Critically assess the effectiveness and role of international efforts to address the impacts of climate change.
批判性地评估国际努力应对气候变化影响的有效性和作用。

Word count excluding references, including headings:2991
字数（不含参考文献，包括标题）：2991

Referencing Style: APA 7th
参考格式：APA 7th

Student Number:23936746 Wang Keira
学生编号：23936746 Wang Keira

Introduction
介绍

When ten-year-old Keira was counting the coconut trees submerged by seawater on the reefs of Kiribati, diplomats on the other side of the globe were arguing late into the night over the 0.5°C temperature control target. This is the divided yet interconnected nature of global governance on climate change. Since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992, this collective action experiment concerning the fate of all humanity has been striving to move forward in the narrow space between urgency and feasibility. However, although these frameworks represent significant progress in agenda-setting and the dissemination of global norms, their effectiveness in addressing the material and distributive impacts of climate change remains highly contested. These debates reveal a paradoxical phenomenon: although the rules of global climate governance are becoming increasingly detailed, their actual effectiveness in the face of a worsening climate crisis falls far short. This essay argues that while international efforts have played a positive role in building consensus and institutional structures, they face major challenges—and limited success—in terms of enforcement, financial support, and the implementation of national responsibilities. This limitation is not only due to many countries failing to fulfill their commitments or provide sufficient funding. More fundamentally, it lies in the inequities embedded in global climate governance. This essay will analyze the issue from three aspects: the limitations of institutional design and enforcement in global climate governance, climate finance and the politics of equity, and the role of non-state actors and the human face of climate governance.
当 10 岁的 Keira 在基里巴斯的珊瑚礁上数着被海水淹没的椰子树时，地球另一端的外交官们正在为 0.5°C 的温度控制目标争论到深夜。这就是全球气候变化治理的分裂但相互关联的本质。自 1992 年《联合国气候变化框架公约》通过以来，这项关乎全人类命运的集体行动实验一直在紧迫性和可行性之间的狭窄空间内努力向前发展。然而，尽管这些框架代表了议程设置和全球规范传播方面的重大进展，但它们在应对气候变化的物质和分配影响方面的有效性仍然存在很大争议。这些辩论揭示了一个自相矛盾的现象：尽管全球气候治理的规则变得越来越详细，但在面对不断恶化的气候危机时，它们的实际效果却远远不够。本文认为，尽管国际努力在建立共识和制度结构方面发挥了积极作用，但它们在执行、财政支持和履行国家责任方面面临重大挑战，但成功有限。这种限制不仅仅是因为许多国家未能履行承诺或提供足够的资金。从根本上说，它在于全球气候治理中嵌入的不平等。 本文将从三个方面分析这个问题：全球气候治理中制度设计和执行的局限性、气候金融和公平政治，以及非国家行为体的作用和气候治理的人性面貌。

The Limitations of Institutional Design and Enforcement in Global Climate Governance
全球气候治理中制度设计和执行的局限性

The Paris Agreement is widely hailed as a milestone in the history of global climate diplomacy. Falkner (2016) insists that “for the first time, 195 countries jointly committed to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), demonstrating unprecedented unity” (p. 1114). However, behind this impressive participation rate lies a fundamental issue: it prioritizes “getting all countries to say YES” over “ensuring all countries take action.” For example, when representatives from South Pacific Island nations called for legally binding emission reduction targets during the negotiations, the final text compromised into a loose model of “voluntary commitments + regular reporting.” This design, though it secured the participation of the United States, came at the cost of enforceability. It lacks strict punitive mechanisms and even a unified verification standard.
《巴黎协定》被广泛誉为全球气候外交史上的里程碑。Falkner （2016） 坚持认为，“195 个国家首次共同承诺国家自主贡献 （NDC），展示了前所未有的团结”（第 1114 页）。然而，在如此令人印象深刻的参与率背后隐藏着一个根本问题：它优先考虑“让所有国家说是”，而不是“确保所有国家都采取行动”。例如，当南太平洋岛国的代表在谈判期间呼吁制定具有法律约束力的减排目标时，最终文本妥协为“自愿承诺 + 定期报告”的松散模式。这种设计虽然获得了美国的参与，但以牺牲可执行性为代价。它缺乏严格的惩罚机制，甚至没有统一的验证标准。

