Anarchy and the struggle for power
无政府状态与权力斗争

From: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), Chapter 2.
《摘自大国政治的悲剧》（W.W. Norton & Company，2001 年），第 2 章。

Great powers, I argue, are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. This perspective does not allow for status quo powers, except for the unusual state that achieves preponderance. Instead, the system is populated with great powers that have revisionist intentions at their core. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} This chapter presents a theory that explains this competition for power. Specifically, I attempt to show that there is a compelling logic behind my claim that great powers seek to maximize their share of world power…
我认为，大国总是在寻找机会，以霸权为最终目标，获得超越对手的力量。这种观点不允许维持现状的大国存在，除非有不寻常的国家取得了优势。相反，这个体系中充斥着以修正主义意图为核心的大国。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 本章提出了一种理论来解释这种权力竞争。具体来说，我试图证明，我所说的大国寻求最大限度地扩大其世界权力份额的说法背后有一个令人信服的逻辑......

My explanation for why great powers vie with each other for power and strive for hegemony is derived from five assumptions about the international system. None of these assumptions alone mandates that states behave competitively. Taken together, however, they depict a world in which states have considerable reason to think and sometimes behave aggressively. In particular, the system encourages states to look for opportunities to maximize their power vis-à-vis other states . . .
我对大国为何相互争权夺利、力争霸权的解释来自于对国际体系的五个假设。其中任何一个假设都没有单独规定国家必须采取竞争行为。然而，将这些假设结合在一起，就能描绘出这样一个世界：在这个世界里，国家有相当多的理由去思考，有时甚至会做出侵略性的行为。尤其是，国际体系鼓励国家寻找机会，最大限度地增强与其他国家的实力......。. .

The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. It is easy to draw that conclusion, since realism depicts a world characterized by security competition and war. By itself, however, the realist notion of anarchy has nothing to do with conflict; it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} Sovereignty, in other words, inheres in states because there is no higher ruling body in the international system. ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} There is no “government over governments.” ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4}
第一个假设是，国际体系是无政府的，但这并不意味着国际体系是混乱无序的。得出这一结论很容易，因为现实主义描绘了一个以安全竞争和战争为特征的世界。然而，现实主义的无政府状态概念本身与冲突无关；它是一种秩序原则，即该体系由独立国家组成，这些国家没有凌驾于它们之上的中央权威。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 换句话说，主权属于国家，因为国际体系中没有更高的统治机构。 ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 不存在 "政府凌驾于政府之上"。 ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4}

The second assumption is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other, although some states have more military might than others and are therefore more dangerous. A state’s military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals in those states could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state. After all, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it.
第二个假设是，大国天生拥有一定的进攻性军事能力，这使它们有能力伤害并可能摧毁对方。国家之间存在潜在的危险，尽管有些国家比其他国家拥有更强的军事实力，因此也更危险。一个国家的军事实力通常与它所掌握的特定武器有关，但即使没有武器，这些国家的个人也可以用他们的双手和双脚攻击另一个国家的人民。毕竟，每个人的脖子都有两只手可以扼住。

The third assumption is that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. Specifically, no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive military capability to attack the first state. This is not to say that states necessarily have hostile intentions.
第三个假设是，国家永远无法确定其他国家的意图。具体来说，没有一个国家能确定另一个国家不会利用其进攻性军事能力攻击第一个国家。这并不是说国家一定有敌对意图。

Indeed, all of the states in the system may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be sure of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty. ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them. ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state’s intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next. Uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities.
事实上，系统中的所有国家都可能是可靠的良性国家，但我们无法确定这一判断，因为意图是无法百分之百确定的。 ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} 侵略的可能原因有很多，没有一个国家可以确定另一个国家不是出于其中的一个原因。 ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} 此外，意图可以迅速改变，因此一个国家的意图可能前一天是善意的，而第二天就会变成敌意。意图的不确定性是不可避免的，这意味着国家永远无法确定其他国家在拥有进攻能力的同时没有进攻意图。

The fourth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great powers. Specifically, states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. Survival dominates other motives because, once a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims. Soviet leader Josef Stalin put the point well during a war scare in 1927: "We can and must build socialism in the [Soviet Union]. But in order to do so we first of all have to exist. ${}^{\text{"}}$${}^{\text{" }}$^("" "){ }^{\text {" }} States can and do pursue other goals, of course, but security is their most important objective.
第四个假设是，生存是大国的首要目标。具体来说，国家寻求维护领土完整和国内政治秩序的自主性。生存支配着其他动机，因为一旦一个国家被征服，它就不可能再追求其他目标。苏联领导人约瑟夫-斯大林在 1927 年的一次战争恐慌中很好地说明了这一点："我们能够也必须在[苏联]建设社会主义。但要做到这一点，我们首先必须存在。 ${}^{\text{"}}$${}^{\text{" }}$^("" "){ }^{\text {" }} 当然，国家可以而且确实在追求其他目标，但安全是它们最重要的目标。

The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it. In particular, they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival. Moreover, states pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions.
第五个假设是，大国是理性的行为体。它们了解外部环境，并从战略角度考虑如何在其中生存。特别是，它们会考虑其他国家的偏好，自己的行为会如何影响其他国家的行为，以及其他国家的行为会如何影响自己的生存战略。此外，国家既关注其行为的长期后果，也关注其行为的近期后果。

