Russia’s vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out
俄罗斯大量苏联时期武器库存即将耗尽

FOR A LONG time it seemed that a war of attrition between Ukraine and a Russia with five times its population could end only one way. But the much-vaunted Russian offensive against Kharkiv in the north that started in May is fizzling out. Its advances elsewhere along the line, especially in the Donbas region, have been both strategically trivial and achieved only at huge cost. The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia keep up its current tempo of operations.
长期以来，乌克兰与人口是乌克兰五倍的俄罗斯之间的消耗战似乎只有一种结局。但是，俄罗斯从 5 月开始对北部哈尔科夫发动的攻势已逐渐瓦解。俄罗斯在沿线其他地区，特别是顿巴斯地区的进展，在战略上微不足道，而且是在付出巨大代价后才取得的。现在的问题与其说是乌克兰能否坚持战斗，不如说是俄罗斯还能将目前的行动节奏维持多久。

The key issue is not manpower. Russia seems able to go on finding another 25,000 or so soldiers each month to retain around 470,000 men at the front, although it is having to pay more for them. Production of missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure is also surging. But for all the talk of Russia having become a war economy, with some 8% of its GDP devoted to military spending, it is able to replace its staggering losses of tanks, armoured infantry vehicles and artillery only by drawing out of storage and refurbishing stocks built up in the Soviet era. Huge though these stocks are, they are not infinite.
关键问题不是人力。俄罗斯似乎有能力每月再找到 2.5 万左右的士兵，在前线保留约 47 万人，尽管它不得不为他们支付更多的费用。用于打击乌克兰基础设施的导弹产量也在激增。尽管俄罗斯的军费开支约占其国内生产总值的 8%，但尽管俄罗斯已成为一个战争经济国家，但它只能通过从仓库中提取和翻新苏联时期积累的库存来补充其损失惊人的坦克、步兵装甲车和火炮。尽管这些库存数量巨大，但并非无穷无尽。

According to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, puts the number of Russian tank losses for which it has either photo or videographic evidence at 3,235, but suggests the actual number is “significantly higher”.
根据大多数情报部门的估计，战争头两年结束后，俄罗斯损失了大约 3000 辆坦克和 5000 辆其他装甲车。荷兰公开情报网站 "Oryx "称，有照片或录像为证的俄罗斯坦克损失数量为 3235 辆，但认为实际数量 "要高得多"。

Aleksandr Golts, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, says that Vladimir Putin has the old politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. He says that Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. Before the Soviet Union’s demise, says Mr Golts, it had as many armoured vehicles as the rest of the world put together.
斯德哥尔摩东欧研究中心（Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies）分析师亚历山大-戈尔茨（Aleksandr Golts）说，弗拉基米尔-普京要为冷战期间建立的庞大武器储备感谢老政治局。他说，苏联领导人知道西方的军事装备比他们自己的先进得多，因此他们选择了大规模生产，在和平时期生产了成千上万辆装甲车，以备战争之需。戈尔茨先生说，在苏联解体之前，它拥有的装甲车数量相当于世界上其他国家装甲车数量的总和。

When the then defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, boasted in December 2023 that 1,530 tanks had been delivered in the course of the year, he omitted to say that nearly 85% of them, according to an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank, were not new tanks but old ones (mainly T-72s, also T-62s and even some T-55s dating from just after the second world war) that had been taken out of storage and given a wash and brush-up.
2023 年 12 月，时任国防部长谢尔盖-绍伊古夸耀说，这一年中交付了 1530 辆坦克，但他没有说，根据伦敦智囊团国际战略研究所的评估，其中近 85% 不是新坦克，而是旧坦克（主要是 t-72 坦克，也有 t-62 坦克，甚至还有一些二战刚结束时的 t-55 坦克），它们被从仓库中取出，进行了清洗和刷新。

