LUCY et al v. ZEHMER et al
LUCY et al 诉 ZEHMER et al

It was W. O. Lucy and J. C. Lucy, complainants, institute this suid against A. H. Zehmer and Ida S. Zehmer, his wife, defendants, to have specific performance of a contract by which it was alleged the Zehmers had sold to W. O. Lucy a tract of land owned by A. H. Zehmer in Dinwiddie county containing 471.6 acres, more or less, known as the Ferguson farm, for $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000. J. C. Lucy, the other complainant, is a brother of W. O. Lucy, to whom W. O. Lucy transferred a half interest in his alleged purchase.
原告 W. O. Lucy 和 J. C. Lucy 对被告 A. H. Zehmer 和他的妻子 Ida S. Zehmer 提起诉讼，要求他们具体履行一份合同，据称 Zehmers 向 W. O. Lucy 出售了 A. H. Zehmer 在丁威迪县拥有的一块土地，占地 471.6 英亩， 或多或少，被称为弗格森农场，因为 $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000 .另一名申诉人 J. C. Lucy 是 W. O. Lucy 的兄弟，W. O. Lucy 将他所谓的购买的一半权益转让给了 W. O. Lucy。

The instrument sought to be enforced was written by A. H. Zehmer on December 20, 1952, in these words: ’ We hereby agree to sell to W. O. Lucy the Ferguson Farm complete for $\mathrm{\$}50,000.00$$\mathrm{\$}50,000.00$$50,000.00\$ 50,000.00, title satisfactory to buyer,’ and signed by the defendants, A. H. Zehmer and Ida S. Zehmer.
寻求执行的文书由 A. H. Zehmer 于 1952 年 12 月 20 日撰写，内容如下：“我们特此同意将弗格森农场出售给 W. O. Lucy，所有权 $\mathrm{\$}50,000.00$$\mathrm{\$}50,000.00$$50,000.00\$ 50,000.00 为买方满意，”并由被告 A. H. Zehmer 和 Ida S. Zehmer 签署。

The answer of A. H. Zehmer admitted that at the time mentioned W. O. Lucy offered him $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000 cash for the farm, but that he, Zehmer, considered that the offer was made in jest; that so thinking, and both he and Lucy having had several drinks, he wrote out ‘the memorandum’ quoted above and induced his wife to sign it; that he did not deliver the memorandum to Lucy, but that Lucy picked it up, read it, put it in his pocket, attempted to offer Zehmer $\mathrm{\$}5$$\mathrm{\$}5$$5\$ 5 to bind the bargain, which Zehmer refused to accept, and realizing for the first time that Lucy was serious, Zehmer assured him that he had no intention of selling the farm and that the whole matter was a joke. Lucy left the premises insisting that he had purchased the farm.
A. H. Zehmer 的回答承认，当时提到的 W. O. Lucy 向他 $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000 提供了农场的现金，但他，Zehmer，认为这个提议是开玩笑的;这样想着，他和露西都喝了好几杯酒，他写下了上面引用的“备忘录”，并说服他的妻子签字;他没有把备忘录交给露西，而是露西捡起来，读了一遍，放进了他的口袋，试图让泽默 $\mathrm{\$}5$$\mathrm{\$}5$$5\$ 5 把这笔交易装订起来，但泽默拒绝接受，他第一次意识到露西是认真的，泽默向他保证，他无意卖掉农场，整件事都是个笑话。露西离开了房子，坚称他买下了这个农场。

December 20 was on Saturday. Next day Lucy telephoned to J. C. Lucy and arranged with the latter to take a half interest in the purchase and pay half of the consideration. On Monday he engaged an attorney to examine the title. The attomey reported favorably on December 31 and on January 2 Lucy wrote Zehmer stating that the title was satisfactory, that he was ready to pay the purchase price in cash and asking when Zehmer would be ready to close the deal. Zehmer replied by letter, mailed on January 13, asserting that he had never agreed or intended to sell.
12 月 20 日是星期六。第二天，露西打电话给 J. C. 露西，与后者安排从购买中获得一半的利息并支付一半的对价。周一，他聘请了一名律师来审查该标题。12 月 31 日，公司报告良好，1 月 2 日，露西写信给 Zehmer，表示所有权令人满意，他准备以现金支付购买价格，并询问 Zehmer 何时准备好完成交易。Zehmer 在 1 月 13 日邮寄的信件中回复称，他从未同意或打算出售。

Thereupon complainants brought this suit. The issue is whether the agreement was entered into with contractual intent or was merely a joke.
因此，投诉人提起了这项诉讼。问题在于该协议是出于合同意图而签订的，还是只是一个玩笑。

In his testimony Zehmer claimed that he ‘was high as a Georgia pine,’ and that the transaction ‘was just a bunch of two doggoned drunks bluffing to see who could talk the biggest and say the most.’ That claim is inconsistent with his attempt to testify in great detail as to what was said and what was done. It is contradicted by other evidence as to the condition of both parties, and rendered of no weight by the testimony of his wife that when Lucy left the restaurant she suggested that Zehmer drive him home. The record is convincing that Zehmer was not intoxicated to the extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the instrument he executed, and hence that instrument is not to be invalidated on that ground.
在他的证词中，Zehmer 声称他“像乔治亚州的松树一样高”，而这笔交易“只是两个顽固的醉汉虚张声势，看谁能说得最多，说得最多。这种说法与他试图就所说的话和所做的事进行非常详细的证词不一致。关于双方情况的其他证据都与之相矛盾，而他妻子的证词也表明，当露西离开餐厅时，她建议泽默开车送他回家，这毫无意义。该记录令人信服地表明，Zehmer 并没有醉酒到无法理解他所执行的文书的性质和后果的程度，因此该文书不应因此而无效。

The evidence is convincing also that Zehmer wrote two agreements, the first one beginning ‘I hereby agree to sell.’ Lucy told him he had better change it to ‘We’ because Mrs. Zehmer would have to sign it too. Zehmer then tore up what he had written, wrote the agreement quoted above and asked Mrs. Zehmer, who was at the other end of the counter ten or twelve feet away, to sign it. Mrs. Zehmer said she would for $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000 and signed it. Zehmer brought it back and gave it to Lucy, who offered him $\mathrm{\$}5$$\mathrm{\$}5$$5\$ 5 which Zehmer refused, saying, ‘You don’ $t$$t$tt need to give me any money, you got the agreement there signed by both of us.’
证据还令人信服地证明，Zehmer 写了两份协议，第一份协议的开头是“我特此同意出售”。露西告诉他，他最好把它改成'我们'，因为泽默夫人也得签字。然后，Zehmer 撕毁了他所写的内容，写下了上面引用的协议，并要求在柜台另一端 10 或 12 英尺外的 Zehmer 夫人签字。Zehmer 夫人说她会支持 $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000 并签署了它。Zehmer 把它带回来交给 Lucy，Lucy 向他 $\mathrm{\$}5$$\mathrm{\$}5$$5\$ 5 提出，但 Zehmer 拒绝了，说：'你不需要 $t$$t$tt 给我任何钱，你在那里得到了我们俩签署的协议。