This reflects what scholars have termed the “voluntary paradox”: broad participation secured at the expense of ambition. The Agreement adopts a hybrid approach, combining bottom-up voluntary pledges with top-down review mechanisms. While this structure was intended to avoid the rigid distributional conflicts that doomed the Kyoto Protocol (Falkner, 2016, p. 1110), it has instead created a system where ambition remains largely discretionary. Bodansky and van (2024) aptly describe the Agreement as a "Goldilocks solution" (p. 289)—neither too strong to alienate major emitters nor too weak to be entirely meaningless. Yet, this compromise has proven inadequate. Even the most optimistic assessments acknowledge that current NDCs will, at best, limit global warming to 2.7°C, far exceeding the Agreement’s aspirational 1.5°C target (Bodansky, 2016, p. 289). This gap between rhetoric and reality emphasizes a critical flaw: without binding obligations, the Agreement relies on moral persuasion and peer pressure, tools that have repeatedly failed to compel meaningful action from high-emitting states.
这反映了学者们所说的“自愿悖论”：以牺牲雄心为代价来获得广泛的参与。该协议采用混合模式，将自下而上的自愿承诺与自上而下的审查机制相结合。虽然这种结构旨在避免注定《京都议定书》的僵化分配冲突（Falkner，2016 年，第 1110 页），但它反而创造了一个野心在很大程度上仍由自由裁量权决定的系统。Bodansky 和 van （2024） 恰当地将该协议描述为“金发姑娘解决方案”（第 289 页）——既不会太强大而疏远主要排放国，也不会太弱而完全没有意义。然而，事实证明，这种妥协是不够的。即使是最乐观的评估也承认，当前的 NDC 充其量只能将全球变暖限制在 2.7°C，远超协议的理想 1.5°C 目标（Bodansky，2016 年，第 289 页）。这种言辞与现实之间的差距凸显了一个关键缺陷：由于没有约束力的义务，该协议依赖于道德说服和同行压力，这些工具一再未能迫使高排放国家采取有意义的行动。

In addition, the voluntary nature of the Paris Agreement is further exacerbated by its weak compliance framework. Unlike traditional treaties with punitive measures for non-compliance, the Agreement establishes a "facilitative" committee that operates in a "non-adversarial and non-punitive" manner (Keohane & Victor, 2011, p. 9). This approach, while politically palatable, renders the Agreement toothless. Dimitrov (2016) notes that the ‘compliance mechanism’ (p. 7) is explicitly designed to avoid confrontation, meaning that even egregious failures to meet NDCs face no formal consequences. The result is a system where countries can freely adjust their commitments based on domestic political expediency, as seen when the U.S. temporarily withdrew from the Agreement under the Trump administration (Falkner, 2016, p. 1122).
此外，《巴黎协定》的自愿性因其薄弱的合规框架而进一步加剧。与传统条约对违规行为采取惩罚措施不同，该协议建立了一个以“非对抗和非惩罚性”方式运作的“促进性”委员会（Keohane & Victor，2011年，第9页）。这种方法虽然在政治上令人满意，但使该协议变得毫无意义。Dimitrov （2016） 指出，“合规机制”（第 7 页）的明确设计是为了避免对抗，这意味着即使严重未能满足 NDC 也不会面临正式后果。结果是一个国家可以根据国内政治权宜之计自由调整其承诺的系统，正如美国在特朗普政府期间暂时退出该协议所见（Falkner，2016 年，第 1122 页）。

