Dawn of a new era in Search: Balancing innovation, competition, and public good
搜尋新時代的曙光：平衡創新、競爭和公共利益

Google search is in the news. Judge Amit Mehta ruled that Google search is a monopoly and is behaving in a manner that suppresses search competition with their distribution agreements. The debate on this has started, and various experts have presented pros and cons on the arguments, along with proposed remedies. We will analyze the extremely complex nature of this case and propose a novel remedy that goes into the heart of what we believe the Sherman Act is trying to achieve.
Google 搜尋成為新聞焦點。法官阿米特·梅塔裁定 Google 搜尋是壟斷行為，並以其分配協議壓制搜尋競爭。有關此事的辯論已經展開，各種專家提出了論點的利弊以及提出的解決方案。我們將分析這個案件的極度複雜性，並提出一個新穎的解決方案，這將深入探討講求的謝爾曼法案所嘗試實現的核心。

Before diving into the ruling, it’s important to note that while we (the authors) are not lawyers or experts on the Sherman Act, we have extensive experience in the tech industry and understand how technology and technology products are used.
在深入討論裁決之前，重要的是要注意，我們（作者）雖然不是律師或講授謝爾曼法案的專家，但我們在科技行業擁有豐富的經驗，並了解技術和技術產品的使用方式。

And for those unfamiliar with Kagi, a brief disclaimer: We are a new participant in the search market, with Kagi Search, a search engine with a distinctive search experience that aligns the interests of users and the search provider. Additionally, we want to address a potential conflict of interest upfront: our proposal would benefit Kagi, but it would also create healthy, true and intense competition in the search space, including to Kagi, which aligns with our understanding of the Sherman Act’s intent.
對於那些對 Kagi 不熟悉的人，簡短聲明：我們是搜索市場的新參與者，擁有具有獨特搜索體驗的搜索引擎 Kagi Search，該體驗使用戶和搜索提供者的利益保持一致。此外，我們想提前解決潛在的利益衝突問題：我們的提議將使 Kagi 受益，但也將在搜索領域創造健康、真實和激烈的競爭，包括對 Kagi 的競爭，這符合我們對 Sherman 法案意圖的理解。

What follows is written in good faith and with the utmost respect for the technology Google has developed and the talented individuals behind it. We acknowledge Google’s significant contributions: continuous investment in improving search technology, free access to search for billions of users, and innovations that have benefited the entire internet ecosystem. Our disagreement lies solely with the business model and its fit in today’s world. While the ad-based model for search has successfully delivered this service to the masses, the time has come to explore alternative business models that better align with user interests and emerging concepts of core data ownership. It is becoming increasingly evident that search results influenced by third-party interests, rather than consumer needs, are at best ‘for entertainment purposes’ and at worst harmful to consumers - an argument we will explore in more detail.
以下內容是出於善意，並對 Google 所開發的技術以及背後的才華機構表示最大的尊重。我們承認 Google 所做出的重大貢獻：持續投資於改進搜索技術、為數十億用戶提供免費搜索訪問權，以及對整個互聯網生態系統帶來益處的創新。我們的分歧僅在於商業模式及其在當今世界中的適應性。雖然基於廣告的搜索模式成功地將此服務提供給大眾，但現在是時候探索更符合用戶利益和新興核心數據所有權概念的替代商業模式了。越來越明顯的是，受第三方利益影響的搜索結果，而不是消費者需求，充其量只是“供娛樂之用”，最壞的情況則對消費者有害 - 這是我們將更詳細探討的論點。

Our position is that the real harm to users does not stem from a lack of choice in search access, but rather from the lack of choice in search experiences themselves. Introducing a variety of search experiences would empower users to choose the one that best aligns with their needs, privacy concerns, and expectations, ultimately leading to a healthier and more competitive search market.
我們的立場是，對用戶造成真正傷害的不是搜索訪問權限的缺乏，而是搜索體驗本身的缺乏選擇。引入各種搜索體驗將使用戶能夠選擇最符合其需求、隱私關注和期望的搜索方式，最終導致更健康、更具競爭力的搜索市場。

Let’s explore the main components of this case in more detail.
讓我們更詳細地探討這個案例的主要組成部分。

Overview of Google architecture
Google 架構概述

Here’s a simplified version of the Google architecture (click to enlarge):
這是 Google 架構的簡化版本（點擊放大）：

Google has innovated on three core aspects of search:
Google 在搜索的三個核心方面進行了創新：

• The Search Index 搜索索引
• The User Index 用戶指數
• The Advertiser Index 廣告商索引

Let’s examine each in more detail.
讓我們更詳細地檢視每一個。

The Search Index 搜索索引

Google has built a massive index of the internet that covers close to 100% of the accessible web. Over the years, Google has smartly invested not only in indexing the web but also in building intelligence to determine which “pages” have more relevant data for the user using algorithms.
Google 已建立了一個龐大的網絡索引，涵蓋了接近 100%的可訪問網絡。多年來，Google 不僅在索引網絡方面做出了聰明的投資，還在建立智能方面進行了投資，以通過算法確定哪些“頁面”對用戶具有更相關的數據。