As emphasized, none of these assumptions alone dictates that great powers as a general rule should behave aggressively toward each other. There is surely the possibility that some state might have hostile intentions, but the only assumption dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says that their principal objective is to survive, which by itself is a rather harmless goal. Nevertheless, when the five assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.
正如我们所强调的那样，这些假设中没有任何一个决定了大国在一般情况下应该对彼此采取侵略行为。某些国家当然有可能怀有敌意，但唯一涉及所有国家共同的特定动机的假设是，这些国家的主要目标是生存，这本身是一个相当无害的目标。然而，当这五种假设结合在一起时，就会产生强大的诱因，促使大国对彼此采取进攻性的思维和行动。具体而言，会产生三种一般行为模式：恐惧、自助和权力最大化。

Great powers fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. For sure, the level of fear varies across time and space, but it cannot be reduced to a trivial level. From the perspective of any one great power, all other great powers are potential enemies. This point is illustrated by the reaction of the United Kingdom and France to German reunification at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that these three states had been close allies for almost forty-five years, both the United Kingdom and France immediately began worrying about the potential dangers of a united Germany. ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8}
大国相互恐惧。它们相互猜疑，担心战争一触即发。它们预感到了危险。国家之间几乎没有信任的余地。可以肯定的是，恐惧的程度因时空而异，但不能将其归结为微不足道的程度。从任何一个大国的角度来看，所有其他大国都是潜在的敌人。冷战结束时英国和法国对德国统一的反应就说明了这一点。尽管这三个国家是近四十五年的亲密盟友，但英国和法国都立即开始担心统一后的德国可能带来的危险。 ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8}

The basis of this fear is that in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the " 911 " problem-the absence of a central authority to which a threatened state can turn for help-and states have even greater incentive to fear each other. Moreover, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of third parties, for punishing an aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war with them.
这种恐惧的基础是，在一个大国有能力相互攻击并可能有动机这样做的世界里，任何一心想要生存的国家都必须至少对其他国家心存疑虑，不愿信任它们。再加上 "911 "问题--受威胁的国家没有一个可以求助的中央权力机构--国家之间相互恐惧的动机就更强烈了。此外，除了第三方可能出于自身利益考虑之外，还没有惩罚侵略者的机制。由于有时难以威慑潜在的侵略者，国家有充分的理由不信任其他国家，并做好与之开战的准备。

The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great powers do not compete with each other as if international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are great.
沦为侵略牺牲品的可能后果进一步凸显了恐惧作为世界政治动力的重要性。大国之间的竞争并不像国际政治仅仅是一个经济市场。国家间的政治竞争比单纯的经济交往要危险得多；前者可能导致战争，而战争往往意味着战场上的大规模杀戮以及对平民的大规模屠杀。在极端情况下，战争甚至会导致国家毁灭。战争的可怕后果有时会导致各国不仅将对方视为竞争对手，还可能将其视为致命的敌人。简而言之，政治对立往往十分激烈，因为利害关系重大。

States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy, and today’s enemy might be tomorrow’s alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
国际体系中的国家也旨在保障自身的生存。由于其他国家是潜在的威胁，也由于在拨打 911 时没有更高的权力机构来营救它们，因此各国不能依赖其他国家来保障自己的安全。每个国家都倾向于认为自己是脆弱的、孤独的，因此它的目标是保障自己的生存。在国际政治中，天助自助者。强调自助并不妨碍各国结成联盟。 ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} 但联盟只是暂时的权宜之计：今天的联盟伙伴可能是明天的敌人，今天的敌人也可能是明天的联盟伙伴。例如，美国在第二次世界大战中与中国和苏联一起对抗德国和日本，但不久之后又在敌人和伙伴之间翻来覆去，在冷战期间与西德和日本结盟对抗中国和苏联。

States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul.
在自助世界中运作的国家几乎总是根据自身利益行事，而不会将自己的利益置于其他国家或所谓国际社会的利益之下。原因很简单：在自助世界里，自私自利是值得的。短期如此，长期也是如此，因为如果一个国家在短期内失利，那么它可能就不会长期存在了。

Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system. The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival. Weaker states will be reluctant to pick fights with more powerful states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. Indeed, the bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker will attack the stronger. Neither Canada nor Mexico, for example, would countenance attacking the United States, which is far more powerful than its neighbors. The ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system. As Immanuel Kant said, "It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible. ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} Survival would then be almost guaranteed. ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11}
由于担心其他国家的最终意图，并意识到自己是在一个自助体系中运作，各国很快就明白，确保自身生存的最佳方式就是成为体系中最强大的国家。相对于潜在对手而言，一个国家越强大，这些对手攻击它并威胁其生存的可能性就越小。弱国不愿与强国交战，因为弱国很可能遭受军事失败。事实上，任何两个国家之间的实力差距越大，弱国攻击强国的可能性就越小。例如，加拿大和墨西哥都不会同意攻击美国，因为美国比邻国强大得多。最理想的情况是成为体系中的霸主。正如伊曼纽尔-康德（Immanuel Kant）所说："如果可能的话，每个国家或其统治者都希望通过征服全世界来实现永久和平。 ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} 这样，生存就几乎有了保障。 ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11}