He appearance of the contract, the fact that it was under discussion for forty minutes or more before it was signed; Lucy’s objection to the first draft because it was written in the singular, and he wanted Mrs. Zehmer to sign it also; the rewriting to meet that objection and the signing by Mrs. Zehmer; the discussion of what was to be included in the sale, the provision for the examination of the title, the completeness of the instrument that was executed, the taking possession of it by Lucy with no request or suggestion by either of the defendants that he give it back, are facts which furnish persuasive evidence that the execution of the contract was a serious business transaction rather than a casual, jesting matter as defendants now contend.
他拿出合同，在签署之前已经讨论了四十分钟或更长时间;露西反对初稿，因为它是用单数写的，他想让泽默太太也签字;为回应这一反对意见而重写，并由 Zehmer 夫人签名;讨论出售中应包括的内容、审查所有权的规定、所执行的文书的完整性、露西在没有任何被告要求或建议归还的情况下占有它，这些事实提供了令人信服的证据，证明合同的执行是一项严肃的商业交易，而不是随意的。 正如被告现在所争辩的那样，开玩笑很重要。

In the field of contracts, as generally elsewhere, 'We must look to the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention rather than to his secret and unexpressed intention. The law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.,
在合同领域，就像在其他地方一样，“我们必须把一个人的外在表达看作是他意图的表达，而不是他秘密的和未表达的意图。法律赋予一个人与其言行的合理含义相对应的意图。

The mental assent of the parties is not requisite for the formation of a contract. If the words or other acts of one of the parties have but one reasonable meaning, his undisclosed intention is immaterial except when an unreasonable meaning which he attaches to his manifestations is known to the other party.
双方的精神同意不是订立合同的必要条件。如果其中一方的言语或其他行为只有一个合理的含义，则他未披露的意图是无关紧要的，除非另一方知道他赋予其表现的不合理含义。

An agreement or mutual assent is of course essential to a valid contract but the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts. If his words and acts, judged by a reasonable standard, manifest an intention to agree, it is immaterial what may be the real but unexpressed state of his mind. So a person cannot set up that he was merely jesting when his conduct and words would warrant a reasonable person in believing that he intended a real agreement. Reversed.
协议或相互同意当然是有效合同的必要条件，但法律赋予一个人与其言行的合理含义相对应的意图。如果以合理的标准来判断他的言行表现出同意的意图，那么他真实但未表达的心理状态是什么就无关紧要了。因此，当一个人的行为和言语足以让一个合理的人相信他打算达成一项真正的协议时，他不能证明他只是在开玩笑。反。

合同各方表示的意思应当足够地明确和具体，否则，其表示可能由于过于含糊不清或模棱两可而不能成为足以使合同成立的意思表示。

77 | 11. App.3d 471, 395 N.E.2d 1061, | 11. App. 1 Dist., 1979.
77 页 |11. App.3d 471， 395 N.E.2d 1061， |11. 附录 1 区，1979 年。

Plaintiff was admitted to the College in early 1973. In his first academic semester, plaintiff failed to attain a passing grade in the course Physiology 101. Plaintiff was given a re-examination in that course, pursuant to the following provision contained in the College’s Student Handbook. Plaintiff failed to attain a passing grade on re-examination. Plaintiff was informed by the College that If he passed his reduced course load the second semester ( no course having been substituted for Physiology 203), he would be allowed to retake and make up Physiology 101 in the summer. Plaintiff failed to attain passing grades in two courses his second semester. On June 14, 1974, he was notified by the College that because of his academic standing he was
原告于 1973 年初被学院录取。在他的第一个学期，原告在生理学 101 课程中未能达到及格分数。根据学院学生手册中的以下规定，原告在该课程中接受了复试。原告在复试时未能达到及格分数。学院通知原告，如果他在第二学期通过了减少的课程负担（没有课程替代生理学 203），他将被允许在暑假重修并补上生理学 101。原告在第二学期的两门课程中未能取得及格成绩。1974 年 6 月 14 日，学院通知他，由于他的学术地位，他
（二）意思表示的确定性
合同各方表示的意思应当足够地明确和具体，否则，其表示可能由于过于含糊不清或模棱两可而不能成为足以使合同成立的意思表示。

77 | 11. App.3d 471, 395 N. E.2d 1061, I 11. App. 1 Dist., 1979.
77 页 |11. App.3d 471， 395 N. E.2d 1061， I 11.App. 1 Dist.，1979 年。

Plaintiff was admitted to the College in early 1973. In his first academic semester, plaintiff failed to attain a passing grade in the course Physiology 101. Plaintiff was given a re-examination in that course, pursuant to the following provision contained in the College’s Student Handbook. Plaintiff failed to attain a passing grade on re-examination. Plaintiff was informed by the College that If he passed his reduced course load the second semester ( no course having been substituted for Physiology 203), he would be allowed to retake and make up Physiology 101 in the summer. Plaintiff failed to attain passing grades in two courses his second semester. On June 14, 1974, he was notified by the College that because of his academic standing he was
原告于 1973 年初被学院录取。在他的第一个学期，原告在生理学 101 课程中未能达到及格分数。根据学院学生手册中的以下规定，原告在该课程中接受了复试。原告在复试时未能达到及格分数。学院通知原告，如果他在第二学期通过了减少的课程负担（没有课程替代生理学 203），他将被允许在暑假重修并补上生理学 101。原告在第二学期的两门课程中未能取得及格成绩。1974 年 6 月 14 日，学院通知他，由于他的学术地位，他
being dismissed from the school. Plaintiff subsequently filed this action against the College alleging a breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges that the College informed him, at that time, that he " should not worry. . . that everything would be done to assist (him), including figuring out some way to help him." Plaintiff contends that this statement by the College gave rise to a binding and enforceable oral contract which was subsequently breached. On December 15, 1977, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.
被学校开除。原告随后对学院提起诉讼，指控学院违反合同。原告声称，学院当时告诉他，他“不应该担心......将尽一切努力帮助（他），包括想办法帮助他。原告辩称，学院的这一声明导致了一份具有约束力和可执行的口头合同，但随后被违反。1977 年 12 月 15 日，初审法院批准了该动议，并驳回了原告的投诉。原告上诉。

