Who Has the Power? Decision Making and Urban Regimes
谁拥有权力？决策与城市制度

Abstract 摘要

“Who has the power in local government?” This question is significant because it enables us to look behind the formal structures of local government and discern the roles of less visible political actors. We can ascertain if there are people and organizations behind the scenes who play an important role in the decision-making process. Furthermore, an understanding of the decision-making process in local government can tell us how democratic or fair the city is in allocating its resources. If the political process appears to respond to a small number of influential business executives representing the corporate elite, then it is a relatively closed political system responding to the few. If, on the other hand, the system appears to be open and responsive to a range of diverse interests, then it is considered more democratic. As we shall see, the question of “who holds the powers?” is a hotly debated topic in the field of urban politics. There is no agreement among academicians as to who has the power to get what they want in the local arena.
"谁掌握着地方政府的权力？这个问题意义重大，因为它使我们能够看到地方政府正式结构的背后，并辨别不太显眼的政治行为者的作用。我们可以确定是否有幕后人员和组织在决策过程中发挥了重要作用。此外，对地方政府决策过程的了解可以告诉我们该城市在分配资源时的民主或公平程度。如果政治程序似乎只对代表企业精英的少数有影响力的企业高管做出回应，那么这就是一个相对封闭的政治体系，只对少数人做出回应。反之，如果这个系统看起来是开放的，能够对各种不同的利益做出反应，那么它就被认为是更加民主的。正如我们将看到的，"谁掌握着权力？"这个问题是城市政治领域争论的热点。对于谁有权力在地方舞台上获得他们想要的东西，学术界的看法并不一致。

\section*{THE SOCIOLOGIST’S APPROACH:} THE DISCOVERY OF A POWER ELITE After decades of field research, sociologists found that in the cities they studied, business elites controlled the decision-making process. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, two Columbia University sociologists, Helen and Robert Lynd, published their pioneering studies in the field of urban decision making. Their books, Middletown and Middletown in Transition, were the result of several years of field research in Muncie, Indiana. $^{.}$ By the time Middletown in Transition was published, it was clear from the Lynds’ research that Middletown was controlled, in all important respects, by the “X Family.” A business elite ran the community, and the X Family dominated that elite.
\社会学家的研究方法权力精英的发现经过数十年的实地研究，社会学家发现，在他们研究的城市中，商业精英控制着决策过程。20 世纪 20 年代末和 30 年代初，哥伦比亚大学的两位社会学家海伦-林德（Helen Lynd）和罗伯特-林德（Robert Lynd）发表了他们在城市决策领域的开创性研究。他们的著作《米德尔敦》（Middletown）和《转型中的米德尔敦》（Middletown in Transition）是他们在印第安纳州曼希进行多年实地研究的成果。 $^{.}$ 在《转型中的米德尔敦》出版时，林德夫妇的研究已经清楚地表明，米德尔敦在所有重要方面都被 "X 家族 "所控制。一个商业精英管理着这个社区，而 X 家族则主宰着这个精英阶层。

The Lynds’ work inspired a new interest in power studies, not just in the power structures of local communities but also in the power structure of the nation as a whole. Over the years numerous power structure studies were undertaken. The possibility that the entire nation might be ruled by a power elite was advanced by researchers such as C. Wright Mills and G. William Domhoff.

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林德夫妇的工作激发了人们对权力研究的新兴趣，不仅研究地方社区的权力结构，还研究整个国家的权力结构。多年来，对权力结构的研究层出不穷。C. Wright Mills 和 G. William Domhoff 等研究人员提出了整个国家可能由权力精英统治的可能性。

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One of the most influential studies to arrive at elitist conclusions has unquestionably been Community Power Structure, Floyd Hunter’s famous analysis of decision makers in Atlanta.

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Published in 1953, the Hunter investigation has served as the archetype for a whole school of community power studies. Because of the overriding importance of Hunter’s study of “Regional City” (Hunter’s pseudonym for Atlanta), its main findings warrant summarization.
弗洛伊德-亨特（Floyd Hunter）对亚特兰大决策者的著名分析报告《社区权力结构》（Community Power Structure）无疑是得出精英主义结论的最有影响力的研究之一。

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亨特的调查报告发表于 1953 年，是整个社区权力研究流派的原型。由于亨特对 "地区城市"（亨特对亚特兰大的化名）的研究极为重要，其主要发现值得总结。

Hunter’s first task was to find out who in Atlanta held power. In order to pursue this question, he employed the reputational approach. Hunter interviewed persons in prominent positions in four groups assumed to have power connections. These groups were business, government, civic associations, and “society.” The leaders of these groups then provided Hunter with lists of persons presumed to have power in community affairs. Hunter then used a system of “judges” and self-selection to determine leadership rank; some forty persons in the top levels of power were identified from more than 175 names. Eleven of these top forty influentials were directly associated with the activities of large commercial enterprises. Seven more were in banking and investment.
亨特的首要任务是找出亚特兰大的掌权者。为了解决这个问题，他采用了声誉法。亨特采访了四个假定拥有权力关系的群体中的重要人物。这四个群体分别是企业、政府、民间协会和 "社会"。然后，这些团体的领导人向亨特提供了据推测在社区事务中拥有权力的人员名单。然后，亨特利用 "评委 "和自我选择系统来确定领导级别；从 175 多个名字中确定了约 40 位最高权力级别的人物。在这 40 位有影响力的高层人士中，有 11 位与大型商业企业的活动直接相关。另有 7 人从事银行和投资业。

These top leaders tend to have expensive offices, frequent similar social clubs, and reside in the best residential districts of the city. These persons are dominant economically and influential politically when they want to be. These leaders are apprehensive of social change. They accept the reports of planning experts but make sure that the reports gather dust in agency files. In short, the recommended programs are stopped before any implementation can be undertaken. On the most important issues, the policymakers are united, and this is a reason for their collective strength.
这些高层领导往往拥有昂贵的办公室，经常出入类似的社交俱乐部，居住在城市最好的住宅区。这些人在经济上占主导地位，在政治上有影响力。这些领导者对社会变革心存顾虑。他们接受规划专家的报告，但确保这些报告在机构档案中蒙尘。总之，建议的计划还没来得及实施，就被制止了。在最重要的问题上，决策者是团结一致的，这也是他们集体力量的一个原因。

Hunter’s overall conclusion is clear and unequivocal; Atlanta is a city dominated by a private business elite. It is a conclusion that he essentially reaffirms in his “revisit” to Atlanta published in 1980.

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亨特的总体结论清晰明确：亚特兰大是一座由私营企业精英主导的城市。他在 1980 年出版的《重访亚特兰大》一书中基本重申了这一结论。

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Hunter’s work triggered scores of decision-making studies by sociologists over the next few years. These studies of local government were remarkably similar in their methodology and findings. Using a reputational approach-asking people to identify who they think are the most important decision makers-they have almost without exception found an elitist governing structure heavily populated by prominent business executives. This pyramidal power structure is often referred to as the power elite.
亨特的研究成果引发了社会学家在接下来的几年里对决策问题的大量研究。这些关于地方政府的研究在方法和结论上都极为相似。他们采用声誉法--让人们找出他们认为最重要的决策者--几乎无一例外地发现了一个由著名企业高管组成的精英治理结构。这种金字塔式的权力结构通常被称为权力精英。

A POLITICAL SCIENCE APPROACH: THE DISCOVERY OF PLURALISM
政治学方法：多元化的发现

The elitist model of local government has been challenged by a school of political scientists, who have charged that power is not as concentrated, nor decision making as closed, as the sociologists concluded. These political scientists attack the elitist theorists for an ideological blindness that predetermines their findings. These political scientists also attack the elitist studies for producing faulty conclusions as a result of faulty methodology.

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精英主义的地方政府模式受到了一派政治学家的质疑，他们认为权力并不像社会学家所断定的那样集中，决策也不像社会学家所断定的那样封闭。这些政治学家抨击精英理论家在意识形态上的盲目性预先决定了他们的研究结果。这些政治学家还攻击精英主义研究因方法错误而得出错误结论。

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Nelson Polsby, for instance, sees more conflict in Middletown than the Lynds admit in their conclusions. Polsby further scores the Lynds for advancing nondisconfirmable propositions; whenever evidence is raised that the city’s elite failed to get its way, the Lynds dismiss the issue in question as not important to the elite. Polsby also attacks Hunter for asking questions that presuppose the existence of an elite and for ignoring evidence that shows that Atlanta’s decision makers were constrained in their operations. Polsby sees more heterogeneity and differences of opinion among Atlanta’s top-identified decision makers than Hunter admits.

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例如，尼尔森-波尔斯比（Nelson Polsby）认为米德尔敦的冲突比林德夫妇在结论中承认的要多。波尔斯比还对林德夫妇提出的无法证实的命题进行了打分；每当有证据表明该市的精英阶层未能如愿时，林德夫妇就会认为有关问题对精英阶层并不重要而予以驳回。波尔斯比还攻击亨特提出的问题预先假定了精英阶层的存在，并且忽略了显示亚特兰大决策者在运作中受到限制的证据。波尔斯比认为，亚特兰大高层决策者之间的异质性和意见分歧比亨特承认的要多。

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More generally, the sociologists were attacked for confusing reputation with reality. By asking local experts to identify individuals they consider to be persons of power, the sociologists uncovered only those who in a community had the reputation for being powerful, not those who definitely exercised control over a city’s affairs. Reputations could be based on misinformation and local mythology; those with the reputation for power might not possess anywhere near as much influence as the common wisdom attributes to them. According to Polsby and others in the school of thought that came to be known as pluralism, research based solely on reputations is insufficient to the task of studying community power. Instead, researchers must focus on behavior; they must investigate the making of important decisions in a community and document who in reality influences those decisions.
更笼统地说，社会学家被抨击为混淆了声誉与现实。社会学家要求当地专家找出他们认为有权势的人，他们发现的只是那些在社区中声名显赫的人，而不是那些对城市事务有绝对控制权的人。这些声誉可能是基于错误信息和地方神话；那些享有权力声誉的人可能并不像人们普遍认为的那样拥有那么大的影响力。根据波尔斯比和后来被称为多元化学派的其他人的观点，仅仅基于声誉的研究不足以完成研究社区权力的任务。相反，研究人员必须关注行为；他们必须调查社区重要决策的制定情况，并记录谁在现实中影响了这些决策。

Of the many decision-making studies that have employed a behavioral methodology and come to a pluralist conclusion, Who Governs?, Robert Dahl’s 1960 study of New Haven, Connecticut, has been the most influential.

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Dahl begins by noting that in any American democratic political system-including that of New Haven-wealth, social position, and other political resources are unequally distributed. Yet to observe that people do not equally share power is not necessarily to imply that a power elite rules a community; it is only the beginning from which to study the distribution of power in a community.
罗伯特-达尔（Robert Dahl）于1960年对康涅狄格州纽黑文（New Haven）进行了研究，在众多采用行为学方法并得出多元主义结论的决策研究中，《谁在治理？

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达尔首先指出，在任何美国民主政治体制中--包括纽黑文的民主政治体制--财富、社会地位和其他政治资源的分配都是不平等的。然而，观察到人们没有平等地分享权力并不一定意味着一个社区是由权力精英统治的；这只是研究社区权力分配的一个开端。

Is power in a community concentrated in one set of hands? Or are different power resources dispersed among different sets of hands? As Dahl phrases it, it is necessary to discover whether “inequalities in resources of influence” are “cumulative’ or ‘noncumulative’”:
一个社区的权力是否集中在一组人手中？还是不同的权力资源分散在不同的人手中？正如达尔所说，有必要了解 "影响力资源的不平等 "是 "累积性的 "还是 "非累积性的"：

That is, are people who are better off in one resource also better off in others? In other words, does the way in which political resources are distributed encourage oligarchy or pluralism?s
也就是说，在一种资源上更富裕的人是否在其他资源上也更富裕？换句话说，政治资源的分配方式是鼓励寡头政治还是多元化？

According to Dahl, power inequalities were cumulative in New Haven society prior to industrialization; preindustrial New Haven was ruled by a closed elite set of economic notables. But industrialization and immigration acted to disperse wealth and voting power. New business entrepreneurs gained money; the immigrants possessed numbers, which was an important resource at the ballot box. As a result, New Haven was transformed from a system of elite domination to a system under which power resources were quite a bit more widely shared, albeit still unequally. Plumealism denotes this latter situation where many groups possess effective power resources.
Dahl 认为，在工业化之前，纽黑文社会的权力不平等是累积性的；工业化前的纽黑文由一群封闭的经济名流精英统治。但工业化和移民分散了财富和投票权。新的商业企业家获得了资金；移民拥有了人数，这是投票箱中的重要资源。因此，纽黑文从一个精英统治的体系转变为一个权力资源共享更为广泛的体系，尽管仍然不平等。翎毛主义指的就是后一种情况，即许多群体拥有有效的权力资源。

Dahl studies the making of decisions in three key issue-areas: political nominations, urban redevelopment, and public education. Dahl observes that only a small number of persons or leaders have direct influence “in the sense that they successfully initiate or veto proposals for policies.” Such a finding might seem to indicate that New Haven was still ruled by an elite few. But Dahl finds that the larger citizenry, while refraining from direct political involvement, still retains considerable indirect influence as a result of democratic norms and the elections process.

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As decisions in each of the three key issue-areas require the assent of local government officials and officials who pursue unpopular courses of action can be denied reelection, elections are a particularly potent weapon in ensuring that decision makers anticipate the public’s concerns.
达尔研究了三个关键问题领域的决策制定：政治提名、城市重建和公共教育。达尔注意到，只有少数人或领导人具有直接影响力，"即他们成功地发起或否决了政策提案"。这一发现似乎表明纽黑文仍由少数精英统治。但 Dahl 发现，广大市民虽然没有直接参与政治，但由于民主规范和选举程序的存在，他们仍然保持着相当大的间接影响力。

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由于三个关键问题领域的决策都需要当地政府官员的同意，而采取不受欢迎的行动方针的官员可能会被剥夺连任的机会，因此选举是确保决策者预见公众关切的一个特别有力的武器。

Dahl also finds that power is not concentrated in the hands of one small elite group. Instead, there is a specialization of iniluence under which different groups of leaders dominate decision making in different issue-areas. Of the fifty persons identified as leaders in the three issueareas, only three “initiated or vetoed policies in more than one issuearea.”

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These were the two mayors, William Celantano and Richard Lee, and the redevelopment director, Edward Logue-public officials all subject to the indirect influence that voters possess. Leaders and subleaders did not come from a single homogeneous stratum of the community. On the contrary, they manifested considerable ethnic, religious, and economic diversity. Once again, Dahl finds no private business elite ruling New Haven.
达尔还发现，权力并没有集中在一个小的精英群体手中。相反，在不同的问题领域，不同的领导群体主导着决策。在被认定为三个问题领域领导者的 50 人中，只有三人 "在一个以上的问题领域发起或否决政策"。

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他们是两位市长威廉-塞兰塔诺（William Celantano）和理查德-李（Richard Lee），以及重建局局长爱德华-罗格（Edward Logue）--他们都是受选民间接影响的公职人员。领导者和次级领导者并非来自单一的社会阶层。相反，他们表现出相当大的种族、宗教和经济多样性。达尔再次发现，没有私人企业精英统治纽黑文。

Dahl also finds that all citizens possess some political resources. Usually citizens find politics unrewarding and choose not to use their power resources, letting these resources lie “slack” or idle. When threatened, however, these citizens can pull in these slack resources and exert influence on political leaders. Dahl cites a case of the developer who tried to construct metal frame houses that residents felt would be incompatible with the character of their neighborhood. Residents pulled in their previously slack resources and mobilized. As a result, the city halted construction of the controversial project.

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达尔还发现，所有公民都拥有一些政治资源。通常情况下，公民认为政治没有回报，会选择不使用他们的权力资源，让这些资源 "闲置 "或闲置。然而，当受到威胁时，这些公民就会动用这些闲置资源，对政治领导人施加影响。达尔引用了一个案例：开发商试图建造金属框架房屋，居民们认为这不符合他们社区的特色。居民们动用了以前松懈的资源并动员起来。结果，市政府停止了这个有争议项目的建设。

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These findings add up to a rejection of the Hunter elitist thesis. No overt or covert elite of economic notables managed New Haven’s affairs. Power was found to be located not in one small group but instead in several specialized groups. Different persons concerned with different issues were active in different issue areas. The citizenry itself possessed considerable influence as a result of its numbers at the ballot box and its ability to pull in slack resources. The result is a system of power unequally, but widely, shared—a system Dahl calls pluralistic democracy.

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这些发现最终否定了亨特精英论。管理纽黑文事务的并不是公开或隐蔽的经济名流精英。我们发现，权力并非掌握在一个小团体中，而是掌握在几个专门团体中。关注不同问题的不同人士活跃在不同的问题领域。市民本身也拥有相当大的影响力，这得益于他们在投票箱前的人数及其拉动闲置资源的能力。其结果是一种权力不平等但广泛分享的制度--达尔称之为多元民主。

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THE ANTI-PLURALISTS AND THE NONDECISION CRITIQUE
反多元主义和非决定性批判

Political science studies using the decision-making approach have repeatedly found that power in cities is pluralistic. Yet not all power analysts accept the methodology and conclusions of the pluralists. These analysts attack the pluralists for failing to prove that the public possesses sufficient indirect influence to constrain decision makers. These critics further charge that the pluralist method of studying only actual behavior ignores what cannot be easily seen; elites are not so dumb as to apply their pressure in full public view.
采用决策方法进行的政治学研究一再发现，城市中的权力是多元化的。然而，并非所有权力分析家都接受多元论者的方法和结论。这些分析家攻击多元论者未能证明公众拥有足够的间接影响力来制约决策者。这些批评者还指责说，多元论者只研究实际行为的方法忽略了不容易看到的东西；精英们不会蠢到在众目睽睽之下施加压力。

Critics of pluralism charge that effective power is not as widely shared or dispersed as the pluralists’ theory asserts. Michael Lipsky, for instance, found that protests produced only the most marginal benefits for the poor. Protest leaders could not sustain their protest organizations or attract media attention for a prolonged period of time. The targets of protest action also possessed various means to deflect protest actions. These targets could dispense highly symbolic pronouncements as to what changes would be undertaken. But seldom were broad-scale changes ever implemented. In the end, protest did very little to change the real living conditions of the poor. Lipsky doubts that the poor, even when organized, are “effectively heard,” as the pluralists insist.

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多元论的批评者指责说，有效的权力并不像多元论者所断言的那样被广泛分享或分散。例如，迈克尔-利普斯基（Michael Lipsky）发现，抗议活动只能为穷人带来最微不足道的好处。抗议活动的领导者无法长期维持他们的抗议组织或吸引媒体的关注。抗议行动的目标也拥有各种转移抗议行动的手段。这些目标可以发表极具象征意义的声明，宣布将进行哪些变革。但很少有大规模的变革得以实施。最终，抗议活动对改变穷人的实际生活条件作用甚微。利普斯基怀疑，穷人即使组织起来，是否也能像多元论者所坚持的那样，"有效地听到他们的声音"。

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Michael Parenti reports similar conclusions from his study of Newark, New Jersey, when that city was still governed by white ethnic politicians. Citizens in a black ward, for instance, pulled in their slack resources in classic pluralist fashion to demand the installation of a new traffic light. Despite years of protests and the accumulation of hundreds of signatures, their efforts secured nothing. In a nearby white ward, however, residents were able to secure such a light in less than a month with fewer than fifty signatures.