Consequently, states pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize their share of world power. Specifically, they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of means-economic, diplomatic, and military-to shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile. Because one state’s gain in power is another state’s loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. The trick, of course, is to be the winner in this competition and to dominate the other states in the system. Thus, the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions. ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12}
因此，各国密切关注权力在它们之间的分配情况，并特别努力使自己在世界权力中的份额最大化。具体来说，它们会寻找机会，通过牺牲潜在对手的利益来获得更多的权力增量，从而改变力量平衡。各国采用经济、外交和军事等多种手段，使力量对比向有利于自己的方向转变，即使这样做会使其他国家产生怀疑甚至敌意。由于一国的得势就是另一国的失势，大国在打交道时往往抱着零和心态。当然，诀窍在于成为这场竞争中的赢家，并在体系中主宰其他国家。因此，"国家最大化相对权力 "的说法等同于认为，国家倾向于对其他国家采取进攻性思维，尽管它们的最终动机只是为了生存。简而言之，大国都有侵略意图。 ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12}

Even when a great power achieves a distinct military advantage over its rivals, it continues looking for chances to gain more power. The pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved. The idea that a great power might feel secure without dominating the system, provided it has an “appropriate amount” of power, is not persuasive, for two reasons. ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} First, it is difficult to assess how much relative power one state must have over its rivals before it is secure. Is twice as much power an appropriate threshold? Or is three times as much power the magic number? The root of the problem is that power calculations alone do not determine which side wins a war. Clever strategies, for example, sometimes allow less powerful states to defeat more powerful foes.
即使大国在军事上取得了超越对手的明显优势，它也会继续寻找机会获得更多的权力。只有在实现霸权之后，对权力的追求才会停止。只要拥有 "适量 "的权力，大国就可能在不主宰整个体系的情况下感到安全，这种观点并不具有说服力，原因有二。 ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} 首先，很难评估一个国家必须拥有超过对手多少的相对权力才会感到安全。两倍于对手的实力是合适的门槛吗？还是三倍的力量才是神奇的数字？问题的根源在于，仅仅计算实力并不能决定哪一方赢得战争。例如，巧妙的战略有时会让实力较弱的国家击败实力较强的敌人。

Second, determining how much power is enough becomes even more complicated when great powers contemplate how power will be distributed among them ten or twenty years down the road. The capabilities of individual states vary over time, sometimes markedly, and it is often difficult to predict the direction and scope of change in the balance of power. Remember, few in the West anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Union before it happened. In fact, during the first half of the Cold War, many in the West feared that the Soviet economy would eventually generate greater wealth than the American economy, which would cause a marked power shift against the United States and its allies. What the future holds for China and Russia and what the balance of power will look like in 2020 is difficult to foresee.
其次，当大国考虑十年或二十年后如何分配力量时，确定多少力量才足够就变得更加复杂。单个国家的能力会随着时间的推移而发生变化，有时甚至是显著变化，因此通常很难预测力量平衡变化的方向和范围。请记住，在苏联解体之前，西方几乎没有人预料到。事实上，在冷战的前半期，许多西方国家担心苏联经济最终会比美国经济创造更多的财富，这将导致明显的力量转移，不利于美国及其盟国。中国和俄罗斯的未来会怎样，2020 年的力量平衡会是什么样子，现在还很难预见。

Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive. ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} But even if a great power does not have the wherewithal to achieve hegemony (and that is usually the case), it will still act offensively to amass as much power as it can, because states are almost always better off with more rather than less power. In short, states do not become status quo powers until they completely dominate the system.
鉴于很难确定今天和明天有多少力量才足够，大国认识到，确保自身安全的最佳方式是现在就实现霸权，从而消除另一个大国挑战的任何可能性。只有误入歧途的国家才会放弃成为体系中霸主的机会，因为它认为自己已经拥有足够的实力生存下去。 ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} 但是，即使一个大国不具备实现霸权的实力（通常就是这种情况），它仍然会采取进攻性行动，尽可能地积聚更多的实力，因为国家的实力越大越好，而不是越小越好。简而言之，国家只有完全主宰整个体系，才会成为维持现状的大国。

All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states. In short, states ultimately pay attention to defense as well as offense. They think about conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense. This inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, where states are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world.
所有国家都受这一逻辑的影响，这意味着它们不仅会寻找机会相互利用，还会努力确保其他国家不会利用它们。毕竟，敌对国家也受同样逻辑的驱使，而且大多数国家都能从其他国家的行动中发现自己的动机。简而言之，国家最终既重视防御，也重视进攻。它们自己考虑征服，也努力阻止侵略国以牺牲自己为代价获得权力。这不可避免地导致了一个不断进行安全竞争的世界，在这个世界里，只要能帮助国家获得对对手的优势，国家就愿意撒谎、欺骗和使用野蛮武力。如果把和平定义为一种安宁或相互和睦的状态，那么在这个世界上，和平是不可能爆发的。

