inevitable. On a much larger island the issue of safety zone boundaries would have been easier to address. ...
(Wadge et al. 1998:3.28) ...
Montserrat has similarities with many South Pacific island countries where there is a high exposure to a range of hazards, but with tiny populations, low tax revenues, and limited skills and human resources (Pelling and Uitto 2002; Lewis 1999). This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to address the disaster risks they face. A characteristic of small island states is that for many hazards, a large percentage of the population is likely to be affected, with few spared to assist in the recovery. In addition, there are diseconomies of scale in the provision of infrastructure and services, and often reliance on a single hospital or a single airport. However, as noted above, Montserrat is different from small, independent, sovereign states since it is a British Dependent Territory, a status that unlocks resources for disaster risk reduction as well as for relief and recovery actions (Pattullo 2000). ...

Economic vulnerability ...

The economy of Montserrat before the eruptions was based on subsistence agriculture and fisheries, tourism and light industry. But with the eruptions, all have been lost or severely depleted. The fisheries have suffered because the volcano seriously damaged the coral reefs and reduced fish density. Farming was mainly in the southern part of the island, and had to be abandoned as this area was within the exclusion zone (Panton and Archer 1996; Brosnam 2000). ...

Failure of protection measures ...

In 1987, the Pan Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Project (PCDPPP) carried out a volcanic hazard risk assessment in Montserrat (Wadge and Isaacs 1987). The subsequent report was not an academic study that remained confined to a university library, since it was addressed to the Government of Montserrat and proposed a series of practical actions. The resulting hazard map projected a number of volcanic scenarios ...
including the potential threat to the capital city, Plymouth. In 1987 the report was handed to the Governor of Montserrat and the Chief of Police who had responsibility for Disaster Preparedness. ...

Ten years later in 1997, when a UK House of Commons Committee conducted an enquiry into the official response to the Montserrat eruption, senior officials said they had no knowledge of the report’s existence. There seems to have been a complete lack of official awareness, interest or practical action to address the volcanic threat that was expressed in a detailed and scientifically substantiated hazard map and volcanic forecast. However, the fact that only 19 people lost their lives in three years of volcanic eruptions reflects well on the system of volcanic risk monitoring, the warning system, emergency management and risk-reduction policies. This achievement is offset by high levels of dissatisfaction with compensation payments, evacuation procedures and emergency shelters among the displaced communities (Clay et al. 1999: vol.1:5 item 20). ...

Plymouth was destroyed by the fall of toxic ash, and this was unavoidable. But there is evidence of human failure as well, and certain losses of critical facilities are very definitely not to be regarded as Acts of God’. As noted above, Plymouth was identified as being severely ‘at risk’ in a scientific assessment in 1987, eight years before the start of volcanic activity. ...

Box 8.3: Chronology of events during the Montserrat eruptions ...

18 July This marked the beginning of volcanic activity, with explosions ...
1995 and ash fall in the Plymouth area as predicted in the assessment. At this time the population was 10,500 . ...
21 August The first eruption was followed by the initial evacuation of 1995 5,000 persons from the capital city, Plymouth. During this phase of the emergency, there was a debate over whether to order a total evacuation from the island. A decision was made to evacuate the most dangerous southern parts of the island, adjacent to the volcano. ...

2 Following further pyroclastic flows, Plymouth was evacuated ...
December for the second time and 6,000 people were relocated to 1995 temporary camps in the north of the island. ...

3 April Plymouth was evacuated for the third and final time. The 1996 Governor declared a state of emergency. From this date the city of Plymouth was abandoned; according to expert medical advice, the ash contained carcinogenic silica including cristoballite (Baxter 1993). ...

23 April A voluntary evacuation scheme was introduced, and islanders 1996 were offered the option to move to the UK for two years; only 40 took up the offer. ...

July 1996 By this time 2,000 residents had left Montserrat, mainly for Antigua or other Caribbean islands, bringing the population down to 8,096. From September 1996 to July 1997 there was a period of intensive volcanic activity. ...

17 A magmatic explosive event took place causing destruction of September houses in Long Ground and other eastern villages. 1996 ...

12 Collapse of ‘Galways Wall’ in the volcanic crater resulting in December concern that a tsunami could now cause a threat to 1996 neighbouring islands, especially Guadeloupe. ...
25 June Pyroclastic flows occurred close to the airport, causing its 1997 closure. Three villages were destroyed and 19 were killed whilst farming on the slopes of the volcano within the exclusion zone, against advice and warning. ...

4 July Following explosive ash eruptions, a revised volcanic risk map 1997 was produced that placed over half the island in the exclusion zone. By this time the population had dropped by a further 3,096 to 5,000 (half the original population). ...

August Three towns were evacuated and 1,598 ‘high-risk’ individuals 1997 were living in shelters. However the design, siting, timing of delivery and administration of the shelters became the subject of sustained criticism (International Development Committee 1997: para 50). ...

19 August At this stage, when the volcanic activity was at its height, the 1997 evacuees had two options, both of which they found highly undesirable. Firstly, they could leave the island and travel to Antigua or other parts of the Caribbean, or move to the UK. The second option was to remain in Montserrat, but to move into overcrowded temporary housing in the relatively less dangerous northern part of the island. A total of 700 took the first option leaving 3-4,000 in the ‘safe zones’. The British Government offered

£ 2, 500

per adult

($ 3, 365)

to provide support for resettlement, but this sum was regarded as derisory by the residents, who conveyed their feelings to the British Government through their political representatives. ...

26 The largest explosion of the entire eruption occurred, ejecting December 50 million cubic metres of material. By this date the population 1997 had dropped by a further 2,000 to just 3,000 . ...

10 March After this date there was a significant reduction in volcanic ...

1998 activity. People slowly started to return to the island so that by December 1998 the population had reached 4,400. ...

February Some families who were unable to return to their homes in the 2002 exclusion zone were still living in temporary housing. A decision on a new airport to replace the original that was destroyed in 1997 had still not been taken. The economic base of the island economy had been seriously disrupted. The future was very much in doubt for those who remained. ...

October The exclusion zone was increased due to the growth of the 2002 volcanic dome. ...

May The volcanic dome was growing again with constant ash falls but 2003 no major volcanic activity in the preceding weeks. The population was estimated to have risen to 4,500 (under half the pre-eruption population). A new airport in the north of Montserrat was being built to replace the airport destroyed in the eruption and is due to open by October 2004.

^{11}

...

During that period no disaster planning or mitigation steps were taken. Why? Furthermore, the authorities (including the British Government) continued to invest in Plymouth, and refurbished the Glendon Hospital at a cost of

£ 5

million (after it was badly damaged by hurricane Hugo in 1989). The decision to approve this, rather than relocate the entire hospital to a safer part of the island, was approved by a Senior Health Official in the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) about a year after the hazard map was published.

^{12}

...

Box 8.4: Progression of vulnerability-the Montserrat eruptions ...

ROOT CAUSES ...

Colonial history and resulting geographically and culturally distant 'overseas’ administration. ...

DYNAMIC PRESSURES ...
Lack of: ...

political interest in the volcanic threat prior to the eruptions; ...
harmonious working relationship between the Government of Montserrat and the British Government during the crisis; ...
a ‘common language’ between scientists and decision makers. ...

Macro-forces ...

patterns of out-migration of skilled people from Montserrat (particularly during the 1960s); ...
diseconomies of scale. ...

UNSAFE CONDITIONS ...

Physical environment: ...

the capital city of Plymouth was sited in a high-risk zone very close to the volcano; ...
key ‘lifelines’ such as the airport and the main hospital were both sited in high-risk zones; ...
extended and acute uncertainties: ‘waiting on the volcano’. ...

Local economy: ...

economy dependent on agriculture, fisheries and tourism, all of which were devastated by the long series of eruptions and accumulation of toxic ash. ...

Social relations: ...

lack of public awareness programmes concerning the volcanic threat prior to the eruptions; ...
differential access to overseas remittance incomes; ...
differential access to immigration opportunities other than the temporary one offered by the British government. ...

Public actions and institutions: ...

before the eruptions there was very limited risk assessment or disaster planning in Montserrat by the government; ...
lack of adequate emergency shelter accommodation. ...

HAZARDS ...

Primary impact: ...

pyroclastic flows, magmatic explosions, ash falls. ...

Secondary impact: ...

coral and fish die off; ...
respiratory illnesses in humans from ash. ...

Livelihoods, warnings, governance and volcanoes ...
In the case of both Nevada del Ruiz and Montserrat there is a complex interrelationship between economic reasons why people are located near volcanoes, the reasons why authorities do or do not issue timely warnings and whether they are acted upon, and the history and form of governance.

^{13}

Lack of access to alternative land means that many low-income farming families are located on the slopes of active volcanoes elsewhere in the Caribbean and in such places as the Philippines, Indonesia, Mexico and countries in Central America and the Andes. An extreme event that demonstrates these economic and political relationships occurred in eastern Congo at the beginning of 2002. ...

Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the eruption of Mount Nyiragongo, 17 January 2002 ...

During the morning of 17 January 2002, Mount Nyiragongo erupted with lava flows spewing in several directions, splitting the city of Goma into segments. The volcano had been a threat to Goma before, most recently in 1977 when 2,000 were killed in a violent eruption. It is a mere 11 km from Goma, a city with a population of 500,000. Accurate informal warnings of an impending eruption had been made by two perceptive local volcanologists, but these were not communicated to the public since there was no responsible government to issue warnings, order evacuations or take any emergency management actions. In place of city government, there was an occupying force of armed rebels fighting the central government of the DRC. ...

Damage was extensive: 14,000 homes out of a total of 100,000 were destroyed; 147 people were reported dead, including at least 50 who died when a petrol station exploded as people looted petrol. About 75 per cent of the population was displaced by the lava flows, mostly to nearby Rwanda. However, as soon as the volcanic eruption subsided there was an immediate reverse flow back into Goma, still smoking from fires ignited by the eruption. This was despite strenuous efforts by the United Nations and local NGOs to prevent a return to the city on safety grounds. The evacuees were very dissatisfied with conditions in the Rwandan relief camps, while reports of the looting of abandoned property made people keen to return and protect their assets. During 1994-1996 many of the city’s inhabitants had witnessed the cholera and violence in the nearby camps for Rwandans displaced by the earlier genocide (1994) in their country. They probably associated all UN-run camps with these conditions, and this added to their aversion to the shelter that was offered (Wisner 2002b). About 30,000 remained in the Rwandan relief camps, but by the end of March 2002 most had returned to Goma. ...

At the time of the eruption, Goma was controlled by a rebel faction, and their presence had led to a progressive decline in living standards, with the economy and all basic services, such as health and education, being decimated. There had been reports of the abuse of children and women by rebel soldiers, who had also made repeated attempts to recruit child soldiers from the local community. ...

Many citizens of Goma were affected deeply by the traumatic events of the Rwanda genocide of 1994, as they played host to a staggering 800,000 Rwandan refugees seeking sanctuary in and near their city. These memories were embedded in attitudes and the behaviour of the society, and their response to this eruption was undoubtedly affected by this experience. HIV-AIDS was an additional source of danger in Goma, and this threat was intensified by the presence of rebel soldiers and the associated prostitution that arose as part of the local economy. ...

Unsafe conditions ...

There are few measures that can be taken to protect buildings and infrastructure from the ravages of a volcanic eruption other than to provide sufficiently strong, incombustible roofs to support hot ash falls. Since Goma is also in an active seismic zone, the materials used, the siting, form and construction of all structures need to be to aseismic standards. This was not the case for normal buildings, and there is also the legacy of the 1994 influx in Goma when housing for the Rwandan refugees was rapidly and badly constructed. These buildings still remained throughout the city. Partly because of the various traumas of the past decade, little attention had been given to hazard-resistant planning or construction in the city. The volcano also destroyed vital 'lifeline’ infrastructure that included 47 schools, two hospitals and several key roads that link parts of the city and the airport. ...

Economic vulnerability ...

Goma was one of the few centres in eastern Congo with anything resembling a functioning economy. The damage to business spelt financial and economic hardship for the community. The rebel forces were probably as poor as the residents of the city and so did not have any resources to bring to assist in the economic recovery of the community. ...

Failure of protective measures ...

All aspects of vulnerability in Goma have been dominated by the fierce conflict between rebel forces and the government of the DRC, and among different rebel groups based in the eastern part of the country. The local government was not democratically elected and failed to serve the interests of its people. The civil strife extended to seven other countries and at least three opposing rebel forces were engaged in this prolonged power struggle that, by 2002, had cost 2.5 million lives.

^{14}

More than 50 million people had had their lives disrupted and jeopardised by the civil war. One of the strongest underlying reasons for the power struggle was the competition for control of the rich mineral resources of the region, especially copper, diamonds, gold and columbite-tantalite (known as coltan, an essential ingredient in electronics, especially mobile phones) (Oxfam, UK 2002). ...

The rebel forces in Goma were not at all equipped to establish any viable local administration. In this power and administrative vacuum the UN and key international NGOs (such as the Red Cross and Caritas) and local NGOs attempted to provide some protection and basic services. However, there was no basis in this restricted role to allow ...
either warning of the eruption or an orderly evacuation. ...

Community resilience ...

The people in Goma had had to become highly resourceful to cope with a series of crises that have threatened their lives and livelihoods. These traumas included volcanic eruption (1977), refugee influx (1994-1996), civil war (most recently since 1998) and then another major eruption (2002). Evidence of their coping strengths and strategies was shown by the spontaneous return to the city of its people, despite the obvious risks from the continuing eruption. Their preferred strategy was to try and protect their livelihoods and assets back home, despite official pressure to remain in safe but uncomfortable refugee camps in Rwanda. In subsequent days people demonstrated further levels of resourcefulness as they cooked food in the ‘ovens’ of boiling lava that lay just below the new ground surface. Other enterprising residents secured bulldozers to create temporary access routes across the lava flows that had divided the city. The relatively low loss of life itself may be testimony to the people’s own capabilities, and may also have been an important factor in maintaining high levels of community morale in the face of this adversity. ...

Policy response and mitigation ...

Five approaches to risk reduction in the face of earthquakes and volcanoes will now be suggested (these are elaborated in Chapter 9). Firstly, earthquake and volcanic disasters can be used as opportunities to challenge the root causes of vulnerability. Popular development organisations can capitalise on a disaster event to challenge and possibly change unjust political, social and economic relations that lead to vulnerability. Holloway has suggested that: ...
[d]isasters will often set up a dynamic in which social structures can be overturned, and relief and rehabilitation judiciously applied can help change the status quo; while projects will be the models in microcosm that can be used to demonstrate to government the possibilities of a variety of ways of working. ...
(Holloway 1989:220) ...
Thus, in the aftermath of the Mexico City and Gujarat earthquakes, neighbourhood and women’s organisations were strengthened, and increased their demands for government services (Robinson et al. 1986; Annis 1988; UNDP 2001a; Bhatt 2003). There is no direct relationship between the strength of local organisations and reduction of vulnerability to disaster, but certainly the converse is true: in the absence of grassroots and neighbourhood organisation, vulnerability increases. ...

Secondly, and following from the first point, local institutions can be strengthened and the capability of families to reduce their own vulnerability can be improved. This is Anderson and Woodrow’s (1998) notion of ‘rising from the ashes’. However, to achieve this, energy and resources need to be focused on strengthening the self-reliance of the most vulnerable households and their institutions, especially local organisations. We ...
return to the difficult question of identifying and aiding ‘the most vulnerable’ in Chapter 9. ...

After an earthquake in Ecuador (March 1987) local artisan builders rebuilt homes in a safe manner in collaboration with an outsider, who reflected on the experience: ...

We have learnt that with outside support, but not external control, and with limited technical objectives the people can achieve great things… [T]rue development, disaster or no disaster, will only take place through the strengthening of indigenous infrastructures directly accountable to local people. ...

(Dudley 1988:120) ...
Accountability builds trust, and trust allows access to the inner workings of local coping mechanisms. When these are translated into architectural form, there is the possibility of designing low-cost, safer shelter together with local people as partners (Maskrey 1989; Aysan and Davis 1992). ...

Thirdly, reconstruction following disaster offers a chance to tap local knowledge and strengthen livelihoods (Oliver-Smith 1988, 1990). An example of the former comes from Gujarat, where in designing new, earthquake-resistant dwellings, local architects and engineers drew inspiration from the traditional bhoonga houses that exist throughout the Kutch region. These circular dwellings (built with a conical roof, mud, sticks and wooden supports) withstood the earthquake on account of their shape and method of construction whilst many modern houses collapsed (UNDP 2001a:9-10). Livelihood support is evident also in cases such as the reconstruction following the Mexico City earthquake, when thousands of labouring jobs were created by the recovery process (Kreimer and Echeverria 1991). ...

Fourthly, the disaster provides an opportunity to develop effective risk assessment with good cost-benefit arguments for protective measures. An example is encouragement offered to local authorities by a World Bank team that has been working in La Paz, the capital city of Bolivia, which faces numerous hazards. In a report on the lessons learnt from the project, the team concluded that risks could be evaluated, quantified, programmed and addressed with measures that the city could afford, even with all its pressing demands on the budget. ...
[W]e calculated that disaster prevention and preparedness would cost US $500,000 in 1987 and total about US

$ 2.5

million, or US

$ 2.50

per capita… [T] his amount is far exceeded by annual losses from natural disasters estimated at

$ 8

per capita. With this minimal level of funding, disaster mitigation could be affordable, cost-effective and within the realm of La Paz’s needs. ...
(Plessis-Fraissard 1989:135) ...
Finally, disasters provide an opportunity to educate political leaders and decision makers about the deeper causes of vulnerability and disaster. Authorities, civic and business leaders may be ignorant, or they may deliberately avoid recognising their own role in increasing vulnerability. They may respond to messages such as that of the financial calculation just discussed. In addition, such leaders may be moved by moral imperatives backed up by political demands. A good example of this is the growing outrage expressed ...
by ordinary people and professionals alike at the collapse of school buildings that have been improperly constructed, often because of corruption. The deaths of schoolchildren in El Salvador and Gujarat (2001), Italy (2002) and Turkey (2003) has led to an increasing outcry both locally and internationally. Thus we may be witnessing the beginning of a pattern that begins with outrage, develops political organisation and eventually leads to legislation and proper enforcement (Wisner 2003b; see Chapter 9 for more on the collapse of school buildings and this general pattern of mounting political pressure for change). ...

Notes ...

1 The earthquake disaster in Peru (31 May 1970) killed 70,000 people, left half a million homeless and seriously damaged 152 provincial cities and 1,500 villages. Oliver-Smith (1994) argues that the causes must be traced back 500 years to the Spanish conquest and the destruction of the Inca ‘prevention mindset’ that had created a remarkable ability to mitigate such hazards. ...
2 The authors, especially Davis, wish to acknowledge the insights and knowledge derived from members of the joint UK-Mexican Government Research Project into Urban Seismic Risk Reduction, 1988-1990, especially Yasemin Aysan, Andrew Coburn, Robin Spence, Alexandro Rivas-Vidal, Susanna Rubin and Hugo GarciaPerez. ...
3 However, in Japan, and particularly in Kobe, over the age of 55 women outnumber men significantly (Ukai 1996), suggesting that the excess mortality of women belonging to older age groups reflects their greater share of the total. ...
4 Discrimination against the Burakumin is not as extreme as is the case for India’s Dalits, but there are similarities. There are also parallels in attempts by the governments of the two countries to discourage such discrimination. There are laws in India aimed at special assistance for the untouchables; while the Japanese government established special funds in 1969 for the improvement of some 4,500 specific neighbourhoods (called, collectively, the Dowa) where Burakumin lived. However, there are probably another 2,000 neighbourhoods inhabited by Buraku that were not included in the original plans (Laidlaw 2001: ch. 3). ...
5 Steinberg (2000:28) points out that San Francisco had been expanding into reclaimed parts of the Bay for more than 100 years. In 1906 the business district suffered as a result of liquefaction of the soil due to its location on landfill that had begun in the 1850s. ...
6 This application of the PAR model was first drafted as a student project in 2002 by postgraduate students undertaking the Masters in Defence Administration course (MDA) at Cranfield University, under the supervision of Ian Davis. The students were: Henry Cummins, Henry Hailstone, Alex Hall, Jamie Hartley, Amanda Hassel, Mike Healey, Duncan Gregory, Tony Leadbeater, Alison Munro, Suzanne Murray, George Ramshaw, Tim Reynolds, Ron Rowley, Caron Tassel, Liren Xie and Yong Zhang. The authors are grateful for the first draft provided by these students, to which modifications have been made. ...

7 This point is also evident in another very rare volcanic hazard, mentioned in Chapter 1, which struck the villages scattered to the north of Lake Nyos in Cameroon on 21 August 1986. A cloud of carbon dioxide gas was released from the lake, for reasons that remain unclear. The gas could have been the product of volcanic activity, or it could be an equally rare event in which gas trapped by a cold layer of very deep water was released due to a minor earthquake. In any case, the gas affected everyone living in the area, and asphyxiated 1,700 people (95,000 survived) (Baxter and Kapila 1989; Sigurdson 1988). ...
8 Eruptions also produce valuable mineral products such as pumice, perlite, scoria, borax and sulphur. Residual heat in volcanic regions can also be tapped to provide cheap geothermal energy. The medicinal and recreational use of hot springs has been recognised throughout the world for thousands of years. ...
9 It caused the death of six of the world’s leading volcanologists, who were conducting scientific studies in the crater at the time. ...
10 Assistance in writing this case study has been generously provided by Franklyn Michael (Permanent Secretary to the Government of Montserrat during the emergency), Roger Bellers (DFID Advisor on Disaster Management to the Overseas Territories), Professor Geoff Wadge (Reading University) and Dr Peter Baxter (University of Cambridge). ...
11 The ODA was Britain’s foreign aid ministry, now called the Department for International Development (DFID). ...
12 The May 2003 update was provided by personal communication between Ian Davis and the Montserrat Desk, Overseas Territories Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK Government, 9 May 2003. ...
13 Since publication of the first edition of this book there has been much work done on early warning systems. In Chapter 7 we saw that despite much progress in understanding the behaviour of cyclones, many social and economic factors can still intervene to block effective warnings. The same is true of volcanoes. There has been considerable progress in producing accurate warnings (Tilling 2002), and some notable success stories such as the warning that saved many lives before Mount Pinatubo erupted in the Philippines in 1991 (Punongbayan and Newhall 1995). Nevertheless, there continue to be situations, such as the one about to be described in eastern Congo, where no effective municipal government existed to organise warnings, or in Montserrat, where economic pressure forced some to disregard warnings. ...
14 A report in 2003 estimated that as many as 4.7 million people could have perished due to violence, disease and starvation during four and a half years of conflict in Congo (Astill and Chevallot 2003). ...

Part III
TOWARDS A SAFER ENVIRONMENT ...

9
TOWARDS A SAFER ENVIRONMENT ...

'Towards a safer environment': are statements of intent merely hot air? ...

Before we review international efforts to reduce people’s vulnerability and make some of our own suggestions, let us engage with some pessimistic views about their efficacy, some of them radical and others post-modern. The story runs something like this. Conferences and the airing of statements of concern, declarations, objectives and principles therein are simply a waste of time. They may stabilise the expectations of international bureaucrats in times of uncertainty, threatened guilt and blame but merely represent manoeuvrings in corridor politics far from the site and sight of death, destruction and destitution (Bellamy Foster 2003; Sachs et al. 2002). Disasters are discursively ‘produced’ by the well-paid and well-fed in rich countries who indulge in essentialising cultural discourses which denigrate large parts of the world as diseaseridden, poverty stricken and disaster prone (see an example of the deconstruction of famine by Bankoff 2001, mentioned in Chapter 1, and a critique similar to ours in Adams 2001; Broch-Due 2000; Leach and Mearns 1996; Hoben 1995). ...

The radical structuralist version of pessimism takes the view that conferences such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 (reviewed in the next section) are nothing more than media events for which corporate sponsorship has already purchased the script, and global corporations have already determined what are to be framed as ‘problems’ or orchestrated as ‘silences’. In short, 'he who pays the piper calls the tune’ (Bellamy Foster 2003; Sachs et al. 2002). Disasters are, in any case, outcomes of global socio-economic forces (‘root causes’ and ‘dynamic pressures’ in the PAR model), and quite outside any transformation which any amount of hot air might offer. ...

Disasters are essentially historically and spatially specific outcomes of the process of contemporary capitalism. Unsafe practices are pursued by privatised public utilities unconcerned by what anyone might say at the conference table. Structural adjustment policies have been adopted without any consideration at all for their impact on increased vulnerability, and have led to cuts in health provision, education and public services in general. The liberalisation of trade is grotesquely one-sided-in that poorer countries are forced to liberalise their economies and open up to imports from the G7 countries, while the USA and the European Union through its Common Agricultural Policy continue to protect their farmers with subsidies. This hypocrisy has an immediate impact upon the ability of farmers and pastoralists to export their produce to rich countries. Furthermore, such political decisions as the embargo imposed on Iraq over the sale of oil and the maintenance of the No Fly Zone have directly caused a huge increase in the vulnerability of the population. In all these cases, corporate capital, and the nation(s) which promote such interests, will do what it will-without the slightest compunction. What impact can ...
a few conferences on disasters ever make? In short, they are no more than media events, bankrolled by the very villains who create vulnerability, and serve merely to soften the sharp and jagged edges of global inequality. Or so the radical argument runs. ...

These sentiments may make good press in the eyes of some in the academy but they probably have even less impact worldwide than a much less radical and less overtly political intervention in the conference hall. While public statements may not be a very effective way of shaming decision makers-they will do most of what they feel like doing anyway-it does draw attention to some of the direct implications of their actions. This has happened, although it is difficult to assess the effect. The impact on global vulnerability of the USA’s decision to walk away from the conference table regarding the international treaty to ban land mines has had direct effect. The decision by the Ethiopian army to plant mines on the agricultural land of Eritrea as an act of war likewise has longlasting effects-as intended. The Sudanese government constantly attempts to starve the SPLA and bombs humanitarian attempts to alleviate suffering. The actions of North Korean and Zimbabwean governments in very different ways have directly caused the starvation and under-nourishment of their citizens. These impacts upon disasters and vulnerability are publicised by conferences and international meetings and, via them, by press, radio and television broadcasts. ...

A radical critique goes further, claiming that corrupt elites in some nations have a selfinterest in continuing the cycle of disaster and reconstruction of the status quo because they benefit financially and politically from the flows of foreign relief (Susman et al. 1983). In a similar way, some have suggested that warlords can create a semi-permanent, quasi-stable economy based on the cycle of violence, displacement of populations and receipt of foreign disaster assistance (Duffield 2001, 2002) and that traders may profit hugely from the relief process (Keen 1994). ...

These pessimistic views have to be confronted, and the limitations of exhortations in international conference halls must clearly be identified along with the considerable opportunities for mobilisation, exchange of information, the creation of new initiatives and new procedures, and commitments of resources. Of course disasters still occur, and in increasing numbers and extent, as this book has shown. But also, there has been a great deal of progress in preventing and alleviating disasters via concerted international efforts. Improvements in the practice of much disaster prevention and mitigation, as well as relief, is technical in nature (as well as political). Some measures have been quite successful. While they may be criticised as a ‘tyranny of techniques’ and as apolitical, they have often proved very successful, and the symbolic shaming of particular perpetrators of vulnerability and disaster may be significant (see, for example, de Waal’s [1997] book Famine Crimes). ...

It is people, rather than a capricious nature, who are to blame for increasing vulnerability. Progress in the prevention of famine and improvements in national food security and famine forecasting have been remarkable, and mostly achieved through technical improvements. Famine is largely a legacy of the past and now only occurs in nations that isolate themselves from such international contact (for example, North Korea for ideological reasons) and countries in the grip of chronic civil war. Therefore, we acknowledge the limitations of what follows, but also the importance, circumscribed though it may be, of international dialogue and action to prevent disasters. ...

From Yokohama to Johannesburg via Geneva ...

The first edition of this book was published just before the mid-point of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), at a pivotal point in the development of disaster risk-reduction policies. This was shortly before the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction held in Yokohama in May 1994, the first UN World Conference to address specifically the issue of disaster risk reduction (United Nations 1994). Now, the second edition of this book follows another major UN conference, this time the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg in August/September 2002 (United Nations 2002a, 2002b). ...

Between these events the millennium occurred, with much fanfare and a number of significant steps taken by the United Nations that may come to be recognised as important milestones in addressing ways to reduce the vulnerability of people and the fragility of their livelihoods. These steps seem to have met with general approval. Whilst there has been a steady stream of critics who have questioned the value and impact of international aid and development assistance, especially in the aftermath of complex emergencies (Vaux 2001; Macrae 2001), there has not been any serious critique of proactive actions taken to reduce disaster risks. ...

Before considering a series of risk-reduction objectives, we believe that it is important to highlight key commitments and decisions coming from these UN initiatives that relate to the theme of this book and its two models of vulnerability and its reduction. ...

The Yokohama Conference, 1994 ...

The 1994 Yokohama conference provided an opportunity for countries to focus on disaster risk reduction, and this was the first international conference where the social aspects of vulnerability were given serious consideration. Previously, a strong emphasis of the IDNDR had been on science and technology. Clear evidence of a change in attitude came in the first affirmation of the Yokohama message. ...

Those usually most affected by natural and other disasters are the poor and socially disadvantaged groups in developing countries as they are least equipped to cope with them. ...
(IDNDR 1994) ...
The sixth affirmation highlighted the idea that community involvement should be actively encouraged in order to gain greater insights into individual and community perceptions of both development and risk. The opinion was expressed that there is a need to understand the social dynamics of hazard-prone communities, and a need for ...
a clear understanding of the cultural and organisational characteristics of each society as well as of its behaviour and interactions with the physical and natural environment. This knowledge is of the utmost importance to determine those things which favour and hinder prevention and mitigation or encourage or limit ...
the preservation of the environment for the development of future generations, and in order to find effective and efficient means to reduce the impact of disasters. ...
(Ibid.) ...

