Wendy Barnaby was asked to write a book about water wars - then the facts got in the way of her story. 温迪-巴纳比（Wendy Barnaby）应邀撰写了一本关于水战争的书，但事实却阻碍了她的故事。
The United Nations warned as recently as last week that climate change harbours the potential for serious conflicts over water. In its World Water Development Report ^(1){ }^{1} of March 2009, it quotes UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noting the risk of water scarcity “transforming peaceful competition into violence”. It is statements such as this that gave birth to popular notions of ‘water wars’. It is time we dispelled this myth. Countries do not go to war over water, they solve their water shortages through trade and international agreements. 联合国上周警告说，气候变化有可能引发严重的水冲突。联合国在其 2009 年 3 月的《世界水资源开发报告》 ^(1){ }^{1} 中援引联合国秘书长潘基文的话指出，水资源短缺有可能 "将和平竞争转化为暴力"。正是这样的言论催生了 "水战争 "的流行概念。现在是我们打破这种神话的时候了。各国不会因水而开战，它们会通过贸易和国际协议解决水资源短缺问题。
Cooperation, in fact, is the dominant response to shared water resources. There are 263 cross-boundary waterways in the world. Between 1948 and 1999, cooperation over water, including the signing of treaties, far outweighed conflict over water and violent conflict in particular. Of 1,831 instances of interactions over international freshwater resources tallied over that time period (including everything from unofficial verbal exchanges to economic agreements or military action), 67%67 \% were cooperative, only 28%28 \% were conflictive, and the remaining 5%5 \% were neutral or insignificant. In those five 事实上，合作是应对共享水资源的主要方式。世界上有 263 条跨界水道。从 1948 年到 1999 年，在水问题上的合作，包括签署条约，远远超过了水冲突，尤其是暴力冲突。在这一时期内统计的 1831 次国际淡水资源互动中（包括从非官方口头交流到经济协议或军事行动等各种情况）， 67%67 \% 是合作性的，只有 28%28 \% 是冲突性的，其余的 5%5 \% 是中立或无关紧要的。在这五个
"In five decades, "五十年后
there were 有
no formal 非正式
declarations of war 宣战
over water." 水上"。
"In five decades,
there were
no formal
declarations of war
over water."| "In five decades, |
| :--- |
| there were |
| no formal |
| declarations of war |
| over water." |
Allan had made the same assumption a few decades earlier when he set out to study the water situation in Libya. By the mid-1980s, water stress in North Africa and the Middle East had worsened; but Allan began to question his assumptions when he found no sign of the widely predicted water wars. Instead, the burgeoning populations of the Middle Eastern economies had no apparent difficulties in meeting their food and water needs. Allan had been forced to grapple with a situation in which people who are short of water do not necessarily fight over it. 几十年前，当艾伦开始研究利比亚的水资源状况时，他也做出了同样的假设。到 20 世纪 80 年代中期，北非和中东地区的水资源紧张状况进一步恶化；但当艾伦发现并没有出现人们普遍预测的水战争时，他开始质疑自己的假设。相反，中东经济体中不断增长的人口在满足食物和水需求方面并没有明显的困难。艾伦不得不面对这样一种情况：缺水的人们并不一定会为争夺水资源而大打出手。
Invisible water 隐形水
Allan’s earlier thinking about water wars began to change after meeting the late Gideon Fishelson, an agricultural economist at Tel Aviv University, Israel. Fishelson argued that it is foolish for Israel, a water-short country, to grow and then export products such as oranges and avocados, which require a lot of water to cultivate. Fishelson’s work prompted Allan to realize that water ‘embedded’ in traded products could be important in explaining the absence of conflict over water in the region. 在结识以色列特拉维夫大学已故农业经济学家吉迪恩-费舍尔森之后，艾伦早先关于水战争的想法开始发生变化。费舍尔森认为，以色列作为一个水资源短缺的国家，种植并出口橙子和鳄梨等需要大量水资源才能种植的产品是愚蠢的。费舍尔森的研究促使艾伦意识到，"嵌入 "在贸易产品中的水可能是解释该地区没有水资源冲突的重要原因。
