BPMA-MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS & TENDER OFFERS, A CASEBOOK APPROACH
BPMA-合并、收购和要约收购，案例集方法

© Copyright Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor Penn State Law, August 20, 2024
© 版权所有 Samuel C. Thompson， Jr.，宾夕法尼亚州立大学法学教授，2024 年 8 月 20 日

NOT FOR PUBLICATION AND FOR USE ONLY IN PROFESSOR THOMPSON’S 2024 COURSE AT PENN STATE LAW: BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M&A I
不得发布，仅供 THOMPSON 教授在宾夕法尼亚州立大学法学院的 2024 年课程中使用：并购 I 的商业规划

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CHAPTER 1
第一章

INTRODUCTION
介绍

[LAST UPDATED AUGUST 20, 2024]
[最后更新日期：2024 年 8 月 20 日]

TABLE OF CONTENTS
目录

I. Scope of Book 2
I. 第 2 册的范围

A. In General 2
A. 一般情况 2

B. Further Elaboration on the Chapters 3
B. 对第 3 章的进一步阐述

II. Scope of Chapter 6
第二。 第 6 章的范围

III. Introduction to Consensual Transactions 6
第三。 共识交易简介 6

A. The Starting Point: Valuation and Due Diligence 6
A. 起点：估值和尽职调查 6

B. Structuring the Transaction: Tax and Corporate Law Considerations 6
B. 构建交易：税务和公司法注意事项 6

1. In General 6
1. 一般情况 6

2. Stock Purchase Structure 7
2. 股票购买结构 7

3. Asset Purchase Structure 8
3. 资产购买结构 8

4. Direct Merger Structure 9
4. 直接合并结构 9

5. Reverse Subsidiary Merger Structure 10
5. 反向子公司合并结构 10

6. Forward Subsidiary Merger Structure 11
6. 正向子公司合并结构 11

7. Compulsory Share Exchange Structure 12
7. 强制股份交换结构 12

8. Short-Form Merger Structure 13
8. 简式合并结构 13

C. Drafting the Acquisition Agreement 14
C. 起草收购协议 14

D. Federal Securities Laws 15
D. 联邦证券法 15

E. Antitrust, Pre-Merger Notification 15
E. 反垄断、合并前通知 15

IV. Introduction to Tender Offers and Related Transactions 16
四。 要约收购和相关交易简介 16

A. The Basic Tender Offer Structure 16
A. 基本要约收购结构 16

B. Hostile and Consensual (Noncontested) Tender Offers 17
B. 敌对和双方同意（无争议）的要约收购 17

C. Second-Step Mergers 17
C. 第二步合并 17

V. A Historical and Economic Perspective on Mergers and Acquisitions 18
V. 并购的历史和经济视角 18

A. A 1998 Perspective from the Then Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers and the Current (2024) Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen 18
A. 1998 年时任经济顾问委员会主席兼现任（2024 年）财政部长珍妮特·耶伦的观点 18

B. A 2022 U.S. Chamber of Commerce “Business Case for Mergers and Acquisitions” 19
B. A 2022 年美国商会“并购商业案例” 19

VI. An Assessment of Various Theories of Mergers and Acquisitions 21
六。 对各种并购理论的评估 21

VII. Introduction to Event Studies: Determining the Wealth Effects of Mergers 23
七。 事件研究导论：确定合并的财富效应 23

VIII. Introduction to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act 25
八。 Sarbanes-Oxley 法案和 Dodd-Frank 法案简介 25

A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 25
A. 《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》第 25 号

B. The Dodd-Frank Act 26
B. 多德-弗兰克法案 26

IX. References 26
九。 参考资料 26

X. Appendix A to Chapter 1, This Appendix Contains the Latest (i.e., June 2024) Update to the Following Sections of Thompson, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers: Sections 1:7.4 to 1:7.44, and Is Presented under the Following Heading: 1:7.4 Introduction to Recent Data on the M&A Marketplace Contained in Sections 1:7.5 through 1:7.44 28
x. 第 1 章附录 A，本附录包含对 Thompson、合并、收购和要约收购以下部分的最新（即 2024 年 6 月）更新：第 1：7.4 至 1：7.44 节，并在以下标题下介绍： 1：7.4 第 1：7.5 节至第 1：7.44 节中包含的并购市场最新数据简介 28

Scope of Book
书籍范围

In General
通常

 This book considers numerous topics arising in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, including corporate, securities, antitrust, pre-merger notification, Federal income taxation, accounting, and valuation.
本书探讨了并购 （M&A） 交易中出现的众多主题，包括公司、证券、反垄断、并购前申报、联邦所得税、会计和估值。

 The M&A topics covered in this book, as well as some topics that are not covered here, such as state taxation of M&A transactions, are addressed in greater detail in my multi-volume treatise on M&A: Mergers Acquisitions and Tender Offers (MATO), infra Section 1.10, which is published by PLI. Several excerpts from MATO are included in this book with the permission of PLI. As indicated in the title, this book is a traditional casebook approach to many of the M&A issues addressed more completely in MATO.
本书中涵盖的并购主题，以及此处未涵盖的一些主题，例如并购交易的国家税收，在我关于并购的多卷本论文中进行了更详细的讨论：合并收购和要约收购 （MATO），下文第 1.10 节，由 PLI 出版。经 PLI 许可，本书收录了 MATO 的几段摘录。如书名所示，本书是一本传统的案例集方法，对 MATO 中更全面地解决了许多并购问题。

The book integrates the consideration of these topics by focusing on various types of M&A transactions. Most of the statutes and rules referred to in this book are contained in the companion text, Thompson, M&A Statutes, Rules, and Documents for Mergers Acquisitions and Tender Offers A Casebook Approach, [hereinafter M&A Statutes, Rules, and Documents], available without charge on Canvas for this course. Also, this companion has several Documentary Appendices, such as merger agreements and SEC disclosure documents for various types of transactions examined in this book.
本书通过关注各种类型的并购交易，整合了对这些主题的考虑。本书中提到的大多数法规和规则都包含在配套文本 Thompson， M&A Statutes， Rules， and Documents for Mergers Acquisitions and Tender OffersA Casebook Approach（以下简称并购法规、规则和文件）中，可在 Canvas 上免费获得本课程。 此外，此配套文件还附有几个文件附录，例如本书中研究的各种类型的交易的合并协议和 SEC 披露文件。

 Throughout the book, problems are used to illustrate the many varied and interrelated principles, and most of the chapters begin with a problem designed to present a real life setting for an examination of the topics covered in that chapter. The approach taken here is intended to help the reader gain both a practical and theoretical understanding of many of the legal problems a business lawyer will likely encounter in practice when working on M&A deals. These deals present some of the most challenging and intellectually rewarding work for business lawyers, and virtually every business lawyer at one point or another will represent either a buyer or seller in a merger or acquisition.
在整本书中，问题被用来说明许多不同且相互关联的原则，大多数章节都从一个问题开始，该问题旨在为研究该章所涵盖的主题提供真实的生活环境。这里采用的方法旨在帮助读者对商业律师在进行并购交易时在实践中可能遇到的许多法律问题有实践和理论上的理解。这些交易为商业律师带来了一些最具挑战性和智力回报的工作，几乎每个商业律师都会在某个时候代表并购中的买方或卖方。

 This book is divided into four parts. Part I, which consists of Chapters 1 through 10, discusses basic legal concepts that impact mergers and acquisitions, such as (1) the rules governing directors' actions; (2) the shareholders' right to vote and to dissent and seek appraisal; (3) the Federal securities law; (4) the Federal income tax; (5) accounting; (6) antitrust; and (7) valuation.
本书分为四个部分。第一部分由第 1 章到第 10 章组成，讨论了影响并购的基本法律概念，例如 （1） 管理董事行为的规则;（2） 股东的投票权、异议权和寻求评估权;（3） 联邦 证券法;（4） 联邦所得税;（5） 会计;（6） 反垄断;以及 （7） 估值。

 Part II, which consists of Chapters 11 through 15, focuses on consensual transactions, including stock and asset acquisitions of closely-held corporations and mergers of publicly-held corporations.
第二部分由第 11 章至第 15 章组成，侧重于双方同意的交易，包括封闭型公司的股票和资产收购以及上市公司的合并。

 Part III, briefly examines special types of M&A transactions in Chapters 16 and 17, with chapter 16 providing a brief introduction to hostile M&A transactions, and chapter 17 briefly discussing several topics. such as cross-border M&A.
第三部分，在第 16 章和第 17 章中简要研究了特殊类型的并购交易，第 16 章 简要介绍了敌对的并购交易，第 17 章简要讨论了几个主题。 例如跨境并购。

Further Elaboration on the Chapters
对章节的进一步阐述

 Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the topics covered herein. Chapter 2 considers the rules regarding the shareholders' right to vote and to dissent and seek appraisal in various types of M&A transactions. The focus is on the law of Delaware, with some brief references to the law of other jurisdictions and to the ABA's Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), which has been adopted at least in part by many states.
第 1 章介绍了本文涵盖的主题。第 2 章考虑了有关股东在各种类型的并购交易中的投票权、异议权和寻求评估权的规则。重点是特拉华州的法律，并简要引用了其他司法管辖区的法律和美国律师协会的《模范商业公司法》（MBCA），该法案至少已被许多州部分采用。

Chapter 3 provides a brief introduction to the basic legal standards governing the actions of a corporation's directors in various types of mergers and acquisitions. The focus here is on the law of Delaware, which has the most highly developed law governing directors. This is a broad topic, and the Delaware Chancery Court and Supreme Court are always issuing new, complex, and long decisions. Consequently, the emphasis here is on some of the basic Delaware cases dealing with M&A. Most of the cases examined here will likely be discussed in any Delaware case dealing in any way with the issues addressed in these fundamental cases.
第 3 章简要介绍了管理公司董事在各种类型的并购中的行为的基本法律标准。这里的重点是特拉华州的法律，该州拥有最发达的董事法律。这是一个广泛的话题，特拉华州衡平法院和最高法院总是发布新的、复杂的和长期的裁决。因此，这里的重点是一些涉及 M&A 的基本特拉华州案例。这里审查的大多数案例都可能在任何特拉华州的案例中讨论，以任何方式处理这些基本案例中涉及的问题。

 Chapter 4 presents an introduction to the impact of the Federal securities laws generally and in mergers and acquisitions. This chapter (1) introduces the registration process under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 33 Act) for public offerings, both Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and offerings by public companies (Secondary Offerings), and (2) examines both the private offering exemption under Regulation D and the resale exemption under Rule 144. The chapter also introduces the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 34 Act) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to lay the foundation for the exploration of more advanced Federal securities issues in subsequent chapters, including the rules governing consensual public company M&A in chapter 13 and tender offers in chapter 16.
第 4 章介绍了联邦证券法的一般影响以及对并购的影响。本章 （1） 介绍了 1933 年证券法（第 33 法案）规定的公开发行、首次公开募股 （IPO） 和上市公司发行（二次发行）的注册程序，以及 （2） 审查了条例 D 下的私募豁免和规则 144 下的转售豁免。本章还介绍了 1934 年证券交易法（第 34 号法案）及其下的第 10b-5 条。第 4 章的目的是为后续章节中探索更高级的联邦证券问题奠定基础，包括第 13 章中关于双方同意的上市公司并购的规则和第 16 章中的要约收购规则。

 Chapter 5 provides an introduction to the Federal income tax aspects of mergers and acquisitions. This chapter looks at both taxable and tax-free acquisitions and illustrates the operation of both concepts.
第 5 章介绍了 并购的联邦所得税方面。本章着眼于应税和免税收购，并说明了这两个概念的运作。

 Chapter 6 considers the accounting rules for mergers and acquisitions. This chapter looks at the rules of the Financial Standards Accounting Board (FASB) and the SEC's financial reporting guidelines, Regulation S-X.
第 6 章考虑了并购的会计规则。本章着眼于财务标准会计委员会 （FASB） 的规则和 SEC 的财务报告指南，即 S-X 条例。

 Chapter 7 provides a basic guide to the use of modern valuation techniques, such as the net present value concept and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), in mergers and acquisitions. These concepts are illustrated by referring to an actual valuation study for an M&A transaction. Chapter 7 is an introduction to many of the concepts discussed more completely in Thompson, Corporate Valuation in Mergers and Acquisitions, infra ______, which is published by PLI.
第 7 章提供了 在并购中使用现代估值技术的基本指南，例如净现值概念和资本资产定价模型 （CAPM）。这些概念通过参考并购交易的实际估值研究来说明。 第 7 章介绍了 PLI 出版的 Thompson， Corporate Valuation in Mergers and Acquisitions， infra ______ 中更完整地讨论的许多概念。

