China has the highest investment share of GDP in the world. It also has among the fastest growing debt burdens in history. These are not unrelated. With growing amounts of investment directed into projects whose economic benefits are less than their economic costs, the surge in China’s debt burden is a direct consequence of this very high investment share.1
中国在全球 GDP 中拥有最高的投资份额。它也拥有历史上增长最快的债务负担之一。这两者并非无关。随着越来越多的投资流向那些经济效益低于经济成本的项目，中国债务负担的激增是这种极高投资份额的直接后果。
What’s more, even as nonproductive investment has led to a faster rise in debt than in GDP, it has also boosted current and past GDP growth to higher levels than China would have otherwise been able to report.2 In theory, Beijing could solve the debt problem associated with high levels of investment by implementing policies that result in a sharp increase in the productivity of investment. It has been proposing this for years, for example by refocusing investment on the technology sector, but it has been unsuccessful so far and, as I explain in a recent paper, it is unlikely ever to be successful. Because China’s imbalances are so deep, the limited number of ways in which they can be resolved all require a significant reduction in China’s reliance on investment to spur growth.
此外，尽管无效的投资导致债务增长速度快于国内生产总值（GDP），但也提高了当前和过去的 GDP 增长水平，使中国能够报告比原本更高的水平。理论上，北京可以通过实施政策，使投资的生产力大幅提高，从而解决与高水平投资相关的债务问题。多年来，北京一直在提出这一点，例如通过将投资重点转向技术领域，但迄今为止并不成功，正如我在最近的一篇论文中所解释的那样，这种做法不太可能成功。由于中国的不平衡问题非常深刻，要解决它们的有限方法都要求大幅减少中国依赖投资来刺激增长的程度。
Given the disproportionately large investment share of economic activity, however, any reduction in its share of GDP must put significant downward pressure on growth in overall economic activity. In this essay I summarize a series of mathematical simulations to show how much GDP growth rates must decline as China attempts to rebalance its economy.
鉴于投资在经济活动中所占份额过大，然而，其在国内生产总值中份额的任何减少都必然会对整体经济活动的增长施加重大下行压力。在本文中，我总结了一系列数学模拟，展示了中国试图实现经济再平衡时国内生产总值增长率必须下降多少。
Beijing Says It Will Boost Consumption
北京表示将促进消费
GDP growth in most large economies is driven primarily by consumption and investment (with net exports usually too small to matter). For this reason, reducing the share of investment in the economy is largely the obverse of raising the share of consumption.
大多数大型经济体的 GDP 增长主要受消费和投资的推动（净出口通常太小而无关紧要）。因此，在经济中减少投资份额在很大程度上是提高消费份额的反面。
In recent years, an increasing number of policymakers in Beijing have called for such a sustained expansion in the role of consumption (even if they remain vague on how to do so). For example, China’s Central Economic Work Conference in December said policymakers would focus “on boosting domestic demand in 2023 by prioritizing the recovery and expansion of consumption.” In March, during the all-important “Two Sessions” meetings, policymakers called for a greater role for domestic consumption in the Chinese economy and stronger coordination between supply-side structural reform and domestic demand expansion.
近年来，越来越多的北京政策制定者呼吁消费在发挥作用方面保持持续扩大（即使他们对如何做到这一点仍然模糊不清）。例如，中国中央经济工作会议在去年 12 月表示，政策制定者将“着重于通过恢复和扩大消费来促进 2023 年的国内需求”。在 3 月份的重要“两会”期间，政策制定者呼吁加强国内消费在中国经济中的作用，并加强供给侧结构性改革与国内需求扩大之间的协调。
But while nearly everyone agrees on the need for a greater role for consumption, there are significant political constraints to rebalancing that have always made it very difficult for countries that have followed an investment-driven development model similar to that of China’s. That’s because after decades during which investment grew faster than GDP, and GDP grew faster than consumption, the relationship between the three must be reversed. For at least the next decade or two, consumption must grow faster than GDP and GDP must grow faster than investment. That is the definition of rebalancing.
但是，虽然几乎所有人都同意需要加大消费在经济中的作用，但在实现再平衡方面存在重大政治约束，这一直使得那些像中国一样遵循投资驱动发展模式的国家很难实现。这是因为在几十年里，投资增长速度超过了国内生产总值（GDP），而 GDP 增长速度又超过了消费，这三者之间的关系必须逆转。在接下来的至少十年或二十年里，消费必须比 GDP 增长更快，而 GDP 必须比投资增长更快。这就是再平衡的定义。
But while policymakers and their advisers discuss increasing the household income share of GDP, there is so far very little discussion (at least in public) about the key constraints on such policies. By definition, increasing the household income share of GDP involves reducing the corporate and government income shares. This means that after decades of doing the opposite, rebalancing policies must effectively transfer income, either explicitly or implicitly, from governments and businesses to households. As of yet, however, there have been few concrete proposals about who will pay for these transfers and how they are to be effected.
然而，尽管决策者及其顾问们正在讨论增加家庭收入在国内生产总值中所占比重，但迄今为止，在公开场合很少讨论这些政策的关键限制。根据定义，增加家庭收入在国内生产总值中所占比重意味着减少企业和政府收入所占比重。这意味着在数十年来一直相反的情况下，再平衡政策必须有效地将收入从政府和企业转移给家庭，无论是明确还是隐含地。然而，迄今为止，关于谁将为这些转移付款以及如何实施这些转移，几乎没有具体的提议。
The Decline in Growth Will Be Unevenly Distributed
增长下降将不均匀分布
Before discussing the simulations and the implications for growth, it is worth noting the political implications. Although much slower GDP growth is probably inevitable for China, the same is not necessarily true for the growth of Chinese consumption or of Chinese household income. China’s rebalancing would require that investment growth declines by much more than GDP growth, which means both consumption growth and household income growth would decline by much less. What may seem like a brutal adjustment for the overall economy does not need to be a brutal adjustment for ordinary Chinese people.
在讨论模拟和对增长的影响之前，值得注意的是政治影响。尽管中国的 GDP 增长放缓很可能是不可避免的，但对中国消费增长或中国家庭收入增长的情况却未必如此。中国的再平衡需要投资增长下降得比 GDP 增长多得多，这意味着消费增长和家庭收入增长的下降会小得多。对整体经济来说可能看起来是一个残酷的调整，但对普通中国人来说未必需要是一个残酷的调整。
But this also implies a much more rapid decline in the share of income retained by other sectors, mainly local governments. In a nondisruptive adjustment, the brunt of the pain will be borne by sectors of the economy that have benefited disproportionately from Chinese growth in the past three decades—mainly local governments. But as Albert Hirschman noted in his writings nearly five decades ago, these sectors have a disproportionate share of political power and tend to be the main constraints on adjustment. We already saw a preview of this during the presidency of Hu Jintao, with the emergence after 2007 of so-called “vested interests” who opposed policies aimed at economic rebalancing.
