In the theory of psycho-analysis we have no hesitation in assuming that the course taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure principle. We believe, that is to say, that the course of those events is invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension, and that it takes a direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension-that is, with an avoidance of unpleasure or a production of pleasure. In taking that course into account in our consideration of the mental processes which are the subject of our study, we are introducing an ‘economic’ point of view into our work; and if, in describing those processes, we try to estimate this ‘economic’ factor in addition to the ‘topographical’ and ‘dynamic’ ones, we shall, I think, be giving the most complete description of them of which we can at present conceive, and one which deserves to be distinguished by the term ‘metapsychological’.’
在精神分析理论中，我们毫不犹豫地认为，心理事件的发展过程是由快乐原则自动调节的。也就是说，我们认为，这些事件的发展过程总是由一种令人不快的紧张状态引起的，它的最终结果与紧张状态的降低--即避免不快或产生快乐--相一致。在考虑作为我们研究对象的心理过程时，如果考虑到这一过程，我们就在工作中引入了'经济'观点；如果在描述这些过程时，除了'地形'和'动力'因素外，我们还试图估计这一'经济'因素，那么我认为，我们将对这些过程做出我们目前所能想象到的最完整的描述，并且值得用'元心理学'一词来加以区分。

It is of no concern to us in this connection to enquire how far, with this hypothesis of the pleasure principle, we have approached or adopted any particular, historically established, philosophical system. We have arrived at these speculative assumptions in an attempt to describe and to account for the facts of daily observation in our field of study. Priority and originality are not among the aims that psycho-analytic work sets itself; and the impressions that underlie the hypothesis of the pleasure principle are so obvious that they can scarcely be overlooked. On the other hand we would readily express our gratitude to any philosophical or psychological theory which was able to inform us of the meaning of the feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which act so imperatively upon us. But on this point we are, alas, offered nothing to our purpose. This is the most obscure and inaccessible region of the mind, and, since we cannot avoid contact with it, the least rigid hypothesis, it seems to me, will be the best. We have decided to relate
在这方面，我们并不关心在快乐原则的假设下，我们在多大程度上接近或采纳了任何特定的、历史上确立的哲学体系。我们是在试图描述和解释我们研究领域的日常观察事实的过程中得出这些推测性假设的。优先性和独创性并不是精神分析工作为自己设定的目标；而快乐原则假设所依据的印象是如此明显，几乎不容忽视。另一方面，如果有任何哲学或心理学理论能够告诉我们快乐和不快乐的含义，我们都会欣然表示感谢。但遗憾的是，在这一点上，我们一无所获。这是心灵中最晦涩难懂、最难以接近的领域，既然我们无法避免与它接触，那么在我看来，最不僵化的假设将是最好的。我们决定讲述
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [See Section IV of ‘The Unconscious’ (1915e).]
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [见《无意识》（1915e）第四节]。
pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is present in the mind but is not in any way ‘bound’; ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} and to relate them in such a manner that unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution. What we are implying by this is not a simple relation between the strength of the feelings of pleasure and unpleasure and the corresponding modifications in the quantity of excitation; least of all-in view of all we have been taught by psycho-physiology-are we suggesting any directly proportional ratio: the factor that determines the feeling is probably the amount of increase or diminution in the quantity of excitation in a given period of time. Experiment might possibly play a part here; but it is not advisable for us analysts to go into the problem further so long as our way is not pointed by quite definite observations. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 把快乐和不快乐与心灵中存在的、但不受任何 "约束 "的兴奋量联系起来，使不快乐与兴奋量的增加相对应，而快乐与兴奋量的减少相对应。我们所说的快乐和不快乐的感觉的强弱与兴奋量的相应变化之间并不是一种简单的关系；从我们从心理生理学所学到的所有知识来看，我们并不是在暗示任何直接的比例关系：决定感觉的因素可能是在一定时间内兴奋量的增减。在这里，实验可能会起到一定的作用；但只要我们还没有非常明确的观察结果，我们分析家就不宜进一步探讨这个问题。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}

We cannot, however, remain indifferent to the discovery that an investigator of such penetration as G. T. Fechner held a view on the subject of pleasure and unpleasure which coincides in all essentials with the one that has been forced upon us by psycho-analytic work. Fechner’s statement is to be found contained in a small work, Einige Ideen zur Schöpfungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen, 1873 (Part XI, Supplement, 94), and reads as follows: 'In so far as conscious impulses always have some relation to pleasure or unpleasure, pleasure and unpleasure too can be regarded as having a psycho-physical relation to conditions of stability and instability. This provides a basis for a hypothesis into which I propose to enter in greater detail elsewhere. According to this hypothesis, every psychophysical motion rising above the threshold of consciousness is attended by pleasure in proportion as, beyond a certain limit, it approximates to complete stability, and is attended by unpleasure in proportion as, beyond a certain limit, it deviates from complete stability; while between the two limits, which may be described as qualitative thresholds of pleasure and
然而，我们不能无动于衷，因为我们发现，像 G. T. 费希纳这样一位具有深刻见解的研究者，在快乐和不快乐的问题上持有一种观点，而这种观点在本质上与精神分析工作强加给我们的观点不谋而合。费希纳的这一观点载于 1873 年出版的一本小册子《Einige Ideen zur Schöpfungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen》（第 XI 部分，补编，94 页），内容如下只要有意识的冲动总是与快乐或不快乐有某种关系，快乐和不快乐也可以被视为与稳定和不稳定的条件有心理-生理关系。这为一个假设提供了基础，我打算在其他地方更详细地探讨这个假设。根据这一假说，每一个高于意识阈限的心理物理运动，如果超过一定限度就接近于完全稳定，那么就会产生快乐；如果超过一定限度就偏离完全稳定，那么就会产生不快乐；而在这两个限度之间，可以说是快乐和不快乐的定性阈限。

unpleasure, there is a certain margin of aesthetic indifference. . . .’ ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}
.............. . .' ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}

The facts which have caused us to believe in the dominance of the pleasure principle in mental life also find expression in the hypothesis that the mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant. This latter hypothesis is only another way of stating the pleasure principle; for if the work of the mental apparatus is directed towards keeping the quantity of excitation low, then anything that is calculated to increase that quantity is bound to be felt as adverse to the functioning of the apparatus, that is as unpleasurable. The pleasure principle follows from the principle of constancy: actually the latter principle was inferred from the facts which forced us to adopt the pleasure principle. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} Moreover, a more detailed discussion will show that the tendency which we thus attribute to the mental apparatus is subsumed as a special case under Fechner’s principle of the ‘tendency towards stability’, to which he has brought the feelings of pleasure and unpleasure into relation.
使我们相信快乐原则在精神生活中占主导地位的事实，还体现在这样一个假设中，即精神机构努力尽可能降低或至少保持恒定的兴奋量。后一种假设只是快乐原则的另一种表述方式；因为如果心理装置的工作是为了保持较低的兴奋量，那么任何旨在增加兴奋量的东西都必然会被认为不利于心理装置的运作，即令人不快。快感原则源于恒定原则：实际上，恒定原则是从迫使我们采用快感原则的事实中推论出来的。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 此外，更详细的讨论将表明，我们这样归因于心理装置的倾向，是作为一个特例归入费希纳的 "趋于稳定 "原则的。