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For Parenti as well as for Lipsky, pluralism does not accurately portray the relative powerlessness of the poor. The poor are excluded from the pluralist interplay.
迈克尔-帕伦蒂（Michael Parenti）在对新泽西州纽瓦克市的研究中也得出了类似的结论，当时该市仍由白人政客统治。例如，一个黑人区的市民以典型的多元主义方式利用他们的闲置资源，要求安装一个新的交通信号灯。尽管他们进行了多年的抗议活动，并积累了数百个签名，但仍一无所获。然而，在附近的一个白人区，居民们只用了不到 50 个签名，就在不到一个月的时间里争取到了这样一个红绿灯。

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在帕伦蒂和利普斯基看来，多元主义并没有准确地描绘出穷人的相对无力。穷人被排除在多元主义的相互作用之外。

Pluralist theorists respond that while power is spread unevenly in American society, no group, not even the minority poor, is totally excluded. The election of black mayors, the increased number of minority
多元论者回应说，虽然美国社会的权力分布不均，但没有一个群体，甚至是少数民族穷人，被完全排除在外。黑人市长的当选，少数族裔人数的增加，都说明了这一点。
appointments, and the advancement of black issue-concerns in both Newark and New York City all point to the power possessed even by the urban poor. No group gets everything that it demands in politics; yet, according to the pluralists, even the minority poor are heard.
在纽瓦克市和纽约市，黑人议员的任命和黑人议题的推进都表明，即使是城市贫民也拥有权力。没有任何一个群体能在政治上得到他们所要求的一切；然而，根据多元化论者的观点，即使是少数族裔的穷人也有发言权。

The debate between the pluralists and elite theorists goes on and on.

^{15}

The elite theorists do not even accept Dahl’s conclusion as to the pluralistic nature of power in New Haven. In a more recent study, Domhoff has reexamined Dahl’s old data and uncovered additional material that was unavailable to Dahl. According to Domhoff, Dahl was “factually wrong” in understating the power of both Yale University and the city’s business institutions on the key redevelopment issue

^{17}

:
多元论者与精英论者之间的争论不绝于耳。

^{15}

精英论者甚至不接受达尔关于纽黑文权力多元化性质的结论。在最近的一项研究中，多姆霍夫重新审查了达尔的旧资料，并发现了达尔没有得到的更多材料。多姆霍夫认为，达尔 "事实上错了"，他低估了耶鲁大学和该市商业机构在重建这一关键问题上的权力

^{17}

：

But whether we look at the origins of the local urban renewal program (in the Chamber of Commerce and Yale) or its eventual outcome (land for the expansion of Yale, the hospital, and the downtown business community), we must conclude, contrary to Who Governs?, that there is a power structure in New Haven, with Yale, the First New Haven National Bank and the Chamber of Commerce at its heart…

^{18}

但是，无论我们从当地城市重建计划的起源（商会和耶鲁）还是其最终结果（耶鲁大学、医院和市中心商业社区的扩张用地）来看，我们都必须得出一个与《谁在治理》一书相反的结论：纽黑文存在着一个以耶鲁大学、第一纽黑文国民银行和商会为核心的权力结构......

^{18}

Domhoff and others charge Dahl with having failed to detect the behindthe-scenes manipulations by the business community and the anticipation of business leaders’ needs by public officials.

^{19}

多姆霍夫等人指责达尔未能发现商界的幕后操纵以及政府官员对商界领袖需求的预判。

^{19}

More critical still are the criticisms made of the pluralists’ insistence on studying only observable behavior in the making of key decisions in a community. This methodology, according to pluralism’s critics, reveals only one “face” of power. Yes, power is exercised in the making of a decision. But power can also be exercised in a way that is not so easily observed if an elite can act to keep an issue from developing to the point that a decision must be made-that is, to use a very awkward phrase, if an issue can be kept among the ranks of a nonissue or nondecision. The pluralist method of focusing only on the making of decisions would miss this “other face” of power-the ability to keep an issue from developing on the urban agenda.

^{20}

更为尖锐的批评是，多元论者坚持只研究社区关键决策制定过程中可观察到的行为。多元论的批评者认为，这种方法只揭示了权力的一个 "面"。没错，权力是在决策过程中行使的。但是，如果精英们能够采取行动，阻止问题发展到必须做出决定的地步，那么权力也可以以一种不那么容易观察到的方式行使，也就是说，用一个非常别扭的词来形容，如果一个问题能够保持在非问题或非决定的行列中，那么权力也可以行使。只关注决策的多元化方法会忽略权力的 "另一面"--阻止问题在城市议程中发展的能力。

^{20}

Matthew Crenson has discovered that a corporation’s reputation for power may be enough to suppress the development of certain issues in a community. Crenson has reported that Gary, Indiana, was relatively late in implementing air pollution controls because of the city’s fear of offending U.S. Steel, the city’s major employer. Yet, according to Crenson, had pluralists studied Gary, they would not have found any overt evidence of U.S. Steel’s role, since the giant corporation did not actively or publicly lobby the mayor or the council. The point is that U.S. Steel did not have to engage in overt political activity. U.S. Steel’s reluctance to install costly air pollution devices in the Gary mills was common knowledge. It was also common knowledge that should stringent regulations be imposed on U.S. Steel, the corporation had the ability to cut back production and employment in Gary by shifting operations to more modern plants located in other cities. According to Crenson, U.S. Steel was an “offstage influential” that did not have to exert a great deal of pressure publicly.

^{21}

The presumption of U.S. Steel’s power was sufficient to delay the imposition of strong air pollution controls.
马修-克伦森（Matthew Crenson）发现，一家公司的权力声誉可能足以压制一个社区某些问题的发展。据 Crenson 报道，印第安纳州加里市在实施空气污染控制方面相对较晚，因为该市害怕得罪该市的主要雇主美国钢铁公司。然而，克伦森认为，如果多元论者对加里市进行研究，他们不会发现美国钢铁公司扮演角色的任何公开证据，因为这家巨型企业并没有积极或公开地游说市长或议会。问题的关键在于，美国钢铁公司没有必要参与公开的政治活动。美国钢铁公司不愿在加里工厂安装昂贵的空气污染装置是众所周知的。同样众所周知的是，如果对美国钢铁公司实施严格的法规，该公司有能力通过将业务转移到其他城市更现代化的工厂来减少在加里的生产和就业。据 Crenson 称，美国钢铁公司是一家 "台下有影响力的公司"，不必公开施加很大的压力。

^{21}

美国钢铁公司的实力足以推迟实施强有力的空气污染控制。

The pluralists reject this nondecision critique.

^{22}

For the pluralists, the nonappearance of a potential issue on the public agenda might simply mean that the public did not care deeply about the matter. Yet Crenson’s study of the slow growth of air pollution controls in Gary shows that though it may be quite difficult, it is not necessarily impossible to document the existence of a nondecision.
多元论者拒绝接受这种不做决定的批评。

^{22}

在多元论者看来，一个潜在的问题没有出现在公共议程上，可能仅仅意味着公众并不关心这个问题。然而，Crenson 对加里市空气污染控制措施发展缓慢的研究表明，虽然要记录 "不决策 "的存在可能相当困难，但也并非不可能。

SUNBELT CITIES: ELITE DOMINANCE AND RECENT TRENDS
太阳带城市：精英主导地位和近期趋势

Of course, no one power structure perspective can capably describe the distribution of power in all cities. One city differs from another. While one may be pluralist in makeup, another may be governed by a power elite. Hunter’s finding that Atlanta was governed by a power elite does not necessarily imply that all American cities are governed by elites.
当然，没有任何一种权力结构观点可以描述所有城市的权力分配情况。一个城市与另一个城市不同。一个城市的构成可能是多元化的，而另一个城市则可能是由权力精英统治的。亨特发现亚特兰大由权力精英统治，但这并不一定意味着所有美国城市都由精英统治。

Yet Hunter’s picture of private elite dominance may be generally applicable to the political styles of Sunbelt communities. One historian has observed that the “commercial-civic elite” has been the most influential group in the southern city, though the elite “did not preside over a monolithic community power structure.”

^{23}

This conclusion is reinforced by Peter Lupsha and William Siembieda, who observe, “A traditional aspect of politics in the Sunbelt has always been the close relationship between the private economic community and the public decisionmaking community.”

^{24}

然而，亨特对私人精英主导地位的描述可能普遍适用于阳光地带社区的政治风格。一位历史学家指出，"商业-公民精英 "一直是南部城市中最具影响力的群体，尽管这些精英 "并没有主持一个单一的社区权力结构"。

^{23}

彼得-鲁普沙和威廉-辛姆比达的观点强化了这一结论，他们认为："太阳带政治的一个传统方面一直是私营经济团体与公共决策团体之间的密切关系"。

^{24}

Nowhere has this close intermingling between the private and public sectors been as strong as in Houston. In Houston, the penetration of government by local business elites was so considerable that the borderline between business and government was no longer clearly discernible:
在休斯顿，私营企业与公共部门之间的这种紧密交融在任何地方都不曾有过。在休斯顿，当地商业精英对政府的渗透如此之深，以至于商业和政府之间的边界已不再清晰可辨：

As Houston grew during the 1950 s and 1960s, the growth coalition held sway over local government. Oscar Holcombe, a land dealer and developer, was mayor for 22 of the years between 1921 and 1957. In 1981, the mayor was a developer; one-third of the city council was in real estate or closely related fields, and the planning commission was composed mostly of developers, builders, and others tied to the real estate industry field.

^{25}

20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代，随着休斯顿的发展，发展联盟对地方政府产生了影响。奥斯卡-霍尔科姆（Oscar Holcombe）是一名土地经销商和开发商，他在 1921 年至 1957 年间担任了 22 年的市长。1981 年，市长是一名开发商；三分之一的市议会成员从事房地产或与房地产密切相关的行业；规划委员会的成员主要是开发商、建筑商和其他与房地产行业相关的人员。

^{25}

The result in Houston was that the city invested considerable sums into the capital outlays demanded by business; also in response to business concern, tax rates and social services were kept at low levels. But Houston was not unique. Similarly strong business-government relationships could be found in the Citizen’s Charter Association in Dallas, the Good Government League in San Antonio, the Phoenix 40, and Albuquerque, Memphis, Miami, Tucson, and New Orleans.

^{26}

休斯顿的结果是，城市为企业所需的资本支出投入了大量资金；同时，为了回应企业的关切，税率和社会服务也保持在较低水平。但休斯顿并非独一无二。在达拉斯的公民宪章协会、圣安东尼奥的好政府联盟、菲尼克斯40，以及阿尔伯克基、孟菲斯、迈阿密、图森和新奥尔良，都可以找到类似的强有力的企业与政府关系。

^{26}

The South’s traditionalistic culture was not the only factor that helped produce this deference to established elites.

^{27}

Elite dominance was also a product of the unique history of cities in the region. Unlike cities in the North where political machines dispensed specific benefits to gain the votes of larger numbers of immigrants and their families,
南方的传统文化并不是造成这种对既有精英敬畏的唯一因素。

^{27}

精英统治也是该地区城市独特历史的产物。与北方城市不同的是，北方城市的政治机器通过提供特定的福利来争取更多移民及其家庭的选票、

Political organization in the Sunbelt cities has never been designed to accommodate mass demands or create services. It was designed to function as an adjunct to the business and economic community providing a mechanism for accommodating growth and development.

^{25}

?
太阳带城市的政治组织从来不是为了满足大众需求或创造服务而设计的。其目的是作为商业和经济界的附属机构，提供一种促进增长和发展的机制。

^{25}

Yet the power of business elites in Sunbelt cities has varied over time. The dominance of local commercial-civic elites and their brand of “business progressivism” was virtually unquestioned until the Depression of the 1930s.

^{29}

But after World War II, returning veterans sought a new brand of civic-mindedness in local affairs; in the 1960s and 1970s, racial minorities and homeowner and environmentalist groups all presented further challenges to local elite dominance.
然而，随着时间的推移，阳光地带城市中商业精英的力量也各不相同。在 20 世纪 30 年代大萧条之前，当地商业-公民精英的主导地位及其 "商业进步主义 "品牌几乎没有受到质疑。

^{29}

但在第二次世界大战之后，回国的退伍军人在地方事务中寻求一种新的公民意识；在 20 世纪 60 和 70 年代，少数民族、房主和环保团体都对地方精英的主导地位提出了进一步的挑战。

In San Antonio, for instance, the growth of that city’s Chicano community has challenged the hold of the traditional governing elite.

^{30}

Similarly in Houston, the growth in minority voting power has led to the election of mayors more willing to seek federal aid for job training and other people-oriented programs.

^{31}

例如，在圣安东尼奥，该市奇卡诺人社区的发展对传统统治精英的统治地位提出了挑战。

^{30}

同样，在休斯顿，少数族裔投票权的增长导致当选的市长更愿意为就业培训和其他以人为本的项目寻求联邦援助。

^{31}

Social change has even made contemporary Atlanta somewhat different from the business elite-dominated city of Hunter’s Regional City:
社会变革甚至使当代亚特兰大与亨特地区城市中商业精英主导的城市有些不同：

As Atlanta has grown from regional city to national metropolis its politics have also gone through two stages. From World War II to 1970 the white business power structure dominated. Since that time political and economic power have become separate entities, and the old forces increasingly have had to share influence with blacks, neighborhood groups, and the suburbs.

^{32}

随着亚特兰大从地区性城市发展成为全国性大都市，其政治也经历了两个阶段。从第二次世界大战到 1970 年，白人商业权力结构占据主导地位。从那时起，政治权力和经济权力成为独立的实体，旧势力越来越多地不得不与黑人、邻里团体和郊区分享影响力。

^{32}

The 1970 s and 1980s saw the election of two black mayors, Maynard Jackson and Andrew Young:
20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代，梅纳德-杰克逊和安德鲁-杨两位黑人市长当选：

Much of the white business community resented Jackson’s nondeferential, some would say abrasive, style. They charged him with reverse discrimination in his contracting and hiring practices, but the mayor rejoined that he was only giving minorities the just due that previous administrations (despite their progressive images) had denied them.

^{33}

许多白人商界人士对杰克逊不近人情、甚至可以说是粗暴的作风深恶痛绝。他们指控杰克逊在签订合同和雇用员工方面存在反向歧视，但市长反驳说，他只是给予少数族裔应有的待遇，而以前的政府（尽管形象进步）却剥夺了他们的权利。

^{33}

Young attempted to pursue a course of economic development that entailed the building of bridges to his city’s business community without sacrificing the concerns of the city’s minority voters who helped elect him. Black electoral power altered the power structure in Atlanta. Yet, as we shall later discuss, downtown business interests maintained a privileged position in the governance of Atlanta despite the emergence of a black electoral majority.
杨试图在不牺牲帮助他当选的该市少数族裔选民的利益的前提下，寻求经济发展道路，这就需要为他所在城市的商界搭建桥梁。黑人选举权改变了亚特兰大的权力结构。然而，正如我们稍后将要讨论的那样，尽管出现了黑人选举多数，但市中心的商业利益仍在亚特兰大的治理中保持着特权地位。
The rapid growth of many Sunbelt communities brought with it new challengers to the traditional local power structures. As Philip J. Trounstine and Terry Christenson observe, "As cities grow, they diversify; elites can’t command all the community’s organizations; competition and pluralism increase.

^{34}

In San Jose, for instance, the 1970s saw a coalition of homeowners and environmentalists confront that city’s growth-oriented business elite as a result of traffic congestion, overcrowding, and the other obvious problems brought about by growth.

^{35}

许多阳光地带社区的快速发展为传统的地方权力结构带来了新的挑战者。正如菲利普-特朗斯汀（Philip J. Trounstine）和特里-克里斯滕森（Terry Christenson）所言，"随着城市的发展，它们也在不断多元化；精英们无法指挥社区的所有组织；竞争和多元化也在加剧。

^{34}

以圣何塞为例，20世纪70年代，由于交通拥堵、过度拥挤以及其他由城市发展带来的显而易见的问题，业主和环保主义者组成了一个联盟，与该市以发展为导向的商业精英对抗。

^{35}

Taxpayer associations, neighborhood and minority groups, and environmentalist organizations have all helped to make power in Sunbelt cities more pluralistic. Still, private power continues to exert great influence in these communities. Evidence from San Jose and Tampa serves as a case in point. Despite the pluralization of politics in San Jose, the names of private businessleaders and professionals still dominate any listing of community influentials. The increased cost of local election campaigns gives new prominence to big money contributors. The older locally rooted business elite no longer rules; but the decisions made by executives of national corporations who have sited facilities in the San Jose area are just as vital to the health of the city as were any of the decisions made by the older elite.

^{36}

Similarly in Tampa, progressive Mayor Sandy Freedman, who was committed to affordable housing and nondiscrimination issues, was also obliged to support the construction of a convention center and the continued award of tax subsidies for development in Tampa’s central business district.

^{37}

纳税人协会、邻里和少数民族团体以及环保组织都有助于使阳光地带城市的权力更加多元化。尽管如此，私人权力仍然在这些社区发挥着巨大的影响力。来自圣何塞和坦帕的证据就是一个很好的例子。尽管圣何塞的政治已经多元化，但私营企业领导人和专业人士的名字仍然在社区有影响力人物的名单中占据主导地位。地方选举活动成本的增加，使得大资金捐助者的地位更加突出。扎根于本地的老一辈商业精英不再主宰一切，但在圣何塞地区建厂的跨国公司高管所做的决定，与老一辈精英所做的决定一样，对城市的健康发展至关重要。

^{36}

同样，在坦帕市，进步的市长桑迪-弗里德曼（Sandy Freedman）在致力于经济适用房和非歧视问题的同时，也不得不支持建设一个会议中心，并继续为坦帕中心商业区的发展提供税收补贴。

^{37}

Recent studies of Florida cities confirm the pluralization of local politics in the Sunbelt. While growth interests continue to be extremely important, Sunbelt cities are not universally dominated by a cohesive elite that dictate policy. Instead, there is a range of municipal responses to growth pressures. In Orlando, city officials placed relatively strong design standards on new development. They also used development as a source of revenues for low- and moderate-income housing. In Fort Lauderdale, in contrast, development was pretty much allowed to proceed on the private sector’s terms. As a result, the construction of the Riverwalk esplanade, a new performing arts center, and other downtown facilities did little to help the city’s low-income residents.

^{38}

But even in Fort Lauderdale, there is no power elite. Instead, the situation is one more of “hyperpluralism,” where rapid growth has overwhelmed city leaders and business interests are fragmented and disorganized. Business leaders have even met in an attempt to enhance their influence as they have complained that the city and county have been insufficiently responsive to growth needs.

