Purchasing System Frauds at Multinational Operations in China and the Role of the Fraud Investigator
跨国企业在华采购系统欺诈及欺诈调查员的角色

Peter Humphrey  韩飞龙

For LexisNexis Procurement Fraud Seminar
为 LexisNexis 采购欺诈研讨会
Shanghai, 10 July 2009
上海，2009 年 7 月 10 日

ChinaWhys  中国观察

Peter Humphrey  韩飞龙

• 34 Years involvement with China and Eastern Europe
  34 年与中国及东欧的交集
• 18 Years in the Media as Foreign Correspondent
  18 年媒体行业外派记者经验
• 11 Years in Risk Management
  11 年风险管理从业经历
• Helping MNCs tackle white collar crime & other risks
  协助跨国企业应对白领犯罪及其他风险
• Headed China investigations of PWC and Kroll
  曾领导普华永道与高乐在中国的调查工作
• Founded ChinaWhys 2003 to help multinationals in China
  2003 年创立 ChinaWhys，旨在为在华跨国企业提供支持
  

  

ChinaWhys  中国观察

MISSION STATEMENT  使命宣言

Fraud Environment  欺诈环境

• China is undergoing a get-rich-quick social transformation and economic development phase
  中国正处于快速致富的社会转型与经济发展阶段
• China’s Cultural Revolution - spiritual void, loss of moral compass
  中国的文化大革命——精神空虚，道德迷失
• The pressure to make money today is enormous, especially among the young - Money means lifestyle and prestige
  当今赚钱的压力巨大，尤其在年轻人中——金钱意味着生活方式和社会地位
• Fraud, embezzlement and corruption is rife in both the public and private sectors - read the local press
  欺诈、挪用公款和腐败在公共和私营部门都极为普遍——看看当地报纸就知道了
• In China 16% of GDP is lost to fraud, embezzlement, etc (Source:
  在中国，16%的 GDP 因欺诈、挪用公款等行为流失（来源：

• In the USA 4-5% (Source: ACFE)
  在美国，欺诈率为 4-5%（来源：ACFE）
• MNCs must take strong measures to prevent and detect fraud they need people with a CFE mindset
  跨国公司必须采取有力措施预防和发现欺诈行为，需要具备 CFE 思维模式的人才

Corruption Perceptions  腐败感知指数

• Fraud in China is closely linked to corruption
  中国的欺诈行为与腐败密切相关
• Transparency International’s global corruption index shows China one of world’s most corrupt places.
  透明国际全球腐败指数显示，中国是全球腐败最严重的地区之一。
• China gets 3.5 marks out of 10 for public sector graft. It ranks half way down the list of $\mathbf{1}\mathbf{8}\mathbf{0}$$\mathbf{1}\mathbf{8}\mathbf{0}$180\mathbf{1 8 0} countries.
  中国在公共部门贪污方面得分为 3.5 分（满分 10 分），在 $\mathbf{1}\mathbf{8}\mathbf{0}$$\mathbf{1}\mathbf{8}\mathbf{0}$180\mathbf{1 8 0} 个国家中排名中游。
• China scores 4.94 points out of 10 for its companies being likely to pay bribes abroad to win business. It ranks ${29}^{\text{th}}$${29}^{\text{th }}$29^("th ")29^{\text {th }} out of 30 top export countries surveyed.
  中国企业在海外为赢得业务而行贿的可能性得分为 4.94 分（满分 10 分），在接受调查的 30 个主要出口国中排名第 ${29}^{\text{th}}$${29}^{\text{th }}$29^("th ")29^{\text {th }} 位。