但这也意味着其他部门，主要是地方政府，所保留收入份额的下降速度要快得多。在一个非破坏性的调整中，痛苦的主要部分将由在过去三十年中国增长中受益不成比例的经济部门承担，主要是地方政府。但正如阿尔伯特·赫希曼在将近五十年前的著作中指出的那样，这些部门拥有不成比例的政治权力，并且往往是调整的主要制约因素。在胡锦涛总统任期期间，我们已经看到了这一点的预演，2007 年后出现了所谓的“既得利益集团”，他们反对旨在经济再平衡的政策。
The way in which a rebalancing takes place also has implications for the global economy. As China’s GDP growth declines, most of this decline will be driven by an even more rapid decline—or even a contraction—in the growth of investment. The parts of the Chinese and global economies that depend heavily on Chinese investment growth, including metals and industrial commodities, will bear the brunt of a Chinese adjustment. The parts of the Chinese and global economies that depend heavily on Chinese consumption, including agricultural commodities, will be affected much less.
再平衡的方式对全球经济也有影响。随着中国的 GDP 增长下降，大部分下降将由投资增长的更快速下降甚至收缩所驱动。依赖中国投资增长的中国和全球经济部分，包括金属和工业大宗商品，将承受中国调整的主要冲击。而依赖中国消费增长的中国和全球经济部分，包括农产品大宗商品，将受到较小影响。
What Is a “Reasonable” Investment Share of GDP?
“合理”投资占 GDP 的比例是多少？
Some analysts, both inside and outside of China, have argued that because it is an economically and politically difficult process, rebalancing is not truly in the interests of Beijing’s policymakers, and that for institutional, ideological, or cultural reasons (or all three), they will resist rebalancing indefinitely. But to argue over whether or not Beijing intends to rebalance its economy is to misunderstand the Chinese economy. Beijing cannot choose whether or not it will rebalance. It can at best choose the way and pace in which it can do so.
一些分析师，无论是中国境内还是境外的，都认为，由于再平衡是一个在经济和政治上都很困难的过程，因此并不真正符合北京政策制定者的利益，而且出于制度、意识形态或文化原因（或三者兼而有之），他们将无限期地抵制再平衡。但是，争论北京是否打算实现经济再平衡是对中国经济的误解。北京无法选择是否进行再平衡。它最多只能选择如何以及在什么速度下进行再平衡。
To understand why, we start out with the simple observation that China currently invests around 42–44 percent of its GDP, and it has invested similar or larger shares for decades. This is extraordinary in the annals of economic history. According to the World Bank, investment comprises around 25 percent of global GDP. Not all countries invest the same amount, of course. For more mature, capital-intensive economies, investment can comprise roughly 15–20 percent of GDP. The same is true for many poor, stagnant economies, often those with weak protections for investors’ rights.
要理解为什么，我们从一个简单的观察开始，即中国目前投资占其国内生产总值的约 42-44％，并且几十年来一直投资相似或更大比例。这在经济史上是非同寻常的。根据世界银行的数据，投资约占全球国内生产总值的 25％。当然，并非所有国家的投资额相同。对于更成熟、资本密集型的经济体，投资可能占国内生产总值的大约 15-20％。对于许多贫困、停滞的经济体来说也是如此，通常是那些对投资者权利保护薄弱的国家。
On the other hand, for developing economies in the midst of their high-growth stages, such as Mongolia, investment levels tend to be much higher, typically around 30–35 percent of GDP. Unbalanced economies that have traditionally relied on high investment to drive growth, such as South Korea and Taiwan, are also in this range.
另一方面，对于处于高增长阶段的发展中经济体，如蒙古，投资水平往往要高得多，通常约占国内生产总值的 30-35%。传统上依赖高投资推动增长的不平衡经济体，如韩国和台湾，也处于这个范围内。
China is different. Investment rose from 24 percent of GDP in 1990 to 40 percent by 2002 and to 47 percent by 2010. It then declined to 43 percent by 2019 and has been between 43 and 44 percent during the COVID-19 period.3
中国与众不同。1990 年，投资占国内生产总值（GDP）的比例从 24%上升至 2002 年的 40%，到 2010 年达到 47%。随后在 2019 年下降至 43%，在 COVID-19 期间保持在 43%至 44%之间。 3
This is where simulating the rebalancing process can be so powerful in helping us understand the consequences of China’s much-needed rebalancing. With a few reasonable assumptions we can easily construct a robust model of the Chinese economy and run simulations that suggest what a rebalancing Chinese economy must look like.
这就是模拟再平衡过程如此强大的地方，它帮助我们理解中国急需的再平衡的后果。在一些合理的假设下，我们可以轻松构建一个强大的中国经济模型，并运行模拟，以揭示一个再平衡的中国经济应该是什么样子。
The first necessary assumption is to determine what the “appropriate” investment share of GDP would be in China’s case. Should it be 25 percent, the global average, or 20 percent, like that of mature economies, or 30 percent, like that of other rapidly growing, underinvested economies, or some other level?
第一个必要的假设是确定中国在 GDP 中的“适当”投资份额应该是多少。应该是 25%，即全球平均水平，还是 20%，类似于成熟经济体，或者是 30%，类似于其他快速增长、投资不足的经济体，或者其他水平？
Some analysts might argue that middle-income countries like China, with per capital investment levels of one-fifth or one-sixth the U.S. level, will be able to maintain very high investment levels as they “catch up” to more advanced economies. They say this in spite of the lack of evidence that poorer economies do indeed regularly “catch up” to richer ones except in extraordinary circumstances.
