John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business 约翰·M·奥林法、经济与商业中心
DOES ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE ADD VALUE? 启蒙股东价值是否增加价值？
Lucian A. Bebchuk 卢西安·A·贝布克Kobi KastielRoberto Tallarita 罗伯托·塔拉里塔
Discussion Paper No. 1077 讨论文件第 1077 号
05/2022
Forthcoming, The Business Lawyer, Volume 77 (2022) 即将出版，《商业律师》，第 77 卷（2022）
Harvard Law School 哈佛法学院
Cambridge, MA 02138 剑桥，马萨诸塞州 02138
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This paper is also Discussion Paper No. 2022-5 of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance: https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/working-papers/ 本文也是哈佛法学院公司治理项目的讨论论文第 2022-5 号： https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/working-papers/
Last Revised May 2022 最后修订于 2022 年 5 月
Forthcoming, 77 The Business Lawyer (2022) 即将出版，《商业律师》77 期（2022）
DOES ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE ADD VALUE? 启蒙股东价值是否增加价值？
Unlike shareholder value maximization (SV), which merely calls on corporate leaders to maximize shareholder value, enlightened shareholder value (ESV) combines this prescription with guidance to consider stakeholder interests in the pursuit of long-term shareholder value maximization. ESV is being increasingly embraced by many actors: it was adopted by the U.K. Companies Act, is being considered for inclusion in the Restatement of Corporate Governance Law, and is broadly supported by both corporate leaders and institutional investors. This article examines whether replacing SV with ESV can be expected to benefit stakeholders or society. 与股东价值最大化（SV）不同，开明的股东价值（ESV）不仅要求企业领导者最大化股东价值，还结合了在追求长期股东价值最大化时考虑利益相关者利益的指导。ESV 正被越来越多的参与者所接受：它已被纳入英国公司法，正在考虑纳入公司治理法的重述，并得到了企业领导者和机构投资者的广泛支持。本文探讨了用 ESV 替代 SV 是否可以预期对利益相关者或社会带来好处。
We begin by arguing that the appeal of ESV and the enthusiasm for it among supporters is grounded in a misperception about how frequent “win-win situations” are. In reality, corporate leaders often face significant trade-offs between shareholder and stakeholder interests, and such situations are exactly those for which the specification of corporate purpose is important. 我们首先认为，ESV 的吸引力及其支持者的热情源于对“双赢局面”出现频率的误解。实际上，企业领导者常常面临股东利益与利益相关者利益之间的重大权衡，而这种情况正是企业目标规范重要的原因。
Furthermore, we explain that, under certain standard assumptions, SV and ESV are always operationally equivalent and prescribe exactly the same corporate choices. We then relax these assumptions and consider arguments that using ESV is beneficial in order to (i) counter the tendency of corporate leaders to be excessively focused on short-term effects, (ii) educate corporate leaders to give appropriate weight to stakeholder effects, (iii) provide cover to corporate leaders who wish to serve stakeholders, and/or (iv) protect capitalism from a backlash and deflect pressures to adopt stakeholder-protecting regulation. We show that each of these arguments is flawed. 此外，我们解释了在某些标准假设下，SV 和 ESV 始终是操作上等价的，并且规定完全相同的公司选择。然后，我们放宽这些假设，并考虑使用 ESV 的好处，目的是 (i) 对抗公司领导者过于关注短期效果的倾向，(ii) 教育公司领导者给予利益相关者影响适当的重视，(iii) 为希望服务于利益相关者的公司领导者提供保护，和/或 (iv) 保护资本主义免受反弹，并抵御采用保护利益相关者的监管的压力。我们表明，这些论点各有缺陷。
We conclude that, at best, replacing SV with ESV would create neither value nor harm. However, to the extent that ESV would give the false impression that corporate leaders can be relied on to protect stakeholders, the switch from SV to ESV would be detrimental for stakeholders and could impede or delay reforms that could truly protect them. 我们得出结论，至多用 ESV 替代 SV 不会创造价值也不会造成伤害。然而，在 ESV 可能给人一种错误印象，即企业领导者可以被依赖来保护利益相关者的情况下，从 SV 转向 ESV 对利益相关者是有害的，并可能阻碍或延迟真正能够保护他们的改革。
I. Introduction … 1 I. 引言 … 1
II. Toward Enlightened Shareholder Value? … 3 II. 朝向开明的股东价值？ … 3
A. Moving from SV to ESV … 3 A. 从 SV 转向 ESV … 3
B. Support from Business Leaders … 7 B. 商业领袖的支持 … 7
Corporate Leaders … 7 企业领导者 … 7
Institutional Investors. … 10 机构投资者……10
III. The Win-Win Illusion … 13 III. 双赢幻觉 … 13
IV. Equivalence to Shareholder Value … 15 IV. 与股东价值的等价性 … 15
V. Arguments that Adopting ESV Would Make a Difference … 17 V. 采用 ESV 会产生影响的论点…… 17
A. Addressing Short-Termism? … 18 A. 解决短期主义？ … 18
B. Educating and Informing Corporate Leaders? … 22 B. 教育和告知企业领导者？ … 22
C. Providing Cover for Directors Seeking to Serve Stakeholders? … 24 C. 为寻求服务利益相关者的董事提供保护？ … 24
D. Improving Corporate Image and Avoiding Regulatory Backlash? … 25 D. 改善企业形象与避免监管反弹？ … 25
VI. Conclusions and Implications … 27 VI. 结论与启示 … 27
I. InTRODUCTION 一. 引言
There are growing concerns about the effects that corporations have on “stakeholders,” including employees, suppliers, customers, local communities, and the environment. In the words of one prominent economist, " [t][t] he world is on fire" and “if we don’t reimagine capitalism, we will all be significantly poorer.” ^(11){ }^{11} Another eminent commentator notes that the traditional model of corporate governance has resulted in “wage stagnation, growing inequality, climate change that threatens humanity, repeated bailouts by the many of the few, consumer exploitation, and increased insecurity, social division, and racial and economic inequality.” ^(2){ }^{2} There is therefore a great deal of support, which we share, for developing rules and arrangements that would produce a capitalism that works for all stakeholders. 人们对企业对“利益相关者”的影响日益关注，包括员工、供应商、客户、当地社区和环境。正如一位著名经济学家所说，“世界正在燃烧”，而“如果我们不重新构想资本主义，我们将都会变得显著贫穷。”另一位杰出的评论员指出，传统的公司治理模式导致了“工资停滞、日益加剧的不平等、威胁人类的气候变化、少数人对多数人的反复救助、消费者剥削，以及增加的不安全感、社会分裂和种族与经济不平等。”因此，我们支持制定能够为所有利益相关者创造有效资本主义的规则和安排。
Even those who agree on the importance of this goal, however, differ substantially in their views on how to advance it. In this article, we focus on one influential and widely supported approach, the view that corporations should replace their traditional purpose of shareholder value maximization (SV) with a standard commonly referred to as “enlightened shareholder value” (ESV). We show that, at best, this approach would fail to deliver any material benefits to stakeholders or society. At worst, however, ESV would fuel confusion and misperceptions about what corporate leaders actually do, and would generate illusory expectations that could impede more promising solutions to social problems. 然而，即使是那些同意这一目标重要性的人，在如何推进这一目标的看法上也存在显著差异。本文关注一种有影响力且广泛支持的方法，即企业应将其传统的股东价值最大化（SV）目标替换为一种通常称为“开明股东价值”（ESV）的标准。我们表明，充其量，这种方法无法为利益相关者或社会带来任何实质性好处。然而，最糟糕的是，ESV 将加剧对企业领导者实际所做工作的混淆和误解，并产生虚幻的期望，这可能会妨碍更有前景的社会问题解决方案。
Part II discusses the ESV approach and the increasing support it has been receiving from academics, corporate leaders, and institutional investors. Unlike the “pluralistic” version of stakeholderism, which considers stakeholder welfare as an end in itself, ESV directs corporate leaders to take into account stakeholder concerns only as a means to the maximization of shareholder value. 第二部分讨论了 ESV 方法及其在学术界、企业领导和机构投资者中日益获得的支持。与将利益相关者福利视为目的本身的“多元主义”版本的利益相关者理论不同，ESV 指引企业领导者将利益相关者的关切仅作为最大化股东价值的手段。
Part III discusses the common misperception that seems to lie at the core of the support for ESV. This misperception, which we call the “win-win illusion,” misconceives the scope and frequency of win-win situations in which the same corporate actions benefit both shareholders and stakeholders. 第三部分讨论了似乎是支持 ESV 的核心的普遍误解。我们称这种误解为“双赢幻觉”，它误解了同一企业行为同时惠及股东和利益相关者的双赢情况的范围和频率。
We show that the win-win illusion is explicitly embraced by some prominent ESV manifestos, such as the 2019 statement of the Business Roundtable 我们表明，一些著名的 ESV 宣言明确接受了双赢幻觉，例如 2019 年商业圆桌会议的声明
on corporate purpose, but it is unsubstantiated. Contrary to the perceptions of many ESV supporters, trade-offs between shareholder interests and stakeholder interests are ubiquitous, and corporate leaders routinely face difficult choices among options with very different effects for shareholders and stakeholders. This recognition, we argue, shows that even if ESV were successful in increasing the focus of corporate leaders on the relevance of stakeholder issues for shareholder value, trade-offs would remain pervasive and would severely limit the potential effects of ESV on societal problems. 关于企业目的，但这一观点缺乏证据。与许多 ESV 支持者的看法相反，股东利益与利益相关者利益之间的权衡是普遍存在的，企业领导者常常面临在对股东和利益相关者影响截然不同的选项之间做出艰难选择的情况。我们认为，这一认识表明，即使 ESV 在提高企业领导者对利益相关者问题与股东价值相关性的关注方面取得成功，权衡仍将普遍存在，并将严重限制 ESV 对社会问题的潜在影响。
Part IV examines the question whether SV and ESV are operationally equivalent, that is, whether corporate leaders operating under an ESV standard would make different decisions than corporate leaders operating under the traditional SV standard. The question is critical because supporters of SV, including Milton Friedman in a famous essay, acknowledge that treating stakeholders well may be good for shareholder value. Therefore, since SV already requires corporate leaders to make stakeholder-friendly decisions if these decisions are indeed shareholder value-maximizing, it is important to understand what a switch from SV to ESV is expected to add to the traditional framework. To this end, Part IV identifies four assumptions under which ESV and SV are operationally equivalent and direct corporate leaders to take the same corporate action. 第四部分探讨了 SV 和 ESV 是否在操作上等效的问题，即在 ESV 标准下运作的企业领导是否会做出与在传统 SV 标准下运作的企业领导不同的决策。这个问题至关重要，因为 SV 的支持者，包括米尔顿·弗里德曼在一篇著名的文章中，承认良好对待利益相关者可能有利于股东价值。因此，由于 SV 已经要求企业领导在这些决策确实是最大化股东价值的情况下做出对利益相关者友好的决策，理解从 SV 转向 ESV 预计会为传统框架增加什么是重要的。为此，第四部分确定了在 ESV 和 SV 操作上等效并指导企业领导采取相同企业行动的四个假设。
Part V relaxes in turn each of the four assumptions discussed in Part IV and examines whether doing so justifies the case for switching from SV to ESV. First, we discuss whether ESV is an effective strategy to address the problem of short-termism, which allegedly affects today’s capitalism. We show that, even if concerns about short-termism were valid, support for ESV would not follow. 第五部分依次放宽第四部分讨论的四个假设，并考察这样做是否为从 SV 转向 ESV 提供了合理依据。首先，我们讨论 ESV 是否是解决 allegedly 影响当今资本主义的短期主义问题的有效策略。我们表明，即使对短期主义的担忧是合理的，支持 ESV 也并不必然。
Second, we discuss whether an ESV standard might be an effective way to focus corporate leaders’ attention on the relevance of stakeholder factors for long-term shareholder value. We argue, however, that there is no evidence that corporate leaders are generally well informed about profitable business strategies but poorly informed about the specific relevance of stakeholder welfare for long-term value. 其次，我们讨论 ESV 标准是否可能是一个有效的方式，以引起企业领导对利益相关者因素对长期股东价值相关性的关注。然而，我们认为，没有证据表明企业领导普遍对盈利商业策略了解良好，但对利益相关者福利对长期价值的具体相关性了解不足。
Third, we discuss whether ESV could provide legal cover or moral support for corporate leaders to make stakeholder-friendly decisions. We show, however, that under SV, thanks to the business judgment rule, corporate leaders already have sufficient legal cover to make stakeholder-friendly decisions and justify them on the grounds that they would contribute to long-term value maximization. 第三，我们讨论 ESV 是否可以为企业领导者提供法律保护或道德支持，以便做出对利益相关者友好的决策。然而，我们表明，在 SV 的框架下，由于商业判断规则，企业领导者已经拥有足够的法律保护来做出对利益相关者友好的决策，并以此为理由，证明这些决策将有助于长期价值最大化。
Fourth and finally, we discuss whether ESV could be a way for corporate leaders to improve the image of their companies, and of capitalism in general, and to deflect pressures for regulatory interventions on business. To those 最后，我们讨论 ESV 是否可以成为企业领导者改善公司形象以及资本主义整体形象的一种方式，并转移对商业的监管干预压力。对于那些
interested in stakeholder protection, however, this should be a reason for opposing ESV, not for supporting it. Indeed, if ESV provided rhetorical and political cover to corporate leaders without producing any benefits for stakeholders, stakeholders would be better off under SV. 对利益相关者保护感兴趣，然而，这应该是反对 ESV 的理由，而不是支持它的理由。实际上，如果 ESV 为企业领导者提供了修辞和政治掩护，却没有为利益相关者带来任何好处，那么利益相关者在 SV 下会更好。
We conclude in Part VI that replacing SV with ESV should not be expected to produce benefits for either shareholders or society and should thus not be appealing to anyone who is concerned about corporate effects on stakeholders. Adopting ESV could at best be just inconsequential, but it could also be counterproductive by introducing illusory expectations that would impede stakeholder-favoring reforms. 我们在第六部分得出结论，认为用 ESV 替代 SV 不应期望为股东或社会带来好处，因此对于关心企业对利益相关者影响的人来说，这并不具有吸引力。采用 ESV 充其量只是无关紧要，但也可能适得其反，因为它会引入虚幻的期望，从而阻碍有利于利益相关者的改革。
II. Toward Enlightened Shareholder Value? II. 朝向启蒙的股东价值？
A. Moving from SV to ESV A. 从 SV 转向 ESV
Under the traditional SV approach, the purpose of a corporation is the maximization of shareholder value (SV). ^(3){ }^{3} Under this view, corporate leaders should aim at creating the most value for shareholders, and corporate governance should be preoccupied with preventing corporate leaders from deviating from that goal and pursuing their own self-interest. 在传统的股东价值（SV）方法下，公司的目的是最大化股东价值。根据这一观点，企业领导者应致力于为股东创造最大价值，企业治理应专注于防止企业领导者偏离这一目标并追求自身利益。
Some of those who seek to reform this traditional conception in order to make capitalism more inclusive advocate making the welfare of stakeholders an element of corporate purpose-in other words, as an end in itself. ^(4){ }^{4} According to this view, the welfare of each group of stakeholders is relevant and 一些寻求改革这种传统观念以使资本主义更加包容的人主张将利益相关者的福祉作为企业目的的一个要素——换句话说，作为一个目的本身。根据这种观点，每个利益相关者群体的福祉都是相关的。
valuable independently of its effect on the welfare of shareholders. ^(5){ }^{5} This approach can be called “pluralistic,” because it provides directors with a plurality of independent constituencies and requires them to weigh and balance a plurality of autonomous ends. ^(6){ }^{6} 独立于其对股东福利的影响而有价值。 ^(5){ }^{5} 这种方法可以称为“多元主义”，因为它为董事提供了多个独立的利益相关者，并要求他们权衡和衡量多个自主目标。 ^(6){ }^{6}
An important application of the pluralistic approach can be found in the so-called constituency statutes adopted by many U.S. states in the late 1980s and early 1990s. ^(7){ }^{7} These statutes authorize directors to consider the interests of stakeholders without limiting the relevance of these interests to their effect on shareholders. Some statutes even explicitly specify that the rule does not require that any particular interests be given priority over others. ^(8){ }^{8} 多元化方法的一个重要应用可以在许多美国州在 1980 年代末和 1990 年代初通过的所谓选区法中找到。这些法令授权董事考虑利益相关者的利益，而不限制这些利益与股东的影响之间的相关性。有些法令甚至明确规定，该规则并不要求任何特定利益优先于其他利益。
By contrast, the “enlightened shareholder value” approach (ESV) considers stakeholder interests “instrumentally,” as means for advancing the goal of long-term shareholder value maximization. ^(9){ }^{9} Under this view, corporate leaders should take into account the interests of stakeholders to the extent, and only to the extent, that doing so would serve the goal of long-term shareholder value maximization. 相比之下，“开明股东价值”方法（ESV）将利益相关者的利益视为“工具性”的，作为实现长期股东价值最大化目标的手段。在这种观点下，企业领导者应考虑利益相关者的利益，只有在这样做能够服务于长期股东价值最大化目标的情况下。
