Feminism often begins with intensity: you are aroused by what you come up against. You register something in the sharpness of an impression. Something can be sharp without it being clear what the point is . . . Things don’t seem right. (Ahmed 2017, 22)
女权主义往往始于强烈：你会被你所遇到的事物所激起。你会从印象的尖锐性中发现一些东西。有些东西可能是尖锐的，但并不清楚重点是什么......。事情似乎不对。(艾哈迈德，2017 年，22）。
“It didn’t really gel”-an observation from an established emotion scholar sympathetic to feminist scholarship after we had both taken part in a workshop on emotion ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} research in International Relations (IR). I agreed. Four feminist scholars (out of nineteen) had been invited. The invitation meant recognition of feminist work as valuable when it comes to research on emotions, affect, passions, and sensibilities in IR. And yet, my impression during the workshop was that it was as if we were speaking different languages. More generally, what was at stake was different understandings of “the political” and, as a result, how to study the politics of emotion
我们都参加了一个关于国际关系（IR）中的情感研究的研讨会，一位同情女性主义学术的知名情感学者对我们说："我们并没有真正融为一体"。我表示同意。十九位女性主义学者中有四位受到了邀请。这一邀请意味着，在国际关系中的情感、情绪、激情和理智研究方面，女性主义工作的价值得到了认可。然而，研讨会期间给我的印象是，我们好像在说不同的语言。更笼统地说，关键在于对 "政治 "的不同理解，以及因此而产生的如何研究情感政治的问题。

in IR. But more specifically, I began to think about how the active disinterest in feminist knowledge in IR more broadly is also often affectively felt.
但更具体地说，我开始思考，在更广泛的范围内，女性主义知识在国际关系学中的主动不感兴趣是如何经常被情感所感受到的。但更具体地说，我开始思考，在更广泛的国际关系学中，对女性主义知识的主动漠视是如何经常被情感所感受到的。

In Living a Feminist Life, Sara Ahmed $(2017$$(2017$(2017(2017, 22) discusses how sensation matters because “you are left with an impression that is not clear or distinct.” She goes on to argue, “a gut feeling has its own intelligence. A feminist gut might sense something is amiss. You have to get closer to the feeling” (Ahmed 2017, 27). My overall impression that something about the interactions during the workshop did not make sense was both an affective and emotional experience: following Ahmed, I wanted to get “closer to the feeling.”
萨拉-艾哈迈德（Sara Ahmed $(2017$$(2017$(2017(2017 , 22）在《女权主义的生活》（Living a Feminist Life）一书中论述了感觉的重要性，因为 "你会留下一种不清晰或不明确的印象"。她接着说，"直觉有它自己的智慧。女权主义者的直觉可能会感觉到不对劲。你必须更接近这种感觉"（Ahmed 2017, 27）。我的总体印象是，研讨会期间的互动有些不合理，这既是一种情感体验，也是一种情绪体验：按照艾哈迈德的说法，我想要 "更接近感觉"。

To me (and, I am sure, other feminists in the room), the impression that our discussions during the workshop “didn’t gel” was no surprise and was perhaps even expected. But, my colleague’s reflection stayed with me because it touched on the much bigger issue of how feminist knowledge on global politics is often ignored more generally in IR. My experience at this workshop fed into previous experiences and my sense of irritation grew. It grew into this paper. Following Sianne Ngai’s (2005) exploration of the critical productivity of negative affective senses (e.g., envy, shame, disgust and paranoia), I want to use my growing sense of irritation to think carefully about how (and why) “It didn’t really gel.”
对我（我相信还有在场的其他女权主义者）来说，我们在研讨会上的讨论 "不融洽 "并不令人意外，甚至可能是意料之中的。但是，我同事的反思让我记忆犹新，因为它触及了一个更大的问题，即女性主义关于全球政治的知识在更广泛的国际关系中是如何被忽视的。我在这次研讨会上的经历与之前的经历相辅相成，我的恼怒感与日俱增。后来，我就写了这篇论文。根据 Sianne Ngai（2005 年）对负面情感（如嫉妒、羞耻、厌恶和偏执）的批判性生产力的探索，我想利用我不断增长的烦躁感来仔细思考 "它并没有真正融为一体 "的方式（以及原因）。

Feminist scholars have successfully drawn attention to the fact that gender matters in global politics. It is a good thing that it no longer makes sense to exclude feminists from various academic spaces-this is not always the case, but the landscape is definitely changing. It is a good thing that many now realize that feminist research matters. And yet, after decades of “including” feminist theory in IR, feminist knowledge remains marginalized. This is not a new observation (Tickner 1997; Steans 2003), but what concerns me is the continuing presence and force of this marginalization and the way it makes itself felt at the levels of affect and emotion.
女权主义学者成功地使人们注意到性别在全球政治中的重要性。将女权主义者排除在各种学术空间之外不再有意义，这是一件好事--情况并非总是如此，但格局肯定在发生变化。许多人现在意识到女性主义研究的重要性，这也是一件好事。然而，在将女性主义理论 "纳入 "国际关系领域几十年之后，女性主义知识仍然被边缘化。这并不是什么新现象（Tickner，1997 年；Steans，2003 年），但令我担忧的是这种边缘化的持续存在和力量，以及这种边缘化在情感和情绪层面的表现方式。

Feminist scholars are increasingly invited into academic spaces, while feminist knowledge is, still, too often ignored. Nonfeminist scholars seem convinced that feminist knowledge does not concern them-a feeling reproduced by a common misunderstanding that feminism is only about “identity politics” or “women’s stuff.” This lack of engagement with feminist theory and methodologies continues despite, or perhaps as a result of, the opening up of those spaces for feminist research. Or to put it differently, the opening up of academic spaces for feminist research has not meant actual feminist change of those spaces. By keeping the invitation open, it seems, nonfeminist scholars can get away with their failure to engage with feminist arguments. This failure is perhaps most obvious with the growing interest in research on emotions and affect in IR.
女性主义学者越来越多地被邀请进入学术空间，而女性主义知识却仍然常常被忽视。非女权主义学者似乎深信，女权主义知识与他们无关--这种感觉因一种普遍的误解而再现，即女权主义只是关于 "身份政治 "或 "妇女的东西"。尽管为女性主义研究开辟了这些空间，但这种缺乏与女性主义理论和方法论接触的现象依然存在，或许这也是女性主义研究开辟这些空间的结果。或者换一种说法，为女性主义研究开放学术空间并不意味着女性主义对这些空间的实际改变。通过保持开放的邀请，非女权主义学者似乎可以摆脱未能参与女权主义论点的困境。这种失败也许最明显地体现在对投资关系中的情感和影响研究的日益浓厚的兴趣上。

Why? Because “emotion” is a term that has long been associated with the personal, the body, the feminine. As the constitutive other of “reason” (as well as the objective, the mind, the masculine) in Western, binary modes of thinking, “emotion” has been (and still is) a political strategy keeping women and the feminine out of politics and political spheres. As a result, much of feminist scholarship has worked to problematize binaries such as emotion/reason, mind/body, and domestic/international. All this is to say that feminist scholarship has a very long history with “the emotional.”
为什么？因为 "情感 "这个词长期以来一直与个人、身体、女性联系在一起。在西方的二元思维模式中，"情感 "是 "理性"（以及客观、心智、男性）的另一个构成要素，因此，"情感 "一直是（现在仍然是）一种政治策略，将女性排除在政治和政治领域之外。因此，女性主义学术研究大多致力于解决情感/理性、心灵/身体、国内/国际等二元对立问题。综上所述，女性主义学术在 "情感 "方面有着悠久的历史。

From a feminist perspective, the aim of this paper is not to convince everyone to pay attention to gender. We know that gender analysis is not necessarily feminist. Instead, my central claim is that any “turning” to affect, emotion, bodies, and embodiment in analyses of global politics in IR without engaging with feminist theory, feminist knowledge, and/or feminist methodologies is political in itself. Going back to my sense of irritation, is it even reasonable to assume that things could “gel” when there is seemingly little understanding of, and engagement with, feminist knowledge on affect, emotions, and the political outside of feminist circles more broadly? I want to use the affective dissonance over an academic workshop to open up wider debates about the research on emotion and affect in IR.
从女性主义的角度来看，本文的目的并不是说服所有人关注性别问题。我们知道，性别分析并不一定是女性主义的。相反，我的核心主张是，在分析投资关系中的全球政治时，如果不结合女性主义理论、女性主义知识和/或女性主义方法论，而 "转向 "情感、情绪、身体和体现，这本身就是政治性的。回到我的恼怒感上，在女性主义圈子之外，似乎很少有人了解和参与女性主义关于情感、情绪和政治的知识，在这种情况下，假设事情可以 "凝固 "是否合理？我想利用一次学术研讨会上的情感失调来开启更广泛的关于情感和情绪在国际关系中的研究的讨论。

The aim of this paper, thus, is to showcase what feminist knowledge on affect, as a politics of emotion, offers, in particular when it comes to methodology, an area deemed understudied (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Åhäll and Gregory 2015). Ambitiously, this paper is also an attempt to convince nonfeminist scholars that “feminism is for everybody” (hooks 2000). I present a feminist methodological approach to the affective-discursive as a way to analyze the politics of emotion. It is important to note that the term “politics of emotion” is an attempt at capturing the political effects of emotional practices, no matter how such emotional practices are defined. This means that the politics of emotion discussed here involves both representations of feelings-those “sensations that have found a match in words” (Brennan 2004, 19)—and the bodily movements often identified as affect. ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} This paper aims to reset, refocus, and reimagine debates on the politics of emotion in IR by following Ahmed’s (2004) encouragement: what should matter for studies of (global) politics is what emotions do politically.
因此，本文旨在展示女性主义关于情感的知识，作为一种情感政治，尤其是在方法论方面，这一领域被认为研究不足（Bleiker 和 Hutchison，2008 年；Åhäll 和 Gregory，2015 年）。雄心勃勃的是，本文也试图说服非女性主义学者，"女性主义是为所有人服务的"（Hooks，2000 年）。我提出了一种女性主义方法论，将情感-话语作为分析情感政治的一种方式。需要注意的是，"情感政治 "一词是试图捕捉情感实践的政治效应，无论这种情感实践是如何定义的。这意味着，这里讨论的情感政治既包括对情感的表述--那些 "在语言中找到了匹配的感觉"（Brennan 2004, 19）--也包括通常被认定为情感的身体动作。 ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 本文旨在重新设定、重新聚焦和重新想象关于投资者关系中的情感政治的辩论，遵循艾哈迈德（2004）的鼓励：对于（全球）政治研究来说，重要的是情感在政治上的作用。

