Germany has for the most part been very welcoming with respect to FDI, with few restrictions for national security. Very recently, this has begun to change dramatically. Since 2004, the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy has had the power to review M&A activity in security related industries including military equipment and IT products used for encryption. This review was extended in 2009 to include any M&A activity by non-European investors if a foreign entity acquired more than 25%25 \% of voting rights. In 2017, in the aftermath of concerns about a 2016 acquisition effort by a Chinese company of a German industrial robotics company and a proposed chip company acquisition, the scope of review was expanded to include critical infrastructure, cloud computing, telematics, and some key software. The 25%25 \% threshold was lowered to 10%10 \% for sector-specific acquisitions that might impinge on national security, and the scope was expanded to include the media in December 2018. 德国在大多数情况下都非常欢迎外国直接投资，对国家安全的限制很少。最近，这种情况开始发生巨大变化。自 2004 年起，德国经济事务和能源部有权审查安全相关行业的并购活动，包括军事装备和用于加密的 IT 产品。2009 年，这一审查范围扩大到非欧洲投资者的任何并购活动，只要外国实体获得的投票权超过 25%25 \% 。2017年，在对2016年一家中国公司收购一家德国工业机器人公司和一家芯片公司的收购提议表示担忧之后，审查范围扩大到关键基础设施、云计算、远程信息处理和一些关键软件。对于可能影响国家安全的特定行业收购， 25%25 \% 门槛降低到 10%10 \% ，2018年12月，范围扩大到媒体。
The renewed emphasis on the regulation of investments by venture capital and private equity firms in the case of FIRRMA raises an important issue regarding how it will carry out its regulatory function. As we have noted, the prior focus of both the US and other countries’ regulations on mergers and acquisitions may have been misplaced. If the goal of other states is to transfer key technologies across borders, there are alternative and more efficient vehicles for doing so, including early stage investment. Over the last 30 years, innovation has been driven by startups backed by seed-stage and follow-up investments by venture capital funds. The new FIRRMA legislation in the US seeks to address this, but it remains an open question whether the opaque origins of investors in many venture capital and private equity firms will prevent technology transfer by foreign countries of critical innovative technologies being developed by Silicon Valley startups. FIRRMA 案重新强调对风险资本和私募股权公司投资的监管，这就提出了一个重要的问 题，即 FIRRMA 将如何履行其监管职能。正如我们所指出的，美国和其他国家之前对并购的监管重点可能是错位的。如果其他国家的目标是跨国转让关键技术，那么还有其他更有效的途径，包括早期投资。在过去的 30 年里，创新一直是由风险投资基金的种子期投资和后续投资所支持的初创企业所推动的。美国新的 FIRRMA 法案试图解决这一问题，但许多风险投资和私募股权公司的投资者来源不透明，是否会阻碍硅谷初创企业开发的关键创新技术在外国的技术转让，这仍是一个未知数。
4. Prospects for Multilateral Management of Economic Statecraft 4.经济外交多边管理的前景
As we have argued, economic statecraft is becoming a central fact of strategic competition among countries at both the national and subnational level - increasingly impacting the global economy. Can the WTO or other international institutions play a role in managing this relatively new trend? Given the serious problems that the WTO faces with the failure of the Doha Round and rise of unilateralism, bilateralism, and minilateralism, as well as the crisis of the WTO appellate body, seeking a path for the WTO to deal with strategic and political competition may seem naïve at best. Yet, as we argue below, there may well be an opening for the creation of international arrangements to play a role in managing the negotiation of bilateral agreements and unilateral controls that create negative externalities. And if created, how these might fit with existing international institutions is also an interesting question. 正如我们所论证的那样，经济国策正在成为各国在国家和次国家层面进行战略竞争的核心事实--对全球经济的影响与日俱增。世贸组织或其他国际机构能否在管理这一相对较新的趋势方面发挥作用？鉴于世贸组织面临着多哈回合谈判失败、单边主义、双边主义和小多边主义抬头以及世贸组织上诉机构危机等严重问题，为世贸组织寻求一条应对战略和政治竞争的道路可能显得过于天真。然而，正如我们在下文中所论述的那样，建立国际安排，在管理双边协议谈判和产生负外部性的单边控制方面发挥作用，很可能是一个开端。如果建立这种安排，如何使其与现有的国际机构相适应也是一个有趣的问题。
Here, we begin with some theoretical arguments about the creation of international regimes and illustrate the arguments with a focus on the creation of the Short Term Arrangement (STA) and Long Term Arrangement (LTA) Regarding International Trade in Cotton as an example of sectoral regime creation. ^(12){ }^{12} Then we consider whether there might be genuine pressure to create international regimes to manage economic statecraft or whether we will remain in a world of globally unmanaged unilateral controls and bilateral agreements. ^(12){ }^{12} 在这里，我们首先从理论上论证了关于创建国际制度的一些论点，并以创建《关于国际棉花贸易的短期安排》（STA）和《关于国际棉花贸易的长期安排》（LTA）作为创建部门制度的范例来说明这些论点。 ^(12){ }^{12} 然后，我们将考虑是否会出现真正的压力，要求建立国际制度来管理经济国策，或者我们是否将继续处于一个全球无管理的单边控制和双边协议的世界。
4.1 The Supply and Demand of International Regimes: Theory and an Example 4.1 国际制度的供求：理论与实例
The study of international regimes has a long history, particularly in international political economy. Keohane and Nye defined international regimes vaguely ‘as sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of international interdependence as international regimes dots\ldots and dots\ldots networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Aggarwal more precisely defined international regimes as ‘rules and procedures that regulate the negotiation of bilateral agreements and restrict the use of unilateral national controls’ (Aggarwal, 1981, 1983). This definition helps us to think of the creation of international regimes in terms of their supply and demand (Keohane, 1982). 对国际制度的研究由来已久，尤其是在国际政治经济学领域。基欧汉和奈将国际制度模糊地定义为 "影响国际相互依存关系的一系列管理安排，如国际制度 dots\ldots 和 dots\ldots 规则、规范和程序网络，它们规范行为并控制其影响"（基欧汉和奈，1977 年）。阿加瓦尔更精确地将国际制度定义为 "规范双边协议谈判和限制使用单边国家控制的规则和程序"（阿加瓦尔，1981 年，1983 年）。这一定义有助于我们从供求关系的角度来思考国际制度的建立（Keohane，1982 年）。