Compared to the traditional formulation of corporate purpose, ESV explicitly focuses on the treatment of stakeholders as a way to achieve longterm shareholder value maximization. Thus, the support for moving from SV to ESV seems to be grounded in the belief (correct, in our view) that the effect of stakeholder treatment on long-term value often represents a factor that is important to take into account in corporate decision-making. Corporations and their long-term success inevitably depend on the cooperation and contributions of stakeholders. For example, corporations depend on employees for human capital, on local and national taxpayers for institutional infrastructure, on customers for revenues, on small and large independent firms and their 与传统的企业目标制定相比，ESV 明确关注利益相关者的处理，以实现长期股东价值最大化。因此，支持从 SV 转向 ESV 的观点似乎基于这样一种信念（在我们看来是正确的）：利益相关者的处理对长期价值的影响往往是企业决策中需要考虑的重要因素。企业及其长期成功不可避免地依赖于利益相关者的合作和贡献。例如，企业依赖员工的人力资本，依赖地方和国家纳税人的制度基础设施，依赖客户的收入，依赖小型和大型独立公司及其
employees for raw materials, intermediate products, and services, and so forth. Furthermore, firms cannot operate and make profit without a certain degree of social and political recognition and acceptance, which is sometimes termed a “social license.” ^(10){ }^{10} 员工获取原材料、中间产品和服务等。此外，企业无法在没有一定程度的社会和政治认可与接受的情况下运营和盈利，这有时被称为“社会许可证”。 ^(10){ }^{10}
As a result, maximizing long-term value for shareholders requires paying close attention to how a company affects stakeholders, which in turn influences how stakeholders may respond. For example, a company’s treatment of employees would likely affect its ability to attract, retain, and motivate its labor force; a company’s treatment of customers would likely affect its ability to produce revenues; and a company’s treatment of local communities or the environment would likely affect its reputation, political support, and peaceful coexistence within the community. The move from SV to ESV is supposed to highlight the importance and significance of taking these factors into account and to ensure that corporate leaders actually do so. 因此，最大化股东的长期价值需要密切关注公司如何影响利益相关者，而这又会影响利益相关者的反应。例如，公司的员工待遇可能会影响其吸引、留住和激励劳动力的能力；公司的客户待遇可能会影响其产生收入的能力；而公司对当地社区或环境的待遇可能会影响其声誉、政治支持和与社区的和平共处。 从 SV 到 ESV 的转变旨在强调考虑这些因素的重要性和意义，并确保企业领导者确实这样做。
A prominent example of legal rules implementing the ESV approach is the 2006 United Kingdom Companies Act. ^(11){ }^{11} Before the enactment of this statute, U.K. company law essentially embraced SV. ^(12){ }^{12} By contrast, the new statute contains a non-exhaustive list of factors that corporate directors should consider in seeking to enhance shareholder value, including “the interests of the company’s employees,” “the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others,” and “the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment.” Importantly, directors are called to consider such factors in order "to promote the success of 实施 ESV 方法的法律规则的一个显著例子是 2006 年英国公司法。在该法案颁布之前，英国公司法基本上采用了 SV。相比之下，新法案包含了一份非详尽的因素清单，企业董事在寻求提升股东价值时应考虑这些因素，包括“公司的员工利益”、“促进公司与供应商、客户及其他方的商业关系的需要”，以及“公司运营对社区和环境的影响”。重要的是，董事们被要求考虑这些因素，以“促进公司的成功”。
the company for the benefit of its [shareholders]." In other words, consideration of these factors is a means to the end of shareholder welfare. ^(13){ }^{13} Furthermore, adding an ESV standard is now under consideration for the new Restatement of Corporate Governance Law. ^(14){ }^{14} “为了其[股东]的利益而设立的公司。”换句话说，考虑这些因素是实现股东福利的手段。 ^(13){ }^{13} 此外，增加 ESV 标准现在正在考虑中，以便于新的公司治理法重述。 ^(14){ }^{14}
Prominent economists have forcefully presented the case for ESV. Rebecca Henderson, for example, devotes a whole chapter of her compelling defense of stakeholder capitalism to examples of companies that improved their bottom line by granting better terms and conditions to small suppliers, turning to renewable sources of energy, or cutting emissions. ^(15){ }^{15} For Henderson, “the embrace of shared value”-that is, “doing the right thing while simultaneously reducing risk, cutting costs, and increasing demand”-is a "powerful way to create economic return. ^(16){ }^{16} 杰出的经济学家们有力地提出了 ESV 的论据。例如，丽贝卡·亨德森在她对利益相关者资本主义的有力辩护中，专门用整整一章来举例说明那些通过给予小供应商更好的条款和条件、转向可再生能源或减少排放而改善其底线的公司。对亨德森而言，“共享价值的拥抱”——即“在降低风险、削减成本和增加需求的同时做正确的事情”——是一种“创造经济回报的强大方式。”
In another important book-length endorsement of the ESV version of stakeholder capitalism, Alex Edmans reviews a substantial body of empirical evidence showing a positive correlation between social performance and financial performance. ^(17){ }^{17} And he argues that companies should focus on growing the whole “pie” (that is, the entire value they create for both shareholders and stakeholders), rather than exclusively on increasing profits. ^(18){ }^{18} 在另一本重要的书籍中，亚历克斯·埃德曼斯对利益相关者资本主义的 ESV 版本进行了长篇支持，回顾了大量实证证据，显示社会绩效与财务绩效之间存在正相关关系。他认为，公司应专注于扩大整个“蛋糕”（即为股东和利益相关者创造的全部价值），而不仅仅是增加利润。 ^(13){ }^{13} See Co. L. Rev. Steering Grp., Developing the Framework 14 (2000) (explaining that the directors’ duty to take into account stakeholder interests should not be viewed as an independent goal). For an analysis of the UK statutory provision of “enlightened shareholder value,” see Andrew Keay, Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: An Interpretation and Assessment, 28 Co. Law. 106, 106-110 (2007). ^(13){ }^{13} 见 Co. L. Rev. Steering Grp., Developing the Framework 14 (2000)（解释董事考虑利益相关者利益的义务不应被视为独立目标）。有关“开明股东价值”英国法定条款的分析，请参见 Andrew Keay, Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: An Interpretation and Assessment, 28 Co. Law. 106, 106-110 (2007)。 ^(14){ }^{14} Restatement of the Law, Corporate Governance § 2.01(a)(1) (Am. L. Inst. Council Draft No. 1, Sept. 7, 2021). ^(14){ }^{14} 法律重述，公司治理 § 2.01(a)(1) (美国法学协会理事会草案第 1 号，2021 年 9 月 7 日)。 ^(15){ }^{15} Henderson, supra note 1, at 49-83. ^(16){ }^{16} Id. at 36,5936,59. ^(17){ }^{17} Alex Edmans, Grow the Pie: How Great Companies Deliver Both Purpose and Profit 105-106, 112 (rev. ed. 2022) (discussing such work, including his own empirical studies). ^(17){ }^{17} 亚历克斯·埃德曼斯，《增长蛋糕：伟大公司如何实现目标与利润》105-106, 112（修订版 2022）（讨论此类工作，包括他自己的实证研究）。 ^(18){ }^{18} See, e.g., id. at 21-22 (“The pie includes the value an enterprise gives to its colleagues . . . the long-term value customers enjoy over and above the price they pay . . . the value to suppliers from a stable source of revenue . . . the value provided to the environment . . . the value enjoyed by communities . . . the value given to the government through tax revenues. A company thus serves not only investors, but also colleagues, customers, suppliers, the environment, communities, and the government.”). ^(18){ }^{18} 见，例如，id. at 21-22（“这个饼包括企业给予其同事的价值……客户在支付价格之上享有的长期价值……供应商从稳定的收入来源中获得的价值……提供给环境的价值……社区享有的价值……通过税收收入给予政府的价值。因此，一家公司不仅服务于投资者，还服务于同事、客户、供应商、环境、社区和政府。”）。
For early recognitions of this view by prominent economics and management scholars, see, for example, Robert E. Freeman., Jeffrey S. Harrison & Andrew C. Wicks, MANAGING FOR Stakeholders: Survival, Reputation, and Success 4 有关这一观点的早期认可，见例如罗伯特·E·弗里曼、杰弗里·S·哈里森和安德鲁·C·威克斯的《为利益相关者管理：生存、声誉与成功》。
ESV has also been receiving significant support from legal scholars. ^(19){ }^{19} A common theme to the views expressed in their works is that serving stakeholders is ultimately good for long-term shareholder value. Finally, and most importantly for practice, might be the broad and growing support that has been expressed from business leaders to which we now turn. ESV 也得到了法律学者的显著支持。 ^(19){ }^{19} 他们作品中表达的观点的一个共同主题是，服务利益相关者最终对长期股东价值是有利的。最后，最重要的是，我们现在要转向的是来自商业领袖的广泛和日益增长的支持。
B. Support from Business Leaders B. 商业领袖的支持
1. Corporate Leaders 1. 企业领导者
In the last few years, a large number of corporate leaders have expressed their strong support for stakeholder-oriented corporate purpose. In 2019, more than 180 CEOs signed the Business Roundtable’s statement in which 在过去几年中，大量企业领导人表达了对以利益相关者为导向的企业宗旨的强烈支持。2019 年，超过 180 位首席执行官签署了商业圆桌会议的声明，其中
(2007) ("[t]here is a very pragmatic reason to adopt a “managing for stakeholders” view: it is what any successful business really does . . . . So, even if the ideologues who insist that the only legitimate purpose of a business is to maximize shareholder value or maximize profits, the only way to do that is to create great products and services that customers want to buy. Even in these narrowly defined businesses, managers must pay attention to supplier and employee relationships . . . ."). （2007） (“[t]here is a very pragmatic reason to adopt a ‘managing for stakeholders’ view: it is what any successful business really does . . . . So, even if the ideologues who insist that the only legitimate purpose of a business is to maximize shareholder value or maximize profits, the only way to do that is to create great products and services that customers want to buy. Even in these narrowly defined businesses, managers must pay attention to supplier and employee relationships . . . .”). ^(19){ }^{19} See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 1401, 1410 (2020) ("[w]e argue that ESG serves shareholders’ interests . . . because it helps companies identify and manage social risks to their business"); Andrew Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance, 76 Mod. L. Rev. 940 (2013); Harper Ho, supra note 9 at 80-81 (claiming that investors view attention to stakeholder interests as “key to long-term financial gain,” and arguing that ESG metrics capture long-term risks that traditional accounting metrics fail to capture); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 515-17 (2005) (discussing a proposal of statutory formulation of ESV). ^(19){ }^{19} 参见，例如，Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 1401, 1410 (2020) ("[w]e argue that ESG serves shareholders’ interests . . . because it helps companies identify and manage social risks to their business"); Andrew Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance, 76 Mod. L. Rev. 940 (2013); Harper Ho, 上述第 9 条，第 80-81 页（声称投资者将关注利益相关者的利益视为“长期财务收益的关键”，并认为 ESG 指标捕捉了传统会计指标未能捕捉的长期风险）；Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 515-17 (2005)（讨论了对 ESV 的法定制定提案）。
In addition to scholars that expressed explicit support for switching to ESV, there are scholars who have paid close attention to ESV and discussed the growing support for it by corporations and investors. For such works, see, for example, Dorothy S. Lund, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Stakeholderism, and Managerial Accountability, in Research Handbook on Corporate Purpose and Personhood 91 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2022); John Loughrey, Andrew Keay & Luca Cerioni, Legal Practitioners, Enlightened Shareholder Value, and the Shaping of Corporate Governance, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 79, 85 (2008). 除了明确支持转向 ESV 的学者外，还有一些学者密切关注 ESV，并讨论了企业和投资者对其日益增长的支持。有关此类作品，请参见，例如，Dorothy S. Lund, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Stakeholderism, and Managerial Accountability, in Research Handbook on Corporate Purpose and Personhood 91 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2022); John Loughrey, Andrew Keay & Luca Cerioni, Legal Practitioners, Enlightened Shareholder Value, and the Shaping of Corporate Governance, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 79, 85 (2008)。
they pledged to “deliver value to all . . . stakeholders.” ^(20){ }^{20} A few months later, the World Economic Forum issued its Davos Manifesto, which argued that the “purpose of a company is to engage all its stakeholders in shared and sustained value creation.” ^(21){ }^{21} And many individual CEOs have been voicing their commitment to stakeholders. ^(22){ }^{22} 他们承诺“为所有...利益相关者提供价值。” ^(20){ }^{20} 几个月后，世界经济论坛发布了达沃斯宣言，认为“公司的目的在于让所有利益相关者参与共同和持续的价值创造。” ^(21){ }^{21} 许多个别首席执行官也在表达他们对利益相关者的承诺。 ^(22){ }^{22}
While some corporate leaders interpret their support for stakeholder capitalism as an endorsement of the pluralistic approach, which considers stakeholder welfare as an independent end, it seems that most of these statements, manifestos, and pledges reflect an ESV approach. Indeed, these declarations are generally careful to avoid expressing any willingness to ever sacrifice shareholder value for stakeholder benefits. 虽然一些企业领导将他们对利益相关者资本主义的支持解读为对多元化方法的认可，该方法将利益相关者的福利视为独立的目标，但似乎这些声明、宣言和承诺大多数反映了一种 ESV 方法。实际上，这些声明通常小心翼翼地避免表达任何愿意为了利益相关者的利益而牺牲股东价值的意愿。
The Business Roundtable, for example, denies that delivering value to stakeholders could prove detrimental to shareholders. Indeed, the Business Roundtable makes it clear that its statement is not a "repudiation of shareholder interests, ^(,23){ }^{, 23} and that protecting stakeholders is the right way to build a successful business for shareholders. ^(24){ }^{24} Moreover, when giving examples of how companies will meet their commitments toward stakeholders, the Business Roundtable does not include any case that suggests that directors would ever put the interests of stakeholders above those of shareholders. ^(25){ }^{25} 例如，商业圆桌会议否认向利益相关者提供价值可能对股东造成损害。实际上，商业圆桌会议明确表示，其声明并不是对股东利益的“否认”， ^(,23){ }^{, 23} 保护利益相关者是为股东建立成功企业的正确方式。 ^(24){ }^{24} 此外，在举例说明公司如何履行对利益相关者的承诺时，商业圆桌会议并未包括任何暗示董事会会将利益相关者的利益置于股东之上的案例。 ^(25){ }^{25}
Indeed, a recent study by two of us examined the corporate governance guidelines of the signatories of the Business Roundtable’s statement, and it found that, whereas almost none of the signatories explicitly express a willingness to trade-off shareholder value and stakeholder benefits, many of them embrace an ESV approach. ^(26){ }^{26} For example, General Motors’ guidelines state that "shareholders’ long-term interests will be advanced by responsibly addressing the concerns of other stakeholders essential to the Company’s success, including customers, employees, dealers, suppliers, government officials and the public at large. ^(27){ }^{27} Similarly, Walmart’s guidelines advise directors to show their "awareness that the Company’s long-term success depends upon its strong relationship with its customers, associates, suppliers and the communities, including the global community, in which it operates. ^(28){ }^{28} 确实，我们中的两位最近的一项研究考察了商业圆桌会议声明签署者的公司治理指南，发现几乎没有签署者明确表示愿意在股东价值和利益相关者利益之间进行权衡，但他们中的许多人都采用了 ESV 方法。例如，通用汽车的指南指出，“通过负责任地解决对公司成功至关重要的其他利益相关者的关切，股东的长期利益将得到提升，包括客户、员工、经销商、供应商、政府官员和公众。”同样，沃尔玛的指南建议董事们要意识到“公司的长期成功依赖于与客户、员工、供应商以及其运营所在社区（包括全球社区）之间的良好关系。”
Indeed, the Davos Manifesto grounds its defense of stakeholder capitalism in the view that such an approach would “strengthen the long-term prosperity of a company.” ^(29){ }^{29} Op-eds and commentary collected on the World Economic Forum’s website clarify that the theory underlying the Davos Manifesto is that " [i]n[\mathrm{i}] \mathrm{n} most companies, strategies to achieve financial success for shareholders will include addressing environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters. ^(330){ }^{330} Indeed, the founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum has defined “stakeholder capitalism” as “a form of capitalism in which companies seek long-term value creation by taking into account the needs of all their stakeholders, and society at large.” ^(31){ }^{31} 确实，达沃斯宣言将其对利益相关者资本主义的辩护建立在这样的观点上，即这种方法将“增强公司的长期繁荣。” ^(29){ }^{29} 在世界经济论坛网站上收集的社论和评论澄清了达沃斯宣言背后的理论，即“ [i]n[\mathrm{i}] \mathrm{n} 大多数公司实现股东财务成功的策略将包括解决环境、社会和治理（ESG）问题。 ^(330){ }^{330} 确实，世界经济论坛的创始人兼执行主席将“利益相关者资本主义”定义为“一种资本主义形式，其中公司通过考虑所有利益相关者及整个社会的需求来寻求长期价值创造。” ^(31){ }^{31}