It must be pointed out, however, that strictly speaking it is incorrect to talk of the dominance of the pleasure principle over the course of mental processes. If such a dominance existed, the immense majority of our mental processes would have to be accompanied by pleasure or to lead to pleasure, whereas universal experience completely contradicts any such conclusion. The most that can be said, therefore, is that there exists in the mind a strong tendency towards the pleasure principle, but that that tendency is opposed by certain other forces or circumstances, so that the final outcome cannot always be in harmony
然而，必须指出的是，严格地说，快乐原则在心理过程中占主导地位的说法是不正确的。如果存在这种主导地位，那么我们绝大多数的心理过程都会伴随着快乐或导致快乐，而普遍的经验却与任何这样的结论完全相悖。因此，我们最多只能说，在思维中存在着向快乐原则发展的强烈倾向，但这种倾向受到某些其他力量或情况的反对，因此最终结果不可能总是和谐一致的
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [Cf. ‘Project’, end of Section 8 of Part I.-‘Aesthetic’ is here used in the old sense of ‘relating to sensation or perception’.]
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [参见 "项目"，第一部分第 8 节末尾--"审美 "在这里是指 "与感觉或知觉有关 "的旧义。］
${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} [The 'principle ‘of constancy’ dates back to the very beginning of Freud’s psychological studies. The first published discussion of it of any length was by Breuer (in semi-physiological terms) towards the end of Section 2(A) of his theoretical part of the Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and Freud, 1895). He there defines it as ‘the tendency to keep intracerebral excitation constant’. In the same passage he attributes this principle to Freud and there in fact exist one or two earlier very brief references to it by Freud himself, though these were not published until after his death. (See Freud, 1941a [1892] and Breucr and Freud, 1940 [1892].) The subject is also discussed at length at the beginning of Freud’s ‘Project’, under the name of ‘neuronic inertia’.]
${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} ['恒常性原则'可以追溯到弗洛伊德心理学研究的初期。布吕尔（Breuer）在《歇斯底里研究》（Breuer and Freud，1895 年）理论部分第 2(A)节末尾，首次以半生理学的术语对其进行了长篇论述。他将其定义为 "保持脑内兴奋恒定的趋势"。在同一段落中，他将这一原则归功于弗洛伊德，而事实上，弗洛伊德本人早先也曾一两次非常简短地提到过这一原则，不过这些都是在他去世后才发表的。(见 Freud, 1941a [1892] 和 Breucr and Freud, 1940 [1892]）弗洛伊德的 "计划 "开头也以 "神经惰性 "为名详细讨论了这一主题。］
with the tendency towards pleasure. We may compare what Fechner ( 1873,90 ) remarks on a similar point: 'Since however a tendency towards an aim does not imply that the aim is attained, and since in general the aim is attainable only by approximations. . . ’
与快乐的倾向。我们可以比较一下费希纳（1873,90）在类似问题上的论述："然而，实现目标的倾向并不意味着目标的实现，而且一般来说，目标只能通过近似的方式实现。. .'

If we turn now to the question of what circumstances are able to prevent the pleasure principle from being carried into effect, we find ourselves once more on secure and well-trodden ground and, in framing our answer, we have at our disposal a rich fund of analytic experience.
如果我们现在来探讨一下什么样的情况能够阻止快乐原则的实施，我们就会发现自己又一次站在了稳妥而成熟的道路上。

The first example of the pleasure principle being inhibited in this way is a familiar one which occurs with regularity. We know that the pleasure principle is proper to a primary method of working on the part of the mental apparatus, but that, from the point of view of the self-preservation of the organism among the difficulties of the external world, it is from the very outset inefficient and even highly dangerous. Under the influence of the ego’s instincts of self-preservation, the pleasure principle is replaced by the reality principle. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} This latter principle does not abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure. The pleasure principle long persists, however, as the method of working employed by the sexual instincts, which are so hard to ‘educate’, and, starting from those instincts, or in the ego itself, it often succeeds in overcoming the reality principle, to the detriment of the organism as a whole.
快乐原则以这种方式受到抑制的第一个例子是我们熟悉的一个经常发生的例子。我们知道，快乐原则是精神器官工作的主要方法，但从机体在外部世界的困难中自我保护的角度来看，它从一开始就效率低下，甚至非常危险。在自我保护本能的影响下，快乐原则被现实原则所取代。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 后一种原则并没有放弃最终获得快乐的意图，但它要求推迟满足，放弃获得满足的若干可能性，暂时容忍不快乐，将其作为通往快乐的漫长间接道路上的一步，并将其付诸实施。然而，快乐原则作为难以 "教育 "的性本能所使用的工作方法长期存在，并且从这些本能或自我本身出发，它常常成功地战胜现实原则，从而损害整个有机体。

There can be no doubt, however, that the replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle can only be made responsible for a small number, and by no means the most intense, of unpleasurable experiences. Another occasion of the release of unpleasure, which occurs with no less regularity, is to be found in the conflicts and dissensions that take place in the mental apparatus while the ego is passing through its development into more highly composite organizations. Almost all the energy with which the apparatus is filled arises from its innate instinctual impulses. But these are not all allowed to reach
然而，毫无疑问，现实原则对快乐原则的取代只能造成少数不愉快的体验，而且绝不是最强烈的不愉快体验。另一种释放不愉快的情况也是经常发生的，那就是当自我发展到更高的复合组织时，精神机构中发生的冲突和矛盾。几乎所有的能量都来自于与生俱来的本能冲动。但这些本能冲动并不能全部达到

the same phases of development. In the course of things it happens again and again that individual instincts or parts of instincts turn out to be incompatible in their aims or demands with the remaining ones, which are able to combine into the inclusive unity of the ego. The former are then split off from this unity by the process of repression, held back at lower levels of psychical development and cut off, to begin with, from the possibility of satisfaction. If they succeed subsequently, as can so easily happen with repressed sexual instincts, in struggling through, by roundabout paths, to a direct or to a substitutive satisfaction, that event, which would in other cases have been an opportunity for pleasure, is felt by the ego as unpleasure. As a consequence of the old conflict which ended in repression, a new breach has occurred in the pleasure principle at the very time when certain instincts were endeavouring, in accordance with the principle, to obtain fresh pleasure. The details of the process by which repression turns a possibility of pleasure into a source of unpleasure are not yet clearly understood or cannot be clearly represented; but there is no doubt that all neurotic unpleasure is of that kind-pleasure that cannot be felt as such. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}
发展的相同阶段。在这一过程中，个别本能或部分本能的目的或要求与其余本能或部分本能的目的或要求不一致的情况一再发生。于是，前者在压抑过程中被从这个统一体中分离出来，停留在较低的心理发展水平上，从一开始就被切断了满足的可能性。如果他们后来成功了，就像被压抑的性本能很容易发生的那样，通过迂回曲折的途径挣扎着获得了直接的或替代性的满足，那么在其他情况下本来是获得快乐的机会的这一事件，却被自我感觉为不快乐。作为以压抑结束的旧冲突的结果，当某些本能正努力按照快感原则获得新的快感时，快感原则又出现了新的破坏。压抑将快乐的可能性转化为不快乐的来源，这一过程的细节还没有被清楚地理解，或者说无法被清楚地表述出来；但毫无疑问，所有神经质的不快乐都是那种--无法被感觉到的快乐。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}

The two sources of unpleasure which I have just indicated are very far from covering the majority of our unpleasurable experiences. But as regards the remainder it can be asserted with some show of justification that their presence does not contradict the dominance of the pleasure principle. Most of the unpleasure that we experience is perceptual unpleasure. It may be perception of pressure by unsatisfied instincts; or it may be external perception which is either distressing in itself or which excites unpleasurable expectations in the mental apparatus-that is, which is recognized by it as a ‘danger’. The reaction to these instinctual demands and threats of danger, a reaction which constitutes the proper activity of the mental apparatus, can then be directed in a correct manner by the pleasure principle or the reality principle by which the former is modified. This does not seem to necessitate any far-reaching limitation of the pleasure principle. Nevertheless the investigation of the mental reaction to external danger is precisely in a position to produce new material and raise fresh questions bearing upon our present problem.
我刚才指出的不愉快的两个来源远远不能涵盖我们大多数不愉快的经历。但对于其余的不愉快，我们可以有理有据地断言，它们的存在与快乐原则的主导地位并不矛盾。我们经历的大多数不愉快都是感知上的不愉快。它可能是本能得不到满足而产生的压力感知；也可能是外部感知，这种感知要么本身令人痛苦，要么在心理装置中激起令人不快的预期，也就是说，它被心理装置视为 "危险"。对这些本能要求和危险威胁的反应，即构成心理装置的适当活动的反应，就可以由快乐原则或现实原则以正确的方式加以引导，而快乐原则或现实原则则由前者加以修正。这似乎并不需要对快乐原则进行任何深远的限制。然而，对外界危险的心理反应的研究恰恰能够产生新的材料，并提出与我们目前的问题有关的新问题。
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [Footrote added 1925:] No doubt the essential point is that pleasure and unpleasure, being conscious feelings, are attached to the ego.
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [Footrote added 1925:]毫无疑问，最重要的一点是，快乐和不快乐作为有意识的感受，是依附于自我的。

