Legal Interpretation  法律解释

Legal interpretation involves scrutinizing legal texts such as the texts of statutes, constitutions, contracts, and wills. This chapter introduces the foundational question of what legal interpretation, by its nature, seeks – and competing answers to that question. It goes on to canvas leading substantive theories of legal interpretation and examines in greater depth a few influential theories and difficulties they encounter. Finally, the chapter considers how theories of legal interpretation should be defended and evaluated.
法律解释涉及对法律文本的细致审查，这些文本包括法规、宪法、合同和遗嘱等。本章探讨法律解释本质上追求什么这一基础性问题及其不同答案，概述了法律解释的主要实体理论，并深入分析了几种有影响力的理论及其面临的难题。最后，本章思考了应如何辩护和评价法律解释理论。

• 1. Introduction  1. 引言
• 2. What Legal Interpretation Seeks
  2. 法律解释的目标
  • 2.1 Linguistic Meaning  2.1 语言意义
  • 2.2 The Correct Resolution of Disputes
    2.2 争议的正确解决
  • 2.3 A Provision’s Contribution to the Content of the Law
    2.3 条款对法律内容的贡献
• 3. Overview of Methods of Legal Interpretation
  3. 法律解释方法概述
• 4. Theories of Legal Interpretation
  4. 法律解释理论
  • 4.1. Intentionalism and Purposivism
    4.1 意图主义与目的论
  • 4.2 Textualism  4.2 文本主义
• 5. How to Argue for and Evaluate Theories of Legal Interpretation
  5. 如何论证和评价法律解释理论
  • 5.1 Theories of Legal Interpretation and Theories of Law
    5.1 法律解释理论与法律理论
  • 5.2 The Potential for Divergence between Theories of Law and Theories of Legal Interpretation
    5.2 法律理论与法律解释理论之间可能存在的分歧
• 6. Conclusion  6. 结论
• Bibliography  参考文献
• Academic Tools  学术工具
• Other Internet Resources
  其他网络资源
• Related Entries  相关条目

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1. Introduction  1. 引言

Legal interpretation is familiar to lawyers, judges, and legal theorists. Public and private disputes of tremendous importance turn on questions of how to interpret legal texts. Yet there is deep and pervasive controversy over the proper theory or method of legal interpretation. Part of the reason for such controversy is that, perhaps surprisingly, there is no consensus with respect to the more fundamental issue of what legal interpretation is – in particular, what its constitutive aim is. Does legal interpretation, for example, seek the linguistic meaning of legal texts, the best resolution of disputes, or legal provisions’ contribution to the content of the law? Without progress on this foundational issue, progress on understanding the proper method of legal interpretation cannot be expected.
法律解释对律师、法官和法律理论家而言并不陌生。具有重大意义的公共与私人争议往往取决于如何解释法律文本的问题。然而，关于法律解释的正确理论或方法存在深刻而普遍的争议。部分原因在于，或许令人惊讶的是，对于更基础的问题——即法律解释的本质是什么，特别是其根本目标为何——尚未达成共识。例如，法律解释是寻求法律文本的语言意义、争议的最佳解决方案，还是法律条款对法律内容的贡献？若不在这一基础问题上取得进展，便无法期待在理解法律解释的正确方法上有所突破。

This chapter begins, in section 2, by canvassing different accounts of what legal interpretation is. Section 3 sketches leading theories or methods of legal interpretation. Section 4 explores a few of these methods, especially intentionalism and textualism (including original meaning originalism), in much greater detail and examines difficulties they encounter. Several distinctions are introduced that enable more precise analysis than the characterizations generally offered in the literature. Section 5 turns to the question of how to defend and evaluate theories of legal interpretation. It concludes with a brief discussion of various kinds of idealization in the theory of legal interpretation.
本章首先在第 2 节中概述了关于法律解释是什么的不同观点。第 3 节勾勒了法律解释的主要理论或方法。第 4 节更详细地探讨了其中几种方法，特别是意图主义和文本主义（包括原旨主义中的原初意义理论），并考察了它们遇到的困难。通过引入若干区分，使得分析比文献中通常提供的描述更为精确。第 5 节转向如何为法律解释理论辩护和评估的问题，最后简要讨论了法律解释理论中各种理想化的类型。