As a global average, people typically drink one cubic metre of water each per year, and use 100 cubic metres per year for washing and cleaning. Each of us also accounts for 1,000 cubic metres per year to grow the food we eat. In temperate climates, the water needed to produce this food is generally taken for granted. In arid regions, Allan described how people depend on irrigation and imported food to fulfill these needs. Imported food, in particluar, saves on the water required to cultivate crops. 从全球平均水平来看，人们通常每人每年饮用 1 立方米的水，每年用于洗涤和清洁的水量为 100 立方米。我们每个人每年还要用 1000 立方米的水来种植食物。在温带气候地区，生产这些食物所需的水通常被认为是理所当然的。在干旱地区，艾伦描述了人们如何依靠灌溉和进口食品来满足这些需求。特别是进口食品，可以节省种植农作物所需的水。
The relationship of food trade to water sustainability is often not obvious, and often remains invisible: no political leader will gain any popularity by acknowledging that their country makes up the water budget only by importing food. Allan saw through this to document how the water budgets of the Middle East were accounted for without conflict. 粮食贸易与水资源可持续发展之间的关系往往并不明显，而且经常是隐形的：任何政治领导人都不会因为承认自己的国家仅靠进口粮食来弥补水资源预算而获得任何支持。艾伦看透了这一点，记录了中东地区的水资源预算是如何在没有冲突的情况下得到核算的。
Allan wrote about embedded water for a few years without it exciting any comment. Then, on a dark Monday afternoon in November 1992, during a routine SOAS seminar, somebody used the term ‘virtual’ water to describe the same concept. Allan realized this attentiongrabbing word, in vogue with the computer- 艾伦写了几年关于嵌入式水的文章，但没有引起任何评论。后来，在 1992 年 11 月一个阴沉的周一下午，在 SOAS 的一次例行研讨会上，有人用 "虚拟 "水一词来描述同样的概念。艾伦意识到，这个吸引眼球的词是计算机领域的流行词。
literate younger generation, would catch on better than his own term. And he was right: “From there on it flew,” he says. 他认为识字的年轻一代会比他自己的任期更受欢迎。他是对的："从那时起，它就飞起来了。
Allan’s work explained how, as poor countries diversify their economies, they turn away from agriculture and create wealth from industries that use less water. As a country becomes richer, it may require more water overall to sustain its booming population, but it can afford to import food to make up the shortfall ^(5){ }^{5}. 艾伦的研究解释了随着贫穷国家经济的多样化，它们如何从农业转向用水量较少的工业来创造财富。随着一个国家变得越来越富裕，它可能需要更多的水来维持人口的增长，但它有能力进口粮食来弥补缺口 ^(5){ }^{5} 。
Areas seemingly desperate for water arrive at sustainable solutions thanks to the import of food, reducing the demand for water and giving an invisible boost to domestic supplies. Political leaders can threaten hostile action if their visible water supplies are threatened (a potentially useful political bluff), while not needing to wage war thanks to the benefits of trade. 由于进口粮食，减少了对水的需求，无形中增加了国内的水供应，看似缺水的地区找到了可持续的解决办法。如果有形的水供应受到威胁，政治领导人可以威胁采取敌对行动（这可能是一种有用的政治虚张声势），而由于贸易带来的好处，他们不需要发动战争。
Sources of war 战争起源
Israel ran out of water in the 1950s: it has not since then produced enough water to meet all of its needs, including food production. Jordan has been in the same situation since the 1960s; Egypt since the 1970s. Although it is true that these countries have fought wars with each other, they have not fought over water. Instead they all import grain. As Allan points out, more ‘virtual’ water flows into the Middle East each year embedded in grain than flows down the Nile to Egyptian farmers. 以色列在 20 世纪 50 年代就缺水了：从那时起，以色列就没有生产出足够的水来满足包括粮食生产在内的所有需求。约旦自 20 世纪 60 年代以来一直处于同样的境地；埃及自 20 世纪 70 年代以来也是如此。虽然这些国家之间确实发生过战争，但它们并不是为了水而战。相反，它们都进口粮食。正如艾伦所指出的，每年流入中东的粮食中的 "虚拟 "水量比尼罗河上流向埃及农民的水量还要多。