^{39}

最近对佛罗里达城市的研究证实了阳光地带地方政治的多元化。尽管增长利益仍然极为重要，但阳光地带的城市并非普遍由一个团结的精英阶层主导政策。相反，城市对增长压力的反应多种多样。在奥兰多，市政官员对新开发项目制定了相对严格的设计标准。他们还将开发作为中低收入住房的收入来源。与此相反，在劳德代尔堡，发展几乎是按照私营部门的条件进行的。因此，滨河大道、新表演艺术中心和其他市中心设施的建设对该市低收入居民的帮助甚微。

^{38}

但即使在劳德代尔堡，也不存在权力精英。相反，这里的情况更像是一种 "超多元化"，快速增长使城市领导者不堪重负，商业利益分散且无序。商界领袖们甚至举行会议，试图提高自己的影响力，因为他们抱怨市政府和县政府没有对增长需求做出充分回应。

^{39}

Downtown-led growth coalitions in the Sunbelt have faced new challenges from homeowners upset at increased congestion and the costs of servicing new development. In St. Petersburg, Florida, city voters have begun to question a downtown development strategy. The Suncoast
在阳光地带，以市中心为主导的发展联盟面临着新的挑战，这些挑战来自于对拥堵加剧和新开发项目服务成本感到不满的业主。在佛罗里达州圣彼得堡市，该市选民开始质疑市中心的发展战略。阳光海岸

Dome failed to attract a major league baseball team and necessitated continued subsidies. Pier Park, a waterfront aquarium and marketplace similar to Baltimore’s Harbor Place, was built despite its overwhelming defeat in a public referendum. The mammoth Bay Plaza development failed to attract shops, restaurants, offices, and other up-scale tenants. Voters, frustrated with the sums of money poured into these projects while neighborhood needs were ignored, finally elected a new mayor and council that proceeded to fire the city manager, indicating a reversal in the city’s policies.

^{40}

圆顶体育馆未能吸引到大联盟棒球队，因此需要继续补贴。码头公园（Pier Park）是一个类似于巴尔的摩海港广场（Harbor Place）的海滨水族馆和集市，尽管在全民公决中以压倒性多数败北，但还是建成了。庞大的海湾广场开发项目未能吸引商店、餐馆、写字楼和其他高档租户。选民们对大量资金投入这些项目，而社区需求却被忽视感到沮丧，最终选出了新的市长和议会，并解雇了城市经理，这表明该市的政策发生了逆转。

^{40}

Similarly, voters in suburban Tampa (Hillsborough County), upset by the prospect of having to pay still more taxes and fees to support growth, in 1990 elected new county commissioners who promised to reverse the promotional practices of the previous board. Suburban communities nationwide have begun to oppose growth projects because the fiscal payoffs of those projects have diminished over time, and such costs as increased traffic congestion have clearly emerged.

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同样，坦帕市（希尔斯伯勒县）郊区的选民对不得不支付更多税费以支持经济增长的前景感到不安，他们于 1990 年选出了新的县委员，承诺扭转上届委员会的促销做法。全国的郊区社区都开始反对发展项目，因为随着时间的推移，这些项目的财政回报越来越少，交通拥堵加剧等代价已经显现出来。

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ECONOMIC POWER AND "CITY LIMITS"
经济实力和 "城市界限"

An examination of power in Sunbelt cities shows that neither elitist nor pluralist theory fully captures the distribution of influence in contemporary urban America. As a result, urban theorists have tried to get around the polarization of the elitism-pluralism debate. Elitism points to the influence that business leaders possess in certain policy areas, but it overstates business influence in other areas. Pluralism, on the other hand, fails to capture the degree of constraint that business does impose on economic decisions and other aspects of city affairs.
对阳光地带城市权力的研究表明，无论是精英主义理论还是多元化理论，都不能完全反映当代美国城市的影响力分布。因此，城市理论家们试图绕开精英主义与多元化辩论的两极分化。精英主义指出了商界领袖在某些政策领域的影响力，但却夸大了商界在其他领域的影响力。另一方面，多元主义未能反映出企业对经济决策和城市事务其他方面的制约程度。

Paul Peterson, in his important work City Limits,

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has attempted to paint a more complex portrait of urban power that points to the extensive influence that the business community possesses over a large range of city affairs. According to Peterson, municipal officials tend to give business leaders what they want even where the local business community does not comprise a vigilant, local elite. The mobility of capital gives the private sector its influence. The owners of a business can simply threaten to locate their facilities in another town or state; cities cannot afford the risk to their job and tax bases. Hence, whenever an important local decision has an impact on a particular development project or the city’s business climate, municipal officials are reduced to anticipating what business wants. It is almost as if politics within the city does not matter; the city as a whole is led to act as if it had a unitary interest in pursuing continued economic development.
保罗-彼得森（Paul Peterson）在其重要著作《城市极限》（City Limits）

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中试图描绘一幅更为复杂的城市权力画卷，指出商界对大量城市事务拥有广泛的影响力。彼得森认为，市政官员往往会满足商界领袖的要求，即使当地的商界并不包括警觉的地方精英。资本的流动性赋予了私营部门影响力。企业所有者可以简单地威胁说要把他们的设施设在另一个城镇或州；城市无法承担其就业和税收基础所面临的风险。因此，每当一个重要的地方决策对某个开发项目或城市的商业环境产生影响时，市政官员就只能预测企业的需求。就好像城市内部的政治并不重要；城市作为一个整体，在追求经济持续发展方面的利益是一致的。

But business does not possess such influence in all aspects of city affairs. Peterson sees three types of city policies-developmental, redistributive, and allocation-only two of which business influence is felt. When it comes to developmental policies that can enhance the economic position of the city, governmental officials are led to anticipate business needs. In the second policy arena, redistributive policies, no city can afford to undertake a course of action designed primarily to serve the city’s more disadvantaged residents. Should a city try to finance too much in the way of neighborhood projects, subsidized housing, or social services, it would be forced to raise taxes, reducing its competitiveness as an attractive site for commerce and industry:
但企业并不是对城市事务的所有方面都有这种影响力。彼得森认为，城市政策有三种类型--发展型、再分配型和分配型，只有其中两种能感受到商业的影响。当涉及到能提高城市经济地位的发展政策时，政府官员会被引导去预测企业的需求。在第二个政策领域，即再分配政策方面，没有一个城市能够承担起主要为城市弱势居民服务的行动方针。如果一个城市试图在社区项目、补贴住房或社会服务方面提供过多资金，它将被迫提高税收，从而降低其作为一个有吸引力的商业和工业基地的竞争力：
[T]he pursuit of a city’s economic interests, which requires an efficient provision of local services, makes no allowance for the care of the needy and unfortunate members of the society. Indeed, the competition among local communities all but precludes a concern for redistribution.

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[一个城市要追求经济利益，就必须有效地提供当地的服务，这就不可能照顾到社会中的贫困和不幸的成员。事实上，地方社区之间的竞争几乎排除了对再分配的关注。

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According to Peterson, city politics is quite different from national politics. The nation may decide on redistributive policy, but no city can jeopardize its business climate by raising taxes to support redistributive services.
彼得森认为，城市政治与国家政治截然不同。国家可以决定再分配政策，但任何城市都不能通过提高税收来支持再分配服务，从而危及其商业环境。

But, as Peterson notes, not all issues in the local arena have a bearing on a city’s competitive position or business climate. There are issues that are neutral in their economic effects. Business has no direct concern over these allocation policies which deal, for instance, with how municipal services such as library books and fire stations are distributed throughout the city. In this arena, cities do not need to follow the dictates of business. Instead, cities can allocate these services in response to a pluralist interest group struggle.
但是，正如彼得森所指出的，并非地方领域的所有问题都会对城市的竞争地位或商业环境产生影响。有些问题对经济的影响是中性的。例如，这些分配政策涉及如何在全市范围内分配图书馆书籍和消防站等市政服务。在这一领域，城市无需听从企业的指令。相反，城市可以根据多元利益集团的斗争来分配这些服务。

For Peterson, New York City’s mid-1970s fiscal crisis only underscores the consequences that result if a municipality ignores “city limits” and attempts to initiate broad social welfare policy. New York was soon forced to scale back services. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Mayor Ed Koch cut social services and instead concentrated on policies designed to promote economic investment in the city.

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As a result, Koch’s critics charged that the mayor catered too much to the needs of corporate investors and paid too little attention to affordable housing and programs for the poor.
在彼得森看来，纽约市 20 世纪 70 年代中期的财政危机只能说明，如果一个城市无视 "城市界限"，试图启动广泛的社会福利政策，将会导致什么样的后果。纽约很快被迫缩减服务。20 世纪 70 年代末和 80 年代初，埃德-科赫市长削减了社会服务，转而集中精力推行旨在促进城市经济投资的政策。

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因此，科赫的批评者指责市长过于迎合企业投资者的需求，而对经济适用房和穷人项目关注太少。

Peterson’s view of the limits of city politics has proven quite controversial.

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His critics charge that cities are not universally reduced to acting as the agents of big corporations. Cities do not always favor local developmental policy over redistributive actions designed to serve low-income people and neighborhoods. There is no simple economic determinism as a city is led to anticipate business’ needs. Instead, local politics remains important.
事实证明，彼得森关于城市政治局限性的观点颇具争议性。

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他的批评者认为，城市并非普遍沦为大公司的代理人。城市并不总是倾向于地方发展政策，而不是旨在服务低收入人群和社区的再分配行动。城市并没有简单的经济决定论，因为城市会预测企业的需求。相反，地方政治仍然很重要。

Certainly Peterson’s assertion that “policies of benefit to the city contribute to the prosperity of all residents”

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is overstated. The maximization of land values works to the benefit of the owners of land; neighborhood residents, in contrast, have a continued interest in fighting development projects that would displace them from their homes or destroy their neighborhoods.

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当然，彼得森关于 "有利于城市的政策促进了所有居民的繁荣"

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的说法有些言过其实。土地价值的最大化对土地所有者有利；相反，附近的居民在反对那些会使他们背井离乡或破坏他们的社区的开发项目时，会持续保持他们的利益。

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Even a city’s business community is not unified in favor of new economic development. While businesses in the central city may benefit from new downtown growth projects, those in other sections of the community may find that they are paying higher taxes to support downtown growth. In Kalamazoo, Michigan, for instance, plans for center city revitalization stalled when the “larger community of business firms” objected to the costs entailed by higher taxes and the rerouting of traffic.

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即使是一个城市的商界也不会一致支持新的经济发展。中心城区的企业可能会从新的市中心发展项目中获益，但社区其他地区的企业可能会发现，他们要为支持市中心的发展支付更高的税收。例如，在密歇根州的卡拉马祖，由于 "更大的商业公司社区 "反对增加税收和改变交通路线所带来的成本，中心城区的振兴计划停滞不前。

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Evidently, city politics is not so “groupless” or consensual as portrayed by Peterson’s unitary interest theory. In many cities, community and neighborhood groups are active and oppose unabated development.

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Should these forces prove powerful, it is in the political interest of elected officials to oppose, not support, new economic development projects. As political scientist Todd Swanstrom observes, the “political logic” may contradict the “economic logic” in a community.

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This is especially true if the economic logic is much weaker than Peterson makes it out to be. Locally imposed taxes and regulations do not have nearly as much influence on the siting decisions by business as is commonly assumed.

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Cities can often support housing and redistributive actions without risking an exodus of business.
显然，城市政治并不像彼得森的单一利益理论所描述的那样 "无团体 "或协商一致。在许多城市，社区和邻里团体非常活跃，反对无节制的开发。

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如果这些力量被证明是强大的，那么反对而不是支持新的经济发展项目就符合民选官员的政治利益。正如政治学家 Todd Swanstrom 所说，"政治逻辑 "可能与社区的 "经济逻辑 "相矛盾。

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如果经济逻辑比彼得森所说的要弱得多，情况就更是如此。地方征收的税收和法规对企业选址决策的影响远没有人们通常认为的那么大。

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城市通常可以支持住房和再分配行动，而不必冒企业外迁的风险。

The “economic logic” of Peterson’s argument may also be flawed, as cities have obligations other than merely the pursuit of businesslike efficiency. Cities must maintain social order, which they can do only by promoting social justice and by working in accordance with norms of fairness. Peterson’s insistence that cities pursue economic efficiency may impede their ability to perform this other, but quite critical, function of local government.

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彼得森论点中的 "经济逻辑 "也可能存在缺陷，因为城市除了追求商业效率之外，还有其他义务。城市必须维护社会秩序，而要做到这一点，城市就必须促进社会公正，并按照公平准则开展工作。彼得森坚持要求城市追求经济效率，这可能会妨碍它们履行地方政府的这一其他但却相当关键的职能。

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Robert Waste charges that Peterson unfairly sees only three types of city policies when there are in fact many more. According to Waste, cities possess more autonomous power than Peterson suggests, as there is a wide range of city policy actions that do not affect development. Further, Peterson ignores the role of city leadership in defining and promoting political issues. A policy issue cannot always simply be fixed as “redistributive” or “developmental”; it often has dimensions of both. Is increased spending on education impermissible under Peterson’s framework because it is a redistributive social welfare program? A creative mayor or policy entrepreneur can reframe or sell redistributive spending as aiding local economic development. Spending on education can be sold as a developmental policy that is necessary if the city is to have a quality labor force capable of attracting business in the future.

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Day care programs, too, are not simply redistributive spending initiatives that require higher taxes imposed on business. Subsidized day care can also be portrayed as a developmental program that allows low-income mothers to work, thereby increasing the availability of low-cost labor in a community.

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罗伯特-瓦斯特指责彼得森只看到了三类城市政策，这是不公平的，事实上还有更多的城市政策。根据 Waste 的观点，城市拥有的自主权比 Peterson 认为的要多，因为有很多城市政策行动并不影响发展。此外，彼得森还忽视了城市领导层在界定和推动政治问题方面的作用。一个政策问题不可能总是被简单地定义为 "再分配 "或 "发展"，它往往兼具这两个方面。在彼得森的框架下，增加教育支出是否因为是再分配的社会福利项目而不被允许？有创造力的市长或政策企业家可以将再分配性支出重新定义为或推销为帮助地方经济发展。教育支出可以被说成是一项发展政策，如果城市要拥有一支能够在未来吸引企业的高素质劳动力队伍，那么这项政策就是必要的。

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日托计划也不仅仅是需要向企业征收更多税收的再分配支出举措。补贴日托也可以说是一项发展计划，它允许低收入母亲工作，从而增加了社区低成本劳动力的供应。

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Despite these criticisms, Peterson’s theory remains important as it points to an extremely strong tendency in city affairs: Cities will tend to cater to the needs of the business community (and of tax-paying upperand upper-middle income residents as well). City officials do exhibit a preference in spending for development projects as opposed to projects for other purposes.

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However, development projects are more controversial than Peterson’s notion of a unitary city interest may suggest. Neighborhood groups and more parochial businesses may even kill a particular development project. But the long-term bias of cities toward economic growth and developer interests cannot be denied.
尽管存在这些批评，彼得森的理论仍然非常重要，因为它指出了城市事务中的一个极其强烈的趋势：城市倾向于迎合商界（以及纳税的中高收入居民）的需求。与其他用途的项目相比，城市官员在开发项目的支出上确实表现出了偏好。

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然而，与彼得森的单一城市利益概念相比，开发项目更具争议性。邻里团体和偏狭的企业甚至会扼杀某个开发项目。但城市对经济增长和开发商利益的长期偏向是不可否认的。

SYSTEMIC POWER AND REGIME THEORY
系统权力和制度理论

Instead of trying to determine whether power structures in cities are generally elitist or pluralist, Clarence Stone asks a more important question: “Why, when all of their actions are taken into account, do officials over the long haul seem to favor upper-strata interests, disfavor lowerstrata interests, and sometimes act in apparent disregard of the contours of electoral power?” 56
克莱伦斯-斯通没有试图确定城市中的权力结构一般是精英主义还是多元化，而是提出了一个更重要的问题："为什么当官员们的所有行为都被考虑在内时，他们会长期偏向上层利益，不利于下层利益，有时还会明显无视选举权力的轮廓？56

Unlike Peterson, Stone does not feel that raw economic determinism universally draws a city to elite-driven economic projects. For Stone, the answer is that upper-strata interests control a disproportionate share of the resources that city decision makers value. As private powers decide where investments will be made, they often possess the ability to determine the success or failure of a particular undertaking desired by city officials. While business leaders cannot command action from the city, they can often frustrate projects they dislike. And while city officials can resist the wishes of business leaders, they soon learn the importance of working with private interests.
与彼得森不同，斯通并不认为原始的经济决定论会普遍地将城市引向精英驱动的经济项目。对斯通来说，答案是上层利益集团控制着城市决策者所看重的过多资源。由于私人势力决定了投资的方向，他们往往有能力决定城市官员所期望的某项事业的成败。虽然商界领袖不能命令城市采取行动，但他们往往可以阻止他们不喜欢的项目。虽然城市官员可以抵制商界领袖的意愿，但他们很快就会认识到与私人利益合作的重要性。

Upper-strata private actors also possess the ability to confer honors and rewards for professional and career accomplishment. They can even bestow a sense of importance and grandeur on hard-pressed city officials. City officials often find themselves drawn to “power lunches” and discussions of grandiose downtown development projects; less glamorous and more difficult proposals for neighborhood improvement and ghetto reclamation offer no equivalent sense of excitement and recognition.
上层私人行为者也有能力为专业和职业成就授予荣誉和奖励。他们甚至还能让苦苦挣扎的市政官员感到自己的重要性和伟大。城市官员经常发现自己被 "权力午餐 "和讨论宏大的市中心开发项目所吸引；而那些不那么光彩夺目、难度更大的邻里改善和贫民窟改造提案却无法给他们带来同等的兴奋感和认同感。

For Stone, power is the ability to get things done. Private actors often control key resources that city officials need to govern successfully. As a result, they often occupy a privileged position in any regime or informal public-private governing arrangement for the city. In some cities, business cooperation is so crucial to the success of public projects that the business community can be seen to possess preemptive power; it can protect its privileged position by parceling out selective benefits to political actors who chose to “go along.” 57
对斯通来说，权力就是完成任务的能力。私人行为者往往控制着城市官员成功治理所需的关键资源。因此，在城市的任何制度或非正式的公私治理安排中，他们往往占据着特权地位。在一些城市，商业合作对公共项目的成功至关重要，以至于商业界可以被视为拥有先发制人的权力；它可以通过将选择性利益分配给选择 "顺从 "的政治参与者来保护其特权地位。57

Regime theory points to the difficulties that political, community, and business leaders face in attempting to forge and sustain a governing coalition. Regime theory also points to the difference between an
制度理论指出了政治、社区和企业领导人在试图建立和维持执政联盟时所面临的困难。政体理论还指出了不同政体之间的区别。
electoral coalition and a governing coalition. During the election, a mayoral candidate courts whoever’s votes or support are needed for victory. But election does not guarantee the ability to govern or get important things done. Once in office, the mayor must build a new working, governing alliance. Oftentimes, he or she must seek cooperation from actors who were not participants in his or her election campaign. The mayor must woo whomever has the resources necessary for governance. The concept of a regime refers to the relatively durable alliances that can emerge among elected officials, their supporters, development interests, property owners, and professional bureaucrats in the day-to-day running of a city.
选举联盟和执政联盟。在选举期间，市长候选人需要获得谁的选票或支持，就向谁求助。但选举并不能保证执政能力或完成重要工作。上任后，市长必须建立一个新的工作和执政联盟。通常情况下，他或她必须寻求那些没有参与其竞选活动的参与者的合作。市长必须向拥有治理所需资源的人求助。政权的概念是指在城市的日常管理中，民选官员、其支持者、发展利益集团、业主和专业官僚之间可能出现的相对持久的联盟。

Regime Politics in Atlanta
亚特兰大的政权政治

Clarence Stone’s study of the governance of Atlanta points to the importance of looking beyond elections and studying power in a city when attempts at governing begin. Atlanta has been traditionally governed by a downtown business elite that responded to change by forging a working coalition with middle-class black allies. There was nothing inevitable about the emergence of this corporate-oriented regime in Atlanta. It was the result of the strategic decisions of the white business community.
克拉伦斯-斯通（Clarence Stone）对亚特兰大治理情况的研究表明，在开始尝试治理时，将目光投向选举之外并研究城市中的权力非常重要。亚特兰大历来由市中心的商业精英统治，他们通过与中产阶级黑人盟友建立工作联盟来应对变革。亚特兰大出现这种以企业为导向的政权并非必然。它是白人商界战略决策的结果。

Atlanta’s growing black population coupled with the suburban exodus of the white population all but assured an eventual black victory at the polls. Maynard Jackson (1973) and Andrew Young (1981) were the first two African-Americans elected mayor. Both, however, soon learned the value of working with the downtown business community-which was able to continue to exert its influence despite the emergence of black electoral power.