These include: a) ranking webpages in terms of relevance (like PageRank™, which was patented but has since expired), b) speeding up crawling by embedding “free” code in websites to make them crawler-friendly, and c) ensuring self-validation of websites by asking webmasters to register their websites in the Google Search Console, verifying domain ownership. All these actions and reinforcements make the Google Index the best in the world and an indispensable resource for Google’s search business.
這些包括：a) 根據相關性對網頁進行排名（例如 PageRank™，曾經取得專利但現已過期），b) 通過在網站中嵌入“免費”代碼來加快爬取速度，使其更適合爬蟲，以及 c) 通過要求網站管理員在 Google 搜索控制台中註冊其網站，驗證域名所有權，確保網站的自我驗證。所有這些行動和強化措施使 Google 索引成為世界上最佳且 Google 搜索業務不可或缺的資源。

This makes the Search Index a very valuable asset that no other company has in its full complexity and size.
這使得搜尋索引成為一項非常有價值的資產，其他公司在其完整複雜性和規模上都沒有。

The User Index 用戶指數

The search engine bar/page is what the consumer or user sees when they start a search query. Google has innovated on the search bar/page by discerning search query intent, providing search query alternatives, location-based search queries, and search query presentation. Once the user enters a search query, Google uses the search index to present results based on what their algorithm anticipates the user wants to see, both for commercial and non-commercial queries. Additionally, the search page also shows ads, which is how Google monetizes their search business.
搜索引擎條/頁是消費者或用戶開始搜索查詢時看到的內容。谷歌通過識別搜索查詢意圖、提供搜索查詢替代方案、基於位置的搜索查詢和搜索查詢呈現等方式對搜索條/頁進行了創新。用戶一旦輸入搜索查詢，谷歌就使用搜索索引根據其算法預測用戶想要查看的結果，無論是商業還是非商業查詢。此外，搜索頁面還顯示廣告，這是谷歌實現搜索業務盈利的方式。

This is where Google pays companies like Apple over $20 billion a year for default placement in browsers. This default placement allows them to add almost all users on those platforms as Google search users, feeding the Search Index and the Advertising Index. Another valuable asset for Google here is the User Index, used to personalize ads to each user’s unique needs as determined by the algorithms governing the User Index. Google does not sell user data but monetizes it across all their platforms through ads. Independent sources say that Google has unique data on over 3 billion users worldwide.
這就是 Google 每年向蘋果等公司支付超過 200 億美元的默認瀏覽器放置費用的地方。這種默認放置使他們能夠將幾乎所有這些平台上的用戶都添加為 Google 搜索用戶，從而為搜索索引和廣告索引提供數據。Google 在這裡的另一個有價值的資產是用戶索引，用於根據管理用戶索引的算法確定的每個用戶的獨特需求來個性化廣告。Google 不出售用戶數據，而是通過廣告在所有平台上實現盈利。獨立消息來源表示，Google 在全球擁有超過 30 億用戶的獨特數據。

The Advertiser Index 廣告商索引

Google generates around $150 billion in search ad revenue (2022). This ad engine has its own team that drives innovation cycles. The Advertiser Index is the largest in the world for online advertising, covering over 90% of the advertisers globally. It is the repository of advertisers, their ads, and their payment plans, driven by complex reverse auction algorithms to place the right ad above the fold, below the fold, and to the right on a search results page. Users get to search for free because they are paying with their usage data for the ads they see and maybe click on.
Google 在 2022 年的搜索廣告收入約為 1500 億美元。這個廣告引擎擁有自己的團隊推動創新週期。廣告主索引是全球最大的線上廣告索引，涵蓋全球超過 90%的廣告主。它是廣告主、廣告和付款計劃的存儲庫，由複雜的反向拍賣算法驅動，以將正確的廣告放置在搜索結果頁面的上方、下方和右側。用戶可以免費搜索，因為他們通過使用數據支付他們看到的廣告，並可能點擊。

With the massive volume of queries and ads served, even if users rarely click on an ad, the sheer volume is enough to generate the highly profitable revenue of USD $150 billion. The CTR (0.86%), CPC ($0.66), and CVR (1.91%) are the estimated stats for Google Ads. These seem small but are gigantic based on the number of users (over 90% of users come to Google), the number of queries (around 1.2 trillion a year), the number of advertisers (over 90% of the online market), and what advertisers are willing to pay for being on the Google platform.
隨著大量的查詢和廣告投放，即使用戶很少點擊廣告，這龐大的量也足以產生高達 1500 億美元的高利潤。CTR（0.86％）、CPC（0.66 美元）和 CVR（1.91％）是 Google 廣告的估計統計數據。這些數據看似微小，但基於用戶數量（超過 90％的用戶使用 Google）、查詢數量（每年約 1.2 萬億次）、廣告主數量（超過 90％的在線市場）以及廣告主願意為在 Google 平台上投放廣告支付的金額，這些數據都是巨大的。

It is estimated that Google generates over $50 per year per user in advertising revenue. Simple math: $150 billion revenue / 3 billion users = $50. Users in the US could easily generate 6 to 10 times the worldwide average, making this a very valuable cohort for Google.
據估計，Google 每位用戶每年廣告收入超過 50 美元。簡單的數學：1500 億美元的收入 / 30 億用戶 = 50 美元。美國用戶很容易產生全球平均值的 6 到 10 倍，使其成為 Google 非常有價值的群體。