Thus, it seems clear that the driving theory behind the massive support expressed by business leaders for stakeholder capitalism is the ESV approach. Pledges by corporate leaders largely avoid the expression of any willingness to ever trade-off shareholder value against stakeholder welfare, and they generally express explicitly or implicitly the view that attention to stakeholder concerns is a strategy to increase shareholder value. 因此，商业领袖对利益相关者资本主义所表达的强烈支持背后的驱动理论显然是 ESV 方法。企业领导者的承诺在很大程度上避免了任何愿意将股东价值与利益相关者福利进行权衡的表述，他们通常明确或隐含地表达了关注利益相关者关切是一种增加股东价值的策略的观点。
2. Institutional Investors 2. 机构投资者
An ESV approach is also shared by the many institutional investors that have voiced support for stakeholder capitalism, ESG stewardship, and inclusive corporate purpose. The three largest asset managers, BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, known as the “Big Three,” have urged CEOs to “serve [their] full set of stakeholders,” ^(32){ }^{32} to manage systemic risks and promote racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, ^(33){ }^{33} and to tackle climate change. ^(34){ }^{34} On a closer examination, however, the Big Three and many other large institutional investors have carefully avoided any endorsement of a pluralistic conception of stakeholder capitalism, and they often explicitly stress that they care about stakeholder concerns because and to the extent that these concerns matter for shareholder value. 一种 ESV 方法也得到了许多支持利益相关者资本主义、ESG 管理和包容性企业目标的机构投资者的认可。三大资产管理公司，黑石集团（BlackRock）、道富集团（State Street）和先锋集团（Vanguard），被称为“巨头三家”，已敦促首席执行官“服务于[他们]的所有利益相关者”， ^(32){ }^{32} 以管理系统性风险并促进种族、民族和性别多样性， ^(33){ }^{33} 并应对气候变化。 ^(34){ }^{34} 然而，经过仔细审查，巨头三家和许多其他大型机构投资者小心翼翼地避免对利益相关者资本主义的多元化概念表示支持，他们通常明确强调，他们关心利益相关者的关注点是因为这些关注点对股东价值的重要性。
BlackRock CEO Larry Fink, for example, has observed that "a company must create value for and be valued by its full range of stakeholders in order to deliver long-term value for its shareholders, ^(35){ }^{35} and that “[s]takeholder capitalism is all about delivering long-term, durable returns for shareholders.” ^(36){ }^{36} Fink’s ESV view is well summarized by his observation that BlackRock’s conviction is that “companies perform better when they are deliberate about their role in society and act in the interests of their employees, customers, communities, and their shareholders.” ^(37){ }^{37} 例如，黑石集团首席执行官拉里·芬克观察到，“公司必须为其所有利益相关者创造价值，并被其所有利益相关者所重视，以便为其股东提供长期价值，”并且“利益相关者资本主义就是为股东提供长期、持久的回报。”芬克的 ESV 观点很好地总结了他的观察，即黑石集团的信念是“当公司明确其在社会中的角色并以员工、客户、社区和股东的利益为重时，它们的表现会更好。” ^(32){ }^{32} Larry Fink, 2021 Letter to CEOs, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 30, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/30/letter-to-ceos. ^(32){ }^{32} 拉里·芬克，2021 年致首席执行官的信，哈佛法学院公司治理论坛（2021 年 1 月 30 日），https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/30/letter-to-ceos。 ^(33){ }^{33} Cyrus Taraporevala, CEO’s Letter on Our 2021 Proxy Voting Agenda, HARV. L. SCh. F. ON Corp. Governance (Jan. 18, 2022), https://corpgov.law.har-vard.edu/2022/01/18/ceos-letter-on-ssga-2022-proxy-voting-agenda. ^(33){ }^{33} 塞勒斯·塔拉波雷瓦拉，首席执行官关于我们 2021 年代理投票议程的信，哈佛法学院公司治理论坛（2022 年 1 月 18 日），https://corpgov.law.har-vard.edu/2022/01/18/ceos-letter-on-ssga-2022-proxy-voting-agenda。 ^(34){ }^{34} John Galloway, Vanguard Insights on Evaluating Say on Climate Proposals, HARV. L. SCh. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 14, 2021), https://corpgov.law.har-vard.edu/2021/06/14/vanguard-insights-on-evaluating-say-on-climate-proposals. ^(34){ }^{34} 约翰·加洛韦，《评估气候提案的先锋见解》，哈佛法学院公司治理论坛（2021 年 6 月 14 日），https://corpgov.law.har-vard.edu/2021/06/14/vanguard-insights-on-evaluating-say-on-climate-proposals。 ^(35){ }^{35} Larry Fink, 2022 Letter to CEOs: The Power of Capitalism, BLACKRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Mar. 19, 2022). ^(35){ }^{35} 拉里·芬克，2022 年致首席执行官的信：资本主义的力量，黑岩集团，https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter（最后访问时间：2022 年 3 月 19 日）。
Similarly, State Street CEO Cyrus Taraporevala has pointed out that “addressing material ESG issues is good business practice and essential to a company’s long-term financial performance-a matter of value, not values.” ^(38){ }^{38} Therefore, the reason why State Street supports addressing ESG risks and stakeholder concerns is because doing so delivers better returns to shareholders. As Taraporevala has made clear, his firm “approach[es] these issues from the perspective of long-term investment value, not from a political or social agenda.” ^(39){ }^{39} 同样，州街资本首席执行官赛勒斯·塔帕雷瓦拉指出，“解决重要的 ESG 问题是良好的商业实践，对公司的长期财务表现至关重要——这是一个价值的问题，而不是价值观的问题。”因此，州街资本支持解决 ESG 风险和利益相关者关切的原因在于，这样做能为股东带来更好的回报。正如塔帕雷瓦拉所明确表示的，他的公司“从长期投资价值的角度来处理这些问题，而不是从政治或社会议程的角度。”
Finally, Vanguard has repeatedly stressed that it approaches ESG issues "from a fiduciary perspective, ^(40){ }^{40} meaning that it considers such issues due to their effect on the financial returns for its clients. In this spirit, Vanguard has argued, for example, that " [c][\mathrm{c}] limate change represents a profound, material, and fundamental risk to companies and their shareholders’ long-term success, ^(41){ }^{41} and that it will keep ESG issues “at the forefront in order to deliver value to Vanguard investors.” ^(42){ }^{42} 最后，先锋集团反复强调，它从“受托人视角”来处理 ESG 问题， ^(40){ }^{40} 这意味着它考虑这些问题是因为它们对客户的财务回报的影响。在这种精神下，先锋集团举例指出，“ [c][\mathrm{c}] 气候变化对公司及其股东的长期成功构成了深刻、实质性和根本性的风险， ^(41){ }^{41} 并且它将把 ESG 问题“置于首位，以便为先锋投资者创造价值。” ^(42){ }^{42}
Even public pension funds such as CalPERS and CalSTRS, which have been traditionally active on social responsibility issues, seem to endorse the ESV version of stakeholder capitalism. CalPERS has made it clear that it “views climate change, and associated risks and opportunities, as an investment issue,” ^(43){ }^{43} and that “by advocating for climate risk reporting, [CalPERS] can better protect our investments that help pay the pensions promised to our members.” ^(44){ }^{44} Similarly, CalSTRS has stated that ESG issues "can affect the 即使是像 CalPERS 和 CalSTRS 这样的公共养老金基金，虽然它们在社会责任问题上一直积极，但似乎也支持利益相关者资本主义的 ESV 版本。CalPERS 明确表示，它“将气候变化及相关风险和机遇视为投资问题”， ^(43){ }^{43} 并且“通过倡导气候风险报告，[CalPERS]可以更好地保护我们的投资，以帮助支付承诺给我们成员的养老金。” ^(44){ }^{44} 同样，CalSTRS 也表示，ESG 问题“可能会影响到”
performance of [its] investments," ^(45){ }^{45} and that "unsustainable practices that hurt long-term profits are risks to the system’s investment, ^(,46){ }^{, 46} with no mention of the possibility that some unsustainable practices may be profitable for investors. “其投资的表现，” ^(45){ }^{45} 并且“损害长期利润的不可持续做法是对系统投资的风险， ^(,46){ }^{, 46} 并未提及某些不可持续做法可能对投资者有利的可能性。
Further evidence that large asset managers’ environmental and social stewardship is grounded in the ESV view is that many environmental and social activists engaging companies on social responsibility issues frame their case as a business case because they want to cater to the ESV narrative embraced by institutional investors. ^(47){ }^{47} Many of these activists have an institutional mandate to advance environmental or social goals, ^(48){ }^{48} and they routinely file shareholder proposals (on their behalf or on behalf of other shareholders) with an explicit prosocial motivation. ^(49){ }^{49} A significant fraction of these proposals, however, present justifications that focus on the financial benefits of the proposed environmental or social action. For example, many proposals on climate change stress the “regulatory risk” of upcoming environmental restrictions that would dramatically change the value of the company’s assets and therefore recommend that the company pivot to greener projects in order to protect shareholder value against such a risk. ^(50){ }^{50} And several proposals pushing for board or workforce diversity similarly praise the positive effects of diversity on financial performance and shareholder value. ^(51){ }^{51} 进一步证据表明，大型资产管理公司的环境和社会管理是基于 ESV 观点的，许多在社会责任问题上与公司互动的环境和社会活动家将他们的案例框架视为商业案例，因为他们希望迎合机构投资者所接受的 ESV 叙事。 ^(47){ }^{47} 这些活动家中的许多人有推进环境或社会目标的机构任务， ^(48){ }^{48} 并且他们通常以明确的亲社会动机提交股东提案（代表他们自己或其他股东）。 ^(49){ }^{49} 然而，这些提案中有相当一部分提出的理由集中在所提议的环境或社会行动的财务利益上。例如，许多关于气候变化的提案强调即将到来的环境限制的“监管风险”，这些限制将显著改变公司的资产价值，因此建议公司转向更环保的项目，以保护股东价值免受此类风险的影响。 ^(50){ }^{50} 并且一些推动董事会或员工多样性的提案同样赞扬了多样性对财务表现和股东价值的积极影响。 ^(51){ }^{51}
45 Corporate Governance Principles 2021, CalSTRS, https://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/corporate_governance_principles_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2022). 45 企业治理原则 2021, CalSTRS, https://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/corporate_governance_principles_1.pdf (最后访问日期：2022 年 3 月 19 日)。 ^(46){ }^{46} Id. ^(47){ }^{47} See generally Roberto Tallarita, Stockholder Politics, 73 HAStings L. J. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3798101 (manuscript at 33-37). ^(47){ }^{47} 一般参见罗伯托·塔拉里塔，《股东政治》，73 哈斯廷斯法律杂志（即将出版 2022），https://ssrn.com/abstract=3798101（手稿第 33-37 页）。 ^(48){ }^{48} See id. at 49-59 (reporting empirical evidence on the activities of the most active sponsors of environmental and social shareholder proposals, many of which engage in policy activism, lobbying, and other forms of advocacy). ^(48){ }^{48} 见 id. 第 49-59 页（报告了关于最活跃的环境和社会股东提案赞助者活动的实证证据，其中许多参与政策活动、游说和其他形式的倡导）。 ^(49){ }^{49} See id. ^(49){ }^{49} 见同上。 ^(50){ }^{50} For an example of an ESV-driven proposal on decarbonization, see the proposal presented in 2018 by Arjuna Capital to ExxonMobil, which requested a report on “how the Company could adapt its business model to align with a decarbonizing economy,” and stressed at length that “[m]ajor oil companies face unprecedented disruption to their business model driven by global imperatives to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius.” ExxonMobil, Inc., S.E.C. No Action Letter Request, 2018 WL 721678, at *7 (Mar. 23, 2018). ^(50){ }^{50} 关于以 ESV 为驱动的脱碳提案的一个例子，请参见 Arjuna Capital 于 2018 年向 ExxonMobil 提出的提案，该提案请求一份关于“公司如何调整其商业模式以适应脱碳经济”的报告，并详细强调“[m]主要石油公司面临着前所未有的商业模式破坏，这一破坏是由全球限制全球变暖至远低于 2 摄氏度的全球迫切要求所驱动的。” ExxonMobil, Inc., S.E.C. No Action Letter Request, 2018 WL 721678, at *7 (2018 年 3 月 23 日)。 ^(51){ }^{51} For an example of an ESV-driven proposal on employee diversity, see the proposal presented in 2017 by the Benedictine Sisters of Boerne, Texas, to Home Depot, which requested a diversity report and justified the request based on, among other things, the fact that "companies with good [equal opportunity employment] ^(51){ }^{51} 关于以 ESV 为驱动的员工多样性提案的一个例子，请参见 2017 年德克萨斯州博尔尼的本尼迪克修女会向家得宝提出的提案，该提案请求提供多样性报告，并基于“拥有良好[平等机会就业]的公司”等因素为该请求提供了理由
III. The Win-Win Illusion III. 双赢幻觉
Supporters of replacing SV with ESV seem to believe not only that doing so would make a difference, which we question below, but that the difference made would be substantial. Under this view, if corporate leaders were to take into account how long-term shareholder value is affected by the treatment of stakeholders, which ESV seeks to ensure, capitalism would work markedly better for all stakeholders. For this reason, ESV supporters such as Rebecca Henderson claim that this approach would entail an “architectural innovation” of how businesses are run, which would enable "reimagining capitalism. ^(5)52{ }^{5} 52 支持用 ESV 替代 SV 的支持者似乎不仅相信这样做会有所不同（我们在下面质疑这一点），而且认为所产生的差异将是显著的。在这种观点下，如果企业领导者考虑到利益相关者的待遇如何影响长期股东价值，而 ESV 旨在确保这一点，那么资本主义将对所有利益相关者的运作明显更好。因此，像 Rebecca Henderson 这样的 ESV 支持者声称，这种方法将涉及对企业运营方式的“架构创新”，这将使“重新构想资本主义”成为可能。
Likewise, the Business Roundtable describes its statement, as do many of those commenting on this statement, as a historic milestone. ^(53){ }^{53} This view, we argue, seems to be grounded in a misperception about the scope and frequency of “win-win situations” in which certain business choices would benefit both shareholders and stakeholders. This view fails to recognize, however, that corporate leaders often face real and significant trade-offs between shareholder and stakeholder interests. 同样，商业圆桌会议将其声明描述为历史性的里程碑，许多对此声明发表评论的人也是如此。 ^(53){ }^{53} 我们认为，这种观点似乎基于对“共赢局面”范围和频率的误解，在这种局面中，某些商业选择将同时惠及股东和利益相关者。然而，这种观点未能认识到，企业领导者往往面临股东和利益相关者利益之间的真实且重要的权衡。
The Business Roundtable, for example, explicitly denies that long-term shareholder value and stakeholder interests may ever be in conflict, by stating that “[w]hile . . . different stakeholders may have competing interests in the short term, . . . the interests of all stakeholders are inseparable in the long term. ^("54){ }^{" 54} This view, however, is unwarranted. In fact, potential trade-offs between shareholders and stakeholders are ubiquitous. Even if a company took all the available opportunities to improve shareholder value by improving stakeholder welfare, there would still be many opportunities to improve stakeholder welfare further, but at the expense of shareholders. Companies 例如，商业圆桌会议明确否认长期股东价值和利益相关者利益可能会发生冲突，声明“虽然……不同的利益相关者在短期内可能有竞争利益……但所有利益相关者的利益在长期内是不可分割的。” ^("54){ }^{" 54} 然而，这种观点是没有根据的。事实上，股东和利益相关者之间的潜在权衡是普遍存在的。即使一家公司利用所有可用机会通过改善利益相关者福利来提高股东价值，仍然会有许多进一步改善利益相关者福利的机会，但这会以牺牲股东利益为代价。公司
records have a competitive advantage in recruiting/retaining employees,” and “[a] diverse work force is more likely to anticipate and respond effectively to consumer demand.” The Home Depot, 2017 Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 28 (Apr. 3, 2017). “记录在招聘/留住员工方面具有竞争优势，”以及“[多元化的劳动力更有可能有效预测和响应消费者需求]。” 家得宝，2017 年代理声明（表格 14A），第 28 页（2017 年 4 月 3 日）。 ^(52){ }^{52} Henderson, supra note 1, at 71-72. ^(53){ }^{53} See, e.g., Afdhel Aziz, The Power of Purpose: How Conscious Capitalism Is Helping Shape the New Paradigm for Business, Forbes (Sept. 5, 2019, 11:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/afdhelaziz/2019/09/05/the-power-of-purpose-how-conscious-capitalism-is-helping-shape-the-new-paradigm-for-business/#3560595679eb (defining the Business Roundtable’s statement as a “revolutionary . . . moment in business”); David Benoit, Top CEOs See a Duty Beyond Shareholders, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 2019, at A1 (referring to the statement as to a “major philosophical shift.”). ^(53){ }^{53} 参见，例如，Afdhel Aziz，《目标的力量：有意识的资本主义如何帮助塑造商业的新范式》，《福布斯》（2019 年 9 月 5 日，上午 11:05），https://www.forbes.com/sites/afdhelaziz/2019/09/05/the-power-of-purpose-how-conscious-capitalism-is-helping-shape-the-new-paradigm-for-business/#3560595679eb（将商业圆桌会议的声明定义为“商业中的一个革命性时刻”）；David Benoit，《顶级首席执行官看到超越股东的责任》，《华尔街日报》，2019 年 8 月 20 日，A1（将该声明称为“重大的哲学转变”）。 ^(54){ }^{54} Bus. Roundtable, Redefined Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 23.