Common Fraud Types in China
中国常见欺诈类型

• Supply chain  供应链
• Distribution fraud  分销欺诈
• Purchasing fraud  采购欺诈
• Distribution/purchasing combined
  分销/采购联合欺诈
• Product adulteration  产品掺假
• Intellectual property  知识产权
• Fakes  假冒产品
• Patent violations  专利侵权
• Data theft  数据盗窃
• Technology theft  技术盗窃
• The “PhD Pirates”  “博士海盗”
• Financial  金融
• Payroll  工资单
• Inventory  库存
• Cash theft  现金盗窃
• VAT/ tax  增值税/税务
• Customs duty  关税
• Bribery  贿赂
• Extortion  勒索
• Securities  证券
• Fraudulent listings  欺诈性上市
• Insider trading  内幕交易
• M&A frauds  并购欺诈

Purchasing System Fraud Aggravated by Global Supply Chain Shift
全球供应链转变加剧的采购系统欺诈

• OUTSOURCING: Multinational manufacturers increasingly outsourcing production of components and finished goods to local suppliers and becoming mere brand managers
  外包趋势：跨国制造商日益将零部件和成品生产外包给本地供应商，自身逐渐转变为单纯的品牌管理方
• LOCALIZATION: Multinationals “localizing” China operations to economize, with top jobs shifting away from expats to empower local managers
  本土化战略：跨国公司通过"本土化"中国业务实现降本增效，高层职位由外籍转向本土经理人以赋能当地团队
• KNOWHOW: Multinationals transfer technology & know-how to partners, suppliers, distributors, staff, government, and moving entire R&D ops to China
  技术转移：跨国公司向合作伙伴、供应商、分销商、员工及政府转移技术诀窍，并将整个研发部门迁至中国

Things that went wrong for some multinationals in China
部分跨国企业在华遭遇的困境

Nurturing a Supply Chain Competitor
培育供应链竞争对手

• Multinational auto parts maker hired handsome and bright young man Bill to be its lead sales manager in China
  跨国汽车零部件制造商聘请了英俊聪明的年轻人比尔担任其中国区销售经理
• Immediately he secretly started a firm run by his brother Fred, and illegally transferred product know-how to this family firm.
  他立即秘密成立了一家由其兄弟弗雷德经营的公司，并非法将产品技术转移至该家族企业
• As Bill’s firm grew, he also transferred management know-how
  随着比尔公司的发展，他还转移了管理技术
• After 7 years, he persuaded his employer to form a JV with this firm, while secretly continuing to grow his family business
  经过 7 年时间，他说服雇主与这家公司成立合资企业，同时暗中继续发展自己的家族生意
• He set up subsidiaries and inserted them into the chain as suppliers of his employer
  他设立子公司，并将其作为供应商插入到雇主的供应链中

Nurturing a Supply Chain Competitor
培育供应链竞争对手

• He copied the multinational’s products, and targeted their customers for OEM work
  他复制了跨国公司的产品，并瞄准其客户进行代工生产
• After 10 years, Bill’s firm grew into a serious competitor, and he quit the MNC to concentrate on running his own firm
  十年后，比尔的公司成长为强劲的竞争对手，于是他辞去了跨国公司的职务，专注于经营自己的企业
• He had achieved vertical integration of coating, components and finished goods
  他实现了涂层、零部件和成品的垂直整合
• His firm then formed a holding company and prepared for IPO
  随后他的公司成立了控股企业，并筹备首次公开募股
• His products compete head-on with his former employer in the marketplace - with considerable cost advantages!
  其产品在市场上与前雇主正面竞争——且拥有显著的成本优势！
• For 10 years they didn’t know!
  十年来他们毫不知情！