Google’s self-feeding engine in action
Google 的自我餵養引擎正在運作

As seen here, Google has built a self-feeding engine where users, advertisers, and webmasters (owners of websites) all willingly give their data, access, and money. This engine generates its own leadership/monopoly momentum where users of the platforms (users, advertisers, and webmasters) are willing partners in this scheme. Users get their search results free, but they must bear the burden of ads and misaligned incentives.
正如在這裡所看到的，Google 建立了一個自我養成的引擎，用戶、廣告商和網站所有者（網站擁有者）都自願提供他們的數據、訪問權限和金錢。這個引擎產生了自己的領導/壟斷勢頭，平台的用戶（用戶、廣告商和網站所有者）願意成為這個計劃的合作夥伴。用戶可以免費獲得他們的搜索結果，但必須承擔廣告和不協調激勵的負擔。

Advertisers get access to the world’s biggest online platform with the largest number of users, whom they can precisely target if they are willing to pay the highest prices for that benefit. Webmasters are eager as their websites are indexed on the world’s largest search index, giving users a chance to visit their websites, which they can monetize.
廣告商可以透過世界上最大的在線平台接觸最多用戶，只要他們願意為此支付最高價格。網站所有者則渴望將其網站索引在全球最大的搜索索引上，讓用戶有機會訪問他們的網站，進而實現盈利。

Google’s search economics and strategy is built on a flywheel very similar to the famous Amazon virtuous cycle:
Google 的搜索經濟學和策略建立在一個非常類似於著名的亞馬遜善循環的飛輪上：

The point here is that competitors can build competing cycles, but challenging a flywheel once it has gathered full momentum is very difficult. In Amazon’s case, they can be challenged by factors like price (which is non-zero), better choice, and user experience. However, with Google, the challenge is significantly harder because the nominal price is “zero,” while users pay in other currencies - personal data, attention, and changes in behavior. As a society, we are only beginning to recognize the importance of these currencies and the impact they have on our lives.
這裡的重點是競爭對手可以建立競爭週期，但一旦飛輪積聚了完整的動能，挑戰它就變得非常困難。在亞馬遜的情況下，他們可能會受到價格（非零）、更好的選擇和用戶體驗等因素的挑戰。然而，對於谷歌來說，挑戰要困難得多，因為名義價格是“零”，而用戶以其他貨幣支付 - 個人數據、注意力和行為變化。作為一個社會，我們才剛開始認識到這些貨幣的重要性以及它們對我們生活的影響。

Now that we understand the architecture, the business strategy, and what goes into Google Search we can examine some key questions.
既然我們了解了架構、商業策略以及 Google 搜索的內容，我們可以探討一些關鍵問題。

Is Google a monopoly?
Google 是壟斷嗎？

This has already been decided by the judge and the answer is Yes.
這已經由法官決定，答案是「是」。

Here is a simple table outlining a few key statistics:
這裡是一個簡單的表格，列出了一些關鍵統計數據：

The data shows that the powerful “Virtuous Cycle” flywheel loop driving the “free” search marketplace is overwhelmingly tilted toward Google. Google is a monopoly by market definition, having over 90% of the queries on their platform.
數據顯示，強大的“善循環”飛輪迴圈驅動“免費”搜索市場，絕大多數傾向於 Google。 Google 根據市場定義是壟斷，其平台上超過 90%的查詢。

They have built this position over many years by pushing hard on multiple factors: early entry advantage to build the flywheel, consistent spending on innovation in all three areas, and doing everything to keep the advantage going. Even with Bing spending 5-10 billion USD a year, for the past two decades, it is not able to overcome the self-feeding juggernaut that Google is. Unless one is willing to break this self-feeding circle, there is no remediation or outside challenge that can overcome the Google monopoly.
他們通過多年來在多個因素上努力，建立了這個地位：早期進入優勢以建立正向循環，持續在所有三個領域進行創新投入，並盡一切努力保持這種優勢。即使 Bing 每年花費 50-100 億美元，在過去的兩個十年裡，也無法克服 Google 所具有的自我滋養的巨大力量。除非有人願意打破這種自我滋養的循環，否則沒有任何補救措施或外部挑戰能夠克服 Google 的壟斷地位。

Is Google preventing competitors from gaining a foothold and are competitors being harmed through default placement deals?
Google 是否阻止競爭對手佔據一席之地，並且競爭對手是否因默認放置協議而受損？

The answer is Yes and No.
答案是肯定和否定。

It can be argued that default placements significantly contribute to maintaining Google’s market share, with Google reportedly paying companies like Apple over $20 billion for this privilege. Apple has stated that Bing does not match Google’s search result quality, and they are unwilling to compromise on user experience by offering subpar results.
可以認為，預設放置對於維持 Google 的市場份額有著顯著的貢獻，據報導，Google 支付蘋果等公司超過 200 億美元以獲得這種特權。蘋果表示，Bing 的搜索結果質量不及 Google，他們不願意因提供次級結果而妥協用戶體驗。

