Burden of proof on the government to show that the challenged action is necessary to advance a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. 政府有舉證責任證明受質疑的行動對於促進強烈的政府利益是必要的，並且是達成該利益的限制性最小的方式。
This standard of review generally applies to: 此審核標準一般適用於
Introduction 簡介
* Three Standards of Review * 三項審核標準
There are three key standards of reviews which reappear constantly throughout Constitutional Law. When a court reviews the constitutionality of government action, it is likely to be choosing from among one of these three standards of review: (1) the strict scrutiny standard (嚴格審查標準); (2) the middle-level review standard (中度審查標準); and (3) the mere rationality standard (基本合理性審查標準)。 《憲法》中不斷出現三種重要的審查標準。當法院審查政府行為是否符合憲法時，很可能會從這三種審查標準中選擇一種：(1) 嚴格審查標準 (strict scrutiny standard)；(2) 中度審查標準 (middle-level review standard)；以及 (3) 僅合理性審查標準 (mere rationality standard)。
a. Substantive Due Process a.實質適當程序
Government action which directly burdens the exercise of a fundamental right. 直接對行使基本權利造成負擔的政府行為。
b. Freedom of Expression b.表達自由
Content based (Track One) government regulation of expression (other than violence, obscenity, defamation or commercial speech, etc.). 以內容為基礎 (第一軌) 政府對表達的管制 (暴力、猥褻、誹謗或商業言論等除外)。
c. Equal Protection Clause c.平等保護條款
Government action which intentionally discriminates against suspect classes or fundamental rights (and some forms of unintentional discrimination against the poor). 故意歧視可疑階級或基本權利的政府行為（以及某些形式的非故意歧視窮人）。
a. State and Local Regulation of interstate Commerce a.州與地方對州際商業的監管
b. Article IV, Section 2 Privileges and Immunities b.第四條第二節 特權與豁免
Example: Discrimination against nonresidents 範例：對非居民的歧視
2. Middle-Level (Balancing) 2.中階（平衡）
Burden of proof on the government to show that the challenged action is substantially related to an important/substantial/significant government interest that outweighs the interest infringed. This standard of review generally applies to: 政府有舉證責任證明受質疑的行為與重要/實質/重大的政府利益有實質關係，且該利益大於受侵害的利益。此審查標準一般適用於
c. Contract Clause c.合約條款
State government impairment of existing private contract rights. Note: Federal government impairment of existing private contract rights will be upheld if rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 州政府對現有私人契約權利的損害。註：聯邦政府對現有私人契約權利的損害，若與合法的政府利益有合理關係，則將予以維護。
d. Equal Protection Clause d.平等保護條款
Government action which intentionally discriminates against gender or illegitimacy. 故意歧視性別或非婚生子女的政府行為。
e. Freedom of Expression e.表達自由
(1) Government action which regulates the method (Track Two) of expression, i.e., “time, place and manner” regulation. (1) 規範表達方式（第二軌）的政府行為，即「時間、地點和方式」規範。
(2) Commercial Speech (other than price information and false, misleading or illegal commercial speech). (2) 商業言論（價格資訊和虛假、誤導或非法商業言論除外）。
3. Rational Basis 3.合理基礎
Burden of proof is on the challenger to show that the challenged action is not rationally related to anv legitimate government interest. This standard of review generally applies to: 挑戰者有舉證責任證明被挑戰的行為與合法的政府利益沒有合理關係。此審查標準一般適用於：
f. Freedom of Association f.結社自由
Government investigations and compelled disclosure. 政府調查和強制披露。
g. Freedom of Religion g.宗教自由
Government action which interferes with religious conduct. Note that religious beliefs are absolutely protected and that there is a special test for government action which “establishes” religion. 干擾宗教行為的政府行為。請注意，宗教信仰絕對受到保護，而且對「確立」宗教的政府行為有特別的檢驗標準。
a. Substantive Due Process a.實質適當程序
Government action which burdens nonfundamental rights. 負擔非基本權利的政府行為。
b. Federal Regulation of Interstate Commerce b.聯邦對州際商業的監管
c. Federal Legislation to enforce the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments c.執行第13、14和15修正案的聯邦立法
d. Equal Protection Clause d.平等保護條款
(1) All government discrimination (intentional or unintentional) against nonsuspect classifications or non-fundamental rights. (1) 所有政府針對非可疑類別或非基本權利的歧視 (無論有意或無意)。
(2) All unintentional government discrimination against suspect/quasisuspect classifications or fundamental rights. (2) 政府針對可疑/疑似類別或基本權利的所有非故意歧視。
I. Federal Judicial Power I.聯邦司法權
1. Review of Acts of Congress 1.國會法令審查
Under Marbury v. Madison, it is the Supreme Court, not Congress, which has the authority and duty to declare a congressional statute unconstitutional if the Court thinks it violates the Constitution. 根據 Marbury v. Madison 案，如果最高法院認為國會法令違反憲法，則有權和義務宣布該法令違憲的是最高法院，而非國會。
2. Review of State Court Decisions 2.州法院判決的審查
a. Must be Based on Federal Law a.必須基於聯邦法律
The Supreme Court may review state court opinions, but only to the extent that the decision was decided based on federal law. 最高法院可以審核州法院的意見，但僅限於該判決是根據聯邦法律做出的。
b. Independent and Adequate State Ground However, even if there is a federal question in the state court case, the Supreme Court may not review the case if there is an independent and adequate state ground for the state court’s decision. b.獨立且充分的州立理由 然而，即使州法院的案件存在聯邦問題，如果州法院的判決有獨立且充分的州立理由，最高法院也不得審理該案件。
c. Review Limited to Decisions of Highest State Court c.審核限於州最高法院的判決
Federal statutes limit Supreme Court review to decisions of the highest state court available. But this does not mean that the top-ranking state court must have ruled on the merit of the case in order for the Supreme Court to review it. All that is required is that the case be heard by the highest state court available to the petitioner. 聯邦法規限制最高法院只能審查最高級州法院的判決。但這並不表示最高級別的州法院必須就案件的優劣做出判決，最高法院才能進行審查。所要求的只是案件必須由請願人可獲得的最高級州法院審理。
d. Writ of Certiorari d.審判令
Parties who are not satisfied with the decision of a lower court must petition the U.S. Supreme Court to hear their case. The primary means to petition the court for review is to ask it to grant a writ of certiorari. This is a request that the Supreme Court order a lower court to send up the record of the case for review. The Court usually is not under any obligation to hear these cases, and it usually only does so if the case could have national significance, might harmonize conflicting decisions in the federal Circuit courts, and/or could have precedential value. Four of the nine Justices must vote to accept a case. 對下級法院判決不滿意的當事人必須請求美國最高法院審理其案件。請求法院審查的主要方式是請求法院頒發審查令狀（writ of certiorari）。這是請求最高法院命令下級法院將案件記錄送交審查。法院通常沒有任何義務審理這些案件，通常只有在案件可能具有全國性意義、可能協調聯邦巡迴法院相互衝突的判決、和/或可能具有先例價值時，法院才會這樣做。九位大法官中必須有四位投票接受案件。
b. Congress has the general power to decide what types of cases the Supreme Court may hear, so long as it doesn’t expand the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction beyond the federal judicial power. b.國會一般有權決定最高法院可以審理哪些類型的案件，只要不把最高法院的司法權擴大到聯邦司法權以外。
d. Congress also may decide what lower federal courts there should be, and what cases they may hear. Again, the outer bound of this power is that Congress can’t allow the federal courts to hear a case that is not within the federal judicial power. d.國會也可以決定應該有哪些下級聯邦法院，以及它們可以審理哪些案件。同樣，這項權力的外部界限是國會不能允許聯邦法院審理不屬於聯邦司法權力範圍內的案件。
3. Congress's Control of Federal Court Jurisdiction 3.國會對聯邦法院管轄權的控制
In order for a case to be heard by the federal courts, the P must get past a series of procedural obstacles which collectively called requirements for justiciability: (1) the case must not require the giving of an advisory opinion; (2) the P must have standing; (3) the case must not be moot; (4) the case must be ripe for decision; and (5) the case must not involve a non-justiciable political question. 為了讓聯邦法院審理案件，訴訟人必須通過一系列的程序障礙，這些障礙統稱為可裁判性要求：(1) 案件不得要求提供諮詢意見；(2) 訴訟人必須有資格；(3) 案件不得無效；(4) 案件的判決時機必須成熟；(5) 案件不得涉及不可裁判的政治問題。
b. Standing b.站立
The federal courts may hear a case only when the P has standing to assert his claim, i.e., the P must have a significant stake in the controversy. 聯邦法院只有在當事人有資格提出其索賠時才能審理案件，也就是說，當事人必須與爭議有重大利害關係。
Three requirements: (1) Iniurv-in-fact: The plaintiff must have suffered or imminently will suffer injury, that is, neither conjectural nor hypothetical; (2) Causation: There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) Redressability: It must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that a favorable court decision will redress the injury. 三項要求：(1) Iniurv-in-fact：原告必須已遭受或即將遭受傷害，即既非猜測也非假設；(2) Causation：(2) 因果關係：損害與所控訴的行為之間必須有因果關係；以及 (3) 可補救性質：法院的有利判決必須有可能糾正損害，而非僅是推測。
a. Advisory Opinion a.諮詢意見
Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution gives the federal courts jurisdiction only over cases and controversies. The federal courts are therefore prevented from issuing opinions on abstract or hypothetical questions. This means that the federal courts may not give advisory opinions. In other words, the federal courts may not render opinions which answer a legal question when no party is before the court who has suffered or faces specific injury. 憲法第 III 條第 2 款僅賦予聯邦法院對案件和爭議的管轄權。憲法第三條第二節僅賦予聯邦法院對案件和爭議的管轄權。因此，聯邦法院不得就抽象或假設的問題發表意見。這表示聯邦法院不得提出諮詢意見。換句話說，聯邦法院不得在沒有當事人遭受或面臨具體損害的情況下，提出回答法律問題的意見。
(1) Injury in Fact (1) 事實傷害
The litigant must show that he has suffered an injury in fact, i.e., he must show that he has himself been injured in some way by the conduct that he complains of. 訴訟人必須證明他已遭受事實上的傷害，也就是說，他必須證明他自己因所申訴的行為而在某方面受到傷害。
(2) Non-Individual Harm (2) 非個人傷害
If the harm suffered by the P is no\boldsymbol{n o} different from that suffered by very large number of people not before the court, he has no standing to sue. 如果 P 所遭受的傷害 no\boldsymbol{n o} 與法院沒有受理的大量人士所遭受的傷害不同，他就沒有資格起訴。
(3) Third Parties’ Rights (3) 第三方權利
Where the rights claimed to be violated are not the rights of the PP, but instead the rights of third party who are not before the court, P also has no standing. 如果聲稱被侵犯的權利不是 PP 的權利，而是法院沒有受理的第三人的權利，則 P 也沒有資格。
(4) Taxpayer (4) 納稅人
The fact that a person’s federal taxes are used to fund an unconstitutional or illegal government program is simply not a sufficient connection with the governmental action to confer standing on the P . 個人的聯邦稅款被用於資助違憲或非法的政府計畫，與政府行為的關聯並不足以賦予個人權利......。
The only exception is a taxpayer sues to overturn a congressional tax or spending program that violates the Establishment Clause. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) 唯一的例外是納稅人起訴推翻國會違反「確立條款」的稅收或開支計畫。Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)
(5) Citizen Suits (5) 公民訴訟
The Court has always held that one federal citizen’s interest in lawful government is no different from the interest of any other citizen, and that an individual litigant relying on citizenship has not show the individualized iniury-in-fact that is required for standing. 法院一直認為，一個聯邦公民在合法政府中的利益與任何其他公民的利益並無差異，個別訴訟人依賴公民身份並未顯示出訴訟資格所需的個人化事實不確定性。
Exception: provided by statute such as Clean Water Act 例外：法令規定，例如《清潔水法》。
c. Mootness c.無效
(1) General Rule (1) 一般規則
A case may not be heard by the federal courts if it is moot. A case is moot if it raised a live controversy at the time the complaint was filed, but events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of an ongoing stake in the controversy. Example: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) 聯邦法院不得審理無效的案件。如果案件在提出訴願時引起了活生生的爭議，但在提出訴願後發生的事件剝奪了訴訟人在爭議中的持續利害關係，則該案件無效。舉例說明：DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974)
(2) Exceptions: (2) 例外：
(a) Capable of Repetition (a) 可重複
A case will not be treated as moot if the issue it raised is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” This takes care of situation in which, if the case were to be declared moot, the P or a different person might be injured in the same way, and his or her claim, too, would be moot before review could be had. 如果案件提出的問題 「能夠重複發生，但又迴避審查」，則案件不會被視為無效。這可以處理以下情況：如果案件被宣布為無效，P或其他人士可能會受到同樣的傷害，而他或她的索賠要求也會在進行審查之前失去意義。
A case will not be moot if there are still collateral consequences that might be adverse to the D. Example: D challenged the constitutionality of his conviction after serving the sentence, because there will probably be future collateral consequences from his conviction, the case will not be considered moot. 如果仍然存在可能對 D 不利的附帶後果，則案件不會被視為無效：D 在服刑後對其定罪的合憲性提出質疑，因為他的定罪可能會在未來產生附帶後果，所以此案不會被視為無效。
d. Ripeness d.成熟度
A case is not yet ripe (and therefore not yet decidable by a federal court) if it has not yet become sufficiently concrete to be adjudicated. One common ripeness problem arises where the P attacks the constitutionality of a statute and says that he has violated the statute, but it is clear that the statute is rarely enforced and probably will not be enforced in this particular situation. 如果一個案件尚未具體到可以判決的程度，則該案件尚未成熟（因此聯邦法院尚未可以判決）。一個常見的成熟度問題出現在 P 攻擊一項法規的合憲性，並說他違反了該法規，但很明顯，該法規很少執行，而且很可能不會在此特定情況下執行。
e. Political Questions e.政治問題
The courts will not decide a case involving the decision of a political question. It does not mean that federal courts will not decide a case that involves politics. Instead, the court will decline to hear a case on political question grounds only if it thinks that the doctrine of separation of powers requires this, or if it thinks that deciding the case would be unwise as a policy matter. 法院不會判決涉及政治問題判決的案件。這並不表示聯邦法院不會判決涉及政治的案件。相反，只有當法院認為三權分立原則要求這樣做，或者法院認為從政策角度來看，判決案件是不明智的，法院才會以政治問題為由拒絕審理案件。
(4) impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; (4) 法院不可能在不表示缺乏對政府協調部門應有尊重的情況下進行獨立解決；
(5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; and (5) 不尋常地需要毫無疑問地堅持已經做出的政治決定；以及
(6) attempting to resolve the matter would create the possibility of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. (6) 試圖解決這個問題，可能會造成不同部門就一個問題發表不同聲明的尷尬情況。
The factors considered (Baker v. Carr): 考慮的因素（Baker v. Carr）：
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department (i.e. foreign affairs, executive war powers or impeachment); (1) 憲法在文字上承諾將問題交由協調的政治部門處理 (例如外交事務、行政戰爭權力或彈劾)；
(2) lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue (Art. IV, Sec. 4, Guaranty Clause); (2) 缺乏司法上可發現和可管理的標準來解決問題 (第四條第四節，保證條款)；
(3) impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; (3) 不可能在沒有初步政策決定的情況下對問題做出決定，而這種政策決定顯然是非司法裁量的；
II. Federal Legislative Power - Commerce Power II.聯邦立法權 - 商業權
Probably Congress’ most important power is the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.” (Art. I. §8). There seem to be four broad categories of activities which Congress can constitutionally regulate under the Commerce power: 國會最重要的權力可能是「規範各州之間的商業」。(Art. I. §8)。根據憲法，國會似乎有四大類活動可以依據商務權進行管制：
1. Channels 1.頻道
First, Congress can regulate the use of the “channel” of interstate commerce. Thus, Congress can regulate in a way that is reasonably related to highways, waterways, and air traffic. Presumably Congress can do so even though the activity in question in the particular case is completely intrastate. 首先，國會可以管制州際商業「通道」的使用。因此，國會可以以與高速公路、水路和空中交通合理相關的方式進行管制。據推測，即使特定案件中的相關活動完全屬於州內活動，國會也可以這樣做。