More fundamentally, the Agreement’s procedural architecture reproduces and reinforces structural inequalities. The Agreement's procedural architecture inadvertently advantages wealthy nations through complex technical requirements. While all nations must submit NDCs, developed countries' superior bureaucratic capacity allows them to craft sophisticated pledges that appear ambitious while minimizing domestic disruption. In contrast, many developing nations—particularly LDCs—struggle with basic reporting due to limited technical expertise (Falkner, 2016, p. 1120). This creates an illusion of equal participation masking structural inequities.
更根本的是，该协议的程序架构复制并强化了结构性不平等。该协议的程序架构通过复杂的技术要求无意中使富裕国家受益。虽然所有国家都必须提交 NDC，但发达国家卓越的官僚能力使它们能够制定看似雄心勃勃的复杂承诺，同时最大限度地减少国内干扰。相比之下，由于技术专长有限，许多发展中国家（尤其是最不发达国家）在基本报告方面苦苦挣扎（Falkner，2016 年，第 1120 页）。这造成了一种平等参与的错觉，掩盖了结构性不平等。

This lack of enforceability is particularly evident in the transparency framework of the Paris Agreement. Although the framework was promoted as a “historic breakthrough,” its core rules were delayed until 2024 to take effect (Falkner, 2016, p. 1120). This means that during the most critical decade of the climate crisis, countries have effectively been fulfilling their commitments under “no supervision.” Developed countries led the formulation of reporting standards but were not required to provide sufficient technical support for verification to developing countries. Developing countries—especially the least developed countries—were forced to struggle to meet complex procedural requirements under conditions of resource scarcity. This dynamic reflects a broader trend in global governance, where procedural complexity often serves as a mechanism of exclusion. A pattern exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol's “low coherence and accountability” (Keohane & Victor, 2011, p. 11). This is not fair at all！
这种缺乏可执行性的情况在《巴黎协定》的透明度框架中尤为明显。尽管该框架被宣传为“历史性突破”，但其核心规则被推迟到 2024 年才生效（福克纳，2016 年，第 1120 页）。这意味着，在气候危机最关键的十年中，各国一直在“无监督”下有效地履行其承诺。发达国家牵头制定了报告标准，但不需要为发展中国家的核查提供足够的技术支持。发展中国家，尤其是最不发达国家，被迫在资源稀缺的条件下努力满足复杂的程序要求。这种动态反映了全球治理的更广泛趋势，其中程序的复杂性往往是一种排斥机制。《京都议定书》的“低连贯性和问责制”（Keohane & Victor，2011年，第11页）就是一个例子。 这根本不公平！

Another key issue in global climate governance is that there are too many institutions, and they are too disorganized. Keohane and Victor (2011) refer to this situation as an “institutional complex” (p. 1)—like a group of departments with overlapping functions but operating independently, which not only leads to inefficiency but sometimes even contradictions. For example, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), two important mechanisms, have made international cooperation more complicated due to inconsistent rules and overly cumbersome procedures (Keohane & Victor, 2011, p. 12). This chaotic situation allows some countries to choose only the agreements that benefit them and evade those that require real obligations—a behavior that can be described by the Chinese idiom “picking the fat and discarding the lean.” What’s worse, the Paris Agreement relies mainly on “naming and shaming” to urge countries to comply. But in reality, this tactic is completely ineffective against major powers. For instance, when it comes to core interests, China and the United States simply do not fear international criticism (Falkner, 2016, p. 1122). Therefore, although the agreement designed some seemingly smart procedures (such as the “ratchet mechanism” for periodically upgrading targets), these innovations have become “toothless tigers” due to the lack of real punitive measures.
全球气候治理的另一个关键问题是机构太多，而且组织太混乱。Keohane 和 Victor （2011） 将这种情况称为“机构综合体”（第 1 页）——就像一组职能重叠但独立运作的部门，这不仅导致效率低下，有时甚至导致矛盾。例如，清洁发展机制（CDM）和绿色气候基金（GCF）这两个重要机制由于规则不一致和程序过于繁琐，使国际合作变得更加复杂（Keohane & Victor，2011，第12页）。这种混乱的局面使一些国家只能选择对他们有利的协议，而逃避那些需要真正义务的协议——这种行为可以用中国成语“挑肥弃瘦”来描述。更糟糕的是，《巴黎协定》主要依靠“点名羞辱”来敦促各国遵守。但实际上，这种策略对大国完全无效。例如，当涉及到核心利益时，中国和美国根本不害怕国际批评（Falkner，2016 年，第 1122 页）。因此，尽管该协议设计了一些看似聪明的程序（例如用于定期升级目标的“棘轮机构”），但由于缺乏真正的惩罚措施，这些创新已经成为“无牙之虎”。