The IDNDR programme Forum, 1999 ...

Five years later the UN International Decade ended with the IDNDR Programme Forum in Geneva in July 1999. By then the social agenda of vulnerability reduction had significantly expanded to the point where no fewer than three of the four ‘Goals for the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction’ were directly concerned with the human dimensions of risk reduction. It is important to note the beginning of a concern for livelihood protection in the conference rhetoric. ...

Goal 1 Increase public awareness of risks…posed to modern societies. ...
Goal 2 Obtain commitments by public authorities to reduce risks to people, their livelihoods, social and economic infrastructure and environmental resources. ...

Goal 3 Engage public participation at all levels of implementation to create disaster-resistant communities through increased partnership. ...

One of the Forum’s objectives went far beyond the Yokohama Message, expressing the intention to gather accurate data for analysis of the effect of disasters on people: ...

Objective 11 Establish internationally and professionally agreed standards/methodologies for the analysis and expression of the socio-economic impacts of disasters on societies. ...

The Forum also established an important link between poverty reduction and mitigation. The Programme Summary reminded delegates: ...
that the people most vulnerable to disasters are the poor, who have very limited resources to avoid losses. Environmental degradation resulting from poverty exacerbates disaster impacts… Innovative approaches are needed; emphasis should be given to programmes to promote community level approaches. ...
(IDNDR 1999) ...

The Millennium Declaration, 2000 ...

A year later the UN system marked the new millennium with a memorable gesture towards the elimination of poverty. Eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were agreed by world leaders in the Millennium Declaration of September 2000. These goals were further broken down into 18 targets (measured by 48 indicators) to be achieved by 2015 (World Bank 2000). ...

While critics may regard these goals as empty political rhetoric, their significance lies in the fact that these are now the internationally agreed yardsticks for national ...
development, with numerical targets and quantifiable indicators to assess progress. All the signatory countries now claim to be working toward these goals, and donors are providing sharply focused aid packages to support their endeavours. ...

Within the Millennium Declaration there are several points where disaster risk reduction is relevant. Under the goal ‘Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger’ there are a pair of targets: to halve between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people whose income is less than

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a day, and also to halve in that same period the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. In this book we have written a good deal (especially in Chapter 3) about the interconnections between household livelihoods and vulnerability. Thus, the relevance of the income goal to vulnerability reduction (and vice versa) is easy to comprehend. Likewise, our discussion of famine in Chapter 4 and chronic hunger and illhealth in Chapter 5 should make their relevance to this second millennium target obvious (and vice versa). ...

The fourth millennium goal is to ‘Reduce child mortality’. We have argued in many places in this book that children, especially those under five years of age, are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of many hazards, as well as the stress of displacement and household livelihood disruption.

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...

Millennium goal number six is to ‘Combat HIV-AIDS, malaria, and other diseases’. Here, too, we have shown numerous cross-connections among biological and other natural hazards. Recall, for example, that African populations affected with HIV-AIDS are less able to cope with the stress of drought and other hazards that threaten food production. Also, in Chapter 5 we reviewed evidence that flooding can bring on epidemic increases of malaria and other water-related diseases. ...

The seventh millennium goal is to ‘Ensure environmental sustainability’. There is a clear link between this goal and the impact of hazards, since major disasters-or the regular occurrence of persistent smaller events-can cumulatively wipe out any hope of sustainable urban or rural development. In particular, one of the targets associated with this goal is to achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020 (Target 11). We have described the multiple hazards faced by the poor in informal urban settlements. Since most of the global population increase during the next 20 years will be in the cities of LDCs it will be impossible to achieve ‘significant improvement’ in the lives of the many slum dwellers without dealing with their vulnerability to floods, storms, earthquakes, landslides and epidemic disease. ...

Among the targets defined as part of the eighth and final millennium goal (‘Develop a global partnership for development’) are the special challenges faced by small island states (Target 14). Our book has provided numerous examples of the catastrophic damage to island economies and livelihoods brought about by volcanic eruptions, drought, tsunamis and tropical cyclones. ...

In Section IV of the Millennium Declaration, entitled ‘Protecting our common future’, there is a further commitment (not expressed or quantified as one of the central eight millennium goals) to intensify collective efforts to reduce the number and effects of natural and man-made disasters. In the so-called ‘Road Map’ towards implementation of the millennium goals, the watchword is protection of the vulnerable and promotion of human security (United Nations 2001). Whilst the direct concern in the document is with women and children in complex humanitarian emergencies, the enforcement of ...
international undertakings to protect human rights, conflict management and peacebuilding, these sections of the Road Map can equally be seen to apply, indirectly, to a reduction of vulnerability to natural hazards (Vatsa 2002a). The Road Map for implementation also announces a fundamental change from reaction and response to prevention and mitigation. It is this last-mentioned shift that will be the focus of much of the final chapter of our book. ...

The Millennium Declaration implies that future disaster risk-reduction structures, plans and policies can no longer be isolated as distinct entities and in future will need to be synchronised with structures, plans and policies concerned with poverty reduction.

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...

The Johannesburg Summit, 2002: World Summit on Sustainable Development ...

The extensive preparatory work for the Summit included a valuable background document, Disaster Risk and Sustainable Development: Understanding the Links between Development, Environment and Natural Hazards Leading to Disasters (ISDR 2002a). This paper was a salutary and rare example of integrated teamwork by various UN agencies (UN ISDR, UNDP, UNEP, UN/Habitat, UN DESA and UN OCHA). It went far beyond any previous official UN document in its review of the scale and complexity of vulnerability. The following quotation is reproduced in full since it demonstrates that the model of vulnerability described in this book is consistent with the emerging international consensus. ...
[Vulnerability]…describes the degree to which a socio-economic system or physical assets are either susceptible or resilient to the impact of natural hazards. It is determined by a combination of several factors, including awareness of hazards, the condition of human settlements and infrastructure, public policy and administration, the wealth of a given society and organised abilities in all fields of disaster and risk management. The specific dimensions of social, economic and political vulnerability are also related to inequalities, to gender relations, economic patterns, and ethnic or racial divisions. ...
(ISDR 2002a, Item 9:6) ...
Despite such enlightened texts produced during the preparatory phase, the final document to emerge from the Johannesburg Summit contained minimal reference to the cause, effect and reduction of vulnerability to disaster. Where references were made to disaster reduction, they tended to revert to technical aspects, in the manner of pre-Yokohama IDNDR deliberations. In item 19 of the Johannesburg Declaration, under the theme ‘Our commitment to sustainable development’, disaster problems had to take their place alongside no less than 17 other threats to sustainable development: ...

We reaffirm our pledge to place particular focus on, and give priority attention to, the fight against the worldwide conditions that pose severe threats to the sustainable development of our people. Among these conditions are: chronic hunger; malnutrition; foreign occupation; armed conflicts; illicit drug problems; organised crime; corruption; natural disasters; illicit arms trafficking; ...
trafficking in persons; terrorism; intolerance and incitement to racial, ethnic, religious and other hatreds; xenophobia; and endemic, communicable and chronic diseases, in particular HIV-AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. ...
(United Nations 2002a: Item 19, our italics) ...
Of course, we have argued in this book that many of the afflictions and problems listed in this passage are indeed connected to disaster vulnerability as the analysis works its way from the specific to the general; that is, from unsafe conditions, through dynamic pressures, to root causes. Also, moving from the political declaration of the Johannesburg Summit to the detailed programme of action, the relevance of disaster risk reduction becomes clearer. ...

For instance, two of the commitments detailed in the Johannesburg programme of action are improving access to safe water supplies and more and cleaner energy sources for many millions of people. If implemented, nearly a billion people would gain better access to clean water by 2015. The direct benefits of water and energy in villages and slums would be to cut the appalling present death rate of thousands of children each day from diarrhoea and reduce unnecessary death and illness from chronic exposure to smoke from the wood and dung used for cooking. However, indirectly, water and energy projects could also reduce vulnerability to natural hazards. How? The answer depends on the way in which such measures are implemented (Wisner 1987b, 1992a). ...

Firstly, the implementation of new water supplies and renewable energy projects in slums and villages would have to be done in a participatory fashion. Such ambitious infrastructure construction would be unfeasible, unsustainable and possibly dangerous if conducted with only a top-down approach, utilising only contractors and private firms. It would be unfeasible because it would simply cost too much. It would be unsustainable because, without the benefit of local knowledge, such schemes would be hard to design and subsequently costly to maintain without local involvement. The danger comes from the creeping privatisation of public utilities. International corporations are now running public water supplies in many countries. However, if one bravely assumed that citizens would be involved in a variety of ways in such new water and energy schemes, the spinoffs for increased local networking and self-organisation could be great. Increased selforganisation in squatter settlements and remote villages is a main prerequisite of disaster risk reduction. People who are better organised can more easily become better prepared, better able to respond to hazard warnings, better able to demand government attention to hazards. ...

Secondly, there are also some very specific technical links between a variety of common natural hazards and projects to improve access to water and to clean energy. In constructing most local, small-scale water projects, an opportunity arises for residents to become more aware of the local topography and the pattern of flow in the watershed where they live. Early warning of flash flooding could easily be built into this phase of a water project. For example, in Honduras and Guatemala local communities (including women in the highlands) have been trained to monitor stream flow and report increases that could herald flooding (USAID n.d.; Fordham 2000; FEMID 2002; Wisner 2003e). Measures to mitigate drought could also be added on to the construction of a village drinking water supply. When rural electricity is provided by solar, wind or micro-hydro ...
technologies, the basis is there for more widespread and reliable communication systems that could be used for sending warning messages. Use of renewable energy for domestic purposes such as cooking would prevent the cutting of trees that anchor slopes, thus preventing landslides and reducing the risk of flooding. ...

The two cases of water supply improvements and the substitution of alternatives for wood fuel in the kitchen can be expected to bring great health benefits-a reduction in diarrhoea from water-borne diseases and in respiratory disease from wood smoke. In turn, savings for the household from not having to travel to the health post and buy medicines will contribute to further improvements in nutrition and well-being (see our Access model, Figure 3.1). A healthier labour force can work harder and perhaps more productively, and indeed water and electricity could provide the basis for new rural and home-based income opportunities. Natural hazards research has repeatedly shown that it is not only better-organised localities that have the capacity to resist extreme events and the resilience to recover quickly, but localities composed of well-nourished and healthy individuals and households with diverse and productive livelihoods. ...

In concluding this discussion concerning the relevance of international agreements, it may be useful to consider the threat posed to overall human development by disaster risk through a familiar metaphor: a large brick building. Constructing and occupying any building is best regarded as a ‘process’, while it is also possible to observe the completed structure as a ‘product’. Similarly, both words can apply to the way human development is created and sustained over time: the walls of our structure comprise bricks, each with a different label. Typical examples could include 'reducing chronic hunger’ or ‘attacking malnutrition’. Such individual bricks are vital elements in the structure: they provide overall support as well as strengthening each other. However, they can easily be removed, and while their absence may initially be hardly noticed, the cumulative effect of removing bricks will weaken the structure and perhaps contribute to sudden collapse. This will obviously cause the destruction of the building in question as well as causing damage to the wider environment. ...

The point needs to be made forcefully that if a concern to reduce risk from natural hazards is separated from social development or poverty reduction in a specific context, it is no exaggeration to state that it can put the entire local development process at risk. Thus vulnerability reduction strategies have to be maintained at all costs and clear objectives are needed in order for this to occur. ...

Risk-reduction objectives ...

We now turn to the core of this final chapter. Here we crystallise seven risk-reduction objectives by reflecting back over Parts I and II of this book. Each of these seven objectives flows from the logic of our Pressure and Release (PAR) and Access models, and each is supported by the body of case material we presented in Part II. The number seven is arbitrary or significant, depending on one’s cultural background and point of view,

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and from a practical point of view, a list with seven items is short enough, we hope, to be memorable. In order to make these seven objectives more memorable, we have assigned each a key word whose first letters spell ‘CARDIAC’-the ‘heart’ or core ...
of our message, as follows: ...

$C =$ Communicate understanding of vulnerability ...
A=Analyse vulnerability ...
$R =$ focus on Reverse of PAR model ...
$D =$ emphasize sustainable Development ...
I=Improve livelihoods改善生计
A=Add recovery增加恢复
$C =$ extend to Culture $C =$ 扩展到文化

First risk-reduction objective
第一个风险减少目标

Understand and communicate the nature of hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities. [Communicate understanding of vulnerability]
理解并传达危险、脆弱性和能力的性质。[传达对脆弱性的理解]

Training and education programmes are concerned with a pair of linked processes. The first is the acquisition of knowledge concerning the nature of hazards, vulnerability and capacities. The second is to build capacities that allow patterns in daily life to change in ways that increase personal and social protection. Public awareness followed by informed action is the bedrock requirement to reduce vulnerability and to develop resilient households, localities and societies (Handmer and Penning-Rowsell 1990).
培训和教育项目涉及一对相互关联的过程。第一个是获取有关危险、脆弱性和能力性质的知识。第二个是建立能力，使日常生活中的模式以增加个人和社会保护的方式发生变化。公众意识以及随之而来的知情行动是减少脆弱性和发展有韧性的家庭、地方和社会的基础要求（Handmer 和 Penning-Rowsell 1990）。

The oft-repeated concern to ‘raise the level of public awareness of disaster risks’ can be found in most national disaster plans and tends to occupy a prominent place in most training courses in disaster management. However, the expression is often no more than a platitude. The subject needs to be reexamined and redefined so that public awareness reaches far deeper levels, not only increasing in knowledge and information but applying it in modified patterns of behaviour. Ambraseys (1995) has reflected on this requirement.
“提高公众对灾害风险的意识”这一反复提到的关注点可以在大多数国家的灾害计划中找到，并且在大多数灾害管理培训课程中占据显著位置。然而，这一表述往往不过是一个陈词滥调。这个主题需要重新审视和重新定义，以便公众意识能够达到更深层次，不仅增加知识和信息，还能在行为模式上进行应用。Ambraseys（1995）对此要求进行了反思。

The term 'Public Awareness’ is often little more than a description of a rag-bag of this or that item of information that is directed to the public; however what is needed is genuine learning to the point where individuals will be prepared to take actions to promote safety which may not always be in their own interests.
“公众意识”一词通常不过是对指向公众的各种信息的描述；然而，所需的是一种真正的学习，达到个人愿意采取行动以促进安全的程度，这些行动可能并不总是符合他们自身的利益。

We take this statement to mean that, like all other aspects of social change and 'development’, vulnerability reduction involves conflicts. Short-term hardship may be required in order to achieve more safety in the long run. Slum dwellers who protest a landlord’s neglect of building maintenance (which could lead, say, to collapse in an earthquake or wind storm) may be threatened with eviction or be beaten by hired thugs.
我们认为这句话的意思是，与社会变革和“发展”的其他方面一样，脆弱性减少涉及冲突。为了在长期内实现更大的安全，可能需要短期的艰难。抗议房东忽视建筑维护的贫民窟居民（这可能导致例如在地震或风暴中倒塌）可能会面临驱逐威胁或被雇佣的打手殴打。

What we mean by ‘understand’ disaster and vulnerability is that ordinary people in unsafe conditions themselves must work through how they got there. Training and consciousness raising should involve their actually working through the ‘pressure’ and ‘release’ analysis themselves.

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It is gratifying, as authors, to be able to report in the second edition of this book that in many parts of the world citizen-based organisations (CBOs) have developed materials and methods based on our PAR model that do
我们所说的“理解”灾难和脆弱性是指，处于不安全条件下的普通人必须自己理清他们是如何走到这一步的。培训和意识提升应该涉及他们自己实际进行“压力”和“释放”分析。

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作为作者，能够在本书的第二版中报告，在世界许多地方，基于我们 PAR 模型的公民组织（CBOs）已经开发出材料和方法，能够做到这一点，令人感到欣慰。
precisely that (see ‘Second risk-reduction objective’ below).
正是这样（见下文“第二个风险减少目标”）。
The mention of CBOs here underscores another important point about ‘understanding’ and what is often referred to as ‘risk communication’. Individuals are unlikely to engage in active learning on their own, especially those who are marginalised. Organisation at various levels is a prerequisite for risk communication that will actually result in changed patterns of vulnerability and capacity. This, in turn, requires governance at the national level that encourages (or at least does not discourage) self-organisation and action by civil society. For example, in late 2002 whole regions of Zimbabwe where the population had organised itself and supported an opposition candidate for president were prevented from receiving foreign famine relief by the national government of the incumbent president. Under these conditions it is hard to imagine much effective ‘risk communication’ taking place on the subject of mitigating the impact of the drought affecting Zimbabwe and several other southern African countries (see Chapter 4).
这里提到的社区基础组织（CBOs）强调了关于“理解”和通常所称的“风险沟通”的另一个重要点。个人不太可能主动进行学习，尤其是那些边缘化的人群。各级组织是实现风险沟通的前提，这种沟通实际上会导致脆弱性和能力模式的改变。这反过来又需要国家层面的治理，鼓励（或至少不阻碍）公民社会的自我组织和行动。例如，在 2002 年底，津巴布韦的整个地区，人口自发组织并支持一位反对派总统候选人，却被现任总统的国家政府阻止接受外国的饥荒救助。在这种情况下，很难想象在减轻影响津巴布韦及其他南部非洲国家干旱的主题上会有有效的“风险沟通”发生（见第 4 章）。

Conventionally, public awareness programmes have been targeted at individuals, whether in schools, religious buildings, teahouses, workplaces or homes. However, this approach may not be the most effective. Quarantelli (2002) has observed the need for public awareness strategies that focus on institutions rather than individuals:
传统上，公众意识项目的目标是个人，无论是在学校、宗教建筑、茶馆、工作场所还是家庭。然而，这种方法可能不是最有效的。Quarantelli（2002）观察到需要关注机构而非个人的公众意识策略：

It is a good idea to try to raise public awareness. But usually this is thought of in terms of individuals. It is actually much easier to try to get the support of key groups, such as churches, certain social clubs, neighbourhood associations, etc. Convincing key informal or formal leaders in such organisations is much easier to do (relatively speaking) than trying to educate the population at large when that is thought of as individuals. One should take advantage of the fact that communities and societies are made up of groups… Getting them to help is very important in any educational effort or attempt to raise awareness or change behaviour.
提高公众意识是个好主意。但通常这被认为是针对个人的。实际上，争取关键团体的支持要容易得多，例如教堂、某些社交俱乐部、邻里协会等。说服这些组织中的关键非正式或正式领导者相对来说要容易得多，而不是试图教育整个社会，尤其是当被视为个体时。应该利用社区和社会是由群体组成的这一事实……让他们参与非常重要，无论是在任何教育努力、提高意识或改变行为的尝试中。

When considering how people perceive risks and understand vulnerability, it is also very important to remember that ordinary people already have knowledge and experience. Whatever form this takes, it must be the starting point for risk communication in the form of a dialogue, not a monologue. We agree entirely with Twigg (2002:20), who observes that ‘[p]eople at risk do make rational choices about protecting themselves from disasters. They do have a view of that risk. We cannot understand responses to EW [early warning] without first having a good understanding of this’. Throughout this book we have mentioned local coping and the potential for building on this as a basis for vulnerability reduction. We do not want to romanticise ‘traditional’ or ‘local’ coping, and do not consider it to be necessarily sufficient, the best or the only kind of response to risk. However, the mobilisation of knowledge and efforts at the neighbourhood and village level is critical. The starting point should be the achievements of ordinary people in ‘living with’ floods, droughts, pest and plant disease attacks, epidemics, storms, earthquakes, steep unstable slopes and volcanoes (Peri Peri 1999). Previous chapters have digested a wealth of evidence to show that people know a good deal about these hazards and are not passive victims.
在考虑人们如何感知风险和理解脆弱性时，重要的是要记住普通人已经拥有知识和经验。无论这种知识和经验以何种形式存在，它都必须成为风险沟通的起点，这种沟通应以对话的形式进行，而非独白。我们完全同意 Twigg（2002:20）的观点，他观察到“处于风险中的人们确实会理性地选择保护自己免受灾害的影响。他们对这种风险有自己的看法。我们无法理解对早期预警（EW）的反应，除非首先对这一点有良好的理解。”在本书中，我们提到了地方应对能力以及在此基础上进行脆弱性减少的潜力。我们并不想美化“传统”或“地方”的应对方式，也不认为它必然足够、最佳或唯一的风险应对方式。然而，在社区和村庄层面动员知识和努力是至关重要的。起点应是普通人在“与”洪水、干旱、害虫和植物病害袭击、流行病、风暴、地震、陡峭不稳定的坡地和火山“共存”方面所取得的成就（Peri Peri 1999）。之前的章节已经消化了大量证据，表明人们对这些危害有相当的了解，并不是被动的受害者。

In fact, our caveat concerning the bland assumptions often made about ‘public
实际上，我们对关于“公众”的平淡假设的警告
education’ and ‘risk communication’ must extend further. Often in Parts I and II we have shown that social processes involve conflict. There can be no assumed cosy coincidence of interest between ‘government’ and ‘experts’ and ‘the people’. The key ingredient that is often missing is trust. In Chapter 1 we acknowledged, but set to one side, a large literature concerned with environmental risks, especially chemical and radiation hazards,

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a literature very nicely reviewed by Barnes (2002).

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Unfortunately there have been very few efforts to link such work on risk, accidents, credibility and outrages (Sandman 1989) in industrial society and work which is primarily focused on natural hazards in developing countries.

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Clearly, the issue of trust and the credibility of governments and official sources of information are also important where slum dwellers have experienced generations of malign neglect or abuse by city authorities (administrations, police and enforcement agencies), or where small farmers have been in long-standing disputes over land and human rights with the very state officials that are supposed to protect them from hurricanes or volcanic eruptions.
“教育”和“风险沟通”必须进一步扩展。我们在第一部分和第二部分中经常展示，社会过程涉及冲突。“政府”、“专家”和“人民”之间不应假定存在舒适的利益巧合。通常缺失的关键成分是信任。在第一章中，我们承认但搁置了一大批关于环境风险的文献，特别是化学和辐射危害的文献，

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这部分文献被 Barnes（2002）很好地回顾过。

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不幸的是，几乎没有努力将工业社会中关于风险、事故、可信度和愤怒的研究（Sandman 1989）与主要关注发展中国家自然灾害的研究联系起来。

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显然，在贫民窟居民经历了几代人被城市当局（行政、警察和执法机构）恶性忽视或虐待的情况下，信任和政府及官方信息来源的可信度问题同样重要，或者在小农与本应保护他们免受飓风或火山喷发的国家官员之间长期存在土地和人权争议的情况下。

These two subjects-local knowledge and trust—are seldom dealt with in discussions of risk communication. However, if our two caveats are taken into account, public awareness of risk can be an effective and efficient tool. Public awareness is a broad process embracing an ongoing exercise in mutual education between authorities and the public. The active involvement in hazard protection of localities at risk is essential, and marks recognition that patterns of vulnerability and most mitigation activities are local in character. The primary level of disaster risk reduction is the neighbourhood or village, and therefore local leaders need to take a primary responsibility.
这两个主题——地方知识和信任——在风险传播的讨论中很少被提及。然而，如果考虑到我们的两个警告，公众对风险的意识可以成为一种有效且高效的工具。公众意识是一个广泛的过程，包含了当局与公众之间持续的相互教育。处于风险中的地方积极参与危险保护至关重要，这标志着对脆弱性模式的认识，以及大多数减灾活动的地方特征。灾害风险减少的主要层面是邻里或村庄，因此地方领导者需要承担主要责任。

Second risk-reduction objective
第二个风险减少目标

Conduct risk assessment by analysing hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities [Analyse vulnerability]
通过分析危险、脆弱性和能力进行风险评估【分析脆弱性】

Integrated hazard and capacity/vulnerability analysis (CVA) rarely happens. In the risk assessment field there is a noticeable bias towards the natural sciences. The majority of disaster managers tend to believe that disaster risk assessment is synonymous with scientifically generated ‘hazard mapping’, and that this is the sum total of the diagnostic process. This view stems from a technocratic and fundamentally false assumption that once hazards are mapped in terms of their location, duration, frequency, severity and impact characteristics, then the risk assessment process is complete. It is also likely that the perception of officials is that hazard mapping is a politically neutral process in sharp contrast to all the sensitivities of vulnerability assessment. Officials may fear being identified or vilified by a hostile media or political opponents if vulnerability analysis reveals past policies that have consciously or unconsciously placed specific groups of people at risk.
综合危险和能力/脆弱性分析（CVA）很少发生。在风险评估领域，明显存在对自然科学的偏见。大多数灾害管理者倾向于认为灾害风险评估等同于科学生成的“危险制图”，并且这就是诊断过程的全部。这种观点源于一种技术官僚的、根本错误的假设，即一旦危险在其位置、持续时间、频率、严重性和影响特征方面被制图，那么风险评估过程就完成了。官员们的看法也可能是，危险制图是一个政治中立的过程，与脆弱性评估的所有敏感性形成鲜明对比。如果脆弱性分析揭示了过去的政策，这些政策有意或无意地使特定群体处于风险之中，官员们可能会担心被敌对媒体或政治对手识别或抨击。

Despite such obstacles, there is evidence of progress in certain areas (Enarson et al. 2003a, 2003b; Cannon et al. 2003; Buckle et al. 2000; Trujillo et al. 2000; Stephen and Downing 2001; King 2001; Brocklesby and Fisher 2003; Beerlandt and Huysman 1999). For example, CVA has been widely used by the International Federation of Red Cross
尽管存在这样的障碍，但在某些领域仍有进展的证据（Enarson et al. 2003a, 2003b; Cannon et al. 2003; Buckle et al. 2000; Trujillo et al. 2000; Stephen and Downing 2001; King 2001; Brocklesby and Fisher 2003; Beerlandt and Huysman 1999）。例如，国际红十字与红新月联合会（IFRC）广泛使用 CVA，他们称之为脆弱性/能力评估，或 VCA。2000 年《世界灾害报告》中对这一进展进行了有益的概述，副标题为《和平与战争中的脆弱性和能力评估》（IFRC 2001a）。该报告强调，全球 178 个国家的红十字与红新月协会现在都将 VCA 作为其灾害援助和发展规划的一个重要组成部分。他们采取了双重方法：评估其成员组织的能力和脆弱性，以及他们所服务的社区（IFRC 1999b）。
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), who call it vulnerability/capacity assessment, or VCA. A useful overview of this progress is set out in the World Disasters Report for 2000, sub-titled Assessing Vulnerabilities and Capacities during Peace and War (IFRC 2001a). This report highlights the fact that many of the 178 national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies throughout the world are now routinely undertaking VCAs as an essential part of their disaster assistance and development planning. They have adopted a dual approach: assess the capacities and vulnerabilities of their member organisations as well as the communities in which they work (IFRC 1999b).
国际红十字与红新月联合会（IFRC）称之为脆弱性/能力评估，或 VCA。2000 年《世界灾害报告》中对这一进展进行了有益的概述，副标题为《和平与战争中的脆弱性和能力评估》（IFRC 2001a）。该报告强调，全球 178 个国家的红十字与红新月协会现在都将 VCA 作为其灾害援助和发展规划的一个重要组成部分。他们采取了双重方法：评估其成员组织的能力和脆弱性，以及他们所服务的社区（IFRC 1999b）。

Some form of CVA is also practised at a local level in many LDCs, following the pathbreaking work of Anderson and Woodrow (1998), who, in turn, built on the efforts of Cuny (1983), Cutler (1984), York (1985) and Maskrey (1989). For example, the Citizens’ Disaster Response Network in the Philippines (CDRN) uses a Hazard, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment Matrix to structure discussion at a local level (Figures 9.1 and 9.2).
在许多最不发达国家（LDCs）中，也在地方层面上实践某种形式的 CVA，这得益于安德森和伍德罗（1998）的开创性工作，他们又建立在库尼（1983）、卡特勒（1984）、约克（1985）和马斯克雷（1989）的努力之上。例如，菲律宾的公民灾害响应网络（CDRN）使用危险、脆弱性和能力评估矩阵来结构地方层面的讨论（图 9.1 和 9.2）。

In a rural, southern African context, the NGO network Peri Peri, explicitly uses the equation

R = H \times V

, as a way of focusing village discussions (Figure 9.3).
在南部非洲的农村背景下，非政府组织网络 Peri Peri 明确使用方程式

R = H \times V

，作为聚焦村庄讨论的一种方式（图 9.3）。

One of the developments in the decade since At Risk was first published has been the proliferation of regional networks of disaster reduction NGOs. As time goes on Asian, Latin American and African networks are interacting, and these kinds of citizen-based, participatory methods for CVA are being shared and adapted for local conditions. Many of these methods originated with various members of the Network of Social Science for Disaster Reduction in Latin America (known as La RED, The Network, for short).