 The antitrust aspects of mergers and acquisitions are considered in Chapter 8. This chapter first gives a broad introduction to the antitrust laws and to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the principal antitrust statute governing mergers and acquisitions. The chapter next introduces the microeconomic principles that provide the theoretical underpinning for antitrust merger policy. The chapter then discusses some of the basic concepts that are in the current Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which were issued on December 18, 2023. This chapter also contains some preferences to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines promulgated by the DOJ and FTC. These Guidelines set forth the enforcement standards generally followed by the DOJ and FTC in deciding whether to challenge a merger or acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In addition, this chapter examines some of the leading cases interpreting Section 7.
第 8 章讨论了并购的反垄断方面。本章首先对反垄断法和《克莱顿法案》第 7 节进行了广泛的介绍，该法案是管理并购的主要反垄断法规。本章接下来介绍了为反垄断合并政策提供理论基础的微观经济学原理。然后，本章讨论了美国司法部 （DOJ） 和联邦贸易委员会 （FTC） 于 2023 年 12 月 18 日发布的现行合并指南中的一些基本概念 。本章还包含对 美国司法部和 FTC 颁布的 2010 年横向合并指南的一些偏好。这些指南规定了美国司法部和 FTC 在决定是否根据《克莱顿法案》第 7 条对合并或收购提出质疑时通常遵循的执行标准。此外，本章还研究了解释第 7 节的一些主要案例。

 The Hart-Scott-Rodino pre-merger notification rules are briefly examined in Chapter 9. Under these rules, prior to completing a merger or acquisition of a certain size, which is determined annually, acquiring and target corporations must provide the Federal antitrust authorities (i.e., the DOJ and FTC) with certain information regarding the transaction to permit the authorities to determine whether to challenge the transaction on antitrust grounds.
第 9 章简要介绍了 Hart-Scott-Rodino 合并前通知规则。根据这些规则，在完成每年确定的一定规模的合并或收购之前，收购公司和目标公司必须向联邦反垄断机构（即司法部和联邦贸易委员会）提供有关交易的某些信息，以允许当局决定是否以反垄断为由对交易提出质疑。

The examination of basic M&A concepts is completed in Chapter 10, which considers confidentiality agreements, due diligence, exclusivity agreements, and letters of intent. These agreements and concepts will apply prior to the structuring of a consensual transaction (see Chapters 11–14) and the drafting of the acquisition agreement (see Chapter 15).
第 10 章完成了对基本并购概念的审查，其中考虑了保密协议、尽职调查、排他性协议和意向书。这些协议和概念将在协商一致的交易构建（见第 11-14 章）和起草收购协议（见第 15 章）之前适用。

 Part II, consensual transactions, addresses the three basic forms of consensual M&A transactions: (1) the acquisition of the stock of a target corporation, (2) the acquisition of the assets of a target corporation, and (3) the acquisition of a target by some form of merger.
第二部分，合意交易，涉及合意并购交易的三种基本形式：（1） 收购目标公司的股票，（2） 收购目标公司的资产，以及 （3） 通过某种形式的合并收购目标公司。

This Part starts with Chapter 11, which considers issues arising in a stock acquisition of a closely-held corporation. This chapter illustrates the application in such transactions of many concepts covered in previous chapters, including Federal income tax, accounting, Hart-Scott-Rodino, and Regulation D under the 33 Act. This chapter also considers the law governing partial stock acquisitions.
本部分从第 11 章开始，该章考虑了封闭型公司的股票收购中出现的问题 。本章说明了前几章中介绍的许多概念在此类交易中的应用，包括联邦所得税、会计、Hart-Scott-Rodino 和 33 法案下的 D 条例。本章还考虑了管理部分股票收购的法律。

 Chapter 12 examines issues arising in an acquisition of the assets of a closely-held corporation, such as the developing law on successor liability. This chapter also illustrates the application of previously covered concepts, such as the Federal income tax provisions, the accounting rules, and the Federal securities laws, in such transactions.
第 12 章研究了收购 封闭型公司资产时出现的问题，例如关于继承人责任的制定法律。本章还说明了以前涵盖的概念（例如联邦所得税规定、会计规则和联邦证券法）在此类交易中的应用。

 Chapter 13 explores issues arising in the acquisition of a publicly-held target corporation in a consensual (negotiated) merger. In particular, this chapter builds on many of the Federal securities law concepts studied in Chapter 4 and also examines the proxy rules under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 34 Act).
第 13 章探讨了 在双方同意（协商）合并中收购上市公司目标公司时出现的问题。特别是，本章以第 4 章中研究的许多联邦证券法概念为基础，并研究了 1934 年《证券交易法》（34 法案）下的代理规则。

 Chapter 14 deals with freezeout mergers and acquisitions by private equity firms in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and management buyouts (MBOs). Private equity firms, such as KKR, raise funds from a small number of wealthy individuals and institutions such as pension funds. The equity capital raised is then used, together with a substantial amount of cash raised through the issuance of debt (i.e., leverage), to acquire publicly-held firms, that is, to take the publicly-held firms private. In addition to examining the structure of a typical freezeout merger and leveraged acquisition, the chapter also examines (1) the corporate governance rules for such transactions; (2) the SEC's going private rules under Rule 13e-3, which are applicable to certain freezeout mergers and MBOs; (3) the application of the law of fraudulent conveyances to LBOs; and (4) the impact of the Federal margin rules on the structuring of LBOs. LBOs may also be used in the acquisition of a closely-held target.
第 14 章涉及私募股权公司在杠杆收购 （LBO） 和管理层收购 （MBO） 中的冻结并购。KKR 等私募股权公司从少数富人和养老基金等机构筹集资金。然后将筹集的股本与通过发行债务（即杠杆）筹集的大量现金一起用于收购上市公司，即将上市公司私有化。除了研究典型的冻结合并和杠杆收购的结构外，本章还研究了 （1） 此类交易的公司治理规则;（2） SEC 根据规则 13e-3 制定的私有化规则，适用于某些冻结合并和 MBO;（3） 欺诈性转让法对 LBO 的适用;以及 （4） 联邦保证金规则对 LBO 结构的影响。杠杆收购也可用于收购封闭式目标。

 Chapter 15 presents an introduction to the principles governing the drafting of the three most common types of acquisition agreements: the merger agreement, the stock acquisition agreement, and the asset acquisition agreement. To bring this topic alive, in discussing the various drafting principles, this chapter refers to acquisition agreements set out in M&A Statutes, Rules, and Documents.
第 15 章介绍了三种最常见的收购协议的起草原则：合并协议、股票收购协议和资产收购协议。为了使这个话题生动起来，在讨论各种起草原则时，本章提到了并购法规、规则和文件中规定的收购协议。

 Part III, briefly examines special types of M&A transactions in Chapters 16 and 17. Chapter 16 briefly considers proxy contests and provides an introduction to the Williams Act, which added Sections 13(d) and (e) and Sections 14(d), (e) and (f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 13(d) regulates open market purchases of the stock of publicly-held corporations, for example, the purchase of stock that is traded on an exchange. Sections 14(d) and (e) regulate third-party tender offers for the stock of publicly-held corporations. These are transactions in which an acquiring firm makes an offer directly to the shareholders of a publicly-held target corporation. Section 13(e) regulates (1) tender offers by an issuer for its own shares, and (2) going private transactions, which involve the acquisition of all of the stock of a publicly-held firm by a controlling shareholder.
第三部分，简要研究了第 16 章和第 17 章中特殊类型的并购交易。 第 16 章简要介绍了代理权争夺，并介绍了《威廉姆斯法案》，该法案在 1934 年《证券交易法》中增加了第 13（d） 和 （e） 条以及第 14（d）、（e） 和 （f） 条。第 13（d） 节规定了公开市场购买上市公司股票的行为，例如，购买在交易所交易的股票。第 14（d） 和 （e） 条对上市公司股票的第三方要约收购进行了监管 。这些交易是收购公司直接向上市公司的目标公司的股东提出要约 的交易。第 13（e） 条规定了 （1） 发行人对其自身股份的要约收购，以及 （2） 私有化交易，其中涉及 控股股东收购上市公司的所有股票。

 Chapter 17, the final chapter, provides brief introductions to several other issues that can arise in M&A including: (1) spin-offs, (2) cross-border M&A, with an emphasis on inbound and outbound M&A between the U.S. and the E.U., and (3) regulatory issues in M&A, including issues involving the Affordable Care Act (i.e., Obamacare); (2) bankruptcy M&A; (3) joint ventures; and (4) ethical issues in M&A. Obviously, chapter 17 can only touch the surface of these issues, which is the case with many chapters of this book.
第 17 章是最后一章，简要介绍了并购中可能出现的其他几个问题，包括：（1） 分拆，（2） 跨境并购，重点是美国和欧盟之间的境内和境外并购，以及 （3） 并购中的监管问题，包括涉及《平价医疗法案》的问题（即.，奥巴马医改）;（2） 破产并购;（3） 合资企业;（4） 并购中的道德问题。显然，第 17 章只能触及这些问题的表面，本书的许多章节都是这种情况。

Scope of Chapter
章节范围

 This chapter introduces some of the underlying concepts and theories of mergers and acquisitions. Section III discusses consensual transactions in which a willing target corporation is acquired by an acquiror in an arm's length transaction. Section IV introduces tender offers and open market purchases. Section V gives a historical and economic perspective on the merger and acquisition process. Section VI presents an assessment of various theories explaining mergers and acquisitions, and Section VII takes a look at the use of event studies for determining the wealth effects of mergers and discusses the results of an event study of the acquisition in 2004 by J.P. Morgan Chase of Bank One. Section IX sets out an introduction to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, and Section X provides references to the vast literature on mergers and acquisitions.
本章介绍了并购的一些基本概念和理论。第 III 节讨论了自愿目标公司被收购方在公平交易中收购的自愿交易。第四部分 介绍了要约收购和公开市场购买。第 V 节提供了并购过程的历史和经济视角。第六部分 对解释并购的各种理论进行了评估，第七部分研究了使用事件研究来确定合并的财富影响，并讨论了摩根大通 2004 年收购第一银行的事件研究结果。第 IX 节对 Sarbanes-Oxley 法案进行了介绍，第 X 节提供了对有关合并和收购的大量文献的参考。

Introduction to Consensual Transactions
共识事务简介

 This section is a modification of an excerpt from Chapter 1 of Thompson, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers, infra Section _________.
本节摘自《汤普森》第 1 章《合并、收购和要约收购》（下文第 _________ 节）。

The Starting Point: Valuation and Due Diligence
起点：估值和尽职调查

 The starting point for any consensual or hostile M&A transaction is the determination by the acquirer of the amount it would be willing to pay for the target and the determination by the target's directors and shareholders of the amount they would be willing to accept from the acquirer. This requires that the target be properly valued, and Chapter 7 discusses some of the basic principles underlying modern valuation techniques. These valuation concepts are discussed more completely in Thompson, Corporate Valuation in M&A, infra Section _____.
任何双方同意或敌意的并购交易的起点是收购方确定其愿意为目标公司支付的金额，以及目标公司的董事和股东确定他们愿意从收购方接受的金额。这需要对目标进行适当的估值，第 7 章讨论了 现代估值技术的一些基本原则。 这些估值概念在 Thompson， Corporate Valuation in M&A， infra Section _____ 中进行了更完整的讨论。

Before a target can be properly valued, the acquirer must have access to confidential information on the target so that the acquirer can complete its due diligence, and Chapter 10 provides a guide to drafting a confidentiality agreement and the conduct of due diligence. If the acquirer will be paying cash, the target will generally not conduct extensive due diligence regarding the acquirer. However, if the acquirer will be issuing stock the target's shareholders will be making an investment in the acquirer, and the target will generally conduct extensive due diligence on the acquirer, which will require access to confidential information pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. In some cases, the parties may come to a basic agreement before they have completed the due diligence process, and they may enter into a letter of intent or similar document, also discussed in Chapter 10.
在对目标公司进行适当估值之前，收购方必须能够获得有关目标公司的机密信息，以便收购方能够完成尽职调查，第 10 章提供了起草保密协议和进行尽职调查的指南。如果收购方将支付现金，目标公司通常不会对收购方进行广泛的尽职调查。但是，如果收购方将发行股票，则目标公司的股东将对收购方进行投资，并且目标公司通常会对收购方进行广泛的尽职调查，这将需要根据保密协议访问机密信息。在某些情况下，双方可能在完成尽职调查过程之前就达成基本协议，并且他们可能会签订意向书或类似文件，第 10 章也将对此进行讨论。