The “security dilemma,” which is one of the most well-known concepts in the international relations literature, reflects the basic logic of offensive realism. The essence of the dilemma is that the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states. Thus, it is difficult for a state to increase its own chances of survival without threatening the survival of other states. John Herz first introduced the security dilemma in a 1950 article in the journal World Politics. ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} After discussing the anarchic nature of international politics, he writes, "Striving to attain security from . . . attack, [states] are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power
安全困境 "是国际关系文献中最著名的概念之一，反映了进攻性现实主义的基本逻辑。安全困境的本质是，一个国家为提高自身安全而采取的措施通常会降低其他国家的安全。因此，一个国家很难在不威胁其他国家生存的情况下增加自己的生存机会。约翰-赫茨于1950年在《世界政治》杂志上发表了一篇文章，首次提出了安全困境。 ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} 在讨论了国际政治的无政府性质后，他写道："为了获得免受......攻击的安全，[国家]被驱使获取越来越多的权力，以摆脱他国权力的影响。这反过来又使他国更加不安全，迫使他们做好最坏的打算。由于在这样一个相互竞争的世界中，没有人会感到完全安全，因此权力
competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on."16 The implication of Herz’s analysis is clear: the best way for a state to survive in anarchy is to take advantage of other states and gain power at their expense. The best defense is a good offense. Since this message is widely understood, ceaseless security competition ensues. Unfortunately, little can be done to ameliorate the security dilemma as long as states operate in anarchy.
竞争随之而来，安全和权力积累的恶性循环也就开始了。"16 赫茨的分析寓意很明显：一个国家在无政府状态下生存的最佳方式就是利用其他国家，以牺牲其他国家为代价获取权力。进攻是最好的防御。由于人们普遍了解这一信息，因此安全竞争无休无止。遗憾的是，只要国家处于无政府状态，就几乎无法改善安全困境。

It should be apparent from this discussion that saying that states are power maximizers is tantamount to saying that they care about relative power, not absolute power. There is an important distinction here, because states concerned about relative power behave differently than do states interested in absolute power. ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} States that maximize relative power are concerned primarily with the distribution of material capabilities. In particular, they try to gain as large a power advantage as possible over potential rivals, because power is the best means to survival in a dangerous world. Thus, states motivated by relative power concerns are likely to forgo large gains in their own power, if such gains give rival states even greater power, for smaller national gains that nevertheless provide them with a power advantage over their rivals. ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} States that maximize absolute power, on the other hand, care only about the size of their own gains, not those of other states. They are not motivated by balance-of-power logic but instead are concerned with amassing power without regard to how much power other states control. They would jump at the opportunity for large gains, even if a rival gained more in the deal. Power, according to this logic, is not a means to an end (survival), but an end in itself. ${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19}
从上述讨论中可以看出，说国家是权力最大化者，等于说国家关心的是相对权力，而不是绝对权力。这里有一个重要的区别，因为关心相对权力的国家与关心绝对权力的国家行为不同。 ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} 追求相对权力最大化的国家主要关注物质能力的分配。特别是，它们试图在潜在对手面前获得尽可能大的实力优势，因为实力是在危险世界中生存的最佳手段。因此，出于对相对实力的考虑，国家很可能会为了较小的国家利益而放弃自身实力的大幅提升（如果这种提升会给对手国家带来更大的实力），而这种较小的国家利益却能使国家获得相对于对手的实力优势。 ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} 另一方面，追求绝对权力最大化的国家只关心自身利益的大小，而不关心其他国家利益的大小。它们的动机不是出于权力平衡的逻辑，而是只关心积累权力，而不关心其他国家控制了多少权力。他们会抓住机会获取巨额利益，即使对手在交易中获得了更多利益。按照这种逻辑，权力不是达到目的（生存）的手段，而是目的本身。 ${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19}

There is obviously little room for status quo powers in a world where states are inclined to look for opportunities to gain more power. Nevertheless, great powers cannot always act on their offensive intentions, because behavior is influenced not only by what states want, but also by their capacity to realize these desires. Every state might want to be king of the hill, but not every state has the wherewithal to compete for that lofty position, much less achieve it. Much depends on how military might is distributed among the great powers. A great power that has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to behave more aggressively, because it has the capability as well as the incentive to do so.
在一个国家都倾向于寻找机会获得更多权力的世界里，维持现状的大国显然没有什么生存空间。然而，大国不可能总是按照自己的进攻意图行事，因为国家的行为不仅受其愿望的影响，也受其实现这些愿望的能力的影响。每个国家都可能想成为山丘之王，但并非每个国家都有能力竞争这一崇高地位，更不用说实现这一目标了。这在很大程度上取决于大国之间如何分配军事实力。与对手相比拥有明显实力优势的大国可能会表现得更具侵略性，因为它有能力也有动机这样做。

By contrast, great powers facing powerful opponents will be less inclined to consider offensive action and more concerned with defending the existing balance of power from threats by their more powerful opponents. Let there be an opportunity for those weaker states to revise the balance in their own favor, however, and they will take advantage of it. Stalin put the point well at the end of World War II: "Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise. ${}^{220}$${}^{220}$^(220){ }^{220} States might also have the capability to gain advantage over a rival power but nevertheless decide that the perceived costs of offense are too high and do not justify the expected benefits.
相比之下，大国在面对强大的对手时，不太会考虑采取进攻性行动，而是更关注如何捍卫现有的力量平衡，使其免受更强大对手的威胁。然而，如果弱国有机会改变平衡，使之对自己有利，它们就会利用这个机会。第二次世界大战结束时，斯大林说得好："每个人都在其军队所及的范围内推行自己的制度。除此之外，别无他法。 ${}^{220}$${}^{220}$^(220){ }^{220} 国家也可能有能力获得对竞争对手的优势，但却认为进攻的成本过高，无法证明预期收益的合理性。