find themselves in these situations all the time. Indeed, some of the most serious societal problems underlying the current debates on corporate purpose involve situations that do not offer win-win choices-but rather present clear and substantial trade-offs between shareholders and stakeholders. Consider the following five hypotheticals. 他们总是发现自己处于这些情况中。实际上，当前关于企业目的的辩论中，一些最严重的社会问题涉及的情况并不提供双赢的选择，而是呈现出股东与利益相关者之间明显且实质的权衡。考虑以下五个假设情况。
Climate Change: Consider an oil and gas company that has already taken into account the effects of its carbon emissions on its own sustainability and reputation. Suppose that the company’s long-term profit maximization would be served by generating over the next ten years massive profits from a project that would produce socially excessive carbon emissions. The decision whether to invest in this project would involve a tradeoff between shareholder interests and society’s interest in reducing climate risks. 气候变化：考虑一家已经考虑到其碳排放对自身可持续性和声誉影响的石油和天然气公司。假设该公司的长期利润最大化将通过在未来十年内从一个将产生社会过量碳排放的项目中获得巨额利润来实现。是否投资该项目的决策将涉及股东利益与社会减少气候风险的利益之间的权衡。
Market Power: Consider a company with already significant market power that could take advantage of existing opportunities and, within what the law permits, increase its market power even more. Expanding and using its market power would involve a tradeoff between the interests of shareholders and those of customers. 市场力量：考虑一家已经拥有显著市场力量的公司，该公司可以利用现有机会，并在法律允许的范围内进一步增强其市场力量。扩展和利用其市场力量将涉及股东利益与客户利益之间的权衡。
Offshoring: Suppose that a company could operate its plants more profitably by moving all its manufacturing facilities abroad to a country with substantially lower labor costs. And suppose further that the extra long-term profits would far exceed any reputational and moral costs to long-term profits that result from such an offshore move. In this case, choosing whether to move the operations offshore would involve a trade-off between the interests of shareholders and the interests of current employees and local communities. 离岸外包：假设一家公司通过将其所有制造设施迁移到一个劳动力成本大幅较低的国家，可以更有利可图地运营其工厂。进一步假设，额外的长期利润将远远超过因这种离岸迁移而导致的对长期利润的任何声誉和道德成本。在这种情况下，选择是否将运营迁移到海外将涉及股东利益与当前员工和当地社区利益之间的权衡。
Labor Share: Consider next a company that operates in the U.S. Rust Belt and employs a large number of blue-collar employees. Suppose that the company’s assets, given all the competitive constraints, are expected to generate over time a stream of profits that would be sufficient to fund all the anticipated investments and still leave a significant stream of annual free cash flow. Deciding how to allocate the free cash flows between dividends to shareholders and extra compensation to employees (beyond what would be needed just to retain them given the limited options available in their communities) would involve a tradeoff between the interests of shareholders and those of employees. 劳动份额：接下来考虑一家在美国铁锈带运营并雇佣大量蓝领员工的公司。假设该公司的资产在所有竞争约束下，预计随着时间的推移会产生一系列足以资助所有预期投资的利润，并且仍然留有可观的年度自由现金流。决定如何在向股东支付股息和向员工提供额外补偿（超出仅仅为了留住他们所需的补偿，考虑到他们社区中有限的选择）之间分配自由现金流，将涉及股东利益与员工利益之间的权衡。
Tax Avoidance: Finally, consider a company that is informed by its advisers that it could adopt structures and arrangements that would enable it to substantially reduce its tax liabilities, in full compliance with the law. Deciding whether and to what extent to take advantage of this opportunity would involve a tradeoff between the interests of shareholders and the interests of taxpayers and society. 税收规避：最后，考虑一家被顾问告知可以采用结构和安排，从而在完全遵守法律的情况下大幅减少税务负担的公司。决定是否以及在多大程度上利用这一机会将涉及股东利益与纳税人和社会利益之间的权衡。
The “win-win illusion” might be in part based on empirical studies documenting a statistically significant association between employee satisfaction “共赢幻觉”可能部分基于实证研究，这些研究记录了员工满意度与之之间的统计显著关联
and shareholder return, ^(55){ }^{55} as well as between social responsibility scores and company valuation. ^(56){ }^{56} These studies, however, at most show that some share-holder-friendly actions can increase shareholder value for some firms, but they do not imply a pervasive lack of substantial trade-offs or that all potential stakeholder-friendly options would generally be good for shareholders. 和股东回报， ^(55){ }^{55} 以及社会责任评分与公司估值之间的关系。 ^(56){ }^{56} 然而，这些研究最多表明某些对股东友好的行动可以为一些公司增加股东价值，但并不意味着普遍缺乏实质性的权衡，或者所有潜在的对利益相关者友好的选项通常对股东都是有利的。
As Alex Edmans concedes in his thoughtful review of the empirical literature on this issue, the fact that there is a positive correlation between social and financial performance in some industries or in some countries does not mean that the same correlation exists in all industries or in all countries. Most importantly, these correlations do not imply that “increasing social performance without limits always increases financial performance.” ^(57){ }^{57} The empirical evidence is thus fully consistent with the ubiquitous presence of trade-offs. 正如亚历克斯·埃德曼斯在他对这一问题的实证文献的深思熟虑的评审中所承认的，某些行业或某些国家之间社会绩效与财务绩效之间存在正相关关系，并不意味着在所有行业或所有国家中都存在相同的相关关系。最重要的是，这些相关性并不意味着“无限制地提高社会绩效总是会提高财务绩效。”因此，实证证据与权衡的普遍存在完全一致。
In the next two Parts we will discuss whether a move from SV to ESV would make any practical difference, and we will consider several factors that could enable ESV to produce an improvement in the extent to which corporate leaders incorporate stakeholder concerns into the maximization of longterm shareholder value. However, the discussion in this Part indicates that even if ESV were successful in increasing the focus of corporate leaders on the relevance of stakeholder issues for shareholder value, trade-offs would remain ubiquitous and many pressing societal problems-particularly those underlying current concerns and current interest in stakeholder capitalismwould not be alleviated through win-win solutions. Thus, to the extent that capitalism is facing “a world on fire,” moving from ESV to SV cannot be expected to have a major effect on the height of the flames. 在接下来的两个部分中，我们将讨论从 SV 转向 ESV 是否会产生任何实际差异，并考虑几个因素，这些因素可能使 ESV 在企业领导者将利益相关者的关注纳入长期股东价值最大化方面产生改善。然而，本部分的讨论表明，即使 ESV 在提高企业领导者对利益相关者问题与股东价值相关性的关注方面取得成功，权衡仍将无处不在，许多紧迫的社会问题——特别是那些导致当前关注和对利益相关者资本主义的兴趣的问题——也无法通过双赢解决方案得到缓解。因此，在资本主义面临“一个燃烧的世界”的情况下，从 ESV 转向 SV 不能指望对火焰的高度产生重大影响。
IV. EQUivalence to Shareholder Value IV. 与股东价值的等价性
The term “enlightened” has positive connotations, and therefore ESV may sound like an improvement on SV. But does ESV in fact lead to different corporate decisions than SV? “开明”一词具有积极的含义，因此 ESV 听起来可能是对 SV 的改进。但 ESV 实际上是否会导致与 SV 不同的企业决策？
The question must be asked because the old-fashioned SV also calls on corporate leaders to take into account stakeholder effects whenever they believe that the treatment of stakeholders would have effects on the long-term shareholder value that corporate leaders are directed to maximize. Indeed, even Milton Friedman, whose views on corporate social responsibility are 这个问题必须被提出，因为传统的 SV 也要求企业领导在认为对利益相关者的处理会影响企业领导被指示最大化的长期股东价值时，考虑利益相关者的影响。实际上，即使是米尔顿·弗里德曼，他对企业社会责任的看法也
often denounced by supporters of ESV, has indicated that shareholder value maximization may sometimes call for stakeholder-friendly decisions. In his well-known 1970 article for the New York Times Magazine, which is often considered a manifesto for the strongest version of SV, he explains that "providing amenities to [the local] community or to improving its government . . . may make it easier to attract desirable employees, it may reduce the wage bill or lessen losses from pilferage and sabotage or have other worthwhile effects. ^("5 "){ }^{\text {5 }} 常常受到 ESV 支持者的谴责，他指出，股东价值最大化有时可能需要做出对利益相关者友好的决策。在他 1970 年为《纽约时报杂志》撰写的著名文章中，这篇文章常被视为 SV 最强版本的宣言，他解释道：“为[当地]社区提供便利或改善其政府……可能会更容易吸引理想的员工，可能会减少工资支出或减少因盗窃和破坏造成的损失，或产生其他有价值的效果。”
Thus, under the “old-fashioned” SV approach, corporate leaders should take into account all factors that could affect long-term shareholder value, including any relevant stakeholder issues. The question then arises whether, in practice, the ESV standard should be expected to lead to a fuller or better consideration of stakeholder effects or otherwise produce different outcomes. 因此，在“老式”的 SV 方法下，企业领导者应考虑所有可能影响长期股东价值的因素，包括任何相关的利益相关者问题。问题随之而来，即在实践中，是否应该期望 ESV 标准能够更全面或更好地考虑利益相关者的影响，或者是否会产生不同的结果。
Are there circumstances in which, under an ESV standard, corporate leaders would choose corporate actions that are more favorable to stakeholders than under an SV standard? In Part V, we present a systematic analysis of the factors that could arguably lead to more stakeholder-friendly corporate decisions in case of a switch from SV to ESV. To prepare the ground for this analysis, we state below a set of four assumptions under which ESV and SV would be operationally fully equivalent, that is, in every situation they would direct corporate leaders to choose the same corporate action. 在什么情况下，根据 ESV 标准，企业领导会选择对利益相关者更有利的企业行动，而不是根据 SV 标准？在第五部分，我们对可能导致在从 SV 转向 ESV 时做出更有利于利益相关者的企业决策的因素进行了系统分析。为了为这一分析奠定基础，我们在下面陈述了一组四个假设，在这些假设下，ESV 和 SV 在操作上是完全等效的，也就是说，在每种情况下，它们都会指引企业领导选择相同的企业行动。
Table 1: Conditions for Equivalence of SV and ESV 表 1：SV 和 ESV 的等价条件
A1: Corporate leaders are not myopic and fully take into account the long-term consequences that their choices have on longterm shareholder value. 企业领导者并非目光短浅，他们充分考虑到其选择对长期股东价值的长期影响。
A2: Corporate leaders are well informed about the consequences of their choices (or at least as well informed about these consequences as other agents in the economy). A2: 企业领导者对其选择的后果有充分的了解（或者至少与经济中其他参与者一样了解这些后果）。
A3: Courts avoid the micromanagement of corporate decisions and defer to the discretion of corporate leaders under the business judgment rule. A3：法院避免对公司决策进行微观管理，并根据商业判断规则尊重公司领导的自由裁量权。
A4: Because outsiders are well-informed too, only changes in actual treatment of stakeholders, and not merely linguistic changes in the formulation of the decision standard, are taken to be actual changes. A4：因为外部人士也信息丰富，所以只有在利益相关者的实际待遇发生变化时，而不仅仅是决策标准表述上的语言变化，才被视为实际变化。
Assumptions A1 and A2 ensure that corporate leaders both (i) pay attention to all the factors that could have an effect on long-term shareholder value and (ii) are well-informed about these effects. Given these assumptions, corporate leaders who are guided by the SV maxim should be expected to take stakeholder issues into account to the extent that doing so would be relevant to maximizing shareholder value. 假设 A1 和 A2 确保企业领导者既关注所有可能影响长期股东价值的因素，又对这些影响有充分的了解。基于这些假设，遵循股东价值最大化原则的企业领导者应当被期望在考虑利益相关者问题时，尽可能地将其与最大化股东价值的相关性纳入考虑。
Assumption A3 excludes an external factor-judicial micromanagement whose scale or nature depends on whether ESV or SV is chosen - that could lead corporate leaders to choose differently under the two standards. Finally, assumption A4 excludes the possibility that outsiders would be “fooled” by the mere use of different language if the difference in language does not result in a different treatment of stakeholders by corporate leaders. 假设 A3 排除了一个外部因素——司法微观管理，其规模或性质取决于选择 ESV 还是 SV——这可能导致企业领导在这两种标准下做出不同的选择。最后，假设 A4 排除了外部人士仅因使用不同语言而被“愚弄”的可能性，前提是语言的差异并未导致企业领导对利益相关者的不同对待。
Thus, under these four assumptions, ESV would be practically indistinguishable from SV. Whenever treating stakeholders well in a given way would be useful for long-term shareholder value, such treatment would be called for under either ESV or SV. And whenever treating stakeholders well would not be useful for long-term shareholder value, such treatment would not be called for under either enlightened shareholder value or old-fashioned shareholder value. And with ESV-guided and SV-guided corporate leaders treating stakeholders in the same way, well-informed outsiders will perceive their identical treatment of stakeholders in the same way. 因此，在这四个假设下，ESV 与 SV 在实践中几乎无法区分。无论以何种方式善待利益相关者对长期股东价值有益，这种善待在 ESV 或 SV 下都是必要的。而无论善待利益相关者对长期股东价值没有益处，这种善待在启蒙股东价值或传统股东价值下都不被要求。而在 ESV 指导和 SV 指导的企业领导者以相同方式对待利益相关者的情况下，信息充分的外部人士将以相同的方式看待他们对利益相关者的相同对待。
The discussion above provides a useful benchmark for examining whether and how a switch to ESV could make a practical and positive difference. In Part V, we will relax in turn each of the above four assumptions, and we will consider the argument for the beneficial significance of ESV that could be introduced in this way. 上述讨论为检验转向 ESV 是否以及如何能够带来实际和积极的变化提供了一个有用的基准。在第五部分中，我们将依次放宽上述四个假设，并考虑以这种方式引入的 ESV 的有益意义的论点。
V. Arguments that Adopting ESV Would Make a Difference V. 采用 ESV 会产生影响的论点
In this Part, we turn to examine four potential arguments (not mutually exclusive) for replacing SV with ESV that could be introduced by relaxing the four assumptions under which SV and ESV are operationally equivalent. Section A relaxes the assumption that corporate leaders take into account both short-term and long-term effects, and it considers the argument that ESV is needed to address corporate leaders’ short-term bias. Section B relaxes the assumption that corporate leaders are well informed about the shareholder value effects of stakeholder-friendly decisions, and it considers the argument that adopting ESV would improve decisions by educating and informing corporate leaders about these effects. Section C relaxes the assumption that courts are largely deferential to the discretion of corporate leaders, and it considers the argument that using the ESV formulation would provide corporate leaders legal cover to make more stakeholder-friendly decisions. Section D considers the argument that, even though ESV would not make a practical 在本部分中，我们将考察四个可能的论点（并非相互排斥），以支持用 ESV 替代 SV，这些论点可以通过放宽 SV 和 ESV 在操作上等效的四个假设来引入。A 节放宽了企业领导者考虑短期和长期影响的假设，并考虑了需要 ESV 来解决企业领导者短期偏见的论点。B 节放宽了企业领导者对利益相关者友好决策的股东价值影响了解充分的假设，并考虑了采用 ESV 将通过教育和告知企业领导者这些影响来改善决策的论点。C 节放宽了法院在很大程度上对企业领导者自由裁量权持宽容态度的假设，并考虑了使用 ESV 表述将为企业领导者提供法律保护，以做出更有利于利益相关者的决策的论点。D 节考虑了即使 ESV 在实践中不会产生
difference for what corporate leaders actually do, using the ESV language would protect capitalism from a backlash and deflect outside pressures and demands for better treatment of stakeholders. 企业领导者实际所做的事情的差异，使用 ESV 语言将保护资本主义免受反弹，并抵御外部压力和对利益相关者更好对待的要求。
A. Addressing Short-Termism? A. 解决短期主义？
