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Equity W10-12解题思路

W10-12 Fiduciary/Trustee Liability 解题思路 

I. Analysis Structure (Apply Systematically to Each Issue/Event) 

For each identified event/action involving a trustee:
对于涉及受托人的每个已识别事件/行为:

A. Trustee Status Check (If Applicable)
A. 受托人身份检查(如果适用)

  • Is the person acting definitely a trustee at the time of the act?
    此人在行为时是否明确地是受托人?
  • If YES: Proceed to analyse their actions based on trustee duties.
    如果是:根据受托人义务分析其行为。
  • If NO (e.g., purported retirement): 
  • Analyse Retirement Validity: 
  • Does the TI authorise the method used? (Facts usually state TI is silent or give specific terms).
    遗嘱条款是否授权使用该方法?(事实通常说明遗嘱条款未作规定或给出具体条款)。
  • If TI silent/not complied with, does TO s.40 apply? (Requires deed, co-trustee consent by deed, minimum trustees remain).
    如果遗嘱条款未作规定/未遵守,是否适用《受托人条例》第 40 条?(需要契约、共同受托人通过契约同意、保留最低数量的受托人)。
  • Has a court order permitted retirement?
    法院命令是否允许退休?
  • Conclusion on Status:  身份结论:
  • Template (Likely Still Trustee): "Regarding [T]'s purported retirement by [method], this appears ineffective. Valid retirement requires authority from the TI, compliance with TO s.40 (requiring deeds, etc.), or a court order, none of which are indicated. Therefore, [T] likely remained a trustee at all relevant times and subject to trustee duties."
    模板(可能仍然是受托人):“关于[T]通过[方法]提出的退休,这似乎无效。有效的退休需要来自信托文书的授权,符合《信托条例》第 40 条(要求契据等),或法院命令,但均未表明。因此,[T]可能在所有相关时间仍然是受托人,并受受托人职责的约束。”
  • Template (Likely Retired): "If the TI permitted retirement via [method used], then [T] ceased to be a trustee from [date]. Liability for subsequent acts of co-trustees generally ceases, unless the retirement was effected precisely to enable a known future breach (Head v Gould). However, [T] remains liable for breaches committed while a trustee."
    模板(可能已退休):“如果信托文书允许通过[使用的方法]退休,那么[T]从[日期]起不再是受托人。通常,对共同受托人后续行为的责任将终止,除非退休的目的是为了促成已知的未来违约(Head v Gould)。但是,[T]仍对担任受托人期间发生的违约行为负责。”
  • If retired: Consider if any liability arises from acts while trustee or based on misuse of information gained during trusteeship.
    如果已退休:考虑在担任受托人期间的行为或基于滥用在受托期间获得的信息而产生的任何责任。

B. Analysis of the Specific Action/Omission
B. 具体行为/不作为分析

  • Framework: Use the two-stage analysis where relevant (esp. for management actions like investments/sales): 1. Power? 2. Duty (Fiduciary / Care)?
    框架:在相关情况下使用两阶段分析(尤其适用于投资/销售等管理行为):1. 权力?2. 义务(信义/注意)?

  • 1. Power Analysis (Did T have authority to act?)
    1. 权力分析(受托人是否有权采取行动?)

  • Identify the power needed: (e.g., power to invest, power of sale, power to delegate, power to remunerate).
    确定所需的权力:(例如,投资权、出售权、委托权、报酬权)。
  • Source of Power: Check hierarchy: (i) TI (express terms, prohibitions?), (ii) TO (default powers, e.g., TO s.4 investment power, unless excluded?), (iii) Common Law.
    权力来源:检查层级:(i)信托文书(明示条款、禁止?),(ii)《受托人条例》(默认权力,例如,《受托人条例》第 4 条投资权,除非排除?),(iii)普通法。
  • Conclusion on Power:  关于权力的结论:
  • If NO Power (Ultra Vires):
    如果没有权力(越权):
  • Template: "[T] lacked the power under the TI or TO to [action]. This action was unauthorised (ultra vires) and constitutes a breach of trust. [T] is strictly liable to restore the trust fund for any resulting loss (£[amount]) or must return the property acquired. Any profit from the unauthorised action belongs to the trust, unless beneficiaries elect to adopt the action (Re Patten)."
    模板:“[受托人]缺乏信托契约或信托书项下[行动]的权力。此行动未经授权(越权),构成违反信托。 [受托人]负有严格责任,须为任何由此造成的损失([金额]英镑)恢复信托基金,或必须返还所取得的财产。未经授权行动产生的任何利润均属于信托,除非受益人选择采纳该行动(Re Patten)。”
  • If YES Power (Intra Vires): Proceed to analyse how the power was exercised (Duty analysis).
    如果有权力(权限内):继续分析权力的行使方式(义务分析)。
  • Template: "The TI grants [T] the power to [action] / TO s.[X] grants the power, and it is not excluded by the TI. Therefore, the action was intra vires. The issue is whether the power was exercised properly, considering fiduciary duties and the duty of care."
    模板:“信托文书授予[T] [行动]的权力/《受托人法》第[X]条授予该权力,且信托文书未排除该权力。因此,该行动是职权范围内的。问题是,考虑到信义义务和注意义务,该权力是否得到适当行使。”
  • 2. Duty Analysis (How was the power exercised / Was there a breach of duty?)
    2. 义务分析(权力是如何行使的/是否存在违反义务的行为?)

