Journal for Critical Animal Studies Editorial Executive Board
《批判动物研究杂志》编辑执行委员会

______________________________________________________________________________
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Editors
编辑者

Dr. Susan Thomas     susanveganthomas@aol.com
苏珊·托马斯博士su 珊 veganthomas@aol.com

Dr. Lindgren Johnson     lindgrenhalejohnson@gmail.com
林德格林·约翰逊博士lindgrenhalejohnson@gmail.com

Associate Editors
副编辑

Dr. Carol Glasser     cglasser@gmail.com
Dr. 玻璃丝glasser@gmail.com

Dr. Mary Trachsel     mary-trachsel@uiowa.edu
玛丽·特拉切尔博士mary-trachsel@uiowa.edu

Media Editor
媒体编辑

Adam Weizenfeld     adam.weizenfeld@gmail.com
亚当·魏森菲尔德adam.weizenfeld@gmail.com

Editorial Board
编委会

For a complete list of the members of the Editorial Board please see the JCAS link on the Institute for Critical Animal Studies website: http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/?page_id=393
请参阅批判性动物研究学院网站上的 JCAS 链接以获取编辑委员会成员的完整列表：http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/?page_id=393

Cover Art
封面艺术

Photograph by Haley Jeppson, hjppsn@gmail.com, with permission.
照片由海利·杰普森拍摄，hjppsn@gmail.com，经允许。

JCAS Volume 12, Issue 3, 2014
JCAS 卷 12，期 3，2014 年

TABLE OF CONTENTS
目录

ISSUE INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………...……………..….1-3
问题介绍……………………………………………………………………..….1-3

ESSAYS
文章

The Cost of Compassion: The Impact of Welfare Reforms on the Profits of Animal Factories and the Retail Price of Animal Products
《同情之代价：福利改革对动物工厂利润和动物产品零售价格的影响》

Norm Phelps …………………………………………………..………………………………4-26
诺姆·菲尔普斯…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4-26

Geschlecht, Speciesism, and Animal Rights in Leopold von Sacher-Masoch
性别、物种主义与萨克斯-马索赫的动物权利

Sean Kelly ……...…………………………………………………………………………...27-49
```html Sean Kelly ……...…………………………………………………………………………...27-49 ``` ```html 肖恩·凯利 ……...…………………………………………………………………………...27-49 ```

Suffering Humanism, or the Suffering Animal
遭受式人文主义，或遭受的动物

Sean Meighoo………………………………………………………………………………..50-74
```html 梅伊胡·肖恩………………………………………………………………………………..50-74 ```

Refusing to Speak: The Ethics of Animal Silence and Sacrifice in Coetzee and Derrida
《拒绝发声：科茨埃与德里达笔下动物沉默与牺牲的伦理》

Sundhya Walther …….....……………………………………………………………………75-96
""" 桑迪亚·瓦尔特 …….....……………………………………………………………………75-96 """

Yoruba Ethico-cultural Perspectives and Understanding of Animal Ethics
《约鲁巴伦理文化视角与动物伦理理解》

A.O. Owoseni and I. O. Olatoye ……………………………………………………………97-118
A.O.Owoseni和 I. O. Olatoye……………………………………………………………97-118

REVIEWS
评论

Film Review: The Ghosts in Our Machine (2013), Bullfrog Films (theater edition: 92 minutes, classroom edition: 60 minutes), directed by Liz Marshall
电影评论：《机器中的幽灵》（2013 年），Bullfrog Films（影院版：92 分钟，课堂版：60 分钟），导演：Liz Marshall

Steve Kaufman ………………………………………………………………………..…..119-121
Steve Kaufman……………………………………………………………………..…..119-121

Book Review: We Animals (2013)
书籍评论：我们动物（2013）

Kathryn Asher ……………………………………………………………………………..122-129
```html 凯瑟琳·阿舍…………………………………………………………………………..122-129 ```

JCAS: Submission Guidelines …………………………………………………………….130-131
JCAS: 提交指南……………………………………………………………….130-131

Volume 12, Issue 3
卷 12，期 3

2014

Issue Introduction
""" 问题引言 """

Author: Mary Trachsel
作者: 玛丽·特拉赫塞尔

ISSUE INTRODUCTION
问题介绍

 While this summer issue of JCAS is not focused on a special topic, the five articles assembled in these pages all participate in the ongoing discussion of intersections and divergences between animal rights and animal welfare discourses in animal ethics, often interrogating the roles of animal suffering and human compassion in constructing the status of nonhuman animals. Are the two orientations—rights and welfare—compatible and even mutually reinforcing, or do they inevitably work at cross-purposes? And if both discursively resolve to questions about the ethics of human relationships to nonhuman animals, what exactly are the real and ideal positions of humans in these relationships? What moral responsibilities do such relationships confer upon human beings? What sacrifices might they demand? And how and to what extent is it possible for human animals to escape an andropocentric worldview in the conduct of these relationships?
""" 虽然本期的《JCAS》没有聚焦于特定主题，但收录在这几页的五篇文章都参与了关于动物伦理中动物权利与动物福利话语交叉与分歧的持续讨论，常常质疑动物痛苦和人类同情心在构建非人类动物地位中的作用。权利和福利这两种取向——它们是否兼容，甚至相互强化，或者它们必然相互对立？如果两者在话语上都转向关于人类与非人类动物之间伦理关系的问题，那么人类在这些关系中的真实和理想位置究竟是什么？这样的关系会给人类带来哪些道德责任？它们可能要求我们做出哪些牺牲？以及人类动物在处理这些关系时，如何以及到什么程度能够摆脱人类中心主义的观点？ """

 The first article to take up such questions in this issue is “The Cost of Compassion,” in which Norm Phelps analyzes the economic impacts of several proposed farmed animal welfare measures on animal factories and retail prices. Focusing primarily on the elimination of gestation crates for sows, battery cages for laying hens and waterbath stunning of broiler chickens prior to slaughter, Phelps uses data from agricultural economists to refute the claim that such welfare measures can actually increase farm profits. Instead, he argues that by passing the added costs of improved animal welfare on to consumers of meat, producers and processors will gradually make meat-eating a less attractive option for increasing numbers of customers; as consumer demand for meat products declines, fewer animals will be subjected to the intolerable conditions of factory farming. Consequently, Phelps maintains, seemingly small welfare improvements may indirectly serve the larger cause of animal liberation rather than merely assuaging the collective conscience of the meat-eating public.
第一篇文章探讨了本期杂志中的此类问题，题为《同情之代价》，Norm Phelps 分析了多项拟议的农场动物福利措施对养殖场和零售价格的经济影响。他主要关注母猪的妊娠栏、产蛋鸡的电池笼以及屠宰前对肉鸡进行水浴击昏的消除，利用农业经济学家的数据反驳了这些福利措施实际上可以增加农场利润的说法。相反，他认为，通过将改善动物福利的额外成本转嫁给肉类消费者，生产商和加工商将逐渐使肉食对越来越多的顾客来说变得不那么有吸引力；随着对肉类产品的需求下降，将会有更少的动物遭受工厂化养殖的难以忍受的条件。因此，Phelps 坚持认为，看似微小的福利改进可能间接地服务于动物解放的大目标，而不仅仅是抚慰肉食公众的集体良心。

 The next article, Sean Kelly’s “Geschlecht, Speciesism, and Animal Rights in Leopold von Sacher-Masoch,” conducts an analytical survey of the 19^th-century Galician author’s literary works, focusing on the intent behind von Sacher-Masoch’s use of the term “Geschlecht,” generally translated into English as “sex,” but carrying in German the broader meaning of “species” or “type.” Kelly argues that human-animal relationships in von Sacher-Masoch’s stories, set in a moral universe of Krieg der Geschlechter—warfare and struggle among “types”—, offer a useful theory of animal rights grounded in the possibility of friendships across the species divide. Interspecies relationships in these stories, Kelly concludes, model animal rights not as legal protections for nonhuman animals but rather as human responsibilities to effect positive changes in the lives of animals, largely through human education guided by the purpose of making animal exploitation unnecessary.
下一篇文章，肖恩·凯利的《性别、物种主义与萨克斯-马索克笔下的动物权利》，对 19 世纪加利西亚作家文学作品的进行了分析性综述，重点关注萨克斯-马索克使用“性别”一词的意图，该词在英语中通常被翻译为“性别”，但在德语中具有更广泛的“物种”或“类型”含义。凯利认为，萨克斯-马索克故事中的人与动物关系，设定在一个“性别战争”的道德宇宙中——即“类型”之间的战争和斗争，为动物权利提供了一个基于跨越物种界限友谊可能性的有用理论。 这些故事中，凯利总结道，跨物种关系并不是将这些故事中的动物权利视为非人类动物的法律保护，而是将它们视为人类对动物产生积极影响的职责，主要通过人类教育来实现，目的是使动物剥削变得不再必要。

 The next two essays, Sean Meighoo’s “Suffering Humanism, or the Suffering Animal” and Sundhya Walther’s “Refusing to Speak: The Ethics of Animal Silence and Sacrifice in Coetzee and Derrida,” both examine the moral significance of nonhuman animal suffering. Through an analysis of Peter Singer’s and Jacques Derrida’s uses of Jeremy Bentham’s famous assertion that nonhuman animals’ moral standing is grounded in their capacity to suffer, Meighoo argues that although Bentham ushered in a radical revision of humanism by replacing the capacity to reason with the capacity to suffer as the core component of moral subjectivity, the inclusion of nonhuman animals in the moral universe of humanity occurs on strictly anthropocentric terms. Meighoo leaves us with the unanswered question, “Is the suffering subject of ethics fundamentally human?”
""" 接下来的两篇论文，肖恩·米戈的《苦难的人文主义，或苦难的动物》和桑迪亚·沃尔瑟的《拒绝发声：在科茨埃和德里达作品中动物沉默与牺牲的伦理》，都探讨了非人类动物苦难的道德意义。通过分析彼得·辛格和雅克·德里达对杰里米·边沁著名论断的应用，即非人类动物的道德地位建立在它们感受痛苦的能力上，米戈认为，尽管边沁通过用感受痛苦的能力取代推理能力作为道德主体的核心要素，从而为人文主义带来了根本性的变革，但非人类动物被纳入人类道德宇宙的过程完全是人类中心主义的。米戈留下了一个未解的问题：“伦理中的苦难主体本质上是否是人类的？” """

 While Walther provides no final answer to this question, her analysis of Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am and Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals and Disgrace suggests that there is no way out of our ethical andropocentrism. She rejects Elizabeth Costello’s interpretation of animal silence in Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals as a form of active resistance to human domination, using Derrida’s lectures and Coetzee’s Disgrace to demonstrate human appropriation of animal silence in a “sacrificial economy.”
虽然瓦尔特没有对这个问题的最终答案给出结论，但她对德里达的《因此我是动物》和库切《动物的生活》以及《耻辱》的分析表明，我们无法摆脱伦理上的男权中心主义。她否定了库切在《动物的生活》中对动物沉默的伊丽莎白·科斯特洛解释，认为这是一种对人类统治的积极抵抗形式，并利用德里达的讲座和库切的《耻辱》来展示人类在“牺牲经济”中对动物沉默的占有。

Finally, Olatoye Olufemi’s and Owoseni Adewale’s “Yoruba Ethico-cultural Perspectives and Understandings of Animal Ethics” questions the Western conceptual division of animal ethics into the separate camps of animal rights and animal welfare by examining the Yoruba concept of animal ethics encoded in oral texts and cultural practices. Concluding that the Yoruba culture of Nigeria does not recognize or uphold the rights/welfare divide, they call for more human cultural diversity in the global conversation about the ethics of human-nonhuman animal relations.
最后，奥拉托耶奥卢费米和奥武森尼阿德瓦莱的“约鲁巴伦理文化视角与理解动物伦理”质疑了将动物伦理划分为动物权利和动物福利两个独立阵营的西方概念，通过考察口头文本和文化实践中的约鲁巴动物伦理观念，得出结论：尼日利亚的约鲁巴文化并不承认或维护权利/福利的划分，他们呼吁在全球关于人-非人动物关系伦理的对话中，有更多人类文化多样性。

Volume 12, Issue 3
卷 12，期 3

2014

The Cost of Compassion: The Impact of Welfare Reforms on the Profits of Animal Factories and the Retail Price of Animal Products
《同情之代价：福利改革对动物工厂利润和动物产品零售价格的影响》

Author: Norm Phelps¹*
作者：诺姆·菲尔普斯¹†

Title: Independent author and animal rights activist
标题：独立作家和动物权利活动家
Affiliation: Society for Ethical and Religious Vegetarians
所属机构：道德和宗教素食者协会

Location: Funkstown, Maryland
位置：芬克斯镇，马里兰州

E-mail: normphelps@animalsandethics.org
电子邮件：normphelps@animalsandethics.org

Key words: animal welfare, animal agriculture, CAFOs, factory farming
关键词：动物福利、动物农业、集约化养殖场、工厂化养殖

THE COST OF COMPASSION: THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORMS ON THE PROFITS OF ANIMAL FACTORIES AND THE RETAIL PRICE OF ANIMAL PRODUCTS
慈悲的成本：福利改革对动物工厂利润和动物产品零售价格的影响

Abstract
抽象

This article considers the impact of welfare reforms on the cost of raising animals for their flesh, eggs, or milk, and on the retail price of animal products. It surveys the academic and industry literature on the subject, with emphasis on the economic impact of three proposed reforms: eliminating gestation crates for pregnant pigs, eliminating barren battery cages for hens who lay eggs, and eliminating electrical water bath stunning for chickens raised for their flesh. It concludes: a) that the plentiful supply of cheap animal products is dependent on the productivity enhancements brought about by industrial techniques; b) that most welfare reforms reduce productivity and thereby increase the cost of raising animals; this in turn increases the retail price of animal products, although in some cases, not beyond consumers’ willingness to pay; c) the size of the cost/price increase depends on the nature of the reform and the number of animals affected; and d) over time, welfare reforms can drive up the retail price of animal products to the point that demand is significantly reduced, thereby reducing the number of animals who are enslaved and slaughtered for their flesh, eggs or milk. Used in conjunction with other strategies, including vegan and abolitionist advocacy, welfare reforms can contribute to the shrinking and eventual abolition of animal agriculture.
本文探讨了福利改革对饲养动物以获取其肉、蛋或奶的成本以及动物产品零售价格的影响。它回顾了关于该主题的学术和行业文献，重点介绍了三个拟议改革的经济学影响：消除怀孕母猪的产床、消除产蛋鸡的空笼，以及消除用于饲养肉鸡的电水浴昏迷。 它得出以下结论：a)丰富的廉价动物产品供应依赖于工业技术带来的生产力提升；b)大多数福利改革会降低生产力，从而提高饲养动物的成本；这反过来又提高了动物产品的零售价格，尽管在某些情况下，价格不会超过消费者的支付意愿；c)成本/价格的增加幅度取决于改革的性质和受影响的动物数量；d)随着时间的推移，福利改革可能会将动物产品的零售价格推高到需求显著减少的程度，从而减少被奴役和屠宰以获取其肉、蛋或奶的动物数量。与其他策略相结合，包括素食主义和废除主义倡导，福利改革可以有助于动物农业的缩小和最终废除。

Introduction
简介

The debate within the animal rights community over the strategy of campaigning for reforms that reduce the physical and emotional suffering of animals began with the work of Gary Francione in 1996. In Rain without Thunder (and in subsequent books, articles, and posts on his popular blog, The Abolitionist Approach), the Rutgers law professor and animal advocate has contended that welfare reforms undermine the animal liberation message by failing to attack the legal status of animals as property and encouraging the public to believe that they can consume products from “humanely raised” animals with a clear conscience.
动物权利运动内部关于通过改革策略减少动物身体和精神痛苦的辩论始于 1996 年加里·弗兰科尼的工作。在《雷雨无雷霆》（以及随后的书籍、文章和他在流行的博客《废除主义方法》上的帖子），这位罗格斯大学法学教授和动物权益倡导者认为，福利改革削弱了动物解放的信息，因为它没有攻击动物作为财产的法律地位，并鼓励公众相信他们可以毫无愧疚地消费“人道饲养”的动物产品。

More recently, Professor Francione has emphasized a third argument in his case against welfare reforms:
最近，弗兰科尼教授在他的反对福利改革的案例中强调了第三个论点：

For the most part producers of animal products derive a palpable economic benefit from making welfare reforms, completely apart from the separate benefit that comes from being able to assure members of the public that the animal products they are consuming have been produced in a “humane” fashion. (Francione and Garner, 2010, p. 45)
大多数动物产品生产者从福利改革中获得了明显的经济效益，这完全独立于他们能够向公众保证他们所消费的动物产品是以“人道”方式生产的这一额外好处。（Francione 和 Garner，2010，第 45 页）

Since the whole point of modern intensive confinement agriculture is to maximize profits, this is an intriguing argument. How does giving animals more space and better care—arrangements that intuitively would seem likely to increase costs—provide producers with “a palpable economic benefit?” Professor Francione asserts that “animal agriculture is not an efficient industry,” going on to explain that when factory farming techniques were being created “there was no thought given to the fact that animals, unlike other production inputs, are sentient, and the stress caused by intensive confinement would cause damage to the animal property” (Francione and Garner, 2010, p. 45).
由于现代集约化养殖的整个目的是最大化利润，这是一个有趣的论点。给动物更多的空间和更好的照顾——这些安排直观上似乎会增加成本——如何让生产者获得“明显的经济效益”？Francione 教授断言“动物农业不是一个高效的行业”，并进一步解释说，当工厂化养殖技术正在被创造时，“没有人考虑到动物，与其他生产投入不同，是有感知的，密集的圈养造成的压力会对动物财产造成损害。”（Francione 和 Garner，2010，第 45 页）

 Professor Francione’s first two arguments have been widely critiqued within the animal rights movement (see, for example, Friedrich, 2011; Phelps, 2007 and 2013, pp. 103-190; Shapiro, 2012). His third argument is sometimes asserted by opponents of welfare reforms but is usually left unsupported, as though its validity were self-evident. Supporters of reforms, on the other hand, have typically ignored Professor Francione’s assertion, as though it did not merit rebuttal. The economic impact of welfare reforms for farmed animals is, nonetheless, susceptible to quantitative analysis and has in recent years been the subject of considerable attention by agricultural economists. Therefore, it will be worthwhile to review the literature on the economic effects of welfare reforms and consider whether they do, in fact, strengthen the animal agriculture industry by reducing the unit cost of production.
教授法兰克 ione 的前两个论点在动物权利运动中受到了广泛的批评（例如，参见弗里德里希，2011 年；菲尔普斯，2007 年和 2013 年，第 103-190 页；夏皮罗，2012 年）。他的第三个论点有时被福利改革的支持者断言，但通常没有得到支持，好像其有效性是显而易见的。另一方面，福利改革对农场动物的经济影响是可以通过定量分析来评估的，近年来，农业经济学家已经对这一问题给予了相当多的关注。因此，回顾关于福利改革经济效应的文献，并考虑这些改革是否确实通过降低生产单位成本来加强动物农业产业，将是值得的。

Sophisticated Industry
复杂产业

 Animal agriculture is among America’s largest industries, generating annual revenues of $180.1 billion a year, not counting revenues from field crops fed to animals (Economic Research Service, 2013). According to calculations made on the basis of U.S. Department of Agriculture statistics by Farm Forward—a non-profit group that advocates for “sustainable” and “humane” animal agriculture—99% of the meat, eggs and dairy consumed in the United States comes from large-scale intensive confinement facilities, known in the industry as Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) and to everyone else as “factory farms” (Farm Forward). Other estimates by persons with extensive knowledge of the American meat, egg, and dairy industries put the number at closer to 95% (See, for example, Keyser, 2013). But whatever the precise figure, no knowledgeable person disputes that substantially all of the meat, eggs and dairy sold in supermarkets and restaurants originates on factory farms.
动物养殖业是美国最大的产业之一，每年创造 1801 亿美元的年收入，还不包括用于饲养动物的作物收入（美国经济研究局，2013 年）。根据美国农业部统计数据，由倡导“可持续”和“人道”动物养殖的非营利组织 Farm Forward 进行的计算显示，美国消费的 99%的肉类、鸡蛋和奶制品来自大规模集约化养殖场，该行业称之为“集约化动物饲养场”（CAFOs），而其他人则称之为“工厂农场”（Farm Forward）。其他对美国肉类、鸡蛋和奶制品行业有深入了解的人士的估计将这一数字接近 95%（例如，参见 Keyser，2013 年）。但无论确切数字如何，没有哪个有知识的人会否认，超市和餐馆销售的几乎所有肉类、鸡蛋和奶制品都来自工厂农场。

 This vast industrial complex is supported by an extensive cadre of academic researchers. While some are employed directly by the giant corporations that dominate America’s food production, most serve on the faculties of land grant universities, institutions that actively support the food industry in general and agriculture in particular.¹ These schools have large and well-funded departments of agricultural economics whose work is supported by an agency of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, the Economic Research Service (ERS).
```html 这个庞大的工业综合体得到了一支庞大的学术研究团队的支撑。其中一些人直接受雇于主宰美国食品生产的巨型企业，而大多数人则服务于公立大学的教职员工，这些大学积极支持食品工业，尤其是农业。<sup>1</sup> 这些学校拥有规模庞大、资金充足的农业经济学系，其工作得到美国农业部下属的经济研究局（ERS）的支持。 ```

 For half a century, the “damage to the animal property” caused by industrial agriculture has been a topic of study at departments of animal science and agricultural economics in land-grant universities and at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (as well as at institutions abroad, especially in the United Kingdom). And as I will show in the following pages, the bottom line for producers remains what it has always been: industrial agriculture provides dramatic increases in productivity made possible by economies of scale, space, time, labor and food that more than offset the costs occasioned by the damage that intensive confinement inflicts on the animals. With certain minor exceptions, which I will discuss in a moment, welfare reforms raise the cost of producing meat, eggs and dairy—they do not lower it.
半个世纪以来，“工业农业对动物财产造成的损害”一直是动物科学和农业经济学系以及美国农业部（以及国外的机构，尤其是在英国）的研究课题。正如我将在以下几页中展示的那样，对于生产者来说，底线始终如一：工业农业通过规模经济、空间、时间、劳动力和食品带来的生产力大幅提升，足以抵消由密集圈养对动物造成的损害所带来的成本。除了某些微小的例外，我将稍后讨论，福利改革提高了生产肉类、鸡蛋和乳制品的成本——而不是降低成本。

Productivity: the Factory Farm’s Competitive Edge
生产率：工厂化农场竞争优势

 The adoption of Industrial farming practices during the second half of the 20^th century was responsible for a quantum leap in the productivity of animal agriculture. Factory farms produce more animals with more edible flesh per animal (or who produce more eggs or milk per animal), in less time, on less land, using less labor and less food than is possible on old-style free-range farms.
20 世纪后半叶，工业农业的采用导致了畜牧业生产力的飞跃。工厂化农场在更短的时间内，在更少的土地上，使用更少的劳动力和更少的食物，生产出更多的动物，每个动物有更多的可食用肉（或者产生更多的蛋或牛奶），比老式放养农场更有效。^第3世纪

 Two of the industry’s leading researchers into the economic impact of welfare reforms are F. Bailey Norwood, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State University, and Jayson L. Lusk, Professor and holder of the Willard Sparks Endowed Chair in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State. Norwood and Lusk cite three striking examples of the increases in productivity brought about by industrial agricultural practices:
两位在福利改革经济影响领域处于行业领先地位的研究人员是俄克拉荷马州立大学农业经济学副教授 F. Bailey Norwood 和俄克拉荷马州立大学农业经济学系教授、Willard Sparks 捐赠讲座教授 Jayson L. Lusk。Norwood 和 Lusk 列举了三个工业农业实践带来的生产力显著提升的典型案例：

In 1929 it took 85 hours to produce 1000 pounds of broilers (chickens raised for meat). Today it takes only one hour. Chicken producers are 85 times more efficient than they were in 1929. Needless to say, this has made chicken much cheaper. Eating chicken used to be a rare treat, reserved for special occasions like Sunday dinners. Now it is the most widely consumed meat in the US. On average, each person in the US consumed about 28 pounds of chicken in 1960, compared to 85 pounds today. And… the price of chicken has fallen 110 percent (adjusting for inflation). Similar efficiency gains have occurred in all livestock sectors. Dairy farms today only need 21 percent as many animals, 23 percent as much feed, 35 percent as much water, and 10 percent as much land as dairy farms did in 1944 to produce the same amount of milk. (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, pp. 39-40)
1929 年生产 1000 磅肉鸡需要 85 小时，而如今仅需 1 小时。鸡肉生产商的效率比 1929 年提高了 85 倍。不用说，这使鸡肉的价格大幅下降。过去吃鸡肉是一种罕见的享受，仅限于像周日晚餐这样的特殊场合。现在，鸡肉已成为美国消费量最大的肉类。平均而言，美国人在 1960 年每人消费约 28 磅鸡肉，而如今是 85 磅。而且，鸡肉的价格下降了 110%（按通货膨胀调整）。在所有畜牧业领域都取得了类似的效率提升。如今，乳牛场只需要 1944 年时的 21%的动物、23%的饲料、35%的水和 10%的土地就能生产出相同数量的牛奶。（诺伍德和卢斯，2011 年，第 39-40 页）

And finally:
最后：

In the early 1930s, the most productive egg farms only produced about 153 eggs per hen per year. Today farmers produce more than 250 eggs per hen per year. That is a remarkable achievement, the benefits of which are passed almost entirely to consumers in the form of lower prices. The industrialization of egg production began in the 1940s and progressed steadily over time… Prices in 1943 were 6.5 times higher [in constant dollars, NP] than they are today. (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, p. 115)
在 20 世纪 30 年代初，最富生产力的养鸡场每只母鸡每年仅产约 153 个鸡蛋。如今，农民们每只母鸡每年能产超过 250 个鸡蛋。这是一项令人瞩目的成就，其带来的好处几乎全部以更低的价格形式惠及消费者。鸡蛋生产的工业化始于 20 世纪 40 年代，并随着时间的推移稳步发展……1943 年的价格（按不变美元计算，NP）比现在高 6.5 倍。（诺伍德和卢斯，2011 年，第 115 页）

The sophisticated equipment needed for a factory farm—including computer-controlled feeding, lighting, climate, and milking systems—is more expensive, but it dramatically reduces the need for human labor. As food production, including animal products, has skyrocketed, the agricultural workforce has plummeted. According the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, between 1910 and 2000 the number of farmers and farm workers fell from 12,809,000 to 1,598,000, a decline of 87 percent (Wyatt and Hecker, 2006, p. 55). Some of this plunge was due to the introduction of tractors and other mechanized farm equipment, which began in the 1920s, but most resulted from the industrial transformation of agriculture that began after World War II.²
复复杂工厂化农场所需的先进设备——包括计算机控制的喂食、照明、气候和挤奶系统——虽然成本较高，但大幅减少了人力需求。随着食品生产，包括动物产品，的激增，农业劳动力大幅下降。根据美国劳工部劳工统计局的数据，从 1910 年到 2000 年，农民和农场工人的数量从 12809000 人下降到 1598000 人，下降了 87%（Wyatt 和 Hecker，2006，第 55 页）。其中一部分下降是由于 20 世纪 20 年代开始引入的拖拉机和其他机械化农业设备，但大部分是由于二战后农业的工业化转型造成的。²

It is these previously unimaginable increases in productivity—that is to say, in efficiency—that have sharply lowered the cost of animal products over the past 60 years. Most animal welfare reforms reduce this efficiency and increase the unit cost of production. To see how this works, let’s consider three reforms that are widely campaigned for today: the abolition of gestation crates for pregnant pigs, the abolition of battery cages for laying hens, and the elimination of electrical bath stunning for broiler chickens.
过去 60 年中，正是这些难以想象的效率提升——也就是说，效率的提升——大幅降低了动物产品的成本。大多数动物福利改革都会降低这种效率并增加生产单位成本。为了了解这是如何发生的，让我们考虑三个今天广泛倡导的改革：废除怀孕母猪的妊娠栏、废除产蛋鸡的笼养，以及消除肉鸡的电击晕厥。

Gestation Crates
妊娠栏

 In industrial pig factories, “breeding sows”—the females who give birth to the pigs who are sent to slaughter—are forced to spend their adult lives in individual metal-frame stalls called “gestation crates.” These stalls are so tiny that the occupant is unable to move, but must constantly lie motionless on her side on a concrete floor. Lusk estimates that a national ban on gestation crates would lead to increased costs for producers of $258 million a year and necessitate a 1.7% increase in the supermarket price of pork.
在工业型猪场中，“繁殖母猪”——那些生下被送往屠宰的猪的雌性——被迫在其成年生活中在被称为“妊娠栏”的金属框架围栏中度过。这些围栏非常小，容纳者无法移动，但必须不断地躺在混凝土地面上，一动不动。Lusk 估计，全国范围内禁止使用妊娠栏将导致生产商每年增加 2.58 亿美元的支出，并需要猪肉超市价格提高 1.7%。

Lynn Seibert, also an agricultural economist at Oklahoma State and Norwood estimated that conversion from gestation crates to group housing for “breeding sows” will cost on average an additional $10.09 per finished pig,³ even as they acknowledge that more experience with group housing and more research, especially in the field of group housing design, is needed before the precise figure can be definitively established (Seibert and Norwood, 2011a).
俄克拉荷马州立大学和诺伍德的农业经济学家林恩·西伯特估计，将妊娠栏转换为“繁殖母猪”的群居饲养将平均额外花费每头成品猪 10.09 美元，³尽管他们承认在群居饲养方面有更多经验以及更多研究，尤其是在群居饲养设计领域的研究，是确定确切数字之前所需要的（Seibert 和 Norwood，2011a）。

According to Seibert and Norwood,
根据 Seibert 和 Norwood 的研究，

Increasing animal welfare for all hogs [they mean all “breeding sows,” NP] in the United States will increase retail pork prices by a maximum of 2% for a small welfare increase and 5% for a large welfare increase. The cost of banning gestation crates measured by this study is lower than the consumer willingness-to-pay from other studies. (Seibert and Norwood, 2011b)
在美国，为了提高所有猪（他们指的是所有“繁殖母猪”，NP）的福利，零售猪肉价格将最多上涨 2%（小幅提高福利）和 5%（大幅提高福利）。根据这项研究，禁止使用妊娠栏的成本低于其他研究中消费者愿意支付的价格。（Seibert 和 Norwood，2011b）

The distinction between “small” and “large” welfare increases is based on the amount of space female pigs are given and the degree of enrichment that is provided, “enrichment” being the industry term for amenities that the animals are given, such as nesting material for pregnant pigs, who like to build soft nests for their newborns.
福利“增加”的“小”与“大”之分，取决于母猪所获得的饲养空间和提供的丰富程度，“丰富”是行业术语，指的是提供给动物的各种便利设施，例如为怀孕母猪提供的筑巢材料，因为母猪喜欢为即将出生的小猪搭建柔软的巢穴。

Norwood and Lusk project that banning gestation crates will increase the retail price of pork by approximately six and a half cents per pound, which they estimate will reduce pork consumption by 1.2% (2011, p. 351), a loss that the industry can easily absorb. The mega pork producers, such as Smithfield Foods, who are planning a phase-out of gestation crates, believe—based on research such as that cited above—that they can pass on the increased cost to consumers. This being the case, they hope that welfare reforms will prove to be a worthwhile investment in damage control, allowing them to avoid unfavorable publicity. The considerable resistance that still exists elsewhere in the pork industry has to do primarily with the upfront capital investment cost, which will take several years to recoup, and a concern that acceding to the demands of animal advocates might encourage activists to make other—more expensive—demands. In any event, the recent sale of Smithfield Foods to Chinese meat processing giant Shuanghui International has cast a shadow of uncertainty over Smithfield’s conversion to group housing.
""" 诺伍德和卢斯预测，禁止妊娠栏将使猪肉零售价格上涨约每磅六分半，他们估计这将使猪肉消费量减少 1.2%（2011 年，第 351 页），这种损失行业可以轻松承受。计划逐步淘汰妊娠栏的大型猪肉生产商，如史密斯菲尔德食品公司，根据上述研究等，认为他们可以将增加的成本转嫁给消费者。在这种情况下，他们希望福利改革能够证明是值得的投资，以控制损害，避免不利的宣传。猪肉行业其他地方仍存在的巨大阻力主要与前期资本投资成本有关，这种成本需要几年时间才能收回，以及担心满足动物保护者的要求可能会鼓励活动家提出其他——更昂贵——的要求。无论如何，史密斯菲尔德食品公司最近被中国肉类加工巨头双汇国际收购，给史密斯菲尔德转向群体饲养蒙上了一层不确定的阴影。 """

In short, current projections are that ending the use of gestation crates will not lower the costs and increase the profits of pig farmers. It will raise their costs by 5% or less, but producers will be able to pass these costs along to consumers while consumption of pork stabilizes at nearly 99% of present levels.
简而言之，目前预测，停止使用妊娠栏不会降低养猪农民的成本并增加利润。这可能会使他们的成本增加 5%或更少，但生产商可以将这些成本转嫁给消费者，而猪肉的消费量将稳定在接近现有水平的 99%。

Battery Cages
电池笼

 The cost increases associated with eliminating gestation crates for sows have only a small impact on the retail price of pork for two reasons: First, the “breeding sows” who are kept in the crates represent only a small fraction of the pigs in a producer’s herd. The pigs who are slaughtered for pork and who constitute the vast majority of the herd are kept in group housing known as confinement sheds (where they have a mere eight square feet per pig [Norwood and Lusk, 39]). Second, the cost of raising the pigs accounts for only 25% of the retail price of pork (Ikerd, 2001). The remaining costs come from slaughter, the post-slaughter butchering and dressing of the meat, storage, and distribution.
""" 关于消除妊娠栏对母猪成本增加的影响，对猪肉零售价格的影响仅是微小的，原因如下：首先，“繁殖母猪”仅占养殖户猪群中的一小部分。而用于生产猪肉并被屠宰的猪，构成了猪群中的绝大多数，它们被饲养在被称为封闭式猪舍的群体饲养环境中（每个猪只有 8 平方英尺的空间[诺伍德和卢斯，第 39 页]）。其次，养猪的成本仅占猪肉零售价格的 25%（伊克尔德，2001 年）。其余的成本来自屠宰、屠宰后的肉类加工和包装、储存和分销。 """

With “laying hens”—the female chickens who produce eggs—the situation is just the opposite. First, the “breeding stock” are kept in group housing, but the hens who actually lay the eggs that go to market—and who constitute the overwhelming majority of the flock—are kept for their entire adult lives in battery cages. This is Norwood and Lusk’s description of a typical battery cage system: “Hen houses are large metal buildings containing from 100,000 to one million hens in cages stacked up to six rows high… [T]ypical cage systems provide 67 square inches per bird” (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, p. 116). Sixty-seven square inches per bird is a space 10 inches long by 6.7 inches wide—smaller than a sheet of typing paper—not enough room for the hens to spread their wings or groom themselves, much less walk around. And, of course, there are no perches for them to sleep on or nests in which to lay their eggs; and since the cages have wire floors, there is no opportunity to take dust baths or to peck in the dirt. Almost invariably, proposals for welfare reforms for chickens include enlarging and enriching battery cages or eliminating them entirely in favor of some form of group housing.
“关于‘产蛋鸡’——即产蛋的母鸡——的情况则正好相反。首先，‘育种群’被饲养在群体饲养环境中，但真正产蛋并进入市场的母鸡——它们构成了鸡群中的绝大多数——在整个成年生活中都被关在电池笼中。这是诺伍德和卢斯对典型的电池笼系统的描述：‘鸡舍是大型金属建筑，里面可以容纳 10 万到一百万只母鸡，笼子堆叠高达六层……[典型的笼子系统为每只鸡提供 67 平方英寸的空间’（诺伍德和卢斯，2011 年，第 116 页）。每只鸡 67 平方英寸的空间，相当于 10 英寸长、6.7 英寸宽——比一张打字纸还要小，不足以让母鸡展开翅膀或梳理羽毛，更不用说走动了。当然，也没有供它们睡觉的栖架或产蛋的巢穴；而且由于笼子有铁丝地板，它们没有机会洗澡或啄食泥土。几乎所有关于改善鸡福利的提议都包括扩大和丰富电池笼，或者完全取消电池笼，转而采用某种形式的群体饲养。”

Second, in regard to shell eggs (the eggs that are sold in supermarkets and restaurants), the eggs that come out of the hens are finished products that require no processing beyond washing, grading and packaging. This means that a large proportion of the retail price of shell eggs represents the cost of raising and maintaining the laying hens and collecting the eggs. Thus, eliminating battery cages has a considerably greater impact on the retail price of eggs than eliminating gestation crates has on the retail price of pork.
第二，关于壳蛋（超市和餐馆销售的鸡蛋），从母鸡那里出来的鸡蛋是成品，只需要清洗、分级和包装，无需进一步加工。这意味着壳蛋的零售价格中很大一部分是饲养和维持产蛋鸡以及收集鸡蛋的成本。因此，取消电池笼对鸡蛋零售价格的影响比取消妊娠栏对猪肉零售价格的影响要大得多。

Norwood and Lusk estimate that a nationwide ban on battery cages for laying hens would cost producers $187 million a year and increase the cost of producing eggs by $0.35 a dozen, leading to a 21% increase in the supermarket price of eggs and a 4.24% decrease in consumption (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, pp. 350-351). This means that at any given time there would be a decrease of more than 14,000,000 hens from the current population of 340,000,000 (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, p. 232).
诺伍德和卢斯估计，全国范围内禁止使用电池笼饲养产蛋鸡将使生产商每年损失 1.87 亿美元，并使每打鸡蛋的生产成本增加 0.35 美元，导致超市鸡蛋价格上涨 21%，消费量下降 4.24%（诺伍德和卢斯，2011 年，第 350-351 页）。这意味着在任何给定时间，都会从目前的 3.4 亿只鸡中减少 1400 多万只（诺伍德和卢斯，2011 年，第 232 页）。

At present, however, there is no politically feasible path to a nationwide ban on battery cages (Shapiro, 2012). And there is no prospect that additional states will ban battery cages, either via the legislature or by ballot initiative (Phelps, 2013, pp. 146-147). This means that the only welfare reform that could become a reality in the near term—say, the next ten to fifteen years—is larger, enriched cages. Larger cages—the size most often proposed is 124 sq. in. per bird—and enriched cages, by which is usually meant cages that contain nests, perches, and gravel for scratching and pecking, are far from ideal. But they are a clear improvement over the present lot of laying hens.
目前，在全国范围内禁止电池笼的政治途径尚不可行（Shapiro，2012）。也没有迹象表明更多州将通过立法或全民公决来禁止电池笼（Phelps，2013，第 146-147 页）。这意味着在近期（比如未来十年到十五年）唯一可能实现的福利改革——即更大的、加厚的笼子。更大的笼子——通常提议的尺寸是每只鸟 124 平方英寸——以及加厚的笼子——通常指的是包含巢穴、栖木和供抓挠啄食的鹅卵石——远非理想。但它们与目前产蛋鸡的处境相比，无疑是一种明显的改善。

Addressing United Egg Producers, a major trade association, in 2012, Hoy Carman, Professor Emeritus, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis, estimated that conversion to a cage-free system would increase production costs by 34.8 percent; enlarged cages that allowed 116 square inches per hen would increase production costs by 12.48 percent and retail prices by 12 percent (Carman, 2012, pp. 2-3). Thus, just as we might expect, enriched cage systems increase operating costs significantly, but also significantly less than cage-free systems.
2012 年，霍伊·卡曼（Hoy Carman）教授，加州大学戴维斯分校农业与资源经济学系退休教授，在向美国主要贸易协会——联合蛋品生产商协会发表演讲时，估计转向无笼养殖系统将使生产成本增加 34.8%；扩大至每只鸡 116 平方英寸的笼子将使生产成本增加 12.48%，零售价格增加 12%（卡曼，2012 年，第 2-3 页）。因此，正如我们可能预期的那样，富集笼系统显著增加了运营成本，但比无笼系统增加的幅度要小得多。

This is confirmed by the experience of JS West, an agricultural, energy and retail conglomerate that has installed one of the largest enriched cage facilities in the United States, housing 151,000 laying hens. In 2011, JS West reported to an egg industry conference hosted by Iowa State University that operating costs at this facility were running 15% to 17% above costs in their conventional battery cage facilities, leading them to charge an additional 10 to 12 cents per dozen for enriched cage eggs. The ultimate effect on the retail price of the eggs was not reported (WATTAgNet, 2011).
这也得到了 JS West 的经验证实，JS West 是一家农业、能源和零售企业集团，在美国安装了最大的富集笼设施之一，容纳了 151,000 只产蛋鸡。2011 年，JS West 在爱荷华州立大学举办的一次蛋业会议上报告称，该设施的经营成本比其传统的电池笼设施高出 15%至 17%，因此他们为富集笼鸡蛋额外收取每打 10 至 12 美分的费用。对鸡蛋零售价格的影响未作报告（WATTAgNet，2011 年）。

Electrical Waterbath Stunning
电气式水浴电击

 Chickens raised for their flesh—known in the industry as “broilers”—are not raised in battery cages. Broiler chickens live on an open floor in a long, narrow single-story confinement shed. According to Norwood and Lusk, industrial methods—primarily the controlled environment of the shed, selective breeding, the routine administration of antibiotics to the entire flock, and the controlled dispensing of scientifically formulated food—have made chicken farming “twice as efficient” as in 1940. “[M]odern broiler breeds produce twice as much meat for the same amount of feed” (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, p. 128). Needless to say, productivity increases on this scale have led to significant reductions in unit cost. “The retail price of broilers was $3.08/lb in 1960 (in inflation adjusted terms) but was only $1.28/lb in 2009. Chicken meat is almost 2.5 times less expensive today than it was in 1960” (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, p. 128).
以其肉质而饲养的鸡——在行业中被称为“肉鸡”——不是在电池笼中饲养。肉鸡生活在宽敞的开放式地板上，在一个长而窄的单层封闭棚舍中。据诺伍德和卢斯所说，工业方法——主要是棚舍的受控环境、选择性育种、对整个鸡群的常规抗生素投喂以及科学配方的饲料的受控分配——使养鸡业“比 1940 年提高了两倍”的效率。“现代肉鸡品种的产量是相同的饲料的两倍”（诺伍德和卢斯，2011 年，第 128 页）。不言而喻，这种规模的生产力提高导致了单位成本的显著降低。“1960 年肉鸡的零售价为每磅 3.08 美元（按通货膨胀调整后的价格），但在 2009 年仅需 1.28 美元/磅。鸡肉现在的价格几乎比 1960 年便宜了 2.5 倍”（诺伍德和卢斯，2011 年，第 128 页）。

 In terms of welfare reforms, Norwood and Lusk observe, accurately, that, “Few alternatives to traditional broiler production are feasible, at least, not any that can generate comparable levels of output at similar cost” (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, p. 131). As a result, the only proposed welfare reform that has generated significant activity in the animal rights community (because it is the only reform that has any possibility of being implemented) has to do with the method of slaughter.
关于福利改革，诺伍德和卢斯准确地观察到：“在传统肉鸡生产方面，几乎没有可行的替代方案，至少没有任何能够在类似成本下产生相当产出水平的方案”（诺伍德和卢斯，2011，第 131 页）。因此，唯一在动物权利社区引起显著活动（因为它是有可能实施的唯一改革）的福利改革，与屠宰方法有关。 

The problem confronting every high-volume slaughterhouse is how to immobilize the animals so that the killing, which is done by slitting the throat, is accomplished quickly, with as few workers as possible, and with minimal bruising to the flesh (although bruising is becoming less important, as I will explain below). Large animals, such as cows or pigs, are typically herded into narrow individual stalls, where they are struck in the head and knocked unconscious by a piston fired from a device called a captive bolt pistol. But birds have such small heads that this is not feasible for poultry. And so, the industry has adopted a method for immobilizing the birds known as “electrical waterbath stunning.” The birds are pulled individually, by hand, from the crates in which they have been transported to the slaughterhouse, flipped upside down and hung by their feet from an overhead conveyer belt. The belt passes over a pan of water through which runs an electrical charge, dipping the birds’ heads—and sometimes upper bodies—into the electrified liquid.
每个高产量屠宰场面临的问题是如何使动物保持静止，以便通过割喉的方式快速完成屠宰，使用尽可能少的工人，并尽量减少对肉质的损伤（尽管如我下面将要解释的，损伤的重要性正在降低）。大型动物，如牛或猪，通常被赶到狭窄的单个围栏中，在那里它们会被头部击打，并被从称为“固定螺栓枪”的装置中射出的活塞击昏。但是，家禽的头很小，这种方法不适用于家禽。因此，该行业采用了被称为“电水浴昏迷”的方法来使家禽保持静止。家禽被逐个从运输到屠宰场的笼子中取出，倒置并悬挂在头顶的传送带上，传送带穿过一个装有电流的盘子，将家禽的头部——有时是上半身——浸入通电的液体中。

The efficacy of electrical waterbath stunning is the subject of intense debate. Industry experts argue that the electric shock renders the majority of birds unconscious, although they generally concede that some birds are merely paralyzed without losing consciousness. Animal rights advocates argue that the shock leaves substantially all of the birds conscious, and thus terrified, as—paralyzed by the electrical shock—they are whisked along by the conveyor belt to have their throats slit—still fully awake. Even within the industry, there is disagreement about the optimum type of current (AC or DC), and the optimum voltage and amperage for rendering the maximum number of birds fully unconscious and keeping them unconscious long enough to allow the throat-slitting to be accomplished without causing internal hemorrhaging that would soak the flesh with blood and cause consumers to refuse to buy it.
电击水浴晕厥的效果引发了激烈的争论。行业专家认为，电击使大多数鸟类失去意识，尽管他们通常承认一些鸟类只是被麻痹而没有失去意识。动物权利倡导者则认为，电击使几乎所有鸟类都保持清醒，因此感到极度恐惧——由于被电击麻痹，它们被带上传送带，喉咙被割开——仍然完全清醒。即使在行业内，对于实现最大数量鸟类完全失去意识以及保持其失去意识状态以避免造成内部出血、使肉被血浸透、导致消费者拒绝购买的最优电流类型（交流电或直流电）、最优电压和电流值也存在分歧。

Some electro-encephalographic (EEG) tests have suggested that most chickens who are subjected to electrical waterbath stunning do, in fact, lose consciousness, but that even under controlled laboratory conditions, no electrical waterbath stunning system will render more than 96% of the birds unconscious—and the number may range well below that depending on the type, voltage and amperage of the current (European Food Safety Authority, 2012). And, of course, ideal laboratory conditions do not exist in an abattoir. Other studies purport to show that electrical waterbath stunning can be virtually 100% effective if the proper type and amount of current is administered (Lines et al., 2011). Still other studies have found that few if any birds are rendered fully unconscious prior to their throats being slit (Shields and Raj, 2010). There is no consensus on this point in the animal science community—in part because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable data under actual abattoir conditions and in part because there is no general agreement on how to define and determine unconsciousness in birds, whose brains are organized differently from mammalian brains, and whose functioning is less understood. Thus, Sara Shields and A. B. M. Raj, leading researchers in the field—Shields at the Humane Society of the United States and Raj at the University of Bristol in the UK—tell us that, “The EEG analytical procedures used to determine the state of consciousness vary widely and are constantly evolving. Therefore, the debate about the persistence of consciousness at the time of onset of convulsions may continue until further research provides insight into or elucidates the brain mechanisms associated with convulsions and the state of consciousness” (Shields and Raj, 2010).
""" 一些电生理学（EEG）测试表明，大多数在电水浴晕厥过程中被处理的鸡确实失去了意识，但在受控的实验室条件下，没有任何电水浴晕厥系统可以使超过 96%的鸡失去意识——这个数字可能远远低于这个比例，具体取决于电流的类型、电压和安培数（欧洲食品安全局，2012 年）。当然，理想的实验室条件在屠宰场并不存在。其他研究声称，如果使用正确的电流类型和数量，电水浴晕厥可以几乎达到 100%的有效率（Lines 等人，2011 年）。还有其他研究发现，在鸡的喉咙被割开之前，很少有鸡能够完全失去意识（Shields 和 Raj，2010 年）。 在动物科学界，关于这一点尚未达成共识——部分原因是由于在屠宰场条件下获取可靠数据的困难，部分原因是因为对于如何定义和确定鸟类的无意识状态没有普遍的共识，鸟类的脑部结构与哺乳动物不同，其功能也了解较少。因此，该领域的领先研究人员 Sara Shields 和 A. B. M. Raj——Shields 在美国人道协会，Raj 在英国布里斯托尔大学——告诉我们，“用于确定意识状态的脑电图分析程序差异很大，并且不断演变。因此，关于抽搐发生时意识持续性的争论可能会继续，直到进一步的研究提供关于与抽搐和意识状态相关的脑部机制的见解或阐明” (Shields 和 Raj，2010)。

And so, at least for the present, slaughterhouse operators can argue that it has not been proven that electrical waterbath stunning fails to render the birds unconscious in much the same way that cigarette manufacturers for decades could argue that it had not been proven that smoking causes cancer. But at this point, the preponderance of the evidence seems to indicate that many, and perhaps virtually all, stunned birds remain conscious until their throats are slit (Shields and Raj, 2010).
因此，至少目前来看，屠宰场经营者可以辩称，尚未证明电水浴晕厥法无法使鸟类失去意识，就像几十年来烟草制造商可以辩称尚未证明吸烟会导致癌症一样。但在此阶段，大量证据似乎表明，许多甚至可能是几乎所有经过晕厥处理的鸟类在喉咙被割开之前仍然保持清醒（Shields 和 Raj，2010）。

 The only alternative to electrical waterbath stunning that has been seriously proposed is controlled atmosphere stunning (CAS)—sometimes known as controlled atmosphere killing (CAK), as I will explain in a moment—of which there are two forms. In both variations, the birds are left in their transport crates and the crates are stacked in a sealed room. In the first variation, called low-atmosphere stunning, the air is removed from the room until the birds lose consciousness. In the second, known as gas stunning, carbon dioxide (CO₂), an inert gas such as argon, or a mixture of CO₂ and an inert gas is introduced into the room with a view to rendering the birds unconscious before they experience the terror that accompanies suffocation.
唯一被认真提出的电气水浴晕厥的替代方案是控制气氛晕厥（CAS），有时也称为控制气氛致死（CAK），我将在稍后解释——这种技术有两种形式。在这两种变体中，鸟类都留在它们的运输笼子里，笼子被堆放在一个密封的房间里。第一种变体被称为低气氛晕厥，通过从房间中抽出空气，直到鸟类失去意识。第二种，称为气体晕厥，将二氧化碳（CO2）、惰性气体如氩气，或者二氧化碳和惰性气体的混合物引入房间，目的是在鸟类经历窒息带来的恐惧之前使它们失去意识。

It is also possible, of course, in both low-atmosphere stunning and gas stunning, to prolong the process until the birds die. This is the method usually preferred by animal activists on the grounds that it avoids any possibility of birds regaining consciousness before their throats are slit. The industry, on the other hand, generally prefers to stun the birds in the controlled atmosphere chamber, rather than kill them—apparently for reasons of public relations. As one producer told The New York Times, “I don’t want the public to say we gas our chickens” (Neuman, 2010).
当然，在低气压晕厥和气体晕厥中，也可以延长这个过程，直到鸟类死亡。动物保护主义者通常倾向于采用这种方法，因为它可以避免鸟类在喉咙被割开之前恢复意识。另一方面，行业通常更倾向于在控制气氛室中使鸟类晕厥，而不是杀死它们——据称这是出于公关原因。正如一位生产商告诉《纽约时报》的那样：“我不想让公众说我们用气体处理鸡”（Neuman，2010）。

 From a welfare perspective, controlled atmosphere killing/stunning is clearly preferable to electrical waterbath stunning, first because the birds remain in their transport crates until they are unconscious or dead; they do not undergo the psychological stress and risk of painful physical injury that accompany being pulled from their crates and shackled upside down to a conveyor belt; second, they are spared the painful electrical shock; and finally, controlled atmosphere killing/stunning can approach 100% effectiveness under slaughterhouse conditions, which electrical waterbath stunning has never been shown to accomplish in an actual working abattoir. The industry, however, is fiercely resisting conversion to CAS, presumably because they believe that it will increase costs. Although this is disputed, the best available evidence suggests that they are right.
从福利角度来看，控制气氛屠宰/昏迷显然优于电水浴昏迷，首先因为鸟类在失去意识或死亡之前都留在运输笼子里；它们避免了被从笼子里拉出来、倒挂到传送带上所伴随的心理压力和痛苦的身体伤害风险；其次，它们免受了痛苦的电击；最后，在屠宰场条件下，控制气氛屠宰/昏迷可以达到接近 100%的有效率，而电水浴昏迷在实际情况中从未被证明能在实际屠宰场中实现。然而，行业却强烈抵制转向 CAS，据信这是因为他们认为这将增加成本。尽管这一点存在争议，但最好的现有证据表明，他们可能是对的。