The discussion is necessarily compressed, and references to further reading are provided. The focus is on statutory and constitutional interpretation, though much of the discussion applies with appropriate qualifications and modifications to the interpretation of administrative regulations and private instruments such as contracts and wills. The interpretation of judicial decisions is a topic best addressed separately. See entry on Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning.
讨论必然较为简略，并附有进一步阅读的参考文献。重点在于成文法与宪法解释，尽管经过适当限定和调整后，大部分讨论也适用于行政规章及合同、遗嘱等私人文书的解释。司法判决的解释则更适合单独讨论，参见《法律推理中的先例与类比》条目。

2. What Legal Interpretation Seeks
2. 法律解释的目标

Lawyers and judges are familiar with various competing theories or methods of legal interpretation and with arguments for and against those theories. (This chapter uses the terms theory of legal interpretation and method of legal interpretation interchangeably.) Leading theories include, for example, textualism, originalism, intentionalism, and purposivism. The questions of which theory is correct, and of the different theories’ pros and cons, are important. But there is a more fundamental question that is less often addressed: what is legal interpretation? More specifically, what does legal interpretation, by its nature, seek? What is its constitutive aim?
律师与法官熟知各种相互竞争的法律解释理论或方法，以及支持与反对这些理论的论据。（本章中“法律解释理论”与“法律解释方法”二词可互换使用。）代表性理论包括文本主义、原旨主义、意图论及目的论等。何种理论正确、各理论优劣如何，这些问题固然重要，但更基础却较少被探讨的问题是：法律解释究竟是什么？更具体而言，法律解释本质上追求什么？其构成性目标为何？

Many activities are defined or constituted in part by their aims. Medicine and cooking are examples. Someone who examines people, prescribes medicines, and performs surgeries is not practicing medicine unless these activities are undertaken for the appropriate purposes. Of course, individual physicians may have many other purposes, such as earning money or impressing people, but such ends are not what the practice of medicine, by its nature, seeks.
许多活动的定义或构成部分取决于其目标，医学与烹饪即为例证。若某人检查患者、开具处方、实施手术，但未以恰当目的开展这些活动，则不能称之为行医。当然，个体医生可能怀有其他目的，如赚钱或博人眼球，但这些并非医学实践本质上的追求。

Legal interpretation starts from certain input, such as legal texts and practices, actions and mental states of certain legal actors, and customs. (It is controversial exactly what the input should include, though certain texts are central.) And legal interpretation yields an output – “an interpretation.” The familiar debate concerns which method of getting from the input to the output is correct. But the more basic issue concerns what the output is supposed to be – what legal interpretation seeks. (For brevity, I will often write simply of what legal interpretation seeks; the qualification “by its nature” should be understood.) In the case of constitutional and statutory provisions, for example, is it the linguistic meaning of the text of the relevant provision? The provision’s contribution to the content of the law? The best resolution of disputes? Or something else?
法律解释始于某些输入，如法律文本与实践、特定法律行为者的行为与心理状态以及习俗。（尽管某些文本处于核心地位，但关于输入应包含哪些内容仍存在争议。）而法律解释则产生一个输出——“一种解释”。常见的争论涉及从输入到输出的哪种方法是正确的。但更根本的问题在于输出应当是什么——即法律解释所追求的目标。（为简洁起见，我常直接表述为“法律解释所追求的目标”；应理解为“就其本质而言”的限定。）例如，在宪法和法规条款的案例中，它是相关条款文本的语言学意义吗？是条款对法律内容的贡献吗？是争议的最佳解决方案吗？还是其他什么？

This issue is more fundamental than more familiar questions about the method of interpretation because which method is correct (and which reasons or arguments count in favor of a method) depends on what legal interpretation seeks. In general, how good a method is depends on what the method is for. The appropriate method for finding, say, the linguistic meaning of a text is likely very different from the appropriate method for finding the best resolution of a dispute. Similarly, the fact that a method is fair or democratic might well be irrelevant if legal interpretation seeks linguistic meaning, but highly relevant if it seeks the best resolution of disputes.
这个问题比关于解释方法的常见问题更为根本，因为哪种方法是正确的（以及哪些理由或论据支持某种方法）取决于法律解释追求的目标。一般而言，方法的优劣取决于其用途。例如，寻找文本语言意义的最佳方法很可能与寻找争议最佳解决方案的适当方法大相径庭。同样，如果法律解释追求的是语言意义，那么某种方法是否公平或民主可能无关紧要；但如果其目标是寻求争议的最佳解决，这些特性就变得高度相关。