There is a long-standing debate in corporate governance scholarship about short-termism. ^(59){ }^{59} Those concerned about short-termism believe that corporate leaders have incentives to focus on short-term consequences and discount long-term consequences and, therefore, underinvest in activities that have long-term payoffs. Note that, to the extent that such a myopic behavior exists, it would likely adversely affect an array of corporate choices including those that have nothing to do with stakeholders. For example, a standard argument made about short-termism is that it leads corporate leaders to underinvest in R&D and other long-term capital. ^(60){ }^{60} 在公司治理学术界，关于短期主义的争论由来已久。 ^(59){ }^{59} 关注短期主义的人认为，公司领导者有动机专注于短期后果，而忽视长期后果，因此在那些具有长期回报的活动上投资不足。请注意，在一定程度上，如果存在这种短视行为，它可能会对一系列公司选择产生不利影响，包括那些与利益相关者无关的选择。例如，关于短期主义的一个标准论点是，它导致公司领导者在研发和其他长期资本上投资不足。 ^(60){ }^{60}
Some supporters of ESV argue that switching from SV to ESV would address the suboptimal treatment of stakeholders that is due to shorttermism. ^(61){ }^{61} The underlying theory is that investing in stakeholder welfare is 一些 ESV 的支持者认为，从 SV 转向 ESV 将解决由于短期主义导致的对利益相关者的次优对待。 ^(61){ }^{61} 其基本理论是，投资于利益相关者的福祉是
often a long-term investment; thus, encouraging corporate leaders to pay attention to stakeholders produces those long-term benefits that short-termism tends to undercut. ^(62){ }^{62} 通常是一项长期投资；因此，鼓励企业领导关注利益相关者会带来那些短期主义往往削弱的长期利益。 ^(62){ }^{62}
Under this view, for example, a company that treats employees or customers well today will be able to reap substantial benefits in the long term by gaining the loyalty or appreciation of such employees or customers. However, so the argument goes, short-termist corporate leaders tend to ignore or discount such long-term payoffs and therefore will underinvest in their employees or customers. In this view, a switch from SV to ESV, by directing corporate leaders to pay attention to stakeholder welfare, will lead corporate leaders to increase their current investment in their employees or customers, which will operate to enhance long-term value. As we explain below, however, even if corporate leaders were biased toward the short term, the case for ESV would not follow. 在这种观点下，例如，今天善待员工或客户的公司将能够通过获得这些员工或客户的忠诚或欣赏，在长期内获得可观的利益。然而，论点认为，短期主义的企业领导者往往忽视或低估这些长期收益，因此会对员工或客户的投资不足。在这种观点中，从 SV 转向 ESV，通过引导企业领导者关注利益相关者的福祉，将使企业领导者增加对员工或客户的当前投资，从而提升长期价值。然而，正如我们下面所解释的，即使企业领导者偏向于短期，支持 ESV 的理由也并不成立。
To begin with, the relation between short-termism and stakeholder welfare is more complicated than ESV supporters suggest. In fact, companies may choose short-termist strategies that are beneficial to stakeholders as well as long-termist strategies that are detrimental to stakeholders. For example, corporate leaders could decide to pay overly generous bonuses to incentivize employees to boost quarterly sales at the expense of long-term value (stake-holder-friendly short-termism); symmetrically, corporate leaders could decide to relocate all manufacturing plants offshore in order to boost long-term profits by killing tens of thousands of local jobs (stakeholder-hostile longtermism). 首先，短期主义与利益相关者福利之间的关系比 ESV 支持者所暗示的要复杂得多。实际上，公司可能会选择对利益相关者有利的短期主义策略，也可能选择对利益相关者有害的长期主义策略。例如，企业领导者可能决定支付过于慷慨的奖金，以激励员工在牺牲长期价值的情况下提升季度销售（对利益相关者友好的短期主义）；相应地，企业领导者可能决定将所有制造工厂迁往海外，以通过消灭数万个本地就业岗位来提升长期利润（对利益相关者敌对的长期主义）。
Second, to the extent that short-termism is a serious concern, it likely affects all choices that have substantial long-term payoffs and not only those 其次，短期主义如果是一个严重的问题，它可能会影响所有具有实质性长期回报的选择，而不仅仅是那些
objective for corporate decision-making . . . . ESV decision rules must look beyond quarterly earnings or other traditional measures . . . ."); see also Lund, supra note 19, at 92 (explaining that supporters of ESV have “criticized [SV] as contributing to corporate short-termism” and argue that ESV would ask “management to promote the long-term value of the firm for the benefit of its shareholders”). 企业决策的目标……ESV 决策规则必须超越季度收益或其他传统指标……"); 另见 Lund, supra note 19, 第 92 页（解释 ESV 的支持者“批评[SV]助长了企业的短期主义”，并认为 ESV 会要求“管理层促进公司的长期价值，以惠及其股东”）。 ^(62){ }^{62} For institutional investors supporting this argument, see, for example, Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose, HARV. L. SCh. F. On Corp. Governance (Jan. 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/a-sense-of-purpose (supporting ESV and arguing that without it, companies “will succumb to short-term pressures to distribute earnings, and, in the process, sacrifice investments in employee development, innovation, and capital expenditures that are necessary for long-term growth”); CalSTRS Corporate Governance Principles 2021, supra note 45 (arguing that CalSTRS is a “long-term investor” and therefore “unsustainable practices that hurt long-term profits are risks to the [fund]'s investment”). ^(62){ }^{62} 对于支持这一论点的机构投资者，参见例如，Larry Fink，《目标感》，哈佛法学院公司治理论坛（2018 年 1 月 17 日），https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/a-sense-of-purpose（支持 ESV，并认为如果没有它，公司“将屈服于短期压力以分配收益，并在此过程中牺牲对员工发展、创新和长期增长所必需的资本支出的投资”）；CalSTRS 公司治理原则 2021，见上文第 45 条（认为 CalSTRS 是“长期投资者”，因此“损害长期利润的不可持续做法对[基金]的投资构成风险”）。
that are related to stakeholders. If one were to assume that instructing corporate leaders to take certain issues into account would lead them to do so, which we will presently question, there is little reason to have such instructions limited to taking into account stakeholder effects. In particular, if telling corporate leaders to take certain effects into account were expected to lead them to give more weight to such effects, then it would be desirable to provide corporate leaders with similar instructions also with respect to other factors that are generally regarded to have substantial long-term effects such as R&D or long-term capital investments. 与利益相关者相关的。如果假设指示企业领导考虑某些问题会导致他们这样做（我们将对此进行质疑），那么没有理由将这些指示仅限于考虑利益相关者的影响。特别是，如果告诉企业领导考虑某些影响被期望能使他们更加重视这些影响，那么同样希望向企业领导提供关于其他通常被认为具有重大长期影响的因素（如研发或长期资本投资）的类似指示。
Third, and importantly, if corporate leaders have incentives to focus on the short term and thus discount long-term effects, which is the premise underlying short-termism concerns, then there is little basis for believing that telling corporate leaders not to do so would address the problem. After all, if telling corporate leaders that they should not be myopic could be expected to ensure that they make decisions that are optimal from a long-term perspective, the short-termism problem would be easily soluble, and concerns about it would be easily dismissible. 第三，重要的是，如果企业领导者有动力关注短期，从而忽视长期影响，这正是短期主义担忧的前提，那么认为告诫企业领导者不要这样做能够解决问题的依据就很少。毕竟，如果告诫企业领导者不应目光短浅能够确保他们做出从长期角度看是最佳的决策，那么短期主义问题就会很容易解决，对此的担忧也会很容易被忽视。
Note that supporters of ESV do not argue for replacing the business judgment rule with increased judicial supervision of managerial discretion. The business judgment rule, under which courts tend to defer to the business judgment of corporate leaders, is widely supported on the grounds that courts have difficulty second-guessing business decisions and that corporate leaders have incentives to use their discretion well. ^(63){ }^{63} In other words, the underlying assumption for keeping the business judgment rule in place is that the way corporate leaders use their discretion depends primarily on their incentives, not on legal rules or other forms of guidance. Thus, as long as corporate leaders have short-term incentives, pontificating to them about the importance of taking into account long-term effects, either in general or with respect to stakeholders in particular, would not address short-termism problems. 请注意，ESV 的支持者并不主张用对管理层自由裁量权的增加司法监督来取代商业判断规则。商业判断规则下，法院倾向于尊重企业领导的商业判断，这一规则得到了广泛支持，理由是法院很难对商业决策进行事后判断，而企业领导有激励去合理使用他们的自由裁量权。换句话说，维持商业判断规则的基本假设是，企业领导使用自由裁量权的方式主要取决于他们的激励，而不是法律规则或其他形式的指导。因此，只要企业领导有短期激励，向他们宣讲考虑长期影响的重要性，无论是一般性还是特别针对利益相关者，都无法解决短期主义问题。
To be sure, some ESV supporters push corporate leaders to adopt internal processes that would facilitate the consideration of stakeholder issues. For example, some institutional investors urge corporate leaders, and support shareholder proposals calling on such leaders, to create board committees or other internal processes that would facilitate such consideration. ^(64){ }^{64} Again, 当然，一些 ESV 支持者推动企业领导者采用内部流程，以便更好地考虑利益相关者问题。例如，一些机构投资者敦促企业领导者，并支持呼吁这些领导者的股东提案，创建董事会委员会或其他内部流程，以便促进这种考虑。 ^(64){ }^{64} 再次，
however, process requirements cannot be relied on to produce optimal longterm decisions when the incentives of decision-makers pull them in a different direction. To illustrate, to the extent that one is concerned that short-term incentives lead to underinvestment in R&D, this concern would not be expected to be addressed by having a board committee or a report to shareholders about the process that corporate leaders are pursuing to consider the subject. 然而，当决策者的激励朝着不同方向时，流程要求不能被依赖于产生最佳的长期决策。举例来说，如果有人担心短期激励导致对研发的投资不足，那么仅仅通过设立一个董事会委员会或向股东报告公司领导在考虑该问题时所采取的流程，并不能解决这一担忧。
Thus, because short-termism concerns are grounded in corporate leaders’ incentives, the effective way to address such concerns is by changing the incentives of corporate leaders. ^(65){ }^{65} In our view, and as one of us recently argued in an article on short-termism, the most effective way to provide corporate leaders with incentives that are more long-term oriented is to design executive pay arrangements with this goal in mind. ^(66){ }^{66} Institutional investors and others who are concerned about short-termism, with respect to stakeholder effects, R&D, or any other factors, should focus on redesigning pay arrangements. 因此，由于短期主义问题源于企业领导者的激励，解决这些问题的有效方法是改变企业领导者的激励。 ^(65){ }^{65} 在我们看来，正如我们其中一位在关于短期主义的文章中最近所论述的，提供企业领导者更具长期导向的激励的最有效方法是设计以此目标为导向的高管薪酬安排。 ^(66){ }^{66} 关注短期主义的机构投资者和其他人，针对利益相关者的影响、研发或任何其他因素，应专注于重新设计薪酬安排。
In sum, however concerned one may be about short-termism, telling corporate leaders to take into account factors that have long-term effects should not be expected to be an effective remedy. To the extent that incentives remain perversely short-termist, as some believe they are, instructions not backed by effective incentives would not address the problem. And to the extent that reforms in pay arrangements or other areas ensure that corporate leaders’ incentives are appropriately focused on the long term, telling corporate leaders to be long-termist would not make an additional practical difference. 总之，无论人们对短期主义有多么担忧，告诉企业领导者考虑具有长期影响的因素不应被期望成为有效的补救措施。在某种程度上，如果激励措施仍然扭曲地偏向短期主义，正如一些人所认为的那样，缺乏有效激励的指示将无法解决问题。而在某种程度上，如果薪酬安排或其他领域的改革确保企业领导者的激励适当地集中于长期，告诉企业领导者要关注长期主义也不会带来额外的实际差异。 ^(65){ }^{65} For this reason, some of those concerned about short-termism support insulating corporate leaders from hedge fund activists and takeovers, which they argue produce incentives to focus on short-term prices rather than long-term value creation. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187 (1991); Bill George, Activists Seek Short-Term Gain, Not Long-Term Value, N.Y. Times: DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:56 AM), http://dealbook.ny-times.com/2013/08/26/activists-seek-short-term-gain-not-long-term-value; Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, Harv. Bus. Rev.(July 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-are-shareholders. ^(65){ }^{65} 因此，一些关注短期主义的人支持将企业领导人与对冲基金活动家和收购隔离开来，他们认为这会产生关注短期价格而非长期价值创造的激励。参见，例如，Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187 (1991); Bill George, Activists Seek Short-Term Gain, Not Long-Term Value, N.Y. Times: DEALBOOK (2013 年 8 月 26 日, 10:56 AM), http://dealbook.ny-times.com/2013/08/26/activists-seek-short-term-gain-not-long-term-value; Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, Harv. Bus. Rev.(2012 年 7 月), https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-are-shareholders. ^(66){ }^{66} Bebchuk, Don’t Let the Short-Termism Bogeyman Scare You, supra note 59 (arguing that those concerned about short-termism should focus on redesigning executive pay before considering other changes to address short-term incentives). For a detailed blueprint for how to design compensation arrangements providing longterm incentives, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1915 (2010). ^(66){ }^{66} 贝布丘克，别让短期主义的妖怪吓到你，见上文第 59 条（主张关注短期主义的人应在考虑其他改变以应对短期激励之前，专注于重新设计高管薪酬）。有关如何设计提供长期激励的薪酬安排的详细蓝图，请参见卢西安·A·贝布丘克和杰西·M·弗里德，《为长期业绩付费》，158 U. PA. L. REv. 1915（2010）。
B. Educating and Informing Corporate Leaders? B. 教育和告知企业领导者？
Next, we relax assumption A2, according to which corporate leaders are well-informed about the consequences of their choices for long-term shareholder value, or at least not less informed than other agents. We thus turn to consider the possibility that corporate leaders are imperfectly informed about the impact of stakeholder-friendly decisions on long-term shareholder value, or that some behavioral factors preclude them from fully appreciating such an impact. Indeed, some supporters of ESV have argued that adopting a standard referring explicitly to stakeholder effects would have informational and educational value that would improve corporate decision making. ^(67){ }^{67} 接下来，我们放宽假设 A2，根据该假设，企业领导者对其选择对长期股东价值的影响信息充分，或者至少不比其他代理人信息更少。因此，我们转而考虑企业领导者对以利益相关者为导向的决策对长期股东价值影响的信息不完全，或者某些行为因素使他们无法充分理解这种影响的可能性。实际上，一些 ESV 的支持者认为，采用一个明确提及利益相关者影响的标准将具有信息和教育价值，从而改善企业决策。
According to this view, some corporate leaders have tended to systematically underappreciate the significance of stakeholder effects for long-term value. Replacing SV with ESV, so the argument goes, would contribute by highlighting and making salient the significance of stakeholder effects and thereby make corporate leaders more likely to take them fully into account. As explained below, however, this argument does not provide a good basis for ESV. 根据这种观点，一些企业领导者倾向于系统性地低估利益相关者影响对长期价值的重要性。有人认为，用 ESV 替代 SV 将有助于突出和强调利益相关者影响的重要性，从而使企业领导者更有可能充分考虑这些因素。然而，如下所述，这一论点并未为 ESV 提供良好的基础。
Generally speaking, corporate governance scholars, including those supporting ESV, do not believe that outsiders should micromanage which information corporate leaders acquire in order to make business decisions. For all factors other than stakeholder effects, supporters of ESV seem happy to accept the assumptions that corporate leaders are likely to be in the best position to assess what information would be relevant for their decisions. And there does not seem to be a good reason for why stakeholder effects should be singled out for special attention. 一般来说，包括支持 ESV 的学者在内的公司治理学者并不认为外部人士应该过度干预公司领导者获取哪些信息以便做出商业决策。对于除利益相关者影响之外的所有因素，ESV 的支持者似乎乐于接受这样的假设：公司领导者很可能处于最佳位置来评估哪些信息对他们的决策是相关的。而且，似乎没有充分的理由说明为什么利益相关者影响应该被特别关注。