3. Articles Moving in Interstate Commerce 3.在州際商業中移動的物品
This includes both the tangible and the intangible merchandises, for example, the state and private parties keep information about the identities of drivers. Since this information gets exchanged across state lines (e.g., from states to companies that want to sell cars), the information is an article in interstate commerce and Congress may regulate how it’s used. (Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 2000) 這包括有形商品和無形商品，例如，州政府和私人保存駕駛者的身份資訊。由於這些資訊會跨州交換 (例如從各州交換給想要銷售汽車的公司)，因此這些資訊是州際商業中的物品，國會可以規範如何使用這些資訊。(Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 2000)
2. Instrumentalities 2.工具
Second, Congress can regulate the “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce, even though the particular activities being regulated are completely intrastate. This category refers to people, machines, and other “things” used in carrying out commerce, e.g., Congress could say that every truck must have a specific safety device, even if the particular truck in question was made and used exclusively within a state. 第二，國會可以規範州際商業的「工具」，即使被規範的特定活動完全是州內活動。例如，國會可以規定每輛卡車都必須裝有特定的安全裝置，即使該卡車完全是在州內製造和使用的。
4. "Substantially Affecting" Commerce 4."實質影響」商業
The biggest (and most challenging) category is that Congress may regulate those activities having a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce. (U.S. v. Lopez, 1995). As to this category the following rules now seem to apply: 最大的（也是最具挑戰性的）類別是國會可以管制那些對州際商業有「實質影響」的活動。(U.S. v. Lopez, 1995)。至於這一類別，目前似乎適用以下規則：
a. Activity is Commercial a.活動為商業活動
If the activity itself is arguably “commercial,” then it doesn’t seem to matter whether the particular instance of the activity directly affects interstate commerce, as long as the instance is part of a general class of activities that, collectively, substantially affect interstate commerce, especially as part of a broad scheme to regulate interstate commerce in the same activity. (Gonzales v. Raich) 如果活動本身可以說是「商業」活動，那麼活動的特定事例是否直接影響州際商業似乎並不重要，只要該事例是一般活動類別的一部分，而這些活動整體上對州際商業有重大影響，尤其是作為管制同一活動的州際商業的廣泛計劃的一部分。(Gonzales v. Raich)
c. Little Deference to Congress c.幾乎不尊重國會
If the activity is not commercial, the Court won’t give much deference to the fact that Congress believed that the activity has the requisite “substantial effect” on interstate commerce. The Court will basically decide this issue for itself. It certainly will no longer be enough that Congress had a “rational basis” for believing that the requisite effect existed-the effect must in fact exist to the Court’s own independent satisfaction. 如果該活動不是商業活動，法院不會太尊重國會認為該活動對州際商業有必要的「實質影響」這一事實。法院基本上會自行決定這個問題。國會有 「合理的基礎 」相信存在必要的影響，這當然不再足夠--影響必須實際存在，讓法院自己獨立滿意。
b. Activity is not Commercial b.活動非商業性
But if the activity itself is “not commercial,” then there will apparently have to be pretty obvious connection between the activity and interstate commerce. (U.S. v. Lopez) 但如果活動本身「非商業性」，則該活動與州際商業之間顯然必須有相當明顯的關聯。(U.S. v. Lopez)
d. Traditional Domain of States d.國家的傳統領域
If what’s being regulated is an activity the regulation of which has traditionally been the domain of the states, and as to which the states have expertise, the Court is less likely to find that Congress is acting within its Commerce power. Thus education, family law and general criminal law are areas where the court is likely to be especially suspicious of congressional “interference.” 如果所規範的是傳統上屬於各州管轄範圍的活動，且各州擁有相關專業知識，則法院不太可能認為國會是在其商業權力範圍內行事。因此，教育、家庭法和一般刑法是法院可能特別懷疑國會「干涉」的領域。
II. Federal Legislative Power - Other National Powers II.聯邦立法權 - 其他國家權力
1. Taxing Power 1.徵稅權
Congress has the power to “lay and collect taxes.” (Art. I. §8.) This is an independent source of congressional power, so it can be used to reach conduct that might be beyond the other sources of congressional power, like the Commerce Clause. 國會有權「設立和徵收稅項」（第一條第八節）。(Art. I. §8.)這是國會權力的獨立來源，因此可以用來處理可能超越其他國會權力來源的行為，例如「商業條款」(Commerce Clause)。
(1) Direct Taxes (1) 直接稅
“Direct taxes” must be allocated among the states in proportion to population. This provision is of little practical importance today. "直接稅」必須按人口比例在各州之間分配。這項規定在今天幾乎沒有什麼實際意義。
(2) No Export Taxes (2) 無出口稅
Congress may not tax any exports from any state, e.g., Congress may not place a tax on all computers which are exported from any state to foreign countries. 國會不得對任何州的任何出口徵稅，例如，國會不得對從任何州出口到國外的所有電腦徵稅。
a. Regulation a.監管
Congress can probably regulate under the guise of taxing, so long as there’s some real revenue produced. 國會也許能夠以徵稅為幌子進行管制，只要能產生一些真正的收入即可。
b. Limits on Taxing Power b.對徵稅權的限制
There are a few limits which the Constitution places upon the taxing power: 憲法對徵稅權有一些限制：
(3) Customs Duties and Excise Taxes must be Uniform (3) 關稅與消費稅必須統一
All customs duties and excise taxes must be uniform throughout the United States. For example, Congress may not place a $.10\$ .10 per-gallon federal excise tax on gasoline sales that takes place in New Jersey, and a $.15\$ .15 per-gallon tax on those that take place in Oklahoma. 所有關稅和消費稅必須在全美統一。例如，國會不得對在新澤西州銷售的汽油徵收每加侖 $.10\$ .10 的聯邦消費稅，而對在俄克拉何馬州銷售的汽油徵收每加侖 $.15\$ .15 的聯邦消費稅。
2. Spending Power 2.消費力
Congress also has the power to “pay the debts and provide for common defense and general welfare of the United States.” (Art. I, §8.) This is the “spending” power. 國會也有權「償還美國的債務，並提供共同防衛和一般福利」。(Art. I, §8.) 這就是「支出」權。
a. Independent Power a.獨立電力
This is an independent power, just like the Commerce power. So Congress could spend to achieve a purely local benefit, even one that it couldn’t achieve by regulating under the Commerce Power. 這是一種獨立的權力，就像商務權一樣。因此，國會可以花錢來達成純粹的地方利益，甚至是它無法透過商業權力下的規範來達成的利益。
b. Use of Condition b.使用條件
Congress may place conditions upon use of its spending power, even if the congressional purpose is in effect to regulate. Conditions placed upon the doling out of federal funds are usually justified under the “Necessary and Proper” Clause (Art. I, § 8, Clause 18), which let Congress use any means to seek an objective falling within the specifically-enumerated powers, as long as the means is rationally related to the objective, and is not specifically forbidden by the Constitution. 國會可以對其支出權力的使用設置條件，即使國會的目的實際上是為了管制。根據「必要且適當」條款(第一條第八款第十八項)，只要手段與目標有合理關聯，且憲法沒有明確禁止，國會就可以使用任何手段達成屬於特別賦予的權力範圍內的目標。
The Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 法院在 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 一案中
(1987), established a five-point rule for considering the constitutionality of expenditure conditions: (1987)，建立了考慮支出條件合憲性的五點規則：
The spending must promote “the general welfare.” 支出必須促進「一般福利」。
The condition must be unambiguous. 條件必須毫不含糊。
The condition should relate “to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.” 該條件應與「特定國家專案或計畫中的聯邦利益」相關。
The condition imposed on the states must not, in itself, be unconstitutional. 施加於各州的條件本身不得違憲。
The condition must not be coercive. 該條件不得具有強制性。
III. Federal Executive Power III.聯邦行政權力
President Can’t Make the Laws 總統不能制定法律
The most important single separation of powers principle might be that the President cannot make the laws. All he can do is to carry out the laws made by Congress. 最重要的單一分權原則可能是總統不能制定法律。他能做的只是執行國會制定的法律。
a. Congress’ Acquiescence a.國會的默許
But the scope of the President’s powers may be at least somewhat expanded by Congress’s acquiescence to his exercise of the power. 但由於國會默許總統行使權力，總統的權力範圍至少可以在一定程度上擴大。
(Concurring Opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer) (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 一案中的同意意見)
b. Delegation b.授權
Congress may delegate some of its power to the President or the executive branch. This is how federal agencies get the right to formulate regulations for interpreting and enforcing congressional statutes. 國會可將部分權力授予總統或行政部門。聯邦機構就是這樣獲得制定法規的權利，以解釋和執行國會法規。
b. Treaties and Executive Agreements b.條約與行政協定
The President has the power to enter into a treaty with foreign nations, but only if two-thirds of the Senate approves. Additionally, the Court has held that the Constitution implicitly gives the President, as an adjunct of his foreign affairs power, the right to enter into an “executive agreement” with a foreign nation, without first getting express congressional consent. 總統有權與外國簽訂條約，但必須獲得參議院三分之二的同意。此外，法院認為憲法隱含賦予總統與外國簽訂「行政協定」的權力，作為其外交事務權力的附屬，而無需先取得國會的明確同意。
2. The War, Treaty and Foreign Affairs Powers 2.戰爭權、條約權和外交權
a. War Powers a.戰爭權力
The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. But only Congress, not the President, can declare war. 總統是武裝部隊的總司令。但只有國會而非總統可以宣戰。
The President can commit US armed forces to repel a sudden attack, but theoretically he cannot fight a long-term engagement without a congressional declaration of war. 總統可以投入美國武裝部隊擊退突然的攻擊，但理論上，如果沒有國會宣戰，他不能打長期的交戰。
When the president acts unilaterally, the agreement is referred to as a “sole executive agreement.” When the president acts with the approval of a simple majority of both houses of Congress, the agreement is known as a “legislative-executive agreement.” Presidents have “assumed” discretion to decide whether to pursue an international agreement as a treaty, a sole executive agreement, or in the form of a legislative-executive agreement. 當總統單方面行事時，該協定稱為 「單獨行政協定」。當總統在國會兩院的簡單多數批准下行事時，該協定稱為 「立法-行政協定」。總統有 「假定 」的自由裁量權來決定是否以條約、單一行政協定或立法-行政協定的形式推行國際協定。
3. Appointment and Removal of Executive Personnel 3.行政人員的任免
The President, not the Congress, is given the power to appoint federal executive officers. 任命聯邦行政人員的權力賦予總統，而非國會。
a. General Scheme a.一般計劃
Only the President may appoint “principal,” i.e., high-level, federal officers. Congress cannot appoint “inferior” federal officials either, but it may say which of the three other entities, the President, the Court, or the Cabinet, may appoint these lower officials. 只有總統可以任命「主要」聯邦官員，也就是高階聯邦官員。國會也不能任命「下級」聯邦官員，但國會可以規定總統、法院或內閣這三個其他實體中的哪一個可以任命這些較低級的官員。
c. Impeachment c.彈劾
Congress can remove any “officer” of the U.S. by impeachment. The House must vote by a majority to impeach. Then, the Senate conducts the trial; a two-thirds vote of the Senators present is required to convict. Conviction can be for treason, bribery, and other “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Probably only serious crimes, and serious non-criminal abuses of power, are within the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors.” 國會可以彈劾的方式解除美國任何「官員」的職務。眾議院必須以大多數票通過彈劾。然後，參議院進行審判；定罪需要出席的參議員三分之二的票數。定罪可以是叛國、賄賂和其他 「重罪和輕罪」。大概只有嚴重罪行和嚴重的非刑事濫權才屬於 「重罪和輕罪」。
b. Removal of Federal Executives b.聯邦行政人員的免職
The power to remove federal executive officers basically rests with the President. The President may remove any executive appointee without cause. 罷免聯邦行政人員的權力基本上在於總統。總統可以無理由罷免任何行政任命官員。
Exceptions: The President must have cause to remove (1) an officer who is appointed pursuant to a statute specifying the length of the term of office; or (2) an officer who performs a judicial or quasi-judicial function. 例外：總統必須有理由罷免：(1) 依據規定任期的法規任命的官員；或 (2) 履行司法或准司法職能的官員。
4. Removal of Federal Judges 4.聯邦法官的罷免
Federal judges cannot be removed by either Congress or the President. Article III provides that federal judges shall hold their office during “good behavior.” This has been held to mean that so long as a judge does not act improperly, he or she may not be removed from office. The only way to remove a sitting federal judge is by formal impeachment proceedings. 聯邦法官不得被國會或總統撤職。第三條規定，聯邦法官應在 「行為良好 」期間擔任其職位。這被認為意味著只要法官沒有不當行為，就不得被免職。罷免現任聯邦法官的唯一方法是進行正式彈劾程序。
b. Executive Immunity b.行政豁免
There’s no executive branch immunity written into the Constitution. But courts have recognized an implied executive immunity based on separation of powers concepts. 憲法中並沒有明文規定行政部門的豁免權。但法院已基於三權分立的概念承認了隱含的行政豁免權。
The President has absolute immunity from civil liability for his official acts. There is no immunity for the President’s unofficial acts, including those he committed before taking office. 總統對其官方行為享有絕對的民事責任豁免權。對於總統的非官方行為，包括他在就職前所犯的行為，則沒有豁免權。
c. Executive Privilege c.行政特權
Presidents have a qualified right to refuse to disclose confidential information relating to the performance of their duties. 會長有特定權利拒絕透露與其履行職責有關的機密資訊。
Since the privilege is qualified, it may be outweighed by other compelling governmental interests. For instance, the need for the President’s evidence in a criminal trial will generally outweigh the President’s vague need to keep information confidential. 由於特權是有限制的，因此可能會被其他迫切的政府利益所抵銷。例如，在刑事審判中需要總統的證據，一般會超過總統對資訊保密的模糊需求。
In 1973, the Department of Justice concluded that the indictment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President would unduly interfere with the ability of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned duties, and would thus violate the constitutional separation of powers. No court has addressed this question directly. 1973 年，司法部得出結論，對在任總統提出起訴和刑事起訴會不適當地干擾行政部門履行憲法指定職責的能力，因此違反了憲法分權的規定。沒有法院直接處理過這個問題。
中華民國憲法第52條：「總統除犯内亂或外患罪外，非經罷免或解職，不受刑事上之訴究。」
V. The Bill of Rights and the Post-Civil War Amendments V.人權法案與內戰後修正案
A. The Bill of Rights and the States A.人權法案與各州
1. Generally 1.一般而言
The first ten amendments to the Constitution, all adopted in 1791, are commonly called the Bill of Rights. Their principal purpose is to protect the individual against various sorts of interference by the federal government. 憲法的前十項修正案均於 1791 年通過，通常稱為《人權法案》。其主要目的是保護個人免受聯邦政府的各種干預。
2. Enactment of the Civil War (1861-1865) Amendments 2.內戰（1861-1865 年）修正案的制定
The relative lack of constitutional restrictions on relations between state governments and individuals was drastically changed by the enactment of the three Civil War Amendments, the 13 th, 14 th and 15 th15 t h. Each of these three was enacted for the purpose of barring discrimination by state against individual, especially blacks. 憲法對州政府和個人之間的關係相對缺乏限制，但內戰期間制定的三項修正案（第13、14和 15 th15 t h 條）徹底改變了這一狀況。這三項修正案都是為了禁止州政府對個人（尤其是黑人）的歧視而制定的。
* 14th Amendment, §1: * 第14修正案，第1節：
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 所有在美國出生或歸化美國並受其管轄的人，均為美國公民及其居住州的公民。任何州均不得制定或執行任何剝奪美國公民特權或豁免權的法律；任何州均不得在未經過適當法律程序的情況下剝奪任何人的生命、自由或財產；也不得拒絕對其管轄下的任何人給予法律的平等保護。
* 13th Amendment, §1: * 第13修正案，第1節：
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 美國境內或任何受美國管轄之處，不得存在奴役或非自願勞役，除非該奴役或非自願勞役是為懲罰被正式定罪之人所犯之罪。
15th Amendment, §1: 第 15 修正案，第 1 節：
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 美國或任何州不得因種族、膚色或先前的奴役狀況而剝奪或限制美國公民的投票權。
3. Due Process of Law and "Incorporation" 3.正當法律程序與 「納入」
The Supreme Court originally seemed to have implicitly rejected the notion that the 14th Amendment automatically made applicable to the states all of the Bill of Rights guarantees. 最高法院最初似乎含蓄地拒絕了第 14 條修正案自動使人權法案的所有保證適用於各州的觀點。