The paper starts by discussing affect theory and feminist critiques of the “affective turn.” It unpacks feminist knowledge and demonstrates how a feminist analysis is, per definition, already both political and affective. There is no feminism without affect. This is because how we feel (consciously or unconsciously) about the world already tells us about how the world works: For feminists, affect, simply, generates feminist questions. ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4}
本文首先讨论了情感理论和女性主义对 "情感转向 "的批判。它解读了女性主义知识，并展示了女性主义分析是如何根据定义既具有政治性又具有情感性的。没有情感就没有女权主义。这是因为我们对世界的感受（有意识或无意识的）已经告诉了我们世界是如何运作的：对女权主义者来说，情感就是产生女权问题的源泉。 ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4}

The second section develops a methodological framework by discussing gender, discourse, and affect as a structure that “goes-without-saying.” Here, the focus is on “feelings of structure” (Ahmed 2010), and Clare Hemmings’ concept of affective dissonance is presented as a methodological tool guiding a feminist curiosity, useful to zoom in on the political puzzle of what emotions do.
第二部分通过讨论性别、话语和情感这一 "不言而喻 "的结构，建立了一个方法论框架。这里的重点是 "结构的情感"（艾哈迈德，2010 年），克莱尔-海明斯（Clare Hemmings）的 "情感失调"（affective dissonance）概念作为一种方法论工具被提出来，引导着女性主义的好奇心，有助于放大情感所做的政治难题。

In the third section, I demonstrate how moments of affective dissonance spark feminist curiosity and how a consideration of affect generates feminist questions about gender, agency, and political violence. I draw on two affective examples of “being emotional about violent women” (see also Åhäll 2012). First, the politics of disgust involved in the representation of US Private Lynndie England, who became the “poster-girl” for the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in 2003. Then, a discussion of how the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) justified keeping a ban on women in combat roles in 2010, even though it did not make (common) sense to do so. The idea here is not to offer an in-depth analysis of either of these events but rather to illustrate a productive feminist methodology that can be used to analyze feelings of structure as a politics of emotion.
在第三部分中，我将展示情感不和谐的时刻如何激发女性主义的好奇心，以及对情感的思考如何产生女性主义关于性别、代理和政治暴力的问题。我借鉴了两个 "对暴力女性情绪化 "的情感实例（另见 Åhäll 2012）。首先是对美国二等兵林迪-英格兰（Lynndie England）的厌恶政治，她在 2003 年成为阿布格莱布监狱丑闻的 "海报女郎"。然后，讨论英国国防部（MOD）如何为 2010 年继续禁止女性担任战斗角色辩护，尽管这样做并不合（常）理。这里的想法并不是要对这两个事件进行深入分析，而是要说明一种富有成效的女权主义方法论，可用于分析作为情感政治的结构情感。

In conclusion, I argue that feminist knowledge on affect demonstrates the political power of emotion research. What feminist knowledge on affect offers is twofold: First, a way to identify “the political” in the affective-discursive because affect generates questions about how the world works. Second, by feeling differently, a feminist analysis is opening up a space for thinking, acting, and knowing differently. This is how feminist knowledge on affect offers a way to retune, reset and reimagine research on the politics of emotion. It shows how and why we must also approach affect as methodology. By prioritizing affect as methodology, moreover, feminist knowledge and analyses should be valuable for critical endeavors interested in changing the status quo, no matter if the political puzzle is about gender or not. In short, if scholars are serious about analyzing the politics of emotion, feminist knowledge on affect must not be ignored.
最后，我认为女性主义关于情感的知识展示了情感研究的政治力量。女性主义情感知识提供了两方面的内容：首先，这是一种在情感-辨证法中识别 "政治 "的方法，因为情感产生了关于世界如何运作的问题。其次，通过不同的感受，女性主义分析为不同的思考、行动和认知开辟了空间。这就是女性主义关于情感的知识如何为情感政治的研究提供了一种重新调整、重新设置和重新想象的方式。它说明了我们如何以及为什么还必须将情感作为方法论来对待。此外，通过将情感作为方法论的优先事项，女性主义知识和分析对于有志于改变现状的批判性努力应该是有价值的，无论政治难题是否与性别有关。总之，如果学者们要认真分析情感政治，就不能忽视女性主义关于情感的知识。

The Problem with “the Affective Turn”
情感转向 "的问题
A growing strand of research on security practices and international conflict is drawing on the so-called “affective turn” in social sciences more broadly by approaching the emotional through “affect” as something different from “emotions” (see Ross 2006, 2014; Adey 2008; Solomon 2012; Anderson 2014; Holland and Solomon 2014). Studies of affect generally tend to move beyond a focus on single emotions to explore our ability to affect and be affected in more depth. Where emotions might be used to denote a more amplified, developed, and coherent form of experience, affect is often seen as something that is before emotions:
越来越多关于安全实践和国际冲突的研究，更广泛地借鉴了社会科学中所谓的 "情感转向"，将 "情感 "作为不同于 "情绪 "的东西来处理（见 Ross 2006, 2014; Adey 2008; Solomon 2012; Anderson 2014; Holland and Solomon 2014）。对情感的研究一般倾向于超越对单一情感的关注，更深入地探讨我们影响和被影响的能力。情绪可能被用来表示一种更加放大、发达和连贯的体验形式，而情感则通常被视为先于情绪的东西：

From this perspective, affect resembles a flow of resonances, a form of emotional communication between body and mind that influences us. Affect is, therefore, often described as nonconscious, nonsubjective or prepersonal, and is contrasted with personal, conscious, emotional experiences often identified as “feelings.” Thus, while emotion is here understood as capturing conscious thoughts, subjective experiences and normative judgements belonging to the individual, affect refers to a completely different order activity. For example, Nigel Thrift suggests that affect can be understood as a “set of embodied practices” or as a form of “indirect and non-reflective” thinking that never quite rises to the level of an emotion (Thrift 2008, 175). To Brian Massumi, affect is not something that can be reduced to one thing, mainly because it’s not a thing but an event or a dimension of every event (Massumi 2015, 47; see also Massumi 2002). Moreover, William Connolly speaks of “thought-imbued energies” expressed as micropolitics, the myriad ordinary and everyday affective relations, material interactions, feelings, habits, and emotions that shape our intersubjective relations and judgments and which typically reside in levels of experience “below” rational or immediately cognitive processing (Connolly 2002, 74).
从这个角度来看，情感类似于一种共振流，是一种影响我们的身体与心灵之间的情感交流形式。因此，情感通常被描述为非意识、非主观或前个人的，并与通常被认定为 "感觉 "的个人、有意识的情感体验形成对比。因此，情感在这里被理解为捕捉属于个人的有意识思想、主观体验和规范性判断，而情感则是指一种完全不同的秩序活动。例如，奈杰尔-特里夫特（Nigel Thrift）认为，情感可以被理解为 "一系列具体的实践"，或者是一种 "间接的、非反思性的 "思维形式，它从未上升到情感的层面（Thrift，2008，175）。在布赖恩-马苏米（Brian Massumi）看来，"情感 "并不能归结为一件事，主要是因为它不是一件事，而是一个事件，或者说是每个事件的一个维度（Massumi 2015, 47; see also Massumi 2002）。此外，威廉-康诺利（William Connolly）谈到了 "思想蕴含的能量"，这种能量表现为微观政治，即无数普通和日常的情感关系、物质互动、感觉、习惯和情绪，它们塑造了我们的主体间关系和判断，通常存在于 "低于 "理性或即时认知处理的经验层面（Connolly 2002, 74）。

An interest in affect necessarily involves a focus on bodies (human and nonhuman). This interest in bodies has above all manifested as an interest in the somatic, taking inspiration from discoveries in neuroscience (see Connolly 2002). That is, neuroscience is presented as an exciting, new, and appropriate (read scientific) way into emotion research in IR, while the much longer history of feminist theorizing about bodies and embodiment, about the personal, emotional, and affective often remains ignored or only superficially engaged with.
对情感的兴趣必然涉及对身体（人类和非人类）的关注。对身体的兴趣首先表现为对躯体的兴趣，从神经科学的发现中获得灵感（见 Connolly，2002 年）。也就是说，神经科学被作为一种令人兴奋的、新的和适当的（科学的）方式进入到 IR 的情感研究中，而女性主义关于身体和体现、关于个人、情感和情绪的理论化的悠久历史往往被忽视或只是肤浅地参与其中。

From a feminist perspective, the enthusiasm about the fact that neuroscientific discoveries provide “concrete evidence for the idea that decisions and judgments are fundamentally imbued with emotion” (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 496) risks missing the point (for nonfeminist critiques see Jeffery 2014; Reus-Smit 2014). This is because, for feminist scholars who in any case reject the emotional/rational and ideational/material divide, the politics of emotion lies elsewhere.
从女性主义的角度来看，对神经科学的发现为 "决策和判断从根本上充满情感这一观点提供了具体证据"（Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 496）这一事实的热情有可能错失重点（非女性主义批评见 Jeffery 2014；Reus-Smit 2014）。这是因为，对于无论如何都拒绝情感/理性和意识形态/物质划分的女性主义学者来说，情感的政治性在于别处。

In order to get to the political power of emotion, I am instead drawing on feminist scholars who have critiqued models of affect that attempt to move “beyond emotion” and “beyond humanity” toward the “transhuman.” To start with, these feminist scholars have pointed out that any “turn to affect” that privileges affect over emotion as its object for analysis implies that there is something “new” going on when, in fact, feminist theorists have long been concerned with the relationships between affect, knowledge, and power (Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 119). The problem is that by prioritizing affect over emotion, a feminized “personal”
为了探究情感的政治力量，我转而借鉴女性主义学者的观点，她们批判了试图 "超越情感 "和 "超越人性 "走向 "超人类 "的情感模式。首先，这些女性主义学者指出，任何 "对情感的转向"，如果将情感置于情感之上作为分析对象，就意味着出现了 "新 "的东西，而事实上，女性主义理论家长期以来一直关注情感、知识和权力之间的关系（Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 119）。问题在于，通过将情感置于情绪之上，女性化的 "个人"（personal
epistemology is rejected. The insistence on affect as something different from emotion in this way risks reinforcing a binary, gendered logic between a mobile, impersonal, masculinized affect and a contained, feminized, personal emotion (see Hemmings 2005; Thien 2005; Hsieh 2008; Wetherell 2012; Ahmed 2014a). In other words, the emphasis on affect as something prepersonal and “transhuman” is universalizing but also masculinizing affect.
认识论遭到拒绝。以这种方式坚持认为情感不同于情绪，有可能强化流动的、非个人的、男性化的情感与包含的、女性化的、个人化的情感之间的二元性别逻辑（见 Hemmings 2005；Thien 2005；Hsieh 2008；Wetherell 2012；Ahmed 2014a）。换句话说，强调情感是超个人和 "超人类 "的东西，是将情感普遍化，同时也是将情感男性化。