一些分析师可能会认为，像中国这样的中等收入国家，人均投资水平只有美国水平的五分之一或六分之一，将能够保持非常高的投资水平，因为它们在“赶上”更先进的经济体时。他们这样说，尽管缺乏证据表明较贫穷的经济体确实经常“赶上”较富裕的经济体，除非在特殊情况下。
Their argument assumes away the institutional differences that determine why some countries (or even regions within a large country) are more economically advanced than others. If developing economies have lower investment levels than advanced economies largely because of institutional constraints that limit their abilities to absorb higher levels productively, China is likely already to be excessively invested in property development and infrastructure relative to its ability to absorb more of either, so that further development is more likely to be the result of institutional reform than of further capital deepening.4
他们的论点假设了决定一些国家（甚至是大国内的某些地区）经济发展程度高于其他国家的制度差异。如果发展中经济体的投资水平较发达经济体低得多，主要是因为制度约束限制了它们有效吸收更高水平的投资的能力，那么相对于其吸收更多的任何一种，中国可能已经过度投资于房地产开发和基础设施，因此进一步发展更可能是制度改革的结果，而不是进一步资本加深的结果。 4
This might suggest that, to be sustainable, China should probably bring investment levels closer to the 20 percent of GDP typical of highly-capital-intensive economies. For the purposes of this exercise, however, I will assume a more favorable path for China in which the appropriate goal is to reduce the investment share of GDP to 30 percent—an investment share typical of rapidly developing, underinvested economies in the midst of their growth booms and one that would still make China among the highest-investing major economies in the world.5
这可能表明，为了可持续发展，中国可能应该将投资水平提高到高资本密集型经济典型的 GDP 的 20% 左右。然而，为了本次练习的目的，我将假设中国走上了更有利的道路，其中适当的目标是将投资占 GDP 的比例降至 30%——这是典型的快速发展、投资不足的经济体在其增长高峰期的投资份额，这仍将使中国成为世界上投资最高的主要经济体之一。 5
I will also assume for the purpose of the simulations that China has ten years to drive down the investment share of GDP to a sustainable 30 percent. This too may be overly optimistic, given how high China’s debt burden already is, but setting these parameters helps define the limits for China’s rebalancing process.
我还将假设在模拟过程中，中国有十年的时间将 GDP 的投资份额降至可持续的 30%。考虑到中国目前的债务负担已经很高，这也许过于乐观，但设定这些参数有助于界定中国再平衡过程的限制。
Of course, the investment share of GDP can only decline from 42 percent to 30 percent as some other share of GDP rises and, in principle, any reduction in the investment share of GDP must be primarily matched by an increase in the consumption share. If investment growth declines sharply, either consumption growth must rise just as sharply or GDP growth must fall. Either way, as the investment share of GDP declines, the consumption share will rise.
当然，GDP 的投资份额只能从 42%下降到 30%，因为 GDP 的其他份额上升，原则上，GDP 的投资份额的任何减少必须主要由消费份额的增加相匹配。如果投资增长急剧下降，那么消费增长必须同样急剧上升，或者 GDP 增长必须下降。无论哪种方式，随着 GDP 的投资份额下降，消费份额将上升。
The Arithmetic of Rebalancing
再平衡的算术
Once we have these assumptions in place, the arithmetic of rebalancing is pretty straightforward. As investment declines to 30 percent of GDP in ten years, China’s GDP growth rate depends mainly on the pace of consumption growth.
一旦我们确立了这些假设，再平衡的算术就变得非常简单明了。在十年内，投资下降到国内生产总值（GDP）的 30%，中国的 GDP 增长率主要取决于消费增长的速度。
We can model a simple but robust description of the Chinese economy by setting investment at 42 percent of GDP (a little better than the current 43–44 percent); net exports at 4 percent of GDP; and consumption at 54 percent of GDP. In this case, growth in China’s GDP over the ten-year period is just the weighted average growth of investment and consumption (assuming net exports are flat) and so will depend primarily on the assumptions we make for investment growth and consumption growth.
我们可以通过将投资设定为 GDP 的 42%（略高于当前的 43-44%）、净出口设定为 GDP 的 4%、消费设定为 GDP 的 54%，来建立一个简单但健壮的中国经济描述模型。在这种情况下，中国 GDP 在十年期间的增长仅仅是投资和消费的加权平均增长（假设净出口保持不变），因此主要取决于我们对投资增长和消费增长所做的假设。
I summarize below the five broad scenarios under which China can rebalance. (The actual numbers are included in Appendix 2.)
我总结了中国可以重新平衡的五种广泛情景。（实际数字包含在附录 2 中。）
A. Rebalance With a Surge in Consumption
A. 消费激增，重新平衡
One scenario would involve a surge in the rate of consumption growth as it replaces investment growth as the driver of GDP. Given that this has never happened in any country before, this is likely to be a very optimistic scenario.
一个可能的情景是消费增长率激增，取代投资增长成为 GDP 的驱动力。鉴于这在任何国家以前都没有发生过，这很可能是一个非常乐观的情景。
Consumption in China has recently been growing by 4–5 percent a year, excluding the COVID-19 years, which were terrible for consumption but are unlikely to be repeated. For consumption to surge even as investment and GDP growth drop sharply, an external factor would need to directly or indirectly drive up growth in household income. This might happen if China were, for example, to transfer roughly 1–2 percentage points of GDP every year from local governments and wealthy individuals to ordinary households.
中国的消费近年来每年增长 4-5％，不包括 COVID-19 年，这对消费是可怕的，但不太可能重复。要使消费激增，即使投资和 GDP 增长急剧下降，一个外部因素需要直接或间接地推动家庭收入增长。如果中国每年从地方政府和富裕个人转移大约 1-2 个百分点的 GDP 到普通家庭，这种情况可能发生。
If that happened, it would be possible in theory to grow both household income and consumption by 6–7 percent a year even as investment growth drops sharply. In that case, how quickly would investment and GDP grow as China rebalances its economy within ten years?
如果发生这种情况，理论上每年家庭收入和消费都有可能增长 6-7％，即使投资增长急剧下降。在这种情况下，中国在十年内重新平衡经济时，投资和国内生产总值（GDP）会以多快的速度增长？
It turns out from the simulation that if investment over the ten-year period grows by 0–1 percent a year, China will have rebalanced in ten years. To give my model more flexibility, I have assumed that private sector investment grows as fast as GDP, in which case any contraction in investment must be fully absorbed by the property and real estate sectors.
从模拟结果来看，如果十年内的投资每年增长 0-1%，中国将在十年内实现再平衡。为了使我的模型更具灵活性，我假设私营部门投资增长速度与国内生产总值一样快，这种情况下，任何投资收缩必须完全由房地产和房地产行业吸收。
This would require that investment in the property and real estate sectors declines annually by 2 percent a year. We can play around with the assumptions, but the main point is that if consumption grows annually by 6–7 percent a year and investment grows annually by 0–1 percent a year, China will have rebalanced its economy within ten years. During that time, China’s average annual GDP growth rate would be 4 percent.
这将要求房地产领域的投资每年下降 2%。我们可以调整假设，但主要观点是，如果消费每年增长 6-7%，投资每年增长 0-1%，中国将在十年内实现经济再平衡。在此期间，中国的年均 GDP 增长率将为 4%。
B. Rebalance While Maintaining Current Consumption Growth Rates
B. 在保持当前消费增长率的同时重新平衡
The problem with the previous scenario is that such large income transfers from local governments to ordinary households are politically difficult to manage without major changes in the country’s economic, financial, and political institutions. This is probably why no high-investment country has ever managed such a transition.