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自《风险》首次出版以来的十年间，灾害减灾非政府组织的区域网络迅速增加。随着时间的推移，亚洲、拉丁美洲和非洲的网络正在互动，这些基于公民的参与性 CVA 方法正在被分享并适应当地条件。这些方法中的许多起源于拉丁美洲社会科学减灾网络的各个成员（简称 La RED，网络）。

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There is also a growing recognition of the need to address vulnerability in some governmental circles. For example, in 2002 the UK House of Commons International Development Committee reported on ‘Global climate change and sustainable development’. The report included a proposal that:
在一些政府圈子中，越来越认识到需要解决脆弱性的问题。例如，2002 年，英国下议院国际发展委员会就“全球气候变化与可持续发展”进行了报告。该报告中包括了一项提议：

Figure 9.1 Hazard, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment Matrix
图 9.1 危害、脆弱性和能力评估矩阵
Source: Heijmans and Victoria (2001:28)
来源：Heijmans 和 Victoria（2001:28）

Citizen-based and development-oriented disaster response
基于公民和以发展为导向的灾害响应

Figure 9.2 Cartoon figures used in local discussions by CRDN to contrast vulnerability and conventional approaches
图 9.2 CRDN 在地方讨论中使用的卡通图形，用于对比脆弱性和传统方法

The goal of disaster responses is to alleviate immediate suffering and bring things back to normal as before the disaster event. Disaster responses consist of a sequential series of actions to gain control over disasters, before, during and after the emergency period (disaster cycle model).
灾害响应的目标是减轻即时痛苦，并将事物恢复到灾害事件发生前的正常状态。灾害响应由一系列顺序行动组成，以在紧急期间（灾害周期模型）之前、期间和之后控制灾害。

Disasters are unforeseen events that disrupt normal life and require help from outside.
灾害是不可预见的事件，扰乱正常生活并需要外部帮助。
People affected by disasters are helpless victims and passive recipients of external aid.
受灾害影响的人是无助的受害者和外部援助的被动接受者。
Stress placed on emergency response, relief, and technological
强调应急响应、救援和技术

The goal is to reduce people’s vulnerability by increasing theire capacities to prepare for, to cope with and to mitigate the adverse effects of disasters. Aware and organised communities can pressure government to implement policies and programs recognising people’s needs and interests and promoting a safer environment.
目标是通过增强人们的准备能力、应对能力和减轻灾害不利影响的能力来减少人们的脆弱性。意识到并组织起来的社区可以施压政府实施承认人们需求和利益的政策和项目，促进更安全的环境。

Disaster is a question of vulnerability. Disasters happen when hazards hit vulnerable communities whose inherent capacity is not enough to protect itself and easily recover from its damaging ffects. Disasters are
灾害是脆弱性的问题。当危险袭击脆弱社区时，灾害就会发生，这些社区的内在能力不足以保护自己并轻易从其破坏性影响中恢复。灾害是
and scientific solutions to address physical vulnerability.
以及解决物理脆弱性的科学解决方案。
Donors decide what victims need.
捐赠者决定受害者需要什么。

Assessment of disaster situations is rapidly carried out by external experts just after the disaster event.
灾后情况的评估由外部专家在灾害事件发生后迅速进行。
5. Responses focus on individual families and on restoring infrastructure that serves national economic interests.
5. 反应集中在个别家庭和恢复服务于国家经济利益的基础设施上。
6. Key players are government, aid agencies, scientists, experts and disaster managers. their capacities.
6. 关键参与者包括政府、援助机构、科学家、专家和灾害管理者。他们的能力。
the product of the social, economic and political environment.
社会、经济和政治环境的产物。
2. People affected by disasters are active actors in rebuilding their life and livelihood. People’s existing capacities are recognised and further strengthened.
受灾害影响的人们是重建生活和生计的积极参与者。人们现有的能力得到认可并进一步增强。
3. Addresses roots of people’s vulnerabilities and contributes to transforming or removing structures generating inequity and underdevelopment.
解决人们脆弱性的根源，并有助于转变或消除产生不平等和欠发达的结构。
4. People’s participation is essential in all phases of disaster management and contributes to building
人们的参与在灾害管理的所有阶段都是至关重要的，并有助于建设。

Assessment of disaster threat situations is a continuous process before, during and after disaster events and involves community members con-sidering class, gender, age, culture, location, etc.
灾害威胁情况的评估是一个持续的过程，发生在灾害事件之前、期间和之后，涉及社区成员考虑阶级、性别、年龄、文化、地点等因素。
5. Premium on building organisational capacity of most-vulnerable communities through formation of grassroots disaster response organisations.
5. 通过建立基层灾害响应组织，提升最脆弱社区的组织能力。
6. The less vulnerable sectors are mobilised into a partnership with the vulnerable sectors in disaster management and development work.
6. 较不脆弱的部门与脆弱部门在灾害管理和发展工作中建立伙伴关系。

The Department of International Development (DFID) should sponsor vulnerability assessments in developing countries and use the information to help target work on adaptation [to climate change] where vulnerability is greatest, rather than focusing work on adaptation only on the poorest.
国际发展部（DFID）应资助发展中国家的脆弱性评估，并利用这些信息帮助确定适应气候变化的工作重点，尤其是在脆弱性最大的地方，而不是仅仅将适应工作集中在最贫困的地区。
(UK House of Commons 2002: Recommendation No. 16)
（英国下议院 2002：建议第 16 号）

Figure 9.3 Flip-chart example of community discussions
图 9.3 社区讨论的翻转图示例
Source: von Kotze and Holloway (1999:47)
来源：von Kotze 和 Holloway（1999：47）

Box 9.1: Emergency Management Australia-extract from a study on the assessment of personal and community resilience and vulnerability (adapted from ISDR 2002b:76).
框 9.1：澳大利亚应急管理——关于个人和社区韧性与脆弱性评估的研究摘录（改编自 ISDR 2002b：76）。

GUIDELINES FOR MAKING RISK ASSESSMENTS
风险评估指南
Contextual aspects:背景方面：

analysis of current and predicted demographics;
当前和预测的人口统计分析；
recent hazard events;最近的灾害事件；
economic conditions;经济条件;
political structures and issues;
政治结构和问题;
geophysical location;地理位置;
environmental condition;
环境条件;
access/distribution of information and traditional knowledge;
信息和传统知识的获取/分配;
community involvement;社区参与;
organisations and management capacity;
组织和管理能力;
linkages with other regional/national bodies;
与其他区域/国家机构的联系;
critical infrastructures and systems.
关键基础设施和系统。

Highly vulnerable:高度脆弱：

infants/children;婴儿/儿童；
frail elderly;虚弱的老年人；
intellectually, psychologically and physically disabled;
智力、心理和身体残疾；
single-parent families;单亲家庭；
new immigrants and visitors;
新移民和访客；
socially/physically isolated;
社会/身体孤立；
seriously ill;重病；
poorly sheltered social groups.
生活条件差的社会群体。

Identifying basic social needs/values:
确定基本社会需求/价值：

sustaining life;维持生命；
physical and mental well-being;
身体和心理健康;
safety and security;安全与保障;
home/shelter;家庭/住所;
food and water;食物和水;
sanitary facilities;卫生设施;
social links;社会联系;
information;信息;
sustain livelihoods;维持生计;
maintain social values/ethics.
维护社会价值观/伦理。

Increasing capacities/reducing vulnerability:
增强能力/减少脆弱性：

positive economic and social trends;
积极的经济和社会趋势；
access to productive livelihoods;
进入生产性生计；
sound family and social structures;
声音家庭和社会结构;
good governance;良好治理;
established networks regionally/nationally;
在区域/国家层面建立的网络;
participatory community structures and management;
参与式社区结构和管理;
suitable physical and service infrastructures;
适当的物理和服务基础设施；
local plans and arrangements;
地方计划和安排；
reserve financial and material resources;
储备财务和物资资源；
shared community values/goals;
共享的社区价值观/目标；
environmental resilience.
环境韧性。

Practical assessment methods:
实用评估方法：
Constructive frameworks; data sources include:
建设性框架；数据来源包括：

local experts;当地专家；
focus groups;焦点小组;
census data;人口普查数据;
survey and questionnaires;
调查和问卷;
outreach programmes;外展项目;
historical records;历史记录;
maps;地图;
environmental profiles.环境概况。

Emergency Management Australia, the national-level disaster management agency, and several Australian states routinely implement risk assessment that includes not only a focus on 'highly vulnerable social groups’9 but also the broader political and socioeconomic context we have been arguing for in our book (Box 9.1).
澳大利亚紧急管理局作为国家级灾害管理机构，以及几个澳大利亚州，定期实施风险评估，不仅关注“高度脆弱的社会群体”，还包括我们在书中所论述的更广泛的政治和社会经济背景（框 9.1）。

Some progress has also been made in developing an agreed methodology to assess risk factors using standardised checklists.

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Many authors have suggested methods (Wisner 2003a; Davis 1994, 2003; Cannon 2000a; Morrow 1999; Lavell 1994). However, an agreed inter-agency or inter-governmental methodology for social vulnerability assessment remains elusive, other than the growing general acceptance of the need to firmly link vulnerability to capacity. One reason for the lack of an agreed methodology is the paucity of information concerning the different assessment approaches used as well as concerning their relative effectiveness as assessment tools. This gap will only be closed by applied, interdisciplinary research that compares assessment approaches across different hazard categories within different country and cultural contexts in order to identify the key variables that are needed relative to different hazards.
在使用标准化检查表评估风险因素方面也取得了一些进展。

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许多作者提出了方法（Wisner 2003a; Davis 1994, 2003; Cannon 2000a; Morrow 1999; Lavell 1994）。然而，除了日益普遍接受将脆弱性与能力紧密联系的必要性外，尚未达成一致的跨机构或跨政府的社会脆弱性评估方法。缺乏一致方法的一个原因是关于不同评估方法的信息稀缺，以及关于它们作为评估工具的相对有效性的信息不足。只有通过应用的跨学科研究，比较不同国家和文化背景下不同危险类别的评估方法，才能填补这一空白，以识别相对于不同危险所需的关键变量。

An example of the difficulty of developing a comprehensive method for assessing vulnerability can be seen in the work of an important international programme called the Global Earthquake Safety Initiative (GESI) (Global Earthquake Safety Initiative 2001). GESI’s pilot programme, completed in 2001, examined the seismic safety of 21 cities. In order to define the seismic vulnerability of each city the project team defined a five-part methodology, with data being collected on the following topics:
开发一种全面评估脆弱性的综合方法的困难可以在一个重要的国际项目——全球地震安全倡议（GESI）（全球地震安全倡议 2001）的工作中看到。GESI 的试点项目于 2001 年完成，检查了 21 个城市的抗震安全。为了定义每个城市的抗震脆弱性，项目团队定义了一个五部分的方法论，收集了以下主题的数据：

Building Fatality Potential (soils/building stock/building construction and materials/building occupancy rates).
建筑致死潜力（土壤/建筑存量/建筑施工和材料/建筑使用率）。
Landslide Fatality Potential (landslides triggered by the earthquake).
山体滑坡致死潜力（由地震引发的山体滑坡）。
Search and Rescue Life-Saving Potential (numbers of people available to participate/levels of training, etc.).
搜救生命拯救潜力（可参与人数/培训水平等）。
Fire Fatality Potential (fires induced by earthquakes).
火灾致死潜力（地震引发的火灾）。
Medical Care Life-Saving Potential (casualty management).
医疗救助生命拯救潜力（伤亡管理）。

It is notable that this list inexplicably omits a range of critical factors that also have a decisive impact on vulnerability and capacity:
值得注意的是，这个列表不可思议地遗漏了一系列对脆弱性和能力有决定性影响的关键因素：

The level and effectiveness of Public Awareness Programmes (particularly those that are focused on school children).
公共意识项目的水平和有效性（特别是那些针对学童的项目）。
The level and effectiveness of Disaster Plans (disaster plans at all levels from national to local).
灾害计划的水平和有效性（从国家到地方的各级灾害计划）。
High-Risk Social Groups (social vulnerability and capacity assessment).
高风险社会群体（社会脆弱性和能力评估）。
Economic Assessment (urban seismic vulnerability is intimately related to those industrial/commercial and individual livelihoods at risk).
经济评估（城市抗震脆弱性与那些面临风险的工业/商业和个人生计密切相关）。

An explanation for such omissions may lie in the difficulty of creating interdisciplinary projects and approaches. GESI is primarily the work of civil engineers, who are inevitably preoccupied with physical, tangible elements, and such concerns as public awareness, disaster planning, social and economic vulnerability may be unfamiliar and outside their sphere of professional competence and influence. However, as the GESI project continues to take on international urban studies, it is vital, and urgent, for the project organisers to expand their assessment criteria and build interdisciplinary teams to undertake the work in each city being investigated. Such teams will need to include social workers, architects, physical planners, government emergency managers, economists and educationists. Without this wider interdisciplinary frame of reference the project will have fundamental flaws in its design.
这种遗漏的解释可能在于创建跨学科项目和方法的困难。GESI 主要是土木工程师的工作，他们不可避免地专注于物理和有形的元素，而公众意识、灾害规划、社会和经济脆弱性等问题可能对他们来说既陌生又超出了他们的专业能力和影响范围。然而，随着 GESI 项目继续进行国际城市研究，项目组织者必须扩展评估标准，并建立跨学科团队，以在每个被调查的城市开展工作，这一点至关重要且紧迫。这些团队需要包括社会工作者、建筑师、城市规划师、政府应急管理人员、经济学家和教育工作者。如果没有这种更广泛的跨学科参考框架，项目在设计上将存在根本缺陷。

The Second Risk-reduction objective offers a framework for complementing the engineering approach to risk assessment we have just criticised. Routine assessment activities already exist that focus on construction safety, harvest forecasts for staple crops (using both field observations, market reports and remote sensing), monitoring of the nutritional status of children, epidemiological surveillance, as well as numerous flood and storm warning systems. However, Part II of the book suggested that vulnerable people often suffer a series of interrelated disasters and that their vulnerability often increases through failure of recovery. This has been aptly termed the ‘ratchet effect’ by Robert Chambers (1983) (see Chapter 3). Existing monitoring systems do not address these cascading, compound problems.
第二个风险降低目标提供了一个框架，以补充我们刚才批评的风险评估工程方法。已经存在的常规评估活动专注于建筑安全、主食作物的收成预测（使用田间观察、市场报告和遥感技术）、儿童营养状况监测、流行病学监测，以及众多洪水和风暴预警系统。然而，本书的第二部分指出，脆弱群体往往遭受一系列相互关联的灾害，并且他们的脆弱性往往因恢复失败而加剧。罗伯特·钱伯斯（1983）恰当地将其称为“棘轮效应”（见第三章）。现有的监测系统并未解决这些级联的复合问题。

Therefore, our recommendation is that these existing routines incorporate an explicit vulnerability orientation and that their results (interpreted differently due to the vulnerability framework) become the focus of a co-ordinating governmental body ('disaster commission’). The information required is summarised in Table 9.1. It concentrates on five groups that are most likely to have the least protection against hazards and the least reserves for recovery. We have chosen these groups for the purposes of demonstration only. Identification of vulnerable groups will vary from society to society, and situation to situation, where very specific differences based on class, caste (if applicable), gender, health status and disability, age, race, nationality and immigration status, and location may all have a role. Our choice in this example is based on the common ground that the cases in Part II seem to suggest. Thus the five vulnerable groups would be:
因此，我们的建议是这些现有的常规应纳入明确的脆弱性导向，并且其结果（由于脆弱性框架的不同解释）应成为一个协调政府机构（“灾害委员会”）的重点。所需的信息总结在表 9.1 中。它集中在五个最可能在灾害面前保护最少、恢复能力最弱的群体。我们选择这些群体仅用于示范目的。脆弱群体的识别因社会和情况而异，其中基于阶级、种姓（如适用）、性别、健康状况和残疾、年龄、种族、国籍和移民身份以及地点的非常具体的差异都可能发挥作用。我们在这个例子中的选择是基于第二部分案例似乎暗示的共同点。因此，这五个脆弱群体是：

a defined group of the poorest households (taking account of relevant definitions of poverty in that context, and data availability);
一组定义明确的最贫困家庭（考虑到该背景下相关的贫困定义和数据可用性）；
women, particularly women-headed households and those from poor households;
女性，特别是女性主导的家庭和来自贫困家庭的女性；
children and youth;儿童和青少年；
the elderly and disabled;
老年人和残疾人；
the poorest and most marginalised of minority groups.
最贫困和最边缘化的少数群体。

Table 9.1 Types of information required for risk assessment, including vulnerability, capacity and exposure to hazards
表 9.1 风险评估所需的信息类型，包括脆弱性、能力和对灾害的暴露

Potentially vulnerable group 潜在脆弱群体	Natural resources自然资源			Physiological and social resources 生理和社会资源			Financial resources财务资源			Hazardousness of home and workplace 家庭和工作场所的危险性
Poorest 33%最贫困的 33%	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-
Middle 33%中间的 33%	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-
Richest 33%最富裕的 33%	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-
Women女性	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-
Children儿童	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-
Elderly and disabled老年人和残疾人	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-
Minority group A少数群体 A	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-
Minority group B少数群体 B	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-
Minority group C少数群体 C	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	0	-

Note:
The symbols are used to signify whether a particular group is likely to experience increased

(+)

, reduced

(-)

or no change ( 0 ) in its situation in regard to the different factors across the columns.

For each group we need to know several aspects of their ‘access to resources’ (as discussed in Chapter 3) as well as the hazardousness of the locations they frequent. In all cases we want to determine, at least in a qualitative way, trends over time. Are they gaining or losing access to resources that can help to protect them or help them to cope and recover? Are the spaces they inhabit or where they work becoming more or less hazardous?

We take the reciprocal relation between vulnerability and capacity into account in our use of the term ‘resource’ in a variety of ways. In each case, an increase in access to a resource (be it natural, physiological, social or financial) suggests an increase in the capacity to cope with and to recover from a hazard event. A decrease in access suggests a decrease in capacity (or an increase in vulnerability).

In Table 9.1 'Natural resources’ refers to land, water, forest products and other natural assets (see also Figures 1.1 and 3.1). In many of the preceding chapters we have seen that the most vulnerable have been losing access to such resources over many years, a trend that the Johannesburg Summit on sustainable development also highlighted. There are many reasons for this trend, including privatisation and concentration of land, increased
inequality in income distribution and land degradation.
'Physiological and social resources’ refer to nutritional status and health, education, access to technology and information. These change in positive or negative directions with time and across generations. For instance, in South Africa the social resource of kinship is reported to be increasingly less important to coping (Sharp and Spiegel 1984). In the USA some reports suggest literacy levels are declining in certain social groups and localities (e.g. Hispanic populations in some of the ghettos of Los Angeles). IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) caused many governments to cut back on education and health budgets and staple food subsidies. This policy acted as a dynamic pressure that increased vulnerability because of the erosive effect it had upon knowledge and access to informational resources as well as upon physiological reserves and resources.
'Financial resources’ refers to income, market access, banking and other credit facilities. Recalling the Access model outlined in Chapter 3, our discussion of coping and the debates surrounding famine in Chapter 4, it should be clear that the concept of ‘financial resources’ can be extended to include liquid assets that a household can sell to buy emergency food, health care or to rebuild a house. They would include, for instance, livestock and jewellery. Overgrazing, privatisation or nationalisation (e.g. of game reserves) can deprive herders of pasture, and so interfere with the assets to which people are accustomed.

The final column contains information about the location of home and livelihood activities in relation to various hazard triggers. These could include biological and physical variables affecting the home and workplace such as slope, soil type, microclimate, and they can be mapped. These variables interact with known (or knowable) hazards, such as torrential rain or the introduction of cholera into the locality. Also relevant is the presence or absence of toxic hazards or the potential for catastrophic industrial accidents (although here we come up against the limit of our self-imposed scope). These ‘hazard maps’ for vulnerable groups change over time as human groups are forced to move about the landscape and as the spatial distribution of livelihood opportunities changes (Figure 3.3).

In this systematic manner it is possible to gather, display and interpret information of very diverse kinds that may influence the vulnerability to disaster of a specific sub-group in society.

Trends could be established by inquiring about each of these items, by row and column, in regard to the situation in the past, for example two generations ago, 10 years ago and at present. The basic question in each case is whether the specific resource or locational factor is significant for increasing the vulnerability of a group to a hazard, and how this factor affects vulnerability over time.

Third risk-reduction objective

Reduce risks by addressing root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions

^{11}

[focus on Reverse in PAR model]

Our book argues that the environment cannot be made safer by technical means alone. The vulnerability perspective suggests both that it is possible to make the human environment safer and that there are limits set by economic and social inequities, cultural biases and political injustices in all societies. We are optimistic about the possibility of improvement. The ‘Pressure’ model can be reversed to provide security instead of risk. Vulnerable people’s access to resources can be improved, and changes in power relations can be made. Vulnerability can be decreased, and if aid is properly conceived and implemented, even the most vulnerable survivors can recover in such a way that future vulnerability is reduced.

Here we illustrate this by presenting a transformed version of the ‘Pressure’ model used throughout this book, recalling that the ’

R

’ in the PAR model means ‘release’. The new outcome is ‘safe’ as opposed to ‘unsafe’ conditions, ‘sustainable’ versus ‘unstable’ or ‘fragile’ livelihoods, and ‘resilience’ (i.e. ‘capable’ versus ‘vulnerable’ people). Figure 9.4 summarises the ‘release’ process as a reversal of disaster 'pressure’.

The social, economic and political mechanisms (dynamic pressures) that translate root causes into unsafe conditions for specific people can sometimes be blocked, changed or even reversed. To illustrate the way the ‘pressure’ process leading to disaster can be reversed, we should recall some of the good news from chapters in Part II. Village-based and regional grain storage has successfully provided food reserves that rid some African farmers of the burden of indebtedness and the cycle of the ‘hungry season’ that can escalate into famine. Primary health care at neighbourhood and village levels (including child immunisation) has dramatically increased protection from some diseases, reducing vulnerability to other hazards, and has improved community water supply and sanitation.

Flood mitigation has also been achieved through local efforts, and the 'living with’ approach is actively competing with technocratic views. Death and damage from tropical storms continues to be high; however the grassroots, decentralised efforts of Red Crescent workers in Bangladesh and the success of storm shelters encourages some optimism. At a more macro-level, but with vital links to localities, the development of early warning systems to track the paths of tropical cyclones, using data gained from remote sensing as well as from weather radar systems, has had a major impact in reducing casualties and property losses. Great progress has been made in low-cost housing design and construction that is much safer in earthquakes, and during the past decade major international retrofit programmes have been undertaken to address low-cost dwellings.

All these relate to the middle of the ‘Release’ model. They are instances of capacitybuilding measures based on pro-poor economic and political changes. Such actions reverse the mechanisms that translate root causes such as long histories of racial discrimination, unequal access to land and other resources, etc. into specific unsafe conditions. There has been less progress in overcoming the effects of other dynamic pressures. Foreign debt, war, global environmental change and rapid urbanisation still provide formidable challenges. However, such initiatives as debt forgiveness and rescheduling, various debt-for-development swaps, and the drafting of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) by various Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) (see Chapter 2) may reduce the influence of some of these dynamic pressures.

Figure 9.4 The release of ‘pressures’ to reduce disasters: progression of safety
Root causes (and global dynamic pressures) can be changed, and should not be regarded as immutable and inevitable. In its 1992 report on the state of the world’s children, UNICEF recommended that most of Africa’s external debts be discounted (UNICEF 1992). Ten years later debt reduction for HIPC countries has become conventional wisdom (although implementation lags). In some cases debts have been cancelled and PRSPs have been written (admittedly in some cases coercively by the World Bank with little local participation). How much these will reduce poverty and therefore indirectly reduce vulnerability remains to be seen.
Peacekeeping efforts by the UN have successfully prioritised humanitarian relief over national sovereignty, and suggest that progress can be made against the influence of war over disaster vulnerability. There is also a considerable focus on the prevention of conflicts (Annan 2002) even though this careful multilateral approach seems, at the time of writing, to be at least temporarily confounded by the unilaterialist doctrine of ‘preemptive war’ developed by the Bush administration in the USA.

In terms of physical hazards, even these can be modified in many cases, although our concern is to ensure that mitigation and modification of the hazards is done in such a way that the investments and science involved do not create other forms of vulnerability, are effective and do not replace proper vulnerability analysis (see ‘Second Risk-reduction objective’ above).

The central role of governance in reversing the PAR model

In the 10 years since the first edition of this book was published, there has been considerable discussion of ‘good governance’ in development studies. Improved
governance is probably the most important factor in reversing many of the dynamic pressures and even the root causes of vulnerability. We understand good governance not merely as a technical matter of free and fair elections, decentralisation and audits, but as a term that covers the ideologies, power relations, formal and informal networks, and resource flows that determine the relationship between the state (at various levels: national, sub-national, local/municipal) and civil society. ‘Good governance’ has aspects that are cultural, political, social and economic. Vatsa (2002b) expresses this very well:

Governance goes much beyond the entity of government. Governance refers to norms, traditions, and processes that impinge on the exercise of formal power and authority. It encompasses government, the private sector, and civil society, and a complex interaction among these segments. The government’s policies, resources, and capacities are shaped by the participation and stakeholding of civil society and the private sector in the political process. The distribution of power and authority is actually decided through reconciliation of competing priorities of different segments.

The close interdependence of norms, networks, knowledge and institutions as well as what were once known as ‘the means and relations of production’ is acknowledged in the literature on ‘livelihoods’ in development studies (Chambers and Conway 1992; Sanderson 2000) and the literature on disaster and resource management where ‘livelihood’ and 'access’ are centrally important (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). Our Access model in Chapter 3 depends on such a notion of governance (‘structure of domination’).

The reader should not mistake our use of the term ‘governance’ with the one-size fitsall blueprint for Western-style democracy that emerged during the 1990s, as part of development discourse, as ‘political conditionality’ (Simon 1995; van Spengen 1995). As in the passage by Vatsa quoted above, we are referring to society-wide participation and negotiation that goes well beyond cosmetic institutional changes such as regular national elections. Good governance is exemplified in Cuba’s management of hurricane Michelle in 2001, a very large and dangerous storm during which only five Cubans died. Wisner identified a ‘golden dozen’ characteristics of social relations and governance that seem to explain Cuba’s success (Wisner 2001c, quoted in IFRC 2002a:28-29).

Social cohesion and solidarity (self-help and citizen-based social protection at the neighbourhood level).
Trust between the authorities (national or sub-national, e.g. municipal) and civil society (the population at large).
Investments in economic development that explicitly take into account the potential consequences for disaster risk reduction or increase.
Investment in human development (basic needs).
Investment in social capital (e.g. training of neighbourhood-based activists).
Investment in institutional capital (e.g. capable, accountable and transparently operating government institutions for the prevention and mitigation of disaster risk, not only for response and preparedness; also, investment in scientific capacity for such institutions as Havana’s Weather Institute, Cuba’s public health service that provided emergency
chlorination water, etc.).
Good co-ordination, information sharing and co-operation among the institutions involved in disaster risk reduction.
Attention given to the most vulnerable groups of people.
Attention given to lifeline infrastructure.
Laws, regulations and directives adequate to support all of the above.
An effective risk communication system and institutionalised historical memory of disasters.
A political commitment to disaster risk reduction.

This ‘golden dozen’ list has many variations and versions in the publications of disaster management worldwide (ISDR 2002b; IFRC 2002a:24-29; Boyce 2000; Mileti 1999). For example, in one of the most concise and comprehensive statements to appear before the Johannesburg Summit, a joint Four-Point Plan for a Safer World was put forward by three institutions: the Benfield Greig Hazards Research Centre (University College London), the Centre for the Epidemiology of Disaster (Catholic University of Louvain) and the development NGO, ActionAid (Yates et al. 2002) (see Box 9.2). All four points include direct and indirect references to good governance in the broad sense in which we use the term, especially points three and four.

Box 9.2: Four-point plan for a safer world

1 Strengthen society's resilience

Accelerate global and national poverty eradication initiatives, informed by people’s vulnerability to disasters.
Put the concerns of vulnerable people at the centre of development policy and practice at all levels.
Review existing long-term development policies and programmes from a vulnerability point of view.
Incorporate vulnerability indicators in national and international programme reviews and evaluations.
Make globalisation work for the poor and for poor nations.

2 Integrate and support disaster reduction measures

Invest in preparedness and mitigation in disaster-prone countries, ideally as a central component of development policy and programming.
Build the capacity of state institutions, civil society organisations and vulnerable populations.
Develop and promote regional and sub-regional approaches and assist vulnerable countries in international negotiations.

3 Tackle sources of risk

Deepen political commitment to environmental protection and renewal-in particular, to full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and recommendations of the Inter-Governmental Panel for Climate Change.
Ensure that development efforts at various levels do not increase vulnerability to natural hazards.
Promote responsive government at all levels to protect citizens’ rights to security of life and livelihood.

4 Improve accountability

Make disaster response and recovery more accountable to the needs of disaster-affected people.
Promote a culture of respecting the rights of disaster-affected populations.
Set specific commitments, targets and indicators for disaster reduction.
Donors should allocate sufficient funding for international initiatives that reduce the impact of emergencies.

A recent analysis and critique of the World Bank’s strategic statement, Attacking Poverty, called attention to the common problem of ‘cultures of secrecy in government, a vacuum of government performance information’ that 'helps to make politics an intrigue rather than a competition to improve services and living standards’ (Journal of International Development 2001). Nowhere is this problem more apparent than in the enforcement of safety codes and standards.

Building codes have proliferated as part of the globalisation of knowledge (Coburn and Spence 2002:213-217). However, they have been so egregiously unenforced in Turkey, El Salvador, Taiwan, India, Italy and Japan that engineers and others who study disasters have begun to speak about corruption. This was especially apparent after the unnecessary loss of life in earthquakes in the Marmara region of Turkey in 1999, in El Salvador and Gujarat in 2001 and in the collapse of school buildings in earthquakes in Italy (2002)12 and the Kurdish, south-eastern region of Turkey in 2003. In the last case, in the aftermath of the collapse of a school dormitory, built in 1998, which resulted in the death of 84 sleeping schoolboys, there have been riots and allegations of corruption in the construction process (Millar 2003a; Wisner 2003b). One parent, waiting to see if his child would be found alive in the rubble said, 'Earthquakes don’t kill people in Turkey, it’s the builders who kill them’ (Millar 2003b).

Political scientists such as May (1992), legal experts (Platt et al. 1999) and sociologists (Stallings 1995), as well as some urban and regional planners (Burby 1998), have studied the development and enforcement of building codes and land-use regulations. The danger of continued ‘business as usual’-corruption, indifference and lack of adequate personnel-is so great that there have been wider calls for a reform of enforcement mechanisms for such regulations (Wisner 2001e). If such reforms were forthcoming, they would stand as an example of a reversal of the PAR model.

