The West pulled further ahead of most of the rest of the world in the 20th century, but some countries bucked the trend and caught up, notably, Japan, South Korea, and (less completely) the Soviet Union. China looks on course to do the same. Growth in these countries was very rapid, and the gap was closed in half a century. They began their growth spurts with an income per head equal to only $20-25\mathrm{\%}$$20-25\mathrm{\%}$20-25%20-25 \% of that in the advanced countries. With the latter growing at $2\mathrm{\%}$$2\mathrm{\%}$2%2 \% per year, the poor country could catch up in two generations ( 60 years) only if its per capita GDP grew at $4.3\mathrm{\%}$$4.3\mathrm{\%}$4.3%4.3 \% per year. This requires total GDP to grow at $6\mathrm{\%}$$6\mathrm{\%}$6%6 \% or more per year depending on population growth. That is a high hurdle. The only way large countries have been able to grow so fast is by constructing all of the elements of an advanced economy - steel mills, power plants, vehicle factories, cities, and so on - simultaneously. This is Big Push industrialization. It raises difficult problems since everything is built ahead of supply and demand. The steel mills are built before the auto factories that will use their rolled sheets. The auto plants are built before the steel they will fabricate is available and, indeed, before there is effective demand for their products. Every investment depends on faith that the complementary investments will materialize. The success of the grand design requires a planning authority to coordinate the activities and ensure that they are carried out. The large
20 世纪西方与世界上大多数国家的差距进一步拉大，但有些国家逆势而上实现了赶超，最显著的是日本、韩国以及（程度稍逊的）苏联。中国看来也正沿着相同路径发展。这些国家的经济增长极其迅猛，仅用半个世纪就缩小了差距。它们经济腾飞初期的人均收入仅为发达国家的 $20-25\mathrm{\%}$$20-25\mathrm{\%}$20-25%20-25 \% 。假设发达国家年增长率为 $2\mathrm{\%}$$2\mathrm{\%}$2%2 \% ，穷国若要在两代人（60 年）内实现赶超，其人均 GDP 年增长率必须达到 $4.3\mathrm{\%}$$4.3\mathrm{\%}$4.3%4.3 \% 。这意味着根据人口增长率不同，其 GDP 总量年增长率需达到 $6\mathrm{\%}$$6\mathrm{\%}$6%6 \% 甚至更高。这是个很高的门槛。大国要实现如此高速增长，唯一途径就是同步建设先进经济体的所有要素——钢厂、发电厂、汽车制造厂、城市等等。这就是大推进式工业化。这种模式会带来诸多难题，因为所有建设都超前于供需关系：在需要使用钢板的汽车厂建成之前，钢厂就已经建好了。 汽车工厂在所需钢材到位前就已建成，甚至在其产品尚未形成有效市场需求时便已投产。每项投资都基于配套投资终将实现的信念。这一宏大蓝图的成功，需要一个规划机构来协调各方行动并确保其落实。大规模
economies that have broken out of poverty in the 20th century have managed to do this, although they varied considerably in their planning apparatus.
20 世纪摆脱贫困的经济体都成功实现了这一目标，尽管它们的规划机制存在显著差异。

The Soviet Union is the classic example of a Big Push. The 1917 Revolution was followed by four years of civil war, which was won by the Bolsheviks, who conceded the peasants’ demands for ownership of the land and its equal division among the farming population. By 1928, the New Economic Policy had revived the economy, Lenin was dead, and Stalin was in power.
苏联是"大推进"模式的经典范例。1917 年革命后经历了四年内战，最终布尔什维克取得胜利，他们接受了农民对土地所有权及在农业人口中平均分配土地的要求。到 1928 年，新经济政策使经济得以复苏，列宁已逝世，斯大林开始掌权。

The USSR faced the same problem as other poor countries: most of the population was in the countryside engaged in handicraft production and small-scale agriculture. The country needed to build a modern, urban economy. That, in turn, required massive investment in modern technology. The Soviet solution was central planning, and the Five Year Plan became its symbol. Since Soviet businesses were state-owned, they could be directed with instructions from the top (the plan) instead of following the incentives of the market. For a long time, the Soviet model looked like a great success and inspired planned development in many poor countries.
苏联面临着与其他贫困国家相同的问题：大部分人口生活在农村，从事手工业生产和小规模农业。国家需要建设现代化的城市经济。这反过来又要求对现代技术进行大规模投资。苏联的解决方案是中央计划，五年计划成为其象征。由于苏联企业归国家所有，它们可以通过来自高层（即计划）的指令来指导，而不是遵循市场的激励。长期以来，苏联模式看起来非常成功，并激励了许多贫困国家进行计划发展。

The Soviet Big Push began with the first Five Year Plan in 1928. The growth strategy rested on four legs. The first was channelling investment into heavy industry and machinery production. This accelerated the capacity to build capital equipment and thereby pushed up the rate of investment. The USSR was large enough to absorb the output of large-scale factories, which became the norm. The second was the use of demanding output targets to direct business operations. Since maximizing output might lead to losses, bank credit was liberally given to businesses so that they could cover their costs. The ‘hard budget constraints’ of capitalism were replaced by ‘soft budget constraints’. Third, agriculture was
苏联的大推进始于 1928 年的第一个五年计划。这一增长战略建立在四大支柱之上：首先是向重工业和机械制造领域集中投资。此举加速了资本设备的生产能力，从而提高了投资率。幅员辽阔的苏联足以消化大规模工厂的产出，这类工厂遂成为标配。其次是运用高要求的产出指标来指导企业经营。由于最大化产出可能导致亏损，银行向企业慷慨提供信贷以覆盖成本。资本主义的"硬预算约束"被"软预算约束"所取代。第三项是农业
collectivized. Politically, this was the most controversial policy since it was anathema to the peasants, who preferred small family farms and periodic redistributions of land by the village to ensure equality. In the event, collectivization resulted in a huge fall in farm output and led to famine in 1933. The fourth was mass education. Schooling was quickly made universal and compulsory. Adult education was pursued vigorously to cut the time for the whole labour force to be trained.
集体化。这成为最具政治争议的政策，因为农民对此深恶痛绝——他们更钟意家庭小农庄，以及由村庄定期重新分配土地以确保公平。最终集体化导致农业产量暴跌，并在 1933 年引发大饥荒。第四大支柱是全民教育：迅速普及义务教育，并大力开展成人教育以缩短整体劳动力培训周期。