Before turning to the leading candidates for what legal interpretation seeks, it is worth considering the recurrent suggestion that interpretation takes place only when the answer to a legal question is not obvious.^[1] We can quickly dispense with this suggestion. It does not capture what paradigmatic theories of legal interpretation are engaged in, for the prescriptions offered by such theories apply to easy problems as well as difficult ones. Moreover, the suggestion would have the unfortunate consequence that legal interpretation would not be a unified subject matter. (Compare excluding from the subject of chemistry those chemical reactions that are already well understood.) Whether one is seeking linguistic meaning, the content of the law, or the best resolution of a dispute, one is engaged in the same enterprise when the issues are easy as when they are difficult. A closely related point is that whether a particular legal issue is easy or difficult is relative to the interpreter. For an experienced tax lawyer, the answer to an arcane tax question may be obvious. The suggestion would therefore have the consequence that what counts as legal interpretation depends on who is doing the interpretation (and when).
在探讨法律解释的主要目标之前，值得思考一个反复出现的观点，即只有当法律问题的答案不明显时，才需要进行解释。 ^[1] 我们可以迅速摒弃这一观点。它未能涵盖典型法律解释理论所关注的内容，因为这些理论提供的指导既适用于难题，也适用于简单问题。此外，这种观点将导致一个不幸的后果，即法律解释不再是一个统一的主题。（类比于将已经充分理解的化学反应排除在化学学科之外。）无论是寻求语言意义、法律内容还是争议的最佳解决方案，处理简单问题与处理难题时，人们从事的是同一项事业。一个密切相关的观点是，特定法律问题是简单还是困难，是相对于解释者而言的。对于经验丰富的税务律师来说，一个晦涩的税务问题的答案可能显而易见。 因此，这一建议将导致法律解释的内容取决于由谁（以及何时）进行解释。

Perhaps surprisingly, most of the literature on legal interpretation does not consider the foundational question of legal interpretation’s constitutive aim.^[2] In evaluating methods of interpretation, writers tend to appeal to whatever considerations strike them as valuable without addressing what legal interpretation is for. For example, Philip Frickey suggests that the way to evaluate purposivism is by asking “whether the interpretations that this theory produces are more worthwhile for a legal system than would be literalist or intentionalist ones” (2006, 851–52).^[3]
或许令人惊讶的是，大多数关于法律解释的文献并未探讨法律解释构成性目标这一基础性问题。 ^[2] 在评估解释方法时，作者们往往诉诸于他们认为有价值的任何考量，而不涉及法律解释的目的。例如，菲利普·弗里克提出，评估目的论的方法在于询问“该理论产生的解释是否比字面主义或意图主义对法律体系更有价值”（2006, 851–52）。 ^[3]

It is likely that the term “legal interpretation” is not always used with a precise and univocal meaning. We have some paradigms of theories of legal interpretation, but it may well be that they are not all engaged in exactly the same enterprise. To the extent that the term has different uses, it’s probably not helpful to try to identify the uniquely correct use of the term. Instead, we should ask how the term would be usefully regimented. The primary desideratum should be to accurately capture the central enterprise of influential theories such as textualism, purposivism, and originalism. Another factor that could favor a particular understanding of legal interpretation is whether it has the consequence that the term picks out a theoretically unified enterprise.
“法律解释”这一术语很可能并不总是以精确且单一的含义被使用。我们拥有一些法律解释理论的范式，但它们很可能并非全都从事完全相同的活动。鉴于该术语存在不同用法，试图确定其唯一正确的用法可能并无助益。相反，我们应当探讨如何对该术语进行有效规范。首要目标应是准确捕捉文本主义、目的论和原旨主义等具有影响力的理论核心内容。另一个可能支持特定法律解释理解的因素是：该术语是否能够指向理论上统一的研究领域。