Amendment VI: Criminal Prosecutions - Jury Trial, Right to Confront and to Counsel 修正案 VI：刑事起訴 - 陪審團審判、對質權和律師權
Amendment VII: Common Law Suits - Jury Trial 修正案七：普通法訴訟 - 陪審團審判
Amendment VIII: Excess Bail or Fines, Cruel and Unusual Punishment 修正案八：超額保釋或罰款、殘忍和不尋常的懲罰
Amendment IX: Non-Enumerated Rights 修正案九：未列明的權利
Amendment X: Rights Reserved to States 修正案 X：各州保留的權利
Amendment I: Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly, Petition 修正案 I：宗教、言論、新聞、集會、請願
Amendment II: Right to Bear Arms 修正案二：攜帶武器的權利
Amendment III: Quartering of Troops 修正案 III：軍隊駐扎
Amendment IV: Search and Seizure 修正案 IV：搜身與扣押
Amendment V: Grand Jury, Double Jeopardy, Self-Incrimination, Due Process 第五修正案：大陪審團、雙重危險、自證其罪、正當程序
* Two Contrasting Views * 兩種截然不同的觀點
There have been two main contrasting views espoused by members of the S . Ct . on this issue: the “selective incorporation” or “fundamental rights” approach, and the “total incorporation” approach. The former has always held a majority on the Court. 在這個問題上，最高法院的成員主要有兩種對立的觀點：「選擇性併入」或「基本權利」方式，以及「完全併入」方式。在這個問題上有兩種主要的對立觀點：「選擇性併入」或「基本權利」方式，以及「完全併入」方式。前者在法院中一直佔大多數。
“Selective Incorporation” or “Fundamental Rights” View "選擇性納入」或「基本權利」觀點
This approach denies that the entire Bill of Rights is made applicable to the states via the 14th Amendment. Instead, the term “liberty” as used in that Amendment is to be interpreted by judges without regard to the Bill of Rights. Only those aspects of liberty that are in some sense “fundamental” are protected by the 14th Amendment against state interference. 這種做法否認了整個人權法案通過第14修正案適用於各州。相反，該修正案中使用的「自由」一詞應由法官在不考慮權利法案的情況下進行解釋。只有那些在某種意義上屬於 「基本 」的自由才受到第14修正案的保護，不受州的干預。
* Modern Approach * 現代方法
The selective incorporation/fundamental rights approach has always held a majority on the Court. The Court today incorporate into the 14th Amendment any guarantee which is “fundamental in the context of the iudicial processes maintained by the American states.” (Duncan v. Louisiana, 1968) 選擇性納入/基本權利的方法在法院中一直佔大多數。法院今天將任何「在美國各州所維持的司法程序背景下屬於基本的」保證納入第14修正案。(Duncan訴路易斯安那州案，1968年)
“Total Incorporation” View 「總合 」檢視
The contrary view, that all of the guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights are made applicable to the states by the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, is usually referred to as the “total incorporation” view. 相反的觀點，即人權法案中規定的所有保證都通過第 14 修正案的「正當程序條款」適用於各州，通常被稱為「完全納入」觀點。
Nearly All Guarantees Incorporated 幾乎包含所有保證
Today, virtually the entire Bill of Rights has been incorporated into the 14th Amendment, one guarantee at a time. 今天，幾乎整個人權法案都被納入了第 14 條修正案，每次都有一項保證。
The only important Bill of Rights guarantees not incorporated are the 5th Amendment’s prohibition of criminal trials without a grand jury indictment, and the 7th Amendment’s right to jury trial in civil cases. 唯一未納入的人權法案重要保證是第 5 修正案禁止在沒有大陪審團起訴的情況下進行刑事審判，以及第 7 修正案在民事案件中的陪審團審判權。
VI. Due Process of Law VI.適當法律程序
A. Due Process Clause in General A.一般的適當程序條款
There are two quite different functions that the Due Process Clause serves. Most obviously, it imposes certain procedural requirements on governments when they impair life, liberty, or property. 正當程序條款有兩個相當不同的功能。最明顯的是，當政府損害生命、自由或財產時，它對政府施加一定的程序要求。
1. Non-fundamental Rights 1.非基本權利
If a right or value is found to be “nonfundamental,” then the government action that impairs that right only has to meet the easy “mere rationality” test. In other word, it just has to be the case that the government is pursuing a legitimate governmental objective, and is doing so with a means that is rationally related to that objective. 如果某項權利或價值被認定為「非基本」，那麼損害該權利的政府行為只需符合簡單的「純合理性」測試。換句話說，政府只需追求合法的政府目標，並採取與該目標合理相關的手段即可。
But the Due Process Clause also limits the substantive power of the government to regulate certain areas of human life. Starting with Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), the Supreme Court established that the Due Process Clause is not only a procedural guarantee but also a substantive limitation on the tvpe of control that the government may exercise over individuals. This “substantive” component of the Due Process Clause derives mainly from the term “liberty”-certain types of state limits on human conduct have been held to so unreasonably interfere with important human rights that they amount to an unreasonable (and therefore unconstitutional) denial of “liberty.” 但「正當程序條款」也限制了政府管制人類生活某些領域的實質權力。從 Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)案開始，最高法院確立「正當程序條款」不僅是一項程序性保證，也是對政府可能對個人行使控制的實質限制。正當程序條款的這個「實質」部分主要來自「自由」一詞--某些類型的國家對人類行為的限制被認為不合理地干擾了重要的人權，以至於等同於不合理（因而違憲）地剝奪了「自由」。
* Economic Regulation * 經濟規範
Nearly all economic regulation (and most “social welfare” regulation) will turn out to implicate only non-fundamental rights, and will almost certainly be upheld under the easy-tosatisfy mere rationality standard. So if one can’t find a fundamental right being impaired, it is relatively safe to presume that the government measure does not violate substantive due process. 幾乎所有的經濟規範（以及大多數的「社會福利」規範）都只會涉及非基本權利，而且幾乎肯定會在容易滿足的純粹合理性標準下獲得支持。因此，如果找不到受到損害的基本權利，就可以相對安全地推定政府措施沒有違反實質的適當程序。
2. Fundamental Rights 2.基本權利
But if a state or federal government is impairing a "fundamental’ right, then the court uses strict scrutiny. Only if the governmental action is “necessary” to achieve a “compelling” governmental objective, will the government avoid violating substantive due process. 但如果州政府或聯邦政府正在損害「基本」權利，則法院會採用嚴格審查。只有當政府行為是為了達成「迫切」的政府目標而「必要」時，政府才能避免違反實質適當程序。
B. Economic and Social-Welfare Regulation B.經濟與社會福利法規
Since 1937 (West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrishminimum wage regulation), the Court has not struck down an economic regulation for violating substantive due process. 自 1937 年 (West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrishminimum wage regulation) 以來，法院從未以違反實質適當程序為由，推翻過任何經濟法規。
1. Two Limits 1.兩個限制
Today, an economic statute has to meet only two easily-satisfied requirements to be in conformity with substantive due process: 今天，經濟法規只需符合兩項容易滿足的要求，即可符合實質適當程序：
a. Legitimate Government Objective The government must be pursuing a legitimate state objective. But virtually any health, safety or “general welfare” goal comes within the government’s “police power” (治安權/規範權) and is thus legitimate. a.合法的政府目標 政府必須追求合法的國家目標。但幾乎任何健康、安全或「一般福利」目標都屬於政府的「治安權/規範權」，因此是合法的。
b. Minimally Rationally Related b.最小合理關聯
Second, there must be a “minimally rational relation” between the means chosen by the legislature and the government objective. 第二，立法機關選擇的手段與政府目標之間必須有一種「最低限度的合理關係」。
To put it another way, the Court will presume that the statute is constitutional unless the legislature has acted in a completely “arbitrary and irrational” way. 換句話說，除非立法機關的行為完全「任意且不合理」，否則法院會推定法規符合憲法。
2. Other Non-fundamental Rights 2.其他非基本權利
Outside the economic area, the same rule applies as long as no fundamental right is being affected: the state must merely be pursuing a legitimate state objective by rational means. So most “social welfare” legislation merely has to meet this very easy standard. 在經濟領域之外，只要不影響基本權利，同樣的規則也適用：國家必須只是以合理的手段追求合法的國家目標。因此，大多數的「社會福利」立法只需符合這個非常容易的標準。
* Rights Governed * 受規範的權利
The only rights that have been recognized as “fundamental” and therefore subject to strict scrutiny for substantive due process purposes are ones related to the loose category “right to privacy.” This is usually relating to a person’s right to make his own decision about highly personal matters. This right derives indirectly from several Bill of Rights guarantees, which collectively create a “penumbra” or “zone” of privacy. 唯一被認定為 「基本 」的權利，因此為了實質適當程序的目的而受到嚴格審查的權利，是與 「隱私權 」這個寬鬆的類別有關的權利。這通常是關於一個人對高度個人的事情做出自己決定的權利。這項權利間接來自幾項人權法案的保證，這些保證共同創造了一個隱私權的 「半影 」或 「區域」。
C. Substantive Due Process and Privacy C.實質適當程序與隱私權
Fundamental Rights Generally 一般基本權利
If a state or federal regulation is impairing a fundamental right, the court strictly scrutinizes the regulation: (1) the objective being pursued by the government must be compelling; and (2) the means chosen by the government must be necessary to achieve that compelling end. In other words, there must not be any less restrictive means. 如果州或聯邦法規正在損害一項基本權利，法院會嚴格審查該法規：(1) 政府追求的目標必須令人信服；(2) 政府選擇的手段必須是達到該令人信服的目的所必需的。換句話說，必須沒有限制性較低的手段。
Several amendments to the U.S. Constitution have been used in determining a right to personal autonomy: 美國憲法的幾項修正案已被用來判定個人自主權：
The First Amendment protects the privacy of beliefs and, perhaps, association. 第一修正案保護信仰隱私，或許也保護結社隱私。
The Third Amendment protects the privacy of the home against the use of it for housing soldiers. 第三修正案保護住宅的隱私權，防止住宅被用來安置士兵。
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy against unreasonable searches. 第四修正案保護隱私不受不合理的搜查。
The Fifth Amendment protects against selfincrimination, which in turn protects the privacy of personal information. 第五修正案」保護免於自證其罪，進而保護個人資訊的隱私。
The Ninth Amendment provides that the “enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by the people.” This has been interpreted as justification for broadly reading the Bill of Rights to protect privacy in ways not specifically provided in the first eight amendments. 第九修正案規定，「憲法中對某些權利的闡述不得解釋為否定或貶低人民保留的其他權利」。這被解釋為廣義理解人權法案以保護前八項修正案未明確規定的隱私權的理由。
2. Birth Control 2.生育控制
Individuals’ interest in using birth control is “fundamental.” So whether a person is married or single, he or she has a fundamental interest in contraception, and the state cannot impair that interest without satisfying strict scrutiny. (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965) 個人使用避孕措施的利益是「基本利益」。因此，無論一個人是已婚或單身，他或她都有避孕的基本利益，而且州政府不能在未滿足嚴格審查的情況下損害該利益。(Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965)
Rights Included 包括權利
The list of rights or interests falling within this “right to privacy” include just a few related areas: marriage, child-bearing, and child-rearing. So the right to use birth control, to live together with one’s own family, to direct the upbringing and education of one’s children, to marry - these are some (probably most) of the specific interests that are 屬於「隱私權」的權利或利益清單只包括幾個相關領域：結婚、生育和養育子女。因此，使用節育措施的權利、與自己的家人共同生活的權利、指導子女成長和教育的權利、結婚的權利 - 這些都是一些（也許是大多數）具體的利益。
“fundamental.” (The right to abortion used to be “fundamental,” but seems to be only “quasifundamental” after Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and now non-fundamental after Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization) 「基本」。(墮胎權曾是 「基本權利」，但在 Planned Parenthood v. Casey 案之後，似乎就只是 「準基本權利」，而在 Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization 案之後，現在就變成非基本權利了)
3. Abortion 3.墮胎
The right of abortion used to be the primary example of a right protected by substantive due process. But the right to abortion as it stood under Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) is now clearly abolished by Dobbs vv. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022). 墮胎權曾經是受到實質適當程序保護的權利的主要例子。但根據Roe v. Wade (1973) 和 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992)，墮胎的權利現在已被Dobbs vv 明確廢除。Jackson 婦女健康組織 (2022)。
In the post-Casey world, a woman has a constitutionally-protected privacy interest in choosing to have an abortion before viability. However, the state has a somewhat countervailing interest in protecting “potential life,” even before viability. 在後 Casey 的世界中，婦女在選擇在存活前進行墮胎時，擁有受憲法保護的隱私權。然而，國家在保護「潛在生命」（即使是在存活前）方面有一定程度的反向利益。
The state does not have the right to ban all previability abortions except those necessary to save the life or health of the mother. 國家無權禁止所有孕前墮胎，除非是為了拯救母親的生命或健康。
However, the state has a far greater ability to regulate the abortion process than it did before Casey. The state may regulate if it does not place an “undue burden” on the woman’s right to choose a pre-viability abortion. A regulation will constitute an “undue burden” if the regulation “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s seeking a pre-viability abortion.” 然而，州政府管制墮胎程序的能力遠大於 Casey 案之前。如果州政府不會對婦女選擇生育前墮胎的權利造成「過度負擔」，就可以進行管制。如果某項規定 「具有在婦女尋求懷孕前墮胎的道路上設置實質障礙的目的或效果」，則該規定將構成 「過度負擔」。
The Supreme Court in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016) clarified exactly what the ‘undue burden’ test requires: “Casey requires courts to consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.” 最高法院在 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016) 案中闡明「不當負擔」測試的確實要求：「Casey要求法院將法律對墮胎機會造成的負擔與這些法律賦予的利益一併考慮」。
The Supreme Court further clarified in June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo (2020) with respect to the undue burden standard: “[T]his standard requires courts independently to review the legislative findings upon which an abortionrelated statute rests and to weigh the law’s ‘asserted benefits against the burdens’ imposes on abortion access.” 最高法院在 June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo (2020) 案中進一步澄清了不當負擔標準："該標準要求法院獨立審查墮胎相關法規所依據的立法結果，並衡量法律「所聲稱的利益與墮胎所造成的負擔」。
In the post-Dobbs world, however, a woman no longer has a constitutionally-protected privacy interest in choosing to have an abortion before viability. It is the holding of the Court in Dobbs that the Constitution does not mention abortion, and the right is neither deeply rooted in the nation’s history nor an essential component of “ordered liberty.” Therefore a state’s previability prohibitions on elective abortions are not unconstitutional as long as it can survive the scrutiny of mere rationality test. 然而，在 Dobbs 案之後的世界中，婦女在選擇於胎兒存活前進行墮胎時，不再擁有受憲法保護的隱私權。法院在 Dobbs 一案中裁定，憲法並未提及墮胎，且該權利既非深植於國家歷史中，也非「有秩序的自由」的重要組成部分。因此，只要州政府在可孕前禁止選擇性墮胎的規定能通過純粹合理性測試的審查，就不會違憲。
In March, 2021, Texas Legislature passed the Texas Heartbeat Act, which bans abortion after the detection of an unborn child’s heartbeat (normally occurs after about six weeks of pregnancy). The law took effect on September 1, 2021, after the Supreme Court denied an emergency request from abortion providers to enjoin the law’s enforcement. It is the first time a state has successfully imposed a six-week abortion ban since Roe v. Wade, and the first abortion restriction to rely on enforcement by private individuals through civil lawsuits, rather than by the government through criminal or civil enforcement. The act establishes a system in which members of the public can sue anyone who performs or facilitates an illegal abortion for a minimum of $10,000 in statutory damages. 2021 年 3 月，德州立法機關通過《德州心跳法》，禁止在偵測到未出生嬰兒心跳後進行墮胎（通常發生在懷孕約六週之後）。最高法院駁回墮胎服務提供者要求禁止執行該法的緊急請求後，該法於 2021 年 9 月 1 日生效。這是自 Roe v. Wade 案以來，第一次有州成功實施六週墮胎禁令，也是第一個依賴私人透過民事訴訟來執行，而非由政府透過刑事或民事執法來執行的墮胎限制。該法案建立了一個制度，讓公眾可以起訴任何執行或協助非法墮胎的人，要求至少 10,000 美元的法定損害賠償。