前一种情况的问题在于，如此大规模的收入转移从地方政府到普通家庭，要在不进行国家经济、金融和政治制度的重大变革的情况下进行管理是政治上困难的。这可能是为什么没有一个高投资国家曾经成功实现这样的转变。
This is also why a second, more realistic rebalancing scenario requires a much sharper slowdown in GDP growth. In this moderately optimistic case, Beijing would implement policies that maintain household income growth and consumption growth at close to pre-adjustment levels—we will assume this means roughly 3–4 percent annually—even as GDP growth drops during the adjustment period. The historical precedents suggest in fact that the required drop in investment and GDP growth would most likely put greater downward pressure on the growth in household income and consumption, but our assumption does provide an upper limit for a moderate adjustment.
这也是为什么第二种更为现实的再平衡方案需要更为明显的 GDP 增长放缓。在这种适度乐观的情况下，北京将实施政策，使家庭收入增长和消费增长维持在接近调整前水平，我们假设这意味着每年大约 3-4%的增长，即使在调整期间 GDP 增长下降。历史先例表明，实际上所需的投资和 GDP 增长下降很可能会对家庭收入和消费增长施加更大的下行压力，但我们的假设为适度调整提供了一个上限。
Assuming Chinese consumption could grow 3–4 percent a year annually for ten years, how quickly must GDP and investment grow for China to rebalance over that period? It turns out that if investment growth over the ten-year period is a negative 1–2 percent a year, China will have rebalanced. Assuming that private sector investment continues to grow at least as fast as GDP, investment in the property and real estate sectors combined must contract by 3–4 percent annually.
假设中国消费每年增长 3-4%，十年内 GDP 和投资增长速度需要多快才能实现中国的再平衡？结果表明，如果十年内投资增长率为每年负 1-2%，中国将实现再平衡。假设私营部门投资继续以至少与 GDP 同步的速度增长，房地产和房地产领域的投资总额必须每年减少 3-4%。
Once again, the point is that if consumption grows annually by 3–4 percent a year and overall investment contracts annually by 1–2 percent a year, China would have rebalanced its economy within ten years. During that time, however, China’s average annual GDP growth rate would have dropped to roughly 1.5 percent.
再次强调的是，如果消费每年增长 3-4%，而整体投资每年收缩 1-2%，中国将在十年内实现经济再平衡。然而，在此期间，中国的年均 GDP 增长率将下降至约 1.5%。
C. Rebalance With a Sharp Decline in Consumption Growth
C. 消费增长急剧下降时重新平衡
The scenarios so far have involved fairly benign assumptions about the evolution of consumption in China: that consumption growth remains broadly at current levels, or higher, while China is adjusting. It is worth noting that most historical precedents suggest that during the very difficult adjustment period, the growth rate in household income, and thus consumption, often declines substantially.
到目前为止，有关中国消费发展的假设相对温和：消费增长保持在当前水平或更高，同时中国正在调整。值得注意的是，大多数历史先例表明，在非常困难的调整期间，家庭收入增长率以及消费往往会大幅下降。
In this third scenario, consumption growth would decline to 1–2 percent. In this case, rebalancing would require an annual decline in investment of nearly 3 percent and GDP growth would be flat. Under these conditions, however, China’s net exports would likely surge, the effect of which would be slightly improved overall growth.
在这第三种情况下，消费增长将下降至 1-2%。在这种情况下，重新平衡将需要投资每年几乎下降 3%，GDP 增长将保持平稳。然而，在这些条件下，中国的净出口可能会激增，其影响将略微改善整体增长。
D. Rebalance With a Sharp Contraction in GDP
D. 国内生产总值急剧收缩时重新平衡
The fourth scenario involves a very sharp, short-term contraction in GDP in which investment would contract far more sharply than household income and consumption. This, for example, is how the United States rebalanced its economy in the early 1930s and Brazil in the 1980s. But while this form of adjustment can be more economically efficient over the longer term, it is usually a chaotic and politically disruptive process in the short term.
第四种情景涉及 GDP 的急剧、短期收缩，其中投资将比家庭收入和消费收缩得更厉害。例如，这就是美国在上世纪 30 年代早期和巴西在上世纪 80 年代重新平衡其经济的方式。然而，虽然这种调整形式在长期内可能更经济高效，但在短期内通常是一种混乱和政治上具有破坏性的过程。
For that reason, I assume Beijing would do all it can to avoid this path. It is very difficult to model this scenario without making all sorts of assumptions about the pace and nature of the initial contraction, but, in any case, it means by definition at least a few years of negative GDP growth. Given China’s closed capital account and powerful regulators, the financial crisis that would lead to such a scenario is very unlikely, and so I don’t bother to model this scenario.
因此，我认为北京会尽其所能避免这条路。在不做各种关于最初收缩速度和性质的假设的情况下，很难对这种情况进行建模，但无论如何，这意味着至少几年的负 GDP 增长。鉴于中国的封闭资本账户和强大的监管机构，导致这种情况的金融危机是非常不太可能的，因此我不费心对这种情况进行建模。
E. Rebalance Over a Much Longer Time Period
E. 在更长的时间周期内重新平衡
It is always possible that China could take much more than ten years to rebalance its economy, as was the case with Japan. The constraint with maintaining excessively high investment rates is that during this period, debt must continue to rise unsustainably. The higher it rises, the greater the risk of a disruptive rebalancing with a sharp, short-term contraction in GDP and the greater the costs associated with the debt.6 For the purposes of this paper, I have run the same simulations over fifteen- and twenty-year periods, assuming that consumption grows by 3–4 percent over these periods and that soaring debt creates no other costs to the economy. In the two time periods, GDP growth over drops to 2 and 2.5 percent, respectively.
中国可能需要超过十年的时间来重新平衡经济，就像日本一样。保持过高的投资率的限制在于在此期间，债务必须继续不可持续地增长。债务增长得越高，经济再平衡的风险就越大，GDP 可能会出现急剧的短期收缩，与债务相关的成本也会越高。为了本文的目的，我对十五年和二十年的时间段进行了相同的模拟，假设在这些时期内消费增长 3-4%，并且飙升的债务对经济没有其他成本。在这两个时间段内，GDP 增长率分别降至 2%和 2.5%。
China’s Limited Options 中国的有限选择
Table 1 summarizes the five scenarios. The summaries are not predictions, but they do indicate the kinds of constraints a rebalancing China must face if we assume—reasonably enough—that China cannot retain the highest investment share of GDP forever and must eventually adjust towards a more “normal” share.