2.1 Linguistic Meaning  2.1 语言意义

In discussions of legal interpretation, there is a widespread assumption – sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit – that legal interpretation seeks the meaning of the legal texts. Frequently, all sides to a legal interpretive debate ostensibly agree that the debate concerns the meaning of a particular legal text (Berman and Toh 2013, 547, fn. 11; Greenberg 2014, 1297 fn. 19; see, e.g., Greenawalt 2004, 275–77; Alexander and Prakash 2004, 991; Goldsworthy 2009, 683; Fallon 2015, 1237, 1297–1307; Lawson 1997; Barak 2005, 3; Whittington 2010, 121; Fiss 1982, 739, 743–45; Dickerson 1975, 3, 217; for judicial examples, see the various opinions in Smith v. United States, and District of Columbia v. Heller).^[4] But this apparent agreement does not in fact tell us much because the term “meaning” (and its cognates) is often used loosely and, in any event, has several senses. There is a broad use of the term in which it is a rough synonym of “implication” or “consequence.” One might ask what the outcome of a particular election means for international trade or for abortion rights.
在关于法律解释的讨论中，普遍存在一种假设——有时明确，有时隐含——即法律解释旨在寻求法律文本的意义。通常，法律解释辩论的各方表面上都同意，辩论涉及的是特定法律文本的含义（Berman 和 Toh 2013, 547, 脚注 11; Greenberg 2014, 1297 脚注 19; 参见例如 Greenawalt 2004, 275–77; Alexander 和 Prakash 2004, 991; Goldsworthy 2009, 683; Fallon 2015, 1237, 1297–1307; Lawson 1997; Barak 2005, 3; Whittington 2010, 121; Fiss 1982, 739, 743–45; Dickerson 1975, 3, 217; 司法案例可参见 Smith v. United States 及 District of Columbia v. Heller 中的不同意见）。 ^[4] 但这种表面上的共识实际上并未告诉我们太多，因为“意义”（及其相关词）这一术语常常被宽松地使用，而且无论如何都有多种含义。该术语有一种宽泛的用法，大致等同于“隐含”或“后果”。人们可能会问某次特定选举的结果对国际贸易或堕胎权意味着什么。

Again, “meaning” can be used to mean, roughly, significance, as when we catch someone doing something inappropriate and ask, “what is the meaning of this?”
同样，“意义”可以用来大致表示重要性，比如当我们发现某人做了不恰当的事情时，会问：“这是什么意思？”

Differently again, “meaning” can be used for the information or content that a symbol expresses or represents. This symbolic meaning can be called meaning in the strict sense. Mathematical symbols and semaphore flags have meanings in the strict sense.
同样地，“意义”也可用于指代符号所表达或代表的信息或内容。这种符号意义可称为严格意义上的意义。数学符号和旗语信号就具有严格意义上的意义。

Linguistic meaning is a species of symbolic meaning. Linguistic meaning is the information that is reliably and systematically conveyed by words, sentences, and other linguistic entities. In fact, there are several kinds and components of linguistic meaning, such as word meaning, semantic content, what is said, speaker meaning, and implicature.^[5] (In this subsection, in considering the possibility that legal interpretation seeks linguistic meaning, I set aside the issue of the type of linguistic meaning.)
语言意义是符号意义的一个种类。语言意义是通过词语、句子及其他语言实体可靠且系统传递的信息。实际上，语言意义包含多种类型和组成部分，如词汇意义、语义内容、所言之意、说话者意义以及言外之意。 ^[5] （在本小节中，在探讨法律解释是否寻求语言意义的可能性时，我暂未考虑语言意义的类型问题。）

The widespread acceptance that legal interpretation seeks the meaning of a statute or constitutional provision most likely reflects some combination of 1) a lack of clarity about the sense in which the term “meaning” is being used; 2) misunderstandings about what linguistic meaning is; 3) a conflation of a provision’s linguistic meaning with its contribution to the content of the law (its contribution, for short); 4) and an assumption that a provision’s contribution is its linguistic meaning.^[6] See Berman and Toh 2013, 547. Even sophisticated theorists who carefully distinguish between different kinds of linguistic meaning fail to distinguish between a provision’s linguistic meaning and its contribution to the content of the law.^[7]
法律解释旨在寻求法规或宪法条款的含义这一普遍接受的观点，很可能反映了以下因素的某种组合：1）对“含义”一词使用方式的不明确；2）对语言含义的误解；3）将条款的语言含义与其对法律内容的贡献（简称“贡献”）混为一谈；4）以及假设条款的贡献即为其语言含义。 ^[6] 参见 Berman 和 Toh 2013 年著作第 547 页。即便是那些仔细区分不同类型语言含义的成熟理论家，也未能区分条款的语言含义与其对法律内容的贡献。 ^[7]