Fourth risk-reduction objective

Build risk reduction into sustainable development $^{13}$ [emphasize sustainable Development]

Disaster vulnerability is also a function of the way in which humans interact with nature. Part II of this book presented many examples. The perspective of the PAR model also suggests that local decisions about land-use are not solely responsible for disastrous results. To assert this would be ‘blaming the victim’. Such problems as land degradation and resource exhaustion-processes that may contribute to disaster vulnerability-are closely linked to society-wide ‘styles’ or modes of production and consumption spatially far removed from the specific site of degradation or depletion. Indeed, before the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development, there was wide consensus that global patterns of production and consumption are implicated, and, more broadly, ‘styles’ of development. This 'style’ includes energy-intensive, industrial production, and urbanisation based on worldwide trade. We would prefer to use the term ‘globalised capitalist mode of production’ for the less-precise word 'style’ (Wisner 2001a; Callinicos 2002). Globalised capitalist production has produced larger and larger scale modifications of ecosystems and the landscape. For instance, in West Virginia (USA), entire mountain tops are exploded and crushed in a new method of coal mining: should anyone be surprised that floods and landslides in that area have increased?

Therefore, when talking about environmental issues and disasters, one has to discuss them in the context of development policy. The coal mining in West Virginia produces income. This shows up in financial accounts as economic growth. Likewise, in the past 50 years, Central America lost half its forest cover to the steadily increasing production of export crops such as bananas, cotton, coffee and beef. This shows up as positive economic growth. However, in neither case does pro-growth economic policy take into account the economic and human cost of the floods and landslides that come hand in hand with ‘progress’.

In the run up to the Johannesburg Summit, many authors revisited the connections between land-use and disaster (Voss and Hidajat 2002; McGuire et al. 2002; ISDR 2002a; Abramowitz 2001; Comfort et al. 1999). They recalled the lessons of hurricanes Mitch (1998) and Andrew (1992), the Mississippi floods (1993), and floods in many parts of Europe during the 1990s, as well as enormous floods in China in 1998. In Part II we commented on these events. Deforestation and other kinds of land-use problems were implicated in all of these disasters. Also fresh in the Johannesburg delegates’ minds were wildfires in Indonesia, the USA, Australia, Mexico and Brazil; mudslides in Venezuela in 1999, Algeria and Brazil in 2001; and a deadly landslide triggered by an earthquake in El Salvador, also in 2001. In all these cases better land-use planning and enforcement could have prevented the extreme natural event from becoming a disaster.

So, at a global level, can ‘sustainable development’ reduce the risks faced by vulnerable people exposed to natural hazards? Global environmental change, especially an increase in climate instability, could easily wipe out any gains in risk reduction
derived from improved access to water supply, sanitation and clean energy sources.

^{14}

However, on the positive side, despite continued opposition by the USA, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change has come into force with the addition of ratifications by Canada and Russia. Also, there is a good deal in the agreements reached at the Johannesburg Summit that could be interpreted and implemented as linking disaster risk reduction and sustainable development. These specific agreements include the following (see United Nations 2002b):

Water, sanitation and energy initiatives hold the potential to significantly decrease the vulnerability of millions of urban and rural households, including the 35 per cent of the population of Africa who could benefit from improved clean energy. The global commitment is to supply sufficient energy to achieve the Millennium Goal of halving by 2015 the proportion of people living on $$ 1$ per day. This energy is also supposed to be ‘reliable, affordable, economically viable, socially acceptable, and environmentally sound’. The indirect effects of improved access to water and energy could be the enhancement of livelihood options as well as savings to households in terms of reduced health care costs (because there is less illness from unclean and insufficient water and the use of smoky fuels) (see the Fifth Risk-reduction objective, below).
The Cities Without Slums initiative contained in the Millennium Goals, with its commitment to improve the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020, also has significant potential to mitigate the risks of earthquake, flood, landslide, storms and epidemic disease faced currently by people living in cities in the LDCs.
Biodiversity, forestry and fishery initiatives are less ambitious, and could portend business as usual. However, even here there is the potential for enhancing household livelihood options and for controlling the large-scale industrial exploitation of resources that continues to displace people and to drive species to extinction.
Civil society was highly visible at the Johannesburg Summit. Eight thousand civil society participants attended the summit. This in itself helps to win credibility for these organisations and offers some protection from hostile opponents in their home countries. As we shall argue in our seventh, and final, risk-reduction objective, strengthening civil society is key to developing a safety culture.

Casting a shadow over these positive aspects of the Johannesburg agreements are the corporate partnerships announced at the Summit. These should cause great concern. For example, nine private energy utilities operating in the European Union have signed agreements with the UN for technical cooperation on energy projects in LDCs. The newly-privatised South African energy company, Eskom, has agreed to 'extend modern energy services to neighboring countries’ even as it cuts off services to thousands of lowincome households in South Africa because of their inability to pay increased electricity rates. Water supplies in many parts of the world are also being privatised (Petrella 2001; Barlow and Clarke 2002). Is it wise to assume that the market alone can allocate services that are essential to human health and security? Can we expect private owners or managers of water supplies and other lifeline infrastructure to invest in strengthening them against damage from natural hazards when this is likely to reduce their short-term profits?

Fifth risk-reduction objective

Reduce risks by improving livelihood opportunities [improve Livelihoods]

Livelihoods provide subsistence, cash income, materials and consumables, stores of food, shelter and clothing. A livelihood is a dynamic portfolio which is assembled, constantly reviewed and updated-often in rapid and radical ways in the face of an impending disaster (see Chapter 3). Livelihoods also provide opportunities to convert one type of capital into another. For example, cash income can be 'invested’ to educate female children; the education of women is probably one of the most effective strategies in reducing vulnerability. Of course, this way of thinking about livelihoods is economistic and structural (this is why it is complemented by the PAR model, which addresses the political aspects of access to resources and livelihoods). Yet the Access model is fundamental to understanding potential vulnerability in the light of durable and longerterm characteristics of the political economy.

Two aspects of the Access model of livelihood do limit its usefulness. The first is the time dimension. When rapid-onset hazards strike, or longer-term disasters as with famine, the HIV-AIDS pandemic and complex emergencies, the livelihood profiles of different households still shape the damage they suffer and the ways they respond. However, the longer-term iterations of livelihood decisions, determined by the access profile of the household, become less predictable within the Access/Livelihood model outlined in Chapter 3. The model allows iterations through time, which are graphically represented in Box 7 of Figure 3.1 as repeated and changing positions of access profiles and income opportunities as the disaster unfolds. These are shaped by rapidly changing access qualifications and by the preferences of households. For example, stealing and looting (e.g. breaking into grain stores) may be tolerated in ways that they would not be in normal times. Income opportunities may now become necessary which are normally precluded for certain individuals or households on the grounds of gender, class and caste, dignity, respect and custom. These changes are seldom predictable as are the other structural determinants of access and vulnerability. The livelihood approach may become less useful in drawn-out and profoundly damaging disasters where the initial pre-disaster livelihood access profiles of households (and their access qualifications and payoffs) become less and less available and/or relevant.

Secondly, the livelihood approach principally focuses on small units, such as households and groups of individuals with shared characteristics across different households (such as women who are poor, the elderly, children or those excluded on the basis of ethnicity, religion or class). The livelihoods approach is not particularly illuminating with regard to the potential for collective action and community selfprotection, nor local politics (which is why it is the complement to our PAR model and third risk-reduction objective, discussed above).

Livelihood patterns that increase vulnerability have the following characteristics. Firstly, they may lack resilience to shocks, either because they are not diversified
(diversification in itself may be a risk-reduction strategy), or are inherently subject to variability (for example, crop yields on non-irrigated land in the semi-arid tropics), or are characterised by low levels of productivity. Secondly, the main activities in a livelihood portfolio may provide little cash or consumptive goods from a narrow range of income opportunities which can only be sold or purchased in a volatile market (for example, pastoralists selling livestock or purchasing grain in a drought). Thirdly, as Chapter 3 and discussion of Table 9.1 have indicated, some livelihood activities lead people into hazardous time/spaces. For example, agricultural labourers may have to work in floodprone lowlands, fishers may have to use small boats during the cyclone season, while urban recyclers are forced to work in and around solid waste sites. Finally, livelihood activities may be embedded in exploitative or competitive social relations where one person’s disaster is another person’s gain.

^{15}

There is a signal failure in most policy approaches to link livelihood characteristics and vulnerability. The development of certain aspects of livelihoods can reduce risk substantially. For instance, land reform can dramatically increase the access of poorer households to new livelihood options. But even in the absence of such dramatic reform, access by the landless to irrigation, water harvesting or trees can provide streams of income that build household resilience (Chambers et al. 1990). These are the kinds of measures that promote sustainable livelihoods and can lead to a reduction in vulnerability. They flow logically from the Access model in Chapter 3 and its applications as outlined in the body of this book. The following is a list of such measures.

Diversifying income sources for the vulnerable within and outside the agricultural sector, with a view to capital formation and the building up of assets of their own.
Diversifying agricultural production and the crops grown.
Increasing food security by enhancing local subsistence production (returns to labour and land, and reduction of risk through climatic variation).
Facilitating local networks of support and risk awareness.
Strengthening local coping mechanisms through the decentralisation of decision making.
Developing 'buffers’ (including food, cash savings and accessible forms of insurance) to cushion the trauma of disasters.
Developing crops and seeds storage (e.g. community grain banks).
Securing increased, equitable access to key resources for those ‘at risk’ (including natural and financial resources-see below-as well as logistical and informational resources such as timely information about extreme events, transportation where evacuation is required, shelter, emergency health services, communication with relatives, etc.).
Challenging the structures of domination that impede the equitable distribution of livelihood resources (including urban and rural land reform, dissemination of knowledge about land law, and vigorous public oversight and regulation of privatised services such as water and electricity).
Developing micro-credit and small-scale, decentralised banking systems.
Public provision of universal education and health care in the longer term and subsidies allowing universal coverage within privatised or mixed delivery systems in the short term.
Recognising the importance of the local state, the municipality and mediating institutions (NGOs) as facilitators of access to key resources for livelihood sustainability.
Giving the necessary encouragement, funding and facilities for women’s empowerment, for example, adult literacy classes, training in interpersonal skills, accounting, managing public meetings, etc., savings clubs, women-only micro-credit and training to combat the threats present after disasters (for example, polluted drinking water, epidemic disease in children).

Sixth risk-reduction objective

Build risk reduction into disaster recovery [Add recovery]

Recovery has received considerable attention in the decade since the first edition of this book. This is due to three developments. Firstly, as we have noted several times, recovery following civil war and other conflicts, often involving the resettlement of large numbers of displaced people, has become a major focus of foreign aid. Some of the concepts that have emerged, such as the ‘relief-development continuum’ (UNDP 1994b) and 'linking relief with development’ (UNDP 1998; Speth 1998) have been extended to recovery following large-scale natural hazard events such as hurricane Mitch and the floods in Mozambique.

Secondly, corporations have begun to invest in measures to ensure ‘business continuity’ in the face of a wide range of risks, including extreme natural events (Pinkerton 2002). So intense is this corporate interest in business recovery that an internet search for the phrase ‘disaster recovery’ yields many more entries for consulting firms and workshops focused on the needs of companies than on the recovery needs and opportunities of households, villages and towns.

Thirdly, the World Bank, regional development banks and bilateral donors have invested large amounts in reconstruction following recent earthquakes (e.g. in Colombia, Turkey and Gujarat), tropical cyclones (e.g. in Central America, India and Mozambique) and floods (e.g. in China and south-east Asia). As the amounts of money have increased, more attention has turned to building ‘sustainable disaster reduction’ into the recovery process so that these lenders and donors will not have to bear the burden of repetitions (Consultative Group 1999). National agencies such as those responsible for emergency management in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA have also begun to seek ways of utilising the ‘window of opportunity’ created by disasters to implement ‘sustainable development’ and reduce repetitive losses.

During the 1990s, ‘holistic’ approaches to recovery (Monday et al. 2001) and 'comprehensive’ recovery became fashionable (Wisner and Adams 2003: ch. 5). In principle, such recovery would address economic, political and social needs-not only rebuilding infrastructure and housing, but opening the way for more resilient livelihoods. In practice, implementation of recovery along these lines requires reversing (or at least substantially palliating) the dynamic pressures and root causes that have contributed to the disaster in the first place. Has this actually happened anywhere? Is it possible?

One high-profile attempt to use a ‘developmental’ and 'comprehensive’ approach following hurricane Mitch in Central America suggests that implementation is very difficult indeed (see Box 9.3). Furthermore, since this approach to recovery based itself on the concept of ‘sustainable development’, it shares the many theoretical and practical problems associated with this controversial and ambiguous concept. Therefore our thinking about this sixth risk-reduction objective requires careful examination of some fundamental issues. What is ‘recovery’, and how long does it take? Can recovery strengthen livelihoods? Can recovery contribute to sustainable development? Can recovery address the dynamic pressures and root causes of disaster vulnerability?

These questions that link disasters to social change inevitably require careful definitions of recovery, sustainability, risk reduction and other key terms. These will reflect the context and material needs of those affected in the disasters, and will also encompass the complex set of linkages between vulnerability, the disaster and recovery. The context for such linkages is a politics where the voices of the vulnerable are seldom heard, and possible solutions are structurally excluded from debates. This may well undermine recoverability and sustainability.

Box 9.3: Central America-implementing comprehensive recovery?

After hurricane Mitch in 1998 (see Chapter 7) the countries of Central America met with aid donors in Stockholm. A series of principles for recovery were set out which seemed to involve a fresh approach that would actually build resilience in households, localities and nations. This would reduce losses from the frequent multiple hazards (hurricane, flood, landslide, volcanic eruption, earthquake) that affect the region. The Stockholm Principles were that recovery assistance should (Wisner 2001f):

reduce the social and ecological vulnerability of the region;
reconstruct and transform Central America on the basis of transparency and good governance;
consolidate democracy and good governance, reinforcing the decentralisation of governmental functions and powers, with the active participation of civil society;
promote respect for human rights, including equality between women and men and the rights of children, ethnic groups and other minorities;
co-ordinate donor efforts, guided by priorities set by the recipient countries;
intensify efforts to reduce the external debt carried by countries of the region.

There is little sign of any of these noble goals having been implemented. Instead the emphasis has been on large-scale infrastructure reconstruction projects and the introduction of technical mapping and planning methods, not on building local capacities or strengthening livelihoods

Of all the countries affected (the others were Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala), El Salvador should have been in the best position to take advantage of financial and technical assistance to increase its resilience. It suffered least, and had only 260 of the 21,000 deaths in the region, only 1 per cent of the injured, and its share of those who needed shelter was only 12 per cent. In addition, El Salvador lost only approximately 10,000 homes of the total of 124,068 (ibid.). Yet El Salvador was fully integrated into the postMitch Stockholm aid process. It was in a much better position to implement new systems and approaches for prevention and mitigation because the damage it had sustained was relatively light. However, very little changed in El Salvador. A coalition of NGOs proposed a new law to modernise the National Emergency

Commission (COEN), making it responsible for prevention as well as recovery. The proposed law was rejected twice by the national assembly, and finally passed in 2002; however, at the time of writing, nearly five years after hurricane Mitch, there are few signs of its implementation. Demands by citizen-based groups that they be part of a planning process for future disasters were ignored by the national government.

As a result, when two earthquakes hit El Salvador in January and February 2001, the ‘lessons of hurricane Mitch’ had not led to any significant institutional development, nor to a better response. More than 1,000 people were killed in these earthquakes, 8,122 injured and more than 150,000 homes destroyed. An additional 185,000 homes were damaged. Infrastructure was also heavily affected, including 23 hospitals, another 121 health care units and 1,566 schools. This represents 40 per cent of hospital capacity and 30 per cent of the nation’s schools. The total economic loss was estimated at

$ 1.255

billion (Government of El Salvador 2001).

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At a very minimum, the Stockholm Principles should have brought forth vigorous government efforts to protect health facilities and schools. These public facilities are subject to damage in a wide range of extreme natural events. A programme to protect them against hurricane force winds or flooding could easily have incorporated strengthening them against earthquakes. However, none of this had been done following hurricane Mitch.

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The recovery process after hurricane Mitch, in particular in El Salvador, must be seen as an object lesson in how not to apply development rather than only welfare criteria, and how not to involve the population in the process.

What is ‘recovery’ and how long does it take?
In 1977 Haas, Kates and Bowden published work on recovery in post-earthquake

Managua, Nicaragua, together with an historical account of recovery in San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake (Haas et al. 1977). Their temporal model seemed to show that ‘recovery’ proceeds in predictable 'waves’ of activity that can be described by bell curvetype graphs. Thus, in the first few days ‘response’ activities rise and fall; immediate short-term ‘relief’ activities increase as ‘response’ tails off. ‘Relief’ itself reaches a peak after a few weeks, and then medium-term ‘reconstruction’ takes centre stage, to be replaced after several months by a set of activities that can be described as longer-term economic and social ‘recovery’-a part of the process that may take several years.

This model, with its intelligible, even aesthetically pleasing, bell curves has been tested in a number of post-disaster situations (Rovai 1994). Humans crave order and meaning and seek to stabilise their expectations in situations of uncertainty. Perhaps we cannot understand why ‘bad things happen to good people’, but at least there may be some order to be found in our ability to start over again and to assist in recovery. There is even a hint of deeper order in the fact that Haas and his colleagues proposed a logarithmic relationship, in which each of the stages from ‘response’ through to ‘recovery’ seems to take ten times as long as the previous stage.

As appealing and reassuring as this model is, one must ask, is it verifiable? Rovai reviewed experience with the model and concludes as follows:

The Haas et al. model of disaster recovery has been criticised (Bolin 1994). Berke et al. (1993) argue that the model is a ‘Value-added’ approach, which views a community as going through a series of fixed stages, each stage a necessary development adding value to the final product, which is a recovered community. The problem, as they define it, is that a value-added approach is a linear and orderly representation of irregular and uncertain decision-making processes: community decision making is not a technical exercise where each stage occurs in ‘proper sequence’ and successful outcomes are guaranteed.

Another study of 14 disaster-stricken communities (Rubin et al. 1985) did not support the model’s linearity of phase occurrence. In these communities, the four stages were not necessarily sequential, sometimes occurring simultaneously or in different sequences. However, Stuphen’s 1983 study of a single community recovering from a flood does support the basic observation of stages of recovery activities, although her study did not reinforce the clear-cut sequence of recovery periods.

There was, however, much overlap between stages in the recovery timelines in both communities…[and]…the length of the phases varied from the logarithmic tenfold increase proposed by Haas et al., although this may be premature…the temporal duration of the restoration and reconstruction periods was directly related to the temporal duration of the emergency period.
(Ibid: 54-55)
The terminology associated with disaster recovery is biased towards optimism. The key words-‘recovery’, ‘re-establish’, ‘reconstruction’, ‘restoration’ and ‘rehabilitation’—are prefixed with ‘re’, indicating a return to the pre-existing situation. A more realistic view challenges the assumption that such recovery will actually be achieved. Instead, the more
pessimistic argument suggests there will be uncertainty, unforeseen events and even the reproduction of vulnerability. A rather depressing implication that is allowed for in both the PAR and Access models is that in some cases the most vulnerable households and individuals do not recover. Many studies demonstrate this failure. Tuareg pastoralists in Sahelian west Africa never managed to restock their herds following the 1967-1973 drought, and were forced to live on the margins of towns (Franke and Chasin 1980). The cyclones in Andhra Pradesh (Chapter 7) also showed that some of the poorest households fell into debt, lost their livelihood options and became landless labourers. Following hurricane Andrew in 1992, many of the low-income Haitian farm workers in southern Dade county simply disappeared. Many thousands who left Montserrat because of the volcanic eruption may never return to the island (Chapter 8).

Even if one does not question the orderliness of ‘recovery’, a good deal of empirical evidence suggests that people who were marginal, excluded and who enjoyed poor access to power and resources before a disaster may lag behind the recovery model’s tidy curves and face greater difficulties in accessing assistance (Fothergill et al. 1999). Such evidence comes from studies following hurricanes Gilbert and Hugo in the Caribbean (Berke and Beatley 1997) and Andrew in south Florida (Peacock et al. 1997) as well as those of the Northridge earthquake (Bolin and Stanford 1998a, 1998b) and the Great Hanshin earthquake that affected Kobe (Hayakawa 2000; see Chapter 8). The Whittier earthquake of 1983 in southern California provides yet more evidence. Miller and Nigg (1993) distinguish between household characteristics which contribute to damage during an ‘event’ and those which contribute to household disruption as a ‘consequence’ of an event. They found that race and ethnicity were significantly associated with household disruption. Studying the aftermath of the Northridge earthquake in southern California a decade later, Bolin and Stanford (1998a, 1998b) came to the same conclusion: Hispanics were less likely to obtain official assistance. Similarly, predominantly African-American areas of greater Miami received lower insurance payments and had less private investment after hurricane Andrew (Dash et al. 1997; Peacock and Girard 1997).

A visit to Managua in 2002 revealed a city centre that had never been rebuilt after the 1972 earthquake. In addition, several hundred thousand of those displaced by the 1972 earthquake still live in very poor, under-served conditions in the area outside Managua to which they were moved as a ‘temporary’ measure. This ‘temporary’ refuge has, in fact, become an official part of Managua’s urban structure, now called Ciudad Sandino. Indeed, Cuidad Sandino-once a ‘temporary’ zone of shelter for earthquake victimsnow has its own newer ‘suburb’ where those who fled hurricane Mitch are concentrated. Its name, ironically, is Nueva Vida (New Life) (Susman 2003). While the situation described is not sufficient evidence to refute the ordered expectations of Haas et al. (1977), it has to be asked what does ‘recovery’ mean in a country where the urban and rural poor have to live from disaster to disaster? Hurricane Mitch (1998) and the nearfamine in rural areas during the drought of 2001-2002 suggest that there was very little resilience, little buffer or reserve in the ‘normal’ life of most people in Nicaragua. In a similar way, in the Philippines, 10 years after the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, the people still suffer from annual flows of lahar in the rainy season. Can there be ‘recovery’ without any capacity to withstand the next crisis or shock?

Peacock, who has worked for years on recovery issues (first in postearthquake

Guatemala and more recently in post-hurricane Miami) is sceptical about the notion of ‘recovery’:

Economists and other social scientists continually report ‘recovery’ levels being reached a few years after an event when talking about a community or region (Wright et al. 1979; Friesma et al. 1979). And yet, one would be hard pressed to suggest that these community level recovery levels were always translated to the household level. Hoover and Bates (1985) clearly showed that communities that experienced earthquake damage in both the highlands and the East [of Guatemala] experienced growth in the number of businesses and in overall community complexity. And yet, Peacock, Killian and Bates (1987), equally clearly showed that a majority of households, particularly those receiving aid in the form of temporary housing, failed to reach recovery levels some four years after the event. Indeed, households that were in communities with higher numbers of Ladinos [non-indigenous Guatemalan] and in department capitals, were much better off than more rural and Indian households.
(Peacock 2002)
We would suggest that in order to have ‘recovered’, a household should have not only reestablished its livelihood, physical assets and patterns of access, but should be more resilient to the next extreme event. Thus, without the profound changes in social relations and structures of domination suggested by our ‘Release’ model, it could be argued that recovery never takes place and never can take place. Changes in social relations that define access to land, credit, employment and information are required to make households more resilient to the next hazard event. In theory, these changes could be the result of a series of public, private and citizen-based activities that had utilised the ‘window’ created by disaster to strengthen capabilities at the local level (Anderson and Woodrow 1998; Berke et al. 1993; IFRC 2001c: 13-23). Also at the level of the locality, recent thinking is that recovery should include mitigation of future extreme events. Examples include financial assistance to relocate houses from the flood plain, conversion of hazardous zones into open space for recreation, enforcement of improved building codes in reconstruction (Mileti 1999:237; Beatley and Berke 1998). However, viewed in this manner, recovery must be conceived over a much longer time-scale than it has been so far (Mitchell 1996).

Can recovery strengthen livelihoods?

The case studies presented in Part II contained many examples of a failure to revive and strengthen livelihoods. Due to unequal access to resources in rebuilding, the gap between the rich and the poor farmers in the Krishna delta of India was greater eight years after the cyclone than before. In Bangladesh, rich landowners are more likely to gain access to new farming land created by floods. Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and other African countries provide cases where drought is an opportunity for the rich to acquire more land and livestock at the expense of the desperate smallholder. After the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala, official recovery widened the gap between rich and poor, and the resulting
resentment, coming after decades of tension over the distribution of land, ushered in a period of bloody repression by the army and death squads (1978-1982).

Other case material reveals how official relief failed to address the marginality of poor rural African Americans in North Carolina after a hurricane, or Hispanic farm and cannery workers in California following an earthquake (Miller and Similie 1992; Laird 1992; Johnston and Schulte 1992). After the 1980 earthquake in Campania (southern Italy) most of the

$ 1.9

billion in relief from the European Community and 18 other countries was paid to Italian contractors and industries from the north, as was the

$ 3

billion the government provided for re-housing. The Italian government’s programme for industrialisation in the affected mountain valleys used up scarce agricultural land and led to the pollution of the rivers with factory effluent. Unique mountain village cultures and ecologies were destroyed, further weakening the potential for local livelihoods in the face of future disasters. On balance, the pre-existing inequalities between the north and the south of Italy were strengthened (Chairetakis 1992).

Failures to revive and to reinforce household livelihoods such as these do not invalidate attempts to integrate new kinds of support for livelihoods into recovery programmes. The UNDP’s notion of ‘curative development’ (Speth 1998) focuses precisely on livelihoods.

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For example, in the aftermath of the 2001 floods in Orissa (India), UNDP (with money from DFID) supported rapid agricultural rehabilitation in the affected coastal districts that enabled the restoration of the farming livelihoods of 15,000 households (UNDP 2001b). An element of increased livelihood resilience was built into this recovery programme: revised rice-planting dates were suggested to the farmers on the basis of a sophisticated agroclimatic model.

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While this UNDP project in Orissa may be an example of development-oriented recovery and seems to be moving in the right direction, it does not take account of all the measures listed earlier in the fifth risk-reduction objective. Farming is essential to rural livelihoods. But crop diversification, irrigation and the development of non-farm income sources, the use of micro-credit for small businesses, training and skills enhancement, could also make livelihoods more resilient. Moreover, as our earlier discussion of the fifth risk-reduction objective makes clear, particular aspects of inequality (especially of land ownership, financial and social capital) structure ‘normal’ access to resources both before and after a disaster. In the case of Orissa, the average size of land holdings was a tiny 0.73 acre/household. The prevailing highly unequal land tenure pattern was not something that was challenged by the UNDP livelihood recovery project. Nevertheless, this and other cases indicate that a livelihood-focused form of comprehensive recovery is possible in principle (see Boxes 9.4 and 9.5).

One of the most effective ways of building more economically resilient communities is through micro-credit schemes being applied to disaster recovery. One must bring banking down to the level of the poorest groups which are normally denied access to small loans other than through the exorbitant interest rates of community money lenders. Loans as small as

$ 50

can be provided to stimulate the reconstruction of small enterprises. The micro-credit movement estimates that 23.6 million people globally were participating in micro-credit schemes in 1999. Significantly, more than half of these were the ‘poorest of the poor’, the majority being women; 78 per cent of MFI (Micro Finance Institution) clients were in Asia (Gardner 2001; Micro Credit Summit 2000).

The best-known institutionalised micro-finance institution is the Grameen Bank, founded in Bangladesh in the 1970s by the economist Muhamed Yunus. The small-scale lending scheme he devised requires no collateral from participants. Those wishing to secure loans are organised into small units of between two and five persons. New loans are only made when old ones have been repaid. Thus the ‘social capital’ of neighbourhood linkages, as well as peer pressure and encouragement, provide a form of ‘moral collateral’. The system has been one of the success stories of development. The Grameen Bank has worked with 2.3 million members, in 40,000 Bangladesh villages, who maintain a remarkably high 95 per cent loan repayment rate (Grameen Bank 2002).

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One value of micro-credit schemes is their potential link to community preparedness programmes, and their importance in assisting disaster recovery. For example, in 1996 Grameen supported rural reconstruction after flooding in Bangladesh by providing small grants for the repair or reconstruction of dwellings. The energy and commitment of groups of women in Bangladesh at one of these gatherings is clear to any visitor, including one of the authors. These programmes are a massive improvement to standing in line passively waiting for relief payments being provided by paternalistic governments and NGOs.

Box 9.4: Flood recovery in Anhui province, China, 1993
After flooding in Anhui province the UNDP allocated

$ 8.3

million as a recovery grant. They assembled an international team of advisers, comprising Chinese and foreign expertise, under the leadership of one of the present authors (Davis et al. 1992). The team was tasked to advise on the allocation of micro-finance schemes to establish and strengthen micro-enterprises in the worst flood-affected areas. UNDP insisted on this ‘developmental approach’ to recovery planning, and no funds whatsoever were used as relief ‘handouts’. Thus the finance was to devolve through micro-credit repayments to enable new investment to recur in the region as permanent development support.

For most of the assessment team this task was completely new territory. They were more familiar with traditional ‘relief distribution’ programmes following disasters, involving cash or ‘food for work’ or direct grants of goods or cash to those in greatest need. An early task for the team was to determine a priority ranking for the type of microcredit tasks to be supported. This was necessary to deal with the continual lobbying the team experienced as various groups put in bids for a portion of the recovery grant. Therefore a variety of criteria were discussed for the selection of projects for investment. The options considered included projects that would:

bring benefits to the most vulnerable communities;
bring benefits to those worst affected by the flooding;
use local materials so that the financial inputs would have a ‘ripple
impact’ (or local economic multiplier), bringing economic benefit down the line to providers of raw materials;
place emphasis on labour rather than capital-intensive approaches to maximise employment in the region;
build from existing micro-credit schemes already in place in the province;
provide support to flood recovery (such as brick making for reconstruction).

Following extensive discussions with the potential stakeholders these criteria were put in ranked order and then used for project selection. A parallel task for the assessment team was to identify suitable institutions to manage such micro-credit programmes.