 In 2007, the European Commission sponsored a study on the economic effects of various forms of animal slaughter. In regard to poultry, the study determined that the cost of a new controlled atmosphere stunning system is from three to five times the cost of a new electrical waterbath system, depending on the manufacturer and the type of system chosen. The authors also estimated that this capital investment could be recouped in two years by a plant running at full capacity (European Commission, 2007, p. 38). Since, as we shall see next, operating costs for controlled atmosphere stunning systems are higher than for electrical waterbath systems, the capital investment would have to be recovered by raising prices—if only minimally.
2007 年，欧洲委员会资助了一项关于各种动物屠宰方式经济影响的研究。关于家禽，该研究确定，根据制造商和所选系统类型，新的控制气氛电击昏系统成本是新的电击水浴系统的三到五倍。作者还估计，这种资本投资可以在满负荷运行的工厂中在两年内收回（欧洲委员会，2007 年，第 38 页）。正如我们接下来将要看到的，控制气氛电击昏系统的运营成本高于电击水浴系统，因此必须通过提高价格来收回这笔资本投资——即使只是微小的提高。

 As to operating costs, the study had this to say,
至于运营成本，该研究是这样说的，

Running costs per bird depend heavily on the system being used and also on throughput. It is therefore very difficult to make generic comparisons between systems. However, equipment manufacturers are unanimous in the view that controlled atmosphere systems result in a higher running cost per bird compared to electrical stunning systems. The cost of actually administering stun using electrical stunning systems is considered by most equipment manufacturers and slaughterhouses to be negligible. . . . Although there is general agreement that the running costs of electrical stunning are insignificant, there is a wide discrepancy in the figures presented above for controlled atmosphere systems. Different sources disagree on the exact difference in costs between the two systems, although it is clear that even if controlled atmosphere stunning systems are relatively more expensive than electrical stunning methods, the actual cost of administering stun per bird remains relatively small. (European Commission, 2007, p. 39)
每只鸟的运行成本取决于所使用的系统以及产量。因此，很难对系统进行通用的比较。然而，设备制造商普遍认为，与电击晕系统相比，控制气氛系统会导致每只鸟的运行成本更高。大多数设备制造商和屠宰场认为，使用电击晕系统进行晕厥的实际成本可以忽略不计。尽管普遍认为电击晕的运行成本微不足道，但上述控制气氛系统的成本数据存在很大差异。尽管很清楚，即使控制气氛晕厥系统相对于电击晕方法来说成本更高，但每只鸟晕厥的实际成本仍然相对较小。（欧洲委员会，2007 年，第 39 页）

This leads the authors to conclude, “The small proportion of consumer price that is accounted for by the cost of stunning means that more expensive methods, such as controlled atmosphere stunning, are unlikely to have any appreciable impact on the final consumer price for poultry” (European Commission, 2007, p. 1).
这导致作者得出结论，“消费者价格中由击昏成本所占的很小比例意味着更昂贵的方法，如控制气氛击昏，不太可能对家禽的最终消费者价格产生任何显著影响””（欧洲委员会，2007 年，第 1 页）。

By this analysis, the situation with controlled atmosphere stunning for poultry is similar to the situation with group housing for pregnant female pigs: the welfare measure will increase costs by a small amount, but any resultant increase in retail price will fall within the limits of consumers’ willingness to pay. Thus, the increase can be passed along to consumers without affecting the market. Producers’ profits will be unaffected.
通过这种分析，控制气氛击昏家禽的情况与怀孕母猪群体饲养的情况相似：福利措施将增加少量成本，但任何由此产生的零售价格上涨都将低于消费者愿意支付的范围。因此，这种增加可以转嫁给消费者，而不会影响市场。生产商的利润将不受影响。

 Temple Grandin agrees with the European Commission that controlled atmosphere stunning will increase the operating costs of slaughterhouses, but disagrees that the increases will be minimal. Whatever opinion one may hold of the ethical status of Professor Grandin’s work, she is among the world’s most knowledgeable specialists in the field of welfare measures for farmed animals—and she gained her reputation by devising methods, such as her famous low-stress chute for cattle going to slaughter, that reduce the operating costs of factory farms and slaughterhouses by reducing animal suffering (Grandin, 2010a). (I will have more to say about this shortly.) Furthermore, she consulted on the design of a controlled atmosphere stunning system for poultry with Bell and Evans, a major manufacturer of chicken products (Neuman, 2010). Grandin’s estimate of the cost implications of controlled atmosphere killing is unequivocal: “A major disadvantage of gas stunning is high installation and operating costs” (Grandin, 2010b).
泰勒·格兰丁同意欧洲委员会的观点，认为控制气氛击晕会增加屠宰场的运营成本，但她不同意这种增加将是微不足道的。无论人们对格兰丁教授工作的道德地位有何看法，她都是世界上在农场动物福利措施领域最知名的专家之一——她通过设计诸如她著名的低压力通道等方法赢得了声誉，这些方法可以减少工厂农场和屠宰场的运营成本，从而减少动物的痛苦（格兰丁，2010a）。（我稍后会对此有更多论述。）此外，她还就贝尔和伊文斯公司设计的控制气氛击晕系统进行了咨询，该公司是主要的鸡肉产品制造商（纽曼，2010）。格兰丁对控制气氛杀戮的成本影响估计是明确的：“气体击晕的一个主要缺点是安装和运营成本高”（格兰丁，2010b）。

 Finally, as I noted above, the industry is fiercely resisting conversion to controlled atmosphere stunning, a strong indicator that they believe it will raise their costs. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) disputes this view, arguing that conversion to CAS will, in fact, lower operating costs—due primarily to lower labor costs and less meat lost to bruising and hemorrhaging. This, in turn, PETA argues, will enable slaughterhouse operators to enjoy lower operating costs (as opposed to the higher operating costs projected by the European Commission and Temple Grandin) and to recoup their initial capital investment within 13 to 16 months (rather than the 24 months projected by the EC) (PETA).
最后，正如我上面所指出的，该行业强烈抵制向控制气氛电击昏倒的转变，这是他们相信这将增加成本的强烈迹象。动物权益保护组织（PETA）对此观点提出异议，认为向 CAS 的转变实际上会降低运营成本——主要得益于降低的劳动力成本和减少因挫伤和出血而损失的部分。PETA 认为，这将使屠宰场运营商能够享受更低的运营成本（而不是欧洲委员会和特姆普·格兰丁预测的更高运营成本），并在 13 至 16 个月内收回初始资本投资（而不是欧洲委员会预测的 24 个月）（PETA）。

PETA’s conclusions rely heavily on hypothetical extrapolations from the meager data that was then available. Their analysis was published before the EC report, and certain of PETA’s key projections now appear to have been optimistic, especially in regard to cost savings from improved meat quality. And, in fact, the EC report cautions against making generalized estimates of economic impact based on improved meat quality.
PETA 的结论在很大程度上依赖于从当时可用数据中得出的假设性外推。他们的分析在 EC 报告之前发表，现在 PETA 的一些关键预测似乎过于乐观，特别是在改善肉类质量方面的成本节约方面。事实上，EC 报告警告不要基于改善的肉类质量做出泛化的经济影响估计。

The economic impact of animal welfare technologies is difficult to assess. On the one hand the cost of implementing such measures might be expected to be known, although in practice this will be dependent on the individual circumstances of slaughterhouses. On the other hand, the economic benefits realized through improved meat quality are harder to quantify (by equipment manufacturers, operators and other key stakeholders), although it is recognized by all actors that they do exist. (European Commission, 2007, p. 20)
动物福利技术的经济影响难以评估。一方面，实施这些措施的成本可能预期是已知的，尽管在实践中这将取决于屠宰场的具体情况。另一方面，通过改善肉类质量所实现的经济效益难以量化（由设备制造商、运营商和其他关键利益相关者），尽管所有参与者都承认它们确实存在。（欧洲委员会，2007 年，第 20 页）

The EC report goes on to note that, “[I]ncreases in the popularity of other products, for example processed wings, may change the traditional economic analysis” (European Commission, 2007, p. 21). Bruising and minor hemorrhaging are not visible on Buffalo Wings, Chicken McNuggets, frozen chicken patties, and other processed chicken products. And so bruised and hemorrhaged flesh intended for this market is shipped rather than discarded—which means that improvements in meat quality do not represent a cost saving in this burgeoning segment of the market. Bruising and hemorrhaging that occur during slaughter are more of an esthetic than a human health concern, since such bruises typically do not involve a break in the skin that would allow pathogens to enter.
欧洲委员会的报告进一步指出，“[例如，其他产品，如加工鸡翅的流行增加，可能会改变传统的经济分析””（欧洲委员会，2007 年，第 21 页）。在鸡翅、鸡肉块、冷冻鸡肉饼和其他加工鸡肉产品上，挫伤和轻微出血是不可见的。因此，为这个市场准备的挫伤和出血的肉被运输而不是丢弃——这意味着在市场这个新兴领域，肉质的改善并不代表成本节约。在屠宰过程中发生的挫伤和出血更多是美观问题，而不是人类健康问题，因为这样的挫伤通常不会造成皮肤破裂，从而允许病原体进入。

In part, the PETA analysis bases its estimate of how long it will take operators to recover the cost of conversion to a CAS system on a 2006 telephone conversation between a PETA staff member and Temple Grandin (PETA). But we have just seen that Professor Grandin regards “high installation and operating costs” as “a major disadvantage” of controlled atmosphere systems—suggesting that her analysis of the data is less sanguine than PETA’s. Finally, if PETA’s projections are realistic, it is hard to understand why operators are not tripping over one another in a mad dash to install CAS systems.
部分来说，PETA 的分析估计操作员恢复 CAS 系统转换成本所需时间，是基于 2006 年 PETA 工作人员与特梅尔·格兰丁（PETA）之间的一次电话交谈。但我们刚刚看到，格兰丁教授认为“高安装和运营成本”是“控制气氛系统的主要缺点”——这表明她对数据的分析比 PETA 更为悲观。最后，如果 PETA 的预测是现实的，那么很难理解为什么运营商没有争先恐后地安装 CAS 系统。

Several years ago, The Humane Society of the United States posted on its website a report arguing that conversion to controlled atmosphere killing would result in significant cost savings for slaughterhouses. In 2006, HSUS took the report down from their website at the request of its author, who said that after further research s/he no longer believed it was accurate.
几年前，美国 humane society of the united states 在其网站上发布了一份报告，称将屠宰场转换为控制气氛屠宰将带来显著的成本节约。2006 年，应报告作者的请求，HSUS 将其从网站上撤下，作者表示，经过进一步研究，他/她不再认为该报告准确。

The following comment from HSUS President Wayne Pacelle’s blog of November 29, 2010 suggests that HSUS does not, in fact, believe that CAK/CAS results in lower operating costs for slaughterhouses:
以下来自 HSUS 主席 Wayne Pacelle 于 2010 年 11 月 29 日博客中的评论表明，HSUS 实际上并不认为 CAK/CAS 会导致屠宰场运营成本降低：

With opinion polls showing that consumers are willing to pay more for higher welfare products, the response of major producers should be to shift to more humane methods [he is referring specifically to CAK/CAS, NP], not to do things the same way and simply rebrand the same old product. (Pacelle, 2010)
随着民意调查显示消费者愿意为更高福利的产品支付更多费用，主要生产商的反应应该是转向更人道的方法[他特别指的是 CAK/CAS，NP]，而不是照旧行事并简单地对同一旧产品进行重新品牌化。 (Pacelle, 2010)

Where Price Is Unimportant: The Anomalous Cases of Foie Gras and Veal
价格无关紧要：鹅肝和牛肉的异常案例

Foie Gras
鹅肝

Foie gras is a diseased organ, the liver of a goose or duck who has consumed far more fat than she can metabolize or eliminate; as a result, she has developed a pathology known as steatosis, in which her liver swells to more than six times its natural size, a painful and debilitating condition. Since it is virtually impossible to induce geese and ducks to consume voluntarily enough fat to cause steatosis, nearly all producers—including all large commercial producers—force feed their birds by inserting a tube down their throats and pouring directly into their stomachs corn that has been boiled in fat. The process is inherently cruel and there is no apparent way to make it less so. Attempts in recent years to produce “humane foiegras,” have either not been shown to inflict less suffering than traditional methods or have not proven feasible on a scale that could accommodate the global market (Glass, 2007). And so, for all practical purposes, foie gras remains an all-or-nothing proposition.
鹅肝是一种病态的器官，是鹅或鸭摄入了远超过其代谢或排泄能力的脂肪，因此其肝脏发生了脂肪肝，肝脏肿大到自然大小的六倍以上，这是一种痛苦且致残的疾病。由于几乎无法诱导鹅和鸭自愿摄入足够的脂肪以引起脂肪肝，几乎所有生产商——包括所有大型商业生产商——都通过将管子插入它们的喉咙并将煮过脂肪的玉米直接倒入它们的胃中来强制喂养它们的鸟。这个过程本身是残忍的，而且没有明显的办法使其变得不那么残忍。近年来尝试生产“人道鹅肝”，要么尚未证明比传统方法造成更少的痛苦，要么尚未证明能够在全球市场上可行（Glass，2007 年）。因此，从实用角度来看，鹅肝仍然是一个非此即彼的选择。

Veal
小牛肉

Veal, long prized by gourmands for its tenderness and white color, is the flesh of a young calf—most often the male child of a dairy cow who must be repeatedly impregnated if she is to continue giving milk. Taken from their mothers when they are no more than three days old (so the farmers can take the milk that otherwise the calves would drink), veal calves have historically been confined in “tethered stalls”—also known as “veal crates”—so tiny that they cannot turn around, where they are fed a liquid diet that contains inadequate iron (or no iron at all) until they are slaughtered at 16 weeks. Veal is tender because the calf was unable to exercise and strengthen his muscles; it is white because he suffered from iron deficiency anemia.
小牛肉，因其柔嫩和白色而历来受到美食家的青睐，是幼小牛的肉——通常是奶牛的雄性后代，如果想要继续产奶，奶牛就必须反复受孕。小牛肉牛在出生后不到三天就被从母亲身边带走（这样农民就可以取走小牛肉牛本应喝的牛奶），历史上它们被关在“拴系栏”中——也称为“小牛肉笼”——空间狭小到无法转身，它们被喂食含有不足铁分（或根本不含铁分）的液体饲料，直到 16 周大时被屠宰。小牛肉之所以柔嫩，是因为小牛肉牛无法运动和加强肌肉；之所以呈白色，是因为它患有缺铁性贫血。

Over the last fifteen years or so, producers have moved away from veal crates to larger stalls or group housing (i.e., several calves living in a confinement shed with an open floor on which they are able to move around). Two decades ago, all veal calves were raised in crates; today 35% of veal calves are raised in some form of group housing and, according to the American Veal Association, by 2017 all veal calves will be raised in group housing (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, p. 144; Wren, 2011). With few exceptions, however, veal calves are still fed a liquid diet (which in recent years may contain at least some iron).
在过去大约十五年的时间里，养殖户们已经从牛犊围栏转向了更大的畜栏或群体饲养（即，几只小牛在一个有开放式地面的封闭棚舍中生活，它们可以在上面自由活动）。二十年前，所有的牛犊都是在围栏中饲养的；如今，35%的牛犊以某种形式的群体饲养方式被饲养，根据美国小牛肉协会的数据，到 2017 年，所有的小牛肉牛犊都将采用群体饲养方式（诺伍德和卢斯，2011 年，第 144 页；雷恩，2011 年）。然而，除了少数例外，牛犊仍然被喂食液体饲料（近年来，这种饲料中至少含有一些铁）。

Because veal has always been such a small part of the American meat market and because veal production has declined dramatically in recent years, the cost impacts of welfare reforms have not been established with any certainty or consistency. What seems likely is this: cattle, even very young cattle, are better able to fend for themselves than other farmed animals such as pigs or chickens. Hence, group housing, or even pasture access—which some veal producers are experimenting with—would likely lower production costs due to decreased expenses for equipment and labor—but at the cost of making the veal tougher and pinker than the veal prized by epicures and wannabe epicures, who have always been the bulk of the market—thereby lowering the price that consumers would be willing to pay. Even so, the largest single cost factor in raising veal calves is their food—typically based on some combination of whey and soy—and so the cost of producing veal fluctuates with the price of whey and soy regardless of the type of housing employed (Wren, 2011).
因为小牛肉在美国肉类市场中所占比例一直很小，并且近年来小牛肉的生产量大幅下降，因此福利改革对成本的影响尚未得到确定或一致。看起来很可能是这样的：牛，即使是幼小的牛，也比其他农场动物如猪或鸡更能自我保护。因此，群居饲养，甚至放牧——一些小牛肉生产商正在尝试这种方法——可能会降低生产成本，因为减少了设备和劳动力的支出，但代价是使小牛肉比美食家们和想要成为美食家的人所珍视的小牛肉更加坚韧和粉红——从而降低消费者愿意支付的价格。即便如此，饲养小牛肉牛最大的单一成本因素是其饲料——通常是乳清和大豆的某种组合——因此，无论采用何种饲养方式，生产小牛肉的成本都会随着乳清和大豆的价格波动（Wren，2011）。 

Campaigns against veal crates and the iron-deficient diet, which began in the 1970s and gained serious traction in the 1980s, have arguably been the most successful of any campaign conducted by the American animal rights movement. Veal has never been a staple of the American diet, and its consumption declined from 5.2 pounds per person in 1960 to 0.4 pounds in 2008 (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, p. 141). By comparison, beef consumption, which has been declining for nearly a decade, is expected to be approximately 55 pounds per person in 2013 (Economic Research Service, 2013). Since veal’s primary consumers are affluent and image-conscious, the veal market is less sensitive to price increases and more sensitive to societal censure than are the markets for other animal products, with the exception of luxury items like foie gras, caviar and fur. Thus, the dramatic decline in veal consumption should be attributed to two factors: the negative public image of veal production created by animal welfare campaigns, and the degrading—as a result of welfare reforms intended to overcome this negative image—of the qualities most favored by consumers of veal: tenderness and whiteness.
""" 20 世纪 70 年代开始的反对小牛栏和铁缺乏饮食的运动，在 80 年代取得了显著成效，可以说是美国动物权利运动中最为成功的运动之一。小牛肉从未成为美国饮食的主食，其消费量从 1960 年的每人 5.2 磅下降到 2008 年的 0.4 磅（诺伍德和卢斯，2011 年，第 141 页）。相比之下，牛肉消费量已经连续十年下降，预计到 2013 年每人消费量约为 55 磅（经济研究局，2013 年）。由于小牛肉的主要消费者是富裕且注重形象的人群，因此小牛肉市场对价格上涨的反应不如其他动物产品市场敏感，除了像鹅肝、鱼子酱和皮草这样的奢侈品市场。 """ 因此，小牛肉消费的戏剧性下降应归因于两个因素：动物福利运动所造成的对小牛肉生产的负面形象，以及为了克服这种负面形象而进行的福利改革导致的消费者最喜爱的品质——嫩度和色泽的退化。

In this connection, it is important to note a crucial difference between the industrial production of foie gras and veal on the one hand and the industrial production of all other animal products on the other. The industrial production of all animal products except foie gras and veal has as its primary purpose the maximization of profits through increases in productivity. By contrast, foie gras and veal are produced by industrial methods because these methods are essential to producing the product (foie gras) or to producing a product with the peculiar qualities that are desired by affluent, status-conscious consumers (veal).⁴
在此关联中，重要的是要注意工业生产鹅肝和牛肉与工业生产其他所有动物产品之间的一个关键区别。除了鹅肝和牛肉之外的所有动物产品的工业生产，其首要目的是通过提高生产力来最大化利润。相比之下，鹅肝和牛肉之所以采用工业方法生产，是因为这些方法是生产产品（鹅肝）或生产具有富裕、注重地位的消费者所期望的特别品质的产品（牛肉）所必需的。工业生产其他所有动物产品（除了鹅肝和牛肉）的首要目的是通过提高生产力来最大化利润。鹅肝和牛肉之所以采用工业方法生产，是因为这些方法是生产产品（鹅肝）或生产具有富裕、注重地位的消费者所期望的特别品质的产品（牛肉）所必需的。通过这些方法生产鹅肝或生产具有富裕、注重地位的消费者所期望的特别品质的牛肉是必需的。这些方法对于生产鹅肝或生产具有富裕、注重地位的消费者所期望的特别品质的牛肉是必需的。⁴

Some Observations About Welfare Reforms
关于福利改革的几点观察

The history of animal agriculture since World War II has been the story of dramatic increases in productivity brought about by technology, chemistry, and the application of rigorous management techniques to the business of raising animals.
第二次世界大战以来，动物农业的历史就是通过技术、化学和严格的管理技术应用于养畜业务，从而带来生产力的显著提高的故事。

These increases in productivity have brought about equally dramatic decreases in the unit cost of production—and therefore in the retail price—of meat, eggs and dairy.
这些生产力的提高同样带来了肉类、蛋类和乳制品的单位生产成本——以及零售价格——的显著降低。

These productivity increases—and the resultant low prices—have been achieved at the cost of catastrophic increases in the suffering of farmed animals. Modern animal agriculture involves a direct trade-off: cheap animal products for horrific cruelty.
这些生产力的提升——以及由此带来的低价格——是以农场动物遭受的灾难性痛苦增加为代价的。现代畜牧业涉及直接的权衡：廉价的动物产品与可怕的残酷对待。

The gravamen of most welfare reforms is to abandon or moderate the techniques and technologies that have increased the productivity of animal agriculture and move toward some compromise between industrial farming methods and traditional “free-range” farming. This nature-oriented category of reforms—which includes group housing for breeding sows and cage-free housing for laying hens—lowers productivity and raises the per-unit cost of production. The degree of economic impact varies according to the nature and scope of the reform.⁵
大多数福利改革的根本目的是放弃或适度减少提高畜牧业生产力的技术和方法，转向工业农业方法和传统“放养”农业之间的某种妥协。这一以自然为导向的改革类别——包括繁殖母猪的群居住房和产蛋鸡的无笼饲养——降低了生产力，提高了单位生产成本。经济影响程度根据改革的性质和范围而有所不同。⁵

An alternative approach to welfare reform is to move in the opposite direction and use advances in technology, animal science, and facility design to reduce the suffering of farmed animals. Two salient examples of this approach are: 1) controlled atmosphere stunning and 2) the kinds of design and equipment modification promoted by Temple Grandin, such as her curved chute for moving cattle into slaughterhouses. Reforms in this technology-oriented category sometimes lower costs (as with Grandin’s cattle chutes) and sometimes raise them (as with CAS). But, thus far at least, they have not been shown to have a significant economic impact.
福利改革的另一种方法是反方向进行，利用技术、动物科学和设施设计方面的进步来减少农场动物的痛苦。这一方法的两个显著例子是：1）控制气氛击晕和 2）由坦普尔·格兰丁推广的设计和设备改造，例如她为将牛送入屠宰场设计的弯曲通道。在以技术为导向的改革中，有时会降低成本（如格兰丁的牛通道），有时会增加成本（如 CAS）。但至少到目前为止，它们尚未显示出重大的经济影响。

Changing Meat, Eggs and Milk into Luxuries
将肉类、鸡蛋和牛奶转变为奢侈品

The claim that welfare reforms promote animal agriculture by increasing producers’ profits is unfounded. Some changes in equipment and facility design can lower simultaneously the stress felt by animals and the operating costs of producers, but these typically have only a small impact on the overall cost of production and even less impact on retail prices. Given the fact that animal agriculture will not be abolished for decades—perhaps centuries—the welfare benefit to animals would appear to outweigh any marginal economic benefit to farmers.
福利改革促进畜牧业通过增加生产者利润的说法是没有根据的。一些设备和设施设计的改变可以同时降低动物感受到的压力和生产者的运营成本，但这些通常对生产成本的整体影响很小，对零售价格的影响更小。鉴于畜牧业在几十年甚至几个世纪内不会消失——福利对动物的好处似乎超过了任何对农民的边际经济好处。

As a general rule, however, welfare reforms increase operating costs, they do not lower them—although the precise amount of increase cannot always be projected with certainty until producers have more experience with reforms. Norwood and Lusk sum up the issue this way:
然而，一般来说，福利改革会增加运营成本，而不是降低它们——尽管在改革有更多经验之前，增加的具体数额无法总是确定。诺伍德和卢斯这样总结了这个问题：

Improving animal welfare will certainly increase production costs at the farm. People who argue otherwise are necessarily asserting that farmers are either too ignorant or too malevolent to improve animal welfare at no cost to themselves. (Believe it or not, there are people who assert that improving animal welfare will lower costs; these beliefs are without merit.) Another fact of which we are certain is that increases in farm production costs will cause food prices to increase… Regulations requiring improved animal care will impose some economic burden on the farmer and the consumer. Even food processors, wholesalers and retailers will be adversely affected. (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, p. 355, italics in original)
改善动物福利无疑会增加农场生产成本。那些认为否则的人必然是在断言农民要么过于无知，要么过于残忍，以至于在没有任何成本的情况下改善动物福利。（信不信由你，有些人声称改善动物福利会降低成本；这些观点毫无根据。）我们还确信的一个事实是，农场生产成本的提高将导致食品价格上涨……要求改善动物护理的法规将对农民 和消费者造成一些经济负担。甚至食品加工商、批发商和零售商也会受到不利影响。（诺伍德和卢斯，2011 年，第 355 页，原文斜体）

It is also true—again as a general rule—that the greater the benefit, and the more animals who are benefited, the higher the cost to producers. The problem with modern animal agriculture is not that it is inefficient. The problem with modern animal agriculture is that it is an extremely efficient industry in which efficiency equates to cruelty.
同样，作为一个普遍规律，收益越大，受惠的动物越多，生产者的成本就越高。现代畜牧业的问题不在于它效率低下。现代畜牧业的问题在于它是一个效率极高的行业，而效率等同于残忍。

In this regard, it is important to recognize that animal agriculture has become efficiency-dependent. The easy availability of essentially infinite supplies of cheap animal products has created a market that can only be satisfied by industrial agriculture. Large-scale animal agriculture can remain profitable only by maintaining a level of efficiency that allows it to produce an unprecedented volume of food that sells on the retail market at historically low prices. The survival of America’s animal-based diet depends upon producers maintaining levels of animal cruelty that are without historical antecedent.
在这方面，重要的是认识到畜牧业已经变得效率依赖。廉价动物产品的基本无限供应创造了只能通过工业农业来满足的市场。大规模畜牧业只有通过维持一种效率，才能生产出前所未有的、在零售市场上以历史最低价格销售的食品量，才能保持盈利。美国以动物为基础的饮食的生存取决于生产商维持历史上前所未有的动物虐待水平。

We can have cheap, plentiful animal products or we can have major, large-scale improvements in the welfare of the billions of animals who are enslaved and slaughtered for their flesh, eggs, or milk. We cannot have both. The arithmetic simply does not work. Old-fashioned free-range farms cannot produce enough food to feed the human population an animal-based diet at a cost that consumers will be willing (or able) to pay.
我们可以有廉价、丰富的动物产品，或者我们可以有对数十亿被奴役和屠宰以供其肉、蛋或奶的动物的福利进行大规模改善。我们两者不能兼得。数学上根本行不通。传统的放养农场无法生产足够的食物，以消费者愿意（或能够）支付的成本来喂养人类人口以动物为基础的饮食。

The question facing producers is not, “Will welfare reforms increase the cost of production?” That issue is settled. The important questions for producers are: “How much will welfare reforms increase the cost of production?” and, “Will consumers pay the higher prices necessary to offset the increased cost?”
生产者面临的问题不是，“福利改革是否会增加生产成本？”这个问题已经解决了。对生产者来说，重要的问题是：福利改革将增加多少生产成本？以及，消费者是否愿意支付更高的价格来弥补增加的成本？

Thus, Seibert and Norwood offer this comment on a remark by Trent Loos, a columnist for the industry journal Feedstuffs: “Mr. Loos asked the correct question: are we willing to pay the higher price associated with increased farm animal welfare?” (Seibert and Norwood, 2011a).
因此，Seibert 和 Norwood 对行业期刊Feedstuffs的专栏作家 Trent Loos 的评论提出了以下观点：“Loos 先生提出了正确的问题：我们是否愿意为提高农场动物福利而支付更高的价格？”（Seibert 和 Norwood，2011a）。

Before his death in 2008, Bruce L. Gardner served as Distinguished Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of Maryland, College Park. Speaking at a conference for industry executives sponsored by the U. S. Department of Agriculture in 2003, Professor Gardner was unequivocal that the lower costs associated with factory farming make possible America’s abundant supply of cheap food from animals. Professor Gardner went on to say, “The issue that arises with respect to costly changes in livestock production practices is just the converse of cost decreases due to productivity gains. Kindness to animals may well cause productivity losses and cost increases. Who then would bear these costs?” (Gardner, 2003). The bulk of these added costs, Dr. Gardner believed, should be borne by consumers rather than producers on the grounds that consumers have been the principal beneficiaries of the cost reductions brought about by industrial agriculture.
在 2008 年去世之前，布鲁斯·L·加德纳曾担任马里兰大学帕克分校农业与资源经济学杰出教授。2003 年，在由美国农业部赞助的业界高管会议上发表演讲时，加德纳教授明确表示，工厂化养殖带来的低成本使得美国能够提供丰富的廉价动物食品。加德纳教授接着说：“关于畜牧业生产方式成本增加的问题，正好是因生产力提高而导致的成本降低的反面。对动物的善待可能会造成生产力下降和成本增加。那么，这些成本将由谁来承担？”（加德纳，2003）。加德纳博士认为，这些额外成本的大部分应由消费者而非生产者承担，理由是消费者一直是工业农业带来的成本降低的主要受益者。

It is not only producers who should be considering the cost increases associated with welfare reforms; this issue should also be near the top of the animal rights agenda. At the present time, one of the most effective ways to attack animal agriculture is to attack its productivity. Every welfare reform that reduces productivity and increases operating costs by even a small amount nudges animal agriculture away from its present posture as provider of vast quantities of cheap food to the masses and toward a shrunken role as purveyor of expensive delicacies to a small, affluent, elitist market. Over time, welfare reforms—in conjunction with an ever-expanding variety of other strategies, including vegan and abolitionist advocacy, flexitarianism, and the promotion of plant-based analogs—have the potential to turn meat, eggs and dairy into the diet of the one percent, at which point it may become politically feasible to abolish animal agriculture entirely.
它不仅仅是生产者应该考虑福利改革带来的成本增加；这个问题也应该成为动物权利议程中的重中之重。目前，攻击动物农业最有效的方法之一就是攻击其生产力。每一次福利改革，即使只是略微降低生产力和提高运营成本，都将推动动物农业从目前为大众提供大量廉价食品的地位，转变为向一小部分富裕、精英市场提供昂贵美食的角色。随着时间的推移，福利改革——结合包括纯素食和废除主义倡导、弹性素食主义以及推广植物性替代品在内的各种策略——有可能将肉类、蛋类和奶制品变成一百分之一人群的饮食，到那时，完全废除动物农业可能变得在政治上可行。

Writing in 2011, Norwood and Lusk argued that, “In thirty years, cage egg production might be a relic of the past … [due] to the activism of concerned consumers and the interest groups they support” (Norwood and Lusk, 2011, p. 318). British newspaper columnist Martin Samuel, describing the impact in the United Kingdom of the European Union’s ban on battery cages, gives us this glimpse at a cage free world.
2011 年，诺伍德和卢斯认为，“在三十年内，笼养蛋的生产可能成为过去的遗迹……这要归功于关心消费者及其支持的利益集团的积极行动。”（诺伍德和卢斯，2011，第 318 页） [由于] 欧洲联盟对电池笼的禁令，英国报纸专栏作家马丁·塞缪尔描述了在英国的影响，给我们展示了无笼世界的一瞥。

On January 1, [2012] the European Union banned battery cages, to widespread public support. Within three months egg prices went through the roof, with the product close to disappearing from supermarket shelves… To the consumer, the initial price hike will be around 20p per dozen, but that will grow; and the rise in the past year already stands at around 70p. Eggs are heading back to the luxury items aisle. You will no longer go to work on an egg. You’ll save up for one at Christmas. (Samuel, 2012)
2012 年 1 月 1 日，欧盟禁止使用电池笼，得到了广泛的公众支持。在三个月内，鸡蛋价格飙升，产品几乎从超市货架上消失……对消费者来说，最初的涨价将大约是每打 20 便士，但这个数字会增长；过去一年的涨幅已经达到大约 70 便士。鸡蛋正回归奢侈品货架。你将不再为了鸡蛋去上班。你将攒钱在圣诞节买一个。（塞缪尔，2012）

Although Samuel’s closing sentence is a bit of hyperbole—for the foreseeable future, the British public will not have to save up for an egg at Christmas—his argument is valid. Welfare reforms move animal products away from being staples for the general public and push them—in some cases, slowly, almost imperceptibly, in other cases, more rapidly—in the direction of becoming luxuries for the affluent. A year after the reforms went into effect, egg prices in England were 40% higher than they had been before the ban—an increase that is attributed to the reforms coupled with high prices for the soy that laying hens are fed (Gray, 2013).
尽管塞缪尔的结尾有点夸张——在可预见的未来，英国公众不必为圣诞节储备鸡蛋——但他的论点是成立的。福利改革将动物产品从大众的必需品推向了奢侈品，这种转变在某些情况下缓慢而几乎察觉不到，在其他情况下则更为迅速。改革实施一年后，英国的鸡蛋价格比改革前高出 40%，这种上涨归因于改革以及喂食产蛋鸡的大豆价格高昂（Gray，2013）。

In the late summer of 2013, the cost-price squeeze on egg producers remains severe throughout the European Union. In August, farmers in Brittany, the major egg-producing region of France, destroyed 5 percent of one day’s production, 100,000 eggs, in an action aimed at publicizing the bind that the ban on battery cages has put them in. Consumers are refusing to pay the higher prices that would be necessary to offset increased production costs, and this means that prices are falling while production costs have risen. Yves-Marie Beaudet, president of the trade association for meat and egg producers in Brittany, has called for a two-year freeze on new egg facilities. The new economics of egg production demands that the number of laying hens be reduced, not increased (Du Guerny, 2013).
在 2013 年晚夏，欧盟对鸡蛋生产者的成本压力依然严峻。8 月份，法国主要鸡蛋生产区布列塔尼的农民为了引起公众关注禁止使用笼子的禁令给他们带来的困境，破坏了一天生产量的 5%，即 10 万枚鸡蛋。消费者拒绝支付更高的价格以弥补生产成本的上升，这意味着价格在下降，而生产成本却在上升。布列塔尼肉类和鸡蛋生产贸易协会主席伊夫-玛丽·博德呼吁暂停两年新的养鸡场建设。鸡蛋生产的新经济模式要求减少产蛋鸡的数量，而不是增加（杜盖尼，2013）。

As prices rise and the customer base shrinks, campaigns against the cruelties unique to factory farming contribute directly to the objective of liberating animals from being born into lives of slavery leading to slaughter. An intermediate goal of the animal rights movement should be to turn beef into veal, eggs into caviar, and milk into champagne. The long-term goal, of course, must remain the abolition of all animal agriculture.
随着价格上涨和客户群减少，反对工厂农场特有的残酷行为的运动直接有助于实现解放动物免受奴隶般生活并最终被屠宰的目标。动物权利运动的中期目标应该是将牛肉变成小牛肉，鸡蛋变成鱼子酱，牛奶变成香槟。当然，长期目标必须是废除所有动物农业。

Notes
备注

 Land grant universities were originally created in 1862 by federal legislation (the first Morrill Act) “which established new public institutions in each state through the grant of federal lands. The original mission of these new institutions was to teach ‘agriculture, military tactics, and the mechanic arts as well as classical studies so that members of the working classes could obtain a liberal, practical education’” (APLU, 2010). The land grant university system has been much expanded over the years and now comprises 74 land grant universities and 25 state university systems, many of which have large and prestigious schools of agriculture, including Auburn, Purdue, Florida A&M, Iowa State, Kansas State, Oklahoma State, the University of Maryland, College Park, Cornell, Ohio State, Texas A&M, and the University of Virginia (APLU).
1862 年，联邦立法（首部莫里尔法案）创立了赠地大学，通过授予联邦土地在每个州建立新的公立机构。这些新机构的原始使命是教授“农业、军事战术、机械艺术以及古典研究，以便工人阶级成员能够获得自由而实用的教育”（美国公立大学协会，2010 年）。赠地大学体系在多年中得到了大幅扩展，现在包括 74 所赠地大学和 25 个州立大学系统，其中许多拥有大型且享有盛誉的农业大学，包括奥本大学、普渡大学、佛罗里达 A&M 大学、爱荷华州立大学、堪萨斯州立大学、俄克拉荷马州立大学、马里兰大学帕克分校、康奈尔大学、俄亥俄州立大学、德克萨斯 A&M 大学和弗吉尼亚大学（美国公立大学协会）。

²The first steam tractors appeared in the 1870s and the first gasoline tractors at the turn of the 20^th century. But tractors did not become popular until the 1920s, after Henry Ford, in 1922, sharply reduced the price for his small, practical “Fordson” model, which had been introduced about five years earlier (White, 2010).
²第一台蒸汽拖拉机出现在 19 世纪 70 年代，第一台汽油拖拉机出现在 20 世纪初。但是拖拉机直到 20 世纪 20 年代才变得流行，亨利·福特在 1922 年大幅降低了他的小型实用型“福特森”车型的价格，该车型大约在五年前推出（怀特，2010 年）。

³A “finished pig” is one who has reached a weight of 240 to 260 pounds, at which point he is sent to slaughter.
³“成品猪”是指体重达到 240 至 260 磅的猪，此时它们会被送往屠宰场。

⁴Foie gras and veal are produced by methods that predate the industrial revolution in agriculture. But these methods are at least proto-industrial in that they rely on technology (the stomach tube) and facility design (the veal crate).
⁴鹅肝和牛肉的生产方法源于工业革命前的农业。但这些方法至少是原工业化的，因为它们依赖于技术（胃管）和设施设计（肉牛笼子）。

⁵By “the scope of the reform,” I mean the percentage of animals in the flock or herd that are affected. Eliminating gestation crates for breeding sows has a narrow scope; eliminating battery cages for laying hens has a wide scope.
⁵“改革的范围”是指受影响的动物在羊群或牛群中所占的百分比。消除繁殖母猪的妊娠笼具有狭窄的范围；消除产蛋鸡的电池笼具有广泛的范围。

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Volume 12, Issue 3
卷 12，期 3

2014

Geschlecht, Speciesism, and Animal Rights in Leopold von Sacher-Masoch
性别、物种主义与萨克斯-马索赫的动物权利

Author: Sean Kelly¹*
作者：凯利，肖恩¹*

Title: Associate Professor of Philosophy and Literature & Director of Honors Program
标题：哲学与文学副教授 & 荣誉项目主任

Affiliation: Florida Gulf Coast University
所属机构：佛罗里达湾岸大学

Location: Fort Myers, Florida
位置：佛罗里达州，弗 ort myers

E-mail: skelly@fgcu.edu
电子邮件：skelly@fgcu.edu

Key words: von Sacher-Masoch, 19^th century, animal rights, Geschlecht, The Wanderer
关键词：萨克斯-马索克，19^世纪，动物权利，性别，《流浪者》

GESCHLECHT, SPECIESISM, AND ANIMAL RIGHTS IN LEOPOLD VON SACHER-MASOCH
《性别》，物种主义，与萨克斯-马索克的动物权利

Abstract
抽象

The term Geschlecht plays a central role in Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s fiction, especially in relation to his thoughts on human/animal interaction. Geschlecht is most often translated into English as sex; however, in German it also means kind or species. According to Sacher-Masoch, any just ethical/political philosophy demands transcending the Krieg der Geschlechter, war of the sexes/species/kinds. Whereas scholars have often addressed Sacher-Masoch’s “war of the sexes,” this paper interrogates what it would mean to end a “war of the kinds.” Via an exploration of the author’s overt treatment of human/animal relationships, the article sketches a theory of animal rights from Sacher-Masoch’s work.
""" 《性别》一词在利奥波德·冯·萨克斯-马索赫的虚构作品中扮演着核心角色，尤其是在他关于人/动物互动的思想方面。性别一词在英语中通常被翻译为“性”，然而在德语中它也意味着“种类”或“物种”。根据萨克斯-马索赫的观点，任何正当的伦理/政治哲学都要求超越“性别/种类/物种之战”，即性别/种类/物种之间的战争。尽管学者们经常探讨萨克斯-马索赫的“性别之战”，但本文旨在探讨结束“种类之战”意味着什么。通过探讨作者对人类/动物关系的直接处理，本文勾勒出萨克斯-马索赫作品中动物权利的理论。 """

Introduction
简介

Within literary circles, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch is most famous for lending his name to an essential component of Freudian ego formation, masochism. The term “masochism,” first coined by Richard Freiherr von Krafft-Ebing in Psychopathia Sexualis (1886), refers less to the author’s works, which consistently employ plotlines wherein men willingly subjugate themselves to women for sexual satisfaction, than to the author’s own life. Sacher-Masoch was known, after all, for finding it erotic to be humiliated before the women he loved, and this sexual lifestyle, along with the moral and medical judgments that society makes about it, has contributed mightily to the ways in which his works have been read, disseminated, and translated.¹ “The readers who associate the writer’s name exclusively with the themes of erotic gratification linked to the experience of submission to the will of another person,” Vitaly Chernetsky warns, “might be surprised to learn that there were historical periods and national cultures that saw Sacher-Masoch very differently” (2008, p. 471). The sexual, to be sure, is the principle plotline for Sacher-Masoch; but readers focusing too narrowly on the war of the sexes risk underappreciating Sacher-Masoch’s wider scope of concern regarding difference. For Sacher-Masoch, to be alive is, in its most widely understood form, to engage in a constant struggle against other kinds. The word that I am loosely translating here as “kind” or “type” is Geschlecht, which Sacher-Masoch’s translators generally render as race or sex, depending upon context. Sacher-Masoch believes that all kinds, species, types of animals—die Geschlechter—“rely on the death of others” in order to live; that “existence is a kind of penance, a painful test, a sad pilgrimage; and that everything that lives, lives from death, from the exploitation of others” (Sacher-Masoch, 2003d, p. 5). The war of the sexes, which Sacher-Masoch describes as a war in which “each struggles to subjugate the other, to make the other into a slave” (Sacher-Masoch, 2003d, p. 7), is simply, for him, the cruelest manifestation of this “Krieg der Geschlechter”² (Sacher-Masoch, 1991, p. 12). Because Sacher-Masoch’s work, like most other literature, is thoroughly anthropo- and androcentric in its content and plotlines, it is no surprise that readers encounter the war between human sexes, classes, races, etc. far more often in his writing than they do the struggle between human and other “kinds” (animals, most notably). But this does not mean that the Galician author did not attend to the problems faced by animal kinds. On the contrary, and as this article contends, he was thoroughly concerned with the plight of animal Geschlechter. The article proceeds by first developing how his defining work, a series of stories and novellas that make up The Legacy of Cain, is prefaced by a story, “The Wanderer,” that defines Geschlecht expansively. Geschlecht, and thus the Krieg der Geschlechter (war of the kinds/sexes), will explicitly include animals. I continue by explicating Sacher-Masoch’s fairly complex and often schizophrenic (to borrow a term from Gary Francione’s works on animal rights) stance on the ethical treatment of animals. I conclude with a brief sketch of the potential contributions that a philosophical system of animal rights derived from Sacher-Masoch’s position should have for animal rights policies and activism today.
在文学界，利奥波德·冯·萨克斯-马索赫最著名的贡献是将他的名字借给了弗洛伊德人格形成理论中的一个基本要素——受虐狂。这个术语“受虐狂”，最早由理查德·冯·克拉夫特-埃宾在《性心理病态》（1886 年）中提出，它所指的并非作者的作品，因为这些作品始终采用男性自愿臣服于女性以获得性满足的情节，而是更多地指向作者本人的生活。毕竟，萨克斯-马索赫以在所爱之女性面前受辱为乐，这种性生活以及社会对其的道德和医学评判，极大地影响了他的作品被解读、传播和翻译的方式。¹“那些将作家的名字仅与与服从他人意志相关的性快感主题联系起来的读者，”维塔利·切列茨基警告说，“可能会惊讶地发现，历史上有些时期和民族文化对萨克斯-马索赫的看法截然不同”（2008 年，第 471 页）。当然，性是萨克斯-马索赫作品的主线；但那些过于狭隘地关注性别战争的人可能会低估萨克斯-马索赫对差异的更广泛关注。对于萨克斯-马索赫来说，活着最普遍的理解形式就是与异类进行持续的斗争。我在这里松散地翻译为“种类”或“类型”的词是“Geschlecht”，萨克斯-马索赫的译者通常根据上下文将其译为“种族”或“性别”。 萨克斯-马索赫认为，所有种类、物种、类型的动物——性别——“都依赖于他人的死亡来生存”；“存在是一种惩罚，一种痛苦的考验，一种悲伤的朝圣之旅；而且所有生物都是通过死亡，通过剥削他人而生存的”（萨克斯-马索赫，2003d，第 5 页）。萨克斯-马索赫描述的性别战争，即“每个都在努力征服对方，让对方成为奴隶”的战争（萨克斯-马索赫，2003d，第 7 页），对他来说，这只是这种“性别战争”²（萨克斯-马索赫，1991，第 12 页）最残酷的表现。由于萨克斯-马索赫的作品，就像大多数其他文学作品一样，在内容和情节上都是彻底的人类中心主义和男性中心主义的，因此读者在他的作品中遇到的人性之间的战争、阶级、种族等之间的战争，远比人与其他“种类”（尤其是动物）之间的斗争更为常见。但这并不意味着这位加利亚作者没有关注动物种类所面临的问题。 相反，正如本文所主张的，他非常关心动物< span id=20 >性别< span id=21 >的困境。文章首先阐述了其定义性作品——一系列故事和短篇小说集《该隐的遗产》< span id=22 >，该作品以故事《流浪者》为序，对< span id=24 >性别< span id=25 >进行了广泛的定义。< span id=26 >性别< span id=27 >，以及由此产生的< span id=28 >性别之战< span id=29 >（种类/性别之战），将明确包括动物。我接着通过阐述萨克斯-马索克对动物伦理待遇的立场，该立场相当复杂且常常表现出精神分裂症（借用加里·弗兰克尼关于动物权利的作品中的一个术语），来继续阐述。最后，我简要概述了从萨克斯-马索克立场中衍生出的动物权利哲学体系对当今动物权利政策和活动可能产生的潜在贡献。

Geschlecht in Sacher-Masoch
性别 在萨克斯-马索赫中

As one can glean from my introduction, this paper hinges on the meaning of the German word Geschlecht. Generally, Geschlecht is translated into English as sex. Thus, to write that Sacher-Masoch was concerned with relations between die Geschlechter seems like common sense. But Geschlecht also carries with it the meaning of “race” or “kind,” and in many instances this is its primary sense. For example, the best translation of das menschliche Geschlecht is the human race/kind. In Sacher-Masoch’s “The Wanderer,” readers get a strong sense of how neatly the author knitted Geschlecht’s senses of sex and race into his philosophy of humankind. That this happens in “The Wanderer” is significant. This short piece acts as the prologue to Sacher-Masoch’s major cycle of stories/novellas, The Legacy of Cain. Michael O’Pecko describes Legacy as “the ambitious, uncompleted cycle of Novellen [in which] Sacher-Masoch intended to portray ‘all of mankind’s greatest problems, all the dangers of existence, all of humanity’s ills’” (2003, p. 181). Sacher-Masoch’s plan for Legacy was for each of its six volumes of six novellas/stories to address one of humanity’s major woes: love, property, the state, war, work, and death. “The Wanderer” serves as the prologue to this cycle, framing humanity’s ills almost entirely within the context of the Krieg der Geschlechter. “The Wanderer” contextualizes this war not through an erotic man/woman relationship narrative, but through a hunting scene in which a man shoots an eagle.
如我的引言中可以得知，这篇论文的核心在于德语单词 Geschlecht 的含义。一般来说，Geschlecht 被翻译成英语为“性别”。因此，说萨克斯-马索赫关注性别之间的关系似乎是常识。但 Geschlecht 也带有“种族”或“种类”的含义，在许多情况下，这是它的主要含义。例如，dasmenschliche Geschlecht 的最佳翻译是“人类种族/种类”。在萨克斯-马索赫的《流浪者》中，读者可以强烈地感受到作者如何巧妙地将 Geschlecht 的性别和种族含义编织进他的人类哲学中。这在《流浪者》中发生是具有意义的。这篇简短的作品是萨克斯-马索赫主要故事/小说集《该隐的遗产》的序言。Michael O’Pecko 将遗产描述为“一项雄心勃勃、未完成的小说集[其中]萨克斯-马索赫意图描绘‘人类所有最大的问题，存在的所有危险，人类的所有弊端’”（2003，第 181 页）。 Sacher-Masoch 的《遗产》计划是每六卷包含六个短篇小说/故事，分别探讨人类的主要痛苦：爱情、财产、国家、战争、工作和死亡。“流浪者”是这个循环的序言，几乎完全在《性别战争》的背景下阐述人类的问题。“流浪者”并不是通过男/女之间的爱情关系叙事来阐述这场战争，而是通过一个猎人射杀雄鹰的场景。

“The Wanderer” begins with an unnamed figure, who, one can presume, is the same unnamed protagonist who appears throughout the stories of Legacy, on a guided hunt in a Galician forest. The gamekeeper accompanying the protagonist sights an eagle, takes aim, and shoots it dead. When the bird’s carcass hits the earth, a wandering holy man appears, calling the hunters “Cain!” in “a voice as stern and mighty as the Lord” (2003d, p. 2). This wanderer, with the appearance of a “creature of superhuman wildness and strangeness,” has the following exchange with the hunting party:
“流浪者”从一位未命名的角色开始，可以推测这位未命名的角色就是贯穿《遗产》故事中的那位未命名的主人公，他在加利西亚森林中进行一次有向导的狩猎。陪同主人公的猎场管理员发现了一只鹰，瞄准并射杀了它。当鸟的尸体落地时，一位游荡的圣徒出现，用“如同主一样严厉而强大的声音”称呼猎人们为“该隐！”（2003d，第 2 页）。这位游荡者，外表像是一个“超凡脱俗的野性和怪异生物”，与狩猎队有以下对话：

“What have you profited by this Cain?” the wanderer turned to me and said after some time had passed, “Is your murderous lust stilled; are you satiated with the blood of your brother?”
“你从这得到了什么好处，该隐？”漫游者过了一会儿转向我说，“你的杀戮欲望平息了吗；你对你兄弟的鲜血感到满足了吗？”

“Isn’t the eagle a predator?” I quickly replied. “Doesn’t it murder the smaller and weaker members of its race [Geschlechts]? Isn’t it more a good work to kill him?”
“鹰不是捕食者吗？”我迅速回答，“它不是杀害其种族中较小和较弱的成员吗[性别]? 杀死他不是一件好事吗？”

“Yes, it is a murderer,” the peculiar old man sighed. “It spills blood like all creatures that live, but must we therefore do the same? I don’t murder, but you – yes – yes – you are of the race [Geschlechte] of Cain. I know you; you have the mark.” (2003d, p. 3)
“是的，它是一个凶手，”那个古怪的老人叹了口气。“它像所有生物一样流淌血液，但我们必须因此也这样做吗？我不杀人，但你——是的——是的——你是该隐的[性别]。我认识你；你有这个标记。”（2003d，第 3 页）

In this exchange, the central question posed to the children of Cain is how to relate to other Geschlechter. In this case, Geschlechter clearly includes animal kinds.
在这个交流中，向该隐的后代提出的核心问题是他们如何与其他性别相处。性别显然包括动物种类。

The wanderer continues to use metaphors of animal exploitation (yokes and whips) to describe his own experience as a child of Cain:
旅人继续用动物剥削（轭和鞭子）的隐喻来描述自己作为该隐之子的经历：

[…] I have understood how to live at the expense of others, from the sweat of my brothers, whom I have degraded into being my slaves, my tools, and I have not hesitated to pay for my pleasures and entertainments with the blood of strangers. But I have worn the yoke more than once, felt the whip, labored for others (2003d, p. 3).
[...] 我已经明白如何以他人的代价生活，从我的兄弟们的汗水中，我将他们贬低为我的奴隶，我的工具，我毫不犹豫地用陌生人的鲜血来支付我的快乐和娱乐。但我不止一次地承受过轭，感受过鞭打，为他人劳作（2003d，第 3 页）。

The killing of an animal incites the wanderer’s initial admonition. Is it merely figurative? If it is, then Sacher-Masoch’s thoughts on animals are perhaps not very interesting; perhaps he is merely emphasizing that he was “treated like an animal.”³ The yoke and the whip are often metaphors for oppression; but Sacher-Masoch is careful to qualify the problems involved with using these and like metaphors. He does so in order to remind readers that human/animal oppression is just as much a part of the legacy of Cain as intrahuman oppression is. For example, further on in “The Wanderer” Sacher-Masoch writes,
动物的杀害引发了漫游者的最初告诫。这仅仅是比喻吗？如果是，那么萨克斯-马索赫关于动物的思想可能并不很有趣；也许他只是在强调自己“被当作动物对待”。³ 马轭和鞭子通常是压迫的隐喻；但萨克斯-马索赫小心翼翼地限定使用这些以及类似隐喻的问题。他这样做是为了提醒读者，人类/动物压迫正如人与人之间的压迫一样，都是该隐遗产的一部分。例如，在《漫游者》中，萨克斯-马索赫进一步写道，