These measures caused the economy to grow rapidly. By the time the Germans invaded in 1940, thousands of factories, dams, and power plants had been built. The plans tilted investment to heavy industry, which boomed. By 1940, pig iron production had increased from a pre-war maximum of 4 million tons per year to 15 million tons. This was twice as much as Britain produced, but still only half as much as the USA. Electric power generation went from 5 to 42 billion kilowatt-hours. (Lenin once quipped that Communism meant ‘Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country’. By that definition, the Revolution was a success.) The investment rate rose from about 8% of GDP in 1928 to $19\mathrm{\%}$$19\mathrm{\%}$19%19 \% in 1939.
这些举措推动经济快速增长。到 1940 年德军入侵时，苏联已建成数千座工厂、水坝和发电站。计划政策向重工业倾斜，使该领域蓬勃发展。1940 年生铁年产量从战前最高 400 万吨激增至 1500 万吨，是英国产量的两倍，但仍仅为美国的一半。发电量从 50 亿千瓦时跃升至 420 亿千瓦时（列宁曾戏称共产主义就是"苏维埃政权加全国电气化"，按此标准革命可谓成功）。投资占 GDP 比重从 1928 年的 8%攀升至 1939 年的 20%。

The production of consumer products also increased but by a smaller amount. Partly, this reflected priorities; partly, it was due to the disastrous collectivization of agriculture. Production rebounded by the end of the decade, however. In 1939, the USSR processed about 900,000 tons of ginned cotton. This was double the 1913 level, $50\mathrm{\%}$$50\mathrm{\%}$50%50 \% more than Great Britain (whose output had fallen considerably due to Japanese competition), but only $52\mathrm{\%}$$52\mathrm{\%}$52%52 \% of the USA’s. While per capita consumption fell sharply in 1932 and 1933, there was a $20\mathrm{\%}$$20\mathrm{\%}$20%20 \% rise in average living standards between 1928 and 1939. In addition, educational and health services were enormously extended.
消费品产量也有所增长，但增幅较小。这在一定程度上反映了政策优先级的安排，部分原因则在于灾难性的农业集体化运动。不过到 1930 年代末期，生产已出现回升。1939 年，苏联加工了约 90 万吨皮棉，是 1913 年水平的两倍， $50\mathrm{\%}$$50\mathrm{\%}$50%50 \% 超过英国（由于日本竞争其产量已大幅下降），但仅为美国产量的 $52\mathrm{\%}$$52\mathrm{\%}$52%52 \% 。虽然 1932 至 1933 年间人均消费量急剧下降，但 1928 至 1939 年间平均生活水平呈现 $20\mathrm{\%}$$20\mathrm{\%}$20%20 \% 上升态势。此外，教育和医疗服务也得到极大扩展。

The Second World War was a huge blow to the USSR: $15\mathrm{\%}$$15\mathrm{\%}$15%15 \% of the Soviet citizens lost their lives (mortality among men aged 20-49
第二次世界大战给苏联带来沉重打击： $15\mathrm{\%}$$15\mathrm{\%}$15%15 \% 苏联公民丧生（20-49 岁男性死亡率
reached $40\mathrm{\%}$$40\mathrm{\%}$40%40 \% ), and housing and factories were destroyed. However, the capital stock was restored by 1950, and rapid economic growth resumed. Investment was kept at about $38\mathrm{\%}$$38\mathrm{\%}$38%38 \% of GDP. By 1975, the USSR produced more than 100 million tons of pig iron and had surpassed the USA. Consumer goods output also increased rapidly. It looked like the Soviet model might really be the best way for a poor country to develop.
高达 $40\mathrm{\%}$$40\mathrm{\%}$40%40 \% ），住房和工厂尽毁。但到 1950 年资本存量已恢复，经济重新实现快速增长。投资额保持在 GDP 的@1%左右。截至 1975 年，苏联生铁产量突破 1 亿吨，超越美国。消费品产量也快速增长。当时看来，苏联模式似乎确实是穷国实现发展的最佳路径。

And then it all went wrong. The growth rate gradually declined in the 1970s and 1980s. By the end of the decade, it was nil. President Gorbachev called for ‘restructuring’ (perestroika). Central planning gave way to the market, but it was too late to save the USSR, and it was dissolved.
随后一切都开始走向错误。20 世纪 70 至 80 年代，经济增长率逐渐下降。到 80 年代末，增速已归零。戈尔巴乔夫总统呼吁"改革"（perestroika）。中央计划让位于市场机制，但为时已晚，苏联最终解体。