A fair observer must acknowledge that being the default search engine within the Apple ecosystem holds substantial economic value - a value determined by fair market forces, with Google agreeing to pay that price. This may come as a surprise, but from our standpoint as a search market participant, this arrangement between Google and Apple is acceptable. (and interestingly what is more problematic is that Apple users cannot choose Kagi as their search engine at all, which consumers see as a hinderance - that said, this issue is beyond the scope of this article).
一個公正的觀察者必須承認，在蘋果生態系統內成為默認搜索引擎具有重大的經濟價值 - 這價值是由公平市場力量確定的，谷歌同意支付這個價格。這可能會讓人感到驚訝，但從我們作為搜索市場參與者的角度來看，谷歌和蘋果之間的這種安排是可以接受的。（有趣的是更為問題的是蘋果用戶根本無法選擇 Kagi 作為他們的搜索引擎，這被消費者視為一種阻礙 - 也就是說，這個問題超出了本文的範圍）。

Even if the government mandates that Google cannot pay for this privilege, two things could happen:
即使政府規定 Google 不能為此特權支付費用，仍可能發生兩種情況：

1. Apple loses $20 billion (Google’s windfall) but keeps Google to maintain consistency in the deeply entrenched user experience.
   蘋果損失 200 億美元（Google 的意外之財），但為了保持根深蒂固的用戶體驗一致性，仍與 Google 合作。
2. Even if users are forced to contend with another choice, the user selection flow can be manipulated to favor Google, maintaining its dominant market share.
   即使用戶被迫面對另一個選擇，也可以操縱用戶選擇流程以支持 Google，保持其主導市場份額。

The result could still be the same - maybe Google’s market share goes down to 80% - is that still a monopoly?
結果可能仍然相同 - 也許谷歌的市場份額下降到 80％ - 這仍然算是壟斷嗎？

Are users being harmed?
用戶是否受到傷害？

The answer is Yes. 答案是肯定的。

This is harder to prove and more nuanced. The service is free to users, the search results are of the best quality among its advertising-driven peers and the results are presented in the blink of an eye. All of these might seem to be an advantage for users and Google.
這更難以證明且更加微妙。該服務對用戶免費，搜尋結果在其以廣告為驅動的同行中質量最佳，並且結果瞬間呈現。所有這些對用戶和 Google 來說可能看似是一個優勢。

Usually a relationship between a user and service provider is direct and the objectives of each are in alignment. In this case there are three parties involved – Google, the Advertiser and the user. Because of the three parties being involved, the objectives are misaligned. This misalignment arises because of the business model being used where Google and the Advertiser are aligned on pushing more ads to the users to generate more revenue while users would prefer to see fewer ads (or no ads) and information in their best interest. For example someone looking for ‘best headphones’ in an ad-based search engine will not get the actual best headphones, but sponsored results from companies which paid the most for the keyword ‘best headphones’. This is a profound mismatch in expectations.
通常，用戶與服務提供商之間的關係是直接的，每個人的目標是一致的。在這種情況下，涉及三方 - Google、廣告商和用戶。由於涉及三方，目標不一致。這種不一致是由於使用的商業模式，其中 Google 和廣告商一致推送更多廣告給用戶以產生更多收入，而用戶則希望看到更少的廣告（或沒有廣告）以及符合他們最佳利益的信息。例如，在基於廣告的搜索引擎中尋找“最好的耳機”的人將不會得到真正的最好的耳機，而是來自為關鍵字“最好的耳機”支付最多的公司的贊助結果。這是期望上的深刻不匹配。

There are four areas where users are being harmed (we acknowledge this is subjective and hard to prove empirically):
有四個領域正在傷害使用者（我們承認這是主觀的，難以在實證上證明）：

1. Limited search results: Users do not get to see any other search results that will use a different set criterion for ranking and presentation and user choice. The user does not know if these are the best results for their query as in 99% of the cases the Google result as presented with ads and ads-based ranking is the only one they see.
   有限的搜索結果：用戶無法看到使用不同排名和展示標準以及用戶選擇的其他搜索結果。用戶不知道這些是否是他們查詢的最佳結果，因為在 99%的情況下，Google 的搜索結果是他們看到的唯一結果，並且帶有廣告和基於廣告的排名。
2. Ad saturation: Users are bombarded with ads. There are no significant number of search providers using a different business model, like subscription-based services, that present results without ad influence. Users see many ads and must navigate ad structures just to get to the results, which is very annoying and often intelligence-insulting.
   廣告飽和：用戶被廣告轟炸。沒有大量採用不同商業模式（如基於訂閱的服務）的搜索提供商，這些提供商呈現結果時不受廣告影響。用戶看到許多廣告，必須在廣告結構中尋找結果，這非常惱人，並且常常冒犯智慧。
3. Privacy concerns: The ad-based model relies on user data, placing privacy in Google’s hands. Google “owns” the data (though they say users can manage their data on the platform, but people rarely do). These hyper-targeted ad structures can be easily manipulated algorithmically (hidden, untouched, and uncontrolled by the user), leading to unintended consequences in search result presentation. This can result in claims of user manipulation and bias enforcement.
   隱私問題：廣告模式依賴用戶數據，將隱私置於 Google 的手中。Google “擁有”數據（儘管他們表示用戶可以在平台上管理自己的數據，但實際上很少有人這樣做）。這些超級定位廣告結構可以通過算法輕鬆操縱（被用戶隱藏、未觸及且無法控制），導致搜索結果呈現意外後果。這可能導致用戶操縱和偏見執行的指控。
4. Misaligned incentives: The main problem with ad-based business model in search and the cause of factors above is the misalignment of incentives. The user and customer are different (customers are advertisers) and every business will try to do what is best for the customer. This will cause the user to be often presented with information and search experience that is not optimized for their needs.
   錯位的激勵機制：廣告為基礎的搜索業務模式的主要問題以及上述因素的原因是激勵機制的錯位。用戶和客戶是不同的（客戶是廣告商），每家企業都會盡力為客戶提供最好的服務。這將導致用戶經常被呈現出不符合其需求的信息和搜索體驗。