To begin with, it is not clear why stakeholder effects are especially likely to be systematically underestimated by corporate leaders. Consider, for example, the language of the British company law provision whose example the Restatement of Corporate Governance Law project is considering following. ^(68){ }^{68} This provision instructs directors to pursue shareholder value, and reminds them that stakeholder effects may be relevant for assessing how best 首先，目前尚不清楚为什么利益相关者的影响特别容易被企业领导系统性低估。例如，考虑一下英国公司法条款的语言，该条款是《公司治理法重述》项目考虑遵循的例子。 ^(68){ }^{68} 该条款指示董事追求股东价值，并提醒他们，利益相关者的影响可能与评估最佳方式相关。
to pursue this goal, yet it does not explicitly mention any of the other factors that unquestionably may be relevant in many situations. Presumably, the implicit assumption is that corporate leaders are well informed about other factors. But what is the reason for believing that corporate leaders are less aware of the relevance of stakeholder effects than they are about the relevance of other factors? 为了追求这一目标，但它并没有明确提到在许多情况下无疑可能相关的其他因素。可以推测，隐含的假设是企业领导者对其他因素有充分的了解。但是，为什么会认为企业领导者对利益相关者影响的相关性了解得不如对其他因素的相关性了解得多呢？
In a debate with one of us, Alex Edmans argued that stakeholder effects often involve the assessment of intangibles and significant uncertainties. ^(69){ }^{69} However, intangibles and significant uncertainties are also involved in assessing other factors such as effects on the value of the company’s brands and the company’s intellectual property. ^(70){ }^{70} It is doubtful, however that anyone would support advocating a normative standard that would guide corporate leaders explicitly to take into account factors such as the value of the company’s brand and intellectual property. ^(71){ }^{71} 在与我们中的一位辩论中，亚历克斯·埃德曼斯（Alex Edmans）认为，利益相关者的影响通常涉及对无形资产和重大不确定性的评估。 ^(69){ }^{69} 然而，在评估其他因素时，如对公司品牌价值和公司知识产权的影响，无形资产和重大不确定性也同样存在。 ^(70){ }^{70} 然而，令人怀疑的是，是否有人会支持倡导一种规范标准，明确指导企业领导者考虑公司品牌和知识产权的价值等因素。 ^(71){ }^{71}
Finally, assuming that it is desirable to educate and inform corporate leaders about the significance of stakeholder effects, we are skeptical that using the language of ESV would be an effective way to do so. Consider a corporate leader who erroneously discounts the long-term effects of treating employees poorly because she believes that those effects would be smaller than what in fact they should be expected to be. In this case, even when reminded of the need to take employee effects into account, the corporate leader would still attach to these effects the leader’s estimate of their magnitude which we assume in this example to be too low. 最后，假设教育和告知企业领导者利益相关者影响的重要性是可取的，我们对使用 ESV 的语言是否有效持怀疑态度。考虑一个企业领导者，她错误地低估了对员工待遇不佳的长期影响，因为她认为这些影响会小于实际应预期的程度。在这种情况下，即使在提醒她需要考虑员工影响时，企业领导者仍会将这些影响与她对其规模的估计相联系，而我们在这个例子中假设这个估计过低。
Thus, the above analysis does not dispute that the provision of information about the significance of stakeholder effects could be valuable, as 因此，上述分析并不否认提供有关利益相关者影响重要性的资讯可能是有价值的，因
would be the case for information about other relevant effects of corporate decisions. Some corporate leaders might well seek such information from their advisers as they do for other types of information. To the extent that some scholars believe that there is insufficient understanding of stakeholder effects, it would make sense for them to seek to educate current and future managers through articles and books, executive education courses, or even MBA courses. However, changes in the language of normative standards are not an effective way for spreading management insights. For the reasons explained above, even accepting that the provision of information could be useful, there is little basis for (i) noting explicitly stakeholder effects but not other types of relevant information that would clearly be worth considering, and (ii) expecting that including such language would have a material effect on actual corporate choices. 这将适用于有关公司决策其他相关影响的信息。一些公司领导可能会像寻求其他类型的信息一样，从他们的顾问那里寻求此类信息。在一些学者认为对利益相关者影响的理解不足的程度上，他们寻求通过文章和书籍、管理人员教育课程，甚至 MBA 课程来教育当前和未来的管理者是有意义的。然而，规范标准语言的变化并不是传播管理见解的有效方式。基于上述原因，即使接受信息的提供可能是有用的，仍然没有足够的依据来（i）明确指出利益相关者影响而不考虑其他显然值得考虑的相关信息，以及（ii）期望包含这种语言会对实际公司选择产生实质性影响。
C. Providing Cover for Directors Seeking to Serve Stakeholders? C. 为寻求服务利益相关者的董事提供保护？
Some supporters of ESV might hope that adopting ESV would enable corporate leaders to provide benefits to stakeholders that would come at the expense of long-term profit. These supporters view stakeholder welfare as an end in itself that is worth serving, and their support for ESV is instrumental, as a tactic aimed at facilitating some outcomes that would be desired under a pluralistic conception of stakeholderism. Under their view, to the extent that some corporate leaders might sometimes be willing to serve stakeholders beyond what shareholder value-maximization would warrant, having ESV in place would encourage corporate leaders to do so by providing corporate leaders with “legal cover” and moral support for making such decisions. 一些 ESV 的支持者可能希望，采用 ESV 能够使企业领导者为利益相关者提供利益，而这将以长期利润为代价。这些支持者将利益相关者的福祉视为一种值得追求的目的，他们对 ESV 的支持是工具性的，作为一种旨在促进在多元利益相关者观念下所期望的某些结果的策略。在他们看来，在某些情况下，一些企业领导者可能愿意超出股东价值最大化所要求的范围来服务于利益相关者，实施 ESV 将鼓励企业领导者这样做，因为它为企业领导者提供了“法律保护”和道德支持，以便做出这样的决策。
According to this view, because courts generally avoid second-guessing the decisions of directors, the language of ESV would allow corporate leaders to use an instrumental rationale to justify a stakeholder-friendly decision, even if the decision was in fact intended to benefit stakeholders but not shareholders. By (insincerely) invoking the view that a stakeholder-friendly approach is believed to increase profits in the long term, corporate leaders would be able to protect the decision from judicial review and thus would be encouraged to make stakeholder-friendly decisions more frequently. 根据这种观点，由于法院通常避免对董事的决定进行事后审查，ESV 的语言将允许企业领导者使用工具性理由来为有利于利益相关者的决策辩护，即使该决策实际上是为了使利益相关者受益而非股东。通过（不真诚地）引用利益相关者友好方法被认为在长期内增加利润的观点，企业领导者将能够保护该决策免受司法审查，从而鼓励他们更频繁地做出有利于利益相关者的决策。
This reasoning, however, is flawed. Even under SV, thanks to the business judgment rule, corporate leaders can readily justify a stake-holder-friendly decision they are interested in making on the grounds that it would contribute to long-term shareholder value. ^(72){ }^{72} Thus, a switch from SV 然而，这种推理是有缺陷的。即使在股东价值（SV）下，由于商业判断规则，企业领导者也可以轻松地为他们感兴趣的以利益相关者为中心的决策辩护，理由是这将有助于长期股东价值。因此，从 SV 的转变
to ESV would add little to their practical freedom to make such decisions under the current legal framework. Corporate leaders wishing to provide benefits to stakeholders, even at the expense of long-term profits, already have sufficient legal cover to do so. To be sure, if adopting ESV led institutional investors to be more deferential to corporate leaders, the new standard might practically increase the discretion of corporate leaders, but is there any reason to expect that corporate leaders would use their reduced accountability to shareholders to benefit stakeholders? As our earlier work has empirically documented, corporate leaders generally do not have incentives to use their discretion to the benefit of stakeholders. ^(73){ }^{73} 将 ESV 纳入考虑对他们在当前法律框架下做出此类决策的实际自由几乎没有增加。希望为利益相关者提供利益的企业领导，即使以牺牲长期利润为代价，已经有足够的法律保障来做到这一点。可以肯定的是，如果采纳 ESV 使机构投资者对企业领导更加尊重，那么这一新标准可能在实践中增加企业领导的自由裁量权，但是否有理由期待企业领导会利用他们对股东的问责减少来惠及利益相关者？正如我们早期的研究所实证记录的那样，企业领导通常没有激励去利用他们的自由裁量权来惠及利益相关者。
Finally, note that this argument in support of ESV amounts to a belief that pluralistic stakeholderism is desirable and that ESV could be used as a mere pretext to conceal a pluralistic approach. If this is the practical justification for ESV, corporate governance scholars should rather examine and discuss the merits of the pluralistic approach, rather than its rhetorical camouflage. 最后，请注意，这一支持 ESV 的论点实际上是一种信念，认为多元利益相关者主义是可取的，而 ESV 可能仅被用作掩盖多元化方法的借口。如果这就是 ESV 的实际理由，企业治理学者应该更好地审视和讨论多元化方法的优点，而不是其修辞上的掩饰。
D. Improving Corporate Image and Avoiding Regulatory Backlash? D. 改善企业形象与避免监管反弹？
Finally, some supporters of moving from SV to ESV argue that such a move is necessary to prevent regulatory and public backlash against corporations. Under this view, public opinion has become increasingly mistrustful of business, ^(74){ }^{74} and as a consequence, corporations might face a public backlash that would impose costly reforms on them. In this situation, signaling to the 最后，一些支持从 SV 转向 ESV 的人认为，这样的转变是必要的，以防止对企业的监管和公众反弹。在这种观点下，公众舆论对商业的信任度越来越低， ^(74){ }^{74} 因此，企业可能面临公众的反弹，这将给它们带来昂贵的改革。在这种情况下，向公众发出信号是至关重要的。
be insulated from liability by the business judgment rule"); Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose? 99 TEXAS L. Rev. 1309, 1325 (2021) ("[e]ven if the Delaware case law is properly understood as conveying a strong commitment to shareholder primacy in the takeover context, we question its relevance to the day-to-day operational decisions that are the focus of the current purpose debate"); Rock, supra note 3, at 375-76 (“outside the “end-game” or conflict situations . . . disinterested directors seeking in good faith to promote the value of the corporation have the discretion to the make the decisions that they believe are best for the corporation and its stakeholders”). 通过商业判断规则免于承担责任"); Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, 企业是否应该有目的? 99 TEXAS L. Rev. 1309, 1325 (2021) ("[e]即使特拉华州的案例法被正确理解为在收购背景下对股东优先权的强烈承诺，我们质疑其与当前目的辩论中日常运营决策的相关性"); Rock, supra note 3, at 375-76 (“在“终局”或冲突情境之外……无私的董事真诚地寻求促进公司的价值，有权做出他们认为对公司及其利益相关者最有利的决策”). ^(73){ }^{73} Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 6, at 139-63; Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, supra note 7 at 152527; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, 40 Yale J. on Reg. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4026803. ^(74){ }^{74} See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 1, at 119 (“the trust gap between business and the general public is accelerating”). ^(74){ }^{74} 见，例如，Henderson, 前引注 1, 第 119 页（“商业与公众之间的信任差距正在加速”）。
outside world that they are paying attention to stakeholder interest is a strategy to allay the public’s concerns, rebuild social trust in business, and thus mitigate the costs of the regulatory and public backlash. ^(75){ }^{75} 关注利益相关者利益的外部世界是一种缓解公众担忧、重建社会对商业信任的策略，从而减轻监管和公众反对的成本。 ^(75){ }^{75}
Whereas each of the arguments discussed in the preceding three Sections focuses on how the move could potentially affect corporate decisions, the fourth argument focuses on how the move would affect the way in which companies are perceived by outsiders. The prospect of improved corporate image, so the argument goes, would make the adoption of ESV worthwhile even if it would not have a material effect on the substance of corporate decisions. 尽管前面三个部分讨论的每个论点都集中在这一举措可能如何影响公司决策，但第四个论点则关注这一举措将如何影响外部人士对公司的看法。论点认为，改善企业形象的前景将使得采用 ESV 变得值得，即使它对公司决策的实质内容没有实质性影响。
Business leaders and their advisers have long recognized the importance of how outsiders perceive corporations and their impact on stakeholders and society. About five decades ago, the Committee for Economic Development, a think tank established by business leaders, warned that "the corporation is dependent on the goodwill of society, which can sustain or impair its existence through public pressures on government. ^(י^(76)){ }^{י{ }^{76}} Fast-forwarding to the present, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink recently stated that companies “[w]ithout a sense of purpose” will “lose the license to operate from key stakeholders.” 77 Given these concerns, some supporters of ESV hope that a formal recognition of the ESV view would allay outsiders’ concerns about the adverse effects of corporate decisions on stakeholders and society. 商业领袖及其顾问早已认识到外部人士对企业的看法及其对利益相关者和社会的影响的重要性。大约五十年前，由商业领袖成立的经济发展委员会警告称，“企业依赖于社会的善意，社会通过对政府的公众压力可以维持或削弱其存在。” ^(י^(76)){ }^{י{ }^{76}} 快进到现在，黑石集团首席执行官拉里·芬克最近表示，缺乏“目标感”的公司将“失去来自关键利益相关者的运营许可。” 77 鉴于这些担忧，一些 ESV 的支持者希望正式承认 ESV 观点能够缓解外部人士对企业决策对利益相关者和社会产生不利影响的担忧。
However, for those genuinely interested in stakeholder protection, this should be a reason for opposing ESV, not for supporting it. Under the considered argument, the move to ESV would produce benefits not by changing 然而，对于那些真正关心利益相关者保护的人来说，这应该是反对 ESV 的理由，而不是支持它的理由。在所考虑的论点下，转向 ESV 所带来的好处并不是通过改变 ^(75){ }^{75} For commentators discussing this view, see, for example, Robert E. Freeman., Jeffrey S. Harrison & Andrew C. Wicks, Managing for Stakeholders: Survival, Reputation, and Success 4 (2007) (“managers must pay attention to supplier and employee relationships, and if they are at all clever they will understand that paying attention to community can help prevent activists, regulators, and others from using the political process to prevent their companies from pursuing profits”); Martin Lipton et al., The New Paradigm A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, Int’l Bus. Council World ECON. F. 7 (2016) (discussing the New Paradigm as a collaboration among shareholders and other stakeholders working together to achieve long-term value and explaining that without it “the demonstrated success of activists in exploiting short-term mindsets, will provoke regulatory and legislative reforms”). ^(75){ }^{75} 对于讨论这一观点的评论者，参见例如 Robert E. Freeman、Jeffrey S. Harrison 和 Andrew C. Wicks 的著作《Managing for Stakeholders: Survival, Reputation, and Success》4（2007 年） (“管理者必须关注供应商和员工关系，如果他们足够聪明，他们会明白关注社区可以帮助防止活动家、监管者和其他人利用政治过程阻止他们的公司追求利润”）；Martin Lipton 等人的《The New Paradigm A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth》，国际商业理事会世界经济论坛 7（2016 年）（讨论新范式作为股东和其他利益相关者共同合作以实现长期价值，并解释如果没有它，“活动家在利用短期思维方面的成功将引发监管和立法改革”）。 ^(76){ }^{76} Comm. For ECON. Dev., Social Responsibilities of Business Corporations 27 (1971). ^(76){ }^{76} 经济发展委员会，商业公司的社会责任 27 (1971)。 ^(77){ }^{77} Larry Fink, AA Sense of Purpose, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Jan. 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/a-sense-of-purpose. ^(77){ }^{77} 拉里·芬克, AA 目标感, 哈佛法学院公司治理论坛 (2018 年 1 月 17 日), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/a-sense-of-purpose.