As the assessment team travelled throughout the flood-affected areas they became aware of the rapid recovery of some of the worst-affected families. Many had already rebuilt their homes within three
months of the flood water receding. This was largely because they had insurance cover and were able to rebuild rapidly as soon as their compensation payments were made. Many of these families had low annual incomes of under

$ 400

per annum, but their insurance cover was part of a government-organised agricultural insurance scheme throughout Anhui Province. Therefore their insurance premiums were very low and took the form of a provincial tax.

The provincial authorities and the UNDP adopted a policy in which families were able to fund their own recovery through small loans (microcredit) and/or via the provision of community insurance.

Box 9.5: Flood recovery in Mozambique, 2000
Following the floods of 2000, major donors in Mozambique followed similar policies to those adopted in Anhui (see Box 9.4). USAID had traditionally dispensed tangible relief goods after disasters; in this case, instead, they provided cash grants of

$ 100

to 85,000 families. The Director of USAID in Mozambique, Cynthia Rozzell, explained the rationale for this approach:

People need money to get back to normal life. The traditional donor response is to pass out seeds or clothes. The people sell those and buy what they really need. So give people money and let them determine their own needs.
(Quoted in Christie and Hanlon 2001:142)
In addition USAID, as well as NGOs such as CARE and World Relief, adopted extensive micro-credit schemes after the flood. USAID set up a

$ 7

million low-interest credit line for wholesalers, and if they took up the offer they were in turn required to extend 60 days credit to their retailers in lieu of the normal 14 days for repayment (ibid.).

Can recovery contribute to sustainable development?

George Nez is an experienced physical planner who played a key role in the reconstruction of two cities that had been destroyed by earthquakes (Skopje in Yugoslavia from 1963 and Managua, Nicaragua from 1972). He has reflected on predisaster constraints that impeded the progress of recovery:

When you direct a reconstruction programme everyone tends to blame the disaster for this or that problem. However, gradually you come to realise that ninety percent of the problems you encounter were present before the disaster event, waiting to be tackled. All that has happened is that the disaster has acted like a sharp surgeon’s scalpel that has been used to expose all manner of weakness and failure, such as poor government, un-enforced building codes, lack of planning, corruption in all directions, etc. The issue poses a dilemma concerning how far it is possible to go, with the limited resources at your disposal, in rebuilding the society as well as its towns and cities.
(Nez 1974, emphasis in original)
Some agencies such as the US Department of Energy (1999) have introduced programmes that promote post-disaster reconstruction with energy-efficient designs; others have found ways for municipalities to convert flood-prone areas into nature reserves and open space (Monday et al. 2001: ch. 7; Burby 1998). Such initiatives are welcome, but they do not constitute ‘sustainable development’. They don’t begin to recognise, much less address, the scope of ‘recovery’ identified by Nez. In our earlier discussion of the Johannesburg Summit and our fourth risk-reduction objective, we emphasised the necessity of combining poverty reduction and the other Millennium Goals with the imperatives of ecological integrity.

The words of Nez above highlight the challenge of building ‘sustainability’ in this broader sense into programmes of recovery. He notes that most of what a planner must confront after a disaster-the obstacles to implementation as well as many of the environmental and social deficiencies encountered-were there before the disaster. We would go further, in light of our PAR model, and argue that many of those environmental and social problems actually contributed to the disaster because of the way they shaped specific forms of vulnerability (unsafe conditions). In short, recovery can only contribute to sustainable development if it challenges ongoing dynamic pressures and root causes of disaster vulnerability.

Can recovery address dynamic pressures and root causes of disaster vulnerability?

We have said a great deal about how root causes and dynamic pressures involve factors and processes that create the vulnerability of unsafe conditions. But it is vital to recognise that those roots and pressures are also operating during the unfolding of a disaster itself. As the cases presented in Part II show, the structures of domination and social relations remove control over the conditions of life and livelihood away from households and localities, and concentrate it in the hands of others (landlords, political functionaries, corporations, banks, development ‘experts’ and refugee-camp organisers). Our discussion of the third risk-reduction objective earlier in this chapter asserted that fundamental changes in governance are required to reverse the PAR model. Recall that governance ‘encompasses government, the private sector, and civil society, and the complex interaction among these segments’ (Vatsa 2002b). Therefore, any recovery programme that shifts power and control back into the hands of households and localities by rearranging the power relations among government, civil society and the private sector will accordingly contribute towards addressing root causes and dynamic pressures. It is not only the sweeping acts of a revolutionary state (such as Cuba’s land reform in 1959) that address deeply entrenched institutional arrangements and values (root causes). Slower and smaller reforms can also be effective (Olson and Gawronski 2003).

It is possible that some of what was happening in Gujarat state (India) in 2002 provides an example of recovery which is contributing to the return of control to ordinary people. The United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) is working with an Indian NGO called SEEDS (Sustainable Environment and Ecological Development Society) in supporting a series of projects where one of the key objectives is to mobilise and sustain local capacities to reduce vulnerability. In their words:

Rehabilitation should be empowering. The project team would not, and should not, remain with the community forever. In such a case, the community who are the first responders should be sufficiently equipped to cater for their immediate needs. A well planned rehabilitation exercise can significantly increase the capacity of the community in a more effective response… The success of the rehabilitation exercise is judged by the degree to which actions are replicated by the community without intervention from the project team. Inputs on capacity building are therefore important. Additionally, the project team needs to ensure that conditions would continue to exist for easy replication.
(UNCRD and SEEDS 2002:7-8)
Challenging patriarchy is another way of changing the power structures which increase vulnerability and reproduce it after a disaster. For example, it is important to ensure that women participate fully in decision making concerning the siting as well as the form and safety of their dwellings. The rationale is that in many societies, such as rural Turkey, women and small children are likely to spend far more time than men in their dwellings during daylight hours and thus are far more vulnerable to seismic impact. The men are more likely to be better protected at work in fields or factories. But it has to be recognised
that providing such enhanced roles for women would of course challenge deeply ingrained cultural and religious tradition in many societies. In the aftermath of the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, women’s organisations such as the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) became active in recovery work, work that, long after homes have been rebuilt, is likely to result in a more active role for more women in their towns and villages (Bhatt 2003; Enarson 2001; Fordham 2001).

The integration of indigenous coping into relief and recovery is another way to challenge long-established beliefs and a distribution of power that hinders recovery and reinforces patterns of vulnerability. This is never easy, especially in hierarchical systems where there is a long history of antagonism between town and country, peasant and landlord, ‘high’ culture and ‘low’ culture, but a disaster may offer opportunities for such challenges to be made. The integration of people’s knowledge is not a mechanical activity, but begins with respect for the people concerned, and it requires their trust. NGOs in less developed countries have led the way in demonstrating respect and building trust, and we provided a sample of the methods they use during our presentation of the second risk-reduction objective earlier in this chapter.

The fruit of these efforts has been the emergence in the 1980s of a development framework based on people’s knowledge and local organisation (Chambers 1994, 1995b, 1997). This approach requires listening to local people (Pradervand 1989; Narayan and Petesch 2002) and having an awareness of how power relations can block participation of the most vulnerable (Johnson and Mayoux 1998). Indeed, as Chambers (1983) writes, it is essential to ‘put the last first’. Doing so opens up a channel of communication between the people and disaster recovery workers that goes beyond ‘consultation’. People are able to express their needs and work together with outsiders to overcome obstacles (Lisk 1985; Wisner 1988a).

In a more specialised domain this participatory method of working has been called the ‘farmer first’ approach (Chambers et al. 1989). In an elaborated form and a more generally applicable approach, it is called a 'deliberative inclusionary process’ (Holmes and Scoones 2000). Water projects, sanitation work, reforestation, housing, grain storage design and many other efforts have benefited from participatory or ‘action research’ methods, in which outsiders and local people are equal learners and teachers (Cuenya et al. 1990; Marchand and Udo de Haes 1990; Wisner et al. 1991). Successes have been registered in Asia and Latin America (Conroy and Litvinoff 1988; Holloway 1989). In Africa this approach to ‘development-with’ the people has been called ‘the silent revolution’ (Cheru 1989; cf. Rau 1991; Kiriro and Juma 1989; Salih 2001).

One example highlights the potential of popular control of the recovery process. Following a landslide, residents of the Caracas (Venezuela) neighbourhood of Nazareno refused to move into remote barracks provided by the government. Instead, they broke into and occupied a local school. They demanded land and assistance in building moresecure homes. The government agreed, and a team including architects and social psychologists from the Escuela Popular de Arquitectura (People’s School of Architecture) worked with the community to develop a permanent recovery plan (Wisner et al. 1991:282; Sanchez et al. 1988).

Seventh risk-reduction objective

Build a safety culture [extend to Culture]

The framework in Part I of this book, and the evidence produced from the cases studied in Part II, have revealed some generalisable truths about disasters. To summarise, disasters

are rooted in everyday life;
are manifestations of development failures;
have distant and remote precursors;
are linked to livelihood resilience and household capabilities;
result in the need to release pressures through changes in institutions, structures of domination and improved access to resources.

The question we address with this final risk-reduction objective concerns the very last of these points. What is to be done to change institutions so that disasters can be prevented, their effects lessened (mitigated), vulnerability reduced, and capabilities and resilience increased? Such institutional change would result in a ‘safer environment’. But how do we get there? All of the preceding risk-reduction objectives depend on the process of institutional change.

In the course of Part II we noted a marked tendency in conventional disaster work to treat symptoms rather than causes. The reason for this bias is that vulnerability is deeply rooted, and any fundamental solutions involve political change, radical reform of the international economic system, and the development of public policy to protect rather than exploit people and natural resources.

Some believe, with good reason, that creating a safer environment depends on moral arguments directed at those with power, a minority who have opportunities to make the world safer for the vast majority. The majority are vulnerable because they are subordinated and unable to make choices that would provide safety even when they are aware of safer options. Looking back over the past few centuries, such moral appeals have sometimes borne fruit. But, more often, safety has been the subject of demands for human rights and dignity made by the vulnerable (and their organisations) themselves. Maskrey observed more than a decade ago that the only ‘choice’ available to the residents of Lima’s squatter settlements was ‘between different kinds of disaster…[P]eople seek to minimise vulnerability to one hazard even at the cost of increasing their vulnerability to another’ (Maskrey 1989:12). That situation has not improved; it may even have deteriorated.

At the beginning of the International Decade for Natural Disaster, the editor of the New Scientist perceptively observed:

All the aims of the IDNDR will cost money, and, in particular, money for things that appear to have no immediate benefit. Few politicians will support something that could bring no visible benefit for 10 or 20 years, let alone a
century. Add to this the fact that many of the measures that could cut the death toll from disasters will disrupt people’s lives, and you have a very good excuse for doing nothing.
(New Scientist 1989:3)
In preparing for the IDNDR, an international committee of experts anticipated this difficulty for governments in ‘selling’ protection policies to their constituencies. So it was proposed that:

efforts to reduce the impacts of natural disasters will gain far wider acceptance if they are perceived as a means to protect economic development and improve living standards rather than to mitigate some hypothetical, localised and infrequent event.

(Austin 1989:65)
That economic argument has now become a matter of consensus. The World Bank, InterAmerican Development Bank and the ProVention Consortium agree that the billions of dollars in losses (from events such as hurricanes Andrew and Mitch, the Kobe and Northridge earthquakes, the Mississippi and River Elbe floods) are extremely serious and substantially reduce economic performance. However, despite this, little has been done to reverse the root causes and dynamic pressures causing widespread vulnerability, even in G7 countries.

There are parallels here with the development of ‘green polities’, where some governments are persuaded to change policy because of carefully-framed economic arguments, often against powerful vested interests. These are also long-term measures that cost large sums of money and cause disturbance. However, while there is now a global political lobby that is pressing for environmental protection (even for ‘environmental justice’), no comparable lobby yet exists for protection from disasters. Also, environmental demands have widespread popular support in many countries where millions of ordinary people have returned ‘green’ candidates to city councils, state and national parliaments. Disaster vulnerability has not yet become so widely accepted as a popular issue, partly because of the persistence in the media and education system of the myth of the ‘naturalness’ of disasters.

At the political level, then, a reduction in disaster vulnerability must become a ‘green’ issue as well as an organic part of a poverty reduction agenda. This may require more work in drawing out the similarities in vulnerability to natural hazards and to technological and environmental hazards. The latter are already a significant part of green consciousness, arising from disasters such as those in Bhopal, Chernobyl, Sellafield, Three Mile Island, Love Canal and the sinking of the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound. To date there has been little contact between academics and activists working in these two areas. Links must also be made between the various bureaucracies that deal separately with disaster risk reduction and environmental protection.

Achieving radical changes to address the fundamental causes of vulnerability is extremely difficult. The mitigation strategy outlined in this chapter focuses on policies and procedures that will reduce some risks even if they leave many vulnerabilities resolutely intact. It is perhaps best described as the ‘art of the possible’. The more
difficult measures that will be needed to reduce vulnerability significantly involve changes in power relations and economic systems.

Popular grassroots involvement in assessing risks and in designing and implementing mitigation measures can have the further, long-term effect of giving people the selfconfidence and organisation to demand more. The words of Boyden and Davis still ring true.
[D]isaster mitigation has implications which are quite different-and much further-reaching-than those of disaster relief. First, relief by its very nature creates dependency between donor and recipient. Mitigation on the other hand aims to increase the selfreliance of people in hazard-prone environments to demonstrate that they have the resources and organisation to withstand the worst effects of the hazards to which they are vulnerable. In other words, disaster mitigation-in contrast to dependency creating relief-is empowering.
(Boyden and Davis 1984:2)
Their view was echoed in 1999 by Ariyabandu, who saw the arguments for investment in mitigation as the following.

Mitigation reduces loss of life and human suffering.
Not all disasters are 'emergencies’. Many disasters including drought and floods are predictable. Investment in mitigation can minimise their impact.
Mitigation reduces the risk element in development investments, thus making development initiatives more stable.
Treating disasters separately from development action can contribute towards increased levels of hazards and vulnerability, and can jeopardise future development initiatives.
Mitigation reduces dependency on relief and aid, and strengthens local capacities for preparedness.
Mitigation reduces the resources required for emergency responses; therefore in the longer run more resources become available for development (Ariyabandu 1999:10).

Critics of status quo development efforts have for some time called attention to the potential of what they call the ‘third system’. This refers to members of civil society who organise to demand their rights and to protect their communities.

^{21}

Ideally, the IDNDR would have captured the imagination of civil society and brought forth an upsurge of such citizen action; but it did not. However, the 1990s did see significant popular protest focused on perceived injustices and the risks of the concentration of economic power brought about by globalisation. There was a very effective campaign for debt amnesty in favour of the poorest, highly indebted countries (the Jubilee campaign). Also, in the past the worldwide movement of consumers’ unions has successfully confronted the power of the pesticide and baby food industries. In the USA, activist Lois Gibbs (whose family became sick because of industrial pollution from Love Canal in her town near Buffalo, New York) now coordinates some 7,000 citizen groups who make up a national toxic monitoring network. Survivors of Chernobyl have become part of the rapidly growing citizen’s environmental movement in the territories of the former Soviet Union. Survivors of the poisoning from the Bhopal chemical factory
explosion have also become activists. There are 4,000 member organisations of the Environmental Liaison Centre (based in Nairobi), the majority of which are in LDCs, and more than 2,000 cities worldwide are involved with Local Agenda 21.

In many parts of the world, school leavers and university graduates are returning to their home localities to use their knowledge. They struggle alongside their neighbours to reclaim sustainable agricultural technologies half-forgotten or buried by the influence of the Green Revolution (Murwira et al. 2000; Marglin 1998). They continue to fight against 'mega-projects’ such as large-scale dams in India, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines, Canada, China and elsewhere. In other urban and rural communities, churches, mosques and other bodies form the focus for a citizen response to economic dislocation and crisis. Food banks, community kitchens and pantries have sprung up all over the USA and in many Latin American countries such as Argentina, to assist and involve poor and hungry people. People’s health centres and public health movements have also emerged in the slums of many of the world’s mega-cities from Brooklyn and the Bronx to Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City and Manila.

Such formal and informal organisations are woefully under-utilised by authorities responsible for disaster mitigation. A four-year comparative study of relations between civil society and more than 220 municipalities in six mega-cities found a consistent pattern of disconnection or antagonism between NGOs and government (Wisner 2002a).

^{22}

NGOs have been quicker to recognise the potential of such groups. The people themselves can campaign to secure their livelihoods and life spaces (Anderson and Woodrow 1998), to recognise the 'untapped power of people’s science’ (Wisner et al. 1977) and the effectiveness of ‘community-based’ mitigation (Maskrey 1989). People organise themselves spontaneously in many areas of life. Organisations such as tenant unions, squatters’ councils, purchasing cooperatives and urban gardening groups often arise as a way of protecting less powerful people from the power of landlords, urban officials or profiteering retailers, organisations that already exist for reasons of selfprotection and perceived threats in the local environment.

In these cases it is quite typical for the organisations to turn their attention to the physical hazards that affect them. In Rio de Janeiro, for instance, one of the most powerful centres of community organisation in the favelas is the samba school. Each year members of a ‘school’ plan for months, organising dancers and making elaborate costumes in advance of a great carnival parade and competition. These events are a focus of poor people’s hope, pride and energy. Could the samba schools become a major force for reducing vulnerability to urban floods and mudslides in Rio? They could be ideally placed to press municipal authorities to clear the rubbish that often blocks drainage channels and leads to floods (see Chapter 6). In fact, in at least one of Rio’s favelas, a grassroots organisation that began campaigning for public health improvements, has taken up the issue of floods (SINAL 1992; E.Williams 1992).

Figure 9.5 suggests the sequence through which the kinds of local organisation just discussed can enter the national legislative process and eventually bring about forms of hazard mitigation. It has happened before in regard to automobile safety, fire safety in public places, chemicals in the environment and a host of other safety issues so common now that they are barely noticed.

Preconditions for citizen participation

Popular organisations-as diverse as trade unions, consumers’ associations, churches, mosques and samba schools-can contribute to the entire range of possible preventive and mitigating action. However, such citizen protest and lobbying only finds full expression under conditions of economic and political democracy and respect for human rights. A minimum level of needs satisfaction is also required before the poorest are able to engage in organised activities to increase security against natural hazards. Where they have jurisdiction, governments must be responsible for the constitutional protection of rights, and for a safety net for the

Figure 9.5 Stages in the development of a safety culture
satisfaction of basic needs sufficient to allow the most vulnerable to participate (Doyal and Gough 1991; Wisner 1988a). If the nation-state has any moral ground for legitimacy, it must be the provision of such basic protection and empowerment.

There must also be a certain minimum level of social peace before the most vulnerable can risk becoming publicly involved. When we wrote the first edition of this book Sudan, Mozambique, El Salvador and Lebanon were beset by war. Of these, only Sudan is still at war, but Colombia, Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and many others have been added to the list. Even as the second edition is being completed, the USA has named an Axis of Evil’, and announced and acted upon a doctrine of ‘pre-emptive war’ that could further destabilise large areas of Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

We are haunted by Hewitt’s sombre vision:
The gravest developments in insecurity, untimely death, uprooting, and impoverishment of peoples in our century have derived from totalitarian violence or monopolistic deployments of science and technology and a war paradigm. They have continued to dominate the landscape during the first half of the IDNDR. There is no indication that such grave dangers arise from too much civil freedom, high quality and equitably distributed social services, devolution of powers, or traditional arrangements for social security and disaster response.
(Hewitt 1998:91)
Under such circumstances, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for ordinary people to exert local, co-operative effort to deal with natural hazards. Lives are stretched to the limit by the struggle to make ends meet, and to deal with the continuing disaster of war. War continues to work powerfully as a dynamic pressure, pushing people into deeper vulnerability. Where war makes national government jurisdiction ambiguous, difficult or impossible, new forms of international intervention are needed, not only to bring an end to the hostilities, but also to ensure that the peace is constructed with a built-in concern for vulnerability to disasters.

But, we have argued, war is not the only global pressure that belongs to the chain of disaster causation. There are other root causes and dynamic pressures that are less intractable, for which there is less excuse for inaction or inadequate responses. If our analysis in this book is persuasive, it must lead to the understanding that disasters are reduced only by releasing people from the unsafe conditions that derive from social, economic and political pressures. These are pressures that will not disappear simply because the new and old economic and technocratic elites concede that they should be abolished. Organised, ordinary people must make them disappear.

We began this chapter with some reflections on the way vulnerability to disasters has been addressed in a series of UN conferences and initiatives that span the past decade. Considerable space was devoted to this review since we regard these deliberations as being significant pointers to the stance taken by the UN and member governments regarding the reduction of risks from natural hazards. However, we also questioned the seriousness of this rhetoric and whether it will lead to a reduction of vulnerability. The world that has given rise to the statements about reducing risk is also the world in which political and economic power is increasingly centralised and concentrated.

Against this background, the skills, capacities and growing political consciousness of ordinary people are important in two ways. Throughout our book we have documented the significance of local knowledge and action. This is the first and most straightforward way in which a ‘bottom-up’ approach is important. Yet such local efforts are often stunted or even blocked by policies that come ‘from above’. Secondly, therefore, local initiatives are important as building blocks toward a ‘global civil society’ 23 that is able to insist on concrete implementation of the goals proclaimed in international forums. Local technical knowledge plays a role in disaster vulnerability reduction; however, there is also an important role to be played by local political understanding and consciousness.

The latter can serve to bring to bear organised popular pressure on legislators, officials and businesses for the reforms required to reverse the direction of our PAR model. Exhortation by UN bodies (or textbook authors) is insufficient without significant pressure for change coming from those most ‘at risk’.

Notes

1 School-aged children are also very much at risk, as the tragic deaths of pupils in a school in Italy in 2002 and a school dormitory in Turkey in 2003, reminded us all.
2 While such linkages are imperative, we are concerned that once disaster-risk reduction is absorbed into the wider picture, there is a possibility that it will be forever lost from view. Our fear comes from listening, rather too often, to development specialists describe disaster mitigation and preparedness dismissively as ‘an integral part of development’. Their analysis is, of course, hard to fault, but the practical outcome of this perspective is the failure to include such concerns in their work. This gives rise to the destruction of development initiatives in disasters as well as the inadvertent increase in vulnerability that can be caused by ‘development’.
3 One is reminded of Gandhi’s list of 'Seven Deadly Social Sins’ and similar catalogues in other traditions. Perhaps we are proposing the opposite: seven social virtues.
4 We mean ‘consciousness raising’ in the sense that the great Brazilian adult educator, Paulo Freire describes in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972), that is, as a ‘study of the (social and physical) environment’.
5 Douglas and Wildavsky (1982); Brown (1987); Wynne (1987); Beck (1992); Slovic (1993).

6 Both Barnes (2002) and Gilbert (1998:16) describe the social disorder following disaster as due, in part, to an upsetting of the system of meaning. We see the issue of ‘trust’ in the context of the system of meaning. It is therefore not only an issue of perceived probity, even-handedness in administration and transparency of bureaucratic process, but goes deeper into the language with which the dominant techno-social order seeks to ‘understand’ cause and effect.
7 Kasperson and Pijawka (1985) may be a notable exception.
8 See the work of Soto (1998); Turcios et al. (2000); Trujillo et al. (2000); Chiappe and Fernandez (2001); Wilches-Chaux and Wilches-Chaux (2001).
9 The Emergency Management Australia framework is described in ISDR (2002b: 76); see also Buckle et al. (2000).
10 We are aware that there are views of vulnerability assessment that favour replacing checklists with a ‘situational’ analysis (Wisner 2003a) or more participatory approaches that privilege the ‘voices of the poor’ (Hewitt 1998; Enarson and Morrow 1997; Narayan and Petesch 2002). While we are largely in agreement from a theoretical and methodological standpoint, we can still see practical situationsfor example, refugee camps, centres for internally displaced people, shelters-where checklists are invaluable. These can, in fact, be developed and validated in quieter
times on the basis of more situationally specific and participatory methods. In addition, we should note that there are ethical concerns which suggest that research and assessment results should, at a very minimum, be shared with the vulnerable people concerned.
11 We will not repeat the many catalogues of specific measures that have been developed over the years by engineers to construct flood- and wind-proof structures, to strengthen buildings against earthquakes, to map, analyse, and in some cases, to provide early warning of hazards (Zschau and Kueppers 2002; Alexander 1993, 2002; Smith 2001; Coburn and Spence 2002; Smith and Ward 1998; Pielke and Pielke 2000; Parker 2000; Parker and Handmer 1992; Chen 2002). We could only scratch the surface of this rich knowledge base, and, in the end, the problem as we see it is not lack of such specific technical understanding, but of the root causes and dynamic pressures that combine to block its effective application. See the section of RADIX devoted to the theme ‘Knowing versus doing’ http://online.northumbria.ac.uk/geography_research/radix/knowingvsdoing.htm
12 In total, 26 schoolchildren plus their teacher died in San Giuliano di Puglia, in southern Italy, when the reinforced concrete second storey of their schoolhouse fell in on them during a moderate earthquake. The first storey was built in the 1950s, prior to strict building codes, while the second was a recent additionmost probably an addition which the original structure could not support safely (Soares 2002).
13 Some of this section is based on Aragon and Wisner (2002). We will not here be making a critique of the term ‘sustainable development’. Many others have pointed out the ambiguity and difficulties of this phrase (Adams 2001; Dovers et al. 2001; Stott and Sullivan 2000; Redclift and Benton 1995; Bramwell 1994; Worster 1993; Dovers and Handmer 1993).
14 Walter and Simms (2002) even write, apocalyptically, of the ‘end of development’ and ‘the great reversal of human progress’ as the result of inattention to global warming.
15 Such a ‘zero sum’ situation is an extreme case, but as we pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, there is ample evidence that traders, war lords and others very clearly benefit from displacement and famine. It is tempting to see such exploitative relations as extreme extensions of ‘normal’ social relations in capitalist society and not as aberrations due to individual misbehaviour. US corporations are lined up to make billions of dollars from the reconstruction of a conquered Iraq (Burkeman 2003; Penman 2003; Dow 2003)—more than

$ 8

billion (Dow 2003), moreover, to come from selling the oil of the vanquished, which makes perfect sense in terms of the logic of capitalism in the twenty-first century.
16 Data on losses vary considerably. For example, the Economic Commission for Latin America’s estimate of total economic loss is closer to

$ 1.5

billion, and the count of homes destroyed has been as high as 300,000, depending on the source. We use Government of El Salvador (GOES) data. This estimate is likely to be on the low side.
17 See Wisner (2001f) for more detail.
18 The term ‘curative development’ is used by UNDP in the context of its post-conflict programme. However, this agency’s programmes that deal with recovery from (and
prevention of) disasters triggered by natural hazard events and those that arise because of violent conflict are housed under the same division (Emergency Response Division) and their approach is very similar. This involves ‘rebuilding infrastructure and production systems’ as well as ‘resettlement and reintegration of displaced people, restoration of health and education services, local planning and participatory systems, and environmental rehabilitation’ (UNDP n.d.: 2). Indeed, the operational co-ordination role mandated to the UNDP Resident Representative in each country means that recovery from all forms of emergency and disaster potentially fall under the brief of UNDP, just as, in principle, all immediate UN disaster response is coordinated by the UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Activity (OCHA). Its ‘compendium of the UNDP record in crisis countries’ (ibid.), describes an 'areafocused’ programme to resettle people displaced by drought in northern Sudan (ibid.: 6) and also the use of the same approach aimed 'at alleviating war-induced deprivation’ (ibid.).
19 Of course, we must hope that this revised crop calendar was the product of a dialogue between the outsiders and the farmers, and not simply imposed from above.
20 Some scepticism has been expressed concerning the very high loan repayment rate reported-more than 90 per cent; however, there is no doubt that the Grameen Bank has provided a valuable service to millions of people in Bangladesh (see LawsonTancred 2002).
21 See Nerfin (1990); Wignaraja (1993); Stiefel and Wolfe (1994); Hall (1995); Burbach et al. (1997); Smith et al. (1997); Alvarez et al. (1998); Mohanty and Mukerji (1998); Fox and Brown (1998); Kothari (1999); de Senillosa (1999); UNRISD (2000).
22 Sponsored by the United Nations University, this study examined perceptions of urban social vulnerability held by municipal officials, citizen-based groups and NGOs in sample districts of six mega-cities (conurbations with more than 10 million inhabitants). The cities surveyed were Tokyo, Manila, Mumbai, Johannesburg, Mexico City and Los Angeles (see Wisner 2002a).
23 On the question of the development of ‘global civil society’ in relation to a wide range of risks, see the Irmgard Coninx Foundation (Berlin) initiative (n.d.).