Structuring the Transaction: Tax and Corporate Law Considerations
构建交易：税务和公司法注意事项

In General
通常

 Once the parties have come to an agreement on price and the other basic terms, the transaction will have to be structured. This will principally present corporate and tax law issues addressed in Chapter 2 (transaction structures and shareholder voting and dissenting rules), Chapter 3 (directors' fiduciary duties), and Chapter 5 (Federal income tax). There is a potential "chicken and egg" problem in creating the structure, because as explained in Chapter 5, in a taxable acquisition an acquirer should generally pay less in a stock acquisition of a stand-alone (i.e., non-subsidiary) target than in an asset acquisition. Thus, if an acquirer has valued the target on the assumption that the acquirer will have a cost basis for the target's assets, but the transaction is structured as a stock acquisition without a cost basis for those assets, the acquirer may be overpaying.
一旦双方就价格和其他基本条款达成协议，就必须对交易进行结构化。这将主要介绍第 2 章（交易结构和股东投票和异议规则）、第 3 章（董事的信托义务）和第 5 章（联邦所得税）中解决的公司和税法问题。创建结构存在潜在的“先有鸡还是先有蛋”的问题，因为如第 5 章所述，在应税收购中，收购方在独立（即非子公司）目标的股票收购中支付的费用通常应低于资产收购。因此，如果收购方在假设收购方将拥有目标资产的成本基础的基础上对目标公司进行估值，但交易的结构是股票收购，而没有这些资产的成本基础，则收购方可能会多付费用。

 In general, the structure of the transaction will not be sensitive to the financial accounting treatment of the transaction, because as discussed in Chapter 6, without respect to the form of the acquisition, the transaction will be accounted for as if the acquirer purchased the target's assets. This purchase accounting rule will create goodwill on the acquirer's balance sheet when the purchase price exceeds the book value of the target's assets.
一般来说，交易的结构不会对交易的财务会计处理敏感，因为如第 6 章所述，在不考虑收购形式的情况下，交易将被会计处理为收购方购买了目标公司的资产。当收购价格超过目标资产的账面价值时，此采购会计规则将在收购方的资产负债表上产生商誉。

 The following sections discuss the most common structures used in consensual, i.e., non-hostile, deals: the stock purchase, the asset purchase, the direct merger, the reverse subsidiary merger, the forward subsidiary merger, the compulsory share exchange, and the short form merger. The diagrams employ the following short-hand definitions of the various parties to the transactions:
以下部分讨论了双方同意交易（即非敌对交易）中最常用的结构：股票购买、资产购买、直接合并、反向子公司合并、远期子公司合并、强制换股和简称合并。这些图表采用了以下交易各方的简写定义：

Stock Purchase Structure
股票购买结构

 In the case of an acquisition of a stand-alone closely held corporation, the principal acquisition structure is a stock purchase pursuant to a stock purchase agreement such as Documentary Appendix U, Annotated Sample Stock Purchase Agreement. The consideration paid by the acquirer is usually cash or its stock, but there are essentially no limitations on the consideration that can be paid. This is true with all of the acquisitions. The following discussions assume that the consideration is either cash or stock in the acquirer.
在收购独立的封闭式公司的情况下，主要的收购结构是根据股票购买协议（如文件附录 U、注释样本股票购买协议）进行股票购买。收购方支付的对价通常是现金或其股票，但对可以支付的对价基本上没有限制。所有收购都是如此。以下讨论假设对价是现金或收购方的股票。

 This structure, which can also be utilized in the acquisition of a subsidiary, is illustrated in Diagram 1-A: Stock Purchase Structure.
这种结构也可用于收购子公司，如图 1-A：股票购买结构所示。

Asset Purchase Structure
资产购买结构

 In some cases, the acquisition of a closely held corporation or a subsidiary will be structured as an asset acquisition pursuant to an asset acquisition agreement such as Documentary Appendix V, Annotated Sample Asset Acquisition Agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, and after any required shareholder vote, the acquirer acquires specified assets of the target and assumes specified liabilities of the target. Thus, whereas in a merger all of a target's assets pass over to the acquirer, in an asset acquisition, only the specified assets and generally only the specified liabilities pass over. As discussed in Chapter 12, in certain asset acquisitions non-specified liabilities may pass-over.
在某些情况下，对封闭型公司或子公司的收购将根据资产收购协议（如文件附录 V、注释样本资产收购协议）构建为资产收购。根据协议，在经过任何必要的股东投票后，收购方收购目标公司的特定资产并承担目标公司的特定负债。因此，在合并中，目标公司的所有资产都转移给收购方，而在资产收购中，只有指定的资产，通常只有指定的负债转移。如第 12 章所述，在某些资产收购中，非特定负债可能会转嫁。

 Usually the target is liquidated after the sale, and the shareholders receive the consideration, unless pursuant to the applicable state law they dissent and have their shares appraised. If a shareholder exercises "dissenter's rights," a court will appraise the value of the shares, which the shareholder will receive in lieu of the basic consideration specified in the agreement. This structure is illustrated in Diagram 1-B: Asset Purchase Structure.
通常，目标公司在出售后被清算，股东收到对价，除非根据适用的州法律，他们提出异议并对其股票进行评估。如果股东行使“异议者权利”，法院将评估股票的价值，股东将获得股份的价值，以代替协议中规定的基本对价。图 1-B：资产购买结构 中说明了此结构。

Direct Merger Structure
直接合并结构

 In the direct merger structure, pursuant to the applicable state law (see Chapter 2), the acquirer and target enter into a merger agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, and after the required shareholder vote, the target merges into the acquirer. By operation of law, all of the target’s assets and liabilities pass over to the acquirer, and the target's shareholders receive the consideration specified in the merger agreement, unless they dissent and seek appraisal of their shares. This type of transaction can be used in the acquisition of a closely held or publicly held target. For an illustration of a merger of a publicly held target into a publicly held acquirer see Documentary Appendix D, JP Morgan Chase–Bank One Direct Stock Merger Agreement. This structure is illustrated in Diagram 1-C: Direct Merger Structure on the next page.
在直接合并结构中，根据适用的州法律（见第 2 章），收购方和目标公司签订合并协议。根据该协议，在所需的股东投票后，目标公司将合并到收购方。根据法律的实施， 目标公司的所有资产和负债都转移给收购方，目标公司的股东获得合并协议中规定的对价，除非他们提出异议并寻求对其股份进行评估。这种类型的交易可用于收购封闭式或公开持有的目标。有关上市公司与上市公司收购方合并的示例，请参阅文件附录 D，摩根大通-第一银行直接股票合并协议。 此结构在下一页的图 1-C：直接合并结构中进行了说明。

Reverse Subsidiary Merger Structure
反向子公司合并结构

 In the case of a consensual acquisition of a stand-alone publicly held corporation, the principal acquisition structure is a reverse subsidiary merger. This type of transaction is sometimes referred to as a reverse triangular merger, because three corporations are involved.
在双方同意收购独立上市公司的情况下，主要收购结构是反向子公司合并。这种类型的交易有时被称为反向三角合并，因为涉及三家公司。

 In this transaction, the acquirer forms a subsidiary (AC-Sub), and pursuant to the applicable state corporate law, the acquirer, AC-Sub, and the target enter into a merger agreement. Thus, there are three parties to the merger agreement, but as will be seen only two of the parties merger. When, after the requisite shareholder vote, the merger becomes effective, (1) AC-Sub merges into the target; (2) the target's shareholders receive the merger consideration, unless they dissent and have their shares appraised; and (3) the acquirer ends up owning all of the target's stock. Thus, the target becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of the acquirer.
在此次交易中，收购方成立子公司 （AC-Sub），并根据适用的州公司法，收购方 AC-Sub 和目标公司签订合并协议。 因此，合并协议有三方，但正如我们将看到的，只有两方合并。 在必要的股东投票后，合并生效时，（1） AC-Sub 合并到目标公司;（2） 目标公司的股东获得合并对价，除非他们持不同意见并对其股票进行评估;（3） 收购方最终拥有目标公司的所有股票。因此，目标公司成为 收购方的全资子公司。

 For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, structuring deals, and Chapter 5, Federal income tax, the reverse subsidiary merger is generally employed in a taxable acquisition where the consideration is cash, as with Documentary Appendix F, Toys (R Us) Reverse Subsidiary Cash Merger Agreement. The reverse subsidiary merger is also generally employed when the consideration is stock as in Documentary Appendix A, Time-Warner Reverse Subsidiary Stock Merger. Where stock is used the transaction may qualify as a tax-free reorganization. See Chapter 5. This structure can be employed in the acquisition of closely held and publicly held targets, and Diagram 1-D: Reverse Subsidiary Merger Structure, illustrates the transaction.
出于第 2 章“构建交易”和第 5 章“联邦所得税”中讨论的原因，反向子公司合并通常用于对价为现金的应税收购，如文件附录 F，玩具 （R U） 反向子公司现金合并协议。当对价为股票时，通常也采用反向子公司合并，如文件附录 A，时代华纳反向子公司股票合并。如果使用股票，则交易可能符合免税重组的条件。见第 5 章。这种结构可用于收购封闭型和上市公司，图 1-D：反向子公司合并结构说明了该交易。

Forward Subsidiary Merger Structure
Forward 子公司合并结构

 In some subsidiary or triangular mergers, the target merges into the subsidiary of the acquiring corporation (AC-Sub), with AC-Sub holding all of target's assets and liabilities and the target's shareholders receiving the merger consideration, subject to exercising their dissenters' rights to appraisal. This type of transaction is called a forward subsidiary or triangular merger. As indicated in Chapter 5, the tax consequences of engaging in a forward subsidiary merger can be dramatically different from the tax consequences of engaging in a reverse subsidiary merger. This type of transaction can be utilized in acquisitions of both closely held and publicly held targets. Diagram 1-E, Forward Subsidiary Merger Structure, illustrates the transaction.
在一些子公司或三角合并中，目标公司并入收购公司的子公司 （AC-Sub），AC-Sub 持有目标公司的所有资产和负债，目标公司的股东接受合并对价，但需要行使其异议人的评估权。这种类型的交易称为远期子公司或三角合并。如第 5 章所述，进行正向子公司合并的税务后果可能与进行反向子公司合并的税务后果截然不同。这种类型的交易可用于收购封闭型和公开持有的目标。图 1-E，Forward 子公司合并结构，说明了交易。

Compulsory Share Exchange Structure
强制换股结构

 The Model Business Corporation Act and some state laws permit the acquisition of a target’s shares in a compulsory share exchange. In this transaction, pursuant to operation of law, the target’s shareholders are required to transfer their shares directly to the acquirer in exchange for the consideration required to be paid in the transaction. Although Delaware law does not have a compulsory share exchange provision, the end result of a reverse subsidiary merger, which is permitted in all states, is generally the same as the end result with a compulsory share exchange, that is, the acquirer ends up owning all of the shares of the target. Diagram 1-F, Compulsory Share Exchange illustrates an acquisition of a publicly held target in a compulsory share exchange.
《模范商业公司法》和一些州法律允许在强制换股中收购目标公司的股份。在本次交易中，根据法律实施，目标公司的股东需要将其股份直接转让给收购方，以换取交易中需要支付的对价。虽然特拉华州法律没有强制性换股条款，但 所有州都允许的反向子公司合并的最终结果通常与强制换股的最终结果相同，即收购方最终拥有目标公司的所有股份。 图 1-F，强制换股说明了在强制换股中收购公众持有的目标。

Short-Form Merger Structure
简式合并结构

 Where a parent corporation owns 90% or more of the stock of a subsidiary, under the laws of most if not all states, the parent can acquire the assets and liabilities of the subsidiary without a vote of the subsidiary's shareholders. This type of transaction is called an upstream short form merger, and if is explored in Chapter 2. Also, the parent can merge downstream into the sub, and some states permit a short form merger to be used in a merger of sister subs. Also, in some states the ownership level for a short-form merger is less than 90%. A short-form merger may be utilized (1) to acquire a long-held sub, and (2) as the follow-up step after a tender offer. This structure is set out in Diagram 1-F: Short Form Merger Structure:
如果母公司拥有子公司 90% 或以上的股票，根据大多数（如果不是全部）州的法律，母公司可以在没有子公司股东投票的情况下收购子公司的资产和负债。这种类型的交易称为上游短格式合并，第 2 章将探讨 if 。此外，母公司可以合并到下游的子公司中，一些州允许在姊妹子公司的合并中使用简短的合并。此外，在一些州，短格式合并的所有权水平低于 90%。简称合并可用于 （1） 收购长期持有的子公司，以及 （2） 作为要约收购后的后续步骤。 该结构在图 1-F：简式合并结构中列出：

