BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：
This past year our registered shareholders increased from about 1900 to about 2900. Most of this growth resulted from our merger with Blue Chip Stamps, but there also was an acceleration in the pace of “natural” increase that has raised us from the 1000 level a few years ago.
过去一年，我们的注册股东人数从大约 1900 人增加到大约 2900 人。其中大部分增长源于我们与蓝筹邮票公司的合并，但“自然”增长的速度也有所加快，使我们从几年前的 1000 人水平提升至今。
With so many new shareholders, it’s appropriate to summarize the major business principles we follow that pertain to the manager-owner relationship:
面对这么多新股东，总结我们遵循的主要商业原则，这些原则与管理者-股东关系相关，是恰当的：
o Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we also are, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.
o 尽管我们的形式是公司制，但我们的态度是合伙制。查理·芒格和我将股东视为所有者-合伙人，而将自己视为管理合伙人。（由于我们持股的比例，我们也是，无论好坏，控制合伙人。）我们不将公司本身视为我们商业资产的最终所有者，而是将公司视为股东拥有资产的渠道。
o In line with this owner-orientation, our directors are all major shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In the case of at least four of the five, over 50% of family net worth is represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our own cooking.
o 遵循这种所有者导向，我们所有的董事都是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的主要股东。在至少五分之四的情况下，超过 50%的家庭净资产由伯克希尔·哈撒韦的持股构成。我们自己吃着自家的饭菜。
o Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize the average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future - a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.
我们的长期经济目标（后面会提到一些限定条件）是最大化每股内在业务价值的年均增长率。我们不以规模来衡量伯克希尔的经济意义或表现，而是以每股的进步来衡量。我们确信未来每股的进步率会下降——资本大幅扩张就会导致这种情况。但如果我们的增长率不超过美国大型公司的平均水平，我们将感到失望。
o Our preference would be to reach this goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.
我们的首选是通过直接拥有能产生现金流并持续获得超平均水平资本回报的多元化企业集团来达到这一目标。我们的第二选择是拥有类似企业的部分股权，主要通过保险子公司购买可交易普通股来实现。企业和保险资本的需求决定了任何给定年份的资本配置。
o Because of this two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
o 由于我们采取了这种双管齐下的企业所有权方法，并且由于传统会计的局限性，合并报告的收益可能无法充分反映我们真实的经营业绩。查理和我，作为所有者和管理者，基本上忽略这些合并数字。然而，我们也会向你们报告我们控制的主要业务的收益，这些数字我们认为非常重要。这些数据，加上我们将提供的关于各业务的其他信息，应该能帮助你们做出关于这些业务的判断。
o Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
会计后果不会影响我们的经营或资本配置决策。当收购成本相似时，我们更倾向于购买 2 美元的收益，这些收益在我们按标准会计准则报告时不可报告，而不是购买 1 美元的收益，这些收益是可报告的。这正是我们经常面临的选择，因为整个企业（其收益将完全可报告）的售价通常是较小部分（其收益将大部分不可报告）的按比例价格的两倍。从整体和长期来看，我们预计未报告的收益将通过资本利得完全反映在我们的内在企业价值中。
o We rarely use much debt and, when we do, we attempt to structure it on a long-term fixed rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, depositors, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care.
我们很少使用大量债务，当我们使用时，我们试图将其结构化为长期固定利率形式。我们会拒绝有趣的机会，而不是过度杠杆化我们的资产负债表。这种保守主义损害了我们的业绩，但它是我们唯一感到舒适的行为，考虑到我们对保单持有人、存款人、贷款人和许多将异常大额净资产托付给我们的股东所承担的信托责任。
o A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
管理层的“愿望清单”不会以股东的利益为代价来满足。我们不会通过以忽视对股东长期经济后果的控制价格购买整个企业来进行多元化。我们只会用你的钱做我们用自己的钱会做的事，充分权衡通过在股票市场直接购买来多元化你自己的投资组合所能获得的价值观。
o We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
我们认为高尚的意图应该定期与结果进行对照检查。我们通过评估留存收益是否随着时间的推移为股东至少提供了每留存 1 美元就对应 1 美元市场价值的收益来测试留存收益的智慧。到目前为止，这一测试已经通过。我们将继续以五年滚动的方式应用这一测试。随着我们净资产的增长，明智地使用留存收益变得更加困难。
o We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance - not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company - and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to - on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
o 我们只有在收到的商业价值与我们付出的相当时才会发行普通股。这一规则适用于所有形式的发行——不仅限于合并或公开股票发行，还包括股票换债务、股票期权和可转换证券。我们不会以与企业整体价值不一致的基础出售您公司的小部分股份——而股份发行正是如此。
o You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns, and are very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling - the advocates will be sincere - but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in it.
你应该完全清楚我和查理共享的一种态度，这种态度损害了我们的财务表现：无论价格如何，我们对出售伯克希尔拥有的任何好企业完全没有兴趣，而且只要我们预期这些企业至少能产生一些现金，只要我们对它们的管理层和劳资关系感觉良好，我们就非常不愿意出售表现不佳的企业。我们希望不要再犯导致我们陷入这种表现不佳的企业中的资本配置错误。对于有人建议通过大规模资本支出使我们的表现不佳的企业恢复到令人满意的盈利能力，我们反应非常谨慎。（预测会非常诱人——倡导者会非常真诚——但最终，在一个糟糕的行业中进行大规模额外投资通常和挣扎在流沙中一样收效甚微。）然而， Gin Rummy 管理行为（每次都丢弃最没有希望的企业）不是我们的风格。我们宁愿让我们的整体结果受到一些惩罚，也不愿参与这种行为。
o We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: the CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.
我们将坦率地向您汇报，强调在评估商业价值时重要的优点和缺点。我们的原则是，如果我们处于您的位置，我们会希望了解的商业事实。我们理应如此。此外，作为一家拥有重要通信业务的公司，如果我们对自己报道的标准低于我们期望我们的新闻人员对他人报道的标准，那将是不可原谅的。我们还认为坦率对我们作为管理者有益：公开误导他人的 CEO 最终可能会在私下里误导自己。
o Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore, we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
尽管我们奉行坦诚政策，但我们将仅在法律要求范围内讨论我们的可交易证券活动。好的投资想法如同好的产品或业务收购想法一样稀有、宝贵且易被竞争对手窃取。因此，我们通常不会谈论我们的投资想法。这一禁令甚至延伸到我们已经出售的证券（因为我们可能再次购买）以及我们被错误传言正在购买的股票。如果我们否认那些报道但在其他场合表示“无可奉告”，那么“无可奉告”就变成了确认。
That completes the catechism, and we can now move on to the high point of 1983 - the acquisition of a majority interest in Nebraska Furniture Mart and our association with Rose Blumkin and her family.
这完成了我们的教义，现在我们可以进入 1983 年的高潮——收购内布拉斯加家具商城多数股权以及我们与罗丝·布卢姆金及其家族的合作。
Nebraska Furniture Mart 内布拉斯加家具商场
Last year, in discussing how managers with bright, but adrenalin-soaked minds scramble after foolish acquisitions, I quoted Pascal: “It has struck me that all the misfortunes of men spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly in one room.”
去年，在讨论那些思维活跃但充满肾上腺素的管理者如何争夺愚蠢收购时，我引用了帕斯卡的言论：“我发现人类所有的不幸都源于一个原因，那就是他们无法静静地待在一个房间里。”
Even Pascal would have left the room for Mrs. Blumkin.
即使是帕斯卡也会为布卢姆金夫人离开房间。
About 67 years ago Mrs. Blumkin, then 23, talked her way past a border guard to leave Russia for America. She had no formal education, not even at the grammar school level, and knew no English. After some years in this country, she learned the language when her older daughter taught her, every evening, the words she had learned in school during the day.
大约 67 年前，23 岁的布卢姆金夫人通过说服边境警卫，成功离开俄罗斯前往美国。她没有受过正规教育，连中学水平都达不到，也不懂英语。在美国生活几年后，她通过大女儿每天晚上教她白天在学校学到的单词，学会了英语。
In 1937, after many years of selling used clothing, Mrs. Blumkin had saved $500 with which to realize her dream of opening a furniture store. Upon seeing the American Furniture Mart in Chicago - then the center of the nation’s wholesale furniture activity - she decided to christen her dream Nebraska Furniture Mart.
1937 年，在经营二手服装多年后，布卢姆金夫人攒下了 500 美元，实现了她开设家具店的梦想。当她看到芝加哥的美国家具市场——当时全国批发家具的中心——她决定将自己的梦想命名为内布拉斯加家具市场。
She met every obstacle you would expect (and a few you wouldn’t) when a business endowed with only $500 and no locational or product advantage goes up against rich, long- entrenched competition. At one early point, when her tiny resources ran out, “Mrs. B” (a personal trademark now as well recognized in Greater Omaha as Coca-Cola or Sanka) coped in a way not taught at business schools: she simply sold the furniture and appliances from her home in order to pay creditors precisely as promised.
当一家仅有 500 美元资金、没有地理位置或产品优势的企业面对富有的、根深蒂固的竞争对手时，她遇到了各种障碍（包括一些意想不到的）。在早期某个时刻，当她的微薄资源耗尽时，“B 夫人”（如今在奥马哈大都会地区与可口可乐或桑卡一样为人熟知的个人品牌）以一种商学院不教授的方式应对：她简单地从家中出售家具和电器，以按期偿还债权人。
Omaha retailers began to recognize that Mrs. B would offer customers far better deals than they had been giving, and they pressured furniture and carpet manufacturers not to sell to her. But by various strategies she obtained merchandise and cut prices sharply. Mrs. B was then hauled into court for violation of Fair Trade laws. She not only won all the cases, but received invaluable publicity. At the end of one case, after demonstrating to the court that she could profitably sell carpet at a huge discount from the prevailing price, she sold the judge $1400 worth of carpet.
奥马哈的零售商开始意识到 B 夫人会为客户提供远比他们更好的优惠，他们向家具和地毯制造商施压，要求不要向她销售。但通过各种策略，她获得了商品并大幅降价。B 夫人随后因违反公平贸易法被起诉到法院。她不仅赢得了所有案件，还获得了宝贵的宣传。在一审结束时，她向法庭展示了她能够以远低于市场价的大幅折扣有利地销售地毯，随后她向法官销售了价值 1400 美元的地毯。
Today Nebraska Furniture Mart generates over $100 million of sales annually out of one 200,000 square-foot store. No other home furnishings store in the country comes close to that volume. That single store also sells more furniture, carpets, and appliances than do all Omaha competitors combined.
如今，内布拉斯加家具商场在一个 2 万平方英尺的商店内每年产生超过 1 亿美元的销售额。全国没有其他家居用品商店能接近这个销量。这家唯一的商店还销售比奥马哈所有竞争对手总和更多的家具、地毯和家电。
One question I always ask myself in appraising a business is how I would like, assuming I had ample capital and skilled personnel, to compete with it. I’d rather wrestle grizzlies than compete with Mrs. B and her progeny. They buy brilliantly, they operate at expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and they then pass on to their customers much of the savings. It’s the ideal business - one built upon exceptional value to the customer that in turn translates into exceptional economics for its owners.
在评估一家企业时，我常常问自己这样一个问题：如果我拥有充足的资本和熟练的人才，我该如何与它竞争。我宁愿与棕熊搏斗，也不愿与 B 太太及其家族竞争。他们购买商品非常精明，运营成本比率是竞争对手连做梦都想不到的，然后他们又将大部分节省传递给顾客。这是一家理想的企业——它建立在为顾客提供卓越价值的基础上，而这种价值又转化为其所有者的卓越经济效益。
Mrs. B is wise as well as smart and, for far-sighted family reasons, was willing to sell the business last year. I had admired both the family and the business for decades, and a deal was quickly made. But Mrs. B, now 90, is not one to go home and risk, as she puts it, “losing her marbles”. She remains Chairman and is on the sales floor seven days a week. Carpet sales are her specialty. She personally sells quantities that would be a good departmental total for other carpet retailers.
B 太太不仅聪明，而且明智，出于长远家庭考虑，她去年愿意出售企业。几十年来，我一直钦佩这个家族和企业，很快就达成了交易。但现年 90 岁的 B 太太不是那种回家去冒险的人，用她的话说，就是“丢掉理智”。她仍然是董事长，每周七天都在销售现场。地毯销售是她的专长。她亲自销售的地毯数量，对其他地毯零售商来说，足以构成一个不错的部门总销售额。
We purchased 90% of the business - leaving 10% with members of the family who are involved in management - and have optioned 10% to certain key young family managers.