In the case of the Soviet Union, there are really two questions. First, what went right? Why did the GDP per head grow so rapidly from 1928 to the 1970s? Part of the answer relates to ‘GDP’ and part to ‘heads’. GDP grew rapidly since Soviet institutions were effective in building large-scale, modern factories. Channelling investment into heavy industry increased the capacity to build structures and equipment, and soft budget constraints created jobs for people who would otherwise have been unemployed in a surplus labour economy. Even the collectivization of agriculture made a contribution (although a small one) by accelerating the migration of people to the cities where the new jobs lay. At the outset, planning did not require much vision since the object was to fit Western technology to Russian geography.
就苏联案例而言，实际存在两个核心问题。首先，早期成功的原因何在？为何 1928 至 1970 年代人均 GDP 能实现高速增长？答案部分关乎"GDP"统计本身，部分涉及"人口"因素。GDP 的快速增长源于苏联体制在建设大型现代化工厂方面的高效性——通过将投资导向重工业，该国提升了基建与设备制造能力；软预算约束政策在劳动力过剩的经济环境中创造了就业机会。即便农业集体化也通过加速人口向城市（新就业岗位所在地）迁移作出了贡献（尽管作用有限）。在起步阶段，由于发展目标只是将西方技术适配俄罗斯地理条件，计划经济并不需要太多前瞻性眼光。

The second reason that GDP per head grew rapidly was because population growth was slow. The number of people rose from 155 million in 1920 to 290 million in 1990. In part, slow growth was due to excess mortality from collectivization and, especially, the Second World War, but their importance was dwarfed by the decline in the fertility rate. In the 1920s, the average Soviet woman had seven children. By the 1960s, this had dropped to 2.5. The growth in urbanization made a contribution,
人均 GDP 快速增长的第二大原因是人口增长缓慢。人口数量从 1920 年的 1.55 亿增长到 1990 年的 2.9 亿。增长缓慢的部分原因在于集体化运动导致的超额死亡率，尤其是第二次世界大战的影响，但这些因素的重要性都被生育率下降所掩盖。1920 年代，苏联女性平均生育 7 个孩子。到 1960 年代，这一数字已降至 2.5 个。城市化进程对此有所贡献，
but the most important cause in the USSR (as in poor countries generally) was the education of women and their paid employment outside the home.
但在苏联（与普遍贫困国家情况类似），最重要的原因在于女性受教育程度提高以及她们走出家庭从事有偿工作。

Second, what went wrong? Why did growth slow in the 1970s and 1980s? The possible answers range from the transient to the fundamental and include the end of the surplus labour economy, the squandering of investment on Siberian development, the arms race with the USA which drained R&D resources from civilian industry, the increased difficulty of planning once technological catch-up was completed and the task was to design the future, the impossibility of central control (what would happen to the US economy if the president had to manage it?), and the cynicism and conformity bred by dictatorship. The collapse of the Soviet Union led many observers to reject state planning and celebrate the virtues of the free market. However, other countries did better with alternative forms of planning.
其次，问题出在哪里？为何经济增长在 20 世纪 70 至 80 年代放缓？可能的解释从暂时性因素到根本性原因不一而足，包括：剩余劳动力经济的终结、对西伯利亚开发的资源浪费、与美国的军备竞赛挤占了民用产业研发资源、技术追赶完成后规划难度加大（当任务变为设计未来时）、中央控制的不可行性（若由总统直接管理美国经济会怎样？），以及专制统治滋生的犬儒主义与盲从。苏联解体使许多观察者否定国家计划体制，转而颂扬自由市场的优越性。然而，其他国家通过不同形式的规划取得了更好成效。

The aims of Japanese policy before the Second World War were summarized in the slogan ‘rich country, strong army’. Defeat in the war led Japan to reject the ‘strong army’, but it pursued ‘rich country’ with even greater commitment. Japan needed a Big Push to close the income gap with the West. The project was remarkably successful. Per capita income grew at $5.9\mathrm{\%}$$5.9\mathrm{\%}$5.9%5.9 \% per year between 1950 and 1990, with a peak rate of $8\mathrm{\%}$$8\mathrm{\%}$8%8 \% between 1953 and 1973. By 1990, West European living standards had been achieved.
二战前日本政策的目标可概括为"富国强兵"这一口号。战败使日本放弃了"强兵"路线，却以更大决心追求"富强"。日本需要一场大推进来缩小与西方的收入差距。这一计划取得了惊人成功——1950 至 1990 年间人均收入年均增长@0%，其中 1953-1973 年峰值期达@1%。到 1990 年，日本已实现西欧国家的生活水平。

Japan accomplished this advance by reversing the technology policy that it had pursued in the Meiji and Imperial periods. Instead of adjusting modern technology to its factor prices, Japan adopted the most modern, capital-intensive technology on a vast scale. The investment rate reached about one-third of national income in the 1970s. The capital stock grew so rapidly that a
日本实现这一飞跃的关键在于逆转了明治时期和帝国时代的技术政策。它不再根据要素价格调整现代技术，而是大规模采用最先进的资本密集型技术。1970 年代投资率已达到国民收入的三分之一。资本存量急速增长，使得
high-wage economy was created within a generation. Factor prices adjusted to the new technological environment, rather than the other way around.
仅用一代人就建成了高工资经济体。要素价格主动适应了新技术环境，而非技术迁就要素价格。

Japanese industrialization in the post-war period required planning, and the key agency was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The policy tools that Japan had perfected in the 1920s and 1930s were used to accelerate the growth rate.
战后日本的工业化进程需要周密规划，其核心执行机构是通商产业省（MITI）。日本在 20 世纪 20 至 30 年代完善的政策工具被重新启用，用以加速经济增长。