F

Drafting the Acquisition Agreement
起草收购协议

 As discussed in Chapter 15, the provisions of the acquisition agreement generally will follow the same basic structure without regard to the type of agreement. The agreement will start with the parties and the "whereas" clauses or "recitals, which set out the basic framework of the deal. The agreement will then address the heart of the transaction, specifying (1) the assets or stock to be acquired or the form of merger, (2) the consideration to be paid, and (3) the mechanics for closing the transaction.
如第 15 章所述，收购协议的规定通常将遵循相同的基本结构，而不考虑协议的类型。该协议将从各方和“鉴于”条款或“序言”开始，这些条款规定了交易的基本框架。然后，该协议将涉及交易的核心，指定 （1） 要收购的资产或股票或合并形式，（2） 要支付的对价，以及 （3） 完成交易的机制。

The agreement next contains representations and warranties, which are statements of fact. The target or its shareholders generally will make extensive representations and warranties, as will the acquirer if the consideration is stock. However, if the consideration is cash, the acquirer's representations and warranties usually are quite limited.
协议接下来包含陈述和保证，它们是事实陈述。目标公司或其股东通常会做出广泛的陈述和保证，如果对价是股票，收购方也会做出广泛的陈述和保证。但是，如果对价是现金，收购方的陈述和保证通常非常有限。

The agreement then generally sets out covenants which deal with matters the parties "will do" (i.e., affirmative covenants) and "will not do" (i.e., negative covenants) between the signing and the closing.
然后，该协议通常规定了契约，这些契约涉及双方在签署和成交之间“将要做”（即肯定性契约）和“不会做”（即消极契约）的事项。

The covenants generally are followed by the conditions to closing, which are followed by the provisions governing the termination of the agreement and miscellaneous provisions.
这些契约之后通常遵循成交条件，然后是管理协议终止的条款和其他条款。

If the transaction involves the acquisition of a closely held corporation, the selling shareholders generally will provide the acquirer with indemnification against certain losses, including losses resulting from materially inaccurate representations and warranties, which generally will survive the closing. On the other hand, in acquisitions of publicly held targets, the representations and warranties generally do not survive the closing and there is no indemnification.
如果交易涉及收购一家封闭型公司，售股股东通常会向收购方提供某些损失的赔偿，包括因重大不准确的陈述和保证而造成的损失，这些损失通常会在交易完成后继续有效。另一方面，在收购上市公司时，陈述和保证通常在交割后不再有效，并且没有赔偿。

Federal Securities Laws
联邦证券法

 The Federal securities laws treatment of the transaction is generally not sensitive to the structure of the transaction. As explained in Chapters 4 and 13, without respect to the structure of the transaction, if the acquirer does not issue securities in the transaction, the acquirer will not have to register the transaction under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 33 Act). On the other hand, without respect to the structure of the transaction, if the acquirer issues securities, such as its stock, in the transaction, (1) in the case of an acquisition of a publicly held target, the acquirer will have to register such stock on SEC Form S-4, and (2) in the case of an acquisition of a closely held target, the acquirer will have to register the stock or establish an exemption from registration, such as an exemption under Regulation D. If the stock is issued pursuant to an exemption from registration, the target's shareholders will have limits on their ability to resell the securities; such resales are generally made pursuant to Rule 144.
联邦证券法对交易的处理通常对交易的结构不敏感。如第 4 章和第 13 章所述，在不考虑交易结构的情况下，如果收购方在交易中未发行证券，则收购方将不必根据 1933 年证券法（第 33 号法案）登记交易。另一方面，在不考虑交易结构的情况下，如果收购方在交易中发行证券（例如其股票），（1） 在收购公开持有的目标的情况下，收购方必须在 SEC 表格 S-4 上注册此类股票，以及 （2） 在收购封闭式目标的情况下， 收购方必须对股票进行登记或建立登记豁免，例如条例 D 下的豁免。如果股票是根据豁免注册发行的，则目标公司的股东转售证券的能力将受到限制;此类转售通常根据 Rule 144 进行。

 In the acquisition of a publicly held target, the target's shareholders will always have the right to vote on the transaction under the applicable corporate law (see Chapter 2), and the acquirer's shareholders may have the right to vote if, inter alia, the acquirer issues more than 20% of its stock in the transaction (see Chapter 2). As discussed in Chapter 13, in the acquisition of a public target (1) a proxy statement under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 34 Act) will have to be prepared for the target's shareholders and for the acquirer's shareholders if they have the right to vote, and (2) a registration statement will have to be prepared by the acquirer if it issues securities in the transaction. The registration statement and the proxy statement or statements can all be included in one disclosure document on Form S-4. If the consideration is cash, only a proxy statement for the target's shareholders is required.
在收购公众持有的目标公司时，根据适用的公司法，目标公司的股东将始终有权对交易进行投票（见第 2 章），如果收购方在交易中发行了超过 20% 的股票，则收购方的股东可能有权投票（参见 第 2 章）。如第 13 章所述，在收购公共目标公司时，（1） 必须根据 1934 年《证券交易法》（第 34 号法案）第 14（a） 条为目标公司的股东和收购方的股东（如果他们有投票权）准备委托书，以及 （2） 如果收购方在交易中发行证券，则必须准备注册声明。注册声明和委托书或委托书都可以包含在 S-4 表格上的一份披露文件中。如果对价为现金，则只需为目标公司股东提供委托书。

Antitrust, Pre-Merger Notification
反垄断、并购前通知

 As discussed in Chapter 8, the antitrust laws are designed to prevent, inter alia, mergers that will substantially lessen competition or lead to a monopoly of a market. In order to give the antitrust authorities the time needed to analyze the antitrust implications of a merger or acquisition, for certain large transactions, the parties are required to make a pre-merger notification filing with the applicable antitrust authorities, such as the FTC and DOJ in the U.S. (discussed in Chapter 9), and the applicable foreign competition authorities where the parties conduct business, such as the Competition Commission in the E.U. (discussed in Chapter ___).
如第 8 章所述，反垄断法旨在防止将大大减少竞争或导致市场垄断的合并。为了给反垄断机构提供分析合并或收购的反垄断影响所需的时间，对于某些大型交易，各方需要向适用的反垄断机构（如美国联邦贸易委员会和美国司法部）（在第 9 章中讨论）以及各方开展业务的适用外国竞争机构提交合并前通知。 例如欧盟的竞争委员会（在第 ___ 章中讨论）。

 Antitrust and regulatory issues generally will be addressed in the representations, covenants, and conditions provisions of the acquisition agreement (see Chapter 15). The representations and warranties section will identify the antitrust and regulatory approvals required; the covenants section will address how the parties will deal with the antitrust and regulatory issues between signing and closing; and the conditions section will make receipt of the antitrust and regulatory approvals conditions to closing.
反垄断和监管问题通常会在收购协议的陈述、契约和条件条款中解决（见第 15 章）。陈述和保证部分将确定所需的反垄断和监管批准;契约部分将讨论双方在签署和交割之间如何处理反垄断和监管问题;条件部分将收到反垄断和监管批准的条件以完成交易。

Introduction to Tender Offers and Related Transactions
要约收购和相关交易简介

 This section is a modification of an excerpt from Chapter 1 of Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers (PLI, updated periodically).
本节摘自 Samuel C. Thompson， Jr. 的《合并、收购和要约收购》（PLI，定期更新）第 1 章的修订。

The Basic Tender Offer Structure
基本要约收购结构

 In a third-party tender offer, an acquirer pursuant to an "offer to purchase," makes an offer directly to the shareholders of a publicly held target to purchase their shares for cash, stock, or any other type of consideration. This type of transaction is illustrated in Diagram 1-H: Tender Offer Structure.
在第三方要约收购中，收购方根据“购买要约”直接向公开持有的目标的股东提出要约，以现金、股票或任何其他类型的对价购买其股票。这种类型的交易在图 1-H：要约收购结构中进行了说明。

 As discussed in Chapters 16, tender offers for, and open market purchases of, the securities of publicly held targets are subject to regulation under the Williams Act provisions of the 34 Act, that is, principally Sections 13(d) and (e) and Section 14(d) and (e) and the regulations thereunder. Also, many states have laws, sometimes referred to as "Baby Williams Acts," regulating these transactions.
如第 1 章和第 6 章所述，公开持有目标的证券的要约收购和公开市场购买受第 34 法案的威廉姆斯法案条款的约束，即主要是第 13（d） 和 （e） 条以及第 14（d） 和 （e） 条及其下的规定。此外，许多州都有法律，有时被称为“婴儿威廉姆斯法案”，对这些交易进行监管。

 Section 13(d) sets out an early warning system to alert the target and the market whenever an acquirer or other person acquires more than 5% of the target's securities. See Chapter 16. Under Section 13(d), the acquirer is required to make a public filing regarding its ownership interests in the target within ten days of crossing the 5% threshold. Further, as discussed in Chapter 3, the flip-in provisions of a firm's poison pill will prevent an acquirer from acquiring more than a specified percentage of the target's shares. In addition, the premerger notification rules will prevent an acquirer from acquiring more than a specified amount of a target's shares prior to filing with the antitrust authorities and having the transaction cleared. Depending on the size of the target, the premerger filing may be required before the acquirer crosses the 5% threshold in Section 13(d).
第 13（d） 条规定了一个预警系统，每当收购方或其他人收购目标公司超过 5% 的证券时，都会向目标公司和市场发出警报。 见第 1 章 6.根据第 13（d） 条，收购方必须在超过 5% 门槛后的 10 天内公开申报其在目标公司的所有权权益。此外，如第 3 章所述，公司毒丸计划的翻转条款将阻止收购方收购超过指定比例的目标公司股票。此外，合并前通知规则将防止收购方在向反垄断机构提交申请并完成交易批准之前收购超过规定数量的目标公司股票。根据目标公司的规模，可能需要在收购方超过第 13（d） 条中的 5% 门槛之前进行合并前申报。

 The acquirer can offer either cash or securities, such as its stock, in a tender offer. Where the acquirer offers securities, the transaction is referred to as an exchange offer, and the transaction is subject to regulation under the 33 Act as well as the 34 Act. Cash tender offers are not subject to regulation under the 33 Act; only the 34 Act applies.
收购方可以在要约收购中提供现金或证券，例如其股票。如果收购方提供证券，则该交易称为交换要约，该交易受 33 法案和 34 法案的监管。现金要约收购不受 33 法案的监管;仅适用 34 法案。

Hostile and Consensual (Noncontested) Tender Offers
敌意和双方同意（无争议）的要约收购

 Tender offers can be either hostile or consensual. Consensual tender offers are generally set out in a merger agreement that provides for a first step tender offer, which is to be followed by a second step “long form,” “short form” of “intermediate form” merger. These transactions are discussed in Chapter 16 and can be made pursuant to the type of merger agreement set out in Documentary Appendix P, Cox Communications Combined Tender Offer and Going Private Merger Agreement. As discussed in Chapter 16, consensual tender offer-mergers can allow the acquirer to get a controlling interest in the target in a shorter period of time than with a one step merger.
要约收购可以是敌对的，也可以是双方同意的。双方同意的要约收购通常在合并协议中规定，其中规定了第一步要约收购，然后是第二步“长格式”和“中间格式”合并的“短格式”。这些交易在第 1 章和第 6 章中讨论，可以根据文件附录 P、Cox Communications 联合要约收购和私有化合并协议中规定的合并协议类型进行。 如第 1 章 6 所述，与一步合并相比，双方同意的要约收购合并可以让收购方在更短的时间内获得目标公司的控股权。

 Both consensual and hostile tender offers are basically subject to the same rules set out in Sections 14(d) and (e) of the 34 Act and the regulations thereunder, including the following: (1) the tender offer must remain open for 20 business days, (2) there must be unlimited withdrawal rights, and (3) all shareholders must receive the highest price offered during the tender offer.
双方同意和敌意要约收购基本上都受 34 法案第 14（d） 和 （e） 条及其下法规中规定的相同规则的约束，包括以下内容：（1） 要约收购必须保持 20 个工作日，（2） 必须有无限制的撤销权，以及 （3） 所有股东必须在要约收购期间收到最高报价。