However, there might be other state constitutional remedy on this regard. The South Carolina Constitution provides a right to privacy that includes the right to abortion, the state’s Supreme Court ruled on 2023/01/05, saying “the decision to terminate a pregnancy rests upon the utmost personal and private considerations imaginable.” 然而，在這方面可能有其他州憲法補救。南卡羅來納州憲法規定了隱私權，其中包括墮胎的權利，該州最高法院於 2023/01/05 裁定，「終止懷孕的決定是基於可以想像的最大個人和隱私考量」。
The decision overturns the state’s law banning abortions after roughly the sixth week of pregnancy. More broadly, it is a victory for abortion rights in the South, where states have severely restricted access. 這項決定推翻了該州禁止在懷孕約第六週後進行墮胎的法律。從更廣泛的層面來看，這是南方墮胎權利的一次勝利，因為南方各州嚴格限制墮胎。
a. Right to Live Together a.共同生活的權利
Relatives have a fundamental right to live together. So a city may not enact a zoning ordinance that prevent first cousins from living together, because the right of members of a family-even a non-nuclear family-to live together is “fundamental,” and any state interference with that right will be strictly scrutinized. (Moore v. East Cleveland, 1977) 親屬有共同生活的基本權利。因此，一個城市不得頒佈區域劃分法令，阻止嫡表兄弟姊妹住在一起，因為家庭成員（即使是非核心家庭）住在一起的權利是「基本權利」，而國家對該權利的任何干預都會受到嚴格審查（Moore v. East Cleveland, 1977）。(Moore訴East Cleveland案，1977年)
Note: What the Court was protecting in Moore was clearly the right of families to live together, not the more general right to live with whomever one wants outside of ties of blood and marriage. Thus the court had previously held that unrelated people had no “fundamental right” to live together (Belle Terre v. Borass, 1974), and in Moore the Court pointed out that families’ rights to live together were different, and much stronger. 註：法院在 Moore 案中所保護的顯然是家庭共同生活的權利，而非在血緣和婚姻關係之外與任何人共同生活的更廣泛權利。因此，法院之前曾認為沒有血緣關係的人沒有共同生活的「基本權利」（Belle Terre v. Borass，1974年），而在Moore案中，法院指出家庭共同生活的權利是不同的，而且強烈得多。
Example 2: There’s also probably a fundamental right to continue parenting-so the state can’t take away one’s child just because it thinks a foster home would be “better” for the child. Even if there’s child abuse, the parent still has a fundamental right to parent, but here the state’s interest in protecting the child would be “compelling,” so putting the child in foster care would probably satisfy strict scrutiny. 例二：繼續為人父母也可能是一項基本權利，因此國家不能因為認為寄養家庭對孩子「更好」，就奪走孩子。即使有虐待兒童的情況，父母仍有為人父母的基本權利，但在此情況下，州政府在保護兒童方面的利益是「強迫性」的，因此將兒童送入寄養家庭可能符合嚴格審查。
b. Upbringing and Education b.成長與教育
A parent’s right to direct the upbringing and education of his/her children is “fundamental.” 父母指導子女成長和教育的權利是「基本權利」。
Example 1: A state may not require parents to send their children to public schools. Parents have a fundamental right to determine how their children will be educated. 範例 1：州政府不得要求家長將其子女送入公立學校。家長有決定如何教育子女的基本權利。
c. Right to Marry c.結婚權利
The right to marry is also fundamental, so again the state can only interfere with this right by passing strict scrutiny. 結婚的權利也是基本權利，所以同樣地，州政府只有通過嚴格審查才能干涉這項權利。
Example: A state may not forbid anyone from remarrying unless he is current on all support payments from his prior marriage. (Zablocki v. Redhail, 1978) 舉例說明：州政府不得禁止任何人再婚，除非他已付清前次婚姻的所有贍養費。(Zablocki訴Redhail案，1978年)
* Same Sex Marriage * 同性婚姻
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to samesex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Obergefell v. Hodges，576 U.S. 644 (2015)，是美國最高法院一宗里程碑式的案件，在該案中，法院以 5:4 的結果裁定，同性伴侶結婚的基本權利受到美國憲法第十四修正案「正當程序條款」和「平等保護條款」的保證。
The Court noted the relationship between the liberty of the Due Process Clause and the equality of the Equal Protection Clause and determined that same-sex marriage bans also violated the latter. Concluding that the liberty and equality of same-sex couples was significantly burdened, the Court struck down same-sex marriage bans for violating both clauses, holding that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all fifty states. 法院注意到「適當程序條款」的自由與「平等保護條款」的平等之間的關係，並裁定同性婚姻禁令也違反了後者。法院認為同性伴侶的自由和平等受到了重大負擔，因此以同性婚姻禁令違反這兩項條款為由駁回了同性婚姻禁令，並認為同性伴侶可以在所有五十個州行使結婚的基本權利。
Citing Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court affirmed that the fundamental rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs,” but the “identification and protection” of these fundamental rights “has not been reduced to any formula.” As the Supreme Court has found in cases such as Loving v. Virginia, Zablocki v. Redhail, and Turner v. Safley, this extension includes a fundamental right to marry. 法院引述 Griswold v. Connecticut 案，確認第十四修正案「正當程序條款」中的基本權利「延伸至某些對個人尊嚴與自主極為重要的個人選擇，包括界定個人身分與信仰的私密選擇」，但這些基本權利的「識別與保護」「並未淪為任何公式」。正如最高法院在Loving v. Virginia、Zablocki v. Redhail和Turner v. Safley等案件中所發現的，這種延伸包括結婚的基本權利。
5. Adult Sex 5.成人性行為
There is no general fundamental right to engage in adult consensual sexual activity. Therefore, the Court will generally review restrictions on adult consensual sexual activity under the mererationality test. 從事成人雙方同意的性活動並不存在一般的基本權利。因此，法院一般會根據 「合理性測試 」來審查對成人雙方同意的性活動的限制。
* Sexual Autonomy * 性自主
However, the Court will sometimes strike down the regulation on the grounds that it interferes with people’s sexual autonomy. 不過，法院有時也會以干預人們的性自主權為由，駁回這項法規。
Most dramatically, the Court has struck down all state laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy, on the grounds that such laws “demean the lives of homosexual persons,” and thus violate their substantive due process rights. They have “the full right to engage in their homosexual conduct without intervention of the government.” (Lawrence vv. Texas, 2003) 最引人注目的是，法院推翻了所有將同性戀雞姦定罪的州法律，理由是這些法律「貶低了同性戀者的生活」，因此侵犯了他們的實質適當程序權利。他們「完全有權在不受政府干預的情況下進行同性戀行為」。(Lawrence vv .德州，2003年)
6. The Right to Die 6.死亡的權利
The law of “right to decline unwanted medical procedures” and “right to die” is still developing: 拒絕不想要的醫療程序的權利」和「死亡的權利」的法律仍在發展中：
a. State’s Interest a.國家利益
The state has an important countervailing interest in preserving life. 國家在維護生命方面具有重要的反向利益。
* Other Sexual Conduct * 其他性行為
Notwithstanding Lawrence, the state can almost certainly prohibit, and punish, such adult consensual sexual activities as adultery, incest, bestiality and bigamy, on the grounds that these activities are provably harmful, and their prohibition is therefore not merely an irrational expression of the majority “moral disapproval.” 儘管有勞倫斯案，國家幾乎可以肯定地禁止和懲罰通姦、亂倫、人獸交和重婚等成人雙方同意的性活動，理由是這些活動證明是有害的，因此禁止這些活動不僅是大多數人「道德上不認同」的非理性表達。
b. Unwanted Medical Procedures b.不想要的醫療程序
A competent adult has a 14th Amendment liberty interest in not being forced to undergo unwanted medical procedures, including artificial life-sustaining measures. It’s not clear whether this is a “fundamental” interest. 有能力的成年人擁有第 14 修正案的自由權益，即不被迫接受不想要的醫療程序，包括人工維持生命的措施。目前尚不清楚這是否屬於「基本」權益。
Example: P, dying of stomach cancer, has a liberty interest in refusing to let the hospital feed him through a feeding tube. 舉例說明：P 患有胃癌，生命垂危，他有自由權益拒絕讓醫院用餵食管餵他。
c. “Clear and Convincing Evidence” c.「明確且令人信服的證據」
Standard 標準
In the case of a now-incompetent patient, the state’s interest in preserving life entitles it to say that it won’t allow the “plug” to be “pulled” unless there is “clear and convincing evidence” that the patient would have voluntarily declined the life-sustaining measures. 對於目前無行為能力的病患，州政府在維護生命方面的利益使其有權表示，除非有「明確且令人信服的證據」證明病患會自願拒絕維持生命的措施，否則州政府不會允許「拔除」「插頭」。
Example: P is comatose, hospitalized, being fed through a tube, and kept breathing through a respirator. P’s parents want the hospital to discontinue the tube-feeding and respirator. In Cruzan v. Missouri (1990), the Court held that the state may insist that if the parents can’t show “clear and convincing evidence” that during her conscious life P showed a desire not to be kept alive by such artificial measures, the measures must be continued. 範例：P 昏迷住院，由插管餵食，並透過呼吸器維持呼吸。P 的父母希望醫院停止插管餵食和呼吸器。在 Cruzan v. Missouri (1990)一案中，法院認為州政府可以堅持，如果父母無法提出「清楚且令人信服的證據」，證明 P 在有意識的生命期間曾表示不希望以這種人工措施維持生命，則必須繼續採取這些措施。
* Living Wills & Health-Care Proxy * 生前預囑與健康照護委託書
But probably the states must honor a “living will” and a “health-care proxy.” In a living will, the signer gives direct instructions. In a health-care proxy, the signer appoints someone else to make health care decisions. 但可能各州必須尊重「生前遺囑」和「醫療照護代理」。在生前遺囑中，簽署人會直接給予指示。在健康照護代理書中，簽署人指定其他人做出健康照護決定。
d. No "Right to Commit Suicide" d.無「自殺權」
Terminally-ill patients do not have a general liberty interest in “committing suicide.” Nor do they have the constitutional right to recruit a third person to help them commit suicide. (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997) 身患絕症的病人不具有「自殺」的一般自由權益。他們也不享有招募第三者協助其自殺的憲法權利。(Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997)
Example: A state may make it a felony for a physician to knowingly prescribe a fatal dose of drugs for the purpose of helping the patient commit suicide. 例如：一個州可能會將醫生故意開出致命劑量的藥物以幫助病人自殺的行為定為重罪。
病人自主權利法(2015/12/18三讀通過， 2016/1/6公布施行)
Fundamental v. Non-fundamental 基本 V. 非基本
In conclusion, deciding whether the right in question is “fundamental” is, as noted, the key to substantive due process analysis. But even it is decided that the right involved is fundamental, one still got to carry out the strict scrutiny analysis. Conversely, even if the right is not fundamental, one still got to apply the “mere rationality” standard, and it could be decided that the state is being so completely irrational that the state action is a violation of substantive due process anyway. 總而言之，如前所述，決定相關權利是否為「基本」權利是實質適當程序分析的關鍵。但是，即使決定所涉及的權利是基本的，我們仍然必須進行嚴格審查分析。反過來說，即使該權利不是基本的，人們仍然必須運用「純粹合理性」的標準，而且可以判定該國家是完全不合理的，以至於該國家行為無論如何都違反了實質的適當程序。
* Life, Liberty or Property * 生命、自由或財產
There cannot be a procedural due process problem, constitutionally, unless government is taking a person’s life, liberty or property. In other words, there is no general constitutional interest in having the government behave with fair procedure. 除非政府正在奪取某人的生命、自由或財產，否則在憲法上不可能存在程序上的適當程序問題。換句話說，憲法並未規定政府必須遵守公平的程序。
Example: City hiring for an opening on its police force. 範例：城市招聘警察。
D. Procedural Due Process D.程序性適當程序
1. Introduction 1.簡介
This is the requirement that the government act with adequate or fair procedures when it deprives a person of life, liberty or property. 這是要求政府在剝奪一個人的生命、自由或財產時，必須以適當或公平的程序行事。
The analysis of the procedural due process issue is thus divided into two main questions: 因此，程序性適當程序問題的分析分為兩個主要問題：
(1) has the individual’s life, liberty or property been “taken”? and if so, (1) 個人的生命、自由或財產是否已被「奪去」？ 如果是的話、
(2) what process was “due” him prior to this taking? (2) 在奪取之前，他「應有」哪些程序？
* Individual Determination * 個人決定
Procedural due process applies only where individual determination are being made. 程序性適當程序僅適用於個人判定。
Example: 範例：
Statute mandating that no person with unpaid child support may marry: substantive due process rarr\rightarrow strict scrutiny. 規定未支付子女撫養費的人不得結婚的法規：實質適當程序 rarr\rightarrow 嚴格審查。
Whether a particular person could be deprived the right of marriage pursuant to that statute: procedural due process rarr\rightarrow fair &\& adequate procedure (notice &\& hearing). 是否可以依據該法規剝奪特定的人結婚的權利：程序上的適當程序 rarr\rightarrow 公平 &\& 足夠的程序（通知 &\& 聽證）。
2. Liberty 2.自由
a. Physical Liberty a.人身自由
This liberty interest is violated if one is imprisoned, or even if one is placed in some other situation where he does not have physical freedom of movement (e.g., juvenile and/or civil commitment). 如果一個人被監禁，或甚至被安置在他沒有身體行動自由的其他情況下（例如，青少年和/或民事羈留），這種自由權益就會受到侵犯。
* Examples of Intangible Rights: * 無形權利的範例：
(1) The right to drive; (1) 駕駛權；
(2) The right to practice one’s profession; (2) 執業的權利；
(3) The right to raise one’s family. (3) 撫養家人的權利。
But one’s interest in having a good reputation is not “liberty”. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) In this case, the court restricted the definition of the constitutional right to privacy “to matters relating to 'marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education”. 但一個人擁有良好聲譽的利益並非「自由」。Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) 在此案中，法院將憲法賦予隱私權的定義限制於「與『婚姻、生育、避孕、家庭關係以及子女養育與教育』有關的事項」。
b. Intangible Liberty Rights b.無形自由權
Also, a person has a liberty interest in being able to do certain intangible things not related to physical freedom of movement. 此外，一個人也有能夠做某些與身體行動自由無關的無形事情的自由權益。
There’s no complete catalog of what interest fall within this “intangible” aspect of liberty. 對於哪些利益屬於自由的「無形」方面，並沒有完整的目錄。
3. Property 3.財產
a. Conventional Property a.傳統財產
Conventional Property means personal and real property. Thus the government cannot impose a monetary fine against a person, or declare a person’s car forfeited, without complying with procedural due process. 常規財產是指個人財產和不動產。因此，在未遵守程序性適當程序的情況下，政府不能對某人處以罰款，或宣佈沒收某人的汽車。
b. Government Benefit b.政府福利
Government benefit may or may not constitute “property” rights. 政府利益可能構成也可能不構成「財產」權。
If one is just applying and hasn’t yet been receiving them, one does not have a property interest in those benefits. But if a person has already been getting the benefits, it’s probably the case that he’s got a property interest in continuing to get them, so that the government cannot terminate those benefits without giving him procedural due process. 如果一個人只是提出申請而尚未領取福利，那麼他對這些福利就沒有財產利益。但是，如果一個人已經在領取福利，那麼他很可能在繼續領取福利的過程中擁有財產利益，因此政府不能在沒有給予他程序性適當程序的情況下終止這些福利。
4. Process Required 4.所需流程
If one is entitled to due process, what procedures does the person get? 如果一個人有權享有適當的程序，那麼他會得到什麼程序？
a. Traditional Civil Litigation a.傳統民事訴訟
When a person’s property at stake is a traditional civil lawsuit, the range of procedural protections required by due process is broad. The litigant probably has a due process right to a hearing, the right to call witnesses, the right to counsel, and the right to a fair and objective trial. 當一個人的財產牽涉到傳統的民事訴訟時，正當程序所要求的程序保護範圍是很廣泛的。訴訟人很可能有獲得聽證的適當程序權利、傳召證人的權利、請律師的權利，以及獲得公平客觀審判的權利。
c. Government Employment c.政府就業
A government job is similar to government benefit. If one is just applying for the job, he clearly does not have a property interest in it. But if one already has the job, then the court looks to state or federal law to determine whether one had a property interest in the job. Ordinarily, if it’s terminable at will, then there is no property right to it. But if either a statute or practices give a person a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to keep the job, then there’s property interest. 政府工作類似於政府福利。如果一個人只是在申請該工作，他顯然對該工作沒有財產利益。但如果某人已經擁有該工作，則法院會根據州法或聯邦法判定某人是否對該工作擁有財產權益。通常來說，如果工作是可以隨意終止的，那麼就不存在財產權。但如果法規或慣例賦予某人「合法的權利要求」來保有該工作，那麼就有財產利益。
b. Criminal Defendants and Prisoners b.刑事被告和囚犯