A condrrion has long been known and described which occurs after severe mechanical concussions, railway disasters and other accidents involving a risk to life; it has been given the name of ‘traumatic neurosis’. The terrible war which has just ended gave rise to a great number of illnesses of this kind, but it at least put an end to the temptation to attribute the cause of the disorder to organic lesions of the nervous system brought about by mechanical force. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} The symptomatic picture presented by traumatic neurosis approaches that of hysteria in the wealth of its similar motor symptoms, but surpasses it as a rule in its strongly marked signs of subjective ailment (in which it resembles hypochondria or melancholia) as well as in the evidence it gives of a far more comprehensive general enfeeblement and disturbance of the mental capacities. No complete explanation has yet been reached either of war neuroses or of the traumatic neuroses of peace. In the case of the war neuroses, the fact that the same symptoms sometimes came about without the intervention of any gross mechanical force seemed at once enlightening and bewildering. In the case of the ordinary traumatic neuroses two characteristics emerge prominently: first, that the chief weight in their causation seoms to rest upon the factor of surprise, of fright; and secondly, that a wound or injury inflicted simultaneously works as a rule against the development of a neurosis. ‘Fright’, ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’ ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} are improperly used as synonymous expressions; they are in fact capable of clear distinction in their relation to danger. ‘Anxiety’ describes a particular state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown one. ‘Fear’ requires a definite object of which to be afraid. ‘Fright’, however, is the name we give to the state a person gets into when he has run into danger without being prepared for it; it emphasizes the factor of surprise. I do not believe anxiety can produce a traumatic neuro-
人们很早就知道并描述了一种在严重的机械性脑震荡、铁路灾难和其他涉及生命危险的事故后出现的病症，它被命名为 "创伤性神经官能症"。刚刚结束的那场可怕的战争引发了大量此类疾病，但它至少结束了将这种疾病的原因归咎于机械力导致的神经系统器质性病变的诱惑。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 外伤性神经官能症的症状表现与癔病相似，也有大量类似的运动症状，但在主观疾病的明显症状（类似于疑病症或忧郁症）以及更全面的全身衰弱和精神能力紊乱的证据方面，通常要超过癔病。无论是战争神经官能症还是和平时期的创伤性神经官能症，都还没有完整的解释。就战争神经官能症而言，有时在没有任何粗暴的机械力量干预的情况下也会出现同样的症状，这一事实似乎既有启发性又令人困惑。在普通的创伤性神经官能症中，有两个特征非常突出：第一，其致病的主要因素是惊讶和惊吓；第二，同时造成的伤口或伤害通常不利于神经官能症的发展。惊吓"、"恐惧 "和 "焦虑" ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 被不恰当地用作同义词；事实上，它们在与危险的关系上有着明显的区别。焦虑 "描述的是一种期待危险或为危险做准备的特殊状态，尽管它可能是一种未知的危险。而 "恐惧 "则需要一个明确的害怕对象。 而 "惊恐 "则是我们对一个人在毫无准备的情况下遇到危险时所产生的状态的称呼，它强调的是出其不意的因素。我并不认为焦虑会产生创伤性神经损伤。

sis. There is something about anxiety that protects its subject against fright and so against fright-neuroses. We shall return to this point later [p. 25 f.$]{}^1$$]{}^1$]^(1)]{ }^{1}
是的。焦虑有一种保护作用，它可以使主体免受惊吓，从而避免惊吓神经症。关于这一点，我们稍后再谈[第 25 页起]。

The study of dreams may be considered the most trustworthy method of investigating deep mental processes. Now dreams occurring in traumatic neuroses have the characteristic of repeatedly bringing the patient back into the situation of his accident, a situation from which he wakes up in another fright. This astonishes people far too little. They think the fact that the traumatic experience is constantly forcing itself upon the patient even in his sleep is a proof of the strength of that experience: the patient is, as one might say, fixated to his trauma. Fixations to the experience which started the illness have long been familiar to us in hysteria. Breuer and Freud declared in $1893{}^2$$1893{}^2$1893^(2)1893{ }^{2} that ‘hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences’. In the war neuroses, too, observers like Ferenczi and Simmel have been able to explain certain motor symptoms by fixation to the moment at which the trauma occurred.
梦的研究可以说是研究深层心理过程的最可靠的方法。现在，创伤性神经官能症患者的梦境有一个特点，那就是反复将患者带回到事故发生时的情境中，而他醒来时又受到了另一场惊吓。这让人们感到非常惊讶。他们认为，即使在睡梦中，创伤经历也在不断地强迫病人，这证明了这种经历的力量：可以说，病人被他的创伤固定住了。在癔症患者身上，我们早已熟知对引发疾病的经历的固着。布雷尔和弗洛伊德在 $1893{}^2$$1893{}^2$1893^(2)1893{ }^{2} 中宣称，"癔病患者主要受回忆的折磨"。在战争神经官能症中，费伦齐和西美尔等观察家也能够通过对创伤发生时刻的固着来解释某些运动症状。

I am not aware, however, that patients suffering from traumatic neurosis are much occupied in their waking lives with memories of their accident. Perhaps they are more concerned with not thinking of it. Anyone who accepts it as something selfevident that their dreams should put them back at night into the situation that caused them to fall ill has misunderstood the nature of dreams. It would be more in harmony with their nature if they showed the patient pictures from his healthy past or of the cure for which he hopes. If we are not to be shaken in our belief in the wish-fulfilling tenor of dreams by the dreams of traumatic neurotics, we still have one resource open to us: we may argue that the function of dreaming, like so much else, is upset in this condition and diverted from its purposes, or we
不过，我不知道创伤性神经官能症患者在清醒时是否经常回忆起他们的事故。也许他们更关心的是不要去想它。如果有人认为梦境会让他们在晚上回到导致他们生病的情景中，这是不言而喻的，那么他就误解了梦的本质。如果梦能让病人看到他健康的过去或他希望治愈的疾病，那才更符合梦的本质。如果我们不能因为创伤性神经症患者的梦而动摇我们对梦能实现愿望的信念，我们还有一个办法：我们可以认为，梦的功能和其他许多功能一样，在这种情况下被打乱了，偏离了它的目的，或者我们可以认为，梦的功能和其他许多功能一样，在这种情况下被打乱了，偏离了它的目的，或者我们可以认为，梦的功能和其他许多功能一样，在这种情况下被打乱了，偏离了它的目的。

may be driven to reflect on the mysterious masochistic trends of the ego.
可能会被驱使反思自我神秘的受虐倾向。

At this point I propose to leave the dark and dismal subject of the traumatic neurosis and pass on to examine the method of working employed by the mental apparatus in one of its earliest normal activities-I mean in children’s play.
至此，我打算抛开创伤性神经官能症这个黑暗而令人沮丧的话题，转而研究精神机构在其最早的正常活动--我指的是儿童游戏--中所采用的工作方法。

The different theories of children’s play have only recently been summarized and discussed from the psycho-analytic point of view by Pfeifer (1919), to whose paper I would refer my readers. These theories attempt to discover the motives which lead children to play, but they fail to bring into the foreground the economic motive, the consideration of the yield of pleasure involved. Without wishing to include the whole field covered by these phenomena, I have been able, through a chance opportunity which presented itself, to throw some light upon the first game played by a little boy of one and a half and invented by himself. It was more than a mere fleeting observation, for I lived under the same roof as the child and his parents for some weeks, and it was some time before I discovered the meaning of the puzzling activity which he constantly repeated.
关于儿童游戏的各种理论，直到最近才由 Pfeifer（1919 年）从精神分析的角度进行了 总结和讨论。这些理论试图揭示引导儿童游戏的动机，但却没有把经济动机，即对所涉及的快乐产 量的考虑放在首位。我并不想把这些现象所涉及的整个领域都包括在内，但通过一次偶然的机会，我得以对一个一岁半的小男孩玩的第一个游戏，以及他自己发明的游戏，作了一些了解。这不仅仅是一次短暂的观察，因为我和这个孩子及其父母在同一个屋檐下生活了几个星期，过了一段时间我才发现他不断重复的令人费解的活动的意义。