With respect to their supply, regimes have long been seen as being supplied by a hegemon with the capacity to coordinate international policies (Olson, 1965; Kindleberger, 1973; Gilpin, 1975; Krasner, 1976). Olson argues that hegemons perform this function because states that are powerful relative to others have a greater incentive to organize - and benefit from - the provision of collective goods (Olson, 1965). International systems without a hegemon - fragmented systems - suffer from an under-supply of international regimes (Keohane, 1982). On the demand side, political actors generally demand regimes for three reasons. First, regimes reduce transaction costs, particularly the costs of providing information to participants and of negotiating and implementing individual accords (Keohane, 1984). Second, actors may wish to control the behavior of other international - or domestic - actors through rule-based systems rather than through direct coercion (Aggarwal, 1983). In a domestic context, signing an international agreement may bolster politicians’ ability to reject demands from interest groups. Third, decision-makers may try to bring lower-level (i.e. more specific) arrangements into conformity with broader institutions. This ‘institutional nesting’ discourages actors from participating in arrangements that might undermine broader accords because of their more significant concerns with these higher-level institutions (Aggarwal, 1985). 长期以来，人们一直认为政权是由有能力协调国际政策的霸权国家提供的（Olson，1965；Kindleberger，1973；Gilpin，1975；Krasner，1976）。奥尔森认为，霸权之所以能发挥这一功能，是因为相对于其他国家而言，强大的国家更有动力组织集体物品的提供，并从中获益（奥尔森，1965 年）。没有霸权的国际体系--四分五裂的体系--受到国际制度供给不足的影响（Keohane，1982 年）。在需求方面，政治行为体一般出于三个原因要求建立制度。首先，制度降低了交易成本，尤其是向参与者提供信息以及谈判和执行单个协议的成本（Keohane，1984 年）。其次，行为体可能希望通过基于规则的制度而非直接胁迫来控制其他国际或国内行为体的行为（Aggarwal，1983 年）。在国内，签署一项国际协议可能会增强政治家拒绝利益集团要求的能力。第三，决策者可能会试图使较低层次（即更具体）的安排与更广泛的制度保持一致。这种 "制度嵌套 "会阻止行为体参与可能会破坏更广泛协议的安排，因为他们更关心这些更高层次的制度（Aggarwal，1985 年）。
How might these ideas be seen in practice? In the past seven decades, we have seen numerous examples of supply and demand of international regimes play out in the global economy. In the 1950s, increasing imports of Japanese and Hong Kong textiles and clothing spurred the US, UK, and several European countries to impose unilateral restrictions or negotiate bilateral agreements with exporters. The United States successfully persuaded the Japanese to restrain their exports of cotton textiles and clothing, creating the first post World War II voluntary export restraint and putting export ‘pressure’ on other countries. The UK also managed to have India, Pakistan, and Hong Kong commit to a slower rate of British market penetration. Finally, the continental European countries, by contrast, did not bother with bilateral negotiations: they simply slapped on import quotas against all ‘offending’ less developed country suppliers. In the case of the US, Hong Kong replaced the Japanese given the Voluntary Export Restraint. Yet when the US government sought to restrict imports from Hong Kong, the negotiations failed as larger and smaller exporters had very different interests making it difficult for the US to get a binding commitment. This problem set the stage for the creation of the STA and its successor, the LTA. 如何在实践中看待这些理念？在过去的 70 年里，我们看到了国际制度的供求关系在全球经济中的无数实例。20 世纪 50 年代，日本和香港纺织品和服装的进口不断增加，促使美国、英国和一些欧洲国家实施单边限制措施或与出口商谈判双边协议。美国成功说服日本限制棉纺织品和服装出口，开创了二战后自愿出口限制的先河，并向其他国家施加了出口 "压力"。英国还设法让印度、巴基斯坦和香港承诺放慢英国市场渗透的速度。最后，相比之下，欧洲大陆国家并没有费心进行双边谈判：它们只是对所有 "冒犯 "欠发达国家的供应商实施进口配额。就美国而言，香港取代了日本的自愿出口限制。然而，当美国政府试图限制从香港的进口时，谈判却以失败告终，因为大型出口商和小型出口商的利益截然不同，美国很难获得具有约束力的承诺。这个问题为《贸易协定》及其后继者《长期协议》的诞生埋下了伏笔。
The first step towards an international sector specific regime in textile trade was taken by the Eisenhower Administration in 1959. At that time, the US asked GATT members to work towards developing a system for coping with low-cost imports. On 20 November 1959, GATT participants agreed upon a procedure to deal with ‘market disruption’, the document setting forth the procedure noting that 'useful experience would be gained by taking up a specific case of market disruption in the near future. ^(13){ }^{13} Building on this accord, the outcome of the negotiations among the importing and exporting countries was the STA in 1961 and its successor in 1962, the LTA. This international regime, nested (and housed) within the GATT, proved to be a negotiated outcome that met American goals and constraints. The regime called for guaranteed growth rates in imports of 5%5 \% or negotiated bilateral agreements that could allow more. ^(14){ }^{14} 1959年，艾森豪威尔政府迈出了建立国际纺织品贸易部门特定制度的第一步。当时，美国要求关贸总协定成员努力制定一个应对低成本进口的制度。1959 年 11 月 20 日，关贸总协定的与会者就处理 "市场混乱 "的程序达成一致，规定该程序的文件指出，"在不久的将来处理一个具体的市场混乱案例将获得有益的经验。 ^(13){ }^{13} 在这一协议的基础上，进口国和出口国的谈判成果是 1961 年的《贸易协定》和 1962 年的后续协定--《长期协议》。事实证明，这个嵌套在关贸总协定内的国际制度是一个符合美国目标和制约因素的谈判成果。该制度要求保证 5%5 \% 进口的增长率，或者通过谈判达成双边协议，允许更多的进口。 ^(14){ }^{14} 。