[A]s soon as the right to exploit lower organisms is permitted by necessity, by the drive for self-preservation, it’s not just restricted to man harnessing animals to the plow or killing them; it’s the stronger exploiting the weaker, the more talented the less talented, the stronger white race the colored races, the more capable, more educated, or by virtue of a benevolent fate, more developed peoples the less developed (2003d, p. 9).
[A]一当允许利用低等生物的权利是出于必要性，出于自我保护的驱使，这不仅仅局限于人类将动物用于耕作或杀死它们；这是强者剥削弱者，更有才能的剥削才能较弱的，白人种族剥削有色人种，更有能力、更有教育或由于仁慈的命运、更发达的民族剥削较不发达的民族（2003d，第9页）。

In this instance it is clear that the harnessing of animals to the plow is really one of the first steps toward justifying the exploitation of one group of humans by another. So the yoke and the whip should not be read merely as harmless metaphors for intrahuman oppressions; instead they act in a synecdotal way: the whip and the yoke are parts of a real oppression, human/animal oppression, that signify and even justify the entirety of oppression. Significantly for our understanding of Sacher-Masoch, the entirety of oppression begins with arguments justifying the exploitation of non-human animals by human ones. So although many thinkers support animal liberation as a subset of other liberation movements that target human liberation, Sacher-Masoch understands animal liberation as a necessary condition for building a society devoid of human oppression of other humans.
""" 在这个例子中，很明显，将动物用于犁耕实际上是走向合理化人类群体之间相互剥削的第一步。因此，轭和鞭子不应仅仅被视为人类内部压迫的无害隐喻；相反，它们以类推的方式发挥作用：鞭子和轭是真实压迫的一部分，包括人类/动物压迫，它们象征着甚至合理化了整个压迫。对于理解萨克斯-马索克来说，整个压迫始于为人类对非人类动物的剥削进行辩护的论点。因此，尽管许多思想家支持将动物解放视为旨在实现人类解放的其他解放运动的一个子集，但萨克斯-马索克认为，动物解放是构建一个没有人类对其他人类进行压迫的社会的必要条件。 """

So at the beginning of “The Wanderer,” Geschlecht’s primary usage is in terms of race or kind, and there is some evidence to suggest that animal liberation is one of the topics foreshadowed by Legacy’s prefacing tale. Sacher-Masoch’s thoughts on relations between die Geschlechter develop as an assertion that Nature has instilled in each living thing an instinct to “propagate the race [Geschlecht]” (2003d, p. 6) at the expense of others. Only once the wanderer introduces this natural, violent drive does love between a man and woman enter the picture. He describes love as a transcendental illusion designed, by “Mother” Nature, to compel propagation of the species. Interestingly, during this discussion of men and women, Sacher-Masoch uses a synonym for Geschlecht: Gattung.
在《流浪者》的开头，“性别”一词的主要用法是种族或种类，有证据表明，萨克斯-马索赫在其序言故事中预示了动物解放是其中一个主题。萨克斯-马索赫关于性别之间关系的思考，是一种断言，即自然在每个生物中注入了一种“繁衍种族[性别]”的本能（2003d，第6 页>）。只有当流浪者引入这种自然、暴力的驱动力后，男性和女性之间的爱情才进入画面。他将爱情描述为“母亲”自然设计的一种超越的幻觉，旨在强迫物种的繁衍。有趣的是，在讨论男性和女性时，萨克斯-马索赫使用了性别的同义词：种类。

It is a shameful insight for us that nature has placed this yearning in us only to make of us its blind, willing tools, for what does it care about us? It wants to propagate the race [Geschlecht]! When we’ve done carrying out nature’s intention, provided for the immortality of the race [Gattung], we can go to ruin, and nature has equipped woman with so much charm only so that she can force us to put on her yoke and say to us: ‘Work for me and my children.’ (2003d, p. 6)
它对我们来说是一个可耻的洞察，大自然将这种渴望植入我们心中，只是为了让我们成为它盲目而愿意的工具，它又何曾关心我们？它只想要种族[性别]的繁衍！当我们完成了大自然的意图，为种族[种类]的永生提供了保障，我们就可以走向毁灭，而大自然赋予女性如此多的魅力，只是为了让她能够强迫我们戴上她的轭，对我们说：“为我和孩子工作。”（2003d，第 6 页）

Here, readers discover that Sacher-Masoch’s Geschlecht is desensualized. In fact, one could argue that man’s eroticization and politicization of his relationship to other Geschlechter serves to blind him to the (sad) fact that Nature has no concern for any individual; all Nature cares about is propagation of the Gattung or type. The individual, especially the individual who wants to believe in personal freedom, eroticizes this relationship to escape the deterministic manner in which one is driven to serve the biological drive to reproduce one’s kind. This, I see as precisely Sacher-Masoch’s point throughout his “women-with-whips” stories—the erotic is a tool or illusion used to keep others from recognizing starkly oppressive relationships.⁴
在这里，读者发现萨克斯-马索克的《性别》被去感性化。事实上，可以争论说，男性对与其他性别关系的性化和政治化，使他忽视了（悲哀的）事实：自然对任何个体都没有关心；自然所关心的只是物种或类型的繁衍。特别是那些想要相信个人自由的个体，通过性化这种关系来逃避被生物驱使去繁殖自己种类的那种决定论的方式。我认为这正是萨克斯-马索克在其“鞭打女人”故事中的观点——性爱是一种工具或幻觉，用来阻止他人认识到赤裸裸的压迫性关系。⁴

 In The Man Who Re-Enlisted, this philosophy is summarized by the narrator, Frinko Balaban, who speaks as the voice of Sacher-Masoch, attempting to demystify the erotic relationship:
在《重征入伍者》中，这种哲学由叙述者弗林科·巴兰（Frinko Balaban）总结，他以萨克斯-马索克的声音讲话，试图阐明性爱关系：

These days, people are always talking about what humans have in common with animals, aren’t they?
这些天，人们总是在谈论人类与动物有哪些共同之处，不是吗？

Well, I’m telling you, relationships between men and women are about nothing but the struggle to survive, like everywhere else. (2003a, p. 109)
告诉你，男人和女人之间的关系就是关于生存的斗争，就像其他地方一样。（2003a，第 109 页）

Here again, Sacher-Masoch frames the mark of Cain, the natural drive to oppress another being in the very act of embracing one’s own life, in terms of human-nonhuman animal relationships. Like the murdered eagle of “The Wanderer,” here the animal – or better, the concept “animality” or “the animal” – represents the unthinking desire to live at the expense of others. Geschlecht is a term that demystifies the man/woman relationship so that the individuals can see it for what it is—a fiercely combative, brutal relation. Further on in The Man Who Re-Enlisted, such a comparison reappears when Balaban describes the man who marries without honest love as an “animal.” “The animal” world is then a world in which the starkness of the war amongst kinds is allowed to manifest itself either without the illusion (“honest love”) that generally conceals it or when the human animal willfully ignores Nature’s employment of these illusions (love, the state, death, etc.) to justify the oppressive relationships that a human is in or about to enter.
在这里，萨克斯-马索克将该隐的标记——在拥抱自己生命的同时压制另一个生命的自然冲动——用人类与非人类动物之间的关系来表述。就像《漫游者》中被谋杀的老鹰一样，这里的动物——或者更确切地说，“动物性”或“动物”这一概念——代表了以牺牲他人为代价生活的无意识欲望。 “性别”一词消除了男/女关系中的神秘感，使个体能够看清其本质——一种激烈对抗的、残酷的关系。在《重征者》中，这样的比较再次出现，当巴兰巴描述一个没有真诚爱情的婚姻者时，称其为“动物”。“动物”的世界是一个允许种类之间战争之残酷性显现的世界，要么是没有这种通常掩盖它的幻想（真诚的爱情），要么是人类动物故意忽视自然利用这些幻想（爱情、国家、死亡等）来为处于或即将进入的压迫性关系辩护。

Human Exceptionalism
人类卓越论

Sacher-Masoch’s position that belief in everlasting bonds, like love or marriage,⁵ merely masks “the animal” is itself interesting, as these values are generally used to differentiate the human from the animal world. But what is more interesting is that because the human animal is the only animal biologically determined to create such ideals, humans become most “animal,” most biologically human, at precisely the time that they let themselves be blinded by their own ideals. So human ability to see beyond the Krieg der Geschlechter does not oppose humans to animals; instead, it allows humans to see the political work performed by the phrase/concept “the animal” in its most “animalistic” form. What I mean by this, is that the speciesist use of the phrase “the animal,” according to Sacher-Masoch, enables humans to justify their biological, (i.e. animalistic), drive to create concepts and use them to oppress others. So uttering “the animal” as a way of distinguishing oneself from other Geschlechter is perhaps the most “savage,” “brutal,” “animalistic” form of living off the blood of others.
《萨克斯-马索赫认为，对永恒纽带，如爱情或婚姻的信仰，仅仅掩盖了“动物性”，这一点本身就很有趣，因为这些价值观通常被用来区分人类与动物世界。但更有趣的是，因为人类动物是唯一一种生物上决定创造这些理想的动物，人类在让自己被自己的理想所蒙蔽的时刻，变得最为“动物性”，最为生物上的人类。因此，人类超越“性别之战”的能力并不将人类与动物对立起来；相反，它使人类能够看到“动物”一词/概念在其最“动物性”形式中所进行的政治工作。我的意思是，根据萨克斯-马索赫的说法，物种主义对“动物”一词的使用，使人类能够为自己的生物（即动物性）驱动力辩护，并利用这些概念来压迫他人。》 所以用“动物”来区分自己与他人可能是最“野蛮”、“残忍”、“动物性”的靠吸取他人鲜血为生的形式。

It is not “the human” that makes the human exceptional in relation to the binary term “the animal.” Instead, the human becomes exceptional only because it can recognize how one’s love of life and the ideals one holds in it produce the deaths of others. To Sacher-Masoch, the human does not gain special status in the cosmos because of this. Although human exceptionalism, especially since Descartes, is the principle most frequently invoked to justify human domination of animals, Sacher-Masoch asserts an alternative perspective. For Sacher-Masoch, the special human power of creating abstractions masquerading as timeless ideals is the human’s most animalistic trait in that it functions to keep us in predator/prey relations. Only with this recognition can humans renounce fighting in the name of their kind and become distinct/ special in kind. This recognition, rather than making humans superior to other animals, prohibits oppression of other animals, positing them as our brothers and sisters, or “kin.” In sum, humans become distinct/ special/ exceptional once they stop living through the deaths of other Geschlechter.
""" 人类之所以在“人”与“动物”的二分法中显得卓越，并非“人”本身。人类之所以卓越，仅仅是因为它能认识到自己对生活的热爱以及所持有的理想如何导致他人的死亡。对于萨克斯-马索克来说，人类并非因此而在宇宙中获得特殊地位。尽管自笛卡尔以来，人类卓越论经常被用来为人类对动物的统治辩护，但萨克斯-马索克提出了另一种观点。在萨克斯-马索克看来，人类创造抽象概念并假扮成永恒理想的特殊能力，是其最动物性的特质，因为它使我们保持在捕食者/猎物关系中。只有通过这种认识，人类才能放弃以自己种类为名而战，并在种类上变得独特/特殊。这种认识，并非使人类优于其他动物，而是禁止对其他动物的压迫，将它们视为我们的兄弟姐妹，或“亲人”。 """“总的来说，人类一旦不再通过其他人的死亡来生活，就会变得独特/特殊/卓越。”性别.

Sacher-Masoch often uses readers’ sympathy for animals to indicate the problematic nature of Nature itself. In Moonlight, for example, Olga comes to understand the need to fully embrace her being as a child of Cain only after she kills five birds on a pleasure hunt. Further on, Olga expresses her freedom as a child of Cain by hosting a rabbit chase. Sacher-Masoch describes Olga during the hare’s final moments:
萨克斯-马索克经常利用读者对动物的同情来暗示自然本身的病态。例如，在《月光》中，奥尔加在一场娱乐狩猎中杀死五只鸟之后，才完全理解作为该隐之子需要完全接受自己的身份。之后，奥尔加通过举办一场兔子追逐来展示作为该隐之子的自由。萨克斯-马索克在兔子最后时刻描述奥尔加：

She laughed like a child that watches a ball fly through the air when the greyhounds finally tossed the animal, screaming with the fear of death, into the air. In all eyes, there was admiration for the bold horsewoman. Her vanity celebrated a new orgy, and it was, of course, only a poor hare that breathed its last at her feet. (2003b, p. 147)
她像看球飞过天空的孩子一样大笑，当猎犬最终将这只动物，带着对死亡的恐惧，扔向空中时。在所有人的眼中，都对这位勇敢的女骑手表示钦佩。她的虚荣心庆祝了一场新的狂欢，当然，只是那只在她脚下断气的可怜野兔。（2003b，第 147 页）

In The Man Who Reinlisted, Sacher-Masoch even uses the common Victorian image of the helplessly beaten horse to establish the morally superior position of Balaban, who steps in to end the beating (2003a, p. 99). So Sacher-Masoch has what appears to be a rather ambivalent relationship to “the animal.” On the one hand it is “the animal” who lives heartlessly off the life, work, and death of others; on the other, the animal is the being through whom humans can come to understand something about moral goodness in the face of a blind, cruel Nature. Understanding the difference between the conceptual work of the term “animal” and animals themselves unwinds this ambivalence to demonstrate that Sacher-Masoch remains critical of the animalistic, brutal, etc. (all that “the animal” entails), opening a space for thinking of real, non-violent relationships with living animals.
《重返军役的男人》中，萨克斯-马索赫甚至运用了维多利亚时代常见的无助受鞭打的马的形象，来确立巴拉班道德上的优越地位，他介入其中，结束了鞭打（2003a，第 99 页）。因此，萨克斯-马索赫对“动物”的关系似乎相当矛盾。一方面，“动物”无情地依赖他人的生命、工作和死亡为生；另一方面，动物是人们通过它来理解面对盲目、残酷的自然时道德善的存在的存在。理解“动物”这一术语的概念性工作与动物本身之间的区别，可以解开这种矛盾，表明萨克斯-马索赫仍然对动物性的、残忍的等（所有“动物”所包含的内容）持批判态度，为思考与活生生的动物建立真实、非暴力的关系开辟了空间。 

Sacher-Masoch’s animal is not, and I stress this, merely an emblem or a figure representing an idyllic relation between human and human. In short, the non-human animals of his literature are not mere allegorical figures. Animals are in no uncertain terms real, living things for Sacher-Masoch, at least as real as other humans. Remember that Sacher-Masoch believed that the desire to justify the subjugation of another life form ultimately leads humans to rationalize that the stronger human could oppress the weaker or the richer the stronger. So if anything, humans’ relationships with other humans constitute a romanticized construct based upon the human’s real, and currently violent, relationships with animals. In Sacher-Masoch’s work, learning to “do one’s duty” or “rely upon the work of your own hands”—in short, the supreme virtues for Sacher-Masoch—begins with reassessing one’s relationship to other animals, or even learning how to have such relationships. For example, Balaban, after fighting to liberate the people from feudal law, returns home to “do his duty.” This includes setting up a bee garden (and studying bees’ behavior), and raising two wolf half-breeds and a tomcat he pulled out of the water (2003a, p. 107). In a more overtly philosophical way, the conversation between Olga and Vladimir after the incident at the rabbit hunt forces reassessment. Immediately following Olga’s rapture at the hare’s death scene, Olga encounters the disapproving stare of Vladimir Podolev, Moonlight’s voice of Sacher-Masoch. Vladimir accuses her of being “either completely heartless or completely unthinking” for delighting “in the death struggles of an animal” (2003b, p. 147). Olga, humiliated by the accusation of thoughtlessness, asks Vladimir to explain, by posing the following question, “Do you believe that man has no right to kill animals?” Vladimir’s response is most telling:
《萨克斯-马索赫的动物并非，我必须强调这一点，仅仅是一个象征或代表人与人之间理想关系的形象。简而言之，他文学中的非人类动物并非仅仅是寓言形象。对于萨克斯-马索赫来说，动物无疑是真实、有生命的存在，至少和其他人类一样真实。记住，萨克斯-马索赫认为，试图为奴役其他生命形式的欲望最终会导致人类合理化，认为强者可以压迫弱者，或者强者可以压迫更富有的弱者。因此，如果有什么不同的话，人类与其他人类之间的关系构成了一个基于人类与动物真实且目前暴力的关系的浪漫化结构。在萨克斯-马索赫的作品中，学会“尽本分”或“依靠自己的双手劳动”——简而言之，这是萨克斯-马索赫认为的最高美德——始于重新评估自己与其他动物的关系，或者学习如何建立这样的关系。例如，巴尔班在为解放人民摆脱封建法律而战斗后，回到家中“尽本分”。” 这包括建立一个蜂园（并研究蜜蜂的行为），以及饲养两只狼半血统和一只他从水中救出的家猫（2003a，第 107 页）。在兔子狩猎事件之后，奥加和弗拉基米尔之间的对话以一种更为明显的哲学方式迫使人们进行反思。在奥加对兔子死亡场面的狂喜之后，奥加遇到了弗拉基米尔·波多列夫不满的目光，月光沙赫-马斯奥克的声音。弗拉基米尔指责她“要么完全无情，要么完全无思想”，因为她“在动物的死亡挣扎中感到快乐”（2003b，第 147 页）。奥加因被指责为无思想而感到羞辱，她要求弗拉基米尔解释，提出了以下问题，“你认为人类是否有权杀死动物？”” 弗拉基米尔的回答最为关键：

I wasn’t talking about killing, but about hounding and tormenting. In general one shouldn’t talk about rights in this world; necessity is all that matters, for it rules everything. In the end, man must live and kill in order to live. If he lives off plants, he kills them, too, for even plants have life. He must kill animals, but he should do no more than is necessary, he shouldn’t torment them, for animals have a will, feelings, and a mind like we do. They think, if not as sophisticatedly as we do, and to delight in their torment is not much better than slaughtering gladiators at the circus. (2003b, p. 148)
我不是在谈论杀人，而是在谈论追捕和折磨。总的来说，在这个世界上，我们不应该谈论权利；必要性才是统治一切的东西。最终，人类必须为了生存而生活和杀人。如果他靠植物为生，他也会杀死它们，因为植物也有生命。他必须杀死动物，但他不应该做得过多，不应该折磨它们，因为动物也有意志、情感和思想，就像我们一样。它们会思考，即使不如我们那么复杂，但以它们的痛苦为乐并不比在马戏团屠杀角斗士好多少。（2003b，第 148 页）

Olga’s response to this chiding is to wrap “herself sullenly in her fur” and roll “up like a spider whose net has been torn” (2003b, p. 149).
奥尔加对这种责备的反应是“闷闷不乐地裹上她的皮毛”，然后“蜷缩起来，就像一个网被撕破的蜘蛛”（2003b，第 149 页）。

 The fur and spider analogy here is significant. Whose fur is it that she curls up within, and how did she acquire it? Having just read an admonishment to be thinking about animals, the reader can only regard these metaphors as harmless by asserting the logic of speciesism⁶ or by intellectually disconnecting fur from its source. The animalistic Olga’s reactions to Vladimir indicate that human cruelty is what is “animal” about humans. While Olga admittedly is an animal no longer bound within the cage of biological determinism, insofar as she rejects all illusions and decides for a nihilistic form of domination, she will become crueler than any “animal” can be. The narrator reveals that Olga’s response was to make Vladimir “her prey”; he would “be surrounded by nets and then pursued like a fox” (2003b, p. 149). So by donning furs, Olga literally becomes animal, not necessarily in Deleuze’s sense of this phrase, but in the sense that she is about to take on the mark of Cain as her own, to adopt all of the stereotypical meanings of “animal.” She will become “the animal” that she is: the cruel human huntress. These furs also indicate that neither she, nor the reader who reads them as symbolic objects, has gained the animal consciousness Vladimir tries to provoke. Instead, Vladimir’s comment in the name of animals elicits the response of the human-animal attacked, “the animal” whose web of ideals has been torn, whose flesh shows under her fur. Human Geschlecht is attacked by Vladimir’s statement; and Olga, in the name of her kind, becomes animal, readies herself to live off of another.
""" 这里的毛皮和蜘蛛的比喻意义重大。她蜷缩在谁的毛皮里，又是如何得到它的？刚刚读到关于思考动物的告诫，读者只能通过主张物种主义逻辑，或者通过从智力上将毛皮与其来源断开联系，来认为这些比喻是无害的。⁶ 动物般的奥尔加对弗拉基米尔的反应表明，人类的残酷才是人类“动物”的一面。虽然奥尔加确实不再受生物决定论的牢笼束缚，因为她拒绝所有幻想，选择了虚无主义的支配形式，但她将比任何“动物”都要残酷。叙述者揭示，奥尔加的反应是将弗拉基米尔变成“她的猎物”；他会“被网围困，然后像狐狸一样被追逐”（2003b，第 149 页）。因此，通过穿上毛皮，奥尔加字面意义上变成了动物，不一定是在德勒兹所说的这个短语的意义上，而是在她即将将该词的所有典型含义作为自己的标记，接受所有“动物”的象征意义。 """”她将成为“她所是的那种动物”：残忍的人类猎手。这些皮毛也表明，她，以及阅读这些作为象征性对象的读者，都没有获得弗拉基米尔试图激发的动物意识。相反，弗拉基米尔以动物的名义发表的评论引发了被人类-动物攻击者的反应，“那个动物”，其理想的网被撕裂，其肉体在皮毛下显露。人类 性别 被弗拉基米尔的陈述攻击；奥加以她所属的类别之名，成为动物，准备从另一个生物身上吸取养分。

 Sacher-Masoch’s position is clearly that animals are to be thought of as fellow travelers, perhaps even companions, in an otherwise cruel state of Nature. There might be some temptation to claim that the author’s use of the animal as a metaphor for savagery contradicts his own message that we should respect them, but as I have demonstrated, Sacher-Masoch explicitly claims that animals are not to be treated cruelly, that they can and should be viewed as companions, and that they possess a faculty akin to consciousness. In his own day, these positions would have placed him amongst the most progressive animal rights activists. In spite of this, there is no question that Sacher-Masoch does believe that human beings are exceptional. This human specialness is twofold. First, humankind manifests itself with special cruelty, and second, humans are the only kind of animal that can renounce Geschlecht altogether. Humans generally experience Nature’s cruelty as disappointment when certain transcendental ideals, like love and marriage, fail. In their failure, these uniquely human ideals disclose that they only exist to trick us into propagating the human race. The human is exceptional in its unique ability to renounce its defining trait, the ability to create ideals, a renunciation that begins, for Sacher-Masoch by disavowing allegiance to “kind,” whether understood as species or gender or clan. The old man from “The Wanderer,” Balaban of The Man Who Reenlisted, and Vladimir from Moonlight are exemplary characters who adopt this moral position. Unfortunately, because these works are little read or commented upon outside the German-speaking world, these examples have been largely overlooked by animal rights proponents and activists.
萨克斯-马索赫的观点显然是，动物应被视为自然界的同行者，甚至可能是伴侣。有人可能会认为，作者将动物作为野蛮的隐喻与他自己的信息——我们应该尊重它们——相矛盾，但正如我所证明的，萨克斯-马索赫明确表示，动物不应受到虐待，它们可以也应该被视为伴侣，并且它们拥有类似于意识的能力。在他自己的时代，这些立场会使他成为最进步的动物权利活动家之一。尽管如此，毫无疑问，萨克斯-马索赫确实相信人类是独特的。这种人类特殊性有两方面。首先，人类表现出特殊的残忍，其次，人类是唯一能够完全放弃性别的动物。人类通常将自然的残忍视为失望，当某些超越的理想，如爱情和婚姻，失败时。在这些独特的理想失败中，人类揭示了它们的存在只是为了诱使我们繁衍人类。 人类在放弃其定义特征——创造理想的能力方面表现得尤为独特,这种放弃对于萨克斯-马索克来说，就是放弃对“种类”的忠诚，无论这种“种类”是指物种、性别还是部落。《漫游者》中的老人、《重征》中的巴拉班，以及《月光》中的弗拉基米尔是采用这种道德立场的典型人物。遗憾的是，由于这些作品在德语世界之外鲜为人知或被评论，这些例子在很大程度上被动物权利倡导者和活动家忽视了。

Moral Responsibilities, Rights, and Animals
道德责任、权利与动物

 Human Geschlecht, insofar as it can renounce the moral relevancy of kinds or types, is exceptional and assumes special responsibilities as a result. To use Tom Regan’s language, Sacher-Masoch’s humans have a certain “agency” that most animals do not have—they can renounce their biology. Introducing language from animal rights discourses is helpful for illustrating Sacher-Masoch’s argument. For him, most animals are moral patients. The argument the hunter of “The Wanderer” implicitly makes in calling the eagle a murderer is that the eagle, insofar as it does not respect moral law, deserves no moral consideration from the hunter. In The Case for Animal Rights, Regan formulates a response to this argument that resembles Sacher-Masoch’s. Regan differentiates between moral agents and moral patients. A moral agent is capable of doing right or wrong because of its rational agency—its capacity to recognize and make rational choices. A moral patient, a being without rational agency, though capable of performing acts that, if performed by a moral agent, would be considered wrong or criminal is not strictly capable of doing right or wrong. Regan formulates his argument as follows:
人类格尔夫，在它能够否认种类或类型的道德相关性时，是独特的，并因此承担着特殊责任。用汤姆·雷根的语言来说，萨克斯-马索赫的人类拥有某种“能动性”，大多数动物都不具备——它们可以否认自己的生物学。引入动物权利话语的语言有助于说明萨克斯-马索赫的论点。对他来说，大多数动物都是道德病人。在《动物权利论案》中，雷根对这种论点作出了回应，这与萨克斯-马索赫的论点相似。雷根区分了道德代理人和道德病人。道德代理人能够行善或作恶，因为它具有理性能动性——它识别和做出理性选择的能力。 道德病人，一个没有理性能力的行为者，尽管能够执行如果由道德行为者执行将被视为错误或犯罪的行为，但并不严格地能够做对或错。瑞根将他的论点表述如下：

Moral patients cannot do what is right or wrong, we have said, and in this respect they differ fundamentally from moral agents. But moral patients can be on the receiving end of right or wrong acts of moral agents, and so in this respect resemble moral agents. A brutal beating administered to a child, for example, is wrong, even if the child herself can do no wrong. […] Unlike the case of the relationship that holds between moral agents, then, the relationship that holds between moral agents, on the one hand, and moral patients, on the other, is not reciprocal. (2004, p. 154)
道德受动者无法行善或作恶，我们曾说过，在这方面它们与道德行为者有根本的不同。但是，道德受动者可以是道德行为者行善或作恶行为的承受者，因此在这方面与道德行为者相似。例如，对一个孩子的残忍殴打是错误的，即使孩子本身无法作恶。那么，与道德行为者之间的关系不同，道德行为者与道德受动者之间的关系不是相互的。（2004，第 154 页）

Moreover, for Sacher-Masoch at least, moral patients are capable of acting in ways that are undesirable and would be wrong if performed by a moral agent. So the eagle can innocently carry out an act, such as killing, for which we would otherwise blame a moral agent, like the hunter. Moreover, the fact that the eagle must kill does not make killing any more or less desirable. Killing is wrong insofar as every moral agent who can deliberately avoid killing is required to do so. On this important point, the wanderer and Vladimir differ. The wanderer apparently knows how to live without killing (assuming that we can take him at his word); but Vladimir, who suggests that everything must kill in order to live, does not appear to know this. Vladimir’s comments imply that when killing is necessary, the human, who is usually a moral agent, reverts to becoming a moral patient, even when the thing killed has morally relevant traits like thoughts or feelings. This echoes Kant’s famous “ought implies can” principle, which asserts that one can only be held morally responsible for acts that are practically possible (in Sacher-Masoch’s case, biologically possible) to perform. So Sacher-Masoch’s argument is that (1) killing⁷ is always undesirable, (2) killing is morally wrong when performed by a moral agent, (3) one is a moral agent whenever one deliberately chooses between killing or not killing (4) one who kills becomes a moral patient only when killing is necessary for life, and (5) the best moral state is living without killing. Sacher-Masoch’s humans become exceptional precisely because they can recognize that (1) combined with their moral agency means they are morally responsible for killing whenever that killing is unnecessary. The truly exceptional human aspires to (5) because this allows for moral agency at all times.
此外，至少对于萨赫-马斯洛克来说，道德上的病人也能以令人不齿的方式行事，如果由道德代理人执行，这些行为将是错误的。因此，老鹰可以无辜地执行像杀戮这样的行为，我们通常会对猎人这样的道德代理人进行谴责。此外，老鹰必须杀戮的事实并不使杀戮变得更有或更少吸引力。只要每个能够故意避免杀戮的道德代理人都有义务这样做，杀戮就是错误的。在这个重要的观点上，漫游者和弗拉基米尔有所不同。漫游者显然知道如何在不杀戮的情况下生活（如果我们相信他的话）；而弗拉基米尔则暗示，为了生存，一切都必须杀戮，这似乎他并不知道这一点。《span id=0>弗拉基米尔的话暗示，当杀戮是必要的时，通常作为道德代理人的人类，即使在被杀的东西具有道德上相关的特质，如思想或情感时，也会退化为道德上的病人。这呼应了康德的著名“应当意味着能够”原则，该原则断言，一个人只能对其实际上可能（在萨赫-马斯洛克的案例中，在生物学上可能）执行的行为承担道德责任。 萨克斯-马索赫的论点是：（1）杀戮总是不可取的，（2）当道德代理人进行杀戮时，杀戮在道德上是错误的，（3）只要一个人在杀戮或不杀戮之间做出有意识的抉择，那么这个人就是一个道德代理人，（4）只有在杀戮对于生命是必要的时候，杀戮者才成为道德上的病人，（5）最好的道德状态是生活在不杀戮之中。萨克斯-马索赫笔下的人类之所以非凡，正是因为他们能够认识到（1）与他们的道德代理性相结合意味着他们在任何杀戮不必要的时候都要对杀戮承担道德责任。真正非凡的人类追求（5），因为这允许他们在任何时候都拥有道德代理权。

 One of the advantages of Sacher-Masoch’s argument is that it accounts for what appears to be a selective blindness regarding animals in his work. As much as Sacher-Masoch is a proponent of animal welfare, at times he seems to abandon this position. Even his most noble characters are clothed in sheepskin and furs and regularly eat meat and utilize work animals. This appears to be an exemplary case of what Francione characterizes as humans’ “moral schizophrenia” regarding animals. Of this, Francione writes, “There is a profound disparity between what we say we believe about animals, and how we actually treat them. On the one hand, we claim to take their interests seriously. […] On the other hand, our actual treatment stands in stark contrast to our proclamations about our regard for their moral status” (2000, pp. xix-xx). Sacher-Masoch’s argument about moral agency shields him against much of the force of Francione’s charge, because the vast majority of his characters have no access to a historical position that would allow them to transcend their local cultural norms regarding how to dress, eat, and work. Moreover, few of them have access to the economic means to create the changes necessary to implement such lifestyle changes, even if they wanted to, and many of the means by which some people currently limit animal use and cruelty (meat substitutes, machines, etc.) were simply not available in 19^th-century Galicia. The upshot is that most of Sacher-Masoch’s characters become moral patients under premise (4) in his argument. Because they cannot live without exploiting or killing, they fall under the Vladimir clause: killing is allowed when it fulfills the basic needs of life, and then one is resigned to adopt the mark of Cain.
萨克斯-马索赫的论点的优势之一在于，它解释了他作品中关于动物所表现出的选择性盲点。尽管萨克斯-马索赫是动物福利的倡导者，但有时他似乎放弃了这一立场。即使是他的最崇高的人物也穿着羊皮和毛皮，并经常食用肉类，利用工作动物。这似乎是弗朗西奥尼所描述的人类对动物“道德分裂”的典型例子。弗朗西奥尼写道：“我们在动物问题上的言论与实际对待它们的方式之间存在着深刻的差异。一方面，我们声称认真对待它们的利益。另一方面，我们的实际待遇与我们对它们道德地位的宣言形成鲜明对比”（2000 年，第 xix-xx 页）。萨克斯-马索赫关于道德能力的论点使他免受弗朗西奥尼指控的大部分冲击，因为他的大多数角色都无法接触到一种历史立场，使他们能够超越当地关于如何穿衣、饮食和工作的文化规范。 此外，其中一些人甚至没有经济手段去创造必要的改变以实施这种生活方式，即使他们愿意，而且一些目前限制动物使用和残忍行为（如肉替代品、机器等）的手段在 19世纪加利西亚根本就不存在。结果是，萨克斯-马索赫的大部分角色都成为他论证中的道德病人。因为他们无法不剥削或杀害而生活，所以他们落入弗拉基米尔条款：当杀害满足基本生活需求时，人们就必须接受该隐的标记。

 At this point, it is helpful to be reminded that the action of a moral patient may, when viewed from the perspective of agency, itself be wrong or undesirable even if it is performed by a moral patient. For example, if a toddler, who is a moral patient, tortures a frog, we allow that the toddler is not morally reprehensible. This however does not mean that we condone frog torture; nor does it mean that we should not try to keep this toddler away from frogs once we know that it is likely that he will torture them. This reconciles Vladimir’s position with that of the wanderer, who claims that killing and exploitation are always wrong and that permitting them on the grounds of necessity is the first step toward permitting humans’ oppressions of other humans. It would seem that Sacher-Masoch, if we are to create a functional position from his various mouthpieces, must never condone animal cruelty or killing even if the responsible actor cannot be accused of animal torture or murder on grounds of moral patient status. So he seems to have his cake and eat it too. He can at once say that killing is always wrong, while simultaneously allowing killing for the sake of survival. This position, though pessimistic, fits well with Sacher-Masoch’s sentiments regarding existence as a whole, which he describes as a perpetual penance, leading Helen Zimmern to conclude that “his pessimism is resigned idealism” (1879, p. 201).
在这个阶段，提醒大家，从行为者的角度来看，一个道德受体的行为本身可能是错误的或不可取的，即使这个行为是由道德受体完成的。例如，如果一个道德受体的幼儿折磨青蛙，我们承认这个幼儿在道德上并不应受到谴责。但这并不意味着我们赞同青蛙的折磨；这也不意味着一旦我们知道这个幼儿很可能会折磨青蛙，我们就应该不采取任何措施来阻止他接近青蛙。这调和了弗拉基米尔的立场与漫游者的立场，漫游者认为杀戮和剥削总是错误的，而以必要性为理由允许这些行为是允许人类压迫其他人类的开始。似乎萨克斯-马索赫，如果我们从他的各种代言人中构建一个可行的立场，就必须永远不赞同动物虐待或杀戮，即使负责的行为者不能因为道德受体的地位而受到动物虐待或谋杀的指控。因此，他似乎既想占便宜又想吃蛋糕。他可以同时说杀戮总是错误的，同时允许为了生存而杀戮。 虽然悲观，但这个职位与萨克斯-马索赫对整个存在的描述相吻合，他将存在描述为永久的赎罪，这使得海伦·齐默恩得出结论：“他的悲观是一种顺从的理想主义”（1879，第 201 页）。

 The New Job suggests that this reconciling of the wanderer’s and Vladimir’s positions is consistent with Sacher-Masoch’s overarching view of animals. Published in 1878, The New Job recounts the life of the peasant Theofil Pisarenko. The reader follows Theofil’s story from serfdom to his liberation and ascent to bourgeois freedom. Of importance in regard to animal rights, his story, as recounted by the narrator, is also bookended by his associations with animals. At the sounds of Theofil’s birth, “the cow bellowed, the horse pawed and neighed and the cock lifted himself, flapped his wings, and crowed” (1891, p. 4) to herald Theofil’s arrival in the world. Even as a child he showed great concern for animals and their welfare. He and his playmate Xenia
《新工作》表明，这种流浪者和弗拉基米尔的立场的一致性符合萨克斯-马索赫对动物的总体观点。这部作品于 1878 年出版，《新工作》讲述了农民泰奥菲尔·皮萨连科的一生。读者跟随泰奥菲尔的经历，从农奴到解放，再到资产阶级的自由。就动物权利而言，他的故事，正如叙述者所讲述的，也以他与动物的关联为开端和结尾。在泰奥菲尔出生的声音中，“母牛哞哞叫，马踢蹄子并嘶鸣，公鸡抬起头，拍打翅膀并啼鸣”（1891，第 4 页），以宣布泰奥菲尔降临人世。即使在孩提时代，他也表现出对动物及其福利的极大关注。他和他的玩伴谢尼娅

[…] looked at ants and bees who worked so indefatigably about them, or watched a drone who, with his little black head peeping out of his yellow fur jacket, his brown legs shimmering in the sun, would bury himself in a little calyx, suck the honey, then buzz over the flowers, sip from this one, flutter over that, all in the greatest hurry and confusion. […] They would build houses in the water of the large stones, cover them with branches, and let the little fish which they caught live in them. They told each other stories about their pets; Xenia praised her lambs, Theofil his horses. (1891, p. 8)
他们观察蚂蚁和蜜蜂不知疲倦地忙碌着，或者注视着一只甲虫，它那小小的黑色头部从黄色的毛皮夹克中探出，棕色的腿在阳光下闪闪发光，它会钻进一个小花托，吮吸蜂蜜，然后嗡嗡地飞到花朵上，从这个花上吸一口，飞到那个花上，忙乱而慌张。他们会在大石头上的水中建造房屋，用树枝覆盖它们，让它们捕捉的小鱼在其中生活。他们互相讲述关于自己宠物的故事；克谢尼娅夸赞她的羊羔，泰奥菲尔夸赞他的马。（1891，第 8 页）

The passage continues to describe how carefully Xenia and Theofil protected their pets from the sun and insects while they grazed in the fields. Toward the end of the novel, the narrator points out that Theofil and his wife, during their twilight years, “would sit under the large apple tree—a spot filled with bitter memories—and watch their grandson as he sits astride the wolf-dog” (1891, pp. 265-266). This description is important not only because it suggests that his posterity will have a unique relationship with animals, but also because it subtly reminds readers that Theofil never forgot that he buried his dog Brytan, a dog whom the narrator introduces as one of Theofil’s only three true friends (1891, pp. 201-204), beneath this very apple tree.
文章继续描述了赛尼亚和泰奥菲洛如何小心翼翼地保护他们的宠物免受阳光和昆虫的侵害，在田野里放牧。在小说的结尾部分，叙述者指出，在晚年，泰奥菲洛和他的妻子会坐在一棵大苹果树下——一个充满苦涩记忆的地方——看着他们的孙子骑在狼狗身上（1891 年，第 265-266 页）。这一描述不仅表明他的后代将与动物有独特的联系，而且微妙地提醒读者，泰奥菲洛从未忘记，他把自己的狗布赖坦——叙述者将其介绍为泰奥菲洛仅有的三个真正的朋友之一（1891 年，第 201-204 页）——埋在了这棵苹果树下。

In many ways, Theofil’s entire life is marked by his relationship to animals. This is explained in the final lines of the novel, where Theofil says that the Galician “peasants were treated worse than brutes” (1891, p. 270). In retrospect, many of The New Job’s uses of animals are meant to reinforce this sentiment. For example, in one scene the lord of the manor uses his riding whip to drive a young Theofil and the other children from the school house, then forces the schoolmaster to teach the lord’s hunting dogs “the famous tricks that wise dogs learn” (1891, p. 13) instead. The lord emphasizes the animal-like nature of the peasant children by asking, “What do these curs need to be taught?” (1891, p. 13). In another example, Sacher-Masoch recounts “the days when noblemen treated their servants like cattle, when Marina Tartakowska wished to hunt and, there being no game, she would have skins of bears, wolves, lynxes, and other animals put on her peasants and then set the dogs upon them to hunt them to death” (1891, p. 100).
在许多方面，Theofil 的一生都与他与动物的关系紧密相连。这一点在小说的最后几行得到了阐述，Theofil 说加利西亚的“农民比野兽还受待遇差”（1891 年，第 270 页）。回顾起来，《新工作》中对动物的运用意在强化这种情感。例如，在一个场景中，庄园主用他的马鞭将年轻的 Theofil 和其他孩子从学校赶走，然后强迫校长教庄园主的猎狗“那些聪明的狗会学的著名技巧”（1891 年，第 13 页）。庄园主通过问“这些狗杂种需要学什么？”（1891 年，第 13 页）来强调农民孩子的动物般本质。在另一个例子中，Sacher-Masoch 讲述了“那些贵族把仆人当牛马一样对待的日子，当 Marina Tartakowska 想狩猎时，因为没有猎物，她会让人把熊、狼、猞猁和其他动物的皮放在她的农民身上，然后让狗去猎杀他们至死”（1891 年，第 100 页）。

Generally, when people say that they were treated like an animal they are claiming that they were treated cruelly; but almost never is this phrase intended to prompt the persons addressed to reconsider their treatment of animals. For Sacher-Masoch, however, as seen in the above examples, human characters are literally interchangeable with animals. There is almost too little distance between animals and peasants to warrant a claim that the relationship is merely metaphorical. In The New Job’s most overt comparison of the peasant to the brute, Theofil must actually bear the yoke and plow the lord’s field. Saborski, the lord of the manor, decided to “turn poor Pisarenko’s life into a living hell” (1891, p. 140) by forcing him to plow his fields day after day. Eventually, one of Theofil’s horses goes lame, leaving only one, who has fallen sick, to plow. Once Theofil recognizes that the remaining horse is too sick to work, he wonders to himself, “How should he who could be so cruel to his fellow-creatures [Saborski] have mercy for the brute?” (1891, p. 141). Theofil, who has empathy for the horse, seems to be applying the ought-implies-can principle here. Since Saborski cannot understand why mercy is in order, Theofil surmises that the situation makes it impossible for him to unhitch the horse. The horse eventually becomes so sick that it can no longer work. Saborski then delivers “two heavy blows” to the horse as it dies and forces Theofil to harness himself to the plow to finish the job. It is at this point that rights are invoked: “‘You have no right to treat a man so,’ said an old peasant” (1891, p. 142). In spite of this protest, Theofil is forced to plow the field for five days. This treatment only ends when Saborski finds out that a committee is coming to town to investigate this mistreatment of his peasants. After being unyoked, Theofil returns home, immediately sets to caring for his lame horse, then stretches himself out in the hay of the stable.
通常，当人们说他们被当作动物对待时，他们是在声称自己受到了残酷的对待；但几乎没有人会用这个短语来促使被称呼的人重新考虑他们对动物的态度。然而，对于萨克斯-马索赫来说，如上例所示，人类角色与动物在实际上是可互换的。动物和农民之间的距离几乎太近，以至于无法声称这种关系仅仅是比喻性的。在《新工作》中对农民与野兽的最明显比较中，泰奥菲尔必须真正承担轭具耕种领主的田地。庄园主萨博斯基决定“让贫穷的皮萨连科的生活变成地狱”（1891 年，第 140 页），强迫他日复一日地耕种自己的田地。最终，泰奥菲尔的一匹马跛了腿，只剩下的一匹也生病了，只能用它来耕作。当泰奥菲尔意识到剩下的马病得太重无法工作，他自问：“他（萨博斯基）如此残忍地对待同类，怎么能对这头野兽（马）有慈悲之心呢？”（1891 年，第 141 页）。 泰奥菲尔对马怀有同情心，似乎在这里应用了“应当蕴含可能”的原则。由于萨博斯基无法理解为什么应该施以仁慈，泰奥菲尔推断，这种情况使得他无法卸下马套。马最终病得无法工作。萨博斯基在马临终时给了它“两记重击”，并强迫泰奥菲尔套上犁继续工作。就在这时，提到了权利：“‘你没有权利这样对待一个人，’一位老农说。”（1891 年，第 142 页）。尽管有这种抗议，泰奥菲尔还是被迫耕了五天的地。直到萨博斯基得知一个委员会即将来镇上调查他对农民的虐待，这种待遇才结束。泰奥菲尔被卸下犁后，立刻回家照顾他那跛脚的马，然后躺在了马厩的干草上。

There are several significant implications of this scene. At the level of plot, the investigating committee orders Saborski to pay Theofil two thousand gulden, which the pastor invests on Theofil’s behalf. Twenty years later, Theofil receives the money with the interest it has earned, and this effectively ends his life as a peasant. With his new wealth, he is able to transform the life of the local peasantry through thriftily taking advantage of two new inventions: the railroad (described by Sacher-Masoch as the “carriage that travels without horses” [1891, p. 235]) and the steam plow. It is notable that the consequence of Theofil’s taking the place of the horse, his wealth, puts him in a position in which he is able to relieve the horse of two of its most important and difficult duties: drawing carriages and cargo over long distances and plowing the field.⁸ So whereas the one who claims, metaphorically, to have been treated like an animal generally has no concern for animals, Theofil’s literally being treated like an animal seems to have encouraged him to welcome the technologies that make it possible for him to not treat animals “like animals.” In light of this, The New Job’s closing paragraph, which suggests that the days of peasants being treated like brutes is behind them, should be read to suggest the dawning of an age in which animals too might not be treated “as animals.”
这段场景有几个重要的含义。在情节层面，调查委员会命令萨博尔斯基支付给泰奥菲尔两千古尔登，牧师代表泰奥菲尔进行了投资。二十年后，泰奥菲尔收到了这笔钱及其产生的利息，这实际上结束了他的农民生活。凭借这笔新财富，他能够通过巧妙地利用两项新发明来改变当地农民的生活：铁路（萨克斯-马索赫将其描述为“无需马匹的车辆” [1891，第 235 页]）和蒸汽犁。值得注意的是，泰奥菲尔取代马匹、他的财富带来的后果，使他处于一个能够减轻马匹两项最重要的艰巨任务的位置：在长途运输马车和货物，以及耕作田地。⁸ 所以，虽然那些自诩为被当作动物对待的人通常对动物漠不关心，但 Theofil 被真正当作动物对待似乎促使他欢迎那些使他能够不对动物“像动物一样”对待的技术。鉴于这一点，《新工作》的结尾段落，暗示农民被当作野兽的日子已经过去，应该理解为动物也可能不再被“当作动物”对待的时代即将到来。”

The second major consequence of Theofil’s treatment like an animal is a glimpse into a way in which something like animal rights might be conceptualized by Sacher-Masoch. The peasant’s appeal to the concept of rights frames this scene by suggesting that the lord is unjustified in claiming a positive right to put Theofil into a situation that might compromise his dignity/interests. This echoes Vladimir’s argument against tormenting animals: “he [man] shouldn’t torment them, for animals have a will, feelings, and a mind like we do. They think, if not as sophisticatedly as we do, and to delight in their torment is not much better than slaughtering gladiators at the circus” (1891, p. 148). Animals should not be tormented because they, like humans, have a subjective experience of events that needs to be acknowledged.⁹ This means that to Sacher-Masoch, animals have morally relevant characteristics, making them objects of concern for moral agents. As being tormented is never in one’s interest, here is another instance in which one might be tempted to claim that no one has a “right” to torment animals. However, Vladimir’s comment is prefaced by the caveat “one shouldn’t talk about rights in this world.” This casts animal rights in an interesting light, because “rights,” as used by both the old peasant and Vladimir, refers to what Steven Wise (2004), following Wesley Hohfeld, calls a liberty right, or the right to do as one pleases. The peasant claims that Saborski is not at liberty to act as he does, just as Vladimir claims that humans should not appeal to a liberty right to excuse their killing of animals. In Vladimir’s case, he believes that humans can simply claim the necessity of eating animals and leave rights out of the equation. Bringing to light the absence of this liberty right, moreover, underscores that there is something wrong with the action (in the one case, harnessing a man to a plow, in the other case, tormenting animals) that instigated the discussion. Like Steven Wise, one might be tempted to suggest that this sense of something wrong with these actions implies that the wronged has rights (such as immunity rights or autonomy rights). However, Sacher-Masoch does not go that far. He simply posits something problematic and morally reprehensible in claiming a right to treat another (human or animal) “like an animal.” He gives rights to neither Theofil nor animals in the process.
第二，将 Theofil 当作动物对待的第二个主要后果，揭示了萨克斯-马索赫可能如何构想类似动物权利的概念。农民对权利概念的呼吁，通过暗示领主无权将 Theofil 置于可能损害其尊严/利益的情况下，为这一场景提供了框架。这呼应了弗拉基米尔反对折磨动物的论点：“人类不应该折磨它们，因为动物有意志、情感和思想，就像我们一样。它们会思考，即使不如我们复杂，以折磨它们为乐并不比在马戏团屠杀角斗士好多少”（1891 年，第 148 页）。动物不应该被折磨，因为它们，就像人类一样，对事件有主观体验，这需要得到认可。[9] 这意味着对萨克斯-马索赫来说，动物具有道德上相关的特征，使它们成为道德主体的关注对象。既然被折磨永远不符合一个人的利益，这又是一个可能会让人想要声称没有人有折磨动物的“权利”的例子。 然而，弗拉基米尔的评论是以这样的前提为开头的：“在这个世界上，我们不应该谈论权利。”这使动物权利的问题变得有趣，因为“权利”一词，无论是老农民还是弗拉基米尔所使用的，都指的是史蒂文·怀斯（2004 年）在韦斯利·霍夫德之后所称为的自由权利，即按照自己的意愿行事的权利。农民声称萨博斯基没有自由这样做，正如弗拉基米尔所声称的，人类不应该利用自由权利来为杀害动物的行为开脱。在弗拉基米尔的情况下，他相信人类可以简单地声称吃动物是必要的，而无需将权利纳入考虑。此外，揭示这种自由权利的缺失，进一步强调了引发讨论的行为（一个案例是将人套在犁上，另一个案例是折磨动物）中存在某种不妥之处。像史蒂文·怀斯一样，人们可能会倾向于认为这种认为这些行为有错的感觉意味着受到伤害的一方拥有权利（如免疫力权利或自主权）。然而，萨克斯-马索赫并没有走那么远。 他仅仅提出了一种有问题的、道德上令人不齿的主张，即声称有权将另一个人（无论是人类还是动物）"像动物一样对待"。在这个过程中，他既没有赋予 Theofil 权利，也没有赋予动物权利。

 But Theofil does seem to learn from this experience that there is significant value in creating a world in which education and scientific advancements make it no longer necessary to kill, debase, or torment. Here I would like to position something like animal rights in Sacher-Masoch’s worldview. Once technology and economic progress make it possible for Theofil to replace the horse with steam, Theofil becomes a moral agent concerning the exploitation of animals for extremely difficult work. At that point, he can no longer appeal to “necessity,” for it is no longer necessary to use the animal like an “animal.” Indeed, it is as though Theofil’s time in the harness has taught him to find a way to make such an act unnecessary, even for a horse. His money, along with technological ingenuity, makes it possible for him to transition from a moral patient to a moral agent. This recognition that one can change something that ought to be changed is precisely the point where moral duty enters the equation, and thus a moral duty toward animals is established.
然而，Theofil 似乎从这次经历中学到了，创造一个教育进步和科学创新使得不再需要杀戮、贬低或折磨的世界具有重大价值。在这里，我想将类似动物权利的观点置于 Sacher-Masoch 的世界观中。一旦技术和经济进步使得 Theofil 能够用蒸汽代替马，Theofil 就成为了关于动物为极其繁重的工作而遭受剥削的道德代理人。到那时，他不能再以“必要性”为借口，因为不再有必要像对待“动物”一样使用动物。事实上，Theofil 在马具中的时光似乎教会了他找到使这种做法变得不必要的途径，即使是对于一匹马也是如此。他的财富加上技术革新，使他从道德上的受动者转变为道德上的行动者。这种认识到一个人可以改变应该改变的事情，正是道德责任进入方程式的时刻，从而确立了动物道德责任。

 This duty, however, does not grant animals universal protection. After all, Theofil can only act as a moral agent in relation to animals because of his education and wealth. Many peasants of Galicia would have neither the imagination nor means to warrant the claim that they can live without exploiting nonhuman animals, and perhaps also human animals. Hence, they remain moral patients in regard to killing (at least) animals. How can Sacher-Masoch get around this? I would turn to the closing “moral” of Venus in Furs for a solution. There, Severin summarizes the upshot of his story:
这项责任，然而，并不能赋予动物普遍的保护。毕竟，Theofil 只能因为他的教育和财富而成为动物道德代理人。许多加利西亚的农民既没有想象力也没有手段来证明他们可以不剥削非人类动物，也许甚至不剥削人类动物。因此，他们在杀戮（至少是动物）方面仍然是道德上的病人。Sacher-Masoch 如何解决这个问题？我会转向《 Venus in Furs》结尾的“道德”部分寻求解决方案。在那里，Severin 总结了他的故事要点：《 Venus in Furs》：

The moral is that woman, as Nature has created her and as she is currently reared by man, is his enemy and can be only his slave or his despot, but never his companion. She will be able to become his companion only when she has the same rights as he, when she is his equal in education and work. (2003c, p. 119)
道德是，女人，正如自然所创造的和目前人类如何养育她，是他的敌人，只能成为他的奴隶或暴君，但永远不会是他的伴侣。只有当她拥有与他相同的权利，当她在教育和工作上与他平等时，她才能成为他的伴侣。（2003c，第 119 页）