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INDEX

Aberfan, Wales:
    landslide from coal waste tip (1966) }18
Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire 159
Aboriginal people, Australia 208
absentee land ownership 28, 130, 219-20,235;
    nineteenth-century Ireland }15
Acapulco:
    effect of hurricane Pauline 233
access:
    idea of 93;
    patterns 99,140
Access model 11, 27, 32, 45, 47, 79-87, 80, 83, 97;
    constructive criticisms 87-8;
    developments since introduction of 86-8;
    illustrating development of famine 132-7,133-153, 136-157, 222;
    illustrating impact of AIDS 165, 166-192;
    of Mexico City earthquake 251-2,252;
    in relation to hurricanes 221-2;
    as research framework 107-8;
    resources during normal life 88-99, 89, 151
    time periods for components of 96;
    transition to disaster 93-105, 95, 96-7,208;
    and understanding vulnerability 97, 193, 242
Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (Mozambique) }22
ActionAid 305
Afghanistan:
    displaced persons due to war 40n, 42n, 42;
    mines and loss of limbs 67, 128;
    risk from Lake Sarez, Tajikistan 185;
    war and drought 5, 24, 150;
    war as root cause of vulnerability 48, 327
Africa:
    adverse agrarian trends in sub-Saharan region 72;
    biological hazards and vulnerability 159-66;
    cholera outbreaks 33;
    cities 65, 159;
    colonial settlement of coastal areas 216;
    debt repayment crises 68, 303;
    disaster reduction networks 293;
    drought 37n, 104;

epidemics in refugee camps 154;
famines

105, 106, 113, 114, 127, 138, 159

;
FEWS developed for 139;
‘flood-retreat’ agriculture 205;
floods in recent years 175;
land clearances 73;
local grain storage 301;
magnitude of HIV-AIDS disaster 23, 101, 164;
participatory development projects 322;
timber industry 73;
vulnerability analysis of HIV-AIDS 159, 161-6,286;
wars during last decades 5, 159, 164,
see also southern Africa;
West Africa
African Americans:
bias against in disaster relief 214, 219, 315, 316
age factor 49, 61-2,72;
in social causation of disasters 5, 6, 31, 234
Agenda 19 20, 26
agriculture see farming
agro-chemicals 158,169
agro-industries 218, 225
Ahmedabad, Gujarat 262
aid see humanitarian aid
aid agencies and organisations 27, 116, 244, 311
AIDS see HIV-AIDS
Airs, Waters and Places (Hippocrates) 170
Alamgir, M. 127
Alexander, D. 45-50,187
Algeria: mudslide (2001) 21, 43n, 307
Alice Springs, Australia:
flood (1985) 208
Amazonian region:
migrants from Brazil 154;
rainforest 103
Ambraseys, N.N. 290
Anderson, M. 106, 276, 293
Andes 75, 103, 153, 155, 274
Andhra Pradesh, south-east India:
coastal livelihoods 219;
cyclones 83-4,215, 221-4,222, 224, 229-30,229, 235-6,315
Angola:
displaced people 315, 160;
mines and loss of limbs 67, 128;
refugees from civil war 65-7,118;
violent conflict 25 , 40n, 65-7,173n;
war as root cause of vulnerability

48, 118, 128

animals:
habitats provided by flooding 176-7;
health risks 177;, 157;
loss of in disasters 191, 194, 231;
with potential to damage crops 146
Annan, Kofi 149
anthrax:
spores sent in US mail (2001) 149
Argentina 63
Arguetta, Manual Colon 245
Ariyabandu, M 325
Armenia, Colombia 65, 243
Armero, Colombia 266
arsenic poisoning:
Bangladesh 149
Asia:
colonial settlement of coastal areas 216;
disaster reduction networks 293;
effect of climate change on monsoon 121;
epidemics in refugee camps 154;
participatory development projects 322;
timber industry 73;
vulnerability to disease in mega-cities 158 , see also South Asia;
south-east Asia
Asian Development Bank 58
Asians:
expelled from Uganda 162
Aswan dam 206
At Risk:
first edition 18, 20, 23, 27-8,75, 85;
present edition 28-36
Attacking Poverty (World Bank) 306
Austin, T. 324
Australia:
Emergency Management 295-7,298, 311; mortality from tropical cyclones 214;
recent floods 74,175 ;
wildfires

21, 75, 170, 307

, see also Aboriginal people
Aztecs 247
baby food industries 325
Bangkok 65
Bangladesh 10, 37n, 55, 75, 103, 206, 236n;
arsenic poisoning 149;
attempt to solve flood problem 195-205,209;
averted famines 114 ;
cyclones 66, 189, 205, 215, 216, 229, 230-1;
famine

106, 113, 121

;
flooding 28, 50-2,65, 175, 176, 178-9,191-2,192, 199, 205, 221;
Grameen Bank’s support for livelihoods 140, 317;
grassroots efforts for protection against storms 301;
IFPRI study of floods 193-5;
inequality in access to land 316;
problems with food price rises 124-5;
problems of population pressure 62, 63;
vulnerability to storms 213, 214, 216-7,218;
war as root cause of vulnerability 128 ,
see also Dhaka
Bangladesh Flood Action Plan (BFAP) 196-203,205
banking see credit schemes
Bankoff, G. 17
Banqiao dam, Henan province (China) 180
Barnes, P. 292
Barnett, A. 164, 165, 167
Basra, Iraq:
cholera 171n
Bates, F. 316
Bay of Bengal 196, 214, 222
Beck, Ulrich 14-6, 17, 34
Belgium:
Centre for Research in the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) 58
Belize 172n
Benfield Greig Hazards Research Centre (UCL) 305
Bengal 125, 129
Bhopal chemical disaster 33-4,324, 325
Bhuj, Gujarat 36, 65, 261-2,262
Biafra 37n, 113, 174n
Bihar 195
biodiversity:
Johannesburg Summit agreements 308;
loss of 73, 154, 169
biological disasters 32-3,33, 164
biological hazards 31, 146-50;
caused by extreme events 150-1;
defences against 157-9;
and health 147, 150-1,154;
livelihoods, resources and disease 151159;
risk reduction in vulnerability to 167-70;
root causes and pressures 159-66;
triggering disasters 146, 148;
vulnerability to

146, 150 - 1, 151, - 6, 159

biological terrorism 147, 148, 149
biotechnology 170
Blaikie, P. 51, 165, 166
Blair, Tony 178

Bluefields, Nicaragua 227
Bolin, R. 214
Bolivia 68, 190,277-
bomb craters 67
Booth, D. 72
Botswana 115, 163
bounded rationality 10,12
Bowden, M. 313
Boyden, J. 325
Brahmaputra, River 195, 198, 207, 230
Brammer, 62
Brazil 60, 73, 220;
drought (1877-8) 121;
famine in north-east region 120;
forest fires and wildfires 20, 170n, 307;
mudslides (2001) 21, 307, see also Porto Alegre;
Rio de Janeiro
Brazilians:
migrants to Amazonian habitats 154
Britain:
colonial policies in India 123-4,129;
colonialism in East Africa 129, 157;
failure to protect Montserrat 268, 270, 271, 272;
flooding and insurance problem 177;
government aims on poverty reduction 139;
and Irish Potato Famine 129, 156;
outbreak of BSE (2001) 16,
see also United Kingdom
British Geological Survey (BGS) 149
Brookfield, H.C. 51
Brown, L. 120
Brundtland Commission 38n
BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) 16
building codes 7, 50, 85, 98, 263, 306, 316
buildings:
in areas prone to tropical cyclones 222;
as cause of landslide disasters 188;
collapse of during floods 189 ;
damage to in earthquakes 246-9,247, 251, 254, 256, 262;
destroyed in Havana by 1996 hurricane 234;
on flood-prone land 175, 209, 210;
unsafe conditions 50, 188;
vulnerable to earthquakes

63, 65, 242 - 3, 254, 257

Bujra, J. 149
bunds 141, 198, see also dikes
Burakumin caste (Japan) 42255

Burby, R. 306
Burkina Faso 10, 140
Burma 40n, 41n, 48
Burton, I. 213
Burundi 25, 162, 174n
Bush, President George W.:
administration 20, 303

Cairo:
‘City of the Dead’ 153
Calcutta 159, 213, 261
Caldwell, J.C. 104
California:
earthquake in Northridge (1994) 19, 59, 214, 253;
earthquakes during 1980s 215, 315;
floods 177;
landslides 12
Cambodia 48, 67, 113, 129
Cameroon see Lake Nyos
Canada 308, 311
Cannon, T. 56, 87, 123
capability 90,97
capacity

11, 95, 321

;
and vulnerability

12, 13, 298, 299

,
see also integrated hazards and capacity/vulnerability analysis (CVA)
Cape Town 170n
capital:
sustainable livelihoods (SL) approach 86, 89, 90
capitalism 49, 159, 225;
disasters as outcomes of 282;
globalised modes of production 307
Caracas, Venezuela 5, 12, 64, 322
CARE 319
Caritas 275
Carney, D. 86
Carson, Rachel 170
Carter, R.W.G. 231
caste:
bias in relief and recovery measures 108n, 209, 222, 236, 262, 263;
Burakumin in Japan 42255;
and coping with disasters 101, 103;
and vulnerability to disasters 31, 222, 234, 308
Castel, R. 16
Catak, Turkey 187, 188
Catas, Peru 240-1
Cater, N. 131
cattle 131, 158, 229
Central America:

Index

acute food emergencies 113;
beach-oriented tourism 233;
cities 65;
impact of hurricane Mitch 20, 172180, 233;
low-income livelihoods 273;
recovery strategy after hurricane Mitch 311, 312-3
Centre for the Epidemiology of Disaster (Catholic University of Louvain) 304
Centre for Research in the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) 22, 58
Chad 10, 48, 128
Chambers, Robert 86,95, 100, 299, 322
Chandpur, Bangladesh:
flood control project 201, 202
Chechnya 40n, 327
Chechnyan refugees 25
Chenzhou, China:
flash flood and landslide 186
Chernobyl nuclear disaster 15, 33-4,324, 325
Chicago:
heat wave 76n
child labour 70
children:
impact of AIDS on mortality 163;
recent earthquake deaths 306;
UN goal to reduce mortality 286;
vulnerability in access to resources 91, 104
Chile 68
China:
annual floods 20, 175;
building of Karakoram Highway 52-3;
dam failures 180 ;
deforestation and flooding 206, 207;
drought (1875-6) 121;
earthquakes 113, 241;
flash floods and landslides 186;
flood prevention measures 210;
flood recovery in Anhui Province 318-9;
floods in 1998 181-4,194, 206, 307;
great floods 189, 191;
Great Leap Forward famine (1958-62) 113, 115, 119, 122, 129, 134;
health improvements from 1960s to 1980s 168;
North Korean famine refugees 25;
production brigades 108n;
reduction of population growth 63;
vulnerability to storms 213;
warning systems 237n,
see also Tianjin
China Daily 180
cholera:
arising from contamination of drinking water 191;
in Basra, Iraq 171n;
in Malawi (2002) 116;
in Nigeria 161;
outbreaks following extreme natural disasters 151, 160;
outbreaks in Latin America 33;
risk reduction approaches 167, 169;
in Rwandan refugee camps 151, 154, 274
Choluteca, Honduras 229
cities:
at risk from flash flooding 190-1;
at risk from landslides 188;
coastal areas 73, 213,216, 220, 232;
and destruction of coastal wetland 73;
GESI programme 298-9;
IDNDR initiatives 19;
impact of extreme natural disasters 151;
Johannesburg Summit agreements 308;
population growth 64;
and vulnerability to disease 158 ,
see also urbanisation
citizen-based organisations (CBOs) 290, 293;
El Salvador 313;
popular protest and campaigns 325-6;
preconditions needed for participation 326-8
Citizens’ Disaster Response Network (CDRN):
Philippines 293, 294-336
civil society 308
civil war:
Angola 48, 67,118;
Burma 40n, 41n, 48;
Cambodia 48;
Colombia 67,327;
Congo 48, 268, 274, 275, 327;
El Salvador 5, 48, 327;
Eritrea 129;
Ethiopia 129n;
Guatemala 9, 48, 316;
Mozambique 48, 54, 225, 226, 327;
recovery following 310;
Sudan 310n, 174n, 327;
Zimbabwe 327n
class:
factors in farming diversification 72;
and HIV-AIDS infection 148;
role in social causation of disasters

5, 6, 31

;
structures of domination

135, 137, 152

;
in vulnerability framework

96, 158, 161, 188, 208, 234, 244, 308

Clay, E. 124
climate change 20,

74, 113, 121, 149 - 50

;
association of floods with 175,184-5;
damaging effects on biodiversity 169-70;
effect on hurricanes 215-6;
Kyoto Protocol 307;
UK International Development Committee Report (2002) 293
Club of Rome 60
coastal areas:
absentee land ownership and disaster risk 27;
degradation of 73,177 ;
displaced people living in 218;
inundation of 121, 176, 179;
livelihoods 214, 216, 219-25;
mangrove forests 67,73 ;
vulnerable to storms 216-9
coastal storms 36, 177, 208, 213-6;
case studies 224-35,235;
vulnerability patterns 216-24,229-30,
see also hurricanes;
tropical cyclones;
typhoons
coca crops:
aerial spraying of 68
Cochabamba, Bolivia 190
Cold War 36n, 149
Colombia:
civil war 67,327;
earthquake 64, 242;
internally displaced persons

25, 40 n, 67, 67

;;
Nevado del Ruiz volcanic eruption 186, 266-7,272
colonialism:
British in India 123-4,129;
British rule in East Africa 129, 157;
history of Montserrat 271;
and settlement in coastal areas 213, 216;
Sudan 132, 137;
Victorian 121
Colorado River 176
commercial cropping:
land clearance for 73
Communist party:
China 182
community initiatives:
coping with disasters 101, 261, 264, 276, 328;
flip chart for discussions 296;
key groups raising public awareness 290;
message from Yokohama conference 284;
mitigation programmes 227, 236, 326;
and political vulnerability in Guatemala 245;
popular control of recovery process 322 ;
social protection measures against flooding 209;
strengthening of organisations 276
complex emergencies

82, 86, 115, 138, 287, 309

;
contributing to famine 138-9;
policy famines and human rights 127-9;
southern Africa 118;
Sudan famine (1998) 131-2
CONCERN 173n
conflict management:
UN millennium goals 286-7
Congo, Democratic Republic of:
conditions when HIV-AIDS epidemic began 162;
internally displaced persons 25 ;
violent conflict and civil wars

5, 40 n, 65, 173 n, 274, 275, 328

;
war as root cause of vulnerability 48,327 ,
see also Goma
constructionism:
approach to risk 17
consumerism 15
consumption:
global patterns 306-7
Contras:
war with Sandinistas 228
Conway, G. 86
coping 32;
Access model 79, 80, 82, 86, 96, 99, 165, 300;
and access to safety

83, 87, 99 - 108

;
with AIDS 165, 166;
definition 100-1;
with famine 135-6;
integration of into recovery 322;
with Kobe earthquake 260-1;
local mechanisms 276, 291, 293, 301;
strategies 99, 101-6,236;
and transition to disaster 106-7;
and vulnerability analysis 105-6,291
coral atolls 75
Cork, University College 173n
Cornia, G. 69
corporate partnerships:
from Johannesburg Summit 308
corporations:
interest in business recovery 311
Corsica 211
Costa Rica 228

Index

credit schemes 140, 169, 222,230, 236, 310, 317, 319
Cromwell, Oliver 155
crops:
adapted to expected flood levels 194;
burning of by armed forces 128;
diseases and pests 146-7,157-8;
local grain storage 301, 310, 322;
loss of due to cyclones and hurricanes 221, 224, 225, 226, 231, 233;
loss of through flooding 191, 221;
and pesticides 67, 158;
prediction activities for risk reduction 140, 299,
see also commercial cropping;
genetically modified (GM) crops
Cuba 168, 321;
cyclones and hurricanes 216, 233-4,235;
management of hurricane Michelle 214, 227, 233-4,304
Cuny, F. 293
Currey, B. 122, 131
Curtis, D. 131
Cutler,P. 92, 124, 293
cyclones see extra-tropical cyclones;
tropical cyclones
Dailey, Florence 268
Dalai-Clayton, B. 202
dams:
building of and effects of flooding lands 73;
campaigns against 326;
‘development’ projects controlling floods 183-4,205, 209-10;
dismantling of in USA 177;
flooding caused by

34, 35, 179 - 80, 180

, 211n;
natural 184-5
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 159
Darwin:
cyclone (1974) 214, 217
Davidson, R. 59
Davis, I. 318, 324
Davis, M. 116, 121
DDT:
and pesticide-resistant mosquitoes 158
De Castro, J. 141n
De Waal, A. 140, 150-1,165, 283
debt:
and austerity programmes

23, 159, 161

;
campaign for amnesty 325;
as dynamic pressure 49, 56, 165, 301;
high indebtedness in Africa 160;
Jamaica 70-1;
and repayment crises 68;
UNICEF recommendations 303
decision making:
and coping with disasters 101, 107, 322;
and pattern of access 99
Declaration and Plan of Action (FAO) 138
deforestation:
and causation of flooding and landslides 7, 20, 42n, 182, 184, 187, 206-7,215, 221, 228-9;
risk reduction approaches 167;
and worsening of hazards

47, 54, 73, 307

, see also forests;
logging
Delhi 65
delta areas 74, 176, 214, 222, 230
democracy:
under threat in southern African countries 118;
Western-style 304
demographic processes 47;
Malthusian theories of famine 119-20, see also population change;
population growth
Deng, L. 131
dengue 75, 168, 172n, 236n
Department of International Development, UK 38n, 86
development:
based on local expertise 322;
by globalised capitalist production 307;
ill-conceived actions after earthquakes 257;
international initiatives to address problems 284, 285;
and modelling knock-on effects of disasters 59;
neo-liberal model of 227;
and relief 311;
sustainable livelihoods (SL) approach 86,236 ;
UNDP approach to recovery planning 318
development programmes:
biological health risks 151, 160;
controlling rivers 205;
Mozambique 225;
War on Want initiative 140
Devereux, S. 115, 119, 124, 139
Dhaka 51,65-,213
diarrhoea:
cause 150;
epidemics in Africa 116, 160;
epidemics in Latin American refugee camps 154;
flood victims 190, 192;
reduction in after water supply improvements 288
dikes 210, 226, 227,
see also bunds
Dinka communities 106
Diriba, K. 123
disability:
role in social causation of disasters 5, 6, 31
disaster preparedness:
for coastal storms 233-4,235;
community programmes 317;
complacency exposed by Kobe earthquake 254, 258-9;
for earthquakes in Mexico 252-3;
failure of Colombia government and subsequent measures 266-7;
failure in Montserrat 268-72;
failures in Goma following volcanic eruption 274-5
Disaster Preparedness Agency, Columbia 267
Disaster Risk and Sustainable Development (ISDR, 2002) 287
disasters:
Access model 79-82, 80, 93-105, 95;
complexity 5 ;
conventional views 9-10;
convergence of thinking about 25-6;
deaths by cause 4 ;
deliberate continuation of cycle 283;
generalisable truths about 323;
impacts and levels of human development 22;
naturalness versus social causation 6-7, 113;
perspective with vulnerability as key factor 9,10 ;
‘pressure point’ of 79, 122;
root causes 27, 282;
statistics 58-9;
sudden-onset and slow-onset 95, 96;
transitions from normal life to 92, 93-4,95, 96-7,243-4;
as unfolding rather than happening 95,130
diseases 3, 32-3;
epidemics 49, 146, 158;
link with wars 5;
and malnutrition 49, 116, 148, 151;
mortality of displaced people 151;
preventive strategies 101, 236;
recent re-emergence of 23;
risk to long-term migrants 153-4;
risks with floods 189, 190, 191-2;
risks in refugee camps 151, 154;
UN millennium goal of combatting 286;
underreported 25 ;
vulnerability to in cities 158,171
see also under names of diseases
displacement of people:
by earthquakes 315 ;
by flash floods and landslides 64, 186, 187, 190, 322;
by tropical cyclones 231;
by violent conflicts

5, 24, 25, 40 n, 54, 67, 128, 225, 226, 311

;
by volcanic eruptions 274, 315;
disease and mortality 315, 153-4;
from homes in Yangtze Basin 182-3;
Mayans in Guatemala 9;
and resulting disasters in Africa 160;
through flooding by dams 35,73 ;
through unequal land ownership 215, see also refugees
Divi Taluk, India 222, 224
domestic violence:
after hurricane Andrew 14
Doyal, L. 101, 147
Drèze, J. 123-4,125
drought 32, 37n, 62, 109n, 160;
Afghanistan 5, 24, 150;
Bangladesh 201;
causing severe biological effects 150 ;
coinciding with wars 5 , 24;
destitution of rural families 65;
development policy 236;
Gujarat 261;
historical episodes associated with El Niño 121;
indicators of vulnerability 98 ;
leading to famine

114, 115, 120 - 1, 121, 148

;
Malawi 116;
Medak District, India 101;
mitigation measures 288;
Mozambique 226;
Nigeria 86, 316;
Sahel (1967-73) 153;
scale of casualties 241;
site of Mexico City 246;
South Africa (1991-3) 140;
southern Africa (2001-2) 61, 118, 291;
Sri Lanka (2001) 25;
Sudan 115, 316
Dudley, E. 277
Duryog Nivaran (South Asia) 31
Dutch colonialism:
Indonesia 191
dysentry 150, 191
early warning systems

139, 279 n, 288, 299, 302

, see also Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS)
Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro (1992) 19, 25
earthquake engineering:
Japanese higher education 257
earthquakes

31, 56, 57, 95

;
associated with volcanic eruptions 265 ;
China 113, 242;
Colombia 65, 242;
Ecuador 64, 276;
El Salvador (2001) 20, 253, 307, 313;
Guatemala (1976) 9, 37n, 243, 244-5,315, 316;
Gujarat, India (2001) 5, 36, 65, 101, 109n, 151, 254, 261-4,276, 277;
IDNDR concerns 19;
impacts in Karakoram (northern Pakistan) 51-3;
Italy 277, 317;
Kobe, Japan (1995) 16, 19, 109n, 254-61, 315;
and landslides 186, 307;
Latur, India 243, 254;
Managua (1972) 55, 313, 315, 320;
Mexico City (1985) 12, 28, 63, 95, 245-53,247, 252-289;
moderate and small events 151;
northern California (1989) 214;
Northridge, California (1994) 20, 59, 214, 254, 258;
Peru 95, 187, 240-1,247;
protective measures 243, 253, 302;
reconstruction after 277, 311, 321;
scale of casualties 241, 261-2;
time-space characteristics 95 , 242;
Turkey 254;
vulnerability

14, 19, 63 - 4, 70, 98, 153, 242 - 3, 246, 298 - 9

East Africa:
cattle mortality due to rinderpest 158
East Asia 113
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) 39n, 216
Ebola 33, 160
Ecological Politics in the Age of Risk (Beck) 14-6
economic approach:
theory of famines 107, 119, 121-19
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) 58
economic development:
in rural coastal Philippines 232;
and ‘selling’ disaster protection policies 323;
unequal policies 25, 236
economic environment:
Access model 81, 97;
influence on disasters 4, 5, 7, 157, 162, 190-1;
vulnerability to disasters

47, 114, 159, 234 - 5, 253, 257 - 8, 268, 272

economic growth:
critiques of 21-3
economic systems:
in social causation of disasters

5, 18, 73, 157, 327

economics:
global dynamic pressures 67-71,120, 161, 252;
impact of earthquakes 250-4,254, 257-8,263-5,313;
impact of floods 175;
impact of wars 67;
losses through disasters 56, 57, 59, 275, 323
economy:
and cycles of disaster 282;
effects of HIV-AIDS pandemic 165;
instability of Uganda in 1970s and 1980s 162-3;
lack of modernisation of 9-10;
liberalisation of 282;
shocks suffered by Nicaragua 228
ecosystems:
floods as essential component of 175-6,176-7;
modified by capitalist production 307;
pressures of coastal cities 213, 219-20
Ecuador:
El Niño 192;
Quito earthquake (1949) 64;
reconstruction after earthquake (1987) 276
education:
on causes of vulnerability and disaster 277;
decline of due to SAPs 69, 71, 282, 299-300;
impact of AIDS on 164;
for public awareness 290-2;
and risk reduction 167, 169, 308, 310
Egypt 103, 158,
see also Cairo
El Niño cycle 20, 74, 192, 215
El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 74, 121, 175,181
El Salvador:
civil war 5, 48, 327;
earthquakes (2001) 20, 186, 254, 307, 313;
failure to enforce building codes 306 ;
failure to implement disaster prevention systems 312-3;
impact of hurricane Mitch 54, 312
Ellis, F. 72
emergencies see complex emergencies
emigration:
Emergency Management Australia 295-7,298, 311
from Ireland following famine 156;
from Pakistan 53,
see also migrants and migration
employment see livelihoods
energy:
Johannesburg Summit agreements 308;
need to provide access to renewable sources 287-8
England:
recent flooding 175;
wind and storm surge from cyclone 236 n
environment:
changes as dynamic pressure

56, 72, 74, 301, 307

;
defences against disease 158-9;
degradation of 154-6;
and health 170;
macro-scale biological hazards 146;
rovision of opportunities and hazards 5, 7
environmental approach:
theory of famine 119-20,120-1
environmental crisis:
Beck’s studies 14-5;
consequences of war 67
environmental determinism 10
environmental protection:
global political lobby for 323;
need to link risk reduction with 324
epizootics 146
Eritrea 67, 129, 174n, 283
Eskom 308
Ethiopia:
civil war 5, 48, 129n, 173n;
coping with disasters 99, 104;
drought (1888-9) 121;
exporting of food despite famine 122;
famines

113, 114, 116, 120, 121, 123, 125, 127, 134

;
land mines 128, 283;
overthrowing of government 54;
recent flooding 175
Ethiopians:
migration and health hazards 153
ethnic cleansing 85, 114
ethnicity:
and vulnerability to disasters

5, 6, 31, 208, 234, 244, 259

ethnoscience 100
Europe:
ageing population 61;
environmental concerns 15 ;
floods in 1990s 20, 175, 176, 307;
integrated pest management 147;
maternal mortality 161;
new map after Second World War 56;
nineteenth-century improvements in living conditions 158, 168
European Union (EU) 123, 142n, 282, 308
evacuations:

Andhra Pradesh 224, 229-30;
community resilience after Kobe earthquake 260-1;
in Cuba during hurricane Michelle 233-4;
earthquake at Catas, Peru 240-1;
failure before volcanic eruption in Colombia 266;
Montserrat 266
exports 49, 68, 161, 225, 227
extra-tropical cyclones

236 n

extreme natural events

107, 140, 307

;
deaths triggered by 23, 59;
and global climate change 121;
indigenous interpretations of 108;
showing economic and political relationships 272;
triggering severe biological effects 150-1
Exxon Valdez:
sinking of 324
family:
social support networks 103-4,134;
and structures of domination 85, 91, 135
famine 95, 113;
Access model 132-7,133-4,136,222;
averted 115, 138;
causes 113-9,131-2,141;
causes of death during 116, 150-1;
causing political upheaval 55;
coping with

101, 105, 106, 136

;
as emblematic political events 113 ;
and gender 37n;
grassroots responses 140;
as human rights issue

119, 127 - 9, 138

;
linked with wars

5, 48, 113, 114, 128, 130, 139, 147, 283

;
manathor (‘epoch-ending’) 101;
overlooked 25;
policy options 137-40;
Sen’s work on 92, 125-6,127, 129, 134, 138;
theories 119-29,130, 141;
unequal distribution of food as cause of 73,122 ;
Watts’s tracing of ‘concatenations’ 132;
women’s songs and stories in Malawi 31,
see also Irish Potato Famine
‘famine crimes’ 127, 140
Famine Crimes (de Waal) 283
Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) 138-9,141n, 167s
Famine Institute, Boston 172n
famine relief

35, 107, 140, 291

Farakka Barrage, India 180, 185
farming:
adverse trends as dynamic pressure 56, 71-2; changes in Mozambique 225;
diversification 103;
effects of coastal storms on 83-4,218, 224;
floods and livelihoods 175-6,179, 205, 316-7;
impact of HIV-AIDS in southern Africa 62;
methods causing worsening of hazards 47,54 ;
and need to engage in non-farm activities 159;
reasons for underproduction 124;
risks posed by wars 67 ,
see also commercial cropping
feminism 31
Ferguson, J. 241
Fiji 214, 220, 233
fires:
triggered by earthquakes 242, 255,
see also forest fires;
wildfires
First World War 33
Firth, R. 136
fisheries:
Johannesburg Summit agreements 308
fishing:
benefits of flooding 179, 202, 205;
coastal livelihoods 219, 220-1,235;
decline of in Montserrat 268;
over-fishing 73
Flood Control Drainage and Irrigation (FCDI) projects 198-200
flood plains 51, 175, 177, 189;
and housing

178, 210, 316

;
opportunities for livelihoods 6, 47, 179
Flood Response Plan (Bangladesh) 203
floods 31, 56, 57, 64, 65, 95, 160, 178-88,242;
after cyclones and hurricanes

19, 74, 94, 121, 215, 226, 227

;
Bangladesh 28, 51,66, 175, 176, 179-,191-3,192, 200, 205, 221;
Bangladesh’s attempt to solve problem 195-205;
benefits of 176,176-7,179-,195;
caused by dams

34, 35, 73

;
caused by silting of rivers 232 ;
challenges and changes in thinking 20, 175-8;
in China in 1998 181-4,194, 206, 307;
community responses to

101, 227, 326

;
control measures 176, 179-84,197-203;
deforestation causation controversy 206-7;
disastrous outcomes 188-95;
effect of climate change 121,175 ;
exposure of people to new health risks 147 ;
flash 178, 179, 185,185-8,190;

IFPRI study of 1998 Bangladesh disaster 193-5;
and landslides 185-8;
‘living with flood’ strategies 203, 205;
Mississippi basin (1993) 20, 175, 177, 197, 307;
Orissa 317;
prevention leaving damaged livelihoods 196-8,202;
prevention and mitigation 209-10,302;
problem in Alexandra Township, Johannesburg 108;
reconstruction after 311;
recovery in Anhui Province, China 318-9;
recovery in Mozambique (2000) 319;
scale of casualties 241;
and severe biological effects 150;
site of Mexico City 246;
small and medium disasters 189-90;
Sri Lanka (2001) 25;
throughout Europe during 1990s 21, 175, 176, 307;
as trigger to famine 121;
and vulnerability 191, 192, 193, 201, 204, 207, 208-9
Florida 218, 219, 315
food:
acute emergencies 113;
approaches to achieving security 138;
chronic insecurity in Malawi 116, 117, 165;
coping with shortages

102, 103, 104, 105

;
disruption of systems by armed conflict 128;
economic influences on consumption 132;
effect of HIV-AIDS on security of 165 ;
failure of distribution systems