Criminal defendants receive the broadest procedural due process protections during the course of their trial (e.g., right to counsel, right to present witnesses, right to confront opposing witnesses, etc.) Once the criminal defendant has been convicted, he gets dramatically less procedural due process protection. There would be no due process violation as long as the prison’s action doesn’t “impose a typical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 刑事被告在審判過程中獲得最廣泛的程序性適當程序保護（例如，獲得律師協助的權利、提出證人的權利、與對方證人對質的權利等）。一旦刑事被告被定罪，他獲得的程序性適當程序保護就會大幅減少。只要監獄的行為沒有「對囚犯造成與監獄生活的一般事件相比典型且重大的困難」，就不會違反適當程序。
c. Non-Judicial Proceeding c.非司法程序
Where the property or liberty interest is being impaired in something other than a judicial proceeding, the state does not have to give the individual the full range of procedural safeguards that would be needed for a court proceeding. Instead, the court conducts a balancing test: the strength of the plaintiff’s interest in receiving the procedural safeguard is weighed against the government’s interest in avoiding extra burden. Example: Welfare termination v. firing government employee 當財產或自由權益在司法程序以外的情況下受到損害時，國家不必給予個人法院程序所需的全部程序性保障。取而代之的是，法院進行平衡測試：原告在獲得程序性保障方面的利益強度與政府在避免額外負擔方面的利益進行權衡。範例：福利終止與解雇政府雇員
A. Generally A.一般而言
1. General Usage 1.一般用法
This Clause was enacted shortly after the Civil War, and its primary goal was to attain free and equal treatment for ex-slaves. But it has always been interpreted as imposing a general restraint on the governmental use of classifications, not just classifications based on race, but also those based on sex, alienage, illegitimacy, wealth, or any other characteristics. 該條款是在南北戰爭後不久制定的，其主要目的是為前奴隸爭取自由平等的待遇。但它一直被詮釋為對政府使用分類的一般限制，不只是基於種族的分類，也包括基於性別、外籍、非婚生、財富或任何其他特徵的分類。
VII. Equal Protection VII.平等保護
Amendment XIV, § 1: 修正案 XIV，第 1 節：
" . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor denv to anv person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " . . .任何州均不得制定或執行任何剝奪美國公民特權或豁免權的法律；任何州均不得在未經適當法律程序的情況下剝奪任何人的生命、自由或財產；也不得在其管轄範圍內剝奪任何人受法律平等保護的權利。 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fU7Lk3PfcxA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ipXs8PJqno https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tsg6kSPK3aQ
2. Application on Federal Government 2.適用於聯邦政府
The direct text of the Clause applies to state governments. But the federal government is also bound by the same rules of equal protection -this happens by the indirect means of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 該條款的直接文本適用於州政府。但是聯邦政府也受到相同的平等保護規則的約束 - 這是透過第五修正案的「正當程序條款」的間接方式發生的。
3. Applicability 3.適用性
This Clause is only implicated where the government makes a classification. It’s not implicated where the government merely decides which of two classes a particular person falls into. 只有當政府進行分類時，才會牽涉到該條款。當政府僅決定某個特定的人屬於兩個類別中的哪一個時，就不涉及此條款。
Example: Job classification v. Status in obtaining Social Security Benefits 範例：工作分類與取得社會安全福利的地位
5. Three Levels of Review 5.三層審核
In the Equal Protection context, there are three types of review: 在平等保護的情況下，有三種類型的審查：
a. Mere Rationality a.單純理性
b. Strict Scrutiny b.嚴格審查
c. Middle-Level Review c.中階檢討
4. Guarantees of the Clause 4.條款保證
The Clause in essence guarantees that people who are similarly situated will be treated similarly. 該條款本質上保證了處境相似的人將獲得相似的待遇。
Example: School Segregation 範例：學校隔離
Ordinary “Mere Rationality” Review 普通「純粹理性」評論
This standard applies to statutes that: (1) are not based on a “suspect classification”; (2) do not involve a “quasi-suspect” category (principally gender and illegitimacy); and (3) don’t impair a “fundamental right.” 此標準適用於下列法規(1) 不是基於「可疑分類」；(2) 不涉及「準可疑」類別 (主要是性別和非婚生)；(3) 不損害「基本權利」。
Almost every economic and social regulation will be reviewed under this standard. 幾乎所有的經濟和社會法規都將根據此標準進行審查。
Standard for "Mere Rationality" Review 純粹理性」審查標準
Where this review is applied, the classification must satisfy two easy tests: (1) government must be pursuing a legitimate governmental objective; and (2) there must be a rational relation between the classification and that objective. Furthermore, it’s not necessary that the court believe that these two requirements are satisfied; it’s enough that the court concludes that it’s “conceivable” that they are satisfied. 在適用此審查的情況下，分類必須符合兩項簡單的測試：(1) 政府必須追求合法的政府目標；(2) 分類與該目標之間必須有合理的關係。此外，法院不一定要相信這兩項要求已經滿足；只要法院認為「可以想像」這兩項要求已經滿足就夠了。
Standard for Strict Scrutiny 嚴格審查的標準
Where strict scrutiny is invoked, the classification will be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. 在援引嚴格審查的情況下，分類只有在為了促進強烈的政府利益時才會得到支持。
Thus not only must the objective be an extremely important one, but the " fitf i t " between the means and the end must be extremely tight. 因此，不僅目標必須極為重要，手段與目的之間的 " fitf i t " 關係也必須極為緊密。
* Strict Scrutiny * 嚴格審查
The Court will give “strict scrutiny” to any statute which is based on “suspect classification” (e.g., race) or which impairs a fundamental right" (e.g., the right to vote). 法院將對任何基於「可疑分類」（如種族）或損害「基本權利」（如投票權）的法規進行「嚴格審查」。
* Middle-Level Review * 中階檢討
In a few context, the Court uses a middle level of scrutiny, more probing than “mere rationality” but less demanding than “strict scrutiny.” This middle level is mainly used for cases involving classifications based on gender and illegitimacy. 在少數情況下，法院使用中間層級的審查，比「純合理性」更具探究性，但不如「嚴格審查」要求嚴格。此中間層級主要用於涉及基於性別和非婚生子女的分類案件。
Standard for Middle-Level Review 中階層審核標準
The means (i.e., classification) chosen by the government must be substantially related to an important governmental objective. 政府選擇的手段（即分類）必須與重要的政府目標有實質關係。
B. Economic and Social Laws B.經濟和社會法律
1. Mere Rationality Test 1.純粹理性測試
For the classifications that do not involve either a suspect class, quasi-suspect class or a fundamental right, i.e., most of the economic and social-welfare legislations, courts use the “mere rationality” standard. 對於不涉及可疑階級、準可疑階級或基本權利的分類，即大多數的經濟和社會福利立法，法院使用「純合理性」標準。
Example: Bus Fares 範例：公車票價
Need Not Be Actual Objective 不必是實際目標
For “mere rationality” standard, the “legitimate governmental objective” part of the test is satisfied even if the statute’s defenders come up with merely a “hypothetical” objective that the legislature “might have” been pursuing. The government does not have to show that the objective it’s pointing to was the one that actually motivated the legislature. 對於 「純粹合理性 」標準，即使法規的辯護者僅僅提出立法機關 「可能 」追求的 「假設 」目標，也能滿足測試的 「合法政府目標 」部分。政府不必證明其所指向的目標是實際推動立法機關的目標。
2. Non-Suspect Classes 2.非可疑類別
Some classifications have been held not to involve a suspect or quasi-suspect class: 有些分類被認為不涉及疑犯或準疑犯類別：
a. Age a.年齡
Example: State troopers to retire over 50. 例如：州警 50 歲以上退休。
b. Wealth b.財富
Example: No low-income housing project unless approved in a popular referendum. 範例：除非經過全民投票批准，否則不得實施低收入住宅專案。
c. Mental Illness or Retardation c.精神疾病或遲鈍
Ex: Zoning Permission (But: City of Cleburne Ex: Zoning Permission (但是：Cleburne 市
v. Cleburne Living Center) v.Cleburne Living Center)
d. Sexual Orientation d.性取向
Mere Rationality with Bite-The Court now seems to review anti-gay legislation a bit more skeptically than most legislation not involving a semi-suspect or suspect class. 被咬的單純理性-法院現在似乎比大多數不涉及半懷疑或懷疑階級的立法更懷疑地審查反同性戀立法。
Ex: Colorado constitutional amendment (Romer v. Evans, 1996). 例如：科羅拉多州憲法修正案 (Romer v. Evans, 1996)。
2. Discrimination/Classification Must be Purposeful/Intentional 2.歧視/分類必須是有目的/故意的
The strict scrutiny will only be applied where the differential treatment of the class is intentional on the part of the government. That is, the mere fact that a law has a less favorable impact on a minority group than it has on the majority is not sufficient to constitute a violation of equal protection. 嚴格審查僅適用於政府有意區別對待該群體的情況。也就是說，僅僅法律對少數群體的影響不如對多數群體的影響，不足以構成違反平等保護。
C. Suspect Classifications-Especially Race C.嫌犯分類 - 特別是種族
1. Three Suspect Classifications 1.三種嫌犯分類
There are only three suspect classes generally recognized by the Supreme Court: 最高法院普遍認可的疑犯類別只有三種：
a. Race a.種族
b. National Origin b.國籍
c. Alienage c.外籍人士
* Three Ways to Show Purpose * 表現目的的三種方式
Purposeful discrimination may appear in any of three ways: (1) the law discriminates on its face, i.e., by its explicit terms; (2) the law, although neutral on its face, is administered in a discriminatory way (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1886); and (3) the law, although it is neutral on its face and is applied in accordance with its terms, was enacted with a purpose of discriminating, as shown by the law’s legislative history, statements made by legislators, the law’s disparate impact, or other circumstantial evidence of intent. 有目的的歧視可能出現在以下三種方式中的任何一種：(1) 法律表面上有歧視，即(2)法律雖然表面上中立，卻以歧視的方式執行（Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1886）；以及 (3)法律雖然表面上中立，且依照其條款執行，卻以歧視的目的制定，如法律的立法歷史、立法者的聲明、法律的不同影響，或其他意圖的環境證據所顯示。
3. Discrimination Must Be Invidious (?) 3.歧視必須是令人反感的（？）
In addition to “purposeful,” it originally must also be “invidious,” i.e., based on prejudice or tending to denigrate the disfavored class. This requirement is what has caused race, national origin, and (for some purposes) alienage to be the only suspect classes-these involve the only minorities against whom popular prejudice is sufficiently deep. 除了「有目的的」之外，它原本也必須是「令人反感的」，也就是基於偏見或傾向於詆毀不受歡迎階級。這個要求導致種族、國籍和（某些目的而言）外國人成為唯一的可疑階級--這些涉及唯一對其有足夠深的民眾偏見的少數族裔。
* Strict Equals Fatal * 嚴格等於致命
Once the courts decide that a suspect classification is involved, and that strict scrutiny must be used, with the exception of issues relating to affirmative action, that scrutiny is almost always fatal to the classification scheme. Purposeful racial or ethnic classification could hardly survived strict scrutiny since 1944 (Korematsu v. United States, 1944). 一旦法院判定涉及可疑分類，並且必須使用嚴格審查，除了與平權行動有關的問題之外，該審查幾乎總是對分類計劃致命的。自1944年（Korematsu v. United States, 1944）以來，有目的的種族或民族分類幾乎無法通過嚴格審查。
It’s often because the means chosen is not shown to be “necessary.” A means is only “necessary” for achieving the particular objective if there are no less discriminatory alternatives that will accomplish the goal as well, or almost as well. 這通常是因為所選擇的手段沒有被證明是 「必要的」。只有在沒有歧視性較低的替代方案可以同樣或幾乎同樣達到目標的情況下，某種手段才是達到特定目標所 「必要的」。
* Rationale for Strict Scrutiny * 嚴格審查的理由
Why does the court give especially scrutiny to governmental action that disadvantages very unpopular minorities? Because ordinarily, groups will protect themselves through use of the political process, but: (1) these particular groups don’t usually have very much political power, because the past discrimination against them includes keeping them out of the voting system; and (2) even if the minority votes in proportion to its numbers, the majority is very likely to vote as a block against it, because of the minority’s extreme unpopularity. 為什麼法院會對不利於非常不受歡迎少數族群的政府行為給予特別的審查？因為一般而言，團體會透過政治程序來保護自己，但是：(1)這些特殊團體通常沒有很大的政治力量，因為過去對他們的歧視包括將他們排除在投票制度之外；(2)即使少數人按其人數比例投票，多數人也很有可能整體投票反對，因為少數人極不受歡迎。
But as the present Supreme Court has expanded the use of “strict scrutiny”, it may have become easier to a measure to survive that scrutiny, especially in the field of affirmative action. For example, in 2003 Gruter v. Bollinger, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s right to give an admissions preference to black and Hispanic applicants in order to obtain a “diverse” entering class, as long as this preference was granted as part of an individualized evaluation process that treated race as merely one “plus factor” among others. 但隨著現在的最高法院擴大了 「嚴格審查 」的使用範圍，某項措施可能變得更容易通過審查，尤其是在平權行動領域。例如，在2003年的Gruter v. Bollinger案中，法院支持密歇根大學法學院有權優先錄取黑人和西班牙裔申請人，以獲得 「多樣化 」的入學階級，只要這種優先錄取是個性化評估程序的一部分，而該程序僅將種族視為其他因素中的一個 「加分因素」。
4. Segregation 4.隔離
The clearest example of a classification involving a suspect class and thus requiring strict scrutiny is segregation. 涉及可疑階級，因此需要嚴格審查的分類，最明顯的例子就是隔離。
Official intentional segregation based on race or national origin is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. As the result of Brown v. Board of Education, even if the government were to maintain truly “separate but equal” facilities, the intentional maintenance of separate facilities per se violates the Equal Protection Clause. 基於種族或國籍的官方蓄意隔離違反了平等保護條款。由於 Brown v. Board of Education 案的結果，即使政府維持真正「分開但平等」的設施，蓄意維持分開的設施本身即違反平等保護條款。
* The Segregation Must be De Jure * 隔離必須是法律上的隔離
However, there is a violation of equal protection only where the segregation is the result of intentional government action. In other words, the segregation must be “de jure,” not merely “de facto,” which means it must be intended or affected by the government action, not just occurred naturally. 但是，只有當隔離是政府蓄意行為的結果時，才會違反平等保護。換句話說，種族隔離必須是 「法律上的」，而不僅僅是 「事實上的」，這意味著種族隔離必須是政府行動的意圖或影響，而不僅僅是自然發生的。
* Education and Housing * 教育和住房
The two areas where official segregation is most often found are education and housing. 官方隔離最常見的兩個領域是教育和住房。
Example: Attendance Zones 範例：考勤區
Example: Government-subsidized Housing 範例：政府資助住房
* Wide Range of Remedies * 範圍廣泛的補救方法
If a court finds that there has been intentional segregation, it has a wide range of remedies to choose from. For example, it can bus students to a non-neighborhood school, or order the redrawing of district boundaries. But whatever the remedy is, the remedy must stop once the effects of the original intentional discrimination have been eradicated. 如果法院發現存在蓄意隔離，則有多種補救措施可供選擇。例如，它可以讓學生搭校車到非鄰近的學校，或下令重新劃定學區分界。但無論是何種補救措施，一旦原始故意歧視的影響被消除，補救措施就必須停止。
D. Race-Conscious Affirmative Action (種族平權措施） D.種族平權措施（Race-Conscious Affirmative Action）。
This involves government trying to help racial or ethnic minorities by giving them some sort of preference. 這涉及政府嘗試透過給予少數族裔某種優惠來幫助他們。
1. Public Entity 1.公共實體
There can only be a violation of equal protection if there’s state action, i.e., action by the federal government or by a state or municipality. In general, the use of affirmative action by private entities does not raise any constitutional issue. 只有在州政府採取行動（即聯邦政府或州或市政府採取行動）的情況下，才會出現違反平等保護的情況。一般而言，私人實體使用平權行動不會引起任何憲法問題。
Past Discrimination as Compelling Interest 過去的歧視為強制性權益
Per Court’s previous decisions, probably the only interests that are likely to qualify as a compelling government interest here are: (1) the government’s interest in redressing past discrimination; and (2) a university’s interest in student-body diversity. 根據法院之前的判決，在此可能符合強制性政府利益的唯一利益是：(1) 政府糾正過去歧視的利益；(2) 大學在學生體制多樣性方面的利益：(1) 政府糾正過去歧視的利益；以及 (2) 大學對學生體制多樣性的利益。
2. Strict Scrutiny 2.嚴格審查