… A binding and enforceable oral contract cannot arise unless the terms of the alleged agreement are sufficiently definite and certain. (See Eisele v. Ayers (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 21 Ill. Dec. 86, 381 N. E. 2d 21 ; Hintz v. Lazarus (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 64, 15 Ill. Dec. 546,373 N.E.2d 1018. ) An " offer must be so definite as to its material terms or require such definite terms in the acceptance that the promises and performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain." (Restatement (Second) of Contracts s 32(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).) The reason for this rule is obvious.
…除非所声称的协议条款足够明确和确定，否则不能产生具有约束力和可执行的口头合同。（参见 Eisele v. Ayers （1978）， 63 Ill. App. 3d 1039， 21 Ill. Dec. 86， 381 N. E. 2d 21 ;Hintz v.Lazarus （1978）， 58 Ill. App.3d 64， 15 Ill. Dec. 546,373 N.E.2d 1018.） “ 要约必须明确其重要条款，或要求在接受时提供如此明确的条款，以使各方提供的承诺和履行是合理确定的。（合同重述（第二）条第 32（1） 条（1964 年第 1 号草案）。这条规则的原因很明显。
“A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what it is. It is not enough that the parties think that they have made a contract; they must have expressed their intentions in a manner that is capable of understanding. It is not even though that they have actually agreed, if their expressions, when interpreted in the light of accompanying factors and circumstances, are not such that the court can determine what the terms of that agreement are. Vagueness of expression, indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms of an agreement, have often been held to prevent the creation of an enforceable contract.” 1 Corbin on Contracts s 95, at 394 (1963) ; see also 1 Williston on Contracts s 37 (3d ed. 1957).
“除非法院能够确定合同是什么，否则它无法执行合同。当事人认为他们已经签订了合同是不够的;他们必须以能够理解的方式表达他们的意图。即使他们实际上已经同意，但如果他们的表达在根据伴随的因素和情况进行解释时，法院无法确定该协议的条款是什么。表达的模糊性、不确定性和协议任何基本条款的不确定性，往往被认为会妨碍制定可执行的合同。1 Corbin on Contracts s 95，第394页（1963年）;另见 1 Williston on Contracts s 37（1957 年第 3 版）。

We find that the vagueness and indefiniteness of the statement attributable to the College prevents the creation of a binding and enforceable oral contract.
我们发现，可归因于学院的声明的模糊性和不确定性阻碍了具有约束力和可执行的口头合同的建立。

Plaintiff next invokes the general rule that the basic legal relationship between a student and a private university or college is contractual in nature, and the catalogues, bulletins, circulars and regulations of the institution, made available to the student, become a part of that contract. See Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 320, 13 Ill. Dec. 699, 371 N. E. 2d 634; Eisele v. Ayers (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 21 Ill. Dec. 86, 381 N. E. 2d 21.
原告接下来援引一般规则，即学生与私立大学或学院之间的基本法律关系本质上是合同性质的，提供给学生的机构目录、公告、通告和条例成为该合同的一部分。参见 Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School （1977）， 69 Ill. 2d 320， 13 Ill. Dec. 699， 371 N. E. 2d 634;Eisele v.Ayers （1978）， 63 Ill. App. 3d 1039， 21 Ill. Dec. 86， 381 N. E. 2d 21.

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that during the 1973-1974 school year he “did
原告在诉状中称，在 1973-1974 学年期间，他“确实
not receive periodic information with respect to his (academic) progress… nor recommendations for improvement” in violation of the following Student Handbook provision :
没有收到有关他（学术）进展的定期信息......或改进建议“，违反了以下学生手册的规定：
“Evaluation of the Student
“对学生的评价
It is desirable that the instructor should periodically inform the student of his progress. . . The student should be informed soon after mid-term examinations of his standing With recommendations, if necessary, for improvement.”
教师最好定期通知学生他的进步。应在期中考试后尽快通知学生他的排名，如有必要，提出改进建议。

Plaintiff contends that the violation of this provision amounted to a breach of contract. We disagree.
原告辩称，违反该条款构成违约。我们不同意。

This particular provision in the Student Handbook was Not an offer or a promise by the College which created a power of acceptance in the plaintiff. The provision was more in the nature of an unenforceable expression of intention, hope or desire. [1 Corbin on Contracts s 15 (1963)] It did not justify an understanding that a commitment had been made by the College and it was not communicated to the plaintiff in such a way as to invite the payment of tuition in reliance thereon. We find that this provision in the Student Handbook was an expression by the College of an unenforceable expectation which plaintiff did not have the power to transform into a binding contractual obligation.
学生手册中的这一特定规定不是学院的要约或承诺，因此在原告中产生了接受权。该条款更像是意图、希望或愿望的不可执行的表达。[1 Corbin on Contracts s 15 （1963）]它并不能证明学院已经做出承诺的理解是合理的，也没有以要求依赖该承诺支付学费的方式传达给原告。我们发现，学生手册中的这一规定是学院表达的不可执行的期望，原告无权将其转化为具有约束力的合同义务。

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
因此，基于上述理由，我们维持初审法院的判决。
Affirmed. 肯定。

二、要约
（一）要约与要约邀请
如果甲通过广告推销一种产品，乙见到该广告之后对甲表示，愿意按广告中写明的条件与甲成交，合同是否在双方之间就此而成立了？如果甲在自己开的商店里陈列了某种商品，乙对甲表示愿意按该商品上的标价购买该商品，甲能否拒绝出售? 解决这类问题的关键是，甲的意思表示是要约，还是与他人开始谈判的建议或请别人向自己发要约的建议（要约邀请）。如果甲的意思表示构成一项要约，则其中包含的条件一旦被接受，合同就成立了。那么，在这两类意思表示之间划出界线
如果甲通过广告推销一种产品，乙见到该广告之后对甲表示，愿意按广告中写明的条件与甲成交，合同是否在双方之间就此而成立了？如果甲在自己开的商店里陈列了某种商品，乙对甲表示愿意按该商品上的标价购买该商品，甲能否拒绝出售?解决这类问题的关键是，甲的意思表示是要约，还是与他人开始谈判的建议或请别人向自己发要约的建议（要约邀请）。如果甲的意思表示构成一项要约，则其中包含的条件一旦被接受，合同就成立了。那么，在这两类意思表示之间划出界线

的法律上的标准是什么呢? 试通过以下案例进行分析。
的法律上的标准是什么呢?试通过以下案例进行分析。

The complaint of the respondent alleges that the appellants were dealers in salt in the city of Milwaukee, including salt of the Michigan Salt Association; that the respondent was a dealer in salt in the city of la Crosse, and accustomed to buy salt in large quantities, which fact was known to the appellants; that on the nineteenth day of September, 1882, the appellants, at Milwaukee, wrote and posted to the respondent at La Crosse a letter, of which the following is a copy:
被告的投诉称，上诉人是密尔沃基市的盐经销商，包括密歇根州盐业协会的盐;答辩人是拉克罗斯市的盐商，习惯于大量购买盐，上诉人知道这一事实;1882 年 9 月 19 日，上诉人在密尔沃基写了一封信，并在拉克罗斯寄给了被告，以下是该信的副本：