The factors noted above on the demand and supply of regimes proved to be critical as this discussion of the problems in textile trade illustrate. From a demand side perspective, the advent of unilateral and bilateral agreements was raising transaction costs. Negotiating with every new importer would an enormously costly undertaking. From a control perspective, the US Government wished to prevent continued lobbying by the textile and apparel industry that would undermine its broader trade goals. In terms of international control, an international regime would allow the Americans to press for further market opening by the UK and Europeans. Finally, the US was promoting the GATT as the mechanism to free up trade, so nesting the textile regime in the GATT would allow it to keep this broader international regime relatively intact, while allowing for an ‘organized deviation’ from non-discrimination under Article 19. 正如本文对纺织品贸易问题的讨论所表明的那样，上文提到的有关制度供求的因素被证明是至关重要的。从需求方的角度来看，单边和双边协定的出现提高了交易成本。与每一个新的进口商进行谈判都是一项成本巨大的工作。从控制的角度来看，美国政府希望防止纺织服装业继续进行游说，以免破坏其更广泛的贸易目标。在国际控制方面，国际制度将使美国人能够迫使英国和欧洲人进一步开放市场。最后，美国正在推动将关贸总协定作为贸易自由化的机制，因此，将纺织品制度嵌套在关贸总协定中将使美国能够保持这一更广泛的国际制度相对完整，同时允许 "有组织地偏离 "第 19 条规定的非歧视。
In terms of supply, while the US was the hegemonic power both with respect to the overall system and trade, bipolar considerations of countering the Soviet Union led it to be more willing to provide concessions to both allies and developing countries that would be affected by the regime. Simply forcing Japanese and Europeans to accept American demands would not suffice. 在供应方面，虽然美国在整个体系和贸易方面都是霸权国家，但出于对抗苏联的两极考虑，美国更愿意向盟国和受该制度影响的发展中国家提供让步。仅仅强迫日本和欧洲接受美国的要求是不够的。
Does the use of unilateral controls and creation of bilateral agreements that create negative externalities for other countries and for existing international regimes provide a basis for moving toward greater multilateral cooperation? We now explore this question in the current era. 使用单边管制和制定双边协议会给其他国家和现有国际制度带来负面外部效应，这是否为加强多边合作提供了基础？我们现在来探讨当今时代的这一问题。
4.2 Managing Economic Statecraft: Unilateral/Bilateral or Multilateral Cooperation? 4.2 管理经济国策：单边/双边还是多边合作？
Our discussion of economic statecraft focusing on industrial policy, trade measures, and new FDI regulation raises the issue of how countries might cooperate on a multilateral basis to address the external impact of such policies. Drawing on insights from international regime theory, we can consider the demand and supply for an international regime (or regimes) to cope with the impact of economic statecraft. Put succinctly, will we remain in a world of unilateral measures and bilateral accords or one in which actors push for the creation of one or more international regimes? 我们在讨论以产业政策、贸易措施和新的外国直接投资法规为重点的经济国策时，提出了各国如何在多边基础上开展合作以应对此类政策的外部影响这一问题。借鉴国际制度理论的见解，我们可以考虑建立一个（或多个）国际制度以应对经济国策影响的供需关系。简而言之，我们将继续处于一个单边措施和双边协议的世界，还是一个行为者推动建立一个或多个国际制度的世界？
The first scenario is fairly simple. Economic statecraft can be handled as it currently being addressed with unilateral industrial policy, trade restrictions, and the creation of domestic regulations on foreign investment - all in the name of national security. It could also be dealt with on a strictly bilateral basis in which agreements like the US-China Phase One agreements are sui generis - mirroring the strategic arms control agreements between the United States and Soviet Union in the Cold War in which additional parties were viewed as unnecessary. Relevant to US concerns about technology and investment, the agreement obliges China to address intellectual property and concerns surrounding technology transfer - particularly in relation to acquisitions, joint ventures, or other investment transactions. This story reflects both a lack of demand for the creation of a regime to address economic statecraft, and a lack of a hegemonic supplier interested in addressing industrial policy, trade restrictions, and discriminatory investment rules. 第一种情况相当简单。可以按照目前的做法，以国家安全为名，通过单边产业政策、贸易限制和制定针对外国投资的国内法规来处理经济国策。也可以在严格的双边基础上处理经济国策，如中美第一阶段协议--反映了冷战时期美国和苏联之间的战略军备控制协议，认为没有必要增加额外的当事方。对于美国关注的技术和投资问题，该协议规定中国有义务解决知识产权和技术转让问题--尤其是与收购、合资或其他投资交易相关的问题。这个故事既反映了缺乏建立一个制度来解决经济国策的需求，也反映了缺乏一个对解决产业政策、贸易限制和歧视性投资规则感兴趣的霸权供应国。
The second scenario reflects the potential for the development of one or more international regimes to address economic statecraft. One the demand side, existing bilateral and minilateral commitments to address issues of economic statecraft represent transaction costs - in terms of investor-state dispute settlement, for example - that a global regime might address. The impetus to address these costs may increase if aspects of economic statecraft are to be included in the mooted agreement between China and the European Union in which protections for foreign investment and market access represent two key areas of negotiations. 第二种情况反映了发展一种或多种国际制度来解决经济国策问题的可能性。在需求方面，现有的解决经济国策问题的双边和多边承诺代表着交易成本--例如在投资者与国家争端解决方面--全球制度可能会解决这些问题。如果中国与欧盟之间酝酿的协议中包含经济国策的内容，那么解决这些成本问题的动力可能会增加，因为在该协议中，保护外国投资和市场准入是两个关键的谈判领域。
With respect to control, a multilateral accord could offer mechanisms for states party to the regime to control the behavior of international actors to their benefit. Washington, for example, might address forced technology transfer while Beijing could safeguard a market for Huawei and ZTE. A regime may also better regulate the behavior of domestic firms that currently engage in technology transfer that governments often see as detrimental to their interests in return for market access. Currently, for example, the US uses mechanisms such as the Commerce Department’s Bureau for International Security (BIS) to regulate trade and outward foreign direct investment. 在控制方面，多边协议可以为该机制的缔约国提供机制，以控制国际行为体的行为，使其对自己有利。例如，华盛顿可以解决强制技术转让的问题，而北京则可以维护华为和中兴的市场。该机制还可以更好地规范国内企业的行为，因为目前国内企业参与技术转让往往被政府视为有损其利益，以换取市场准入。例如，目前美国利用商务部国际安全局（BIS）等机制来监管贸易和对外直接投资。