Users might not care about the harm of being in the palms of advertisers and 3rd party interest (instead of their own) if the service is free. However, getting unbiased, correct information without influence from advertisers or other algorithms looking to manipulate users is undeniably critical for making the right decisions on information, purchases, politics, and scientific information.
用戶可能不會在服務免費的情況下關心被廣告商和第三方利益（而非他們自己）所傷害的問題。然而，獲取沒有廣告商或其他算法影響的公正、正確信息，對於在信息、購買、政治和科學信息上做出正確決定是至關重要的。

If consumers are being harmed and no other competitive solutions are on the horizon to correct this, we must start looking at remedies that are lasting, easily enforceable, and easily cross-checked for compliance. If we do not apply these principles, the solution will fail or be more harmful to the users.
如果消費者受到傷害，且沒有其他競爭性解決方案來糾正這一問題，我們必須開始尋找持久、易於執行且易於交叉檢查遵循的補救措施。如果我們不遵循這些原則，解決方案將失敗或對用戶造成更大傷害。

What are the right remedies?
什麼是正確的療法？

The court has made its ruling, and discussions about remedies have ensued.
法院已經做出裁決，並展開了有關補救措施的討論。

We will not delve into other remedies that have been already suggested (such as restricting default search agreements, providing access to clickstream and query data, or splitting AdWords, Android, YouTube, and Chrome from Google) because we believe they address the wrong outcome (how to hurt Google) and fail to pave the way for true innovation, more diverse competition and better outcomes for consumers. Readers are encouraged to explore the “References and further reading” section at the end of this article for more information on these approaches.
我們不會深入探討已經提出的其他解決方案（例如限制默認搜索協議、提供點擊流和查詢數據的訪問權，或將 AdWords、Android、YouTube 和 Chrome 從 Google 中分離），因為我們認為這些方法並非解決正確問題（如何傷害 Google），也未能為真正的創新、更多元化的競爭和消費者獲得更好的結果鋪平道路。讀者被鼓勵探索本文末尾的“參考文獻和進一步閱讀”部分，以獲取有關這些方法的更多信息。

Instead, we should first step back and consider what is the fundamental problem that we are trying to solve?
相反，我們應該先退一步，考慮我們試圖解決的根本問題是什麼？

The primary purpose of the Sherman Act is not to shield competitors from the success of legitimate businesses or to prevent those businesses from earning fair profits from consumers. Rather, it is to preserve a competitive marketplace that protects consumers from abuses (see also Competition law and consumer protection, Kluwer Law International, pp. 291–293).
Sherman 法案的主要目的並非是保護競爭對手免受合法企業成功的影響，或阻止這些企業從消費者那裡獲得公平利潤。相反，其目的是維護一個保護消費者免受濫用的競爭市場（參見《競爭法與消費者保護》，Kluwer Law International，第 291-293 頁）。

We’ve established that Google’s monopoly is rooted in its significant market share, which is sustained by critical assets under its unique control - the search index, the user index, and the advertiser index. Access to these essential assets is not available to any competitors.
我們已經確定谷歌的壟斷地位根植於其重要的市場份額，這是由其獨特控制下的關鍵資產支撐的 - 搜索索引、用戶索引和廣告商索引。這些重要資產的訪問權並不對任何競爭對手開放。

The ad-based search experience, while highly successful, subtly exploits users in ways that are not immediately obvious, though evidence is steadily building.
廣告為基礎的搜索體驗雖然非常成功，但以一種不那麼明顯的方式利用用戶，儘管證據正在穩步增加。

We’ve heard from Kagi users that they cannot imagine going back to an ad-based search experience. They came to appreciate this straightforward incentive structure: if the search experience is not good, and they are not finding information they need, they can simply stop paying for the service, incentivizing the search provider to do better (see My Search Engine Is Perhaps My Favourite Tech Service and How Kagi finally let me lay Google Search to rest).
我們聽到 Kagi 用戶說，他們無法想像回到基於廣告的搜索體驗。他們開始欣賞這種直接的激勵結構：如果搜索體驗不好，他們找不到需要的信息，他們可以簡單地停止支付服務費，激勵搜索提供者做得更好（參見我的搜索引擎也許是我最喜歡的技術服務以及 Kagi 最終讓我放下 Google 搜索）。

There is emerging academic research, such as the study Is Google Getting Worse? A Longitudinal Investigation of SEO Spam in Search Engines, that suggests a steady decline in search result quality across major ad-based search engines.
有新興的學術研究，例如研究《Google 變差了嗎？搜索引擎中 SEO 垃圾郵件的縱向調查》，表明主要基於廣告的搜索引擎的搜索結果質量正在穩步下降。

Google founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, predicted this would happen as far back as 1998, stating:
Google 的創始人拉里·佩奇和谢尔盖·布林早在 1998 年就预测到这种情况会发生，他们曾表示：