我们收购了该企业 90%的股份——将 10%的股份留给参与管理家族成员，并且将 10%的股份期权给了某些关键年轻家族管理人员。
And what managers they are. Geneticists should do handsprings over the Blumkin family. Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s son, has been President of Nebraska Furniture Mart for many years and is widely regarded as the shrewdest buyer of furniture and appliances in the country. Louie says he had the best teacher, and Mrs. B says she had the best student. They’re both right. Louie and his three sons all have the Blumkin business ability, work ethic, and, most important, character. On top of that, they are really nice people. We are delighted to be in partnership with them.
他们当经理可真是一把好手。遗传学家们应该为布卢姆金一家翻跟斗。B 太太的儿子路易·布卢姆金多年来一直是内布拉斯加家具商城的总裁，被广泛认为是全国最精明的家具和电器采购商。路易说他遇到了最好的老师，B 太太说她遇到了最好的学生。他们俩都说得对。路易和他的三个儿子都继承了布卢姆金家族的商业头脑、职业道德，最重要的是品格。不仅如此，他们还是非常好的人。我们非常高兴能与他们合作。
Corporate Performance 公司业绩
During 1983 our book value increased from $737.43 per share to $975.83 per share, or by 32%. We never take the one-year figure very seriously. After all, why should the time required for a planet to circle the sun synchronize precisely with the time required for business actions to pay off? Instead, we recommend not less than a five-year test as a rough yardstick of economic performance. Red lights should start flashing if the five-year average annual gain falls much below the return on equity earned over the period by American industry in aggregate. (Watch out for our explanation if that occurs as Goethe observed, “When ideas fail, words come in very handy.”)
1983 年，我们的账面价值从每股 737.43 美元增加到每股 975.83 美元，增幅为 32%。我们从不非常重视这一年的数据。毕竟，行星绕太阳公转所需的时间为何要精确同步于商业行为产生回报所需的时间呢？相反，我们建议将五年作为一个粗略的经济表现衡量标准，不应少于五年。如果五年平均年增长率远低于美国工业在该时期整体获得的净资产收益率，那么红灯就应该亮起。（如果这种情况发生，请留意我们的解释，正如歌德所说，“当思想失败时，文字就派上大用场了。”）
During the 19-year tenure of present management, book value has grown from $19.46 per share to $975.83, or 22.6% compounded annually. Considering our present size, nothing close to this rate of return can be sustained. Those who believe otherwise should pursue a career in sales, but avoid one in mathematics.
在现任管理层 19 年的任期内，账面价值从每股 19.46 美元增长到每股 975.83 美元，年复合增长率为 22.6%。考虑到我们目前的规模，不可能持续这种回报率。那些对此持不同意见的人应该追求销售职业，但应避免从事数学职业。
We report our progress in terms of book value because in our case (though not, by any means, in all cases) it is a conservative but reasonably adequate proxy for growth in intrinsic business value - the measurement that really counts. Book value’s virtue as a score-keeping measure is that it is easy to calculate and doesn’t involve the subjective (but important) judgments employed in calculation of intrinsic business value. It is important to understand, however, that the two terms - book value and intrinsic business value - have very different meanings.
我们报告我们的进展情况，以账面价值为标准，因为在我们这个案例中（尽管并非所有情况下都是如此），它是一种保守但相当充分的内在商业价值增长的替代指标——这是真正重要的衡量标准。账面价值作为记录保持措施的优点在于它易于计算，并且不涉及在计算内在商业价值时所使用的主观（但重要）的判断。然而，重要的是要理解，这两个术语——账面价值和内在商业价值——具有非常不同的含义。
Book value is an accounting concept, recording the accumulated financial input from both contributed capital and retained earnings. Intrinsic business value is an economic concept, estimating future cash output discounted to present value. Book value tells you what has been put in; intrinsic business value estimates what can be taken out.
账面价值是一个会计概念，记录了从投入资本和留存收益中累积的财务投入。内在商业价值是一个经济概念，估算未来现金流的现值。账面价值告诉你已经投入了什么；内在商业价值估算可以取出什么。
An analogy will suggest the difference. Assume you spend identical amounts putting each of two children through college. The book value (measured by financial input) of each child’s education would be the same. But the present value of the future payoff (the intrinsic business value) might vary enormously - from zero to many times the cost of the education. So, also, do businesses having equal financial input end up with wide variations in value.
一个类比可以说明这种差异。假设你花费相同的金额资助两个孩子的大学教育。每个孩子教育项目的账面价值（以财务投入衡量）将是相同的。但未来收益的现值（内在商业价值）可能会有巨大差异——从零到教育成本的许多倍。因此，财务投入相同的公司最终价值也会有巨大差异。
At Berkshire, at the beginning of fiscal 1965 when the present management took over, the $19.46 per share book value considerably overstated intrinsic business value. All of that book value consisted of textile assets that could not earn, on average, anything close to an appropriate rate of return. In the terms of our analogy, the investment in textile assets resembled investment in a largely-wasted education.
在伯克希尔，1965 财年伊始，当现任管理层接手时，每股 19.46 美元的账面价值大大高估了内在商业价值。所有这些账面价值都由纺织资产构成，这些资产平均无法赚取接近适当回报率的收益。用我们的类比来说，投资于纺织资产类似于投资于一项大部分被浪费的教育。
Now, however, our intrinsic business value considerably exceeds book value. There are two major reasons:
现在，然而，我们的内在商业价值大大超过了账面价值。有两个主要原因：
(1) Standard accounting principles require that common stocks held by our insurance subsidiaries be stated on our books at market value, but that other stocks we own be carried at the lower of aggregate cost or market. At the end of 1983, the market value of this latter group exceeded carrying value by $70 million pre-tax, or about $50 million after tax. This excess belongs in our intrinsic business value, but is not included in the calculation of book value;
(1) 标准会计准则要求我们保险子公司持有的普通股按市价入账，但其他我们持有的股票则按成本与市价孰低计价。到 1983 年底，后者的市价超过账面价值 7000 万美元（税前），或约 5000 万美元（税后）。这部分超额属于我们内在业务价值，但不计入账面价值计算中；
(2) More important, we own several businesses that possess economic Goodwill (which is properly includable in intrinsic business value) far larger than the accounting Goodwill that is carried on our balance sheet and reflected in book value.
(2) 更重要的是，我们拥有几家经济商誉（这应正确计入内在业务价值）远大于我们资产负债表上所反映的会计商誉。
Goodwill, both economic and accounting, is an arcane subject and requires more explanation than is appropriate here. The appendix that follows this letter - “Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities” - explains why economic and accounting Goodwill can, and usually do, differ enormously.
商誉，无论是经济的还是会计的，都是一个深奥的课题，需要比这里更详细的解释。随信附上的附录——《商誉及其摊销：规则与现实》——解释了为什么经济商誉和会计商誉可以，并且通常差异巨大。
You can live a full and rewarding life without ever thinking about Goodwill and its amortization. But students of investment and management should understand the nuances of the subject. My own thinking has changed drastically from 35 years ago when I was taught to favor tangible assets and to shun businesses whose value depended largely upon economic Goodwill. This bias caused me to make many important business mistakes of omission, although relatively few of commission.
你可以在从未思考过商誉及其摊销的情况下，过上充实而富有回报的生活。但投资和管理的学子们应当理解这一问题的细微之处。我自己的思维方式与 35 年前截然不同，那时我被告知要偏爱有形资产，而回避那些价值很大程度上依赖于经济商誉的企业。这种偏见导致我犯了许多因遗漏而造成的重要商业错误，尽管因越权而犯的错误相对较少。
Keynes identified my problem: “The difficulty lies not in the new ideas but in escaping from the old ones.” My escape was long delayed, in part because most of what I had been taught by the same teacher had been (and continues to be) so extraordinarily valuable. Ultimately, business experience, direct and vicarious, produced my present strong preference for businesses that possess large amounts of enduring Goodwill and that utilize a minimum of tangible assets.
凯恩斯指出了我的问题：“困难不在于新思想，而在于摆脱旧思想。”我的转变来得很晚，部分原因是我从这位老师那里学到的许多东西（并且至今仍然）具有非凡的价值。最终，直接和间接的商业经验，让我形成了现在强烈的偏好——偏爱那些拥有大量持久商誉且极少使用有形资产的企业。
I recommend the Appendix to those who are comfortable with accounting terminology and who have an interest in understanding the business aspects of Goodwill. Whether or not you wish to tackle the Appendix, you should be aware that Charlie and I believe that Berkshire possesses very significant economic Goodwill value above that reflected in our book value.
我向那些熟悉会计术语并对理解 Goodwill 商业方面感兴趣的人推荐附录。无论你是否打算阅读附录，都应知道查理和我都认为伯克希尔拥有非常显著的经济 Goodwill 价值，这超过了我们账面价值所反映的价值。
Sources of Reported Earnings
报告收益来源
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In 1982, Berkshire owned about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps whereas, in 1983, our ownership was 60% throughout the first six months and 100% thereafter. In turn, Berkshire’s net interest in Wesco was 48% during 1982 and the first six months of 1983, and 80% for the balance of 1983. Because of these changed ownership percentages, the first two columns of the table provide the best measure of underlying business performance.
下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的来源。1982 年，伯克希尔拥有蓝筹邮票公司约 60%的股份，而 1983 年，我们的持股在前六个月为 60%，之后为 100%。相应地，1982 年和 1983 年前六个月，伯克希尔对 Wesco 的净权益为 48%，而 1983 年剩余时间的净权益为 80%。由于这些股权比例的变化，表格的前两列提供了衡量潜在业务表现的最佳指标。
All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. (We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very important.) Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix, is set forth as a separate item. Net Earnings Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax -------------------------------------- ------------------ Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ 1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- (000s omitted) Operating Earnings: Insurance Group: Underwriting ............ $(33,872) $(21,558) $(33,872) $(21,558) $(18,400) $(11,345) Net Investment Income ... 43,810 41,620 43,810 41,620 39,114 35,270 Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (100) (1,545) (100) (1,545) (63) (862) Associated Retail Stores .. 697 914 697 914 355 446 Nebraska Furniture Mart(1) 3,812 -- 3,049 -- 1,521 -- See’s Candies ............. 27,411 23,884 24,526 14,235 12,212 6,914 Buffalo Evening News ...... 19,352 (1,215) 16,547 (724) 8,832 (226) Blue Chip Stamps(2) ....... (1,422) 4,182 (1,876) 2,492 (353) 2,472 Wesco Financial - Parent .. 7,493 6,156 4,844 2,937 3,448 2,210 Mutual Savings and Loan ... (798) (6) (467) (2) 1,917 1,524 Precision Steel ........... 3,241 1,035 2,102 493 1,136 265 Interest on Debt .......... (15,104) (14,996) (13,844) (12,977) (7,346) (6,951) Special GEICO Distribution 21,000 -- 21,000 -- 19,551 -- Shareholder-Designated Contributions .......... (3,066) (891) (3,066) (891) (1,656) (481) Amortization of Goodwill .. (532) 151 (563) 90 (563) 90 Other ..................... 10,121 3,371 9,623 2,658 8,490 2,171 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Operating Earnings .......... 82,043 41,102 72,410 27,742 68,195 31,497 Sales of securities and unusual sales of assets .. 67,260 36,651 65,089 21,875 45,298 14,877 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Total Earnings .............. $149,303 $ 77,753 $137,499 $ 49,617 $113,493 $ 46,374 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
所有因各业务实体出售资产而产生的重要收益和损失，均与表格底部附近的证券交易合并，不计入经营收益。（我们认为任何年度已实现资本收益或损失的数据都毫无意义，但我们认为多年累计的已实现和未实现资本收益非常重要。）此外，商誉摊销不针对特定业务进行扣除，根据附录中说明的原因，作为单独项目列示。 净收益 所得税前收益 税后收益 -------------------------------------- ------------------ 总计 伯克希尔股份 伯克希尔股份 ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ 1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- (省略 000s) 营业利润：保险集团：承保 ............ $(33,872) $(21,558) $(33,872) $(21,558) $(18,400) $(11,345) 净投资收益 ... 43,810 41,620 43,810 41,620 39,114 35,270 Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (100) (1,545) (100) (1,545) (63) (862) 相关零售店 .. 697 914 697 914 355 446 内布拉斯加家具商场(1) 3,812 -- 3,049 -- 1,521 -- See's 糖果 ............. 27,411 23,884 24,526 14,235 12,212 6,914 水牛城晚报 ...... 19,352 (1,215) 16,547 (724) 8,832 (226) 蓝筹邮票(2) ....... (1,422) 4,182 (1,876) 2,492 (353) 2,472 Wesco 金融 - 母公司 .. 7,493 6,156 4,844 2,937 3,448 2,210 互助储蓄和贷款 ... (798) (6) (467) (2) 1,917 1,524 精密钢铁 ........... 3,241 1,035 2,102 493 1,136 265 债务利息 .......... (15,104) (14,996) (13,844) (12,977) (7,346) (6,951) 特殊 GEICO 分销 21,000 -- 21,000 -- 19,551 -- 股东指定捐赠 .......... (3,066) (891) (3,066) (891) (1,656) (481) 商誉摊销 .. (532) 151 (563) 90 (563) 90 其他 ..................... 10,121 3,371 9,623 2,658 8,490 2,171 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 营业利润 .......... 82,043 41,102 72,410 27,742 68,195 31,497 证券销售和非经常性资产处置 .. 67,260 36,651 65,089 21,875 45,298 14,877 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 总利润 .............. $149,303 $ 77,753 $137,499 $ 49,617 $113,493 $ 46,374 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
(1) October through December (2) 1982 and 1983 are not comparable; major assets were transferred in the merger.