An international accord would strengthen the hand of the BIS and decrease lobbying by domestic firms. A key part of the US-China agreement, though not focused on only technology, also is creating critical externalities. Of greatest immediate significance is a Chinese commitment to purchase $200\$ 200 billion of manufactured goods, agricultural products, energy, and services over the next two years, which would naturally come at the expense of exports by other countries. Although from a realist perspective this does not hurt the US, it could raise pressure for an international accord by its allies harmed by such purchases. 国际协议将加强国际清算银行的作用，减少国内企业的游说。中美协议的一个关键部分虽然并非只关注技术，但也在创造关键的外部效应。最直接的意义在于，中国承诺在未来两年内购买 $200\$ 200 十亿美元的制成品、农产品、能源和服务，这自然会牺牲其他国家的出口。虽然从现实主义的角度来看，这不会对美国造成损害，但它可能会使受到此类采购损害的美国盟国面临达成国际协议的压力。
In terms of the demand for consistency with higher-level regimes, under the current US administration, it would be an understatement to say that this pressure has dramatically fallen in significance. Currently the United States has blocked the appointment of judges to the Appellate body of the WTO, and a number of trade measures that it has used are clearly a violation of WTO norms, if not rules. The TRIMs and TRIPs agreements also have not been explicitly addressed in the US-China accord. 就要求与更高级别的制度保持一致而言，在现任美国政府的领导下，如果说这种压力的重要性急剧下降，那也是轻描淡写。目前，美国已经阻止了世贸组织上诉机构法官的任命，它所采取的一些贸易措施明显违反了世贸组织的规范，甚至是规则。与贸易有关的投资措施协议》（TRIMs）和《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》（TRIPs）也没有在中美协议中明确提及。
On the supply side, the situation looks more difficult. Unlike the post-World War II liberal economic order that was led primarily by the US but with some support from the UK, the story of regime creation with two superpower rivals looks more likely to devolve into two spheres of influence with their own institutions as we saw with US-Soviet rivalry. But for now, the current context remains different in that the US and China are highly economically interdependent - a marked difference from the Cold War. Whether Chinese and American firms benefitting from their cross-order economic exchange will be enough of a driving force to promote US-Chinese cooperation in regime creation remains unclear. With the Trump administration promoting decoupling of the US economy from China, and at least some firms looking for alternatives to their high dependence on their Chinese assembly operations, this factor may diminish in importance. The Covid-19 crisis appears to be reinforcing this distancing as well. 在供应方面，情况似乎更加困难。二战后的自由经济秩序主要由美国主导，但也得到了英国的一些支持，与此不同的是，两个超级大国对手建立政权的故事看起来更有可能演变成两个拥有各自机构的势力范围，正如我们在美苏竞争中所看到的那样。但就目前而言，中美两国在经济上高度相互依存，这与冷战时期的情况截然不同。中美两国企业从跨边界经济交流中获益是否足以推动中美在制度创建方面的合作，目前仍不清楚。随着特朗普政府推动美国经济与中国脱钩，至少有一些企业正在寻找替代方案，以摆脱对中国组装业务的高度依赖，这一因素的重要性可能会降低。科威德-19 危机似乎也在加强这种疏远。
Continuing in a scenario vein, what does the integration of economic statecraft into these regimes mean for the broader global economic regime? The institutional design of regimes can vary in terms of a variety of parameters including membership, strength, scope, flexibility (Haas, 1975; Aggarwal, 1985; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001). What are the alternatives for a ‘fit’ with existing international regimes? (Aggarwal, 1998). Here, we can consider three potential regime types that might address issues of economic statecraft. 继续假设，将经济外交纳入这些制度对更广泛的全球经济制度意味着什么？制度设计可能因成员、实力、范围、灵活性等各种参数而异（Haas, 1975; Aggarwal, 1985; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001）。与现有国际制度 "契合 "的替代方案有哪些？(Aggarwal, 1998）。在此，我们可以考虑三种可能解决经济外交问题的潜在制度类型。
The first potential outcome is the modification of the existing WTO to incorporate new issues relating to economic statecraft. At present, as academics have noted, and as US policymakers such as Peter Navarro and Robert Lighthizer under Trump have noted, the WTO has failed to reign in a variety of Chinese industrial policy efforts. ^(15){ }^{15} How might this be done? One approach would be an expansion of the issue scope of the GATT as was done with services as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations that created the WTO. Indeed, we have already seen the introduction of investment and intellectual property issues into the WTO. Of these, the TRIMs agreement has been less impressive than the TRIPs agreement, with the latter having a very significant impact on issues such as the regulation of access to pharmaceutical drugs. Yet, at present, with the end of Doha Round negotiations, this seems to be an unlikely path for the moment. 第一个潜在结果是修改现有的世贸组织，以纳入与经济国策有关的新问题。目前，正如学者们所指出的，也正如特朗普领导下的彼得-纳瓦罗（Peter Navarro）和罗伯特-莱特希泽（Robert Lighthizer）等美国政策制定者所指出的，世贸组织未能遏制中国的各种工业政策努力。 ^(15){ }^{15} 如何做到这一点？一种方法是扩大《关贸总协定》的议题范围，就像创建世贸组织的乌拉圭回合谈判中对服务业所做的那样。事实上，我们已经看到世贸组织引入了投资和知识产权问题。其中，《与贸易有关的投资措施协定》不如《与贸易有关的知识产权协定》令人印象深刻，后者对诸如药品使用权的管理等问题产生了非常重大的影响。然而，目前随着多哈回合谈判的结束，这条路似乎暂时不太可能走通。
Second, one could envisage the creation of sector-specific agreements in investment and intellectual property that would be broken out of the WTO as in the case of the STA/LTA, with a separate modified meta-regime of principles and norms and a different set of rules and procedures. Optimism on this score might come from the successful negotiation of three open sectoral agreements of the Information Technology Agreement, the Financial Services Agreement, and the Basic Telecommunications Agreement (Aggarwal and Ravenhill, 2001). As in the case of the STA/LTA and its successor, the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, this would be an example of nested multilayered regimes. It might also be possible to have the creation of regional approaches as was 其次，我们可以设想在投资和知识产权领域制定针对具体部门的协定，这些协定将脱离世贸组织，就像《科技协定》和《贸易协定》一样，有一个单独的经过修改的元原则和规范制度，以及一套不同的规则和程序。信息技术协议》、《金融服务协议》和《基础电信协议》这三份开放性部门协议的成功谈判可能会使人们对此感到乐观（Aggarwal 和 Ravenhill，2001 年）。与《科技协定》/《贸易协定》及其后续协定《多光纤安排》一样，这也是嵌套多层次制度的一个例子。也有可能建立地区性的方法，例如