“The goals of the advertising business model do not always correspond to providing quality search to users.” … “We expect that advertising funded search engines will be inherently biased towards the advertisers and away from the needs of the consumers.”
廣告業務模式的目標並不總是與為用戶提供優質搜索相一致。我們預期，廣告資助的搜索引擎將天生偏向廣告商，而遠離消費者的需求。

And Google employees are saying this now themselves publicly:
谷歌員工現在公開表示這一點：

But have you seen the internet recently? The top 5 results are usually just some garbage content farm that has buggy code from 2008 that’s been updated only for SEO and still doesn’t work.
但你最近有看過網路嗎？前五名的結果通常只是一些垃圾內容農場，那裡的程式碼來自 2008 年，僅為了 SEO 而更新，仍然無法運作。

It’s important to note that this decline does not indicate a deterioration in the quality of the Search Index itself. Rather, it reflects the choices made by search providers - in this case, Google Search - regarding what to show from that index to the consumer. Unfortunately, these choices seem to be increasingly aligned with the interests of advertisers rather than those of the consumer.
重要的是要注意，這種下降並不表示搜索指數本身的質量惡化。相反，它反映了搜索提供者（在這種情況下是 Google 搜索）對於向消費者展示來自該指數的內容所做的選擇。不幸的是，這些選擇似乎越來越與廣告商的利益相一致，而不是與消費者的利益相一致。

This has profound implications for the search landscape, as it suggests that other entities (government and privately own) could make different choices with the same Search Index - and create search experiences that better align with consumer interests.
這對搜索領域有深遠的影響，因為它表明其他實體（政府和私人所有）可以使用相同的搜索索引做出不同的選擇，並創建更符合消費者利益的搜索體驗。

And maybe most importantly, if we step back and ask ourselves what kind of society we want to live in, hardly anyone would say we want to consume critical information from sources that do not have our best interest in mind. Yet that is exactly how our current situation can be described.
也許最重要的是，如果我們退一步問自己我們想要生活在什麼樣的社會，幾乎沒有人會說我們想要從沒有我們最佳利益在心中的來源中消費關鍵信息。然而，這正是我們目前情況的描述。

Political scientist Ian Bremmer’s astute observation becomes particularly relevant in this context:
政治學家伊恩·布雷默（Ian Bremmer）的敏銳觀察在這個情境中變得特別重要：

“The idea that we get our information as citizens through algorithms determined by the world’s largest advertising company is my definition of dystopia.”
「我認為，我們作為公民透過由全球最大廣告公司決定的演算法獲取資訊的概念，是我對反烏托邦的定義。」

This underscores the need to reassess our approach to search and information access in the digital age.
這凸顯了我們在數位時代重新評估搜索和資訊存取方式的必要性。

We think that any effective remedy should not attack Google’s business model or its remarkable ingenuity and execution. Instead, it should focus on access to core technologies within its flywheel that will foster more diverse competition. This approach would encourage the development of new solutions and business models in search, ultimately benefiting the consumer.
我們認為，任何有效的補救措施都不應該影響 Google 的商業模式或其卓越的創造力和執行力。相反，它應該專注於其飛輪內核心技術的訪問，這將促進更多元化的競爭。這種方法將鼓勵在搜索領域開發新的解決方案和商業模式，最終使消費者受益。

Of course, any remedy should pass the tests of:
當然，任何補救措施都應該通過以下測試：

1. Is it long-lasting? 它是否持久？
2. Is it easily enforceable?
   是否容易強制執行？
3. Can it be easily verified?
   可以輕易驗證嗎？

There are three core technology aspects here: the Search Index, the User Index, and the Advertiser Index.
這裡有三個核心技術方面：搜索索引、用戶索引和廣告主索引。

The User Index and the Advertiser Index are tied to the business model, and any remedy here will impact only the business (including payments for placements, etc.), with no actual benefit to the consumer. That leaves the Search Index.
用戶指數和廣告商指數與商業模式相關，任何處理只會影響業務（包括放置費用等），對消費者沒有實際好處。這樣只剩下搜索指數。

The Search Index is the core engine that drives the search flow and generates results pertinent to the user. If we want different search products (the search page) to flourish and different business models for search products to flourish, we should consider separating the Search Index from the other two indexes and make the Search Index available to competitors. This will drive enormous innovation and free competitors to pursue different business models. The innovation on presenting results to users can center around different ranking criteria, different business models, and different user controls on the data they see.
搜索索引是驅動搜索流程並生成與用戶相關的結果的核心引擎。如果我們希望不同的搜索產品（搜索頁面）蓬勃發展，並且希望不同的搜索產品的業務模式蓬勃發展，我們應該考慮將搜索索引與其他兩個索引分開，並將搜索索引提供給競爭對手。這將推動巨大的創新，並使競爭對手能夠追求不同的業務模式。向用戶呈現結果的創新可以圍繞不同的排名標準、不同的業務模式和用戶對他們所看到的數據的不同控制而展開。

Since search is a critical but essential resource for all users, the solution we propose is to consider allowing fair access to the Search Index or take it a step further into known precedents, and consider treating the Search Index as an “Essential Facility”.
由於搜索對所有用戶來說是一個至關重要但必不可少的資源，我們提出的解決方案是考慮允許對搜索索引進行公平訪問，或者更進一步地參考已知的先例，並將搜索索引視為“基本設施”。