  • (a) Was a FIDUCIARY DUTY breached? (Core = Loyalty; Bristol & West)
    (a) 是否违反了信义义务?(核心=忠诚;Bristol & West 案)

  • Identify Potential Breach: No-Conflict, No-Competition, No-Profit, Self-Dealing, Fair-Dealing, Unauthorised Remuneration, Confidentiality.
    识别潜在的违约行为:无冲突、无竞争、无利润、自我交易、公平交易、未经授权的报酬、保密。
  • Apply Relevant Rule(s) & Template: (Use templates from previous detailed response, e.g.)
    应用相关规则和模板:(使用之前详细回复中的模板,例如)
  • No-Conflict Template: "Did [T]'s action create a 'real sensible possibility of conflict' (Boardman) between duty and interest? If yes -> Breach."
    无冲突模板:“[T]的行为是否在义务和利益之间造成了‘实际可感知的冲突可能性’(Boardman)?如果是 -> 违约。”
  • No-Competition Template: "Did [T]'s business compete with the trust? (Re Thompson). If yes -> Breach. Remedy: Injunction/Account."
    无竞争模板:“[T]的业务是否与信托存在竞争?(Re Thompson)。如果是 -> 违约。补救措施:禁令/账目。”
  • No-Profit Template: "Did [T] profit via position without authorisation? (Regal Hastings - strict). If yes -> Breach. Remedy: Account/Constructive Trust."
    无利润模板:“[T]是否未经授权通过职位获利?(Regal Hastings - 严格)。如果是 -> 违约。补救措施:账目/推定信托。”
  • Self-Dealing Template: "Did [T] buy trust property? (Tito). If yes -> Breach. Voidable ex debito. Remedy: Rescission or Account/Compensation."
    自我交易模板:“[T]是否购买了信托财产?(Tito)。如果是 -> 违约。当然可以撤销。救济:撤销或账目/赔偿。”
  • Fair-Dealing Template: "Did [T] buy B's interest? (Tito). If yes -> Potentially voidable unless T proves fairness/disclosure."
    公平交易模板:“[T]是否购买了受益人的权益?(Tito)。如果是 -> 潜在的可撤销,除非受托人证明公平/披露。”
  • Remuneration Template: "Was payment authorised (TI/TO/Court/B)? (Robinson v Pett). If no -> Breach. Remedy: Repayment."
    报酬模板:“付款是否已授权(信托文件/法院/受益人)?(Robinson v Pett)。如果没有 -> 违约。救济:偿还。”
  • (b) Was the DUTY OF CARE breached? (Relevant for management actions like investment, administration, delegation, supervision).
    (b) 是否违反了注意义务?(与投资、管理、授权、监督等管理行为相关)。

  • Identify Applicable Standard: Was duty excluded by TI? If not: Common Law (Speight / Whiteley) or TO s.3A (post-Dec 2013)? Note higher standard for professionals (Bartlett / TO s.3A(b)) or those with special knowledge (TO s.3A(a)).
    确定适用标准:受托文件是否排除该义务?如果没有:普通法(Speight / Whiteley)或《受托人条例》第 3A 条(2013 年 12 月之后)?注意专业人士(Bartlett /《受托人条例》第 3A(b)条)或具有特殊知识的人(《受托人条例》第 3A(a)条)的更高标准。
  • Assess Conduct: Did T act with required prudence? Consider: advice sought/ignored, diversification, rationale (Cowan – best financial interest?), supervision (Re Lucking's).
    评估行为:受托人是否以要求的谨慎态度行事?考虑:寻求/忽略的建议、多元化、理由(Cowan – 最佳财务利益?)、监督(Re Lucking's)。
  • Conclusion on Duty of Care:
    关于注意义务的结论:
  • Template (Breach): "[T]'s actions in [action], specifically [details e.g., failing to seek advice, ignoring warnings, improper motive violating Cowan], fell below the standard of care required of [specify standard, e.g., a prudent trustee / professional under TO s.3A(b)]. This constitutes a breach of the duty of care."
    模板(违约):“[受托人]在[行为]中的行为,特别是[细节,例如,未能寻求建议、忽略警告、违反 Cowan 的不当动机],低于[指定标准,例如,根据《受托人条例》第 3A(b)条的谨慎受托人/专业人士]所要求的注意标准。这构成了违反注意义务。”
  • Template (No Breach): "[T]'s actions appear consistent with the standard of care required. Although a loss resulted, this appears to be an error of judgment, not a failure of duty."
    模板(无违约):“[T]的行为似乎符合要求的谨慎标准。尽管造成了损失,但这似乎是判断失误,而不是未能履行职责。”