Perhaps most fundamentally, the problem with focusing on affect as something prepersonal and nonconscious is that the social is excluded (Hemmings 2005). I am following Teresa Brennan (2004), who, similarly to Connolly, understands affect as energies transmitted through bodily encounters. However, her point is to show that the individual emotional experience cannot be separated from the social environment. She discusses the notion of an “affective atmosphere” as that feeling that you get when you walk into a room and sense a particular mood in the air. This, Brennan argues, means that “the emotions or affects of one person, and the enhancing or depressing energies these affects entail, can enter into another” (Brennan 2004, 3). Thus, in this sense, even our most intimate feelings do not really belong to us but are an effect of the body’s encounters with others. The moods of others can have a physical and psychological impact on others without their consent. “[T]he emotions of two are not the same as the emotions of one plus one” (Brennan 2004, 51). In addition, I am drawing on Sara Ahmed in that the affective atmosphere is also dependent on the baggage that we bring with us: “What we will receive as an impression will depend on our affective situation” (Ahmed 2010, 36). In other words, even when we feel we have the same feeling, we do not necessarily have the same relationship to that feeling (Ahmed 2004, 10). Affect is already partial and contextualized. Again, the point is to focus on the social (and political), as Ahmed explains: “I turned to emotions as they help me to explain not only how we are affected in this way or that, by this or that, but also how those judgements then hold or become agreed as shared perceptions” (Ahmed 2014a, 208, added emphasis).
也许从根本上说，将情感作为一种前个人的、非意识的东西来关注，其问题在于社会性被排除在外（Hemmings，2005 年）。特雷莎-布伦南（Teresa Brennan，2004 年）的观点与康诺利相似，她将情感理解为通过身体接触传递的能量。不过，她的观点是，个人的情感体验不能与社会环境相分离。她讨论了 "情感氛围 "的概念，认为当你走进一个房间，感觉到空气中弥漫着一种特殊的情绪时，你就会有这种感觉。布伦南认为，这意味着 "一个人的情绪或情感，以及这些情感所带来的增强或压抑的能量，可以进入另一个人的情绪或情感"（布伦南，2004 年，3）。因此，从这个意义上说，即使是我们最亲密的情感也并不真正属于我们自己，而是身体与他人相遇时产生的一种效应。他人的情绪会在未经他人同意的情况下对他人的身体和心理产生影响。"两个人的情绪和一个人加一个人的情绪是不一样的"（Brennan 2004, 51）。此外，我还借鉴了萨拉-艾哈迈德的观点，即情感氛围也取决于我们带来的包袱："我们的印象取决于我们的情感状况"（Ahmed 2010, 36）。换句话说，即使我们觉得自己有相同的感觉，我们与这种感觉的关系也不一定相同（Ahmed 2004, 10）。情感已经是片面的和语境化的。同样，正如艾哈迈德所解释的，重点在于关注社会（和政治）："我转向情感，因为情感不仅能帮助我解释我们如何受到这样或那样的影响，如何受到这样或那样的影响，还能帮助我解释这些判断是如何作为共同的认知而成立或达成一致的"（Ahmed 2014a, 208, 着重号后加）。

Ahmed compares the popular separation between affect and emotions to an egg: “That we can separate them does not mean they are separate” (Ahmed 2014a, 210). She challenges the distinction between affect and emotions by discussing emotions as the idea of “impression,” precisely to avoid making analytical distinctions between bodily sensation, emotion, and thought. Emotions involve bodily processes of affecting and being affected, but, for Ahmed as well as for Hemmings, affect is not something prepersonal that flows between bodies in a generic sense. Rather, some bodies generate different affective responses in a particular context than others. Certain (gendered, raced, sexed) subjects therefore become the objects of others’ affective responses. This is how emotions are a matter of how we come into contact with objects and others (Ahmed 2014a, 208). Thus, crucially, following Ahmed, an approach to affect that takes the social into account means that that which flows is not affect per se, but objects. In this paper, the object that flows, in a context of political violence, is “Woman,” but this thinking about objects and others is perhaps best illustrated by Ahmed’s discussion of “the stranger”:
艾哈迈德将情感与情绪之间流行的分离比作鸡蛋："我们可以将它们分开，但这并不意味着它们是分开的"（Ahmed 2014a，210）。她将情感作为 "印象 "的概念来讨论，正是为了避免对身体感觉、情感和思想进行分析性区分，从而挑战了情感和情绪之间的区别。情绪涉及影响和被影响的身体过程，但在艾哈迈德和海明斯看来，情感并不是在身体之间流动的一般意义上的前个人的东西。相反，有些身体在特定环境中产生的情感反应与其他身体不同。因此，某些（性别、种族、性别）主体成为他人情感反应的客体。这就是情感如何成为我们与客体和他人接触的问题（Ahmed，2014a，208）。因此，重要的是，在艾哈迈德之后，考虑到社会性的情感方法意味着流动的不是情感本身，而是客体。在本文中，政治暴力背景下流动的对象是 "女人"，但艾哈迈德对 "陌生人 "的讨论或许最能说明这种关于对象和他人的思考：

To recognise somebody as a stranger is an affective judgement: a stranger is the one who seems suspicious; the one who lurks. I became interested in how some bodies are “in an instant” judged as suspicious, or as dangerous, as objects to be feared, a judgement that can have lethal consequences. There can be nothing more dangerous to a body than the social agreement that that body is dangerous. (Ahmed 2014a, 211)
把某人认作陌生人是一种情感判断：陌生人就是看起来可疑的人；潜伏的人。我感兴趣的是，有些身体是如何 "瞬间 "被判定为可疑或危险的，是值得惧怕的对象，而这种判定可能带来致命的后果。对身体而言，最危险的莫过于社会一致认为该身体是危险的。(艾哈迈德，2014a，211）

The important point that Ahmed makes is that the body of the stranger is already perceived as dangerous before it arrives and that we cannot therefore only focus our attention on the actual affective encounter when one body is affected by another. Instead, we must focus attention on “the histories that come before subjects” in order to understand how “the immediacy of bodily reactions are mediated” (Ahmed 2014a, 212).
艾哈迈德提出的重要观点是，陌生人的身体在到达之前就已被视为危险，因此我们不能只关注一个身体受到另一个身体影响时的实际情感遭遇。相反，我们必须关注 "主体之前的历史"，以理解 "身体反应的直接性是如何被中介的"（Ahmed 2014a，212）。

That affective processes-both between and within bodies-are already social, moreover, means that it has everything to do with gender. This is because gender plays a fundamental role in how our social worlds work. Before talking about how gender matters in more depth, we must first discuss how an interest in affect can be combined with feminism’s interest in political change and transformation.
此外，情感过程--包括身体之间和身体内部的情感过程--已经具有社会性，这意味着它与性别息息相关。这是因为性别在我们的社会世界如何运作中扮演着根本性的角色。在更深入地讨论性别如何重要之前，我们必须首先讨论如何将对情感的兴趣与女权主义对政治变革和转型的兴趣结合起来。

Feminism is often simplistically assumed to be “only” about women’s lives and experiences, about “identity politics.” However, as Marysia Zalewski points out, it is more appropriate to think of feminism as primarily concerned with the kinds of questions that are fundamentally about how the world works (Zalewski 2015, 4). And of course, the world also works affectively and emotionally.
女权主义常常被简单地认为 "仅仅 "与女性的生活和经历有关，与 "身份政治 "有关。然而，正如玛丽莎-扎莱夫斯基（Marysia Zalewski）所指出的，更恰当的看法是，女权主义主要关注的是那些从根本上关乎世界如何运作的问题（Zalewski 2015, 4）。当然，世界也是在情感和情绪上运行的。

What unites various strands of feminist research, in and beyond IR, is a feminist questioning about how bodies matter politically, through ideas about gendera social construction. Most often, the focus is on “women,” that is, those bodies identified as female, precisely because such bodies have been underrepresented and/or represented in particular ways in global politics. But, a focus on bodies also includes attention to male, intersexual, queer, transsexual, and/or raced, classed, aged, able/disabled, or in other ways “othered” bodies. A focus on how gendered bodies matter includes attentiveness to how notions of masculinity and femininity are constructed and continuously reproduced. It concerns how bodies are positioned and valued in relation to other bodies. That is, gender informs social norms about bodies and, crucially, relationships between different bodies. What is more, while it is possible to do gender analysis without feminism, a feminist perspective on gender is always about power. To paraphrase Cynthia Enloe, any feminist perspective puts politics-and thereby power-at the core of the analysis in a way that a gender analysis does not (Enloe 2010, xi-xii). In other words, the difference between gender analysis and feminist analysis is that the latter is always about changing the status quo. What is feminist is that which concerns political and social change and transformation. Thus, a feminist approach to the politics of emotion through gender is about how we become invested in social norms, it is about the affective investments in gender as a social norm.
在国际关系中和国际关系之外，将女权主义研究的各种分支结合在一起的，是女权主义对身体如何通过性别--一种社会建构的观念在政治上发挥作用的质疑。大多数情况下，关注的焦点是 "女性"，即那些被认定为女性的身体，这正是因为这些身体在全球政治中的代表性不足和/或以特定的方式被代表。但是，对身体的关注也包括对男性、双性恋、同性恋、变性人和/或种族、阶级、年龄、健全/残疾或其他方面的 "其他 "身体的关注。关注性别化的身体是如何重要的，包括关注男性和女性的概念是如何构建并不断复制的。它涉及身体与其他身体的关系是如何定位和评价的。也就是说，性别影响着关于身体的社会规范，更重要的是，影响着不同身体之间的关系。更重要的是，虽然没有女性主义也可以进行性别分析，但女性主义的性别视角总是与权力有关。套用辛西娅-恩洛（Cynthia Enloe）的话说，任何女性主义视角都将政治--也就是权力--置于分析的核心，而性别分析则不然（Enloe 2010, xi-xii）。换句话说，性别分析与女性主义分析的区别在于，后者总是要改变现状。女性主义分析涉及政治和社会变革与转型。因此，女性主义通过性别来研究情感政治的方法是关于我们如何对社会规范进行投资的，是关于对作为社会规范的性别进行情感投资的。

Perhaps most importantly for a discussion of feminism and affect, feminist theory challenges knowledge as objective, particularly through a focus on the importance of being as a mode of knowing. Here, I am following Clare Hemmings who argues that feminist theory has privileged affect as a marker of the relationship between ontology and epistemology (Hemmings 2012, 148). To most feminists, the interest in how gender (and also other identity “markers” such as race, class, age, (dis) ability) functions as a politics of bodies is personal. The political logic of gender is personally felt. We might say, as Ahmed suggests, that feminism is “an inheritance of the sadness of becoming conscious of gender as a restriction of possibility that was not necessary” (Ahmed 2014b). Feminists are affectively moved to identify as feminists in order to change a particular politics. Indeed, it is the “question of affect-misery, rage, passion, pleasure-that gives feminism its life” (Hemmings 2012, 150).
对于女性主义与情感的讨论而言，或许最重要的是，女性主义理论挑战了知识的客观性，尤其是通过关注存在作为一种认知模式的重要性。在此，我追随克莱尔-海明斯（Clare Hemmings）的观点，她认为女性主义理论将情感视为本体论与认识论之间关系的标志（Hemmings 2012, 148）。对大多数女权主义者而言，性别（以及种族、阶级、年龄、（不）能力等其他身份 "标记"）如何发挥身体政治的作用是个人兴趣所在。性别的政治逻辑是个人所能感受到的。我们可以说，正如艾哈迈德所言，女权主义是 "一种继承，是在意识到性别作为对可能性的限制并非必要时的悲伤"（艾哈迈德，2014b）。为了改变特定的政治，女权主义者在情感上被打动，认同为女权主义者。事实上，正是 "情感问题--悲哀、愤怒、激情、愉悦--赋予了女权主义生命"（Hemmings 2012, 150）。