underway with the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and the conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement. Here, the fit with the WTO might be looser. 跨太平洋伙伴关系》和《跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴关系》正在进行之中，《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》也已缔结。在这方面，与世界贸易组织的契合可能较为松散。
The final candidate is the creation of an international set of regimes to address economic statecraft on a sectoral basis, which would provide a division of labor or horizontal regimes. In this case, we would see concerns over the need to globally manage of ‘strategic industries’ and ‘frontier technologies’, but each with its individual characteristics. As a result, it is possible that regimes addressing digital technologies, telecommunications, and biotechnology, for example, might be created that are separated from oversight by the WTO. As an example, the Information Technology Agreement 2 and Basic Telecommunications Agreement among others, could exist - independent of the procedures of the WTO rather than being embedded in them. 最后一个候选方案是建立一套国际制度，以部门为基础处理经济国策，这将提供一种分工或横向制度。在这种情况下，我们会看到对全球管理 "战略产业 "和 "前沿技术 "需求的关注，但每个产业和技术都有各自的特点。因此，有可能建立一些制度来处理数字技术、电信和生物技术等问题，这些制度与世贸组织的监督是分开的。例如，《信息技术协定》2 和《基本电信协定》等可以独立于世贸组织的程序而存在，而不是嵌入其中。
5. Case Studies of Economic Statecraft 5.经济外交案例研究
As the contributors to this special issue show, the trends that we have identified both theoretically and in practice are widespread across markets. Indeed, the authors involved in this special issue examine economic statecraft in the United States, China, Japan, India, and elsewhere. 正如本特刊的撰稿人所言，我们在理论上和实践中发现的趋势普遍存在于各个市场。事实上，本特刊的作者们研究了美国、中国、日本、印度和其他国家的经济国策。
The special issue begins with an account of how the United States uses tools of economic statecraft to engage in strategic competition. Linda Weiss notes that the United States has renewed its strategic focus on technological superiority following China’s recent emergence as a credible geopolitical rival. This has reinvigorated US efforts to sustain high-tech leadership as the basis of its military primacy - and has been reflected in civil-military integration for cutting-edge technologies. At the center of these efforts are the defense and defense-related agencies of the national security state (NSS) whose mission is to dominate the new technological frontiers of military power and achieve future competitive advantage. Alongside the quest for breakthroughs in foundational technologies, NSS agencies are seeking to correct long neglected deficiencies in advanced manufacturing, by rebuilding the industrial ecosystem’s supply chains depleted after decades of offshoring. However, unlike its authoritarian rival, Washington faces the challenge of having to balance security imperatives with commercial interests. 特刊首先介绍了美国如何利用经济国策工具参与战略竞争。琳达-魏斯指出，在中国最近成为可信的地缘政治对手之后，美国重新将战略重点放在了技术优势上。这为美国保持高科技领先地位的努力注入了新的活力，而高科技领先地位是美国军事优势的基础--这也反映在尖端技术的军民融合上。这些努力的核心是国家安全机构（NSS）中的国防和国防相关机构，它们的使命是主导军事力量的新技术前沿，实现未来的竞争优势。在寻求基础技术突破的同时，国家安全机构还在努力纠正先进制造业中长期被忽视的缺陷，重建经过数十年离岸外包而耗尽的工业生态系统供应链。然而，与独裁对手不同，华盛顿面临的挑战是必须在安全需要与商业利益之间取得平衡。
Seung-Youn Oh, in turn, examines the global and regional implications of China’s revitalized state capitalism model through the sectoral lens of the Chinese automotive industry, which stands at the intersection of both traditional and green industrial policy. Starting as a cautious participant in the WTO, China has moved rapidly along the learning curve to skillfully navigate the system and create spaces for its industrial policy objectives to prop up local and national champions. It shifts policy measures to simply comply with the WTO rulings and to adopt other measures with similar effects that prioritize sectoral development. While China’s gaming of the WTO system fostered domestic growth in Chinese companies with protections from fierce foreign competitions, key initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative link purchasing diplomacy with the opening up of overseas markets to develop Chinese players into global champions. In addition to the use of economic leverage to induce positive behaviors, Beijing is increasingly unafraid of resorting to exclusionary diplomacy. This provides political justifications for discrimination against foreign competitors in the Chinese market while moving forward with the industrial upgrading of domestic players. Seung-Youn Oh 则通过中国汽车产业的行业视角，探讨了中国振兴后的国家资本主义模式对全球和地区的影响，因为中国汽车产业是传统产业政策和绿色产业政策的交汇点。从谨慎地加入世贸组织开始，中国沿着学习曲线迅速前进，巧妙地驾驭着这一体系，并为其产业政策目标创造空间，以扶持地方和国家的领军企业。中国转变了政策措施，不再单纯遵守世贸组织的裁决，而是采取其他具有类似效果的措施，优先考虑部门发展。中国对世贸组织体系的博弈促进了中国企业的国内发展，保护其免受激烈的外国竞争，而 "一带一路 "倡议等关键举措则将采购外交与开放海外市场联系起来，将中国企业发展成为全球冠军。除了利用经济杠杆诱导积极行为，中国政府也越来越不惧怕诉诸排外外交。这为在中国市场上歧视外国竞争者提供了政治理由，同时也推动了国内企业的产业升级。
When linked together, these factors - all byproducts of China’s approach to state-led capitalism - combine to weaponize trade, disrupt global supply chains, and dampen confidence in economic interdependence. Along with authoritarian institutions and assertive nationalism, Beijing is likely to resort to coercive economic measures to advance its strategic goals. The political risks will also increase as Chinese companies catch up with rivals and achieve technological self-sufficiency under Beijing’s heavy subsidization and favorable industrial policies. As much as China plays the liberal trading system to its own advantage, it is important to note that China has achieved its large and growing share of global trade because of its participation in the global 这些因素都是中国以国家为主导的资本主义的副产品，当它们联系在一起时，就会使贸易武器化，扰乱全球供应链，削弱人们对经济相互依存的信心。除了威权体制和自信的民族主义，中国政府还可能采取胁迫性经济措施来推进其战略目标。随着中国企业在中国政府的大量补贴和优惠的产业政策下赶超对手，实现技术自给自足，政治风险也将随之增加。尽管中国利用自由贸易体系为自己谋利，但必须指出的是，中国之所以能在全球贸易中占据巨大且不断增长的份额，是因为中国参与了全球贸易体系。