Here, Sacher-Masoch discloses that rights are positive protections designed to enable companionable relations. In the case of Venus, the rights to education and work are the necessary conditions by which woman can become man’s moral companion. This gives us the first hint at Sacher-Masoch’s theory of rights: They are legal instruments used to create the minimum conditions for companionship/equality. In the case of men and women, there is little question that Sacher-Masoch shares a theory of rights that is similar to that of a noted critic of animal rights, Richard A. Posner. Posner believes that, “Legal rights are instruments for securing the liberties that are necessary if a democratic system of government is to provide a workable framework for social order and prosperity” (2004, p. 57). Granted, Sacher-Masoch’s companionship goes slightly beyond Posner’s “social order and prosperity,” but the idea that rights are instruments designed to help moral agents (and patients) to prosper is something both would certainly agree upon. The reason that I bring in Posner here is that he pokes great fun at the notion of granting animals rights. He rightly asks questions such as, “When human and animal rights collide, do the former have any priority?” and “What is to be done when animal rights collide with each other, as they do with laws that by protecting wolves endanger sheep?” (2004, p. 57). These are important questions that, when rhetorically posed, create a real challenge for anyone who wants to acknowledge something like animal rights. But these are only problems if we think of animals as agents who employ their rights as moral agents do. For Sacher-Masoch, nonhuman animals are always moral patients, and moral patients, because they cannot act rightly or wrongly, are not able to exercise a right to their own ethical benefit or detriment. So to claim that Sacher-Masoch’s “animal rights” position demands that we legally protect an animal’s ability to act in a certain way might be misguided.
在这里，萨克斯-马索克披露，权利是积极的保护措施，旨在促进亲密关系。在《维纳斯》的情况下，教育和工作权利是女性成为男性道德伴侣的必要条件。这为我们揭示了萨克斯-马索克关于权利的理论：它们是用于创造陪伴/平等最低条件的法律工具。在男女之间，萨克斯-马索克与著名动物权利批评家理查德·A·波斯纳的权利理论相似性几乎毫无疑问。波斯纳认为，“法律权利是确保民主制度政府能够为社会组织和繁荣提供可行框架的必要自由手段”（2004 年，第 57 页）。当然，萨克斯-马索克的陪伴概念略超出了波斯纳的“社会组织和繁荣”，但权利是旨在帮助道德代理人（和患者）繁荣的工具，这一点两者肯定都会同意。我之所以提到波斯纳，是因为他对赋予动物权利这一概念进行了极大的嘲讽。 他正确地提出了诸如“当人类和动物权利发生冲突时，前者是否具有优先权？”以及“当动物权利相互冲突时，比如保护狼而危及羊的法律，我们该怎么办？”等问题（2004，第 57 页）。这些问题非常重要，当它们以修辞方式提出时，对任何想要承认动物权利的人来说都构成了真正的挑战。但如果我们把动物视为像道德代理人一样运用自己权利的代理人，那么这些问题就只是问题。对于萨克斯-马索克来说，非人类动物始终是道德上的病人，而道德病人由于不能正确或错误地行动，因此无法行使对自己道德利益或损害的权利。因此，声称萨克斯-马索克的“动物权利”立场要求我们法律上保护动物以某种方式行动的能力可能是错误的。

 But what if we thought, as Tom Regan (2004) does, of giving animals rights as moral patients? There is no evidence that Sacher-Masoch believes we should do this in the sense that we currently do—as when the law provides certain legal protections to children, the mentally disabled, etc. However, there are other ways of thinking about these rights. Returning to the idea of work and education, the two rights named in Venus, what would it mean to allow something like work or education to be devoted to something rather than, or in addition to, granted to it? Above, I claimed that humans become moral agents in regard to animals precisely when they can no longer claim that they must eat them, kill them, be entertained by them, etc. (Even Theofil used his horses, one to the death, because he had no other feasible option but to work them so.) What if granting rights to education to the animal, as a moral patient, meant not teaching it how to build steam engines or to adopt alternative eating habits, but instead meant that we devoted education to them by teaching humans alternative ways of acting and working, ways that replaced humans’ current habits of action and mind that exploit animals? What if it meant that those who know it is not necessary to kill animals for food or fight them as entertainment have an ethical responsibility to teach other humans how to eat without killing, how to be entertained without exploiting? What if it meant devoting significant research to finding new technologies to replace animal work or exploitation? Understood in this way, Sacher-Masoch’s animals’ right to education would morally justify humane education¹⁰ curricula; would allow researchers to devote research to making animals’ lives better without worrying about the accusation that they should be devoting their time to less trivial matters; and would function to make education a far less anthropocentric endeavor. Most importantly, it would end the claim that animal rights is merely a Eurocentric discourse whose proponents have no more right to push on others than a whale- or cat-eating culture has to evangelize its beliefs about a proper diet. Animals would then have rights to education in that legally protected, and educationally sound pedagogical practice, would 1) emphasize respect for animals, even when others understand this as moral proselytizing, 2) teach that it is wrong to continue practices and habits that are exploitive of animals when alternative practices are possible, 3) design life-skills curricula that help those who cannot envision the feasibility of these alternative practices to do so (such as vegetarian cooking or the use of computer simulators to reduce the need for animals in research), 4) de-anthropocentrize the mission of educational institutions, and 5) discount any unnecessary piece of knowledge gained at the expense of animals’ welfare (e.g., performing cruel experiments on animals so that we can better understand maternal bonds or the effects of sleep deprivation) as unworthy of academic attention.
""" 但如果我们像汤姆·雷根（2004 年）所做的那样，认为赋予动物权利是道德病人应有的权利呢？没有证据表明萨克斯-马索赫认为我们应该像我们现在这样去做——比如法律为儿童、精神残疾人等提供某些法律保护。然而，还有其他思考这些权利的方式。回到工作和教育这个想法，在《维纳斯》中提到的这两项权利，如果允许像工作或教育这样的东西被用于某种目的，而不是仅仅或除了授予它之外，这意味着什么呢？上面，我声称人类在无法再声称他们必须吃它们、杀死它们、被它们娱乐等时，才成为动物的道德代理人（甚至泰奥菲尔也用他的马，一匹马被杀，因为他除了工作它们之外没有其他可行的选择）。）如果赋予动物作为道德患者的教育权，意味着的不是教它们如何建造蒸汽机或采取替代的饮食习惯，而是通过教育人类采取替代的行为和工作方式，取代人类目前那些剥削动物的行动和思维方式，那会怎样呢？如果这意味着那些知道杀戮动物并非为了食物或将其作为娱乐并非必要的人，有责任教育其他人类如何在不杀戮的情况下进食，如何在不剥削的情况下娱乐，那会怎样呢？如果这意味着投入大量研究以寻找替代动物劳动或剥削的新技术，那会怎样呢？以这种方式理解，萨克斯-马索赫笔下的动物教育权在道德上为人文教育课程提供了正当性；将允许研究人员致力于改善动物生活的研究，而无需担心被指责应该将时间投入到更不重要的事情上；并且将使教育成为一种远非人类中心主义的努力。 最重要的是，这将结束动物权利仅仅是欧洲中心主义话语的说法，其支持者没有比鲸鱼或猫食文化传播其关于适当饮食的信仰更有权利向他人施加压力。动物将享有在法律保护下、教育上合理的教学法实践中的教育权利，这种教学法将 1）强调对动物的尊重，即使其他人将其视为道德传教，2）教导继续那些有替代做法的剥削动物的做法是错误的，3）设计生活技能课程，帮助那些无法想象这些替代做法可行性的人（如素食烹饪或使用计算机模拟来减少动物在研究中的需求），4）使教育机构的使命去人类中心化，5）贬低任何以牺牲动物福利为代价获得的不必要知识（例如，为了更好地理解母性联系或睡眠剥夺的影响而对动物进行残酷实验）为不值得学术关注的内容。

 Of course, one should look at a list such as this with suspicion. Would this all not amount to a form of cultural or ethical imperialism? Wouldn’t this fortify other unsound forms of cultural elitism and paternalism, especially amongst Europeanized cultures, that would in turn improperly justify other forms of exploitation? There is no question that many individuals view their ability to exploit animals less than others as a form of moral superiority, one that Harold Fromm characterizes as “a futile metaphysic of virtue and self-blamelessness” (2010). But this is not what I am suggesting about Sacher-Masoch’s position. For him, those who view the use and exploitation of animals as necessary—whether that necessity is real, merely economic, or just strongly apparent does not matter—must be treated as moral patients in regards to animals. There is no question that this will lead to or at least be perceived as paternalism by those designated moral patients. Simultaneously though, the moral agent cannot claim moral superiority because the moral patient is simply acting in the realm of necessity. Blaming a peasant for continuing to use oxen instead of a tractor that he could nowise purchase nor maintain would be no different than blaming a cat for eating a wren. And while many would read this comparison of a peasant to a cat as degrading and dehumanizing, I would suggest that that is only so within a set of speciesist hierarchies that, as I demonstrated in the Geschlecht section of this paper, Sacher-Masoch’s position would force one to reject. Unquestionably, criticism of this position as bordering upon imperialistic or paternalistic should not be taken lightly, for the position certainly opens the door for many other abuses; yet this possibility for animal rights should not be dismissed merely because it smacks of other historical indiscretions. As Sacher-Masoch sees it, animals do have significant, morally relevant interests. Intervening in the name of these is a far cry from arbitrarily imposing a set of one’s own cultural norms upon another. And since he understands the arguments for the exploitation of one human group by another as logical consequences of arguments justifying one life form’s domination by another, the claim that cultural imperialism is wrong, insofar as this assumes that one group of people should not dominate another, should only be taken seriously if it is uttered by one who is already willing to give up dominating other life forms wherever possible.
当然，人们应该对这样的名单持怀疑态度。这难道不是一种文化或伦理帝国主义的表现吗？这难道不会加强其他不合理的文化精英主义和父权主义吗？尤其是那些欧洲化的文化，这反过来又可能不当地为其他形式的剥削提供正当理由吗？毫无疑问，许多人将他们剥削动物的能力视为一种道德优越感，哈罗德·弗罗姆将其描述为“一种徒劳的形而上学，即美德和自我无过失的哲学”（2010 年）。但我的观点并非如此。对于萨克斯-马索克来说，那些认为使用和剥削动物是必要的——无论这种必要性是真实的、仅仅是经济的，还是仅仅表面上明显——都必须被视为动物道德上的受保护者。毫无疑问，这将导致或至少被指定为道德受保护者的人视为父权主义。然而，同时，道德代理人不能声称道德优越性，因为道德受保护者只是在必要性的领域内行动。 责怪一个农民继续使用他无力购买也无力维护的拖拉机而不是牛，这与责怪一只猫吃了一只麻雀并无二致。虽然许多人会将农民与猫的比较视为贬低和去人性化，但我认为这只是一种物种主义等级制度下的看法，正如我在本文的《性别》部分所展示的，萨克斯-马索赫的立场会迫使人们拒绝这种看法。毫无疑问，对这种立场进行批评，认为其接近帝国主义或父权主义，不应被轻视，因为这种立场确实为许多其他滥用打开了大门；然而，仅仅因为这种可能性与历史上的不当行为相似，就否认动物权利的可能性是不应该的。正如萨克斯-马索赫所认为的，动物确实有重要的、道德上相关的利益。以这些利益的名义进行干预，与随意将自己的文化规范强加于他人截然不同。 既然他理解了通过一种人类群体剥削另一种人类群体的论点作为论证一种生命形式支配另一种生命形式的逻辑后果，那么关于文化帝国主义是错误的这一说法，只要它假定一个群体不应该支配另一个群体，那么只有当它是由一个愿意尽可能放弃支配其他生命形式的人说出时，才应予以认真对待。

 While I believe one could outline a similar list of moral responsibilities to animals in regard to the right to work, presenting only this justification for humane education is enough to demonstrate that Sacher-Masoch’s position on animals, when expanded in systematic fashion, offers us a unique way of thinking animal rights and our own responsibilities toward animals. Rather than offering animals rights as legal protections that we extend to them regardless of circumstances, Sacher-Masoch’s (animal) rights would call us to focus on creating the conditions wherein we could identify unnecessary animal exploitation and eliminate it, work to change conditions such that animal exploitation becomes unnecessary where it is currently necessary (e.g., some forms of animal research), and force us to reassess many of our obviously exploitive practices, asking if they really are necessary for our continued existence. These rights would also, in a resignedly idealist way, allow for the continued “exploitation” of animals where it is necessary for individual humans’ survival or where the conditions are such that humans cannot see the possibility of adopting alternative, non-exploitive practices. To the animal liberationist, it might be more expedient to simply give animals the same rights that we give to humans and be done with it. Yet I would argue that Sacher-Masoch’s position ultimately has more argumentative applicability, primarily because of how well it coheres with moral orthodoxy¹¹ when compared the liberationist stance.
""" 虽然我认为可以列出类似的道德责任清单，以动物的权利到工作的权利为例，但仅以此作为人道教育的理由就足以证明，萨克斯-马索赫关于动物的观点，如果以系统化的方式扩展，为我们提供了一种独特的思考动物权利以及我们对自己动物责任的方式。与其将动物权利视为无论在何种情况下都给予它们的法律保护，萨克斯-马索赫（动物）的权利将要求我们关注创造条件，以便我们能够识别不必要的动物剥削并消除它，努力改变条件，使动物剥削变得不再必要（例如，某些形式的动物研究），并迫使我们重新评估许多显然具有剥削性的做法，质疑它们是否真的对我们继续生存是必要的。 """ 这些权利也可能以一种辞职的理想主义方式，允许在必要的情况下继续“剥削”动物，或者在这种情况下，人类无法看到采用非剥削性实践的可能性。对于动物解放主义者来说，可能更方便的做法是直接给予动物与人类相同的权利，然后就此结束。然而，我认为萨克斯-马索赫的观点在论证上最终具有更大的适用性，主要是因为它与道德正统的契合度更高，与解放主义立场相比。

 For those who read Sacher-Masoch in English, it is unfortunate that his most widely read English-language work, Venus in Furs, does not include many interactions between living human and nonhuman animals. However it does quite openly discuss the problem of Geschlecht, and a significant number of important interactions between humans are mediated by the skins of animals (furs and leather), their products (silk), and the implements of their torture and servitude (whips, yokes, ropes, etc.). With the expansive notion of Geschlecht detailed in the first part of this article, many new questions are opened regarding even Venus. If we read Venus only as addressing the war of the sexes, we may miss how the whips and the furs indicate not-so-invisible traces of real human oppressions, and fail to understand them as something more than fetish objects. Moreover, Venus’ “moral” regarding the management of human relationships via rights to work and education may provide a unique model for thinking about animal rights, a model tentatively sketched in the final pages of this paper. And just as human domination of animals provides the justification for intrahuman oppression, perhaps Venus’ answer to the question of how men and women can be companions might afford us new ways to think about animal rights and companionship. In short, Sacher-Masoch has much to teach us about animals, oppression, and exploitation. Unfortunately, many readers, primarily due to psychoanalysis’ influence, focus attention too narrowly on the sexual side of Geschlecht in his work.
""" 对于那些用英语阅读萨克斯-马索赫的人来说，遗憾的是，他最广为人知的英语作品《皮囊之爱》并没有包含许多人与非人类动物之间的互动。然而，它却相当公开地讨论了“性别”问题，以及大量重要的人际互动是通过动物的皮毛（皮草和皮革）、其产品（丝绸）以及折磨和奴役的工具（鞭子、轭具、绳索等）来实现的。在本文第一部分详细阐述的“性别”广泛概念下，许多关于《维纳斯》的新问题也被提出。如果我们仅仅将《维纳斯》视为探讨性别战争，我们可能会错过鞭子和皮草所暗示的不那么隐秘的人类压迫痕迹，并且无法理解它们不仅仅是恋物对象。 此外，金星关于通过工作权和受教育权管理人际关系的“道德”可能为思考动物权利提供独特的思考模式，这一模式在本论文的最后几页进行了初步的勾勒。正如人类对动物的统治为人类内部的压迫提供了正当性，也许金星对男女如何成为伴侣的回答可能为我们思考动物权利和伴侣关系提供新的思路。简而言之，萨克斯-马索克有很多关于动物、压迫和剥削的教诲。不幸的是，许多读者，主要是由于精神分析的影响，过于狭窄地将注意力集中在他的作品中的性别的性方面。

This article offers only a fraction of Sacher-Masoch’s thoughts on the significance of this term, especially in regard to animals, calling attention to the consistent concern that Sacher-Masoch displayed for animals and the animal rights position that might be gleaned from his work. But there is much more to be thought regarding the animal in Sacher-Masoch. For example, his minor works provide much evidence of a fairly complex philosophy of companionship that begins with befriending animals. As naïve as this might sound, naïve because of our own speciesist attitudes, his model for interspecies relationships deserves full consideration as an ethico-political philosophy; for it certainly would represent a unique alternative to the psychoanalytic ethic of masochism that holds such firm sway in Sacher-Masoch scholarship.
这篇文章仅对萨赫勒-马索克关于这一术语重要性的思考进行了部分阐述，尤其是在动物方面，突出了萨赫勒-马索克对动物的持续关注，以及从他的作品中可以提炼出的动物权利立场。但关于萨赫勒-马索克笔下的动物，还有许多值得思考之处。例如，他的次要作品提供了大量证据，表明他有一个相当复杂的伴侣哲学，这一哲学始于与动物的交朋友。尽管这听起来可能有些天真，因为我们的物种主义态度，但他的跨物种关系模式作为一个伦理-政治哲学，值得全面考虑；因为它确实代表了与在萨赫勒-马索克研究中占据牢固地位的心理分析式受虐主义伦理的独特替代方案。

Notes
备注

This should not be surprising as several of his works, including his most widely read one, Venus in Furs, are semi-autobiographical.
这并不令人惊讶，因为他的许多作品，包括他最广为人知的一部作品，《 Venus in Furs》，都是半自传体的。

2 Sacher-Masoch: “Have you ever seen greater hatred than between people who were once united in love? Have you anywhere found more cruelty and less mercy than between man and woman?” (2003d, p. 7)
2 萨赫-马斯洛奇：“你有没有见过比曾经相爱的人们之间更深的仇恨？你有没有在任何地方发现比男女之间更多的残酷和更少的仁慈？”（2003d，第 7 页）

3 To argue that one treats animals improperly because the phrase “treated like an animal” denotes inhumane treatment is a very limiting argument. J. M. Coetzee employs a variation of this argument in The Lives of Animals and, though sympathetic to it, offers a fairly cutting critique (1999, p. 49). An analogous argument would be to substitute “like a bowling ball” for “like an animal.” No one would allow that a child should be treated like a bowling ball. However, from that one cannot conclude that we need to shutter bowling alleys. Moreover, thinkers such as Kant and Locke had, previous to Sacher-Masoch, overtly suggested that we need to treat animals well because our relations to animals were analogues to our relations to humans. But they were merely analogues; Kant thought that we had no direct duties toward animals because they lacked reason. Sacher-Masoch’s position on this phrase will be treated further on in this paper.
""" 3 认为人们对待动物不恰当，仅仅因为“像对待动物一样”这个短语意味着不人道，这是一个非常局限的论点。J.M. 科茨在《动物的生活》中使用了这种论点的变体，尽管他对这种论点表示同情，但也提出了相当尖锐的批评（1999 年，第 49 页）。一个类似的论点是将“像保龄球一样”替换为“像动物一样”。没有人会允许孩子被像保龄球一样对待。然而，从这个观点中并不能得出我们需要关闭保龄球馆的结论。此外，康德和洛克等思想家在萨克斯-马索赫之前就明确表示，我们需要善待动物，因为我们的动物关系类似于我们的人际关系。但它们只是类似；康德认为，我们没有直接对动物的责任，因为它们缺乏理性。本文将进一步探讨萨克斯-马索赫对这个短语的观点。 """

4 For a full discussion of Sacher-Masoch’s treatment of the nature in relation to the individual, see Sean Kelly’s “Leopold von Sacher-Masoch and Human Rights,” in Modern Austrian Literature (2010).
4关于萨克斯-马索克对自然与个体关系的全面讨论，请参阅肖恩·凯利的《利奥波德·冯·萨克斯-马索克与人权》，载于《现代奥地利文学》（2010 年）。.

5 Sacher-Masoch: “You are blind, mad fools! You’ve created an everlasting bond between man and woman as if you were capable of changing nature, capable with your ideas and fantasies, of commanding the plant to bloom and never to wither or bear fruit” (2003d, p 7).
5萨克斯-马索克：“你们是盲目的疯子！你们创造了一个永恒的男女之间的纽带，仿佛你们能够改变自然，能够用你们的思想和幻想，命令植物开花，永不凋谢或结果”（2003d，第 7 页）。

6 Peter Singer defines speciesism as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species” (2002, p. 6). I am using it in an expansive sense – to fail to take another species that might have morally relevant qualities into account in one’s ethical decision making merely because of its species.
6 彼得·辛格将物种主义定义为“一种偏见或态度，即对自己物种成员利益的偏爱和对其他物种成员利益的偏见”（2002 年，第 6 页）。我在这里使用的是广义上的定义——仅仅因为一种物种可能具有道德上相关的特质，就忽略这种物种在道德决策中的考量。

7 One can substitute “cruelty,” “oppression,” or “exploitation” for “killing,” and the argument would work the same for Sacher-Masoch.
7 可以用“残忍”、“压迫”或“剥削”来替换“杀害”，对于萨克斯-马索赫的论证也是适用的。

8 One could make the argument that the engineering advances of the 19^th century were a necessary condition for the beginnings of the animal rights movement, as many of these machines replaced the work horse.
8有人可能会认为，19^世纪的工程技术进步是动物权利运动开始的必要条件，因为这些机器取代了役马。

9 The fact that Vladimir qualifies animals as having “a will, feelings, and a mind” is vital here. What he is claiming is that animals have qualities that place them within the scope of human moral concern. Without this qualification, animals would be no different from the plants that he mentions in the preceding sentence. By making this distinction, Sacher-Masoch avoids something like what Paul W. Taylor (1986) would call a “biocentric” or life-centered ethical approach.
9弗拉基米尔将动物视为拥有“意志、情感和心智”，这一点至关重要。他所主张的是，动物具有使它们处于人类道德关怀范围内的品质。如果没有这种资格，动物将与他在上一句中提到的植物没有区别。通过这种区分，萨克斯-马索克避免了保罗·W·泰勒（1986 年）所说的“生物中心”或生命中心的伦理方法。

10 Here, I am using “humane education” in the technical sense. The Institute for Humane Education defines it as a form of education that “instills the desire and capacity to live with compassion, integrity, and wisdom, but also provides the knowledge and tools to put our values into action in meaningful, far-reaching ways” (Institute for Humane Education n.d.). In general, humane education is more often associated with animal welfare than with human or environmental concerns.
10在这里，我使用“人道教育”这一术语的严格意义。人道教育研究所将其定义为一种“培养同情心、正直和智慧生活的愿望和能力，同时也提供知识和工具，以有意义、深远的方式将我们的价值观付诸实践”（人道教育研究所，日期不详）。总的来说，人道教育更常与动物福利相关联，而不是与人类或环境问题相关。

11 Robert Garner does an excellent job of laying out the consequences of the moral orthodoxy position in Animal Ethics. He defines it as follows: “Animals have an interest in not suffering but this can be overridden to promote the greater good of humans who are autonomous agents” (2005, p. 15). The most significant difference between this definition and Sacher-Masoch’s would be that “to promote the greater good of humans” would need to be replaced with “when it is necessary for survival.” Garner does go on to explain, “Even if moral orthodoxy is accepted there are few uses of animals which are necessary” (2005, p. 15). Here Sacher-Masoch should agree.
11罗伯特·加纳出色地阐述了道德正统立场所带来的后果，在《动物伦理学》中。他将其定义为：“动物有免受痛苦的利益，但这种利益可以被超越，以促进作为自主主体的人类的更大福祉”（2005 年，第 15 页）。与萨克斯-马索赫的定义相比，最显著的区别在于“促进人类的更大福祉”应改为“当它是生存所必需的时候”。加纳接着解释说：“即使接受道德正统，也很少有使用动物是必要的”（2005 年，第 15 页）。在这里，萨克斯-马索赫应该会同意。