Any affirmative action program that classifies on the basis of race will also be strictly scrutinized. So a race-conscious affirmative action plan, whether it’s in the area of employment, college admissions, voting rights or anywhere else, must be adopted for the purpose of furthering some “compelling” government interest, and the racial classification must be “necessary” to achieve that compelling government interest. 任何基於種族進行分類的平權行動計劃也將受到嚴格審查。因此，有意識的種族平權行動計劃，無論是在就業、大學入學、投票權或其他方面，都必須是為了促進某些 「強烈的 」政府利益而採取的，而且種族分類必須是為了實現該強烈的政府利益所 「必需的」。
* Clear Evidence of Discrimination * 歧視的明顯證據
Even if the government’s trying to redress past discrimination, there’s got to be clear evidence that this discrimination in fact occurred. 即使政府試圖糾正過去的歧視，也必須有明確的證據證明這種歧視確實發生過。
Redressing past discrimination “by society as a whole” will not suffice. There must be past discrimination closely related to the problem, typically discrimination by government. (City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 1989) 糾正「整個社會」過去的歧視並不足夠。必須有與問題密切相關的過去的歧視，典型的是政府的歧視。(City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 1989)
Using of Quotas 配額的使用
A racially-based quota is an inflexible number of admissions slots, dollar amount, or other “goodies” set aside for minorities. 以種族為基礎的配額是指預留給少數族群的招生名額、金額或其他「好處」，其數量不夠靈活。
Probably virtually all racially-based quotas will be struck down even where the government is trying to eradicate the effects of past discrimination-the Court will probably say that a quota is not “necessary” to remedy discrimination, because more flexible “means” can do the job. 幾乎所有基於種族的配額都會被推翻，即使政府正試圖消除過去歧視的影響 - 法院很可能會說，配額不是補救歧視的「必要」，因為更靈活的「手段」可以達到目的。
2. Gender 2.性別
Sex-based classifications require middle-level review. 基於性別的分類需要中層審核。
So if government intentionally classifies on the basis of sex, it’s got to show that it’s pursuing an important objective, and that the sex-based classification scheme is substantially related to that objective. 因此，如果政府故意基於性別進行分類，就必須證明它是在追求一項重要目標，而且基於性別的分類方案與該目標有實質關係。
Example: Different retirement age for male and female teachers-not likely to survive middlelevel review. 例如：男女教師的退休年齡不同 - 不可能通過中階層的審核。
E. Middle-Level Review (Gender, Illegitimacy and Alienage) E.中階檢討 (性別、非法居留與外籍身份)
1. Introduction 1.簡介
A few types of classifications are subjected to “middle-level” review. In applying this standard, the government objective must be “important,” and the means must be “substantially related” to that objective. Unlike in “mere rationality” review, the Court will not hypothesize objectives; it will consider only those objectives that are shown to have actually motivated the legislature. 少數類別的分類需接受「中層」審查。在應用此標準時，政府的目標必須「重要」，而手段必須與該目標「實質相關」。與「純理性」審查不同的是，法院不會假設目標；法院只會考慮那些被證明實際推動立法機關的目標。
* Purpose Must be Intentional Discrimination * 目的必須是故意歧視
Sex-based classifications will only be subjected to middle-level review if the legislature has intentionally discriminated against one sex in favor or another. If, as the result of some government act, one sex happens to suffer an unintended burden greater than the other sex suffers, that’s not enough for middle-level review. 基於性別的分類只有在立法機關故意歧視某一性別而偏袒另一性別時，才會受到中間層級的審查。如果由於某些政府行為，某個性別碰巧承受了比另一個性別更大的非故意負擔，那就不足以進行中層審查。
Example: Absolute Preference to Veterans for Civil Services (Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 1979) 範例：絕對優待退伍軍人擔任公職 (Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 1979)
* Benign or Invidious/Male or Female * 良性或隱性/男性或女性
The same standard of review is used whether the sex-based classification is “invidious” (intended to harm women) or “benign” (intended to help women, or even intended to redress past discrimination against them). 無論基於性別的分類是 「令人反感」（意圖損害婦女）或 「良性」（意圖幫助婦女，或甚至意圖糾正過去對婦女的歧視），都使用相同的審查標準。
Also, where government classifies based on sex, the scheme can be attacked either by a male or by a female, and either gender will get the benefit of mid-level review. 此外，當政府根據性別進行分類時，男性或女性均可對該計劃提出攻擊，且任何性別均可獲得中級審核的利益。
Example: Drinking Age in Oklahoma (Craig v. Boren, 1976) 範例：俄克拉何馬州的飲酒年齡 (Craig v. Boren, 1976)
* Tougher Review * 更嚴格的審查
Although the Supreme Court still gives genderbased classifications only mid-level, not strict, scrutiny, the Court now applies that scrutiny in a very tough way. The Court now says that it will require an “exceedingly persuasive iustification” for any gender-based classification, and will review it with “skeptical scrutiny.” 儘管最高法院仍僅給予性別分類中級審查，而非嚴格審查，但法院現在以非常嚴苛的方式應用該審查。法院現在表示，任何基於性別的分類都需要「極具說服力的理由」，並將以「懷疑的審查」來審查。
* Stereotype * 定型
If the legislature has made a sex-based classification that seems to reinforce stereotypes about the “proper place” of women, it probably cannot survive middle-level review. 如果立法機關所做的性別分類似乎強化了關於女性「適當位置」的定型觀念，則可能無法通過中級審查。
Example: Virginia Military Institute (U.S. v. Virginia, 1996) 範例：弗吉尼亞軍事學院 (U.S. v. Virginia, 1996)
3. Illegitimacy 3.非法性
Classifications disadvantaging illegitimate children are “semi-suspect” and therefore get middle-level review. 對非婚生子女不利的分類屬於 「半可疑」，因此會進行中級審查。
So the state cannot simply bar unacknowledged illegitimate children from bringing wrongful death actions, from having any chance to inherit, etc. Such children must be given at least some reasonable opportunity to obtain a judicial declaration of paternity. 因此，國家不能簡單地禁止未被承認的非婚生子女提起非正常死亡訴訟，禁止他們有任何機會繼承遺產等。必須至少給予這些子女一些合理的機會，以取得父親身份的司法宣告。
Example: No action for child support after the child turns 6 (Clark v. Jeter, 1988). 舉例說明：子女滿 6 歲後，不得就子女贍養費提起訴訟（Clark 訴 Jeter，1988 年）。
4. Alienage 4.外籍人士
Alienage might be thought of as a “semisuspect” category. In fact, though, alienage classifications, depending on the circumstances, will be subject either to strict scrutiny, middlelevel scrutiny or to mere rationality review. Alienage discrimination means a person is discriminated against because he is not yet a United States citizen. 外籍人士可能會被視為「半可疑」的類別。但事實上，外國人分類，視情況而定，將受到嚴格審查、中級審查或僅合理性審查。外籍歧視是指一個人因為尚未成為美國公民而受到歧視。
However, strict scrutiny does not apply where the discrimination against aliens relates to a “function at the heart of representative government.” Basically, this means that if the alien is applying for a government job, and the performance of this job is closely tied in with politics, iustice or public policy, the courts use only “mere rationality” review. So government may discriminate against aliens with respect to posts like state trooper, public school teacher, or probation officer. 但是，如果對外國人的歧視與 「代議政府的核心職能 」有關，則不適用嚴格審查。基本上，這意味著如果外國人申請的是政府工作，而該工作的執行與政治、正義或公共政策密切相關，則法院僅使用「純合理性」審查。因此，政府可以在州警察、公立學校教師或緩刑官等職位上歧視外國人。
* General Rule * 一般規則
Subject to one major exception (representative government), discrimination against aliens is subject to strict scrutiny. 除了一個主要例外（代議政制），對外國人的歧視必須經過嚴格審查。
Example: A state cannot prevent resident aliens from practicing law, because such a classification cannot survive strict scrutiny. 舉例說明：一個州不能阻止居住在該州的外國人執業，因為這樣的分類無法通過嚴格審查。
* Education of Illegal Aliens * 非法移民的教育
If a state denies free public education to illegal aliens, this will be subjected to intermediate-level review, and probably struck down (Plyer v. Doe, 1982). 如果一個州拒絕讓非法居留的外國人接受免費的公共教育，這將會受到中級審查，很可能會被推翻（Plyer v. Doe，1982）。
But this come from a combination of the fact that the plaintiffs were aliens and also that they were children. If a state discriminates against adult illegal aliens, the outcome is still uncertain. 但這來自於原告是外國人以及他們是兒童這兩個事實的結合。如果一個州歧視成年非法外國人，結果仍然是不確定的。
5. Other Unpopular Groups 5.其他不受歡迎團體
Discrimination against other unpopular groups might conceivable be subjected to middle-level review. For instance, discrimination against the elderly, homosexuals or the disabled might possibly trigger middle-level review, but the Court has not addressed this questions yet. 可以想像，對其他不受歡迎群體的歧視可能會受到中級審查。例如，對老年人、同性戀者或殘障人士的歧視可能會引發中間層級審查，但法院尚未處理此類問題。
2. Fundamental Rights Under Equal Protection Clause 2.平等保護條款下的基本權利
The short list of rights that are “fundamental” for equal protection strict scrutiny purposes is as follows: (1) the right to vote; (2) maybe the right to be a political candidate; (3) the right to have access to the courts for certain kinds of proceedings; (4) the right to migrate interstate; and (5) the right to marry. 就平等保護的嚴格審查目的而言，屬於「基本」權利的簡單清單如下：(1)投票權；(2)或許是政治候選人的權利；(3)就某些種類的訴訟向法院提出訴訟的權利；(4)跨州移民的權利；以及(5)結婚的權利。
F. Fundamental Rights F.基本權利
1. Generally 1.一般而言
Strict scrutiny can be triggered not only when a “suspect classification” is used, but also when a “fundamental right” is burdened by the classification the government is selected, regardless the people who are burdened are not members of a suspect class. 嚴格審查不僅會在使用「可疑分類」時啟動，也會在政府選擇的分類對某項「基本權利」造成負擔時啟動，不論受負擔的人是否屬於可疑類別。
3. Voting Rights 3.投票權
The right to vote in state and local elections is “fundamental,” so any classification that substantially burdens the right to vote is often strictly scrutinized. 在州和地方選舉中投票的權利是「基本權利」，因此任何對投票權造成重大負擔的分類通常都會受到嚴格審查。
In deciding whether to use strict scrutiny, the Court seems to place great weight on whether the voting regulation is reasonably related to determining voter qualifications. 在決定是否使用嚴格審查時，法院似乎非常重視投票法規是否與決定選民資格合理相關。
Related to Voter Qualifications? 與選民資格有關？
If the Court decides that the regulation is not reasonably related to determining voter qualifications, then the Court uses strict scrutiny, and will probably strike down the regulation. (Examples: Reynolds v. Sims; ballot restricted to “interested voters”) 如果法院判定該規定與確定選民資格無合理關係，則法院會使用嚴格審查，並可能會推翻該規定。(Examples: Reynolds v. Sims; ballot restricted to "interested voters") (範例：Reynolds v. Sims; 選票僅限於「有興趣的選民」)
But if it is reasonably related to determining voter qualifications, then the Court generally uses some less stringent review method (typically, an intermediate-level balancing test), and is likely to uphold the measures. (Example: voter identification requirement, denial of vote to felons) 但如果該措施與確定選民資格有合理關係，則法院通常會使用一些較寬鬆的審查方法（通常是中級平衡測試），並很可能會支持該措施。(Example: voter identification requirement, denial of vote to felons)
* Unfair to New Parties * 對新訂約方不公平
Restrictions that are unfair to new, not-yetestablished parties will likely to be invalidated. Example: A rule saying that a minor party can get its candidate on the ballot only if it presents signatures from 15%15 \% of the voters, holds a formal primary, and has an elaborate party structure, violates Equal Protection. (Williams v. Rhodes, 1968) 對新的、尚未成立的當事人不公平的限制可能會被宣告無效。例如：規定小政黨只有在提交 15%15 \% 選民的簽名、舉行正式初選並擁有複雜的政黨結構的情況下，才能將其候選人列入選票，此規定違反了平等保護。(Williams訴Rhodes案，1968年)
4. The Right to be Political Candidates 4.成為政治候選人的權利
The right to be a political candidate, and to have one’s name on the ballot, seems to be quasi-fundamental. 成為政治候選人的權利，以及讓自己的名字出現在選票上的權利，似乎是准基本權利。
The two kinds of ballot restrictions that the Supreme Court does seem to give strict or almost strict scrutiny to are: 最高法院似乎對兩種投票限制給予嚴格或幾乎嚴格的審查：
(1) Unfair to New Parties (1) 對新訂約方不公平
(2) Based on Wealth (2) 基於財富
Based on Wealth 以財富為基礎
Ballot access limits that are based on wealth is likely to be stricken down. 以財富為基礎的投票權限制很可能會被取消。
Example: A $700 candidate filing fee, which the state refuses to waive for an indigent candidate, violates Equal Protection. (Lubin v. Panish, 1974) 舉例說明：700美元的候選人報名費，州政府拒絕免除貧困候選人的報名費，違反了平等保護。(Lubin v. Panish, 1974)
5. Court Access 5.法院存取
Access to the courts is sometimes a “fundamental right,” so that if the right is burdened by a state-imposed classification, it will sometimes be closely scrutinized. Basically, what it comes down to is that if the state imposes a fee\boldsymbol{f e} \boldsymbol{e} that the rich can pay but the poor cannot, and the access relates to a criminal case, strict scrutiny will be used. 向法院提起訴訟有時是一項「基本權利」，因此如果這項權利受到國家強加的分類負擔，有時就會受到嚴格審查。基本上，這歸結為：如果國家強加一項 fee\boldsymbol{f e} \boldsymbol{e} 富人可以支付但窮人無法支付的費用，而且訴諸法院的權利與刑事案件有關，則會採用嚴格審查。
Example: The state cannot charge an indigent for his trial transcript in a criminal case. (Griffin v. Illinois, 1956) 例如：在刑事案件中，州政府不能向貧困者收取其審訊謄本的費用。(Griffin v. Illinois, 1956)
6. Right to Travel/Migrate Interstate 6.州際旅行/移民的權利
The so-called “right to travel” is generally a fundamental right. This term is misleading, it’s really the right to change one’s state of residence or employment. So any time the state imposes a classification that burdens one’s right to change her state of residence or employment, which mainly means that if the state imposes a substantial waiting period on newly-arrived residents, before they can receive some vital governmental benefit, that classification will be strictly scrutinized. 所謂的「旅行權」一般是一項基本權利。這個詞有誤導性，它其實是指改變居住或就業狀態的權利。因此，任何時候，如果州政府施加的分類對一個人改變居住或就業狀態的權利造成負擔，這主要是指如果州政府對新來的居民施加相當長的等待期，然後他們才能獲得一些重要的政府福利，則該分類將受到嚴格審查。
* Civil Litigation * 民事訴訟
When civil litigation is involved, access to the courts is usually not fundamental. Only for various family-law proceedings (e.g., divorce, paternity suits, termination of parental rights) is the state barred from charging fees for the indigent. (Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971; M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 1996) 當涉及民事訴訟時，訴諸法院通常不是基本原則。只有在各種家庭法訴訟（例如離婚、親子關係訴訟、終止父母權利）中，國家才禁止向貧困者收取費用。(Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971; M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 1996)
* Vital Governmental Benefit * 重要政府福利
If the benefit is vital, the state generally may not impose a substantial waiting period (example: oneyear waiting period before receiving welfare benefits-strictly scrutinized and likely to fail). But if the benefit is not vital, then the state may be able to do so (example: one-year waiting period before a student can qualify for low in-state tuition at the public university-no need to be strictly scrutinized and likely to survive). 如果福利是重要的，州政府一般不可以施加長時間的等待期（例如：領取福利前的一年等待期 - 嚴格審查，很可能失敗）。但如果該福利並非重要，則州政府可能可以這樣做（例如：學生在公立大學符合州內低廉學費資格前的一年等待期--無需嚴格審查，而且很可能會存活）。
7. The Right to Marry 7.結婚的權利
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Obergefell v. Hodges，576 U.S. 644 (2015)，是美國最高法院一宗里程碑式的案件，法院在該案中以 5:4 的結果裁定，同性伴侶結婚的基本權利受到美國憲法第十四修正案「正當程序條款」和「平等保護條款」的保證。
VIII. Freedom of Expression VIII.表達自由
A. Introduction A.簡介
1st Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 第一修正案：「國會不得制定關於建立宗教或禁止自由信教的法律；不得妨礙言論自由或出版自由；不得妨礙人民和平集會及向政府請願申訴的權利」。