MITI concerned itself with two kinds of problems. One related to the scale of production - the issue that defeated ISI in Latin America. Steel was one of Japan’s great successes. Production had increased from 2.4 million tons in 1932 to a peak of 7.7 million tons in 1943, then dropped to 0.5 million in 1945, and had returned to 4.8 million in 1950. A key feature of steel production is that costs are minimized with large-scale, capital-intensive mills. In 1950, minimum efficient size was 1-2.5 million tons. Most US mills were bigger than that, but only one Japanese mill (Yawata, with a capacity of 1.8 million tons) was in the range. The rest of Japan’s mills produced half a million tons or less. As a result, Japanese steel was at least $50\mathrm{\%}$$50\mathrm{\%}$50%50 \% more expensive than US or European steel, despite Japan’s low wages. MITI’s objective in the 1950s was to restructure Japan’s industry so that all steel was produced in mills of efficient size. MITI’s power came from its control of the banking system and its authority to allocate foreign exchange, which was needed to import coking coal and iron ore. By 1960, capacity had grown to 22 million tons in modernized, large-scale mills. After 1960, MITI’s guidance was less direct. Expansion continued through the construction of new facilities on ‘green field’ sites. These were all of minimum efficient size, which had by then increased to about 7 million tons; in contrast, most capacity in the USA was in old mills of less than efficient size. Japanese mills were also technically more advanced. 83% of Japan’s steel in the mid-1970s was smelted in basic oxygen furnaces against $62\mathrm{\%}$$62\mathrm{\%}$62%62 \% in the USA, and $35\mathrm{\%}$$35\mathrm{\%}$35%35 \% was continuously cast
通商产业省主要关注两类问题。其一是与生产规模相关的问题——这个问题曾导致拉丁美洲的进口替代工业化战略失败。钢铁产业是日本最成功的案例之一。日本钢产量从 1932 年的 240 万吨攀升至 1943 年 770 万吨的峰值，1945 年骤降至 50 万吨，到 1950 年已恢复至 480 万吨。钢铁生产的关键特征在于：大规模资本密集型钢厂能实现成本最小化。1950 年时，最低有效生产规模为 100-250 万吨。美国钢厂大多超过这一规模，而日本仅八幡制铁所（产能 180 万吨）接近该标准，其余钢厂产能均在 50 万吨以下。尽管日本工资水平较低，其钢材成本仍比欧美高出至少 $50\mathrm{\%}$$50\mathrm{\%}$50%50 \% 。通产省在 1950 年代的目标是重组日本钢铁产业，使所有钢材都在达到有效规模的钢厂生产。该部门通过掌控银行体系及分配进口焦煤与铁矿石所需的外汇审批权来推行政策。至 1960 年，日本现代化大型钢厂的产能已提升至 2200 万吨。 1960 年后，通产省的指导变得更为间接。通过"绿地"新建工厂，产业扩张仍在持续。这些新建工厂都达到了当时 700 万吨的最低效率规模，而美国大部分产能仍来自效率规模不足的老旧钢厂。日本钢厂在技术上也更为先进。1970 年代中期，日本 83%的钢铁采用碱性氧气转炉冶炼，而美国这一比例仅为 $62\mathrm{\%}$$62\mathrm{\%}$62%62 \% ，连续铸造比例达 $35\mathrm{\%}$$35\mathrm{\%}$35%35 \% 。
compared to $11\mathrm{\%}$$11\mathrm{\%}$11%11 \% in the USA. Despite a large increase in wages, Japan was the world’s low-cost steel producer due to its commitment to modern capital-intensive technology. Over 100 million tons were produced in 1975.
与美国 $11\mathrm{\%}$$11\mathrm{\%}$11%11 \% 相比，尽管工资大幅上涨，日本仍凭借对现代化资本密集型技术的投入成为全球低成本钢铁生产国。1975 年其钢铁产量突破 1 亿吨。

Who was going to buy all that steel? Shipbuilding, automobiles, machinery, and construction were major domestic purchasers. Those industries had to expand in step with the steel industry. Ensuring that result was a second planning problem. Their technologies also had to be decided, and a large-scale, capitalintensive approach was taken with these as with steel. In the case of automobiles, for instance, Japanese firms had more capital per worker than their US counterparts, and the Japanese capital was more effective since ‘just in time’ delivery meant that much less of it consisted of unfinished components. Also, the scale of production was larger in Japan. In the 1950s, the minimum efficient size of assembly plants was close to 200,000 vehicles per year. Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors annually produced 150,000-200,000 vehicles per plant. In the 1960s, new Japanese auto plants incorporated on site stamping and multiple assembly lines to push the minimum efficient size above 400,000 units per year. All Japanese manufacturers produced at this level, and the most efficient, like Honda and Toyota, could reach 800,000 vehicles per plant per year. Japan’s move to highly capitalintensive methods created the most efficient industry in the world, and one which could price its products competitively and still pay high wages.
谁来消化这些钢材？造船、汽车、机械和建筑是主要的国内采购方。这些产业必须与钢铁工业同步扩张。如何确保这一结果成为第二个规划难题。这些行业的技术路线同样需要确定，最终它们与钢铁业一样采取了大规模资本密集型发展模式。以汽车业为例，日本企业的人均资本投入已超过美国同行，且由于"准时制"生产大幅减少了半成品库存，日本资本的利用效率更高。此外，日本的生产规模更为庞大。1950 年代，汽车组装厂的最低有效规模接近年产 20 万辆，当时福特、克莱斯勒和通用汽车每家工厂的年产量为 15-20 万辆。到了 1960 年代，日本新建的汽车工厂整合了冲压车间与多条装配线，将最低有效规模提升至年产 40 万辆以上。所有日本制造商都达到这一水平，而效率最高的本田和丰田，单厂年产能甚至可达 80 万辆。 日本转向高度资本密集型生产方式，打造了全球最高效的产业体系，使其产品既能保持价格竞争力，又可支付高额工资。