C. Causation (Link Breach to Loss for Compensation)
C. 因果关系(将违约与损失联系起来以获得赔偿)

  • Test: Did the identified breach cause the loss being claimed? Apply "but for" test with hindsight (Target Holdings).
    测试:已确定的违约是否导致了所声称的损失?运用事后“但如果”测试 (Target Holdings)。
  • Template: "The loss of £[amount] directly resulted from [the specific breach identified above]. But for this breach, the trust fund would have [state outcome, e.g., retained the £X / not lost value]. Therefore, causation is established."
    模板:“£[金额]的损失直接由[上述已确定的具体违约行为]导致。但如果不存在此违约,信托基金本应[说明结果,例如,保留了£X / 未损失价值]。因此,因果关系成立。”

D. Liability of Co-Trustees
D. 共同受托人的责任

  • Rule: Joint and several liability is the default (Bahin v Hughes).
    规则:共同且各自承担责任是默认规则 (Bahin v Hughes)。
  • Apply: Was another trustee passive? Did they facilitate? Were they deceived by fraud? Is a retired trustee liable (Head v Gould)?
    应用:另一位受托人是否消极不作为?他们是否提供了便利?他们是否被欺诈所蒙蔽?退休的受托人是否承担责任 (Head v Gould)?
  • Template: "Trustees [X, Y, Z] are jointly and severally liable for this breach. [Passive Trustee]'s non-involvement provides no defence (Bahin). [Facilitating Trustee] actively participated. [Retired Trustee] is also liable as they likely remained a trustee / failed to prevent a contemplated breach."
    模板:“受托人[X、Y、Z]对此违约行为承担共同且各自的责任。[消极受托人]的不参与不能提供辩护理由 (Bahin)。[协助受托人]积极参与。[退休受托人]也承担责任,因为他们可能仍然是受托人/未能阻止预期的违约行为。”

E. Remedies  E. 救济

  • State specific remedies available for each established breach against the liable trustee(s): Equitable Compensation (restore loss), Account of Profits (disgorge gain), Constructive Trust, Rescission (if possible), Injunction. Note potential election issues (Tang Man Sit).
    说明针对已确立的每项违约行为,可向负有责任的受托人寻求的具体救济措施:衡平赔偿(恢复损失)、利润追缴(吐出收益)、推定信托、撤销(如果可能)、禁令。注意潜在的选择问题(Tang Man Sit)。
  • Template: "Consequently, B can seek [Remedy, e.g., equitable compensation of £X / account of £Y profit] from [Liable Trustee(s), jointly and severally]."
    模板:“因此,B 可以向[负有责任的受托人]共同及分别寻求[救济,例如,£X 的衡平赔偿/£Y 利润的追缴]。”

F. Defences  F. 抗辩

  • Exemption Clause: Check TI. Is it valid (Armitage re fraud; TO s.41W re prof. negligence)? Does it cover the breach?.
    免责条款:检查信托文件。它是否有效(Armitage 案关于欺诈;信托法第 41W 条关于专业疏忽)?它是否涵盖了违约行为?
  • TO s.60 Relief: Did T act (1) Honestly AND (2) Reasonably AND (3) Ought fairly be excused? Burden on T. Analyse each limb. High bar, esp. for professionals or clear breaches.
    信托法第 60 条的救济:受托人是否(1)诚实地且(2)合理地且(3)应被公正地宽恕?举证责任在受托人身上。分析每个部分。标准很高,特别是对于专业人士或明显的违约行为。
  • Beneficiary Consent/Acquiescence: Requires fully informed, sui juris beneficiaries.
    受益人同意/默认:要求完全知情、具有完全行为能力的受益人。
  • Template: "[T] may seek TO s.60 relief. While potentially honest, [T]'s actions in [breach] were likely unreasonable because [reason]. Even if reasonable, the court may find it unfair to excuse them given [e.g., extent of loss]. Relief is unlikely."
    模板:“[受托人]可能会寻求信托法第 60 条的救济。虽然可能诚实,但[受托人]在[违约]中的行为可能是不合理的,因为[原因]。即使是合理的,鉴于[例如,损失的程度],法院也可能认为宽恕他们是不公平的。不太可能获得救济。”

II. Overall Conclusion & Advice
II. 总体结论与建议

  1. Summarise: Briefly recap the main breaches, who is liable for each (specifying joint/several liability), and the primary remedies.
    总结:简要回顾主要违约行为,谁对每项违约行为负责(明确是共同责任还是分别责任),以及主要的补救措施。
  2. Advise Client (B): Clearly state the recommended course of action – e.g., "B should pursue claims against T1, T2, and T3 jointly and severally for equitable compensation totalling £X for the investment and property sale losses, plus repayment of £Y remuneration. B should also seek an account of profits from T1 regarding the competing business." Note any practical limitations (e.g., trustee insolvency, property irrecoverable).
    向客户(B)提供建议:明确说明建议的行动方案——例如,“B 应该对 T1、T2 和 T3 共同且分别地提出索赔,以获得总计 X 英镑的投资和房产出售损失的衡平法赔偿,以及 Y 英镑的报酬偿还。B 还应就 T1 关于竞争业务的利润进行账目清算。” 注意任何实际限制(例如,受托人破产、财产无法追回)。