economy, not despite it. China’s state-led capitalism partly contributed to the global turn toward protectionism and Washington’s pivot to unilateralism, but it is the Chinese economy that bleeds significantly due to the clouded prospects of further trade liberalization. 而不是尽管如此。中国国家主导的资本主义在一定程度上促成了全球转向保护主义和华盛顿转向单边主义。
Expanding on the analysis of the United States and a rising China, Kristi Govella examines the question of how middle powers have used economic statecraft to cope with the emergence of strategic competition between the US and China through an analysis of Japanese policy from the end of World War II to the present. By tracing the evolution of three different tools of Japanese economic statecraft - trade arrangements, official development assistance, and dual-use technology - she demonstrates that economic levers have long been important to Japan’s attempts to shape its surroundings, particularly due to constitutional constraints on its use of military power. 克里斯蒂-戈维拉（Kristi Govella）在对美国和崛起中的中国进行分析的基础上，通过对二战结束至今日本政策的分析，探讨了中等强国如何利用经济国策应对中美之间出现的战略竞争这一问题。通过追溯日本经济国策的三种不同工具--贸易安排、官方发展援助和军民两用技术--的演变，她证明了经济杠杆长期以来对日本塑造周边环境的努力非常重要，特别是由于宪法对其使用军事力量的限制。
Govella argues that the rise of China in the 2000s and the escalation of US-China competition in the 2010s have led Japan to respond by adapting its existing use of economic statecraft to simultaneously balance against China and stabilize the international order. First, Japan attempted to maintain continuity by supporting the multilateral trading system and by championing the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership after its abandonment by the United States. Second, Japan has responded to Chinese assertiveness in the region by using its official development assistance to stabilize and build defense capacity in Southeast and South Asian countries to enable them to resist Chinese influence. Third, increasing competition from China in the domain of outer space has led Japan to militarize its substantial suite of dual-use technologies, quietly augmenting its capabilities in ways that have strategic relevance for the country’s security in other domains. Govella’s case studies highlight the fact that while Japan is employing economic statecraft in some traditional ways, its use of dual-use technology in particular reflects the changing nature of the economic tools at states’ disposal, suggesting the need to evaluate the emergence of a new economic statecraft. Govella认为，2000年代中国的崛起和2010年代中美竞争的升级促使日本通过调整其现有的经济国策来同时平衡中国和稳定国际秩序。首先，日本试图通过支持多边贸易体系和在美国放弃全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定后支持该协定来保持连续性。其次，针对中国在该地区的强硬态度，日本利用其官方发展援助来稳定东南亚和南亚国家的局势并建设防卫能力，使其能够抵御中国的影响。第三，中国在外空领域日益激烈的竞争促使日本将其大量军民两用技术军事化，悄无声息地增强自身能力，这对日本在其他领域的安全具有战略意义。戈维拉的案例研究强调了这样一个事实，即虽然日本正在以某些传统方式运用经济国策，但其对军民两用技术的使用尤其反映了国家所掌握的经济工具的性质正在发生变化，这表明有必要对新经济国策的出现进行评估。
Govella demonstrates that while middle powers like Japan may not have the ability to compete in the same manner as great powers, they have significant material and diplomatic resources at their disposal that can be mobilized in response to changes in the international environment. Her findings support existing literature that has shown that middle powers favor multilateral institutions and other diplomatic tools that enable them to mediate the vagaries of great power politics and reduce instability in the international system. Japan’s economic statecraft has primarily used its economic tools to positively bolster relationships that serve to counter China, instead of taking punitive or retaliatory actions that undermine liberal economic norms. Importantly, Govella suggests that the economic strategies of middle powers such as Japan must be taken into account in order to fully understand the multiple forces that are struggling to reshape the international order. 戈维拉证明，虽然像日本这样的中等强国可能没有能力以大国的方式参与竞争，但它们拥有大量的物质和外交资源，可以被调动起来应对国际环境的变化。她的研究结果支持了现有的文献，这些文献表明，中等强国青睐多边机构和其他外交工具，这使它们能够调解大国政治的变幻莫测，减少国际体系的不稳定性。日本的经济国策主要是利用其经济工具来积极巩固与中国的关系，而不是采取破坏自由经济准则的惩罚性或报复性行动。重要的是，戈维拉认为，要充分理解正在努力重塑国际秩序的多种力量，就必须考虑到日本等中等强国的经济战略。
Amitendu Palit, similarly, assesses India’s ambition of playing a prominent role in regional and global affairs that has been particularly visible since the assumption of office by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May of 2014. With Modi reelection for a second term in office in 2019, expectations regarding India’s prominence in global affairs remain high. Such expectations, though, need to be realistically calibrated in the backdrop of India’s external trade policy. Driven by domestic politics, India’s trade policy has become conspicuously inward and disengaging, which contrasts with the signals conveyed by its foreign policy. 阿米坦杜-帕利特（Amitendu Palit）同样对印度在地区和全球事务中发挥突出作用的雄心壮志进行了评估，这种雄心壮志在印度总理纳伦德拉-莫迪 2014 年 5 月上任后尤为明显。随着莫迪在 2019 年再次当选连任，人们对印度在全球事务中发挥突出作用的期望仍然很高。不过，这种期望需要在印度对外贸易政策的背景下进行现实的调整。在国内政治的驱动下，印度的贸易政策变得明显内向和脱离实际，这与其外交政策所传达的信号形成了鲜明对比。