I think that the Paris Agreement's institutional flaws reflect a deeper pathology in global climate governance. Namely, the prioritization of political acceptability over environmental effectiveness. For students from developing nations, this isn't merely academic. When the Sierra Leonean delegate cried "Co-financing, I don't understand that phrase! We are the least of the least!" (Roberts & Parks, 2007, p. 1), they highlighted how procedural designs exclude those most affected. Until governance structures move beyond voluntary frameworks to address power asymmetries directly, the gap between climate promises and action will persist.
我认为，《巴黎协定》的制度性缺陷反映了全球气候治理中更深层次的病态。即，政治可接受性优先于环境有效性。对于来自发展中国家的学生来说，这不仅仅是学术上的。当塞拉利昂代表喊道：“共同融资，我听不懂这句话！我们是最小的！（罗伯茨和帕克斯，2007 年，第 1 页），他们强调了程序设计如何排除那些受影响最大的人。除非治理结构超越自愿框架，直接解决权力不对称问题，否则气候承诺和行动之间的差距将持续存在。

Climate Finance and the Politics of Equity
气候金融和公平政治

Another major question that limits the effectiveness of international climate governance lies in the ongoing disputes over climate finance and the fair distribution of responsibilities. While developed nations proudly announce climate finance pledges, the reality for vulnerable countries is one of unmet promises, creative accounting, and deepening distrust. This failure goes beyond mere implementation gaps—it reflects systemic inequities in how climate governance distributes both burdens and resources.
制约国际气候治理有效性的另一个主要问题在于气候融资和责任公平分配的持续争议。虽然发达国家自豪地宣布气候融资承诺，但脆弱国家的现实是承诺未兑现、创造性的会计核算和不断加深的不信任。这种失败不仅仅是实施差距，它反映了气候治理如何分配负担和资源的系统性不平等。

Although developed countries committed in 2009 to mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020 to support developing nations in mitigation and adaptation, this target has not been met in practice. According to Roberts (2015), even the definition of “climate finance” (p. 9) remains vague and controversial, allowing donor countries to count loans or existing aid flows as climate-related funding.
尽管发达国家在 2009 年承诺 到 2020 年每年筹集 1000 亿美元来支持发展中国家的减缓和适应，但这一目标在实践中并未实现。根据 Roberts （2015） 的说法，即使是“气候融资”（第 9 页）的定义也仍然模糊且有争议，允许捐助国将贷款或现有援助流算作气候相关资金。

This raises serious questions about transparency and trust, especially among countries in the Global South who are already dealing with the worst effects of climate change. The consequences are starkly visible in adaptation finance, which receives less than 25% of total climate funding despite being the priority for vulnerable nations (Betzold, 2015, p. 6). Small Island Developing States (SIDS), for example, report that adaptation projects are often piecemeal—like donor-funded seawalls that collapse when external funding dries up (Betzold, 2015, p. 6). This "projectivization" of climate finance prioritizes visible, short-term interventions over systemic capacity-building, leaving communities perpetually dependent on unpredictable external aid.
这引发了对透明度和信任的严重质疑，尤其是在已经在应对气候变化最严重影响的南半球国家中。其后果在适应资金中显而易见，尽管它是脆弱国家的优先事项，但其获得的气候资金不到气候总资金的 25%（Betzold，2015 年，第 6 页）。例如，小岛屿发展中国家 （SIDS） 报告说，适应项目通常是零散的——就像捐助者资助的海堤在外部资金枯竭时倒塌一样（Betzold，2015 年，第 6 页）。气候融资的这种“项目化”优先考虑可见的短期干预，而不是系统性的能力建设，使社区永远依赖不可预测的外部援助。