In short, great powers are not mindless aggressors so bent on gaining power that they charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories. On the contrary, before great powers take offensive actions, they think carefully about the balance of power and about how other states will react to their moves. They weigh the costs and risks of offense against the likely benefits. If the benefits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propitious moment. Nor do states start arms races that are unlikely to improve their overall position . . . [S]tates sometimes limit defense spending either because spending more would bring no strategic advantage or because spending more would weaken the economy and
简而言之，大国并不是一心想夺取权力的无谓侵略者，他们不会一头扎进失败的战争中，也不会追求岌岌可危的胜利。恰恰相反，大国在采取进攻行动之前，会仔细考虑力量平衡以及其他国家对其行动的反应。它们会权衡进攻的成本和风险以及可能带来的利益。如果得不偿失，它们就会按兵不动，等待更有利的时机。国家也不会展开不可能改善其整体地位的军备竞赛......。[国家有时会限制国防开支，要么是因为增加开支不会带来战略优势，要么是因为增加开支会削弱经济和国防开支。
undermine the state’s power in the long run. ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21} To paraphrase Clint Eastwood, a state has to know its limitations to survive in the international system . .
从长远来看，这会削弱国家的力量。 ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21} 套用克林特-伊斯特伍德（Clint Eastwood）的话说，一个国家要想在国际体系中生存，就必须知道自己的局限性......。

Great powers, as I have emphasized, strive to gain power over their rivals and hopefully become hegemons. Once a state achieves that exalted position, it becomes a status quo power. More needs to be said, however, about the meaning of hegemony.
正如我所强调的那样，大国都在努力获得超越对手的权力，并希望成为霸主。一旦一个国家获得了这一崇高地位，它就会成为一个维持现状的大国。不过，关于霸权的含义，还有更多需要说明的地方。

A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system. ${}^{22}$${}^{22}$^(22){ }^{22} No other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it. In essence, a hegemon is the only great power in the system. A state that is substantially more powerful than the other great powers in the system is not a hegemon, because it faces, by definition, other great powers. The United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century, for example, is sometimes called a hegemon. But it was not a hegemon, because there were four other great powers in Europe at the time-Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia-and the United Kingdom did not dominate them in any meaningful way. In fact, during that period, the United Kingdom considered France to be a serious threat to the balance of power. Europe in the nineteenth century was multipolar, not unipolar.
霸权是指一个国家非常强大，能够支配该体系中的所有其他国家。 ${}^{22}$${}^{22}$^(22){ }^{22} 没有任何其他国家有足够的军事实力与之抗衡。从本质上讲，霸主是体系中唯一的大国。一个比体系中其他大国强大得多的国家不是霸主，因为根据定义，它要面对其他大国。例如，19 世纪中期的英国有时被称为霸主。但它并不是霸主，因为当时欧洲还有其他四个大国--奥地利、法国、普鲁士和俄国--英国并没有以任何有意义的方式支配它们。事实上，在那个时期，英国认为法国是对均势的严重威胁。19 世纪的欧洲是多极的，而不是单极的。

Hegemony means domination of the system, which is usually interpreted to mean the entire world. It is possible, however, to apply the concept of a system more narrowly and use it to describe particular regions, such as Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. Thus, one can distinguish between global hegemons, which dominate the world, and regional hegemons, which dominate distinct geographical areas. The United States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere for at least the past one hundred years. No other state in the Americas has sufficient military might to challenge it, which is why the United States is widely recognized as the only great power in its region.
霸权意味着对体系的统治，通常被解释为对整个世界的统治。不过，也可以更狭义地应用体系的概念，用它来描述特定地区，如欧洲、东北亚和西半球。因此，我们可以区分主宰世界的全球霸权和主宰不同地理区域的地区霸权。至少在过去一百年里，美国一直是西半球的地区霸主。美洲没有任何其他国家拥有足够的军事实力来挑战美国，因此美国被公认为该地区唯一的大国。

My argument . . . is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. The principal impediment to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power across the world’s oceans onto the territory of a rival great power. The United States, for example, is the most powerful state on the planet today. But it does not dominate Europe and Northeast Asia the way it does the Western Hemisphere, and it has no intention of trying to conquer and control those distant regions, mainly because of the stopping power of water. Indeed, there is reason to think that the American military commitment to Europe and Northeast Asia might wither away over the next decade. In short, there has never been a global hegemon, and there is not likely to be one anytime soon.
我的论点是......我的论点是，除了一个国家取得明显核优势这种不太可能发生的情况外，任何国家几乎都不可能实现全球霸权。统治世界的主要障碍是难以跨越世界各大洋将力量投射到对手大国的领土上。例如，美国是当今世界上最强大的国家。但它并不像统治西半球那样统治欧洲和东北亚，也无意征服和控制这些遥远的地区，这主要是因为水的阻挡力。事实上，我们有理由认为，美国对欧洲和东北亚的军事承诺可能会在未来十年内逐渐消失。简而言之，世界上从未有过霸主，也不可能很快出现。