Nurturing a Supply Chain Competitor
培育供应链竞争对手

Office Products - Supply Chain Fraud
办公用品 - 供应链欺诈

• MNC office products maker in Shanghai “123 Inc” got an anonymous email alleging an employee of its China firm, Buyer A, held shares in a main Chinese supplier, Supplier Y.
  位于上海的跨国办公用品制造商“123 公司”收到一封匿名邮件，指控其中国子公司采购员 A 持有一家主要中国供应商 Y 的股份。
• 123 Inc obtained business licence of Supplier Y but did not find Buyer A’s name listed as a shareholder or officer.
  123 公司获得了供应商 Y 的营业执照，但未发现买方 A 的名字被列为股东或高管。
• An investigator who reviewed the incorporation file more closely found that Y was registered at two different addresses.
  调查员在更仔细地查阅公司注册文件后发现，Y 公司在两个不同的地址进行了注册。
• Investigator visited address 1 and found manufacturer Z, a former supplier to 123 Inc. There the investigator learned that senior managers of company $Z$$Z$ZZ had left two years ago to set up their own firm and had stolen Z’s clients.
  调查员走访了地址 1，发现制造商 Z 曾是 123 公司的供应商。在那里，调查员了解到公司 $Z$$Z$ZZ 的高级管理人员两年前离职创办了自己的公司，并窃取了 Z 的客户。

Office Products - Supply Chain Fraud
办公用品 - 供应链欺诈

• In office emails, we found Buyer A had told a supplier he and friends had bought some land to build a factory, and asked the supplier to send all emails henceforth to his private address.
  在办公室邮件中，我们发现买方 A 曾告知某供应商，他与朋友购买了一块土地用于建厂，并要求该供应商此后将所有邮件发送至其私人地址。
• When visiting address 2, investigator met shareholders of supplier Y and learned Y was bulding a big factory in Kunshan. This confirmed information from Buyer A’s email.
  调查员走访地址 2 时，会见了供应商 Y 的股东，并获悉 Y 正在昆山兴建一座大型工厂。这证实了买方 A 邮件中的信息。
• Investigator obtained the name of new factory X.
  调查员获取了新工厂 X 的名称。
• We examined Company X’s incorporation file. We discovered Buyer A was listed as Deputy General Manager of Company X.
  我们查阅了 X 公司的注册文件，发现买方 A 被列为 X 公司的副总经理。
• And Company X was planning to manufacture exactly the same products as 123 Inc.
  而 X 公司正计划生产与 123 公司完全相同的产品。

Office Products - Supply Chain Fraud
办公用品 - 供应链欺诈

Textile Sourcing Kickback Scams - How Sue became a millionaire
纺织品采购回扣骗局——苏如何成为百万富翁

• Sue was a merchandiser with a multinational’s China Rep Office. Over the years, she formed close ties with the suppliers, and extracted bribes for giving them orders.
  苏曾是一家跨国公司中国代表处的采购员。多年来，她与供应商建立了密切关系，并通过给予订单从中收取贿赂。
• The contracts were signed between the supplier and the MNC HQ’s’ sourcing dept.
  合同由供应商与跨国企业总部的采购部门签署。
• But Sue held the real power making all the buying decisions.
  但苏掌握实权，所有采购决策皆由她一手把控。
• During a 10-year career she made millions of $ for herself in kickbacks and bought several luxury mansions in Shanghai.
  十年职业生涯中，她通过回扣敛财数百万美元，并在上海购置了数套豪华宅邸。
• The behavior of Sue and the like compromised quality controls and corporate social responsibility standards.
  苏及其同类行径损害了质量控制与企业社会责任标准。

What is wrong with the sourcing process flow?
采购流程中存在的问题是什么？

The System Didn't Work - Why?
系统为何失效？

• Senior manager (an expat) was locked out of commercial decision loop and relied mostly on reports.
  高级经理（外籍人士）被排除在商业决策圈外，主要依赖报告获取信息。
• Buyer controlled access to expat manager as he/she spoke good English.
  采购员因英语流利而掌控了与外籍经理的沟通渠道。
• Technician / factory inspector rarely challenged buyer’s decisions because he had no direct and regular access to expat manager.
  技术员/工厂检验员很少质疑买家的决定，因为他无法直接且定期接触到外籍经理。
• QC had no power to influence supplier selection but he might be blamed for shipment delays if he challenged quality of goods.
  质检人员无权影响供应商选择，但如果他质疑货物质量，可能会因发货延迟而受到指责。
• Supplier knew exactly who was decision maker, and that is where he invested his resources often in kickbacks, etc.
  供应商清楚谁是决策者，并会将资源集中在那里，常以回扣等形式进行投入。