The “Essential Facilities” Doctrine
“基本設施”原則

The Essential Facilities Doctrine is an antitrust principle that requires the owner of an “essential” or “bottleneck” facility to provide competitors with access on reasonable terms. This doctrine has been applied across various industries, from railroads to news services and electrical utilities.
基本設施原則是一項反壟斷原則，要求“基本”或“瓶頸”設施的所有者以合理條件向競爭對手提供接入。這一原則已在各個行業中應用，從鐵路到新聞服務和電力公用事業。

The doctrine traces its origins to the 1912 Supreme Court case United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, which addressed railroads controlling access to key bridges and facilities in St. Louis. This ruling laid the foundation for regulated access to the expansive railroad network in the U.S., even though it was primarily built by private companies.
這一原則的起源可以追溯到 1912 年最高法院的案例《美國訴終端鐵路協會案》，該案涉及鐵路公司控制聖路易斯重要橋樑和設施的問題。這一裁決為美國龐大的鐵路網絡實現了受監管的接入，即使這個網絡主要是由私人公司建設的。

Over the years, the doctrine has been applied in cases involving news services (Associated Press v. United States, 1945), electrical utilities (Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 1973), and more recently, cable distribution networks (Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 2021).
多年來，這一原則已應用於涉及新聞服務（Associated Press v. United States, 1945）、電力公用事業（Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 1973）以及最近的有線分發網絡（Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 2021）的案例中。

This doctrine ensures that critical infrastructure, such as railroad, power lines or communication infrastructure, built by private enterprises, serves the public good. It’s a principle that could also be applied to a unique bottleneck resource in the digital age - the Search Index.
這個原則確保了由私營企業建造的關鍵基礎設施，如鐵路、電力線路或通信基礎設施，能夠為公眾利益服務。這是一個原則，也可以應用於數位時代中的獨特瓶頸資源 - 搜尋索引。

Benefits of this approach
這種方法的好處

The Google Search Index is a unique and irreplaceable resource within the digital ecosystem. Mandating fair access to it or treating it as an essential facility could address the core issues identified in the US vs. Google case, aligning with the Sherman Act’s objective to promote innovation and genuine competition that benefits consumers.
Google 搜尋索引是數位生態系統中獨特且不可替代的資源。強制對其進行公平存取或將其視為基本設施，可以解決美國訴 Google 案中所識別的核心問題，符合謝爾曼法案促進創新和真正造福消費者的目標。

The insurmountable challenge for any new search company to provide a novel search experience lies in the inability to build a Search Index that competes with Google, due to the enormous investment costs, technological barriers, and time required. It’s akin to expecting a new transportation company to build its own version of the entire railroad infrastructure before even putting a train on the tracks.
對於任何新的搜尋公司來說，提供一種新穎的搜尋體驗所面臨的無法逾越的挑戰在於無法建立一個能與 Google 競爭的搜尋索引，這是由於巨大的投資成本、技術障礙和所需的時間。這就好比期望一家新的運輸公司在甚至將火車放上軌道之前就建立自己版本的整個鐵路基礎設施。

Key components of this approach include separating the index from the search product, allowing other companies to develop innovative search solutions using the same high-quality web index. Additionally, providing standardized, fair, and non-discriminatory programmatic access through well-defined application programming interfaces (APIs) is crucial, as Google’s Search Index currently remains the only major search index not easily accessible under commercially friendly terms.
該方法的關鍵組件包括將索引與搜索產品分開，允許其他公司使用相同高質量的網絡索引開發創新的搜索解決方案。此外，通過明確定義的應用程序編程接口（API）提供標準化、公平和非歧視性的程序化訪問至關重要，因為谷歌的搜索索引目前仍然是唯一一個在商業友好條款下不易訪問的主要搜索索引。

Implementing a tiered pricing model would facilitate various levels of access, accommodating startups and established companies alike, enabling them to pay for access to the Search Index similarly to any other company. Establishing regulatory oversight through a dedicated body would ensure fair access and compliance. These measures would foster a more competitive and innovative search ecosystem, benefiting consumers and the broader market.
實施分層定價模型將促進不同級別的訪問，滿足初創企業和已建立的公司，使它們能夠像其他公司一樣支付訪問搜索索引的費用。通過專門機構建立監管監督將確保公平訪問和合規性。這些措施將促進更具競爭力和創新性的搜索生態系統，使消費者和更廣泛的市場受益。