The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon and possibly control another region that is nearby and accessible over land. The United States is the only regional hegemon in modern history, although other states have fought major wars in pursuit of regional hegemony: imperial Japan in Northeast Asia, and Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany in Europe. But none succeeded. The Soviet Union, which is located in Europe and Northeast Asia, threatened to dominate both of those regions during the Cold War. The Soviet Union might also have attempted to conquer the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, with which it shared a border. But even if Moscow had been able to dominate Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which it never came close to doing, it still would have been unable to conquer the Western Hemisphere and become a true global hegemon.
一个大国所能期望的最好结果就是成为地区霸主，并有可能控制邻近且可通过陆路进入的另一个地区。美国是现代史上唯一的地区霸主，尽管其他国家也曾为追求地区霸权而进行过大规模战争：东北亚的日本帝国，欧洲的拿破仑法国、威廉明德和纳粹德国。但无一成功。位于欧洲和东北亚的苏联在冷战期间曾威胁要主宰这两个地区。苏联还可能试图征服石油资源丰富的波斯湾地区，因为它与该地区接壤。但是，即使莫斯科能够称霸欧洲、东北亚和波斯湾地区，它也无法征服西半球，成为真正的全球霸主。

States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from
实现地区霸权的国家试图阻止其他地区的大国
duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers. Thus the United States, for example, played a key role in preventing imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union from gaining regional supremacy. Regional hegemons attempt to check aspiring hegemons in other regions because they fear that a rival great power that dominates its own region will be an especially powerful foe that is essentially free to cause trouble in the fearful great power’s backyard. Regional hegemons prefer that there be at least two great powers located together in other regions, because their proximity will force them to concentrate their attention on each other rather than on the distant hegemon.
重复他们的壮举。换句话说，地区霸主不希望同行。因此，美国在阻止日本帝国、威廉明德国、纳粹德国和苏联获得地区霸权方面发挥了关键作用。地区霸权国家试图遏制其他地区的霸权国家，因为它们担心称霸本地区的敌对大国会成为特别强大的敌人，基本上可以随意在心怀恐惧的大国后院制造麻烦。地区霸权更希望至少有两个大国共同位于其他地区，因为它们的接近会迫使它们将注意力集中在彼此身上，而不是远方的霸权。

Furthermore, if a potential hegemon emerges among them, the other great powers in that region might be able to contain it by themselves, allowing the distant hegemon to remain safely on the sidelines. Of course, if the local great powers were unable to do the job, the distant hegemon would take the appropriate measures to deal with the threatening state. The United States, as noted, has assumed that burden on four separate occasions in the twentieth century, which is why it is commonly referred to as an “offshore balancer.”
此外，如果其中出现了一个潜在的霸权国家，该地区的其他大国或许能够自行遏制它，让远方的霸权国家安全地置身事外。当然，如果当地大国无法做到这一点，远方的霸主就会采取适当措施对付这个威胁国家。如前所述，美国在 20 世纪曾四次承担起这一重任，这也是美国通常被称为 "离岸平衡者 "的原因。

In sum, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world. That state would be a status quo power, and it would go to considerable lengths to preserve the existing distribution of power. The United States is in that enviable position today; it dominates the Western Hemisphere and there is no hegemon in any other area of the world. But if a regional hegemon is confronted with a peer competitor, it would no longer be a status quo power. Indeed, it would go to considerable lengths to weaken and maybe even destroy its distant rival. Of course, both regional hegemons would be motivated by that logic, which would make for a fierce security competition between them . . .
总之，任何大国的理想状态都是成为世界上唯一的地区霸主。这个国家将是一个维持现状的大国，它将不遗余力地维护现有的权力分配。今天，美国就处于这种令人羡慕的地位；它主宰着西半球，世界其他任何地区都没有霸主。但是，如果一个地区霸主遇到一个同行竞争者，它将不再是一个维持现状的大国。事实上，它会不遗余力地削弱甚至摧毁其遥远的竞争对手。当然，两个地区霸主都会受到这种逻辑的驱使，这将使它们之间展开激烈的安全竞争.............

1 Most realist scholars allow in their theories for status quo powers that are not hegemons. At least some states, they argue, are likely to be satisfied with the balance of power and thus have no incentive to change it. See Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996, special issue on “Realism: Restatements and Renewal,” ed. Benjamin Frankel), pp. 98-101; and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 84-86, 91-92, 125-26.
1 大多数现实主义学者在其理论中允许非霸权国家维持现状。他们认为，至少有一些国家可能会对均势感到满意，因此没有动力去改变它。见 Randall L. Schweller，"Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias：What Security Dilemma？安全研究》第 5 期，第 3 号（1996 年春，"现实主义 "特刊：重述与复兴 "特刊，Benjamin Frankel 编辑），第 3 页。Benjamin Frankel），第 98-101 页；以及 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration：Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp.
2 The concept of anarchy and its consequences for international politics was first articulated by G. Lowes Dickinson, The European Anarchy (New York: Macmillan, 1916). For a more recent and more elaborate discussion of anarchy, see [Kenneth N.] Waltz, Theory of International Politics [(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979)], pp. 88-93. Also see Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Imperialism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pt. 1; and Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique,” Review of International Studies 17, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 67-85.
2 G. Lowes Dickinson 在《欧洲无政府状态》（纽约：麦克米伦，1916 年）中首次阐述了无政府状态的概念及其对国际政治的影响。关于无政府状态的最新详细论述，见 [Kenneth N.] Waltz, Theory of International Politics [(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979)]，第 88-93 页。另见 Robert J. Art 和 Robert Jervis 编著的《国际政治》：Anarchy, Force, Imperialism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pt：A Critique," Review of International Studies 17, No. 1 (January 1991), pp.
3 Although the focus in this study is on the state system, realist logic can be applied to other kinds of anarchic systems. After all, it is the absence of central authority, not any special characteristic of states, that causes them to compete for power. Markus Fischer, for example, applies the theory to Europe in the Middle Ages, before the state system emerged in 1648. See Fisher, “Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices,” International Organization 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 427-66. The theory can also be used to explain the behavior of individuals. The most important work in this regard is Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1986). Also see Elijah Anderson, “The Code of the Streets,” Atlantic Monthly, May 1994, pp. 80-94; Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47; and Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 6.
3 虽然本研究的重点是国家制度，但现实主义逻辑也适用于其他类型的无政府制度。毕竟，是中央权威的缺失，而非国家的任何特殊性，导致了国家之间的权力竞争。例如，马库斯-费舍尔（Markus Fischer）将这一理论应用于 1648 年国家制度出现之前的中世纪欧洲。见 Fisher，"Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices，"International Organization 46，No.2 (Spring 1992)，pp.427-66。该理论还可用于解释个人行为。这方面最重要的著作是托马斯-霍布斯（Thomas Hobbes）的《利维坦》（Leviathan）。C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1986).另见 Elijah Anderson，"The Code of the Streets"，《大西洋月刊》，1994 年 5 月，第 80-94 页；Barry R. Posen，"The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict"，《生存》第 35 期，第 1 号（1993 年春），第 27-47 页；以及 Robert J. Spitzer，《枪支管制政治》（新泽西州查塔姆：查塔姆研究所，1995 年），第 6 章。6.
4 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problem and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), p.14.
4 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares：国际组织的问题与进展》，第 4 版（纽约：兰登书屋，1971 年），第 14 页。