A third planning problem was to ensure an expansion of consumer demand in Japan to purchase these consumer durables. Japan’s distinctive industrial relations institutions made a contribution: among large firms, company unions, seniority wages, and lifetime employment meant that some of the surplus of successful firms was shared with their employees. Small firms, however, provided many jobs in Japan, and in the 1950s (as in the interwar period), they paid low wages. During the 1960s and
第三个规划难题是确保日本国内消费需求扩张以消化这些耐用消费品。日本独特的劳资关系制度发挥了作用：在大企业中，企业工会、年功序列工资制和终身雇佣制意味着成功企业的部分盈余会与员工共享。然而中小企业提供了大量就业岗位，1950 年代（与战间期相同）这些企业薪资水平较低。1960 年代及之后

1970s, the vast expansion of industry ended the labour surplus, and the dual economy disappeared, as wages in the small firm sector rose rapidly. Rising incomes from the expansion of employment led to a revolution in lifestyle as Japanese bought refrigerators and automobiles made with the enlarged supply of steel. Not only did the Japanese have more gadgets, but they ate better and grew taller. In 1891, the average conscript was 157 cm tall, while his counterpart in 1976 was 168 cm . Japanese consumer spending validated the decisions to expand capacity and raise wages, so that the capital-intensive technology was appropriate after the fact, if not before.
20 世纪 70 年代，工业的迅猛扩张终结了劳动力过剩现象，随着小型企业部门工资的快速上涨，二元经济结构随之消失。就业扩张带来的收入增长引发生活方式革命，日本人开始购买利用增产钢材制造的冰箱和汽车。日本人不仅拥有更多电器，饮食质量也得到改善，平均身高显著增长——1891 年应征士兵平均身高为 157 厘米，而 1976 年已增至 168 厘米。日本消费者的支出行为印证了扩大产能与提高工资决策的正确性，使得资本密集型技术即便在事前未被看好，事后也被证明是适宜的选择。

A final planning problem related to the international market. This problem had ramifications far beyond MITI. In the mid-1970s, the Japanese steel industry was exporting almost one-third of its output, mainly to the USA. Similar percentages of automobiles and consumer durables were also shipped there. The US production of steel and autos collapsed under the impact of Japanese competition; indeed, the decline of the American Rust Belt was the counterpart to Japan’s Economic Miracle. The USA could easily have prevented these imports by continuing the high tariff policy it had followed since 1816. So-called ‘voluntary export restraints’ were negotiated, but they were only temporary expedients. Instead, the USA elected to cut tariffs but only if other countries did likewise (multilateral trade liberalization). One reason was that the USA emerged from the Second World War as the world’s most competitive economy, so expanding its export opportunities seemed more rewarding than unnecessarily protecting its home market. Japan’s export success called this assumption into question. Japan, however, had established itself as the USA’s bulwark against Communism in East Asia, and its geopolitical importance maintained its trade options.
最后一个与国际市场相关的规划问题。这一问题的影响远超通产省范畴。20 世纪 70 年代中期，日本钢铁业近三分之一的产量出口至美国，汽车和耐用消费品对美出口比例也与之相当。在日企竞争冲击下，美国的钢铁和汽车产业急剧萎缩——美国"锈带"的衰落恰与日本"经济奇迹"形成鲜明对照。若延续 1816 年以来的高关税政策，美国本可轻易阻挡这些进口商品。虽然美日达成了所谓"自愿出口限制"协议，但这仅是权宜之计。美国最终选择降低关税，但前提是其他国家同步行动（多边贸易自由化）。部分原因在于二战后的美国作为全球最具竞争力经济体，拓展出口机遇比过度保护本土市场更具价值。而日本出口的辉煌成就，令这一前提假设开始受到质疑。 然而，日本已确立自身作为美国在东亚抵御共产主义的堡垒地位，其地缘政治重要性保障了贸易选择空间。

The era of high-speed growth could not last forever. The end of the boom is conventionally dated to the collapse of the real estate and share bubbles in 1991, which ushered in an era of deflation.
高速增长的时代不可能永远持续。经济繁荣期的终结通常以 1991 年房地产和股市泡沫破裂为标志，这开启了通货紧缩的时代。

The cause, however, was more fundamental, for it was the elimination of the conditions that allowed rapid growth in the first place. Japan grew rapidly by closing three gaps with the West - in capital per worker, education per worker, and productivity. This was done by 1990, and Japan was then like any other advanced country: it could grow only as fast as the world’s technology frontier expanded - a per cent or two each year. The post-1990 growth slowdown was inevitable.
但根本原因在于支撑高速增长的基础条件已不复存在。日本通过缩小与西方在三大领域的差距实现快速增长——人均资本、人均教育水平和生产率。到 1990 年这些差距已基本消除，此时日本与其他发达国家无异：其经济增长只能与世界技术前沿的拓展速度同步——每年约 1%-2%。1990 年后经济增长放缓是必然结果。