The child was not at all precocious in his intellectual development. At the age of one and a half he could say only a few comprehensible words; he could also make use of a number of sounds which expressed a meaning intelligible to those around him. He was, however, on good terms with his parents and their one servant-girl, and tributes were paid to his being a ‘good boy’. He did not disturb his parents at night, he conscientiously obeyed orders not to touch certain things or go into certain rooms, and above all he never cried when his mother left him for a few hours. At the same time, he was greatly attached to his mother, who had not only fed him herself but had also looked after him without any outside help. This good little boy, however, had an occasional disturbing habit of taking any small objects he could get hold of and throwing them away from him into a corner, under the bed, and so on, so that hunting for his toys and picking them up was often quite a business. As he did this he gave vent to a loud, long-drawn-out ’ $\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{o}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{O}$$\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{o}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{O}$O-o-O-O\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{o}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{O} ', accompanied by an expression of interest and satisfaction. His mother
孩子的智力发育一点也不早熟。一岁半时，他只能说几个能听懂的话；他还能用一些声音来表达周围的人能听懂的意思。不过，他与父母和他们的一个女仆关系很好，大家都夸他是个 "好孩子"。他晚上不打扰父母，自觉遵守不碰某些东西或不进某些房间的命令，最重要的是，当母亲离开他几个小时时，他从不哭闹。同时，他非常依恋母亲，因为母亲不仅亲自喂养他，还在没有任何外人帮助的情况下照顾他。不过，这个乖巧的小男孩偶尔会有一个令人不安的习惯，那就是把他能拿到的任何小东西都拿走，然后从他身边扔到角落里、床底下等等，因此，寻找他的玩具并把它们捡起来常常是一件非常麻烦的事情。当他这样做的时候，他会发出一声响亮而悠长的" $\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{o}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{O}$$\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{o}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{O}$O-o-O-O\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{o}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{O} "，并伴有感兴趣和满意的表情。他的母亲

and the writer of the present account were agreed in thinking that this was not a mere interjection but represented the German word ‘fort’ [‘gone’]. I eventually realized that it was a game and that the only use he made of any of his toys was to play ‘gone’ with them. One day I made an observation which confirmed my view. The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind him, for instance, and play at its being a carriage. What he did was to hold the reel by the string and very skilfully throw it over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time uttering his expressive ’ $0-0-0-0$$0-0-0-0$0-0-0-00-0-0-0 '. He then pulled the reel out of the cot again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful ’ $da$$da$dad a ’ [‘there’]. This, then, was the complete game-disappearance and return. As a rule one only witnessed its first act, which was repeated untiringly as a game in itself, though there is no doubt that the greater pleasure was attached to the second act. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}
和本文作者一致认为，这不是一个单纯的感叹词，而是代表德语单词 "fort"（"消失"）。我最终意识到这是一种游戏，而他对玩具的唯一用途就是玩 "消失"。有一天，我的观察证实了我的看法。孩子有一个木制的卷轴，上面绑着一根绳子。他从来没有想过要把它拉到身后的地板上，比如说，把它当做一辆马车来玩。他所做的是用绳子牵着卷轴，然后非常熟练地把它扔到有窗帘的小床的边缘，让它消失在床边，同时发出他那富有表现力的" $0-0-0-0$$0-0-0-0$0-0-0-00-0-0-0 "的声音。然后，他又用绳子把卷轴拉出小床，并欢呼着" $da$$da$dad a "（"在那儿"）。这就是完整的游戏--消失和回归。通常，人们只看到它的第一幕，而这一幕作为游戏本身被不厌其烦地重复着，尽管毫无疑问，更大的乐趣是在第二幕上。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}

The interpretation of the game then became obvious. It was related to the child’s great cultural achievement-the instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his mother to go away without protesting. He compensated himself for this, as it were, by himself staging the disappearance and return of the objects within his reach. It is of course a matter of indifference from the point of view of judging the effective nature of the game whether the child invented it himself or took it over on some outside suggestion. Our interest is directed to another point. The child cannot possibly have felt his mother’s departure as something agreeable or even indifferent. How then does his repetition of this distressing experience as a game fit in with the pleasure principle? It may perhaps be said in reply that her departure had to be enacted as a necessary preliminary to her joyful return, and that it was in the latter that lay the true purpose
于是，对这个游戏的解释就显而易见了。这与孩子的伟大文化成就有关--他放弃了本能（即放弃了本能的满足），允许母亲离开而没有提出抗议。他为此补偿自己，就像他自己上演了他触手可及的物品的消失和回归。当然，从判断游戏是否有效的角度来看，这并不重要，重要的是孩子是自己发明了这一游戏，还是根据外界的某种建议接手了这一游戏。我们感兴趣的是另一点。孩子不可能对母亲的离开感到高兴，甚至漠不关心。那么，他把这种痛苦的经历当作游戏来重复又如何符合快乐原则呢？也许有人会回答说，母亲的离去是她快乐归来的必要前奏，而后者才是真正的目的。

of the game. But against this must be counted the observed fact that the first act, that of departure, was staged as a game in itself and far more frequently than the episode in its entirety, with its pleasurable ending.
游戏的一部分。但与此相悖的是，我们必须看到，第一幕，也就是出发的那一幕，本身就是一场游戏，其上演的频率远远高于整部剧集及其令人愉悦的结局。

No certain decision can be reached from the analysis of a single case like this. On an unprejudiced view one gets an impression that the child turned his experience into a game from another motive. At the outset he was in a passive situation-he was overpowered by the experience; but, by repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took on an active part. These efforts might be put down to an instinct for mastery that was acting independently of whether the memory was in itself pleasurable or not. But still another interpretation may be attempted. Throwing away the object so that it was ‘gone’ might satisfy an impulse of the child’s, which was suppressed in his actual life, to revenge himself on his mother for going away from him. In that case it would have a defiant meaning: ‘All right, then, go away! I don’t need you. I’m sending you away myself.’ A year later, the same boy whom I had observed at his first game used to take a toy, if he was angry with it, and throw it on the floor, exclaiming: ‘Go to the fwont!’ He had heard at that time that his absent father was ‘at the front’, and was far from regretting his absence; on the contrary he made it quite clear that he had no desire to be disturbed in his sole possession of his mother. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} We know of other children who liked to express similar hostile impulses by throwing away objects instead of persons. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} We are therefore left in doubt as to whether the impulse to work over in the mind some overpowering experience so as to make oneself master of it can find expression as a primary event, and independently of the pleasure principle. For, in the case we have been discussing, the child may, after all, only have been able to repeat his unpleasant experience in play because the repetition carried along with it a yield of pleasure of another sort but none the less a direct one.
对这样一个单独的案例进行分析并不能得出确定的结论。如果不带偏见地看，我们就会得出这样的印象：这个孩子从另一个动机出发，把他的经历变成了一种游戏。一开始，他处于被动状态--他被这种经历压倒了；但是，通过重复这种经历--尽管这种经历令人不快--作为一种游戏，他扮演了一个积极的角色。这些努力可以归结为一种掌握的本能，而这种本能的作用与记忆本身是否令人愉悦无关。但也可以尝试另一种解释。扔掉物品使其 "消失 "可能是为了满足孩子在实际生活中被压抑的一种冲动，即报复母亲离开了他。在这种情况下，它就有了一种蔑视的含义：'好吧，那你走吧！我不需要你。我自己把你送走。'一年后，我在他第一次游戏中观察到的那个男孩，如果对玩具生气，就会拿起玩具扔到地上，然后喊道：'去死吧！'。他当时听说他不在的父亲'在前线'，他一点也不后悔父亲不在，相反，他非常明确地表示，他不想在母亲的独占权上受到打扰。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 据我们所知，还有一些孩子喜欢用扔东西而不是扔人的方式来表达类似的敌对冲动。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 因此，我们不禁要问，在头脑中反复琢磨某种令人难以忍受的经历，从而使自己成为它的主人的冲动，是否可以作为一种主要事件，独立于快乐原则之外而得到表达。 因为，在我们所讨论的案例中，孩子之所以能够在游戏中重复他不愉快的经历，可能只是因为这种重复带来了另一种但同样是直接的快乐。