表 1 总结了五种情景。这些摘要并非预测，但它们确实表明了重新平衡中国必须面对的各种限制，如果我们合理地假设中国不能永远保持最高的 GDP 投资份额，并最终必须调整到更“正常”的份额。
| Table 1 表 1 | |||
| Consumption growth 消费增长 | Investment growth 投资增长 | GDP growth GDP 增长 | |
| Optimistic scenario (A) 乐观情景（A） | 6–7% 6–7% 6–7% | 0–1% 0–1% 0–1% | 4% |
| Moderate scenario (B) 中等情景（B） | 3–4% | -1–2% | 1.5% |
| Difficult scenario (C) 困难情景（C） | 1–2% | -2–3% | 0% |
| Crisis scenario (D) 危机情景（D） | NA | NA | NA |
| 15- and 20-year scenario (E) 15 年和 20 年情景（E） |
3–4% | 0–1% 0–1% 0–1% | 2.5% |
It’s worth summarizing a few key points:
值得总结几个关键点：
- China’s only alternative to rebalancing is for it to maintain its extraordinarily high investment share of GDP. Given that this high share is precisely what has driven the very rapid surge in China’s debt burden, continuing this trend will mean an unsustainable increase in the country’s debt burden. My simulations all assume, by the way, that there is no limit to how much debt can grow and that there are no financial distress costs associated with rising debt burden, even though these assumptions are clearly very optimistic.
中国唯一的再平衡选择是保持其占国内生产总值的极高投资份额。鉴于这一高份额正是推动中国债务负担迅速激增的原因，继续这一趋势将意味着中国债务负担不可持续地增加。顺便说一下，我的模拟都假设债务增长没有限制，且与不断增加的债务负担相关的金融困扰成本不存在，尽管这些假设显然非常乐观。 - There are arithmetically only a limited number of ways China can rebalance its economy. They all require by definition that after three decades in which consumption growth sharply lagged GDP growth, it must now drive GDP growth. A declining investment share of GDP means that GDP growth must outpace investment growth, which in turn means that consumption growth must outpace GDP growth.
中国在重新平衡经济方面只有有限的算术方法。根据定义，这些方法都要求在消费增长远远落后于 GDP 增长的三十年后，现在必须推动 GDP 增长。GDP 投资份额的下降意味着 GDP 增长必须超过投资增长，这反过来意味着消费增长必须超过 GDP 增长。 - Unless Beijing can somehow manage to set off a surge in consumption growth, which is possible but highly unlikely, it will be very difficult for a rebalancing China to grow at rates much higher than 2 percent. This is because investment in China plays such a disproportionately large role in generating economic activity that any attempt to rein it in will cause significant reductions in the growth of economic activity. We have already seen how this works with Beijing’s belated attempt in 2021 to rein in the property sector.
除非北京能够以某种方式引发消费增长激增，这是可能的但极不可能的，否则要让中国实现再平衡并以高于 2%的速度增长将非常困难。这是因为中国的投资在促进经济活动方面发挥着如此不成比例的重要作用，任何试图控制投资的举措都将导致经济活动增长显著减缓。我们已经看到了这一点，就在 2021 年北京迟来的试图控制房地产行业时。 - China can slow down the adjustment pace to one that is more politically acceptable, but this involves two costs. The first is that a longer period in which debt continues to rise faster than the country’s debt-servicing capacity increases the risk of a disruptive financial adjustment. The second is that, like with Japan, slower growth stretches out over a much longer time period. It is worth noting that in the early 1990s, Japan’s share of global GDP was close to 18 percent. Within twenty years, it was less than 8 percent. This is a nearly unprecedented peacetime decline.
中国可以放慢调整步伐，使其更具政治可接受性，但这涉及两个成本。第一个是债务持续增长速度快于国家偿债能力增长的时间越长，金融调整风险增加的可能性也越大。第二个是，与日本一样，增长放缓会延伸到更长的时间段。值得注意的是，在 1990 年代初，日本在全球 GDP 中的份额接近 18％。二十年后，这一比例降至不到 8％。这是一个几乎前所未有的和平时期下降。 - The slowdown in growth associated with China’s rebalancing will be very unevenly distributed across the various sectors of the economy. If done correctly, ordinary households will not be affected much because the growth in household income can be maintained at levels close to pre-adjustment growth levels. The brunt of the pain will be borne by sectors of the economy that have benefited disproportionately from Chinese growth in the past three decades—mainly local governments.
与中国再平衡相关的增长放缓将在经济各个领域之间分布非常不均匀。如果做得正确，普通家庭不会受到太大影响，因为家庭收入的增长可以维持在接近调整前增长水平。痛苦的主要部分将由在过去三十年中不成比例地受益于中国增长的经济部门承担，主要是地方政府。 - China will probably see a surge in consumption in 2023, but this will be driven more by a partial reversal of the terrible contraction in 2022 than by any serious structural adjustment towards a more balanced economy. Until there has been a substantial implicit or explicit redistribution of income from various other sectors of the Chinese economy to the household sector, there can be no sustainable rebalancing of the Chinese economy.
中国可能会在 2023 年看到消费激增，但这更多是由于 2022 年可怕的萎缩部分逆转，而不是由于朝着更加平衡的经济结构调整。在从中国经济的各个其他部门向家庭部门进行实质性的隐性或明示收入再分配之前，中国经济就不可能实现可持续再平衡。 - There is no way to measure how long China can continue along its current unbalanced path, but historical precedents suggest that once the country decides, or is forced, to get its surge in debt under control, the rebalancing process will have begun. Historical precedents also suggest that the longer China waits—and so the greater the consequent buildup in debt—the more difficult the adjustment is likely to be as the financial distress costs associated with the debt must rise.
目前没有办法衡量中国能够继续沿着当前不平衡的道路走多久，但历史先例表明，一旦该国决定或被迫控制其债务激增，再平衡过程就已经开始了。历史先例还表明，中国等待的时间越长——因此债务积累越大——随着与债务相关的金融困境成本上升，调整可能会变得更加困难。
A rebalancing of the Chinese economy inevitably involves a difficult transition to a very different set of business, financial, and political institutions. But China’s choice is not whether to rebalance from investment to consumption, but rather how to manage the rebalancing from investment to consumption so as to minimize disruption. This means that China’s overall GDP growth rate will depend crucially on the pace of future consumption growth. While it is possible in principle to engineer an acceleration in consumption growth, China’s experience over the past fifteen years (not to mention Japan’s over the past thirty years) shows just how difficult this is.
中国经济的再平衡不可避免地涉及到一个艰难的转型，需要建立一个非常不同的商业、金融和政治体系。但中国的选择并不是要从投资向消费进行再平衡，而是如何管理这种从投资向消费的再平衡，以尽量减少干扰。这意味着中国的整体 GDP 增长率将关键取决于未来消费增长的速度。虽然原则上可以加速消费增长，但中国过去十五年的经验（更不用说日本过去三十年的经验）表明这是多么困难。
But it is impossible to keep such a high investment share indefinitely. China must rebalance to get debt under control. Without much, much faster consumption growth, driven by substantial and politically contentious income transfers, the arithmetic is unassailable: the only way to rebalance involves much slower GDP growth.