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亚特兰大不断增长的黑人人口加上郊区白人人口的外流，几乎确保了黑人在投票中的最终胜利。梅纳德-杰克逊（Maynard Jackson，1973 年）和安德鲁-杨（Andrew Young，1981 年）是头两位当选市长的非裔美国人。不过，两人很快就认识到了与市中心商界合作的价值--尽管黑人选举力量已经崛起，但商界仍能继续施加影响。

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Maynard Jackson was a political outsider who challenged Atlanta’s traditional system of elite-led accommodation. He sought to make Atlanta more racially inclusive. Initially, he attempted to reshape the planning process to allow neighborhoods a veto over growth projects backed by the downtown elite. He insisted on strong affirmative action policies, awarding 20 percent of contracts on development projects to minority firms. He also sought to reform the police department. But major initiatives could seldom be realized without business support, and Jackson soon recognized the need for business cooperation if he was going to be able to complete a number of his desired projects. As a result, he eventually worked out a series of accommodations with the city’s business elite, cutting back his support of the neighborhood planning system and giving business leaders greater access to city hall. Business leaders regarded Jackson as impertinent, but realized that they, too, needed to forge a cooperative working relationship with a city government that controlled resources critical to the health of their downtown establishments. As a result, a new reconciliation was reached. The city’s traditional governing coalition was reconstituted, but on altered terms.
梅纳德-杰克逊（Maynard Jackson）是一位政治局外人，他对亚特兰大以精英为主导的传统体制提出了挑战。他试图让亚特兰大更具种族包容性。起初，他试图重塑规划流程，让社区对市中心精英支持的发展项目拥有否决权。他坚持实施强有力的平权行动政策，将开发项目 20% 的合同授予少数族裔公司。他还试图改革警察部门。但是，如果没有企业的支持，重大举措很少能够实现，杰克逊很快就认识到，要想完成他所希望的一些项目，就需要企业的合作。因此，他最终与该市的商界精英达成了一系列妥协，减少了对街区规划系统的支持，并给予商界领袖更多进入市政厅的机会。商界领袖认为杰克逊无礼，但他们也意识到，他们也需要与市政府建立合作的工作关系，因为市政府控制着对其市中心企业健康发展至关重要的资源。因此，双方达成了新的和解。该市的传统管理联盟得以重组，但条件有所改变。
City business leaders found it more comfortable working with Jackson’s successor, Andrew Young, who recognized that the support of neighborhood groups was insufficient to ensure the completion of new projects. Young sought the cooperation of business leaders in building a new Atlanta that would provide increased opportunities for its black citizens. A weakened neighborhood movement lay outside a city governing coalition of middle-class black leaders and white business interests who pursued unabated economic growth combined with new opportunities for minority businesses.
杰克逊的继任者安德鲁-杨认识到，邻里团体的支持不足以确保新项目的完成，他认为与杰克逊的继任者合作会更轻松。杨寻求商业领袖的合作，以建设一个能为黑人市民提供更多机会的新亚特兰大。在由黑人中产阶级领袖和白人商业利益组成的城市管理联盟之外，还有一个被削弱的邻里运动，他们追求的是经济的持续增长，以及为少数民族企业提供新的机会。

The tensions between Atlanta’s neighborhood movement and the city’s business elite and black middle-class growth coalition have persisted over time. For example, neighborhood leaders protested the city’s plans to demolish houses and small businesses in a low-income part of the city in order to clear the site for a park that will serve as a gathering area for visitors to the 1996 Olympics, hosted by Atlanta.

^{59}

亚特兰大的邻里运动与该市的商业精英和黑人中产阶级增长联盟之间的紧张关系长期存在。例如，邻里领袖抗议市政府计划拆除该市低收入地区的房屋和小企业，以便为亚特兰大主办的 1996 年奥运会清理出一个公园场地，作为游客聚集区。

^{59}

There is no unified governing elite in Atlanta with absolute power. Yet, despite the growth of black electoral power, business has emerged as a partner in the city’s governing coalition. The different partners in Atlanta’s governing regime have different goals, and business can be defeated. Yet, business concerns in Atlanta are usually taken into account.
亚特兰大没有拥有绝对权力的统一管理精英。然而，尽管黑人选举力量不断壮大，商界却已成为城市治理联盟中的合作伙伴。亚特兰大管理体制中的不同合作伙伴有着不同的目标，商界可能会被打败。然而，亚特兰大的商业问题通常会得到考虑。

Different Regime Types 不同的制度类型

While the business community controls key resources and hence occupies a privileged position in city affairs, there is no guarantee that a business-oriented regime will emerge in any particular city. In New York, a city that is substantially bigger and more diverse than Atlanta, the business community is less cohesive and enjoys a less dominant position in local affairs than the business community enjoys in Atlanta. In New York, the mayor, public sector officials, and other political groups offer a stronger counterweight to corporate elites.

^{60}

虽然商界控制着关键资源，因此在城市事务中占据着特权地位，但并不能保证任何特定城市都会出现以商界为导向的政权。纽约比亚特兰大大得多，也更加多元化，但与亚特兰大相比，纽约商界的凝聚力较弱，在地方事务中的主导地位也较弱。在纽约，市长、公共部门官员和其他政治团体能够更有力地抗衡企业精英。

^{60}

Different regimes or informal governing alliances have emerged at different times and in different cities. While a great many cities have corporate-oriented governing regimes, others do not. Other cities lack a governing regime because no stable, governing alliance has emerged.
不同时期和不同城市出现了不同的制度或非正式治理联盟。许多城市有以企业为导向的管理体制，但也有一些城市没有。还有一些城市没有管理体制，因为没有出现稳定的管理联盟。

Clarence Stone has identified three different types of regimes in the governing of cities.

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A corporate regime (also called a development regime) promotes the interests of major downtown corporations. Equity concerns are slighted. A caretaker regime (also referred to as a maintenance regime), in contrast, will often fail to initiate large-scale development projects. In a caretaker city, government focuses on the provision of routine services as the small business community and homeowners alike both fear raising taxes and the disruption of established patterns of social interaction. The rarest regime type of all is the progressive regime, where a city responds to the demands of lower- and middle-class citizens and environmentalist groups in challenging growth.
克拉伦斯-斯通（Clarence Stone）在城市管理中发现了三种不同类型的制度。

^{61}

企业制度（也称为发展制度）促进市中心大企业的利益。公平问题被忽视。与此相反，看守政府（也称维护政府）往往不会启动大规模的开发项目。在看守型城市中，由于小企业和房主都担心增加税收和破坏既有的社会交往模式，因此政府将重点放在提供日常服务上。最罕见的制度类型是进步制度，在这种制度下，城市会响应中下层市民和环保团体的要求，对增长提出挑战。

In fact, there may be two variants of the progressive regime. A middle-class progressive regime that responds to the concerns of environmentalists and homeowners may be seen as progressive in its priorities as compared to the downtown growth coalition. But its policies will be quite different from those of a city with a regime devoted to lower-class opportunity expansion that seeks policies designed to aid the position of the poor and racial minorities. Harold Washington’s relatively brief mayoralty in Chicago represents just such a lower-class progressive coalition. As we shall see, in San Francisco an incipient progressive regime of homeowners and environmentalists challenged high-rise office construction. But these activists failed to initiate policies that would provide new job opportunities and affordable housing for blue-collar workers and the poor.
事实上，进步制度可能有两种变体。与市中心增长联盟相比，一个响应环保主义者和房主关切的中产阶级进步体制在其优先事项上可能被视为是进步的。但它的政策将与一个致力于扩大下层机会、寻求旨在帮助穷人和少数民族地位的政策的城市的政策截然不同。哈罗德-华盛顿（Harold Washington）在芝加哥相对短暂的市长任期就代表了这样一个下层进步联盟。正如我们将要看到的，在旧金山，由房主和环保主义者组成的进步主义政权萌芽于挑战高层办公楼的建设。但这些积极分子未能提出为蓝领工人和穷人提供新的就业机会和经济适用房的政策。

THE DEBATE OVER CITY POWER: THREE CASE STUDIES
关于城市权力的辩论：三个案例研究

The study of community power is an inexact science. Different urban observers have come to different conclusions in answering the questions: Who holds the power in city politics? and Exactly what influence does the business community enjoy in city affairs? A look at three different case studies will show how different urban analysts can come to different conclusions.
社区权力研究是一门不精确的科学。不同的城市观察家在回答这些问题时得出了不同的结论：谁掌握着城市政治中的权力？商界在城市事务中究竟享有怎样的影响力？通过对三个不同案例的研究，我们可以看到不同的城市分析家是如何得出不同结论的。

New York City: Fiscal Crisis and Rebound
纽约市：财政危机与反弹

New York City’s politics has almost always been described in terms of pluralist group interaction. Douglas Yates has even used the term streetfighting pluralism to denote the intensity of competition among various neighborhood and institutional groups in the city.

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In fact, this pluralist competition can help to explain why New York went to the brink of default in 1975; at the same time that the city was losing much of its tax base to both the suburbs and the Sunbelt, New York mayors simply spent more to accommodate the demands of municipal labor unions, service providers, and neighborhood groups in order to gain their political support.
纽约市的政治几乎总是用多元化群体互动来描述。道格拉斯-耶茨（Douglas Yates）甚至用 "巷战多元主义"（streetfighting pluralism）一词来形容纽约市各个社区和机构团体之间竞争的激烈程度。

^{63}

事实上，这种多元化竞争有助于解释为什么纽约在1975年濒临破产；在纽约市的税收基础被郊区和阳光地带大量夺走的同时，纽约市长们为了获得他们的政治支持，只得花费更多的资金来满足市政工会、服务提供商和邻里团体的要求。

Yet this pluralist view of the roots of New York City’s fiscal crisis ignores the role played by local and national financial elites in helping to bring about that crisis. New York’s banks and other financial institutions encouraged, and profited from, continued borrowing by the city. The banks continued to lend money to the city until changes in the tax code and new investment opportunities made new write-offs more profitable than municipal bonds.

^{64}

然而，这种对纽约市财政危机根源的多元化观点忽视了当地和全国的金融精英在帮助导致这场危机中所扮演的角色。纽约的银行和其他金融机构鼓励纽约市继续借贷，并从中获利。银行继续借钱给纽约市，直到税法的变化和新的投资机会使得新的注销比市政债券更有利可图。

^{64}

It was the action of the banks themselves that directly precipitated the fiscal crisis. When credit to New York City began to appear overextended, the banks began to “dump” their portfolios of New York City bonds. Such a move signalled a lack of faith by the financial community in the creditworthiness of New York. Following the lead of the banks, no other actors were willing to extend New York the credit the city needed to pay off past debts that had become due and to provide the necessary funds to continue operations:
直接引发财政危机的是银行本身的行为。当纽约市的信贷开始出现过度扩张时，银行开始 "抛售 "纽约市的债券组合。此举表明金融界对纽约的信用缺乏信心。在银行的带动下，没有其他行为者愿意向纽约提供该市所需的信贷，以偿还过去到期的债务，并提供继续运营所需的资金：

So long as dealing in New York municipal securities had been a highprofit, low-risk venture for the city’s banks, they had been quite happy to participate without asking too many embarrassing questions of city officials. But when the

11

major New York banks realized in the spring of 1975 that the outside world would shortly be able to figure out what the municipal government had been doing, they unloaded

$ 2.7

billion in New York City securities that they owned. With the banks’ flooding the market with old New York bonds at the same time the city was seeking to sell additional hundreds of millions in new municipal notes and bonds, the market in the city’s securities collapsed.

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对纽约的银行来说，只要纽约市政证券交易是一项高利润、低风险的事业，它们就会非常乐意参与其中，而不会向市政官员提出太多令人尴尬的问题。但是，1975 年春天，当纽约的主要银行意识到外界很快就会发现市政府的所作所为时，它们纷纷抛售了所拥有的价值 10 亿美元的纽约市证券。由于银行在市场上大量抛售旧的纽约债券，而与此同时，纽约市政府又在寻求出售数亿新的市政票据和债券，因此纽约市的证券市场崩溃了。

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As New York journalists Jack Newfield and Paul DuBrul point out, “[I]t was the banks themselves that had overloaded the market.”

^{"6}

正如纽约记者杰克-纽菲尔德（Jack Newfield）和保罗-杜布鲁尔（Paul DuBrul）所指出的，"是银行本身让市场超负荷运转"。

^{"6}

Despite their culpability in extending New York credit and in precipitating the crisis, financial elites in New York were still able to protect their interests and even enhance their power as a result of the crisis. Fifty-six thousand municipal workers lost jobs, and a wage freeze was imposed on public service workers as unions lost bargaining clout.

^{67}

As fiscal crisis analyst Martin Shefter has affirmed, it was
尽管纽约的金融精英在提供纽约信贷和引发危机方面负有责任，但他们仍然能够保护自己的利益，甚至在危机中增强自己的权力。五万六千名市政工人失业，公共服务部门的工人工资被冻结，工会失去了谈判的影响力。

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正如财政危机分析家马丁-谢弗特（Martin Shefter）所肯定的，这是
programs with predominantly black clienteles-youth services, addiction services, compensatory higher education-which have suffered disproportionately severe budget and personnel cutbacks. Moreover, personnel have been fired in disproportionate numbers from job categoriesclerical, paraprofessional, and maintenance-heavily staffed by blacks and Puerto Ricans.

^{ss}

以黑人为主要服务对象的计划--青年服务、戒毒服务、补偿性高等教育--遭受了不成比例的严重预算和人员削减。此外，黑人和波多黎各人占多数的工种--文秘、辅助专业人员和维修人员--被解雇的人数也不成比例。

^{ss}

In contrast, financial elites who willingly incurred risk when they lent the city money for profit were made to suffer virtually no penalty at all; they were repaid by the city every cent they were owed.
与此相反，金融精英们在借钱给城市牟利时甘愿承担风险，却几乎没有受到任何惩罚；他们所欠的每一分钱都由城市偿还。

The creation of new institutions for the monitoring of the city’s financial affairs, first the Municipal Assistance Corporation (known popularly as Big MAC), and later the Emergency Fiscal Control Board, further gave the city’s financial community new influence over the city’s taxing, spending, and development programs. The business community was able to gain such concessions as increased tax abatements, the revocation of the stock transfer tax, the offering of tax subsidies for gentrification, and the capital financing of economic development projects such as the new Convention Center.

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市政援助公司（俗称 "大 MAC"）以及后来的紧急财政控制委员会等监督城市财政事务的新机构的成立，进一步赋予了城市金融界对城市税收、支出和发展计划的新影响力。商界得以获得更多优惠，如增加减税、取消股票转让税、为绅士化提供税收补贴，以及为新会议中心等经济发展项目提供资本融资。

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The fiscal crisis led city officials to pursue economic development with little regard for the social purposes of a project. Multimillionaire developer Donald Trump was given an estimated tax break of

$ 120

million to convert the failing Commodore Hotel into the Grand Hyatt Hotel. He was given another

$ 100

million in tax breaks to build the luxury condominiums of Trump Tower on Fifth Avenue.

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Yet it is too simplistic to maintain that Trump dictated to city officials. The city denied Trump
财政危机导致市政官员一味追求经济发展，而很少考虑项目的社会目的。千万富翁开发商唐纳德-特朗普（Donald Trump）获得了约

$ 120

万美元的税收减免，将濒临倒闭的准将酒店（Commodore Hotel）改建为君悦酒店（Grand Hyatt Hotel）。他又获得了

$ 100

百万美元的税收减免，用于建造第五大道上的特朗普大厦豪华公寓。

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然而，认为特朗普对市政府官员指手画脚未免过于简单。市政府拒绝了特朗普
permission and development assistance to build what would have been the world’s tallest skyscraper, the proposed 150 -story Television City. Community groups had objected that such a structure would cast a shadow across Central Park and would bring too much congestion and automobile traffic to surrounding neighborhoods
在获得许可和开发援助的情况下，该公司建造了世界上最高的摩天大楼--拟建的 150 层电视城。社区团体反对说，这样的建筑会给中央公园投下阴影，而且会给周边社区带来过多的交通拥堵和汽车流量

The influence of New York’s business community increased and the power of municipal unions and minorities declined as a result of the fiscal crisis. Yet, this does not mean that a cohesive business elite ran New York City’s affairs in the postfiscal crisis era. While the Emergency Fiscal Control Board (later just known as the Fiscal Control Board) dealt with the big budgetary numbers and set overall priorities, city officials still had the power to decide exactly what programs were funded and what combination of incentives were given each project. The bankers and developers were even defeated on numerous issues. As political scientist Robert Bailey reminds us, "[W]hile private economic influence was greatly enhanced, it was not omnipotent.

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Also, in the midst of the economic boom that followed the fiscal crisis, the city regained autonomy.
纽约商界的影响力因财政危机而增加，市政工会和少数族裔的权力则因财政危机而下降。然而，这并不意味着在后财政危机时代，纽约市的事务由一个团结的商业精英来管理。虽然紧急财政控制委员会（后来仅称为财政控制委员会）负责处理庞大的预算数字并确定总体优先事项，但市政官员仍有权决定具体资助哪些项目，以及对每个项目采取何种激励措施。银行家和开发商甚至在许多问题上被击败。正如政治学家罗伯特-贝利（Robert Bailey）提醒我们的那样："虽然私人经济的影响力大大增强，但它并不是万能的。

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另外，在财政危机之后的经济繁荣时期，城市重新获得了自主权。

From 1977 to 1989, New York City enjoyed a tremendous economic resurgence, gaining 150,000 jobs, almost 15 percent of its work force.

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New York had transformed itself economically and politically. The industrial and port jobs the city lost to automation, to the suburbs, to the Sunbelt, and to overseas competitors were never recaptured. Instead, New York rebuilt its computer and telecommunications infrastructure and became an international headquarters city, a center of global finance and banking. However, side by side with New York’s growing fortune was a new inequality; newer immigrant groups and a female-dominated clerical work force did not share fully in the prosperity enjoyed by those who held well-paid managerial and professional jobs.