In this way, it is precisely because feminists in IR ask important questions about bodies in relation to war, security, or global politics that feminist scholars often have a different way into “the political” than traditional, state-based IR theories. The famous feminist slogan “the personal is political” (and international) means that feminist research agendas are often tuned in to stories, experiences, and representations of peoples/individuals/bodies rather than those of states or political elites. It also means that the personal and subjective is theoretical. Feminist claims to knowledge are not claiming to objectively reveal “the truth,” not least because feminist theorizing often starts from silenced and/or ignored “truths.” Instead, feminist knowledge is about challenging norms, the normative, and the normal, often through lived
因此，正是因为女性主义国际关系学家提出了关于与战争、安全或全球政治相关的身体的重要问题，所以女性主义学者往往能够以不同于传统的、以国家为基础的国际关系理论的方式进入 "政治"。女性主义的著名口号 "个人即政治"（和国际性）意味着女性主义的研究议程往往关注人民/个人/身体的故事、经验和表述，而不是国家或政治精英的故事、经验和表述。这也意味着个人和主观是理论性的。女权主义者的知识主张并不是要客观地揭示 "真相"，尤其是因为女权主义者的理论往往是从被压制和/或被忽视的 "真相 "出发的。相反，女权主义的知识是对规范、准则和常态的挑战，通常是通过生活中的实践来实现的。
experiences. As Judith Butler’s theory of performativity has taught us, theory is not just about what we think. It is also about what we do. Theory is also lived. This is why, in a cultural context of patriarchy and sexism, feminist scholars are often interested in challenging the politics of “common sense,” that which we tend to take for granted. To this end, feminist scholars in IR have, for example, demonstrated how militarization functions as the normalization of war in the everyday (Enloe 2000; Åhäll 2016a) or how justification for war often relies on particular “veiled references” based on ideas about masculinities and femininities as a politics of common sense (Shepherd 2006). ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5}
经验。正如朱迪斯-巴特勒（Judith Butler）的表演理论告诉我们的那样，理论不仅关乎我们在想什么。它还关乎我们的所作所为。理论也是生活的。正因如此，在父权制和性别歧视的文化背景下，女性主义学者往往热衷于挑战 "常识 "政治，即我们往往认为理所当然的政治。为此，国际关系中的女性主义学者举例说明了军事化是如何在日常生活中使战争正常化的（Enloe 2000；Åhäll 2016a），或者战争的正当性是如何经常依赖于基于男性和女性观念的特殊 "隐蔽指涉 "的常识政治的（Shepherd 2006）。 ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5}

While feminists comfortably theorize the subjective, the particular, the ignored perspective, what makes research feminist is not limited to analyses of “women” or perhaps even gender. Instead, what makes research feminist is that it asks feminist research questions (see Wibben 2011). And again, feminist research questions are about power and how the world works through power structures. This is why, when it comes to feminist knowledge on affect, I agree with Pedwell and Whitehead’s statement that “feminist theory might most productively explore affects less for how they dominate, regulate and constrain individual subjects and more for the possibilities they offer for thinking (and feeling) beyond what is already known and assumed” (Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 117). The next section discusses gender, discourse, and affect as “feelings of structure” informing such a politics of common sense in greater detail.
女权主义者将主观、特殊、被忽视的视角理论化，但女性主义研究并不局限于对 "女性 "或性别的分析。相反，研究之所以是女性主义的，是因为它提出了女性主义的研究问题（见 Wibben，2011 年）。同样，女性主义研究问题涉及权力以及世界如何通过权力结构运作。这就是为什么在谈到女性主义关于情感的知识时，我同意佩德韦尔和怀特海的观点，即 "女性主义理论最有成效的探索可能不是情感如何支配、管理和限制个体主体，而是情感为超越已知和假设的思考（和感受）提供的可能性"（佩德韦尔和怀特海，2012, 117）。下一节将更详细地讨论作为 "结构情感 "的性别、话语和情感对常识政治的影响。

In the preface to the essay collection Mythologies, first published in 1957, Roland Barthes explains how he “wanted to track down, in the decorative display of whatgoes-without-saying, the ideological abuse which . . is hidden there” (Barthes 2000a, 11, emphasis in original). Elsewhere, Barthes suggests that if we can understand how a narrative is seen and consumed as common sense, we can expose underlying hierarchical structures. He refers to the “narrative situation” as the protocols and “grammar” according to which the narrative is consumed (Barthes 2000b, 287). To Stuart Hall, language and behavior are the media of the material registration of ideology, the modality of its functioning (Hall 1985, 99). That is why we have to analyze or deconstruct language but also behavior in order to decipher the patterns of ideological thinking inscribed in them (Hall 1985, 100). Hall draws on Althusser’s break with classical Marxist notions of ideology, which means that systems of representation are essentially founded on unconscious structures (1985, 106). As Hall explains:
在 1957 年首次出版的散文集《神话》的序言中，罗兰-巴特（Roland Barthes）解释了他是如何 "想要在不言而喻的装饰性展示中，追踪......隐藏在其中的意识形态滥用"（Barthes 2000a, 11, 楷体为原文所加）。在其他地方，巴特认为，如果我们能够理解叙述是如何被视为常识并被消费的，我们就能揭露潜在的等级结构。他将 "叙事情境 "称为叙事消费所依据的协议和 "语法"（Barthes 2000b, 287）。在斯图尔特-霍尔看来，语言和行为是意识形态物质注册送68的媒介，是意识形态运作的模式（霍尔，1985 年，99 页）。正因如此，我们不仅要分析或解构语言，还要分析或解构行为，以破译其中蕴含的意识形态思维模式（Hall 1985, 100）。霍尔借鉴了阿尔都塞与经典马克思主义意识形态概念的决裂，即表征系统本质上建立在无意识结构之上（1985, 106）。正如霍尔所解释的：

We know the words to the song, “Rule Britannia” but we are “unconscious” of the
我们知道 "不列颠统治 "这首歌的歌词，但我们却 "无意识 "地意识到
deep structure-the notions of nation, the great slabs and slices of imperialist history,
深层结构--民族概念、帝国主义历史的大板块和切片、
the assumptions about global domination and supremacy, the necessary Other of
关于全球统治和至高无上的假设，《世界人权宣言》的必要的 "其他
other peoples’ subordination-which are richly impacted in its simple celebratory
其他民族的从属地位--这在其简单的庆祝活动中产生了丰富的影响。
resonances. (Hall 1985, 106)
共鸣。(霍尔，1985 年，106 页）
Such unconscious structures, whether we want to call it “unconscious ideology” (Weber 2005) or “myth” (Barthes 2000a) or politics of common sense is about something that is difficult to identify. It is the common-sense foundation of our world-views that is often left unchallenged, beyond debate (Weber 2005, 5). And yet, to consider the investments we have in such unconscious structures is precisely to
这种无意识的结构，无论我们称之为 "无意识的意识形态"（韦伯，2005 年）还是 "神话"（巴特，2000 年 a），抑或是常识政治，都是关于难以辨认的东西。它是我们世界观的常识基础，而这种常识基础往往不被质疑，也无法辩论（韦伯，2005 年，5）。然而，考虑我们在这种无意识结构中的投资恰恰是为了

attend to how they become meaningful, or indeed, as Ahmed $(2004,56)$$(2004,56)$(2004,56)(2004,56) suggests, are felt as natural.
关注它们是如何变得有意义的，或者正如艾哈迈德 $(2004,56)$$(2004,56)$(2004,56)(2004,56) 所说，它们是如何变得自然的。

Discourse is here used as social meaning-making, or signification, through visual, aural, and/or other sensory representations. It is, as Margaret Wetherell argues, futile to try to pull affect apart from meaning-making, the semiotic and the discursive: “it is the discursive that very frequently makes affect powerful, makes it radical and provides the means for affect to travel” (Wetherell 2012, 19-20). Discourse as meaning-making is not only about words simply because the way we interpret the world is not limited to spoken or written words. It is also about how those words are delivered, and, crucially, it is about the gaps and silences involved in how we make sense of the world. Wetherell $(2012,4)$$(2012,4)$(2012,4)(2012,4) uses the concept of “practice” to better capture “how the affective textures and activities of everyday life are shaped.”
在这里，"话语 "是指通过视觉、听觉和/或其他感官表征进行的社会意义生成或符号化。正如玛格丽特-韦瑟尔（Margaret Wetherell）所言，试图将情感与意义生成、符号学和话语割裂开来是徒劳的："正是话语常常使情感变得强大、激进，并为情感的传播提供了途径"（Wetherell 2012, 19-20）。作为意义生成的话语并不仅仅与文字有关，因为我们解释世界的方式并不局限于口头或书面文字。它还关系到这些词语是如何传递的，而且，至关重要的是，它关系到我们如何理解世界时所涉及的空白和沉默。Wetherell $(2012,4)$$(2012,4)$(2012,4)(2012,4) 使用了 "实践 "这一概念，以更好地捕捉 "日常生活的情感质地和活动是如何形成的"。
“Practice” is also a useful way to think about how ideas about gender are structuring our lives affectively. Gender is, of course, about identity, but from a feminist poststructuralist perspective, gender is analyzed as a discursive power relation, a logic that informs and produces global politics (Butler 2011; see also Shepherd 2015). Thinking about gender as a logic informing practice enables a critique of how, in my case, “Woman” (as the subject of the female-identified body more generally, rather than about any particular female-identified body) discursively “get said” (Zalewski 2000, 69). But, it is equally about “Woman” as “what-goes-without-saying,” an affective logic and practice. This is why discourse as meaning-making must be understood beyond words, as the “affective-discursive” (Wetherell 2012).
"实践 "也是思考性别观念如何影响我们生活的一种有用方式。当然，性别与身份有关，但从女性主义后结构主义的角度来看，性别被分析为一种话语权力关系，一种指导和产生全球政治的逻辑（巴特勒，2011 年；另见谢泼德，2015 年）。将性别作为一种指导实践的逻辑来思考，可以批判在我的案例中，"女人"（作为女性认同身体的主体，而非任何特定的女性认同身体）是如何被话语 "说出来 "的（Zalewski 2000, 69）。但是，这同样是关于 "女人 "作为 "不说出来的东西"，一种情感逻辑和实践。这就是为什么作为意义生成的话语必须超越语言，被理解为 "情感-话语"（Wetherell，2012 年）。