但是，无法永远保持如此高的投资份额。中国必须重新平衡以控制债务。没有更快速的消费增长，这需要大量且在政治上具有争议的收入转移来推动，算术是无法反驳的：重新平衡的唯一方式涉及更慢的 GDP 增长。
Appendix 1: China’s Investment-Driven Growth Model
附录 1：中国的投资驱动增长模式
When China began its reform and opening up in the 1980s, its economy—after five decades of anti-Japanese war, civil war, and Maoism—was severely underinvested for its level of social development. What its economy needed above all was significant investment in transportation and other infrastructure, urban property development, and manufacturing facilities, which is why it benefited enormously from the very high investment that propelled growth forward and accommodated the rising needs of Chinese businesses and workers.
当中国在 1980 年代开始改革开放时，其经济——经历了五十年的抗日战争、内战和毛主义统治——在社会发展水平上严重投资不足。中国经济最需要的是在交通和其他基础设施、城市房地产开发以及制造设施方面进行重大投资，这就是为什么中国经济极大受益于推动增长并满足中国企业和工人不断增长需求的高投资。
But high domestic investment requires either high domestic savings or high imports of savings from abroad (such as through large current account deficits). China, like other countries that followed a similar “Asian” model, chose to fund its rapidly-growing investment—the most rapid in history—by forcing up domestic savings.
但高额的国内投资要求要么是高额的国内储蓄，要么是高额的外部储蓄输入（比如通过巨额的经常账户赤字）。中国，像其他遵循类似“亚洲”模式的国家一样，选择通过促使国内储蓄增加来资助其迅速增长的投资——这是历史上最快速的增长。
By definition, savings is the part of national income (GDP) that isn’t consumed, and so forcing up the share of GDP that is saved is just the obverse of forcing down the share of GDP that is consumed. Because most consumption is household consumption, and the constraint on household consumption is the direct and indirect income households receive, the most effective way to force down the share of GDP that is consumed is to constrain growth in household income relative to GDP. As households receive a declining share of what they produce (GDP), consumption will also become a declining share of GDP.7
根据定义，储蓄是国民收入（GDP）中未被消费的部分，因此，增加 GDP 中储蓄的份额只是减少 GDP 中消费的份额的反面。由于大部分消费是家庭消费，而对家庭消费的限制是家庭直接和间接收入，减少 GDP 中消费的份额最有效的方法是限制家庭收入的增长相对于 GDP。随着家庭获得的份额减少（GDP），消费也将成为 GDP 的减少份额。 7
As a result of consumption-constraining policies implemented in the past three to four decades, Chinese banks, where most of the savings accumulated, were able to pour funding at very low interest rates into a wide variety of projects. This at first benefited the Chinese economy as productive investment grew at the fastest pace in history.
由于过去三到四十年实施的消费限制政策，大部分储蓄积累在中国银行，这些银行得以以极低利率向各种项目注入资金。最初，这使中国经济受益，因为生产性投资增长速度创历史新高。
But, by definition, a good development model is one that addresses and resolves the imbalances that had repressed development. A successful development model, in other words, is one that also makes itself obsolete. Precisely because China’s growth model was extremely successful, it rapidly closed the gap between China’s actual level of investment and the level of investment its businesses and workers could productively absorb given its particular set of institutions and constraints.
但是，根据定义，一个良好的发展模式是解决抑制发展的不平衡的模式。换句话说，一个成功的发展模式也是一个使自身过时的模式。正是因为中国的增长模式非常成功，它迅速缩小了中国实际投资水平与其企业和工人在特定制度和约束条件下能够有效吸收的投资水平之间的差距。
The same thing happened to every other country that followed this growth model. But when that happens, by definition the productivity benefits of additional investment must decline. As they decline, a growing share of additional investment begins to generate less economic value than the value of labor and resources employed.
每个遵循这种增长模式的国家都发生了同样的事情。但是当这种情况发生时，根据定义，额外投资的生产力收益必须下降。随着这种下降，越来越多的额外投资开始产生的经济价值低于所使用的劳动力和资源的价值。
We can see this in China’s debt numbers. When productive investment is funded by debt, the contribution to GDP exceeds the associated increase in debt, and so there is no increase in the country’s debt burden (typically measured as its debt-to-GDP ratio). But once these investments are no longer productive enough to justify the spending, the associated debt will automatically rise faster than the investments’ contribution to GDP.
我们可以从中国的债务数据中看到这一点。当生产性投资由债务资助时，对 GDP 的贡献超过了债务增加，因此国家的债务负担没有增加（通常以债务/GDP 比率来衡量）。但一旦这些投资不再足够生产，无法证明支出的合理性，相关债务将自动增长速度超过投资对 GDP 的贡献。
This eventually happened to every country that has followed this growth model: a period of rapid, sustainable, investment-driven growth with stable debt levels was followed by a period of still rapid but unsustainable growth, driven by a surging debt burden. This started to happen to China about fifteen years ago, as the continuation of China’s high investment levels led necessarily to a rising debt burden.
这种增长模式最终发生在每个国家身上：快速、可持续、由投资驱动的增长期后面是快速但不可持续的增长期，由不断增长的债务负担推动。这种情况大约在十五年前开始发生在中国，因为中国高投资水平的持续导致债务负担不断上升。
That is why, one way or another, even if it is possible to switch some of its nonproductive investment into more productive sectors, the investment share of China’s GDP must decline sharply in the next few years. There is simply no way China can continue to maintain what is the highest investment share of GDP in history. The conditions that made this high level of investment sustainable have long ago disappeared, and historical precedents suggest that the sooner the investment share of GDP is reduced to a sustainable level, the better for the long-term health, growth, and stability of the economy.
这就是为什么，无论如何，即使将一些非生产性投资转移到更具生产力的领域是可能的，中国 GDP 的投资份额在未来几年必须急剧下降。中国不可能继续保持历史上最高的 GDP 投资份额。使这种高水平投资可持续的条件早已消失，历史先例表明，越早将 GDP 的投资份额降至可持续水平，对经济的长期健康、增长和稳定越有利。
Appendix 2: Simulations Associated With Each of the First Three Scenarios
附录 2：与前三种情景相关的模拟
The top row for each scenario shows the assumptions associated with that scenario. We show what a straight-line application of these assumptions would look like in years one through ten. The average ten-year GDP growth rate (in the right-most column) is calculated from the numbers generated in the GDP column.