the substance of corporate decisions but by improving corporate image and thereby precluding public policy reforms that would sacrifice long-term profits for the benefit of stakeholders. But for those interested in stakeholder protection, making stakeholder-protecting reforms less likely by merely improving corporate image - and not necessarily matching this with substantive change-would make things worse, not better. 企业决策的实质，而是通过改善企业形象，从而排除那些为了利益相关者而牺牲长期利润的公共政策改革。但对于那些关注利益相关者保护的人来说，仅仅通过改善企业形象而使得保护利益相关者的改革变得不太可能——而不一定与实质性变化相匹配——将使情况变得更糟，而不是更好。
As two of us explain in detail elsewhere, one of the effects of an illusory hope that ESV would improve stakeholder welfare might be a reduced demand for meaningful legal and regulatory reforms that could effectively protect stakeholders. ^(78){ }^{78} In this case, the adoption of the ESV principle would not only fail to directly improve stakeholder protection but also indirectly deteriorate the overall level of such protection. 正如我们两人 elsewhere 详细解释的那样，虚幻希望 ESV 会改善利益相关者福利的一个影响可能是对能够有效保护利益相关者的有意义的法律和监管改革的需求减少。在这种情况下，采纳 ESV 原则不仅未能直接改善利益相关者保护，反而可能间接恶化这种保护的整体水平。
The analysis up to this Section has shown that moving from SV to ESV should not be expected to produce material improvements in the treatment of stakeholders and their protection. That is, not only would such a move fail to produce the major improvement hoped for by those under the win-win illusion discussed in Part III, but it would also produce no material benefits for stakeholders. Whereas our analysis thus far has shown that moving from SV to ESV would not produce benefits for stakeholders, it has not identified any harms that could result from such a move, leaving open the possibility that the change in language would be merely inconsequential and neutral. As we now wish to stress, however, such a move could well be counterproductive and detrimental for the protection of stakeholders. 到本节为止的分析表明，从 SV 转向 ESV 不应期望在利益相关者的处理及其保护方面产生实质性的改善。也就是说，这样的转变不仅无法实现第三部分中讨论的那些抱有双赢幻想的人的主要期望改善，而且对利益相关者也不会产生任何实质性的好处。尽管到目前为止我们的分析表明，从 SV 转向 ESV 不会为利益相关者带来好处，但并未识别出这种转变可能导致的任何伤害，这使得语言的变化可能仅仅是无关紧要和中立的。然而，我们现在希望强调的是，这样的转变可能会适得其反，并对利益相关者的保护产生不利影响。
The reason is that, whereas the change in language would not produce material benefits in how stakeholders are actually treated, it could introduce expectations about the prospect of such improvements. Indeed, to the extent that some of the support for the move to ESV is intended to deflect pressures for reforms that would regulate and constrain companies, then the introduction of such expectations might be part of the motivation for the move. However, because any such expectations would be illusory and unrealistic, as our analysis has shown, the introduction of such expectations would be counterproductive. Those who are seriously concerned about corporate effects on stakeholders should thus be wary of any changes in corporate image that would be largely rhetorical rather than reflecting meaningful changes in the treatment of stakeholders. 原因在于，虽然语言的变化不会在实际对待利益相关者的方式上产生实质性的好处，但它可能会引入对这种改善前景的期望。实际上，在某种程度上，支持转向 ESV 的部分原因是为了转移对规范和限制公司的改革的压力，因此引入这种期望可能是推动这一转变的动机之一。然而，正如我们的分析所示，任何这样的期望都是虚幻和不切实际的，因此引入这种期望将是适得其反的。因此，那些真正关心公司对利益相关者影响的人应该对任何主要是修辞性的公司形象变化保持警惕，而不是反映对利益相关者待遇的实质性变化。
VI. Conclusions and Implications VI. 结论与启示
This article has provided an analysis of ESV. We have explained that the appeal of ESV lies partly in the misperception of win-win situations. Our 本文对 ESV 进行了分析。我们解释了 ESV 的吸引力部分在于对双赢局面的误解。我们的
world is one in which trade-offs are ubiquitous, and any discussion of corporate purpose should grapple with this reality. Furthermore, reviewing the full set of possible arguments, we have concluded that replacing SV with ESV would not deliver any value. 世界是一个权衡无处不在的地方，任何关于企业目的的讨论都应当面对这一现实。此外，经过对所有可能论点的全面审查，我们得出结论，替换 SV 为 ESV 不会带来任何价值。
At best, such a replacement would be unhelpful but harmless, as it would simply use a seemingly nicer language without making any difference in corporate actions. In such a case, the choice would not matter because it would be operationally inconsequential. Still, it would be useful to be clear-eyed about it, and our analysis would provide the needed clarity. 在最好的情况下，这种替代方案将是无益但无害的，因为它只会使用一种看似更好的语言，而不会对企业行为产生任何影响。在这种情况下，选择将无关紧要，因为它在操作上没有实质性影响。尽管如此，清晰地认识到这一点仍然是有用的，我们的分析将提供所需的清晰度。
At worst, however, replacing SV with ESV would be actively counterproductive. This would be the case if such a replacement would produceand could even be intended to produce - misperceptions as to what corporate leaders can be expected to do. As we have shown, using ESV language should not be expected to produce any material improvement in the treatment of stakeholders. However, using this language could well contribute to misperceptions and illusory expectations that would disserve the interests of stakeholders and society. 然而，在最坏的情况下，用 ESV 替代 SV 将是积极的反效果。如果这样的替代会产生——甚至可能是故意产生——对企业领导者可以被期望做什么的误解，那么情况就是如此。正如我们所示，使用 ESV 语言不应期望在对待利益相关者方面产生任何实质性的改善。然而，使用这种语言可能会导致误解和虚幻的期望，从而损害利益相关者和社会的利益。
James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School. For other affiliations and activities, see http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/bio.shtml. 詹姆斯·巴尔·阿梅斯 法律、经济学和金融教授，哈佛法学院公司治理项目主任。有关其他隶属关系和活动，请参见 http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/bio.shtml。 †\dagger Associate Professor, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law; Senior Research Fellow of the Program on Corporate Governance, and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. 特拉维夫大学法学院副教授；哈佛法学院公司治理项目高级研究员及法学讲师。 ‡\ddagger Lecturer on Law, Terence M. Considine Senior Fellow in Law and Economics, and Associate Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School. 哈佛法学院法律讲师、特伦斯·M·康斯代恩法律与经济学高级研究员，以及公司治理项目副主任。
For helpful comments and suggestions, we are grateful to Stavros Gadinis, Ron Gilson, and Virginia Harper Ho, as well as to participants in the London Business School debate on stakeholder capitalism and in The Business Lawyer’s ESG Symposium. The Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business provided financial support. 我们感谢 Stavros Gadinis、Ron Gilson 和 Virginia Harper Ho 的有益评论和建议，以及参与伦敦商学院关于利益相关者资本主义辩论和《商业律师》ESG 研讨会的参与者。哈佛法学院公司治理项目和约翰·M·奥林法律、经济与商业中心提供了财务支持。
This article is part of the research project on stakeholder capitalism of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. Companion articles written as part of the project are Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 91 (2020); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 94 S. CaL. L. Rev. 1467 (2021); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, 75 VAND. L. ReV. (forthcoming 2022); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID 40 Yale J. Reg. (forthcoming 2022); and Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESGBased Compensation, 48 J. CorP. L. (forthcoming 2022). 本文是哈佛法学院公司治理项目中关于利益相关者资本主义的研究项目的一部分。作为该项目的一部分撰写的相关论文包括：Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 91 (2020); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 94 S. CaL. L. Rev. 1467 (2021); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, 75 VAND. L. ReV. (即将出版 2022); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID 40 Yale J. Reg. (即将出版 2022); 以及 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESGBased Compensation, 48 J. CorP. L. (即将出版 2022)。
^(1){ }^{1} Rebecca Henderson, Reimagining Capitalism in a World of Fire 8, 11 (2020). ^(1){ }^{1} 瑞贝卡·亨德森，《在火焰世界中重新想象资本主义》8, 11 (2020)。 ^(2){ }^{2} Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy. A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 Bus. LAW. 397, 399 (2021). ^(2){ }^{2} 莱奥·E·斯特赖恩， Jr.，《恢复：利益相关者治理在重建公平和可持续的美国经济中必须发挥的作用》。对罗克教授的回复，76 商法 397, 399 (2021)。
^(3){ }^{3} In 1997, the Business Roundtable’s “Statement on Corporate Governance” expressed a commitment to SV, stating that “the paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders.” Bus. Roundtable, Statement on Corporate Governance 3 (1997), http://www.ralphgo-mory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Business-Roundtable-1997.pdf; see also Jean Tirole, Theory of Corporate Finance 56 (2006) (“economists, and for that matter much of the legal framework, have always asserted, on the grounds that prices reflect the scarcity of resources, that management should aim at maximizing shareholder wealth”); Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The Debate over Corporate Purpose, 76 Bus. LAW. 363, 368 (2021) (“In the traditional view… corporate managers face a constrained optimization problem: maximize the value of the company subject to side constraints imposed by regulation (and possibly social and ethical norms).”). 1997 年，商业圆桌会议的《公司治理声明》表达了对股东价值（SV）的承诺，指出“管理层和董事会的首要职责是对公司的股东负责。” 商业圆桌会议，《公司治理声明》第 3 页（1997），http://www.ralphgo-mory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Business-Roundtable-1997.pdf；另见让·蒂罗尔，《公司金融理论》第 56 页（2006） (“经济学家，以及法律框架中的大部分内容，一直主张，基于价格反映资源稀缺性，管理层应旨在最大化股东财富”); 爱德华·B·洛克，2020 年公司是为谁管理的？关于公司目的的辩论，76 商业法律杂志 363，368（2021） (“在传统观点中……公司管理者面临一个受限的优化问题：在受监管（以及可能的社会和伦理规范）约束的情况下最大化公司的价值。”)。 ^(4){ }^{4} See, e.g., Colin MAyEr, PRosperity 39 (2018) (arguing that the purpose of business should not be to make profits for shareholders but to “produc[e] profitable solutions to problems of people and planet”). ^(4){ }^{4} 参见，例如，Colin MAyEr, PRosperity 39 (2018)（认为商业的目的不应是为股东赚取利润，而是“为人类和地球的问题提供盈利的解决方案”）。
^(5){ }^{5} See, e.g., Colin Mayer, The Governance of Corporate Purpose (Eur. Corporate Gov. Inst. Working Paper No. 609/2021, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3928613 (“a purpose of producing profitable solutions and not profiting from producing problems extends accountability to a wider body of beneficiaries than just shareholders”). ^(5){ }^{5} 参见，例如，Colin Mayer，《企业目标的治理》（欧洲公司治理研究所工作论文第 609/2021 号，2021 年），https://ssrn.com/abstract=3928613（“生产盈利解决方案的目的，而不是从生产问题中获利，将问责制扩展到比仅仅股东更广泛的受益人群体”）。 ^(6){ }^{6} See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 91, 114 (2020) (defining “pluralistic stakeholders” in the sense discussed in this article). ^(6){ }^{6} 见 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, 《利益相关者治理的虚幻承诺》，106 康奈尔法律评论 91, 114 (2020)（在本文讨论的意义上定义“多元利益相关者”）。 ^(7){ }^{7} For a detailed discussion of the constituency statutes and their approach, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 94 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1467, 1485-95 (2021). ^(7){ }^{7} 有关选区法和其方法的详细讨论，请参见 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 94 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1467, 1485-95 (2021)。 ^(8){ }^{8} See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. Stat. § 10-830 (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717 (Consol. 2020); 15 PA. Cons. Stat. AnN. § 1715 (LexisNexis 2020). ^(8){ }^{8} 见，例如，ARIZ. REV. Stat. § 10-830 (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717 (Consol. 2020); 15 PA. Cons. Stat. AnN. § 1715 (LexisNexis 2020)。 ^(9){ }^{9} For articles supporting ESV, see, for example, Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. Corp. L. 59 (2010). ^(9){ }^{9} 有关支持 ESV 的文章，请参见，例如，Virginia Harper Ho， “启蒙股东价值”：超越股东-利益相关者分歧的公司治理，36 J. Corp. L. 59 (2010)。
^(10){ }^{10} For a discussion of the relevance of social license for corporations, see generally Hillary A. Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License, 94 S. CaL. L. Rev. 785 (2021). ^(10){ }^{10} 关于社会许可对公司的相关性讨论，通常参见 Hillary A. Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License, 94 S. CaL. L. Rev. 785 (2021)。 ^(11){ }^{11} Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (UK). ^(11){ }^{11} 公司法 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (英国)。 ^(12){ }^{12} John Loughrey, Andrew Keay & Luca Cerioni, Legal Practitioners, Enlightened Shareholder Value, and the Shaping of Corporate Governance, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 79, 83 (2008) (stating that, according to the Company Law Review Steering Group, the committee charged with studying and proposing a framework to reform company law, the then current law “reflected the fact that companies are managed for the benefit of the shareholders”). ^(12){ }^{12} 约翰·洛赫里，安德鲁·基，卢卡·切里奥尼，《法律从业者、开明的股东价值与公司治理的塑造》，8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 79, 83 (2008)（指出，根据公司法审查指导小组的说法，该委员会负责研究和提出改革公司法的框架，当时的法律“反映了公司是为了股东的利益而管理的事实”）。
^(20){ }^{20} Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, Bus. Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019), https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment. ^(20){ }^{20} 关于公司的目的声明，商业圆桌会议（2019 年 8 月 19 日），https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment。 ^(21){ }^{21} Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, World Econ. F. (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.wefo-rum.org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-of-a-com-pany-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution. ^(21){ }^{21} 达沃斯宣言 2020：第四次工业革命中公司的普遍目的，世界经济论坛（2019 年 12 月 2 日），https://www.wefo-rum.org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-of-a-com-pany-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution. ^(22){ }^{22} For such expressions of support by CEOs, see, for example, Ajay Banga, Mastercard CEO: How to Make the Digital Economy Work for Everyone, Fortune.com, Aug. 23, 2019, https://fortune.com/2019/08/23/g7-meeting-master-card-business-roundtable; Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote “An Economy That Serves All Americans,” Bus. Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-rede-fines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans (quoting Jamie Dimon). ^(22){ }^{22} 对于首席执行官此类支持的表达，参见例如 Ajay Banga，万事达卡首席执行官：如何让数字经济为每个人服务，Fortune.com，2019 年 8 月 23 日，https://fortune.com/2019/08/23/g7-meeting-master-card-business-roundtable；商业圆桌会议重新定义公司的目的，以促进“服务所有美国人的经济”，商业圆桌会议（2019 年 8 月 19 日），https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-rede-fines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans（引用 Jamie Dimon）。 ^(23){ }^{23} Bus. Roundtable, Redefined Purpose of a Corporation: Welcoming the Debate, Medium (Aug. 25, 2019), https://medium.com/@BizRoundtable/redefined-purpose-of-a-corporation-welcoming-the-debate-8f03176f7ad8. ^(23){ }^{23} 商业圆桌会议，重新定义公司的目的：欢迎辩论，Medium（2019 年 8 月 25 日），https://medium.com/@BizRoundtable/redefined-purpose-of-a-corporation-welcoming-the-debate-8f03176f7ad8。 ^(24){ }^{24} Id. (“for corporations to be successful . . . , they need to consider the interests and meet the fair expectations of a wide range of stakeholders in addition to shareholders, including customers, employees and the communities in which they operate”). ^(24){ }^{24} Id. (“为了使公司成功……，他们需要考虑利益相关者的利益并满足他们的合理期望，这些利益相关者除了股东外，还包括客户、员工以及他们所运营的社区”).