The Court listed four distinct reasons why the fundamental right to marry applies to same-sex couples. First, “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.” Second, “the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals,” a principle applying equally to same-sex couples. Third, the fundamental right to marry “safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education”; as same-sex couples have children and families, they are deserving of this safeguard. Fourth, “marriage is a keystone of our social order,” and “[t]here is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle”. 法院列出了四個不同的理由，說明同性伴侶適用於基本的婚姻權利。首先，“關於婚姻的個人選擇權是個體自治概念的固有部分。”第二， “婚姻的權利是基本的，因為它支持兩個個人之間的聯繫，對於承諾的個體來說，沒有其他聯繫具有如此重要的意義”，這個原則適用於同性伴侶。第三，基本的婚姻權利“保護了孩子和家庭，從而從與子女撫養、生育和教育相關的權利中獲得意義”；由於同性伴侶有孩子和家庭，他們值得獲得這種保護。第四，“婚姻是我們社會秩序的基石”，“就這個原則而言，同性和異性伴侶之間沒有差異”。
1. Related Rights 1.相關權利
There are thus several distinct rights which may be grouped under the category “freedom of expression”: freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of petition. Additionally, there is a well-recognized “freedom of association” which, although it is not specifically mentioned in the 1 st Amendment, is derived from individuals’ rights of speech and assembly. 因此，有幾個不同的權利可以歸類為“表達自由”：言論自由、傳播自由、集會自由和請願自由。此外，有一個廣為認可的“結社自由”，雖然它並未在第一修正案中明確提及，但卻源自個體的言論和集會權利。
2. Two Broad Classes 2. 兩大類
Whenever there is a constitutional challenge based on the 1st Amendment’s freedom of expression, the key question to ask is, “Is this governmental action content-based or contentneutral?” If the action is “content-based,” the government’s action will generally be subjected to strict scrutiny, and the action will rarely be sustained. On the other hand, if the action is “content-neutral,” the government’s action is subjected to a much less demanding standard, and is thus much more likely to be upheld. 每當有基於第一修正案表達自由的憲法挑戰時，要問的關鍵問題是：「這項政府行為是基於內容還是內容中立？如果該行為是 「基於內容」，政府的行為通常會受到嚴格審查，而且該行為很少會獲得支持。另一方面，如果該行動是 「內容中立 」的，則政府的行動將受到較寬鬆的標準審查，因此更有可能獲得支持。
* Motive Counts * 动機計數
When a court decides whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral, motive count for everything-the question is what the government really intends to do. If the court believes that the government intends to inhibit certain speech because of its message, the court will treat the statute as content-based (and strictly scrutinize it) even though it is neutral on its face. 當法院決定一項法規是基於內容還是內容中立時，動機是最重要的--問題是政府的真正意圖是什麼。如果法院認為政府打算因某些言論的訊息而對其加以抑制，則即使法規表面上是中性的，法院也會將其視為基於內容（並對其進行嚴格審查）。
3. Analysis of Content-Based Action 3.以內容為基礎的行動分析
A governmental action that burdens a person’s expression is “content-based” if the government is aiming at the “communicative impact” of the expression. 如果政府的目的在於表達的「傳播影響」，那麼對某人的表達造成負擔的政府行為就是「以內容為基礎」的。
Example: Ad of Pharmacists v. Distribution of all Leaflets 範例：藥劑師廣告 v. 散發所有傳單
Once we’ve decided that the action is contentbased, we then have to determine whether the expression falls within a category that is protected by the 1st Amendment. 一旦我們判定該行為是以內容為基礎，我們就必須判定該表達方式是否屬於第一修正案所保護的類別。
Unprotected Category 無保護類別
If the speech falls into certain pre-defined unprotected categories, then the government can basically ban that expression completely based on its content, without any interference at all from the 1st Amendment. 如果言論屬於某些預先定義的不受保護類別，那麼政府基本上就可以根據其內容完全禁止該表達，而完全不受第一修正案的干預。
The main “unprotected” categories are: (1) 不受保護」的主要類別有(1)
advocacy of imminent lawless behavior; (2) fighting words; (3) defamation; (4) fraudulent misrepresentation; and (5) obscenity. 鼓吹即將發生的不法行為；(2) 打鬥性語言；(3) 誹謗；(4) 欺詐性失實陳述；以及 (5) 淫穢。
But even speech falling within an “unprotected category” receives one small 1st Amendment protection: government must regulate in a basically content-neutral way. 但即使是屬於「不受保護類別」的言論，也會受到第一修正案的一小部分保護：政府必須以基本上不影響內容的方式進行管制。
Example: The state may ban all “fighting words.” But it may not choose to ban just those fighting words directed at the listener’s race, religion, or other enumerated traits. 例如：州政府可以禁止所有 「打架的言詞」。但它不能選擇只禁止那些針對聽眾的種族、宗教或其他所列特徵的鬥爭性言行。
If the government restriction is content-neutral, there is a three-part test, which is basically boils down to mid-level review, that the government must satisfy before its regulation will be sustained if that regulation substantially impairs expression: 如果政府的限制是內容中立的，則有三項測試，基本上可歸結為中層審查，政府必須滿足此三項測試，其規範才能在大幅損害表達的情況下獲得支持：
Significant Governmental Interest 重大政府利益
Narrowly Tailored 狹義定制
Alternative Channels for Expression 其他表達管道
* Protected Category * 受保護類別
All expression not falling into one of those five-pre-defined categories is “protected.” If expression is protected, then any government ban or restriction on it based on its content will be presumed to be unconstitutional. The Court will subject any content-based regulation of protected speech to strict scrutiny. 所有不屬於這五個預先定義類別之一的表達都是 「受保護的」。如果言論受到保護，那麼政府基於其內容而對其實施的任何禁令或限制都將被推定為違憲。法院將對任何基於內容的受保護言論進行嚴格審查。
Example: No sign of “public disrepute” within 500 feet of a foreign embassy (Boos v. Barry, 1988). 例如：外國大使館 500 英呎範圍內不得有「公眾恥辱」的標誌 (Boos v. Barry, 1988)。
5. Overbreadth 5.過於廣泛
A statute is overbroad, and therefore violates the 1st Amendment, if it bans speech which could constitutionally be forbidden but also bans speech which is protected by the 1 st Amendment. Example: A statute prohibits anyone from “burning a U.S. flag for any purpose whatsoever.” This is probably unconstitutionally overbroad, because it appears to apply to constitutionally-protected conduct (e.g., burning that’s intended as a political expression). 如果一項法規禁止憲法可禁止的言論，但同時也禁止受第 1 修正案保護的言論，則該法規過於廣泛，因此違反第 1 修正案。舉例說明：一項法規禁止任何人「為任何目的燒毀美國國旗」。這可能是違憲的過寬，因為它似乎適用於受憲法保護的行為（例如，旨在作為政治表達的焚燒）。
6. Vagueness 6.含糊不清
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if the conduct forbidden by it is so unclearly defined that a reasonable person would have to guess at its meaning. 如果一項法規所禁止的行為定義不明確，以至於合理的人必須猜測其含義，則該法規即屬違憲地含糊不清。
Example: A statute prohibits anyone from “burning a U.S. flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government.” This is probably unconstitutionally vague, because there’s no way to tell what the statute means by “symbol of opposition to organized government.” 例如：一項法規禁止任何人「燒毀美國國旗作為反對有組織政府的象徵」。這可能是違憲的含糊之處，因為無法判斷法令中「反對有組織政府的象徵」是什麼意思。
C. Fighting Words C.鬥語
One of the “unprotected categories” consists of “fighting words.” They are words which are likely to make the person to whom they are addressed commit an act of violence, probably against the speaker. Expression that falls within the “fighting words” category can be flatly banned or punished by the state. 「不受保護的類別 」之一包括 「打架用語」。這些詞語很可能會使對方做出暴力行為，很可能是針對說話者。國家可以明令禁止或懲罰屬於 「打架 」類別的言論。
B. Advocacy of Illegal Conduct B.鼓吹非法行為
The government can ban speech that advocate crime or the use of force if it shows that two requirements are met: 政府若能證明符合兩項要求，即可禁止鼓吹犯罪或使用武力的言論：
Intent: The advocacy must be intended to incite or produce “imminent lawless action”; and 意圖：倡議必須意圖煽動或產生「即時不法行動」；且
Likelihood: The advocacy must be in fact be likely to incite or produce that imminent lawless action. 可能性：宣導必須事實上可能煽動或產生即將發生的不法行動。
Example: Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) 範例：Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)
* Limits * 限制
But the “fighting words” doctrine is tightly limited: 但「鬥言論」教義是有嚴格限制的：
Anger not enough: The crowd must be so angry that they are likely to fight. 憤怒還不夠：群眾必須非常憤怒，以至於有可能打架。
Crowd control: The police must control the angry crowd instead of arresting the speaker if they’ve got the physical ability to do so. 人群控制：警察必須控制憤怒的群眾，而不是逮捕演講者，如果他們有足夠的體力這樣做。
Dislike of speaker’s identity: The doctrine doesn’t apply where it’s the identity or lawful acts of the speaker, rather than his threatening words, that moves the crowd to anger. 不喜歡演講者的身份：如果是演講者的身份或合法行為，而非其威脅性的言詞，激發群眾的憤怒，則該原則不適用。
* Hate Speech * 仇恨言論
A ban on speech or conduct intended or likely to incite anger or violence based solely on particular listed topics or motives-such as race, color, religion or gender hatred-is impermissibly content-based. That’s true even if all the speech/ conduct banned falls within an “unprotected” category such as “fighting words.” 僅基於特定列出的主題或動機（例如種族、膚色、宗教或性別仇恨）而禁止意圖或可能煽動憤怒或暴力的言論或行為，是不被允許的基於內容的禁止。即使所有被禁止的言論/行為都屬於 「不受保護 」的類別，例如 「打架詞」，也是如此。
However, a state may impose a content-based ban on particular instances of unprotected speech if the ban forbids only the very worst examples illustrating the very reason the particular class of speech is unprotected. (Virginia v. Black, 2003) 然而，如果州政府只禁止最糟糕的例子，說明特定類別的言論不受保護的原因，則州政府可以對不受保護的特定言論實例施加基於內容的禁令。(Virginia v. Black, 2003)
2. Public Figures 2.公眾人物
The rule of Times v. Sullivan applies not only to public “officials” but also to public “figures.” Thus a well known college football coach, and a prominent retired Army general, were public figures who had to show that the defendant acted with actual malice. (Assoc. Press v. Walker, 1967) Times v. Sullivan案的規則不僅適用於公共 「官員」，也適用於公共 「人物」。因此，一位知名的大學足球教練和一位傑出的退役軍隊將領都是公眾人物，他們必須證明被告的行為具有實際惡意。(Assoc. Press v. Walker, 1967)
D. Defamation and Invasion of Privacy D.誹謗和侵犯隱私
The 1st Amendment places limits on the extent to which a plaintiff may recover tort damages for defamation. 第一修正案對原告因誹謗而獲得侵權損害賠償的程度設有限制。
Test: Where P is a public official, he may only win a defamation suit against DD for a statement relating to P’s official conduct if P can prove that D’s statement was made either “with knowledge that it was false” or with “reckless disregard” of what it was true or false. These two mental states are usually collectively referred to as the “actual malice” requirement. 測試：當 P 是公職人員時，只有當 P 能夠證明 D 的陳述是在 「明知其為虛假 」或 「罔顧 」其真假的情況下作出的，他才有可能贏得針對 DD 與 P 的公職行為有關的陳述的誹謗訴訟。這兩種心理狀態通常統稱為「實際惡意」要求。
* Partial or Involuntary Public Figure * 部分或非自願公眾人物
Someone who voluntarily injects himself into a public controversy will be a public figure for just that controversy - thus an anti-abortion activist might be a public figure for any news story concerning abortion, but not for stories about his private life unrelated to abortion. 自願投入公眾爭議的人，會因為該爭議而成為公眾人物，因此反墮胎活動人士可能會因為任何有關墮胎的新聞報導而成為公眾人物，但不會因為與墮胎無關的私人生活報導而成為公眾人物。
Also, some people may be “involuntary” public figure, e.g., a criminal defendant is an involuntary public figure, so he cannot sue or recover for a news report about his crime or trial unless he shows actual malice. 此外，有些人可能是「非自願」的公眾人物，例如，刑事被告是非自願的公眾人物，因此他不能因新聞報導他的罪行或審判而提出起訴或賠償，除非他顯示出實際的惡意。
E. Obscenity E.猥褻
Expression that is obscene is simply unprotected by the 1st Amendment, so the state can ban it, punish it, or do whatever else they want without worrying about the 1st Amendment. 淫穢的表達方式根本不受第一修正案的保護，因此州政府可以禁止、懲罰或做任何他們想做的事，而無需擔心第一修正案。
Significance 意義
So something will not be “obscene” unless it depicts or describes “hard core sex”, e.g., mere nudity, by itself, is not obscene. 因此，除非描繪或描述「嚴重的性行為」，否則不會被視為「淫褻」，例如，純粹的裸體本身就不是淫褻。
* Three-part Test * 三部分測試
For a work to be “obscene,” all three parts of the following test must be satisfied: 作品要成為 「淫穢」，必須符合下列驗證標準的所有三個部分：
Prurient Interest: The average person, applying today’s community standards, must find that work as a whole appeals to the “prurient” interest; 色情趣味：一般人應用今日的社會標準，必須發現作品整體上吸引了「淺趣」；
Sexual Conduct: The work must depict or describe in a “patently offensive way” particular types of sexual conduct defined by state law; and 性行為：作品必須以「顯著冒犯的方式」描繪或描述州法律所定義的特定類型的性行為；以及
Lack Value: The work taken as a whole, must lack “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” 缺乏價值：作品整體而言必須缺乏「嚴重的文學、藝術、政治或科學價值」。
* Materials Addressed to Minors * 針對未成年人的材料
It will be much easier for the government to keep erotic materials out of the hands of minors. Probably even minors have some first Amendment interest in receiving sexually explicit materials, but this is typically outweighed by the government’s compelling interest in protecting minors against such material. So the distribution of non-obscene but sexually explicit materials may basically be forbidden to minors. 對政府來說，將更容易阻止未成年人接觸色情材料。可能即使未成年人在接收露骨色情材料方面也有一定的第一修正案利益，但這通常會被政府在保護未成年人免受此類材料侵害方面的強烈利益所抵銷。因此，基本上可以禁止向未成年人散佈非猥褻但性露骨的資料。
* Adult's Rights Impaired * 成人的權利受到損害
But if a measure aimed at minors substantially impair the access of adults to material that is “indecent” but not obscene, the measure will be struck down. 但如果針對未成年人的措施嚴重損害成年人取得「不雅」但非淫褻的資料，則該措施將被撤銷。
Example: If Congress outright bans all “indecent” material on the Internet (as it has done-Communication Decency Act), out of a fear that the material will be seen by minors, the measure will be found to violate the First Amendment rights of Adults. (Reno v. ACLU, 1997) 例如：如果國會因為擔心未成年人會看到網際網路上所有「不雅」的資料，而徹底禁止這些資料（就像國會所做的--通訊正當法案），這項措施就會被認為違反成人的第一修正案權利。(Reno v. ACLU, 1997)
F. Commercial Speech F.商業言論
Speech that is commercial-that is, speech advertising a product or proposing some commercial transaction-gets 1st Amendment protection. But this protection is in some ways more limited than the protection given to noncommercial (e.g., political) speech. 商業性言論，即宣傳產品或建議某些商業交易的言論，獲得第一修正案的保護。但這種保護在某些方面比給予非商業（例如政治）言論的保護更為有限。
* Private Possession by Adults * 成人私人擁有
The mere private possession of obscene material by an adult may not be made criminal (Stanley v. Georgia, 1969). 成人僅私藏猥褻物品不得被定為犯罪（Stanley v. Georgia, 1969）。
However, the states may criminalize even private possession of child pornography (Osborne v. Ohio, 1990). 然而，各州甚至可以將私人擁有兒童色情物品的行為列為犯罪（Osborne v. Ohio，1990 年）。
Also, the state may punish a person who supplies pornography even to consenting adults. In other words, there is a right to have pornography for one’s own home use, but not a right to supply it to others for their home use. 此外，即使是提供色情物品給同意的成年人，國家也可以懲罰此人。換句話說，有權擁有色情物品供自己在家使用，但無權提供給他人在家使用。
* Truthful Commercial Speech * 真實的商業言論
Truthful commercial speech gets a pretty fair degree of 1 st Amendment protection. The government may restrict truthful commercial speech only if the regulation directly advances a substantial governmental interest in a way that is no more extensive than necessary to achieve the government’s objective. So it’s basically a mid-level review to restrictions based on the content of commercial speech. 真實的商業言論獲得相當程度的第一修正案保護。政府僅可限制真實的商業言論，前提是該法規直接促進了重大的政府利益，且其範圍不超過實現政府目標所需。因此，這基本上是對基於商業言論內容的限制的中級審查。
* False, Deceptive or Illegal * 虛假、欺騙或非法
False or deceptive commercial speech may be forbidden by the government. Similarly, speech which proposes an illegal transaction may be forbidden (e.g., advertisements for cocaine). 虛假或欺騙性的商業言論可能會被政府禁止。同樣，建議非法交易的言論也可能被禁止（例如，可卡因廣告）。
The “Central Hudson Test” for Restrictions on Commercial Speech 商業言論限制的「Central Hudson 驗證標準
The regulated speech concerns an illegal activity, 受管制的言論涉及非法活動、
The regulated speech is misleading, or 受管制的言論具有誤導性，或
The government’s interest in restricting the speech is substantial, the regulation in question directly advances the government’s interest, and the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest. 政府限制該言論的利益是重大的，有關的法規直接促進政府的利益，而且該法規是狹義地為了服務政府的利益。