 Tender offers are made pursuant to an "offer to purchase" like Documentary Appendix M, Oracle Tender Offer for Peoplesoft. The acquirer generally publishes a summary advertisement in the financial press such as Documentary Appendix, N, Oracle-PeopleSoft Summary Advertisement. The tender offer can commence upon the filing of a Schedule T-O. See Documentary Appendix M. No pre-clearance of the tender offer is required, although if the SEC discovers material inaccuracies, the acquirer may be required to extend the tender offer. Within ten business days of the commencement of a tender offer, the target's board must file Schedule 14D-9 and take a position on the tender offer or state that it cannot take a position. See Documentary Appendix O, PeopleSoft 14D-9 Statement.
要约收购是根据“购买要约”进行的，例如文件附录 M，Oracle 对 Peoplesoft 的要约收购。收单机构通常会在财经媒体上发布摘要广告，例如 Documentary Appendix， N， Oracle-PeopleSoft Summary Advertisement。要约收购可以在提交附表 T-O 后开始。参见文件附录 M。要约收购不需要预先批准，但如果 SEC 发现重大不准确之处，收购方可能需要延长要约收购。在要约收购开始后的十个工作日内，目标公司的董事会必须提交附表 14D-9 并就要约收购表明立场，或声明其不能采取立场。 请参阅文档附录 O，PeopleSoft 14D-9 声明。

 Hostile tender offers will face defensive tactics employed by the target's directors, and these tactics are discussed in both Chapters 3 (fiduciary duties) and Chapter 16 (tender offers). Also, the acquirer will have to give careful attention to any Baby Williams Act that may be applicable. See Chapter 16. The acquirer may have to conduct a proxy contest (see Chapter 16) to remove the target's board and dismantle the defensive measures, such as a poison pill.
敌意要约收购将面临目标公司董事采用的防御性策略，这些策略在第 3 章（信托义务）和第 1 章 6（要约收购）中都有讨论。此外，收购方必须仔细注意任何可能适用的 Baby Williams 法案。见第 16 章。收购方可能必须进行代理权争夺（见第 1 章 6）以移除目标公司的董事会并拆除防御措施，例如毒丸。

Second-Step Mergers
第二步合并

 Most tender offers are followed by a second step merger to eliminate the remaining public shareholders of the target. The acquirer generally does not want to own less than 100% of the stock of the target because the presence of minority shareholders can lead to litigation brought by shareholders regarding transactions between the parent and the sub. Section 251(h) of the Delaware Corporate law, which was enacted in 2013 and provides for what is referred to as an “intermediate form” mergers, which in many instances, makes it easier to effectuate second step mergers. Second step freezeout mergers as well as freezeout mergers that are not preceded by a tender offer may be subject to the SEC's going private rules under Section 13e-3 (see Chapter 17). These rules require the acquiring parent or controlling group to explain why the transaction is fair to the minority shareholders. Also, such transactions may be subject to scrutiny under the entire fairness standard of review in Delaware and other states (see Chapter 3).
大多数要约收购之后是第二步合并，以消除目标公司的剩余公众股东。收购方通常不希望拥有目标公司少于 100% 的股份，因为少数股东的存在可能导致股东就母公司与子公司之间的交易提起诉讼。特拉华州公司法第 251（h） 条于 2013 年颁布，规定了所谓的“中间形式”合并， 在许多情况下，这使得实现第二步合并变得更加容易。第二步：冻结合并以及之前未进行要约收购的冻结合并可能受 SEC 根据第 13e-3 条的私有化规则的约束（参见第 1、7 章）。这些规则要求收购母公司或控制集团解释为什么交易对少数股东公平。此外，此类交易可能会根据特拉华州和其他州的整个公平审查标准受到审查（见第 3 章）。

A Historical and Economic Perspective on Mergers and Acquisitions
并购的历史和经济视角

A 1998 Perspective from the Then Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers and the Current (2024) Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen
时任经济顾问委员会主席、现任（2024 年）财政部长珍妮特·耶伦 （Janet Yellen） 的 1998 年观点

Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on Mergers and Corporate Consolidation
参议院司法委员会关于合并和公司合并的听证会

June 16, 1998, Testimony of Dr. Janet Yellen, Chair, Council of Economic Advisers [Currently, in 2024, the Secretary of Treasury]
1998 年 6 月 16 日，经济顾问委员会主席珍妮特·耶伦博士 [现任财政部长（2024 年任财政部长）] 的证词

 Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be here this morning to talk about some of the economic issues raised by the current merger wave. My testimony contains four sections. The first puts the current merger wave into historical perspective. The main message from that section is that merger activity has certainly increased substantially in the past few years, but it is not clear that the level of merger activity is "unprecedented." The second section examines the question of what the current increase in merger activity means for the economy. Here the main message is that mergers affect economic performance primarily through their impact on competitive conditions in specific markets rather than on broader macroeconomic conditions. The third section looks at the causes and consequences of mergers. Here there is no simple conclusion. Many, if not most mergers are motivated by the desire to achieve greater operating efficiencies and lower costs. But it is impossible to rule out anticompetitive motives or simple managerial hubris as explanations for mergers. * * *
主席先生和委员会成员，今天早上很高兴能在这里讨论当前合并浪潮提出的一些经济问题。我的证词包含四个部分。第一个将当前的合并浪潮置于历史角度。该部分的主要信息是，在过去几年中，合并活动确实大幅增加，但尚不清楚合并活动的水平是否“史无前例”。第二部分探讨了当前合并活动的增加对经济意味着什么的问题。这里的主要信息是，合并主要通过它们对特定市场的竞争条件的影响，而不是对更广泛的宏观经济条件的影响来影响经济表现。第三部分着眼于合并的原因和后果。这里没有简单的结论。许多（如果不是大多数）合并的动机是为了实现更高的运营效率和更低的成本。但是，不能排除反竞争动机或简单的管理傲慢作为合并的解释。* * *

 Mergers: A Historical Perspective.[In 1998 the] United States [was] in the midst of its fifth major merger wave in a hundred years. The previous four merger waves provide background and perspective for assessing today's merger activity.
合并：历史视角。[1998 年] 美国 [正] 处于一百年来的第五次重大合并浪潮中。前四次合并浪潮为评估今天的合并活动提供了背景和视角。

—The Great Merger Wave of the 1890s. The first great merger wave at the turn of the last century was the culmination of the trust movement, when numerous small and mid-sized firms were consolidated into single dominant firms in a number of industries. Examples include Standard Oil and U.S. Steel. One estimate is that this merger wave encompassed at least 15 percent of all plants and employees in manufacturing at the turn of the century. An estimated 75 percent of merger-related firm disappearances occurred as a result of mergers involving at least five firms, and about a quarter involved 10 or more firms at a time. The sharp decline in merger activity during 1903 and 1904 was probably related to the onset of a severe recession and the legal precedent for prohibiting market-dominating mergers under the antitrust laws that was established by the Northern Securities Case.
——1890 年代的合并大潮。上世纪之交的第一波大合并浪潮是托拉斯运动的高潮，当时许多中小型公司被合并为多个行业的单一主导公司 。示例包括 Standard Oil 和 U.S. Steel。据估计，在世纪之交，这场合并浪潮至少涵盖了制造业所有工厂和员工的 15%。据估计，75% 的与合并相关的公司消失是由于至少涉及 5 家公司的合并造成的，大约四分之一同时涉及 10 家或更多公司。1903 年和 1904 年期间合并活动的急剧下降可能与严重经济衰退的开始以及根据北方证券案确立的反垄断法禁止市场主导合并的法律先例有关。

—The Roaring Twenties. The merger movement of the 1920s saw the consolidation of many electric and gas utilities as well as manufacturing and minerals mergers. Some of the most prominent manufacturing mergers (such as the one that produced Bethlehem Steel) created relatively large number-two firms in industries previously dominated by one giant.
——咆哮的二十年代。 1920 年代的合并运动见证了许多电力和天然气公用事业的合并以及制造和矿产的合并。一些最著名的制造业合并（例如产生伯利恒钢铁公司的合并）在以前由一家巨头主导的行业中创造了相对较大的第二大公司。

—The "Go-Go" Sixties. The 1960s conglomerate wave represented a deflection of the "urge to merge" away from horizontal (same-industry) mergers, perhaps due to stronger antitrust enforcement. The constant-dollar value of mergers in manufacturing and minerals surpassed the prior peak attained in 1899 (though it remained much smaller as a share of the economy). The 1960s boom was also fueled by a strong stock market and financial innovation (such as convertible preferred stocks and debentures). This merger wave ended with a decline in stock prices that was especially severe for companies that had aggressively pursued conglomerate mergers.
——“Go-Go”六十年代。1960 年代的企业集团浪潮代表了“合并冲动”从横向（同行业）合并的转移，这可能是由于更严格的反垄断执法。制造业和矿产业合并的不变美元价值超过了 1899 年达到的先前峰值（尽管它在经济中的份额仍然要小得多）。强劲的股票市场和金融创新（如可转换优先股和债券）也推动了 1960 年代的繁荣。这波合并浪潮以股价下跌告终，对于积极寻求企业集团合并的公司来说尤其严重。

—The Deal Decade of the 1980s. Unlike other merger booms, this one began in a depressed stock market. With stock prices low relative to the cost of building new capacity, it appeared cheaper to expand by takeover. The 1980s boom was marked by an explosion of hostile takeovers and financial innovation (such as junk bonds and leveraged buyouts). The 1980s wave was unique in the prevalence of cash purchases (as opposed to acquisition through stock). Efforts to dismantle conglomerate firms put together in the previous wave and redeploy their assets more efficiently may have been an important driving force. Finally, the antitrust environment was more permissive and companies were more willing to attempt horizontal mergers.
——1980 年代的 Deal Decade。与其他合并热潮不同，这一次始于低迷的股市。由于股价相对于建设新产能的成本较低，因此通过收购进行扩张似乎更便宜。1980 年代的繁荣以敌意收购和金融创新（如垃圾债券和杠杆收购）的爆炸式增长为标志。1980 年代的浪潮在现金购买（而不是通过股票收购）的盛行方面是独一无二的。努力拆除上一波合并在一起的企业集团公司并更有效地重新部署其资产可能是一个重要的驱动力。最后，反垄断环境更加宽松，公司更愿意尝试横向合并。

 Qualitatively, the current merger wave appears to be a reversion to pre-1980s form in some ways: It is taking place in a strong stock market, and stock rather than cash is the preferred medium. But many mergers are neither purely horizontal (in general large horizontal mergers would raise antitrust issues) nor purely conglomerate. Rather they represent market extension mergers (companies in the same industry that serve different and currently non-competing markets) or mergers seeking "synergy," in which companies in related markets expect to take advantage of "economies of scope."
从质量上讲，当前的合并浪潮似乎在某些方面恢复到 1980 年代之前的形式：它发生在一个强劲的股票市场中，股票而不是现金是首选的媒介。但许多合并既不是纯粹的横向合并（一般来说，大型横向合并会引发反垄断问题），也不是纯粹的企业集团。相反，它们代表市场延伸合并（同一行业的公司服务于不同且目前没有竞争的市场）或寻求“协同效应”的合并，其中相关市场的公司希望利用“范围经济”。

 By almost any quantitative measure, the current merger boom is substantial. * * * The total value of all deals announced in 1992—a year of especially low activity—was only $150 billion. The value of all deals announced in 1997 ($957 billion) was equivalent to about 12 percent of GDP, and activity so far in 1998 suggests another record year by this measure. * * * The last time merger activity was this large a share of GDP was during the Great Merger Wave at the turn of the last century.
几乎从任何量化指标来看，当前的并购热潮都是巨大的。* * * 1992 年宣布的所有交易总价值仅为 1500 亿美元，这一年是活动特别低的一年。1997 年宣布的所有交易价值（9570 亿美元）相当于 GDP 的 12% 左右，而 1998 年迄今的活动表明，按这一标准衡量，这又是创纪录的一年。* * * 上一次合并活动占 GDP 的比重如此之大是在上世纪之交的合并大潮期间。

 One reason current merger activity is so large relative to the size of the economy is the run up in stock prices in the past few years. When merger activity is expressed relative to the market value of U.S. companies, its level remains lower than it was in the 1980s. * * *
相对于经济规模而言，当前合并活动如此之大的一个原因是过去几年股价的上涨。当合并活动相对于美国公司的市值表示时，其水平仍低于 1980 年代。

A 2022 U.S. Chamber of Commerce “Business Case for Mergers and Acquisitions”
2022 年美国商会“并购商业案例”

A 2022 publication by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce lays out the following:
美国商会 2022 年的一份出版物列出了以下内容：

“Business Case for Mergers and Acquisitions”¹
“并购业务案例”¹

To stay competitive and adapt to new trends, businesses of all sizes and throughout industries may seek to merge with or acquire one another. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) happen regularly in the business world, and when executed well, they can promote competition amongst businesses, empower entrepreneurship, and protect consumers while allowing for increased freedom.
为了保持竞争力并适应新趋势，各种规模和各个行业的企业都可能寻求相互合并或收购。并购 （M&A） 在商业世界中经常发生，如果执行得当，它们可以促进企业之间的竞争，增强创业精神，保护消费者，同时允许增加自由。