The “new originalists” (see section 3) explicitly advocate using the term “constitutional interpretation” for the process of discovering the meaning of the constitutional text (to be distinguished from “constitutional construction,” an “essentially creative” process of constructing meaning). But, with the important exception of Larry Solum (2010), it is clear from their writings that they are not using the term “meaning” consistently for linguistic meaning, often seeming to have in mind, for example, a legal norm or understandings about how a legal norm was to be applied to specific cases (e.g., Whittington 1999a, 5–11; Barnett 2013, 419). For further examples, see section 4.2. As suggested below, it is arguable that their view is best reconstructed as holding that legal interpretation seeks the content of the law, which they hold to be constituted by “public meaning.”
“新原旨主义者”（见第 3 节）明确主张使用“宪法解释”这一术语来描述发现宪法文本意义的过程（以区别于“宪法构建”，即一种“本质上具有创造性”的意义构建过程）。然而，除拉里·索勒姆（2010 年）这一重要例外，从他们的著作中可以明显看出，他们并未始终如一地将“意义”一词用于语言意义，而似乎常常考虑的是法律规范或关于如何将法律规范应用于具体案例的理解（例如，惠廷顿 1999a，5-11；巴尼特 2013，419）。更多例子见第 4.2 节。如下文所述，有观点认为他们的立场最好被重构为：法律解释寻求的是法律的内容，而他们认为这些内容由“公共意义”构成。

It is crucial not to conflate a provision’s linguistic meaning with its contribution to the content of the law. It might turn out that a statute’s contribution is constituted by its linguistic meaning (or, more precisely, by a specific kind of linguistic meaning), but this is a highly controversial claim about how the content of the law is determined. If, in addressing the preliminary question of what legal interpretation seeks, we simply conflate a statute’s contribution with its linguistic meaning, then, among other mistakes, we miss the need for a substantive argument for that claim.
关键不可将条款的语言意义与其对法律内容的贡献混为一谈。一个法规的贡献可能确实由其语言意义（或更准确地说，由某种特定类型的语言意义）构成，但这一关于法律内容如何确定的观点极具争议性。如果在探讨法律解释目标这一初步问题时，我们简单地将法规的贡献等同于其语言意义，那么除了其他错误外，我们还将忽略为该主张提供实质性论证的必要性。

Despite the widespread assumption that legal interpretation seeks linguistic meaning, many prominent and influential theories of legal interpretation – including purposivism, some forms of intentionalism, Ronald Dworkin’s theory, and pragmatism – do not make any kind of linguistic meaning the focus of their inquiry, though this fact is often obscured by confusions about the nature of linguistic meaning as well as claims by the advocates of the theories. (See sections 3 and 4.) In fact, as we will see (section 4.2), there is a good case that even contemporary textualism is not best understood as trying to ascertain linguistic meaning.
尽管普遍认为法律解释寻求的是语言意义，但许多重要且有影响力的法律解释理论——包括目的论、某些形式的意图主义、罗纳德·德沃金的理论以及实用主义——并未将任何类型的语言意义作为其探究的核心，尽管这一事实常因对语言意义本质的混淆以及理论支持者的主张而被掩盖。（参见第 3 和第 4 节。）事实上，正如我们将看到的（第 4.2 节），有充分理由认为，即使是当代文本主义也不应被简单地理解为试图确定语言意义。

What can be said in favor of the claim that legal interpretation seeks linguistic meaning? It is often taken as a starting point that interpretation is the activity of attributing meaning. (e.g., Knapp and Michaels 1982; 1983; Graglia 1992; Fish 2005; 2008; Michaels 2009; Alexander 2013). By definition, one version of the argument goes, interpretation of any object seeks its meaning – presumably in the strict sense of what that object symbolizes or represents. (If “meaning” were intended in the loose sense of significance, the argument could yield no real constraint on legal interpretation.) A different but related argument is that legal interpretation is an instance of linguistic interpretation, and linguistic interpretation seeks linguistic meaning (e.g., Soames, 2009; Alexander 2011).
支持法律解释寻求语言意义这一主张的理由是什么？通常认为解释是赋予意义的活动（如 Knapp 和 Michaels 1982；1983；Graglia 1992；Fish 2005；2008；Michaels 2009；Alexander 2013）。根据定义，一种观点认为，对任何对象的解释都寻求其意义——严格来说，即该对象象征或代表什么。（如果“意义”是在宽泛的重要性意义上使用，这一论点就无法对法律解释施加真正的限制。）另一个不同但相关的论点是，法律解释是语言解释的一个实例，而语言解释寻求的是语言意义（如 Soames, 2009；Alexander 2011）。