(1) 1982 年 10 月至 12 月 (2) 1982 年和 1983 年不可比；合并中主要资产已转移。
For a discussion of the businesses owned by Wesco, please read Charlie Munger’s report on pages 46-51. Charlie replaced Louie Vincenti as Chairman of Wesco late in 1983 when health forced Louie’s retirement at age 77. In some instances, “health” is a euphemism, but in Louie’s case nothing but health would cause us to consider his retirement. Louie is a marvelous man and has been a marvelous manager.
关于 Wesco 拥有的业务，请阅读 Charlie Munger 在第 46-51 页的报告。Charlie 在 1983 年末取代 Louie Vincenti 担任 Wesco 董事长，Louie 因健康原因在 77 岁时退休。在某些情况下，“健康”是一个委婉的说法，但在 Louie 的情况下，只有健康原因才会让我们考虑他的退休。Louie 是一位了不起的人，并且一直是一位杰出的管理者。
The special GEICO distribution reported in the table arose when that company made a tender offer for a portion of its stock, buying both from us and other shareholders. At GEICO’s request, we tendered a quantity of shares that kept our ownership percentage the same after the transaction as before. The proportional nature of our sale permitted us to treat the proceeds as a dividend. Unlike individuals, corporations net considerably more when earnings are derived from dividends rather than from capital gains, since the effective Federal income tax rate on dividends is 6.9% versus 28% on capital gains.
表格中报告的特别 GEICO 分销情况是在该公司对其部分股票进行要约收购时产生的，它从我们和其他股东那里购买了股票。应 GEICO 的要求，我们提供了数量的股份，在交易后保持了我们的持股比例不变。我们出售股份的按比例性质使我们能够将所得视为股息。与个人不同，公司从股息中获得的净收益远高于资本利得，因为股息的有效联邦所得税率为 6.9%，而资本利得税率为 28%。
Even with this special item added in, our total dividends from GEICO in 1983 were considerably less than our share of GEICO’s earnings. Thus it is perfectly appropriate, from both an accounting and economic standpoint, to include the redemption proceeds in our reported earnings. It is because the item is large and unusual that we call your attention to it.
即使加上这一特别项目，1983 年我们从 GEICO 获得的总股息也远低于我们占 GEICO 收益的份额。因此，从会计和经济角度来看，将赎回所得纳入我们报告的收益是完全恰当的。正是因为该项目金额巨大且不寻常，我们才引起您的注意。
The table showing you our sources of earnings includes dividends from those non-controlled companies whose marketable equity securities we own. But the table does not include earnings those companies have retained that are applicable to our ownership. In aggregate and over time we expect those undistributed earnings to be reflected in market prices and to increase our intrinsic business value on a dollar-for-dollar basis, just as if those earnings had been under our control and reported as part of our profits. That does not mean we expect all of our holdings to behave uniformly; some will disappoint us, others will deliver pleasant surprises. To date our experience has been better than we originally anticipated, In aggregate, we have received far more than a dollar of market value gain for every dollar of earnings retained.
展示我们收入来源的表格包括那些非受控公司的股息，这些公司是我们持有的可交易股权证券。但该表格不包括那些公司留存且适用于我们所有权的收益。总体而言，随着时间的推移，我们预计这些未分配的收益将反映在市场价格中，并按美元对美元的方式增加我们内在的业务价值，就像这些收益在我们控制之下并作为我们利润的一部分报告一样。这并不意味着我们期望所有的投资都表现一致；有些会让我们失望，另一些则会带来惊喜。到目前为止，我们的经验比最初预期要好，总体而言，我们每留存一美元的收益，获得的市值增值远超一美元。
The following table shows our 1983 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All numbers represent 100% of Berkshire’s holdings, and 80% of Wesco’s holdings. The portion attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco has been excluded. No. of Shares Cost Market ------------- ---------- ---------- (000s omitted) 690,975 Affiliated Publications, Inc. .... $ 3,516 $ 26,603 4,451,544 General Foods Corporation(a) ..... 163,786 228,698 6,850,000 GEICO Corporation ................ 47,138 398,156 2,379,200 Handy & Harman ................... 27,318 42,231 636,310 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. 4,056 33,088 197,200 Media General .................... 3,191 11,191 250,400 Ogilvy & Mather International .... 2,580 12,833 5,618,661 R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc.(a) 268,918 341,334 901,788 Time, Inc. ....................... 27,732 56,860 1,868,600 The Washington Post Company ...... 10,628 136,875 ---------- ---------- $558,863 $1,287,869 All Other Common Stockholdings ... 7,485 18,044 ---------- ---------- Total Common Stocks .............. $566,348 $1,305,913 ========== ==========
下表展示了我们 1983 年年终可交易股权的净持有情况。所有数字代表伯克希尔 100%的持有情况，以及威斯科 80%的持有情况。威斯科少数股东应占的部分已被排除在外。 股份数量 成本 市值 ------------- ---------- ---------- （省略 000s）690,975 附属出版物公司 .... $ 3,516 $ 26,603 4,451,544 通用食品公司(a) ..... 163,786 228,698 6,850,000 GEICO 公司 ................ 47,138 398,156 2,379,200 汉迪与哈曼 ................... 27,318 42,231 636,310 国际公共集团公司，Inc. 4,056 33,088 197,200 媒体通用 .................... 3,191 11,191 250,400 奥格尔维与马瑟国际 .... 2,580 12,833 5,618,661 R.J.雷诺兹工业公司，Inc.(a) 268,918 341,334 901,788 时代公司 ....................... 27,732 56,860 1,868,600 华盛顿邮报公司 ...... 10,628 136,875 ---------- ---------- $558,863 $1,287,869 所有其他普通股控股 ... 7,485 18,044 ---------- ----------普通股总额 .............. $566,348 $1,305,913 ========== =========
(a) WESCO owns shares in these companies.
(a) WESCO 持有这些公司的股份。
Based upon present holdings and present dividend rates - excluding any special items such as the GEICO proportional redemption last year - we would expect reported dividends from this group to be approximately $39 million in 1984. We can also make a very rough guess about the earnings this group will retain that will be attributable to our ownership: these may total about $65 million for the year. These retained earnings could well have no immediate effect on market prices of the securities. Over time, however, we feel they will have real meaning.
根据目前的持股情况和当前的股息率——不包括去年 GEICO 按比例赎回等特殊情况——我们预计该集团的报告股息在 1984 年将约为 3900 万美元。我们还可以粗略估计该集团将保留的归属于我们所有权的收益：这些收益可能总计约 6500 万美元。这些留存收益很可能不会立即对证券的市场价格产生影响。然而，随着时间的推移，我们相信它们将具有实际意义。
In addition to the figures already supplied, information regarding the businesses we control appears in Management’s Discussion on pages 40-44. The most significant of these are Buffalo Evening News, See’s, and the Insurance Group, to which we will give some special attention here.
除了已提供的数字外，我们控制的企业信息出现在管理层讨论部分，第 40 至 44 页。其中最重要的是《Buffalo Evening News》、See's 以及保险集团，我们将在这里给予一些特别关注。
Buffalo Evening News
First, a clarification: our corporate name is Buffalo Evening News, Inc. but the name of the newspaper, since we began a morning edition a little over a year ago, is Buffalo News.
首先，需要澄清一点：我们的公司名称是 Buffalo Evening News, Inc.，但报纸的名称自一年多前开始出版晨报以来，已改为 Buffalo News。
In 1983 the News somewhat exceeded its targeted profit margin of 10% after tax. Two factors were responsible: (1) a state income tax cost that was subnormal because of a large loss carry-forward, now fully utilized, and (2) a large drop in the per-ton cost of newsprint (an unanticipated fluke that will be reversed in 1984).
1983 年，《新闻报》的税后利润率略微超过了其 10%的目标利润率。有两个因素导致了这种情况：（1）由于有大量的亏损结转，导致州所得税成本处于不正常低位，现已完全利用；（2）新闻纸的每吨成本大幅下降（这是一个意料之外的因素，将在 1984 年逆转）。
Although our profit margins in 1983 were about average for newspapers such as the News, the paper’s performance, nevertheless, was a significant achievement considering the economic and retailing environment in Buffalo.
尽管 1983 年《新闻报》的利润率与《新闻报》这类报纸的平均水平相当，但考虑到布法罗的经济和零售环境，该报纸的表现仍然是一项重大成就。
Buffalo has a concentration of heavy industry, a segment of the economy that was hit particularly hard by the recent recession and that has lagged the recovery. As Buffalo consumers have suffered, so also have the paper’s retailing customers. Their numbers have shrunk over the past few years and many of those surviving have cut their linage.
布法罗集中了重工业，这一经济部门受到最近衰退的严重打击，且复苏滞后。随着布法罗消费者的困境加剧，该报纸的零售客户也遭受了损失。近年来，他们的数量不断减少，许多幸存者也削减了他们的业务规模。
Within this environment the News has one exceptional strength: its acceptance by the public, a matter measured by the paper’s “penetration ratio” - the percentage of households within the community purchasing the paper each day. Our ratio is superb: for the six months ended September 30, 1983 the News stood number one in weekday penetration among the 100 largest papers in the United States (the ranking is based on “city zone” numbers compiled by the Audit Bureau of Circulations).
在这个环境中，《新闻报》有一个突出的优势：其公众认可度，这一点可以通过报纸的“渗透率”来衡量——即社区内每天购买报纸的家庭百分比。我们的渗透率非常出色：截至 1983 年 9 月 30 日止的六个月中，《新闻报》在美国前 100 家最大报纸中在平日渗透率方面排名第一（该排名基于发行局编制的“城市区域”数据）。
In interpreting the standings, it is important to note that many large cities have two papers, and that in such cases the penetration of either paper is necessarily lower than if there were a single paper, as in Buffalo. Nevertheless, the list of the 100 largest papers includes many that have a city to themselves. Among these, the News is at the top nationally, far ahead of many of the country’s best-known dailies.
在解读排名时，需要注意的是许多大城市有两家报纸，在这种情况下，任何一家报纸的渗透率必然低于只有一家报纸的情况，就像布法罗市一样。然而，前 100 家最大报纸的名单中包括许多独占一个城市的报纸。在这些报纸中，《新闻报》在全国范围内位居榜首，远超美国许多最著名的日报。
Among Sunday editions of these same large dailies, the News ranks number three in penetration - ten to twenty percentage points ahead of many well-known papers. It was not always this way in Buffalo. Below we show Sunday circulation in Buffalo in the years prior to 1977 compared with the present period. In that earlier period the Sunday paper was the Courier-Express (the News was not then publishing a Sunday paper). Now, of course, it is the News. Average Sunday Circulation -------------------------- Year Circulation ---- ----------- 1970 314,000 1971 306,000 1972 302,000 1973 290,000 1974 278,000 1975 269,000 1976 270,000
在这些大型日报的周日版中，新闻报的渗透率排名第三，比许多知名报纸高出十到二十个百分点。在布法罗，情况并非总是如此。下面我们展示了 1977 年之前布法罗的周日发行量，并与当前时期进行了比较。在那个更早的时期，周日报纸是 Courier-Express（当时新闻报还没有出版周日版）。现在，当然就是新闻报了。 平均周日发行量 -------------------------- 年份 发行量 ---- ----------- 1970 314,000 1971 306,000 1972 302,000 1973 290,000 1974 278,000 1975 269,000 1976 270,000
1984 (Current) 376,000 1984 (当前) 376,000
We believe a paper’s penetration ratio to be the best measure of the strength of its franchise. Papers with unusually high penetration in the geographical area that is of prime interest to major local retailers, and with relatively little circulation elsewhere, are exceptionally efficient buys for those retailers. Low-penetration papers have a far less compelling message to present to advertisers.