Two Common Types of M&As. While there are five major types of business mergers, the two most common ones are horizontal mergers and vertical mergers.
两种常见的并购类型。虽然企业合并有五种主要类型，但最常见的两种是横向合并和纵向合并。

A horizontal merger is when two competing companies in the same industry form a single entity. A recent example of this is when the Walt Disney Company acquired 21st Century Fox. Both Disney and Fox were large media conglomerates with recognizable film and television brands. Disney’s acquisition of Fox made them a stronger media presence overall. When such large corporations merge, the government may step in and intervene.
横向合并是指同一行业的两家竞争公司形成一个实体。最近的一个例子是华特迪士尼公司 收购 21 世纪福克斯。迪士尼和福克斯都是拥有知名电影和电视品牌的大型媒体集团。迪士尼对福克斯的收购使他们总体上成为更强大的媒体影响力。当这些大公司合并时，政府可能会介入并干预。

“They often draw some antitrust scrutiny” . . . “If you think about the first and second-largest competitors in a marketplace and they try to merge, the government might step in and say, ‘that's not a good idea.’”
“他们经常受到一些反垄断审查”...... “如果你想想市场上的第一大和第二大竞争对手，他们试图合并，政府可能会插手说，'这不是一个好主意。'

A vertical merger happens when a company is in a certain space and acquires another to move up its supply chain. In 2015, Swedish furniture company Ikea bought forests in Romania and the Baltics to control the timber costs for wood production.
当一家公司处于某个领域并收购另一家公司以提升其供应链时，就会发生纵向合并。2015 年，瑞典家具公司宜家 在罗马尼亚和波罗的海购买了森林 ，以控制木材生产的木材成本。

“Rather than continuing to buy from another company, to aid your manufacturing process, you want to go and actually become the producer of those inputs[.]”
“与其继续从另一家公司购买来帮助你的制造过程，不如真正成为这些投入的生产商。“

Third Type of Merger. Another form of merger or acquisition is a conglomerate transaction, which involves a merger of two firms that operate in separate and distinctive markets.
第三种类型的合并。另一种形式的合并或收购是企业集团交易，它涉及在独立和独特市场运营的两家公司合并。

The Economic Analysis of M&As. Every year, thousands of mergers and acquisitions take place, from national corporations to regional companies. M&As strengthen the economy as a whole, as these transactions improve products and services and fuel beneficial efficiencies.
并购的经济分析。每年都会发生数千起并购事件，从国家公司到区域公司。并购可以增强整体经济，因为这些交易可以改善产品和服务并促进有益的效率。

The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have the power to block deals they believe are likely to harm consumers and the economy. The government will make its argument in court through economic analysis, which looks at any potential negative implications the transaction may have.
联邦贸易委员会（Federal Trade Commission）和司法部（Department of Justice）有权阻止他们认为可能损害消费者和经济的交易。政府将通过经济分析在法庭上提出论点，经济分析着眼于交易可能产生的任何潜在负面影响。

“Economic analysis is really what is important from the consumer’s view.” . . . “Oftentimes [the government is] looking at what happens to price or what happens to output.
“从消费者的角度来看，经济分析确实是重要的。“ . . . .“通常 [政府] 正在关注价格会发生什么变化或输出会发生什么变化。

[As demonstrated in chapter 8, in highly concentrated markets, price tends to be higher and output lower, thus having fewer sales at higher prices.] If two companies merge and the price goes up, that's a red flag. If two companies merge and output goes down — when there's less output — there's likely going to be an effect on price.”
[如第 8 章所示，在高度集中的市场中，价格往往较高，产出往往较低，因此价格较高时销售额较低。 如果两家公司合并并且价格上涨，那就是一个危险信号。如果两家公司合并并且产量下降——当产量减少时——可能会对价格产生影响。

The Government Monitors Harm to Competition. When a merger or acquisition is proposed, the government can challenge it. [See Chapter 8] However, it only challenges about 3 percent of these deals. If it does, all parties are required to turn over data and interview competitors to understand the market dynamics.
政府监控对竞争的损害。当有人提出合并或收购时，政府可以对其进行质疑。 [见第 8 章]然而，它只挑战了这些交易的 3% 左右。如果是这样，各方都需要交出数据并采访竞争对手以了解市场动态。

“The burden is on the government to show that the merger sometimes creates harm to competition[.]” . . . “But what does harm to competition mean? It doesn't mean what happens to the other competitors. It means what happens to the consumer.”
“政府有责任证明合并有时会对竞争造成损害。“ . . . .“但对竞争的伤害意味着什么？这并不意味着其他竞争对手会发生什么。这意味着消费者会发生什么。

The Government Should Play an Important But Limited Role in M&As. Government oversight in M&As is important to protect the consumer and the economy from a single business having a monopoly on a market sector and controlling prices. However, [some argue] that its role should be limited.
政府应该在并购中发挥重要但有限的作用。 政府对并购的监督对于保护消费者和经济免受垄断市场部门和控制价格的单一企业的影响非常重要。然而，[一些人认为] 它的作用应该受到限制。

“Government doesn't always know best, the idea that the government can stand in and micromanage the economy will lead to a disastrous result,” he said.
“政府并不总是最清楚，政府可以插手并对经济进行微观管理的想法将导致灾难性的结果，”他说。

“If the government started to scrutinize mergers in a way that looked at things beyond consumers and the interest of consumers, then all of a sudden you'd be bringing in all kinds of other factors into merger analysis[.]” . . . “That kind of government oversight is overbearing, and it really limits economic freedom.”
“如果政府开始以一种超越消费者和消费者利益的方式审查并购，那么突然之间，你就会把各种其他因素纳入并购分析中。“ . . . .“这种政府监督是专横的，它确实限制了经济自由。”

An Assessment of Various Theories of Mergers and Acquisitions
对各种并购理论的评估

 There are numerous studies of the economic effects of mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. One of the most comprehensive guides to this extensive literature is an article by Professor Roberta Romano of the Yale Law School entitled: A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 Yale Journal on Reg. 119 (1992). Notwithstanding that the article was written many years ago, the basic findings have been generally confirmed by many studies of the economic impact of M&As.
关于合并、收购和收购的经济影响，有很多研究。耶鲁大学法学院的罗伯塔·罗马诺 （Roberta Romano） 教授的一篇文章是关于这些广泛文献的最全面的指南之一，题为：收购指南：理论、证据和监管，耶鲁大学注册杂志 9 号。 119 （1992 年）。 尽管这篇文章是多年前写的，但基本发现已被许多关于并购经济影响的研究普遍证实。

 As indicated by the following excerpt from this article, target shareholders benefit in all forms of acquisitions:
如本文摘录所示，目标股东在各种形式的收购中均获益：

One important, and undisputed, datum about acquisitive transactions should be noted from the outset: acquisitions generate substantial gains to target company shareholders. All studies find that target firms experience statistically significant positive stock price responses to the announcement of takeover attempts or merger agreements. On average, there is a 20% increase over the pre-announcement market price for mergers and a 30% increase for tender offers in the period around the takeover announcement. Abnormal returns in going-private transactions (leveraged buyouts) are of similar magnitude, ranging across studies between 20% and 37%. Without question, the announcement of a bid is good news for target shareholders. Id. at 122.
从一开始就应该注意一个关于收购交易的重要且无可争议的数据：收购为目标公司股东带来了可观的收益。所有研究都发现，目标公司对收购尝试或合并协议的公告的积极股价反应具有统计学意义。平均而言，在收购公告前后的期间，合并的市场价格比公告前的市场价格高出 20%，要约收购的价格高出 30%。私有化交易（杠杆收购）中的异常回报幅度相似，在研究中在 20% 到 37% 之间。毫无疑问，宣布出价对目标股东来说是个好消息。同上，第 122 页。

 Also, as indicated from the following excerpt, the evidence on the benefit to the shareholders of acquirors is less certain:
此外，如以下摘录所示，关于收购方股东利益的证据不太确定：

The data are more ambiguous, however, concerning [the returns of the shareholders] of acquiring firms. . . . Depending on the sample and time period, acquirers experience positive, negative, or zero abnormal returns on a bids announcement and completion. From the acquirer's perspective, there are two classes of explanations or motivations for a takeover: value-maximizing and non-value-maximizing ones. Value-maximizing explanations view takeovers as undertaken in order to increase the equity share price of the acquiring firm. Non-value-maximizing explanations consider takeovers in diametrically opposite terms, as transactions that maximize managers' utility rather than shareholder wealth. These two explanations therefore predict a different stock price reaction, positive and negative, respectively. Id. at 123.
然而，关于收购公司的 [股东回报] 的数据则更加模糊。 根据样本和时间段，收单机构在出价公告和完成时会遇到正、负或零异常回报 。从收购方的角度来看，收购有两类解释或动机：价值最大化和非价值最大化。价值最大化解释将收购视为为了提高收购公司的股价而进行的收购。非价值最大化解释以截然相反的术语将收购视为最大化经理效用而不是股东财富的交易。因此，这两种解释分别预测了不同的股价反应，即积极和消极。同上，第 123 页。

 Professor Romano sets out several possible explanations of why the returns to the acquirors are ambiguous:
罗马诺教授列出了几种可能的解释，解释了为什么向收购者提供的回报是模棱两可的：

There are, however, theoretically plausible reasons for not finding positive abnormal returns to bidders even when acquisitions are value-maximizing transactions. First, acquiring firms are typically much larger than target firms, making it more difficult to measure abnormal returns. Second, a bid may reveal information about the bidding firm unrelated to the particular acquisition, confounding the stock price effect. Third, if the takeover market is competitive, then bidders will earn only normal returns, as abnormal profits are competed away. Finally, for acquiring firms that have an active mergers and acquisitions program, the gain from a specific acquisition may have been anticipated in the bidder's stock price at the time the mergers and acquisitions program was announced. Id. at 123–124.
然而，理论上也有合理的理由，即使收购是价值最大化的交易，也没有为投标人找到积极的异常回报。首先，收购公司通常比目标公司大得多，这使得衡量异常回报更加困难。其次，出价可能会泄露与特定收购无关的出价公司的信息，从而混淆股价影响。第三，如果收购市场竞争激烈，那么竞标者将只能获得正常回报，因为异常利润被争夺走。最后，对于拥有积极并购计划的收购公司，在宣布并购计划时，投标人的股价可能已经预见到特定收购的收益。同上，第 123-124 页。

Most of the studies relied on by Professor Romano are "event studies," and these studies are explored in the next section.
罗马诺教授所依赖的大多数研究都是“事件研究”，这些研究将在下一节中探讨。

 In his book, The Synergy Trap: How Companies Lose in the Acquisition Game, Professor Mark L. Sirower, a professor of business strategy and competitive analysis at the NYU Business School, has emphasized the significant challenges facing acquirors in mergers and acquisitions:
纽约大学商学院商业战略和竞争分析教授 Mark L. Sirower 教授在他的著作《协同陷阱：公司如何在收购游戏中失败》中强调了收购方在并购中面临的重大挑战：

Few, if any, corporate resource decisions can change the value of a company as quickly or dramatically as a major acquisition. Yet the change is usually for the worse. Shareholders of acquiring firms routinely lose money right on announcement of acquisitions. Sirower, Imagined Synergy: A Prescription for a No-Win Deal, a chapter from The Synergy Trap, excerpted in Mergers and Acquisitions 23 (January/February 1998).
很少有公司资源决策能像重大收购那样迅速或戏剧性地改变公司的价值。然而，这种变化通常是向更坏的方向发展。收购公司的股东通常会在宣布收购时亏损。Sirower，《想象中的协同效应：不赢交易的处方》，《协同效应陷阱》中的一章，摘自《并购》第 23 期（1998 年 1 月/2 月）。

 He goes on to say that in many acquisitions, the acquiror is making a gift to the target's shareholders:
他接着说，在许多收购中，收购方都是在向目标公司的股东赠送礼物：

When executives play the acquisition game, they pay, in addition to the current market price, an up-front premium for an uncertain stream of payoffs sometime in the future. Since shareholders do not have to pay a premium to buy the shares of the target on their own, these payoffs, the synergies, must represent something that shareholders cannot get on their own. They must mean improvements in performance greater than those already expected by the markets. If these synergies are not achieved, the acquisition premium is merely a gift from the shareholders of the acquirer to the shareholders of the target company. Id.
当高管们玩收购游戏时，除了当前的市场价格外，他们还为未来某个时候不确定的回报流支付了前期溢价。由于股东不必支付溢价即可自行购买目标公司的股票，因此这些回报、协同效应必须代表股东自己无法获得的东西。它们必须意味着性能的改进大于市场已经预期的水平。如果这些协同效应没有实现，收购溢价只是收购方股东对目标公司股东的礼物。同上。