South Korea have followed close on Japan’s heels in catching up to the West. Both were Japanese colonies, which gave them an ambiguous start. Modern educational systems were created, but the emphasis was on teaching Japanese rather than Korean . Infrastructure and agricultural development aimed to make the colonies food suppliers for Japan. Per capita income reached $1,548 in 1940. Following the Second World War, the Japanese were expelled, their property seized, and their land holdings redistributed among the rural population, creating egalitarian peasant societies. Beginning in the 1950s, both territories vigorously pursued industrialization. South Korea, in particular, followed the Japanese Big Push model closely. Advanced technology was imported and mastered by Korean firms since foreign firms were excluded from the country. The state planned investment and restricted imports to protect the Korean manufacturers it promoted. As in Japan, high quality and performance were advanced by requiring these firms to export large fractions of their production. Korea established the heavy industries like steel, shipbuilding, and autos that were Japan’s successes, and, a decade or two later, they became Korea’s successes as well.
韩国紧随日本脚步追赶西方。两国都曾是日本殖民地，这使得它们的起点充满矛盾。现代教育体系虽已建立，但重点在于教授日语而非韩语。基础设施与农业发展旨在将殖民地变为日本的粮食供应地。1940 年人均收入达到 1,548 美元。二战后日本殖民者被驱逐，其财产遭没收，土地重新分配给农村人口，形成了平等主义的农民社会。自 1950 年代起，两地都大力推进工业化。韩国尤其严格遵循日本的大推进模式。由于外资企业被拒之门外，韩国企业引进并掌握了先进技术。国家规划投资并限制进口以保护其扶持的本土制造商。与日本如出一辙，通过要求这些企业将大部分产品用于出口，推动了产品质量与性能的提升。 韩国效仿日本成功发展钢铁、造船和汽车等重工业，经过一二十年的努力，这些产业同样在韩国取得了成功。

The rise of South Korea is impressive but will be dwarfed in significance if China continues to industrialize as rapidly as it has in recent decades. When the Communists seized
韩国的崛起令人瞩目，但若中国继续保持近几十年的快速工业化步伐，其发展意义将使韩国相形见绌。1949 年共产党执政时
power in 1949, GDP per capita was at rock bottom ($448). By 2006, income reached $6,048 per head, placing China among the middle-income countries. This was far better performance than most of Asia, Africa, or Latin America (Table 1).
，中国人均 GDP 处于历史最低点（448 美元）。到 2006 年，人均收入已达到 6048 美元，使中国跻身中等收入国家行列。这一表现远超亚洲、非洲和拉丁美洲大多数国家（见表 1）。

How did China do it? The usual answer is ‘free-market reforms’, but this is incomplete. The economic history of China since 1949 divides into two periods - the planning period (1950-78) and the reform period (1978 to present). In the first, China adopted a Communist system with collective farms, state-owned industry, and central planning along Soviet lines. The development strategy favoured the expansion of heavy industry to create the machinery and structures of an urban, industrial society. The investment rate was pushed to about one-third of GDP, and industrial output grew rapidly. Technology policy, dubbed ‘walking on two legs’, combined capital-intensive, advanced technology with labour-intensive manufacturing where feasible. Steel production, always an objective of Big Push industrializers, jumped from about 1 million tons per year in 1950 to 32 million in 1978. Despite gyrations in policy, including the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), the subsequent famine, and the Cultural Revolution (1967-9), per capita income more than doubled from $\mathrm{\$}448$$\mathrm{\$}448$$448\$ 448 in 1950 to $\mathrm{\$}978$$\mathrm{\$}978$$978\$ 978 in 1978 (2.8% per year). This was no mean achievement but did not distinguish China from many other poor countries.
中国是如何做到的？通常的答案是"自由市场改革"，但这并不全面。1949 年以来的中国经济史可分为两个阶段——计划经济时期（1950-78 年）和改革开放时期（1978 年至今）。在前一阶段，中国效仿苏联模式建立了共产主义制度，实行集体农庄、国有工业和中央计划体制。发展战略侧重扩张重工业，以构建城市工业社会所需的机械设备和基础设施。投资率被推高至 GDP 的三分之一左右，工业产出快速增长。被称为"两条腿走路"的技术政策，将资本密集型先进技术与可行的劳动密集型制造相结合。作为大推进工业化核心目标的钢产量，从 1950 年的约 100 万吨飙升至 1978 年的 3200 万吨。尽管经历了大跃进（1958-60 年）、随后的大饥荒和文革（1967-69 年）等政策动荡，人均收入仍从 1950 年的 $\mathrm{\$}448$$\mathrm{\$}448$$448\$ 448 增长至 1978 年的 $\mathrm{\$}978$$\mathrm{\$}978$$978\$ 978 （年均增长 2.8%），翻了一番多。这虽非微不足道的成就，但当时中国与许多其他贫困国家相比并无显著差异。

Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping began ‘reforms’ in 1978. Planning has been dismantled and a market economy created in its stead. Unlike Eastern Europe’s ‘shock therapy’, China has reformed by gradually modifying and supplementing its institutions. Since 1978, growth has also surged.
1976 年毛泽东逝世后，邓小平于 1978 年启动"改革开放"。计划经济体制逐步瓦解，取而代之的是市场经济体制。与东欧"休克疗法"不同，中国通过渐进式制度调整与完善推进改革。自 1978 年以来，经济增长迅猛。

The first reforms were in agriculture and illustrate the complexity of the issues. Two reforms were particularly important: First, in 1979 and 1981, state procurement agencies increased their purchase prices by a total of $40-50\mathrm{\%}$$40-50\mathrm{\%}$40-50%40-50 \% for production beyond the obligatory deliveries specified in the plan. Second, collective
首轮改革始于农业领域，其进程充分体现了转型议题的复杂性。两项改革举措尤为关键：其一，1979 至 1981 年间，国家收购机构将超计划定额交售部分的农产品收购价格累计提高 $40-50\mathrm{\%}$$40-50\mathrm{\%}$40-50%40-50 \% ；其二，集体
cultivation was replaced by the Household Responsibility System. Under the HRS, the land of the collectives was divided into small farms leased to families, who were obliged to deliver their share of the commune’s plan obligations but who were allowed to keep the income from sales at the high prices for production that exceeded quotas.
耕作制被家庭联产承包责任制取代。该制度将集体土地划分为家庭承包的小型农场，农户在完成公社计划任务后，可保留超产部分按高价销售所得收益。