Nor shall we be helped in our hesitation between these two views by further considering children’s play. It is clear that in
我们在这两种观点之间犹豫不决时，也不能进一步考虑儿童的游戏。显然，在

their play children repeat everything that has made a great impression on them in real life, and that in doing so they abreact the strength of the impression and, as one might put it, make themselves master of the situation. But on the other hand it is obvious that all their play is influenced by a wish that dominates them the whole time-the wish to be grown-up and to be able to do what grown-up people do. It can also be observed that the unpleasurable nature of an experience does not always unsuit it for play. If the doctor looks down a child’s throat or carries out some small operation on him, we may be quite sure that these frightening experiences will be the subject of the next game; but we must not in that connection cverlook the fact that there is a yield of pleasure from another source. As the child passes over from the passivity of the experience to the activity of the game, he hands on the disagreeable experience to one of his playmates and in this way revenges himself on a substitute.
在游戏中，孩子们重复着现实生活中给他们留下深刻印象的一切事物，他们这样做是在削弱印象的力量，可以说，是让自己成为情境的主人。但另一方面，很明显，他们所有的游戏都受到一个始终支配着他们的愿望的影响，那就是希望自己长大成人，能够做大人做的事情。我们还可以看到，不愉快的经历并不总是不适合游戏。如果医生检查孩子的喉咙或给他做小手术，我们可以肯定，这些可怕的经历将成为下一个游戏的主题；但我们不能因此而忽视另一种快乐的来源。当孩子从被动的经历转入游戏的活动时，他就会把不愉快的经历转嫁给他的一个玩伴，并以这种方式向替代者报复。

Nevertheless, it emerges from this discussion that there is no need to assume the existence of a special imitative instinct in order to provide a motive for play. Finally, a reminder may be added that the artistic play and artistic imitation carried out by adults, which, unlike children’s, are aimed at an audience, do not spare the spectators (for instance, in tragedy) the most painful experiences and can yet be felt by them as highly enjoyable. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} This is convincing proof that, even under the dominance of the pleasure principle, there are ways and means enough of making what is in itself unpleasurable into a subject to be recollected and worked over in the mind. The consideration of these cases and situations, which have a yield of pleasure as their final outcome, should be undertaken by some system of aesthetics with an economic approach to its subject-matter. They are of no use for our purposes, since they presuppose the existence and dominance of the pleasure principle; they give no evidence of the operation of tendencies beyond the pleasure principle, that is, of tendencies more primitive than it and independent of it.
尽管如此，从这一讨论中可以看出，没有必要假定存在一种特殊的模仿本能来为游戏提供动机。最后，需要提醒的是，成人的艺术游戏和艺术模仿不同于儿童的游戏和模仿，它们是以观众为对象的，不会让观众（例如悲剧中的观众）免于最痛苦的经历，但却能让他们感到非常愉快。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 这就令人信服地证明，即使在快乐原则的支配下，也有足够的方法和手段把本身令人不快的东西变成一个可以在头脑中回味和琢磨的主题。对这些以产生快乐为最终结果的案例和情境的思考，应该由某种以经济学方法处理其主题的美学体系来进行。它们对我们的目的毫无用处，因为它们预先假定了快乐原则的存在和支配地位；它们没有提供快乐原则之外的倾向，即比快乐原则更原始和独立于快乐原则的倾向的运作证据。
1 [Freud had made a tentative study of this point in his posthumously published paper on ‘Psychopathic Characters on the Stage’ (1942a) which was probably written in 1905 or 1906.]
1 [弗洛伊德在其死后发表的论文《舞台上的精神变态角色》（1942a）中对这一点进行了初步研究，该论文可能写于 1905 年或 1906 年]。

Twenty-five years of intense work have had as their result that the immediate aims of psycho-analytic technique are quite other to-day than they were at the outset. At first the analysing physician could do no more than discover the unconscious material that was concealed from the patient, put it together, and, at the right moment, communicate it to him. Psychoanalysis was then first and foremost an art of interpreting. Since this did not solve the therapeutic problem, a further aim quickly came in view: to oblige the patient to confirm the analyst’s construction from his own memory. In that endeavour the chief emphasis lay upon the patient’s resistances: the art consisted now in uncovering these as quickly as possible, in pointing them out to the patient and in inducing him by human influence-this was where suggestion operating as ‘transference’ played its part-to abandon his resistances.
经过二十五年的紧张工作，如今精神分析技术的直接目标已与最初的目标大相径庭。起初，分析医生所能做的不过是发现隐藏在病人内心深处的无意识材料，将其归纳整理，并在适当的时机将其传达给病人。那时，精神分析首先是一门解释的艺术。由于这并不能解决治疗问题，人们很快就想到了另一个目标：让病人从自己的记忆中证实分析师的构思。在这一努力中，主要重点在于病人的抵触情绪：现在的艺术在于尽快揭露这些抵触情绪，向病人指出它们，并通过人的影响诱导他--这就是作为 "移情 "发挥作用的暗示--放弃他的抵触情绪。

But it became ever clearer that the aim which had been set up-the aim that what was unconscious should become con-scious-is not completely attainable by that method. The patient cannot remember the whole of what is repressed in him, and what he cannot remember may be precisely the essential part of it. Thus he acquires no sense of conviction of the correctness of the construction that has been communicated to him. He is obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would prefer to see, remembering it as something belonging to the past. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} These reproductions, which emerge with such unwished-for exactitude, always have as their subject some portion of infantile sexual life-of the Oedipus complex, that is, and its derivatives; and they are invariably acted cut in the sphere of the transference, of the patient’s relation to the physician. When things have reached this stage, it may be said that the earlier neurosis has now been replaced by a fresh, ‘transference neurosis’. It has
但是，人们越来越清楚地认识到，用这种方法并不能完全达到所设定的目标--让无意识的东西变成有意识的东西。病人不可能记住他被压抑的全部内容，而他记不起来的内容可能恰恰是其中最重要的部分。因此，他无法获得对已传达给他的结构的正确性的确信感。他不得不把被压抑的材料当作当代的经验来重复，而不是像医生所希望的那样，把它当作属于过去的东西来记忆。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 这些以如此不希望的精确性出现的再现，总是以幼年性生活的某些部分--即俄狄浦斯情结及其衍生物--为主题；它们总是在转移的范围内、在病人与医生的关系中进行。当事情发展到这一阶段，可以说先前的神经症已经被新的 "移情神经症 "所取代。它已经

been the physician’s endeavour to keep this transference neurosis within the narrowest limits: to force as much as possible into the channel of memory and to allow as little as possible to emerge as repetition. The ratio between what is remembered and what is reproduced varies from case to case. The physician cannot as a rule spare his patient this phase of the treatment. He must get him to re-experience some portion of his forgotten life, but must see to it, on the other hand, that the patient retains some degree of aloofness, which will enable him, in spite of everything, to recognize that what appears to be reality is in fact only a reflection of a forgotten past. If this can be successfully achieved, the patient’s sense of conviction is won, together with the therapeutic success that is dependent on it.
医生一直在努力将这种转移性神经症控制在最狭小的范围内：尽可能多地将其纳入记忆渠道，尽可能少地让其作为重复出现。记忆的内容和再现的内容之间的比例因人而异。一般来说，医生不能放弃对病人进行这一阶段的治疗。他必须让病人重新体验他被遗忘的生活中的某些部分，但另一方面又必须注意让病人保持某种程度的冷漠，这将使他能够不顾一切地认识到，看似现实的东西实际上只是被遗忘的过去的反映。如果能够成功地做到这一点，病人的信念感和治疗的成功也就水到渠成了。

In order to make it easier to understand this ‘compulsion to repeat’, which emerges during the psycho-analytic treatment of neurotics, we must above all get rid of the mistaken notion that what we are dealing with in our struggle against resistances is resistance on the part of the unconscious. The unconsciousthat is to say, the ‘repressed’-offers no resistance whatever to the efforts of the treatment. Indeed, it itself has no other endeavour than to break through the pressure weighing down on it and force its way either to consciousness or to a discharge through some real action. Resistance during treatment arises from the same higher strata and systems of the mind which originally carried out repression. But the fact that, as we know from experience, the motives of the resistances, and indeed the resistances themselves, are unconscious at first during the treatment, is a hint to us that we should corfect a shortcoming in our terminology. We shall avoid a lack of clarity if we make our contrast not between the conscious and the unconscious but between the coherent ego ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} and the repressed. It is certain that much of the ego is itself unconscious, and notably what we may describe as its nucleus; ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} only a small part of it is covered by the term ‘preconscious’. ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} Having replaced a purely descriptive
为了更容易理解在对神经症患者进行精神分析治疗时出现的这种 "强迫重复"，我们首先必须摒弃一种错误的观念，即我们在与阻力的斗争中所面对的是无意识的阻力。无意识，也就是 "被压抑的"，对治疗的努力不提供任何阻力。事实上，它本身除了冲破压在它身上的压力，迫使自己进入意识或通过某种实际行动排解之外，别无其他努力。治疗过程中的抵触情绪也是来自于原本进行压抑的更高层次和更高的心智系统。但是，正如我们从经验中了解到的那样，在治疗过程中，抵制的动机，甚至抵制本身，起初都是无意识的，这一事实提示我们应该改进我们术语中的缺陷。如果我们不是在有意识和无意识之间进行对比，而是在连贯的自我 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 和被压抑的自我之间进行对比，我们就可以避免缺乏清晰度。可以肯定的是，自我的大部分本身是无意识的，尤其是我们可以称之为其核心的部分； ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} "前意识 "一词只涵盖了其中的一小部分。 ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 用 "前意识 "取代了纯粹描述性的 "意识"。

terminology by one which is systematic or dynamic, we can say that the patient’s resistance arises from his ego, ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} and we then at once perceive that the compulsion to repeat must be ascribed to the unconscious repressed. It seems probable that the compulsion can only express itself after the work of treatment has gone half-way to meet it and has loosened the repression. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}
我们可以说，病人的抗拒来自于他的自我， ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 这样，我们就会立刻意识到，强迫重复必须归因于被压抑的无意识。看来，只有在治疗工作进行到一半，并放松了压抑之后，这种强迫性才能表现出来。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}