Introduction to Event Studies: Determining the Wealth Effects of Mergers
事件研究导论：确定合并的财富效应

 This section provides a basic illustration of the event study methodology for determining the market reaction for both the target and bidder firms upon the announcement of a merger or acquisition.²¹ Event studies are based on the efficient capital markets hypothesis, which holds that markets react quickly and accurately to new information. Thus, this hypothesis predicts, for example, that upon the announcement of a merger of two publicly-held firms, the market will quickly and accurately assess the prospects of the transaction for both firms and such assessment will be reflected in the share price of the firms. The purpose of this section is to give the student an introduction to an important methodology for critically thinking about the wealth effects of mergers. An event study analysis of a merger can easily be done with an Excel spread sheet, which was used in the following illustration.
本节提供了事件研究方法的基本示例，用于确定目标公司和投标公司在宣布合并或收购时的市场反应。²¹ 事件研究基于有效资本市场假说，该假说认为市场对新信息的反应迅速而准确。因此，该假设预测，例如，在宣布两家上市公司合并后 ，市场将快速准确地评估两家公司的交易前景，并且这种评估将反映在公司的股价中。本节的目的是向学生介绍一种批判性思考合并对财富影响的重要方法。合并的事件研究分析可以很容易地使用 Excel 电子表格完成，如下图所示。

 This section discusses the results of an event study of the market's reaction to the announcement of the acquisition by J.P. Morgan Chase of Bank One in January 2004. Both companies were large publicly-held financial institutions. The merger agreement and SEC disclosure document for this transaction are Documentary Appendices D and E of M&A Statutes, Rules, and Documents, supra Section 1.1. Both the Delaware Supreme Court and the U.S. district court rejected challenges to the transaction. The discussion here focuses on the results of the event study and a more complete discussion of the actual steps in the event study can be found in Thompson, Business Planning for M&A IV, infra Chapter 1, References.
本节讨论了一项事件研究的结果，该研究记录了市场对摩根大通于 2004 年 1 月宣布收购 Bank One 的反应。这两家公司都是大型公共控股金融机构。本次交易的合并协议和 SEC 披露文件是 M&A 法规、规则和文件的文件附录 D 和 E，同上第 1.1 节。特拉华州最高法院和美国地区法院都驳回了对该交易的质疑。此处的讨论侧重于事件研究的结果，有关事件研究中实际步骤的更完整讨论，请参见 Thompson，M&A IV 的业务规划，下第 1 章，参考资料。

 This study has three basic purposes: (1) determine the return for the target's shareholders, the Bank One shareholders; (2) determine the return for the bidder's shareholders, the J.P. Morgan Chase shareholders; and (3) determine the combined return for the target's and bidder's shareholders. As Professor Weston points out: "The most important query concerning the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions is whether the transactions create wealth. In other words are mergers positive net present value (NPV) projects?"³² The NPV concept is explored in Chapter 7. As indicated above, in most acquisitions the target's shareholders benefit and the acquiror's shareholders have slight gains or losses. The combined returns are more ambiguous.
本研究有三个基本目的：（1）确定目标公司的股东，即Bank One的股东的回报;（2） 确定投标人的股东，即摩根大通股东的回报;以及 （3） 确定目标公司和投标人股东的综合回报。正如 Weston 教授指出的那样：“关于并购的财富效应，最重要的问题是交易是否创造了财富。换句话说 ，合并是正净现值 （NPV） 项目吗？³² 第 7 章探讨了 NPV 概念。 如上所述，在大多数收购中，目标公司的股东受益，而收购方的股东则略有收益或损失。合并的回报更加模糊。

This study reached the following conclusions on the returns to (1) the Target’s (i.e., Bank One’s) shareholders; (2) the Acquirer’s (i.e. Chase’s) shareholders, and (3) the combined return of the Target’s and Acquirer’s shareholders:
本研究对 （1） 目标公司（即 Bank One 的）股东;（2） 收购方（即 Chase 的）股东，以及 （3） 目标公司和收购方股东的综合回报：

 Target Returns. Bank One's stock return between the pre-announcement to post-announcement period was 13.20%. The S&P 500 returned only 0.43% over this same period. Therefore, the net-of-market or abnormal return for Bank One was 12.77% (i.e., 13.20 – 0.43%). This type of return is consistent with the studies discussed by Professor Romano above.
Target 返回。Bank One 在公告前至公告后期间 的股票回报率为 13.20%。同期标准普尔 500 指数的回报率仅为 0.43%。 因此，Bank One 的净市场或异常回报率为 12.77%（即 13.20 – 0.43%）。这种类型的回报与 Romano 教授上面讨论的研究一致。

 Bidder Returns. The acquirer, J.P. Morgan-Chase, had a stock return for the pre-announcement to post-announcement period equal to 0.34%. However, the S&P 500 returned 0.43% over the same window. Therefore, the net-of-market return for J.P. Morgan-Chase was –0.09%, indicating that there was a slight negative reaction by the J.P. Morgan-Chase shareholders. This type of return is consistent with the studies discussed by Professor Romano above.
投标人退货。收购方 J.P. Morgan-Chase 在公告前至公告后期间的股票回报率为 0.34%。然而，标准普尔 500 指数在同一窗口的回报率为 0.43%。因此，摩根大通的市场净回报率为 -0.09%，表明摩根大通股东有轻微的负面反应。这种类型的回报与 Romano 教授上面讨论的研究一致。

 The Combined Return. The combined return is the weighted average of the returns of the two parties in the merger where the weights are the equity value (i.e., total market capitalization) of the particular target and bidder. Since the shareholders of the target firm, Bank One, had a wealth gain of approximately $6.3 billion, and the shareholders of the bidder firm, J.P. Morgan Chase, had a wealth loss of roughly $71 million, the combined wealth creation is roughly $6.25 billion. This equates to a 4.85% return on the pre-announcement combined firm value of $129 billion.
组合回报。合并回报是合并中双方回报的加权平均值，其中权重是特定目标和投标人的股权价值（即总市值）。 由于目标公司 Bank One 的股东获得了大约 63 亿美元的财富，而投标公司 JP Morgan Chase 的股东损失了大约 7100 万美元，因此总共创造了大约 62.5 亿美元的财富。这相当于公告前公司总价值 1290 亿美元的 4.85% 回报率。

Thus, although this merger produced a slight wealth loss for the shareholders of J.P. Morgan Chase, on an aggregate basis the merger produced a significant gain. Transactions in which the shareholders of both the target and acquiror experience wealth gains are unambiguously economically beneficial.
因此，尽管这次合并给摩根大通的股东带来了轻微的财富损失，但从总体上看，合并产生了可观的收益。目标公司和收购方的股东都获得财富收益的交易无疑是经济上有益的。

Introduction to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act
Sarbanes-Oxley 法案和 Dodd-Frank 法案简介

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
萨班斯-奥克斯利法案

 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was enacted in response to the Enron and other corporate accounting scandals, dramatically changed the law governing publicly held corporations. This section introduces the Act.
2002 年的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》是为应对安然和其他公司会计丑闻而颁布的，极大地改变了管理上市公司的法律。本节介绍该法案。

Chapter 3, directors' duties, examines the provisions of the Act that are most likely to have an impact on corporate governance: (1) the rules governing public company audit committees, (2) the rules on audit committee financial experts, (3) the rules governing codes of ethics, and (4) the related rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ Stock Market requiring public companies to have a majority of independent directors.
第 3 章“董事的职责”研究了该法案中最有可能对公司治理产生影响的条款：（1） 管理上市公司审计委员会的规则，（2） 审计委员会财务专家的规则，（3） 道德准则的规则，以及 （4） 纽约证券交易所和纳斯达克股票市场的相关规则，要求上市公司拥有大多数独立董事。

Chapter 4 reviews the following provisions of the Act: (1) the rules regarding management assessment of internal controls, (2) the rules requiring officer certification of financial reports, and (3) the rules dealing with enhanced disclosure of beneficial interest under Section 16 of the 34 Act. The rules dealing with the professional responsibility for attorneys are briefly addressed in Chapter 17, which briefly addresses several issues.
第 4 章审查了该法案的以下条款：（1） 关于内部控制的管理层评估的规则，（2） 要求高级职员对财务报告进行认证的规则，以及 （3） 根据 34 法案第 16 条处理加强实益权益披露的规则。第 17 章简要介绍了涉及律师职业责任的规则 ，其中简要讨论了几个问题。

 Some of the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (34 Act) and other provisions imposed obligations on the SEC without amending the 34 Act. The Senate Report explained the purpose of the Act:
Sarbanes-Oxley 法案的一些条款修订了 1934 年证券交易法（34 法案）和其他条款，这些条款对 SEC 施加了义务，但未修订 34 法案。参议院报告解释了该法案的目的：

The purpose of the [the Act] is to address the systemic and structural weaknesses affecting our capital markets which were revealed by repeated failures of audit effectiveness and corporate financial and broker-dealer responsibility in recent months and years. The [Act] creates a strong independent board to oversee the conduct of the auditors of public companies, and it strengthens auditor independence from corporate management by limiting the scope of non-audit services that auditors can offer their public company audit clients. * * * The [Act] also requires steps to enhance the direct responsibility of senior corporate management for financial reporting and for the quality of financial disclosures made by public companies. * * *
[该法案] 的目的是解决影响我们资本市场的系统性和结构性弱点，这些弱点在最近几个月和几年的审计有效性以及公司财务和经纪交易商责任的反复失败中暴露出来。该法案创建了一个强大的独立委员会来监督上市公司审计师的行为，并通过限制审计师可以为其上市公司审计客户提供的非审计服务的范围，加强了审计师独立于公司管理层的独立性。* * * 该法案还要求采取措施加强公司高级管理层对财务报告和上市公司财务披露质量的直接责任。* * *

 The Dodd-Frank Act
多德-弗兰克法案

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 added several sections to the 34 Act relating to corporate governance, including the following: (1) provisions giving the shareholders a "say on pay" and "say on golden parachutes" (see Chapter 13); (2) a provision authorizing the SEC to adopt rules relating to proxy access (that is, permitting certain shareholders to include their own director nominees on the company's proxy card at the company's expense) (see Chapter 16); and (3) a provision authorizing the closing of the ten-day window in section 13(d), the early warning system (see Chapter 16).
2010 年《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案》在 34 法案中增加了与公司治理相关的几个条款，包括以下内容：（1） 赋予股东“薪酬发言权”和“黄金降落伞发言权”的条款（见第 13 章）;（2） 授权 SEC 采用与代理访问相关的规则的条款（即允许某些股东在公司的代理卡上包括他们自己的董事提名人，费用由公司承担）（见第 16 章）;以及 （3） 授权关闭第 13（d） 节中 10 天窗口的条款，即早期预警系统（见第 1 章6）。

References
引用

 The literature dealing with mergers and acquisitions is quite extensive. The purpose of this section is to set out some of the most important references. References are also provided at the end of each chapter. It must be emphasized that in considering any of these sources, the latest edition of the source should be consulted.
涉及并购的文献相当广泛。本节的目的是列出一些最重要的参考资料。每章末尾还提供了参考资料。 必须强调的是，在考虑这些来源中的任何一个时，都应该参考最新版本的来源。

 This book is a successor to Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Business Planning for Mergers and Acquisitions, Fourth Edition (2015) [hereinafter Thompson, Business Planning for M&A].
本书是 Samuel C. Thompson， Jr.， Business Planning for Mergers and Acquisitions， Fourth Edition （2015） [以下简称 Thompson， Business Planning for M&A] 的继任者。

The topics addressed in each of the chapters of this book, as well as other topics, are addressed in treatise form in Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers (PLI, Second Edition 2022, updated periodically) [hereinafter Thompson, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers]. The excerpts in this book from Thompson, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers are reprinted with permission. In reviewing any of the references in this section and throughout the book, the reader should consult the latest version of the referenced document.
本书每一章中涉及的主题以及其他主题均以论文形式在 Samuel C. Thompson， Jr.，Mergers， Acquisitions and Tender Offers（PLI，2022 年第二版，定期更新）[以下简称 Thompson，Mergers， Acquisitions and Tender Offers] 中以论文形式讨论。本书摘自汤普森的《合并、收购和要约收购》（Mergers， Acquisitions and Tender Offers），经许可转载。在查看本节和整本书中的任何参考文献时，读者应查阅参考文献的最新版本。