The progressive and proactive role India wants to play on the global stage demands a strong and engaging foreign policy including commitment to addressing major global concerns. India is seen to be doing so on climate change and sustainable development. But on trade it continues to remain affected by hesitation and cynicism arising from mindsets shaped by resistance to competition. Lack of political support for trade along with unfamiliarity with modern trade issues also contributes to the tendency to disengage. 印度希望在全球舞台上扮演积极进取的角色，这就要求其外交政策强有力且具有吸引力，包括致力于解决重大的全球问题。在气候变化和可持续发展方面，印度正在这样做。但在贸易方面，印度仍然受到因抵制竞争而形成的心态所导致的犹豫不决和冷嘲热讽的影响。缺乏对贸易的政治支持以及对现代贸易问题的不熟悉也助长了印度的脱离倾向。
Palit’s article probes factors determining the tendency of India’s trade policies to turn inward and disengage from trade negotiations. These include the relative lack of competitiveness of its 帕利特的文章探讨了决定印度贸易政策转向内向和脱离贸易谈判趋势的因素。这些因素包括印度相对缺乏竞争力。
domestic industry compared with economies that have made rapid progress in exports and captured large shares of world markets; the absence of influential domestic lobby groups and constituencies that benefit from trade and can pressurize the government to pursue a liberal trade policy agenda; and, finally, a distinct unfamiliarity and discomfort in dealing with modern generation trade agreements that contain several complex issues. 与那些在出口方面取得快速发展并在世界市场上占有较大份额的经济体相比，这些国家的国内工业发展缓慢；缺乏有影响力的国内游说团体和选民，而这些团体和选民从贸易中获益，并能向政府施压，以推行自由贸易政策议程；最后，在处理包含多个复杂问题的现代贸易协定时，这些国家明显感到不熟悉和不适应。
The final two papers consider what might be done to address the challenges faced by the liberal trade regime. 最后两篇论文探讨了如何应对自由贸易体制所面临的挑战。
Existing accounts of the Sino-US rivalry often privilege actions and statements by leaders in national capitals. This perspective overlooks the role that sub-national authorities can play, either acting independently or complementing national policies. Drawing from the existing literature, available data sources, and statements by private sector participants, Simon Evenett characterizes and assesses the role that US sub-national agencies have played as subsidizers of firms located in their jurisdictions. Interestingly, and complementing the paper by Oh, Evenett finds that the automobile sector is a frequent recipient of local government largesse in the United States. US criticisms of the lack of transparency of Chinese sub-national subsidy regimes have equal force when American sub-national government comes under scrutiny. The most commonly used form of subsidy used by US cities and states are tax breaks and many jurisdictions are not fulfilling their national obligations to report transparently. Furthermore, while American local subsidization occurs, it is far from clear they are following Washington DC’s lead, which is ironic because the same point is made about the relationship between Beijing and its sub-national levels of government. The conclusion that the criticisms of Chinese sub-national regime by the United States also applies at home is difficult to avoid. 现有关于中美竞争的论述往往偏重于国家首都领导人的行动和声明。这种观点忽视了国家以下各级政府可以发挥的作用，它们可以独立行事，也可以补充国家政策。西蒙-埃文尼特（Simon Evenett）从现有文献、可用数据来源和私营部门参与者的声明中汲取营养，描述并评估了美国次国家机构作为其管辖范围内企业的补贴者所扮演的角色。有趣的是，埃文尼特发现，汽车行业是美国地方政府补贴的频繁接受者。美国对中国国家以下各级补贴制度缺乏透明度的批评，在美国国家以下各级政府接受审查时同样具有说服力。美国各市和各州最常用的补贴形式是税收减免，而许多辖区并没有履行透明报告的国家义务。此外，虽然美国的地方补贴时有发生，但很难看出他们是在效仿华盛顿特区的做法，这一点很具有讽刺意味，因为同样的观点也适用于北京与其国家以下各级政府之间的关系。美国对中国国家以下各级政府的批评同样适用于中国国内，这一结论难以避免。
Cohen and Rogers, on the other hand, focus on the potential for an intellectual property regime to re-invigorate the existing global economic order. They note that through legislative changes, tariff wars and executive actions, the Trump Administration has injected a new urgency into international technology and supply chain management, particularly between the United States and China. Analytically, the situation invites a perspective that links practical/ on-the-ground responses by commercial actors to the politics of technological competition between superpowers. Cohen and Rogers approach the management of supply chain disruption in terms of a key security issue motivating recent changes to the trade environment: the protection of intellectual property. After reviewing critical policy developments on both sides of the Pacific in conjunction with recent trade statistics, they turn to a discussion of the opportunity that intellectual property licensing provides for managing supply chain linkages between the United States and China. Viewing intellectual property as both a driver and a solution of trade difficulties highlights the sorts of cross-jurisdictional nuances that can better inform policy and business decisions in the broader international trade regime. 科恩和罗杰斯则关注知识产权制度重新激活现有全球经济秩序的潜力。他们指出，通过立法改革、关税战和行政行动，特朗普政府为国际技术和供应链管理注入了新的紧迫性，尤其是在美国和中国之间。从分析角度看，这种情况需要一种视角，将商业参与者的实际/实地应对措施与超级大国之间的技术竞争政治联系起来。科恩和罗杰斯从促使近期贸易环境发生变化的一个关键安全问题--知识产权保护--出发，探讨了供应链中断的管理问题。在结合最近的贸易统计数据回顾了太平洋两岸的重要政策发展之后，他们转而讨论了知识产权许可为管理中美之间的供应链联系所提供的机遇。将知识产权视为贸易困难的驱动力和解决方案，可以突出跨司法管辖区的细微差别，从而更好地为更广泛的国际贸易体制中的政策和商业决策提供信息。
In doing so, their paper looks to enhance perspectives on solutions to trade tensions in both a bilateral and multilateral context. By noting the IP intensitivity of supply chains, they promote further research on how intellectual property licensing vis-a-vis supply chains could promote a sort of regulatory arbitrage as opportunistic actors look to other markets with robust licensing regimes that go well beyond minimum requirements of the TRIPS Agreement. 在此过程中，他们的论文着眼于在双边和多边背景下提高解决贸易紧张局势的视角。通过指出供应链的知识产权敏感性，他们推动进一步研究供应链的知识产权许可如何会促进某种监管套利，因为机会主义行为者会将目光投向拥有远超《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》最低要求的健全许可制度的其他市场。