我们相信，报纸的渗透率是衡量其专营权强度的最佳指标。在主要地方零售商最感兴趣的地区具有异常高渗透率，而在其他地区发行量相对较少的报纸，对于那些零售商来说是非常高效的购买选择。渗透率低的报纸向广告商展示的说服力要弱得多。
In our opinion, three factors largely account for the unusual acceptance of the News in the community. Among these, points 2 and 3 also may explain the popularity of the Sunday News compared to that of the Sunday Courier-Express when it was the sole Sunday paper:
据我们看来，三个因素在很大程度上解释了《新闻》在当地社区的异常接受度。其中，第 2 点和第 3 点也可以解释《新闻》在周日发行时比《周日快邮快报》更受欢迎的原因（当时《周日快邮快报》是唯一的周日报纸）：
(1) The first point has nothing to do with merits of the News. Both emigration and immigration are relatively low in Buffalo. A stable population is more interested and involved in the activities of its community than is a shifting population - and, as a result, is more interested in the content of the local daily paper. Increase the movement in and out of a city and penetration ratios will fall.
（1）第一点与《新闻》的优缺点无关。在布法罗，移民和移民都相对较低。稳定的人口比流动的人口更关心并参与社区活动——因此，他们对当地日报的内容更感兴趣。增加城市人口的流动，渗透率就会下降。
(2) The News has a reputation for editorial quality and integrity that was honed by our longtime editor, the legendary Alfred Kirchhofer, and that has been preserved and extended by Murray Light. This reputation was enormously important to our success in establishing a Sunday paper against entrenched competition. And without a Sunday edition, the News would not have survived in the long run.
(2) 《新闻报》在编辑质量和诚信方面的声誉，是由我们长期担任编辑的传奇人物阿尔弗雷德·基尔希霍费尔精心打造，并由默里·莱特得以保持和扩展。这一声誉对于我们成功对抗强大竞争者创办一份星期日报至关重要。如果没有星期日报，新闻报将无法长期生存。
(3) The News lives up to its name - it delivers a very unusual amount of news. During 1983, our “news hole” (editorial material - not ads) amounted to 50% of the newspaper’s content (excluding preprinted inserts). Among papers that dominate their markets and that are of comparable or larger size, we know of only one whose news hole percentage exceeds that of the News. Comprehensive figures are not available, but a sampling indicates an average percentage in the high 30s. In other words, page for page, our mix gives readers over 25% more news than the typical paper. This news-rich mixture is by intent. Some publishers, pushing for higher profit margins, have cut their news holes during the past decade. We have maintained ours and will continue to do so. Properly written and edited, a full serving of news makes our paper more valuable to the reader and contributes to our unusual penetration ratio.
(3)《新闻报》名副其实——它提供的新闻量非常罕见。1983 年，我们“新闻版面”（指编辑内容，不包括广告）占报纸内容的 50%（不包括预先印刷的增刊）。在那些主导市场且规模相当或更大的报纸中，我们只知道有一家报纸的新闻版面比例超过《新闻报》。虽然没有全面的数字，但抽样调查显示平均比例在 30%以上。换句话说，每页而言，我们的报纸提供的新闻量比典型报纸多 25%以上。这种富含新闻的混合内容是刻意为之。一些出版商为了追求更高的利润率，在过去十年中削减了他们的新闻版面。我们一直保持这一比例，并将继续这样做。经过恰当的撰写和编辑，充足的新闻内容使我们的报纸对读者更有价值，并有助于我们独特的渗透率。
Despite the strength of the News’ franchise, gains in ROP linage (advertising printed within the newspaper pages as contrasted to preprinted inserts) are going to be very difficult to achieve. We had an enormous gain in preprints during 1983: lines rose from 9.3 million to 16.4 million, revenues from $3.6 million to $8.1 million. These gains are consistent with national trends, but exaggerated in our case by business we picked up when the Courier-Express closed.
尽管《新闻报》的品牌影响力强大，但报纸内页广告（与预印广告相对）的增长将非常困难。1983 年我们在预印广告方面取得了巨大增长：行数从 930 万增加到 1640 万，收入从 360 万美元增加到 810 万美元。这些增长与全国趋势一致，但由于《快讯报》停刊时我们承接的业务，我们的情况更为突出。
On balance, the shift from ROP to preprints has negative economic implications for us. Profitability on preprints is less and the business is more subject to competition from alternative means of delivery. Furthermore, a reduction in ROP linage means less absolute space devoted to news (since the news hole percentage remains constant), thereby reducing the utility of the paper to the reader.
总的来说，从报纸内页广告转向预印广告对我们来说具有负面影响。预印广告的盈利能力较低，且更容易受到其他配送方式的竞争。此外，报纸内页广告的减少意味着用于新闻的绝对空间减少（因为新闻版面比例保持不变），从而降低了报纸对读者的价值。
Stan Lipsey became Publisher of the Buffalo News at midyear upon the retirement of Henry Urban. Henry never flinched during the dark days of litigation and losses following our introduction of the Sunday paper - an introduction whose wisdom was questioned by many in the newspaper business, including some within our own building. Henry is admired by the Buffalo business community, he’s admired by all who worked for him, and he is admired by Charlie and me. Stan worked with Henry for several years, and has worked for Berkshire Hathaway since 1969. He has been personally involved in all nuts-and-bolts aspects of the newspaper business from editorial to circulation. We couldn’t do better.
斯坦·利普西在亨利·乌尔班退休后于年中成为《布法罗新闻》的出版人。在周日报纸推出后引发的诉讼和亏损的黑暗日子里，亨利从未退缩——这一举措的明智性在新闻界受到了质疑，包括我们公司内部的一些人。亨利受到布法罗商界的钦佩，受到所有为他工作的人的钦佩，也受到查理和我钦佩。斯坦与亨利共事多年，自 1969 年起为伯克希尔·哈撒韦工作。他一直亲自参与报纸业务的各个方面，从编辑到发行。我们再也无法做得更好了。
See’s Candy Shops See's Candy Shops
The financial results at See’s continue to be exceptional. The business possesses a valuable and solid consumer franchise and a manager equally valuable and solid.
See’s 的财务业绩继续表现出色。这家公司拥有宝贵而稳固的消费特许权，以及同样宝贵而稳固的经理。
In recent years See’s has encountered two important problems, at least one of which is well on its way toward solution. That problem concerns costs, except those for raw materials. We have enjoyed a break on raw material costs in recent years though so, of course, have our competitors. One of these days we will get a nasty surprise in the opposite direction. In effect, raw material costs are largely beyond our control since we will, as a matter of course, buy the finest ingredients that we can, regardless of changes in their price levels. We regard product quality as sacred.
近年来，See’s 遇到了两个重要问题，其中至少有一个正在逐步得到解决。其中一个问题涉及成本，但不是原材料成本。近年来，我们在原材料成本上享受了优惠，当然，我们的竞争对手也如此。总有一天，我们会收到来自相反方向的措手不及的惊喜。实际上，原材料成本在很大程度上超出了我们的控制范围，因为我们会一如既往地购买最优质的原料，无论其价格水平如何变化。我们视产品质量为神圣。
But other kinds of costs are more controllable, and it is in this area that we have had problems. On a per-pound basis, our costs (not including those for raw materials) have increased in the last few years at a rate significantly greater than the increase in the general price level. It is vital to our competitive position and profit potential that we reverse this trend.
但其他类型的成本更具可控性，而我们在这一领域遇到了问题。按每磅计算，我们近几年的成本（不包括原材料成本）以显著高于一般价格水平上升的速度增加。扭转这一趋势对我们的竞争地位和盈利潜力至关重要。
In recent months much better control over costs has been attained and we feel certain that our rate of growth in these costs in 1984 will be below the rate of inflation. This confidence arises out of our long experience with the managerial talents of Chuck Huggins. We put Chuck in charge the day we took over, and his record has been simply extraordinary, as shown by the following table: 52-53 Week Year Operating Number of Number of Ended About Sales Profits Pounds of Stores Open December 31 Revenues After Taxes Candy Sold at Year End ------------------- ------------ ----------- ---------- ----------- 1983 (53 weeks) ... $133,531,000 $13,699,000 24,651,000 207 1982 .............. 123,662,000 11,875,000 24,216,000 202 1981 .............. 112,578,000 10,779,000 24,052,000 199 1980 .............. 97,715,000 7,547,000 24,065,000 191 1979 .............. 87,314,000 6,330,000 23,985,000 188 1978 .............. 73,653,000 6,178,000 22,407,000 182 1977 .............. 62,886,000 6,154,000 20,921,000 179 1976 (53 weeks) ... 56,333,000 5,569,000 20,553,000 173 1975 .............. 50,492,000 5,132,000 19,134,000 172 1974 .............. 41,248,000 3,021,000 17,883,000 170 1973 .............. 35,050,000 1,940,000 17,813,000 169 1972 .............. 31,337,000 2,083,000 16,954,000 167
在近几个月里，我们在成本控制上取得了很大的进步，我们确信 1984 年这些成本的增长率将低于通货膨胀率。这种信心源于我们长期以来对查克·哈金斯管理才能的丰富经验。我们接手后立即将查克任命负责人，他的业绩简直非凡，如下表所示： 52-53 周 年度 营业额 利润 吨数 开设门店数 结束于大约 销售额 利润 吨数 门店数量 12 月 31 日 收入 税后利润 销售糖果数量 年末情况 ------------------- ------------ ----------- ---------- ----------- 1983 年（53 周）... $133,531,000 $13,699,000 24,651,000 207 1982 年 .............. 123,662,000 11,875,000 24,216,000 202 1981 年 .............. 112,578,000 10,779,000 24,052,000 199 1980 年 .............. 97,715,000 7,547,000 24,065,000 191 1979 年 .............. 87,314,000 6,330,000 23,985,000 188 1978 年 .............. 73,653,000 6,178,000 22,407,000 182 1977 年 .............. 62,886,000 6,154,000 20,921,000 179 1976 年（53 周）... 56,333,000 5,569,000 20,553,000 173 1975 年 .............. 50,492,000 5,132,000 19,134,000 172 1974 年 .............. 41,248,000 3,021,000 17,883,000 170 1973 年 .............. 35,050,000 1,940,000 17,813,000 169 1972 年 .............. 31,337,000 2,083,000 16,954,000 167
The other problem we face, as the table suggests, is our recent inability to achieve meaningful gains in pounds sold. The industry has the same problem. But for many years we outperformed the industry in this respect and now we are not.
根据表格所示，我们面临的另一个问题是近期未能实现英镑销售额的显著增长。整个行业都面临同样的问题。但多年来，我们在这一方面表现优于行业，而现在我们不再如此。
The poundage volume in our retail stores has been virtually unchanged each year for the past four, despite small increases every year in the number of shops (and in distribution expense as well). Of course, dollar volume has increased because we have raised prices significantly. But we regard the most important measure of retail trends to be units sold per store rather than dollar volume. On a same-store basis (counting only shops open throughout both years) with all figures adjusted to a 52-week year, poundage was down .8 of 1% during 1983. This small decline was our best same-store performance since 1979; the cumulative decline since then has been about 8%. Quantity-order volume, about 25% of our total, has plateaued in recent years following very large poundage gains throughout the 1970s.
我们零售店的销售量在过去四年中几乎保持不变，尽管店铺数量每年都有小幅增加（分销费用也随之增加）。当然，由于我们显著提高了价格，销售额（以美元计算）有所增长。但我们认为衡量零售趋势最重要的指标是每家店铺的销售量，而不是销售额。按同店销售基础（仅计算两年内都营业的店铺）且所有数据都调整为 52 周计算，1983 年的销售量下降了 0.8%。这一小幅下降是我们自 1979 年以来最好的同店销售表现；自那时以来的累计下降约为 8%。占我们总销售额约 25%的定量订单销售量，在经历了 1970 年代的显著增长后，近年来趋于平稳。
We are not sure to what extent this flat volume - both in the retail shop area and the quantity order area - is due to our pricing policies and to what extent it is due to static industry volume, the recession, and the extraordinary share of market we already enjoy in our primary marketing area. Our price increase for 1984 is much more modest than has been the case in the past few years, and we hope that next year we can report better volume figures to you. But we have no basis to forecast these.