Farm output surged as these policies were put in place, and that is the main case for their importance. Between 1970 and 1978, GDP originating in agriculture grew at $4.9\mathrm{\%}$$4.9\mathrm{\%}$4.9%4.9 \% per year, which is even more than the $3.9\mathrm{\%}$$3.9\mathrm{\%}$3.9%3.9 \% realized between 1985 and 2000. However, between 1978 and 1984, output leapt up at $8.8\mathrm{\%}$$8.8\mathrm{\%}$8.8%8.8 \% per year. Grain production also grew faster in 1978-84 than it did before or after. Since the rise in prices and the HRS increased the financial incentive for peasants to increase output, the usual conclusion is that the policy changes caused the output growth.
随着这些政策的实施，农业产出大幅增长，这成为其重要性的主要依据。1970 年至 1978 年间，农业 GDP 年均增长率达 $4.9\mathrm{\%}$$4.9\mathrm{\%}$4.9%4.9 \% ，甚至超过了 1985 年至 2000 年间实现的 $3.9\mathrm{\%}$$3.9\mathrm{\%}$3.9%3.9 \% 。然而在 1978 至 1984 年间，产出以每年 $8.8\mathrm{\%}$$8.8\mathrm{\%}$8.8%8.8 \% 的速度跃升。粮食产量在 1978-84 年间的增速也高于前后时期。由于价格上升和家庭联产承包责任制增强了农民增产的经济激励，普遍结论认为政策变革推动了产出增长。

Reform, however, has to share the credit with other developments that were consequences of earlier planning decisions. The reason that Chinese farmers could increase output was because they could use advanced technology that was also coming together at the same time as rural institutions were reformed. Increasing grain yields requires three improvements under Chinese conditions - better water control, high-yielding seed, and fertilizer. There was a large increase in irrigated acreage in China between the 1950s and 1970s, and millions of tube wells were drilled in north China to supply water there. The increase in the supply of water contributed to the growth in grain output during the planning period, and was a prerequisite for the rapid output growth around 1980.
然而，改革必须与其他发展成果共享荣誉，这些成果是早期规划决策带来的连锁反应。中国农民能够提高产量的原因在于，他们在农村体制改革推进的同时，也获得了先进技术的应用条件。在中国国情下，粮食增产需要三大要素的协同改善——完善水利设施、采用高产品种和增施化肥。1950 至 1970 年代期间，中国灌溉面积大幅扩展，华北地区还开凿了数百万口机井保障供水。水利供给的增长不仅推动了计划经济时期的粮食增产，更为 1980 年前后的产量飞跃奠定了先决条件。

Dramatic yield increases required seed that responded to fertilizer. The biological problem is a general one in the tropics: if fertilizer is applied to the traditional varieties of rice, they produce more leaves and longer stalks. The plant eventually topples over (lodges), preventing the formation of grain. The solution lies in
要实现产量跃升，还需要能对化肥产生响应的改良种子。这本质上是个热带农业普遍存在的生物学难题：若对传统水稻品种施用化肥，植株会过度生长茎叶。最终作物倒伏（lodges）会导致无法结穗。解决问题的关键在于
dwarf rice with fibrous stalks that do not lodge, so that the extra growth from fertilizing goes into seed rather than foliage. Japanese rice was naturally of this character, which was the biological basis for the growth in farm output in the Meiji period. Japanese rice could not be cultivated further south, however, due to differences in the length of the day, so it was necessary to breed dwarf varieties suitable to tropical latitudes. The most famous is IR-8, which was developed at the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines and released in 1966. IR-8 and its successors have been the basis of the Green Revolution in much of Asia. What is less well appreciated is that China got there first. The Chinese Academy of Sciences’ breeding programme produced a high-yield dwarf rice two years before IR-8. It was the diffusion of the new dwarf rice that caused Chinese farm output to explode.
矮秆稻米具有纤维质茎秆不易倒伏的特性，因此施肥带来的额外生长会促进籽粒而非叶片的发育。日本稻米天然具备这一特性，这成为明治时期农业产量增长的生物学基础。然而由于日照时长差异，日本稻米无法在更南部的地区种植，因此需要培育适应热带纬度的矮秆品种。最著名的是 IR-8 水稻，由菲律宾国际水稻研究所研发并于 1966 年发布。IR-8 及其后续品种成为亚洲大部分地区绿色革命的基础。鲜为人知的是，中国在这方面其实更早取得突破。中国科学院育种项目在 IR-8 问世前两年就培育出了高产矮秆水稻。正是这种新型矮秆稻种的推广，推动了中国农业产量的爆发式增长。

High-yielding rice gives high yields only if it is heavily fertilized. In the 1970s, Chinese farmers were already using traditional fertilizers to the maximum. Heavier application required the industrial production of nitrate. Efforts to increase fertilizer production in the 1960s had not been particularly successful, so in 1973-4 the state purchased 13 ammonia factories from foreign suppliers. These came on stream in the late 1970s and provided the fertilizer that caused yields to shoot up. There is no way to know whether the rise in farm output between 1978 and 1984 required the reforms or whether it would have occurred anyway.
高产水稻只有在大量施肥的情况下才能获得高产量。20 世纪 70 年代，中国农民已经将传统肥料的使用发挥到极致。若要进一步增加施肥量，就需要工业化生产硝酸盐。60 年代提高化肥产量的努力并未取得显著成效，因此 1973-74 年间国家从国外供应商处购入了 13 座氨气工厂。这些工厂于 70 年代末投产，提供了促使产量激增的化肥。我们无从得知 1978 至 1984 年间农业产出的提升是否必须依赖改革措施，抑或这种增长本就会自然发生。