Taken together, the articles in this special issue suggest that there is a need to look beyond the existing economic conflagration between Washington and Beijing to understand the intricacies of the challenges faced by the existing international trade regime - and that for the regime to be saved, we might need to consider new answers to both new and old problems. 综合来看，本特刊中的文章表明，有必要超越华盛顿和北京之间现有的经济冲突，来理解现有国际贸易体制所面临的错综复杂的挑战--要想挽救这一体制，我们可能需要考虑新老问题的新答案。
The analyses in this special issue also suggest that the links between global economic consideration and international security are growing more, rather than less, important. As a result, the special issue provides support for the contention that further work examining the political economy of security is warranted and points to a research agenda that considers the role of firms, governments, and multilateral institutions to address this changing environment. 本特刊的分析还表明，全球经济考量与国际安全之间的联系越来越重要，而不是越来越不重要。因此，本特刊为以下论点提供了支持，即有必要进一步研究安全的政治经济学，并指出研究议程应考虑企业、政府和多边机构的作用，以应对这一不断变化的环境。
Acknowledgement. For research assistance we would like to thank Tim Marple, Ishana Ratan, and Philip Rogers. Aggarwal would like to thank the Ministry of Education and the National Research Foundation of the Republic of Korea (NRF-2017S1A3A2067636) for research support. Both of us are grateful for the support of the UC National Laboratory Fees Research Program. 致谢。感谢蒂姆-马普尔、伊莎娜-拉坦和菲利普-罗杰斯为我们的研究提供帮助。Aggarwal 感谢大韩民国教育部和国家研究基金会（NRF-2017S1A3A2067636）的研究支持。我们两人都感谢加州大学国家实验室费用研究计划的支持。
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Cite this article: Aggarwal VK, Reddie AW (2021). Economic Statecraft in the 21st Century: Implications for the Future of the Global Trade Regime. World Trade Review 20, 137-151. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474562000049X 《引用本文：Aggarwal VK, Reddie AW (2021).21 世纪的经济外交：对全球贸易体制未来的影响》。World Trade Review 20, 137-151.https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474562000049X
^(2){ }^{2} All three sets of measures reflect empirical examples of what Farrell and Newman theorize as weaponized interdependence: Farrell and Newman (2019). ^(2){ }^{2} 这三套措施都反映了法雷尔和纽曼理论中武器化相互依存的经验实例：法雷尔和纽曼（2019 年）。 ^(3){ }^{3} The grand strategy literature also acknowledges the economic aspects of national policy-making, even if much of the literature remains focused on military capabilities and objectives. Goldstein (2005), for example, describes grand strategy as ‘the distinctive combination of military, political, and economic means by which a state seeks to ensure its national interests’. ^(3){ }^{3} 大战略文献也承认国家政策制定的经济方面，尽管大部分文献仍侧重于军事能力和目标。例如，Goldstein（2005）将大战略描述为 "一个国家寻求确保其国家利益的军事、政治和经济手段的独特组合"。
^(4){ }^{4} These scholars also emphasize the systemic processes that facilitate innovation rather than single purpose products with limited civilian applications: Bracken et al. (2005); Cheung (2011). ^(4){ }^{4} 这些学者还强调了促进创新的系统过程，而不是民用用途有限的单一目的产品：Bracken 等人（2005 年）；Cheung（2011 年）。 ^(5){ }^{5} For the case in question, see Panel Report, Russia - Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (Russia-Traffic in Transit), WT/DS512/R. ^(5){ }^{5} 关于本案，见专家组报告，俄罗斯--过境运输措施（俄罗斯--过境运输），WT/DS512/R.。 ^(6){ }^{6} See the discussion by Mastanduno (1991) who examines arguments about national security and industrial policy in the context of responding to Japan’s economic policies. ^(6){ }^{6} 参见 Mastanduno（1991 年）的讨论，他在回应日本经济政策的背景下研究了有关国家安全和产业政策的论点。
^(7){ }^{7} A Franco-German Manifesto for a European Industrial Policy Fit for the 21st Century’, 2019. ^(7){ }^{7} 《法德关于适合 21 世纪的欧洲工业政策的宣言》，2019 年。 ^(8){ }^{8} For an in-depth discussion of the use industrial policy by US policy-makers, see Aggarwal and Reddie, 2018. ^(8){ }^{8} 有关美国决策者使用产业政策的深入讨论，请参见 Aggarwal 和 Reddie，2018.。 ^(9){ }^{9} See Aggarwal and Aggarwal (2016), for an analytical review of the political and economic benefits and costs of industrial policy. ^(9){ }^{9} 参见 Aggarwal 和 Aggarwal (2016)，对产业政策的政治和经济效益及成本进行了分析回顾。 ^(10){ }^{10} See CRS, 2019, for a detailed discussion of these measures. ^(10){ }^{10} 有关这些措施的详细讨论，请参见 CRS, 2019。 ^(11){ }^{11} There is some ambiguity regarding the provisions in Article XIX with respect to the need to apply safeguards on a Most-Favored Nation basis and the question of compensation (Ginzburg, 1992; Pickard and Kimble, 2007). The Trump administration has chosen the interpretation most favorable to its actions to avoid both MFN and compensation. ^(11){ }^{11} 第 XIX 条中关于在最惠国基础上适用保障措施的必要性和补偿问题的规定存在一些模糊之处（Ginzburg，1992 年；Pickard 和 Kimble，2007 年）。特朗普政府选择了对其行动最有利的解释，以避免最惠国待遇和补偿。
^(12){ }^{12} Although the Information Technology, Basic Telecom Agreement, and Financial Services Agreements are also examples of sectoral accords under the WTO (Aggarwal and Ravenhill, 2001), the STA/LTA provide better insight into the driving factors for a regime. ^(12){ }^{12} 虽然《信息技术协议》、《基础电信协议》和《金融服务协议》也是世贸组织下部门协议的范例（Aggarwal 和 Ravenhill，2001 年），但《科技协议》/《贸易协定》更能让我们深入了解制度的驱动因素。
^(13){ }^{13} New York Times, 20 November 1959, p. 9. ^(13){ }^{13} 《纽约时报》，1959 年 11 月 20 日，第 9 页。 ^(14){ }^{14} This international regime morphed in the Multifiber Arrangement in 1974 and was eventually phased as part the Uruguay Round negotiations in 2005. ^(14){ }^{14} 这一国际制度在 1974 年演变为《多纤维安排》，并最终在 2005 年作为乌拉圭回合谈判的一部分分阶段实施。
^(15){ }^{15} For an examination of the problems that the WTO has faced in constraining economic statecraft measures and the need for reforms, see Evenett and Vines, 2012 and Aggarwal and Evenett, 2014. ^(15){ }^{15} 有关世界贸易组织在限制经济国策措施方面所面临的问题以及改革必要性的研究，请参阅 Evenett 和 Vines，2012 年以及 Aggarwal 和 Evenett，2014 年。