^(26){ }^{26} See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, 75 VAND. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3899421. In particular, the study found that about 20 percent of the signatory companies have corporate governance guidelines that express support for an ESV approach. ^(26){ }^{26} 一般而言，参见 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, 75 VAND. L. Rev. (即将出版 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3899421。特别是，该研究发现大约 20% 的签署公司拥有支持 ESV 方法的公司治理指南。 ^(27){ }^{27} General Motors Company Board of Directors Corporate Governance Guidelines, Gen. Motors Co. 2 (Aug. 8, 2017), https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/data/BRTPurposeArchive/GM1.pdf. ^(27){ }^{27} 通用汽车公司董事会公司治理指南，通用汽车公司 2 (2017 年 8 月 8 日)，https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/data/BRTPurposeArchive/GM1.pdf。 ^(28){ }^{28} Walmart Inc. Corporate Governance Guidelines, Walmart Inc. 3 (Feb. 6, 2020), https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/data/BRTPurposeArchive/Walmart1.pdf. ^(28){ }^{28} 沃尔玛公司企业治理指南，沃尔玛公司 3 (2020 年 2 月 6 日)，https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/data/BRTPurposeArchive/Walmart1.pdf。 ^(29){ }^{29} Davos Manifesto 2020, supra note 21. ^(29){ }^{29} 达沃斯宣言 2020，见注 21。 ^(30){ }^{30} Milton Cheng, Beatriz Pessoa de Araujo & Julia Hayhoe, Questions Directors Need to Ask in the Age of Stakeholder Capitalism, World Econ. F. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/what-is-the-role-of-directors-in-the-age-of-stakeholder-capitalism. ^(30){ }^{30} 米尔顿·程、贝阿特丽斯·佩索阿·德·阿劳霍与朱莉亚·海霍，董事在利益相关者资本主义时代需要问的问题，世界经济论坛（2020 年 1 月 8 日），https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/what-is-the-role-of-directors-in-the-age-of-stakeholder-capitalism。 ^(31){ }^{31} Klaus Schwab & Peter Vanham, What Is Stakeholder Capitalism?, World ECON. F. (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/01/klaus-schwab-on-what-is-stakeholder-capitalism-history-relevance. ^(31){ }^{31} 克劳斯·施瓦布 & 彼得·范哈姆，《什么是利益相关者资本主义？》，世界经济论坛（2021 年 1 月 22 日），https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/01/klaus-schwab-on-what-is-stakeholder-capitalism-history-relevance。
^(36){ }^{36} Id. ^(37){ }^{37} Id.
^(38){ }^{38} Cyrus Taraporevala, CEO Letter to Board Members Concerning 2020 Proxy Voting Agenda, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Feb. 3, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/03/ceo-letter-to-board-members-concern-ing-2020-proxy-voting-agenda. ^(38){ }^{38} 塞勒斯·塔拉波雷瓦拉，首席执行官致董事会成员关于 2020 年代理投票议程的信，哈佛法学院公司治理论坛（2020 年 2 月 3 日），https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/03/ceo-letter-to-board-members-concern-ing-2020-proxy-voting-agenda。 ^(39){ }^{39} Cyrus Taraporevala, 2019 Proxy Letter-Aligning Corporate Culture with Long-Term Strategy, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Jan. 15, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/15/2019-proxy-letter-aligning-corporate-culture-with-long-term-strategy. ^(39){ }^{39} Cyrus Taraporevala, 2019 年代理信——将企业文化与长期战略对齐，哈佛法学院公司治理论坛（2019 年 1 月 15 日），https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/15/2019-proxy-letter-aligning-corporate-culture-with-long-term-strategy. ^(40){ }^{40} Climate Change Investment Stewardship Insights 2021, VaNGUARD, https://global.vanguard.com/documents/voting-insights-climate-proposals2021.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2022). ^(40){ }^{40} 气候变化投资管理洞察 2021, VaNGUARD, https://global.vanguard.com/documents/voting-insights-climate-proposals2021.pdf (最后访问日期：2022 年 3 月 19 日)。 ^(41){ }^{41} Id. ^(42)2020{ }^{42} 2020 Investment Stewardship Annual Report, VANGUARD, https://global.van-guard.com/documents/2020-investment-stewardship-annual-report.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2022). ^(42)2020{ }^{42} 2020 投资管理年度报告，VANGUARD，https://global.van-guard.com/documents/2020-investment-stewardship-annual-report.pdf（最后访问日期：2022 年 3 月 19 日）。 ^(43){ }^{43} Why Climate Risk Reporting Is Important, CalPERS, https://news.calpers.ca.gov/why-climate-risk-reporting-is-important (last visited Mar. 19, 2022). ^(43){ }^{43} 为什么气候风险报告很重要，CalPERS，https://news.calpers.ca.gov/why-climate-risk-reporting-is-important（最后访问时间：2022 年 3 月 19 日）。 ^(44){ }^{44} Id.
^(55){ }^{55} See Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and Equity Prices, 101 J. Fin. Econ. 621, 622 (2011). ^(55){ }^{55} 见 Alex Edmans, 股票市场是否充分评估无形资产？员工满意度与股价, 101 J. Fin. Econ. 621, 622 (2011)。 ^(56){ }^{56} See Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang & Luc Renneboog, Socially Responsible Firms, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 585, 586 (2016). ^(56){ }^{56} 见 Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang & Luc Renneboog, 社会责任公司, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 585, 586 (2016)。 ^(57){ }^{57} Edmans, Grow the Pie, supra note 17, at 137.
^(58){ }^{58} Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM12. ^(58){ }^{58} 米尔顿·弗里德曼，《企业的社会责任是增加其利润》，纽约时报，1970 年 9 月 13 日，SM12。
^(59){ }^{59} For authors supporting the view that corporate leaders are short-termist, see, for example, Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-andBlood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1871-72 (2017); Klaus Schwab, Five Leadership Priorities for 2017, WORLD ECON. F., https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/five-leadership-priorities-for-2017 (last visited Mar. 17, 2022); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. Rev. 653, 653-54, 657-59 (2010); Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, 61 Fin. Analysts J. 65 (2005). ^(59){ }^{59} 支持企业领导者短期主义观点的作者包括，例如，Leo E. Strine, Jr.，《谁在狼咬时流血？对对冲基金激进主义和我们奇怪的公司治理体系的血肉之躯的视角》，126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1871-72 (2017)；Klaus Schwab，《2017 年的五个领导优先事项》，WORLD ECON. F.，https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/five-leadership-priorities-for-2017（最后访问日期：2022 年 3 月 17 日）；William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter，《反对股东赋权的案例》，158 U. PA. L. Rev. 653, 653-54, 657-59 (2010)；Alfred Rappaport，《短期业绩痴迷的经济学》，61 Fin. Analysts J. 65 (2005)。
For authors questioning the magnitude of the short-termist problem, see, for example, Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637 (2013); Mark J. Roe, Looking for the EconomyWide Effects of Stock Market Short-Termism, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3986570 (unpublished manuscript). For a recent essay on the significance of the shorttermism problem, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Don’t Let the Short-Termism Bogeyman Scare You, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 2021, at 43. 对于质疑短期主义问题严重性的作者，参见例如 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637 (2013); Mark J. Roe, Looking for the EconomyWide Effects of Stock Market Short-Termism, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3986570 (未发表手稿)。有关短期主义问题重要性的最新论文，请参见 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Don’t Let the Short-Termism Bogeyman Scare You, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 2021, 第 43 页。 ^(60){ }^{60} For authors supporting the view that short-termism is leading corporate leaders to underinvest in R&D, see, for example, John C. Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. Corp. L. 545, 580 (2016); William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, Harv. Bus. Rev, Sept. 2014, at 46. ^(60){ }^{60} 对于支持短期主义导致企业领导者在研发上投资不足的观点的作者，参见，例如，John C. Coffee Jr. 和 Darius Palia，《门口的狼：对冲基金激进主义对公司治理的影响》，41 J. Corp. L. 545, 580 (2016)；William Lazonick，《没有繁荣的利润》，哈佛商业评论，2014 年 9 月，第 46 页。 ^(61){ }^{61} See, e.g., Harper Ho, supra note 9, at 99 ("[u]nder an enlightened shareholder value paradigm then, generating long-term shareholder wealth is the fundamental ^(61){ }^{61} 参见，例如，Harper Ho, 前注 9, 第 99 页 ("在一个开明的股东价值范式下，创造长期股东财富是基本的
^(63){ }^{63} See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law 248 (3d ed. 2015); Rock, supra note 3, at 375. ^(63){ }^{63} 参见，例如，Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law 248 (第 3 版 2015); Rock, 上述注释 3, 第 375 页。 ^(64){ }^{64} See, e.g., CEO’s Letter on Our 2019 Proxy Voting Agenda, State St., https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/15/2019-proxy-letter-aligning-corporate-culture-with-long-term-strategy (last visited Mar. 17, 2022) (calling on boards to proactively review and monitor corporate culture, aggressive sales practices and/or unethical behaviors, which negatively impacted long-term company performance). ^(64){ }^{64} 参见，例如，首席执行官关于我们 2019 年代理投票议程的信，State St.，https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/15/2019-proxy-letter-aligning-corporate-culture-with-long-term-strategy（最后访问日期：2022 年 3 月 17 日）（呼吁董事会主动审查和监控企业文化、激进的销售行为和/或不道德行为，这些行为对公司长期业绩产生了负面影响）。
^(67){ }^{67} These values were stressed by Alex Edmans in his discussion of our earlier work at a conference at the University of Chicago. For his presentation slides, see https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pef-2020/slides/ed-mans_chicago-bebchuk-tallarita-discussion-alex-e.pdf. For additional discussions of the educational value of ESV, see Guido Ferrarini, Corporate Purpose and Sustainability, ECGI Working Paper No. 559/2020 (2020), at 53, https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/ferrarinifinal.pdf. See also Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 19. ^(67){ }^{67} 这些价值观在亚历克斯·埃德曼斯（Alex Edmans）于芝加哥大学会议上讨论我们早期工作的过程中得到了强调。有关他的演示幻灯片，请参见 https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pef-2020/slides/ed-mans_chicago-bebchuk-tallarita-discussion-alex-e.pdf。有关 ESV 教育价值的更多讨论，请参见 Guido Ferrarini 的《企业目的与可持续性》，ECGI 工作论文第 559/2020 号（2020 年），第 53 页，https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/ferrarinifinal.pdf。另见 Gadinis & Miazad，前注 19。 ^(68){ }^{68} See supra notes 11-13. ^(68){ }^{68} 见上文注释 11-13。
^(69){ }^{69} Edmans, supra note 67. Edmans stressed this point also in a virtual debate with one of us, Stakeholder Capitalism: The Case For and Against, Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Dec. 16, 2020, https://ecgi.global/video/stakeholder-capitalism-case-and-against. ^(69){ }^{69} Edmans, supra note 67. Edmans 在与我们之一的虚拟辩论中也强调了这一点，利益相关者资本主义：支持与反对的案例，欧洲公司治理研究所，2020 年 12 月 16 日，https://ecgi.global/video/stakeholder-capitalism-case-and-against。 ^(70){ }^{70} For empirical studies showing that investors seem to underestimate the value of research and development expenditures, marketing expenditures, and other intangible assets, see Louis K. C. Chan, Josef Lakonishok & Theodore Sougiannis, The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures, 56 J. Fin. 2431 (2001); Rajiv D. Banker, Rong Huang, Ram Natarajan & Sha Zhao, Market Valuation of Intangible Asset: Evidence on SG&A Expenditure, 94 Acct. Rev. 61 (2019). 对于实证研究表明投资者似乎低估了研发支出、营销支出和其他无形资产的价值，参见 Louis K. C. Chan, Josef Lakonishok & Theodore Sougiannis, The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures, 56 J. Fin. 2431 (2001); Rajiv D. Banker, Rong Huang, Ram Natarajan & Sha Zhao, Market Valuation of Intangible Asset: Evidence on SG&A Expenditure, 94 Acct. Rev. 61 (2019)。 ^(71){ }^{71} Alternatively, it might be argued that many corporate leaders might have greater difficulty fully appreciating stakeholder effects, such as effects on employees, because of their own life experience. However, to the extent that there are behavioral or psychological impediments to the ability of some corporate leaders to appreciate stakeholder issues, we doubt that telling corporate leaders that doing so would be useful would address the problem. ^(71){ }^{71} 另外，可以认为许多企业领导可能由于自身的生活经历而更难充分理解利益相关者的影响，例如对员工的影响。然而，鉴于某些企业领导在理解利益相关者问题方面可能存在行为或心理障碍，我们怀疑告诉企业领导这样做会有益处是否能解决这个问题。
^(72){ }^{72} BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63 at 248 (" [t][t] he court may hold forth on the primacy of shareholder interests, or may hold forth on the importance of socially responsible conduct, but ultimately it does not matter. Under either approach, directors . . . will ^(72){ }^{72} BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63 at 248 (" [t][t] 法院可能会阐述股东利益的优先性，或者可能会阐述社会责任行为的重要性，但最终这并不重要。无论哪种方式，董事们……
^(78){ }^{78} See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 6, at 168-75. ^(78){ }^{78} 见 Bebchuk & Tallarita, 上述第 6 条, 第 168-175 页。