5 The claim that states might have benign intentions is simply a starting assumption. I argue subsequently that when you combine the theory’s five assumptions, states are put in a position in which they are strongly disposed to having hostile intentions toward each other.
5 国家可能怀有善意只是一个起点假设。我随后将论证，如果将该理论的五个假设结合起来，国家就会处于一种强烈倾向于彼此怀有敌意的境地。
6 My theory ultimately argues that great powers behave offensively towards each other because that is the best way for them to guarantee their security in an anarchic world. The assumption here, however, is that there are many reasons besides security for why a state might behave aggressively toward another state. In fact, it is uncertainty about whether those non-security causes of war are at play, or might come into play, that pushes great powers to worry about their survival and thus act offensively. Security concerns alone cannot cause great powers to act aggressively. The possibility that at least one state might be motivated by non-security calculations is a necessary condition for offensive realism, as well as for any other structural theory of international politics that predicts security competition. Schweller puts the point well: “If states are assumed to seek nothing more than their own survival, why would they feel threatened? Why would they engage in balancing behavior? In a hypothetical world that has never experienced crime, the concept of security is meaningless.” Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias,” p. 91. Herbert Butterfield makes essentially the same point when he writes, “Wars would hardly be likely to occur if all men were Christian saints, competing with one another in nothing, perhaps, save self-renunciation.” C.T. McIntire, ed., Herbert Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 73. Also see Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 2.
6 我的理论最终认为，大国之所以对彼此采取进攻性行为，是因为这是在一个无政府世界中保障自身安全的最佳方式。然而，这里的假设是，一个国家之所以会对另一个国家采取进攻性行为，除了安全原因之外，还有很多其他原因。事实上，正是由于不确定这些非安全原因是否在起作用或可能起作用，大国才会担心自己的生存，从而采取进攻行动。仅有安全方面的担忧并不能促使大国采取进攻性行动。至少有一个国家可能出于非安全考虑，这是进攻性现实主义的必要条件，也是任何其他预测安全竞争的国际政治结构理论的必要条件。施韦勒（Schweller）说得很好："如果假定国家寻求的只是自身的生存，那么它们为什么会感到威胁？它们为什么会采取平衡行为？在一个从未经历过犯罪的假想世界中，安全的概念毫无意义"。施韦勒：《新现实主义的现状偏差》，第 91 页。赫伯特-巴特菲尔德（Herbert Butterfield）也提出了基本相同的观点，他写道："如果所有的人都是基督教的圣人，除了自我放弃之外，也许在任何事情上都相互竞争，那么战争就几乎不可能发生"。C.T. McIntire 编，《赫伯特-巴特菲尔德：赫伯特-巴特菲尔德：基督教与历史著作》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1979 年），第 73 页。另见 Jack Donnelly，《现实主义与国际关系》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2000 年），第 2 章。
7 Quoted in Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 271.
7 引自乔恩-雅各布森：《当苏联进入世界政治》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，1994 年），第 271 页。
8 See Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany’s Road to Unification (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1993), chap. 12; Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), chaps. 25-26; and Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), chap. 4.
8 见 Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall：德国的统一之路》（华盛顿特区：布鲁金斯学会出版社，1993 年），第 12 章；Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), chaps.12; Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), chaps.25-26; and Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed：A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), chap.4.
9 Frederick Schuman introduced the concept of self-help in International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), pp. 199-202, 514, although Waltz made the concept famous in Theory of International Politics, chap. 6. On realism and alliances, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
9 Frederick Schuman 在《International Politics：9 弗雷德里克-舒曼在《国际政治：西方国家体系导论》（纽约：麦格劳-希尔，1933 年）第 199-202 页和第 514 页中提出了自助的概念，尽管华尔兹在《国际政治理论》第 6 章中提出了这一概念。6.关于现实主义与联盟，见 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987)。
10 Quoted in Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946), p. 40.
10 引自马丁-怀特：《强权政治》（伦敦：皇家国际事务研究所，1946 年），第 40 页。