73, 127, 136

;
gender and survival strategies 134 ;
grain storage development projects 322;
local storing in rural areas 102, 301;
nineteenth-century improvements in the West 167;
policy 107, 137-8;
and population growth 120;
problems with rising prices 117, 124-5,127;
risks to 15,67 ;
seasonal factors 95;
self-sufficiency 138 ;
and Sen’s concept of ‘entitlements’ 92;
and theories of famine 121-7;
undermining of security by export promotion 49 ;
use of as weapon 113,
see also nutrition
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 138, 139, 141n, 165
Food Availability Decline (FAD) 121-3,126-7,128, 130, 131, 139, 140
food entitlement decline (FED) 125-7,128, 129, 130, 131, 140
food markets:
theory of famine concerning failure of 123-5,127, 130
food-for-work programmes 107
Ford, K. 70
forest fires 95, 170n
forests 146;
burning of in wars 67;
community farming in Sri Lanka 220;
effect of economic ‘growth mentality’ on 68;
Johannesburg Summit agreements 308,
see also deforestation;
trees
Four-Point Plan for a Safer World 305
France 158, 170n, 196
Freire, Paulo 329n
Frente Unido de la Revolucion (Guatemala) 245
Friedman, T. 22

Galeras volcano 267
Ganges, River 180, 195, 198, 207, 210, 230
Gardner, G. 23
gastro-enteritis:
deaths during famines 150
gender:
factors in farming diversification 72;
and HIV-AIDS infection 148, 162, 163;
measures in Human Development Report 22;
politics within households 91, 134;
role in social causation of disasters 5,6 ;
structures of domination 135;
and vulnerability

14, 30 - 1, 31, 161, 188, 208 - 9, 234, 308

gender relations 107
genetic engineering 170
genetically modified (GM) crops 35 , 73
Geneva:
IDNDR Programme Forum (1999) 284-5
Genoa:
protests against economic globalisation 21
genocide 9, 151, 174n, 268, 274
geographical location:
history of Mexico City 246;
and HIV-AIDS infection 148;
homes on flood-prone land 175, 208, 209, 210, 216, 225-6;
resettlement of people 54, 153-4;
vulnerability to disasters

14, 62, 63 - 4, 70, 257, 300

Germany 157,
see also Hamburg
Gibbs, Lois 325
Giddens, A. 16, 17

Gilchrist, J.A. 213
glaciers:
and flooding 184-5,211n
Global Earthquake Safety Initiative (GESI) 346-299
Global Environmental Outlook report, third (UNEP) 20
global warming 74, 121, 175,219, 236
globalisation:
and coastal cities 213;
critiques and protests against 21-3,326;
economic pressures 67-71,252
Goma, eastern Congo:
Mount Nyiragongo volcanic eruption (2002) 24, 25, 65, 151, 267, 274-5;
Rwandan refugee camps 151, 154
Gough, I. 101, 147
governance:
Cuba’s success in management of hurricane Michelle 304;
failures in 127, 165, 235, 272;
role of in risk reduction 303-6,320-1
governments:
claims against for gross negligence 267;
difficulties of war situation 327;
and disaster statistics 58;
failure to support earthquake victims 264;
failures with regard to famines

54, 118, 122, 126, 127 - 8, 128, 129

;
need to ‘sell’ protection policies 323;
preconditions needed for citizen participation 326-8;
responses to cyclones in Mozambique 225-7;
risk reduction measures in Mexico City 246;
role in vulnerability to cyclones

222, 224, 229

;
secrecy of 306
Goyder, and C. 124
Grameen Bank, Bangladesh 140, 317
Grand Canyon 177
Green Movement:
new thinking on rivers 175
'green polities’ 324
Green Revolution 35-6,74, 198, 202, 326
greenhouse gas emissions 74, 121;
Kyoto Treaty 20, 150
Griggs, G.B. 213
Guali, River (Colombia) 266
Guatemala 9;
civil war 48, 316;
earthquake (1976) 9, 37n, 242, 244-5,315, 316;
impact of hurricane Mitch 172312
Guatemala City:
housing vulnerable to disasters 153, 244, 245
Guinea-Bissau 26, 168

Gujarat, India:
cyclone (1998) 215, 229, 235-6;
earthquake (2001)

5, 36, 101, 109 n, 151, 253, 261 - 4, 276, 277

;
reconstruction after earthquake 276, 311, 322
Gulf War 67
Guyana 75

Haas, E. 313, 314, 315
Habitat II conference, Istanbul, Turkey 19
Haghebaert, B. 87
Haiti 219-20
Haitians 219, 315
Hamburg:
sewers 173n
Hamilton, K. 140
Hangzhou Decalaration (1999) 213
Hansen, S. 78n
Haq, K. 69
Hardin, G. 119
Hart, J. 169
Harvie, D. 128
Hat Yai, Thailand 187
Havana 234
Hay, R. 124
hazard mapping 236, 249, 269292, 300
Hazard, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment Matrix 292, 293
hazards:
Access model 80, 82;
relations with risk and vulnerability

45, 98, 191

;
role in social causation of disasters

5, 6, 114

;
types and contribution to deaths 3 ,
see also biological hazards;
natural hazards;
technological hazards
health:
campaigns 163,168 ;
effects of climate change 121, 150;
hazards caused by floods 176 ;
mental 172n;
and normal life 146,150, 151;
and risk reduction

1, 7, 59, 167, 168, 170

;
and vulnerability to biological hazards 147, 150-1,153-4,156, 162
health care and services:
at neighbourhood levels 302;
breakdown of 25,149 ;
community initiatives 325 , 326;
cuts in budgets by African governments 160;
decline of due to SAPs 69, 71, 161, 282, 299-300;
as factor in determining length of life 148;
policy to improve access to 168 , 236 ;
in risk reduction objectives 310
heat waves

76 n

Henoa, Rosa Maria 266
herbicides 67
Herrera, Fernando 241
Hewitt, K. 18, 63, 114,128, 327
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs):
assistance initiatives 69-70,160, 302, 303
Himalayas 103, 185, 206-7
Hippocrates 170
Hispanic people:
discrimination against 215, 218, 253, 315, 316;
ghettos of Los Angeles 300
history:
events as root cause of disasters 300, 155, 247
HIV-AIDS 5, 23, 26, 33, 95, 148, 154, 160-1;
global campaign against 149;
impact of 166-192;
impact in southern Africa 61, 62, 118, 148;
magnitude of disaster in Africa 23, 101, 164;
Malawi 116, 166;
risk in Goma, Congo 274;
risk reduction approaches 167;
South Africa and refusal of drug treatments 163-4;
Uganda 109n, 162-3;
UN millennium goal of combatting 286;
vulnerability analysis of African pandemic 159, 161-6,286
Holloway, R. 276
homelessness 231, 245, 261
Honduras 10, 20, 37n, 215, 228-9,288, 312
Hong Kong 213
Hoover, G. 316
households:
Access model 27, 47, 79-82, 80, 85, 87, 88-92, 96, 97, 98, 152221;
and famines 134-5,136-8;
impact of AIDS 165, 166-192;
impact of Mexico City earthquake 251, 252;
recovery 315 ;
social support networks 103-4;
storm impacts 221
housing:
collapse of in Karakoram 52;
nineteenth-century improvements in the West 167;
overcrowding 47, 156, 252;
participatory development projects 322;
raised above normal flood levels 209, 222;
rebuilding safe homes after earthquakes 276, 321;
relocation of from flood plain 316;
use of flood plains in UK 177-8;
and vulnerability to disaster

153, 156, 208, 210, 216, 229, 245, 274

;
vulnerable to earthquakes 257,259 ,
see also sum dwellers;
squatter settlements
Howrah, near Calcutta 159
Huang River, China 189
human actions:
combined with natural hazards

5, 181 - 2, 240 - 1

;
and greenhouse gases 121;
influence on physical and biological effects 7;
in social causation of disasters 5, 6, 113
human development:
decline in improvements 23;
and disaster impacts 22, 288-9;
impact of AIDS 164;
notion and measurement of 26, 146, 167
Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP) 22, 23, 26, 146
human rights:
aspect of famine 119, 127-9,138;
and UN millennium goals 286-7
humanitarian aid:
agencies 80;
danger of undermining coping strategies 106;
diverted by the state 85 ;
famine relief 128 ;
for recovery from violent conflicts 24-5,311;
UN prioritisation of 303
hunger 3,116 , 193-4;
and Sen’s concept of ‘entitlements’ 92
hurricanes 37n, 214, 216;
Access model 221;
Hurricane Andrew (1992) 14, 20, 74, 217, 218, 259, 307, 315;
Hurricane Bebe 219;
Hurricane Camille 214, 217;
Hurricane Gilbert (1988) 71, 74, 214, 217, 315;
Hurricane Hugo (1989) 71, 74, 214,219, 272, 315;
Hurricane Joan (1988) 74, 214, 228;
Hurricane Michelle 214, 233, 304;
Hurricane Mitch (1998) 20, 55, 172180, 214, 215, 222, 228-9,233, 307, 311, 312, 315-;
Hurricane Pauline (1997) 233;
islands particularly vulnerable to 233-5;
recovery patterns 315,
see also coastal storms;
tropical cyclones;
typhoons

Hyderabad 65
hydro-electric power (HEP) 179, 180, 183, 206

Ibadan, Nigeria 159
Idaho:
Grand Teton dam 179
‘ill-being’ 13, 97
immigrants:
'hot bedders’ 88
immigration status 6
immunisation:
local-level initiatives 301;
UNICEF programme 167
Inca Empire:
Spanish conquest of 95
income opportunities

90 - 1, 96, 97, 103, 208, 308

;
inequalities in rural areas 218, 230;
lack of in Ethiopia 123;
mitigation strategies 102
India:
coastal zones at risk from storms 218, 220, 222, 224, 229;
deaths due to extremes of temperature

76 n

;
decline in birth rates 60 ;
delta regions 75 ;
drought 101, 121;
earthquakes see under Gujarat;
Latur;
expansion of railways 124,126 ;
exporting of food despite malnutrition 123;
failure to enforce building codes 306 ;
flood mitigation measures 209, 210;
flooding from collapse of natural dam 184;
food scarcity in southern regions 104;
local floods 191;
plague outbreaks 33,
see also Andhra Pradesh;
Bhopal chemical disaster;
under names of cities
Indian Ocean 75
Indonesia 40n, 60, 73, 274;
forest fires and wildfires

20, 170 n, 307

;
recent storms and floods 189, 190-1
industrialisation 34
industries:
destruction of by tropical cyclones 219, 226;
impact of Gujarat earthquake 262
inequalities:
in access to resources

6, 62, 123, 208, 218, 222

;
in disaster recovery programmes 316;
income opportunities 218, 230;
land ownership 62, 194, 232;
related to vulnerability 287;
water and sanitation systems 159
inflation 28, 70
influenza:
virus after First World War 33, 147
infrastructure:
decline of due to SAPs 69;
declining budgets for maintenance of 159,161 ;
destruction of by earthquakes 313;
destruction of in extreme natural disasters 151, 274;
destruction of through wars in Africa 5;
policies for reconstruction 287-8,312;
when violent conflict interacts with natural hazards 24
Ingushetia:
Chechnyans refugees 25
insects:
and biological hazards 146-7
integrated hazard and capacity/vulnerability analysis (CVA) 292-3
Inter-American Development Bank 58, 323
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 39n
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) 6, 18, 19, 147, 283, 284-5,323, 325
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 292
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI): study of 1998 floods in Bangladesh 193-5
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 40n, 117, 128, 141n; austerity programmes for debt repayment 159, 161;
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 23, 27, 69,161, 300
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) 287
Interpretations of Calamity (ed. Hewitt) 114
Iran 60
Iraq:
displaced people 60;
health situation under US occupation 171n;
oil embargo and No Fly Zone 282;
reconstruction of 330n;
war (1991) 103;
war (2003) 141n, 327
Irish Potato Famine (1845-8) 74, 113, 126, 129, 148, 155-6,156,
irrigation:
dams 180, 183, 205;
health risks posed by schemes 151;
provided by floods in Bangladesh 176, 178-9
Islamabad 53
islands:
problems in addressing disaster threats 268, 286;
vulnerability to coastal storms 219, 231, 233-4
Istanbul 20, 65
Italy

277, 306, 317, 329 n

Ives, J. 207
Ivory Coast 327, see also Abidjan

Jakarta 190-1,213
Jamaica 70-1,214, 217,217, 218, 220
Japan 42n, 62, 196, 214, 255, 306,
see also Kobe;
Tokyo;
Yokohama
Java 190
Jefferson, Thomas 173
Jigyasu, Rohit 262
Jodha, N. 101
Johannesburg 108,159;
World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) 19, 20, 282, 283, 287-9,299, 305, 307-8
Johnstown, Pennsylvania 211n
Journal of International Development 306

Kala Azar (visceral leishmanaisis) 25
Kano, Northern Nigeria 63, 161, 206
Karachi 53, 213
Karakoram:
impacts of landslide and earthquake 51-3
Kariba dam 154
Kates, R. 213, 313
Kebbede, G. 124
Kent, R.C. 138
Kenya 10, 63, 115, 159, 162, 165, 168, 220,316, see also Nairobi
Kerala State, India:
reduction of population growth 63
Khartoum 65,186
Kilburn, C. 216
Killian, C. 316
Kingston, Jamaica 217
Kinshasha, Zaire 64
kinship see family
Kirdar, U. 69
knowledge:
awareness of volcanic risk 265;
limits to 55-6;
required for resources 100, 299-300;
use of in protest and campaigns 325
Kobe, Japan:
earthquake (1995) 15, 19, 109n, 253, 254-61, 256, 315
Kordofan, Sudan 129
Korea:
drought (1888-9) 121,
see also North Korea
Krishna Delta, India 222, 224, 316
Kumar, G. 122
Kyoto Treaty (1997) 20, 150,307

La Niña cycles 74, 215
La Paz, Bolivia 190, 276-7
La RED (Network of Social Science for Disaster Reduction) 30, 189, 190, 293
Lagos 159
lahars (mud and debris landslides) 186, 265, 315
Laidlaw, I. 255
Laird, R. 214
Lake Nyos, Cameroon 9, 278n
Lake Sarez, Tajikistan 185
Lake Texcoco, Mexico 246, 251
land degradation 20, 73, 154, 306;
causal sequences 51-3
land loss:
through flooding 194-5
land mines 67, 128, 283
land ownership 62, 194, 215, 218, 232, see also absentee land ownership
land reform 7, 62-3, 107, 169, 232, 321
land use:
absentee interests 220;
connections with disaster 307;
different aspects of deforestation 206;
ill-conceived development 257, 306;
regulations and restrictions 7, 306;
and vulnerability to volcanoes 272
landslides

12, 31, 121, 151

;
after hurricanes in Central America 20, 74, 228;
and flash floods 185-8;
forming natural dams 184;
impacts in Karakoram (northern Pakistan) 51-3;
linked to tropical cyclones

94, 121, 228, 233

;
linked to volcanic eruptions 265;
risk at Three Gorges reservoir, China 184;
triggered by earthquakes 20, 242, 245, 307;
triggered by war activities 67, see also mudslides
Late Victorian Holocausts (Davis) 115, 121
Latin America 245
Latin America:
cholera outbreaks 33;
colonial settlement of coastal areas 216;
community-based vulnerability assessment 74-5;
De Castro’s work 141n;
debt crisis 68;
disaster reduction networks and research 58, 293;
epidemics in refugee camps 154;
initiatives to help the hungry 63;
La RED 30, 189, 190, 293;
participatory development projects 322;
vulnerability to disease in mega-cities 158 ,
see also Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)
Latur, India:
earthquake 242, 253
Lavell, A. 190
law and order:
in Access model 85, 135, 15-4
Leaf, M. 197-8,202-3,212n
Lebanon 327
Leftwich, A. 128
Lesotho 119, 164
less developed countries (LDCs) 3, 5, 15;
capacity/vulnerability analysis (CVA) work 29;
deaths from HIV-AIDS 23;
and flooding 150, 175;
garbage dump homes 153;
in global economy 68 ;
highly populated coastal mega-cities 213;
imposition of SAPs on 48-9;
population growth 60, 64;
recovery methods of NGOs 322;
support networks and ‘moral economy’ 105 ;
use of protective agro-chemicals 157-8;
vulnerable to storms 213
Leyte Island, Philippines 231
Liberia 5, 26, 48, 327
Lima 323
Lindsay, Dr John 169
livelihoods 6, 11;
Access model 31, 79, 81, 89-91, 99, 140, 152
change of location 54;
coastal areas 213, 216, 219-24,222-3,224-5;
contemporary analysis of 13-4;
damage of by flood prevention 196-7,202;
disruption of by floods 193-5,208;
disruption of due to disasters in Africa 160, 162;
diversification 72, 159;
floods as key part of 175-6,179;
health risks 151
in IDNDR conference rhetoric 284-5;
impact of earthquakes 251, 257-8;
impact of HIV-AIDS 165, 166-192, 309;
Johannesburg Summit agreements 308;
loss of due to wars 67;
problems of landless people 62, 232;
recovery programmes 316-9;
risk reduction by improvement of 308-10;
sustainable livelihoods (SL) approach 86;
unsafe conditions 50, 131, 161;
urban hillside slum dwellers 12 ;
and vulnerability to hazards

11, 234, 272, 300, 308 - 9

,
see also sustainable livelihoods (SL) approach
Local Agenda 19325
local communities see community initiatives
locusts 122, 160, 168
logging 54, 182, 187, 206,
see also deforestation
Loma Prieto:
earthquake (1989) 257
Lomborg, Bjorn 39n
London:
sewers 173n
Los Angeles 15, 170n, 300, see also Northridge;
Topanga Canyon
Louvain, Catholic University of 305
Love Canal, near Buffalo 324, 325
Luanda 67
Luzon, Philippines 231

Maasai 231
McGuire, B. 215-6
Major, John 178
malaria

25, 67, 69, 75, 116, 151, 162

;
global campaign against 149;
resurgence of 158;
risk of after floods 191, 192, 286;
risk reduction approaches 167;
risk to long-term migrants and refugees 153, 154;
UN millennium goal of combatting 286
Malawi:
diseases weakening the population 116;
famine (2002) 31,114, 116-9;
frequent drought 116;
HIV-AIDS 163, 165;
Mozambican refugees 54;
recent flooding 175;
refusal of GM maize as part of famine relief

42 n, 73

;
women’s oral history of 1949 famine 31
Malaysia 170n
Mali 10, 139, 206
malnutrition:
and countries exporting food 122-3,129;
and disease

49, 116, 147, 151

;
risk in squatter settlements 63;
risks with floods 189;
Uganda 162
Malthusianism and neo-Malthusianism:
theory of famine 119-20,138
Mamdani, M. 127
Mameyes, Puerto Rico 187, 188
Managua:
earthquake (1972) 54, 313, 315, 320
Mandela, Nelson 164
mangroves:
destruction of 67, 73, 154, 219-20,232
Manila 39, 153, 231, 232
Maputo 225
marginality:
and bias in hurricane relief 214;
and inability to recover from disasters 315 ;
notions of in disaster studies 9 ;
and vulnerability 48, 253
market liberalisation 69,117, 282
Martinique:
volcanic eruption 240
Marx, Karl 122
Maskrey, A. 106, 227, 293, 323
Maslow, A. 100
Mason, I. 216
Mauritania 141, 206
Mauritius 216, 235, 237n
May, P. 306
Mayan Indians:
Guatemala 9, 244
Mbeki, President Thabo 164
measles 164, 153, 160, 167
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF):
list of most underreported crises 25
media:
perceptions of floods 175;
publicising political impacts upon disasters 282;
selective treatment of disasters 25
medical care:
access as factor in HIV-AIDS infection 148
Meghna, River 62, 198
Memphis, Tennessee 148
Mende 109n
meningitis 33, 160
Messerli, B. 207
Mexico 9, 60, 233, 274;
wildfires and forest fires 20, 170n, 307
Mexico City:
earthquake (1985) 12, 28, 63, 95, 245-53,247, 248, 252-289, 276;
location of 56;
poor sanitation system 159;
reconstruction and job creation 277;
slum dwellers 63-4,245;
vulnerability to earthquakes 246-53,247, 249
Miami:
hurricane Andrew 20, 217, 259, 315;
tropical storms 213;
vulnerable groups 39315
micro-organisms 146, 168
Miculax,… 246
Middleton, N. 27,27-8
migrants and migration:
coastal areas 216, 230, 232;
disease risks 153-4;
high-risk groups in Kobe 254-5;
for labour in South Africa 117, 163, 172n;
rural-urban 50, 62, 63, 65;
and vulnerability to biological hazards 153-4,
see also emigration
military control:
Guatemala 9;
impact on vulnerability 47-8,128
Millennium Development Goals (UN) 285-6
Miller, K. 315
Mills, C.Wright 29
mineral resources:
and power struggle in Congo 274
Mississippi basin:
floods (1993) 20, 175, 177, 196, 307
mitigation 108, 283;
community-based programmes 227, 289, 325-6;
failure of exposed by Kobe earthquake 258-60;
local-level responses to flood risks 209, 301;
in recovery process 315, 324-6;
strategies 102, 169, 209-1,276-7,277
modernisation 73, 259, 264;
ecological 15, 16, 34

Mombasa 162
Monsanto 68
monsoons 74, 121
Montserrat:
volcanic eruptions (1995-8) 16, 267-72
‘moral economy’ 104-5
morbidity:
effect of higher rates 148;
from flooding 190, 192;
increase of with food shortages 136;
‘normal levels’ 151
more developed countries (MDCs):
constructionists approach to risk 17;
in global economy 68;
recent severe floods 175,176 ;
and ‘risk society’ 15-6;
vulnerable to storms 213
Morocco:
drought (1877-8) 121
Morrow, B. 75
mortality:
AIDS 165;
caused by floods 175, 189, 190-1,192;
caused by tropical cyclones 214, 221, 230-1;
children 163, 286;
during famines

136, 150 - 1

;
effect of higher rates 148 ;
from collapse of buildings during earthquakes 242;
‘normal levels’ 151
mosquitoes 152, 158, 168, 236n
Mount, J. 18, 176, 177
Mount Nyiragongo see under Goma
Mount Pelée:
volcanic eruption 240
Mount Pinatubo:
eruption (1991) 30, 279n, 315;
lake in crater 185
Mozambique:
cyclones 214, 216-7,218, 224-7,226, 229;
deaths from violent conflict 173n; floods 175, 184, 191, 210n, 225, 319;
HIV infection 163;
mines and loss of limbs 67;
PHC network 168;
recent food crisis 118;
war refugees

54, 225, 226

;
war as root cause of vulnerability 48, 128, 327
mudslides 21, 42n, 94, 215, 228, 265, 267, 307;

Payatas (near Manila) 39n, 64, 95;
Venezuela 5, 21, 64, 186, 209, 307, 322,
see also landslides
Munich Re (reinsurance company) 58, 175
Murosaki, Professor 257

Nairobi 325
Namibia 164
National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) 117
National Geology and Mining Institute 266
natural disasters:
natural and social components 8;
in second half of twentieth century 56,57 ;
triggering human disasters

55, 80 - 1, 95, 114, 121, 129, 131, 138

;
UN millennium goal of reducing 286
natural hazards 25-6, 45, 132, 138, 292;
combined with human action 5,8 ;
and global climate change 121;
interactions with violent conflict 24-5,67;
socio-economic factors and vulnerability to

7, 45, 287

;
time-space factors of vulnerability 50-3,80-1, 92-4,98, 242, 250
natural resources:
degradation of as dynamic pressure

56, 68, 73

;
exploitation of 68;
vulnerability through loss of access to 299
natural science and scientists:
analysis of natural phenomena 21,292
naturalness:
in analysis of natural disasters

9, 17, 113, 323

;
versus social causation of disasters 6-7
nature reserves:
created from flood-prone areas 320
needs 100-1,106, 147
neo-liberalism 21, 49,117, 128, 227,
see also structural adjustment programmes (SAPs)
Nepal 10, 37N, 72, 103, 105, 186, 211n
Netherlands 172n, 237n
Nevado del Ruiz:
volcanic eruption (1985) 186, 266-7,272
New Orleans 177, 217;
hurricane evacuation worries 217
New Scientist 323
New World:
introduction of virulent organisms INto 157
New York City:
September 112001 attacks 33
New Zealand 311
Nez, George 320

Ng’ambi, F. 117
Nicaragua 173n;
help for victims of hurricane Joan 214, 228;
impact of hurricane Mitch 20, 54, 214, 215, 228-9,312, 315;
response to floods (1982) 227;
revolutionary movement

55, 213, 228

;
volcanic eruption (1992) 265;
vulnerability to storms 213,
see also Managua
Niehof, A. 107
Niger 55
Nigeria 26, 28, 86, 113, 116, 132, 147,161, 316, see also Biafra; Ibadan;
Kano;
Lagos
Nigg, J. 315
Nile, River 205
9/11 see September 112001
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 19, 24, 30, 58, 227;
appeal to protect biodiversity 155 ;
disaster recovery work 312-3,319, 321, 322, 326;
drought coping strategy in southern Africa 118;
efforts in Goma 274-5;
initiatives for food security 138, 139;
risk and disaster reduction policies 168,293 ;
social protection measures against flooding 209;
use of PAR model 74-5;
vulnerability assessments 14
normal life 9, 14, 146-;
Access model 79, 80, 81, 82, 84-5,88-99, 89, 208;
and development of famine 133-153, 134, 136-7;
events that cause deaths 3 ;
floods as essential component 175-6;
and transition to famine conditions 136-157;
and transitions to disaster 92, 93-105, 95, 96-7,107, 243-4;
and vulnerability

18, 31, 191, 209

North America 62, 147, 168, 176,
see also Canada;
United States of America
North American Indians:
Powhatan confederacy in Virginia 173
North Korea:
famine since 1995s 25, 113, 115, 122, 282, 283
North Vietnam 214, 227, see also Vietnam
Northridge, California: earthquake (1994) 19, 59, 214, 253, 258, 315
nuclear accidents 147
nuclear war 15, 33
nuclear waste dumping 34
'nuclear winter’ 33
nutrition:
decline of due to SAPs 69, 299-300;
during ‘normal’ times 134, 151, 153;
need for policies to improve 169;
vulnerable groups 117, 209,
see also food
oil:
boom (1970s) 67, 161;
discovery during seismic mapping 241;
spills 34
O’Keefe, P. 27,28
Oklahoma City:
bombing of Murrah Federal Building 33
Oliver-Smith, A. 95, 101, 247
Onimode, B. 68
Operation Hunger in South Africa 140
Organisation of American States (OAS) 13
Orissa:
aftermath of floods 316-7;
cyclones 189, 215, 222, 224, 229
Osaka 255
Our Common Future (WCED) 20
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) (Britain) 272
Owusu, K. 118
Oxfam 69, 130, 186, 245
ozone layer:
destruction of 170

Pacific Ocean 74
Pakistan 54, 195, 229, see also Karachi;
Karakoram
Palaw’ans (Philippines) 232
Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) 58
Pan Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Project (PCDPPP) 268
Parker, D. 176
Pasto, Columbia 267
Payatas (near Manila):
mudslide 38n, 64, 94
peace-building 24, 287,327
Peacock, W. 315
Pearce, F. 180
Peña, Rolamdo Andrade 245

Peri Peri 30, 293
Peru 10, 39n, 68, 95, 187, 192, 240-1,247, see also Lima
Peshtigo, Wisconsin: forest fire 170n
pesticides 16, 67, 152, 158,169, 325
pests 147, 148, 157-8
Philippines 73, 103, 170n, 218, 237n, 274;
‘Citizens’ Disaster Response Network 292, 293, 294-336;
impact of typhoons in 1980s 231-2;
vulnerability to storms 213, 218, 220, 232,
see also Manila;
Mount Pinatubo;
Payatas
plague 33, 116, 148, 158, 168
Platt, R. 306
Plessis-Fraissard, M. 277
Plymouth, Montserrat:
failure of volcano protection measures 268-73
pneumonia 160
poisonous gas emissions:
carbon dioxide cloud from Lake Nyos 9, 278n;
volcanoes 240, 265
policy famines

122, 127, 129

policy making:
addressing earthquakes and volcanoes 276-7;
addressing famines 138-41;
addressing floods 175 ;
charting impacts of 107;
Mexican programme of disaster preparedness 252-3;
reducing risk of biological disaster 168-9;
responding to coastal storms 234-6;
towards a safety culture 323-5;
vulnerability as tool of

13, 323 - 4

political approach:
theory of famines 119, 130
political ecology 10
political economy

10, 85, 91 - 2, 132, 137, 309

political environment:
Access model 81, 97, 308;
effects of HIV-AIDS on 165;
influence on disasters

4, 5, 7, 115, 157, 311

;
pressures on disaster statistics 59;
as root cause of vulnerability

47, 54, 91, 114, 160, 240, 242, 245, 253, 306

political organisation:
and pressure for change 278
political systems:
control of post-disaster aid 244-5;
role in social causation of disasters

5, 18, 127, 327

pollution:
caused by flood damage to industrial plants 176;
from forest fires in Indonesia 170n;
of Love Canal, near Buffalo 325;
as pervasive hazard 154;
risks in Mexico 246
Polynesia see Tikopia
population change:
decrease due to Irish Potato Famine 156;
as dynamic pressure

56, 60 - 3

;
urbanisation 19,
see also demographic processes
population growth:
and development of coastal areas 213;
and economic growth

9 - 10, 119

;
urban areas 64;
and vulnerability to disasters

54, 56, 60 - 1, 72, 250

Porto Alegre, Brazil:
World Social Forum (2000) 21
Posoltega, Nicaragua 228
post-colonial states 137
post-structuralism:
critique of disaster discourse 17-8
poverty:
AIDS as linked with 164;
British government’s aim to reduce 139;
caused by flooding 194;
due to global economic pressure 69-70;
and effect of neo-liberal policies 127;
Gujarat underclasses 263;
and loss of self-respect 101;
as measure in Human Development Report 22;
prioritising of by World Bank 138;
UN initiatives to address 283, 285-7,308, 320;
and vulnerability