Since the invasion, about 175 reasonably modern T-90M tanks have been sent to the front line. The IISS estimates that annual production this year could be approaching 90. However, Michael Gjerstad, an analyst with the IISS, argues that most of the T-90Ms are actually upgrades of older T-90As. As those numbers dwindle, production of newly built T-90Ms this year might be no more than 28. Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military capacity at the Washington-based Centre for European Policy Analysis, reckons that Russia can build only 30 brand-new tanks a year. When the Ukrainians captured a supposedly new T-90M last year, they found that its gun had been made in 1992.
自入侵以来，约有 175 辆相当现代化的 t-90m 坦克被运往前线。国际保险协会估计，今年的年产量可能接近 90 辆。不过，该研究所的分析师迈克尔-格尔斯塔德（Michael Gjerstad）认为，大部分 t-90m 实际上是老式 t-90as 的升级版。随着这些数量的减少，今年新生产的 t-90ms 可能不会超过 28 辆。位于华盛顿的欧洲政策分析中心（Centre for European Policy Analysis）的俄罗斯军事能力专家帕维尔-卢津（Pavel Luzin）估计，俄罗斯每年只能生产 30 辆全新的坦克。乌克兰人去年缴获了一辆据说是全新的 t-90m 坦克，但他们发现这辆坦克的火炮是 1992 年制造的。

Mr Luzin reckons that Russia’s ability to build new tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, or even to refurbish old ones, is hampered by the difficulty of getting components. Stores of components for tank production that before the war were intended for use in 2025 have already been raided, while crucial equipment, such as fuel-heaters for diesel engines, high-voltage electrical systems and infrared thermal imaging to identify targets, were all previously imported from Europe; their sale is now blocked by sanctions. The lack of high-quality ball-bearings is also a constraint. Chinese alternatives are sometimes available, but are said not to meet former quality standards.
卢津先生认为，俄罗斯制造新坦克或步兵战车的能力，甚至翻新旧坦克的能力，都因难以获得零部件而受到影响。战前用于 2025 年坦克生产的零部件库存已被洗劫一空，而柴油发动机燃油加热器、高压电气系统和用于识别目标的红外热成像等关键设备以前都是从欧洲进口的，现在这些设备的销售因制裁而受阻。缺乏高质量的滚珠轴承也是一个制约因素。中国的替代品有时也能买到，但据说达不到以前的质量标准。

Those are not the only problems when it comes to building new armoured vehicles or trying to modernise old ones. Ferroalloy production has actually decreased in the past two years, says Mr Luzin. Most welding in the weapons factories is still done by hand, and despite factories supposedly working triple shifts, Mr Luzin says that the firms are struggling to recruit enough workers. They also largely depend on machine tools imported years ago from Germany and Sweden, many of which are now old and hard to maintain.
在制造新装甲车或对旧装甲车进行现代化改造时，这些并不是唯一的问题。卢津先生说，铁合金的产量在过去两年中实际上有所下降。武器工厂的大部分焊接工作仍由手工完成，尽管工厂据称实行三班倒工作制，但卢津先生说，企业很难招募到足够的工人。他们在很大程度上还依赖多年前从德国和瑞典进口的机床，其中许多机床现在已经老旧，难以维护。

Moreover, the old Soviet armaments supply chain no longer exists. Ukraine, Georgia and East Germany were all important centres of Soviet weapons and components manufacture. Ironically, Kharkiv was the main producer of turrets for T-72 tanks. The number of workers in Russia’s military-industrial complex has also fallen dramatically, says Mr Luzin, from about 10m to 2m, without any offsetting step-change in automation.
此外，旧的苏联军备供应链已不复存在。乌克兰、格鲁吉亚和东德都曾是苏联重要的武器和零部件制造中心。具有讽刺意味的是，哈尔科夫曾是 t-72 坦克炮塔的主要生产地。卢津先生说，俄罗斯军工综合体的工人数量也急剧下降，从大约 1000 万降至 200 万，而自动化程度却没有任何相应的提高。

Another concern is artillery-barrel production. For now, with the help of North Korea, Russia appears to have enough shells, probably about 3m this year—sufficient to outgun the Ukrainians until recently by at least 5:1 and in some places by much more. But the drawback of such high rates of fire has been the wear and tear on barrels. In some highly contested areas, the barrels of howitzers need replacing after only a few months.
另一个令人担忧的问题是炮弹生产。目前，在朝鲜的帮助下，俄罗斯似乎拥有足够的炮弹，今年可能约有 300 万发--足以在最近之前以至少 5:1 的比例超过乌克兰人，在某些地方甚至更高。但高射速的缺点是炮管磨损严重。在一些争夺激烈的地区，榴弹炮的炮管几个月后就需要更换。