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从 1977 年到 1989 年，纽约市的经济出现了巨大的复苏，增加了 15 万个工作岗位，几乎占其劳动力总数的 15%。

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纽约在经济和政治上都实现了转型。由于自动化、郊区、阳光地带和海外竞争对手的冲击，纽约失去的工业和港口工作岗位再也找不回来了。相反，纽约重建了计算机和电信基础设施，成为国际总部城市、全球金融和银行业中心。然而，与纽约日益增长的财富并存的是新的不平等；新移民群体和以女性为主的文职工作队伍并没有充分分享到那些从事高薪管理和专业工作的人所享有的繁荣。

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But it is too simple to portray business elites as having dictated the transformation of New York City. The business community-diverse, fragmented, and divided-lacked such extensive power. Instead, it was a political official, Mayor Ed Koch, who put together a dominant governing coalition, fusing business needs with those of the city’s remaining conservative Italian and middle-class Jewish voters (and some of the more conservative elements in the black and Hispanic communities as well). Koch juggled this quite delicate coalition, often favoring business investment while at times raising taxes on business and opposing projects supported by the business community in order to appease his white ethnic voting base. Koch gave developers extensive financial support, tax exemptions, loans, grants, and zoning bonuses that allowed new buildings to exceed the local zoning code. Business influence was important but not dictatorial in New York; politics and public officials, too, counted.

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但是，将商界精英描绘成纽约市转型的主宰者未免过于简单。多元、分散、分裂的商界缺乏如此广泛的权力。反倒是政治官员埃德-科赫（Ed Koch）市长组建了一个占主导地位的执政联盟，将商业需求与该市剩余的保守派意大利裔和中产阶级犹太裔选民（以及黑人和西班牙裔社区中的一些保守派）的需求融合在一起。科赫在这个相当微妙的联盟中游刃有余，他经常支持商业投资，但有时也会提高商业税收，反对商业界支持的项目，以安抚他的白人选民群体。科赫为开发商提供了广泛的财政支持、免税、贷款、赠款和分区奖励，允许新建筑超越当地的分区法规。在纽约，商业影响力很重要，但不是独裁；政治和政府官员也很重要。

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Koch served three 4-year terms as mayor. But in 1989, voters tired of Koch’s more extreme public statements and elected the city’s first AfricanAmerican mayor, David Dinkins. Dinkins was elected by a multiracial coalition of blacks, Latinos, and liberal whites, especially Jews.

^{75}

科赫曾三度担任市长，任期四年。但在 1989 年，选民们厌倦了科赫更为极端的公开言论，选出了该市第一位非裔美国人市长大卫-丁金斯（David Dinkins）。丁金斯是由黑人、拉美裔和自由派白人（尤其是犹太人）组成的多种族联盟选举产生的。

^{75}

Dinkins was a much different sort of mayor than Koch. Nonetheless, he was fiscally conservative and he faced new budget problems as a result of a new fiscal crisis precipitated by a real-estate slump and the inability of the city to contain the costs of servicing its large impoverished population.

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Dinkins also did not attempt to cultivate community organizations as an independent political force in the city. As mayor he was unable to establish a progressive regime capable of governing the city.

^{7}

His failure to curtail a riot in which a Jewish student was killed alienated the affections of part of the city’s Jewish community. In 1993, Republican Rudolph Giuliani essentially reassembled the Koch conservative coalition and won the mayoralty. The business community was once again more fully incorporated into a conservative governing coalition.
丁金斯是一位与科赫截然不同的市长。尽管如此，他在财政上还是比较保守的，而且由于房地产不景气和城市无力控制为大量贫困人口提供服务的成本而引发的新财政危机，他面临着新的预算问题。

^{76}

丁金斯也没有尝试培养社区组织，使其成为城市中一支独立的政治力量。作为市长，他未能建立一个能够管理城市的进步政权。

^{7}

他未能制止一场骚乱，一名犹太学生在骚乱中丧生，这疏远了该市部分犹太社区的感情。1993年，共和党人鲁道夫-朱利安尼（Rudolph Giuliani）基本上重新组建了科赫保守派联盟，并赢得了市长职位。商界再次被更全面地纳入保守派执政联盟。

San Francisco: From Manhattanization to an Antiregime
旧金山：从曼哈顿化到反制度

San Francisco, like New York, has been portrayed as a pluralist city where power is fragmented among different competing groups.

^{78}

The increased clout of the city’s gay and lesbian community only reinforces the view that San Francisco is a city fairly open to newly emergent political groups. Yet elite influence is clearly felt in what otherwise appears to be such a politically open city.
旧金山与纽约一样，一直被描绘成一个权力分散在不同竞争团体之间的多元化城市。

^{78}

该市男同性恋和女同性恋社区影响力的增加，只是强化了这样一种观点，即旧金山是一个对新兴政治团体相当开放的城市。然而，在这座看似政治开放的城市中，却能明显感受到精英的影响。

According to political scientists Chester Hartman and Rob Kessler, the building of the Yerba Buena Center (a large development project that includes the new Moscone Convention Center) was “an attempt by the city’s ruling forces to expand the city’s downtown boundaries, across 120 -foot wide Market Street into the South of Market area, traditionally a low-prestige, low-rent area housing blue-collar workers and lowerincome residents.”

^{79}

The center was to combine an indoor sports arena, exhibition hall, and new office and commercial facilities.
根据政治学家切斯特-哈特曼（Chester Hartman）和罗布-凯斯勒（Rob Kessler）的研究，耶尔巴布埃纳中心（包括新的莫斯克尼会议中心在内的大型开发项目）的建设是 "城市统治势力试图扩大市中心的边界，穿过 120 英尺宽的市场街，进入市场南部地区，该地区传统上是一个低档次、低租金的地区，居住着蓝领工人和低收入居民"。

^{79}

该中心将包括一个室内体育馆、展览馆以及新的办公和商业设施。

The project was supported by the convention industry and those downtown interests that would benefit from increased tourism, office construction, and real estate development. However, the operation of the convention center was likely to require a continuing subsidy. Estimates as to the number of jobs generated by the project were inflated in that construction of the office buildings at the center took away from construction that would have occurred elsewhere in the city. Construction at the site also displaced 723 businesses and 7,600 jobs.

^{80}

Displaced residents from the South of Market area found themselves paying increased rents for housing in nearby overcrowded neighborhoods. Rising land values in the project area further fueled the gentrification and displacement processes.
该项目得到了会展业和市中心利益集团的支持，这些利益集团将从旅游业、办公楼建设和房地产开发的增长中获益。然而，会议中心的运营可能需要持续的补贴。关于该项目创造的就业机会的估计被夸大了，因为中心办公楼的建设占用了本该在城市其他地方进行的建设。此外，该项目还取代了 723 家企业和 7 600 个工作岗位。

^{80}

南市场地区的搬迁居民发现，在附近拥挤不堪的社区居住，他们需要支付更高的房租。项目区不断攀升的土地价值进一步加剧了贵族化和流离失所的进程。

Mayor Dianne Feinstein’s concern for the health of the city’s business district was reinforced by her dependency on downtown money for her election efforts. Her campaign war chest "came primarily from downtown corporations and big business.

^{s1}

This relationship was most clearly revealed in her successful campaign against a recall effort-a campaign where the

$ 1, 000

per contributor limit under San Francisco law was not
Dianne Feinstein 市长对该市商业区健康状况的关注，因她在竞选活动中对市中心资金的依赖而得到加强。她的竞选资金 "主要来自市中心的公司和大企业。

^{s1}

这种关系在她成功反对罢免的竞选活动中表现得淋漓尽致。
applicable: “Nearly half a million dollars came in within a few weeks, almost all from large corporate contributions garnered at a February 14 fundraising dinner…”

^{82}

适用："几周内就收到了近50万美元，几乎全部来自2月14日筹款晚宴上获得的大公司捐款......"

^{82}

Yet not all observers agree that San Francisco is dominated by an elite-led growth coalition. The increased power of advocacy groups representing the concerns of racial minorities, gays, environmentalists, and those in need of affordable housing can be seen to attest to San Francisco’s pluralistic makeup. These groups forced the adoption of plans and ordinances that controlled rents, limited condominium conversions, protected the city’s stock of low-income residential hotels, and restricted the construction of new high rises downtown. In 1987 these groups helped elect a mayor, Art Agnos, who promised to protect neighborhoods even at the cost of questioning certain economic growth projects. One critic has charged that, far from being dominated by a progrowth coalition, San Francisco is ruled by neighborhood activists and antigrowth organizations that have throttled development with endless public hearings, environmental reporting, and procedural requirements.

^{83}

This apparent shift in power in the city during the early days of the Agnos administration was reported by the San Francisco Chronicle:
然而，并非所有观察家都认为旧金山是由精英领导的增长联盟所主导。代表少数种族、同性恋、环保主义者和经济适用房需求者利益的宣传团体的力量不断增强，这足以证明旧金山的多元化构成。这些团体迫使旧金山通过了一些计划和法令，以控制租金、限制公寓改建、保护城市中的低收入住宅酒店，并限制在市中心建造新的高层建筑。1987 年，这些团体帮助选出了市长阿特-阿格诺斯（Art Agnos），他承诺即使以质疑某些经济增长项目为代价，也要保护居民区。一位批评家指责说，旧金山远非由一个经济增长联盟所主导，而是由邻里活动家和反经济增长组织所统治，他们通过无休止的公开听证、环境报告和程序要求来限制发展。

^{83}

《旧金山纪事报》报道了阿戈诺斯执政初期城市权力的明显转移：

In the six months since Agnos has been mayor of San Francisco, he has slowly, systematically turned over the keys of City Hall to people who in the past often had the door slammed in their face… Some old-time political players-the Chamber of Commerce, many labor unions, downtown business and development groups and even the Rev. Cecil Williams-are finding their keys to City Hall do not work anymore.

^{sit}

在阿戈诺斯担任旧金山市长的六个月里，他慢慢地、有计划地将市政厅的钥匙交给了那些过去经常被当面摔门而去的人......一些老牌政治人物--商会、许多工会、市中心的商业和发展团体，甚至塞西尔-威廉姆斯牧师--发现他们进入市政厅的钥匙不再起作用了。

^{sit}

San Francisco’s progrowth regime collapsed in the 1970s and 1980s, as restrictive growth measures took their toll and businesses found new sites in the rapidly growing cities of the Silicon Valley and the South Bay. But Mayor Agnos was not always a dependable friend of antigrowth forces. As he attempted to govern the city and meet the needs of its diverse population, he needed to assemble the support of actors beyond those groups who had supported him in the election. In office, Agnos backed a number of major growth projects, including a major waterfront development project and a new ballpark for the Giants, who had threatened to leave the city for the South Bay. Many of his former grassroots supporters saw the mayor as a “progrowth wolf in slow-growth clothing.”

^{s5}

20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代，随着限制性增长措施带来的损失，以及企业在硅谷和南湾等快速发展的城市找到新的发展地点，旧金山的增长机制逐渐瓦解。但阿戈诺斯市长并不总是反增长势力的可靠朋友。当他试图治理这座城市并满足其多元化人口的需求时，他需要汇集那些在选举中支持他的团体之外的行动者的支持。在任期间，阿戈诺斯支持了一系列重大发展项目，包括大型海滨开发项目和巨人队的新球场，巨人队曾威胁要离开这座城市前往南湾。他以前的许多基层支持者将这位市长视为 "披着缓慢增长外衣的增长之狼"。

^{s5}

No truly progressive regime emerged in San Francisco. Instead, the forces of the “wild left” proved more adept at blocking projects they detested than at building a coalition capable of governing the city. Rather than building a progressive regime, the neighborhood and environmentalist forces in San Francisco remained a grassroots movement, what Richard DeLeon called an antiregime-a loose alliance of groups capable of blocking the big projects of the old growth coalition but unable to formulate workable, positive projects to reconnect the city with business, restore the city’s economic base, and meet the jobs, social welfare, and housing needs of the city’s poor and working class.

^{s6}

旧金山没有出现真正的进步政权。相反，"狂野左派 "的力量被证明更善于阻止他们厌恶的项目，而不是建立一个能够治理城市的联盟。旧金山的邻里和环保力量并没有建立起一个进步的政权，而是停留在一个草根运动的层面上，即理查德-德莱昂（Richard DeLeon）所说的 "反对派"（antiregime）--一个松散的团体联盟，能够阻止旧增长联盟的大型项目，但却无法制定出可行的、积极的项目来重新将城市与商业联系起来，恢复城市的经济基础，满足城市贫民和工人阶级的就业、社会福利和住房需求。

^{s6}

Disappointed in the mayor’s support for big growth projects, especially the China Basin ballpark, grassroots activists in the 1991 election showed no great love for Agnos. Frank Jordan, a conservative “ex-cop,” won the mayoralty by promising to reverse the “anything goes” philosophy of San Francisco and take back the city’s streets from panhandlers. In office, he cracked down on the homeless and began new initiatives to privatize municipal services.
在 1991 年的选举中，由于对市长支持大型发展项目（尤其是中国盆地球场）感到失望，基层活动家们对阿戈诺斯并无好感。弗兰克-乔丹（Frank Jordan）是一名保守的 "前警察"，他承诺要扭转旧金山 "随心所欲 "的理念，从乞丐手中夺回旧金山的街道，从而赢得了市长职位。上任后，他严厉打击无家可归者，并开始实施市政服务私有化的新举措。

Detroit: The Controversy over Poletown
底特律关于波莱镇的争议

Detroit, too, has been portrayed as a pluralist city where a number of interests contend for power. Automobile executives are challenged by union officials. The rise of black political power and the continued reelection of black mayors only further attest to the permeability of Detroit’s influence structure. Yet in recent years Detroit has also lost both a substantial portion of its population and job base. This loss has given leaders in the automobile industry the ability to exert tremendous influence over Detroit on matters directly affecting corporate interests.
底特律也被描绘成一个多元城市，在这里，各种利益集团争权夺利。汽车公司高管受到工会官员的挑战。黑人政治力量的崛起和黑人市长的不断连任进一步证明了底特律影响力结构的渗透性。然而，近年来底特律也失去了相当一部分人口和就业基础。这种损失使得汽车行业的领导者有能力在直接影响企业利益的问题上对底特律施加巨大的影响。

The building of a new General Motors assembly plant in Detroit’s Poletown neighborhood serves as only the most notable case in point. In 1980 General Motors announced that it was closing two of its older Detroit factories with the intention of establishing a new, more modern, automated facility at a “greenfield” site in another part of the country. City officials quickly scrambled to find General Motors an acceptable alternative site and to meet GM’s consequent demands regarding site preparation and tax abatements. The city, having already suffered a considerable loss of jobs and population, felt it could not afford to face the consequences of a GM pullout.
通用汽车公司在底特律波利敦社区新建的装配厂只是一个最显著的例子。1980 年，通用汽车公司宣布关闭其在底特律的两家老工厂，打算在美国另一个地区的 "绿地 "上新建一座更现代化、自动化程度更高的工厂。市政府官员迅速行动起来，为通用汽车公司寻找可接受的替代厂址，并满足通用汽车公司随之提出的厂址准备和减税要求。该市已经遭受了相当大的就业和人口损失，认为自己无法承受通用汽车撤出的后果。

City officials offered GM nine possible sites; GM found suitable only the site in Poletown, the mixed black and Polish community adjacent to the old Dodge Main plant. The corporation resisted the pleas of area residents who sought to scale down the scope of site development in order to minimize the displacement the project would impose on the neighborhood. The city acquired homes under a “quick take” procedure; homes were demolished before final compensation in all cases could be arranged.
市政府官员向通用汽车公司提供了九个可能的选址，但通用汽车公司认为只有波莱镇的选址合适，波莱镇是一个黑人和波兰人混居的社区，毗邻老道奇总厂。该公司拒绝了该地区居民的请求，他们要求缩小选址开发的范围，以尽量减少该项目对附近居民造成的迁移。市政府按照 "快速收购 "程序收购房屋；在所有情况下，房屋在最终补偿安排好之前就被拆除。

The costs, in both human and dollar terms, were substantial:
无论从人力还是从金额上看，代价都是巨大的：
This facility, the infamous “Poletown” plant, involved the destruction of a neighborhood. It was industrial urban renewal in a grand scale: within 18 months of the announcement of the project, 1,500 homes, 144 businesses, two schools, a hospital, 16 churches and an abandoned reinforced concrete automobile assembly plant whose demolition cost alone was estimated at

$ 12

million were gone, and 3,438 citizens had to be relocated.

^{$7}

这个设施，也就是臭名昭著的 "波莱镇 "工厂，毁掉了一个街区。这是一次规模宏大的工业化城市改造：在项目宣布后的 18 个月内，1500 栋住宅、144 家企业、两所学校、一所医院、16 座教堂和一座废弃的钢筋混凝土汽车装配厂都消失了，仅拆除费用一项就估计高达

$ 12

百万美元，3438 名居民不得不搬迁。

^{$7}

The costs did not stop there. Site preparation costs were estimated at

$ 200

million.

^{88}

Court settlements, including interest and attorney fees, were likely to drive the costs of assembling the land much higher.

^{89}

The city diverted Community Development Block Grant money from other neighborhood and downtown projects in order to help pay for the costs of site acquisition and preparation in Poletown.
费用还不止于此。场地准备费用估计为

$ 200

百万美元。

^{88}

包括利息和律师费在内的法庭和解费用很可能会使征集土地的费用更高。

^{89}

市政府从其他社区和市中心项目中挪用了社区发展整笔拨款，以帮助支付波莱镇的土地征用和准备费用。

The new plant added little municipal revenues that could be used to improve services for the people of Detroit. The plant was given a 50 percent tax abatement for a period of twelve years, thereby cutting in half the revenues the project was to bring to Detroit. Furthermore, under the tax increment financing plan for the project, property tax revenue derived from the plant could be used only to repay the initial loans on the project and to make further improvements in the project area: “[T]he municipal general fund and other taxing districts receive little of the benefits from the new investment.”

^{so}

新工厂增加的市政收入很少，无法用于改善底特律人民的服务。该工厂获得了为期 12 年的 50%的减税优惠，从而使该项目为底特律带来的收入减少了一半。此外，根据该项目的增税融资计划，从该工厂获得的财产税收入只能用于偿还该项目的初始贷款和进一步改善项目区域："市政总基金和其他征税区从新投资中获得的收益很少"。

^{so}

Nor was there any guarantee that GM would deliver all the jobs it had promised. Automation and robotics would reduce the number of jobs at the plant. Economic conditions in a competitive industry could conceivably force the company to employ only one shift, thereby halving the 6,000 jobs the company had said it would fill. This eventually is what happened. The agreement between GM and the city imposed obligations only on one side:
通用汽车也无法保证能提供其承诺的所有工作岗位。自动化和机器人技术将减少工厂的工作岗位数量。可以想象，在竞争激烈的行业中，经济条件可能会迫使公司只雇用一个班次的员工，从而将公司承诺提供的 6000 个工作岗位减少一半。这最终成为现实。通用汽车公司和市政府之间的协议只规定了一方的义务：

Yet nowhere in the process does the city propose performance constraints to ensure net benefits before the project is actually undertaken. The people of the City of Detroit assumed all the expenses and took all the risks. GM managed to maintain the option of when and under what conditions the proposed plant would be completed, and to determine the level of employment at the plant when and if it began operating.