The former argument does not take us very far. To begin with, the claim that interpretation of an object is, by definition, the search for its meaning is dubious. Radiologists interpret x-rays, and x-rays don’t have meanings in the strict sense. More to the point, the meaning of the word “interpretation” or the nature of interpretation (in general, as opposed to legal interpretation specifically) is peripheral to our concerns. Rather, as noted above, the central consideration is what the paradigm theories – textualism, purposivism, and the like – are engaged in. If it turns out that they are engaged in some enterprise that is not correctly designated “interpretation,” then so be it. It would not be problematic if legal interpretation – the topic of this chapter – is not in fact a type of interpretation properly so called (cf. Sunstein 2015).
前一种论点并未深入探讨。首先，将对象的解释定义为对其意义的追寻这一主张本身就值得商榷——放射科医师解读 X 光片，而 X 光片严格来说并不具有"意义"。更重要的是，"interpretation"一词的含义或解释行为的本质（泛指一般性解释，而非特指法律解释）并非我们关注的核心。正如前文所述，关键问题在于范式理论——文本主义、目的论等——实际从事的是什么活动。即便最终发现这些理论所从事的事业不能被准确称为"解释"，那也无妨。即使本章讨论的法律解释严格来说并不属于真正意义上的解释类型（参见 Sunstein 2015），这本身并不构成理论障碍。

The second argument – that linguistic interpretation in general seeks the linguistic meaning of texts – begs the question because it starts from the assumption that legal interpretation is a type of linguistic interpretation. It’s uncontroversial that legal interpretation typically involves scrutinizing linguistic texts, among other things – even that interpreting linguistic texts is typically part of what goes into legal interpretation. But in an inquiry into the constitutive aim of legal interpretation, it is question begging to assume that legal interpretation is linguistic interpretation in a sense that entails that legal interpretation has the constitutive aim of linguistic interpretation.^[8]
第二个论点——即语言解释通常寻求文本的语言意义——是在回避问题，因为它始于法律解释是语言解释的一种类型这一假设。无可争议的是，法律解释通常涉及对语言文本的仔细审查，以及其他事项——甚至解释语言文本通常是法律解释的一部分。但在探讨法律解释的构成性目标时，假设法律解释是语言解释，从而意味着法律解释具有语言解释的构成性目标，这是在回避问题。 ^[8]

An important reason for rejecting the claim that legal interpretation seeks linguistic meaning derives from three propositions that are widely shared by theorists of legal interpretation: 1) legal interpretation often yields interpretations that resolve legal disputes; 2) in resolving disputes, judges must follow the content of the law except in extremely unusual circumstances; 3) the content of the law is often determinate enough to resolve disputes. Given these tenets, the output of legal interpretation cannot be merely the linguistic meaning of the relevant texts. If it were, and if judges must in general follow the content of the law, then legal interpretation would not be able to yield outputs that resolve legal disputes; there would have to be a further step of ascertaining the content of the law. In addition, as will be evident from the discussion in sections 3 and 4, most theories of legal interpretation make legal interpretation depend on factors that are not relevant to ascertaining linguistic meaning.
拒绝法律解释旨在寻求语言意义这一主张的一个重要原因，源于法律解释理论家广泛认同的三个命题：1）法律解释常产生能解决法律争议的诠释；2）除极端特殊情况外，法官裁决争议时必须遵循法律内容；3）法律内容通常具有足够确定性以解决争议。基于这些原则，法律解释的产出不能仅是相关文本的语言意义。若果真如此，且法官通常必须遵循法律内容，那么法律解释将无法产生解决法律争议的结果——必须存在进一步确定法律内容的步骤。此外，从第 3 节和第 4 节的讨论中可明显看出，多数法律解释理论使法律解释依赖于与确定语言意义无关的因素。