There is no doubt that the resistance of the conscious and unconscious ego operates under the sway of the pleasure principle: it seeks to avoid the unpleasure which would be produced by the liberation of the repressed. Our efforts, on the other hand, are directed towards procuring the toleration of that unpleasure by an appeal to the reality principle. But how is the compulsion to repeat-the manifestation of the power of the repressed related to the pleasure principle? It is clear that the greater part of what is re-experienced under the compulsion to repeat must cause the ego unpleasure, since it brings to light activities of repressed instinctual impulses. That, however, is unpleasure of a kind we have already considered and does not contradict the pleasure principle: unpleasure for one system and simultaneously satisfaction for the other. ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} But we come now to a new and remarkable fact, namely that the compulsion to repeat also recalls from the past experiences which include no possibility of pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction even to instinctual impulses which have since been repressed.
毫无疑问，有意识和无意识的 "自我 "的反抗是在快乐原则的支配下进行的：它试图避免因被压抑者的解放而产生的不快。而我们的努力则是为了通过诉诸现实原则来获得对这种不快的容忍。但是，强迫重复--被压抑者力量的体现--与快乐原则又有什么关系呢？很显然，在强迫重复下重新体验的大部分东西一定会给自我带来不快，因为它使被压抑的本能冲动的活动暴露出来。然而，这是我们已经考虑过的一种不快，与快乐原则并不矛盾：一个系统感到不快，另一个系统同时感到满足。 ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 但是，我们现在要面对一个新的显著事实，那就是强迫重复也会使人回忆起过去的经历，而这些经历中不可能有快乐，即使在很久以前，也不可能给被压抑的本能冲动带来满足。

The early efflorescence of infantile sexual life is doomed to extinction because its wishes are incompatible with reality and with the inadequate stage of development which the child has reached. That efflorescence comes to an end in the most distressing circumstances and to the accompaniment of the most painful feelings. Loss of love and failure leave behind them a permanent injury to self-regard in the form of a narcissistic scar, which in my opinion, as well as in Marcinowski’s (1918), contributes more than anything to the ‘sense of inferiority’
婴幼儿性生活的早期萌芽注定要消亡，因为它的愿望与现实不符，也与儿童所处的不成熟的发展阶段不符。在最痛苦的情况下，伴随着最痛苦的感觉，这种萌芽也就结束了。失去爱和失败会以自恋伤疤的形式给自尊心留下永久的伤害，在我看来，自恋伤疤和马奇诺夫斯基（1918 年）的观点一样，对 "自卑感 "的影响比任何东西都大。

which is so common in neurotics. The child’s sexual researches, on which limits are imposed by his physical development, lead to no satisfactory conclusion; hence such later complaints as ‘I can’t accomplish anything; I can’t succeed in anything’. The tie of affection, which binds the child as a rule to the parent of the opposite sex, succumbs to disappointment, to a vain expectation of satisfaction or to jealousy over the birth of a new baby-unmistakable proof of the infidelity of the object of the child’s affections. His own attempt to make a baby himself, carried out with tragic seriousness, fails shamefully. The lessening amount of affection he receives, the increasing demands of education, hard words and an occasional punishment-these show him at last the full extent to which he has been scorned. These are a few typical and constantly recurring instances of the ways in which the love characteristic of the age of childhood is brought to a conclusion.
这在神经症患者中很常见。儿童的性研究受到其身体发育的限制，无法取得令人满意的结果，因此后来才会有'我一事无成；我一事无成'之类的抱怨。感情的纽带通常把孩子与异性父母联系在一起，但这种纽带却因失望、对满足的虚妄期待或对新生命诞生的嫉妒而屈服--这无疑证明了孩子感情对象的不忠。他以悲剧性的严肃态度尝试自己生一个孩子，但却可耻地失败了。他得到的爱越来越少，教育的要求越来越多，严厉的言辞和偶尔的惩罚--这些终于让他看到了自己被蔑视的程度。这些都是童年时代特有的爱情如何走向终结的一些典型的、不断重复出现的例子。

Patients repeat all of these unwanted situations and painful emotions in the transference and revive them with the greatest ingenuity. They seek to bring about the interruption of the treatment while it is still incomplete; they contrive once more to feel themselves scorned, to oblige the physician to speak severely to them and treat them coldly; they discover appropriate objects for their jealousy; instead of the passionately desired baby of their childhood, they produce a plan or a promise of some grand present-which turns out as a rule to be no less unreal. None of these things can have produced pleasure in the past, and it might be supposed that they would cause less unpleasure to-day if they emerged as memories or dreams instead of taking the form of fresh experiences. They are of course the activities of instincts intended to lead to satisfaction; but no lesson has been learnt from the old experience of these activities having led instead only to unpleasure. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} In spite of that, they are repeated, under pressure of a compulsion.
病人会在转移过程中重复所有这些不希望出现的情况和痛苦的情绪，并以最大的智慧使它们复活。他们试图在治疗还未完成时就中断治疗；他们想方设法再次让自己感到被蔑视，迫使医生对他们严厉说话，冷淡对待他们；他们为自己的嫉妒寻找合适的对象；他们不再是童年时热切渴望的婴儿，而是提出一个计划或许诺一个宏伟的未来--而这些计划或许诺通常都是虚幻的。这些事情在过去都不可能产生快乐，而如果它们以回忆或梦境的形式出现，而不是以新鲜经历的形式出现，那么它们在今天引起的不快可能会少一些。当然，它们是本能的活动，目的是为了获得满足感；但是，我们并没有从这些活动只会导致不愉快的旧经验中吸取教训。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 尽管如此，这些活动还是在强迫的压力下重复着。