^{97}

然而，在实际开展项目之前，该市并未在任何地方提出绩效限制，以确保净效益。底特律市人民承担了所有费用，也承担了所有风险。通用汽车公司设法保留了何时以及在何种条件下建成拟建工厂的选择权，并决定了工厂开始运营时的就业水平。

^{97}

There was not even an attempt to uncover just what tax subsidies GM needed to stay in Detroit. Instead, the city quickly acceded to the corporation’s wish for the “maximum allowable tax abatement”

^{s2}

under state law! The “key issue was simply whether and how the city of Detroit could meet the stringent and inflexible demands of General Motors. There was, in a word, no policy discretion; there was only capitulation.”

^{93}

The power of General Motors had, in effect, made Detroit a “‘company town’ acting as effective advocate for the corporation.”

^{94}

通用汽车公司甚至没有试图去了解它需要哪些税收补贴才能留在底特律。相反，底特律市政府很快就满足了通用汽车公司的愿望，根据州法律，给予了 "最大限度的减税"

^{s2}

！问题的关键在于底特律市能否以及如何满足通用汽车公司严格而僵化的要求。一句话，没有政策自由裁量权，只有屈服"。

^{93}

实际上，通用汽车公司的权力已经使底特律成为"'公司城市'，成为公司的有效代言人"。

^{94}

Overall, the Poletown project can be seen as a bad deal for the city. The project has not paid for itself. By 1996 the city of Detroit will have paid

$ 100

million in excess of revenues and will still owe nearly

$ 50

million. The city has even been forced to divert general fund revenues to help repay the bonds.

^{95}

According to Bryan Jones and Lynn Bachelor, while the project may be defended as a “loss leader” strategy by serving “as a beacon to other industries that Detroit was a city that welcomed heavy industry,” overall the model of industrial urban renewal used in Poletown “must be considered at best a questionable approach.”

^{96}

总体而言，波罗镇项目对该市来说是一笔糟糕的交易。该项目没有收回成本。到 1996 年，底特律市已经支付了超出收入的

$ 100

百万美元，但仍欠下近

$ 50

百万美元。该市甚至被迫挪用普通基金收入来帮助偿还债券。

^{95}

布莱恩-琼斯（Bryan Jones）和林恩-贝克尔（Lynn Bachelor）认为，虽然该项目可以作为一种 "亏损领导者 "战略来辩护，因为它 "向其他行业树立了底特律是一座欢迎重工业的城市的灯塔"，但总体而言，波镇采用的工业城市改造模式 "充其量只能被视为一种值得商榷的方法"。

^{96}

The costs stemming from Poletown do not end there. Chrysler Corporation asked for a virtual carbon copy of the Poletown deal as it threatened to move and close its old Jefferson Avenue plant on the east side of Detroit. Economic conditions had changed as the automobile industry entered a period of prosperity, yet Detroit’s poor taxpayers were asked to subsidize a new automotive plant. Although the evidence from Poletown showed that the city gave far more than it received in the previous deal with GM, the corporate regime in Detroit pursued an arrangement with Chrysler. The city further incurred additional costs in the environmental cleanup of the contaminated site.

^{97}

波莱镇带来的成本还不止于此。克莱斯勒公司在威胁要搬迁并关闭其位于底特律东边杰斐逊大道的旧工厂时，提出了与波雷镇交易几乎一模一样的要求。随着汽车工业进入繁荣期，经济条件发生了变化，但底特律贫穷的纳税人却被要求补贴一家新的汽车厂。尽管来自波莱镇的证据显示，底特律市付出的远比之前与通用汽车公司交易时得到的多，但底特律的公司政权还是与克莱斯勒公司达成了协议。底特律市政府进一步承担了污染场地的环境清理费用。

^{97}

That GM exerted enormous influence in the Poletown case is undeniable. Yet in their book reviewing the Poletown controversy, Jones and Bachelor argue that local politics and leadership played more important roles in determining the outcome of this affair than is commonly assumed. While GM’s demands and ability to build a new plant in another state confined the range of actions Detroit had at its disposal, it was still the city itself that decided to initiate action in response to the corporation’s announced intention to leave. Detroit acted more quickly and with greater success than did other Michigan cities confronted with similar threats of lost automobile production.

^{98}

Mayor Coleman Young proved to be an adept leader who got his bureaucracy to quickly formulate, and his city council to approve, a plan that would avert GM’s departure. Who would invest in Detroit if GM were perceived to be abandoning the community?
不可否认，通用汽车在波勒镇事件中施加了巨大影响。然而，琼斯和贝克尔在回顾波勒镇风波的书中认为，当地政治和领导层在决定这一事件的结果方面发挥了比人们通常认为的更重要的作用。虽然通用汽车的要求和在另一个州建立新工厂的能力限制了底特律可以采取的行动范围，但仍是底特律市自己决定采取行动来应对该公司宣布的撤离意向。与密歇根州其他城市相比，底特律市在面临汽车产量下降的类似威胁时，行动更为迅速，也取得了更大的成功。

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事实证明，科尔曼-扬市长是一位干练的领导者，他让他的官僚机构迅速制定了一项避免通用汽车离开的计划，并获得了市议会的批准。如果通用汽车被认为要放弃底特律，谁还会在底特律投资呢？

There were also hidden beneficiaries to the choice Young had made. The media focused on the resistance by the white-dominated Poletown Neighborhood Council; ignored were the community’s citizens, including a number of black citizens, who were more than pleased with the generous property settlements. Also unseen were the jobs that would be maintained in Detroit-jobs that would go to black workers as well as white workers. Mayor Young saw the controversy in racial terms: “In the mayor’s mind the issue was zero-sum, part of a continuing black/white struggle.”

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The white residents of Poletown could not be given any more favorable treatment than had been received by black residents who had opposed earlier urban renewal efforts. As Jones and Bachelor sum up, “Paradoxically, by refusing to yield an inch to the ‘little man’ Coleman Young kept faith with the ‘forgotten citizen’ of Poletown: the black majority of the neighborhood.” 100
杨所做的选择也有隐藏的受益者。媒体关注的焦点是白人占主导地位的波莱镇邻里委员会的抵制；而被忽视的是该社区的居民，包括一些黑人居民，他们对慷慨的财产赔偿感到非常高兴。同样被忽视的还有底特律将保留的工作岗位--这些工作岗位将提供给黑人工人和白人工人。杨市长从种族角度看待这场争议："在市长的心目中，这个问题是零和的，是黑人和白人持续斗争的一部分"。

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坡镇的白人居民不能得到比反对早期城市改造努力的黑人居民更有利的待遇。正如 Jones 和 Bachelor 总结的那样，"矛盾的是，通过拒绝向'小人物'让步，科尔曼-杨与波莱镇的'被遗忘的公民'--该社区的大多数黑人--保持了信任"。100

There was no simple economic determinism in the Poletown case. While the influence of GM was considerable, it was the city itself that decided on a plan of action. Jones and Bachelor use the phrase “creative bounded choice”

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to denote both the private corporation’s power and the latitude still possessed by city actors. According to Jones and Bachelor, "Business interests do not invariably dominate government policy even where a single industry dominates the community."102
在波城事件中，并不存在简单的经济决定论。虽然通用汽车的影响相当大，但决定行动计划的还是城市本身。Jones 和 Bachelor 用 "有限制的创造性选择"

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来表示私营公司的权力和城市行为者仍然拥有的自由。根据 Jones 和 Bachelor 的观点，"即使在单一行业主导社区的情况下，商业利益也不会一成不变地主导政府政策 "102。

Political leadership undoubtedly remains an important factor in city affairs, and economic determinism is too simplistic a way to look at city
政治领导无疑仍是城市事务中的一个重要因素，而经济决定论则是一种过于简单化的看待城市的方式。
politics. Yet the lessons from Poletown must be primarily those of the considerable power possessed by the private corporation and the limitations that such power imposes on a city’s course of action. Detroit rushed to judgment, giving in speedily and unconditionally to GM’s demands.
政治。然而，从波莱镇得到的教训必须主要是私营公司所拥有的巨大权力，以及这种权力对城市行动方针的限制。底特律匆忙作出判断，迅速无条件地满足了通用汽车的要求。

What the Three Case Studies Show
三个案例研究的启示

The evidence in the community power debate is more than a bit ambiguous. In the three case studies reported above, both pluralist and elite theorists can find points of evidence that support their views of community power.
关于社区权力的争论中，证据并不明确。在上文报告的三个案例研究中，多元论者和精英论者都能找到支持其社区权力观点的证据点。

Pluralists can point to the fact that New York’s mayors overspent in an attempt to mollify the demands of the city’s pluralistic social structurethe diverse ethnic, minority, neighborhood, business, and municipal work force groups that all competed for power in New York City. Furthermore, after the crisis, elites could not unilaterally impose desired service cuts and economic development plans on the city; instead, these had to be negotiated with the city’s elected officials. Mayor Koch proved to be a troublesome business ally, at times raising taxes and opposing their projects. The city also elected its first African-American, community-oriented mayor. Similarly, both the empowerment of new groups in San Francisco and the leadership exerted by Detroit’s Coleman Young on behalf of his black constituents can be used to underscore the pluralist interpretation of power. Especially in San Francisco, where neighborhood and environmental forces have imposed numerous restrictions on new development, it is difficult to portray policy in the city simply as being dictated by the business community.
多元主义者可以指出，纽约的市长们超支是为了满足该市多元社会结构的要求，即不同的种族、少数族裔、邻里、商业和市政劳动力群体，他们都在纽约市争夺权力。此外，危机过后，精英们不能单方面将削减服务和经济发展计划强加给城市，而必须与民选官员进行协商。事实证明，科赫市长是一个令人头疼的商业盟友，他有时会提高税收并反对他们的项目。此外，该市还选出了首位以社区为导向的非裔美国人市长。同样，旧金山新团体的赋权和底特律科尔曼-扬代表其黑人选民所发挥的领导作用都可以用来强调权力的多元化解释。特别是在旧金山，社区和环境力量对新开发项目施加了诸多限制，因此很难将该市的政策简单地描述为由商界主导。

Elite theorists, on the other hand, can find evidence to support their point of view. They can point to the role played by the banks in New York City-both in extending the city’s debt and in dumping their portfolios to precipitate the crisis. Elite theorists can also point out that, in the wake of the crisis, the city redefined its agenda so as to advance the interests of corporations and cut back the services given the poor, minorities, and neighborhood groups. Similarly, in San Francisco the pace of the economic transformation of that city has essentially continued despite the opposition and political victories of neighborhood groups and community activists. The city’s Downtown Plan restricted growth in the central business district only when market forces would no longer support such growth. It also shifted growth to the South of Market area, just south of the old downtown, where property owners were given new and profitable development rights.

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And in Detroit a neighborhood was destroyed to make way for a new General Motors plant-a plant that was given extensive subsidies and tax breaks without requiring any firm reciprocal commitment by the corporation.
另一方面，精英理论家可以找到支持其观点的证据。他们可以指出纽约市的银行所扮演的角色--既扩大了该市的债务，又抛售了其投资组合，从而引发了危机。精英理论家们还可以指出，危机发生后，纽约市重新制定了其议程，以促进企业的利益，削减为穷人、少数民族和邻里团体提供的服务。同样，在旧金山，尽管邻里团体和社区活动人士反对并取得了政治上的胜利，但该市的经济转型步伐仍在继续。只有当市场力量不再支持中心商业区的增长时，该市的市中心计划才会限制这种增长。该计划还将增长转移到市场南部地区，也就是旧市中心的南部，那里的业主获得了新的有利可图的开发权。

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在底特律，一个社区被摧毁，以便为通用汽车公司的新工厂让路--该工厂获得了大量补贴和税收减免，却不要求公司做出任何坚定的对等承诺。

The three case studies also underscore the notion of city limits in that cities are led to initiate policies favorable to new investment from the fear that possible investment will locate elsewhere. Clearly, business elites are not all powerful; they can be beaten back on specific issues or sets of issues. Yet, as the three studies show, overall, despite occasional setbacks, development favored by elites continues.
这三个案例研究还强调了城市限制的概念，即由于担心可能的投资会转移到其他地方，城市才会启动有利于新投资的政策。显然，商业精英并非无所不能；他们可能会在一些具体问题或一系列问题上被打回原形。然而，正如这三份研究报告所显示的，总体而言，尽管偶有挫折，但精英们青睐的发展仍在继续。

A Chicago case study further makes this point. Chicago’s business community lost out in its desire for the city to host the 1992 World’s Fair. Mayor Harold Washington refused to embrace enthusiastically the proposal, which gained little support from South Side community leaders. The city’s business community was beaten on an important issue. Still, the city provided its corporate community with numerous benefits in the form of favors in a wide variety of subsidized growth projects.

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芝加哥的一个案例研究进一步说明了这一点。芝加哥商界希望该市主办 1992 年世界博览会，但最终未能如愿。哈罗德-华盛顿市长拒绝热情接待这一提议，而这一提议几乎没有得到南区社区领导人的支持。该市商界在一个重要问题上遭到了失败。尽管如此，该市还是在各种补贴发展项目中，以优惠的形式为企业界提供了许多好处。

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But the “city limits” thesis understates the importance of local politics. As regime theory suggests, in each of the three case studies, local elections and municipal political actors were important determinants of local policy. While business leaders occupied a privileged position in city affairs, there was nothing economically deterministic or automatic that led a city to cede to business interests. Mayors Koch, Giuliani, and Jordan formed corporate-oriented governing regimes; Dinkins and Agnos did not, even though they at times favored specific development projects. Koch, at times, even favored the demands of his white ethnic supporters and neighborhood groups in opposing certain development efforts. In Detroit, Coleman Young insisted that African-American concerns be respected in any such governing partnership. While Young proved to be a dependable business ally on the Poletown and Chrysler East Jefferson projects, he was a less dependable partner in other areas.

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In all three case studies, city officials and community leaders alike found it difficult to sustain a workable governing alliance that was capable of getting things done.
但是，"城市界限 "理论低估了地方政治的重要性。正如制度理论所指出的，在三个案例研究中，地方选举和市政政治参与者都是地方政策的重要决定因素。虽然商业领袖在城市事务中占据特权地位，但并没有什么经济决定因素或自动因素导致城市向商业利益让步。科赫市长、朱利安尼市长和乔丹市长形成了以企业为导向的管理体制；而丁金斯市长和阿戈诺斯市长则没有形成这种体制，尽管他们有时会支持特定的发展项目。科赫有时甚至倾向于其白人支持者和邻里团体的要求，反对某些开发项目。在底特律，科尔曼-扬（Coleman Young）坚持认为，在任何此类管理伙伴关系中，非裔美国人的关切都应得到尊重。事实证明，杨在波莱镇和克莱斯勒东杰斐逊项目上是一个可靠的商业盟友，但在其他领域，他却不是一个可靠的合作伙伴。

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在所有三个案例研究中，城市官员和社区领袖都发现很难维持一个能够完成任务的可行的管理联盟。

CONCLUSIONS: A VIEW OF CONSTRAINED LOCAL POWER
结论：地方权力受到制约的观点

As we have seen in this chapter, the debate over the nature of power in cities continues. Elite theorists believe that a relatively small group of corporate officials, local business leaders, and persons of high social status make the key decisions in a city. In contrast, the pluralists argue that power is more widely spread and that a great many people have the ability to form groups and influence city decision making. In turn, the antipluralists argue that relatively powerless citizens have a difficult time in organizing. Furthermore, antipluralists contend that powerful corporations can keep unwanted issues off a city’s agenda, as was the case when the presence of U.S. Steel delayed the imposition of air pollution controls in Gary, Indiana. Local political systems are not as penetrable as the pluralists presume
正如我们在本章中所看到的，关于城市权力性质的争论仍在继续。精英论者认为，一个城市的关键决策是由相对较小的一群公司官员、地方商业领袖和社会地位较高的人做出的。与此相反，多元化论者则认为，权力的分布更为广泛，许多人都有能力组成团体并影响城市决策。反之，反多元化论者则认为，相对无权的市民很难组织起来。此外，反多元化论者还认为，强大的企业可以将不想要的问题排除在城市议程之外，美国钢铁公司的存在就拖延了印第安纳州加里市空气污染控制措施的实施。地方政治体制并不像多元化主义者推测的那样具有渗透性

In part, the debate continues because the exact distribution of power varies from one city to the next. Power in one city might be highly structured, while in another it might be more widely spread. The debate also persists as there is no clear and convincing evidence as to what exactly is
之所以争论不休，部分原因是不同城市的权力分配各不相同。一个城市的权力可能高度结构化，而另一个城市的权力可能分布更广。争论之所以持续不断，还因为没有明确而令人信服的证据来证明到底什么是 "权力"。
the shape of power in a particular city. Our review of politics in New York, San Francisco, and Detroit points to pieces of evidence that both pluralists and elite theorists can use to support their interpretations of urban power.
特定城市的权力形态。我们对纽约、旧金山和底特律政治的回顾指出了一些证据，多元论者和精英论者都可以利用这些证据来支持他们对城市权力的解释。

More recent attempts have been made to synthesize the evidence in the urban debate. While no closed-power elite exists in a great many American cities, a systemic view of power emerges nonetheless. While business elites can be beaten on specific issues, city officials act over the long haul to pursue development and provide tax incentives and other subsidies that favor upper-strata interests. Paul Peterson provides one very convincing explanation of why cities so often pursue policies favored by upper-strata interests: Cities must pursue continued development in order to maintain their job and tax bases.
最近，人们试图综合城市辩论中的证据。虽然美国许多城市并不存在封闭的权力精英，但还是出现了一种系统的权力观。虽然商业精英在具体问题上可能会被击败，但城市官员会采取长期行动来追求发展，并提供有利于上层利益的税收优惠和其他补贴。保罗-彼得森（Paul Peterson）提供了一个非常令人信服的解释，说明了为什么城市经常推行有利于上层利益的政策：城市必须追求持续发展，以维持就业和税收基础。

Peterson provides us with a powerful insight when he argues that much can be gained by conceptualizing cities as if they had a unitary or consensual interest in pursuing "those policies which are in the interests of the city, taken as a whole. "106 Coleman Young, for instance, was led to the distasteful act of destroying Poletown in order to save Detroit as a whole. Contemporary city decision making remains highly constrained by private decisions and the mobility allowed corporate investment choices in a free market.
彼得森为我们提供了强有力的见解，他认为，将城市概念化，将其视为具有追求 "符合城市整体利益的政策 "的统一或共识利益，可以获得很多益处。"106 例如，科尔曼-扬为了拯救底特律的整体利益，做出了摧毁坡镇的令人厌恶的行为。当代城市决策仍然受到私人决策和自由市场中企业投资选择流动性的高度制约。

Cities are not in a strong position to challenge the claims made by business. Jobs often equate with votes, and local officials do not want to put themselves in the position of not supporting jobs for their cities. City officials also have no way to determine accurately whether a business is serious in its threats to move to another city or to locate a new facility elsewhere. Nor can municipal officials accurately assess just what concessions a business really needs to locate in a city.