From a governance perspective, this financial gap reflects deeper inequalities embedded in international climate negotiations. Okereke (2010, p. 468) argues that while the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) is formally recognised, in reality, powerful countries often resist binding obligations or attempt to shift responsibilities through market-based mechanisms. As a result, many developing countries feel they are being asked to take on a disproportionate burden without receiving adequate support. For example, China and India have consistently highlighted the need for historical responsibility to be taken seriously, especially given that their per capita emissions remain lower than those of developed states (Gupta & van der Grijp, 2010, p. 211). This power asymmetry demonstrates most brutally in the "Loss and Damage" negotiations. Despite vocal advocacy from SIDS and LDCs, developed countries—led by the U.S. and EU—have blocked any institutional arrangement that could imply liability or compensation (Dimitrov, 2016, p. 4). The resulting compromise, Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, is a hollow shell: it acknowledges loss and damage but explicitly rules out liability (Mechler et al., 2019, p. 15). For frontline communities facing existential threats, this represents a deep betrayal—a literal "writing off" of their futures.
从治理的角度来看，这种资金缺口反映了国际气候谈判中更深层次的不平等。Okereke（2010 年，第 468 页）认为，虽然“共同但有区别的责任”（CBDR） 原则得到正式承认，但实际上，大国往往抵制有约束力的义务或试图通过市场机制转移责任。因此，许多发展中国家认为，在没有得到足够支持的情况下，他们被要求承担不成比例的负担。例如，中国和印度一直强调需要认真对待历史责任，特别是考虑到他们的人均排放量仍然低于发达国家（Gupta和van der Grijp（2010，第211页）。这种权力不对称在“损失与损害”谈判中表现得最为残酷。尽管小岛屿发展中国家和最不发达国家大声疾呼，但以美国和欧盟为首的发达国家阻止了任何可能暗示责任或赔偿的制度安排（Dimitrov，2016 年，第 4 页）。由此产生的妥协，即《巴黎协定》第 8 条，是一个空壳：它承认损失和损害，但明确排除责任（Mechler 等人，2019 年，第 15 页）。对于面临生存威胁的前线社区来说，这代表着一种深刻的背叛——字面意义上的对他们未来的 “抹杀”。

From a student perspective, I feel that these tensions are not only political but also moral. Coming from a developing country myself, I can understand why trust in global climate institutions can be fragile. When promises are delayed or redefined, and when funding is tied to complex conditions, it becomes harder to believe that international cooperation is genuinely equitable. As Ciplet, Roberts and Khan (2015, p. 4) point out, climate governance is “not just about reducing emissions but about negotiating power and justice in a deeply unequal world.” This makes climate finance more than a technical issue, it is a test of political will and global solidarity. Without fair and predictable financial mechanisms, even the best institutional designs will remain insufficient. Effective climate action requires not only innovation and ambition, but also a willingness to confront uncomfortable questions about responsibility, justice, and power.
从学生的角度来看，我觉得这些紧张关系不仅是政治上的，也是道德上的。我自己来自发展中国家，可以理解为什么对全球气候机构的信任会很脆弱。当承诺被推迟或重新定义时，当资金与复杂的条件挂钩时，就更难相信国际合作是真正公平的。正如 Ciplet、Roberts 和 Khan （2015， p. 4） 指出的那样，气候治理“不仅仅是减少排放，而是在一个极度不平等的世界中谈判权力和正义”。这使得气候融资不仅仅是一个技术问题，更是对政治意愿和全球团结的考验。如果没有公平和可预测的金融机制，即使是最好的制度设计也将是不够的。有效的气候行动不仅需要创新和雄心，还需要愿意面对有关责任、正义和权力的令人不安的问题。