MILWAUKEE, September 19, 1882.
密尔沃基，1882 年 9 月 19 日。
J. H. Moulton, Esq., La Crosse, Wis. -DEAR SIR: In consequence of a rupture in the salt trade, we are authorized to offer Michigan fine salt, in full car-load lots of 80 to 95 bbls., delivered at your city, at 85 c . per bbl., to be shipped per $C$$C$CC. &N. W. R. R. Co. only. At this price it is a bargain, as the price in general remains unchanged. Shall be pleased to receive your order.
J. H. Moulton， Esq.， La Crosse， Wis. -尊敬的先生： 由于盐业贸易的中断，我们被授权提供密歇根州的细盐，以 80 至 95 桶的满载批次，以 85 摄氏度的浓度运送到您所在的城市。每 bbl.，每 $C$$C$CC .&N. W. R. R. Co. 仅限。在这个价格下，这是很划算的，因为价格总体上保持不变。很高兴收到您的订单。

Yours truly, 此致

The plaintiff further shows that he received said letter in due course of mail, towit, on the twentieth day of September, 1882, and that he, on that day, accepted the offer in said letter contained, to the amount of two thousand barrels of salt therein named, and immediately, and on said day, sent to said defendants at Milwaukee a message by telegraph, as follows:
原告进一步证明，他在 1882 年 9 月 20 日通过邮件收到了上述信件，并在当天接受了信件中的提议，其中包含了 2000 桶盐，并立即在上述日期通过电报向密尔沃基的上述被告发送了一份信息， 如下：

LA CROSSE, September 20, 1882.
拉克罗斯，1882 年 9 月 20 日。
To C. J. Kershaw & Son, Milwaukee, Wis. : Your letter of yesterday, received and noted. You may ship me two thousand $(2,000)$$(2,000)$(2,000)(2,000) barrels Michigan fine salt, as offered in your letter. Answer.
致C. J. Kershaw & Son， Milwaukee， Wis. ： 您昨天的信，已收到并注明。你可以按照你信中提供的，给我寄两千 $(2,000)$$(2,000)$(2,000)(2,000) 桶密歇根细盐。答。

That said telegraphic acceptance and order was duly received by said defendants on the twentieth day of September, 1882, aforesaid; that two thousand barrels of said
上述被告于 1882 年 9 月 20 日正式收到上述电报接受和命令;那两千桶说
salt was a reasonable quantity for this plaintiff to order in response to said offer, and not in excess of the amount which the defendants, from their knowledge of the business of the plaintiff, might reasonably expect him to order in response thereto.
盐是原告人为回应上述要约而订购的合理数量，且不超过被告人根据对原告人业务的了解，可能合理地期望他为回应上述要约而订购的盐量。

That although said defendants received said acceptance and order of this plaintiff on said twentieth day of September, 1882, they attempted, on the twenty-first day of September, 1882, to withdraw the offer contained in their said letter of September 19, 1882, and did, on said twenty-first day of September, 1882, notify this plaintiff of the withdrawal of said offer on their part; that this plaintiff thereupon demanded of the defendants the delivery to him of two thousand barrels of Michigan fine salt, in accordance with the terms of said offer, accepted by this plaintiff as aforesaid, and offered to pay them therefor in accordance with said terms, and this plaintiff was ready to accept said two thousand barrels, and ready to pay therefor in accordance with said terms. Nevertheless, the defendants utterly refused to deliver the same, or any part thereof, by reason whereof this plaintiff sustained damage to the amount of eight hundred dollars.
尽管上述被告在 1882 年 9 月 20 日收到了本原告的上述接受和命令，但他们在 1882 年 9 月 21 日试图撤回其 1882 年 9 月 19 日信函中包含的要约，并在 1882 年 9 月 21 日通知该原告他们撤回了上述要约;原告随后要求被告按照上述要约的条款向他交付两千桶密歇根细盐，原告如前所述接受了该报价，并提出按照上述条款向他们付款，本原告准备接受上述两千桶， 并准备根据上述条款支付费用。然而，被告完全拒绝交付该物品或其任何部分，因此该原告遭受了 800 美元的损失。

Wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendants for the sum of eight hundred dollars, with interest from the twenty-first day of September, 1882, besides the costs of this action.
因此，原告要求判决被告支付 800 美元，以及从 1882 年 9 月 21 日起的利息，以及本诉讼的费用。

To this complaint the appellants interposed a general demurrer. The circuit court overruled the demurrer, and from the order overruling the same the defendants appeal to this court.
对于这项投诉，上诉人提出了一般异议。巡回法院推翻了异议人，被告不服推翻相同的命令，向本法院提出上诉。

The only question presented is whether the appellant’s letter, and the telegram sent by the respondent in reply thereto, constitute a contract for the sale of 2,000 barrels of Michigan fine salt by the appellants to the respondent at the price named in such letter.
提出的唯一问题是，上诉人的信件和被告为回复信函而发送的电报是否构成上诉人以信中提到的价格向被告出售 2,000 桶密歇根细盐的合同。

The counsel for the respondent clearly appreciated the necessity of putting a construction upon the letter which is not apparent on its face, and in their complaint have interpreted the letter to mean that the appellants by said letter made an express offer to sell the respondent, on the terms stated, such reasonable amount of salt as he might order, and as the appellants might reasonably expect him to order, in response thereto. If in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover in this action it is necessary to prove the allegations, then it seems clear to us that the writings between the parties do not show the contract. It is not insisted by the counsel for the respondent that any recovery can be had unless a proper construction of the letter and telegram constitute a binding contract between the parties. The counsel for the respondent claims that the
答辩人的律师显然明白有必要对这封信进行解释，但从字面上看并不明显，并在他们的投诉中将这封信解释为上诉人通过该信函明确提出要约，按照所述条件向答辩人出售他可能订购的合理数量的盐。 以及上诉人可能合理地期望他下令回应。如果为了使原告有权在本诉讼中追偿，有必要证明指控，那么我们似乎很清楚，双方之间的书面文件并未显示合同。答辩人的律师并未坚持认为，除非对信件和电报的适当解释构成双方之间具有约束力的合同，否则可以进行任何追偿。被告的律师声称
letter of the appellants is an offer to sell to the respondent, on the terms mentioned, any reasonable quantity of Michigan fine salt that he might see fit to order, not less than one car-load.
上诉人的信函是要约，根据上述条款向被申请人出售他认为适合订购的任何合理数量的密歇根细盐，不少于一车。