What psycho-analysis reveals in the transference phenomena of neurotics can also be observed in the lives of some normal people. The impression they give is of being pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some ‘daemonic’ power; but psychoanalysis has always taken the view that their fate is for the most part arranged by themselves and determined by early infantile influences. The compulsion which is here in evidence differs in
精神分析在神经症患者的移情现象中所揭示的东西也可以在一些正常人的生活中观察到。他们给人的印象是被恶毒的命运所追逐，或被某种 "恶魔 "的力量所占有；但精神分析一直认为，他们的命运大部分是由他们自己安排的，是由幼年时期的影响所决定的。这里的强迫在以下方面有所不同
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [This sentence was added in 1921.]
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [这句话是 1921 年加上的]。
no way from the compulsion to repeat which we have found in neurotics, even though the people we are now considering have never shown any signs of dealing with a neurotic conflict by producing symptoms. Thus we have come across people all of whose human relationships have the same outcome: such as the benefactor who is abandoned in anger after a time by each of his protegés, however much they may otherwise differ from one another, and who thus seems doomed to taste all the bitterness of ingratitude; or the man whose friendships all end in betrayal by his friend; or the man who time after time in the course of his life raises someone else into a position of great private or public authority and then, after a certain interval, himself upsets that authority and replaces him by a new one; or, again, the lover each of whose love affairs with a woman passes through the same phases and reaches the same conclusion. This ‘perpetual recurrence of the same thing’ causes us no astonishment when it relates to active behaviour on the part of the person concerned and when we can discern in him an essential char-acter-trait which always remains the same and which is compelled to find expression in a repetition of the same experiences. We are much more impressed by cases where the subject appears to have a passive experience, over which he has no influence, but in which he meets with a repetition of the same fatality. There is the case, for instance, of the woman who married three successive husbands each of whom fell ill soon afterwards and had to be nursed by her on their death-beds. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} The most moving poetic picture of a fate such as this is given by Tasso in his romantic epic Gerusalemme Liberata. Its hero, Tancred, unwittingly kills his beloved Clorinda in a duel while she is disguised in the armour of an enemy knight. After her burial he makes his way into a strange magic forest which strikes the Crusaders’ army with terror. He slashes with his sword at a tall tree; but blood streams from the cut and the voice of Clorinda, whose soul is imprisoned in the tree, is heard complaining that he has wounded his beloved once again.
尽管我们现在考虑的这些人从未表现出任何通过产生症状来处理神经质冲突的迹象，但他们与我们在神经质患者身上发现的强迫重复的现象毫无二致。因此，我们所接触到的人，其人际关系的结果都是一样的：比如一个恩人，他的每一个被保护人在一段时间后都会愤怒地抛弃他，无论他们之间的差异有多大，因此他似乎注定要尝尽忘恩负义的苦果；又比如一个人，他的友谊都以朋友的背叛而告终；或者，一个人在他的一生中一次又一次地把别人提升到一个重要的私人或公共权威的位置上，然后，过了一段时间，他自己又颠覆了这个权威，并由一个新的权威取而代之；再或者，一个情人与一个女人的每一段恋情都经历了同样的阶段，得出同样的结论。当这种 "同一事物的永久重复 "涉及到当事人的主动行为时，当我们能够在当事人身上发现一种始终不变的基本性格特征时，这种 "同一事物的永久重复 "就不会让我们感到惊讶，而这种性格特征又不得不在相同经历的重复中得到体现。如果当事人的经历看起来是被动的，他对这种被动的经历没有任何影响，但在这种情况下，他遇到了相同宿命的重复，这种情况就会给我们留下更深刻的印象。例如，有一个女人连续嫁给了三任丈夫，每任丈夫不久后都病倒了，她不得不在病床上照顾他们。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 塔索在他的浪漫史诗《解放的耶路撒冷》（Gerusalemme Liberata）中为这样的命运描绘了一幅最动人的诗意画面。 故事的主人公坦克雷德在一场决斗中无意间杀死了心爱的克洛琳达，当时她正伪装成敌方骑士的盔甲。在她下葬后，他进入了一片奇异的魔法森林，十字军大军闻风丧胆。他用剑砍向一棵高大的树，但鲜血从树上流下，克洛琳达的声音从树上传来，她的灵魂被囚禁在树上，抱怨他再次伤害了他的爱人。

If we take into account observations such as these, based upon behaviour in the transference and upon the life-histories of men and women, we shall find courage to assume that there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure principle. Now too we shall be inclined to ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} Cf. the apt remarks on this subject by C. G. Jung (1909).
如果我们考虑到根据转移中的行为和男女的生命史得出的诸如此类的观察结果，我们就会有勇气认为，在人的头脑中确实存在着一种压倒快乐原则的重复强迫。现在，我们也会倾向于 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 参阅荣格（C. G. Jung，1909 年）关于这个问题的精辟论述。
relate to this compulsion the dreams which occur in traumatic neuroses and the impulse which leads children to play.
创伤性神经官能症中出现的梦境以及引导儿童玩耍的冲动都与这种强迫有关。

But it is to be noted that only in rare instances can we observe the pure effects of the compulsion to repeat, unsupported by other motives. In the case of children’s play we have already laid stress on the other ways in which the emergence of the compulsion may be interpreted; the compulsion to repeat and instinctual satisfaction which is immediately pleasurable seem to converge here into an intimate partnership. The phenomena of transference are obviously exploited by the resistance which the ego maintains in its pertinacious insistence upon repression; the compulsion to repeat, which the treatment tries to bring into its service is, as it were, drawn over by the ego to its side (clinging as the ego does to the pleasure principle). ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} A great deal of what might be described as the compulsion of destiny seems intelligible on a rational basis; so that we are under no necessity to call in a new and mysterious motive force to explain it.
但需要注意的是，只有在极少数情况下，我们才能观察到纯粹的强迫重复的效果，而没有其他动机的支持。在儿童游戏的案例中，我们已经强调了可以从其他方面来解释强迫的出现；重复的强迫和本能的满足感似乎在这里汇聚成一种亲密的伙伴关系。移情现象显然被自我顽固坚持压抑的抵抗所利用；治疗试图为其服务的强迫性重复，就像这样，被自我吸引到了它的身边（就像自我紧紧抓住快乐原则一样）。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 大量可以被描述为命运的强制力的东西，在理性的基础上似乎是可以理解的；因此，我们没有必要要求一种新的、神秘的动力来解释它。

The least dubious instance [of such a motive force] is perhaps that of traumatic dreams. But on maturer reflection we shall be forced to admit that even in the other instances the whole ground is not covered by the operation of the familiar motive forces. Enough is left unexplained to justify the hypothesis of a compulsion to repeat-something that seems more primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the pleasure principle which it over-rides. But if a compulsion to repeat does operate in the mind, we should be glad to know something about it, to learn what function it corresponds to, under what conditions it can emerge and what its relation is to the pleasure principle -to which, after all, we have hitherto ascribed dominance over the course of the processes of excitation in mental life.
最不值得怀疑的[这种动机]的例子也许是创伤性梦境。但经过更成熟的思考，我们将不得不承认，即使在其他例子中，我们熟悉的动机的作用也无法涵盖全部内容。还有足够多的东西没有被解释清楚，以证明重复强迫的假设是正确的--这种东西似乎比它所超越的快乐原则更原始、更基本、更本能。但是，如果强迫重复确实在思维中起作用，我们应该很高兴对它有所了解，了解它与什么功能相对应，在什么条件下会出现，它与快乐原则有什么关系--毕竟，迄今为止，我们一直认为快乐原则在精神生活的激发过程中占主导地位。
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [Before 1923 the last clause read: ‘the compulsion to repeat is as it were called to its help by the ego, clinging as it does to the pleasure principle.’]
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [在 1923 年之前，最后一句是：'重复的强迫性是自我的召唤，因为它依附于快乐原则']。

What follows is speculation, often far-fetched speculation, which the reader will consider or dismiss according to his individual predilection. It is further an attempt to follow out an idea consistently, out of curiosity to see where it will lead.
以下是一些推测，往往是牵强附会的推测，读者可以根据自己的喜好加以考虑或否定。此外，这也是出于好奇心，试图持续追踪一个想法，看看它将通向何方。

Psycho-analytic speculation takes as its point of departure the impression, derived from examining unconscious processes, that consciousness may be, not the most universal attribute of mental processes, but only a particular function of them. Speaking in metapsychological terms, it asserts that consciousness is a function of a particular system which it describes as Cs. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} What consciousness yields consists essentially of perceptions of excitations coming from the external world and of feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which can only arise from within the mental apparatus; it is therefore possible to assign to the system Pcpt.-Cs. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} a position in space. It must lie on the borderline between outside and inside; it must be turned towards the external world and must envelop the other psychical systems. It will be seen that there is nothing daringly new in these assumptions; we have merely adopted the views on localization held by cerebral anatomy, which locates the ‘seat’ of consciousness in the cerebral cortex-the outermost, enveloping layer of the central organ. Cerebral anatomy has no need to consider why, speaking anatomically, consciousness should be lodged on the surface of the brain instead of being safely housed somewhere in its inmost interior. Perhaps we shall be more successful in accounting for this situation in the case of our system Pcpt.-Cs.
精神分析推测的出发点是通过研究无意识过程得出的印象，即意识可能不是心理过程最普遍的属性，而只是心理过程的一种特殊功能。用元心理学的术语来说，它断言意识是一个特殊系统的功能，它把这个系统描述为 Cs。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 意识所产生的东西主要包括对来自外部世界的刺激的感知，以及只有在心理装置内部才能产生的快乐和不快乐的感觉；因此，我们可以把 Pcpt.-Cs. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 在空间中的位置。它必须位于外部和内部之间的边界线上；它必须转向外部世界，必须包围其他心理系统。我们可以看到，这些假设并没有什么大胆的新意；我们只是采纳了大脑解剖学关于定位的观点，它把意识的 "位置 "定位在大脑皮层--中枢器官的最外层、包裹层。大脑解剖学不需要考虑为什么从解剖学的角度来说，意识应该被安置在大脑的表面，而不是被安全地安置在大脑最内部的某个地方。也许我们在解释我们的 "Pcpt.-Cs "系统中的这种情况时会更加成功。