Perhaps the most often quoted example of a water war is the situation in the West Bank between Palestinians and Israel. But as Mark Zeitoun, senior lecturer in development studies at the University of East Anglia in Norwich, UK, has explained, contrary to what both the mass media and some academic literature say on the subject, while there is conflict and tension - as well as cooperation - there is no ‘water war’ here either ^(6){ }^{6}. 巴勒斯坦人和以色列人在约旦河西岸的局势也许是最常被引用的水战例子。但是，正如英国诺里奇东英吉利大学发展研究高级讲师马克-泽图恩（Mark Zeitoun）所解释的那样，与大众媒体和一些学术文献在这个问题上的说法相反，虽然这里存在冲突和紧张局势，也有合作，但并不存在 "水战争" ^(6){ }^{6} 。
Ten million people now live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. If they were to be self-sufficient in food, they would need ten billion cubic metres of water per year. As it is, they have only about one-third of that: enough to grow 15-20%15-20 \% of their food. They import the rest in the form of food. When it comes to water for domestic and industrial use, the rainfall and geology of the West Bank alone should provide enough water for the population there: Ramallah has a higher annual average rainfall than Berlin. But today, water for even these needs is scarce. 现在，有一千万人生活在约旦河和地中海之间。如果要实现粮食自给自足，他们每年需要 100 亿立方米的水。而现在，他们只有大约三分之一的水：足够种植 15-20%15-20 \% 他们的食物。其余的水则以粮食的形式进口。就家庭和工业用水而言，仅西岸的降雨量和地质条件就足以为当地居民提供足够的用水：拉马拉的年平均降雨量高于柏林。但如今，连满足这些需求的水都很稀缺。
of future shortages, does cause war - oil. But the strategic significance of oil is immeasurably higher than that of water. Serious interruptions of oil supplies would stop highly developed economies in their tracks. Oil is necessary for a developed economy, and a developed economy provides for all the needs of its citizens, including water. People in developed economies do not die of thirst. 石油是战争的导火索。但是，石油的战略意义要比水的战略意义大得多。石油供应的严重中断会使高度发达的经济停滞不前。石油是发达经济的必需品，而发达经济会满足国民的所有需求，包括用水。发达经济体的人不会渴死。
My encounter with Allan’s work killed my book. I offered to revise its thesis, but my publishers pointed out that predicting an absence of war over water would not sell. 我与艾伦作品的相遇扼杀了我的书。我提出修改论点，但出版商指出，预测不会因水而发生战争是不会畅销的。
Book or no book, it is still important that the popular myth of water wars somehow be dispelled 不管有没有书，以某种方式打破水战的流行神话仍然很重要
Power struggles and politics have led to overt and institutionalized conflict over water - but no armed conflict, as there is over borders and statehood. Instead, Palestinian and Israeli water professionals interact on a Joint Water Committee, established by the Oslo-II Accords in 1995. It is not an equal partnership: Israel has de facto veto power on the committee. But they continue to meet, and issue official expressions of cooperation, even in the face of military action. Inequitable access to water resources is a result of the broader conflict and power dynamics: it does not itself cause war. 权力斗争和政治导致了公开和制度化的水资源冲突--但并没有像边界和建国问题那样发生武装冲突。相反，巴勒斯坦和以色列的水务专业人员在 1995 年根据《奥斯陆第二项协定》成立的联合水务委员会上进行互动。这不是一种平等的伙伴关系：以色列在委员会中拥有事实上的否决权。但是，即使在军事行动面前，他们仍继续举行会议，并发表正式合作声明。不公平地获取水资源是更广泛的冲突和权力动态的结果：它本身并不会引起战争。
The Nile Basin Initiative, launched in 1999 and encompassing nine nations, is another example of the way in which wider geopolitical and economic factors help to balance water allocation. Historically, vast differences in the political clout of nations across which, or along which, a river flows have resulted in unequal water division. Under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, Egypt has had rights to 87%87 \% of the Nile’s water, with Sudan having rights to the rest. Ethiopia, whose highlands supply 86%86 \% of Nile water, does not even figure in the agreement: continuing conflicts weakened the agreement to a point where Ethiopia has been unable to press a claim. But Egypt’s desire to consolidate its economic development necessitates that it now come to better terms with its neighbours, improving prospects for local trade. So Egypt is willing to 1999 年发起的尼罗河流域倡议包括九个国家，它是更广泛的地缘政治和经济因素帮助平衡水资源分配的另一个例子。从历史上看，河流流经或沿岸国家政治影响力的巨大差异导致了水资源分配的不平等。根据 1959 年埃及和苏丹签订的《尼罗河水域协议》，埃及有权使用尼罗河的 87%87 \% 水，苏丹有权使用其余的水。埃塞俄比亚的高地提供了 86%86 \% 的尼罗河水，但它甚至没有出现在协议中：持续不断的冲突削弱了协议的效力，使埃塞俄比亚无法提出要求。但埃及希望巩固其经济发展，因此现在必须与邻国达成更好的协议，改善当地贸易的前景。因此，埃及愿意