每种情景的顶部行显示与该情景相关的假设。我们展示了这些假设的直线应用在第一年至第十年的情况。十年平均 GDP 增长率（在最右列）是根据 GDP 列生成的数字计算得出的。
| Scenario 1 情景 1 | |||||||||
| Average 10-year growth rate 平均 10 年增长率 |
6.5% | Flat | -2.0% | -2.0% | 4.0% | 0.5% | 4.1% | ||
| Year | Consumption | Trade surplus 贸易顺差 | Infrastructure investment 基础设施投资 |
Real estate investment 房地产投资 | Other investment 其他投资 | Total investment 总投资 | Investment share of GDP 投资占国内生产总值的比例 | GDP | GDP growth GDP 增长 |
| 0 | 54.0 | 4.0 | 14.0 | 13.0 | 15.0 | 42.0 | 42% | 100.0 | NA |
| 1 | 57.5 | 4.0 | 13.7 | 12.7 | 15.6 | 42.1 | 41% | 103.6 | 3.6% |
| 2 | 61.2 | 4.0 | 13.4 | 12.5 | 16.2 | 42.2 | 39% | 107.4 | 3.7% |
| 3 | 65.2 | 4.0 | 13.2 | 12.2 | 16.9 | 42.3 | 38% | 111.5 | 3.8% |
| 4 | 69.5 | 4.0 | 12.9 | 12.0 | 17.5 | 42.5 | 37% | 115.9 | 4.0% |
| 5 | 74.0 | 4.0 | 12.7 | 11.8 | 18.2 | 42.7 | 35% | 120.6 | 4.1% |
| 6 | 78.8 | 4.0 | 12.4 | 11.5 | 19.0 | 42.9 | 34% | 125.7 | 4.2% |
| 7 | 83.9 | 4.0 | 12.2 | 11.3 | 19.7 | 43.2 | 33% | 131.1 | 4.3% |
| 8 | 89.4 | 4.0 | 11.9 | 11.1 | 20.5 | 43.5 | 32% | 136.9 | 4.4% |
| 9 | 95.2 | 4.0 | 11.7 | 10.8 | 21.3 | 43.9 | 31% | 143.0 | 4.5% |
| 10 | 101.4 | 4.0 | 11.4 | 10.6 | 22.2 | 44.3 | 30% | 149.6 | 4.6% |
| Scenario 2 情景 2 | |||||||||
| Average 10-year growth rate 平均 10 年增长率 |
3.5% | Flat | -3.5% | -3.5% | 1.5% | -1.4% | 1.5% | ||
| Year | Consumption | Trade surplus 贸易顺差 | Infrastructure investment 基础设施投资 |
Real estate investment 房地产投资 | Other investment 其他投资 | Total investment 总投资 | Investment share of GDP 投资占国内生产总值的比例 | GDP | GDP growth GDP 增长 |
| 0 | 54.0 | 4.0 | 14.0 | 13.0 | 15.0 | 42.0 | 42% | 100.0 | NA |
| 1 | 57.5 | 4.0 | 13.7 | 12.7 | 15.6 | 42.1 | 41% | 103.6 | 3.6% |
| 2 | 61.2 | 4.0 | 13.4 | 12.5 | 16.2 | 42.2 | 39% | 107.4 | 3.7% |
| 3 | 65.2 | 4.0 | 13.2 | 12.2 | 16.9 | 42.3 | 38% | 111.5 | 3.8% |
| 4 | 69.5 | 4.0 | 12.9 | 12.0 | 17.5 | 42.5 | 37% | 115.9 | 4.0% |
| 5 | 74.0 | 4.0 | 12.7 | 11.8 | 18.2 | 42.7 | 35% | 120.6 | 4.1% |
| 6 | 78.8 | 4.0 | 12.4 | 11.5 | 19.0 | 42.9 | 34% | 125.7 | 4.2% |
| 7 | 83.9 | 4.0 | 12.2 | 11.3 | 19.7 | 43.2 | 33% | 131.1 | 4.3% |
| 8 | 89.4 | 4.0 | 11.9 | 11.1 | 20.5 | 43.5 | 32% | 136.9 | 4.4% |
| 9 | 95.2 | 4.0 | 11.7 | 10.8 | 21.3 | 43.9 | 31% | 143.0 | 4.5% |
| 10 | 101.4 | 4.0 | 11.4 | 10.6 | 22.2 | 44.3 | 30% | 149.6 | 4.6% |
| Scenario 3 情景 3 | |||||||||
| Average 10-year growth rate 平均 10 年增长率 |
1.5% | Flat | -4.5% | -4.5% | 0.0% | -2.7% | 0.1% | ||
| Year | Consumption | Trade surplus 贸易顺差 | Infrastructure investment 基础设施投资 |
Real estate investment 房地产投资 | Other investment 其他投资 | Total investment 总投资 | Investment share of GDP 投资占国内生产总值的比例 | GDP | GDP growth GDP 增长 |
| 0 | 54.0 | 4.0 | 14.0 | 13.0 | 15.0 | 42.0 | 42% | 100.0 | NA |
| 1 | 54.8 | 4.0 | 13.4 | 12.4 | 15.0 | 40.8 | 41% | 99.6 | -0.4% |
| 2 | 55.6 | 4.0 | 12.8 | 11.9 | 15.0 | 39.6 | 40% | 99.3 | -0.3% |
| 3 | 56.5 | 4.0 | 12.2 | 11.3 | 15.0 | 38.5 | 39% | 99.0 | -0.3% |
| 4 | 57.3 | 4.0 | 11.6 | 10.8 | 15.0 | 37.5 | 38% | 98.8 | -0.2% |
| 5 | 58.2 | 4.0 | 11.1 | 10.3 | 15.0 | 36.4 | 37% | 98.6 | -0.2% |
| 6 | 59.0 | 4.0 | 10.6 | 9.9 | 15.0 | 35.5 | 36% | 98.5 | -0.1% |
| 7 | 59.9 | 4.0 | 10.1 | 9.4 | 15.0 | 34.6 | 35% | 98.5 | 0.0% |
| 8 | 60.8 | 4.0 | 9.7 | 9.0 | 15.0 | 33.7 | 34% | 98.5 | 0.0% |
| 9 | 61.7 | 4.0 | 9.3 | 8.6 | 15.0 | 32.8 | 33% | 98.6 | 0.1% |
| 10 | 62.7 | 4.0 | 8.8 | 8.2 | 15.0 | 32.0 | 32% | 98.7 | 0.1% |
Notes 备注
1 Chinese debt levels are often compared to those of the United States and the European Union (EU), but there are at least two reasons why these comparisons make little sense. First, and most obviously, even the most cursory glance at comparable debt levels globally makes clear that more advanced economies are able to sustain higher debt levels than less advanced economies. Second, and more importantly, most government debt (the largest category) in the United States and the EU is created to fund transfers among different sectors of the economy. A much smaller share of U.S. or EU debt, in other words, is associated with the systematic overvaluation of domestic assets than Chinese debt, and so does not require the writing down of fictitious wealth. In a February 8, 2022, paper, I discussed how excessively high debt levels can affect an economy. In an August 23, 2021, paper, I reintroduced and expanded John Kenneth Galbraith’s concept of the “bezzle,” or fictitious wealth, and explained how it matters to the Chinese economy.