我们不确定这个平板体积——无论是在零售店区域还是在数量订购区域——在多大程度上是由于我们的定价政策，在多大程度上是由于静态行业总量、经济衰退以及我们在主要营销区域已经享有的市场份额。我们 1984 年的价格上涨比过去几年要温和得多，我们希望明年可以向你们报告更好的销量数据。但我们没有基础来预测这些。
Despite the volume problem, See’s strengths are many and important. In our primary marketing area, the West, our candy is preferred by an enormous margin to that of any competitor. In fact, we believe most lovers of chocolate prefer it to candy costing two or three times as much. (In candy, as in stocks, price and value can differ; price is what you give, value is what you get.) The quality of customer service in our shops - operated throughout the country by us and not by franchisees is every bit as good as the product. Cheerful, helpful personnel are as much a trademark of See’s as is the logo on the box. That’s no small achievement in a business that requires us to hire about 2000 seasonal workers. We know of no comparably-sized organization that betters the quality of customer service delivered by Chuck Huggins and his associates.
尽管存在销量问题，See 的优势众多且重要。在我们主要的营销区域——西海岸，我们的糖果以巨大的优势胜过所有竞争对手。事实上，我们相信大多数巧克力爱好者更喜欢我们的糖果，而不是价格高出两三倍的糖果。（在糖果和股票中一样，价格与价值可能不同；价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的。）我们店铺中顾客服务的质量——这些店铺由我们直接经营而非特许经营商经营——与产品质量一样出色。热情、乐于助人的员工是 See 的标志，就像盒子上一样。在需要我们雇佣约 2000 名季节性工人的行业中，这绝非小成就。我们不知道有哪个规模相当的组织能比 Chuck Huggins 和他的同事们提供更好的顾客服务质量。
Because we have raised prices so modestly in 1984, we expect See’s profits this year to be about the same as in 1983.
由于我们在 1984 年适度提价，我们预计 See 今年的利润将与 1983 年大致相同。
Insurance - Controlled Operations
保险 - 控制运营
We both operate insurance companies and have a large economic interest in an insurance business we don’t operate, GEICO. The results for all can be summed up easily: in aggregate, the companies we operate and whose underwriting results reflect the consequences of decisions that were my responsibility a few years ago, had absolutely terrible results. Fortunately, GEICO, whose policies I do not influence, simply shot the lights out. The inference you draw from this summary is the correct one. I made some serious mistakes a few years ago that came home to roost.
我们两家都经营保险公司，在一家我们不经营但具有重要经济利益的保险公司——GEICO 上，有着巨大的经济利益。所有结果可以轻易总结：总体而言，我们经营的公司，其承保结果反映了几年前由我负责的决策的后果，结果非常糟糕。幸运的是，GEICO，其政策不受我影响，表现却极为出色。你从这总结中得出的推论是正确的。几年前我犯了一些严重的错误，现在终于要付出代价了。
The industry had its worst underwriting year in a long time, as indicated by the table below: Yearly Change Combined Ratio in Premiums after Policy- Written (%) holder Dividends ------------- ---------------- 1972 .................... 10.2 96.2 1973 .................... 8.0 99.2 1974 .................... 6.2 105.4 1975 .................... 11.0 107.9 1976 .................... 21.9 102.4 1977 .................... 19.8 97.2 1978 .................... 12.8 97.5 1979 .................... 10.3 100.6 1980 .................... 6.0 103.1 1981 .................... 3.9 106.0 1982 (Revised) .......... 4.4 109.7 1983 (Estimated) ........ 4.6 111.0
该行业经历了很长时间以来最糟糕的承保年，如下表所示： 年度变化 综合比率 在保费中 在保单后 书面 (%) 持有人股息 ------------- ---------------- 1972 .................... 10.2 96.2 1973 .................... 8.0 99.2 1974 .................... 6.2 105.4 1975 .................... 11.0 107.9 1976 .................... 21.9 102.4 1977 .................... 19.8 97.2 1978 .................... 12.8 97.5 1979 .................... 10.3 100.6 1980 .................... 6.0 103.1 1981 .................... 3.9 106.0 1982 (修订) .......... 4.4 109.7 1983 (估计) ........ 4.6 111.0
Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages.
来源：Best’s Aggregates and Averages。
Best’s data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual, and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit and one above 100 indicates a loss.
Best’s 数据反映了整个行业的实际经验，包括股票、共同和相互保险公司。综合比率表示总保险成本（已发生的损失加上费用）与保费收入的比较；比率低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 表示亏损。
For the reasons outlined in last year’s report, we expect the poor industry experience of 1983 to be more or less typical for a good many years to come. (As Yogi Berra put it: “It will be deja vu all over again.”) That doesn’t mean we think the figures won’t bounce around a bit; they are certain to. But we believe it highly unlikely that the combined ratio during the balance of the decade will average significantly below the 1981-1983 level. Based on our expectations regarding inflation - and we are as pessimistic as ever on that front - industry premium volume must grow about 10% annually merely to stabilize loss ratios at present levels.
由于去年报告中所述的原因，我们预计 1983 年的糟糕行业状况在未来几年内将大致保持典型状态。（正如约吉·贝拉所说：“这将是似曾相识的再次上演。”）这并不意味着我们认为这些数字不会有所波动；它们肯定会。但我们认为，在剩余的十年中，综合比率平均显著低于 1981-1983 年水平的可能性极小。根据我们对通货膨胀的预期——而且我们同样 在那方面依然悲观——行业溢价总量每年必须增长约 10%才能将目前的损失率稳定下来。
Our own combined ratio in 1983 was 121. Since Mike Goldberg recently took over most of the responsibility for the insurance operation, it would be nice for me if our shortcomings could be placed at his doorstep rather than mine. But unfortunately, as we have often pointed out, the insurance business has a long lead-time. Though business policies may be changed and personnel improved, a significant period must pass before the effects are seen. (This characteristic of the business enabled us to make a great deal of money in GEICO; we could picture what was likely to happen well before it actually occurred.) So the roots of the 1983 results are operating and personnel decisions made two or more years back when I had direct managerial responsibility for the insurance group.
1983 年，我们的综合比率是 121。由于迈克·戈德伯格最近接手了大部分保险业务的责任，如果我们的不足之处能归咎于他而不是我，那将对我很方便。但不幸的是，正如我们经常指出的那样，保险业务具有较长的滞后时间。尽管商业政策可以更改，人员可以得到改善，但必须经过一段显著的时间才能看到效果。（这种业务特点使我们能够在 GEICO 赚了很多钱；我们可以在事情实际发生之前就想象出可能发生的情况。）因此，1983 年结果的根本原因是两年或更早之前我直接负责保险集团时的运营和人事决策。
Despite our poor results overall, several of our managers did truly outstanding jobs. Roland Miller guided the auto and general liability business of National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company to improved results, while those of competitors deteriorated. In addition, Tom Rowley at Continental Divide Insurance - our fledgling Colorado homestate company - seems certain to be a winner. Mike found him a little over a year ago, and he was an important acquisition.
尽管我们的整体业绩不佳，但我们的几位经理确实做了非常出色的工作。罗兰·米勒指导了国家保险公司的汽车和一般责任险业务，以及国家火灾和海事保险公司，使业绩得到改善，而竞争对手的业绩则恶化。此外，科罗拉多分水岭保险公司的汤姆·罗利——我们新兴的科罗拉多本土公司——似乎肯定会成为赢家。迈克一年多前发现了他，他是一次重要的收购。
We have become active recently - and hope to become much more active - in reinsurance transactions where the buyer’s overriding concern should be the seller’s long-term creditworthiness. In such transactions our premier financial strength should make us the number one choice of both claimants and insurers who must rely on the reinsurer’s promises for a great many years to come.
我们最近变得活跃起来——并且希望变得更加活跃——在再保险交易中，买方的首要关注点应该是卖方的长期信用状况。在这样的交易中，我们卓越的财务实力应该使我们成为索赔人和保险公司首选，他们必须依赖再保险人的承诺在未来许多年里。
A major source of such business is structured settlements - a procedure for settling losses under which claimants receive periodic payments (almost always monthly, for life) rather than a single lump sum settlement. This form of settlement has important tax advantages for the claimant and also prevents his squandering a large lump-sum payment. Frequently, some inflation protection is built into the settlement. Usually the claimant has been seriously injured, and thus the periodic payments must be unquestionably secure for decades to come. We believe we offer unparalleled security. No other insurer we know of - even those with much larger gross assets - has our financial strength.
这类业务的重大来源是结构化和解——一种在索赔人分期接收款项（几乎总是每月，终身）而非一次性巨额和解金的损失解决程序。这种和解形式对索赔人具有重要税务优势，同时也防止其挥霍一大笔和解金。通常，和解中会包含一定的通货膨胀保护。通常情况下，索赔人受到严重伤害，因此未来几十年分期付款必须绝对安全。我们相信我们提供无与伦比的安全保障。我们所知的其他任何保险公司——即使那些拥有更大总资产的公司——都没有我们这样的财务实力。
We also think our financial strength should recommend us to companies wishing to transfer loss reserves. In such transactions, other insurance companies pay us lump sums to assume all (or a specified portion of) future loss payments applicable to large blocks of expired business. Here also, the company transferring such claims needs to be certain of the transferee’s financial strength for many years to come. Again, most of our competitors soliciting such business appear to us to have a financial condition that is materially inferior to ours.
我们同样认为我们的财务实力应该能够吸引那些希望转移损失准备的公司。在这些交易中，其他保险公司会向我们支付大额款项，以承担适用于大额到期业务的全部（或特定部分的）未来损失支付。同样，转移此类索赔的公司需要确保受让方的财务实力在未来多年内保持稳定。再次，我们注意到大多数寻求此类业务的竞争对手，其财务状况似乎远不如我们。
Potentially, structured settlements and the assumption of loss reserves could become very significant to us. Because of their potential size and because these operations generate large amounts of investment income compared to premium volume, we will show underwriting results from those businesses on a separate line in our insurance segment data. We also will exclude their effect in reporting our combined ratio to you. We “front end” no profit on structured settlement or loss reserve transactions, and all attributable overhead is expensed currently. Both businesses are run by Don Wurster at National Indemnity Company.
潜在而言，结构化和解以及损失准备金的承担可能对我们变得非常重要。由于这些业务的潜在规模较大，并且与保费收入相比，这些业务产生的投资收益巨大，我们将在我们的保险部门数据中单独列出这些业务的承保结果。我们还将在我们向你们报告的综合比率中排除其影响。我们对结构化和解或损失准备金交易不“预提”利润，所有可归属的管理费用均按当前费用处理。这两项业务均由 Don Wurster 在 National Indemnity Company 负责运营。
Insurance - GEICO 保险 - GEICO
Geico’s performance during 1983 was as good as our own insurance performance was poor. Compared to the industry’s combined ratio of 111, GEICO wrote at 96 after a large voluntary accrual for policyholder dividends. A few years ago I would not have thought GEICO could so greatly outperform the industry. Its superiority reflects the combination of a truly exceptional business idea and an exceptional management.
1983 年，Geico 的业绩表现远胜于我们自己的保险业绩。与行业综合费率 111%相比，Geico 在进行了大规模自愿递延以支付保单持有人红利后，仍能以 96%的费率运营。几年前，我绝不会想到 Geico 能如此大幅超越行业水平。它的优势体现了真正卓越的商业理念与卓越管理的结合。
Jack Byrne and Bill Snyder have maintained extraordinary discipline in the underwriting area (including, crucially, provision for full and proper loss reserves), and their efforts are now being further rewarded by significant gains in new business. Equally important, Lou Simpson is the class of the field among insurance investment managers. The three of them are some team.
杰克·伯恩和比尔·辛德勒在承保领域（包括至关重要的全额和适当损失准备金的计提）始终保持着非凡的纪律性，而他们的努力现在正通过新业务的显著增长得到进一步回报。同样重要的是，卢·辛普森在保险投资管理领域堪称顶尖。他们三人堪称梦幻组合。
We have approximately a one-third interest in GEICO. That gives us a $270 million share in the company’s premium volume, an amount some 80% larger than our own volume. Thus, the major portion of our total insurance business comes from the best insurance book in the country. This fact does not moderate by an iota the need for us to improve our own operation.