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Volume 12, Issue 3
卷 12，期 3

2014

Suffering Humanism, or the Suffering Animal
遭受式人文主义，或遭受的动物

Author: Sean Meighoo¹
作者: 肖恩·米戈¹†

Title: Asst. Professor, Graduate Institute of Liberal Arts
```html 标题：助理教授，文学院研究生院 ```

Affiliation: Emory University
所属机构: 埃默里大学

Location: Atlanta, GA
位置：亚特兰大，GA

E-mail: sean.meighoo@emory.edu
电子邮件：sean.meighoo@emory.edu

Key words: Singer, Bentham, Derrida, Levinas, animal rights, humanism, ethics, suffering
关键词：歌手，本瑟姆，德里达，列维纳斯，动物权利，人文主义，伦理，苦难

SUFFERING HUMANISM, OR THE SUFFERING ANIMAL
苦难与人文主义，或苦难的动物

Abstract
抽象

 Within the animal rights movement as well as the currently burgeoning field of animal studies, the capacity for suffering has largely displaced the capacity for reason or language as the ultimate criterion for defining the ethical subject. However, while the concept of suffering certainly seems to undermine any ethical philosophy based on the ostensibly human capacity for reason or language, it nonetheless remains attached to a more radical form of humanism based on the capacity for ethics itself. This article offers a critical reading of the concept of suffering in Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, Jacques Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am, Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, and Emmanuel Levinas’s Humanism of the Other. The following questions are posed in relation to these four very different texts: Does the concept of suffering entail a philosophical recourse to humanism? Does the discourse of animal rights remain dependent on this humanist concept of suffering? Is the “suffering animal” none other than the classical subject of humanism, even if the capacity for suffering has now been extended beyond the human being to the animal as such?
在动物权利运动以及目前蓬勃发展的动物研究领域，忍受痛苦的能力已经取代了理性或语言的能力，成为界定道德主体的最终标准。然而，尽管痛苦的概念似乎削弱了任何基于表面上人类理性或语言能力的伦理哲学，但它仍然与一种基于自身道德能力的更激进的人道主义形式相联系。本文对彼得·辛格的《动物解放》、雅克·德里达的《因此我是动物》、杰里米·边沁的《道德立法原理导论》以及埃马纽埃尔·列维纳斯的人类异化人道主义进行了批判性阅读。 以下问题被提出与这四个非常不同的文本相关：苦难的概念是否意味着对人文主义的哲学回归？动物权利的论述是否仍然依赖于这种人文主义苦难的概念？所谓的“受苦的动物”是否就是人文主义经典的主题，即使痛苦的能力现在已经被扩展到动物本身，而不仅仅是人类？

The Ethical Question of the Animal: Singer, Derrida, Bentham
动物伦理问题：辛格、德里达、边沁

Within the animal rights movement as well as the field of animal studies—a currently burgeoning academic field whose debt to the animal rights movement remains to be calculated—the capacity for suffering has largely displaced the capacity for reason or language as the ultimate criterion for defining the ethical subject. The discourse of animal rights has thus called into question the ethical project of humanism, inasmuch as this project is based on the classical philosophical definition of the human being as a “rational animal.” The human being might now be defined as a “suffering animal,” but the human is no longer the only being who might be defined by this capacity. Through the concept of suffering, then, animal rights discourse has accomplished nothing less than the very redefinition of who or what counts as an ethical subject. Yet this discourse also seems, even in its most radical articulations, to rely on some form of humanism – perhaps not the classical rationalist brand of humanism that we have all come to know and critique, but another type of humanism that is based on the concept of suffering itself. This new type of humanism extends the capacity for suffering to the animal, but continues to privilege the human’s experience of it. Compassion or empathy is readily granted to the animal, but only insofar as it is identifiable or recognizable to the human. The animal is rendered subject to ethical consideration, but the human still occupies the position of the sovereign ethical subject who dispenses this consideration. What I am claiming, then, is that humanism has survived the critique of rationalism that distinguishes the more radical quarters of contemporary ethical theory, including animal rights discourse. Although humanism has been closely associated with the classical philosophical tradition of rationalism for many centuries, it is an ethical project that is both older and newer than rationalist philosophy, having preceded the advent of rationalism and now following along in its wake. Presupposing the exceptional status of the human being in relation to the animal, nature, or the world, as the case may be, the ethical project of humanism provides the ground for all subsequent philosophical disputes between rationalism and empiricism, idealism and materialism, or individualism and structuralism. Humanism is plainly a kind of speciesism, but more to the point, it is a kind of speciesism that has rigorously determined the economic, political, and cultural relations between the “human” and the “animal,” these terms themselves having been determined by its governing logic of exclusion.
在动物权利运动以及动物研究领域——一个目前正蓬勃发展的学术领域，其与动物权利运动的债务尚未得到计算——痛苦的能力在很大程度上取代了理性或语言的能力，成为定义道德主体的最终标准。因此，动物权利话语质疑了人文主义的伦理项目，因为这一项目基于古典哲学对人类定义为“理性动物”的定义。《人类》或许现在可以被定义为“痛苦动物”，但人类不再是唯一可能通过这种能力来定义的存在。因此，通过痛苦的概念，动物权利话语已经完成了对谁或什么是道德主体的重新定义。然而，即使在最激进的表述中，这种话语似乎也依赖于某种形式的人文主义——可能不是我们所有人都熟悉并批判的古典理性主义人文主义，而是一种基于痛苦本身概念的人文主义。 这种新类型的人文主义将痛苦的能力扩展到动物，但仍然优先考虑人类对痛苦的体验。同情或同理心可以轻易地赋予动物，但前提是它能够被人类识别或辨认。动物被置于道德考量的范畴之内，但人类仍然占据着至高无上的道德主体地位，负责分配这种考量。因此，我所主张的是，人文主义在当代伦理理论的激进派别，包括动物权利话语的批判中幸存了下来。尽管人文主义与理性主义这一古典哲学传统紧密相连已有数百年，但作为一个伦理项目，它既比理性主义更古老，又比理性主义更年轻，它先于理性主义的兴起，现在又紧随其后。 假设人类相对于动物、自然或世界具有特殊地位，人类主义的伦理项目为理性主义与经验主义、唯心主义与唯物主义、个人主义与结构主义之间的所有后续哲学争论提供了基础。人类主义明显是一种物种主义，但更重要的是，它是一种严格确定了“人类”与“动物”之间经济、政治和文化关系的物种主义，这些术语本身也是由其统治逻辑的排他性所决定的。

In this paper, I want to pose some questions of my own on the concept of suffering in the discourse of animal rights—certainly not with any intention of rejecting animal rights discourse altogether, but rather in the hopes of further pursuing the line of questioning that this discourse has already opened for us.¹ Does the concept of suffering entail a philosophical recourse to humanism? Is the discourse of animal rights dependent on this humanist concept of suffering? Must we suffer humanism in the name of the animal? These questions complicate the concept of suffering, or to put it better, they broach its irreducible complexity. As the title of my paper suggests, the concept of suffering suffers itself, undergoing a strange dehiscence or bifurcation into at least two divergent yet indivisible forms, the transitive and the intransitive, doubling and redoubling on itself. On one hand, there is “suffering” as in the experience, sensation, or feeling of pain, while on the other, there is “suffering” as in endurance, forbearance, or indeed, subjection as such. One form of suffering seems to center or recenter the experience of the human being, while the other seems to decenter this experience by calling attention to the precarious constitution of the ethical subject. This divided concept of suffering which has figured so prominently in animal rights discourse thus harbors an ineradicable ambivalence around the status of the human. The questions that I am posing, then, do not only ask whether this discourse remains trapped or caught within the snare of humanism, but they also ask whether it is necessary or even possible to escape. After all, animal rights discourse has already made a radical intervention into contemporary ethical theory precisely by inhabiting or parasiting the humanist discourse of “rights,” not to mention the very concept of the “animal.” Perhaps the discourse of animal rights cannot afford to simply abandon the ethical project of humanism, even if it were possible to do so. In any case, these questions are not to be discarded too easily without considering their implications for animal rights activists as well as animal studies scholars who are interested in dislodging the human subject from its privileged ethical status.
在本文中，我想就动物权利话语中的苦难概念提出一些我自己的问题——当然，这并非要完全否定动物权利话语，而是希望进一步探讨这一话语已经为我们开启的追问之路。 [1] 这些问题使苦难的概念变得复杂，或者说，它们触及了其不可还原的复杂性。正如我的论文标题所暗示的，苦难本身也遭受苦难，经历了一种奇特的开裂或分化，至少分为两种相互分离但又不可分割的形式，即及物和不及物，自我加倍和重复加倍。 一方面，我们所说的“苦难”指的是痛苦的经验、感觉或情感，另一方面，所说的“苦难”则是指忍耐、忍受，甚至可以说是屈服本身。一种苦难似乎以某种方式聚焦或重新聚焦人的体验，而另一种苦难则似乎通过关注道德主体的脆弱性来分散这种体验。这种关于苦难的分裂概念在动物权利话语中占据了如此重要的地位，因此围绕着人的地位始终存在着不可消除的矛盾。因此，我提出的问题不仅在于探讨这种话语是否陷入了人文主义的陷阱，还在于探讨是否有可能或有必要摆脱这种困境。毕竟，动物权利话语正是通过占据或寄生在“权利”这一人文主义话语中，以及“动物”这一概念中，对当代伦理理论进行了激进干预，更不用说对“动物”这一概念的干预了。或许，动物权利话语无法简单地放弃人文主义的伦理项目，即使这样做是可能的。 无论如何，这些问题不能轻易被忽视，而应考虑它们对动物权利活动家和动物研究学者的影响，他们希望打破人类在道德地位上的特权。

I want to pursue this line of questioning on the concept of suffering as it bears on, or rather, as it is borne by two philosophical texts, Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation and Jacques Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am, two very different texts by two very different philosophers who have nonetheless both taken up the ethical question of the animal—two philosophical texts, moreover, which I would not hesitate to call two of the most important such texts on this question. Singer is an Australian philosopher who, it seems, remains one of the last champions of utilitarianism, a school of thought founded by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century. Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals was one of Singer’s first works, and its remarkable success among academic and popular audiences alike played no small part in determining the trajectory that the rest of his work would follow. Originally published in English in 1975 and republished in a revised and expanded edition in 1990, Singer’s Animal Liberation galvanized the animal rights movement as few other philosophical texts have ever galvanized contemporary social justice movements, fully earning its admittedly dubious title as the “bible” of the animal rights movement. Derrida was an Algerian-born French philosopher who is probably best known as the founder of deconstruction, although he himself resisted any claims to having founded a school of thought at all. The Animal That Therefore I Am was one of Derrida’s last works, based on a ten-hour address that he delivered in 1997 at the third of four Cerisy conferences that were eventually dedicated to his work. Although some parts of this address were published during his lifetime, Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am was only published as a complete monograph in French in 2006, some two years after he had passed away, providing a substantial albeit late contribution to his previously established body of work. While Singer’s Animal Liberation was largely responsible for establishing animal rights as a central issue of concern within the field of philosophical ethics in the last decades of the 20^th century, Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am is now one of the key sources of reference in the interdisciplinary field of animal studies that has emerged during the first decades of our present century. It is also fair to say, however, that while Singer’s utilitarian approach to ethics is generally considered anachronistic if not completely outmoded by his philosophical contemporaries even as his work on animal rights in particular continues to enjoy a popular readership, Derrida’s deconstructive approach has recently drawn an increasing interest within contemporary ethical theory although his work appears to attract a more academically specialized audience.
""" 我想继续探讨关于痛苦的观念，这一观念与以下两部哲学著作相关，或者说，这一观念承载着这两部著作，即彼得·辛格的《动物解放》和雅克·德里达的《因此我是动物》，这两部由两位截然不同的哲学家撰写的非常不同的文本，尽管如此，他们两人都探讨了动物伦理问题——而且，这两部哲学文本，我毫不犹豫地称其为关于这一问题的最重要的文本。辛格是一位澳大利亚哲学家，似乎仍然是功利主义的最后一位捍卫者，这一思想流派由 18 世纪末的英国哲学家杰里米·边沁创立。《动物解放：对待动物的新伦理》是辛格的早期作品之一，它在学术界和普通读者中的巨大成功在很大程度上决定了其后续作品的发展轨迹。 原版于 1975 年用英语出版，1990 年修订并扩充后再次出版，辛格的《动物解放》像其他哲学文本很少能激发当代社会正义运动一样，激起了动物权利运动，完全赢得了其公认的、有争议的“圣经”之称。德里达是一位出生于阿尔及利亚的法国哲学家，他最著名的身份可能是解构主义的创始人，尽管他自己拒绝承认创立了一个思想学派。德里达的《因此我是动物》是他最后的著作之一，基于他在 1997 年第三场、共四场的塞里西会议上的十小时演讲。尽管演讲中的一些部分在他生前已经发表，但德里达的《因此我是动物》直到 2006 年才作为完整的专著在法语中出版，距离他去世已有两年，为他的先前作品集提供了重要的、尽管是晚期的贡献。而辛格的《动物解放》在很大程度上为在 20 世纪最后几十年将动物权利确立为伦理学领域关注的中心问题做出了贡献，德里达的《因此我是动物》现在已成为动物研究这一跨学科领域的关键参考资料之一，该领域在我们这个世纪的最初几十年里兴起。然而，可以说，尽管辛格关于动物权利的工作继续受到广泛的读者欢迎，但他的功利主义伦理方法通常被认为过时，甚至被他的哲学同代人完全摒弃，而德里达的解构主义方法最近在当代伦理理论中引起了越来越多的兴趣，尽管他的作品似乎吸引了一个更学术化的观众。Animal Liberation在很大程度上为在 20 世纪最后几十年将动物权利确立为伦理学领域关注的中心问题做出了贡献，德里达的《因此我是动物》现在已成为动物研究这一跨学科领域的关键参考资料之一，该领域在我们这个世纪的最初几十年里兴起。然而，可以说，尽管辛格关于动物权利的工作继续受到广泛的读者欢迎，但他的功利主义伦理方法通常被认为过时，甚至被他的哲学同代人完全摒弃，而德里达的解构主义方法最近在当代伦理理论中引起了越来越多的兴趣，尽管他的作品似乎吸引了一个更学术化的观众。^th世纪，Derrida 的The Animal That Therefore I Am现在已成为动物研究这一跨学科领域的关键参考资料之一，该领域在我们这个世纪的最初几十年里兴起。它也是公平的，然而，可以说，尽管辛格关于动物权利的工作继续受到广泛的读者欢迎，但他的功利主义伦理方法通常被认为过时，甚至被他的哲学同代人完全摒弃，而德里达的解构主义方法最近在当代伦理理论中引起了越来越多的兴趣，尽管他的作品似乎吸引了一个更学术化的观众。century.It is also fair to say, however, that while Singer’s utilitarian approach to ethics is generally considered anachronistic if not completely outmoded by his philosophical contemporaries even as his work on animal rights in particular continues to enjoy a popular readership, Derrida’s deconstructive approach has recently drawn an increasing interest within contemporary ethical theory although his work appears to attract amore academically specialized audience.

For all their philosophical and political differences, the concept of suffering thus marks a curious point of intersection between Singer and Derrida’s respective texts. Not only do they both cite Bentham’s famous question on the capacity for suffering among animals, but they also make the argument that this capacity is not simply one capacity among others. Rather, for Singer as well as for Derrida, suffering is a singular capacity that defines or in some sense conditions all other capacities. In the first chapter of Animal Liberation, Singer cites an extended passage from Bentham’s text, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation:
尽管在哲学和政治观点上存在差异，但痛苦的概念在辛格和德里达的各自文本中却构成了一个奇特的重叠点。他们不仅都引用了边沁关于动物痛苦能力著名问题的论述，而且他们都认为这种能力并非仅仅是众多能力中的一种。相反，对于辛格来说，以及对于德里达来说，痛苦是一种独特的、定义或在一定程度上决定其他所有能力的力量。在《动物解放》的第一章中，辛格引用了边沁著作《道德与立法原理导论》中的长篇段落：

The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden [sic] from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (Bentham cited in Singer, 2002, p. 7, emphasis in original)
那一天或许会到来，那时动物界中的其他生物也可能获得那些从未能被剥夺的权利，而这些权利只有暴政之手才能剥夺。[原句如此]法国人已经发现，皮肤之黑并不是一个人类应该被抛弃，任由折磨者任意摆布的理由。或许有一天，人们会认识到，腿的数量、皮肤的绒毛，或者骶骨的末端，这些理由同样不足以成为抛弃一个敏感生命使其遭受同样命运的依据。还有什么其他的东西应该划出不可逾越的界限呢？是理性的能力，还是或许语言的交流能力？但是，一个成熟的马或狗，与一个出生仅一天、一周或甚至一个月的婴儿相比，无疑是一个更加理性、更加会交流的动物。但是，假设情况相反，那又有什么用呢？问题不是，它们能否推理？也不是它们能否说话？而是，它们能否感受痛苦？ （边沁在辛格 2002 年引用，第）7，原文强调）

Singer’s appeal to Bentham is not surprising, of course, since he bases his own argument for animal liberation—and not for animal rights—on the ethical principles of utilitarianism. Distancing himself from the philosophical discourse of rights, Singer recalls that Bentham himself “described ‘natural rights’ as ‘nonsense’ and ‘natural and imprescriptible rights’ as ‘nonsense upon stilts’” (Singer, 2002, p. 8). Indeed, Singer claims to have circumvented the entire debate on animal rights by basing his argument directly on what he calls Bentham’s “formula” for moral equality: “Each to count for one and none for more than one” (Singer, 2002, p. 5). Taking up Bentham’s question on the capacity for suffering, then, Singer explains that this capacity provides the sole precondition for all ethical or moral interests:
歌手对边沁的呼吁并不令人惊讶，因为他在自己的动物解放论证中——而不是动物权利论证——基于功利主义的伦理原则。他将自己与权利哲学的讨论保持距离，回忆起边沁本人将“自然权利”描述为“胡说”以及“自然和不可剥夺的权利”为“荒谬至极”（Singer，2002，第 8 页）。事实上，辛格声称自己绕过了整个动物权利的辩论，直接基于他所称的边沁的“道德平等公式”：“每个人一票，没有人比一个人多”（Singer，2002，第 5 页）。因此，辛格接着解释说，痛苦的能力是所有伦理或道德利益的唯一先决条件：

The capacity for suffering – or more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness – is not just another characteristic like the capacity for language or higher mathematics… The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way… The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is… not only necessary, but also sufficient for us to say that a being has interests – at an absolute minimum, an interest in not suffering. (Singer, 2002, pp. 7-8, emphasis in original)
""" 忍受痛苦的能力——或者更严格地说，忍受痛苦以及/或享受或快乐的能力——并不只是像语言能力或高等数学能力那样的另一种特性……忍受痛苦以及享受的能力是拥有兴趣的前提，在我们能够有意义地谈论兴趣之前，这一条件必须得到满足……忍受痛苦以及享受的能力是……不仅必要，而且也是我们说一个生物具有兴趣——至少在绝对意义上，对不遭受痛苦的兴趣——的充分条件。（Singer，2002，第 7-8 页，原文有强调）

For Singer, it is this original capacity for suffering that defines the ethical subject. Any subject that is capable of suffering before it is capable of thinking or speaking deserves our ethical or moral consideration. The capacity for suffering thus constitutes an original capacity in its most radical sense—a pre-original capacity as such—an original capacity that not only precedes the capacity for reason or language, but creates the very possibility for any such capacity. Suffering is the capacity for having other capacities.
对于歌手来说，这种原始的承受痛苦的能力 正是 定义了道德主体的本质。任何在能够思考和说话之前就能承受痛苦的主体，都应得到我们的道德或伦理考量。因此，承受痛苦的能力构成了最根本的原始能力——一种先于原始能力的能力——一种原始能力，它不仅先于理性或语言的能力，而且创造了这种能力存在的可能性。痛苦是拥有其他能力的能力。

Similarly, in the first chapter of The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida repeats Bentham’s question on the capacity for suffering without, however, formally citing Bentham’s text. Indeed, Derrida reduces Bentham’s question to its most highly condensed form: “‘Can they suffer?’ asks Bentham, simply yet so profoundly” (Derrida, 2008, p. 27). But what might seem like Derrida’s passing reference to Bentham is nonetheless surprising. For although Derrida offers no more than a very loose reading of Bentham’s text—an uncharacteristically loose reading for those who are acquainted with Derrida’s close and notoriously dense readings of other philosophical, literary, and cultural texts—not only does it remain his only reference to the Anglo-American philosophical tradition in the entire text, but more importantly, Derrida’s appeal to Bentham signals a pivotal point in his argument, no less than it does in Singer’s case. It is not surprising that Derrida also distances himself from, as he puts it, “what is still presented in such a problematic way as animal rights” (Derrida, 2008, pp. 26-27, emphasis in original). What is surprising is that he traces his own argument back to Bentham’s question itself. Derrida explains that Bentham did not merely propose another question on the animal, but moreover “proposed changing the very form of the question regarding the animal that dominated discourse within the tradition, in the language both of its most refined philosophical argumentation and of everyday acceptation and common sense” (Derrida, 2008, p. 27). Derrida argues that this question on the capacity for suffering foregoes the very concept of capacity, capability, or power, suggesting instead a radical form of passivity:
同样，在《因此我是动物》的第一章中，德里达重复了边沁关于痛苦承受能力的问题，然而并没有正式引用边沁的文本。事实上，德里达将边沁的问题简化到了最浓缩的形式：“‘它们能感到痛苦吗？’边沁问道，简单却深刻”（德里达，2008 年，第 27 页）。但看似德里达对边沁的简单提及实则令人惊讶。因为尽管德里达对边沁的文本只进行了非常宽松的解读——对于一个熟悉德里达对其他哲学、文学和文化文本的密切且著名地密集解读的人来说，这是一种不寻常的宽松解读——但这不仅是他整部文本中唯一一次对英美哲学传统的提及，更重要的是，德里达对边沁的引用标志着他论点的关键点，这与辛格的情况一样。德里达也把自己与所谓的“动物权利”这一仍然以如此有问题的形式呈现的事物保持距离，这一点并不令人惊讶（德里达，2008 年，第 26-27 页，原文加粗）。 令人惊讶的是，他把自己的论点追溯到边沁的问题本身。德里达解释说，边沁并不仅仅提出了关于动物的新问题，而且更重要的是，“他提出了改变关于动物的问题的形式，这种形式在传统话语中占据主导地位，无论是在最精致的哲学论证语言中，还是在日常接受和常识中”（德里达，2008，第 27 页）。德里达认为，关于忍受痛苦能力的问题，摒弃了能力、能力或力量的概念，而是提出了一种激进形式的被动性：

The first and decisive question would rather be to know whether animals can suffer…
首要的、决定性的问题或许应该是：动物是否能够承受痛苦……

Once its protocol is established, the form of this question changes everything… [It] is disturbed by a certain passivity. It bears witness, manifesting already, as question, the response that testifies to a sufferance, a passion, a not-being-able. The word can [pouvoir] changes sense and sign here once one asks, “Can they suffer?” Henceforth it wavers… “Can they suffer?” amounts to asking “Can they not be able?” (Derrida, 2008, pp. 27-28, emphasis in original)
. 一旦其协议确立，这种问题的形式就会改变一切……[它]因某种被动性而受到干扰。它作为问题，已经表现出证词，见证了苦难、激情、无法做到。单词可以 [pouvoir] 在这里一旦问出“他们能受苦吗？”就改变了意义和符号。从此以后，它摇摆不定……“他们能受苦吗？”等同于问“他们不能做到吗？”（德里达，2008 年，第 27-28 页，原文加粗）

For Derrida, it is not a capacity as such that defines the ethical subject, but the capacity for suffering, which is to say, an incapacity. Suffering marks an absolute openness or vulnerability to others rather than the possession of some particular faculty. It is precisely the subject’s powerlessness to defend or protect itself that demands our ethical attention. The capacity for suffering, then, indicates an incapacity, an inability, or a radical passivity that is prior to all capacities, an incapacity that problematizes every recourse to reason, language, or any other capacity that would presumably distinguish the human from the animal.
对于德里达来说，定义道德主体的并非某种能力本身，而是忍受痛苦的能力，也就是说，一种无能。痛苦标志着对他人绝对的开放或脆弱，而非拥有某种特定的能力。正是主体无力自卫或保护自己，才要求我们给予道德关注。因此，忍受痛苦的能力表明了一种无能、一种无力或一种先于所有能力的根本被动性，这种无能质疑了所有诉诸理性、语言或其他可能区分人与动物的能力。

Singer and Derrida’s common appeal to Bentham is especially remarkable in so far as they both extend Bentham’s question on the capacity for suffering in much the same direction, it seems to me, well beyond Bentham’s own argument. Bentham’s question appears in one of his first works, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, originally published in English in 1789 and republished in a revised edition in 1823. Although Bentham is widely considered to have established the earliest philosophical foundations for the animal rights movement as well as the field of animal studies—his rightly famous question on the capacity for suffering among animals commanding the attention of philosophers as different from each other in all other respects as Singer and Derrida themselves—his own attention to this question is somewhat limited. As its title only partly indicates, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation is primarily concerned with the philosophical theory of penal legislation or criminal law. Certainly, it is safe to say that at least among readers of 20^th-century continental philosophy, Bentham is less famous for his question on the capacity for suffering among animals in this text than he is infamous for his architectural design of the Panopticon, the prison model that Michel Foucault analyzes so trenchantly in Discipline and Punish.
《歌手和德里达对边沁的共同呼吁特别引人注目，因为他们似乎都沿着边沁关于痛苦承受能力的问题延伸了同样的方向，远远超出了边沁自己的论点。边沁的问题出现在他的早期作品之一《道德与立法原理引论》中，最初于 1789 年用英文出版，1823 年再次以修订版的形式出版。尽管边沁被广泛认为是动物权利运动以及动物研究领域最早哲学基础的建立者——他关于动物痛苦承受能力的著名问题引起了与他和德里达在其他所有方面都截然不同的哲学家们的关注——但他本人对这一问题的关注却相对有限。正如其标题仅部分表明的那样，《道德与立法原理引论》主要关注刑罚立法或刑事法的哲学理论。》 当然可以说，至少在 20 世纪大陆哲学的读者中，边沁在这段文字中关于动物痛苦承受能力的提问不如他因潘诺斯克监狱模型而臭名昭著，该模型被米歇尔·福柯在《惩罚与纪律》中深刻分析。^第-世纪的《惩罚与纪律》。

In any case, while Bentham presents a detailed outline of the ethical principles of utilitarianism in the first few chapters of his text, his discussion of animals remains cursory at best. Indeed, his question on their capacity for suffering only appears in a long footnote to the last chapter of his text on the delimitation of penal jurisprudence. In the first part of this chapter, Bentham sets out to delimit ethics from legislation in general, or what he calls “private ethics” from “the art of legislation” (cf. Bentham, 1996, p. 281). In a passage that marks a significant departure from the classical philosophical tradition of humanism, Bentham argues that all humans as well as nonhuman animals are to be considered ethical subjects or moral agents:
不论如何，虽然边沁在其文本的前几章中详细阐述了功利主义的伦理原则，但他对动物的讨论最多只是肤浅。事实上，关于动物是否能够感受痛苦的提问，仅出现在他关于刑罚法界限的文本最后一章的一个长脚注中。在这一章的第一部分，边沁试图界定伦理与立法的一般性，或者说他所说的“私人伦理”与“立法艺术”之间的区别（参见边沁，1996，第 281 页）。在一段标志着从古典哲学传统的人文主义中显著转变的论述中，边沁认为所有人类以及非人类动物都应被视为伦理主体或道德代理人：

Ethics at large may be defined, the art of directing men’s [sic] actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view.
伦理学总体上可以定义为，指导人们的行为以产生尽可能多的幸福，对于那些利益相关者而言的艺术。[如此]

What then are the actions which it can be in a man’s [sic] power to direct? They must be either his [sic] own actions, or those of other agents…
那么，人能够指导的行为有哪些呢？它们要么是他自己的行为，要么是其他代理人的行为...（sī）......（sī）......

What other agents then are there, which, at the same time that they are under the influence of man’s direction, are susceptible of happiness? They are of two sorts: 1. Other human beings who are styled persons; 2. Other animals, which on account of their interests having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of things. (Bentham, 1996, p. 282, emphasis in original)
那么，在同时受到人的指导和能够感受到幸福的情况下，还有哪些其他代理人呢？它们有两种：1. 被称为个人的其他人；2. 由于古代法学家对它们的利益视而不见，而被降格为事物的其他动物。（边沁，1996 年，第 282 页，原文有强调）

Bentham attaches a long footnote to the end of this passage in which he defends his claim for the ethical agency of animals by posing his deliberately rhetorical question on their capacity for suffering.² However, having established that humans alone are to be considered legal subjects or “persons,” he does not mention animals in his text again. Moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, while Bentham makes frequent use of the concept of suffering throughout his text, he does not offer a definition of this concept as such. Basing the ethical principles of utilitarianism on the mutually opposed concepts of pain and pleasure in the very first sentence of his first chapter (cf. Bentham, 1996, p. 11), he appears to use the concept of suffering synonymously with the concept of pain in some passages of his text, but differently in many others. Bentham comes closest to defining the concept of suffering itself in his distinction between the four concepts of coercion or restraint, apprehension, sufferance, and sympathy or connection (cf. Bentham, 1996, pp. xx, 163, 223, 287). But this definition of sorts only suggests that he considers suffering one particular form of pain. What all this is to say is that Bentham’s argument in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation does not offer a philosophically rigorous or even thematically consistent concept of suffering. Notwithstanding his immensely productive question on the capacity for suffering among animals, there is little if any indication in Bentham’s own text that this capacity constitutes what both Singer and Derrida argue is, in a much more radical sense, the singular precondition for all other capacities.
Bentham 在本段末尾附上了一段长长的脚注，在其中他通过提出一个故意具有修辞性的问题来捍卫他关于动物具有道德行为能力的观点，即动物的痛苦能力。然而，尽管他已经确立人类是唯一应被视为法律主体或“人”的，他在文本中再也没有提到动物。更重要的是，虽然 Bentham 在其文本中频繁使用痛苦的概念，但他并没有对这个概念给出定义。他在第一章节的第一句话中（参见 Bentham，1996，第 11 页）将功利主义的伦理原则建立在痛苦和快乐这两个相互对立的概念之上，似乎在某些段落中将痛苦的概念与痛苦的概念同义使用，但在许多其他段落中则有所不同。 本特姆在其对强制或约束、恐惧、忍受和同情或联系（参见本特姆，1996，第 pp 页。）这四种痛苦概念的区分中，最接近于定义痛苦本身的概念。但这种定义仅暗示他认为痛苦是痛苦的一种特定形式。这一切想要表达的是，本特姆在《道德与立法原理引论》中的论证并没有提供一个哲学上严谨或主题上一致的概念。尽管他对动物痛苦能力的提问极具生产力，但在本特姆自己的文本中，这种能力构成辛格和德里达所认为的，在更激进的意义上，所有其他能力的唯一先决条件，几乎没有或没有迹象。

Yet this point of intersection between Singer’s Animal Liberation and Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am marks as much a meeting between these two very different philosophers and their texts as a parting of ways. For although there is arguably only a slight difference between Singer’s concept of suffering as an original capacity on one hand and Derrida’s concept of suffering as an incapacity on the other, Singer proceeds to ground his concept of suffering on a decidedly anthropocentric analysis of pain, while Derrida goes on to unground the philosophical foundation of the human subject altogether. Still within the first chapter of Animal Liberation, just a few paragraphs following his citation and discussion of Bentham’s question, Singer anticipates the inevitable objection to his argument, namely that “[n]onhuman animals have no interests… because they are not capable of suffering” (Singer, 2002, p. 9). Astonishingly enough, he immediately concedes that “[nonhuman animals] are not capable of suffering in all the ways that human beings are,” quickly moving on to address instead the “more sweeping” yet “less plausible” objection that “animals are incapable of suffering in any way at all” (Singer, 2002, pp. 9-10). It is at this point in his argument that Singer switches out the concept of suffering for the concept of pain, doing so without noting this switch himself, or perhaps, without even noticing it. Of course, he might have very well defended this switch in his text by appealing to Bentham again who, after all, appears to use the concept of suffering synonymously with the concept of pain in certain passages of his own text. However, Singer’s more radical argument that the capacity for suffering constitutes a precondition for all ethical or moral interests should have complicated any such simple substitution on his part. By switching out the concept of suffering for the concept of pain, it seems to me that Singer reduces what he previously claimed to be the original capacity for suffering to merely one capacity among others.
然而，这种交集——辛格的《动物解放》与德里达的《因此我是动物》——不仅标志着这两位截然不同的哲学家及其文本的相遇，也标志着他们分道扬镳。尽管在辛格将痛苦视为一种原始能力与德里达将痛苦视为一种无能之间，可能只有微小的差别，但辛格继续将他的痛苦概念建立在一种明显的人类中心主义的痛苦分析之上，而德里达则继续消解人类主体的哲学基础。即便在《动物解放》的第一章中，就在他引用并讨论了边沁的问题之后不久，辛格就预见到了对他论证不可避免的反对意见，即“非人类动物没有利益……因为它们无法感受痛苦”（辛格，2002，第 9 页）。 令人惊讶的是，他立即承认“[非人类动物]在所有方面都无法像人类那样感受到痛苦”，然后迅速转向处理一个“更为广泛”但“不太可信”的反对意见，即“动物根本无法以任何方式感受到痛苦”（Singer，2002，第 9-10 页）。正是在他的论点达到这一点时，辛格将“痛苦”的概念替换为“痛苦”的概念，而他本人并未注意到这一替换，或许甚至没有意识到。当然，他完全可以在他的文本中通过再次引用边沁来为这种替换进行辩护，因为毕竟，边沁在自己的某些段落中似乎将“痛苦”的概念与“痛苦”的概念同义使用。然而，辛格更为激进的论点，即“感受痛苦的能力是所有伦理或道德利益的前提条件”，应该使他的这种简单替换变得复杂。在我看来，通过将“痛苦”的概念替换为“痛苦”的概念，辛格似乎将之前声称的原始的“感受痛苦的能力”仅仅降低为众多能力中的一种。

It is little wonder, then, that Singer ends up resorting to such anthropocentric criteria in his analysis of pain. He begins this analysis, quite rightly, by questioning the capacity for pain among humans as well as nonhuman animals: “Do animals other than humans feel pain? How do we know? Well, how do we know if anyone, human or nonhuman, feels pain?” (Singer, 2002, p. 10). Singer argues that the individual human subject experiences pain, but only infers pain in other humans from their expression of it: “We know that we ourselves can feel pain… from the direct experience of pain that we have… But how do we know that anyone else feels pain? We cannot directly experience anyone else’s pain… [W]e can only infer that others are feeling it from various external indications” (Singer, 2002, p. 10). Singer thus proceeds to question the capacity for pain among nonhuman animals by comparing their behavior and physiology to human behavior and physiology, affirming their basic similarity despite what he freely admits is the greater capacity for reason among humans:
那也就难怪，辛格在他的痛苦分析中最终求助于如此以人类为中心的标准。他开始分析时，非常正确地提出了人类以及非人类动物感受痛苦的能力问题：“除了人类，其他动物会感到痛苦吗？我们怎么知道？嗯，我们怎么知道任何人，无论是人类还是非人类，是否感到痛苦？”（辛格，2002 年，第 10 页）。辛格认为，个体人类主体能够感受到痛苦，但只能从他人的痛苦表达中推断出其他人类也在感受痛苦：“我们知道我们自己能够感受到痛苦……因为我们亲身经历过痛苦……但我们怎么知道其他人也在感受痛苦呢？我们无法直接体验他人的痛苦……我们只能从各种外部迹象中推断出他人也在感受痛苦”（辛格，2002 年，第 10 页）。因此，辛格通过将非人类动物的行为和生理与人类的行为和生理进行比较，来质疑非人类动物感受痛苦的能力，尽管他承认人类在理性方面有更大的能力，但他仍然肯定了它们的基本相似性：

If it is justifiable to assume that other human beings feel pain as we do, is there any reason why a similar inference should be unjustifiable in the case of other animals?
如果认为其他人类会像我们一样感到疼痛是合理的，那么在动物身上做出类似的推断又有什么不合理的呢？

Nearly all the external signs that lead us to infer pain in other humans can be seen in other species, especially the species most closely related to us—the species of mammals and birds. The behavioral signs include writhing, facial contortions, moaning, yelping or other forms of calling, attempts to avoid the source of pain, appearance of fear at the prospect of its repetition, and so on. In addition, we know that these animals have nervous systems very like ours, which respond physiologically as ours do when the animal is in circumstances in which we would feel pain: an initial rise of blood pressure, dilated pupils, perspiration, an increased pulse rate, and, if the stimulus continues, a fall in blood pressure. Although human beings have a more developed cerebral cortex than other animals, this part of the brain is concerned with thinking functions rather than with basic impulses, emotions, and feelings. These impulses, emotions, and feelings are located in the diencephalon, which is well developed in many other species of animals, especially mammals and birds. (Singer, 2002, p. 11)
几乎所有引导我们推断其他人类痛苦的体外迹象都可以在其他物种中看到，尤其是在与我们最为接近的物种中——哺乳动物和鸟类。这些行为迹象包括扭曲身体、面部表情扭曲、呻吟、尖叫或其他形式的呼救，试图避免疼痛的来源，对重复疼痛的恐惧表现，等等。此外，我们知道这些动物的神经系统与我们的非常相似，当动物处于我们感到疼痛的情况下时，它们的生理反应与我们的反应相同：血压最初上升，瞳孔扩大，出汗，心率增加，如果刺激持续，血压下降。尽管人类的大脑皮层比其他动物更为发达，但这一部分大脑主要与思考功能有关，而不是与基本冲动、情感和感觉有关。这些冲动、情感和感觉位于间脑，许多其他物种的动物，尤其是哺乳动物和鸟类，间脑都得到了很好的发展。（Singer，2002，第 11 页）

Obviously, what Singer is trying to establish in this passage is the conclusion that the pain experienced by nonhuman animals is no more questionable than the pain experienced by other humans: “If we do not doubt that other humans feel pain we should not doubt that other animals do so too” (Singer, 2002, p. 15). Furthermore, he calls specific attention to mammals and birds in this passage in preparation for his extended discussion on scientific experimentation and factory farming in the following two chapters of Animal Liberation, both practices of which are based largely on the systematic exploitation of precisely these animals. Yet nonetheless, by basing his analysis of pain on the specific criteria of human behavior and physiology, Singer seems to suggest that the ethical or moral interests of nonhuman animals are ultimately determined by their ability to be identified or recognized as such by humans themselves. By reducing his concept of suffering to the capacity for pain, then, Singer forecloses the possibility of an ethics that would not invariably center itself on the human subject.³
显然，在这段文字中，辛格试图确立的结论是，非人类动物所经历的痛苦并不比其他人类所经历的痛苦更有疑问：“如果我们不怀疑其他人类会感到痛苦，那么我们也不应该怀疑其他动物也会感到痛苦”（辛格，2002 年，第 15 页）。此外，他在这段文字中特别提到了哺乳动物和鸟类，为他在《动物解放》接下来的两章中关于科学实验和工厂化养殖的深入讨论做了铺垫，这两种做法在很大程度上都是基于对这些动物的系统性剥削。然而，尽管如此，辛格通过将他对痛苦的剖析建立在人类行为和生理学的具体标准之上，似乎暗示了非人类动物的伦理或道德利益最终取决于人类自身能否识别或认可它们。因此，辛格将痛苦的概念简化为痛苦的承受能力，从而排除了存在一种不以人类主体为中心的伦理学的可能性。³

Meanwhile, in the first chapter of The Animal That Therefore I Am, once again just a few paragraphs following his discussion of Bentham’s question, Derrida proposes to trace an itinerary between all three Cerisy conferences that had been dedicated to his work so far. This itinerary would follow “another logic of the limit” (Derrida, 2008, p. 29), which he names “limitrophy”: “Limitrophy is therefore my subject. Not just because it will concern what sprouts or grows at the limit, around the limit, by maintaining the limit, but also what feeds the limit, generates it, raises it, and complicates it. Everything I’ll say will consist, certainly not in effacing the limit, but in multiplying its figures, in complicating, thickening, delinearizing, folding, and dividing the line precisely by making it increase and multiply” (Derrida, 2008, p. 29, emphasis in original). Derrida thus declares that he has no intention of questioning the limit or line that is typically drawn between humans and animals. He even appears to accept what he calls “the thesis of a limit as rupture or abyss” (Derrida, 2008, p. 30), the rupture or abyss that so deeply separates humans from animals: “To suppose that I, or anyone else for that matter, could ignore that rupture, indeed that abyss, would mean first of all blinding⁴ oneself to so much contrary evidence; and, as far as my own modest case is concerned, it would mean forgetting all the signs that I have managed to give, tirelessly, of my attention to difference, to differences, to heterogeneities and abyssal ruptures as against the homogeneous and continuous” (Derrida, 2008, p. 30). However, Derrida goes on to argue that this limit or abyssal rupture not only defies any simple opposition between humans on one hand and animals on the other, but also disbands the very concept of the animal. Playing on the French term bêtise meaning “stupidity” but carrying connotations of animality or bestiality, he even goes so far as to accuse any philosopher who employs the term “animal” as a generic category for all nonhuman animals—which is to say, more or less, all philosophers—of stupidity, or what has been translated rather liberally into English as “asinanity”⁵
与此同时，在《所以我是动物》的第一章中，在讨论了边沁的问题之后，仅仅几段之后，德里达再次提出要追踪迄今为止所有专门针对他作品的塞里西会议之间的行程。这条行程将遵循“另一种极限逻辑”（德里达，2008 年，第 29 页），他称之为“极限繁殖论”： “因此，‘极限繁殖论’是我的主题。不仅因为它将关注在极限、围绕极限、维持极限中发芽或生长的东西，而且还包括滋养极限、产生它、提升它和使它复杂化的东西。我所说的每一件事，当然不是消除极限，而是在增加和繁殖极限的形态，在使它复杂化、加厚、去线性、折叠和分割线条，正是通过使它增加和繁殖。”（德里达，2008 年，第 29 页，原文有强调）。因此，德里达宣布他无意质疑通常在人类和动物之间划定的极限或线条。 他甚至似乎接受了所谓的“极限作为断裂或深渊的论题”（德里达，2008 年，第 30 页），这种断裂或深渊深刻地将人类与动物分开：“假设我，或者任何人，能够忽视这种断裂，实际上这种深渊，首先意味着使自己无视大量相反的证据；至于我自己的谦逊之例，这意味着忘记我不断给出的所有迹象，这些迹象表明我关注差异，关注差异，关注异质性和深渊断裂，而不是同质性和连续性”（德里达，2008 年，第 30 页）。然而，德里达继续论证，这种极限或深渊断裂不仅挑战了人类与动物之间任何简单的对立，而且也消解了动物这一概念。在法国语中，“bêtise”一词意为“愚蠢”，但带有动物性或兽性的含义，他甚至走得如此之远，以至于指责任何将“动物”一词用作所有非人类动物（即，或多或少，所有哲学家）的通用类别的哲学家为愚蠢，或者说，这个词被相当自由地翻译成英语中的“愚蠢”（asinity）^:

Beyond the edge of the so-called human, beyond it but by no means on a single opposing side, rather than “The Animal” or “Animal Life” there is already a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living, or more precisely (since to say “the living” is already to say too much or not enough), a multiplicity of organizations of relations between living and dead, relations of organization or lack of organization among realms that are more and more difficult to dissociate by means of the figures of the organic and inorganic, of life and/or death. These relations are at once intertwined and abyssal, and they can never be totally objectified. They do not leave room for any simple exteriority of one term with respect to another. It follows that one will never have the right to take animals to be the species of a kind that would be named The Animal, or animal in general. Whenever “one” says “The Animal,” each time a philosopher, or anyone else, says “The Animal” in the singular and without further ado, claiming thus to designate every living thing that is held not to be human… he [sic] utters an asinanity [bêtise]. (Derrida, 2008, p. 31, emphasis in original)
""" 超越所谓的人的边界，但并非站在对立的单一一方，不是“动物”或“动物生命”，而是已经存在一个异质的多重性生命，或者更准确地说（因为说到“生命”已经说得太多或太少），是生与死之间关系的多重组织，组织或无组织的关系在越来越难以用有机与无机、生命与/或死亡的图景来区分的领域之间。这些关系既是交织的又是深渊般的，它们永远不能被完全《对象化》。它们不会为任何一方相对于另一方的简单外在性留下空间。因此，人们永远没有权利将动物视为一个被称为《动物》的物种，或者一般意义上的动物。 """ 每当“一”说“动物”时，每当哲学家或其他人说“动物”，在单数形式且不加解释的情况下，声称以此来指代所有非人类生物……他[（原文如此）]发出了一种荒谬（愚蠢）。（德里达，2008，第 31 页，原文强调）31，原文强调）

Later in the same chapter, Derrida coins the French term l’animot precisely in order to reinscribe the singular form “animal,” l’animal, with the plural form “animals,” les animaux, as well as to recall the word for “word” itself, le mot, the possession of which, as language or logos, is so commonly held to distinguish humans from animals (cf. Derrida, 2008, pp. 41, 47-48). This attention to the limit, then, fractures not only the concept of the animal, but also its human counterpart. By resisting the imperative to define the human subject by any one capacity—whether it is the capacity for reason, language, or suffering itself—Derrida opens up the possibility that Singer seems to foreclose, the possibility of an ethics that would not invariably entail the philosophical recourse to humanism.
在相同章节的后面，德里达精确地创造了法语术语“l’animot”，正是为了重新界定单数形式的“动物”（l’animal），以及复数形式的“动物们”（les animaux），同时唤起“词”（le mot）本身的概念，即语言或“logos”，其拥有通常被普遍认为区分人类与动物的特征（参见德里达，2008 年，第 41、47-48 页）。因此，这种对极限的关注不仅打破了“动物”的概念，也打破了与之相对应的人类概念。通过抵制以任何一种能力——无论是理性、语言还是痛苦本身——来定义人类主体的命令，德里达开启了辛格似乎关闭的可能性，即一种不必然涉及哲学人道主义的伦理的可能性。

Yet I do not want to conclude my reading of Animal Liberation and The Animal That Therefore I Am by simply pitting Singer against Derrida. And I certainly do not want to suggest that Singer’s rather crude concept of suffering has been outmoded or superseded by Derrida’s more refined concept of suffering, either. What I would suggest instead is that Singer’s argument on the capacity for suffering as an original or pre-original capacity in its most radical sense offers an important antecedent to Derrida’s own argument. Indeed, Singer even anticipates Derrida’s argument by attending to the limit or abyssal rupture between humans and animals himself in the preface to the original edition of his text, deconstructing, we might say, the very concept of the animal:
然而，我不想仅仅通过将辛格与德里达对立来结束我对《动物解放》和《因此我是动物》的阅读。我当然也不希望暗示辛格关于痛苦的相对粗糙的概念已经被德里达关于痛苦的更为精致的概念所取代或超越。相反，我想提出的是，辛格关于痛苦能力的论点，作为最激进意义上的原始或先验能力，为德里达自己的论点提供了一个重要的先导。事实上，辛格甚至通过关注人类与动物之间的极限或深渊断裂，在原文的序言中预见到了德里达的论点，我们可以说，他解构了动物这一概念本身：>

We commonly use the word “animal” to mean “animals other than human beings.” This usage sets humans apart from other animals, implying that we are not ourselves animals—an implication that everyone who has had elementary lessons in biology knows to be false.
我们通常用“动物”一词来指代“除了人类以外的动物”。这种用法将人类与其他动物区分开来，暗示我们自身不是动物——这是一个连上过基础生物课的人都知道是错误的暗示。

In the popular mind the term “animal” lumps together beings as different as oysters and chimpanzees, while placing a gulf between chimpanzees and humans, although our relationship to those apes is much closer than the oyster’s. (Singer, 2002, p. xxiv)
在大众观念中，“动物”一词将像牡蛎和黑猩猩这样截然不同的生物混为一谈，同时将黑猩猩和人类之间划出一条鸿沟，尽管我们与这些猿类的关系比与牡蛎的关系更近。（辛格，2002 年，第 xxiv 页）

However, Singer’s argument on the capacity for suffering in Animal Liberation does indeed seem to ultimately recenter itself on the human subject, even if this subject is no longer defined by the capacity for reason as much as it is defined by the capacity for ethics itself. In the last chapter of his text, Singer attempts to address some likely objections to his general argument. In response to the objection that humans are morally justified in killing nonhuman animals for food inasmuch as nonhuman animals kill each other for the same reason, Singer argues that only humans are capable of making ethical or moral choices: “[N]onhuman animals are not capable of considering the alternatives, or of reflecting morally on the rights and wrongs of killing for food; they just do it… Every reader of this book, on the other hand, is capable of making a moral choice on this matter” (Singer, 2002, p. 224). Quite aware of the apparent contradiction in his argument, Singer defends his claim on the distinctly human capacity for ethics—or more specifically, the capability of making ethical or moral choices among those he calls “normal adult humans” (Singer, 2002, p. 225)—by appealing to Bentham once again, modifying his famous question on the capacity for suffering:
然而，辛格在《动物解放》中关于痛苦承受能力的论点确实最终重新聚焦于人类主体，即使这个主体不再由理性能力来定义，而是由道德能力本身来定义。在他的文本最后一章中，辛格试图回应对他一般论点的可能反对意见。针对人类为了食物而杀死非人类动物在道德上是有正当理由的这种反对意见，辛格认为只有人类能够做出道德选择：“[非人类动物]无法考虑替代方案，也无法在道德上反思杀死食物的权利与错误；他们只是这样做……另一方面，这本书的每一位读者都能够在这一问题上做出道德选择”（辛格，2002 年，第 224 页）。十分清楚他论点的明显矛盾，辛格通过强调人类特有的道德能力——或者更具体地说，他在“正常成年人类”中称为做出道德或道德选择的能力（辛格，2002，第 225 页）——来捍卫他的主张：再次引用边沁，修改了他关于忍受痛苦能力的著名问题：

My point is not that animals are capable of acting morally, but that the moral principle of equal consideration of interests applies to them as it applies to humans. That it is often right to include within the sphere of equal consideration beings who are not themselves capable of making moral choices is implied by our treatment of young children and other humans who, for one reason or another, do not have the mental capacity to understand the nature of moral choice. As Bentham might have said, the point is not whether they can choose, but whether they can suffer. (Singer, 2002, p. 225)
我的观点并不是说动物能够进行道德行为，而是道德原则中的平等考虑利益适用于它们，就像适用于人类一样。我们常常认为，将那些自身无法做出道德选择的存在纳入平等考虑的范围是正确的，这可以从我们对年幼儿童和其他由于某种原因没有理解道德选择本质的人类所采取的态度中看出。正如边沁可能会说的，关键不在于他们是否能够选择，而在于他们是否能够遭受痛苦。（Singer，2002，第 225 页）

But in this case, given that Bentham considers humans as well as nonhuman animals ethical subjects or moral agents, Singer’s argument on the distinctly human capacity for ethics seems significantly less radical than Bentham’s argument. Singer thus continues to privilege the human subject in his own argument on the capacity for suffering, recasting the rational subject of classical humanism as the ethical subject of another, more contemporary form of humanism. The question still remains for us, then, whether it is the concept of suffering itself that ultimately provides the philosophical foundation for this new type of humanism.
但在这种情况下，鉴于边沁将人类以及非人类动物视为道德主体或道德代理人，辛格关于人类独特伦理能力的论点与边沁的论点相比似乎并不那么激进。因此，辛格继续在他的关于痛苦能力的论点中赋予人类主体特权，将古典人文主义的理性主体重新诠释为另一种更现代形式的人文主义的伦理主体。那么，问题仍然存在，那就是痛苦的概念是否最终为这种新型人文主义提供了哲学基础。

The Other Humanism: Derrida, Bentham, Levinas
另一种人文主义：德里达、边沁、列维纳斯

Derrida’s reading of Bentham’s question on the capacity for suffering in The Animal That Therefore I Am is just as surprising for its brevity as it is for its generosity. In a passage from this text that I will risk citing once again in my paper, Derrida argues that Bentham’s question circumvents the concept of capacity altogether:
德里达对边沁关于动物痛苦承受能力的提问的解读，其简洁性如同其慷慨一样令人惊讶。在这本书中，我将冒险再次引用的一段文字中，德里达认为边沁的问题绕过了能力这一概念：

The first and decisive question would rather be to know whether animals can suffer…
首要的、决定性的问题或许应该是：动物是否能够承受痛苦……

Once its protocol is established, the form of this question changes everything… [It] is disturbed by a certain passivity. It bears witness, manifesting already, as question, the response that testifies to a sufferance, a passion, a not-being-able. The word can [pouvoir] changes sense and sign here once one asks, “Can they suffer?” Henceforth it wavers… “Can they suffer?” amounts to asking “Can they not be able?” (Derrida, 2008, pp. 27-28, emphasis in original)
""" 一旦其协议确立，这种问题的形式就会改变一切……[它]受到某种被动性的影响。它作为问题，已经表现出证词，见证了痛苦、激情、无法做到。单词可以 [pouvoir] 在这里一旦问出“他们能受苦吗？”就改变了意义和符号。从此以后，它摇摆不定……“他们能受苦吗？”等同于问“他们不能做到吗？”（德里达，2008 年，第 27-28 页，原文加粗）

For Derrida, then, the capacity for suffering indicates an incapacity, an inability, or a radical form of passivity that precedes all capacities as such. Yet this very brief reading of Bentham’s question—what some of Derrida’s more avid readers might even call a cursory reading, however generous it may well be—finds little support in Bentham’s own text, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in which this question was first posed. Indeed, what I want to suggest is that Derrida’s reading of Bentham’s question owes less to Bentham himself than it does to the Lithuanian-born French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas.
对于德里达来说，忍受的能力表明了一种无能、一种无力，或者是一种先于所有能力本身的根本性的被动性。然而，这种对边沁问题的简短阅读——即便是再宽容，一些德里达的忠实读者甚至可能称之为粗略的阅读——在边沁最初提出这个问题的文本《道德与立法原理导论》中，却找不到多少支持。事实上，我想提出的是，德里达对边沁问题的解读，与其说是来自边沁本人，不如说是来自立陶宛出生的法国哲学家埃马努埃尔·列维纳斯。

This claim of mine might seem especially contentious given that Derrida’s reading of Levinas in The Animal That Therefore I Am is far less generous than his reading of Bentham, presenting what is arguably Derrida’s least generous reading of Levinas that he has ever presented over the course of his work. The text of The Animal That Therefore I Am itself is organized around Derrida’s reading of the concept of the animal within the philosophical tradition extending, as he says, “from Aristotle to Lacan, and including Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, and Levinas” (Derrida, 2008, p. 32), a remarkably consistent and essentially dogmatic concept of the animal that only betrays what Derrida calls these philosophers’ own bêtise or “asinanity” (Derrida, 2008, p. 31). In his reading of Levinas toward the end of the second chapter of his text, a reading that is much closer and more careful than his brief reading of Bentham in the first chapter, Derrida accuses Levinas of “a profound anthropocentrism and humanism” (Derrida, 2008, p. 113) that is “more significant than all the differences that might separate Levinas from Descartes and from Kant on the question of the subject, of ethics, and of the person” (Derrida, 2008, p. 106), adding that “Levinas also remains profoundly Heideggerian” (Derrida, 2008, p. 110) on the question of death. Derrida insists that what might appear to be Levinas’s radical reformulation of the ethical subject in terms of the “face” is still caught within the same philosophical tradition that it was intended to escape, clearly reinscribing the discourse of humanism as well as the unabashedly gendered discourse of fraternalism:
这一主张可能显得尤为有争议，鉴于德里达在《所以我是动物》中对列维纳斯的理解远不如他对边沁的理解那么宽容，呈现了可能是德里达所呈现的关于列维纳斯最不宽容的解读，这在他的整个作品中是前所未有的。正如德里达所说，《所以我是动物》这部文本本身是围绕他对动物这一概念在哲学传统中的解读组织的，这一传统从亚里士多德到拉康，包括笛卡尔、康德、海德格尔和列维纳斯，形成了一个非常一致且本质上教条化的动物概念，它仅仅暴露了德里达所说的这些哲学家自身的愚蠢或“愚蠢”（Derrida，2008，第 31 页）。 在他对利维纳斯文本第二章节的阅读中，这种阅读比他在第一章对边沁的简要阅读更为接近和细致，德里达指责利维纳斯“深刻的以人为中心的人本主义”（德里达，2008，第 113 页），这种以人为中心的人本主义“比可能将利维纳斯与笛卡尔和康德在主体、伦理和人格问题上的所有差异都更为重要”（德里达，2008，第 106 页），并补充说“利维纳斯在死亡问题上也保持着深刻的海德格尔式”（德里达，2008，第 110 页）。德里达坚持认为，尽管利维纳斯可能对伦理主体的“面孔”进行了激进的重构，但这种重构仍然被困在它试图逃离的同一哲学传统中，明显重新确立了人本主义的论述以及毫不掩饰的性别化的兄弟情谊论述：

[E]ven if Levinas inflects what he inherits, even if he inverts what could be described as the traditional and ontological tendency concerning the subject, even if he does that in a strong, original, and let’s say, subversive manner… even if he submits the subject to a radical heteronomy, even if he makes of the subject a subject that is subjected to the law of substitution, even if he says about the subject that it is above all a “host”… even if he reminds us that the subject is a “hostage”… this subject of ethics, the face, remains first of all a fraternal and human face… If, in his new heteronomous and ethical definition, the human subject is a face, according the animal or the animot any of the traits, rights, duties, affections, or possibilities recognized in the face of the other is out of the question. (Derrida, 2008, pp. 106-107)
即使列维纳斯对他的继承进行了扭曲，即使他颠倒了可以描述为传统和本体论上的关于主体的倾向，即使他以强烈、原创和可以说颠覆性的方式这样做……即使他将主体置于一种激进的他律之中，即使他将主体变成一个受替代法律支配的主体，即使他关于主体说它首先是一个“宿主”……即使他提醒我们主体是一个“人质”……这个伦理学的主体，即面孔，首先仍然是一个兄弟般的人性面孔……如果，在他的新的他律和伦理定义中，人类主体是一个面孔，那么在动物或所谓的animot中，任何在他人面孔中被认可的特质、权利、义务、情感或可能性都是无关紧要的。（德里达，2008，第 106-107 页）

As Derrida goes on to demonstrate, Levinas himself asserted that this phenomenon of the “face” which defines the ethical subject belongs exclusively to the human being, maintaining a strict distinction between the human and the animal on this matter despite all biological evidence to the contrary: “The human face is completely different [from] the face of an animal” (Levinas cited in Derrida, 2008, pp. 107-108). Derrida thus concludes his close reading of Levinas with a harsh indictment against the ethical project with which Levinas claimed to surpass the philosophical tradition of rationalism itself: “It is, therefore, not sufficient for an ethics to recall the subject to its being-subject, host or hostage, subjected to the other, to the wholly other or to every other. More than that is required to break with the Cartesian tradition of an animal without language and without response” (Derrida, 2008, p. 118).⁶ It certainly seems, then, that Derrida rejects Levinas’s reformulation of the ethical subject entirely, inasmuch as this subject firmly reinstates the fundamentally human subject of the classical philosophical tradition.
正如德里达继续展示的那样，列维纳斯本人断言，这种定义道德主体的“面孔”现象仅属于人类，尽管有所有相反的生物证据，但他仍然在这个问题上严格区分了人类与动物：“人类的面孔与动物的面孔完全不同”（列维纳斯，见德里达，2008 年，第 107-108 页）。因此，德里达在仔细阅读列维纳斯之后，对他的道德项目提出了严厉的批评，该项目声称超越了理性主义本身的哲学传统：“因此，仅仅让伦理学将主体召回其主体性，即作为主人或囚犯，受他人、完全不同于他人的或任何他人的支配，这是不够的。还需要更多来打破没有语言和反应的动物的笛卡尔传统”（德里达，2008 年，第 118 页）。因此，似乎德里达完全否定了列维纳斯对道德主体的重新定义，因为这种主体坚定地恢复了古典哲学传统中的基本人类主体。

And yet, Derrida’s reading of Bentham’s question on the capacity for suffering is deeply indebted to Levinas’s particularly idiomatic formulation of the ethical subject in many of his later texts, but most notably, in his essay “Without Identity.” Derrida does not mention this text by Levinas at all in The Animal That Therefore I Am, even though he would probably have been well acquainted with it. In any case, returning to his reading of Bentham’s question in which he associates the capacity for suffering with an incapacity, inability, or radical passivity, Derrida further associates this capacity with vulnerability, anguish, and what he calls a “nonpower”:
然而，德里达对边沁关于痛苦承受能力的提问的解读，深深得益于列维纳斯在其许多后期文本中对道德主体的独特而富有特色的表述，尤其是在他的论文《无身份》中。德里达在《因此我是动物》一书中并未提及这篇列维纳斯的文本，尽管他可能非常熟悉它。无论如何，回到他对边沁关于痛苦承受能力的提问的解读，他将这种能力与无能、无力或根本的被动性联系起来，并将这种能力进一步与脆弱、痛苦以及他所说的“非权力”联系起来：

And what of this inability [impouvoir]? What of the vulnerability felt on the basis of this inability? What is this non-power at the heart of power? … Being able to suffer is no longer a power; it is a possibility without power, a possibility of the impossible. Mortality resides there, as the most radical means of thinking the finitude that we share with animals, the mortality that belongs to the very finitude of life, to the experience of compassion, to the possibility of sharing the possibility of this non-power, the possibility of this impossibility, the anguish of this vulnerability, and the vulnerability of this anguish. (Derrida, 2008, p. 28)
关于这种无力感[impouvoir]?关于基于这种无力感而产生的脆弱感？这种力量核心中的非力量是什么？……能够承受不再是一种力量；它是一种没有力量的可能性，一种不可能性的可能性。死亡就存在于这里，这是最激进的思考我们与动物共享的有限性的方式，属于生命本身的有限性，属于同情心的体验，属于分享这种非力量的可能性，分享这种不可能性的可能性，这种脆弱感的痛苦，以及这种痛苦的脆弱感。（德里达，2008，第 28 页）

This chain of associations between suffering, incapacity, inability, passivity, vulnerability, anguish, and nonpower in The Animal That Therefore I Am recalls Levinas’s idiomatics in “Without Identity” so strongly that it might indeed be tempting to speculate that there is some sort of disavowal if not repression operating within Derrida’s text.
在《因此我是动物》中，关于痛苦、无力、无能、被动、脆弱、痛苦和非力量的这一系列联想，与列维纳斯在《无身份》中的语用学如此相似，以至于人们确实可能会推测，在德里达的文本中存在某种否认，如果不是压抑。

Of course, any such disavowal would require little justification on Derrida’s behalf, at least as far as I am concerned. For “Without Identity” forms part of a series of texts in which Levinas attempts nothing less than a reclamation of humanism from the various currents of anti-humanism within 20^th-century continental philosophy and social, cultural, and literary theory. Originally published in the journal L’Éphémère in 1970, “Without Identity” also appeared in Levinas’s volume of essays published in 1972, Humanism of the Other. In his foreword to the volume, Levinas announces what he emphatically calls his “inopportune” (Levinas, 2003, p. 3, emphasis in original) philosophical project: “The three essays in this small volume… mark the stages of an ‘out of date consideration’ that is not yet or no longer frightened by the word humanism” (Levinas, 2003, p. 3). He goes on to affirm that this humanism precludes any consideration of the human subject on the biological basis of its purported animality: “[H]umanity is not a genre like animality” (Levinas, 2003, p. 7). In the second essay of the volume, “Humanism and An-archy,” Levinas states his own position in relation to anti-humanism, appealing to what he calls “the pre-original responsibility for the other” (Levinas, 2003, p. 56) that distinguishes the human subject as such in terms of the “saying”: “Modern anti-humanism is undoubtedly right in not finding in man [sic] taken as individual of a genus or an ontological reason—an individual like all substances persevering in being—a privilege that makes him [sic] the aim of reality… [But] [m]odern anti-humanism may be wrong in not finding for man, lost in history and in order, the trace of this pre-historic an-archic saying” (Levinas, 2003, pp. 56-57). “Without Identity” thus stands as a crucial text in Levinas’s ongoing formulation of the ethical subject that personifies his “humanism of the other,” both extending and expanding on the idiomatics that he had already introduced in some of his previous texts.
当然，对于我来说，任何这样的否认都无需德里达进行过多辩解。《无身份》是莱维纳斯一系列文本中的一部分，这些文本旨在从 20 世纪大陆哲学、社会、文化和文学理论中的各种反人道主义流派中重新肯定人道主义。该文最初于 1970 年发表在《L’Éphémère》杂志上，后来也收录在莱维纳斯 1972 年出版的论文集《他人的人道主义》中。在论文集的序言中，莱维纳斯明确宣布了他所谓的“不合时宜”的哲学项目：“本小册子中的三篇论文……标志着一种‘过时思考’的阶段，这种思考并不因‘人道主义’一词而感到恐惧” (莱维纳斯，2003 年，第 3 页，原文有强调)。 他接着断言，这种人文主义排除了对人类主体基于其所谓动物性的生物基础的任何考虑：“[人类]并非像动物性那样是一种类型”（列维纳斯，2003 年，第 7 页）。在卷的第二篇文章《人文主义与无政府主义》中，列维纳斯阐述了自己相对于反人文主义的立场，他提到了所谓的“对他人先于原初的责任”（列维纳斯，2003 年，第 56 页），从“言说”的角度区分了人类主体本身：“现代反人文主义无疑正确地没有在将人视为一个属或本体论原因的个体——一个像所有物质一样持续存在的个体——中找到特权，使他成为现实的终极目标……[但]现代反人文主义可能在没有为迷失在历史和秩序中的人找到这种史前无政府主义的言说的痕迹方面是错误的”（列维纳斯，2003 年，第 56-57 页）。 “无身份”是利科在持续构建道德主体过程中的一篇关键文本，体现了他的“他人的人道主义”，在扩展和扩展他之前一些文本中已经引入的习语方面。

But what makes this text particularly germane to Derrida’s reading of Bentham’s question is Levinas’s attention to the concept of suffering itself. In “Without Identity,” Levinas mounts a defense of humanism, metaphysics, and subjectivity alike against the combined onslaught of Heidegger and what he calls “the social sciences,” presumably referring to structuralism (Levinas, 2003, p. 58 ff.). It is in the third section of his text, which is aptly named “Subjectivity and Vulnerability,” that he sets out to present his reformulation of the ethical subject. Elaborating on the concept of the opening,⁷ Levinas argues that the vulnerability of this subject takes precedence over any ontological analysis of being, even coining the title of his last major work, Otherwise Than Being, in this passage:
但是，莱维纳斯对苦难这一概念的重视，使得这段文字特别与德里达对 Bentham 问题的解读相关。在《无身份》一文中，莱维纳斯对人文主义、形而上学和主观性进行了辩护，反对海德格尔以及他所称的“社会科学”，这大概是指结构主义（莱维纳斯，2003，第 58 页及以后）。在文本的第三部分，即题为“主体性与脆弱性”的部分，他着手阐述自己对伦理主体的重新定义。在详细阐述开篇概念的基础上，莱维纳斯认为，这一主体的脆弱性优先于对存在的任何本体论分析，甚至在他的最后一部重要作品中，将标题定为《存在之外》，如下所述：

Opening is the stripping of the skin exposed to wound and outrage. Opening is the vulnerability of a skin offered in wound and outrage beyond all that can show itself, beyond all that of essence of being can expose itself to understanding and celebration. In sensibility “is uncovered,” is exposed a nude more naked than the naked of skin that, form and beauty, inspires the plastic arts; nakedness of a skin offered to contact, to the caress that always, even ambiguously in voluptuousness, is suffering for the suffering of the other. Uncovered, open like a city declared open to the approaching enemy, sensibility beneath all will, all act, all declaration, all taking stands—is vulnerability itself. Is it? Doesn’t its being consist in divesting itself of being; not to die, but to alter into “otherwise than being”? Subjectivity of the subject, radical passivity of man [sic] who elsewhere poses himself [sic], declares himself being and considers his sensibility an attribute. Passivity more passive than all passivity, sent back into the pronominal particle se, which has no nominative. The Ego from top to toe and to the very marrow is—vulnerability (Levinas, 2003, p. 63, emphasis in original).
开启，是剥去暴露于创伤和愤怒之下的皮肤。开启，是皮肤在创伤和愤怒中暴露出的一切，超越了一切可以展现的自我，超越了一切存在本质可以暴露于理解和庆祝的自我。在感性中，“被揭露”的是比皮肤更赤裸的裸露，那皮肤，其形态与美丽，激发了造型艺术；裸露的皮肤，是奉献于接触，奉献于那始终存在、即使模糊地在肉欲中也是为了他人的痛苦而痛苦的抚摸。被揭露，如同一个向即将到来的敌人开放的城市，所有意志、所有行为、所有宣言、所有立场之下的感性——本身就是脆弱。是吗？它的存在不在于摆脱存在；不是死亡，而是转变为“不同于存在”？主体的主观性，人的根本被动性[此处原文有误]，他在别处设定自己[此处原文有误]，宣称自己是存在，并将他的感性视为一种属性。 被动性比所有被动性都更被动，被送回到代词小品词 se，它没有主格。从头顶到脚趾，到骨髓，自我是————脆弱性（列维纳斯，2003，第 63 页，原文有强调）。

Levinas explains that this radical form of suffering, this “suffering of the other,” is not an intentional suffering that is willed by the self, the ego, or consciousness, but rather a prior vulnerability or opening to the other that the subject is powerless to control. Citing the Book of Lamentations, he argues that this form of suffering is irreducible to either humiliation or submission:
莱维纳斯解释说，这种极端的痛苦，这种“他人的痛苦”，并非自我、自我意识或意识所意愿的有意为之的痛苦，而是一种先于对他人开放或脆弱的状态，主体对此无能为力。他引用了《哀歌集》，认为这种痛苦形式无法简化为屈辱或屈服：

“Opening” of the sensibility cannot be interpreted as simple exposure to the affection of causes. The other by whom I suffer is not simply the “stimulus” of experimental psychology and not even a cause that, by the intentionality of suffering, would by whatever rights be thematized. Vulnerability is more (or less) than passivity receiving form or shock. It is the aptitude—that any being in its “natural pride” would be ashamed to admit—for “being beaten,” for “getting slapped.” As admirably expressed in a prophetic text: “He turns his cheek to the one who slaps him and is satiated with shame.” Without introducing any deliberate seeking of suffering or humiliation (turning the other cheek) it suggests, in the primary suffering, in suffering as suffering, a hard unbearable consent that animates passivity, strangely animates it in spite of itself, whereas passivity as such has neither force nor intention, neither like it or not. The impotence or humility of “to suffer” is beneath the passivity of submission. (Levinas, 2003, pp. 63-64, emphasis in original)
""" “感性的‘开启’不能被理解为对情感原因的简单暴露。我所遭受的‘他人’并非仅仅是实验心理学的‘刺激’，甚至不是通过遭受的意向性，无论基于何种权利都应被主题化的‘原因’。脆弱性不仅仅是（或不如说更不是）被动地接受形式或冲击。它是任何在其‘自然骄傲’中都会感到羞耻承认的‘被打败’、‘被扇耳光’的能力。正如一个预言性的文本中所出色地表达的那样：‘他转向打他的人的脸颊，并因羞愧而满足。’在没有引入任何故意的寻求痛苦或羞辱（转另一边脸颊）的情况下，它暗示在最初的痛苦中，在作为痛苦的痛苦中，一种难以忍受的、不由自主地激发的同意，这种同意奇怪地激发了被动性，尽管被动性本身既没有力量也没有意图，既不像它也不像它。‘遭受’的无力或谦卑低于服从的被动性。（列维纳斯，2003 年，第 63-64 页，原文加粗）” """

It seems to me that it is precisely this “primary suffering” or “suffering as suffering,” as Levinas puts it, from which Derrida himself principally draws in his reading of Bentham’s question on the capacity for suffering among animals. Despite his rejection of Levinas’s blatantly anthropocentric concept of the face, Derrida refers us to a whole host of concepts associated with Levinas’s essentially humanist ethical project—first and foremost among which is the concept of suffering itself—in order to deconstruct the concept of the animal within the classical philosophical tradition of humanism. Of course, the paradoxical force of such an effort is not unfamiliar to those who are already acquainted with Derrida’s work. Yet Derrida’s lack of attention to this paradoxical effort on his own part is curious, to say the least.
在我看来，正是这种“原始的痛苦”或“作为痛苦的痛苦”，正如列维纳斯所说，德里达在阅读边沁关于动物痛苦能力的提问时，主要从中汲取灵感。尽管德里达明确拒绝了列维纳斯明显的人类中心主义的面孔概念，但他还是将我们引向了一系列与列维纳斯本质上的人道主义伦理项目相关的概念——其中最重要的是痛苦的概念——以便在人类主义传统的经典哲学中对动物的概念进行解构。当然，这种努力的悖论力量对于那些已经熟悉德里达作品的人来说并不陌生。然而，德里达对自己这种悖论性努力的忽视至少是令人好奇的。

To be clear, I am not suggesting that Derrida simply should not have attended to the concept of suffering, or that he should not have followed Levinas so closely, however surreptitiously, in his reading of Bentham’s question. After all, it would have been difficult for Derrida to state his differences with Levinas in any less uncertain terms, if not in his reading of Bentham’s question as such, then certainly in his reading of Levinas’s formulation of the ethical subject insofar as it regards the animal, or rather, insofar as it entirely disregards the animal.⁸ What I am suggesting is that the concept of suffering itself remains deeply indebted to the ethical project of humanism, notwithstanding the very centrality of this concept to both the animal rights movement and the field of animal studies. Even in its most radical articulations, in Singer’s Animal Liberation as well as in Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am, the concept of suffering betrays its attachment to the human subject, even if the capacity for suffering has now been extended beyond the human being to the animal or l’animot, as the case may be. The concept of suffering in the discourse of animal rights, then, always runs the risk of being reappropriated in the service of humanism—whether in the service of a more classical, rationalist brand of humanism or another type of humanism altogether—a risk that must be run by any concept in ethical theory. Suffering and pain, vulnerability and anguish, or indeed, radical passivity and openness can always be reclaimed as the defining characteristics of the human being. And this is just what Levinas has done in what I would gladly concede is his radically original ethical project.
为了明确，我并不是说德里达不应该关注苦难的概念，或者不应该如此秘密地追随列维纳斯阅读 Bentham 的问题。毕竟，如果不在阅读 Bentham 的问题本身，那么至少在阅读列维纳斯对道德主体的阐述中，尤其是它关于动物的部分，或者更确切地说，在它完全忽视动物的部分，德里达要表达与列维纳斯的不同之处，恐怕难以用更不确定的措辞来表达。⁸我所要表达的是，苦难的概念本身仍然深深植根于人文主义的道德项目之中，尽管这一概念在动物权利运动和动物研究领域中占据着核心地位。 即使在最激进的表述中，无论是辛格的《动物解放》还是德里达的《因此我是动物》，痛苦的概念仍然暴露出它与人类主体的联系，即使痛苦的能力已经扩展到动物或所谓的“l’animot”，具体情况而定。因此，在动物权利话语中，痛苦的概念始终存在被人类主义重新占有的风险——无论是服务于更经典的理性主义人类主义，还是另一种类型的人类主义——这是任何伦理理论概念都必须承担的风险。痛苦和痛苦，脆弱和焦虑，或者确实，极端的被动和开放，都可以被重新定义为人类的特征。这正是列维纳斯在他的伦理项目中所做的，我愿意承认这是一个极其原创的伦理项目。

For better or worse, the concept of suffering in animal rights discourse thus finds itself strangely dependent on a most unlikely source. The triangle formed by the intertextual relationship between Singer, Derrida, and Bentham opens up or unfolds itself into a square, bringing Levinas into this relationship as well, but only as a silent or mute partner:
无论好坏，动物权利话语中的苦难概念竟然奇妙地依赖于一个最不可能的来源。由 Singer、Derrida 和 Bentham 之间的互文关系形成的三角形，展开成一个正方形，将 Levinas 也纳入这一关系，但仅作为一个沉默或无声的伙伴：

   Singer    Derrida
SingerDerrida

Bentham Levinas
边沁列维纳斯

Figure 1: The semiotic square or open triangle of suffering
图 1：符号方阵或苦难的开放三角形

This semiotic square or open triangle constitutes a heterogeneous field of relations in which each one of these relations is irreducible to the others. These multiple relations between Singer, Derrida, Bentham, and Levinas encompass a variety of attitudes—the serious engagement, the casual encounter, the secret liaison, and mutual repugnance among others, only some of which I have traced out in this paper.⁹ But the point I want to make does not concern these philosophers and their texts themselves as much as it concerns the concept of suffering that binds them all together. For while this concept of suffering certainly seems to undermine any ethical project that is based on the ostensibly human capacity for reason or language, it is nonetheless attached to a more radical form of humanism that is based on the capacity for ethics as such. Again, the concept of suffering suffers itself, not only split apart but drawn and quartered between suffering as in the feeling of pain and suffering as in subjection, human suffering and animal suffering.
""" 这 符号学方阵或开放三角形构成了一个异质的关系场，其中每一个关系都无法还原为其他关系。这些多重关系——涉及 Singer、Derrida、Bentham 和 Levinas——涵盖了各种态度——严肃的投入、随意的相遇、秘密的联姻，以及其他一些我在本文中仅略述的态度。⁹ 但我想阐述的观点并不主要关乎这些哲学家及其文本本身，而是关乎将他们联系在一起的概念——痛苦。因为尽管这种痛苦的概念似乎破坏了任何基于表面上的人类理性或语言能力的伦理项目，但它却与一种更激进的人道主义形式相联系，这种人道主义基于伦理本身的能力。再次，痛苦的概念自身也遭受了折磨，不仅被分裂，而且在痛苦作为痛苦的感觉和痛苦作为服从之间，在人类痛苦和动物痛苦之间被撕裂和肢解。 """

What exactly this all means for animal rights activists and animal studies scholars alike, to put it more plainly, is that despite the obvious gains to be won by extending the capacity for ethics or morality from the human to the animal—a capacity that is grounded on radical suffering, absolute openness, and the irrevocable bond to others—there are limits to this strategy. Now, it appears that this strategy is becoming increasingly popular not only within animal rights discourse, but also within contemporary culture more generally, and again, with very good reason. Attesting to the growing lure of this strategy, a number of trade books based on the discipline of ethology or animal behavior have recently been published, demonstrating the evidence for compassion or empathy among various nonhuman animals. These important works seem even more radical than Singer’s Animal Liberation, the grand manifesto of the animal rights movement itself, insofar as they suggest that animals might be considered ethical subjects or moral agents in their own right.¹⁰ And yet, even when the purported “nature” of human morality is not the explicit focus of attention in these books—a “nature” that nonhuman animals are presumed to somehow embody or incarnate—the capacity for ethical behavior among animals is inevitably rendered in terms that are easily assimilable to humans’ own experience of compassion or empathy. In other words, human ethics remains the model for animal ethics. It is thus no coincidence that those nonhuman animals who are most readily recognized as ethical subjects themselves (apes, dolphins, and dogs among a few others) are the same nonhuman animals who have previously been supposed to display some evidence of the capacity for reason or language. Meanwhile, those nonhuman animals who are exploited on a mass scale in the practices of factory farming and scientific experimentation (cows, chickens, and rats among many others) appear much less likely to be awarded such recognition, remaining strangely opaque to humans for whatever reason. My point, of course, is not to say which nonhuman animals suffer more than others, or to say which forms of suffering are worse than others. Rather, the point that I am trying to make is that extending the capacity for ethics to the animal has its limitations as well as its own particular strategic benefits.
""" 对于动物权利活动家和动物研究学者来说，这一切究竟意味着什么，更直白地说，尽管将道德或伦理的范畴从人类扩展到动物——这一范畴建立在极端痛苦、绝对开放和不可逆转的与他人之间的联系之上——显然可以带来明显的收益，但这种策略也有其局限性。现在，这种策略不仅在动物权利话语中，而且在更广泛的文化中越来越受欢迎，这同样是有充分的理由的。为了证明这种策略日益具有吸引力，最近出版了一些基于动物行为学或动物行为学科的贸易书籍，展示了各种非人类动物之间存在的同情或同理心。这些重要的作品甚至比辛格的《动物解放》——动物权利运动的伟大宣言——还要激进，因为它们暗示动物可以被视为具有自身权利的伦理主体或道德代理人。 """¹⁰即便在这些书籍中，人类道德的所谓“本质”并非关注的焦点——这种“本质”被认为是非人类动物以某种方式体现或承载的——动物展现出的道德能力也必然是以人类自身对同情或同理心的体验为参照来描述的。换句话说，人类道德仍然是动物道德的模范。因此，那些最容易被认可为道德主体的非人类动物（如猿类、海豚和狗等）也是那些以前被认为显示出推理或语言能力迹象的非人类动物。与此同时，那些在工厂养殖和科学实验中被大规模利用的非人类动物（如牛、鸡和老鼠等）似乎不太可能获得这样的认可，它们对人类来说显得异常模糊，原因不明。 当然，我的观点并不是要说明哪种非人类动物遭受的痛苦更多，或者哪种形式的痛苦更糟。相反，我试图表达的观点是，将道德观念扩展到动物身上也有其局限性，同时也具有其独特的战略优势。的观点是，我正在试图表达的是

The question that finally remains for us, then, is whether it is ethics itself—a concept that is practically synonymous with humanity, humaneness, or humanitarianism as such—that ultimately distinguishes the human from the animal. Is the suffering subject of ethics fundamentally human? If so, then the question of the animal, rather than providing us with merely another ethical question, threatens to expose the very limits of ethical discourse. And as for the radical ethical discourse of animal rights, perhaps it is finally condemned to suffer humanism, precisely in the name of a suffering animal, the only animal that has ever suffered the name “animal,” which is to say, the human.
""" 最终留给我们的问题是：是否正是伦理本身——一个与人性、仁慈或人道主义几乎同义的观念——最终区分了人与动物。伦理的苦难主体本质上是否属于人类？如果是这样，那么关于动物的问题，与其说仅仅为我们提供了一个伦理问题，不如说它威胁要揭示伦理话语的极限。至于激进的动物权利伦理话语，也许它最终注定要遭受人类主义的命运，这正是以受苦的动物的名义，即那个唯一遭受“动物”之名的动物，也就是说，人类。

Notes
备注

¹ Although Singer, Derrida, and Bentham all reject the philosophical concept of “rights” for various reasons, I am proceeding as if their respective works addressing the ethical question of the animal formed part of the discourse of “animal rights,” simply leaving aside for now the daunting task of charting the problematic relationship between the philosophical discourse on animals and the political movement for animal rights.
¹尽管辛格、德里达和边沁由于各种原因都拒绝“权利”这一哲学概念，但我仍然假设他们各自关于动物伦理问题的作品构成了“动物权利”话语的一部分，现在暂且不探讨哲学动物话语与动物权利政治运动之间复杂关系的艰巨任务。

² Aside from Singer’s and Derrida’s common appeal to his question on the capacity for suffering, Bentham’s entire footnote is surely worth a close reading in itself, not only for his complimentary remarks on both Hinduism and Islam and his sharp criticism of African slavery in the colonies, and not only for his opinion on animals’ incapacity to anticipate the future and his recourse to the idea of a cruel and indifferent “nature,” but also for what I have called the strange dehiscence or bifurcation that the concept of suffering suffers itself:
² 除了辛格和德里达都提到的关于忍受痛苦的能力的问题之外，本特姆的整个脚注本身也绝对值得仔细阅读，这不仅是因为他对印度教和伊斯兰教的赞誉之词，以及他对殖民地奴隶制的尖锐批评，不仅是因为他对动物无法预知未来的看法，以及他诉诸于残酷无情的“自然”这一观念，而且也因为我所说的痛苦概念本身所经历的奇特裂变或分支：

Under the Gentoo [sic] and Mahometan [sic] religions, the interests of the rest of the animal creation seem to have met with some attention. Why have they not, universally, with as much as those of human creatures, allowance made for the difference in point of sensibility? Because the laws that are have been the work of mutual fear; a sentiment which the less rational animals have not had the same means as man [sic] has of turning to account. Why ought they not? No reason can be given. If the being eaten were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to eat such of them as we like to eat: we are the better for it, and they are never the worse. They have none of those long-protracted anticipations of future misery which we have. The death they suffer in our hands commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than that which would await them in the inevitable course of nature. If the being killed were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to kill such as molest us; we should be the worse for their living, and they are never the worse for being dead. But is there any reason why we should be suffered to torment them? Not any that I can see. Are there any why we should not be suffered to torment them? Yes, several… The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing, as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden [sic] from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate? [sic] What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversible [sic] animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (Bentham, 1996, pp. 282-283, emphasis in original)
在基恩托[1]和马霍梅特[2]宗教之下，其他动物的权益似乎也受到了一些关注。为什么它们没有得到普遍的重视，就像人类一样，考虑到感性的差异？因为现行的法律是相互恐惧的产物；这种情感，比人类，理性较低的其他动物没有同样的手段来利用。它们为什么不应该呢？没有理由可以给出。如果被吃掉是全部，那么我们吃掉我们喜欢吃的它们，是有充分的理由的：这对我们有益，而它们却不会变得更糟。它们没有我们那样的对未来痛苦的长期期待。在我们手中的死亡通常，并且总是可能，比自然不可避免的进程中的死亡更快，并且因此更不痛苦。 如果被杀死的都是他们，那么我们被允许杀死那些侵害我们的人，确实有很好的理由；他们的存在让我们变得更糟，而他们的死亡却不会对他们造成任何伤害。但是，我们为什么应该被允许折磨他们呢？我看不出有任何理由。有没有不让我们折磨他们的理由？当然有，很多……我痛心地说，在许多地方，这样的日子还没有过去，大多数物种，被称为奴隶，在法律上被对待得和英国等地对待低等动物一样。也许有一天，动物界其余的成员将获得那些从未被暴政剥夺的权利。法国人已经发现，皮肤的黑不是让一个人类在没有救济的情况下被折磨者任意摆布的理由。 或许有一天人们会认识到，腿的数量、皮肤的绒毛状或骶骨的终止，都是放弃一个敏感生命于相同命运的同等不足的理由？还有什么应该划出不可逾越的界限？是理性的能力，还是，也许，话语的能力？但是，一个成熟的马或狗，与一个一天、一周或甚至一个月大的婴儿相比，无疑是一个更理性、更会说话的动物。但是，如果情况相反，那又有什么用呢？问题不是，它们能否推理？也不是，它们能否说话？而是，它们能否感受痛苦？（边沁，1996 年，第 282-283 页，原文有强调）（282-283，原文有强调）

³ Singer resumes his anthropocentric analysis of pain in the fourth chapter of his text on vegetarianism, placing nonhuman animals along a hierarchically ordered “evolutionary scale” beginning at the top with mammals and birds, proceeding downward with reptiles and fish, and ending at the bottom with crustaceans and mollusks, all the while retaining human behavior and physiology as the very measure of this scale:
```html <sup>3</sup> 在其关于素食主义的文本的第四章中，歌手继续进行以人为中心的痛苦分析，将非人类动物置于一个等级分明的“进化尺度”上，从顶部开始是哺乳动物和鸟类，向下依次是爬行动物和鱼类，最后是甲壳类和软体动物，同时始终以人类的行为和生理学作为衡量这一尺度的标准： ```