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城市并不具备挑战企业主张的实力。工作机会往往等同于选票，地方官员不想让自己陷入不支持本市工作机会的境地。城市官员也无法准确判断企业是否真的威胁要搬迁到另一个城市或在其他地方建立新的工厂。市政官员也无法准确评估企业在某市落户到底需要哪些优惠条件。

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Yet, there is no simple economic determinism. Politics remains important, and some cities are willing to challenge the policy priorities of growth coalitions. Peterson clearly overstates the degree to which a city possesses a unitary interest in pursuing development. Citizens who are threatened by displacement, overcrowding, congestion, and higher taxes associated with continued development may at times be able to form political coalitions opposed to the demands of real estate developers and elite forces. Also, the business community itself is often divided. While some sectors of a business community receive the benefits of new growth projects, other sectors find that they are only paying new taxes or losing customers and services to the new development projects.
然而，并不存在简单的经济决定论。政治因素依然重要，一些城市愿意挑战增长联盟的政策重点。彼得森显然夸大了一个城市在追求发展方面拥有单一利益的程度。受到流离失所、过度拥挤、交通堵塞和持续发展带来的更高税收威胁的市民有时可能会组成政治联盟，反对房地产开发商和精英势力的要求。此外，商界本身也往往存在分歧。当商界的某些部门从新的发展项目中获益时，其他部门却发现，他们只能为新的发展项目缴纳新的税款或失去客户和服务。

The notion of regime theory points to the difficulty that both city officials and private elites face in attempting to construct sustained, workable, governing alliances. City officials and business leaders need each other. Business leaders can often thwart the initiatives desired by city leaders. Municipal officials, in turn, control key resources essential to the good health of the business community, especially if businesses are not as free to pick up and relocate as the theory of capital mobility so often suggests.
制度理论的概念指出了城市官员和私人精英在试图构建持续、可行的治理联盟时所面临的困难。城市官员和商界领袖相互需要。商界领袖往往会阻挠城市领袖所希望的举措。反过来，市政官员又控制着对商界健康发展至关重要的关键资源，尤其是当企业并不像资本流动性理论通常所认为的那样可以自由选择和迁移时。

In governing, mayors must seek to build effective governing coalitions. Electoral power is not enough to guarantee effective governance. As a consequence, governing coalitions by necessity will often include actors that were not a part of the electoral coalition that put a mayor in office. Regime theory points to the importance of these informal governing alliances or coalitions. The business community often occupies a privileged place, but not a dictatorial or command position, in such informal governing alliances.
在治理方面，市长必须寻求建立有效的治理联盟。选举权不足以保证有效的治理。因此，执政联盟中往往必然会包括一些参与者，而这些参与者并不属于使市长就职的选举联盟。制度理论指出了这些非正式治理联盟的重要性。在这些非正式的治理联盟中，商界往往享有特权地位，但不是独裁或指挥地位。

Private institutions exert great influence in local affairs. Yet private elites do not simply dictate to city officials. Politics within a city and the leadership actions of city officials remain important. Government leaders choose which tasks they seek to accomplish and what alliances they will build in support of those tasks.

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As we shall see in the next chapter, the formal structure of local government, too, helps to determine just whose interests are represented in city hall.
私营机构在地方事务中发挥着巨大的影响力。然而，私人精英并不是简单地对城市官员发号施令。城市内部的政治和城市官员的领导行为仍然非常重要。政府领导人会选择他们想要完成的任务，以及他们将建立什么样的联盟来支持这些任务。

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正如我们将在下一章中看到的，地方政府的正式结构也有助于确定市政厅代表了谁的利益。

NOTES 注释

Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, Middletown (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929), and Middletown in Transition (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1937).
罗伯特-S.和海伦-M.-林德：《米德尔敦》（纽约：Harcourt, Brace, 1929 年）和《转型中的米德尔敦》（纽约：Harcourt, Brace, 1937 年）。
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); and G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1967).
C.C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); and G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America?(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1967)。
Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963). The book was originally published in 1953.
Floyd Hunter，《社区权力结构》（纽约州花园城：Anchor Books，1963 年）。该书最初出版于 1953 年。
Floyd Hunter, Community Power Succession: Atlanta’s Policymakers Revisited Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
Floyd Hunter, Community Power Succession：亚特兰大决策者再探北卡罗来纳州教堂山，北卡罗来纳大学出版社，1980 年）：北卡罗来纳大学出版社，1980 年）。
Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963). Also see Robert A. DahI, “A Critique of the Ruling’ Elite Model,” American Political Science Review 52 (June 1958): 463-69; and Raymond Wolfinger, “A Plea for a Decent Burial,” American Sociological Review 27 (December 1962): 841-47.
Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963).另见 Robert A. DahI, "A Critique of the Ruling' Elite Model," American Political Science Review 52 (June 1958)：463-69; and Raymond Wolfinger, "A Plea for a Decent Burial," American Sociological Review 27 (December 1962)：841-47.
Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, pp. 21-24.
Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, pp.
Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961). Also see Raymond Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974); and Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, pp. 69-97.
Robert A. Dahl，《谁在治理？美国城市的民主与权力》（康涅狄格州纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1961 年）。另见 Raymond Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974); and Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, pp.
Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 7.
达尔，《谁在治理》，第 7 页。
Ibid., p. 163 同上，第 163 页
Ibid., pp. 100-103, 137-40, 163-65, and 311-25.
同上，第 100-103 页、第 137-40 页、第 163-65 页和第 311-25 页。
Ibid., p. 181. 同上，第 181 页。
Ibid., pp. $192 - 99$ 同上，第 $192 - 99$ 页。
Ibid., p. 305. 同上，第 305 页。
Michael Lipsky, Protest in City Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972).
Michael Lipsky，《城市政治中的抗议》（芝加哥：Rand McNally，1972 年）。
Michael Parenti, “Power and Pluralism: View from the Bottom,” Journal of Politics 32 (1970): 501-30.
迈克尔-帕伦蒂，《权力与多元主义：View from the Bottom," Journal of Politics 32 (1970)：501-30.
In particular, see Robert J. Waste, ed., Community Power: Future Directions in Urban Research (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1986).
具体参见 Robert J. Waste 编著的《社区权力》（Community Power：城市研究的未来方向》（Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1986）。
G. William Domhoff, Who Really Rules? New Haven and Community Power Reexamined (Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing, 1978), p. 113 and Chapter 5. Also see Robert A. Dahl, “Rethinking Who Governs? New Haven, Revisited,” in Community Power: Future Directions in Urban Research, ed. Robert J. Waste (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1986).
G. William Domhoff, Who Really Rules?New Haven and Community Power Reexamined》（加州圣莫尼卡：固特异出版社，1978 年），第 113 页和第 5 章。另见 Robert A. Dahl，"重新思考谁在治理？New Haven, Revisited," in Community Power：城市研究的未来方向》，罗伯特-J.Robert J. Waste (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1986)。
Domhoff, Who Really Rules? New Haven and Community Power Reexamined, p. 113.
Domhoff, Who Really Rules?纽黑文与社区权力再审视》，第 113 页。
Ibid., pp. 107-113; and Matthew Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: $A$ Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 108-109.
同上，第 107-113 页；Matthew Crenson，《空气污染的非政治学》： $A$ 《城市非决策研究》（巴尔的摩：约翰-霍普金斯出版社，1971 年），第 108-109 页。
Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “The Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962): 947-52. Also see Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 43-46.
Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962)：947-52.另见 Bachrach 和 Baratz, Power and Poverty：理论与实践》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1970 年），第 43-46 页。
Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution, pp. 55-82 and 107.
Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution, 第 55-82 页和第 107 页。
Richard M. Merelman, “On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power,” American Political Science Review 62 (June 1968): 451-60; Raymond E. Wolfinger, “Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics,” American Political Science Review 65 (December 1971): 1063-1980; and Geoffrey Debnam, “Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz,” American Political Science Review 69 (September 1975): 889-99 (and pp. 900-07 for Bachrach and Baratz’s reply and Debnam’s rejoinder).
Richard M. Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power," American Political Science Review 62 (June 1968)：451-60; Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," American Political Science Review 65 (December 1971)：1063-1980; and Geoffrey Debnam, "Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz," American Political Science Review 69 (September 1975)：889-99（第 900-07 页为巴赫拉奇和巴拉兹的回复以及德布南的反驳）。
Blaine A. Brownell, “The Urban South Comes of Age, 1900-1940,” in The City in Southern History, ed. Blaine A. Brownell and David R. Goldfield (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977), pp. 142-43.
Blaine A. Brownell, "The Urban South Comes of Age, 1900-1940," in The City in Southern History, ed. Blaine A. Brownell and David R. Goldfield (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977), pp.
Peter A. Lupsha and William J. Siembieda, “The Poverty of Public Services in the Land of Plenty: An Analysis and Interpretation,” in The Rise of the Sunbelt Cities, ed. David C. Perry and Alfred J. Watkins (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 185
Peter A. Lupsha and William J. Siembieda, "The Poverty of Public Services in the Land of Plenty：An Analysis and Interpretation," in The Rise of the Sunbelt Cities, ed. David C. Perry and Alfred J. Watkins (Beverly Hills, Watkins).David C. Perry 和 Alfred J. Watkins (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977)，第 185 页。
Arnold Fleischmann and Joe R. Feagin, “The Politics of Growth-Oriented Urban Alliances: Comparing Old Industrial and New Sunbelt Cities,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 23 (December 1987): 216.
Arnold Fleischmann 和 Joe R. Feagin，"以增长为导向的城市联盟政治：比较老工业城市和新阳光地带城市》，《城市事务季刊》第 23 期（1987 年 12 月）：216.
Lupsha and Siembieda, “The Poverty of Public Services in a Land of Plenty,” p. 185 .
Lupsha 和 Siembieda，"富饶之地公共服务的贫困"，第 185 页。
Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), pp. 109-49.
Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism：A View from the States, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), pp.
Lupsha and Siembieda, “The Poverty of Public Services in a Land of Plenty,” p. 187.
Lupsha 和 Siembieda，"富饶之地公共服务的贫困"，第 187 页。
Brownell, “The Urban South Comes of Age, 1900-1940,” p. 150.
Brownell, "The Urban South Comes of Age, 1900-1940," 第 150 页。
David R. Johnson, “San Antonio: The Vicissitudes of Boosterism,” in Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II," ed. Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), pp. 235-54; and David R. Johnson, John A. Booth, and Richard J. Harris, eds., The Politics of San Antonio: Community, Progress, and Power (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).
David R. Johnson，"San Antonio：The Vicissitudes of Boosterism," in Sunbelt Cities：第二次世界大战以来的政治与发展》，理查德-M. 伯纳德和布拉德利-R. 莱斯主编（德克萨斯州奥斯汀：德克萨斯大学出版社）。Richard M. Bernard 和 Bradley R. Rice（德克萨斯州奥斯汀：德克萨斯大学出版社，1983 年），第 235-54 页；以及 David R. Johnson、John A. Booth 和 Richard J. Harris 编辑的《圣安东尼奥的政治》：社区、进步与权力》（林肯，内布拉斯加州：内布拉斯加大学出版社，1983 年）。
Fleischmann and Feagin, “The Politics of Growth-Oriented Urban Alliances,” p. 216.
Fleischmann 和 Feagin，《以增长为导向的城市联盟政治》，第 216 页。
Bradley R. Rice, “Atlanta: If Dixie Were Atlanta,” in Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II, p. 44
Bradley R. Rice，"亚特兰大：如果迪克西是亚特兰大》，载于《阳光地带城市》：第二次世界大战以来的政治与发展》，第 44 页
Ibid., p. 51. 同上，第 51 页。
Philip J. Trounstine and Terry Christensen, Movers and Shakers: The Study of Community Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), p. 40.
Philip J. Trounstine 和 Terry Christensen, Movers and Shakers：社区权力研究》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1982 年），第 40 页。
Ibid., pp. 99-108. 同上，第 99-108 页。
Ibid., pp. 127 and $162 - 92$ .
同上，第 127 页和 $162 - 92$ 页。
Robert Kerstein, “The Political-Economy of Urban Development in Tampa” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Urban Affairs Association, March 8-11, 1989).
Robert Kerstein，《坦帕市城市发展的政治经济学》（在城市事务协会年会上提交的论文，1989 年 3 月 8-11 日）。
Robyne S. Turner, “Growth Politics and Downtown Development: The Economic Imperative in Sunbelt Cities,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 28 (September 1992): 3-21.
Robyne S. Turner，"增长政治与市中心发展：太阳带城市的经济要务》，《城市事务季刊》第 28 期（1992 年 9 月）：3-21.
Ronald K. Vogel, Urban Political Economy: Broward County, Florida (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1992), pp. 68-79, 101-07, and $113 - 17$ .
Ronald K. Vogel，《城市政治经济学》：Broward County, Florida (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1992), pp.
Platon N. Rigos and Darryl Paulson, “Public-Private Partnerships: When Things Fall Apart—The Case of St. Petersburg, Florida” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 3-6, 1992).
Platon N. Rigos 和 Darryl Paulson，"Public-Private Partnerships：佛罗里达州圣彼得堡案例"（1992 年 9 月 3-6 日在芝加哥举行的美国政治学协会年会上提交的论文）。
On the new opposition to growth in suburban Tampa, see three papers and articles by Robert Kerstein: “Suburban Growth Politics in Hillsborough County: Growth Management and Political Regimes,” Social Science Quarterly 74 (September 1993): 614-620; “Growth Politics in Tampa and Hillsborough County,” Journal of Urban Affairs 13 (1991): 55-76; and “Housing Policy in Tampa and Hillsborough County: 1937-1992” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Urban Affairs Association, Cleveland, April 1992). Mark Schneider, “Undermining the Growth Machine: The Missing Link between Local Economic Development and Fiscal Payoffs,” Journal of Politics 54 (February 1992): 214-30, presents evidence on the mounting suburban opposition nationwide to new growth projects.
关于坦帕市郊反对增长的新动向，请参阅 Robert Kerstein 撰写的三篇论文和文章："希尔斯伯勒县的郊区增长政治：增长管理与政治制度》，《社会科学季刊》第 74 期（1993 年 9 月）：614-620; "Growth Politics in Tampa and Hillsborough County," Journal of Urban Affairs 13 (1991)：55-76; and "Housing Policy in Tampa and Hillsborough County：1937-1992 年"（1992 年 4 月在克利夫兰举行的城市事务协会年会上提交的论文）。马克-施耐德：《破坏增长机器：The Missing Link between Local Economic Development and Fiscal Payoffs," Journal of Politics 54 (February 1992)：马克-施耐德："Undermining the Growth Machine: The Miss Link between Local Economic Development and Fiscal Payoffs," Journal of Politics 54 (February 1992): 214-30, 提供了全国范围内郊区对新增长项目日益强烈的反对意见。
Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981)
保罗-E-彼得森，《城市界限》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1981 年）
Ibid., pp. $37 - 38$ . 同上，第 $37 - 38$ 页。
Ibid., pp. 206-12. 同上，第 206-12 页。
For an exchange between Peterson and his critics, see Heywood T. Sanders and Clarence N. Stone, “Developmental Politics Reconsidered,” pp. 521-39; Paul E. Peterson, “Analyzing Development Politics: A Response to Sanders and Stone,” pp. 540-47; and Sanders and Stone, “Competing Paradigms: A Rejoinder to Peterson,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 22 (June 1987): 548-51. For an extensive detailing of the arguments critical of Peterson, see Clarence N. Stone and Heywood T. Sanders, eds., The Politics of Urban Development (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1987).
彼得森与其批评者之间的交流，见 Heywood T. Sanders 和 Clarence N. Stone，"Developmental Politics Reconsidered"，第 521-39 页；Paul E. Peterson，"Analyzing Development Politics：对桑德斯和斯通的回应"，第 540-47 页；以及桑德斯和斯通，"竞争范式：A Rejoinder to Peterson," Urban Affairs Quarterly 22 (June 1987)：548-51.有关批评 Peterson 的论点的详细内容，请参阅 Clarence N. Stone 和 Heywood T. Sanders 编著的《城市发展政治》（Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1987）。
Peterson, City Limits, p. 147.
彼得森，《城市极限》，第 147 页。
John R. Logan and Harvey L Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).
John R. Logan 和 Harvey L Molotch，《城市财富》：The Political Economy of Place（加州伯克利：加州大学出版社，1987 年）。
Heywood T. Sanders, “The Politics of Development in Middle-Sized Cities,” in The Politics of Economic Development, ed. Clarence N. Stone and Heywood T.
海伍德-桑德斯，"中等城市的发展政治"，《经济发展政治》，克莱伦斯-斯通和海伍德-T-桑德斯合编。Clarence N. Stone 和 Heywood T.

Sanders, pp. 182-98 (the quotation appears on p. 192). The point that a city’s business community is often divided and hence does not comprise a single monolithic elite was made much earlier by pluralists in the community power debate. See Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress, pp. 147-51.
桑德斯，第 182-98 页（引文见第 192 页）。一个城市的商界往往是分裂的，因此并不是由单一的精英组成，这一点多元论者在社区权力辩论中更早地提出过。见 Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress, 第 147-51 页。
49. John Clayton Thomas, Between Citizen and City: Neighborhood Organizations and Urban Politics in Cincinnati (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1986), pp. 1-21.
49.John Clayton Thomas, Between Citizen and City：Neighborhood Organizations and Urban Politics in Cincinnati (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1986), pp.
50. Todd Swanstrom, “Semisovereign Cities: The Politics of Urban Development,” Polity 21 (Fall 1988): 96-110. Also see Kenneth K. Wong, City Choices: Education and Housing (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 147.
50.Todd Swanstrom, "Semisovereign Cities：The Politics of Urban Development," Polity 21 (Fall 1988)：96-110.另见 Kenneth K. Wong, City Choices：教育与住房》（纽约州奥尔巴尼：纽约州立大学出版社，1990 年），第 147 页。
51. Ibid., pp. 88-96. Also see David I. Birch, “Who Creates Jobs?” Public Interest (Fall 1981): 3-14; and Ardeshir Anjomani, Jon Erickson, and Anthony Oji, “Major Factors Influencing Industry Location in Texas” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Urban Affairs Association, Baltimore, March 8-11, 1989).
51.同上，第 88-96 页。另见 David I. Birch，"谁创造了工作机会？Public Interest (Fall 1981)：3-14; and Ardeshir Anjomani, Jon Erickson, and Anthony Oji, "Major Factors Influencing Industry Location in Texas" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Urban Affairs Association, Baltimore, March 8-11, 1989).
52. William J. Grimshaw, “Revisiting the Classics: Political Order, Economic Efficiency, and Social Justice” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1-4, 1994).
52.William J. Grimshaw, "Revisiting the Classics：Political Order, Economic Efficiency, and Social Justice" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1-4, 1994).
53. Robert J. Waste, “City Limits, Pluralism, and Urban Political Economy,” Journal of Urban Affairs 15, 5 (1993): 445-55. Peterson, City Limits, p. 52, acknowledges that education policy is difficult to classify, as it spills over into more than one policy area.
53.Robert J. Waste, "City Limits, Pluralism, and Urban Political Economy," Journal of Urban Affairs 15, 5 (1993)：445-55.彼得森在《城市界限》第 52 页中承认，教育政策很难分类，因为它涉及多个政策领域。
54. Jeffrey R. Henig, “Defining City Limits,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 27 (March 1992): 384 .
54.Jeffrey R. Henig, "Defining City Limits," Urban Affairs Quarterly 27 (March 1992)：384 .
55. Thomas Longoria, Jr., “Empirical Analysis of the City Limits Typology,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 30 (September 1994): 102-13.
55.Thomas Longoria, Jr., "Empirical Analysis of the City Limits Typology," Urban Affairs Quarterly 30 (September 1994)：102-13.
56. Clarence N. Stone, “Systemic Power in Community Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory,” American Political Science Review 74 (December 1980): 978
56.Clarence N. Stone, "Systemic Power in Community Decision Making：A Restatement of Stratification Theory," American Political Science Review 74 (December 1980)：978
57. Clarence N. Stone, Regime Politics-Governing Atlanta: 1946-1988 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1989), p. 242.
57.Clarence N. Stone, Regime Politics-Governing Atlanta：1946-1988》（堪萨斯州劳伦斯：堪萨斯大学出版社，1989 年），第 242 页。
58. The story of Atlanta under Jackson and Young in the 1970 s and 1980 s is told by Stone, Regime Politics, pp. 77-159.
58.斯通（Stone）在《政权政治》（Regime Politics）一书中讲述了 20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代杰克逊和杨领导下的亚特兰大的故事，第 77-159 页。
59. “Plan for Olympic Park Spurs Atlanta Protest,” The New York Times, November 21, 1993.
59."奥林匹克公园计划引发亚特兰大抗议》，《纽约时报》，1993 年 11 月 21 日。
60. John Hull Mollenkopf, A Phoenix in the Ashes: The Rise and Fall of the Koch Coalition in New York City Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 201-02.
60.John Hull Mollenkopf, A Phoenix in the Ashes：The Rise and Fall of the Koch Coalition in New York City Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992), pp.
61. Clarence N. Stone, “Summing Up: Urban Regimes, Development Policy, and Political Arrangements,” in The Politics of Economic Development, ed. Stone and Sanders, pp. 272-73; and Clarence N. Stone, “Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach,” Journal of Urban Affairs 15, 1 (1993):