As the only communications between the parties, upon which a contract can be predicated, are the letter and the reply of the respondent, we must look to them, and nothing else, in order to determine whether there was a contract in fact. We are not at liberty to help out the written contract, if there be one, by adding by parol evidence additional facts to help out the writing so as to make out a contract not expressed therein. If the letter of the appellants is an offer to sell salt to the respondent on the terms stated, then it must be held to be an offer to sell any quantity at the option of the respondent not less than one car-load. The difficulty and injustice of construing the letter into such an offer is so apparent that the learned counsel for the respondent do not insist upon it, and consequently insist that it ought to be construed as an offer to sell such quantity as the appellants, from their knowledge of the business of the respondent, might reasonably expect him to order. Rather than introduce such an element of uncertainty into the contract, we deem it much more reasonable to construe the letter as a simple notice to those dealing in salt that the appellants were in a condition to supply that article for the prices named, and requesting the person to whom it was addressed to deal with them. This case is one where it is eminently proper to heed the injunction of Justice FOSTER in the opinion in Lyman v. Robinson, 14 Allen, 254: “That care should always be taken not to construe as an agreement letters which the parties intended only as preliminary negotiations.”
由于双方之间唯一可以作为合同前提的通信是被申请人的信件和回复，因此我们必须查看它们，而不是其他任何内容，以确定是否存在事实上的合同。如果有书面合同，我们不能随意帮助书面合同，通过口头证据添加额外的事实来帮助书面合同，从而证明合同中没有明示。如果上诉人的信件是按所述条款向答辩人出售盐的要约，则必须被视为根据答辩人的选择出售不少于一车盐的要约。将这封信解释为这样的要约的困难和不公正是如此明显，以至于被告的博学律师并不坚持它，因此坚持认为它应该被解释为出售上诉人根据他们对被告业务的了解，可能合理地期望他订购的数量。我们认为，与其在合约中引入这种不确定因素，不如将该信件解释为向盐业经营者发出简单的通知，表明上诉人有能力以上述价格供应该物品，并要求收件人处理这些物品，这要合理得多。在本案中，非常应该听取 FOSTER 法官在 Lyman v.Robinson， 14 Allen， 254一案中写道：“应始终注意不要将双方仅打算作为初步谈判的协议书解释为协议书。

We place our opinion upon the language of the letter of the appellants, and hold that it cannot be fairly construed into an offer to sell to the respondent any quantity of salt he might order, nor any reasonable amount he might see fit to order. The language is not such as a business man would use in making an offer to sell to an individual a definite amount of property. The word " sell" is not used. They say, “we are authorized to offer Michigan fine salt,” etc., and volunteer an opinion that at the terms stated it is a bargain. They do not say, we offer to sell to you. They use general language proper to be addressed generally to those who were interested in the salt trade. It is clearly in the nature of an advertisement or business circular, to attract the attention of those interested in that business to the fact that good bargains in salt could be had by applying to them, and not as an offer by which they were to be bound, if
我们对上诉人信件的措辞提出意见，并认为这封信不能被公平地解释为向答辩人出售他可能订购的任何数量的盐，或他认为适合订购的任何合理数量的盐。该语言不像商人在提出向个人出售一定数量的财产的要约时使用的语言。没有使用“sell”一词。他们说，“我们有权提供密歇根州的细盐”等，并自愿提出意见，认为按照规定的条款，这是一笔划算的交易。他们没有说，我们要卖给你。他们使用一般性的语言，这些语言通常适用于那些对盐贸易感兴趣的人。广告或商业通告的性质显然是吸引那些对该业务感兴趣的人的注意，即如果他们提出申请，可以获得盐的好交易，而不是作为他们被约束的要约。
accepted, for any amount the persons to whom it was addressed might see fit to order. We think the complaint fails to show any contract between the parties, and the demurrer should have been sustained.
接受，无论收件人可能认为适合订购多少。我们认为投诉未能证明双方之间存在任何合同，因此异议应该得到支持。

The order of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, according to law.
巡回法院的命令被推翻，根据法律，该案发回重审。

如果甲用信件向在异地的乙发出要约，之后感到反海，他能不能在该信件到达乙那里之前使用更快捷的通信手段，比如传真或电传，将该要约撤销呢？通过阅读以下案例，你将得到启示。

On October 10, 1942, the National Housing Agency, Federal Public Housing Authority, hereinafter for brevity referred to as the Authority, invited bids for the construction of a war housing project at Hatboro, Pennsylvania. The invitation stated that bids would be opened at the Authority’s office at 270 Broadway at 2 P. M. on October 22. On October 21, the plaintiffs mailed a letter from Atlantic City, New Jersey, which was their principal place of business, to the Authority, containing a bid of $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000. This letter arrived in time for the opening of bids.
1942 年 10 月 10 日，国家住房局，即联邦公共住房管理局（以下简称管理局），为宾夕法尼亚州哈特伯勒的战争住房项目建设招标。邀请函指出，将于 10 月 22 日下午 2 点在位于百老汇 270 号的管理局办公室开标。10 月 21 日，原告从新泽西州大西洋城（他们的主要营业地点）向管理局邮寄了一封信，其中包含 $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 .这封信及时到达，正好赶上开标。

The instructions to bidders, which were sent by the Authority to prospective bidders, contained in section 9 (1) a provision that telegraphic modifications of bids already submitted in writing would be considered if received by the Authority prior to the hour set for the opening of bids. This provision, which was usual in invitations, was often made use of by bidders, including the plaintiffs, when bidding for Government contracts. It enabled them to set their final bids on the basis of late offers received by them from prospective subcontractors, and of late information concerning prices. The plaintiffs, having received late offers from subcontractors justifying a reduction of their mailed bid, sent a telegram at 12:43 P. M. on October 22 reducing
管理局向潜在投标人发出的给投标人的指示在第 9 条第 （1） 款中载有一项规定，即如果在规定的开标时间之前收到管理局已以书面形式提交的投标书的电报修改，将予以考虑。这项规定在邀请函中很常见，包括原告在内的投标人在竞标政府合同时经常使用。它使他们能够根据潜在分包商的延迟报价和有关价格的延迟信息来确定最终报价。原告收到了分包商的延迟报价，证明降低其邮寄投标是合理的，并于 10 月 22 日中午 12 点 43 分发送了一份电报，降低了
their bid by $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000. The plaintiffs very strongly desired that this telegram should reach the Authority before 2 P. M., and sought to have the telegraph company guarantee that it would do so. The company would not so guarantee, and in fact the telegram was not delivered to the Authority until about 3 P. M.
他们的出价由 $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000 .原告非常强烈地希望这封电报能在下午 2 点之前到达管理局，并寻求电报公司保证它会这样做。公司不会这样保证，事实上，电报直到下午 3 点左右才送到管理局。