Advertising of Lawful but Harmful Products Sellers of products that are lawful but harmful receive the same protection as any other commercial speaker. That is, the fact that government could completely ban the product does not mean that government can automatically curtail truthful advertising to an important government objective, and the court will require a fairly tight fit between means and end. 合法但有害產品的廣告合法但有害產品的銷售者與其他商業言論者一樣，受到相同的保護。也就是說，政府可以完全禁止產品的事實，並不表示政府可以自動將真實的廣告限制在重要的政府目標上，法院會要求手段和目的之間有相當緊密的配合。
Example: Tobacco Advertising Ban for Protecting Children (Lorillard Tobacco vs. Reilly, 2001) 範例：保護兒童的煙草廣告禁令 (Lorillard Tobacco vs. Reilly, 2001)
* Lawyers * 律師
The qualified First Amendment protection given to commercial speech means that lawyers have a limited right to advertise. Thus a state may not ban all advertising of lawyers or even ban advertising directed to a particular problem. On the other hand, the states may ban certain types of in-person solicitation by lawyers seeking clients, e.g., ban solicitation if visiting victims in person by tort lawyers who want to obtain a contingent-fee agreement. 第一修正案賦予商業言論的限制性保護意味著律師擁有有限的廣告權。因此，各州不得禁止所有律師廣告，甚至不得禁止針對特定問題的廣告。另一方面，各州可以禁止律師為尋求客戶而進行某些類型的當面招攬，例如，如果侵權律師希望獲得或有收費協議，則禁止其在當面探訪受害人時進行招攬。
G. Time, Place and Manner Regulation G. 時間、地點與方式規範
A “time, place and manner” regulation of publicforum speech has to pass a three-part test to avoid being a violation of the 1 st Amendment: 公共論壇演講的「時間、地點與方式」規範必須通過三項測試，才能避免違反第一修正案：
1. Content-Neutral 1.內容中立
It has to be content-neutral. In other words, the government can’t really be trying to regulate content under the guise of regulating “time, place and manner.” 它必須是內容中立的。換句話說，政府不能打著管制「時間、地點和方式」的幌子來管制內容。
Ex: Limited time for parades to protest government policies. 例如：抗議政府政策的遊行時間有限。
* Protected Category * 受保護類別
All expression not falling into those five-defined categories is “protected.” If expression is protected, then any government ban or restriction on it based on its content will be presumed to be unconstitutional. The court will subject any content-based regulation of protected speech to strict scrutiny. 所有不屬於這五個定義類別的表達都是 「受保護的」。如果言論受到保護，那麼政府基於其內容而對其實施的任何禁令或限制都將被推定為違憲。法院將對任何基於內容的受保護言論進行嚴格審查。
2. Narrowly Tailored 2.狹義定制
It’s got to be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. 它必須狹義地針對重大的政府利益。
This basically means that not only must the government be pursuing an important interest, but there must not be some significantly less intrusive way that government could achieve its objective. 這基本上意味著，政府不僅必須追求重要的利益，而且必須沒有一些侵擾性顯著較低的方式可以讓政府達成目標。
Ex: No handbills for preventing littering. 例如：沒有防止亂丟垃圾的手冊。
3. Alternative Channels 3.替代渠道
The state must “leave open alternative channels” for communicating the information. 國家必須「開放其他管道」以傳達資訊。
Ex: Parade or demonstration can only take place in one park and one street. 例如：遊行或示威只能在一個公園和一條街道上進行。
H. Symbolic Expression H.符號表達
The Court uses essentially the same rules to analyze restrictions on symbolic expression as it does for restrictions that apply to verbal speech, or to verbal speech coupled with conduct. 法院使用基本相同的規則來分析對象徵性表達的限制，就像分析適用於口頭言論或與行為相結合的口頭言論的限制一樣。
1. How Conduct Becomes Expression 1.行為如何成為表達
The standard in deciding whether a conduct could be considered as an expression and therefore protected by the First Amendment is whether “an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and whether the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” (Texas v. Johnson, 1989) 決定某行為是否可被視為一種表達，並因此受到第一修正案保護的標準，是「是否存在傳達特定訊息的意圖，以及該訊息是否很有可能被觀看該訊息的人所理解」。(Texas v. Johnson, 1989)
2. Standard 2.標準
Thus: (a) any attempt by government to restrict symbolic expression because of the content of the message will be strictly scrutinized and almost certainly struck down; (b) any restriction on the time, place or manner of symbolic expression will have to be narrowly tailored to a significant governmental objective and will have to leave open alternative channels. 因此(a) 政府因訊息內容而限制象徵性表達的任何嘗試都會受到嚴格審查，而且幾乎肯定會被推翻；(b) 對象徵性表達的時間、地點或方式的任何限制都必須狹隘地針對重要的政府目標，而且必須開放其他渠道。
3. Flag Burning 3.燒旗
If a state bans flag desecration or mutilation, and either on the statute’s face or as it is applied, the statute is directed only at particular message, it will be invalid. For example, both the Texas and federal flag burning statutes have been struck down by the Supreme Court. In the federal statute case, the Court concluded that Congress was trying to preserve the flag as a “symbol of national unity.” The statute was therefore content-based, so the Court struck it down. 如果某州禁止褻瀆國旗或肢解國旗，但無論從法規的表面或應用上來看，該法規僅針對特定訊息，則該法規將無效。例如，德州和聯邦的燒旗法規都被最高法院推翻。在聯邦法規案中，法院的結論是國會試圖保留國旗作為「民族團結的象徵」。因此，該法規是基於內容的，所以法院將其推翻。
2. Subpoenas by government 2.政府傳票
The press does not get any constitutional special protection from government demands that the press furnish information which other citizens would have to furnish. Hence, reporters are also subject to grand jury investigations, but in limited circumstances can quash evidence and/or refuse to cooperate under their First Amendment freedom of the press, when their own safety or the identity of an informant would be compromised. 新聞界不會因政府要求新聞界提供其他公民必須提供的資訊而獲得任何憲法特別保護。因此，記者也會受到大陪審團的調查，但在有限的情況下，當記者自身的安全或線人的身份會受到損害時，他們可以根據第一修正案的新聞自由撤銷證據和/或拒絕合作。
I. Freedom of the Press I.新聞自由
1. Prior Restraint 1.事先約束
In general, the government will not be able to obtain a prior restraint again broadcasters or publishers. In other words, only in exceptionally rare circumstances may the government obtain an injunction against the printing or airing of a story, and the government will almost never be allowed to require that a publisher or broadcaster obtain a permit before it runs a story. 一般而言，政府無法取得對廣播業者或出版業者的事先限制。換句話說，只有在極其罕見的情況下，政府才能獲得禁止印刷或播出某篇報導的禁制令，而且政府幾乎永遠不會被允許要求出版商或廣播公司在播出某篇報導之前取得許可。
Example: N.Y Times v. U.S 範例：紐約時報訴美國
3. Disclosure of Confidential or IllegallyObtained Information 3.披露機密或非法獲取的資訊
If a media member lawfully obtains information about a matter of public significance, government may punish disclosure of the information only if government has " a need of the highest order," which it will rarely be found to have. 如果媒體成員合法地獲得了關於對公眾有重大影響的事項的資訊，只有在政府有「最高等級的需 要」時，政府才可能懲罰披露該資訊的行為，而政府很少會被發現有此需要。
But if the publisher itself has acted illegally in obtaining the information, then government may make it a crime to publish the information, no matter how newsworthy it is. 但如果發佈者本身非法取得資訊，則無論該資訊有多大新聞價值，政府都可以將發佈該資訊定為犯罪。
IX. Freedom of Association IX.結社自由
A. Generally A.一般而言
1st Amendment recognizes the concept of “freedom of association.” In general, the idea is that if an individual has a 1st Amendment right to engage in a particular expressive activity, then a group has a “freedom of association” right to engage in that same activity as a group. 第一修正案承認 「結社自由 」的概念。一般而言，這個概念是，如果個人擁有第一修正案所賦予的從事特定表達活動的權利，則團體擁有以團體名義從事相同活動的 「結社自由 」權利。
B. Illegal Membership B.非法會員
The freedom of association also means that mere membership in a group or association may not be made illegal. Membership in a group may only be made part of an offense if: (1) the group is actively engaged in unlawful activity, or incite others to imminent lawless action; and (2) the individual knows of the group’s illegal activity, and specifically intends to further the group’s illegal goals. 結社自由還意味著不得將僅是團體或協會成員的身份定為非法。只有在以下情況下，團體成員身份才可能成為違法行為的一部分：(1) 該團體積極從事非法活動，或煽動他人即將採取非法行動；且 (2) 個人知道該團體的非法活動，並明確打算促進該團體的非法目標。
Example: Advocating imminent overthrow of the government. 範例：鼓吹即將推翻政府。
Right not to Associate 不聯繫的權利
Individuals and groups also have a well-protected “right not to associate.” Thus any government attempt to make an individual give financial support to a cause she dislikes, or to make a group take members whose presence would interfere with the group’s expressive activities, will be strictly scrutinized. 個人和團體也有受到良好保護的「不結社權利」。因此，任何政府企圖強迫個人向她不喜歡的事業提供財務支持，或強迫團體吸收會干擾團體表達活動的成員，都會受到嚴格審查。
Example: Public school teacher required to pay union due has a freedom-of-association right not to support some causes the teacher dislikes. 例如：公立學校教師被要求支付工會應得的費用，有不支持教師不喜歡的某些事業的結社自由權利。
X. Freedom of Religion X.宗教自由
Amendment I: 修正案 I：
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . …’ "國會不得制定關於建立宗教或禁止自由信教的法律；..........'
A. Introduction A.簡介
There are two quite distinct clauses in the First Amendment pertaining to religion. 第一修正案中有兩項相當不同的條款與宗教有關。
Establishment Clause 設立條款
Free Exercise Clause 自由行使條款
* Free Exercise Clause * 自由行使條款
This clause bars any law “prohibiting the free exercise of religion.” The main purpose of it is to prevent the government from outlawing or seriously burdening a person’s pursuit of whatever religion (and whatever religious practices) he chooses. 該條款禁止任何「禁止自由從事宗教活動」的法律。它的主要目的是防止政府取締或嚴重負擔一個人追求他所選擇的任何宗教（和任何宗教實踐）。
Establishment Clause 設立條款
This clause prohibits any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” The main purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prevent government from endorsing or supporting religion. 該條款禁止任何「尊重建立宗教」的法律。設立宗教條款的主要目的是防止政府認可或支持宗教。
* Applicable to States * 適用於國家
Both clauses have been interpreted to apply also to the states, by means of the 14th Amendment’s due process clause. 透過第 14 修正案的適當程序條款，這兩項條款也被解釋為適用於各州。
Conflict 衝突
There might sometimes be a conflict between the two clauses, i.e., a religious group may be asking for some government benefit; if the benefit is given, there may be an Establishment Clause problem. Yet if the benefit is not given, this may be a burdening of religion. When the two clauses seem to conflict, the Free Exercise Clause dominates. 有時候，這兩個條款之間可能會發生衝突，也就是說，一個宗教團體可能會要求政府提供某些利益；如果提供了利益，就可能會有「確立條款」的問題。然而，如果不提供利益，這可能是對宗教的負擔。當這兩項條款似乎有衝突時，自由行使條款會佔主導地位。
Example: Public University Meeting Rooms 範例：公立大學會議室
2. Three-Part Test 2.三部分測試
Government action that has some relationship to religion will violate the Establishment Clause unless it satisfies all three parts of the following test (known as the “Lemon” test, from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971): 與宗教有某種關係的政府行為，除非符合下列測試的所有三個部分（稱為「Lemon」測試，源自 1971 年的 Lemon v. Kurtzman 案），否則會違反「確立條款」：
B. The Establishment Clause B.設立條款
1. General Rule 1.一般規則
The overall purpose of this clause is to put a wall between church and state. In other words, the government must stay out of the business of religion, and religion groups must to some extent stay out of the business of government. So Congress cannot establish an “official religion of the U.S.” and the government cannot intentionally prefer one religion over another religion. 該條款的整體目的是在政教之間設置一堵牆。換句話說，政府必須置身於宗教事務之外，而宗教團體也必須在某種程度上置身於政府事務之外。因此國會不能建立「美國官方宗教」，政府也不能刻意偏好某種宗教而非另一種宗教。
(1) Purpose (1) 目的
First, the government action must have a secular legislative purpose. In other words, there must be some governmental purpose that has nothing to do with religion. (If there is both a religious and a non-religious purpose, then this is probably satisfied.) Example: Alabama statute- “Every public school student shall have the opportunity to engage in silent prayer or meditation for at least two minutes at the start of every school day.” (Wallace v. Jaffree, 1985) 首先，政府行為必須具有世俗的立法目的。換句話說，必須有一些與宗教無關的政府目的。(如果既有宗教目的又有非宗教目的，那就很可能符合這一點)。舉例說明：阿拉巴馬州法規：「每個公立學校的學生都應有機會在每天上課開始時進行至少兩分鐘的默禱或冥想。(Wallace v. Jaffree, 1985)
(2) Effect (2) 效果
Second, the government action’s principal or primary effect must not to be to advance religion. But incidental effects that help religion do not violate this prong. 第二，政府行為的主要或主要效果不得是促進宗教。但有助於宗教的附帶效果並不違反此原則。
Example: College classroom for night use. 範例：夜間使用的大學教室。
C. The Free Exercise Clause C.自由行使條款
1. General Rule 1.一般規則
Under this clause, the government is barred from making any law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from getting in the way of people’s ability to practice their religion. 根據該條款，政府不得制定任何「禁止自由信奉」宗教的法律。自由行使條款防止政府妨礙人們信奉宗教。
(3) Entanglement (3) 纏結
Finally, the governmental action must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 最後，政府行為不得造成政府與宗教的過度糾葛。
Example: Massachusetts lets a church veto the issuance of a liquor license to any premises located within 500 feet of the church. The Court held this statute violates the Establishment Clause, because it entangles churches in the exercise of governmental powers. (Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 1982) 例如：馬薩諸塞州允許教會否決向教會 500 英尺範圍內的任何處所簽發飲酒許可證。法院認為此法規違反 「設立條款」，因為它使教會糾纏於政府權力的行使。(Larkin訴Grendel's Den案，1982年)
The Free Exercise Clause not only prevents the government from unduly burdening a person’s abstract “belief”, but also sometimes relates to “conduct”. 自由行使條款」不僅防止政府對個人抽象的「信仰」造成不當負擔，有時也涉及「行為」。
Free Exercise problems most typically arise when government acting in pursuit of non-religious objectives, either (1) forbids or burdens conduct which happens to be required by someone’s religious belief (Jewish soldiers’ yarmulkes); or (2) compels or encourages conduct which happens to be forbidden by someone’s religious beliefs. 自由行使問題最常發生在政府為了追求非宗教目標，而(1)禁止或加重某人宗教信仰所要求的行為（猶太士兵的圓帽）；或(2)強制或鼓勵某人宗教信仰所禁止的行為。
2. Intentional v. Unintentional Burdens 2.故意負擔與非故意負擔
The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from unduly interfering with religion whether the government does so intentionally or unintentionally. However, different standards of review applied. 自由行使條款」防止政府不當干擾宗教，不論政府是有意或無意為之。但是，適用不同的審查標準。
* Intentional Burden * 故意負擔
If the interference with religion is intentional on government’s part, then the interference is subjected to the most strict scrutiny, and will virtually never survive. 如果對宗教的干擾是政府刻意為之，那麼這種干擾就必須經過最嚴格的審查，而且幾乎永遠無法存活。
Example: Outlaws all animal sacrifice for disliking Santeria. (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 1993) 例如：因不喜歡桑特里亞教而取締所有動物祭祀。(Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 1993)
Unintentional Burden 非故意的負擔
If government unintentionally burdens religion, the Free Exercise Clause is still applied. Here, however, the government action is not per se illegal. Instead, the Court traditionally uses a somewhat less stringent form of scrutiny. For example, if the government makes certain conduct a crime, and this unintentionally burdens the exercise of religion, the Court does not use strict scrutiny, and instead uses “mere rationality” review. 如果政府無意中對宗教造成負擔，則仍適用「自由行使條款」。但在此，政府行為本身並不違法。相反地，法院傳統上使用較寬鬆的審查方式。舉例來說，如果政府將某些行為列為犯罪，而此舉無意中對宗教活動造成負擔，則法院不會使用嚴格審查，而是使用「純合理性」審查。