我们在 GEICO 中大约持有三分之一股份。这使我们在公司保费总量中占有 2.7 亿美元的份额，这个数额比我们自己的保费量高出约 80%。因此，我们绝大部分的保险业务都来自全国最优质的保险组合。这一事实丝毫不会减轻我们改进自身运营的必要性。
Stock Splits and Stock Activity
股票分割与股票交易活动
We often are asked why Berkshire does not split its stock. The assumption behind this question usually appears to be that a split would be a pro-shareholder action. We disagree. Let me tell you why.
我们经常被问及为什么伯克希尔不拆分股票。这个问题背后的假设通常是拆分会是利于股东的举动。我们不同意。让我告诉你们原因。
One of our goals is to have Berkshire Hathaway stock sell at a price rationally related to its intrinsic business value. (But note “rationally related”, not “identical”: if well-regarded companies are generally selling in the market at large discounts from value, Berkshire might well be priced similarly.) The key to a rational stock price is rational shareholders, both current and prospective.
我们的一个目标是让伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票价格与其内在业务价值合理相关。（但请注意“合理相关”，而不是“完全相同”：如果市场上许多备受推崇的公司普遍以远低于其价值的折扣出售，伯克希尔的价格也可能相似。）合理股票价格的关键在于理性的股东，包括现有股东和潜在买家。
If the holders of a company’s stock and/or the prospective buyers attracted to it are prone to make irrational or emotion- based decisions, some pretty silly stock prices are going to appear periodically. Manic-depressive personalities produce manic-depressive valuations. Such aberrations may help us in buying and selling the stocks of other companies. But we think it is in both your interest and ours to minimize their occurrence in the market for Berkshire.
如果一家公司的股东和/或被其吸引的潜在买家容易做出非理性或基于情绪的决策，那么股票价格将周期性地出现一些相当荒谬的价格。躁狂抑郁症患者会产生躁狂抑郁症式的估值。这种异常现象可能会帮助我们买卖其他公司的股票。但我们认为，最大限度地减少它们在伯克希尔市场上的发生，既符合你们的利益，也符合我们的利益。
To obtain only high quality shareholders is no cinch. Mrs. Astor could select her 400, but anyone can buy any stock. Entering members of a shareholder “club” cannot be screened for intellectual capacity, emotional stability, moral sensitivity or acceptable dress. Shareholder eugenics, therefore, might appear to be a hopeless undertaking.
要获得仅由优质股东组成并非易事。阿斯特夫人可以挑选她的 400 人，但任何人都可以购买任何股票。股东“俱乐部”的新成员无法根据智力水平、情绪稳定性、道德敏感度或可接受的着装进行筛选。因此，股东优生学可能看起来是一项无望的尝试。
In large part, however, we feel that high quality ownership can be attracted and maintained if we consistently communicate our business and ownership philosophy - along with no other conflicting messages - and then let self selection follow its course. For example, self selection will draw a far different crowd to a musical event advertised as an opera than one advertised as a rock concert even though anyone can buy a ticket to either.
然而，在很大程度上，我们觉得如果我们始终如一地传达我们的商业和所有权理念——而不附加其他条件——就能够吸引并保持高质量的所有权 相互矛盾的信息——然后让自我选择按其自身规律发展。例如，自我选择会把与宣传为歌剧的音乐会截然不同的观众吸引过来，而宣传为摇滚音乐会的音乐会，即使任何人都可以购买两张门票。
Through our policies and communications - our “advertisements” - we try to attract investors who will understand our operations, attitudes and expectations. (And, fully as important, we try to dissuade those who won’t.) We want those who think of themselves as business owners and invest in companies with the intention of staying a long time. And, we want those who keep their eyes focused on business results, not market prices.
通过我们的政策和沟通——我们的“广告”——我们试图吸引那些能够理解我们的运营、态度和期望的投资者。（同样重要的是，我们试图劝阻那些不适合的人。）我们希望那些自视为企业主，并有意长期投资于公司的投资者。而且，我们希望那些专注于业务成果而非市场价格的投资者。
Investors possessing those characteristics are in a small minority, but we have an exceptional collection of them. I believe well over 90% - probably over 95% - of our shares are held by those who were shareholders of Berkshire or Blue Chip five years ago. And I would guess that over 95% of our shares are held by investors for whom the holding is at least double the size of their next largest. Among companies with at least several thousand public shareholders and more than $1 billion of market value, we are almost certainly the leader in the degree to which our shareholders think and act like owners. Upgrading a shareholder group that possesses these characteristics is not easy.
具有这些特征的投资者是少数，但我们拥有非常出色的群体。我相信超过 90%——可能超过 95%——的我们的股份由五年前持有伯克希尔或蓝筹股的股东持有。我估计超过 95%的我们的股份由那些持股规模至少是其次大持股规模两倍的投资者持有。在至少有数千名公众股东且市值超过 10 亿美元的上市公司中，我们在股东思考和行动上像企业主的程度方面几乎肯定是领导者。升级具有这些特征的股东群体并不容易。
Were we to split the stock or take other actions focusing on stock price rather than business value, we would attract an entering class of buyers inferior to the exiting class of sellers. At $1300, there are very few investors who can’t afford a Berkshire share. Would a potential one-share purchaser be better off if we split 100 for 1 so he could buy 100 shares? Those who think so and who would buy the stock because of the split or in anticipation of one would definitely downgrade the quality of our present shareholder group. (Could we really improve our shareholder group by trading some of our present clear-thinking members for impressionable new ones who, preferring paper to value, feel wealthier with nine $10 bills than with one $100 bill?) People who buy for non-value reasons are likely to sell for non-value reasons. Their presence in the picture will accentuate erratic price swings unrelated to underlying business developments.
如果我们拆分股票或采取其他专注于股价而非企业价值的行动，我们将吸引到比退出卖方群体更劣质的进入买方群体。在 1300 美元时，几乎没有投资者买不起伯克希尔的一股。如果我们拆分 100 股为 1 股，让他能买 100 股，潜在的单一股票购买者会更好吗？那些认为会更好并因为拆分或预期拆分而购买股票的人，肯定会降低我们现有股东群体的质量。（我们能真的通过用一些现有明智的股东成员换取易受影响的新的股东成员来改善我们的股东群体吗？那些新成员更喜欢纸面价值而非实际价值，他们感觉九张 10 美元的钞票比一张 100 美元的钞票更富有。）因为非价值原因购买的人可能会因为非价值原因卖出。他们的存在将加剧与企业基本发展无关的随机价格波动。
We will try to avoid policies that attract buyers with a short-term focus on our stock price and try to follow policies that attract informed long-term investors focusing on business values. just as you purchased your Berkshire shares in a market populated by rational informed investors, you deserve a chance to sell - should you ever want to - in the same kind of market. We will work to keep it in existence.
我们将尽量避免那些以短期股价为关注点吸引买家的政策，而将努力遵循那些吸引关注企业价值的明智长期投资者的政策。正如你购买伯克希尔股票时，市场是由理性的明智投资者构成的，你理应有机会在同样的市场中出售——如果你有此意愿的话。我们将努力保持其持续存在。
One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on activity. Brokers, using terms such as “marketability” and “liquidity”, sing the praises of companies with high share turnover (those who cannot fill your pocket will confidently fill your ear). But investors should understand that what is good for the croupier is not good for the customer. A hyperactive stock market is the pickpocket of enterprise.
股票市场的讽刺之一在于对活跃度的强调。经纪人使用“市场性”和“流动性”等术语，赞美那些高股本周转率的公司（那些不能填满你的口袋的人会自信地填满你的耳朵）。但投资者应该明白，对赌场有利的并不一定对客户有利。过度活跃的股票市场是企业的小偷。
For example, consider a typical company earning, say, 12% on equity. Assume a very high turnover rate in its shares of 100% per year. If a purchase and sale of the stock each extract commissions of 1% (the rate may be much higher on low-priced stocks) and if the stock trades at book value, the owners of our hypothetical company will pay, in aggregate, 2% of the company’s net worth annually for the privilege of transferring ownership. This activity does nothing for the earnings of the business, and means that 1/6 of them are lost to the owners through the “frictional” cost of transfer. (And this calculation does not count option trading, which would increase frictional costs still further.)
例如，考虑一家典型公司，假设其股东权益收益率为 12%。假设其股票年换手率非常高，达到 100%。如果买入和卖出股票每次都要抽取 1%的佣金（对于低价股票，这个比率可能要高得多），并且如果股票按账面价值交易，那么我们假设的公司所有者将每年支付公司净资产的 2%，以获得转移所有权的特权。这种活动对企业的收益毫无帮助，并且意味着他们中有 1/6 的收益会因转移的“摩擦”成本而损失。（而且这个计算还不包括期权交易，这会进一步增加摩擦成本。）
All that makes for a rather expensive game of musical chairs. Can you imagine the agonized cry that would arise if a governmental unit were to impose a new 16 2/3% tax on earnings of corporations or investors? By market activity, investors can impose upon themselves the equivalent of such a tax.
所有这一切使得这场音乐椅游戏相当昂贵。你能想象如果政府机构对企业的收益或投资者的收益征收新的 16 2/3%的税，会引发怎样的痛苦呼声吗？通过市场活动，投资者可以对自己施加相当于这种税率的负担。
Days when the market trades 100 million shares (and that kind of volume, when over-the-counter trading is included, is today abnormally low) are a curse for owners, not a blessing - for they mean that owners are paying twice as much to change chairs as they are on a 50-million-share day. If 100 million- share days persist for a year and the average cost on each purchase and sale is 15 cents a share, the chair-changing tax for investors in aggregate would total about $7.5 billion - an amount roughly equal to the combined 1982 profits of Exxon, General Motors, Mobil and Texaco, the four largest companies in the Fortune 500.
市场交易 1 亿股的日子（而且，当包括场外交易时，目前这种交易量异常低）对股东来说是诅咒，不是祝福——因为这意味着股东在改变席位上要支付比 5000 万股交易日多一倍的费用。如果 1 亿股交易日持续一年，并且每次买卖的平均成本为每股 15 美分，那么投资者总体上缴纳的席位变更税将总计约 75 亿美元——这个数额大致相当于 1982 年埃克森、通用汽车、莫比尔和德士古四家《财富》500 强最大公司的利润总和。
These companies had a combined net worth of $75 billion at yearend 1982 and accounted for over 12% of both net worth and net income of the entire Fortune 500 list. Under our assumption investors, in aggregate, every year forfeit all earnings from this staggering sum of capital merely to satisfy their penchant for “financial flip-flopping”. In addition, investment management fees of over $2 billion annually - sums paid for chair-changing advice - require the forfeiture by investors of all earnings of the five largest banking organizations (Citicorp, Bank America, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover and J. P. Morgan). These expensive activities may decide who eats the pie, but they don’t enlarge it.
这些公司在 1982 年底的总净资产达到 750 亿美元，占《财富》500 强总净资产和净收入的 12%以上。根据我们的假设，投资者每年为了满足他们对“金融投机”的偏好，不得不放弃这笔巨额资本所产生的全部收益。此外，每年超过 20 亿美元的资产管理费——这些费用是为了更换董事长而支付的——要求投资者放弃五大银行集团（花旗集团、美国银行、大通曼哈顿银行、制造 Hanover 银行和摩根大通）的全部收益。这些昂贵的活动可能决定了谁会分得这块蛋糕，但它们并不能扩大这块蛋糕。
(We are aware of the pie-expanding argument that says that such activities improve the rationality of the capital allocation process. We think that this argument is specious and that, on balance, hyperactive equity markets subvert rational capital allocation and act as pie shrinkers. Adam Smith felt that all noncollusive acts in a free market were guided by an invisible hand that led an economy to maximum progress; our view is that casino-type markets and hair-trigger investment management act as an invisible foot that trips up and slows down a forward-moving economy.)
(我们认识到一种观点，即这类活动能提升资本配置过程的合理性。我们认为这一观点站不住脚，总体而言，过度活跃的股市会破坏理性资本配置，起到缩小蛋糕的作用。亚当·斯密认为，自由市场中所有非勾结行为都受到一只看不见的手的引导，推动经济走向最大进步；而我们的观点是，赌场式市场和触发式投资管理如同一个看不见的脚，会绊倒并减缓经济前进的步伐。)
Contrast the hyperactive stock with Berkshire. The bid-and- ask spread in our stock currently is about 30 points, or a little over 2%. Depending on the size of the transaction, the difference between proceeds received by the seller of Berkshire and cost to the buyer may range downward from 4% (in trading involving only a few shares) to perhaps 1 1/2% (in large trades where negotiation can reduce both the market-maker’s spread and the broker’s commission). Because most Berkshire shares are traded in fairly large transactions, the spread on all trading probably does not average more than 2%.