engage in the multilateral initiative to cooperate more on matters such as hydroelectric power development, power-sharing cooperatives, river regulation and water-resources management. 参与多边倡议，在水电开发、电力共享合作社、河流治理和水资源管理等问题上加强合作。
Likewise, although India and Pakistan have fought three wars and frequently find themselves in eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, arbitrated by the World Bank, has more than once helped to defuse tensions over water. 同样，尽管印度和巴基斯坦已经打了三场战争，并经常陷入针锋相对的对抗，但由世界银行仲裁的 1960 年《印度河水域条约》不止一次地帮助化解了因水源问题而产生的紧张局势。
Oil and water don't mix 油和水不能混在一起
Yet the myth of water wars persists. Climate change, we are told, will cause water shortages. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that up to 2 billion people may be at risk from increasing water stress by the 2050s, and that this number could rise to 3.2 billion by the 2080s^(7)2080 \mathrm{~s}^{7}. 然而，水战争的神话依然存在。我们被告知，气候变化将导致水资源短缺。据政府间气候变化专门委员会估计，到 2050 年代，可能会有多达 20 亿人面临水资源日益紧张的风险，到 2080s^(7)2080 \mathrm{~s}^{7} 年，这一数字可能会上升到 32 亿。
Water management will need to adapt. But the mechanisms of trade, international agreements and economic development that currently ease water shortages will persist. Researchers, such as Aaron Wolf at Oregon State University, Corvallis, and Nils Petter Gleditsch at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, point out that predictions of armed conflict come from the media and from popular, non-peer-reviewed work. 水资源管理需要进行调整。但目前缓解水资源短缺的贸易、国际协议和经济发展机制将继续存在。俄勒冈州立大学科瓦利斯分校的亚伦-沃尔夫（Aaron Wolf）和奥斯陆国际和平研究所的尼尔斯-彼得-格莱蒂奇（Nils Petter Gleditsch）等研究人员指出，对武装冲突的预测来自媒体和流行的、未经同行评审的著作。
There is something other than water for which shortages, or even the perceived threat 除了水之外，还有其他原因导致水源短缺，甚至可能造成威胁。
once and for all. This will not only stop unsettling and incorrect predictions of international conflict over water. It will also discourage a certain public resignation that climate change will bring war, and focus attention instead on what politicians can do to avoid it: most importantly, improve the conditions of trade for developing countries to strengthen their economies. And it would help to convince water engineers and managers, who still tend to see water shortages in terms of local supply and demand, that the solutions to water scarcity and security lie outside the water sector in the water/food/trade/economic development nexus. It would be great if we could unclog our stream of thought about the misleading notions of ‘water wars’. 一劳永逸。这不仅将停止令人不安的、不正确的关于因水而发生国际冲突的预测。它还将打消公众对气候变化将带来战争的某种悲观情绪，转而将注意力集中在政治家可以做些什么来避免战争：最重要的是，改善发展中国家的贸易条件，以加强其经济。这将有助于说服水利工程师和管理人员--他们仍然倾向于从本地供需的角度看待水资源短缺问题--相信水资源短缺和安全的解决办法在于水利部门之外的水资源/粮食/贸易/经济发展关系中。如果我们能够消除对 "水战争 "这一误导性概念的误解，那就太好了。
Wendy Barnaby is editor of People & Science, the magazine published by the British Science Association. 温迪-巴纳比是英国科学协会出版的杂志《人与科学》的编辑。
e-mail: w.barnaby@btinternet.com 电子邮件：w.barnaby@btinternet.com
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