Formal & Informal Chain of Command & Communication Structures
正式与非正式的指挥链及沟通结构

Megastore Hit by Purchasing Fraud
大型超市遭遇采购欺诈

• European warehouse store chain discovered rampant corruption in its buying department.
  欧洲仓储式连锁超市发现采购部门存在猖獗腐败现象
• Staff owned or took massive kickbacks from suppliers, manipulated transaction system, diverted rebate goods, accepted other advantages, etc.
  员工收受供应商巨额回扣、操纵交易系统、截留返利商品、接受其他利益输送等
• Some 30% of all transactions was going into staff pockets. Eroded margins. Threatened bottom line.
  约 30%交易金额流入员工腰包，利润率遭侵蚀，企业盈亏面临威胁

Warehouse Megastore Chain
大型超市连锁仓库

Kickbacks - When Your Buyer Becomes Your Supplier's Salesman
回扣——当你的采购员变成供应商的推销员

Own Companies - Anita's Network
自有企业——安妮塔的关系网

Common Flaws Seen in MNCs
跨国企业中常见的缺陷

• No pre-employment screening
  无入职前背景调查
• No checking of vendors, distributors
  未对供应商、分销商进行核查
• Poor due diligence on JV partners
  对合资伙伴的尽职调查不足
• High staff turnover, poor retention
  员工流动率高，留存率低
• Weak internal controls, SOPs not enforced
  内部控制薄弱，标准操作程序未执行
• Sloppy corporate security and data protection
  企业安全与数据保护松散
• Cross-departmental collusion
  跨部门串通
• Inter-department miscommunication, aggravated by matrix management structures
  跨部门沟通不畅，矩阵式管理结构加剧了这一问题
• Management missed or ignored warning signals
  管理层遗漏或忽视了预警信号
• Bad management of cultural differences!
  文化差异处理不当！

The Gap at Multinationals in China
跨国公司在中国的差距

• Corporate HQ is linguistically and culturally blind
  企业总部在语言和文化上存在盲区
• Local culture of favor trading defeats the control mechanisms
  地方人情交易文化破坏了控制机制
• Senior manager or expat manager not hands-on, unable to reach out to all levels of staff, rely too much on a single point of reporting
  高级经理或外派经理不亲力亲为，无法触及各级员工，过度依赖单一汇报点
• Junior local staff have no channel to communicate to HQ or senior managers if they want to report problems
  基层本地员工若想反映问题，缺乏与总部或高层管理者沟通的渠道
• This gap creates fertile ground for deception and fraud
  这一空白为欺骗和欺诈行为提供了滋生的土壤
• And bad people take advantage of it
  而心怀不轨之人便趁机利用

Cultural & Social Environment
文化与社会环境

Available Lines of Investigation
现有调查线索

Fraud Risk Management Tools
欺诈风险管理工具

• Investigative Due Diligence (IVDD)
  调查性尽职调查（IVDD）
• Employee screening  员工背景筛查
• Vendor background checks
  供应商背景调查
• Ethics hotlines  道德热线
• Strong internal audit operation
  强有力的内部审计运作
• Third-party market price checking
  第三方市场价格核查
• Reactive Investigations  反应性调查
• Forensic accounting  法务会计
• Code of Conduct  行为准则
• Training (ethics, best practices)
  培训（道德规范、最佳实践）
• Corporate Security  企业安全
• IT Security  信息技术安全