The logic of gender works-affectively, emotionally, and performativelythrough such “unconscious” structures that we might want to call cultural “shared meanings,” “agreed or shared perceptions” (Ahmed 2014a, 208), or perhaps just social norms, that which is normalized, indeed, common sense. Something that just “is” or something we just “do.” Exploring gender as a political puzzle of “what-goeswithout-saying” is in other words about paying attention to shared meaning-making, including, but also beyond, words. That is, including an affective logic influencing social norms. Importantly, the “unconscious” is here not understood as the unconscious of a subject but, as Ahmed puts it, “the failure of presence-or the failure to be present-that constitutes the relationality of subject, objects, signs and others” (Ahmed 2004, 46). “Unconscious” is understood as a failure in recognizing the affective investments that perpetuate particular social norms. This is important because “there is nothing more affective . . . than an agreement, precisely because what is in agreement does not tend to be registered by consciousness” (Ahmed 2014a, 219).
性别逻辑通过这种 "无意识 "结构有效地、情感地和表演性地发挥作用，我们可以将其称为文化上的 "共同含义"、"一致或共同的认知"（Ahmed 2014a, 208），或者可能只是社会规范，即正常化的、实际上是常识的东西。它只是 "是 "的东西，或者说我们只是 "做 "的东西。将性别问题作为 "不言而喻 "的政治难题来探讨，换句话说，就是要关注共同的意义生成，包括但也超越言语。也就是说，包括影响社会规范的情感逻辑。重要的是，这里的 "无意识 "不是指主体的无意识，而是如艾哈迈德所说的，"在场的失败--或无法在场--构成了主体、客体、符号和他人的关系"（艾哈迈德，2004 年，46）。"无意识 "被理解为未能认识到延续特定社会规范的情感投资。这一点很重要，因为 "没有什么比协议更具情感性......，恰恰是因为协议中的东西往往不会被意识记录下来"（Ahmed 2014a，219）。

The affective workings of gender as a social norm, I would suggest, can be traced both through representations of those emotions surfaced as conscious feelings and through the unconscious apolitical commonsensical and/or bodily thinking we tend to identify as affect. To feminists it is the politics of emotion that matter, and if the political outcome is the same (such as reinforced inequality or sexism), then whether we prefer to identify such affective workings as emotions, feelings, or affect is secondary. Similarly, the question is not necessarily whether or not an affective movement is experienced consciously or unconsciously by the subject but how affective processes have political effects. What matters is what the emotional, however defined, $do$$do$dod o. And, for the purpose of this paper, what matters from a methodological perspective is how affect sparks a feminist curiosity about gendered politics and practices.
我认为，性别作为一种社会规范的情感运作，既可以通过那些作为有意识的情感浮现出来的情感表征来追溯，也可以通过我们倾向于认定为情感的无意识的非政治常识和/或身体思维来追溯。对女权主义者来说，重要的是情感政治，如果政治结果是相同的（比如强化了不平等或性别歧视），那么我们是否更愿意将这种情感运作认定为情绪、感觉或情感就是次要的了。同样，问题不在于情感运动是否被主体有意识或无意识地体验到，而在于情感过程如何产生政治效应。重要的是情感是什么，无论如何定义， $do$$do$dod o 。就本文而言，从方法论的角度来看，重要的是情感如何激发女性主义对性别政治和实践的好奇心。

In the introduction to The Curious Feminist (2004), Enloe explains how being curious takes energy and that certain ideas are appealing precisely because they preserve energy because we don’t have to think twice about them. In this way, something
在《好奇的女权主义者》（The Curious Feminist，2004 年）的序言中，恩洛解释了好奇心是如何耗费精力的，而某些想法之所以吸引人，正是因为它们能保存精力，因为我们无需三思而后行。这样，一些
deemed “natural,” “inevitable,” or “common sense” “saves mental energy.” It is just “normal.” It is just what we do.
视为 "自然"、"必然 "或 "常识"，"节省脑力"。这就是 "正常"。我们就是这么做的。

After all, what is deemed natural hasn’t been self-consciously created. No decisions have to be made. The result: we can imagine that there is nothing we need to investigate. (Enloe 2004, 1)
毕竟，被视为自然的东西并不是有意识地创造出来的。无需做出任何决定。结果是：我们可以想象，没有什么是我们需要研究的。(Enloe 2004, 1）

Enloe explains that so many power structures-inside households, within institutions, in societies, in international affairs-are dependent on our continuing lack of curiosity. Our lack of curiosity about how the world works serves somebody’s political purpose. And it is because any power arrangement that is imagined to be legitimate, timeless, and inevitable is so rigid and difficult to break through that, Enloe suggests, we need to be genuinely curious about others’ lack of curiosity. Only this way can we meaningfully engage with those who take any power structure as unproblematic (Enloe 2004, 3).
恩洛解释说，许多权力结构--家庭内部、机构内部、社会中、国际事务中--都依赖于我们持续缺乏好奇心。我们对世界是如何运转的缺乏好奇心，这符合某些人的政治目的。恩洛认为，正是因为任何被想象为合法、永恒和不可避免的权力安排都是如此僵化和难以突破，所以我们需要对他人缺乏好奇心真正感到好奇。只有这样，我们才能与那些认为任何权力结构都没有问题的人进行有意义的交流（Enloe 2004, 3）。

However, from a methodological perspective, Enloe’s discussion of feminist curiosity does not go far enough, it does not explain how such a feminist curiosity happens affectively. Thus, there is scope for development. Here, I am reworking Enloe’s idea of feminist curiosity by combining it with Clare Hemmings’ idea of affective dissonance.
然而，从方法论的角度来看，恩洛对女性主义好奇心的讨论还不够深入，没有解释这种女性主义好奇心是如何在情感上发生的。因此，恩洛的观点仍有发展的余地。在此，我将结合克莱尔-海明斯（Clare Hemmings）的情感失调（affective dissonance）理念，对恩洛的女性主义好奇心理念进行再加工。

Hemmings (2012) develops the concept of affective solidarity as the foundation for a feminist politics of transformation by combining a rereading of feminist standpoint through affect with Elspeth Probyn’s (1993) idea of feminist reflexivity. To Hemmings, a feminist politics for change necessarily begins from an affective shift initiated by experience of affective dissonance $(2012,157)$$(2012,157)$(2012,157)(2012,157). To illustrate feminist reflexivity as an experienced difference between our own sense of being and the world’s judgements upon us as gendered beings, she tells a story about her own reasoning at the age of seventeen, a story that should resonate with many feminists:
海明斯（Hemmings）（2012）将通过情感重读女性主义立场与埃尔斯珀斯-普罗宾（Elspeth Probyn，1993）的女性主义反思性思想相结合，提出了情感团结的概念，作为女性主义变革政治的基础。在海明斯看来，女性主义变革政治必然始于由情感失调体验引发的情感转变 $(2012,157)$$(2012,157)$(2012,157)(2012,157) 。为了说明女权主义的反身性是我们自身的存在感与世界对我们作为性别人的判断之间的一种经验差异，她讲述了自己 17 岁时的一个推理故事，这个故事应该会引起许多女权主义者的共鸣：

This is similar to what Ahmed means by “Becoming a feminist involves coming up against the world” (Ahmed 2017, 19). The point that Hemmings emphasizes though, through the concept of affective dissonance, is that politics can be characterized as “that which moves us, rather than that which confirms us in what we already know” (Hemmings 2012, 151).
这与艾哈迈德所说的 "成为一名女权主义者需要与世界对抗"（Ahmed 2017, 19）有异曲同工之妙。海明斯通过 "情感失调 "这一概念强调的一点是，政治可以被描述为 "打动我们的东西，而不是确认我们已有认知的东西"（Hemmings 2012, 151）。

Hemmings discusses affective dissonance as “the judgment arising from the distinction between experience and the world” (Hemmings 2012, 157). This sense of dissonance might become a sense of injustice and then a desire to rectify that. If so (she makes clear that this might not always be the case), an affective shift that makes it possible to imagine a different politics, a different practice of politics, has taken place. Hemmings argues that, “in order to know differently we have to feel differently” (2012, 150, emphasis added). An affective shift might in this way inspire critical thinking to imagine an alternative politics.
海明斯（Hemmings）认为情感失调是 "由经验与世界之间的区别而产生的判断"（Hemmings 2012, 157）。这种不和谐感可能会变成一种不公正感，进而产生纠正这种不公正的愿望。如果是这样（她明确指出，情况并非总是如此），那么就发生了情感上的转变，从而有可能想象出一种不同的政治，一种不同的政治实践。海明斯认为，"为了以不同的方式认识，我们必须以不同的方式感受"（2012, 150, 着重号后加）。情感的转变可能会以这种方式激发批判性思维，从而想象出另一种政治。

While Hemmings’ argument centers on how affective dissonance can lead to affective solidarity as a feminist politics of transformation, I propose that the concept of affective dissonance is useful as a methodological tool for analyses of the politics of emotion more broadly. This is because it explains how a feminist
海明斯的论点集中在情感失调如何导致情感团结作为一种女性主义变革政治，而我则提出，情感失调的概念作为一种方法论工具，对于分析更广泛的情感政治非常有用。这是因为它解释了女性主义如何
curiosity about how the world works happens. It illustrates how affect generates feminist questions. It shows how an experience of affective dissonance can spark a feminist curiosity. And, by being curious about that which affectively stirred our curiosity in the first place, we might be able to identify political practices as affective meaningmaking, as feelings of structure, as “that-which-goes-without-saying.” This is how a feminist methodology to the affective-discursive offers possibilities for thinking and feeling “beyond what is already known and assumed” (Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 117). And this should be of interest to any scholar interested in changing the status quo of global politics, whether it is a politics of emotion or a politics of common sense.
对世界如何运作的好奇心。它说明了情感是如何产生女性主义问题的。它展示了情感失调的体验如何激发女性主义的好奇心。而且，通过对最初激起我们好奇心的情感的好奇，我们也许能够将政治实践确定为情感意义建构，确定为结构感受，确定为 "不言而喻的东西"。这就是女性主义的情感-辨证方法论如何为 "超越已知和假设"（Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 117）提供思考和感受的可能性。任何有志于改变全球政治现状的学者都应该对此感兴趣，无论是情感政治还是常识政治。

In this section, I return to two examples of my past research where a gendered politics of emotion takes place, where the “cultural landscape vibrates with surface tensions spied or sensed” (Stewart 2007, 45). The aim here is not to offer a detailed analysis of these events (this has been done elsewhere) but to demonstrate how attention to the emotional and affective through “feelings of structures” and common sense “judgement” informs my research about gender, agency, and political violence. In both examples, it is a sense of affective dissonance that identifies a representational gap, sparks a feminist curiosity, guides me to identify/locate the “key” to the political puzzle, and helps me to understand what emotion (in its broadest sense) does politically.
在本节中，我将回到我过去研究中的两个例子，在这两个例子中，发生了性别化的情感政治，"文化景观与被窥探或感觉到的表面紧张关系一起振动"（Stewart，2007 年，45）。这里的目的并不是要对这些事件进行详细分析（这一点已在其他地方做过），而是要展示我是如何通过 "结构感受 "和常识性 "判断 "来关注情感和情绪，并将其应用于我对性别、代理和政治暴力的研究中的。在这两个例子中，正是情感上的不和谐感发现了表象上的差距，激发了女权主义的好奇心，引导我识别/定位政治难题的 "关键"，并帮助我理解情感（广义上的）在政治上的作用。