Consciousness is not the only distinctive character which we ascribe to the processes in that system. On the basis of impressions derived from our psycho-analytic experience, we assume that all excitatory processes that occur in the other systems leave
意识并不是我们赋予该系统过程的唯一独特特征。根据我们从精神分析经验中获得的印象，我们假定其他系统中发生的所有兴奋过程都离开了意识。

permanent traces behind in them which form the foundation of memory. Such memory-traces, then, have nothing to do with the fact of becoming conscious; indeed they are often most powerful and most enduring when the process which left them behind was one which never entered consciousness. We find it hard to believe, however, that permanent traces of excitation such as these are also left in the system Pcpt.-Cs. If they remained constantly conscious, they would very soon set limits to the system’s aptitude for receiving fresh excitations. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} If, on the other hand, they were unconscious, we should be faced with the problem of explaining the existence of unconscious processes in a system whose functioning was otherwise accompanied by the phenomenon of consciousness. We should, so to say, have altered nothing and gained nothing by our hypothesis relegating the process of becoming conscious to a special system. Though this consideration is not absolutely conclusive, it nevertheless leads us to suspect that becoming conscious and leaving behind a memory-trace are processes incompatible with each other within one and the same system. Thus we should be able to say that the excitatory process becomes conscious in the system Cs. but leaves no permanent trace behind there; but that the excitation is transmitted to the systems lying next within and that it is in them that its traces are left. I followed these same lines in the schematic picture which I included in the speculative section of my Interpretation of Dreams. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} It must be borne in mind that little enough is known from other sources of the origin of consciousness; when, therefore, we lay down the proposition that consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace, the assertion deserves consideration, at all events on the ground of its being framed in fairly precise terms.
在它们身上留下的永久痕迹构成了记忆的基础。那么，这些记忆痕迹与意识化的事实毫无关系；事实上，当留下这些痕迹的过程从未进入意识时，它们往往是最强大和最持久的。然而，我们很难相信，在 Pcpt.-Cs 系统中也会留下这样的永久性激发痕迹。如果它们一直处于有意识状态，那么它们很快就会对系统接受新激励的能力产生限制。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 另一方面，如果它们是无意识的，那么我们就会面临一个问题，那就是如何解释无意识过程在一个系统中的存在，而这个系统的运作本来是伴随着意识现象的。可以说，我们把有意识的过程归入一个特殊系统的假设，既没有改变什么，也没有得到什么。尽管这种考虑并非绝对确凿，但它还是让我们怀疑，在同一个系统中，有意识和留下记忆痕迹是互不相容的过程。因此，我们应该可以说，兴奋过程在系统 Cs.中变得有意识，但并没有在那里留下永久的痕迹；但兴奋被传递到系统 Cs.中的下一个系统，正是在这些系统中留下了兴奋的痕迹。我在《梦的解析》中的推测部分所包含的示意图中也遵循了同样的思路。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 必须牢记的是，人们对意识起源的其他来源知之甚少；因此，当我们提出 "意识是由记忆痕迹产生的 "这一命题时，无论如何，这一论断都值得考虑，因为它的措辞相当精确。

If this is so, then, the system Cs. is characterized by the peculiarity that in it (in contrast to what happens in the other psychical systems) excitatory processes do not leave behind any permanent change in its elements but expire, as it were, in the phenomenon of becoming conscious. An exception of this sort
如果是这样的话，那么，Cs.系统的特点就在于，在这个系统中（与其他心理系统中的情况相反），兴奋过程不会在其元素中留下任何永久性的变化，而是会在有意识的现象中消失。这种情况的一个例外是
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} What follows is based throughout on Breuer’s views in [the second section of his theoretical contribution to] Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and Freud, 1895). [Freud himself discussed the subject in The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Ed., 5, 538 and it had previously been fully considered in his ‘Project’ of 1895 (1950a), Part I, Section 3. He returned to the topic later in his paper on the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad’ (1925a).]
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 以下内容均以布雷尔在《歇斯底里研究》（布雷尔与弗洛伊德，1895 年）[其理论贡献的第二部分]中的观点为基础。[弗洛伊德本人在《梦的解析》（标准版）5, 538 中讨论了这一主题，在他 1895 年的 "计划"（1950a）第一部分第 3 节中也对其进行了全面探讨。后来，他在关于 "神秘的写字板"（1925a）的论文中又回到了这个话题。］

2 [Standard Ed. 5. 538.1
2 [标准版5.538.1
to the general rule requires to be explained by some factor that applies exclusively to that one system. Such a factor, which is absent in the other systems, might well be the exposed situation of the system Cs., immediately abutting as it does on the external world.
在一般规则中，"Cs.系统 "与 "Cs.系统 "之间的差异需要用只适用于该系统的某种因素来解释。这种因素在其他系统中是不存在的，很可能就是系统 Cs 的暴露状况，因为它紧邻外部世界。

Let us picture a living organism in its most simplified possible form as an undifferentiated vesicle of a substance that is susceptible to stimulation. Then the surface turned towards the external world will from its very situation be differentiated and will serve as an organ for receiving stimuli. Indeed embryology, in its capacity as a recapitulation of developmental history, actually shows us that the central nervous system originates from the ectoderm; the grey matter of the cortex remains a derivative of the primitive superficial layer of the organism and may have inherited some of its essential properties. It would be easy to suppose, then, that as a result of the ceaseless impact of external stimuli on the surface of the vesicle, its substance to a certain depth may have become permanently modified, so that excitatory processes run a different course in it from what they run in the deeper layers. A crust would thus be formed which would at last have been so thoroughly ‘baked through’ by stimulation that it would present the most favourable possible conditions for the reception of stimuli and become incapable of any further modification. In terms of the system Cs., this would mean that its elements could undergo no further permanent modification from the passage of excitation, because they had already been modified in the respect in question to the greatest possible extent: now, however, they would have become capable of giving rise to consciousness. Various ideas may be formed which cannot at present be verified as to the nature of this modification of the substance and of the excitatory process. It may be supposed that, in passing from one element to another, an excitation has to overcome a resistance, and that the diminution of resistance thus effected is what lays down a permanent trace of the excitation, that is, a facilitation. In the system Cs., then, resistance of this kind to passage from one element to another would no longer exist. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} This picture can be brought into relation with Breuer’s distinction between quiescent (or bound) and mobile cathectic energy in the elements
让我们以最简化的形式把活的有机体想象成一个由易受刺激的物质组成的未分化的囊泡。那么，朝向外部世界的表面从其本身的情况来看就已经分化，并将成为接受刺激的器官。事实上，胚胎学作为发育历史的再现，实际上向我们表明，中枢神经系统起源于外胚层；皮层的灰质仍然是生物体原始表层的衍生物，并可能继承了它的某些基本特性。因此，我们可以很容易地推测，由于外界刺激对囊泡表面的不断冲击，囊泡表面一定深度内的物质可能已经发生了永久性的改变，因此兴奋过程在囊泡内的运行轨迹与在深层的运行轨迹不同。这样就会形成一层外壳，它最终会被刺激彻底 "烤透"，从而为接收刺激提供最有利的条件，并无法再发生任何改变。就 Cs.系统而言，这意味着它的元素不会再因为受到刺激而发生永久性的改变，因为它们已经在有关方面发生了尽可能大的改变：然而，现在它们已经能够产生意识了。关于物质和激发过程的这种变化的性质，人们可能会产生各种想法，但这些想法目前还无法证实。 可以认为，在从一个元素传递到另一个元素的过程中，激发必须克服阻力，而阻力的减小正是激发的永久痕迹，即促进作用。那么，在 Cs 系统中，这种从一个元素传递到另一个元素的阻力就不复存在了。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 这幅图景可以与布雷尔对元素中静止能量（或束缚能量）和流动灾难能量的区分联系起来
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [This passage is foreshadowed in the later half of Section 3 of Part I of the ‘Project’.]
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} [这段话在 "项目 "第一部分第 3 节的后半部分有所预示]。