1 中国的债务水平经常与美国和欧盟进行比较，但至少有两个原因说明这些比较毫无意义。首先，显而易见的是，即使是对全球可比债务水平的粗略审视也清楚地表明，更发达的经济体能够承受比不那么发达的经济体更高的债务水平。其次，更重要的是，美国和欧盟的大部分政府债务（最大类别）是为了资助经济不同部门之间的转移而产生的。换句话说，与中国的债务相比，美国或欧盟的债务中与国内资产的系统性高估相关的份额要小得多，因此不需要书写虚假财富。在 2022 年 2 月 8 日的一篇论文中，我讨论了过高的债务水平如何影响经济。在 2021 年 8 月 23 日的一篇论文中，我重新介绍并扩展了约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷思的“bezzle”概念，即虚假财富，并解释了它对中国经济的重要性。
2 Entities that operate under soft-budget constraints—the term used by Hungarian economist János Kornai to describe entities (usually government-related) that can ignore budget constraints—are able to incur losses as they engage in economic activity whose benefits are political and social rather than economic. Because they are able for very long periods of time to carry nonproductive investment on their books at cost, they are effectively capitalizing a portion of investment that, because it did not create value for the economy, should have been expensed. This, in turn, creates both fictitious wealth and overstates GDP that must eventually be reversed.
2 在软预算约束下运作的实体——这个术语是匈牙利经济学家扬诺什·科尔奈用来描述可以忽视预算约束的实体（通常是与政府相关的）——能够承担损失，因为它们从事的经济活动的好处是政治和社会的，而不是经济的。由于它们能够长时间以来按成本记录非生产性投资，它们实际上是在资本化一部分投资，因为这部分投资并没有为经济创造价值，本应该计入费用。这反过来创造了虚假财富，并夸大了最终必须逆转的 GDP。
3 Whether this astonishingly high level of investment is good bad for overall growth depends on underlying circumstances. In Appendix 1, I describe China’s investment-driven growth model, investment and consumption levels during the past twenty years, and the conditions that made the investment-driven growth model so successful in its early decades but obsolete in the past ten to fifteen years.
这种惊人的高投资水平对整体增长是好是坏，取决于基本情况。在附录 1 中，我描述了中国的投资驱动增长模式，过去二十年的投资和消费水平，以及使得这种投资驱动增长模式在早期几十年间如此成功，但在过去十到十五年变得过时的条件。
4 China’s surging debt in the past fifteen years is very strong evidence that China is overinvested, as I explain in Appendix 1. A number of analysts have argued that as long as China’s investment per capita is much lower than that of countries at the capital frontier, such as the United States, it must by definition have room to increase investment, but this assumption is based on confusion over what is an appropriate investment level for each economy. The amount of investment an economy can productively absorb per capita depends on a number of factors, most importantly its set of institutions and constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions (see Douglass North) and that determine the overall productivity of workers and businesses. In a 2020 paper, I referred to the maximum level of investment that an economy can productively absorb as its “Hirschman level.”
4 过去十五年中国债务激增是中国过度投资的强有力证据，详见附录 1。许多分析师认为，只要中国人均投资远低于美国等资本前沿国家，就必然有增加投资空间，但这一假设基于对每个经济体适当投资水平的混淆。一个经济体每人能够有效吸收的投资量取决于许多因素，最重要的是其制度和约束条件，这些条件构建了政治、经济和社会互动的框架（参见道格拉斯·诺斯），并决定了工人和企业的整体生产力。在 2020 年的一篇论文中，我提到了一个经济体能够有效吸收的最大投资水平，称之为“赫希曼水平”。
5 The GDP share of investment in Japan, whose experiences in the 1980s and subsequent adjustment are increasingly seen as a potential model for China, was around 37 percent in the 1970s and 33 percent in the 1980s. It declined to 31 percent in the 1990s and to 25 percent over the next two decades, with an average GDP growth rate declining from around 4 percent in the two decades before 1990 to less than 0.5 percent in the three decades since.
5 日本投资在国内生产总值中的份额，其在 20 世纪 80 年代的经验和随后的调整越来越被视为中国的潜在模式，20 世纪 70 年代约为 37％，80 年代为 33％。它在 1990 年代下降到 31％，在接下来的两个十年中下降到 25％，平均国内生产总值增长率从 1990 年前的两个十年约为 4％下降到自那时以来的三个十年不到 0.5％。
6 See note 1. 请参见注释 1。
7 There are many ways to constrain the growth of household income relative to GDP, but they all involve implicit or explicit transfers from the household sector to businesses or government. Undervalued exchange rates, for example, effectively transfer income from households (who are net importers) to manufacturers (who are net exporters). Repressed interest rates and administered credits transfer income from households (who are net lenders into the financial system) to businesses and governments (who are net borrowers). Laws that discriminate against organizing labor, or against labor mobility, put downward pressure on wage growth relative to productivity growth. Consumer goods shortages (as in the Soviet Union) reduce the real value of household income. Excessive spending on transportation and logistical infrastructure that benefit businesses even when their cost to the overall economy exceeds their economic value is a major hidden transfer from households to businesses. Consumption and income taxes can repress the relative growth of household income. Even environmental degradation is a kind of transfer, in which businesses boost profits at the expense of higher healthcare costs for workers. There are many other such transfers.
7 有许多种方式可以限制家庭收入与国内生产总值的增长，但它们都涉及从家庭部门向企业或政府的隐性或明示转移。例如，低估的汇率有效地将收入从家庭（净进口者）转移给制造商（净出口者）。抑制的利率和管理的信贷将收入从家庭（向金融系统净贷款者）转移给企业和政府（净借款者）。歧视组织劳工或劳动力流动的法律对工资增长相对于生产率增长施加下行压力。消费品短缺（如苏联）降低了家庭收入的实际价值。过度投资于交通和后勤基础设施，即使它们对整体经济的成本超过了它们的经济价值，也是从家庭向企业的主要隐性转移。消费和所得税可能抑制家庭收入的相对增长。 即使环境恶化也是一种转移，企业通过提高利润来牺牲工人更高的医疗费用。还有许多其他类似的转移。