Climate finance cannot remain a discretionary act of Northern generosity. It must be reimagined as reparations for ecological debt, delivered through automatic mechanisms like a fossil fuel levy. The alternative continued reliance on voluntary pledges and market mechanisms, it will only deepen the world's climate apartheid. As the Pacific climate envoy once declared, "We are not drowning. We are fighting" (Ciplet et al., 2015, p. 210). But without radical equity in finance, even the strongest fighters will be swept away by the rising tides of injustice.
气候融资不能继续是北方慷慨的自由裁量行为。它必须被重新构想为对生态债务的赔偿，通过化石燃料税等自动机制来实现。否则，继续依赖自愿承诺和市场机制，只会加深世界的气候种族隔离。正如太平洋气候特使曾经宣称的那样，“我们没有被淹死。我们正在战斗“（Ciplet 等人，2015 年，第 210 页）。但是，如果没有金融领域的激进公平，即使是最强大的斗士也会被不断上升的不公正浪潮所席卷。

The Role of Non-State Actors and the Human Face of Climate Governance
非国家行为者的作用和气候治理的人性面貌

In recent years, non-state actors such as cities, civil society groups, and corporations have emerged as crucial participants in global climate governance. Their growing influence has been seen as a way to bypass the limitations of intergovernmental negotiations and enhance local-level action. Bäckstrand et al. (2017) highlight that non-state initiatives can “increase legitimacy and inclusiveness” (p. 576) by bringing in voices often excluded from state-centric decision-making. In particular, indigenous communities, youth movements, and environmental NGOs have drawn attention to the human impacts of climate change that formal institutions often overlook.
近年来，城市、公民社会团体和企业等非国家行为体已成为全球气候治理的重要参与者。他们日益增长的影响力被视为 绕过政府间谈判限制和加强地方行动的一种方式。Bäckstrand 等人（2017 年）强调，非国家倡议可以通过引入通常被排除在以国家为中心的决策之外的声音来“提高合法性和包容性”（第 576 页）。 特别是，土著社区、青年运动和环境非政府组织引起了人们对气候变化对人类影响的关注，而这些影响往往是正式机构所忽视的。

However, while this shift toward polycentric governance appears promising on the surface, the practical impact of non-state actors remains uneven. Bulkeley et al. (2014, p. 146) observe that while cities and businesses are often praised for their innovation, many lack clear mandates, long-term accountability, or sufficient resources. Voluntary climate commitments made by corporations, for example, may boost reputation but not always translate into concrete emissions reductions.
然而，尽管这种向多中心治理的转变表面上似乎很有希望，但非国家行为体的实际影响仍然不均衡。Bulkeley 等人（2014 年，第 146 页）观察到，虽然城市和企业经常因其创新而受到赞扬，但许多城市和企业缺乏明确的授权、长期问责制或足够的资源。例如，企业做出的自愿气候承诺可能会提高声誉，但并不总是转化为具体的减排。

From a human rights perspective, these gaps are especially concerning. Climate change is not just an environmental issue—it is fundamentally about people. According to Knox (2018), the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, climate change constitutes a “systemic threat to the enjoyment of human rights” (p. 3), particularly for the most vulnerable communities. Rising sea levels, extreme weather, and climate-induced displacement disproportionately affect those with the least power and voice in global forums.
从人权的角度来看，这些差距尤其令人担忧。气候变化不仅仅是一个环境问题，从根本上说，它与人有关。根据联合国人权与环境问题特别报告员 Knox （2018） 的说法，气候变化构成了“对享有人权的系统性威胁”（第 3 页），尤其是对最脆弱的社区而言。海平面上升、极端天气和气候引起的流离失所不成比例地影响了那些在全球论坛中权力和话语权最弱的人。