In my earlier discussion of the evidence that nonhuman animals are capable of suffering, I suggested two indicators of this capacity: the behavior of the being, whether it writhes, utters cries, attempts to escape from the source of pain, and so on; and the similarity of the nervous system of the being to our own. As we proceed down the evolutionary scale we find that on both these grounds the strength of the evidence for a capacity to feel pain diminishes. With birds and mammals the evidence is overwhelming. Reptiles and fish have nervous systems that differ from those of mammals in some important respects but share the basic structure of centrally organized nerve pathways. Fish and reptiles show most of the pain behavior that mammals do. In most species there is even vocalization, although it is not audible to our ears…
在我之前关于非人类动物能够感受痛苦的证据的讨论中，我提出了两个这样的能力指标：生物的行为，无论是扭动、发出叫声、试图逃离痛苦的来源，等等；以及生物的神经系统与我们自己的相似性。随着我们沿着进化阶梯向下走，我们发现在这两个方面，能够感受痛苦的能力的证据强度都在减弱。在鸟类和哺乳动物中，证据是压倒性的。爬行动物和鱼类的神经系统在某些重要方面与哺乳动物不同，但它们共享基本的中心神经通路结构。鱼类和爬行动物表现出与哺乳动物相似的大多数痛苦行为。在大多数物种中，甚至还有发声，尽管这些声音对我们来说是听不到的……

When we go beyond fish to the other forms of marine life commonly eaten by humans, we can no longer be quite so confident about the existence of a capacity for pain. Crustacea—lobster, crabs, prawns, shrimps—have nervous systems very different from our own. Nevertheless… if there is some room for doubt about the capacity of these animals to feel pain… they should receive the benefit of the doubt.
当我们超越鱼类，转向人类常食用的其他海洋生物时，我们不能再那么确信它们具有疼痛感的能力。甲壳类动物——龙虾、蟹、虾、虾——的神经系统与我们自己的非常不同。然而……如果我们对这些动物是否具有疼痛感的能力还存在疑虑……那么它们应该得到怀疑的益处。

Oysters, clams, mussels, scallops, and the like are mollusks, and mollusks are in general very simple organisms. (There is an exception: the octopus is a mollusk, but far more developed, and presumably more sentient, than its distant mollusk relatives.) With creatures like oysters, doubts about a capacity for pain are considerable… But while one cannot with any confidence say that these creatures do feel pain, so one can equally have little confidence in saying that they do not feel pain…
牡蛎、蛤蜊、贻贝、扇贝等都是软体动物，一般来说，软体动物是非常简单的生物。（有一个例外：章鱼是一种软体动物，但比其远亲软体动物发达得多，也许更具有感知能力。）对于像牡蛎这样的生物，对它们是否具有疼痛感的疑虑相当大……但是，虽然不能有信心地说这些生物确实感到疼痛，同样也不能有信心地说它们没有感到疼痛……

This takes us to the end of the evolutionary scale, so far as creatures we normally eat are concerned… (Singer, 2002, pp. 171-174)
这带我们走到了进化阶梯的尽头，到目前为止，我们通常食用的生物是关注的…（歌手，2002，第 171-174 页）

⁴ This note simply marks the space for a future task that would not only yield a close reading of Derrida’s own rich discourse on blindness throughout his work, but also precipitate a critical confrontation between the discourses of animal studies and disability studies.
⁴这个注释仅仅为未来的一项任务预留空间，这项任务不仅将深入阅读德里达在其作品中关于失明的丰富论述，还将引发动物研究与残疾研究话语之间的批判性对抗。

⁵ This liberal translation of the French term bêtise by the neologism “asinanity” appears to have been derived from crossing the two English terms “asininity” and “inanity” together, even though “asininity” as such would have provided a more effective translation, it seems to me, not only for its lexical proximity to bêtise itself but also for its widespread currency and grammatical functionality—all of which is to take for granted, of course, that “asinanity” has not simply been misspelled.
⁵这种对法语术语的宽松翻译愚蠢通过新造词“愚蠢性”来实现，这似乎是从将两个英语术语“愚蠢性”和“无意义”结合起来，尽管“愚蠢性”本身可能提供了更有效的翻译，在我看来，这不仅因为其与愚蠢本身的词汇接近，还因为其广泛的流通性和语法功能——当然，这一切都假定“愚蠢性”并非简单的拼写错误。愚蠢性

⁶ Derrida also delivers a very pointed if not barbed commentary on Levinas’s account of the dehumanization of Jewish prisoners of war in Nazi Germany:
⁶德里达也对列维纳斯关于纳粹德国对犹太战俘非人化的描述进行了非常尖锐的，如果不是尖刻的评论：

[I]t is not sufficient to subvert the traditional subject by making it a subject-host or hostage of the other in order to recognize in what continues to be called “the animal”… something other than a deprivation of humanity. The animal remains for Levinas what it will have been for the whole Cartesian-type tradition: a machine that doesn’t speak, that doesn’t have access to sense, that can at best imitate “signifiers without a signified”… a sort of monkey with “monkey talk,” precisely what the Nazis sought to reduce their Jewish prisoners to. (Derrida, 2008, p. 117)
[I]这并不足以通过使传统主题成为其他主题的奴隶或人质来颠覆它，以认识到在继续被称为“动物”的东西中，除了人性的剥夺之外，还有什么。对于列维纳斯来说，动物仍然是整个笛卡尔式传统所认为的那样：一个不会说话的机器，它无法获得感觉，最多只能模仿“没有所指的能指”……就像有“猴子语言”的猴子一样，这正是纳粹试图将他们的犹太囚犯降低到的那种状态。（德里达，2008，第 117 页）没有感觉，最多只能模仿“没有所指的能指”……就像有“猴子语言”的猴子一样，这正是纳粹试图将他们的犹太囚犯降低到的那种状态。（德里达，2008，第 117 页）

⁷ Levinas reclaims the concept of the opening from Kant as well as Heidegger and the social sciences:
⁷ 列维纳斯从康德那里重新夺回了“开启”的概念，以及海德格尔和社会科学：

All that is human is outside, say the social sciences. It is all outside and everything in me is open. Is it certain that subjectivity, in this exposure to all winds, is lost among things or in matter? Doesn’t subjectivity signify precisely by its incapacity to shut itself up from inside? Opening can in fact be understood in several senses.
所有的人类都在外面，社会科学如是说。它都在外面，我里面的每一件事都是开放的。在所有风之中暴露，主观性是否会在事物或物质中丢失？难道主观性不是正因为它无法从内部封闭自己而具有意义吗？实际上，开放可以理解为几个不同的意义。

First it can signify the opening of all objects to all others, in the unity of the universe governed by the third analogy of experience in [Kant’s] Critique of Pure Reason.
首先，它可以指所有物体对所有其他物体的开放，在由经验的第三个类比所统治的宇宙的统一性中，[康德的] 《纯粹理性批判》如是。

But the term opening can designate the intentionality of consciousness, an ecstasy in being. Ecstasy of ex-sistence, according to Heidegger, animating consciousness that, by the original opening of the essence of being (Sein), is called to play a role in this drama of opening…
但术语开启可以指代意识的意向性，一种存在的狂喜。根据海德格尔的观点，存在（Sein）的原始开启所引发的狂喜，是意识在开启存在本质（本质）的戏剧中所扮演的角色...

However, opening can have a third sense. No longer the essence of being that opens to show itself, not consciousness that opens to the presence of the essence open and confided in it. (Levinas, 2003, pp. 62-63, emphasis in original)
然而，开启还可以有第三种含义。不再是开启以展示其本质的存在，也不是开启以向本质呈现其存在的意识，而是对它有所托付的存在。（列维纳斯，2003，第 62-63 页，原文加粗）

⁸ Derrida’s disavowal of Levinas’s particular formulation of the ethical subject in “Without Identity” is perhaps most apparent in his general discussion on Levinas’s concept of nudity, which as he rightly points out, remains circumscribed by the twin discourses of humanism and fraternalism:
⁸德里达在《无身份》中对列维纳斯关于伦理主体的特定表述的否认，在他对列维纳斯关于裸露概念的普遍讨论中表现得尤为明显。他正确地指出，这一概念仍然受人文主义和兄弟情谊的双重话语所局限：

The word nudity, which is used so frequently, which is so indispensable for Levinas in describing the face, skin, and vulnerability of the other or of my relation to the other, of my responsibility for the other when I say “here I am,” never concerns nudity in its sexual difference and never appears within the field of my relation to the animal. The animal has neither face nor even skin in the sense Levinas has taught us to give to those words. There is, to my knowledge, no attention ever seriously given to the animal gaze, no more than to the difference among animals, as though I could no more be looked at by a cat, dog, monkey, or horse, than by a snake or some blind protozoon. (Derrida, 2008, p. 107)
“裸露”一词，被频繁使用，对列维纳斯来说不可或缺，用于描述他人的面孔、皮肤和脆弱性，或者是我与他人的关系，当我说出“我在这里”时，我所承担的对他人的责任，它从未涉及裸露的性差异，也从未出现在我与动物的关系领域内。在列维纳斯教导我们的意义上，动物既没有面孔，甚至也没有皮肤。据我所知，从未有人认真关注过动物的目光，也没有关注过动物之间的差异，就好像我不能被猫、狗、猴子或马注视，也不能被蛇或某种盲目的原生动物注视一样。（德里达，2008，第 107 页）

⁹ For more on the semiotic square, cf. Greimas, 1987; for more on the open triangle, cf. Derrida 1981. Certain elements of the avunculate system (cf. Lévi-Strauss, 1963) and the L schema (cf. Lacan, 2006) may be detected in this hybrid structure as well.
⁹关于符号方阵的更多信息，参见格雷马斯，1987；关于开放三角形的更多信息，参见德里达，1981。在这个混合结构中，也可以发现某些祖系系统（参见列维-斯特劳斯，1963）和 L 图式（参见拉康，2006）的元素。

¹⁰ For a small but significant sample of these works on the capacity for empathy among animals, cf. Bekoff, 2007; de Waal, 2009.
¹⁰关于动物之间同情能力的这些作品的小样本，但意义重大，参见贝科夫，2007；德·瓦尔，2009。

References
参考文献

Bekoff, M. (2007). The Emotional Lives of Animals: A Leading Scientist Explores Animal Joy,  Sorrow, and Empathy—And Why They Matter. Novato, CA: New World Library.
贝科夫，M. (2007). 动物的内心世界：一位领先科学家探索动物的快乐、 悲伤和同理心——以及它们为何重要. 诺瓦托，加利福尼亚州：新世界图书馆。

Bentham, J. (1996). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
边沁，J. (1996). 道德与立法原理绪论. 牛津：克拉伦登出版社。

de Waal, F. (2009). The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society. New York: Harmony Books.
de Waal, F. (2009). 同理心时代：自然对更友好社会的启示. 纽约：和谐图书公司。

Derrida, J., & Mallet, M. L. (Ed.). (2008). The Animal That Therefore I Am (D. Wills, Trans.). New York: Fordham University Press.
Derrida, J., & Mallet, M. L. (Ed.). (2008). 因此我是动物（D. Wills 翻译）. 纽约：福德汉姆大学出版社。

Derrida, J. (1981). Dissemination (B. Johnson, Trans). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
德里达，J. (1981). 散播（B. Johnson，译）芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社。

Greimas, A. J. (1987). On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory (P. J. Perron, & F. H. Collins, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
格雷马斯，A. J. (1987). 意义论：符号学理论选集（P. J. Perron & F. H. Collins，译）明尼苏达：明尼苏达大学出版社。

Lacan, J. (2006). Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
拉康，J. (2006). 《著作：英文首版全集（F. Fink，译）纽约：W.W.诺顿出版社。

Lévi-Strauss, C. (1963). Structural Anthropology (C. Jacobson, & B. G. Schoepf, Trans.). New York: Basic Books.
列维-斯特劳斯，C. (1963). 《结构人类学（C. Jacobson & B. G. Schoepf，译）纽约：基础书籍出版社。

Levinas, E. (2003). Humanism of the Other (N. Poller, Trans.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
列维纳斯，E. (2003). 他人的存在主义 (N. Poller, Trans.). 尤里卡纳：伊利诺伊大学出版社。

Singer, P. (2002). Animal Liberation (2^nd ed.). New York: Ecco.
辛格，P. (2002). 动物解放 (第 2^版). 纽约：Ecco。

Volume 12, Issue 3
卷 12，期 3

2014

Refusing to Speak: The Ethics of Animal Silence and Sacrifice in Coetzee and Derrida
《拒绝发声：科茨埃与德里达笔下动物沉默与牺牲的伦理》

Author: Sundhya Walther¹*
作者：桑迪亚·瓦尔特¹†

Title: PhD candidate in English and South Asian Studies
标题：英语与南亚研究博士候选人
Affiliation: University of Toronto

隶属:多伦多大学
Location: Toronto, Ontario, CA
位置: 加拿大安大略省多伦多
E-mail: sundhya.walther@mail.utoronto.ca

电子邮件：sunyia.walther@mail.utoronto.ca

Key words: Coetzee; Derrida; animals; sacrifice; silence; ethics
关键词：科茨；德里达；动物；牺牲；沉默；伦理

REFUSING TO SPEAK: THE ETHICS OF ANIMAL SILENCE AND SACRIFICE IN COETZEE AND DERRIDA
拒绝发声：在科茨和德里达作品中动物沉默与牺牲的伦理

Abstract
抽象

J.M. Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello interprets animal silence as a form of resistance to human exploitation. This essay interrogates Elizabeth Costello's interpretation of animal silence by exploring the role of such silence in the construction of the human subject via its constitutive finitude. I consider three textual speaker/protagonists—Elizabeth Costello in The Lives of Animals, Derrida in The Animal that Therefore I Am, and David Lurie in Disgrace—who are interested, and even invested, in the relationship between the particular resistant potential of animal silence and their own mortality as autobiographically-speaking human beings. I argue that the intersection between nonhuman silence and human mortality should be understood through the concept of sacrifice, which, as my reading of Derrida demonstrates, destabilizes any interpretation of animal silence as autonomously resistant. Through this relationship between silence and sacrifice, I seek to resituate the ethics of Disgrace, and especially to decentre the speaking voice of David Lurie as the ethical heart of the narrative, presenting a significant revision to previous readings of the novel. While much critical attention has proposed that the seeming expansion of Lurie's sympathetic imagination in his interactions with dogs signals his development as an ethical being, my argument locates the ethic of the novel not in the speaking voice of David Lurie, but rather in the many significant silences, both human and animal, contained within the text.
J.M. 科茨的《伊丽莎白·科斯特洛》将动物沉默视为对人类剥削的抵抗形式。本文通过探讨这种沉默在构建人类主体及其构成性有限性中的作用，质疑伊丽莎白·科斯特洛对动物沉默的解释。我考虑了三位文本中的说话者/主人公——伊丽莎白·科斯特洛在《动物的生活》中、德里达在《因此我是动物》中，以及大卫·卢里在《耻辱》中——他们对动物沉默的特定抵抗潜力和他们作为自传性人类自身的死亡关系感兴趣，甚至投入其中。我主张，非人类沉默与人类死亡之间的交汇应通过牺牲的概念来理解，正如我对德里达的解读所表明的，它破坏了任何将动物沉默视为自主抵抗的解释。 通过沉默与牺牲之间的这种关系，我试图重新定位《耻辱》的伦理观，特别是要使大卫·卢里的说话声音不再是叙事的伦理核心，对小说的先前解读进行重大修正。虽然许多批评意见都提出，卢里在与狗的互动中似乎扩展了他的同情想象力，这标志着他作为一个道德人的发展，但我的论点认为，小说的伦理并不在于大卫·卢里的说话声音，而在于文本中包含的许多重要沉默，无论是人类的还是动物的。

 In The Lives of Animals, Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello declares, “Animals have only their silence left with which to confront us. Generation after generation, heroically, our captives refuse to speak to us” (Coetzee, 1999, p. 25). Costello draws attention to the “generation” and re-generation of animals as suffering objects of human possession; at the same time, she anthropomorphically codes animal silence as “heroic,” casting the position of the animal outside of human language as an active resistance to domination. For Costello, the animal does not lack language; rather, the animal “refuses” to enter into a relationship with human language in which it would inevitably be cast as inferior. While this idea of the nonhuman animal's “heroism” offers a sense of agency rather than passivity to the oppressed and exploited animal, Costello's dependence on silence in constructing heroism is ethically problematic. In this essay, I argue that the intersection of nonhuman silence and human language should be understood through the concept of sacrificial exchange, and that this sacrificial economy destabilizes any interpretation of animal silence as autonomously resistant.¹ The three texts I consider, The Lives of Animals, The Animal That Therefore I Am, and Disgrace, are centrally concerned with the ethical stakes of textual representation and the way that representation becomes foundational for the material exploitation of nonhuman animals. The speaker/protagonists of these texts—Elizabeth Costello, Jacques Derrida, and David Lurie—are all interested, and even invested, in the relationship between the resistant potential of animal silence and their own mortality as autobiographically-speaking human beings. A rigorous attention to the relationship between silence and sacrifice exposed in these three texts relocates in particular the ethics of Disgrace. While most previous interpretations of this novel focus on the ethical development or attainment of “grace” in the protagonist, David Lurie, my analysis decentres Lurie's oppressive perspective, establishing instead the novel's many significant silences, both human and animal, as the ethical heart of the narrative.
在《动物的生活》一书中，库切笔下的伊丽莎白·科斯特洛宣称：“动物只剩下沉默来面对我们。一代又一代，我们的囚徒英勇地拒绝与我们交谈”（库切，1999，第 25 页）。科斯特洛将“一代”和再一代的动物描绘为受人类占有之苦的对象；同时，她将动物的沉默拟人化为“英勇”，将动物置于人类语言之外的位置，将其视为对统治的积极抵抗。对科斯特洛来说，动物并非缺乏语言；相反，动物“拒绝”进入与人类语言的关系，在这种关系中，它不可避免地会被视为低劣。虽然这种非人类动物的“英勇”理念为受压迫和剥削的动物提供了一种能动性而非被动性，但科斯特洛在构建英雄主义时对沉默的依赖在伦理上是有问题的。 在这篇论文中，我主张应通过牺牲交换的概念来理解非人类沉默与人类语言的交汇，并且这种牺牲经济破坏了对动物沉默作为自主抵抗的任何解释。《动物的生活》、《因此我是动物》和《耻辱》这三部文本是我考虑的对象，它们都集中在文本表征的伦理风险以及表征如何成为非人类动物物质剥削的基础。这些文本中的说话者/主人公——伊丽莎白·科斯特洛、雅克·德里达和大卫·卢里——都对动物沉默的抵抗潜力与作为自传性的人类自身的死亡之间的关系感兴趣，甚至投入其中。对这些文本中揭示的沉默与牺牲之间的关系进行严谨的关注，特别是将《耻辱》的伦理学重新定位。 虽然以往对这部小说的解释大多集中在主人公大卫·卢里的道德发展或“恩典”的获得上，但我的分析将卢里的压迫性视角置于次要地位，相反，将小说中许多重要的人性和动物沉默确立为叙事的道德核心。

 Coetzee (1999) originally delivered The Lives of Animals as a series of lectures at Princeton University, challenging the expected form of the lecture by presenting, instead of a philosophical meditation, a fictional text. Within this text, Coetzee's protagonist, the novelist Elizabeth Costello, is also invited to deliver two philosophical lectures, in which she addresses the representation of nonhuman animals in philosophy and literature. Throughout The Lives of Animals, Costello explores ways in which textual and linguistic representation (particularly in philosophical discourse) creates and maintains the conditions for the physical oppression of animals. From her perspective, the entry of the animal into language, via this textual representation, amounts not to an inclusion, but rather to a violent exclusion of the animal through the appropriation and containment of its silence. Aaltola (2010) argues that “silence,” in The Lives of Animals, is a matter of not being heard, rather than not speaking.² Thus, both the animal and the poet are heroic in their silences, because both refuse to adapt to the requirements of audiences that are deaf to their concerns (Aaltola, 2010, p. 121). Aaltola's reading suggests that animality functions in the novel as a trope for artistic creation, and that this representation of animals, rather than embodied animal lives, has been Costello's subject all along. Is the silence of nonhuman animals, then, a mode of resistance, or does it in fact allow nonhuman animals to be cast as blank figures for textual representation? Is Costello herself silencing other animals by using them to fuel her own generative power?
科茨（1999 年）最初在普林斯顿大学以一系列讲座的形式发表了《动物的生活》，挑战了讲座的预期形式，没有呈现哲学沉思，而是呈现了一篇虚构文本。在这篇文本中，科茨的主人公小说家伊丽莎白·科斯特洛也被邀请发表两场哲学讲座，她在讲座中讨论了哲学和文学中非人类动物的表现。在《动物的生活》一书中，科斯特洛探讨了文本和语言表现（特别是在哲学话语中）如何创造和维持对动物的物理压迫条件。在她看来，动物通过这种文本表现进入语言，并不是一种包含，而是一种通过占有和限制其沉默的暴力排斥。阿托拉（2010 年）认为，《动物的生活》中的“沉默”是指没有被听到，而不是没有说话。² 因此，动物和诗人都在沉默中表现出英雄气概，因为两者都拒绝适应那些对他们的关切充耳不闻的观众的要求（Aaltola，2010，第 121 页）。Aaltola 的解读表明，在小说中，动物性作为一种艺术创作的隐喻发挥作用，而这种对动物的描绘，而非动物本身的生活，一直是 Costello 的主题。那么，非人类动物的沉默是一种抵抗方式，还是实际上它让非人类动物成为了文本表现的空白人物？Costello 本人是否通过利用动物来激发自己的创造力而使其他动物沉默？

 Costello sees the animal rendered powerless by the physical inevitability of animal genocide, what Derrida calls the “artificial, infernal, virtually interminable survival” of the livestock animal in the industrialized conditions of human consumption (Derrida, 2008a, p. 26). Costello's idea that animals “confront us” with their silence suggests that language, and the animal as defined by language, are intimately entwined with the horrific “generation”—“generation after generation”—of animal bodies. As a result of this entanglement of human language with the physical oppression of nonhuman animals, silence is the animal's only available form of resistance. The problematic nature of this construction is exposed, however, when we connect this “interminable” generation with the argument, frequently expressed in Western philosophy, that the animal cannot die, that the animal's lack of language prevents it from experiencing finitude, the self-conscious living toward death that, in turn, comes to define the human in opposition to the nonhuman animal. In his Electric Animal, Lippit (2000) provides a thorough genealogy of this undying animal.³ Although his opening premise is that animals are “no longer sacrificial” but “spectral” and “undead” (Lippit, 2000, p. 1), Lippit acknowledges that the constitution of the human subject, as defined by its finitude, requires the sacrifice of the animal (p. 8). Animals appear in Electric Animal as a kind of technology for defining the human; although Lippit imagines this technology as having a fragmenting or interruptive effect on human language (p. 183), it is in fact linguistic representation that creates the opposition between the undeath of the animal and the finitude of the human. As Lippit observes, “by tracking the animal across the philosophical spectrum, one discovers the systemic manner in which the figure of the animal comes to portray a serial logic: the animal is incapable of language; that lack prevents the animal from experiencing death; this in turn suspends the animal in a virtual, perpetual existence” (p. 7). Elizabeth Costello's connection between language and oppression suggests that defining a lack that excludes the animal from death occurs in language, so the only recourse for the animal is a resistant silence that in turn defines the animal, for language, as undying; this relationship of generation to silence uncovers the tautological foundation of the distinction between human and animal death. Human finitude is based on the suspension of the animal, and this suspension is founded on the animal's silence. The philosophical denial of finitude to the animal may be the reason that, in Coetzee’s title, animals can only have lives—life after life, without recognizable deaths.
""" 科斯特洛认为，动物在动物大屠杀的物理必然性面前变得无能为力，正如德里达所说的“人工的、地狱般的、几乎无尽的生存”——在人类消费的工业化条件下，牲畜的这种生存（德里达，2008a，第 26 页）。科斯特洛认为，动物以其沉默“面对我们”，这表明语言，以及语言定义的动物，与动物身体的恐怖“世代”——“一代又一代”——紧密相连。然而，当我们将这种“无尽的”世代与西方哲学中经常表达的观点联系起来时，即动物不能死亡，动物缺乏语言阻止了它体验有限性，而这种有限性反过来又定义了人类与非人类动物的对立，这种结构的棘手性质就暴露出来了。 在《电动物》（Lippit，2000 年）一书中，Lippit（2000 年）详细追溯了这种永不消逝的动物的谱系。尽管他的开篇论点是动物不再是“祭品”，而是“幽灵”和“不死”（Lippit，2000 年，第 1 页），但 Lippit 承认，人类主体的构成，以其有限性为定义，需要牺牲动物（第 8 页）。在《电动物》中，动物作为一种定义人类的技术出现；尽管 Lippit 想象这种技术具有分裂或中断人类语言的效果（第 183 页），但实际上是语言的表现形式创造了动物的不死与人类的有限性之间的对立。 正如利皮特观察到的，“在哲学的各个领域中追踪动物，可以发现动物形象所体现的系统性逻辑：动物无法使用语言；这种缺乏阻止了动物体验死亡；反过来，这又使动物处于一种虚拟的永恒存在之中”（第 7 页）。伊丽莎白·科斯特洛将语言与压迫之间的联系表明，将动物排除在死亡之外的这种缺乏是在语言中发生的，因此动物唯一的出路是一种抵抗的沉默，而这种沉默反过来又定义了动物，对于语言来说，是永恒的；这种生成与沉默之间的关系揭示了人类与动物死亡之间区别的循环论基础。人类的有限性建立在动物的悬置之上，而这种悬置建立在动物的沉默之上。哲学上对动物有限性的否认可能是库切在书名中所说的，动物只能有生命——生命轮回，没有可识别的死亡。

 Human death is the corollary subject to animal life in The Lives of Animals. In the performance of the lecture, Costello herself confronts her audience with a silence: the silence of the decaying, gendered body, the silence of a movement towards death that might elude narrativization. Costello’s hope for herself (as an author who exists, finally, in the generation and regeneration of her works), and for the animal, is to stand, silently, outside the spectralizing logic of representation. Costello's perception of her own bodily mortality thus shapes her conceptualization of animal silence. In Durrant's (2006) analysis, the decay of Costello's body, as figured throughout the text, is part of her “sacrifice” to the animal; he argues that she is literally walking “flank to flank” (Coetzee, 1999, p. 65) with the dying animal body (Durrant, 2006, p. 132). What is missing in Durrant's reading is that livestock animals are never permitted to live out their corporeal lives; they are not in the process of dying, but instead are being herded to their deaths. Killed as juveniles, replaced by another generation of juveniles, with bodies perfected for consumption by antibiotics and genetic engineering, animals do not live toward death in the same way Elizabeth Costello does. I do not mean to suggest that Costello herself is not an animal; rather, I want to point out that she enjoys a privileged relationship to her own individual animality that is denied to most nonhuman animals by the conditions of their material and discursive oppression. Human awareness of the changes wrought by time upon a single body requires a degree of individuation reserved for human beings and, to a lesser extent, companion animals. Costello's decaying body is a privilege of being human, a fact that complicates philosophical and literary equations between animality and corporeality.
在《动物的生命》中，人类的死亡是动物生命的必然结果。在演讲表演中，科斯特洛本人将沉默呈现给观众：那是腐朽、性别化的身体的沉默，是可能逃避叙事化的死亡进程的沉默。科斯特洛对自己（作为一个最终存在于其作品生成和再生的作者）以及对动物的希望，是默默地站在表征的幽灵化逻辑之外。科斯特洛对自己身体死亡的认识，塑造了她对动物沉默的概念化。在达伦特（2006 年）的分析中，贯穿文本的科斯特洛身体的腐朽，是她对动物的“牺牲”的一部分；他论证说，她实际上是“肩并肩”（科茨，1999 年，第 65 页）与垂死的动物身体同行（达伦特，2006 年，第 132 页）。达伦特的阅读中缺失的是，家畜从未被允许活出它们肉体的生命；它们不是在死亡的过程中，而是在被驱赶到死亡。 被作为幼崽杀死，被新一代幼崽所取代，它们的身体经过抗生素和基因工程的优化，以适应被消费，动物们并不像伊丽莎白·科斯特洛那样走向死亡。我并不是说科斯特洛本人不是动物；相反，我想指出的是，她享有与自身个体动物性的一种特权关系，而大多数非人类动物由于物质和话语压迫的条件而被剥夺了这种关系。人类对时间对一个单一身体所造成的变化的认识，需要一种只有人类和在一定程度上是伴侣动物才能享有的个体化程度。科斯特洛那正在腐烂的身体是人类的特权，这一事实使得动物性与肉体之间的哲学和文学等式变得复杂。

 Costello herself is not immune to this uncritical association between animality and embodiment; her concept of the sympathetic imagination calls us to recognize our shared embodiment with animals. She equates the state of being “full of being” (the fullness that, she argues, allows human beings to imagine themselves in the positions of others through an exercise of the “sympathetic imagination”) with “embodiedness” (Coetzee, 1999, p. 33). Kafka, she claims, felt like an animal-human hybrid because his brain or consciousness was (like Red Peter's) “mounted inexplicably on [a] suffering animal [body]” (Coetzee, 1999, p. 30). Despite her insistence on animality as a form of full embodiment that human and nonhuman animals share, the only living bodies that appear in The Lives of Animals are human. Costello's concern is clearly to engage with the nonhuman animal as a representational figure—rather than a material body—and to expose how the nonhuman animal as a figure (and particularly as an undying figure) supports the human ability to represent or narrativize its own embodiment and bodily mortality. Bodily change, decay, and degeneration are, in a sense, narrative movements; they are part of the privilege of self-narration, of autobiography. Against these movements, we can set the suspension of the nonhuman animal: multiple rather than individual, eternally young, eternally “healthy” animal bodies in industrial agriculture are held in a state of undeath. The sacrifice of nonhuman animal bodies for human use is thus not only the sacrifice of their lives, but also the sacrifice of their life narratives, their movements of living and dying. This static condition is chillingly literalized by such devices as gestation stalls and veal crates, which, preventing any movement, hold the animal body in a condition that can be termed neither life nor death.
科斯特洛本人也并非免受这种将动物性与具身性联系起来的非批判性联想的影响；她的同情想象力概念呼吁我们认识到人类与动物共享的具身性。她将“充满存在”的状态（她认为这种状态允许人类通过“同情想象力”的练习想象自己处于他人的位置）等同于“具身性”（科茨埃，1999，第 33 页）。她声称，卡夫卡感觉自己像是一个动物-人类混合体，因为他的大脑或意识（就像《红彼得》一样）是“不可思议地安装在”一个“受苦的动物身体”上的（科茨埃，1999，第 30 页）。尽管她坚持认为动物性是人类和非人类动物共享的一种完整具身形式，但在《动物的生活》中出现的唯一活生生身体都是人类的。科斯特洛的关注显然是作为一个象征性形象——而不是一个物质身体——与非人类动物互动，并揭示非人类动物作为象征（尤其是作为一个不朽的象征）如何支持人类代表或叙述自己的具身性和身体死亡。 身体的变化、衰败和退化在某种程度上是叙事运动；它们是自我叙述、自传的特权的一部分。与这些运动相对的是非人类动物的暂停：在工业农业中，这些动物身体不是个体的，而是多重的，永远年轻，永远“健康”，被保持在一种不死的状态。因此，为了人类的利用而牺牲非人类动物的身体，不仅是对他们生命的牺牲，也是对他们生命叙事、他们生与死的运动的牺牲。这种静态状态被诸如妊娠栏和牛犊栏等装置冷酷地具体化，这些装置阻止任何运动，将动物身体保持在既不是生命也不是死亡的状态。

 Against this undeath of the nonhuman animal, human beings can achieve a relationship of finitude to their own mortality. Elizabeth Costello aligns the figure of the writer—and, by extension, herself—with the animal not by linking body to body, in a shared experience of embodied mortality, but by linking the writer to the animal spectre to spectre, in an experience of undeath. The Lives of Animals suggests that Costello is afraid of not dying. As a public figure, and in her writing, Elizabeth Costello is generated and regenerated. Yet despite her ability to narrate, the technologies of reproduction that perpetuate the existence of her words function, in fact, to suspend her narrative, rendering silent her autobiographical voice. In this undeath of the author, writing and animality are linked: both animals and writers sacrifice their finitude to a consuming audience.⁴ Costello's insistence on the embodied nature of nonhuman animal experience, then, is also an insistence on her own embodied experience and sense of her own exploitation, and on her own desire to live toward her death.
""" 面对这种非人类动物的永生，人类能够与自己的死亡建立起有限的关系。伊丽莎白·科斯特洛将作家的形象——以及由此延伸到她自己的形象——与动物联系起来，并非通过身体与身体的连接，在共同体验到的 具身死亡中，而是通过将作家与动物幽灵联系起来，在一种永生的体验中。 《动物的一生》 表明，科斯特洛害怕的并非 死亡。作为一个公众人物，在她的写作中，伊丽莎白·科斯特洛被创造和再生。然而，尽管她能够叙事，那些延续她文字存在的复制技术实际上却使她的叙事暂停，使她的自传性声音沉默。在这种作者的永生中，写作与动物性被联系起来：动物和作家都将自己的有限性献给了一个消耗性的受众。 """⁴科斯特洛坚持非人类动物经验的具身性质，这同样也是对她自己具身经验和自身剥削感的坚持，以及她对自己生命终结的渴望。

 If to be silent, in these lectures, is not to be heard, both the suspension and the silences of the writer and the animal are aligned; silence perpetuates the state of undeath, since to speak and to be understood is to narrativize oneself, to change one’s self over time, in short, to autobiographize. Throughout the text, we see the audience's resistance to understanding Elizabeth Costello, as we can imagine an audience resisting Coetzee's challenge to the form of the lecture. To speak about one's life or experiences and to be understood presupposes the ability to live towards a death, to move, age, and decay; it presupposes the capacity to experience finitude. Finitude is not only consciousness of mortality, but also the ability to narrativize one's mortality, an ability dependent upon the freedom to experience one's own mortal body. This experience is what is denied to nonhuman animals in the industrial conditions of generation and regeneration against which Costello speaks; finitude, most often figured as something that animals constitutively lack, is in fact something they are denied, not only in literary or philosophical representation, but also in the material conditions of their exploited lives.
如果在这场讲座中保持沉默意味着无法被听到，那么作家和动物的沉默与停顿就达到了一致；沉默延续着不死的状态，因为说话并被理解就是叙述自己，随着时间的推移改变自己，简而言之，就是自传化。在整个文本中，我们看到观众对理解伊丽莎白·科斯特洛的抵制，正如我们可以想象观众抵制库切对讲座形式的挑战。谈论自己的生活或经历并被理解，前提是能够向死亡生活，移动，变老，腐烂；这需要体验有限性的能力。有限性不仅仅是死亡意识的觉醒，也是叙述自己死亡的能力，这种能力依赖于体验自己肉体的自由。 这种经历被否认给了非人类动物，在 Costello 所提到的工业生产与再生产条件下；有限性，通常被描绘为动物天生缺乏的东西，实际上是被剥夺的，不仅是在文学或哲学的表述中，而且在他们被剥削的生活的物质条件下。

 Elizabeth Costello's plea for the ethical consideration of animals relies on two central assumptions about animality: first, that animals are constitutively silent, and that this silence can be interpreted as a form of resistance, and second, that animals are properly associated with embodiment. Exploitation, according to Costello, denies the corporeality of animals by denying their embodied suffering, a form of suffering that a new ethics, drawn from poetic discourse and based on the sympathetic imagination, should seek to recognize. In his series of lectures, collected in
伊丽莎白·科斯特洛对动物的道德考量的呼吁基于关于动物性的两个核心假设：首先，动物天生沉默，这种沉默可以解释为一种抵抗形式；其次，动物与身体存在恰当的联系。根据科斯特洛的观点，剥削否认了动物的身体存在，通过否认他们的身体痛苦，这种痛苦是一种应该被新的伦理学所认识到的痛苦，这种伦理学源于诗歌话语，并基于同情想象。The Animal That Therefore I Am,
因此我是的动物，Jacques Derrida exposes how these same representational tropes enact a sacrifice of the animal that enables humans to experience their own bodily decay. One morning, naked, in his bedroom, Jacques Derrida is confronted,
雅克·德里达揭示了这些相同的表征手法如何执行对动物的牺牲，这种牺牲使人类能够体验到自身的身体衰败。一天早晨，裸体地在他的卧室里，雅克·德里达遭遇了，“frontally,” with the silent animal in the form of his cat (Derrida, 2008a: 4). As Elizabeth Costello might hope, the animal’s silence “shame[s]” the philosopher in this moment of interspecies encounter (Derrida, 2008a, p. 4), when each is confronted with the material, individual, body of the other. Of this materiality Derrida is careful to assure us: the animal “is a real cat [...]. It isn’t the figure of cat. It doesn’t silently enter the bedroom as an allegory for all the cats on the earth, the felines that traverse our myths and religions and fables” (2008a, p. 6). Again, a few pages later, Derrida emphasizes that the cat “does not appear here to represent, like an ambassador, the immense symbolic responsibility with which our culture has always charged the feline race” (2008a, p. 9). Derrida is too sensitive a reader not to recognize his own paranoiac repetition. His disavowal of his cat’s relationship to the cats of human culture functions as a reminder that, in fact, she enters the scene of her encounter with him as a figure always already predetermined in his mind by representation. It thus becomes clear that, like Costello, Derrida is concerned with the construction of animal
“直面”，以他那只沉默的动物——猫（德里达，2008a：4）为象征。正如伊丽莎白·科斯特洛所希望的那样，在这场跨物种的相遇中，动物的沉默“羞辱”了哲学家（德里达，2008a，第 4 页），因为此时他们各自面对着对方的物质、个体、身体。德里达对此物质性非常小心地向我们保证：这只动物“是一只真正的猫 [...]. 它不是猫的象征。它不会无声地进入卧室，作为地球上所有猫、穿越我们的神话、宗教和寓言的猫的寓言”（2008a，第 6 页）。再次，几页之后，德里达强调猫“并不以大使的身份出现，在这里代表我们文化一直赋予猫科动物的巨大象征责任”（2008a，第 9 页）。德里达作为一个过于敏感的读者，不可能不认识到他自己的偏执重复。他对自己的猫与人类文化中猫的关系的否认，实际上是一个提醒，即实际上，她进入与他相遇的场景时，已经在他心中被表征所预先决定了。因此，很明显，就像科斯特洛一样，德里达关注的是动物的构建figures
形象in philosophical discourse. Derrida's body, rather than the cat's, is his focus in narrating their opening encounter, and his body speaks the text of the lecture. Although like Costello, Derrida attempts to use cultural representations to dismantle anthropocentric conceptions of the animal, his text is skeptical about the emancipatory potential of recognizing mutual animal-human embodiment. The fact that his cat is at once both a “real” cat and a cultural figure, rather than a simply and fully embodied being, is one of the ways Derrida highlights his consciousness of the relations of power and the weight of culture, both of which determine in advance the course of any discussion of the animal. I am, then, in agreement with Shukin (2009), who finds the cat a spectral, rather than an embodied or material presence in the text (p. 37). I do not agree, however, that Derrida's discussion, as a result, ignores the difference between figurative and corporeal life, nor, in my view, does he disregard the relations of power, such as the “material institutions
在哲学对话中。德里达在叙述他们的初次相遇时，关注的不是猫的身体，而是他自己的身体，他的身体在演讲中讲述文本。尽管像科斯特洛一样，德里达试图利用文化表征来解构人类中心主义的动物观念，但他的文本对承认动物与人类共同具身化的解放潜力持怀疑态度。他的猫既是“真实”的猫，又是文化符号，而不是一个简单而完全具身的存在，这是德里达强调他对权力关系和文化重量的意识的一种方式，这两者预先决定了任何关于动物的讨论的走向。因此，我与舒金（2009 年）的观点一致，他认为猫在文本中是一种幽灵般的，而不是具身或物质的存在（第 37 页）。然而，我并不认为德里达的讨论因此忽略了象征性和物质生活的区别，在我看来，他也没有忽视权力关系，例如“宠物所有权”的物质制度（舒金，2009 年，of pet ownership” (Shukin, 2009,
的研究 p. 38), that inform his meeting with the cat. On the contrary, Derrida's encounter foregrounds how an embodied relation with the material animal is made impossible by just the institutions that Shukin names, by relations of power that are rendered first and most influentially in human language. The spectrality of the animal figure, and the way it creates and sustains structures of power based on species, is the very subject of Derrida's discussion. This spectrality, while it enables the process of deconstruction, is in itself disturbing and problematic to Derrida, as indicated by his references to the conditions of industrial slaughter.
第 38 页），这些内容为他与猫的相遇提供了信息。相反，德里达的遭遇突显了，正是舒金所提到的那些制度，正是那些首先并以人类语言最为显著表现出来的权力关系，使得与物质动物的具身关系变得不可能。动物形象的幽灵性，以及它如何基于物种构建并维持权力结构，正是德里达讨论的主题。这种幽灵性虽然能够促进解构的过程，但它本身对德里达来说既令人不安又充满问题，正如他关于工业屠宰条件的引用所指出的。