This would bring about several significant benefits:
這將帶來幾個重大好處：

1. Increased competition: Lowering barriers to entry would encourage the development of new, specialized search engines and applications.
   增加競爭：降低進入門檻將鼓勵新的專業搜索引擎和應用程式的發展。
2. Alternative business models: This approach would enable the creation of paid, private, and free public search options, offering consumers more choice and aligning with their varied needs and preferences.
   替代商業模式：這種方法將使付費、私人和免費公共搜索選項得以創建，為消費者提供更多選擇，並與他們多樣化的需求和偏好保持一致。
3. Improved privacy options: By facilitating search products that don’t rely on data collection for advertising, users would have greater control over their privacy.
   改進的隱私選項：通過促進不依賴數據收集進行廣告的搜索產品，用戶將對其隱私享有更大控制權。
4. Enhanced search quality: Increased competition could lead to improvements in algorithms and overall user experience, benefiting consumers.
   增強的搜索質量：競爭的增加可能會促使算法和整體用戶體驗的改善，從而使消費者受益。
5. Preservation of search as a public good: Ensuring broad access to high-quality search capabilities would help maintain search as a vital resource for everyone.
   搜索的保存作為公共利益：確保廣泛獲得高質量的搜索功能將有助於保持搜索對每個人都是一個重要資源。
6. Economic growth: Opening up the search index could drive the creation of new businesses and services built on search capabilities, contributing to overall economic growth.
   經濟增長：開放搜索指數可能推動基於搜索功能建立的新業務和服務的創建，從而促進整體經濟增長。
7. Enabling a public search engine: Last but not least, when considering how we access information as citizens in a modern society, it is crucial to recognize information access as a fundamental human right. The traditional role that public libraries played for centuries in informing citizens is no longer sufficient in the digital age. A public search engine could ensure non-discriminatory access to information, funded by taxpayer money, serving the best interests of all citizens. Imagine it as your local public library on steroids.
   啟用公共搜索引擎：最後但同樣重要的是，在考慮我們作為現代社會公民如何獲取信息時，必須認識到信息訪問是一項基本人權。傳統上公共圖書館在幾個世紀中為市民提供信息的角色在數字時代已不再足夠。一個公共搜索引擎可以確保所有市民以非歧視性方式獲取信息，由納稅人資助，服務所有市民的最大利益。想像它是你當地的公共圖書館的強化版。

Addressing potential challenges
應對潛在挑戰

Our proposal raises important questions and potential challenges, including:
我們的提議引發了重要問題和潛在挑戰，包括：

• Impact on innovation incentives
  對創新激勵的影響
• Technical feasibility 技術可行性
• International coordination
  國際協調
• Fair compensation 合理的補償
• Unintended consequences 意外後果

While significant, these challenges are not insurmountable. Open dialogue and expertise from various sectors can lead to workable solutions.
儘管具有重大挑戰性，但這些挑戰並非不可克服。開放對話和來自各個領域的專業知識可以帶來可行的解決方案。

A Path Forward 前進的道路

Judge Mehta’s ruling has opened a window for meaningful reform in the search market. By opening access to the dominant search index or treating it as an essential facility, we have the opportunity to foster a more open and competitive search ecosystem that better serves users’ needs.
梅塔法官的裁決為搜索市場的有意義改革打開了一扇窗戶。通過開放對主導性搜索索引的訪問或將其視為基本設施，我們有機會促進一個更開放和競爭激烈的搜索生態系統，更好地滿足用戶的需求。

As we move forward, it’s crucial to remember that the future of search will impact how we access information, make decisions, and understand the world. This future should be shaped through collaborative efforts considering all stakeholders’ needs, especially end-users.
隨著我們不斷前進，重要的是要記住搜索的未來將如何影響我們獲取信息、做出決策和理解世界。這個未來應該通過協作努力來塑造，考慮所有利益相關者的需求，尤其是最終用戶。

To realize the benefits of this proposal, we must also address the broader ecosystem, including promoting more choices in web browsers and empowering users to select search engines that best meet their needs and values.
為了實現這項提議的好處，我們還必須解決更廣泛的生態系統問題，包括促進網頁瀏覽器的更多選擇，讓用戶選擇最符合其需求和價值觀的搜索引擎。

Policymakers, industry leaders, and the public should join this crucial conversation. Together, we can work towards a future where search technology is harnessed for the greatest public good, fostering innovation, respecting privacy, and ensuring equitable access to the world’s information - all while prioritizing the needs and rights of consumers.
政策制定者、行業領袖和公眾應該加入這一關鍵對話。我們可以共同努力，朝著一個利用搜索技術為最大公眾利益而努力的未來前進，促進創新，尊重隱私，確保對世界信息的平等訪問 - 同時優先考慮消費者的需求和權利。

References and further reading
參考文獻與進一步閱讀

• US. v. Google Judge Mehta ruling (PDF)
  美國訴 Google 梅塔法官裁決（PDF）
• A Critical Analysis of the Google Search Antitrust Decision (International Center for Law & Economics)
  對谷歌搜索反壟斷決定的批判性分析（國際法律與經濟中心）
• The DOJ’s Google Search Case – What Next? (Tech Policy Press)
  司法部的 Google 搜索案 - 接下來會怎樣？（Tech Policy Press）
• “Google is a Monopolist” – Wrong and Right Ways to Think About Remedies (Tech Policy Press)
  “Google 是壟斷者”-思考補救措施的錯誤和正確方式（Tech Policy Press）
• An analysis of potential remedies to address Google’s search monopoly (Consumer Reports)
  分析潛在的解決方案以應對 Google 的搜索壟斷（Consumer Reports）
• Friendly Google and Enemy Remedies (Stratechery)
  友好的 Google 和敵對的 Remedies (Stratechery)

Published by Raghu Murthi and Vladimir Prelovac on August 29, 2024. Authors would like to thank Megan Gray for prior discussions on this subject.
由 Raghu Murthi 和 Vladimir Prelovac 於 2024 年 8 月 29 日出版。作者感謝 Megan Gray 對這個主題的先前討論。