Feminist scholars have pointed out how women’s violence tends to be discussed in terms of violent women’s gender: “Woman” is not supposed to be violent (c.f. Elshtain 1995; Alison 2004; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007, 2008; Gentry 2009). These gender norms are specifically upheld through emotional communication. Stories about women and violence, that is when women are acting against gendered expectations of them being “naturally” peaceful for example, are often specifically communicated through a sense of confusion, surprise, or shock. Elsewhere, I argue that emotions and emotionality function in two different ways in representations of female agency in political violence: as the portrayal of “women being emotional” and as “being emotional about [violent] women” (Åhäll 2012; see also Åhäll 2015). While the first function, the representation of “women as emotional” as a way to circumscribe their agency, is a fairly well-rehearsed feminist argument, I am here focusing on the latter, the politics involved in the emotional reaction, sometimes “shock-factor,” through which “Woman” as an object is often represented in contexts of political violence.
女权主义学者指出，妇女暴力往往是从暴力妇女的性别角度来讨论的："女人 "不应该有暴力倾向（参见 Elshtain，1995 年；Alison，2004 年；Sjoberg 和 Gentry，2007 年、2008 年；Gentry，2009 年）。这些性别规范通过情感交流得到具体维护。关于妇女与暴力的故事，也就是当妇女的行为违背了人们对她们 "天生 "平和的性别期望时，往往是通过一种困惑、惊讶或震惊的感觉来具体传达的。在其他地方，我认为情感和情感性在政治暴力中女性角色的表述中有两种不同的功能："女性情感化 "和 "对[暴力]女性情感化"（Åhäll，2012 年；另见 Åhäll 2015 年）。前者的功能是将 "情感化的女性 "表述为一种限制女性能动性的方式，这是一个相当成熟的女性主义论点，而我在此关注的是后者，即情感反应（有时是 "休克因素"）所涉及的政治，在政治暴力的语境中，"女性 "作为一个客体常常通过这种方式被表述出来。

Lynndie England, the female military police officer who found herself at the center of the so-called Abu Ghraib prison scandal where US military personnel were depicted abusing Iraqi prisoners in 2003/4, is one of the most iconic examples of this within a “war on terror” context. England was portrayed as “an enigma” and “a mystery” simply because her behavior, and appearance, did not seem to fit with cultural ideas about women, war, and appropriate femininity. She was described as “evil,” “witch,” and a “whore,” and many, including President Bush, expressed a (bodily) feeling of disgust. While the photographs depicting what was going on at Abu Ghraib were sickening, what caught feminists’ attention was how the individual body of England came to personify and channel much of the public outcry. In May 2004, BBC News reported that the photos of England were “images that will haunt America’s occupation of Iraq” and that “it is Lynndie England’s face most linked to
林迪-英格兰（Lynndie England）是 "反恐战争 "背景下最具代表性的例子之一，她是所谓的阿布格莱布监狱丑闻的核心人物，2003 年至 2004 年期间，美军人员被描述虐待伊拉克囚犯。英格兰被描绘成 "一个谜 "和 "一个神秘的人"，仅仅是因为她的行为和外表似乎不符合关于女性、战争和适当的女性气质的文化观念。她被描述为 "邪恶"、"巫婆 "和 "妓女"，包括布什总统在内的许多人都表达了（身体上的）厌恶之情。尽管描述阿布格莱布发生的事情的照片令人作呕，但引起女权主义者注意的是，英格兰的个人身体是如何化身并引导公众的愤怒情绪的。2004 年 5 月，英国广播公司新闻报道称，英格兰的照片是 "困扰美国占领伊拉克的图像"，"林迪-英格兰的脸与以下内容联系最为紧密
the horror” (Myrie 2004). In particular, the media coverage focused repeatedly on the fact that England was smiling for the camera in several photos:
恐怖"（Myrie，2004 年）。特别是，媒体报道反复关注英格兰在几张照片中对着镜头微笑的事实：

Because of the smiles, and the fact that the Iraqi detainees depicted were naked males, England was depicted as having an “evident taste for cruelty” (Goldenberg 2004). Her “grin” became “the symbol of sadistic practices at Abu Ghraib prison” (Goldenberg 2004). Lynndie England became the “sex sadist of Baghdad” (Brittain 2006,86 ) and a symbol of everything that was wrong with the war in Iraq. Although investigations and testimonies exposed that the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib was part of a much bigger cultural phenomenon, including poor leadership, the image of England as “evil” and “disgusting” stuck. In 2009, five years after the images became public and several years after England had finished serving her punishment, BBC radio conducted two separate lengthy interviews with her, and an interview in the Guardian was introduced as:
由于她的笑容，以及被描绘的伊拉克被拘留者都是赤身裸体的男性这一事实，英格兰被描绘成 "明显喜欢残忍"（Goldenberg，2004 年）。她的 "笑容 "成了 "阿布格莱布监狱虐待行为的象征"（Goldenberg 2004）。林迪-英格兰成了 "巴格达的性虐待狂"（布里坦，2006,86），成了伊拉克战争一切错误的象征。尽管调查和证词揭露了阿布格莱布监狱虐待囚犯是包括领导不力在内的更大文化现象的一部分，但英格兰 "邪恶 "和 "令人作呕 "的形象依然存在。2009 年，在图片公开五年后，英格兰服刑期满数年后，BBC 电台分别对她进行了两次长时间的采访，《卫报》对她的一次采访作了如下介绍：

In 2004, photographs of abuses at Abu Ghraib shocked the world. Seven people were
2004 年，有关阿布格莱布监狱虐待行为的照片震惊了世界。七人被
charged, but the face of the scandal will always be Lynndie England, the 21-year-old
但丑闻的代言人永远是林迪-英格兰（Lynndie England）。
private grinning at the camera. (Brockes 2009)
私人对着镜头咧嘴大笑。(布罗克斯，2009 年）
While the representation of England can tell us much about how gender intersects with class and sexuality, as many have already shown, ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} what is interesting from a methodological point of view is the representational gap between the (emotional) obsession with the particular body of England and her, in reality, rather marginal involvement in the abuse that took place at Abu Ghraib (as well as in other US-run detention facilities).
正如许多人已经指出的那样，对英格兰的表述可以告诉我们很多关于性别与阶级和性的交集的信息， ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} 从方法论的角度来看，有趣的是对英格兰特殊身体的（情感）痴迷与她在阿布格莱布监狱（以及美国管理的其他拘留所）发生的虐待事件中的实际参与程度之间的表述差距。

More specifically, it was how this representational gap was communicated through feelings about “motherhood” and ideas about appropriate femininity more broadly that initially sparked my feminist curiosity. England was pregnant when the scandal broke, which meant that a potential tension between “Woman” as life-giving (motherhood) vs. life-taking (soldier) could not be ignored. Visually, England’s pregnant body not only disrupted the “natural” virtues of womanhood, such as care, compassion, and gentleness but it was also “evidence” of misconduct because in order to become pregnant England must have broken the rules. During her trials, the military prosecutors’ main strategy to argue England’s guilt in the prison abuse at Abu Ghraib was to present England as sexually deviant. Footage of England engaging in sexual acts was used. The footage did not show her torturing prisoners. In the end, England was sentenced to three years in prison for “posing in photos,” the third highest sentence (Åhäll 2015, 114-135).
更具体地说，正是这种表象上的差距如何通过对 "母性 "的感受和更广泛的适当女性特质的观念来传达，才最初引发了我对女权主义的好奇。丑闻曝光时，英格兰已经怀孕，这就意味着 "女人 "作为赋予生命（母性）与夺取生命（士兵）之间的潜在矛盾不容忽视。从视觉上看，英格兰怀孕的身体不仅破坏了女性的 "自然 "美德，如关爱、同情和温柔，而且还是不当行为的 "证据"，因为英格兰要怀孕就必须违反规定。在对英格兰的审判中，军方检察官辩称英格兰在阿布格莱布监狱虐待事件中有罪的主要策略是将英格兰描述为性变态。他们使用了英格兰进行性行为的录像。这些录像并没有显示她虐待囚犯。最终，英格兰因 "摆姿势拍照 "被判入狱三年，刑期排名第三（Åhäll 2015, 114-135）。

England and Charles Graner, her then boyfriend who also was involved in the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, had started their relationship prior to their deployment to Iraq, but it did not seem to matter that some of the photos depicting England in sexual acts, or implied sexual acts, were not even taken at Abu Ghraib. The mere existence of such photos made her easy to frame as a sexual predator and thereby sexually deviant to normative femininity. She was likened to a porn star:
英格兰和她当时的男友查尔斯-格兰纳（Charles Graner）也参与了阿布格莱布监狱的虐囚事件，他们是在被派往伊拉克之前开始交往的，但这似乎并不重要，因为一些描绘英格兰性行为或暗示性行为的照片甚至都不是在阿布格莱布监狱拍摄的。仅仅因为这些照片的存在，她就很容易被诬陷为性掠夺者，从而在性方面偏离了规范的女性形象。她被比作色情明星：

The disproportionate focus on England in comparison to others involved, but also how her alleged agency in torture was framed through a gendered and sexualized politics of disgust, did not seem to make sense. Sianne Ngai (2005, 335) refers to disgust as “the ugliest of ugly feelings.” She explores disgust as the opposite of desire and attraction, as an ugly feeling that “block[s] sympathetic identification” (Ngai 2005, 340). Because of this quality, disgust functions to police societal borders more broadly and Ngai therefore refers to disgust as the most political of the “minor negative affects” (see also Tyler 2013 on “revolting subjects”).
与其他涉案人员相比，英格兰受到的关注过多，而且她被指控在酷刑中的作用是如何通过性别化和性化的厌恶政治被定格的，这似乎并不合理。Sianne Ngai（2005，335）将厌恶称为 "丑陋情感中最丑陋的情感"。她将厌恶视为欲望和吸引力的对立面，是一种 "阻碍同情认同 "的丑陋感觉（Ngai，2005，340）。由于这种特质，厌恶在更大范围内起到了警示社会边界的作用，因此 Ngai 将厌恶称为 "次要负面情感 "中最具政治性的情感（另见 Tyler 2013 关于 "反感主体 "的论述）。