 The clearest indication in Derrida’s text that he is, through this staged encounter, engaging with a full cultural history of the animal in the Western tradition is his focus on the gaze. When Derrida encounters the animal through her “gaze,” he does so as a consequence of the repression of other sense experience in the construction of the human.⁵ Derrida's encounter occurs when he is “caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an animal” (2008a, p. 3). His attention to the gaze does not, however, belie an unconscious anthropocentrism.⁶ The deliberateness of this focus is clear in his repetition of “animal” sense-language—“sniff the trace” (2008a, p. 32); “to track, to sniff, to trail, and to follow” (2008a, p. 33)—and by his explicit observation of the effacement of smell in philosophy and literature (2008a, p. 55). At the moment of the encounter, then, when Derrida recognizes, through “the gaze called 'animal' [...] the abyssal limit of the human” (2008a, p. 12), he indicates that what is at issue is the human itself. The gaze is what humans use, from the confines of their own sensory limitations, to imagine (as Elizabeth Costello does) a resistant place outside of language in which the animal might stand, not smelling but looking, “just to see” (Derrida, 2008a, p. 4).⁷
```html 在德里达的文本中，最明显的迹象是他通过这种舞台化的遭遇，与西方传统中动物的全部文化历史进行互动的是他对目光的关注。当德里达通过动物的“目光”遭遇动物时，这是由于在构建人类的过程中，其他感官体验被压抑的结果。<sup>5</sup>德里达的遭遇发生在他被“赤裸裸地、沉默地”动物的目光所“捕获”的时候（2008a，第 3 页）。然而，他对目光的关注并不表明无意识的物种中心主义。<sup>6</sup>T这种关注的刻意性在他的“动物”感语言重复中表现得非常明显——“嗅探痕迹”（2008a，第 32 页）；“追踪、嗅探、追踪和跟随”（2008a，第 33 页）——以及他明确地观察到哲学和文学中嗅觉的消失（2008a，第 55 页）。在遭遇的时刻，因此，当德里达通过“被称为‘动物’的目光 [...] 认识到人类的深渊极限”（2008a，第 ``` 12)，他指出，问题的关键在于人类本身。目光是人类在自身的感官局限中用来想象（正如伊丽莎白·科斯特洛所做的那样）一个抵抗语言的空间，动物可以站立，不是闻而是看，“仅仅为了看”（德里达，2008a，第 p 页）4)⁷

 This desire to place oneself fully inside one's body, to experience being “full of being,” can be seen in Costello's idealistic conception of animal embodiment. While Costello employs representational tropes that code animality as a form of pure embodiment, Derrida attempts to subvert them. The form of the lecture makes the lecturer's body the most “real” embodied presence in the room. Coetzee, of course, complicates this form by performing the lecture in the character of Elizabeth Costello, a performance that Laura Wright has identified as a kind of “drag” (2006, p. 100). This complication marks Coetzee's consistent preoccupation with the authority of the speaker or the focal consciousness in fiction, the voice that shapes the reading or interpretation. In The Lives of Animals, the layering of performances draws deliberate attention to both Coetzee’s and Costello's refusal to obey the generic requirements of the philosophical lecture. As readers of the text, we can only imagine the jarring experience of hearing Elizabeth Costello, voiced by Coetzee, begin the lecture again, after eighteen pages have already elapsed: “'Ladies and gentlemen,' she begins” (1999, p. 18). The insertion of such a conventional opening into this unconventional text wryly destabilizes the idea that the lecturer is present, as a speaking body who speaks for, and by extension of, herself/himself, something Coetzee consistently refuses to do. This layering of voices and bodies in The Lives of Animals functions similarly to Derrida's encounter with his cat: the spectrality of the figures (cat, Costello) destabilizes the very idea of “full” embodiment. In the act of performance, these lecturers’ ability to appear as speaking, self-narrating bodies depends upon the spectral, undying figures of animals. Asserting that humans and animals are linked by a shared sense of embodiment merely utilizes an existing trope of animality in order to constitute the “fullness” of human experience. The existence of nonhuman animals as corporeal beings is sacrificed to the human need self-consciously to narrate individual human bodily experience, the subjective experience of living-toward-death. As Derrida argues in The Gift of Death, death itself confers singularity, or “irreplaceability,” upon the subject (2008b, p. 42). This human autobiographical discourse holds nonhuman animals in place, as spectral figures, so that humans can move forward in time, can experience their own singular finitudes.
这种将自己完全置于自身身体中的愿望，体验“充满存在感”，在科斯特洛对动物存在的理想化构想中可见。虽然科斯特洛使用象征手法将动物性编码为一种纯粹的存在形式，但德里达试图颠覆这些手法。讲座的形式使得演讲者的身体成为房间里最“真实”的存在。当然，库切通过以伊丽莎白·科斯特洛的角色进行演讲，复杂化了这种形式，劳拉·赖特将其识别为一种“变装”（2006 年，第 100 页）。这种复杂化标志着库切对小说中说话者权威或焦点意识的持续关注，即塑造阅读或解释的声音。在《动物的生活》中，表演的叠加故意引起了我们对库切和科斯特洛拒绝遵守哲学讲座的体裁要求的关注。作为文本的读者，我们只能想象听到由库切配音的伊丽莎白·科斯特洛在已经过去了十八页之后再次开始演讲的震撼体验：“女士们，先生们，”她开始说”（1999 年，第）。 18). 将这种传统开场白插入到这篇非常规文本中，巧妙地颠覆了讲师作为说话的肉体，代表并延伸到她/他自己说话的观念，这是科茨伊一贯拒绝做的事情。在《动物的生活》中，这种声音和身体的叠加作用与德里达与他的猫的相遇相似：这些人物（猫、科斯特洛）的幽灵性质颠覆了“完整”存在的观念。在表演行为中，这些讲师作为说话、自我叙述的身体的呈现能力依赖于动物这些幽灵般、不朽的形象。声称人类和动物通过共同的实体感相联系，只是利用了动物性的一个现有象征，以构成人类经验的“完整性”。非人类动物的实体存在被牺牲，以满足人类有意识地叙述个体人类身体经验、向死而生的主观经验的需求。 如德里达在《死亡的礼物》中所论证的，死亡本身赋予主体独特性，或“不可替代性”（2008b，第 42 页）。这种人类自传性话语将非人类动物定位为幽灵般的形象，以便人类在时间中前进，体验他们自己的独特有限性。

 Derrida’s representation of the silent animal gaze exposes the limitations of Elizabeth Costello’s construction of silence as a locus of resistance. For Derrida, the idea of the animal’s silence supports and reinforces the conceptual violence of representation, which, in turn, supports and reinforces material violence against animal bodies. From Derrida's perspective, therefore, silence cannot function as the animal’s resistance to domination by language. The task of The Animal That Therefore I Am is to uncover the trace of the animal within language, not to place animal silence on the opposite side of an abyss from human speech. The exposure of the animal's trace reveals the sacrifice that allows the human to occur as an autobiographical (that is, a self-narrating) subject. In Derrida's autobiographical lectures as in The Lives of Animals, an audience faces the silence of the decaying body. In his nudity, during the opening encounter, Derrida indicates that his body—particular, male, aging—will be a concern for this text. Towards the end of the four talks included in the volume, Derrida indicates a plan for his future work on the question of the animal; he says, “I’ll do it, I hope, if I have the time and strength” (2008a, p. 159). This awareness that time is escaping him arises directly from the sacrifice of animal finitude. Derrida indicates that to speak about the animal, in its discursive undeath, is to be haunted by mortality: the undying animal makes possible both the lecture as a speaking-towards-death and human living-towards-death. In their bodily mortality, neither Derrida nor Costello gains a sense of the animality of their decaying bodies. Rather, it is under the silent gaze of the animal that the human body is configured as mortal, and that the apprehension of that mortality creates the finitude that is the autobiographical condition. Nonhuman animals -- out of time, out of death, out of language -- can only, through their silent gaze, exist in a supplementary, and sacrificial, relationship to this human autobiographical narrative.
""" 德里达对沉默的动物目光的描绘，揭示了伊丽莎白·科斯特洛对沉默作为抵抗焦点的构建的局限性。对德里达来说，动物沉默的概念支持并强化了表征的暴力，而这种暴力反过来又支持并强化了对动物身体的物质暴力。因此，从德里达的角度来看，沉默不能作为动物对语言支配的抵抗。动物因此是我》的任务是揭示动物在语言中的痕迹，而不是将动物沉默置于与人类言语相隔的深渊的另一边。动物痕迹的揭露揭示了允许人类作为自传性（即自我叙述的）主体出现所付出的牺牲。在德里达的自传性讲座中，正如在《动物的生活》中，观众面对着腐烂身体的沉默。在开场相遇时，德里达通过自己的裸露表明，他的身体——特定的、男性的、衰老的——将成为本文的焦点。 """ 在本卷最后四篇演讲的结尾，德里达提出了他未来关于动物问题的研究计划；他说，“如果我有时间和精力，我会去做这件事”（2008a，第 159 页）。这种意识到时间正在从他身边溜走的感觉直接源于对动物有限性的牺牲。德里达指出，在话语的未死状态中谈论动物，就是被死亡所困扰：不朽的动物使得演讲作为一种面向死亡的说话成为可能，也使得人类作为一种面向死亡的活着成为可能。在他们的身体有限性中，德里达和科斯特洛都没有获得他们正在腐烂的身体动物性的感觉。相反，正是在动物的沉默注视下，人类身体被配置为有限的，而这种对有限性的感知创造了自传性条件。非人类动物——超越时间、超越死亡、超越语言——只能通过它们的沉默注视，以一种补充的和牺牲性的关系存在于这种人类自传性叙事中。

 If the animal is sacrificed to an eternal undeath in order that the human may die, a corollary sacrifice can also be performed: the animal can be killed so that the human may become immortal. This relationship is the basis of what I will, drawing from Derrida's The Gift of Death, call the “sacrificial economy”: put simply, this economy turns upon the exchange of death for life, and life for death. Thinking broadly, we can see that this unequal trade supports a vast range of relationships between human and nonhuman. Certain cultural traditions of representing human consciousness, civility, achievement, and morality depend to a certain extent on a sacrifice of the animal as an unconscious, uncivil, backward, amoral being. This definition of human life in opposition to animal life rests upon metaphorical animal death: the animal is dead to consciousness, dead to civility, dead to progress, and dead to morality. In more material ways, animal death supports human life, with meat consumption being only the most literal manifestation of a broader carnophallogocentric economy.⁸ Both meat consumption and (self-) consciousness, however, point to the ways in which animals must live in order for the human to die: by feeding the body (a process that necessarily recalls the body's vulnerability to decay) and by being conscious of one's own embodiment, one's own movement through a life, the human establishes its sense of finitude. In The Animal That Therefore I Am and The Lives of Animals, we see this latter manifestation of the sacrificial economy in two speakers whose performances connect animal silence with a human ability to experience finitude.
""" 如果动物被献祭以换取永恒的不朽，从而让人类死亡，那么也可以进行一种相应的献祭：杀死动物以使人类获得不朽。这种关系构成了我将从德里达的《死亡的赠礼》中汲取的“献祭经济”的基础：简单来说，这种经济以死亡换取生命，以生命换取死亡。从广义上讲，我们可以看到这种不平等的贸易支持了人类与非人类之间广泛的关系。某些文化传统在表现人类意识、文明、成就和道德时，在一定程度上依赖于将动物作为无意识、不文明、落后、不道德的存在进行献祭。这种将人类生活与动物生活对立起来的定义，建立在隐喻性的动物死亡之上：动物对意识、文明、进步和道德都已死去。在更物质化的层面上，动物死亡支撑着人类生活，其中肉食消费只是更广泛的肉食-阳具-话语中心经济的最直接表现。 """⁸動物攝食和（自我）意識，然而，都指向動物必須如何生活，以便人類死亡：通過供養身體（這是一個必然會讓人想起身體易於腐敗的過程）和意識到自己的具體存在，自己的生命旅程，人類建立自己的有限感。在《所以我是動物》和《動物的生命》中，我們看到這後一種犧牲經濟的表現，在兩位演講者的表演中，他們的表現將動物的沉默與人類體驗有限性的能力相連結。

 What happens, on the other hand, when a human being, supposedly fully self-conscious, wants to escape his own finitude, to live forever, to stop his mortal progress, to render himself undead? Coetzee's novel Disgrace, published in the same year as The Lives of Animals, depicts just such a subject, a subject desperate to escape his own mortality. Disgrace is the story of a literature professor, David Lurie, who, after refusing to apologize for his sexual exploitation of a student, retreats from his urban life to his daughter Lucy's remote homestead. Although it is written in the third person, the narrative is focalized exclusively through Lurie, creating a claustrophobic, insular, and solipsistic perspective. To approach the intersection of silence and sacrifice in Disgrace, it is necessary to recognize that the protagonist David Lurie's self-consciousness is dependent upon silences. From the beginning of the novel, women are the silent figures through which Lurie constructs his image of himself. Lurie “hear[s] no female voice” (Coetzee, 2000: 52), despite the fact that women are trying to speak to him; he does not hear the prostitute Soraya, who rebuffs his incursion into her life, nor does he hear his student Melanie, who tries to prevent him from raping her (indeed, he even refuses to read her statement). Women, nevertheless, refuse to remain silent: despite the ways in which Lurie's narrative attempts to contain and control the voices of women, they insistently interrupt the text, demonstrating the limits of Lurie's insular and solipsistic world. Silences are the foundation of Lurie's selfhood; he, however, is only interested in two silences: his own, in front of the committee, and Lucy's, on the subject of her rape. Lucy's silence is indeed a way of resisting Lurie's domination of the narrative (although, with regard to her position as a whole, her decision not to speak is more complex): she will not allow him to take her story. While Lurie views Lucy's silence as wrongheaded, he sees his own as almost heroic. In both instances, the novel problematizes the idea of silence as resistance. Lucy's silence is clearly an attempt to navigate between passivity and resistance, atonement and autonomy; her silence is not a pure act of resistance, but rather a negotiation of priorities and desires to which the tight focalization through Lurie allows us no access. Lucy's silence results from a need to reconfigure a shattered self. Lurie's silence, by contrast, allows him to maintain his autonomous self-perception, and his narrative of himself as a wronged lover; his refusal to engage in any mutually responsive conversation about his actions is a manifestation of his extreme solipsism and his desperate attachment to autonomous selfhood. His narrative allows us to see how “speech” -- with Lurie as the logocentre of the novel -- appropriates the silence of the other. When Lurie begins to encounter animals, and animal silence, then, the ground has already been laid for an exploration of the limits of the human sympathetic imagination in relationships in which one party is voiced and the other is silent.
""" 另一方面，当一个人，一个本应完全具有自我意识的人，想要逃离自己的有限性，想要永生，想要停止自己的凡人生涯，想要让自己成为不死之身时，会发生什么？库切在同年出版的小说《耻辱》中描绘了这样一个主题，一个渴望逃离自身死亡的主题。《耻辱》讲述了一位文学教授大卫·卢里，在拒绝为他对学生的性剥削道歉后，从城市生活退隐到女儿露西的偏远农场。尽管这部小说采用第三人称叙述，但叙事完全聚焦于卢里，创造了一种压抑、封闭和自我中心的视角。要探讨《耻辱》中沉默与牺牲的交汇点，必须认识到，《耻辱》的主角大卫·卢里的自我意识依赖于沉默。。 """ 从小说的开头，女性就成了卢里构建自我形象的无声角色。卢里“听不到任何女性的声音”（科茨，2000：52），尽管女性试图与他对话；他听不到妓女索拉亚，她拒绝他闯入她的生活，也听不到他的学生梅勒妮，她试图阻止他强奸她（事实上，他甚至拒绝阅读她的陈述）。然而，女性拒绝保持沉默：尽管卢里的叙事试图控制和限制女性的声音，她们却不断地打断文本，展示了卢里封闭和自我中心的世界的局限性。沉默是卢里自我意识的基石；然而，他只对两种沉默感兴趣：他在委员会面前的沉默，以及露西在关于她被强奸的话题上的沉默。露西的沉默确实是一种抵抗卢里对叙事控制的手段（尽管，就她的整体立场而言，她选择沉默的决定更为复杂）：她不允许他占据她的故事。尽管卢里认为露西的沉默是错误的，但他认为自己的沉默几乎是英雄式的。在两种情况下，这部小说都质疑了沉默作为抵抗的观点。露西的沉默显然是她试图在被动与抵抗、赎罪与自主之间寻找平衡；她的沉默并非纯粹的抵抗行为，而是一种对优先级和欲望的协商，卢里通过紧密的聚焦让我们无法窥见其中。露西的沉默源于她需要重新构建破碎的自我。相比之下，卢里的沉默使他能够维持他自主的自我认知，以及他作为受伤害的恋人的叙事；他拒绝参与任何关于自己行为的相互回应的对话，这是他极端的自我中心主义和对自主自我身份的绝望依恋的体现。他的叙事让我们看到，“言语”——以卢里作为小说的语中心——如何将他人的沉默据为己有。当卢里开始遇到动物，以及动物的沉默时，探索人类同情想象力的极限的基础已经奠定，在这种关系中，一方发声而另一方沉默。

 Lurie's decaying body obsesses him: he views himself as becoming “unlovely” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 44) and “old” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 190). One of the central questions of Disgrace is clearly whether Lurie will accept the fact of his embodiment, whether he can accept the movement of the autobiographical narrative by learning how to die. Citing the change in Lurie's physical and material life, much of the criticism of Disgrace relies on an equation of animality with abjection: Lurie, through the “reduction” of his circumstances, becomes increasingly abject, until he has “nothing,” a fact that, in turn, allows him to connect with his own animality and to sympathize with nonhuman animals (Boehmer, 2002, pp. 343, 346; 2006, p. 137; Durrant, 2006, p. 129). This reading rests, however, on some problematic ground. First, Lurie in no way relinquishes his position of privilege. While it is true that he is no longer a professor, that he has been physically injured, and that he has fewer material possessions than he once did, he is nevertheless still a white male in a place where, despite a (slowly and incompletely) shifting social order, white maleness is the ultimate position of power. As Boehmer (2002, p. 349) notes, David Lurie remains a subject, in the classical sense; at the end of the novel, he is still a speaking “I.”⁹ That Lurie is never “abject” is indicated by his continued hold on the narrative, colonizing and dominating the voices of others. His repeated assertion that he has been “enriched” by his relationships demonstrates, for example, his appropriation of the perspectives of women into his own narrative (Coetzee 2000, pp. 56, 70, 192). Although, as McDunnah observes, there are striking moments when his control falters (2009, p. 21), Lurie continues to guide and construct the text through its conclusion. His undeniable power over the narrative, and his position of privilege over a reader who is trapped inside his point of view, problematizes any reading of him as a figure of abjection or reduction.
卢里的衰败之躯让他着迷：他觉得自己正在变得“丑陋”（科茨埃，2000 年，第 44 页）和“衰老”（科茨埃，2000 年，第 190 页）。《耻辱》这部作品的核心问题显然是卢里是否能够接受自己的实体存在，是否能够通过学习如何死亡来接受自传性叙事的流动。许多对《耻辱》的批评通过卢里身体和物质生活的变化，将动物性与屈辱等同起来：卢里通过“境遇的降低”变得越来越屈辱，直至他“一无所有”，这一事实反过来又使他能够与自己的动物性相连接，并同情非人类动物（博伊默，2002 年，第 343、346 页；2006 年，第 137 页；达兰特，2006 年，第 129 页）。然而，这种解读存在一些问题。首先，卢里并没有放弃他的特权地位。 尽管他不再是教授，身体也受到了伤害，而且物质财产比以前少，但他仍然是一个白人男性，在一个尽管社会秩序（缓慢且不完整地）在变化的地方，白人男性仍然是至高无上的地位。正如波伊默（2002 年，第 349 页）所指出的，大卫·卢里在小说的结尾仍然是一个在经典意义上的主体；他仍然是说话的“我”。卢里从未“沦为卑贱”，这可以从他继续掌握叙事、殖民和支配他人声音的事实中看出。例如，他反复声称自己通过与他人的关系“得到了丰富”，这表明了他将女性的观点纳入自己的叙事中（科茨 2000 年，第 56、70、192 页）。尽管，正如麦克唐纳观察到的，在他控制动摇的时刻是引人注目的（2009 年，第 21 页），卢里仍然继续引导和构建文本，直至其结尾。 他的无可否认的叙事力量，以及他对陷入其观点的读者的特权地位，使任何将他视为边缘化或简化的角色的阅读都变得复杂。

 This idea of reduction brings us to the second point that has been central to some interpretations of Lurie's development: the idea that an animal is reducible to a body, and any human awareness of embodiment (hunger, pain, etc.) necessarily connects to the animality of that human body. A nonhuman animal is a figure of silent bodily suffering, and Lurie, because he suffers physically, is “reduced” to an animal; this reduction is the source of what these readers see as Lurie's expanded sympathies with other species (O'Neill, 2009, p. 203; van Heerden, 2010, p. 56; Wright, 2010, p. 162). What Derrida teaches us, however, is that we should be suspicious of tropes of animality, and this idea of the body as “animal” is one of the most persistent tropes in Western culture. If Lurie sees himself becoming animalized and abject through his experience, there is no reason to trust his interpretation; he has given us enough reason to question his self-representations, despite Attridge's strange assertion that “we have no reason to doubt” Lurie's “own account” (2000, p. 104). The first act of the novel, before Lurie leaves Cape Town, clearly establishes his vice-grip on the narrative (with, as Myrtle Hooper perceives, the limited third person serving as a block to any reader response, any “you” to complement the speaking “I” [2010, p. 143]), as well as the demonstrable faults in his interpretations of other characters, especially in his encounters with Melanie Isaacs. Like Rosemary Jolly, I contend that the novel carefully avoids endorsing the “objectifying discourse” that defines the body as “animal” (2006, p. 153). What we can see, however, is that Lurie himself draws the association between his own physical mortality and that of the animals around him.
这种关于“简化”的想法引出了第二个要点，这个要点在一些关于卢里发展的解读中占据核心地位：即动物可以被简化为身体，任何关于身体（饥饿、痛苦等）的人类意识必然与该人类身体的动物性相联系。非人类动物是沉默的身体痛苦的象征，卢里因为身体上的痛苦而被“简化”为动物；这种简化是这些读者认为卢里对其他物种同情心扩大的来源（奥尼尔，2009 年，第 203 页；范赫登，2010 年，第 56 页；赖特，2010 年，第 162 页）。然而，德里达教导我们，我们应该对动物性的隐喻持怀疑态度，而将身体视为“动物”的这种观念是西方文化中最持久的隐喻之一。如果卢里认为自己的经历使他变得动物化和卑贱，那么我们没有理由相信他的解读；尽管阿特里奇提出了一个奇怪的论断——“我们没有理由怀疑”卢里的“自己的叙述”（2000 年，第 104 页），但他已经给了我们足够的理由去质疑他的自我呈现。 小說的第一幕，在 Lurie 离开开普敦之前，清楚地确立了他对叙事的掌控（正如 Myrtle Hooper 所感知的，有限的第三人称叙述作为一种障碍，阻止了读者的任何反应，任何“你”来补充说话的“我”（2010 年，第 143 页），以及他在解读其他角色，尤其是在与 Melanie Isaacs 的交往中表现出的明显错误。像 Rosemary Jolly 一样，我认为这部小说小心翼翼地避免支持将身体定义为“动物”的“物化话语”（2006 年，第 153 页）。然而，我们可以看到，Lurie他自己将自身生理死亡与周围动物的死亡联系起来。

 Lurie, as a “city boy” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 218), has long been estranged from living animals. As Tom Herron observes, animals in the first section of the novel appear only as food and metaphors, and Lurie's narrative is not particularly attentive to them (2005, p. 475). When he moves to Lucy's farm, however, physical contact with animals is unavoidable, and animals begin to appear regularly in his line of sight. In particular, after the attack in which Lurie is burned, the dogs are killed, and Lucy is raped, Lurie becomes more attentive to the animals around him. This widening of his gaze has been read as the development of Lurie's respect for the lives of other species, and as evidence of his deeper understanding of his kinship with other animals (Aaltola, 2010, p. 129; Donovan, 2004, p. 79; Herron, 2005, pp. 471, 478; van Heerden, 2010, p. 56). The observable change in Lurie's view of other species does arise directly from the coincidence of his physical contact with animals and his experience of his own bodily vulnerability, but this shift in his thinking is not a deepening of compassion or sympathy, but rather an awakening to the possibilities of the sacrifice.
鲁里作为一个“城市男孩”（科茨埃，2000 年，第 218 页），长期以来与活生生的动物保持着距离。正如汤姆·赫伦所说，小说的第一部分中，动物仅以食物和隐喻的形式出现，鲁里的叙述对它们并不特别关注（赫伦，2005 年，第 475 页）。然而，当他搬到露西的农场后，与动物的物理接触变得不可避免，动物开始频繁地出现在他的视野中。特别是在鲁里被烧伤、狗被杀以及露西被强奸的事件之后，鲁里开始更加关注周围的动物。这种视野的拓宽被解读为鲁里对其他物种生命的尊重的发展，以及他对自己与其他动物亲缘关系的更深入理解（阿托拉，2010 年，第 129 页；多诺万，2004 年，第 79 页；赫伦，2005 年，第 471、478 页；范赫登，2010 年，第 56 页）。鲁里对其他物种观感的明显变化确实直接源于他与动物的物理接触以及他对自己身体脆弱性的体验，但这种思维上的转变并非是对同情或怜悯的深化，而是一种对牺牲可能性的觉醒。

 Derrida observes that “at the heart of all these discourses [through which philosophy defines the animal] sacrifice beats like a vital impulse” (2008a, p. 90, emphasis in original). One of the central paradoxes of the sacrificial economy is that the animal must be unlike the human in order to be sacrificed in place of the human, but enough like the human for that sacrifice to have value. This sacrificial economy emerges as the crux of both conceptual and material relationships between human and nonhuman animals in The Lives of Animals and The Animal That Therefore I Am. Both texts concern representations of animals that rely upon the undeath of the animal, upon the animal as a figure, rather than as a body. The logic of these representations then expands and extends, governing, as both Costello and Derrida note, the practices of “generation” that support intensive agriculture. David Lurie, in the urban context of the first part of Disgrace, is engaged with similar kinds of representation. The animal appears as object (meat) and as metaphorical figure, manifestations that both rely on the suspension of animal lives and deaths. In the rural setting of the second part of the novel, however, physical contact with animals makes animal life and death “real” for Lurie. His movement from the city to the country signifies a turn from one method of sacrificial exchange—animal life for human death—to another—animal death for human life. “Real” animals are thus folded into the sacrificial economy in a way that does not require humans to confront their own failure of sympathy; rather, the inverse logic allows the conventional power relation between human and nonhuman to flow smoothly between urban and rural spaces. At a time when Lurie is becoming increasingly aware of his own mortality, he finds, in his exposure to animals, a way that he may be able to maintain the integrity of his selfhood. He imagines that he can perpetuate his existence as his own image of himself through the sacrifice of the animal.
""" 德里达观察到，“在所有这些定义动物的话语中[通过这些话语，哲学定义了动物] 牺牲 蕴含着一种生命冲动” (2008a, 第 90 页，原文有强调)。牺牲经济的核心悖论之一在于，动物必须 不同于 人类，才能作为人类的替身被牺牲，但又必须 足够像 人类，才能使这种牺牲具有价值。这种牺牲经济在《动物的生活》和《因此我是动物》中，成为人类与非人类动物之间在概念和物质关系上的关键所在。正如科斯特洛和德里达所指出的，这些表征的逻辑扩展并延伸，支配着支持集约型农业的“繁殖”实践。 """ 大卫·卢里在《耻辱》第一部分的城市背景下，与类似的表征方式有关。动物被描绘成物体（肉类）和隐喻性形象，这两种表现都依赖于动物生命的悬置和死亡。然而，在小说的第二部分乡村背景下，与动物的物理接触使动物的生命和死亡对卢里来说“真实”。他从城市到乡村的迁移象征着从一种牺牲交换方式——动物生命换取人类死亡——到另一种——动物死亡换取人类生命——的转变。“真实”的动物因此被纳入牺牲经济体系，这种方式不需要人类面对自己同情心的失败；相反，这种逆向逻辑使得人类与非人类之间的传统权力关系在城市和乡村空间之间流畅地流动。在卢里越来越意识到自己的死亡的时刻，他发现，通过接触动物，他可能找到一种维持自我完整性方式。他想象自己可以通过牺牲动物来延续自己的存在，作为他自己的形象。

 It is through Lurie's relationship with dogs that the text exposes this shift in his thinking. Having once asserted that animals are categorically different from human beings, and having expressed his relationship to animals solely in terms of his carnivory, Lurie begins to believe that the dogs he helps to euthanize at Bev Shaw's clinic possess both “a body and a soul” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 161). In the clinic yard where Lurie attempts to compose an opera about Byron and his mistress Teresa, a dog whom he calls Driepoot is apparently affectionate towards him: “Arbitrarily, unconditionally, he has been adopted; the dog would die for him, he knows” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 215). Lurie’s “knowledge” of the dog’s devotion to him echoes his similar ascription of feelings and motivations to the novel’s female characters; the convenient difference, here, is that there is no human language to resist Lurie’s dominating voice.¹⁰ I would like to draw particular attention to the moment when, hearing Lurie's banjo, “the dog smacks its lips and seems on the point of singing too, or howling” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 215, my emphasis). Lurie asks himself if he would “dare” to “bring a dog into the piece” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 215). Something, however, stops the dog from giving voice at the crucial “point,” and Lurie does not mention his interspecies opera again. In displaying the desire to sing, but not singing (or not being allowed, by Lurie, to sing), Lurie’s dog—that is, the dog that exists in his interpretation—becomes an object fit for sacrifice.
通过卢里与狗的关系，文本揭示了他在思考上的转变。他曾经断言动物与人类在本质上截然不同，并且仅以他的肉食主义来表述他与动物的关系，但卢里开始相信他在比夫·肖的诊所帮助安乐死的狗既拥有“身体也拥有灵魂”（科茨埃，2000 年，第 161 页）。在卢里试图创作一部关于拜伦和他的情人特蕾莎的歌剧的诊所院子里，他称之为 Driepoot 的狗显然对他充满爱意：“它无条件地被收养了；他知道狗会为他而死”（科茨埃，2000 年，第 215 页）。卢里对狗对他忠诚的“认识”与他将情感和动机归因于小说中的女性角色的方式相似；这里的便利差异在于，这里没有人类语言来抵抗卢里的主导声音。¹⁰我想特别关注这样一个时刻，当卢里弹奏班卓琴时，“狗舔了舔嘴唇，似乎正要唱歌或嚎叫”（科茨埃，2000 年，第⁴页）。 215，我的强调）。卢里自问是否“敢”将“狗”带入作品中（科茨埃，2000，第 215 页）。然而，某物阻止了狗在关键“时刻”发声，卢里再也没有提及他的跨物种歌剧。在表现出想要歌唱的欲望，但并未歌唱（或未被卢里允许歌唱）的情况下，卢里的狗——即存在于他的解读中的狗——变成了一个适合牺牲的对象。

 The final scene of Disgrace is the subject of much critical debate. As Rita Barnard admits, this moment presents a “strenuous interpretive challenge” (2003, p. 221). Geiger compares the ending of Disgrace to “an open wound” (2010, p. 159); this fitting analogy calls into question any redemptive reading of Lurie's decision to euthanize (or, rather, to ask Bev to euthanize) Driepoot. It may be that, as Donovan and Barnard have argued, the death of Driepoot can be seen as an acknowledgement, on Lurie's part, of the sheer insurmountable scale of animal suffering (Barnard, 2003, p. 222; Donovan, 2004, p. 88), a reading that would align with Derrida's conclusions about sacrifice in The Gift of Death (2008b, p. 71). This kind of gesture, however, does not seem consistent with Lurie as we have seen him. What is consistent is his appropriation of another's voice, of another's life, in service of his own desires. In sacrificing Driepoot, Lurie makes an attempt to save himself from his own mortality by asserting the substitutable finitude of the dog. Lurie brings the dog to Bev, “Bearing him in his arms like a lamb” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 219), evoking sacrifices in the Christian tradition. We should remember, in this moment, Melanie Isaacs, who has also been “borne” in Lurie's arms; her name now appears as a clear reference to Abraham's sacrificial gesture. I draw attention to this connection not to make a simple equation between Melanie and Driepoot, or exploited woman and exploited animal, but rather to demonstrate the referential texture that the novel uses to signal its ambivalence about Lurie's action, an ambivalence that complicates, if not entirely forestalls, any redemptive reading of Driepoot's death. The final words of the novel are Lurie’s: “Yes, I am giving him up” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 219). Had this sentence not featured the fatal pronoun, “I,” that has signaled the solipsism of Lurie’s narrative, it might be argued that, in fact, he has substantially developed as an ethical being; it is clear, however, that Lurie himself, and not the dog, remains the subject of this sacrifice. Once again, we see Lurie taking over the voice and the body of the other. Driepoot's life is not Lurie's to “give up”; in fact, Lurie is not “giving up” anything in this moment. Rather, he is reasserting himself as a subject through the sacrifice of the (animal) other.
""" 《耻辱》的最后一幕引发了众多批评性讨论。正如 Rita Barnard 所承认的，这一刻提出了一个“艰难的解读挑战”（2003 年，第 221 页）。Geiger 将《耻辱》的结局比作“一个开放的伤口”（2010 年，第 159 页）；这个恰当的比喻质疑了 Lurie 选择安乐死（或者说，让 Bev 安乐死）Driepoot 的救赎性解读。或许正如 Donovan 和 Barnard 所论证的，Driepoot 的死亡可以被看作是 Lurie 对动物痛苦规模巨大到无法克服的承认（Barnard，2003 年，第 222 页；Donovan，2004 年，第 88 页），这种解读与 Derrida 在《死亡的礼物》中关于牺牲的结论相一致（2008b，第 71 页）。然而，这种举动似乎与我们所看到的 Lurie 并不一致。与他一致的是，他利用他人的声音，他人的生命，来服务于自己的欲望。 """ 在献祭德里普特时，卢里试图通过断言狗的可替代有限性来拯救自己免于自身的 mortality。卢里将狗抱给贝夫，“像抱一只羔羊一样抱着它”（科茨埃，2000 年，第 219 页），唤起了基督教传统中的牺牲。在这一刻，我们应该记住梅勒妮·艾萨克斯，她也曾被卢里“抱”在怀里；她的名字现在明显是对亚伯拉罕牺牲行为的指涉。我之所以强调这种联系，并不是为了简单地将梅勒妮与德里普特等同起来，或者将受剥削的女性与受剥削的动物等同起来，而是为了展示这部小说如何使用这种指涉性纹理来传达对卢里行为的矛盾态度，这种矛盾态度使得对德里普特死亡的救赎性解读变得复杂，如果不是完全阻止的话。小说的最后一句话是卢里说的：“是的，我在放弃他”（科茨埃，2000 年，第 219 页）。如果这句话没有出现那个致命的代词“我”，那个已经标志着卢里叙述的利己主义，可能会有人认为，事实上，他已经在道德上有了实质性的发展；然而，很明显，卢里本人，而不是狗，是这次牺牲的主题。 再次，我们看到 Lurie 接管了其他人的声音和身体。Driepoot 的生命不是 Lurie 可以“放弃”的；事实上，在这个时刻，Lurie 并没有“放弃”任何东西。相反，他通过牺牲（动物）其他者来重新肯定自己作为一个主体的地位。

 Lurie's opera does not represent an ethical opening through interspecies collaboration, an act of the sympathetic imagination, or a becoming-animal; it may suggest all of these things, but, primarily, it is another instance of Lurie’s appropriation of the voice of another into his own narrative.¹¹ By bringing Driepoot to the very edge of entering human cultural representation on his own terms, by “howling,” and then foreclosing the possibility of that voice, Lurie makes of the dog the perfect sacrifice that he could never quite make of the languaged female of his own species: the silence of the animal, accompanied here by the possibility of animal voice, is the condition of the entry of the animal into the sacrificial economy as Lurie has begun to perceive it. In order for a sacrifice to be meaningful, the animal object must have finitude; to have finitude, the animal must have (the potential for) language; in order to be sacrificed in the stead of the human, the animal must be (potentially) languaged but silent; these conditions are the necessary requirements for the sacrifice of Driepoot's life for Lurie's.¹²
Lurie 的歌剧并不代表通过跨物种合作、同情想象或成为动物来开启道德上的新篇章，它可能暗示了所有这些，但主要是 Lurie 将他人的声音纳入自己叙事的另一个例子。通过将 Driepoot 带到进入人类文化表征的边缘，通过“嚎叫”，然后封堵这种声音的可能性，Lurie 将狗变成了他永远无法对自身物种中的语言女性做出的完美牺牲：动物的沉默，伴随着这里动物声音的可能性，是动物进入 Lurie 开始理解的牺牲经济的条件。¹¹ 以使牺牲有意义，牺牲的动物对象必须具有有限性；为了具有有限性，动物必须具有（潜在的）语言能力；为了能够代替人类被牺牲，动物必须（潜在地）被赋予语言但保持沉默；这些条件是 Driepoot 的生命为 Lurie 的生命牺牲的必要条件。¹²

 As Marais notes, Disgrace, particularly through the focalization through David Lurie, demonstrates the limitation of Costello's “sympathetic imagination” (2001, p. 15). This limitation is, indeed, central to the ethic of the book, which also problematizes Costello's configuration of animal silence as a form of resistance by foregrounding the way in which Lurie appropriates the silences of others. In Disgrace, no easy opposition distinguishes silence from speech. Inside Lurie's consciousness, those who speak (like Melanie) can be silenced, and those who are silent (like Lucy) can be made to “speak” through his interpretation of their silence. Through this representation Lurie's dominance of the narrative displays the entrenchment of certain forms of privilege, despite the changed social structures of the “new” South Africa; in Disgrace, there is still no autonomous female or animal voice. This representation amounts to a powerful social critique as soon as we recognize that the principal ethical movement here is not the master narrative of Lurie's “development,” but rather the momentary interruptions of all of those imperfectly silenced non-Luries who introduce fissures into his narrative control. Coetzee is not a writer who is particularly interested in redemption, or in teleological forms of character development. It is therefore surprising that David Lurie has so often been read as someone who “develops.” Undoubtedly he changes in some respects, but the reader observes the change within the enclosure of Lurie's own perspective.
正如马里斯所指出的，《耻辱》通过大卫·卢里的聚焦，展示了科斯特洛的“同情想象力”（2001 年，第 15 页）的局限性。这种局限性确实是本书伦理的核心，同时也质疑了科斯特洛将动物沉默视为抵抗形式的配置，通过突出卢里如何利用他人的沉默。在《耻辱》中，沉默与言语之间没有简单的对立。在卢里的意识中，那些说话的人（如梅拉妮）可能会被沉默，而那些沉默的人（如露西）可能会通过他对其沉默的解释而被“说话”。通过这种表现，卢里对叙事的主导地位显示了某些形式的特权得以根深蒂固，尽管“新”南非的社会结构已经改变；在《耻辱》中，仍然没有女性或动物的声音是自主的。 这种表述一旦我们认识到主要的伦理运动并非卢里的“发展”主导叙事，而是那些不完美地被沉默的非卢里人时刻打断他的叙事控制，就变成了有力的社会批判。科茨埃并非一个特别关注救赎或目的论形式的性格发展的作家。因此，大卫·卢里经常被解读为“发展”的人，这令人惊讶。毫无疑问，他在某些方面有所改变，但读者观察到这种变化是在卢里自己的视角范围内。

 This more critical assessment of David Lurie complicates previous readings that to different extents actually adopt Lurie's perspective when interpreting the novel.¹³ To question the extent of David Lurie's moral awakening, redemption, or “state of grace” (Attridge, 2000, p. 112) at the end of his narrative is not to empty the novel of its ethical content; rather, it is to decentre Lurie as the text's ethical focus. This move is a crucial one, and its necessity is everywhere indicated throughout the course of the novel in the narratives to which we never have access (Melanie's statement; Lucy's experience of the rape; Driepoot's “song”). Lucy gives us a key to interpreting the novel when she tells David, “You behave as if everything I do is part of the story of your life. You are the main character, I am a minor character who doesn't make an appearance until halfway through. Well, contrary to what you think, people are not divided into major and minor. I am not minor. I have a life of my own” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 198). Lucy seems to speak, here, for all of the others, both human and nonhuman, who have “enriched” Lurie's narrative. She indicates the proliferation of possible stories, the sheer multiplicity of voices, that Lurie chooses to keep silent.¹⁴ Lucy's own insistent use of the pronoun “I” possibly indicates a parallel solipsism in her own narrative. Particularly in the context of their discussion of Lucy's pregnancy, however, Lucy’s use of first-person appears as an assertion against Lurie's dominant “I,” and, used quite consciously on Lucy's part, against the ethical impoverishment of Lurie's perspective. The material point is that we do not get more than a glimpse into the functioning of Lucy's “I” as a narrative centre before Lurie forecloses this possibility, calling it an “eruption” (Coetzee, 200, p. 198). He immediately cuts off her attempt to assert her own subject when he tells her, “That's enough, Lucy” (Coetzee, 2000, p. 198). What Disgrace suggests is that, despite the end of apartheid, despite the change in social structures, despite the emphasis on truth-telling and confession, the white male is still casting himself as “the main character” in the narrative of the nation, and he still attempts to dominate all other voices with his version of events. This entrenched privilege allows David Lurie to position himself as a victim, denying both his position of privilege and his anxiety over that position's new instability. He maintains the integrity of his self-construction by silencing all other voices, sacrificing them to the dominating speech of the white, male, carnophallogocentric subject.
对大卫·卢里的这种更为批判性的评价，使得之前对小说的解读在某种程度上实际上采纳了卢里的视角。注[13]¹³质疑大卫·卢里在叙事结尾时的道德觉醒、救赎或“恩典状态”（Attridge，2000，第 112 页）的程度，并不是要剥夺小说的道德内涵；相反，这是将卢里从文本的道德焦点中移开。这一转变至关重要，小说的整个过程中都暗示了这一转变的必要性，包括我们无法接触到的叙述（梅勒妮的陈述；露西的强奸经历；德里普特的“歌曲”）。当露西告诉大卫，“你表现得好像我做的每一件事都是你生命故事的一部分。你是主角，我是直到一半才出现的配角。但是，正如你所想的，人们并不是分为主角和配角的。我不是配角。我有自己的生活”（Coetzee，2000，第 198 页）时，她为我们解读这部小说提供了一把钥匙。 露西似乎代表了所有其他人，无论是人类还是非人类，他们“丰富了”卢里的叙事。她指出了可能的叙事的增殖，卢里选择保持沉默的众多声音的纯粹多样性。¹⁴露西坚持使用代词“我”可能表明她自己的叙事中存在一种唯我主义。然而，在讨论露西怀孕的背景下，露西使用第一人称似乎是一种对抗卢里主导的“我”的声明，并且，在露西的刻意使用下，对抗卢里视角的道德贫乏。关键点是，在卢里将其称为“爆发”（科伊策，200，第 198 页）并切断她试图确立自己主体性的尝试之前，我们并没有深入了解露西的“我”作为叙事中心的运作。他立刻说：“露西，够了”（科伊策，2000，第 198 页）。耻辱所暗示的是，尽管种族隔离已经结束，尽管社会结构发生了变化，尽管强调说真话和忏悔，白人男性仍然将自己定位为“国家叙事中的主角”，他仍然试图用自己的版本的事件来支配所有其他声音。这种根深蒂固的特权让大卫·卢里将自己定位为受害者，否认了他的特权地位以及这种地位新不稳定性的焦虑。他通过压制所有其他声音，将它们献给白人、男性、卡诺法洛哥中心主义的支配性话语，来维持他自我构建的完整性。

 When Elizabeth Costello speaks of the confrontation with animal silence, she envisions that silence as a form of resistance to human oppression. Derrida's lectures demonstrate, however, that silence itself has been appropriated by philosophical discourse to contain the animal within a sacrificial economy: silence renders the animal paradoxically deathless and, when the possibility of language is present, sacrificeable. In this doubled and contradictory relation to death, the animal can function either to bolster the immortality of the human subject, or to allow that subject the experience of finitude, access to the autobiographical narrative of living and dying, and the promise of a recognizable death. Derrida’s challenge to Elizabeth Costello's conception of animal silence as a form of resistance is affectingly realized in the narrative of Disgrace, in which the speaking subject's power over the silent other is encapsulated in Driepoot's sacrificial death. In Disgrace, nonhuman animals indicate the ethical potential that occurs between silence and speech, between the constructs of pure embodiment and pure consciousness; only by interrupting the economics of sacrificial exchange that appropriate both the voice and the silence of the other (in Disgrace, both nonhuman and female) can entrenched relations of power, based on race, gender, species, ability, and other categorical constructs be exposed and challenged. By thoroughly challenging the concepts of language and embodiment that so rigidly separate human from nonhuman in ways that serve human privilege, we can locate the potential for a new ethical relation between animal and human, a new relation that the material conditions referenced in each of these texts render both necessary and urgent.
当伊丽莎白·科斯特洛谈到与动物沉默的对抗时，她将这种沉默视为对人类压迫的一种抵抗形式。然而，德里达的讲座表明，沉默本身已经被哲学话语所挪用，将动物置于一种牺牲经济之中：沉默使动物 paradoxically 死而不亡，当语言的可能性存在时，又使其可被牺牲。在这种双重且矛盾的关系中，动物可以起到增强人类主体不朽性的作用，或者让该主体体验到有限性，获得生存与死亡的传记性叙述，以及一个可识别的死亡承诺。德里达对伊丽莎白·科斯特洛将动物沉默视为抵抗形式的挑战，在《耻辱》这部小说的叙事中感人地得到了体现，其中说话的主体对沉默的他人的权力在德里普特的牺牲性死亡中得到了体现。 在《耻辱》中，非人类动物表明了在沉默与言语之间、纯粹的身体构造与纯粹的意识之间所发生的伦理潜力；只有通过打断既攫取他者声音又攫取他者沉默的牺牲性交换的经济，才能揭露和挑战基于种族、性别、物种、能力和其他范畴构建的根深蒂固的权力关系。（在《耻辱》中，无论是非人类还是女性）通过彻底挑战将人类与非人类严格分开的概念，这些概念服务于人类特权，我们可以找到动物与人类之间新的伦理关系的潜力，这种新的关系，这些文本中提到的物质条件使它变得既必要又紧迫。

Acknowledgements:  I am grateful for the help offered by Professor Chelva Kanaganayakam, Professor Sara Salih, and Professor Victor Li during my preparation of this essay. Thanks are also due to the three anonymous readers for their thorough and constructive critique. Finally, I have been fortunate to receive the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program, and the University of Toronto.
致谢: 我要感谢在撰写这篇论文期间，Chelva Kanaganayakam 教授、Sara Salih 教授和 Victor Li 教授提供的帮助。同时，也要感谢三位匿名审稿人提供的详尽而有建设性的批评。最后，我要感谢加拿大社会科学与人文研究理事会、安大略省研究生奖学金计划以及多伦多大学给予的支持。

Notes
备注

¹ Derrida refers to an "economy of sacrifice" throughout The Gift of Death (2008b, pp. 10, 94).
¹德里达在其著作《死亡的礼物》（2008b，第 10、94 页）中多次提到了“牺牲的经济”。。

2 As Julietta Singh also suggests in her recent article on listening and disciplinarity in The Lives of Animals.
2正如朱丽叶塔·辛格在其关于倾听和学科性的最新文章中提出的《动物的生活》。。

3 As Nicole Shukin observes, in the end Lippit seems actually to endorse this idea (Shukin 2009, p. 41).
3正如妮可·舒金所观察到的，最终利皮特似乎实际上支持这个观点（舒金 2009，第 41 页）。

4 Of course, this interpretation presupposes a highly figurative understanding of the relationships between human and animal; the link between being an exploited animal and being a famous author is nonexistent in material terms. The text fully engages with this metaphorical connection, however. For example, President Garrard concludes the first day's presentation with the words: "Much food for thought. We look forward to tomorrow's offering" (Coetzee 1999, p. 45), evoking both the consumption and sacrifice of Elizabeth Costello.
当然，这种解释预设了对人与动物之间关系的极度象征性理解；在物质层面上，成为被剥削的动物和成为著名作家之间的联系是不存在的。然而，文本完全融入了这种隐喻性的联系。例如，加拉德总统在第一天演讲结束时说：“许多值得深思。我们期待明天的作品”（科伊策，1999 年，第 45 页），既唤起了伊丽莎白·科斯特洛的消费和牺牲。

5 In addition to Derrida himself (2008a, p. 55), Cary Wolfe also discusses this repression in the Freudian definition of the human at some length (2003, pp. 2-3). For Wolfe, it is necessary that we "recast the figure of vision" and "resituate it as only one sense among many in a more general -- and not necessarily human -- bodily sensorium" (2003, p. 3). Like Costello, then, Wolfe sees a productive anti-anthropocentrism in a concept of the fully embodied being (whether human or nonhuman); he does not, however, propose any escape from the fact that just such a concept of embodiment has been a constitutive part of speciesist discourse in the West.
""" 除了德里达本人（2008a，第 55 页）之外，凯里·沃尔夫也详细讨论了弗洛伊德对人类的定义中的这种压抑（2003，第 2-3 页）。沃尔夫认为，我们必须“重新塑造视觉形象”，并将其“重新定位为众多感官中的一种，在更一般——且不一定是人类——的感官体系中”（2003，第 3 页）。因此，沃尔夫与科斯特洛一样，认为在完全具身化的存在（无论是人类还是非人类）的概念中，存在着一种富有成效的反人类中心主义；然而，他并没有提出任何逃离这样一个概念——这种具身化的概念一直是西方物种主义话语的构成部分。

6 This text has come in for criticism, particularly for Derrida's seeming attachment to a boundary between animal and human. Matthew Calarco finds Derrida's reassertion of this boundary both "dogmatic" and "puzzling" (2008, p. 145). It is indeed a strange moment when Derrida claims that "[e]verybody agrees on this [the existence of the animal-human boundary]; discussion is closed in advance; one would have to be more asinine than any beast [...] to think otherwise" (2008a, p. 30). This departure from his habitual style of thinking (what question is ever "closed in advance" for Derrida?), however, indicates that deliberate attention is being drawn to this moment. Derrida is at work in this text thoroughly destabilizing the meanings of "asinine" and "beast," and is engaging with figures that are called "animal" and "human," rather than actual living beings. Keeping all this in mind complicates, I think, the anthropocentrism of this statement.
6　这段文字受到了批评，尤其是德里的拉似乎对动物与人类之间的界限有所依恋。马修·卡拉尔科认为德里达重申这一界限既“教条”又“令人费解”（2008 年，第 145 页）。德里达声称“[关于这一点，每个人都同意；讨论事先就已经结束；任何野兽都比愚蠢的人更有可能认为否则……]”（2008a，第 30 页），这确实是一个奇怪的瞬间。然而，这种与他习惯的思维方式（德里达的问题何时是“事先就封闭”的？）的偏离，表明有意将注意力引向这一时刻。德里达在这篇文章中彻底颠覆了“愚蠢”和“野兽”的含义，并正在与被称为“动物”和“人类”的形象打交道，而不是真正的生物。考虑到所有这些，我认为这复杂化了这一陈述的人类中心主义。

7 John Berger suggests a complex relation to the animal gaze, one in which the state of being seen by the nonhuman animal has a certain power to "surprise" the human (1980, p. 5). Nevertheless, any focus on the gaze, because of its limitation to the most privileged human sense apparatus, remains anthropocentric.
7 约翰·伯格提出了动物凝视的复杂关系，其中被非人类动物看到的状况具有某种“惊讶”人类的力量（1980，第 5 页）。然而，由于凝视局限于最特权的人类感官装置，因此任何对凝视的关注都仍然是人类中心的。

8 Derrida coins the term "carnophallogocentrism" in the interview "Eating Well" (Derrida, 1991).
8 德里达在访谈《吃得健康》中提出了“肉食男权中心主义”这一术语（德里达，1991 年）。

9 This is one reason that I find readings that suggest that Lurie "loses himself" (Marais, 2001, p. 11) unconvincing. The fact that Lurie maintains his status as a subject also calls into question the idea that his condition of disgrace can be figured as a becoming-animal, as Tom Herron's interpretation suggests (2005, pp. 471, 482).
9 我认为那些认为 Lurie“迷失自我”（Marais，2001，第 11 页）的说法并不令人信服。Lurie 仍然保持着作为主体的地位，这也对 Tom Herron 的解读——将他的耻辱状态视为“成为动物”的过程——提出了质疑（2005，第 471、482 页）。

10 As in the case of Lurie's claims about the novel's female characters, some critics also accept that Lurie is accurately reporting the emotions of Driepoot (for example, van Heerden, 2010: 57). I am not questioning the fact that dogs can communicate their emotions in ways that humans can understand; rather, I am entirely skeptical of David Lurie as a recorder of the interior lives of others.
10 正如 Lurie 对小说中女性角色的说法一样，一些评论家也接受 Lurie 准确地描述了 Driepoot 的情感（例如，van Heerden，2010：第 57 页）。我并不质疑狗能够以人类可以理解的方式传达情感的事实；相反，我对 David Lurie 记录他人内心生活的能力持怀疑态度。

11 Calina Ciobanu's recent essay argues that the interspecies opera opens the possibility of posthumanist representation in the novel, and provides a lens through which to read Lurie's ethical change (2012, p. 682). While this reading is a sensitive and interesting one, it does not take into account that Driepoot does not, in fact, lend his voice to the opera.
11 Calina Ciobanu 最近的论文认为，跨物种歌剧为小说中的后人类主义表现提供了可能性，并为阅读 Lurie 的道德转变提供了一个视角（2012，第 682 页）。虽然这种阅读方式敏感且有趣，但它没有考虑到 Driepoot 实际上并没有为歌剧发声。

12 This moment recalls Agamben's reading of Hegel, which suggests that human language arises not from animal silence, but from the animal voice as it can only articulate itself in the moment of death (1991, p. 45). Agamben examines another philosophical strain of thinking about the nonhuman animal's relation to death and to language, one that, again, requires the sacrifice of the animal.
12 这一时刻让人联想到 Agamben 对 Hegel 的解读，他认为人类语言并非源于动物的沉默，而是动物在死亡时刻才能表达自己（1991，第 45 页）。Agamben 探讨了关于非人类动物与死亡和语言关系的另一种哲学思考，这同样需要牺牲动物。

13 Examples include Attridge's claims that the committee is "puritanical" and "moralistic" (2000, p. 102), and that Lurie's coercive relationship with Melanie is "a singular erotic experience" (2000, p. 117), van Heerden's view that Melanie is "ignorant" and that Lurie tries "to initiate her into a deeper appreciation of art" (2010, p. 48), and Marais's contention that Lurie becomes Lucy's "keeper" (2001, p. 11).
13 例子包括 Attridge 对委员会“清教徒式”和“道德主义”的断言（2000，第 102 页），以及 Lurie 与 Melanie 之间强制性的关系是“一种独特的性经验”（2000，第 117 页），van Heerden 认为 Melanie 是“无知的”，而 Lurie 则试图“引导她更深入地欣赏艺术”（2010，第 48 页），以及 Marais 认为 Lurie 成为 Lucy 的“守护者”（2001，第 11 页）。

14 Lucy's statement also goes some way towards disproving Hooper's claim that the novel uncritically adopts or endorses Lurie's perspective, particularly with regard to the female characters (Hooper 2010, pp. 140, 142-143).
14 Lucy 的声明也有助于反驳 Hooper 的观点，即这部小说无批判地接受或支持 Lurie 的观点，特别是在女性角色方面（Hooper 2010，第 140、142-143 页）。

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Volume 12, Issue 3
卷 12，期 3

2014

Yoruba Ethico-cultural Perspectives and Understanding of Animal Ethics
《约鲁巴伦理文化视角与动物伦理理解》

Author: A.O. Owoseni¹
作者：A.O.奥武森尼¹

Title: Ph.D. student in Department of Philosophy
标题：哲。德。哲学系学生
Affiliation: University of Ibadan

所属机构：爱丁堡大学
Location: Ibadan, Nigeria

位置：尼日利亚，尼日利亚
E-mail: a.owoseni@yahoo.com