将过度活跃的股市与伯克希尔进行对比。我们股票当前的买卖价差约为 30 点，即略超过 2%。根据交易规模的不同，伯克希尔卖方收到的款项与买方付出的成本之间的差额可能从 4%（涉及少量股票的交易）到 1 1/2%（在大型交易中，谈判可以减少做市商的价差和经纪人的佣金）。由于伯克希尔的大部分股票交易规模都相当大，所有交易的价差很可能平均不超过 2%。
Meanwhile, true turnover in Berkshire stock (excluding inter-dealer transactions, gifts and bequests) probably runs 3% per year. Thus our owners, in aggregate, are paying perhaps 6/100 of 1% of Berkshire’s market value annually for transfer privileges. By this very rough estimate, that’s $900,000 - not a small cost, but far less than average. Splitting the stock would increase that cost, downgrade the quality of our shareholder population, and encourage a market price less consistently related to intrinsic business value. We see no offsetting advantages.
与此同时，伯克希尔股票的真实交易量（不包括经销商之间交易、赠与和遗赠）可能每年为 3%。因此，我们的股东总体上每年为转让特权支付了伯克希尔市值的约 6/100 的 1%。根据这个非常粗略的估计，那将是 90 万美元——这不是一个小数目，但远低于平均水平。拆分股票会增加这一成本，降低股东群体的质量，并促使市场价格与内在商业价值的关系不那么一致。我们没有看到任何抵消这些劣势的优势。
Miscellaneous 杂项
Last year in this section I ran a small ad to encourage acquisition candidates. In our communications businesses we tell our advertisers that repetition is a key to results (which it is), so we will again repeat our acquisition criteria.
去年在这一部分，我刊登了一则小广告来鼓励潜在收购者。在我们的通信业务中，我们告诉广告商重复是取得成效的关键（事实也是如此），因此我们将再次重复我们的收购标准。
We prefer: (1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax earnings), (2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations), (3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt, (4) management in place (we can’t supply it), (5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it), (6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
我们更倾向于： (1) 大额采购（至少 500 万美元的税后利润），(2) 展现出持续盈利能力（未来预测对我们来说意义不大，也不关注“扭亏为盈”的情况），(3) 股本回报率高且几乎不使用债务的企业，(4) 现有管理层（我们无法提供管理团队），(5) 结构简单的企业（如果涉及大量技术，我们将无法理解），(6) 明确的报价（我们不想在不了解价格的情况下，浪费自己和卖家初步讨论交易的时间）。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.
我们不参与敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全的保密，并在五分钟内给出明确的答复——我们是否感兴趣。我们倾向于现金收购，但在我们获得的内在商业价值与我们付出的相当时，会考虑发行股票。我们邀请潜在卖家通过联系我们过去合作过的人来了解我们。对于合适的企业——和合适的人——我们可以提供一个良好的发展平台。
* * * * *
About 96.4% of all eligible shares participated in our 1983 shareholder-designated contributions program. The total contributions made pursuant to this program - disbursed in the early days of 1984 but fully expensed in 1983 - were $3,066,501, and 1353 charities were recipients. Although the response measured by the percentage of shares participating was extraordinarily good, the response measured by the percentage of holders participating was not as good. The reason may well be the large number of new shareholders acquired through the merger and their lack of familiarity with the program. We urge new shareholders to read the description of the program on pages 52- 53.
大约 96.4%的所有合格股份参与了我们的 1983 年股东指定贡献计划。根据该计划所做的总贡献——于 1984 年初拨付但完全计入 1983 年费用——为 3,066,501 美元，1353 家慈善机构为受益者。尽管参与股份的百分比所显示的响应非常出色，但参与者的百分比所显示的响应则不尽如人意。原因可能是通过合并获得的大量新股东对计划不熟悉。我们敦促新股东阅读第 52-53 页的计划描述。
If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the actual owner’s name, not in “street” or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 28, 1984 will not be eligible for any 1984 program.
如果您希望参加未来的项目，我们强烈 敦促你立即确保你的股份是 登记在实际所有者的名下，而不是“街道”或代名人 名称。1984 年 9 月 28 日未注册的股份将 不符合任何 1984 年计划。
* * * * *
The Blue Chip/Berkshire merger went off without a hitch. Less than one-tenth of 1% of the shares of each company voted against the merger, and no requests for appraisal were made. In 1983, we gained some tax efficiency from the merger and we expect to gain more in the future.
蓝筹股/伯克希尔合并顺利进行。每家公司不到十分之一的股份投票反对合并，且未提出任何评估请求。1983 年，我们从合并中获得了税收效率，预计未来将获得更多。
One interesting sidelight to the merger: Berkshire now has 1,146,909 shares outstanding compared to 1,137,778 shares at the beginning of fiscal 1965, the year present management assumed responsibility. For every 1% of the company you owned at that time, you now would own .99%. Thus, all of today’s assets - the News, See’s, Nebraska Furniture Mart, the Insurance Group, $1.3 billion in marketable stocks, etc. - have been added to the original textile assets with virtually no net dilution to the original owners.
关于合并的一个有趣细节：伯克希尔现在有 1,146,909 股流通股，而 1965 财年伊始，即现任管理层开始负责时的流通股为 1,137,778 股。当时你持有的公司 1%股份，现在将变为 0.99%。因此，今天的所有资产——新闻、西尔斯、内布拉斯加家具商场、保险集团、13 亿美元的流通股等——都已与原始纺织资产合并，而原始所有者的净稀释几乎为零。
We are delighted to have the former Blue Chip shareholders join us. To aid in your understanding of Berkshire Hathaway, we will be glad to send you the Compendium of Letters from the Annual Reports of 1977-1981, and/or the 1982 Annual report. Direct your request to the Company at 1440 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha, Nebraska 68131.
我们很高兴有前蓝筹股东加入我们。为了帮助您了解伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司，我们将很乐意为您提供 1977-1981 年年度报告中的信件汇编，以及/或者 1982 年年度报告。请将您的请求发送至内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 1440 号，邮编 68131。
Warren E. Buffett March 14, 1984 Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特 1984 年 3 月 14 日 董事长
Appendix 附录
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities
商誉及其摊销：规则与现实
This appendix deals only with economic and accounting Goodwill – not the goodwill of everyday usage. For example, a business may be well liked, even loved, by most of its customers but possess no economic goodwill. (AT&T, before the breakup, was generally well thought of, but possessed not a dime of economic Goodwill.) And, regrettably, a business may be disliked by its customers but possess substantial, and growing, economic Goodwill. So, just for the moment, forget emotions and focus only on economics and accounting.
本附录仅涉及经济和会计意义上的商誉——而非日常用语中的商誉。例如，一家企业可能深受大多数顾客喜爱，甚至被爱戴，但可能没有经济意义上的商誉。（在拆分之前，AT&T 普遍受到好评，但没有任何经济意义上的商誉。）遗憾的是，一家企业可能不受顾客欢迎，但拥有大量且不断增长的商誉。因此，暂时忘掉情感，只关注经济和会计问题。
When a business is purchased, accounting principles require that the purchase price first be assigned to the fair value of the identifiable assets that are acquired. Frequently the sum of the fair values put on the assets (after the deduction of liabilities) is less than the total purchase price of the business. In that case, the difference is assigned to an asset account entitled "excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired". To avoid constant repetition of this mouthful, we will substitute "Goodwill".
当一家企业被收购时，会计准则要求首先将购买价格分配给所收购的可识别资产公允价值。通常情况下，扣除负债后的资产公允价值总和低于企业的总购买价格。在这种情况下，差额被分配到一个名为“收购净资产成本溢价”的资产账户中。为了避免不断重复这个长名称，我们将用“商誉”来替代。
Accounting Goodwill arising from businesses purchased before November 1970 has a special standing. Except under rare circumstances, it can remain an asset on the balance sheet as long as the business bought is retained. That means no amortization charges to gradually extinguish that asset need be made against earnings.
来自 1970 年 11 月之前收购的企业所产生的商誉具有特殊地位。除特殊情况外，只要保留所收购的企业，商誉就可以作为资产负债表上的资产长期存在。这意味着无需对收益进行摊销费用，以逐步消除该资产。
The case is different, however, with purchases made from November 1970 on. When these create Goodwill, it must be amortized over not more than 40 years through charges – of equal amount in every year – to the earnings account. Since 40 years is the maximum period allowed, 40 years is what managements (including us) usually elect. This annual charge to earnings is not allowed as a tax deduction and, thus, has an effect on after-tax income that is roughly double that of most other expenses.
然而，从 1970 年 11 月开始进行的收购情况则不同。当这些收购产生商誉时，必须通过每年等额的摊销费用，在不超过 40 年的期限内将其摊销至收益账户。由于 40 年是允许的最大期限，管理层（包括我们）通常会选择 40 年。每年对收益的摊销费用不允许作为税收抵扣，因此其对税后收入的影响大约是大多数其他费用的两倍。
That’s how accounting Goodwill works. To see how it differs from economic reality, let’s look at an example close at hand. We’ll round some figures, and greatly oversimplify, to make the example easier to follow. We’ll also mention some implications for investors and managers.
这就是会计商誉的运作方式。为了了解它与经济现实的差异，让我们来看一个贴近实际的例子。我们将对一些数字进行四舍五入，并大大简化，以使例子更易于理解。我们还将提及对投资者和管理者的某些启示。
Blue Chip Stamps bought See’s early in 1972 for $25 million, at which time See’s had about $8 million of net tangible assets. (Throughout this discussion, accounts receivable will be classified as tangible assets, a definition proper for business analysis.) This level of tangible assets was adequate to conduct the business without use of debt, except for short periods seasonally. See’s was earning about $2 million after tax at the time, and such earnings seemed conservatively representative of future earning power in constant 1972 dollars.
蓝筹邮票公司于 1972 年初以 2500 万美元的价格收购了 See's，当时 See's 的净资产约为 800 万美元。（在本讨论中，应收账款将被归类为有形资产，这对于商业分析来说是恰当的定义。）这种水平的有形资产足以在不使用债务的情况下开展业务，除了季节性短期的例外。当时 See's 的税后利润约为 200 万美元，这样的盈利似乎保守地代表了以 1972 年不变美元计算的未来的盈利能力。
Thus our first lesson: businesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates of return. The capitalized value of this excess return is economic Goodwill.
因此，我们的第一个教训是：当企业预期能产生远超市场回报率的资产收益时，其价值自然会远高于净资产。这种超额回报的资本化价值就是经济商誉。
In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s – doing it, furthermore, with conservative accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories, receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.
1972 年（以及现在），相对较少的企业能够持续获得像 See's 那样在税后净有形资产上赚取 25%的利润——而且还是通过保守的会计方法和没有财务杠杆来实现。产生超额回报率的是无形资产，特别是基于消费者无数次对产品和人员都感到愉快的体验而建立起来的普遍良好的声誉，而不是存货、应收账款或固定资产的公允市场价值。
Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price. Consumer franchises are a prime source of economic Goodwill. Other sources include governmental franchises not subject to profit regulation, such as television stations, and an enduring position as the low cost producer in an industry.
这样的声誉创造了一种消费者忠诚度，使得产品的购买价值而不是生产成本成为决定销售价格的主要因素。消费者忠诚度是经济商誉的主要来源。其他来源包括不受利润监管的政府特许权，例如电视台，以及作为行业低成本生产者的持久地位。
Let’s return to the accounting in the See’s example. Blue Chip’s purchase of See’s at $17 million over net tangible assets required that a Goodwill account of this amount be established as an asset on Blue Chip’s books and that $425,000 be charged to income annually for 40 years to amortize that asset. By 1983, after 11 years of such charges, the $17 million had been reduced to about $12.5 million. Berkshire, meanwhile, owned 60% of Blue Chip and, therefore, also 60% of See’s. This ownership meant that Berkshire’s balance sheet reflected 60% of See’s Goodwill, or about $7.5 million.