11 If one state achieves hegemony, the system ceases to be anarchic and becomes hierarchic. Offensive realism, which assumes international anarchy, has little to say about politics under hierarchy. But as discussed later, it is highly unlikely that any state will become a global hegemon, although regional hegemony is feasible. Thus, realism is likely to provide important insights about world politics for the foreseeable future, save for what goes on inside in a region that is dominated by a hegemon.
11 如果一个国家实现了霸权，这个体系就不再是无政府的，而是等级森严的。进攻性现实主义假定国际无政府状态，对等级制度下的政治几乎无话可说。但正如后面所讨论的，任何国家都不太可能成为全球霸主，尽管地区霸权是可行的。因此，在可预见的未来，现实主义可能会为世界政治提供重要的见解，但霸权统治的地区内部发生的事情除外。
12 Although great powers always have aggressive intentions, they are not always aggressors, mainly because sometimes they do not have the capability to behave aggressively. I use the term “aggressor” throughout this book to denote great powers that have the material wherewithal to act on their aggressive intentions.
12 虽然大国总是有侵略意图，但它们并不总是侵略者，主要是因为有时它们没有能力采取侵略行为。我在本书中一直使用 "侵略者 "一词来指那些有足够物质条件来实现其侵略意图的大国。
13 Kenneth Waltz maintains that great powers should not pursue hegemony but instead should aim to control an “appropriate” amount of world power. See Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 40.
13 肯尼斯-华尔兹认为，大国不应追求霸权，而应以控制 "适当 "数量的世界权力为目标。见华尔兹，"The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory"（《新现实主义理论中的战争起源》），收录于罗伯特-罗特伯格和西奥多-K-拉布编著的《重大战争的起源与预防》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1989 年），第 40 页。
14 The following hypothetical example illustrates this point. Assume that American policymakers were forced to choose between two different power balances in the Western Hemisphere. The first is the present distribution of power, whereby the United States is a hegemon that no state in the region would dare challenge militarily. In the second scenario, China replaces Canada and Germany takes the place of Mexico. Even though the United States would have a significant military advantage over both China and Germany, it is difficult to imagine any American strategist opting for this scenario over U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.
14 下面的假设性例子说明了这一点。假设美国决策者被迫在西半球两种不同的力量平衡中做出选择。第一种是目前的力量分布，即美国是该地区任何国家都不敢在军事上挑战的霸主。在第二种情况下，中国取代加拿大，德国取代墨西哥。尽管美国在军事上对中国和德国都有很大优势，但很难想象会有美国战略家选择这种情况，而不是美国在西半球的霸权。
15 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, No. 2 (January 1950), pp. 157-80. Although Dickinson did not use the term “security dilemma,” its logic clearly articulated in European Anarchy, pp. 20, 88.
15 John H. Herz，《理想主义国际主义与安全困境》，《世界政治》第 2 期（1950 年 1 月），第 157-80 页。虽然迪金森没有使用 "安全困境 "一词，但其逻辑在《欧洲无政府状态》中有明确阐述，第 20 页和第 88 页。

16 Herz, “Idealist Internationalism,” p. 157.
16 Herz，"理想主义国际主义"，第 157 页。
17 See Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507; Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-66; and Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” American Political Science Review 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-20.
17 见 Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation：A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp：3 (April 1991), pp. 336-66; and Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review 85, No.

18 See Michael Mastanduno, “Do Relative Gains Matter? America’s Response to Japanese Industrial Policy,” International Security 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113.
18 见 Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?美国对日本工业政策的回应》，《国际安全》第 16 期，第 1 号（1991 年夏），第 73-113 页。
19 Waltz maintains that in Hans Morgenthau’s theory, states seek power as an end in itself; thus, they are concerned with absolute power, not relative power. See Waltz, “Origins of War,” pp. 40-41; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 126-27. Although Morgenthau occasionally makes statements that appear to support Waltz’s charge, there is abundant evidence in Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973) that states are concerned mainly with the pursuit of relative power.
19 华尔兹认为，在汉斯-摩根索的理论中，国家寻求权力本身就是目的；因此，国家关心的是绝对权力，而不是相对权力。见华尔兹：《战争的起源》，第 40-41 页；以及华尔兹：《国际政治理论》，第 126-27 页。虽然摩根索偶尔发表的言论似乎支持华尔兹的指控，但摩根索在《国家间的政治》（Politics among Nations）一书中提供了大量证据：The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973)）中有大量证据表明，国家主要关注的是对相对权力的追求。
20 Quoted in Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 36.
20 引自 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace：The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 （新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1999 年），第 36 页。
21 In short, the key issue for evaluating offensive realism is not whether a state is constantly trying to conquer other countries or going all out in terms of defense spending, but whether or not great powers routinely pass up promising opportunities to gain power over rivals.
21 简而言之，评价进攻现实主义的关键问题不在于一个国家是否不断试图征服其他国家或在国防开支方面全力以赴，而在于大国是否经常放弃有希望战胜对手的机会。
22 See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 29; and William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 12-14.
22 见 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1981 年），第 29 页；以及 William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance：The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.