At 2 P. M. the bids, of which there were five, were opened by a Mr. Skinner in the conference room of the Authority’s offices in New York, and the amounts of the bids were read aloud to those present. The plaintiffs’ bid of $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 was lowest, the next one being $\mathrm{\$}4,000$$\mathrm{\$}4,000$$4,000\$ 4,000 higher. A Mr. Hager of Philadelphia, who was in the insurance and surety bond business, had been requested by the plaintiffs to attend the opening to observe and report what happened. After the bids had been read, Hager went downstairs to a public telephone and called the plaintiffs and advised them that their bid of $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 was the low bid. He was asked by the plaintiffs to find out whether their telegram modifying their bid had been received. He returned to the room where the bids had been opened, and was told by Skinner that he had not heard of any such telegram. Hager then returned to the public telephone and reported to the plaintiffs what he had learned. He was told to go back and tell Skinner to disregard the telegram when it arrived, as it had been sent ‘in error.’
下午 2 点，斯金纳先生在纽约管理局办公室的会议室里开标，其中有五个，并向在场的人大声宣读了投标金额。原告的出价 $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 最低，其次是 $\mathrm{\$}4,000$$\mathrm{\$}4,000$$4,000\$ 4,000 更高的。A 费城的 Hager 先生从事保险和担保债券业务，原告要求他出席开庭典礼，观察和报告发生的事情。读完出价书后，Hager 下楼拨打公共电话给原告打电话，告诉他们他们的出价 $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 是最低出价。原告要求他了解是否已收到修改其出价的电报。他回到开标的房间，斯金纳告诉他，他没有听说过任何这样的电报。Hager 随后返回公共电话，向原告报告他所了解到的情况。他被告知回去告诉斯金纳，当电报到达时不要理会它，因为它是“错误”发送的。

On November 6 the Authority wrote the plaintiffs that it had accepted their bid of $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000, as reduced by their telegram, and that a contract setting the price at $\mathrm{\$}643,000$$\mathrm{\$}643,000$$643,000\$ 643,000 was being prepared for the plaintiffs’ signature. On November 12 the plaintiffs and the Authority signed such a contract, but pursuant to discussion, inserted in it the following statement:
11 月 6 日，管理局写信给原告，表示已接受他们的电报降低的出价 $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 ，并且 $\mathrm{\$}643,000$$\mathrm{\$}643,000$$643,000\$ 643,000 正在准备一份确定价格的合同供原告签署。11 月 12 日，原告和管理局签署了这样一份合同，但经过讨论，在合同中插入了以下声明：

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, it is mutually understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that neither the execution of this Contract nor any action taken thereunder, nor the recital of the contract sum herein, shall constitute or be construed as a waiver by the contractors of any right which the said contractors might have to establish, by such lawful process as the said contractors shall deem expedient, the true contract price to be the sum of $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 being the amount of the written bid submitted plus the cost of the Performance and Payment Bonds as hereinbefore stated. The government grants the aforesaid right of action to the contractors and shall not interpose the defense of waiver or estoppel.
尽管本协议中有任何相反的规定，本协议双方均相互理解并同意，本合同的执行或根据本合同采取的任何行动，或本协议中合同金额的叙述，均不构成或被解释为承包商放弃上述承包商可能必须确立的任何权利。 通过上述承包商认为合适的合法程序，真实的合同价格是提交的书面投标金额加上上述履约和付款保证金成本的总和 $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 。政府授予承包商上述诉讼权，不得干预弃权或禁止反言的抗辩。

The construction called for by the contract has been completed. The plaintiffs are suing for the $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000 involved in the telegram. The plaintiffs assert that, since their telegram reducing their bid had not been received by the Authority by two o’clock, the hour set for opening bids, and since section $9(1)$$9(1)$9(1)9(1) of the instructions to bidders, quoted
合同要求的施工已经完成。原告正在为 $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000 电报中的涉案人员提起诉讼。原告声称，由于管理局在两点钟之前没有收到他们降低出价的电报，即开标的时间，并且由于对投标人的指示部分 $9(1)$$9(1)$9(1)9(1) 被引用
in finding 3 said ‘Unless specifically authorized, telegraphic bids will not be considered, but modifications by telegraph of bids already submitted will be considered if received prior to the hour set for opening:’ the Authority had no right to consider their telegraphic modification, just as they would have had no right to have it considered, if their original bid had not been the low bid. The Government urges that the quoted provision was inserted for the benefit of the Government; that it could, at its option, either insist upon it or waive it; and that since the plaintiffs’ bid in writing was already low, and hence no other bidder could complain, there was no reason why the Government could not accept a still lower, though belated, offer from the already low bidder.
在调查结果 3 中说“除非得到特别授权，否则不会考虑电报投标，但如果在设定的开标时间之前收到电报对已提交的投标的修改，将考虑通过电报进行的修改：”管理局无权考虑他们的电报修改，就像如果他们的原始出价不是最低出价，他们无权被考虑一样。政府促请为政府的利益而插入所引用的条款;它可以自行选择坚持或放弃它;而且，由于原告的书面出价已经很低，因此没有其他出价者可以抱怨，因此政府没有理由不接受已经很低的出价者提出的更低但迟来的报价。

We think that the plaintiffs did not make an effective offer to reduce their written bid. They dispatched a telegram intended to make such an offer, but when they learned that the telegram had been delayed and that their written bid of $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 was low, they formed the intention to withdraw the offer contained in the telegram, and communicated that intention to the intended offeree, the Authority, before their offer reached it. An offer is not made until it is communicated to the offeree, and until it is made it may be withdrawn, or obliterated, by a communication expressing an intent to do so. If the willingness to contract on the basis of words previously dispatched no longer exists, and if the absence of that willingness has been brought home to the person to whom the words were dispatched, the words, when they later arrive, are empty of the substance necessary to the meeting of the minds of parties in a contract. We have found that the plaintiffs’ oral message, withdrawing the offer to reduce their bid, was delivered through Hager to Skinner before the telegram was delivered to the Authority. There was, therefore, no offer to reduce the bid, made either on time or late, which the Authority could accept, either under the particular procedures by which Government contracts are made, or under ordinary contract law.
我们认为，原告没有提出有效的要约来减少他们的书面出价。他们发出了一份电报，打算提出这样的报价，但当他们得知电报被延迟并且他们的书面出价 $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 很低时，他们形成了撤回电报中包含的报价的意图，并在他们的报价到达之前将这一意图传达给预期的要约人，即管理局。要约在传达给受要约人之前不会提出，并且在提出之前，可以通过表示要约意图的通信撤回或消除要约。如果根据先前发送的文字签订合同的意愿已不复存在，并且如果接收文字的人已经意识到这种意愿的缺失，那么当这些文字后来到达时，这些文字就没有了合同中各方思想相遇所必需的实质。我们发现，原告撤回要约以降低出价的口头信息是在电报交付给管理局之前通过 Hager 传递给 Skinner 的。因此，无论是根据订立政府合同的特定程序，还是根据普通合同法，管理局都没有可以接受的按时或延迟出价的报价。