10, 11, 30, 31, 50, 70, 201, 209, 224, 227, 230, 244, 246, 303

Poverty Reduction Strategy Policy/Papers (PRSP) 69-70,301, 303
power relations:
effect on vulnerability

18, 48, 54, 240, 259, 321

;
and recovery efforts 321, 322;
role in social causation of disasters 5, 7, 27
pressure groups 30
Pressure and release (PAR) model 27, 30, 32, 45, 51, 46, 79,85, 88, 98, 107, 121, 132, 137, 314;
cause and effect 47-53,91, 95;
cyclones 222,224, 226, 227;
earthquakes 253, 263-5;
famine in Sudan (1998) 130-1,133-151;
flood disasters 188, 204, 208;

HIV-AIDS 165;
Irish Potato Famine (1845-8) 155-6,156;
reversed for progression of safety 301-6,302, 328;
transition from normal to famine conditions 136-157, 243-4;
uses of

75, 139, 291

;
weaknesses 83
prevention 30, 31, 101, 108, 277, 283;
failure of measures in El Salvador 312-3;
failure of measures in Montserrat 268-72;
of flooding in Bangladesh 195-205;
initiatives to support livelihoods 140;
problems with US flood control measures 176, 177;
strategies for flood problems 209-10
privatisation 69, 227, 235, 282, 288, 300, 307
production:
global patterns 306-7
prostitution 163, 275
protest 21, 325
ProVention Consortium 324
psychosocial impacts 13-4
public awareness:
training and education programmes 290-2
public services 63, 69, 151, 227, 282
public utilities 282, 287, 308
Puerto Rico see Mameyes
Quarantelli, E.L. 101, 291
Quito, Ecuador: earthquake (1949) 64
race inequality:
in disaster relief assistance 214, 315;
in location of US hazardous waste facilities 34
radiation 170,292
Rahmato, D. 99, 134
rainfall:
causing mudslides and landslides

12, 94, 186, 228, 232

;
with cyclones and hurricanes

215, 224, 226, 227, 229

;
effect of climate change 121;
floods 178, 180, 181, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 205;
and introduction of bunds 141;
and Sudan famine 132,
see also monsoons
Rajasthan, India:
flash floods 195
Rangasami, A. 136
Raphael, B. 101
Ravallion, M. 125
reconstruction 107, 314,316 ;
after earthquakes

276, 311, 321

;
Grameen Bank’s support of 317;
pre-disaster constraints to progress 319-20
recovery

30, 32, 311, 313 - 22

;
Access model 79, 82, 252-289;
aided by reducing vulnerability 236 ;
from cyclones and hurricanes 214, 230, 236, 311, 312-3;
ill-conceived actions after earthquakes 257;
inequality of options after Gujarat earthquake 262;
of Mexico City from earthquake 252-289, 253;
risk reduction objectives 310-3,322-7;
undermined by misdirected relief efforts 99
Red Crescent 231, 301
Red Cross 186, 191, 234, 266, 274-5;
World Disasters Report 2001 22, 30
Red River, Vietnam 214
Reddy, A.V.S. 224
reforestation 322
refugee camps 151, 154, 160, 274
refugees:
Chechnyan 25;
from households 88;
from Rwanda in Goma camps 151, 154, 274,275;
from wars 66-7,118, 128, 160;
Mozambican 54;
North Koreans fleeing famine 25;
Sudan 41n, 151;
worldwide problem 26,
see also displacement of people
rehabilitation 314, 321
relief

5, 18, 283, 311, 314, 319

;
failures and misdirected efforts 100, 317,
see also famine relief
religion:
history of conflict in Gujarat 263;
role in social causation of disasters 31
RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana) 226
reservoirs:
created by dams 180
resilience 49, 169, 315;
communities after earthquake disasters 260-1, 264
resources:
in Access Model 47, 83, 88-9,89, 90-2;
access to 83, 84-5,88-9,99, 134-5,242,243-4,308;
allocation of in households 91, 96, 152
diversion of by violent conflicts 24 ;
exhaustion of 307 ;
inequality of access to

6, 62, 91, 104, 123, 208, 218, 222

;
livelihood 32, 100;
post-event coping strategies 105;
in risk reduction objectives 310 ;
role in social causation of disasters

5, 27, 47

;
vulnerability/capacity analysis 299,
see also natural resources
respiratory illnesses 192, 289
Reuters 118
Rhine, River 175
rights

89, 104, 170 n

Rio de Janeiro 11, 12, 186, 187, 188, 326;
Earth Summit (1992) 19, 154
risk:
awareness 86;
Beck’s studies 14-6;
deconstructive approaches 17-8;
need for greater understanding of 284;
relations with vulnerability and hazard 4,45 ;
‘voluntary’ versus ‘involuntary’ 12
risk assessment:
programmes 292-300;
project in La Paz 276-7;
RADIUS 19
risk communication 290-1
risk reduction:
international initiatives 283-9;
need for link with environmental protection 324;
seven objectives 289-329;
in sustainable development strategies 19-20,236, 306-8,311;
in vulnerability to biological hazards 168-70;
in vulnerability to earthquakes and volcanoes 19, 253, 275-7
risk society

14, 146, 148

Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity? (Beck) 14-6
rivers:
and 1998 flooding in Bangladesh 199;
as crucial to livelihoods 205;
effect of deforestation 182;
flood prevention measures 209-10;
floods 178, 189, 194-5,221, 236;
idea of allowing free flow of

175, 176, 183

;
silting 183, 232
Rivers, J. 92
Rogers, P. 204
Rohingya Muslims 40n, 41n
Ross, L. 207
Rovai, E. 314
Rozzell, Cynthia 319
rural areas:
conservation measures from population pressure 63;
decline in public services 25,72 ;
depression leading to urbanisation 159;
diversifying income sources 103;
economic development in Philippines 232;
income opportunities 90;
loss of resources to coastal cities 220;
resettlement of Tanzanians 54;
storing of food and saleable assets 103;
unexploded mines and loss of limbs 67;
vulnerability to storms 214, 218
Russia 121, 308
Rwanda 151, 162, 174n, 274
Ryan, A. 120
safety:
access to

83, 87, 98 - 9

;
building culture of 322-7,327,
Sahel 37n, 55, 121, 127, 138, 140,153, 315
Sainsbury’s supermarket 211n
St Croix, island of 219
St Pierre, Martinique:
volcanic eruption 240
San Diego 170n
San Francisco 12, 257, 313
San Pedro harbour, Los Angeles 15
Sandinistas, Nicaragua 214, 227, 228
Sandwip Island 218, 231
sanitation:
conditions affecting vulnerability

156, 158, 162

;
Johannesburg Summit agreements 308;
local-level projects 301, 322;
need to provide improved access to 169 ;
nineteenth-century improvements in the West 167
Santa Cruz, Bolivia: flash floods 190
SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) 148, 149, 168
Save the Children 141n
schistosomiasis 152, 168
Schramm, … 246
science 149, 259;
precautionary 21,169-70
Scott, J.C. 101, 104
Seaman, J. 106
Seattle:
protests against globalisation 21
Second World War 56, 153

SEEDS (Sustainable Environment and Ecological Devlopment Society) 321
seismic hazard mapping 240-1,242
seismic risk zones

64, 107, 274

Sellafield 324
Sen, Amartya 76n, 90, 104, 121, 125-6,127, 129, 134, 138, 170n
Sena Sugar Estates 226
Senegal 26, 190, 191, 206
Senegal, River 205
September 112001 16, 33
sexual practice:
and HIV-AIDS infection 148, 161, 162, 163
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) 161-2,168, 172n
Shakur, T. 66
Shanghai 213
Siberia:
Soviet settlers 154
Sierra Leone 5, 26, 40n, 48, 109n, 327
Sikander, A.S. 195
Silent Spring (Carson) 170
Silent Violence (Watts) 132
Sind:
cyclone 229
Singapore 170n
skin cancer 170
Skopje:
earthquake 320
sleeping sickness 26,154
slum dwellers 6, 9, 12, 34, 36, 63-4,232, 244, 286, 290, 326
smallpox 154, 158, 167, 173n
Smith, Adam 122
social environment:
Access model 79;
influence on disasters 4-5, 7, 311;
versus naturalness in disasters 6-7, 113
social groups:
vulnerable 254-5,261-2,268, 274,299-,299, 308-10
social protection 5, 81, 87, 179, 188, 203, 209-10,235
social relations:
Access model 80, 81, 85, 91, 97, 132, 250;
Cuba’s management of hurricane Michelle 304;
effects of HIV-AIDS on 165;
and recovery 315,320 ;
and vulnerability of Montserrat 272
social support networks 103-5,106, 222
social systems:
in causation of disasters

5, 6, 9, 18, 73, 83, 88, 113, 114, 148, 328

;
opportunity for change following disasters 276-7
socialism 225, 228
socio-economic forces

87, 99, 107, 221, 282

;
risk assessment focus on 298;
vulnerability 11-2, 31, 160, 162, 208, 244-6,253, 268, 282
soil:
benefits of floodwaters 176, 179;
conservation measures 63;
damage and destruction 73, 188, 233;
effect of economic ‘growth mentality’ on 68
Somalia 25, 48, 174n, 175
South Africa:
Eskom 308;
HIV-AIDS 163-4,165, 171n;
migrant labour 117, 164, 172n, 225;
support for people facing famine in Bantustans 140,
see also Cape Town;
Johannesburg
South Asia 31, 74, 113, 194, 205, 229
south-east Asia 50, 113, 175, 181, 194
southern Africa:
community-based vulnerability assessment 74-5;
drought 61, 118, 291;
famines 114;
impact of HIV-AIDS epidemic 61, 62, 118, 147, 163;
Peri Peri 30;
use of GM maize in famine relief 35
Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference/Community (SADCC/SADC) 35n
Soviet Union:
collapse of

36 n

;
entry of into world markets 132;
forcible collectivisation in 1930s 123, 126, 130;
former countries of 186, 325;
settlers in Siberia 154;
tornado (1984) 237n
Space Shuttle Columbia:
loss of 16
Spanish colonialism 95, 247
species loss 73, 168
squatter settlements

36, 51, 63, 66, 88, 232, 244, 252, 323

Sri Lanka 25, 63, 220, 229
Stallings, R. 306
Stanford, L. 214
starvation 113, 125, 126-7,130, 150, 153;
governments’ deliberate policies of 282, 290
the state:
in Access model 85,135;
functions/dysfunctions as root cause of vulnerability 47-8,225, 235;
responses to cyclones in Mozambique 225-7
Stewart, F. 69

Stockholm Principles 312-3
Stop Disasters 19
storm surges

55, 84, 94, 214, 215, 222, 224, 228, 229 - 30, 235

storms 57, 74, 175,187, 190, 236,
see also coastal storms;
hurricanes;
tropical cyclones
Streeten, P. 170n
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 23, 27, 49,69-,71, 72, 117, 138, 161, 282-,300
structures of domination:
Access model 80, 85,91, 96, 97, 152, 250-;
and famine

135, 136, 222

;
and recovery 221-2,315, 320;
and vulnerability to floods 208
Sutphen, S. 314
subjective impacts 13-4
Sudan 168, 316;
civil war 316n, 173n, 327;
colonial history 132, 137;
drought 5, 115;
exporting of food despite famine 122;
famines

106, 113, 115, 120, 128, 130 - 2, 132, 133 -, 136;

government’s deliberate actions to increase suffering 282;
refugees and displaced people 41n, 151;
spraying of cotton crop in Gezira scheme 158;
war as root cause of vulnerability

5, 48, 128, 131 - 2

,
see also Khartoum
Sudan dioch birds 160
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 282
Sundarbans 218
sustainable development 8, 24;
recovery contributing to 319-20;
and risk reduction 19-20,236, 306-8,311;
UK International Development Committee Report (2002) 293;
UN millennium goal of ensuring 286,
see also World Summit on Sustainable Development
sustainable livelihoods (SL) approach 86,123, 139-40
Swaziland 164
Sweden:
Red Cross initiative 30
Swedish Rescue Services Agency 64
Swift, J. 105, 140
Swiss Re (reinsurance company) 58
Sydney 170n

Taiwan 306
Tajikistan 185
Takayama, Tatou 259

Tangshan, China:
earthquake (1976) 113, 241
Tanzania 10, 54n, 162, 168, see also Dar es Salaam
taxation 123, 135
technocratic approaches

21, 236, 283, 292

;
to flood problems 200-1,202-3,209-10
technological hazards 15, 33-6
terrorism 15, 33;
sabotaging reconstruction of Guatemala 245;
US war on 20, 33, 149,
see also biological terrorism
Thailand 170n, 187, 206, 220, see also Bangkok
Thatcher, Margaret 178
Third World:
as term 36 n
Three Gorges dam, China 180, 184
Three Mile Island 324
Tianjin, China 65
Tibet 185, 186
Tikopia, Polynesia:
famine 136
timber industry:
and destruction of forests 73, 229, see also logging
time:
dimension in vulnerability to disasters

7 - 8, 11, 50, 54, 94 - 6, 96, 308

time-space factors:
natural hazards 50-4,80-2, 93-4,98, 241, 242, 250;
in preventive strategies 101
Tobin Tax 22
Tobriner, S. 246
Tokyo 33, 213, 257
Tomblin, J. 265
Tonga 75, 216, 235
Topanga Canyon, Los Angeles 11, 12
tornadoes 151, 237n
tourism:
and coastal areas 213, 219, 220, 232, 235
toxic spills 34
trauma 101
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 164
trees:
destruction of by pollution 155, see also forests
tropical cyclones 31, 56, 75, 94, 160, 211n, 213;
Andhra Pradesh (south- east India) 83-4,215, 221-4,223, 229-30,229, 315;

Bangladesh 66, 189, 205, 215, 216, 229, 230-1;
and biological hazards 150, 151;
East Pakistan 54;
effect of climate change 121;
efforts at protection from 302;
Gujarat 261;
Mozambique 225-7,226;
in north Indian ocean 229;
as physical hazard 215-6;
reconstruction after 311;
shelters 222, 231, 235-6,236, 302;
Tracy 217;
warning systems 224, 231, 235,
see also coastal storms;
hurricanes;
typhoons
tsetse flies 152
tsunami 95, 178, 241, 243, 265
Tuareg pastoralists 315
tuberculosis

26, 69, 116, 149, 150, 160, 167, 168, 172 n

Turkey 242, 254, 277, 306, 321, 329n, see also Catak; Istanbul
Turkmenistan 186
Tuvalu 75
Twigg, J. 291
typhoid 151
typhoons 180, 214, 231-2,
see also hurricanes;
tropical cyclones
Uganda 109n, 162-3,168, 174n
Ukraine:
famine under Soviets 113, 126, 129,
see also Chernobyl nuclear disaster
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) 149, 167, 303
United Kingdom:
Commons enquiry into Montserrat eruption 303; Commons International Development Committee 293; Department for International Development 38n, 86; NGO World Development Movement 117; use of flood plains for housing 177-8, see also Britain
United Nations:
AIDS Programme 164;
campaign against diseases 149;
and disaster statistics 58;
efforts in Goma 274-5;

FAO see Food and Agriculture Organisation;
IDNDR see International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction;
millennium initiatives to address poverty 283, 285-7,308, 320, 328;
peace-keeping efforts 303 ;
population predictions 60, 64;
recent report on Malawi 116;
regional economic commissions 58
United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) 321
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 13, 22-3,196, 241, 317,318-9,
see also Human Development Index (HDI)
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 19
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) 22
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 204, 319
United States of America (USA) 15, 64, 74, 120, 129, 164n, 237n, 300;
biological terrorist attacks 149;
coasts prone to storms 213, 216-7,218;
collapse of confidence in flood control measures 176, 177, 179, 196;
dangers of dam collapse 180;
earthquakes see Northridge, California;
farming subsidies 282;
limiting of funding for AIDS campaign 149;
location of hazardous waste facilities 34;
mismanagement of hurricane relief 214;
and Nicaragua’s war against Contras 228;
opposition to Kyoto Treaty 20, 150;
post-disaster reconstruction programmes 320;
'pre-emptive war’ doctrine 303, 327;
and reconstruction of Iraq 330
risk reduction measures 311;
and treaty to ban international mines 282;
‘War on Drugs’ 67;
war on terrorism 21, 33, 149, 327;
wildfires and forest fires 20, 170n, 307,
see also Chicago;
Idaho;
Los Angeles;
Memphis, Tennessee;
Mississippi basin;
Virginia
University College London (UCL) 305
Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) 10
urbanisation:
as defence against disease 158;
as dynamic pressure 49, 53-4, 56, 63-7,216, 252, 301;
as increasing risk factor 5,19 ;
as root cause of vulnerability

56, 158, 217, 234, 253

,
see also cities
Uruguay 68

Uzbekistan 186
van der Wusten, 67
Vatsa, K. 304, 321
Vaughan, M. 31
Venezuela:
debt 68;
mudslides 5, 21, 64, 186, 208, 307, 322
Vietnam 67, 186, 236n, see also North Vietnam
violent conflict 3, see also civil war; wars
Virginia, USA: new method of coal mining 307
volcanic ash: benefits to soil 266; destruction in Montserrat 266, 272
volcanic eruptions 31, 56, 150, 151, 265; Las Casitas, Nicaragua 228; Martinique 240;
Montserrat (1995-8) 16, 267-72;
Mount Nyiragongo, Goma, Congo (2002) 24, 25, 65, 151, 267, 274-5;
Mount Pinatubo, Philippines 31, 278n, 315;
Nevado del Ruiz, Colombia (1985) 186, 266-7,273;
scale of casualties 240, 241;
site of Mexico City 246
volcanoes:
settlement on slopes of 6, 266, 274;
threats of massive explosions 3
vulnerability 10-4, 25-6, 30, 50,97, 148-;
Access model 45, 47, 60, 88, 97, 107, 250;
gap widening within society 19 ;
as key factor in disasters

8 - 9, 10, 140

;
and normal daily life

18, 31, 192

;
politically induced

128, 240, 241

;
and poverty

10, 11, 31, 51, 70, 201, 224, 227, 230, 244, 246

;
Pressure and Release (PAR) model 45, 46, 82-3,137, 156, 300-6;
relations with risk and hazard 4, 45, 98, 191, 226;
risk reduction objectives 289-328;
social production of 45, 47, 274
vulnerability/capacity analysis (VCA) 292

Wadge, G. 269
Walker, P. 131
war lords 24, 25, 65, 282
War on Want 140
wars:

Afghanistan 5, 24, 40n, 41n, 48, 150, 327;
Africa 5, 159-60,164;
Biafra 113;
Bush administration’s ‘pre-emptive war’ 303;
Chechnya 40n;
and displacement of people 40n, 67;
as dynamic pressure 49, 56, 67,131, 165, 328;
Ethiopia 5, 48;
and humanitarian relief 24-5;
Iraq (1991) 103;
Iraq (2003) 142n, 327;
Liberia 48, 327;
linked with disease 5;
linked with famine

5, 48, 113, 128, 130, 138, 148, 283

;
loss of lives during twentieth century 33 ;
as root cause of vulnerability

48, 56, 128, 327

;
Sierra Leone 48, 327;
Somalia 48;
Sri Lanka 25;
Sudan 5, 48, 131-2;
Uganda 162;
Vietnam 67,
see also civil war;
First World War;
violent conflicts
waste management systems:
economic failure of 160
water:
contamination of following floods

150, 176, 191

;
international goals for improved access 169, 287-8,308;
local-level initiatives for improved supply 301, 322;
mismanagement of resources 73;
need for access to clean supplies 7,159 ;
people lacking safe supplies

158, 162, 222

;
privatisation of 307 ;
salinisation of supplies 94, 240;
shortages in Bangladesh 201
water industry:
critiques of 21-2
Watts, M. 116, 132
weather:
unusual extremes 157,191 ,
see also climate change;
rainfall
well-being 23, 88, 97, 101, 152
West, R. 187
West Africa:
displacement of people 25
wetlands 67, 73, 220
White, G. 213
Whitehead, A. 85
Whiteside, A. 164
wildfires 21, 75, 170n, 307
wildlife:
destruction of by pollution 155
Winchester, P. 83, 221-2,222, 224, 229-30,236
Wisner, B. 304
women:
education of 309;
empowerment of 63;
irrigated gardening groups 140;
need for credit schemes 169;
oral history of 1949 famine in Malawi 31;
participation in recovery work 321;
poverty in Malawi 116;
resources as less available to 91, 104;
vulnerability

161, 162, 188, 209

Woodrow, P 106, 276, 293
work see livelihoods
World Bank 23, 58, 141n, 303, 311, 323;
austerity programmes for debt repayment 159, 161, 228;
and Bangladesh Flood Action Plan 196;
Disaster Management Facility 30;
neo-liberal policies 117, 128;
and risk assessment 276-7;
statement on attacking poverty 138, 306;
structural adjustment programmes 69,117, 300-;
World Development Report (2001) 22, 69, 163
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)/Brundtland Commission 38n;
Our Common Future 20
World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (Yokohama, 1994) 19, 283, 284
World Development Report (World Bank, 2001) 22, 69, 163
World Disasters Report 2001 (International Red Cross) 22, 30, 293
World Food Programme (WFP) 116, 118, 141n
World Health Organisation (WHO) 39n, 58, 146, 151, 168, 173n, 224
World Relief 319
World Social Forum 21
World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002) 19, 20, 282, 283, 287-9,299, 305, 307-8
World Trade Organisation 21
World Urbanisation Prospects 64
World Vision 142n
World Vulnerability Report (UNDP, 2002) 22-3

Yangtze River:
and floods of 1998 180, 181, 182, 183-4,206

Index
447

yaws 167
yellow fever 148, 192
Yellow River, China 210
Yokohama:
rebuilding of after 1923 Tokyo earthquake 257;
World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (1994) 19, 283, 284
Yomiuri Shimbun 259
York, S. 293
Yugoslavia:
earthquake 320
Yunus, Muhamed 318

Zaire:
violent conflicts 5, 173n
Zambia 43n, 74, 118, 163, see also Kariba dam
Zimbabwe 28, 43n, 54, 74, 82, 115, 161, 163; civil unrest 118n;
government policies deliberately causing starvation 282, 291, see also Kariba dam
Zimmerman, R. 21

Notes:
$^{a}$ the source for political violence data is Sivard (2001). For all other causes, data is summarised from that available at www.cred.be/emdat
$^{b}$ this figure has been increased by us to an estimate of 70 million, much higher than the official data, which would give a total of around 18 million. This is to compensate for large-scale under-reporting of deaths from drought and famine. There are several reasons why this can occur. For instance, it is often the case that governments conceal or refuse to acknowledge famine for political reasons. The Great Leap Forward famine in China (1958-1961) was officially denied for more than 20 years, and then low estimates put the number of deaths at 13 million and higher ones at up to 30 million or more (see Chapter 4). A further problem is that sometimes recorded deaths in famine are limited to those who die in officially managed feeding or refugee camps. Many more are likely to die unrecorded at home or in other settlements.

Also available as a printed book see title verso for ISBN details也可作为印刷书籍获取，详见书名页的 ISBN 信息

AT RISK《风险》

AT RISK《风险》

© 2004 Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon and Ian Davis© 2004 Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon 和 Ian Davis

CONTENTS目录

ILLUSTRATIONS插图

Figures图表

Tables表格

FOREWORD前言

The Great Wave大浪

Element 1: disaster元素 1：灾难

Element 2: hazards元素 2：危害

Element 3: vulnerability元素 3：脆弱性

Element 4: capacity and resilience元素 4：能力和韧性

Element 5: culture元素 5：文化

Notes注释

PREFACE TO THE 2004 EDITION2004 年版前言

Note注释

PREFACE TO THE 1994 EDITION ...

Notes ...

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...

Part I FRAMEWORK AND THEORY ...

1 THE CHALLENGE OF DISASTERS AND OUR APPROACH ...

In at the deep end ...

Abstract ...

Conventional views of disaster ...

What is vulnerability? ...

The basic idea and some variations ...

Multiple meanings of 'vulnerable' ...

Risk society? ...

Deconstructive approaches ...

Vulnerability and normal daily life ...

Changes since the first edition ...

The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) ...

Urban growth and the growth of urban concerns ...

Changes in earth care ...

The emergence of the 'precautionary principle' ...

Critiques of economic globalisation ...

Changes in human development and well-being人类发展和福祉的变化

War and humanitarian relief战争与人道主义救援

Media and policy selectivity媒体和政策的选择性

Convergence and critique收敛与批评

Convergence收敛

Critique批评

Audiences观众

Scope and plan of the book书籍的范围和计划

Limits and assumptions限制和假设

Limitations of scale规模的局限性

Technological hazards技术性危害

Notes注释

At Risk 42 ...

The nature of vulnerability ...

Two models ...

Cause and effect in the Disaster Pressure model灾害压力模型中的因果关系

The chain of explanation解释链

Box 2.1: Landless squatters in Dhaka案例 2.1：达卡的无地占用者

Time and the chain of explanation时间与解释链

Limits to our knowledge我们知识的局限性

Global trends and dynamic pressures全球趋势和动态压力

Where do disaster statistics come from?灾害统计数据来自哪里？

Abstract摘要

Population change人口变化

Urbanisation城市化

War as a dynamic pressure战争作为一种动态压力

Global economic pressures全球经济压力

Adverse agrarian trends and livelihood diversification不利的农业趋势和生计多样化

Natural resource degradation自然资源退化

Global environmental change全球环境变化

Uses of the PAR modelPAR 模型的用途

Notes注释

3

ACCESS TO RESOURCES AND COPING IN ADVERSITY资源获取与逆境应对

Access to resources-an introduction资源获取——导言

The purpose of the Access model获取模型的目的是

Access in more detail更详细的获取方式

New thinking since 1994自 1994 年以来的新思维

'Normal life'-the formal Access model“正常生活”——正式的接入模型

Households and access in a political economy家庭与政治经济中的获取

Transitions from 'normal life' to disaster从“正常生活”到灾难的过渡

Time-space positioning of hazards危害的时间-空间定位

Also available as a printed book see title verso for ISBN details
也可作为印刷书籍获取，详见书名页的 ISBN 信息

© 2004 Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon and Ian Davis
© 2004 Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon 和 Ian Davis

Element 3: vulnerability
元素 3：脆弱性

Element 4: capacity and resilience
元素 4：能力和韧性

PREFACE TO THE 2004 EDITION
2004 年版前言

1
THE CHALLENGE OF DISASTERS AND OUR APPROACH ...

Changes in human development and well-being
人类发展和福祉的变化

War and humanitarian relief
战争与人道主义救援

Media and policy selectivity
媒体和政策的选择性

Convergence and critique
收敛与批评

Scope and plan of the book
书籍的范围和计划

Cause and effect in the Disaster Pressure model
灾害压力模型中的因果关系

The chain of explanation
解释链

Box 2.1: Landless squatters in Dhaka
案例 2.1：达卡的无地占用者

Time and the chain of explanation
时间与解释链

Limits to our knowledge
我们知识的局限性

Global trends and dynamic pressures
全球趋势和动态压力

Where do disaster statistics come from?
灾害统计数据来自哪里？

War as a dynamic pressure
战争作为一种动态压力

Global economic pressures
全球经济压力

Adverse agrarian trends and livelihood diversification
不利的农业趋势和生计多样化

Natural resource degradation
自然资源退化

Global environmental change
全球环境变化

Uses of the PAR model
PAR 模型的用途

ACCESS TO RESOURCES AND COPING IN ADVERSITY
资源获取与逆境应对

Access to resources-an introduction
资源获取——导言

The purpose of the Access model
获取模型的目的是

Access in more detail
更详细的获取方式

New thinking since 1994
自 1994 年以来的新思维

'Normal life'-the formal Access model
“正常生活”——正式的接入模型

Households and access in a political economy
家庭与政治经济中的获取

Transitions from 'normal life' to disaster
从“正常生活”到灾难的过渡

Time-space positioning of hazards
危害的时间-空间定位

Post-event transition to disaster
事件后的灾难过渡

Access, transition and safety
访问、过渡与安全

Coping and access to safety
应对与安全获取

Types of coping strategies
应对策略的类型

Impact-minimising strategies
减少影响的策略

Diversifying income sources
多样化收入来源

Development of social support networks
社会支持网络的发展

Post-event coping strategies
事件后的应对策略

Coping and vulnerability analysis
应对与脆弱性分析

Coping and transition to disaster
应对与灾难过渡

The Access model as a research framework
访问模型作为研究框架

Part II VULNERABILITY AND HAZARD TYPES
第二部分脆弱性与危险类型

4
FAMINE AND NATURAL HAZARDS
饥荒与自然灾害

Causes, pressures, unsafe conditions and famine
原因、压力、不安全条件和饥荒

Strengthening livelihood systems
加强生计系统

Response to famine from the grassroots level
自下而上的对饥荒的响应

5
BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS ...

Human health, daily life and vulnerability
人类健康、日常生活与脆弱性

What are biological hazards?
什么是生物危害？

Limitations to our treatment of biological hazards
我们对生物危害的处理限制

Biological links with other hazards
生物与其他危害的联系

Livelihoods, resources and disease
生计、资源和疾病

The role of access
访问的角色

Vulnerability-creating processes
造成脆弱性的过程

Migration and biological hazards
迁移与生物危害

Regional physical environment
区域物理环境

Pressures affecting defences against biological hazards
影响生物危害防御的压力

Environmental and cultural defences
环境和文化防御

Root causes and pressures
根本原因和压力

Biological hazards and vulnerability in Africa
非洲的生物危害和脆弱性

Box 5.2: HIV-AIDS in Africa
案例 5.2：非洲的 HIV-AIDS

Steps towards risk reduction
风险减少的步骤

Flood disasters, challenges and changes in thinking
洪水灾害、挑战与思维变化

Floods as known risks
已知风险的洪水

The paradox of flood control
洪水控制的悖论

Flash floods and landslides
突发洪水和山体滑坡

Summary: floods and vulnerability
摘要：洪水与脆弱性

Flood prevention and mitigation
洪水防治与减灾