电子邮件：a.owoseni@yahoo.com

Author: I. O. Olatoye^2*
作者： O. O. Olatoye^2†

Title: Lecturer I in Department of Veterinary Public Health and Preventive Medicine
标题：兽医公共卫生与预防医学系讲师 I
Affiliation: University of Ibadan

隶属：I大学院
Location: Ibadan, Nigeria

位置：I大学院，尼日利亚
E-mail: olatoye@vetmed.wsu.edu

电子邮件：olatoye@vetmed.wsu.edu

Key words: Yoruba, cultural knowledge, animal ethics, animal rights, animal welfare
关键词：约鲁巴语，文化知识，动物伦理，动物权利，动物福利

YORUBA ETHICO-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES AND UNDERSTANDING OF ANIMAL ETHICS
《约鲁巴伦理文化视角与动物伦理理解》

Abstract
抽象

While divisions between animal rights and animal welfare have preoccupied public discourse and practice concerning animal ethics in developed countries, little consideration has been accorded to non-Western framings of animal ethics. Yoruba ethno-cultural settings in Africa have displayed certain philosophical and ethico-traditional understandings of human-animal relations through activities that engage animals for food and economic purposes and in religious practices and festivals. This article raises the fundamental question: Is there a Yoruba understanding of animal ethics? This inquiry was conducted by critically surveying the traditional framework of wise sayings, proverbs, practices, adages and relational attitudes of the Yoruba. We identify the Yoruba understanding of animal ethics by engaging these perspectives alongside the Western distinction between animal welfare and animal rights. We argue that the Yoruba understanding, including a superstitious, relational attitude toward nonhuman animals, is essential to the global discourse of animal ethics and animal liberation. This work takes for granted that the global project of animal ethics should be rooted in a cross-cultural understanding of human-animal relations, Western and non-Western, in order to forge a model for the quest of animal liberation across all cultures including the Yoruba enclave.
在发达国家，动物权利与动物福利之间的分歧占据了关于动物伦理的公共讨论和实践，而对非西方动物伦理框架的考虑却很少。非洲的约鲁巴民族文化背景通过涉及动物用于食物和经济目的的活动，以及宗教仪式和节日中的动物，展示了某些关于人兽关系的哲学和伦理传统理解。本文提出了一个基本问题：约鲁巴是否有关于动物伦理的理解？这一探究通过批判性地审视约鲁巴的传统智慧、谚语、实践、格言和人际关系态度来进行。我们通过与西方关于动物福利和动物权利的区别相结合，确定了约鲁巴对动物伦理的理解。我们认为，包括对非人类动物的超自然、关系态度在内的约鲁巴理解对于全球动物伦理和动物解放的讨论至关重要。 这项工作假定全球动物伦理项目应以跨文化的人类-动物关系为基础，包括西方和非西方，以构建一个适用于所有文化，包括约鲁巴地区的动物解放追求的模型。

Animal Ethics: Between Animal Rights and Animal Welfare
动物伦理：动物权利与动物福利之间

The need to contextualize ‘globalized’ discourse within historical or cultural particularities to assess the universality of principles, theories and practices cannot be overemphasized. This article explores cultural particularities often taken for granted in assessing human-nonhuman animal relations, using an inquiry into the Yoruba understanding of animal ethics as a case study. Following the ‘reflective impulse’ of the Yoruba notion of human-animal relations, our study departs from the prevailing framework of animal ethics as currently pursued in intellectual circles. Despite a tendency to pose the Western intellectual perspective as a yardstick, we assert the need to include other cultural perspectives in the discourse of animal rights and animal welfare. Many non-Western perspectives do not align wholly with Western viewpoints, and accordingly, many non-Western ethico-cultural perspectives have not yet been acknowledged. In the case of the Yoruba, the central question of this article—whether the Yoruba have an understanding of animal ethics—differs from the question of whether the Yoruba conceptualize animal ethics in its own right. Focusing on the latter question implies that the Yoruba might hold a distinct system of animal ethics that sets them apart from the rest of humanity.¹ Such a stance would create intellectual bifurcations that could obscure a common outlook, generating an us/them perspective that scholars like Anthony Appiah, Godwin Sogolo and others have argued against.²
需要将“全球化”话语置于历史或文化特定性中进行语境化，以评估原则、理论和实践的普遍性，这一点的重要性不容忽视。本文探讨了在评估人-非人动物关系时常常被忽视的文化特定性，以对约鲁巴动物伦理观念的研究作为案例。遵循约鲁巴关于人-动物关系的“反思冲动”，我们的研究脱离了目前在学术界追求的动物伦理框架。尽管有将西方知识分子的视角作为衡量标准的倾向，但我们主张在动物权利和动物福利的讨论中纳入其他文化视角。许多非西方视角并不完全与西方观点一致，因此许多非西方的伦理文化视角尚未得到认可。在约鲁巴的情况下，本文的核心问题——约鲁巴是否理解动物伦理——与约鲁巴是否独立地概念化动物伦理的问题不同。 关注后一个问题意味着约鲁巴人可能拥有一种独特的动物伦理体系，使他们与人类其他成员区别开来。这样的立场可能会造成知识上的分歧，从而模糊共同的观点，产生学者如安东尼·阿皮亚、戈德温·索戈洛和其他人反对的我们/他们视角。¹这种立场可能会导致学者如安东尼·阿皮亚、戈德温·索戈洛和其他人反对的知识分歧，从而产生模糊共同观点的我们/他们视角。²

Animal ethics describes the study of human-non-human relations. The focus on animal ethics in this article is an attempt to understand the appropriate human regard for non-human animals in Yoruba culture. Animal ethics is the umbrella under which the two camps of animal rights and animal welfare are organized, though animal ethics also includes other subject matters, such as animal law, speciesism, animal cognition, the concept of non-human personhood, human exceptionalism, and theories of justice. Animal ethics also shares a common concern with environmental ethics, as it considers animals within the purview of the reckless damages man has done to the natural environment as a whole.³ While some may consider humans to be the “apex of creation,” without other creatures (visible and invisible) in the environment, human life is incomplete—in fact, impossible (Ogunade, 2004, p. 183). This assertion presupposes that nature is not meant for human purposes alone, implying that all species should work alongside each other to ensure the health and wellbeing of nature as a whole. This stance introduces moral issues that have created a divide among animal ethicists, separating them into the camps of animal rights proponents and animal welfare proponents.
动物伦理学描述了人与非人类动物之间的关系。本文关注动物伦理，旨在理解约鲁巴文化中人类对非人类动物的适当关怀。动物伦理学是动物权利和动物福利两大阵营的组织框架，同时还包括其他主题，如动物法、物种主义、动物认知、非人类人格概念、人类优越论和正义理论。动物伦理学还与环保伦理学有共同关注点，因为它考虑了动物在人类对整个自然环境造成的肆意破坏中的地位。^[3]虽然有些人认为人类是“创造的顶峰”，但没有环境中的其他生物（可见的和不可见的），人类生活是不完整的——事实上，是不可能的（奥古纳代，2004，第 183 页）。这一断言预设了自然并非只为人类目的而存在，意味着所有物种都应该共同努力，以确保整个自然的健康和福祉。 这种立场引入了道德问题，这些问题在动物伦理学家中造成了分歧，将他们分为动物权利倡导者和动物福利倡导者两个阵营。

According to Barcalow (1994), moral issues arise from choices that affect the “well-being of others” (p. 4). An action becomes morally questionable when it opens alternate courses of bringing harms or benefits to oneself or others, however those “others” may be identified. Animal rights proponents hold that animals are moral persons, and they thus condemn any sort of human exploitation of other animals, including their use for food/fiber, experimentation, entertainment or sport, or as pets. They argue that human beings hold no special place in nature, and that it is ignorance for humans to think they are at the “pinnacle of creation” (Olen & Barry, 1992, p. 340). Central to this perspective is the claim that all beings/species experience pain equally. Whether the subject of feelings or pain is a human or non-human animate being, causing pain and suffering is inherently wrong.⁴
根据 Barcalow（1994）的观点，道德问题源于影响“他人福祉”的选择（第 4 页）。当一项行为可能导致对自己或他人造成伤害或带来利益的不同途径时，该行为就变得道德上有疑问，无论这些“他人”如何定义。动物权利倡导者认为动物是道德主体，因此他们谴责任何形式的人类对其他动物的剥削，包括用于食物/纤维、实验、娱乐或体育，或作为宠物。他们认为人类在自然界中没有特殊地位，人类认为自己是“创造之巅”是无知的表现（Olen & Barry，1992，第 340 页）。这一观点的核心是所有生物/物种都同样经历痛苦的主张。无论是人类还是非人类动物，造成痛苦和苦难本身就是错误的。⁴

This camp has also argued that certain human interests are trivial and insignificant by comparison with important animal interests. Accordingly, acting on human impulses to the detriment of animals is unjustifiable, and interests such as food consumption, experimentation, or research are thus called into question. It is assumed that the only reason we humans carry on the way we do is that we are too lazy or thoughtless to change or explore other alternatives (Olen & Barry, 1992, p. 341). Animal rights proponents also contend that other animals, like human beings, have inalienable natural rights. Rights to live and to move unhindered are instances of such entitlements, since other animals, like humans, are sentient beings. Peter Singer’s notion of “equal consideration” as expounded in some of his works (Singer, 1990; Singer, 1995, pp. 55-62) according to Gruen (1993), “provides the moral foundation for this budding and boisterous animal liberation movement” (p. 343) that proceeds under the banner of animal rights. Moreover, Tom Regan’s notion of equal/moral rights is entrenched in this view in animal ethics.⁵ Ingrid Newkirk, cofounder and president of the animal rights organization, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), is fervent about this ethical point of view, asserting the following:
""" 这个营地还认为，某些人类利益与重要的动物利益相比微不足道。因此，以损害动物利益为代价的人类冲动是不合理的，食物消费、实验或研究等利益因此受到质疑。人们认为，我们人类之所以继续这样行事，仅仅是因为我们太懒惰或太粗心，不愿意改变或探索其他替代方案（Olen & Barry，1992，第 341 页）。动物权利支持者还认为，其他动物，如同人类一样，拥有不可剥夺的自然权利。生存和自由移动的权利就是这种权利的体现，因为其他动物，如同人类一样，是有感知的生物。彼得·辛格在其一些作品中阐述的“平等考虑”观念（辛格，1990；辛格，1995，第 55-62 页），根据 Gruen（1993）的说法，“为这个正在兴起且充满活力的动物解放运动提供了道德基础”（第 343 页），该运动以动物权利为旗帜。此外，汤姆·雷根关于平等/道德权利的观念在动物伦理学中得到了巩固。 """⁵英格丽德·纽柯克，动物权利组织“善待动物组织”（PETA）的联合创始人兼总裁，对此道德观点充满热情，她坚持以下观点：

Instead of seeing all the other species on Earth as ours to convert into hamburgers, handbags, living burglar alarms, amusements, test tubes with whiskers, and so on, we need to respect them as fellow beings, as other individuals and families and tribes who have the same basic interests in experiencing joy and love and living without needless pain and harassment as we do.
我们不应该把地球上的其他物种视为我们的食物、手袋、活体防盗警报器、娱乐、有胡须的试管等等，而应该尊重它们作为与我们有着相同基本利益的其他个体、家庭和部落，它们同样渴望体验快乐和爱，以及在没有必要痛苦和骚扰的情况下生活。

Organizations like People for Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), New Jersey Animal Rights Alliance (NJARA), Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) are at the forefront of championing this ethical point of view.
动物权利组织如“善待动物组织”（PETA）、“新泽西动物权利联盟”（NJARA）、“动物解放阵线”（ALF）和“美国人类协会”（HSUS）在倡导这一伦理观点方面处于前沿地位。

Several arguments have been presented to counter what many consider as the “absolutist” thinking of animal rights proponents. Critics of animal rights question whether animals can be morally considerable, since their actions are the automatic output of innate feelings that they are likely incapable of moderating and for which they therefore cannot be held responsible. The claim is that other animals do not possess capacities equal to those of human beings in terms of intelligence, rationality, obligations, duties, moral claims or sense of virtue and vice. It has also been argued that equal treatment of animals and humans would lead to disastrous consequences, engendering economic devaluation in terms of consumption and trade patterns and loss of jobs among ranchers, farmers, fishermen, butchers and others, potentially leading to economic dependency of some nations on others. Equal consideration of other animals would also have far reaching negative effects on progressive research, such as the use of animals as test models to verify the viability of treatments of diseases and eradication of organisms detrimental to human wellbeing. The presupposition here is that holding on to the animal rights ethical standpoint in theory and practice would be inimical to public health and one-health concerns.⁶ In this sense, Olen and Barry (1992) have noted that “whatever good comes to non-human animals, the consequences to humans would be disastrous” (p. 342).
一些论点被提出以反驳许多人认为的动物权利支持者的“绝对主义”思维。动物权利的批评者质疑动物是否可以在道德上被考虑，因为它们的行为是本能情感的自动输出，它们很可能无法调节这些情感，因此不能对此负责。有人认为，其他动物在智力、理性、义务、责任、道德主张或善恶感等方面并不具备与人类相等的能力。也有人认为，对动物和人类进行平等对待将导致灾难性的后果，在经济消费和贸易模式上造成贬值，并可能导致牧场主、农民、渔民、屠夫和其他人失业，可能使一些国家的经济依赖其他国家。对其他动物的平等考虑也将对进步研究产生深远负面影响，例如使用动物作为测试模型以验证疾病治疗的可行性和消除对人类福祉有害的有机体。 这里的前提假设是，在理论和实践中坚持动物权利的伦理立场将不利于公共卫生和“一人健康”的关注。⁶ 在这个意义上，Olen 和 Barry（1992）指出，“无论对非人类动物带来什么好处，对人类的影响将是灾难性的”（第 342 页）。

In theological terms, St. Aquinas and St. Augustine taught that the universe is constructed as a hierarchy in which beings at lower levels (animals) were created to serve those above them (human beings). St. Augustine maintained that “by a most just ordinance of the creator, both their life and their death are subjected to our use.”⁷ According to this view, it matters little that animals are used as food or as experimental tools, since they are not entitled to any form of rights. Baxter (1999), for instance, believes that rights are unique to human beings. In his view, animals do not use or understand moral judgment in conducting relationships with other species. The soundest policy, then, according to Baxter is “to take account of only the needs and interest of people, not penguins or pine trees” (p. 148). Such claims run counter to the viewpoint of animal rights proponents, as they presuppose that, after all, relationships with members of our own species are appropriately the primary moral concern for humans (Olen & Barry, p. 343).
在神学观点上，圣托马斯·阿奎那和圣奥古斯丁认为，宇宙被构建为一个等级体系，其中较低级别的生物（动物）被创造出来为高于它们的生物（人类）服务。圣奥古斯丁坚持认为，“按照创造者最公正的安排，它们的生与死都受制于我们的利用。”根据这种观点，动物被用作食物或实验工具，这并不重要，因为它们没有权利。例如，巴克斯特（1999 年）认为，权利是人类独有的。在他看来，动物在与其他物种的关系中不使用也不理解道德判断。因此，根据巴克斯特的观点，最稳妥的政策是“只考虑人的需求和利益，而不是企鹅或松树”（第 148 页）。这样的说法与动物权利倡导者的观点相悖，因为它们预设了，毕竟，与同类的交往是人类首要的道德关注（Olen & Barry，第 343 页）。

This speciesist stance has been proposed by anti-animal rightists, who regard moral consideration of other animals as a defect in rationality. The animal welfare movement, however, offers a different ethical point of view. Scholars like Francione and Regan (1992) agree that animal welfare tenets differ from the claims of animal rights. They maintain not only that the philosophies of animal rights and animal welfare are separated by irreconcilable differences, but also that the enactment of animal welfare measures actually impedes the achievement of animal rights. They conclude that welfare reforms by their very nature can only serve to retard the pace at which animal rights goals are achieved (pp. 140-142).
""" 这种立场是由反动物权利主义者提出的，他们认为对其他动物的道德考虑是理性上的缺陷。然而，动物福利运动提出了不同的伦理观点。学者如弗朗西奥内和雷根（1992 年）认为，动物福利原则与动物权利的主张不同。他们不仅认为动物权利和动物福利的哲学观点之间存在不可调和的差异，而且还认为实施动物福利措施实际上阻碍了动物权利的实现。他们得出结论，福利改革本身只能减缓实现动物权利目标的速度（第 140-142 页）。 """

The argument here is that the animal welfare position is inconsistent with and ethically unacceptable to the claims of the animal rightists, or “abolitionists” as they are often called. Prior to the inception of the movement, the welfare approach held human morality and behavior as its central concern. Combined with animal welfare movements and animal-protection legislation, the efforts of British dignitaries like Richard Martin, who championed the first Animal Welfare Organization in 1822, expanded the sense of “welfarism” to include nonhuman animals. Organizations like the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (MSPCA), Compassion in World Farming (CIWF) and the National Animal Interest Alliance (NAIA) among others are foremost organizations spearheading the cause of animal welfare. Unlike the Animal Rights movement, these organizations do not clamor for total abolition of the use of animals; rather, they emphasize the prevention of animal suffering, promoting animal health and projecting a just and compassionate society for the ethical treatment of animals whenever they are used for human purposes. They advocate that animals be granted proper training to enable them to live safely and comfortably in a society dominated by human standards; stray animals should be adopted and neutered and spayed to prevent overpopulation and the suffering that attends it; sick and injured animals should be given veterinary care. The United Kingdom (UK) has exerted tremendous effort to promote animal welfare. In 1979, the UK government set up the Farm Animals Welfare Council, recommending the following five freedoms or principles of animal welfare:
在这里的论点是，动物福利立场与动物权利主义者，或他们常被称作的“废除主义者”的主张不一致，在道德上也是不可接受的。在运动兴起之前，福利方法将人类道德和行为视为其核心关注点。结合动物福利运动和动物保护立法，像理查德·马丁这样的英国显贵所做出的努力，在 1822 年倡导成立了第一个动物福利组织，将“福利主义”的概念扩展到了非人类动物。美国防止虐待动物协会（ASPCA）、马萨诸塞州防止虐待动物协会（MSPCA）、世界农场动物关怀组织（CIWF）和国家动物利益联盟（NAIA）等组织是推动动物福利事业的主要组织。 与动物权利运动不同，这些组织并不主张完全废除动物的使用；相反，它们强调预防动物痛苦，促进动物健康，并倡导建立一个公正、仁慈的社会，以对动物的伦理待遇进行管理，无论它们在何种情况下被用于人类目的。它们主张赋予动物适当的训练，使它们能够在以人类标准为主导的社会中安全、舒适地生活；流浪动物应被收养并绝育，以防止过度繁殖及其带来的痛苦；病伤动物应得到兽医护理。英国（UK）在促进动物福利方面付出了巨大的努力。1979 年，英国政府成立了农场动物福利委员会，并推荐以下五个自由或动物福利原则：

Freedom from thirst and hunger
饥渴的自由

Freedom from discomfort
不舒适的自由

Freedom from pain, injury and diseases
疼痛、伤害和疾病的自由

Freedom to express normal behavior
表达正常行为的自由

Freedom from fear and distress⁸
自由从恐惧和痛苦中解脱出来⁸

From the standpoint of Animal Welfare groups, the observation of these freedoms amounts to moral consideration for animals and that animals like humans are morally considerable. The objective of animal welfare advocates is the humane use of animals, whatever the purpose. Unlike Animal Rights proponents, Animal Welfarists do not seek to eliminate the use or companionship of animals by humans. For the welfarist, as long as animal pain and suffering is avoided, the value of animal lives is not compromised. This is a way of saying that within the framework of Animal Welfarism, animals do not have autonomous moral rights that equal those of humans. The point of convergence between animal rights and animal welfare is that both are concerned with the status and conditions of animals’ existence, while the point of divergence lies in the degrees to which animals may be subjected to use by humans. Often times, the Abolitionist strand of Animal Rightists condemn and seek to abolish human use of animals regardless of whether that use may be termed “humane” or “inhumane,” while animal welfare emphasizes and allows only the “humane” use and treatment of animals.
从动物福利组织的角度来看，这些自由的观察等同于对动物的道德考量，认为动物与人类一样具有道德价值。动物福利倡导者的目标是人道地使用动物，无论目的如何。与动物权利倡导者不同，动物福利主义者并不寻求消除人类对动物的利用或陪伴。对于福利主义者来说，只要避免动物的痛苦和苦难，动物生命的价值就不会受到损害。这意味着在动物福利主义的框架内，动物并不具有与人类相等的自主道德权利。动物权利与动物福利的交汇点在于，两者都关注动物存在的状态和条件，而分歧点在于动物可能受到人类利用的程度。很多时候，动物权利的废除主义流派谴责并寻求废除人类对动物的利用，无论这种利用是否被称为“人道”或“不人道”，而动物福利则强调并仅允许对动物的“人道”使用和对待。

Despite extensive global attention to the animal welfare-rights distinction, there remains a need to deploy cultural epistemic outlooks on the issue. In this study, we consider Yoruba perspectives on human-animal relations in an effort to discern a Yoruba understanding of animal ethics.
尽管全球对动物福利权利区分的关注广泛，但仍需运用文化认识论视角来探讨这一问题。在本研究中，我们考虑了约鲁巴人对人兽关系的看法，以揭示约鲁巴人对动物伦理的理解。

Yoruba Culture: Perspectives on Human-Animal Relations
约鲁巴文化：人兽关系视角

 Who are the Yoruba? What is the Yoruba conception of human-animal relations? To what extent is the Yoruba conception bound by a cultural, or collective, philosophy? Does this conception presuppose a Yoruba understanding of Animal Ethics? If it does, what moral principles and questions does this ethical system yield? Can it be affirmed as a welfarist or rightist orientation? What is the contribution of the Yoruba understanding of animal ethics to the global discourse?
谁是约鲁巴人？约鲁巴人对人兽关系的看法是什么？这种看法在多大程度上受到文化或集体哲学的束缚？这种看法是否预设了约鲁巴人对动物伦理的理解？如果是的话，这一伦理体系产生了哪些道德原则和问题？它是否可以被视为福利主义或权利主义的取向？约鲁巴人对动物伦理的理解对全球话语有何贡献？

For decades, scholars have acknowledged ties between African modes of knowing and interpreting reality and the influence of cultural traditions, values, religions, customs and beliefs of the people. These connections have especially attracted the interest of scholars who investigate African epistemology, logic, ethics and morality.⁹ The Yoruba tribe is no exception to this rule. We take it for granted that the Yoruba conception of the ideals and principles that guide human-animal relations may be accessed through the framework of oral tradition, encoded in thoughts, proverbs, adage, and wise sayings which have served as the repository of social and ethical norms and cultural expectations about the status of animals under the custodianship of the local community, elders or native heads (Adewoye, 2007, p. 53).
几十年来，学者们已经认识到非洲认识现实和解释现实的方式与非洲人民的文化传统、价值观、宗教、习俗和信仰之间的联系。这些联系特别吸引了研究非洲认识论、逻辑、伦理和道德的学者的兴趣。⁹约鲁巴部落也不例外。我们理所当然地认为，约鲁巴关于指导人兽关系的理想和原则可以通过口头传统框架来获取，这些传统被编码在思想、谚语、格言和智慧话语中，这些话语一直是社会和伦理规范以及关于动物在地方社区、长者或本地首领监护下的地位的文化期望的宝库（Adewoye，2007，第 53 页）。

Yoruba Culture and Identity
约鲁巴文化和身份

Who and what are included in the phrase “the Yoruba and their culturally related people”? Akinjogbin attempts to describe this group broadly, via the baselines of language, common origin, similar institutions, modes of worship, beliefs, membership, customs as well as other usages (2008, p. 7), but these baselines are yet to be proven sufficient and adequate for the categorization of the Yoruba. For the purpose of this work, we define the Yoruba by geographical and cultural criteria. The Yoruba are an ethnic group located in South Western Nigeria and Southern Benin in West Africa and constitute over 35 million people in total; the majority are from Nigeria and make up 21% of its population.¹⁰ There are also accounts that the Yoruba are found in Togo, Sierra Leone, Ghana and the diasporic regions of Cuba, Brazil, Trinidad, Tobago¹¹ and others. The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria (those within the geographical boundaries of Oyo, Ogun, Ekiti, Ondo, Lagos, Osun) are the focus of this study. Following Akinjogbin (2008, p. 9), it is less difficult to categorize these sects as Yoruba, as their history and ways of life confirm a continuum in terms of cultural traditions, common language, and political organization of war and peace.
谁和什么是“约鲁巴及其文化相关人群”这个短语的组成部分？阿金约金试图从语言、共同起源、相似制度、崇拜方式、信仰、成员资格、习俗以及其他用法等基本线出发，广泛地描述这一群体（2008 年，第 7 页），但这些基本线尚未被证明足以对约鲁巴进行分类。为了本研究的需要，我们根据地理和文化标准来定义约鲁巴。约鲁巴是一个位于西非西南部尼日利亚和南部贝宁的族群，总人数超过 3500 万；其中大多数来自尼日利亚，占其人口的 21%。也有说法称约鲁巴人在多哥、塞拉利昂、加纳以及古巴、巴西、特立尼达、多巴哥等地的海外地区被发现。本研究聚焦于尼日利亚西南部的约鲁巴人（那些位于奥约、奥贡、埃基蒂、翁多、拉各斯、奥松地理边界内的人）。根据阿金约金（2008 年，第... 9)，将这些教派归类为约鲁巴族较为容易，因为他们的历史和生活方式证实了在文化传统、共同语言以及战争与和平的政治组织方面存在连续性。

The Yoruba exhibit common linkages of ancestral traits, customs, rites, beliefs and social institutions. Thinkers like Ojo (2008) and Olajubu (2008, pp. 13-46) have contributed their intellectual insights on the identity of these linkages. Ojo (2008, p. 14) notes the pervasive elements of ancestral veneration (masquerades, deities, ancestors, worship of gods like Sango, Ogun and others), rituals, artifacts, and divination system (Ifa), and he traces these through the process of intra and inter-ethnic diffusion among the Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria. Focusing on the presence of oral artists (poets, priests, diviners, singers, enchanters, etc.) in Yoruba land, Olajubu (2008) has identified the prevailing trend of orature (oral literature ingrained in the traditional or cultural corpus of the Yoruba view on reality as a whole) as an intrinsic virtue of the average Yoruba. He asserts that “among the Yoruba, verbal art is a specialist art and artists are special members of the society” (p. 32). Of interesting note is Olajubu’s emphasis on stereotype oral productions or appreciation (poetry, chants, panegyric—in Yoruba, ijala, oriki, ewi) about virtually all things among the Yoruba, including animals,¹² birds, and plants (p. 38). Of particular interest to the present study is consideration of how a Yoruba cultural understanding of animals is encapsulated in this body of sayings, adages, views, proverbs, poetry, practices and so on. By analyzing Yoruba orature, we attempt to derive the ethical implications of some Yoruba perspectives on human-nonhuman animal relations.
《约鲁巴人具有共同的祖先特征、习俗、仪式、信仰和社会制度联系。思想家如奥约（2008 年）和奥拉朱布（2008 年，第 13-46 页）对这种联系的身份贡献了他们的智力见解。奥约（2008 年，第 14 页）指出，祖先崇拜（面具舞、神祇、祖先、对神如珊戈、奥贡和其他人的崇拜）、仪式、文物和占卜系统（伊فا）的普遍元素，并追溯了这些元素在尼日利亚西南部约鲁巴人中的族内和族间扩散过程。奥拉朱布（2008 年）关注约鲁巴地区口头艺术家（诗人、祭司、占卜者、歌手、巫师等）的存在，确定了口头文学（植根于约鲁巴对现实整体的传统或文化观念中的口头文学）是普通约鲁巴人的内在美德。他断言，“在约鲁巴人中，口头艺术是一种专业艺术，艺术家是社会中的特殊成员”（第 32 页）。》 值得注意的是奥拉朱布对刻板印象口头创作或欣赏（诗歌、颂歌、赞歌——在约鲁巴语中称为ijala、oriki、ewi）的强调，几乎涵盖了约鲁巴人的所有事物，包括动物、¹²鸟类和植物（第 38 页）。本研究特别关注的是，如何通过分析约鲁巴口头文学，来探讨约鲁巴文化对动物的理解如何体现在这些谚语、格言、观点、诗歌、习俗等作品中。通过分析约鲁巴口头文学，我们试图推导出一些约鲁巴对人与非人类动物关系的观点的伦理含义。

Yoruba Cultural Understanding of Animals
尤鲁巴文化对动物的理解

Olusola (2006, pp. 155-172) has attempted to discern the Yoruba cultural understanding of animals, which he called Yoruba ‘ontological perceptions’ of animals (p. 155), by earmarking the classification of animals, placement of animals in the Yoruba cosmology, religion, traditions, economics (food and hunting), and interactions between humans and animals. His efforts have yielded the following insights on the existential status of animals among the Yoruba:
奥卢索拉（2006 年，第 155-172 页）试图辨别尤鲁巴文化对动物的理解，他称之为尤鲁巴的“本体论感知”动物（第 155 页），通过确定动物的分类、动物在尤鲁巴宇宙观、宗教、传统、经济（食物和狩猎）中的位置，以及人类与动物之间的互动。他的努力产生了以下关于动物在尤鲁巴存在状态的见解：

In Yoruba understanding, animals are categorized by groups, habitat and physiological traits. Thus within Yoruba animal kingdom classification, we have eran omi (aquatic, sea or water animals), eran ile (land animals), eran afayafa (reptiles), eran elese meji – (bipeds), eran elese merin (quadrupeds), eye (birds), eku (rats), eran ile (domesticated animals), eran igbe (wild animals) (p. 156).
在约鲁巴的理解中，动物根据群体、栖息地和生理特征进行分类。因此，在约鲁巴的动物王国分类中，我们有以下类别：水生动物（包括海洋和水生动物），陆生动物，爬行动物，两足动物，四足动物，鸟类，啮齿类动物，家养动物，野生动物（第 156 页）。

The Yoruba perception of animals is complemented with taboos and mythical explanations about certain animals. These explanations are preserved through the tradition of folklore, religious beliefs and worship practices, poetry, legends, rituals and so on. Examples are taboos against the interruption of sexual intercourse among animals, prohibitions against killing or eating sacred animals like vultures, ground hornbills, and parrots. The case of adie irana (the fowl that clears the road),¹³ which is designated for rituals and buried along with the corpse of an extraordinary member of the society, shows that the Yoruba cosmos is filled with religious-metaphysical interpretations of animals. This reveals that some animals among the Yoruba are granted ‘divine’ rights and are revered. The myth surrounding the reverence for the river goddess Oya and buffalos (exempted from the category of game animals to be hunted) also illustrates this Yoruba belief (pp. 157-158). This also accounts for the Yoruba belief in the transmigration of human spirits into the bodies of animals: insects, birds, goats, deer etc. (p. 159). Though this sort of thought is mysteriously rather than scientifically grounded, it accounts for the Yoruba belief that “possessed” animals are perpetrators of both evil and good deeds.
《约鲁巴人对动物的认知，补充了关于某些动物的禁忌和神话解释。这些解释通过民间传说、宗教信仰和崇拜仪式、诗歌、传说、仪式等传统得以保存。例如，禁止打断动物间的性行为的禁忌，禁止杀害或食用如秃鹫、地犀鸟和鹦鹉等神圣动物。关于adieirana（清除道路的鸡），¹³它被指定用于仪式，并与社会中非凡成员的尸体一起埋葬，这表明约鲁巴宇宙充满了对动物的宗教-形而上学解释。这揭示了在约鲁巴人中，某些动物被赋予了“神圣”的权利，受到尊敬。围绕对河流女神Oya和（免于被猎杀的）水牛的尊敬的神话也说明了这种约鲁巴信仰（第 157-158 页）。 这也解释了约鲁巴人相信人类灵魂可以转世投胎到动物身体中：昆虫、鸟类、山羊、鹿等。（第 159 页）。尽管这种想法更神秘而非科学，但它解释了约鲁巴人认为“附身”的动物既是邪恶行为的施害者，也是善行的执行者。

In ‘traditional’¹⁴ Yoruba land, both nonhuman animals and humans are perceived as agents of propitiation/sacrifices to the gods, animals are given meaningful names similar to the practice of naming human beings, and they may be the subject of panegyrics or songs of praise.
在“传统”¹⁴ 的约鲁巴土地上，非人类动物和人类都被视为向神祇献祭的祭品，动物被赋予与人类命名相似的有意义的名字，它们也可能是赞歌或颂歌的主题。

In Yoruba cultural understanding, there are patterns of both unhealthy and healthy relationships between humans and other animals. Olushola (2006) portrays this aptly with reference to the hunting expeditions among the Yoruba. The hunting song below displays an unhealthy relationship between humans and animals:
在约鲁巴文化的理解中，人类与其他动物之间存在健康和不健康的互动模式。奥卢索拉（2006）通过提及约鲁巴人的狩猎远征很好地描绘了这一点。下面的狩猎歌曲展示了人类与动物之间不健康的关系：

Omo ale lehoro ninu igbe o!   Rabbit is a bastard in the bush
哦莫阿勒勒霍尼努伊格贝哦！ 兔子在灌木丛中是个混蛋

Omo ale lehoro ninu igbe o!   Rabbit is a bastard in the bush
哦莫阿勒勒霍尼努伊格贝哦！ 兔子在灌木丛中是个混蛋

Bo ba ti rode     Whenever it sees the hunter
""" 波巴提罗德 每当它看到猎人 """

Ni o pale mo kia    It will quickly take to its heels
""" 你若不跑 它就会迅速逃跑 """

Omo ale lehoro ninu igbe o!   Rabbit is a bastard in the bush! (p. 164)
奥莫阿莱莱霍罗尼努伊格贝奥! 兔子在灌木丛中是个混蛋！（第 164 页）

Ajibade Olusola further hinted that some sayings, folklore and folk songs of the Yoruba illustrate healthy interactions or relationships with animals. Mo maja leyin, o jan an nigi, emi naa lo jan nigi – “if you beat my dog which follows me with a rod, I am the one you have beaten with the rod,” (p. 165) is an instance of such sayings. Folk songs like the following also affirm healthy relationships with animals among the Yoruba:
阿吉巴代·奥卢索拉进一步指出，一些谚语、民间故事和民间歌曲展示了约鲁巴人与动物之间的健康互动或关系。莫马莱因，奥贾安尼吉，埃米纳阿洛贾安尼吉——“如果你用棍子打我跟着我的狗，你就是用棍子打了我，”（第 165 页）是这类谚语的一个例子。以下这样的民间歌曲也证实了约鲁巴人与动物之间的健康关系：

 Adie mi     My rooster
Adie mi 我的公鸡

 Eyi ti mora     The one that I bought
Eyi ti mora 我买的那只

 O si je lo     It went out
哦，如果是这样的话 它走出了

 O ko si koto     It fell into a pit
哦，你是谁啊 它掉进了坑里

 Iya bami gbe     Mother helped me carry it
我媽幫我帶 媽媽幫我帶著它

 Gbigbe ti mo gbe    As I carried it
我帶著它 當我帶著它時

 Gbigbon ni n gbon    It was shaking
大公牛在牛群中 它在震动

 Mo wa fi yena     I put it by the fire side for warmth (p. 167)
我把它放在火边取暖 （第 167 页）

Popular folklore, moonlit tales about tortoise, man and the squirrel¹⁵ also portray patterns of interaction between humans and animals in the Yoruba worldview (p. 166) and inform the Yoruba about the natural character and attitudinal (psychological, physiological, and biological) dispositions of classes of animals.
流行民间传说，关于乌龟、人和松鼠的月光故事¹⁵也描绘了在约鲁巴世界观中人类与动物之间的互动模式（第 166 页），并告知约鲁巴人关于动物的自然性格和态度（心理的、生理的、生物的）倾向。

The Yoruba also demonstrate an awareness of the mental consciousness of animals and their experience of pain and suffering, yet they conceive of animals as nutritional, a consumable means of promoting human health and satisfaction:
约鲁巴人也表现出对动物心理意识和它们痛苦与苦难体验的认识，然而他们把动物视为营养品，一种促进人类健康和满足感的可消费手段:

Bi ereke omo eranko ko ba ba je, ti omo eniyan ko ni dun – “if the cheek of the offspring of an animal is not broken, that of the humans will not be sweet”.
牛犊不破皮，人皮不甜——“如果动物的崽儿皮没破，人的皮就不会甜”。

Oju ni maluu n ro, obe o dara lorun – “The cow is suffering only during the time of slaughter, knife is not something pleasant on the neck”.
牛在屠宰时才受苦，刀刃放在脖子上并不愉快。 – “牛在屠宰时才受苦，刀刃放在脖子上并不愉快。”

Ife ti a fe adie ko denu, ibi ki a paaje lo mo – “Our love for roosters is not genuine; the point is to kill (and eat)¹⁶ them” (pp. 168-169)
我们对公鸡的爱并不真诚；目的是为了杀（并吃）它们。 – “我们对公鸡的爱并不真诚；目的是为了杀（并吃）它们。”¹⁶”（第 168-169 页）

These three sayings illustrate that the Yoruba cultural philosophy reckons that animals are sources of human food, despite human awareness that killing animals causes them pain. The consumption of animals surpasses the purpose of nutrition to include medication/treatments (healing, in Yoruba land), as animals’ bodily parts are ground alongside other curative ingredients to treat specific ailments.¹⁷
这些三个谚语说明，约鲁巴文化哲学认为，尽管人类意识到杀戮动物会使其感到痛苦，但动物仍然是人类食物的来源。动物的消费目的超越了营养，还包括了药物/治疗（在约鲁巴地区指治愈），因为动物的各个部位与其他药用成分一起被磨碎，以治疗特定的疾病。[1][7]

 Olusola’s (2006) attempt to categorize elements of the Yoruba cultural (collective) philosophy about animals is not all encompassing, however. idowu’s (2008) collection of 1,000 Yoruba proverbs (written in Yoruba language) provides further insights into Yoruba cultural perspectives about animals. Beyond the assessment of human-animal relations via the frameworks of sayings, adages and so forth, Idowu’s collection demonstrates that the Yoruba also perceive animal-animal relations and interpret them as holding metaphorical significance for human-human relations. The following proverbs from Idowu’s collection are instances of such:
Olusola（2006）对约鲁巴文化（集体）哲学中关于动物的元素的分类并不全面，然而.我多乌（2008）收集的 1000 条约鲁巴谚语（用约鲁巴语书写）进一步揭示了约鲁巴文化对动物的看法。除了通过谚语、格言等框架评估人兽关系之外，多乌的收集还表明，约鲁巴人也认为动物与动物之间的关系具有隐喻意义，对人与人之间的关系有启示。以下来自多乌收集的谚语就是这样的例子：

Aguntan to baja rin yoo jegbe (p. 12) – “The goat that frolics with dogs would definitely eat faeces.”
Aguntan to baja rin yoo jegbe（第 12 页）——“与狗嬉戏的山羊肯定会吃粪便。”

Aja iwoyii lo mo ehoro iwoyi le (p. 12) – ‘‘It is the dog of this modern time that can chase the rabbit of this modern time.’’
啊呀，我友友啊，洛莫埃霍罗我友友勒（第 12 页）——“这个时代的狗能追这个时代的兔子。”

Ajanaku koja, mo ri nnkan firi, ti a ba rerin, ka sope a rerin (p. 13) – ‘‘The elephant’s passage is beholding and majestic; when we see an elephant, we should acknowledge we have seen an elephant.’’
阿贾库科贾，莫里恩坎菲里，提阿巴勒林，卡索佩阿勒林（第 13 页）——“大象的行进是令人敬畏和庄严的；当我们看到大象时，我们应该承认我们看到了大象。”

Proverbs of this category, as suggested before, have metaphorical import for humans, but to delve into this would mean drifting into another discourse. However, it is important to note that the Yoruba perspectives do not exclude considerations of animal-animal relations, and as shown in the three proverbs above, these considerations extract from the peculiarities of particular species of animals (size, feeding habits, natural dispositions or attitudes). For instance, the proverb “the goat…faeces’’ derives from the observation of local dogs in Yoruba communities that feed on debris, human waste products and other waste, while the second proverb “it is the dog…times’’ is an extract of the sensitive dispositions of both animals involved in a predatory chase and survival scuffle. The last proverb derives from observations of the size of the elephant. Still other proverbs employ images of animals, yet are neutral in their implications for human-human and animal-animal relations. Such proverbs are aphorisms of warning, precaution and modesty. For instance:
这类谚语，如前所述，对人类具有隐喻意义，但深入探讨这会意味着进入另一个话题。然而，值得注意的是，约鲁巴的观点并不排除对动物-动物关系的考虑，正如上面三个谚语所示，这些考虑是从特定物种的动物特性（体型、饮食习惯、自然倾向或态度）中提取出来的。例如，“山羊……粪便”这个谚语源自约鲁巴社区中观察到的当地狗，它们以垃圾、人类排泄物和其他废物为食，而第二个谚语“狗……时代”则是从参与捕食追逐和生存混战的两种动物敏感倾向中提取出来的。最后一个谚语源自对大象体型的观察。还有其他谚语使用动物的形象，但在人类-人类和动物-动物关系方面却是中性的。这类谚语是警告、预防和谦逊的格言。例如：

Aja tii yoo sonu, ko ni gbo fere ode (p. 12) – “A dog destined to get lost would never heed the hunter’s whistle.”
啊呀，这只狗注定要迷路，它绝不会听从猎人的哨声。（第 12 页）——“注定要迷路的狗不会理会猎人的哨声。”

Asa to ba fara wegun, eyin aaro ni yoo sun (p. 13) – “A hawk that imitates the ways of a vulture would find itself in the pot of soup.”¹⁸
阿萨要远离，鹰眼要识途。（第 13 页）——“模仿秃鹫行为的鹰会发现自己掉进了汤锅里。”¹⁸

Labalaba to ba digbo legun, aso re a faya (p. 43) – “A butterfly that perches on thorns or spikes would have its skin torn.”
Labalaba to ba digbo legun, aso re a faya（第 43 页）“蝴蝶落在荆棘或尖刺上，其皮肤会被撕裂。”

 Further probing of this general perception of animals from the Yoruba point of view raises the possibility of a Yoruba ethico-cultural understanding of animal ethics.
从约鲁巴人的观点进一步探讨这种对动物的普遍看法，可能会引发约鲁巴人对动物伦理的伦理文化理解的可能性。

Yoruba Ethico-Cultural Understanding: Implications for Animal Ethics
约鲁巴伦理文化理解：对动物伦理的启示

The Yoruba tradition does not display in clear terms the sphere of its ethical viewpoint regarding human-to-animal relationships. Some sayings, proverbs and beliefs appear seductively ‘rightist’ in pattern or represent a shift from a welfarist to a rightist concern for animals. The Yoruba says ise eniyan nise eranko¹⁹- “the way of man/humans is also the way of animals.” Often, such sayings have dual meanings, as both metaphoric and literal expressions in reference to human and non-human situations. The saying above implies something of Singer’s emphasis on equal treatment. For Singer, the capacity to suffer is the primary criterion for considering the interest of any being, even though extending the basic principle of equality from one group to another does not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant exactly the same rights to both groups (Regan, 1980, pp. 101-102; Singer, 1992, pp. 343). This saying further extends the imperative of the assertion in Yoruba that a kimo alaja, kanaa aja re pa – “when we know and are friends with the owner of a dog, we should not beat the dog at all or beat the dog to death” (Adewoye, 2007, p. 54); this implies that we must treat a dog in the terms we find appropriate for treatment of its (known) owner. This claim is an indicator of the Yoruba tradition against inhumane treatment of animals, which they believe is closely linked to inhumane treatment of (proximate) fellow humans.
约鲁巴传统并没有明确表达其关于人兽关系的伦理观点范围。一些谚语、格言和信仰似乎具有诱人的“右翼”模式，或者从福利主义转向对动物的“右翼”关注。约鲁巴人说ise eniyan nise eranko¹⁹-“人的方式也是动物的方式。”这样的谚语通常具有双重含义，既是隐喻也是对人类和非人类情况的直接表达。上述谚语暗示了辛格对平等关注的强调。对于辛格来说，能够感受痛苦是考虑任何生物利益的主要标准，尽管将平等的基本原则从一个群体扩展到另一个群体并不意味着我们必须以完全相同的方式对待这两个群体，或者赋予这两个群体完全相同的权利（Regan, 1980, pp. 101-102; Singer, 1992, pp. 343）。 这句话进一步扩展了约鲁巴语中的命令式断言：“一个 kimo alaja，kanaa aja re pa – “当我们了解并与狗的主人成为朋友时，我们绝对不应该打狗，或者把狗打死”（Adewoye，2007，第 54 页）；这意味着我们必须以我们认为适合对待狗（已知）主人的方式对待狗。这一主张是约鲁巴传统反对虐待动物的一个标志，他们认为这与虐待（亲近的）人类密切相关。

Akeyinje ko mope idi n ro adie (Adewoye, 2007, p. 56) – “The person who consumes the egg does not know the pains the hen passed through during the hatching process,” – is also an aphorism in the Yoruba traditional worldview that opposes non-humane consideration of animals by criticizing the prevailing speciesist stance of humans toward animals as well as the reckless damage and lack of empathy demonstrated by the ends (human life) to the means (animal life). This adage warns against careless human treatment of animals and the disruption of the life cycle that occurs when animals are regarded as mere commodities.
阿凯因杰曾经说：（Adewoye, 2007, 第 56 页）——“吃鸡蛋的人不知道母鸡孵化过程中的痛苦，”——这句话也是约鲁巴传统世界观中的一个谚语，它反对对动物的非人道考虑，通过批评人类对动物的普遍物种主义立场以及对待手段（动物生命）时的鲁莽破坏和缺乏同情心（目的——人类生命）。这个谚语警告人们不要对动物采取粗心大意的态度，以及当动物被视为纯粹的商品时发生的生命周期的破坏。

Additionally, Ingold (1988, p. 12) maintains that most cultural/traditional conceptions share classic anthropological implications of totemic practices in regard to animals. The Yoruba tradition may not be exempted from this category, as can be seen in many of the examples presented below. Totemism (or totemic practices) refers to specific meanings or beliefs that people attribute to certain images or objects. In some cases among the Yoruba, these objects may include carcasses or images of animals, which are used as symbols of religious allegiance (faith and belief). Totemic beliefs in this sense simply imply that we owe religious allegiance to animals as objects of worship and as such, we ought to revere, respect and care for them. Some animals within the Yoruba traditional corpus are revered as sacred figures of religious worship. Some of these animals include the yellow palm bird (popularly called eye oga), vulture (igun) and royal python. Any attempt to fell a tree where the decorous bird (eye oga) lays its eggs is to visit doom upon the society. The vulture in Yoruba land is a sacred bird and should not be used as a burnt offering, game or food. The Yoruba saying confirms this: a ki pa igun, a ki je igun, a ki fi igun bori (Adewoye, 2007, p. 54) – “We do not kill the vulture, we do not eat the vulture, we do not use the vulture as sacrifice to the gods to remedy human destiny.” This saying warns against any attempt to kill the vulture for food, or use it as sacrifice to the gods. The Yoruba tradition further encourages the preservation of animals through certain rituals, customs or taboo. A good example of this is common among some families and towns in Yoruba land. In Ondo town for instance, indigenes are forbidden to eat giant rats (okete). Also, the Onikoyi and Alapa family are forbidden to eat yellow palm birds or any kind of snake. In addition, certain species of animals are categorized as sacred within the Yoruba community during certain festive periods or ceremonial events like Ogun, Osun festivals. This indeed informs the preference of the Yoruba community in employing animals like doves and goats as sacrifices for societal purification or stability. Furthermore, animals like dogs are used for hunting and as pets, since they are conceived as instruments of appeasement to the gods. The wrath of the gods, manifest in accidents, unforeseen/spiritual contingencies or outbreaks of illness, follows upon the human-caused death of an animal that is a companion or favored being of a god.²⁰ The saying that eyele ko kin bonile je, kobonile mu, kowa dojo iku ko yeri— “the dove does not drink and dine with its owner and on the day death beckons, it should flee”—illustrates the extent of Yoruba beliefs about the roles of these animals. According to such beliefs in Yoruba culture, a god’s wrath serves as propitiation or atonement for the individual’s life that was claimed by the god. Hence, some animals simply become totems and are regarded as sacred, enjoying a privileged place in the Yoruba community (through due feeding, care and husbandry); these animals are by human ingenuity (within the Yoruba parlance) reserved for the gods.
此外，英戈尔德（1988 年，第 12 页）认为，大多数文化/传统观念都包含经典人类学对图腾实践的动物含义。约鲁巴传统可能也不例外，以下许多例子可以证明这一点。图腾主义（或图腾实践）指的是人们赋予某些图像或对象的具体含义或信仰。在约鲁巴人中，这些对象可能包括动物尸体或动物图像，它们被用作宗教忠诚（信仰和信念）的象征。在这种意义上的图腾信仰简单来说就是，我们应将宗教忠诚赋予动物，作为崇拜的对象，因此，我们应该尊敬、尊重并关爱它们。在约鲁巴传统文献中，一些动物被视为宗教崇拜的圣物。其中一些动物包括黄棕鸟（俗称“eye oga”），秃鹫（igun），以及王蛇。任何试图砍伐黄棕鸟（eye oga）产卵的树的企图，都将给社会带来灾难。 在约鲁巴地区，秃鹫是一种神圣的鸟类，不应被用作祭品、猎物或食物。约鲁巴谚语证实了这一点：“我们不打杀秃鹫，我们不吃秃鹫，我们不把秃鹫作为祭品献给神灵以改变人的命运。”（Adewoye，2007，第 54 页）这句谚语警告人们不要为了食物而杀害秃鹫，也不要将其作为祭品献给神灵。约鲁巴传统还通过某些仪式、习俗或禁忌来鼓励保护动物。例如，在奥ンド镇等地，居民被禁止食用巨型老鼠（okete）。此外，Onikoyi 和 Alapa 家族被禁止食用黄棕鸟或任何类型的蛇。另外，在奥贡（Ogun）、奥孙（Osun）等节日或庆典期间，某些动物物种在约鲁巴社区中被视为神圣。 这确实反映了约鲁巴社区在采用鸽子、山羊等动物作为社会净化或稳定的牺牲品时的偏好。此外，狗等动物被用于狩猎和作为宠物，因为它们被视为安抚神灵的工具。当人类导致神灵的伴侣或宠物的死亡时，神灵的愤怒就会随之而来，表现为事故、不可预见/精神上的意外或疾病的爆发。《伊莱科金比隆伊，科邦伊穆，科瓦多伊库科耶里——鸽子不与主人同饮同食，死亡召唤之日，它应该逃跑》这句谚语说明了约鲁巴人对这些动物角色的信仰。根据约鲁巴文化的这种信仰，神的愤怒为被神夺去生命的个体提供了赔偿或赎罪。 因此，一些动物成为图腾，被视为神圣，享有特权地位，在约鲁巴社区中（通过适当的饲养、照料和饲养管理）；这些动物（在约鲁巴语中）是人类智慧（保留给神灵）的专属。

Beyond this, the Yoruba ethico-cultural perspective assumes a superstitious stance, not necessarily built upon religious grounds but deriving from mysterious (metaphysical) explanatory models about the unique attributes of some animals, which shape the relational attitudes of humans toward animals. For instance, the cat (Olongbo in Yoruba) is mystical because of its inherent agility that enables it not to land on its back no matter the altitude or the gravitational force employed in throwing the cat. Also, the unique sparkle of the cat’s bright eyes in the night informs the traditional Yoruba that this kind of creature is likely to be from the world beyond, despite scientific explanations about animal anatomy, genetics and physiology. Among the Yoruba this perception has patterned relational attitudes toward animals such as cats, owls (Owiwi), and even flocks of sheep and goats. In Yoruba land these animals are perceived as stakeholders in terrestrial-celestial realms,²¹ and as such many Yoruba stand in awe of these animals and ‘relate with them in their own right.’²² The assumption here is that even in the case of conceiving of such animals as mysterious, as observed in Yoruba ethico-cultural enclaves, it is still necessary to classify such conceptions as factors in the Yoruba’s relational attitude toward other animals if the account of Yoruba understanding of animal ethics is to be complete. An ‘outsider,’ not aware of such dispositional tendencies, upon contact with the Yoruba, may be quick to categorize such relational tendencies of human to animal relations as motivating an animal rights stance that grants autonomy to animal existence. On the contrary, it is difficult to classify such tendencies as characterizing an animal rights position, as the motivations behind the Yoruba superstitious stance differ from those of animal rights advocates. For the sake of brevity, it is appropriate to consider this perspectival factor in human-animal relationships among the Yoruba as a ‘superstitious relational attitude.’
此外，约鲁巴的伦理文化视角采取了一种迷信的态度，这种态度并非建立在宗教基础上，而是源自于对某些动物独特属性神秘（形而上学）解释模型，这些模型塑造了人类对动物的相互态度。例如，猫（在约鲁巴语中称为奥隆博）因其内在的敏捷性而显得神秘，这种敏捷性使它无论在多高的高度或使用多大的重力抛掷，都不会倒立。此外，猫在夜晚明亮眼睛的独特闪烁也使传统的约鲁巴人相信这种生物可能来自另一个世界，尽管有关于动物解剖学、遗传学和生理学的科学解释。在约鲁巴人中，这种观念塑造了对猫、猫头鹰（奥维维）、甚至羊群和山羊群等动物的相互态度。 在约鲁巴地区，这些动物被视为陆地-天界中的利益相关者，因此许多约鲁巴人对这些动物充满敬畏，并以它们自身的权利“与之建立联系”。在这里的假设是，即使在约鲁巴伦理文化聚居区观察到将这些动物视为神秘的情况下，如果想要完整地描述约鲁巴对动物伦理的理解，仍然有必要将这些观念归类为约鲁巴人对其他动物关系态度的因素。一个不了解这种倾向性的“局外人”，在与约鲁巴人接触时，可能会迅速将这些人与动物关系的态度归类为推动动物权利立场，赋予动物存在自主权的动机。相反，将这些倾向归类为具有动物权利立场特征是困难的，因为约鲁巴迷信立场背后的动机与动物权利倡导者的动机不同。 为了简洁起见，将约鲁巴人的人与动物关系中的这一视角因素视为“迷信的交往态度”是恰当的。’

Practices, attitudinal dispositions, sayings, aphorisms and proverbs that have bearing on the Yorubas’ traditional conception of human-animal relations are too immense to be captured here, but our concern goes beyond this to stress the salient points that distinguish the Yoruba ethical understanding of human-animal relations. The points below stand out, given the insight above.
尤鲁巴人认为动物有情感和痛苦，不仅如此，尤鲁巴人禁止对动物进行残忍/残酷的行为，这可以从以下谚语中看出：a kimo alaja kanaa aja repa – “当我们知道狗的主人时，我们绝对不应该打狗，更不用说打死它了”（这意味着我们应该以对待狗主人的方式对待狗） – 以及 ise eniyan nise eranko – “人的方式也是动物的方式。”

The Yoruba attribute feelings and pain to animals. Not only this, the Yoruba forbid cruelty/brutality to animals, as is implied in sayings like a kimo alaja kanaa aja re pa – “when we know the owner of a dog, we should not beat the dog at all/ to death” (which implies that we must treat a dog in the same terms we would treat its known owner) – and ise eniyan nise eranko – “the way of man/human is also the way of animals.”
尤鲁巴人认为动物有情感和痛苦。不仅如此，尤鲁巴人禁止对动物进行残忍/残酷的行为，正如以下谚语所暗示的：a kimo alaja kanaa aja repa – “当我们知道狗的主人时，我们绝对不应该打狗，更不用说打死它了”（这意味着我们应该以对待狗主人的方式对待狗） – 并且ise eniyan nise eranko – “人的方式也是动物的方式。”

The Yoruba perceive a religious connotation in animals’ status, as can easily be inferred from the totemic implications highlighted above. There is also a saying to the effect that agbalagba to n ta roba mo eye, ti koba fisile, yoo wo ina (Adewoye, 2007, p. 54) – “an elderly person taunting the peace of a bird relentlessly by stoning would be condemned to the gulf of fire.” The simple point conveyed here is that the Yoruba conception transcends the status of the elders (custodians) or the most eminent members of society, urging everyone to respect the inherent value of animals, regarding them and treating them as ‘beings’ in their own right.
约鲁巴人认为动物的地位具有宗教含义，这可以从上述图腾含义中轻易推断出来。还有一句俗语，大意是agbalagba to n ta roba mo eye, ti koba fisile, yoo wo ina（Adewoye，2007，第 54 页）——“一个老人不停地用石头打鸟，破坏其安宁，将会被诅咒进入火海。”这里传达的简单观点是，约鲁巴人的观念超越了长者（守护者）或社会中最显赫成员的地位，敦促每个人都尊重动物固有的价值，将它们视为‘存在’本身。

By virtue of these points, it may not entirely be out of place to state that the Yoruba ultimately conceive of animals as moral beings, thereby embracing an understanding of animal ethics.
依据这些观点，可以说约鲁巴人最终将动物视为道德存在，从而接受了对动物伦理的理解。