18 - 22

.
61.Clarence N. Stone, "Summing Up：城市制度、发展政策和政治安排"，载于《经济发展的政治》，Stone 和 Sanders 编辑，第 272-73 页；以及 Clarence N. Stone，"城市制度和治理能力：城市治理"，载于《经济发展的政治》，Stone 和 Sanders 编辑，第 272-73 页。斯通和桑德斯，第 272-73 页；以及 Clarence N. Stone，"Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern：A Political Economy Approach," Journal of Urban Affairs 15, 1 (1993)：

18 - 22

。
62. Richard Edward DeLeon, Left Coast City: Progressive Politics in San Francisco, 1975-1991 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), pp. 142-49.
62.Richard Edward DeLeon, Left Coast City：Progressive Politics in San Francisco, 1975-1991 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), pp.
63. Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York Russell Sage Foundation, 1960); Donald H. Haider, “Sayre and Kaufman Revisited: New York City Government Since 1965,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 15 (December 1979): 123-45; and Douglas Yates, The Ungovernable City (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977).
63.Wallace Sayre 和 Herbert Kaufman，Governing New York City（纽约 Russell Sage 基金会，1960 年）；Donald H. Haider，"Sayre and Kaufman Revisited：1965 年以来的纽约市政府》，《城市事务季刊》第 15 期（1979 年 12 月）：123-45; and Douglas Yates, The Ungovernable City (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977).
64. Jack Newfield and Paul DuBrul, The Abuse of Power: The Permanent Government and the Fall of New York (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 45-46. Also see Richard S. Morris, Bum Rap on America’s Cities (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp. 51-66.
64.Jack Newfield and Paul DuBrul, The Abuse of Power: The Permanent Government and the Fall of New York (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp.另见 Richard S. Morris, Bum Rap on America's Cities (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980)，第 51-66 页。
65. Martin Shefter, “New York City’s Fiscal Crisis: The Politics of Inflation and Retrenchment,” Public Interest 48 (Summer 1977): 111-12
65.Martin Shefter, "New York City's Fiscal Crisis：The Politics of Inflation and Retrenchment," Public Interest 48 (Summer 1977)：111-12
66. Newfield and DuBrul, The Abuse of Power, p. 41. For a parallel case as to the role played by the Cleveland financial community in bringing about that city’s financial default, see the exchange between Davita Silfen Glasberg, “The Political Economic Power of Finance Capital and Urban Fiscal Crisis: Cleveland’s Default, 1978”; Todd Swanstrom, “On The Power of Finance Capital Over Cities: A Rejoinder…”; and Glasberg’s “Reply” in the Journal of Urban Affairs 10 (1988): 219-52.
66.Newfield and DuBrul, The Abuse of Power, p. 41。关于克利夫兰金融界在导致该市财政违约中所扮演的角色，可参见 Davita Silfen Glasberg，"The Political Economic Power of Finance Capital and Urban Fiscal Crisis：克利夫兰的违约，1978 年"；Todd Swanstrom，"On The Power of Finance Capital Over Cities：以及格拉斯伯格在《城市事务杂志》10（1988 年）上发表的 "答复"：219-52.
67. Shefter, “New York City’s Fiscal Crisis,” p. 114.
67.Shefter, "纽约市的财政危机"，第 114 页。
68. Ibid. 68.同上。
69. Robert W. Bailey, The Crisis Regime: The MAC, the EFCB, and the Political Impact of the New York City Financial Crisis (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984), pp. 173-75.
69.Robert W. Bailey, The Crisis Regime：The MAC, the EFCB, and the Political Impact of the New York City Financial Crisis (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984), pp.
70. Bernard J. Frieden, “The Downtown Job Puzzle,” The Public Interest 97 (Fall 1989): 80-81; and Joe R. Feagin and Robert Parker, Building American Cities: The Urban Real Estate Game, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), pp. 69-70.
70.Bernard J. Frieden, "The Downtown Job Puzzle," The Public Interest 97 (Fall 1989)：80-81; and Joe R. Feagin and Robert Parker, Building American Cities：The Urban Real Estate Game, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), pp.
71. Bailey, The Crisis Regime, p. 174. Also see Haider, “Sayre and Kaufman Revisited,” p. 142.
71.Bailey, The Crisis Regime, p. 174。另见 Haider，"Sayre and Kaufman Revisited"，第 142 页。
72. Mollenkopf, A Phoenix in the Ashes, pp. 3-4.
72.莫伦科夫，《灰烬中的凤凰》，第 3-4 页。
73. Ibid., pp.

44 - 68

.
73.同上，第

44 - 68

页。
74. Ibid., pp. 126-27, 142-47, and 201-02. Also see Susan S. Fainstein and Norman S. Fainstein, “New York City: A Manhattan Business District, 1945-1988,” in Unequal Partnerships: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment in Postwar America, ed. Gregory D. Squires (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 59-79.
74.同上，第 126-27、142-47 和 201-02 页。另见 Susan S. Fainstein 和 Norman S. Fainstein，"New York City：A Manhattan Business District, 1945-1988," in Unequal Partnerships：The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment in Postwar America》，Gregory D. Squires 编辑（新泽西州）。Gregory D. Squires (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1989), pp.
75. Asher Arian, Arthur S. Goldberg, John H. Mollenkopf, and Edward T. Rogowsky, Changing New York City Politics (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 1-3 and

69 - 114

.
75.Asher Arian, Arthur S. Goldberg, John H. Mollenkopf, and Edward T. Rogowsky, Changing New York City Politics (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp.
76. Susan S. Fainstein, “The Second New York Fiscal Crisis,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 16 (March 1992): 129-37.
76.Susan S. Fainstein, "The Second New York Fiscal Crisis," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 16 (March 1992)：129-37.
77. Mollenkopf, A Phoenix in the Ashes, pp. 204-07.
77.莫伦科夫，《灰烬中的凤凰》，第 204-07 页。
78. Frederick M. Wirt, “Alioto and the Politics of Hyperpluralism,” Transaction 7 (April 1970): 46-55.
Frederick M. Wirt, "Alioto and the Politics of Hyperpluralism," Transaction 7 (April 1970)：46-55.
79. Chester Hartman and Rob Kessler, “The Illusion and Reality of Urban Renewal: San Francisco’s Yerba Buena Center,” in Marxism and the Metropolis, ed. William K. Tabb and Larry Sawers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 154.
79.切斯特-哈特曼和罗布-凯斯勒，《城市重建的幻想与现实：San Francisco's Yerba Buena Center," in Marxism and the Metropolis, ed. William K. Tabb and Larry Sawers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp.William K. Tabb 和 Larry Sawers（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1978 年），第 154 页。
80. Ibid., p. 168 80.同上，第 168 页
81. Chester Hartman, The Transformation of San Francisco (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), p. 169.
81.Chester Hartman, The Transformation of San Francisco (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), p. 169。
82. Ibid., p. 174. 82.同上，第 174 页。
83. Dennis J. Coyle, “The Balkans by the Bay,” Public Interest 91 (Spring 1988):

67 - 78

.
Dennis J. Coyle, "The Balkans by the Bay," Public Interest 91 (Spring 1988)：

67 - 78

。
84. Dawn Garcia, “Who Holds the Keys to Power in S.F. under Agnos?” San Francisco Chronicle, July 11, 1988.
84.Dawn Garcia，"在阿戈诺斯的领导下，谁掌握着旧金山的权力钥匙？旧金山纪事报》，1988 年 7 月 11 日。
85. DeLeon, Left Coast City, p. 12.
85.DeLeon, Left Coast City, 第 12 页。
86. Ibid., pp.

7 - 8

and 132-33. Also see Richard E. DeLeon, “The Urban Antiregime: Progressive Politics in San Francisco,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 27 June 1992):

555 - 79

86.同上，第

7 - 8

页和第 132-33 页。另见 Richard E. DeLeon，"The Urban Antiregime：旧金山的进步政治"，《城市事务季刊》，1992 年 6 月 27 日：）

555 - 79

。
87. Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, “Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus,” in Urban Economic Development, Urban Affairs Annual Review, vol. 27, ed. Richard D. Bingham and John P. Blair (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 245.
87.Bryan D. Jones 和 Lynn W. Bachelor，"地方政策自由裁量权与公司盈余"，《城市经济发展》，《城市事务年度评论》，第 27 卷，Richard D. Bingham 和 John P. Blair 编辑（加州比佛利山庄：Sage 出版社，1984 年），第 245 页。Richard D. Bingham and John P. Blair (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 245.
88. Ibid., p. 253. 88.同上，第 253 页。
89. Bill McGraw, “Poletown Land Costs Double, and Are Likely to Climb Higher,” Detroit Free Press, March 1, 1988, pp. 1 and 11.
89.Bill McGraw，"Poletown 土地成本翻了一番，并有可能继续攀升"，《底特律自由报》，1988 年 3 月 1 日，第 1 页和第 11 页。
90. Jones and Bachelor, “Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus,” p. 255
90.Jones and Bachelor, "Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus," p. 255
91. David Fasenfast, “Community Politics and Urban Redevelopment: Poletown, Detroit, and General Motors,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 22 (September 1986): 114 .
91.David Fasenfast, "Community Politics and Urban Redevelopment：Poletown, Detroit, and General Motors," Urban Affairs Quarterly 22 (September 1986)：114 .
92. Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor (with Carter Wilson), The Sustaining Hand: Community Leadership and Corporate Power (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1986), p. 129.
92.Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor (with Carter Wilson), The Sustaining Hand：Community Leadership and Corporate Power (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1986), p. 129.
93. Jones and Bachelor, “Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus,” p. 246.
93.Jones and Bachelor, "Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus," p. 246.
94. Ibid., p. 260. 94.同上，第 260 页。
95. Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, The Sustaining Hand: Community Leadership and Corporate Power, 2nd ed., revised (Lawrence, KS: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1993), pp. 215-16.
95.Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, The Sustaining Hand：Community Leadership and Corporate Power, 2nd ed., revised (Lawrence, KS: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1993), pp.
96. Ibid., p. 216 96.同上，第 216 页
97. Ibid., pp. 217-32. 97.同上，第 217-32 页。
98. Ibid., pp. 107-08 and 115-27.
98.同上，第 107-08 页和第 115-27 页。
99. Ibid., p. 161 99.同上，第 161 页
100. Ibid., pp. 161-62. 100.同上，第 161-62 页。
101. Ibid., p. 248 101.同上，第 248 页
102. Ibid., p. 254 102.同上，第 254 页
103. Hartman, The Transformation of San Francisco, pp. 236-60 and 273-79, especially p. 277.
103.Hartman, The Transformation of San Francisco, 第 236-60 页和第 273-79 页，尤其是第 277 页。
104. Anne B. Shlay and Robert P. Giloth, “The Social Organization of a Land-Based Elite: The Case of the Failed Chicago 1992 World’s Fair,” Journal of Urban Affairs 9 (November 1987): 305-24.
104.Anne B. Shlay and Robert P. Giloth, "The Social Organization of a Land-Based Elite：芝加哥 1992 年世博会失败案例》，《城市事务杂志》第 9 期（1987 年 11 月）：305-24.
105. Marion E. Orr and Gerry Stoker, “Urban Regimes and Leadership in Detroit,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 30 (September 1994): 48-73
105.Marion E. Orr 和 Gerry Stoker，"底特律的城市制度和领导力"，《城市事务季刊》第 30 期（1994 年 9 月）：48-73
106. Peterson, City Limits, p. 4
106.Peterson, City Limits, 第 4 页
107. Jones and Bachelor, “Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus,” p. 265.
107.Jones and Bachelor, "Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus," p. 265.
108. Stone, “Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern,” pp. 1-2.
108.Stone, "Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern," pp.

4

Formal Structure and Leadership Style
正式结构和领导风格

Many political issues are never effectively resolved at the local level because of the legal restraints imposed by state governments on local government powers. State constitutions, state laws, and state provisions for city charters all spell out the exact formal powers allotted municipalities. These documents define a local jurisdiction’s spending obligations as well as its taxing and borrowing authority. State constitutions and state law even determine the formal structure of local government-whether a city has a strong-mayor, weak-mayor, council-manager (city manager), or commission system of government.
由于州政府对地方政府权力施加的法律限制，许多政治问题在地方一级从未得到有效解决。州宪法、州法律和州对城市章程的规定都明确规定了赋予市政当局的正式权力。这些文件规定了地方政府的支出义务以及征税和借贷权力。州宪法和州法律甚至还决定了地方政府的正式结构--一个城市是采用强市长制、弱市长制、议会经理制（城市经理），还是委员会制。

The formal rules and structure of government help to determine who gets what in the local arena. The different structures of local government have different biases. Groups who feel that a locality is not responding adequately to their needs will, at times, push for changes in the rules of operation of local government.
政府的正式规则和结构有助于决定谁能在地方舞台上获得什么。地方政府的不同结构有不同的偏向。认为地方政府没有充分满足其需求的团体有时会推动地方政府改变运作规则。

The reform movement, which gained power during the Progressive Era early in the twentieth century, brought one such set of changes that has had lasting influence on the structure and operations of municipal governments-and of the national and state governments as well (see “The Reform Movement and the Progressive Era” on pages 102-103). As we shall discuss in more detail in the next two chapters, the reformers were upset with the way political party machines had been running cities. The reformers sought the introduction of structural and electoral reforms to weaken the power of the machines and the interests the machines served. Among these reforms were the council-manager and commission forms of government, the direct primary, at-large and nonpartisan voting rules, and the introduction of civil service or merit systems for the protection of public employees.
改革运动在二十世纪初的进步时代获得了权力，它带来了一系列这样的变革，对市政府的结构和运作，以及对国家和州政府的结构和运作产生了持久的影响（见第 102-103 页 "改革运动和进步时代"）。正如我们将在接下来的两章中详细讨论的那样，改革者对政党机器管理城市的方式感到不满。改革者寻求引入结构性改革和选举改革，以削弱政党机器的力量以及政党机器所服务的利益集团。这些改革包括议会-经理制和委员会制的政府形式，直接初选、全体投票和无党派投票规则，以及引入公务员制度或绩优制度以保护公职人员。

Yet the victory of the reformers, while quite substantial, was not complete. In a great many cities reformed institutions coexist side by side
然而，改革者的胜利虽然相当可观，却并不彻底。在许多城市，改革后的机构并存着

URBAN POLITICS 城市政治

FIFTH EDITION 第五版

∵

F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc. ITASCA, ILINOIS

∵

F.E. Peacock 出版社，Inc.伊利诺伊州伊塔斯卡市

Power in Metropolitan America
美国大都市的权力

BERNAPD H. ROSS aMERICAN UNIVERSITy
MYRON A. LEVINE Albion college
MYRON A. LEVINE 阿尔比恩学院

To Nettie and 致内蒂和
the memory of Len, 纪念莱恩
both of whom taught me to love the city.
他们都教会我热爱这座城市。

B.H.R.

To my mother and father.
敬我的父母
M.A.L.

Bernard H. Ross and Myron A. Levine would like to dedicate this edition
Bernard H. Ross 和 Myron A. Levine 谨将此版本献给
to the late Charles H. Levine, our friend and colleague who taught us both so much about urban politics and administration.
已故的查尔斯-H-莱文（Charles H. Levine），他是我们的朋友和同事，在城市政治和管理方面教给我们很多东西。

Contents 目录

FIGURES 数字xiTABLES 表格xiiPREFACE Xv 序言 Xv

1. THE L.A. RIOTS AND THE URBAN SITUATION
1
1.洛杉矶骚乱与城市状况 1

The Urban Riots of the 1960 s
20 世纪 60 年代的城市骚乱
The Riots in South Central, 1992
1992 年中南部骚乱
Urban Riots and the Urban Situation 7
城市骚乱与城市状况 7
Political Power and Urban America 9
政治权力与美国城市 9
Conclusions 结论

2. THE EVOLUTION OF CITIES AND SUBURBS
29
2.城市和郊区的演变 29

The Growth of Metropolitan America: Natural Factors 29 Governmental Influences on Metropolitan Development 34 The Importance of Corporate and Private Power 42
美国大都市的发展：自然因素 29 政府对大都市发展的影响 34 企业和私人力量的重要性 42
The Shift to the Sunbelt 48
向阳光地带的转移 48
Is the Urban Crisis Over? 55
城市危机结束了吗？55
Gentrification 56 城市化 56
Conclusions 58 结论 58

Who Has the Power? Decision Making and Urban Regimes 谁拥有权力？决策与城市制度

Abstract 摘要

A POLITICAL SCIENCE APPROACH: THE DISCOVERY OF PLURALISM政治学方法：多元化的发现

THE ANTI-PLURALISTS AND THE NONDECISION CRITIQUE反多元主义和非决定性批判

SUNBELT CITIES: ELITE DOMINANCE AND RECENT TRENDS太阳带城市：精英主导地位和近期趋势

ECONOMIC POWER AND "CITY LIMITS"经济实力和 "城市界限"

SYSTEMIC POWER AND REGIME THEORY系统权力和制度理论

Regime Politics in Atlanta亚特兰大的政权政治

Different Regime Types 不同的制度类型

THE DEBATE OVER CITY POWER: THREE CASE STUDIES关于城市权力的辩论：三个案例研究

New York City: Fiscal Crisis and Rebound纽约市：财政危机与反弹

San Francisco: From Manhattanization to an Antiregime旧金山：从曼哈顿化到反制度

Detroit: The Controversy over Poletown底特律关于波莱镇的争议

What the Three Case Studies Show三个案例研究的启示

CONCLUSIONS: A VIEW OF CONSTRAINED LOCAL POWER结论：地方权力受到制约的观点