 Valuation in M&A, which is introduced in chapter 11, is addressed more completely in Samuel C. Thompson, Jr. Corporate Valuation in Mergers and Acquisitions (PLI, 2023, updated periodically) [hereinafter Thompson, Corporate Valuation in M&A). Also, the Federal income tax aspects of M&A, which are addressed in chapter 5, are addressed more completely in Samuel C. Thompson, Jr. Business Tax Deskbook (PLI, 2019, updated periodically) [hereinafter Thompson Business Tax Deskbook].
第 11 章介绍了并购中的估值，在 Samuel C. Thompson， Jr. 中得到了更完整的讨论。 并购中的企业估值（PLI，2023 年，定期更新）[以下简称 Thompson，并购中的企业估值）。此外， 第 5 章中涉及的 M&A 的联邦所得税方面在 Samuel C. Thompson， Jr. 中得到了更完整的讨论。 营业税桌面手册（PLI，2019 年，定期更新）[以下简称汤普森营业税桌面手册]。

 One of the leading books dealing with negotiated acquisitions is Kling and Nugent, Negotiated Acquisitions of Companies, Subsidiaries and Divisions, (2005) [hereinafter Kling and Nugent, Negotiated Acquisitions]. Another important, but somewhat dated, book addressing negotiated acquisitions is Freund, Anatomy of a Merger (1975) [hereinafter Freund, Anatomy of a Merger]. Detailed information dealing with tender offers, takeovers and freezeouts is contained in Lipton and Steinberger, Takeovers & Freezeouts (2000) [hereinafter Lipton and Steinberger, Takeovers & Freezeouts]; Brown, Ferrara, Bird, Kubek and Regner, Takeovers: A Strategic Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions(2nd Edition, 2004) [hereinafter Brown et al, Takeovers: A Strategic Guide]; and Fleischer and Sussman, Takeover Defense (6th Edition, 2004) [hereinafter Fleischer and Sussman, Takeover Defense]. For a treatment of going private transactions see Borden, Going Private (1994) [hereinafter Borden, Going Private]. For a discussion of both negotiated acquisitions and takeovers, see Lorne, Acquisitions and Mergers: Negotiated and Contested Transactions (2006) [hereinafter Lorne, Negotiated and Contested Transactions]. For a student's hornbook treatment of M&A see Bainbridge, Mergers and Acquisitions (2003).
Kling 和 Nugent 的《公司、子公司和部门的谈判收购》（2005 年）是涉及谈判收购的主要书籍之一。另一本关于谈判收购的重要但有些过时的书是 Freund， Anatomy of a Merger （1975） [以下简称 Freund， Anatomy of a Merger]。有关收购要约、收购和冻结的详细信息包含在Lipton和Steinberger的《收购与冻结》（2000）[以下简称Lipton和Steinberger，《收购与冻结]》中;Brown、Ferrara、Bird、Kubek 和 Regner，《收购：并购战略指南》（第 2 版，2004 年）[以下简称 Brown 等人，《收购：战略指南》];以及 Fleischer 和 Sussman，《收购防御》（第 6 版，2004 年）[以下简称 Fleischer 和 Sussman，《收购防御》]。有关私有化交易的处理方法，参见 Borden， Going Private （1994） [以下简称 Borden， Going Private]。有关谈判收购和收购的讨论，参见 Lorne，收购和合并：谈判和争议交易 （2006） [以下简称 Lorne，谈判和争议交易]。 有关学生对并购的角簿处理，请参见 Bainbridge， Mergers and Acquisitions （2003）。

 The Negotiated Acquisitions Committee of the American Bar Association has published several excellent books on various aspects of mergers and acquisitions: ABA, Model Stock Purchase Agreement with Commentary (1995) [hereinafter ABA Model Stock Purchase Agreement]; ABA, Model Asset Purchase Agreement with Commentary (2001) [hereinafter ABA Model Asset Purchase Agreement]; ABA, Manual on Acquisition Review (1995) [hereinafter ABA Acquisition Review]; ABA, The M&A Process (2005) [hereinafter ABA M&A Process]; and ABA, Model Merger Agreement for the Acquisition of a Public Company (2011) [hereinafter ABA, Model Public Company Merger Agreement].
美国律师协会谈判收购委员会出版了几本关于并购各个方面的优秀书籍：ABA，带评论的股票购买协议范本（1995 年）[以下简称 ABA 股票购买协议范本];ABA，《示范资产购买协议及评论》（2001）[以下简称 ABA 示范资产购买协议];ABA，《收购审查手册》（1995 年）[以下简称 ABA 收购审查];ABA，《并购流程》（2005 年）[以下简称 ABA 并购流程];以及 ABA，《上市公司收购合并协议范本》（2011 年）[以下简称 ABA，《上市公司合并协议范本》]。

 For a general treatment of Delaware corporate law see Balotti and Finkelstein, Delaware Law of Corporations & Business Organizations (1999) [hereinafter Balotti and Finkelstein, Delaware Corporate Law] and Ward, Welch and Turezyn, Folk on the Delaware General Corporate Law: Fundamentals, (4th Edition 2006) [hereinafter Folk on Delaware Corporate Law]. For a general treatment of corporate law, see American Bar Association, Model Business Corporation Act (Revised through 2005)[hereinafter Model Business Corporation Act]. For a treatment of the fiduciary duties of directors and the related business judgment rule, see Block, Barton, and Radin, The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors (5th Edition 1998) [hereinafter Block et al, Business Judgment Rule]. See also ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1994) [hereinafter the ALI Corporate Governance Project) and Thompson, The Merger and Acquisition Provisions of the ALI Corporate Governance Project As Applied to the Three Steps in the Time-Warner Acquisition, 1996 Columbia Business Law Review 145 (1996) [hereinafter Thompson, The M&A Provisions of the ALI Corporate Governance Project].
关于特拉华州公司法的一般处理，参见Balotti和Finkelstein，特拉华州公司和商业组织法（1999年）[以下简称Balotti和Finkelstein，特拉华州公司法]和Ward，Welch和Turezyn， Folk on the Delaware General Corporate Law： Fundamentals，（2006 年第 4 版）[以下简称 Folk on Delaware Corporate Law]。有关公司法的一般处理，参见美国律师协会，《模范商业公司法》（2005 年修订）[以下简称《模范商业公司法》]。有关董事的受托责任和相关商业判断规则的处理，参见 Block、Barton 和 Radin，商业判断规则：公司董事的受托责任（1998 年第 5 版）[以下简称 Block 等人，商业判断规则]。 另见 ALI 的《公司治理原则：分析和建议》（1994 年）[以下简称 ALI 公司治理项目]和 Thompson，《适用于时代华纳收购三个步骤的 ALI 公司治理项目的并购条款》，1996 年哥伦比亚商法评论 145 （1996） [以下简称 Thompson，ALI 公司治理项目的并购条款]。

 Two of the leading authorities on Federal securities law related to mergers and acquisitions are Loss and Seligman, Securities Regulation, (3rd Edition, 1995) [hereinafter Loss and Seligman, Securities Regulation] and Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation (5th Edition 2005) [hereinafter Hazen, Securities Regulation].
与并购相关的联邦证券法的两个主要权威是 Loss 和 Seligman，证券法规（1995 年第 3 版）[以下简称 Loss 和 Seligman，证券法规] 和 Hazen，证券法规法（2005 年第 5 版）[以下简称 Hazen，证券法规]。

 Two of the leading authorities on taxation of mergers and acquisitions are Ginsburg and Levin, Mergers, Acquisitions and Buyouts (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter Ginsburg and Levin, Mergers and Acquisitions] and Bittker and Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders (7th Edition, 2000) [hereinafter Bittker and Eustice, Corporate Tax]. For a casebook treatment of taxation of mergers and acquisitions, see Thompson, Corporate Taxation Through the Lens of Mergers and Acquisitions [hereinafter Thompson, Corporate Taxation Through the Lens of M&A]. See also Thompson, U.S. International Tax Planning and Policy, Including Cross-Border M&A (2006) [hereinafter Thompson, U.S. International Tax Planning and Policy].
关于并购税收的两个主要权威是 Ginsburg 和 Levin，《合并、收购和收购》（2006 年 1 月）[以下简称 Ginsburg 和 Levin，《合并和收购]》，以及 Bittker 和 Eustice，《公司和股东的联邦所得税》（第 7 版，2000 年）[以下简称 Bittker]和 Eustice，公司税]。有关并购税收的案例集处理，参见 Thompson， Corporate Taxation Through the Lens of Mergers and Acquisitions [以下简称 Thompson， Corporate Taxation Through the Lens of M&A]。 另见 Thompson，美国国际税务规划和政策，包括跨境并购 （2006） [以下简称 Thompson，美国国际税务规划和政策]。

 For an exploration of the antitrust aspects of mergers and acquisitions see Areeda and Turner, Antitrust Law, Chapters 9, 10, and 11 (2004) [hereinafter Areeda and Turner, Antitrust]; Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, Chapters 12 and 13 (3rd Edition 2005) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy]; Sullivan and Grimes, The Law of Antitrust (2000) [hereinafter Sullivan and Grimes, Antitrust]; and American Bar Association, Mergers and Acquisitions, Understanding the Antitrust Laws (2nd Edition 2004) [hereinafter ABA Mergers and Acquisitions]. For a comprehensive look at antitrust pre-merger notification see Axinn, Fogg, Stoll, & Prager, Acquisitions Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (Revised Edition, 2005) [hereinafter Axinn et al., Hart-Scott-Rodino] and ABA, Section of Antitrust Law, The Merger Review Process (3rd Edition 2006) [hereinafter ABA The Merger Review Process].
有关并购反垄断方面的探讨，参见 Areeda 和 Turner，《反垄断法》，第 9、10 和 11 章（2004 年）[以下简称 Areeda 和 Turner，《反垄断》]; Hovenkamp，《联邦反垄断政策》，第 12 章和第 13 章（2005 年第 3 版）[以下简称 Hovenkamp，反垄断政策];Sullivan 和 Grimes，《反垄断法》（2000 年）[以下简称 Sullivan 和 Grimes，《反垄断》];以及美国律师协会，《并购》，《了解反垄断法》（2004 年第 2 版）[以下简称 ABA 并购]。有关反垄断合并前通知的全面了解，请参阅Axinn， Fogg， Stoll和Prager， 根据Hart-Scott-Rodino反垄断改进法案进行的收购（修订版，2005年）[以下简称Axinn等人，Hart-Scott-Rodino]和美国律师协会，反垄断法部分，合并审查程序（2006 年第 3 版）[以下简称 ABA，The Merger Review Process]。

 For an excellent review of banking acquisitions see Herlihy et al, Financial Institutions Mergers and Acquisitions (2005) [hereinafter Herlihy et al, Financial Institutions M&A].
有关银行收购的精彩评论，请参阅 Herlihy 等人，金融机构并购 （2005） [以下简称 Herlihy 等人，金融机构并购]。

 The literature dealing with the finance and economics of mergers and acquisitions is also quite extensive. One of the best surveys of this literature is Romano, A Guide to Takeover Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 Yale Journal on Reg. 119 (1992). An excerpt from this article is set out in this chapter. See also the excellent collection of materials in Part II, Motives for Acquisitions, of Gilson and Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions, 253–638 (1995).
涉及并购的金融和经济学的文献也相当广泛。对这些文献的最佳调查之一是 Romano，A Guide to Takeover Theory， Evidence and Regulation，9 Yale Journal on Reg. 119 （1992）。本章摘录了本文的摘录。另请参见 Gilson 和 Black 的第二部分，收购动机，The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions， 253–638 （1995） 中的优秀资料集。

 General information on M&A is available from many publications, including the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, The Economist, Corporate Control Alert, Mergers and Acquisitions, and The Deal.
有关并购的一般信息可从许多出版物获得，包括《华尔街日报》、《纽约时报》、《经济学人》、《企业控制警报》、《并购》和《交易》。

Appendix A to Chapter 1, This Appendix Contains the Latest (i.e., June 2024) Update to the Following Sections of Thompson, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers: Sections 1:7.4 to 1:7.44, and Is Presented under the Following Heading: Section 1:7.4 Introduction to Recent Data on the M&A Marketplace Contained in Sections 1:7.5 through 1:7.44
第 1 章附录 A 包含对 Thompson、合并、收购和要约收购以下部分的最新（即 2024 年 6 月）更新：第 1：7.4 至 1：7.44 节，并在以下标题下介绍：第 1：7.4 节 第 1：7.5 节至第 1：7.44 节中包含的并购市场最新数据简介

THIS APPENDIX IS IN A SEPARATE DOCUMENT.
本附录位于单独的文档中。