Thus, the methodological approach I am illustrating here is not about the actual affective encounter, it is not about how receivers of the news about England felt. It is also not only about how the individual subject (England) was disciplined, demonized, and objectified. Instead, by paying attention to feelings of structure in which the object affectively flows, in this case “Woman” in a context of torture, we can focus on “the histories that come before the subject,” as Ahmed put it. We can focus on what the emotional obsession about “Woman” and torture does politically, beyond this individual case. The methodological approach is about how, through a moment of affective dissonance, a representational gap is identified, and a feminist curiosity about gender, agency and political violence is sparked. And, it is about how a feminist gut feeling might put into question the emotional representation that was immediately mediated as commonsensical about England’s involvement at Abu Ghraib. By feeling differently about England, a feminist methodology can offer a way to think differently about gender, agency, and political violence.
因此，我在此说明的方法论并不涉及实际的情感接触，也不涉及有关英格兰的新闻接收者的感受。它也不仅仅关注个体主体（英格兰）是如何被规训、妖魔化和对象化的。相反，通过关注客体在情感上流动的结构的感受，在这个案例中，"女人 "在酷刑的背景下，我们可以关注艾哈迈德所说的 "先于主体的历史"。我们可以关注关于 "女人 "和酷刑的情感纠缠在政治上的作用，超越了这个个案。这种方法论是关于如何通过情感失调的瞬间，发现表象上的差距，并激发女性主义对性别、代理和政治暴力的好奇心。此外，它还涉及女权主义者的直觉如何对英国参与阿布格莱布监狱事件的情感表述提出质疑，而这种情感表述被认为是符合常理的。通过对英国的不同感受，女权主义方法论可以提供一种对性别、代理和政治暴力进行不同思考的方式。

In 2016, the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) announced that they were removing their ban on women in combat roles. My feminist curiosity about the British ban on women in combat roles was sparked when, in 2010, the MOD announced that they were keeping the exclusion policy: “The consequences of opening up these small tactical teams in close combat roles to women are unknown” (MOD 2010a, 3, emphasis added). Andrew Robathan, minister for defence personnel, welfare and veterans, explained:
2016 年，英国国防部（MOD）宣布取消对女性担任战斗角色的禁令。2010 年，英国国防部宣布将继续保留这一排斥政策，这引发了我对英国禁止女性参与战斗的女权主义好奇心："向女性开放这些担任近距离战斗角色的小型战术小组的后果尚不可知"（MOD 2010a，3，着重部分由作者标明）。国防人事、福利和退伍军人部部长安德鲁-罗巴森解释说
We looked closely at the findings of this review but the conclusions were inconclusive.
我们仔细研究了这次审查的结果，但结论并不明确。
There was no evidence to show that a change in current policy would be beneficial or
没有证据表明改变现行政策会带来益处，或
risk-free, and so a decision was made to take a precautionary approach and maintain
无风险，因此决定采取预防措施，保持
the current position. (MOD 2010b, emphasis added)
目前的立场。(MOD 2010b，着重部分由作者标明）
We looked closely at the findings of this review but the conclusions were inconclusive. There was no evidence to show that a change in current policy would be beneficial or risk-free, and so a decision was made to take a precautionary approach and maintain the current position. (MOD 2010b, emphasis added)
我们仔细研究了这次审查的结果，但结论并不明确。没有证据表明改变现行政策是有益或无风险的，因此我们决定采取预防措施，维持目前的立场。(MOD 2010b，着重部分由作者标明）

Intrigued, I decided to do my own analysis of the four reports included in the 2009/2010 review and also of the MOD statements justifying this decision (see also Åhäll 2016b). Again, I found an affective logic informing a representational gap.
出于好奇，我决定自己分析 2009/2010 年审查中的四份报告，以及解释这一决定的国防部声明（另见 Åhäll 2016b）。我再次发现，情感逻辑为表述差距提供了依据。

After opening up more and more positions to women during the 1990s, the MOD published the first exclusion policy on women in combat roles in 2002. Legally, the exclusion policy was exempted from European Union (EU) sex discrimination legislation by referring to combat effectiveness: women could be excluded from those posts where the military judgement is that the employment of women would undermine and degrade combat effectiveness (MOD 2010a, 1). Crucially, the reason women were excluded from close-combat roles was not because of their perceived physiological and/or psychological differences to men, such as physical strength or aggression, but because the presence of women’s bodies was seen to constitute a potential risk to team cohesion. A lack of cohesion, in turn, was seen to impact negatively upon combat effectiveness. A female body in a small-combat unit was thought to compromise the combat effectiveness of “the band of brothers” (see also MacKenzie 2015).
在 20 世纪 90 年代向妇女开放越来越多的职位之后，国防部于 2002 年公布了第一份关于妇女担任 战斗角色的排斥政策。从法律上讲，该排斥政策不受欧洲联盟（欧盟）性别歧视立法的约束，因为它提到了战斗力：如果军方认为雇用女性会破坏和降低战斗力，则可以将女性排除在这些职位之外（MOD，2010a，1）。至关重要的是，女性被排除在近距离作战岗位之外的原因并不是因为她们被认为在生理和/或心理上与男性存在差异，如体力或攻击性，而是因为女性身体的存在被认为会对团队凝聚力构成潜在风险。缺乏凝聚力反过来又会对战斗力产生负面影响。小型作战部队中的女性身体被认为会损害 "兄弟连 "的战斗力（另见麦肯齐，2015 年）。

While others have critiqued the MOD’s failure to distinguish between social and task cohesion (see Basham 2009; also Woodward and Winter 2007), what initially attracted my feminist curiosity was that the exclusion policy was made in the name of “killing”: women were excluded from so-called ground close combat roles defined as “roles that are primarily intended and designed with the purpose of requiring individuals on the ground to close with and kill the enemy” (MOD 2010a, 5, emphasis added). Brig. Richard Nugee, who was leading the 2009/2010 review, had ensured that any decision to remove the ban would be taken for military reasons. Yet, the decision to keep the exclusion policy in 2010 turned out to be based not so much on the findings from the review reports, that is on the real-life experiences of women and men serving in combat roles/situations or knowledge-sharing from other countries, but on the undisclosed opinions of the “Service Chiefs.” It was the “Service Chiefs” who “evaluated the evidence that the individual pieces of research provided but also considered the relative weight that needed to be accorded to each of the conclusions” (MOD 2010a, 2).
虽然其他人批评国防部未能区分社会凝聚力和任务凝聚力（见 Basham，2009 年；Woodward 和 Winter，2007 年），但最初吸引我的女权主义好奇心的是，排斥政策是以 "杀戮 "的名义制定的：妇女被排除在所谓的地面近距离战斗角色之外，这些角色被定义为 "主要意图和设计是要求个人在地面与敌人近距离接触并杀死敌人的角色"（MOD，2010a，5，着重部分由作者标明）。旅长 Richard Nugee领导 2009/2010 年审查工作的理查德-努吉旅长曾保证，任何取消禁令的决定都是出于军事原因。然而，在 2010 年做出的保留排除政策的决定，其依据并不是审查报告的结论，即在战斗岗位/环境中服役的男女人员的实际经验或其他国家的知识共享，而是 "军种首长 "未公开的意见。正是 "处长 "们 "评估了各项研究提供的证据，同时也考虑了需要给予每项结论的相对权重"（国防部，2010a，2）。

In contrast to the MOD’s conclusion that it would make most sense to keep the ban, I found that the conclusions of the review were clear: All four reports failed to establish a link between gender-cohesion-combat effectiveness. To me, it seemed that the review was set up to find a (scientific) link between gender-cohesion-combat effectiveness simply because this was the only way the ban could legally be justified. When the reports failed to do so, the MOD interpreted this as “the conclusions of the review were inconclusive.” I sensed feelings of structure and my aim became to show how “common sense” simply did not make sense, how common sense was gendered and based in an affective logic informing such unconscious and uncurious structures.
与国防部关于保留禁令最合理的结论相反，我发现审查的结论很明确：所有四份报告都没 有在性别凝聚力和战斗力之间建立联系。在我看来，审查的目的似乎只是为了找到性别凝聚力与战斗力之间的（科学）联系，因为只有这样才能在法律上证明禁令的合理性。当报告未能做到这一点时，国防部将其解释为 "审查结论没有定论"。我感觉到了结构的感觉，我的目的是要说明 "常识 "是如何根本不合理的，常识是如何被性别化的，又是如何建立在一种情感逻辑的基础上，为这种无意识和不严肃的结构提供信息的。

The affective logic involved in this particular exclusion policy could perhaps be identified as “unease,” or perhaps even “fear,” about legitimizing women into roles with the task “to close with and kill.” Crucially, it is women’s bodies, including what women’s bodies “stand for,” that is at the heart of the argument. It is not about what women are actually doing in war. Such sentiments briefly resurfaced immediately after the January 2013 announcement that the United States would work toward removing their exclusion policy on women in combat roles. In a debate on whether or not the UK should follow suit, British columnist Charles Moore said the following on the BBC Radio 4 show Any Questions?:
这种特殊的排斥政策所涉及的情感逻辑或许可以被确定为 "不安"，或许甚至是 "恐惧"，即把妇女合法化，使其承担 "接近和杀戮 "的任务。至关重要的是，妇女的身体，包括妇女的身体 "代表 "什么，才是争论的核心。这与妇女在战争中的实际行动无关。2013 年 1 月，美国宣布将努力取消排斥妇女参战的政策，紧接着这种情绪又短暂出现。英国专栏作家查尔斯-摩尔（Charles Moore）在英国广播公司第四台节目《有问题吗？

Similar to the representation of England as particularly disgusting, there is an affective logic communicating a gap between what “Woman” should or should not be doing in war and what women are already doing in war. And, for the purpose of my argument, what matters is how the keeping of the ban is justified through a common sense, precautionary, logic, even though the review showed that the exclusion policy itself might be unjustified. Importantly, it is precisely this affective logic about Woman and common sense that helps me to zoom in on the political, in this case the gendered politics involved in keeping the ban.
与英国特别令人厌恶的表述类似，在 "女人 "应该或不应该在战争中做什么与妇女已经在战争中做什么之间存在着情感逻辑上的差距。而且，就我的论点而言，重要的是如何通过常识、预防性逻辑来证明保留禁令是合理的，尽管审查表明排除政策本身可能是不合理的。重要的是，正是这种关于 "女人 "和常识的情感逻辑帮助我放大了政治性，在这里是指维持禁令所涉及的性别政治。

The idea of women and violence is often communicated through feelings of (a gendered) structure-of confusion, shock, pity, or unease about legitimizing/normalizing women’s agency in killing. This emotional representation demonstrates that there has been a disruptive moment with regards to gendered social
妇女与暴力的概念往往是通过（性别）结构--困惑、震惊、怜悯或对妇女杀人行为合法化/正常化的不安--来传达的。这种情感表述表明，性别化社会已经出现了一个颠覆性的时刻。
norms. It is “a testament to that we have reached some form of societal bordercrossing as [gendered] common sense is no longer making sense” (Åhäll 2015, 142, emphasis in original).
规范。这 "证明我们已经达到了某种形式的社会跨界，因为[性别]常识不再有意义"（Åhäll，2015，142，着重号为原文所加）。