This human toll is not hypothetical—it is unfolding daily in communities worldwide. In the Pacific Islands, rising saltwater intrusion destroys farmland, forcing families to abandon ancestral homes. In sub-Saharan Africa, prolonged droughts turn pastoral livelihoods into battles for survival. Yet, these stories rarely shape the metrics of "success" in climate governance. While states debate percentage points of emission cuts, a mother in Bangladesh counts the days until the next flood swallows her home. The disconnect between policy language and human experience reveals a fundamental flaw in how we frame climate action: when resilience is reduced to infrastructure projects rather than cultural and emotional survival, we risk addressing symptoms while ignoring the wound. The true measure of progress should be whether a child in a climate-vulnerable region can grow up without fearing that their future will be washed away.
这种人员伤亡不是假设的，它每天都在世界各地的社区中发生。在太平洋岛屿，不断上升的盐水入侵摧毁了农田，迫使家庭放弃祖传的房屋。在撒哈拉以南非洲，持续的干旱使牧民的生计变成了生存之战。然而，这些故事很少影响气候治理的“成功”指标。当各州就减排百分点进行辩论时，孟加拉国的一位母亲正在数着距离下一次洪水吞噬她家的日子。政策语言与人类经验之间的脱节揭示了我们构建气候行动的一个根本缺陷：当韧性被简化为基础设施项目而不是文化和情感生存时，我们就有可能忽视伤口，而忽视症状。衡量进步的真正标准应该是生活在气候脆弱地区的儿童能否在成长过程中不用担心他们的未来会被冲走。

Coming from a region already experiencing climate stress, I sometimes feel that global conversations still remain too abstract. We talk about mitigation targets and carbon pricing, but rarely about how a failed harvest means a family goes hungry, or how children walk further for clean water. Schlosberg (2013, p. 42) reminds us that climate justice must go beyond distribution—it must also include recognition, participation, and capacity-building. Without these dimensions, even well-intentioned climate efforts risk reinforcing existing inequalities.
我来自一个已经面临气候压力的地区，有时觉得全球对话仍然过于抽象。我们谈论减缓目标和碳定价，但很少谈论歉收如何意味着一个家庭挨饿，或者孩子们如何走得更远才能获得清洁水。Schlosberg （2013， p. 42） 提醒我们，气候正义必须超越分配——它还必须包括认可、参与和能力建设。如果没有这些维度，即使是善意的气候努力也有可能加剧现有的不平等。

The growing role of non-state actors is undoubtedly a positive development, offering new avenues for engagement and innovation. However, their impact will remain limited unless they operate within frameworks that prioritize human rights and justice. Voluntary corporate commitments must be matched with enforceable standards; local climate projects need sustained funding and institutional support. Climate governance must not treat the wisdom of Indigenous peoples as mere “decoration”, their traditional knowledge must genuinely guide our actions. Otherwise, so-called “global cooperation” will only become a lively but ultimately useless performance. In assessing whether climate governance is successful, we must not look only at cold numbers. For example, how many tons of carbon were reduced, or how much money was invested. The real standard is whether the most vulnerable groups have been protected: whether children in small island states can continue to live on the land of their ancestors, whether herders can keep their cattle and sheep alive during droughts.
非国家行为体日益增长的作用无疑是一个积极的进展，为参与和创新提供了新的途径。然而，除非它们在优先考虑人权和正义的框架内运作，否则它们的影响将仍然有限。自愿性企业承诺必须与可执行的标准相匹配;地方气候项目需要持续的资金和机构支持。气候治理不能将原住民的智慧仅仅视为“装饰品”，他们的传统知识必须真正指导我们的行动。否则，所谓的“全球合作”只会成为一场生动但最终毫无用处的表演。在评估气候治理是否成功时，我们不能只看冷冰冰的数字。F或示例，减少了多少吨碳，或投资了多少钱。真正的标准是最脆弱的群体是否得到保护：小岛屿国家的儿童是否能够继续生活在他们祖先的土地上，牧民能否在干旱期间让他们的牛羊活着。