We consider now what we regard as the essence of the case; the meaning of the special language inserted in the contract because of the problem arising out of the telegram relating to the $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000. The plaintiffs contend that the contract is, in reality, a promise by the Government to pay either $\mathrm{\$}643,000$$\mathrm{\$}643,000$$643,000\$ 643,000 for the work, or, if it shall be determined by suit that the Government did not have a bid, which it had a right to accept, for $\mathrm{\$}643,000$$\mathrm{\$}643,000$$643,000\$ 643,000, but only a bid for $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000, then to pay $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000. The Government contends that the inserted language means only that the
我们现在考虑一下我们认为的本质是什么;由于与 $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000 .原告辩称，该合同实际上是政府承诺支付工程 $\mathrm{\$}643,000$$\mathrm{\$}643,000$$643,000\$ 643,000 费用，或者，如果通过诉讼确定政府没有投标，而它有权接受， $\mathrm{\$}643,000$$\mathrm{\$}643,000$$643,000\$ 643,000 但只是一个投标 $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 ，然后付款 $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 。政府辩称，插入的措辞仅意味着
plaintiffs may bring a suit and that the Government will not interpose the defenses of waiver or estoppel; but that it affects in no way the balance of the contract which is a plain agreement on the part of the plaintiffs to do the work for $\mathrm{\$}643,000$$\mathrm{\$}643,000$$643,000\$ 643,000.
原告可以提起诉讼，并且政府不会干预弃权或禁止反言的抗辩;但它绝不影响合同的余额，而合同是原告方明确同意为 $\mathrm{\$}643,000$$\mathrm{\$}643,000$$643,000\$ 643,000 .

We have concluded above that the plaintiffs’ bid was $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000. That was, therefore, the price which the Authority promised to pay for the work. It follows that the plaintiffs may recover $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000.
我们在上面得出结论，原告的出价是 $\mathrm{\$}693,000$$\mathrm{\$}693,000$$693,000\$ 693,000 .因此，这就是管理局承诺为这项工作支付的价格。因此，原告可以追讨 $\mathrm{\$}50,000$$\mathrm{\$}50,000$$50,000\$ 50,000 .

It is so ordered. 它是这样命令的。

英美法规定，要约在到达受要约人时生效，因此，在要约送达受要约人之前，要约人可以撤销要约。请参考下面的判例。

208 III. App. 3d 953, 567 N. E. 2d 345 , III. App. 4 Dist. ,1991
208 三.App. 3d 953， 567 N. E. 2d 345 ， III.App. 4 Dist. ，1991 年

This action involves an alleged breach of contract between plaintiff seller, Beard Implement Company, Inc., a farm implement dealership, and defendant buyer, Carl Krusa, a farmer, for the purchase of a 1985 Deutz-Allis N-5 combine. On December 23, 1985, defendant met with plaintiff’s representatives at plaintiff’s office in Arenzville, Illinois. Defendant testified that one of plaintiff’s representatives filled out a purchase order for a new combine for the price of $\mathrm{\$}52,800$$\mathrm{\$}52,800$$52,800\$ 52,800 cash and the trade-in of the combine defendant then owned. Defendant signed the Allis-Chalmers purchase order, which was dated December 23, 1985. None of plaintiff’s representatives signed that order on December 23, 1985, or at any time thereafter. The bottom left corner of this order reads as follows:
该诉讼涉及原告卖方 Beard Implement Company， Inc.（一家农具经销商）与被告买方 Carl Krusa（一名农民）之间涉嫌违反合同，以购买 1985 年的 Deutz-Allis N-5 联合收割机。1985 年 12 月 23 日，被告在伊利诺伊州阿伦茨维尔的原告办公室会见了原告的代表。被告作证说，原告的一名代表以 $\mathrm{\$}52,800$$\mathrm{\$}52,800$$52,800\$ 52,800 现金和被告当时拥有的联合收割机的以旧换新价格填写了一份新联合收割机的采购订单。被告签署了 Allis-Chalmers 采购订单，日期为 1985 年 12 月 23 日。原告的代表均未在 1985 年 12 月 23 日或之后的任何时间签署该命令。此订单的左下角显示如下：

DEALER’s SALESMAN 经销商的推销员
This order subject to acceptance by dealer.
此订单须经经销商接受。
Accepted by: $$$$qquad\qquad 接受方： $$$$qquad\qquad
DEALER" 经销商”
At the same time defendant signed the purchase order, he also signed a counter check drawn on a local bank in the amount of $5,200. On December 26, 1985, defendant wrote a letter to plaintiff but sent on December 27, 1985. That letter read as follows:
被告在签署采购订单的同时，还签署了一张由当地银行开出的 5,200 美元的柜台支票。1985 年 12 月 26 日，被告给原告写了一封信，但于 1985 年 12 月 27 日寄出。那封信的内容如下：
“As I told you by phone on Dec. 26, 85, I do not wish to purchase the 1985 N 5 combine we talked about so please send me the uncashed counter check on the Bank of Bluffs for the amount of $5,200. Since my ‘Purchase Order Sheet’ had not yet been signed by the dealer rep, the check wasn’t cashed before notification, & the combine wasn’t picked up…”
“正如我在 85 年 12 月 26 日通过电话告诉你的那样，我不想购买我们谈到的 1985 年 N 5 联合收割机，所以请把 Bank of Bluffs 的未兑现柜台支票寄给我，金额为 5,200 美元。由于我的'采购订单表'还没有被经销商代表签署，所以在通知之前没有兑现支票，也没有领取联合收割机...”

Plainriff brought action against prospective buyer for breach of purchase contract. The Circuit Court, Cass County, Robert L. Welch, J., entered judgment in favor of seller, and buyer appealed.
Plainriff 以违反购买合同为由对潜在买家提起诉讼。卡斯县巡回法院 Robert L. Welch， J. 作出有利于卖方的判决，买方提出上诉。

In the instant case, the purchase order form signed by defendant constitutes an offer made by defendant to plaintiff. Thus, this court needs to determine whether defendant’s offer was accepted by plaintiff.
在本案中，被告签署的采购订单构成被告向原告提出的要约。因此，本法院需要确定原告是否接受了被告的要约。

The printed form agreement before the Court was drafted by the defendant and contains the following clause: ‘This order cancels and supersedes any prior agreement and as of the date hereof comprises the entire agreement relating to the subject matters covered hereby. . .’ It is clear that the defendant, the offeree, intended that this form agreement be deemed to be the entire contract and any verbal agreements, if contrary to the terms of the written agreement, not be binding.
向法院提交的打印格式协议由被告起草，其中包含以下条款：“本命令取消并取代任何先前的协议，截至本协议日期，构成与本协议所涵盖的主题相关的整个协议。很明显，被告，即受要约人，打算将这种格式协议视为整个合同，而任何口头协议，如果与书面协议的条款相抵触，则不具有约束力。

In the bottom lefthand corner of the agreement there is printed in large underlined type: ’ . . . THIS ORDER SHALL NOT BECOME BINDING UNTIL ACCEPTED BY DEALER OR HIS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.’ . . . At the bottom of the paragraph containing this sentence is a blank line under which is printed ‘purchaser’s signature’. Plaintiff signed on this line. Below this is a blank line which has printed before it ‘Accepted By’. Under this line is printed ‘Dealer or his Authorized Representative’. This line bears no signature.
在协议的左下角，用带下划线的大字体印着：“ .本订单在经销商或其授权代表接受之前不具有约束力。在包含这句话的段落的底部是一条空行，下面印有“购买者签名”。原告在这条线上签字。下面是一个空行，该空行在“Accepted By”之前打印。在此行下方印有 'Dealer or his Authorized Representative'。这句话没有署名。