Investigative Due Diligence
调查性尽职调查

Investigative Due Diligence
调查性尽职调查

• Who are the real decision makers, directors, shareholders?
  真正的决策者、董事、股东是谁？
• Business acumen?  商业敏锐度？
• Political influence?  政治影响力？
• Hidden liabilities?  潜在负债？
• Track record, reputation, integrity
  过往记录、声誉、诚信
• What happened to their last five deals?
  他们最近五笔交易情况如何？

Supply Chain Due Diligence
供应链尽职调查

• Distributors  分销商
• 3PLs  第三方物流服务商
• Suppliers  供应商
• Construction contractors
  建筑承包商
• Lessors  出租人
• JV partners  合资伙伴
• Contract manufacturers  合同制造商
• Senior hires  高级人才招聘
• Etc  其他

Vendor Integrity Program (VIP)
供应商诚信计划(VIP)

• Transparent bidding process.
  透明的招标流程
• Accountability - get vendors to sign your Code of Ethics
  问责制 - 让供应商签署您的道德准则
• Data - get vendors to complete detailed questionnaire and check the information they provide.
  数据 - 让供应商完成详细问卷并核实他们提供的信息
• Check ownership - is it owned by your employees?
  核查所有权 - 是否为您的员工所有？
• Does it physically exist?. Often just paper companies.
  它是否实际存在？通常只是空壳公司。
• Check integrity, business practices, track record.
  核查诚信度、商业行为及过往记录。
• Monitoring - sudden change of suppliers or volume.
  监控——供应商或交易量的突然变化。
• Whistle-blowing. Provide a channel for ethics complaints.
  举报机制。提供道德投诉渠道。
• Link to an employee integrity program.
  关联至员工诚信计划。
• Combine in-house and independent external resources.
  整合内部资源与独立外部资源。

Employee Integrity Program (EIP)
员工诚信计划(EIP)

• Clear employment policy that deters unethical people.
  明确的雇佣政策以杜绝不道德人员。
• Data - get recruits to complete detailed personal data forms.
  数据 - 让新员工填写详细的个人资料表格。
• Check and verify data. Reject dishonest candidates.
  检查并核实数据。拒绝不诚实的候选人。
• Have a Code of Ethics that strictly forbid conflicts of interest.
  制定严格的《道德准则》，禁止利益冲突。
• Tie the Code into employment contracts.
  将《道德准则》纳入雇佣合同。
• Employee screening - Did this buyer run side businesses in previous jobs? Did he cheat his last employer? Does he own any companies? Does he live beyond his “means”?
  员工背景调查——该买家是否在过往工作中经营副业？是否欺骗过前雇主？名下是否拥有公司？生活水平是否超出其“收入水平”？
• Ethics hotline. A vital communication channel.
  道德热线。至关重要的沟通渠道。
• Protect and reward people who uphold ethical practices.
  保护并奖励坚守道德实践的人员。
• Ethics training - frequent reminders on Code of Ethics.
  道德培训——定期进行《道德准则》提醒教育。
• Combine in-house and independent external resources.
  整合内部资源与独立外部资源。

Ethics Hotline  道德热线

• Set up whistle-blowing channel for ethics complaint.
  设立道德投诉的举报渠道。
• A rewards system to encourage reporting.
  建立奖励机制以鼓励举报。
• Publicise your Code of Ethics widely.
  广泛宣传您的道德准则。
• Advertise hotline to staff, clients, vendors, distributors.
  向员工、客户、供应商及分销商宣传热线电话。
• Provide postal, fax, email and online reporting channels.
  提供邮寄、传真、电子邮件及在线举报渠道。
• Anonymous allegations must be treated seriously.
  必须认真对待匿名举报。
• Don’t throw away or shred allegation letters.
  不要丢弃或撕毁指控信函。
• Analyse and investigate any serious complaints.
  分析并调查所有严重投诉。
• Use an ombudsman to conduct investigations.
  利用申诉专员进行调查。
• Send a deterrent signal by punishing offenders.
  通过惩处违规者发出威慑信号。