Enterprises, communities, and civil society organizations can indeed help make up for the shortcomings of international agreements, but only on one condition: their actions must be driven by conscience, and they must truly listen to the voices of those who endure climate disasters every day. Getting more people involved in climate action is of course a good thing, but the focus should not be on the “number of participants,” but on the results of that participation. Have those on the front lines of the crisis truly received fair treatment and tangible help?
企业、社区和公民社会组织确实可以帮助弥补国际协议的不足，但前提是一个条件：他们的行动必须由良知驱动，他们必须真正倾听每天遭受气候灾难的人们的声音。让更多的人参与气候行动当然是一件好事，但重点不应该放在“参与者的数量”上，而应该放在参与的结果上。那些在危机前线的人真的得到了公平的待遇和切实的帮助吗？

Conclusion
结论

When we look closely at how international climate efforts actually work, it’s clear that although they’ve helped build global frameworks and raise awareness, the results are still very limited. Agreements like the UNFCCC have brought countries together and created important systems, but weak enforcement, lack of funding, and unclear responsibilities have made it hard to turn words into real action. Climate finance—something that’s supposed to help vulnerable countries adapt—still hasn’t met the promises made. And while non-state actors like NGOs and companies are trying to help, their actions often aren’t well-regulated, which means they sometimes do more talking than changing. What’s even more frustrating is that the human stories—families losing their homes to floods, farmers struggling with drought—are often ignored in high-level meetings.
当我们仔细观察国际气候努力的实际运作方式时，很明显，尽管它们帮助建立了全球框架并提高认识，但结果仍然非常有限。像《联合国气候变化框架公约》这样的协议将各国团结在一起，建立了重要的系统，但执行不力、缺乏资金和责任不明确，使得难以将言语转化为实际行动。气候融资本应帮助脆弱国家适应气候变化，但仍然没有兑现承诺。虽然非政府组织和公司等非国家行为者试图提供帮助，但他们的行为往往没有得到很好的监管，这意味着他们有时更多的是说说而非改变。更令人沮丧的是，人类的故事——家庭因洪水而失去家园，农民与干旱作斗争——在高层会议上经常被忽视。

As a student from the developing world, I can see how these big climate promises don’t always match what people are going through every day. A signed agreement doesn’t help a family whose harvest has failed. If climate efforts really want to be effective, they need to shift power—not just money—to the people who are actually facing the crisis. That means thinking about justice, not just carbon targets: things like forgiving debt for climate-affected countries, creating legal support for climate refugees, and giving real resources to Indigenous communities protecting their land. The Paris Agreement’s “bottom-up” approach is a start, but it needs to go further—like letting local voices shape national plans and giving affected groups the power to say no to harmful projects.
作为一名来自发展中国家的学生，我可以看到这些重大的气候承诺并不总是与人们每天所经历的相匹配。签署协议对收成歉收的家庭没有帮助。如果气候努力真的想有效，就需要将权力——而不仅仅是金钱——转移到真正面临危机的人们身上。这意味着要考虑正义，而不仅仅是碳目标：比如免除受气候影响国家的债务，为气候难民提供法律支持，以及为保护土地的原住民社区提供真正的资源。《巴黎协定》的“自下而上”方法是一个开始，但它需要更进一步——例如让地方声音来制定国家计划，并赋予受影响群体对有害项目说不的权力。

In the end, climate governance has to make a choice: keep things the way they are or truly stand with the people it says it’s helping. Without sharing power and resources more fairly, even the best-designed systems won’t fix the deeper problems. Climate justice isn’t just a nice idea—it’s the only way this can really work.
最后，气候治理必须做出选择：保持现状，还是真正与它所说的帮助者站在一起。如果不更公平地分享权力和资源，即使是设计最好的系统也无法解决更深层次的问题。气候正义不仅仅是一个好主意，而且是真正发挥作用的唯一方式。

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