让我们回到 See 的例子中的会计处理。蓝筹公司以超过净资产 17 亿美元的价格收购 See，这要求蓝筹公司在账簿上建立一笔等额的商誉作为资产，并每年摊销该资产 400 万美元，持续 40 年。到 1983 年，经过 11 年的摊销，这 17 亿美元已减少至约 12.5 亿美元。与此同时，伯克希尔公司持有蓝筹公司 60%的股份，因此也持有 See 公司 60%的股份。这种持股意味着伯克希尔公司的资产负债表上反映了 See 公司商誉的 60%，即约 7.5 亿美元。
In 1983 Berkshire acquired the rest of Blue Chip in a merger that required purchase accounting as contrasted to the "pooling" treatment allowed for some mergers. Under purchase accounting, the "fair value" of the shares we gave to (or "paid") Blue Chip holders had to be spread over the net assets acquired from Blue Chip. This "fair value" was measured, as it almost always is when public companies use their shares to make acquisitions, by the market value of the shares given up.
1983 年，伯克希尔公司通过并购收购了蓝筹公司的其余股份，这次并购需要采用购买会计方法，而不是某些并购允许的"合并"处理方式。在购买会计方法下，我们给予（或"支付"）蓝筹公司股东的"公允价值"必须分摊到从蓝筹公司获得的净资产中。这个"公允价值"的衡量方式，正如上市公司在用股票进行收购时几乎总是那样，是通过放弃的股票的市场价值来确定的。
The assets "purchased" consisted of 40% of everything owned by Blue Chip (as noted, Berkshire already owned the other 60%). What Berkshire "paid" was more than the net identifiable assets we received by $51.7 million, and was assigned to two pieces of Goodwill: $28.4 million to See’s and $23.3 million to Buffalo Evening News.
所"购买"的资产包括蓝筹公司（如前所述，伯克希尔已持有其余 60%）拥有的全部资产的 40%。伯克希尔"支付"的金额比我们收到的可识别净资产多 5170 万美元，并分配到两笔商誉：2840 万美元给 See's，2330 万美元给 Buffalo Evening News。
After the merger, therefore, Berkshire was left with a Goodwill asset for See’s that had two components: the $7.5 million remaining from the 1971 purchase, and $28.4 million newly created by the 40% "purchased" in 1983. Our amortization charge now will be about $1.0 million for the next 28 years, and $.7 million for the following 12 years, 2002 through 2013.
因此，在合并后，伯克希尔为 See's 保留了一笔包含两个部分的商誉资产：1971 年收购剩余的 750 万美元，以及 1983 年通过"购买"40%新产生的 2840 万美元。我们现在的摊销费用将为未来 28 年约 1000 万美元，以及 2002 年至 2013 年这 12 年约 700 万美元。
In other words, different purchase dates and prices have given us vastly different asset values and amortization charges for two pieces of the same asset. (We repeat our usual disclaimer: we have no better accounting system to suggest. The problems to be dealt with are mind boggling and require arbitrary rules.)
换句话说，不同的购买日期和价格使得同一笔资产的不同部分产生了截然不同的资产价值和摊销费用。（我们重申我们的常规声明：我们没有更好的会计系统可以建议。要解决的问题令人难以置信，需要采用任意规则。）
But what are the economic realities? One reality is that the amortization charges that have been deducted as costs in the earnings statement each year since acquisition of See’s were not true economic costs. We know that because See’s last year earned $13 million after taxes on about $20 million of net tangible assets – a performance indicating the existence of economic Goodwill far larger than the total original cost of our accounting Goodwill. In other words, while accounting Goodwill regularly decreased from the moment of purchase, economic Goodwill increased in irregular but very substantial fashion.
但经济现实是什么呢？一个现实是，自收购 See's 以来，每股收益表中每年扣除的摊销费用并非真正的经济成本。我们知道这一点，因为 See's 去年在约 2 亿美元的净有形资产上实现了税后 1300 万美元的收益——这一业绩表明其经济商誉远大于我们会计商誉的原始总成本。换句话说，虽然会计商誉从购买那一刻起一直在减少，但经济商誉则以不规则但非常显著的方式在增加。
Another reality is that annual amortization charges in the future will not correspond to economic costs. It is possible, of course, that See’s economic Goodwill will disappear. But it won’t shrink in even decrements or anything remotely resembling them. What is more likely is that the Goodwill will increase – in current, if not in constant, dollars – because of inflation.
另一个现实是，未来的年度摊销费用将不会与经济成本相匹配。当然，See's 的经济商誉可能会消失。但它不会以递减的方式缩小，或者任何与之相似的任何方式。更有可能的是，商誉会增加——以当前美元（如果不是不变美元）计——因为通货膨胀。
That probability exists because true economic Goodwill tends to rise in nominal value proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let’s contrast a See’s kind of business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See’s in 1972, it will be recalled, it was earning about $2 million on $8 million of net tangible assets. Let us assume that our hypothetical mundane business then had $2 million of earnings also, but needed $18 million in net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that mundane business would possess little or no economic Goodwill.
这种概率的存在是因为真正的经济商誉往往会随着通货膨胀在名义价值上成比例地增长。为了说明这一点，让我们将 See's 公司这类业务与一家更普通的业务进行对比。当我们 1972 年购买 See's 公司时，会记得它以 800 万美元的净有形资产赚取了约 200 万美元。让我们假设我们假设的这家普通业务当时也有 200 万美元的收益，但正常运营需要 1800 万美元的净有形资产。在这家普通业务上，仅以 11%的回报率来要求有形资产，那么它几乎或完全没有经济商誉。
A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or for $18 million. In contrast, we paid $25 million for See’s, even though it had no more in earnings and less than half as much in "honest-to-God" assets. Could less really have been more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is "yes" – even if both businesses were expected to have flat unit volume – as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of continuous inflation.
因此，像这样的业务很可能以净有形资产的价值出售，即 1800 万美元。相比之下，我们以 2500 万美元的价格购买了 See's 公司，尽管它的收益没有增加，而且"货真价实"的资产不到一半。我们的购买价格真的暗示了"少即是多"？答案是"是"——即使两家公司都被预期单位数量保持不变——只要像我们在 1972 年所预期的那样，预计世界将持续通货膨胀。
To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits also must double.
要理解原因，不妨想象价格水平翻倍后对这两家企业的后续影响。两家企业都需要将名义收入翻倍至 400 万美元，以跟上通货膨胀的步伐。这似乎并不难：只需以加倍之前的原价销售相同数量的单位，并且假设利润率保持不变，那么利润也必须翻倍。
But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales means correspondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories. Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of the owner.
但关键在于，为了实现这一点，两家企业可能都需要将名义上的净有形资产投资翻倍，因为这是通货膨胀通常对企业（无论好坏）施加的经济要求。销售额翻倍意味着相应地需要立即投入更多的美元到应收账款和库存中。固定资产中的美元投入对通货膨胀的反应会更慢，但可能同样确定。而所有这些为通货膨胀所需的投资都不会提高回报率。这项投资的动机是企业的生存，而不是所有者的繁荣。
Remember, however, that See’s had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation. The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large – a need for $18 million of additional capital.
然而，请记住 See’s 的净资产只有 800 万美元。因此，它只需要再投入 800 万美元来满足通货膨胀带来的资本需求。而那家普通业务公司，负担则大得多——需要额外 1800 万美元的资本。
After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 million annually, might still be worth the value of its tangible assets, or $36 million. That means its owners would have gained only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)
尘埃落定后，那家普通业务公司现在每年赚取 400 万美元，其价值可能仍等于其有形资产的价值，即 3600 万美元。这意味着其所有者每投入一美元新资本，只能获得一美元的票面价值。（这是他们如果将钱存入储蓄账户所能达到的相同一美元对一美元的结果。）
See’s, however, also earning $4 million, might be worth $50 million if valued (as it logically would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained $25 million in nominal value while the owners were putting up only $8 million in additional capital – over $3 of nominal value gained for each $1 invested.
然而，See’s 也赚取 400 万美元，如果按照我们购买时的相同逻辑进行估值，其价值可能达到 5000 万美元。因此，在所有者只投入 800 万美元额外资本的情况下，其票面价值将增加 2500 万美元——每投入一美元新资本，就能获得超过三美元的票面价值。
Remember, even so, that the owners of the See’s kind of business were forced by inflation to ante up $8 million in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.
记住，即便如此，See 那种业务的业主们也因通货膨胀被迫追加 800 万美元的额外资本，仅仅是为了在真实利润上保持持平。任何没有杠杆的、需要一定净有形资产来运营的企业（几乎所有企业都需要）都会受到通货膨胀的伤害。需要很少有形资产的企业受伤害最小。
And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom – long on tradition, short on wisdom – held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In Goods We Trust"). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return – rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.
当然，这个事实对许多人来说一直很难理解。多年来，传统的观念——传统多，智慧少——一直认为，拥有自然资源、工厂和机器或其他有形资产的企业最能提供通货膨胀保护（“我们信赖实物商品”）。事情并非如此。资产密集型企业的回报率通常很低——这些回报率往往几乎不足以资助现有企业因通货膨胀而产生的需求，没有剩余资金用于真实增长、分配给业主或收购新企业。
In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment – yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.
相比之下，在通货膨胀时期积累起来的许多商业巨富，其财富主要来源于拥有那些将具有持久价值的无形资产与相对较少的实体资产要求相结合的经营业务。在这种情况下，收益以名义美元的形式大幅增长，而这些美元大部分用于收购其他企业。这一现象在通信行业尤为明显。这个行业对实体投资的要求不高——但其特许经营权却得以长期维持。在通货膨胀期间，商誉就像一个不断给予馈赠的礼物。
But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic Goodwill. Spurious accounting Goodwill – and there is plenty of it around – is another matter. When an overexcited management purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are observed. Because it can’t go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the Goodwill account. Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such circumstances it might better be labeled "No-Will". Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an "asset" just as if the acquisition had been a sensible one.
但这一说法自然只适用于真正的经济商誉。虚假的会计商誉——而且周围充斥着大量此类商誉——则是另一回事。当过度兴奋的管理层以荒唐的价格收购一家企业时，之前描述的同样会计技巧会被使用。由于没有其他去处，这种荒唐最终会进入商誉账户。考虑到创建该账户的管理缺乏纪律，在这种情况下，它或许最好被标记为"无意志"。无论是什么术语，40 年的仪式通常都会被遵守，被资本化的肾上腺素仍然作为"资产"留在账上，就好像收购是明智的一样。
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If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.
如果你仍然坚持认为商誉的会计处理是衡量经济现实的最佳指标，我建议你思考最后一件事。
Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore, it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.
假设一家公司每股净资产为 20 美元，所有资产都是有形资产。进一步假设该公司内部开发了一些卓越的消费特许权，或者它幸运地通过最初的 FCC 拨款获得了一些重要的电视台。因此，它通过有形资产赚取了大量利润，比如每股 5 美元，或 25%。
With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.
在这样的经济条件下，它可能每股售价高达 100 美元或更多，而且很可能在整体业务的谈判出售中也能达到这个价格。
Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill (just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a $2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate "true" earnings per share? And, if so, should the new "true" earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his purchase price?
假设一个投资者以每股 100 美元的价格买入股票，实际上每股支付 80 美元作为商誉（正如一个公司购买整个公司的情况）。投资者是否应该每年摊销 2 美元每股的摊销费用（80 美元除以 40 年）来计算"真实"每股收益？如果是这样，那么新的"真实"每股收益 3 美元是否应该让他重新考虑购买价格？
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We believe managers and investors alike should view intangible assets from two perspectives:
我们相信，管理者和投资者都应该从两个角度来看待无形资产：
Operations that appear to be winners based upon perspective (1) may pale when viewed from perspective (2). A good business is not always a good purchase – although it’s a good place to look for one.
从视角（1）来看看似是成功运营的业务，从视角（2）来看可能会黯然失色。一个好的企业并不总是好的收购目标——尽管它是寻找收购目标的良好起点。
We will try to acquire businesses that have excellent operating economics measured by (1) and that provide reasonable returns measured by (2). Accounting consequences will be totally ignored.
我们将尝试获取那些根据（1）具有优秀经营经济效益，并根据（2）提供合理回报的企业。会计后果将完全被忽略。
At yearend 1983, net Goodwill on our accounting books totaled $62 million, consisting of the $79 million you see stated on the asset side of our balance sheet, and $17 million of negative Goodwill that is offset against the carrying value of our interest in Mutual Savings and Loan.
到 1983 年底，我们账簿上的净商誉总额为 6200 万美元，其中包括资产负债表资产方列出的 7900 万美元，以及 1700 万美元的负商誉，该负商誉与我们在互助储蓄和贷款中的持股账面价值相抵消。
We believe net economic Goodwill far exceeds the $62 million accounting number.
我们相信，净经济商誉远远超过账面上的 6200 万美元。
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