In When Women Kill (2003), Belinda Morrissey shows how murders committed by women are narrated repeatedly as traumatic events. The trauma, Morrissey argues, resides in the structure of the experience of the event, rather than in the event itself. This experience, moreover, causes an inability to assimilate or understand the event, yet the traumatized society condemns it by repeating it over and over via narrative representation (Morrissey 2003, 10). The repetition of the traumatic event means something. It fulfils a particular function for society. Morrissey argues that the use of what she calls “conventional stock stories” across a range of empirical cases of women murderers points to the influence of an imaginary realm, an unconscious aspect structuring the development of narratives and discourses. These stories, Morrissey argues, present stereotypical or mythic characters who embody traits evaluated as either ideal or condemnable, positive or negative. In essence, they represent the cultural capital on which discourses rely for community acceptance and comprehension. These stock stories may be specific to a particular discourse, but most frequently “they exist transdiscursively, extant within the cultural unconscious” (Morrissey 2003, 9).
在《当女人杀人时》（2003 年）一书中，贝琳达-莫里西（Belinda Morrissey）展示了妇女所犯的谋杀案是如何作为创伤性事件被反复叙述的。莫里斯认为，创伤在于事件体验的结构，而非事件本身。此外，这种体验导致人们无法吸收或理解该事件，而受到创伤的社会却通过叙事表述一遍又一遍地重复谴责该事件（Morrissey 2003, 10）。创伤事件的重复是有意义的。它满足了社会的特定功能。莫里西认为，在一系列女性杀人犯的实证案例中使用了她所谓的 "传统故事"，这表明了想象领域的影响，即无意识方面对叙事和话语发展的结构性影响。莫里西认为，这些故事呈现的是刻板印象或神话人物，他们所体现的特征被评价为理想的或应受谴责的、积极的或消极的。从本质上讲，它们代表了话语赖以被社会接受和理解的文化资本。这些故事可能是特定话语所特有的，但最常见的情况是 "它们以跨话语的方式存在，存在于文化无意识之中"（Morrissey 2003, 9）。

It is because, as explained above, gender functions as a logic that goes-withoutsaying that such feelings of structure are also practiced unconsciously, uncuriously. In the essay, “The Third Meaning,” written in 1970 (published in the collection Image-Music Text), Barthes addresses what he calls “the obtuse meaning.” The obtuse meaning is different from the “obvious” meaning. The obtuse meaning is about disguise and, more importantly for the purpose of my argument, the obtuse meaning is about emotion. Caught up in the disguise, Barthes argues, such emotion is never sticky, it is an emotion that simply designates “what one loves, what one wants to defend.” The obtuse meaning is about “an emotion value, an evaluation” (Barthes 2000b, 324). Although he does not use the term affect himself, in my reading Barthes is here describing affective movement (never sticky) and affective judgment (emotion value).
这是因为，如上文所述，性别作为一种逻辑发挥作用，这种结构感也是无意识地、不经意地实践的。在 1970 年撰写的《第三种意义》一文（发表于《图像-音乐-文本》一书）中，巴特谈到了他所谓的 "钝性意义"。晦涩的意义不同于 "显而易见 "的意义。朦胧的意义是关于伪装的，对我的论点而言，更重要的是，朦胧的意义是关于情感的。巴特认为，囿于伪装，这种情感从来都不是粘性的，它是一种情感，只是指定了 "一个人所热爱的，一个人想要捍卫的"。晦涩的含义是关于 "一种情感价值，一种评价"（巴特，2000b, 324）。尽管巴特本人并未使用 "情感 "这一术语，但在我的解读中，巴特在此描述的是情感运动（从不粘滞）和情感判断（情感价值）。

In order to understand the politics of emotion involved in the two illustrative cases discussed, it is not enough to analyze the obvious meaning. Instead, an affectively informed feminist curiosity zooms in on the obtuse meaning involved. It zooms in on the less obvious, hidden, emotion value about gender norms. Thus, the MOD’s statement about a precautionary approach because the implications are “unknown” and Moore’s viewpoint that women’s killing in the name of state-sanctioned political violence represents “the end of civilization” are clues that the ban might be in place because of an emotional value about how gender plays a fundamental role in how the world works. The problem with a policy such as the exclusion ban on women in combat roles, justified by the idea of “Woman” rather than individual women’s and men’s experiences, is, of course, that individuals are being judged and valued on the basis of the (assumed) shape of their bodies rather than their actual capabilities and actions. It means that the idea of legitimizing women’s killing impacts upon, destabilizes, and ultimately threatens broader ideas about what women and men should or should not be doing, irrespective of what women and men are actually already doing in war. The obtuse meaning is affectively communicating a logic of gender as “that-which-goes-without-saying.”
为了理解所讨论的两个案例中涉及的情感政治，仅仅分析显而易见的含义是不够的。相反，女性主义的情感好奇心会放大其中的模糊含义。它放大了不那么明显的、隐藏的、关于性别规范的情感价值。因此，国防部关于采取预防措施的声明，因为其影响是 "未知的"，以及摩尔关于以国家认可的政治暴力为名杀害妇女代表着 "文明的终结 "的观点，都提供了线索，表明禁令的出台可能是出于一种情感价值观，即性别在世界如何运作中扮演着根本性的角色。当然，以 "女性 "而非男女个人经历为理由而制定的禁止女性担任战斗角色的政策，其问题在于，对个人的评判和估价是基于其身体的（假定）形状，而非其实际能力和行动。这意味着，将女性杀戮合法化的观点影响、动摇并最终威胁到关于女性和男性应该或不应该做什么的更广泛观点，而不管女性和男性在战争中实际上已经在做什么。这种晦涩难懂的含义在情感上传达了一种性别逻辑，即 "不言而喻"。

While the “obvious” meaning in the emotional representation of Lynndie England might be about “disgust,” how the individual subject was disciplined and demonized through emotional representation, the obtuse meaning is about understanding what such feelings of structure do. That is to say, while the structures of gender are felt by those who are limited by them, the way in which I use “feelings of structure” here is not only about what we are called upon, interpellated, to feel about her (disgusted). Instead, it is about how the (gendered) boundaries of those
林迪-英格兰的情感表述中 "显而易见 "的含义可能是 "厌恶"，即个体主体如何通过情感表述被规训和妖魔化，而晦涩难懂的含义则是理解这种结构感的作用。也就是说，虽然性别结构是由那些受其限制的人所感受到的，但我在这里使用 "结构感受 "的方式，并不仅仅是指我们被要求、被解释对她的感受（厌恶）。相反，它涉及的是这些（性别）界限是如何
structures are policed and reinforced through an affective logic, either manifested as “feelings” or immediately mediated as apolitical “common sense,” consciously or unconsciously. Inspired by Ahmed’s thinking, the object that affectively flows in both representations of female agency in political violence is “Woman.” In the examples used here it is the idea of “Woman” as torturer (including sexualized torture) and as killer in war that affectively moves. It is culturally shared ideas about what female bodies should or should not do that are the objects that affectively move.
这种情感逻辑或表现为 "感觉"，或自觉或不自觉地立即成为非政治的 "常识"。受艾哈迈德思想的启发，在政治暴力中女性代理的两种表述中，情感流动的对象都是 "女人"。在这里使用的例子中，"女人 "作为酷刑实施者（包括性化酷刑）和战争中的杀手的观念在情感上是流动的。关于女性身体应该做什么或不应该做什么的文化观念才是情感流动的对象。

Feminist scholarship tends to center on two main things: an analytical focus on gender, however defined, and political change. However, feminist knowledge and feminist theory is useful for much broader critical endeavors. Feminist knowledge is about imagining how things could be different, and, importantly for the argument here, this imagination is developed affectively. This paper has demonstrated how the policing of gender norms is a subtle process, at times performed through unconscious structures immediately mediated as common sense. It is communicated through a politics of emotion, often in everyday contexts, as affective judgments. Analyzing representations of “Woman” [female body] and violence, I am not interested so much in the “real” affective impression body to body, but the affectivediscursive in-between as shared meanings. This is because a feminist approach to the politics of emotion is about the affective investments of gender as a social norm.
女权主义学术研究往往集中在两个主要方面：对性别（无论其定义如何）的分析和政治变革。然而，女性主义知识和女性主义理论对于更广泛的批判性工作非常有用。女性主义知识是关于如何想象事物可能会有所不同的知识，而对于本文的论点而言，重要的是，这种想象力是以情感为基础发展起来的。本文论证了性别规范的维持是一个微妙的过程，有时是通过无意识的结构进行的，并立即以常识为媒介。它通过情感政治进行传播，通常在日常语境中作为情感判断。在分析 "女人"（女性身体）和暴力的表征时，我感兴趣的不是身体与身体之间 "真实 "的情感印象，而是作为共同意义的情感--模糊--之间的情感。这是因为，女性主义的情感政治方法是关于作为社会规范的性别的情感投资。

In order to understand such affective investments as a politics of emotion, I argue, we must also approach affect as methodology. To this end, what feminist knowledge offers is twofold: First, a way to identify “the political” in the affective-discursive because affect generates questions about how the world works. Second, by feeling differently, a feminist analysis opens up a space for thinking, acting, and knowing differently. There are feelings of structure everywhere. Depending on our own cultural baggage, we will encounter and feel those structures differently. By using affective dissonance as a methodological tool that sparks a feminist curiosity about challenging power structures, whether these are conscious or unconsciously, uncuriously commonsensical, it is possible to unpack those feelings of structure as political. This is how feminist knowledge on affect offers a way to retune, reset, and reimagine research on the politics of emotion. By prioritizing affect as methodology, feminist knowledge and analyses should be valuable for critical endeavors interested in changing the status quo, no matter if the political puzzle is about gender or not. If scholars are serious about analyzing the politics of emotion, feminist knowledge must not be ignored.
我认为，为了将这种情感投资理解为情感政治，我们还必须将情感作为方法论来对待。为此，女性主义知识提供了两方面的内容：首先，这是一种在情感-辨证中识别 "政治 "的方法，因为情感会产生关于世界如何运作的问题。其次，通过不同的感受，女性主义分析为不同的思考、行动和认知开辟了空间。结构感无处不在。根据我们自身的文化包袱，我们会以不同的方式接触和感受这些结构。通过将情感失调作为一种方法论工具，激发女性主义对挑战权力结构的好奇心，无论这些权力结构是有意识的还是无意识的，也无论它们是否符合常识，我们都有可能将这些结构感解读为政治感。这就是女性主义关于情感的知识如何为情感政治的研究提供了一种重新调整、重新设置和重新想象的方法。通过将情感作为方法论的优先事项，女性主义的知识和分析对于有志于改变现状的批判性努力应该是有价值的，无论政治难题是否与性别有关。如果学者们要认真分析情感政治，就不能忽视女性主义知识。

Only then could our discussions potentially “gel.”
只有这样，我们的讨论才有可能 "融为一体"。

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