On the back of the agreement are printed ten conditions. * * * Paragrpah 10 states:
协议背面印有十个条件。* * * Paragrpah 10 州：
'This order is subject to acceptance by the dealer, which acceptance shall be signified by the signature of Dealer, Dealer’s Manager or other authorized signature on the reverse side hereof.,
“本订单须经经销商接受，经销商应由经销商、经销商经理签名或本订单背面的其他授权签名表示接受。”

It is obvious that the parties intended the agreement to be bilateral and that the offer by the plaintiff to purchase the pickup be deemed accepted by the defendant only when he or his authorized representative signed the order.
很明显，双方的意图是双边协议，只有当原告或其授权代表签署订单时，原告购买皮卡的提议才被视为被被告接受。

The presenting of the order by the dealer was an invitation to the plaintiff to make an offer to purchase the pickup truck. The signing of the order by the plaintiff constituted an offer by him to purchase the truck. By the printed terms of the agreement only the signature of the defendant or its authorized representatives would constitute acceptance of the plaintiff’s offer and thus create a binding bilateral contract. In a bilateral contract it is essential that the fact of acceptance be communicated to the offeror. The failure of the defendant or his representative to sign the order is conclusive proof that the defendant did not accept the offer. It was the defendant who drafted the agreement and set forth the manner in which it would accept an offer. The fact that defendant ordered and accepted delivery of a pickup truck does not constitute acceptance under the terms of the agreement. By the terms of the agreement only the signature of the defendant could constitute acceptance. The plaintiff’s refusal to accept the truck constituted a valid revocation of his offer. As a general rule, an offer may be revoked or withdrawn at any time before it is accepted with certain exceptions set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code. This case does not fall within any of the code exceptions.
经销商出示订单是邀请原告提出购买皮卡车的要约。原告签署命令构成他购买卡车的要约。根据协议的印刷条款，只有被告或其授权代表的签名才构成对原告要约的接受，从而构成具有约束力的双边合同。在双边合同中，必须将接受的事实传达给要约人。被告或其代表没有签署该命令，即为被告没有接受该要约的决定性证据。被告起草了协议并规定了其接受要约的方式。被告订购并接受交付皮卡车的事实并不构成协议条款下的接受。根据协议的条款，只有被告的签名才能构成接受。原告拒绝接受卡车构成对其要约的有效撤销。作为一般规则，要约在被接受之前可以随时撤销或撤销，但《统一商法典》中规定的某些例外情况除外。这种情况不属于任何代码异常。

The Court finds by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that an enforceable bilateral contract was not formed because of defendant’s failure to accept plaintiff’s offer and that plaintiff validly revoked his offer.
法院以公平的可信证据认定，由于被告未能接受原告的要约，因此没有形成可执行的双边合同，并且原告有效地撤销了其要约。

For the reasons stated, the judgment in favor of plaintiff is reversed.
基于上述理由，有利于原告的判决被推翻。

194 Misc. 65, 88 N.Y.S. 2 d 136 Jan 22, 1949
194 Misc. 65， 88 N.Y.S. 2 d 136 1949 年 1 月 22 日

Action on contract for support by Agnes Collins against Edmund Collins. On motion to dismiss amended complaint for insufficiency on its face.
Agnes Collins 对 Edmund Collins 的赡养合同提起诉讼。动议驳回修改后的起诉书，理由是其表面不充分。

Motion granted. 动议获得批准。

This motion to dismiss the amended complaint for insufficiency on its face, which was heretofore granted by default, has been, by consent, restored to the calendar and is now considered on the merits.
这项驳回修改后的投诉的动议，该动议迄今已默认批准，经同意，已恢复为日历，现在根据案情进行审议。

This is an action, as shown in the complaint, by a mother, allegedly aged and destitute, against her son. It is set forth in the complaint that the defendant, the son, agreed to pay to the plaintiff, the mother, the sum of $\mathrm{\$}50$$\mathrm{\$}50$$50\$ 50 per month for her support and that the agreement was based upon ‘good and valuable consideration.’ The defendant demanded a bill of particulars and plaintiff served one, in which the consideration for such agreement is stated to be ‘love and affection’. This application to dismiss the amended complaint, under rule 112 of the Rules of Civil Practice, is predicated upon the complaint as limited by the bill of particulars.
正如投诉所示，这是一位据称年老且贫困的母亲对她的儿子采取的行动。诉状中指出，被告儿子同意每月向原告 $\mathrm{\$}50$$\mathrm{\$}50$$50\$ 50 母亲支付抚养费，并且该协议是基于“良好和有价值的对价”。被告要求提供了一份明细单，原告送达了一份明细单，其中称此类协议的对价是“爱和感情”。根据《民事实务规则》第 112 条，驳回修改后的投诉的申请，是基于投诉受到详情法案的限制。
‘Love and affection’ is not a sufficient consideration to support an executory contract. The case would be different if an executed deed, assignment or mortgage were involved; if in fact the transaction were accomplished.
“爱和感情”不是支持执行合同的充分考虑因素。如果涉及已执行的契约、转让或抵押，情况会有所不同;如果交易实际上已经完成。

The plaintiff relies upon Calhoun v. Calhoun ( 49 App. Div. 520), but that action was founded upon a mortgage which had been executed and delivered. It is true that it was stated in the opinion that love and affection, or the moral obligation to support, constituted a sufficient consideration. But such statement was unnecessary to the decision, which could have rested either upon the fact that the mortgage in suit had been delivered and the transaction was, therefore, executed; or upon the fact that the defendant had undertaken to support the plaintiff, his mother, partly at least, because she had conveyed a farm to him. The view expressed in that opinion that love and affection alone, or a moral obligation to support, is a sufficient consideration is not, wherever an executory agreement is involved, in accord with the rule in this State (Cf. Whitaker v. Whitaker, 52 N. Y. 368 ; Matter of Wilbur v. Estate of Warren, 104 N.
原告依据的是 Calhoun v.Calhoun （ 49 App. Div. 520） 一案中，但该诉讼是建立在已执行和交付的抵押的基础上的。诚然，该意见书指出，爱和感情，或赡养的道德义务，构成了充分的对价。但这种陈述对决定来说是不必要的，因为决定可能基于以下事实：涉案抵押权已经交付，因此交易已经执行;或者被告承诺至少部分支持原告的母亲，因为她将一个农场转让给他。该意见书中表达的观点是，无论涉及执行协议，仅靠爱和感情或抚养的道德义务就是一个充分的对价，这与本州的规则并不一致（参见 Whitaker v. Whitaker， 52 N. Y. 368 ;Wilbur v.沃伦庄园，104 N.