GEGA2001
大中华区与全球经济
第九讲 中国国有企业改革
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mN9qoi2oEHY
背景
国有企业是中央非农部门企业体系中的主要经济单位
规划系统。（中国经济的支柱）
国有企业的主要职能是实现政府生产和分配商品的目标。
政府在规划、协调和资源分配方面发挥着至关重要的作用，而国有企业在决定生产什么和生产多少、调整劳动力或决定盈余或利润的使用方面几乎没有自主权。
产品价格不是指导企业生产决策的主要信号，而是被政府用来在经济部门之间分配资源，特别是工业部门，以实现雄心勃勃的工业化计划。
背景
国有企业负责员工及其家庭的福利，包括住房、医疗保健、教育和退休。
国有企业缺乏市场化激励和多重功能，导致其效率低下，导致计划经济时期长期存在低产出、短缺问题。
随着国有企业部门在经济中的范围缩小，以市场为导向的发展取得了进展。
中国的经济转型以其渐进式和实验性的改革方式而著称，国有企业改革就是一个典型的例子。
国有企业改革---所有制转型的关键问题
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中国国有企业改革的一项关键政策措施是通过部分或全部国有化来减少政府对国有企业资产的持有，从而改变所有权。
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这项措施具有双重效果，一方面减轻了政府因国有企业效率低下而造成的成本负担，另一方面为私营企业创造了参与和扩张的机会。
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市场改革计划的基石，始于政府承认多所有权经济制度和私有产权。
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全经济所有制改革在非国有企业的出现中发挥了至关重要的作用，大大增强了转型初期的市场竞争。
国有企业改革的关键问题---市场竞争与预算软约束
在中央计划下，国有企业不必相互竞争，也不必与市场上其他所有制形式的企业竞争
国有企业改革的首要步骤是使该行业暴露在市场竞争中。
软预算约束“（Kornai，1986年）。通常，补贴、免税和软信贷是帮助企业缓解预算限制的关键渠道。
国有企业改革中的关键问题 --- 自治、企业监督和公司治理
The primary objective of SOE reform is to reduce government intervention
in business operations and provide autonomy and delegate the use rights of SOE assets to managers.
The separation between the owners and managers or ownership and control, giving rise to the principal–agent problem.
The enterprise managers with the advantage of insider information may abuse their power to benefit themselves .
The problem is usually more pervasive in SOEs due to the weak monitoring of assets caused by high costs of monitoring, the lack of incentives created by the entrenched interests of supervisory agency officials.
Critical issues in SOE reform --- Commercial objectives and the sectoral dimension of SOE reform
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SOEs play an essential role in maintaining social stability by providing employment and protection of workers’ welfare.
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Over the past few decades, SOEs have played an essential role in developing large-scale infrastructure projects, carried out by governments at both central and local levels to support economic growth.
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SOEs have also been considered key instruments in promoting technological advances, securing strategic resources and advancing national interests.
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The low economic performance of SOEs is attributable to the multi-objective nature of their operation.
Four stages of SOE reforms
Autonomy with the contract responsibility system and competition, 1978–92, Stage 1
In the early 1980s, an enterprise responsibility system was implemented based on the success of the household responsibility system in the agricultural sector.
The primary objective of the program was to increase SOEs’ productivity, output and profitability . After fulfilling state plans and output quotas, enterprises were allowed to keep a share of total profits from production and make decisions about production plans, workforce adjustment and product marketing. (Profit retention, 12%)
In 1984, enterprise rights were extended to production planning, purchase of inputs, worker payment and recruitment, staffing and the use of retained profits.
Enterprise
responsibility
system
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Under the contract system, each SOE was allowed to adopt a compulsory plan or market-oriented scheme.
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Under the compulsory scheme, the enterprise had to fulfil an output quota to be sold to the state at state-set prices, but it was supplied with material inputs at planned prices.
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Under the market-oriented scheme, the enterprise was allowed to sell on the market but had to buy material inputs at market prices.
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As a result of providing greater autonomy and incentives, the program—initially trialled on 100 enterprises in Sichuan province— was quickly adopted and applied to 6,600 SOEs in 1980, to 42,000 in 1981 and almost the entire industrial sector in 1983.
Enterprise
responsibility
system
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The system was developed with greater emphasis on
enterprises’ responsibilities for profits and losses and more stable quotas on output and profits.
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By the end of 1988, the contract system had been applied to about 93 per cent of SOEs.
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The contract and two-tier price systems represent the typical dual-track and incremental approach to China’s SOE reforms, with planning-based and market based coordination mechanisms.
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Enterprise autonomy and market entry led to significant changes in the SOE sector; with an increasing number of lossmaking enterprises and substantial total losses, contributing to government revenue decline.
Also contributing to SOE’s worsening performance --
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SOEs had to bear policy burdens relating, in particular, to expenses for health care, housing and education for their workers, and also had to act as a social safety net maintaining employment for redundant workers.
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The lack of adequate monitoring was attributed to SOEs’ poor performance (Huang 1999), and another consequence was that many managers abused their position for personal benefit such as through hiding profits (Chow 2002). This problem became more complicated in the later stages of SOE reform.
Ownership reform through “grasping the large, letting go of the
small’, 1992–2003, Stage 2
The second stage of reform was characterised by ownership transformation with a focus on the privatisation of SOEs, which began after Deng Xiaoping’s tour of southern China in 1992.
Gaizhi (改制） became an essential element in the government’s grand strategy of building ‘ a modern Chinese enterprise system’ for the ‘socialist market economy’, as set forth by the fourteenth National Congress of the CPC.
In line with this target, priority reform steps were taken to develop an institutional framework for the modern enterprise system, based on the Western corporate model.
The government issued the Company Law in 1993 and the Competition Law in 1994. The
promulgation of specific laws and policies was a substantial step in establishing the regulatory framework for the growing multi-ownership enterprise sector and supervisory functions over SOEs.
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Further, the xiagang (‘laid-off’下崗) policy, which allowed a large number of workers to be laid-off in the process of ownership change, was carried out. (40%)
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In 1997, the fifteenth National Congress set out the establishment of a social security system.
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In the early 1990s, other complementary reforms were carried out, including to fiscal and trade policy.
Fiscal system reforms were aimed at setting up a broad tax base and stable central–local government relations. Trade policy reforms unified exchange rates and liberalised the trade regime for enterprises of all ownership types. aimed at China potentially joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), another significant push factor for the SOE privatisation process.
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Moreover, stock markets were established (1990) and developed with the securities law enacted in 1999 to support the ownership transformation of SOEs.