TROUBLESHOOTING INVESTIGATIONS
故障排查调查

Why do you need a $3^{\text{rd}}$$3^{\text{rd }}$3^("rd ")3^{\text {rd }}-party to investigate fraud?
为什么调查欺诈需要一个 $3^{\text{rd}}$$3^{\text{rd }}$3^("rd ")3^{\text {rd }} 方？

Police or prosecutors need you to prepare the ground for them. So you have to conduct your own inquiries first.
警方或检察官需要你为他们打好基础。因此，你必须先自行进行调查。

Suggested Lines of Inquiry
建议的调查方向

• Corporate filings  公司备案文件
• Personal records  个人记录
• Real estate records  房地产记录
• Travel records  旅行记录
• Communications patterns  通讯模式
• Price verification  价格验证
• Computer forensics  计算机取证
• Desk audits  案头审计
  

  

• Forensic accounting  法务会计
• Interviews - overt / covert
  访谈 - 公开/隐蔽
• Site visits under cover
  秘密实地考察
• Surveillance & monitoring
  监视与监控
• Sting operations  诱捕行动

The ACFE  美国注册舞弊审查师协会

• Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) leading anti-fraud educator and association for antifraud professionals. Its HQ is in Texas, USA.
  注册舞弊审查师协会（ACFE）是领先的反欺诈教育机构及反欺诈专业人士协会，总部位于美国德克萨斯州。
• ACFE provides globally preferred “Certified Fraud Examiner” (CFE) qualification.
  ACFE 提供全球认可的“注册舞弊审查师”（CFE）资格认证。
• Members in over 125 countries
  遍布 125 个国家的会员
• CFEs knowledgeable in four critical areas:
  精通四大关键领域的注册舞弊审查师：
• fraudulent financial transactions;
  欺诈性金融交易；
• criminology and ethics;  犯罪学与职业道德；
• legal elements of fraud;
  欺诈的法律要素；
• fraud investigation.  欺诈调查。
  

  

The ACFE  美国注册舞弊审查师协会

• ACFE awards the CFE designation to professionals who have met a stringent set of criteria, including character, experience and education.
  ACFE 向符合严格标准的专业人士授予注册舞弊审查师（CFE）资格，这些标准包括品行、经验和教育背景。
• CFEs have the ability to examine data and records to detect fraud and trace fraudulent transactions; interview suspects to obtain information and confessions; write investigation reports; report their findings to clients and testify at a trial.
  注册舞弊审核师（CFE）具备审查数据和记录以侦测欺诈及追踪欺诈交易的能力；可询问嫌疑人以获取信息和供词；撰写调查报告；向客户汇报调查结果并在庭审中作证。
• CFEs must have an understanding of the law as it relates to fraud and investigation.
  注册舞弊审核师必须理解与欺诈及调查相关的法律。
• CFEs must understand the underlying factors that drive people to commit fraud.
  注册舞弊审核师必须了解驱使人们实施欺诈的深层动因。
• CFEs on six continents have investigated more than 1 million suspected cases of criminal fraud.
  六大洲的注册舞弊审核师已调查超过 100 万起涉嫌刑事欺诈的案件。

Role of CFEs in China
注册舞弊审查师(CFE)在中国的作用

• Very few trained fraud investigators in China
  中国受过专业培训的舞弊调查人员非常少
• Probably less than 30 certified CFEs working in mainland China
  在中国大陆工作的持证 CFE 可能不足 30 人
• Internal audit functions at MNCs in China generally weak
  跨国公司在华内部审计职能普遍薄弱
• Big accounting firms often fail to spot fraud, and when they are called in, fail to solve cases
  大型会计事务所往往难以发现欺诈行为，即便介入调查也常无法破案
• One reason is the cultural and language barrier
  原因之一是文化和语言障碍
• Another reason is too much clinging to the voucher-matching approach
  另一个原因是过度依赖凭证核对方法