The character of technological change in Chinese agriculture resembles that of Japan and reflects the development of technology tailored to the country’s factor proportions. As in Japan, labour was abundant and land scarce, so technological advance has until recently concentrated on augmenting the productivity of land. Comparatively little investment has been directed towards saving labour. The history of the Green Revolution in China differs in this respect from its history in India, where mechanization accompanied the adoption of high-yielding crops. Access to cheaper credit gave large-scale
中国农业技术变革的特点与日本相似，反映了根据本国要素禀赋比例量身打造的技术发展路径。与日本一样，中国劳动力充裕而土地稀缺，因此直到近期，技术进步仍主要集中于提升土地生产率。相对而言，节约劳动力的技术投资较少。中国绿色革命的发展历程在这方面与印度不同——在印度，高产作物的推广伴随着机械化进程。获得廉价信贷的优势使印度大规模
farmers the advantage in India, and they increased the size of their holdings at the expense of small farmers, who often lost their land. Farm machinery allowed fewer people to cultivate the soil. China avoided these conflicts. The communal ownership of land equalized holdings in China and preserved small farms, which was a more rational response to the abundance of labour and scarcity of capital, as well as being more equitable.
农户受益，他们通过挤压小农权益来扩大经营规模，导致小农经常丧失土地。农业机械化的推进使得耕作所需人力减少。中国避免了这些矛盾。土地集体所有制实现了经营规模的均等化，保护了小农经济，这种模式既是对劳动力充裕和资本稀缺更理性的应对，也更具公平性。

Reforms have also transformed the industrial sector. The first steps were also taken in the countryside. Manufacturing by-employments had always been a feature of rural China and were taken up by collective farms. After 1978, ‘township and village enterprises’ (TVEs) were promoted by local party officials. Consumer goods production had lagged, and the TVEs filled the gap, selling their goods in the free market. The consumer goods industries had low capital to labour ratios (unlike the heavy industries that were the focus of planning), so the TVEs used appropriate technology for China, which is why they succeeded in market competition. Between 1978 and 1996, TVE employment grew from 28 million to 135 million, and TVEs increased their share of GDP from $6\mathrm{\%}$$6\mathrm{\%}$6%6 \% to $26\mathrm{\%}$$26\mathrm{\%}$26%26 \%. Marketization was extended throughout the state sector from the mid-1980s when the state froze its plan targets and allowed enterprises to sell production beyond plan requirements on the free market. Since then, the economy has ‘outgrown the plan’ and become increasingly market-driven, as it has expanded.
改革同样重塑了工业领域。变革的第一步同样始于农村。家庭手工业一直是中国乡村的特色，后由集体农场承接。1978 年后，地方党政干部开始推动"乡镇企业"发展。当时消费品生产长期滞后，乡镇企业通过自由市场销售产品填补了这一空白。这类轻工业具有劳动密集型特点（与计划经济的重工业重点不同），因此乡镇企业采用了适合中国国情的技术路线，从而在市场竞争中取得成功。1978 至 1996 年间，乡镇企业就业人数从 2800 万激增至 1.35 亿，其 GDP 占比从 $6\mathrm{\%}$$6\mathrm{\%}$6%6 \% 提升至 $26\mathrm{\%}$$26\mathrm{\%}$26%26 \% 。市场化进程自 1980 年代中期扩展到整个国有部门，当时国家冻结计划指标，允许企业将超计划产量投入自由市场。此后，随着经济规模扩张，国民经济逐渐"突破计划框架"，日益由市场力量主导。

In 1992, the 14th Party Congress endorsed the ‘socialist market economy’ as the goal of reform, and material balance planning, the centrepiece of central planning, was abolished. Subsequent reforms created a financial system to take the place of state allocation of investment and converted state-owned enterprises from government departments into publicly owned corporations. The reform of state-owned industry has involved deep cuts in employment and closing down unproductive capacity. This is a result that the USSR never accomplished and which may have
1992 年，党的十四大确立"社会主义市场经济"为改革目标，废除了作为计划经济核心的物质平衡计划体制。后续改革建立了替代国家投资分配的金融体系，并将国有企业从政府部门转型为公有制公司。国有工业改革涉及大幅裁员和淘汰落后产能——这是苏联从未实现的成果，也或许是
contributed to its growth slowdown by locking a large share of the work force in unproductive jobs rather than redeploying them to new, high-productivity facilities. As investment has become more market-driven, the investment rate has remained high. The state remains active, if less formally involved, in guiding investment in energy and heavy industry. Perhaps for this reason, the steel industry has continued to grow explosively. It now produces 500 million tons per year. The USA, the USSR, and Japan never produced more than 150 million tons, so China has broken all world records. China’s population is, of course, much larger, but production per head, now 377 kg (up from 2 kg per head in 1950 and 102 kg as recently as 2001), has reached the consumption level of rich countries. Between 1978 and 2006, per capita income grew at $6.7\mathrm{\%}$$6.7\mathrm{\%}$6.7%6.7 \% per year.
将大量劳动力锁定在低效岗位而非重新配置到高生产率的新设施中，导致了经济增长放缓。随着投资日益由市场驱动，投资率仍保持高位。国家在能源和重工业领域的投资引导中虽减少了形式化参与，但仍保持活跃。或许正因如此，钢铁产业持续爆发式增长，如今年产量已达 5 亿吨——美国、苏联和日本的历史峰值均未超过 1.5 亿吨，中国由此创下世界纪录。中国人口基数固然庞大，但人均产量已达 377 公斤（195 年仅 2 公斤/人，2001 年为 102 公斤/人），达到发达国家消费水平。1978 至 2006 年间，人均收入年增长率达 $6.7\mathrm{\%}$$6.7\mathrm{\%}$6.7%6.7 \% 。