Over a barrel 过桶

Yet, says Mr Luzin, there are only two factories that have the sophisticated Austrian-made rotary forging machines (the last one was imported in 2017) needed to make the barrels. Each can produce only around 100 barrels a year, compared with the thousands needed. Russia has never made its own forging machines; it imported them from America in the 1930s and looted them from Germany after the war.
然而，卢津先生说，只有两家工厂拥有制造木桶所需的奥地利制造的精密旋转锻造机（最后一台是 2017 年进口的）。每家工厂每年只能生产约 100 个桶，而需要的桶却有数千个。俄罗斯从未制造过自己的锻造机，而是在 20 世纪 30 年代从美国进口，并在战后从德国掠夺。

The solution has been to cannibalise barrels from old towed artillery and fit them to self-propelled howitzers. Richard Vereker, an open-source analyst, thinks that by the start of this year about 4,800 barrels had been swapped out. How long the Russians can carry on doing this depends on the condition of the 7,000 or so that may be left. Mr Gjerstad says that with multi-launch rocket systems, such as the TOS-1A, eking out barrel life has already meant much shorter bursts of fire.
解决办法是从老式牵引火炮上拆卸炮管，将其安装到自行榴弹炮上。公开资料分析师理查德-维尔克（Richard Vereker）认为，到今年年初，已经有大约 4800 个炮管被换掉。俄罗斯人还能坚持多久，取决于剩下的大约 7000 个炮管的状况。格尔斯塔德先生说，对于多管火箭发射系统（如 tos-1a）来说，延长发射筒的寿命已经意味着缩短发射时间。

But the biggest emerging problem is with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, which are still crucial to any offensive ground operations at scale. Although the IISS estimated that in February this year Russia may have had about 3,200 tanks in storage to draw on, Mr Gjerstad says up to 70% of them “have not moved an inch since the beginning of the war”. A large proportion of the T-72s have been stored uncovered since the early 1990s and are probably in very poor condition.
但新出现的最大问题是坦克和步兵战车，它们对任何大规模地面进攻行动仍然至关重要。虽然据国际原子能机构估计，今年 2 月俄罗斯可能有大约 3,200 辆坦克可供使用，但杰斯塔德先生说，其中多达 70% 的坦克 "自战争开始以来寸步未动"。很大一部分 t-72 坦克自 20 世纪 90 年代初以来一直露天存放，状况可能非常糟糕。

Both Mr Golts and Mr Luzin reckon that at current rates of attrition Russian tank and infantry-vehicle refurbishment from storage will have reached a “critical point of exhaustion” by the second half of next year. Mr Gjerstad gives it a few months longer. But the Russians will not want to reach a cliff-edge when they suddenly have only very few new tanks to send to the front. The new defence minister, Andrei Belousov, appears to be focused on ramping up production of drones.
戈尔茨先生和卢津先生都认为，按照目前的损耗率，到明年下半年，俄罗斯坦克和步兵战车的整修工作将达到 "枯竭的临界点"。格尔斯塔德先生认为还要再等几个月。但是，俄罗斯人不希望突然间只有很少的新坦克可以派往前线，从而陷入悬崖边缘。新任国防部长安德烈-别洛乌索夫（Andrei Belousov）似乎正专注于提高无人机的产量。

Unless something changes, before the end of this year, Russian forces may have to adjust their posture to one that is much more defensive, says Mr Gjerstad. It could even become apparent before the end of summer. Mr Putin’s interest in a temporary ceasefire may soon increase. ■
格尔斯塔德先生说，除非有什么变化，否则在今年年底之前，俄罗斯军队可能不得不调整态势，转而采取防御性更强的态势。这种情况甚至可能在夏季结束前变得明显。普京先生对临时停火的兴趣可能很快就会增加。■

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