ACFE in China  中国反舞弊联盟

• We established first ACFE China chapters just last year
  我们于去年刚刚成立了中国首个 ACFE 分会
• Shanghai Chapter (about 30 members plus supporters)
  上海分会（约 30 名会员及支持者）
• Beijing Sub-chapter (about 30 members plus supporters)
  北京子分会（约 30 名会员及支持者）
• Working for official recognition and legitimacy
  正在争取官方认可与合法地位
• Cooperation with universities in Beijing, Shanghai (law and accounting depts), National Accounting Institute, to win legitimacy
  与北京、上海（法律和会计部门）的大学及国家会计学院合作，以赢得合法性
• Many accounting firms fail in China in anti-fraud work.
  许多会计师事务所在中国的反欺诈工作中表现不佳
• So there is a need to train an army of CFE-minded professionals to handle fraud in China
  因此需要培养一批具备注册舞弊审查师（CFE）思维的专业人士来处理中国的欺诈问题

How to Join ACFE
如何加入注册舞弊审查师协会（ACFE）

• Visit www.acfe.com  访问 www.acfe.com
• Contact Mr. Andy Kwok andykwok128@gmail.com
  联系郭安迪先生 andykwok128@gmail.com

Benefits  福利

• Professional Education & Training
  专业教育与培训
• Certification as CFE  注册舞弊审核师认证
• ACFE Bookstore  ACFE 书店
• Online Resources  在线资源
• Professional Contacts  专业联系人

China's ideal forensic accountants?
中国理想的法务会计师？

• Sound knowledge of operational process and understanding of business objectives
  扎实的运营流程知识和对业务目标的理解
• Strong Chinese language skills essential. Twists of language often mask fraud.
  出色的中文能力至关重要。语言的微妙变化常掩盖欺诈行为。
• Good communication skills with Chinese people, able to draw out people of different levels and positions to get information.
  具备与中国人良好的沟通技巧，能够引导不同层级和职位的人员获取信息。

China's ideal forensic accountants?
中国理想的法务会计师？

• Good analytical skills - able to synthesize information obtained in different languages (both documents and oral info) to make sense out of it all
  优秀的分析能力——能够综合不同语言（包括文件和口头信息）获得的信息，并理解其含义。
• Great attention to detail, especially to links between physical process, documents and behaviour
  对细节极为关注，尤其是对实际流程、文件和行为之间的联系。
• Investigation skills beyond ticking a checklist, able to observe signs of control failure from what is not obvious - who owns those two red Ferraris that I saw at the factory door? Why aren’t they on the books!
  调查技能远不止勾选清单，要能从不起眼处察觉控制失效的迹象——工厂门口那两辆红色法拉利是谁的？为什么账上没有记录！
• Think outside the box, see beyond the vouchers and financial documents - it’s not only what appears in the books that counts, but what does not appear there.
  跳出思维定式，超越凭证和财务文件——重要的不仅是账面上有的，还有那些账面上没有的。

Bedtime Reading  睡前阅读

• “Mr. China”, by Tim Clissold
  《中国先生》，蒂姆·克里索德著
• “One Billion Consumers”, by James McGregor
  “十亿消费者”，作者：詹姆斯·麦格雷戈
• ACFE publications, e.g.  ACFE 出版物，例如
• The Fraud Examiner’s Manual
  欺诈审查员手册
• Encyclopedia of Fraud  欺诈百科全书

Keys to Lower Risks & Reduced Losses
降低风险与减少损失的关键

• Honest employees  诚实的员工
• Reliable Partners  可靠的合作伙伴
• Clear and Visible Deterrents
  清晰可见的威慑措施
• Adequate Corporate Security
  充分的企业安全保障
  

  

ChinaWhys  中国观察

Promoting Transparency and Business Ethics in China
推动中国商业道德与透明度建设

peter.humphrey@chinawhys.com