It might be objected that finding the linguistic meaning of the relevant legal texts does resolve disputes because the linguistic meaning constitutes the provision’s contribution to the law. This objection concedes that legal interpretation seeks a provision’s contribution to the law and assumes that that contribution is constituted by linguistic meaning. The objection therefore should be understood as taking the position that legal interpretation, by its nature, seeks the (provisions’ contribution to the) content of the law, and further holding, based on a controversial substantive claim about how the content of the law is determined, that the correct method of legal interpretation is to ascertain linguistic meaning. At any rate, legal interpretation’s constitutive aim should not be understood in a way whose plausibility depends on a controversial substantive claim about how the content of the law is determined.
有人可能会反驳说，确定相关法律文本的语言学意义确实能解决争议，因为语言学意义构成了该条款对法律的贡献。这一反驳承认法律解释旨在寻求条款对法律的贡献，并假设该贡献由语言学意义构成。因此，应将该反驳理解为持以下立场：法律解释本质上追求的是（条款对）法律内容的贡献，并进一步基于一个有争议的实质性主张——即关于法律内容如何确定的观点——认为法律解释的正确方法是确定语言学意义。无论如何，不应以一种其合理性依赖于关于法律内容如何确定的有争议实质性主张的方式，来理解法律解释的构成性目标。

The argument based on the three widely shared propositions counts strongly in favor of either the position that legal interpretation seeks the correct resolution of disputes or the position that it seeks the content of the law. Let us address these positions in turn.
基于三个广泛认同的命题的论点强烈支持以下两种立场之一：法律解释旨在寻求争议的正确解决，或法律解释旨在寻求法律的内容。让我们依次探讨这些立场。

2.2 The Correct Resolution of Disputes
2.2 争议的正确解决

According to the former position, legal interpretation seeks something broader than linguistic meaning and provisions’ contribution to the law. It seeks the resolution of disputes that come before courts or other adjudicators. The position is not often explicitly defended. In fact, there has been a recent tendency to insist on distinguishing between adjudication (understood as encompassing everything that courts must do to resolve disputes) and interpretation.^[9]
根据前一种观点，法律解释寻求的不仅是语言意义和法律条文对法律的贡献，还包括更广泛的内容。它旨在解决提交至法院或其他裁决机构面前的争议。这一立场并不常被明确辩护。事实上，近来有一种趋势强调要将裁决（理解为法院为解决争议所需做的一切）与解释区分开来。 ^[9]

The most important factors favoring the dispute-resolution understanding of legal interpretation (over an understanding on which legal interpretation seeks a provision’s contribution) are the open-ended process characteristic of much legal interpretation and the ad hoc or eclectic approach to evaluating methods of legal interpretation employed by much writing on legal interpretation. Lawyers and judges typically take into account a wide range of factors in legal interpretation without a well-structured conception of how and why these different factors are relevant.
支持法律解释争议解决理解（而非寻求条款贡献的理解）的最重要因素，是许多法律解释所具有的开放性过程特征，以及大量关于法律解释的著作在评估法律解释方法时所采用的临时性或折衷性方法。律师和法官在法律解释中通常会考虑广泛的因素，而对这些不同因素如何及为何相关的理解缺乏结构化的概念。

In addition, traditional writings on legal interpretation, as well as many contemporary ones, take an eclectic approach to defending and evaluating methods of interpretation, appealing to whatever aspects or consequences of a method are valuable or desirable. (E.g., Posner 1986, 201; Molot 2006, 64–65.)^[10] This kind of approach seems better suited to identifying the best method of resolving disputes than to finding the most reliable method of ascertaining a provision’s contribution to the law. On the other hand, as noted above, the use of such an approach may simply reflect the fact that most writers have not carefully considered the question what legal interpretation seeks.
此外，关于法律解释的传统著作以及许多当代作品，在辩护和评估解释方法时采取了一种折衷主义的方式，诉诸于任何有价值或可取的方法方面或后果。（例如，Posner 1986, 201; Molot 2006, 64–65。） ^[10] 这种方法似乎更适合于确定解决争议的最佳方法，而非寻找确定条款对法律贡献的最可靠方法。另一方面，如上所述，使用这种方法可能仅仅反映了大多数作者并未仔细考虑法律解释追求什么的问题。

Several factors mitigate against the understanding of legal interpretation as seeking the best overall resolution of disputes. First, this understanding would exclude the possibility that legal interpretation can be engaged in by actors who are not resolving specific disputes. It would even exclude the possibility of legal interpretation by an institution in an authoritative opinion whenever the institution is not considering how to resolve a dispute. Second, more importantly, on this understanding of legal interpretation, it would comprise several different activities: ascertaining what the law is; creating so-called decision rules to implement broad legal norms, such as constitutional doctrines; making discretionary decisions not governed by dispositive legal standards, such as fixing criminal sentences under statutes that specify a range of permissible sentences; fashioning new legal standards; figuring out how to resolve disputes when not resolved by applicable first-order legal norms, for example by applying burdens of proof or other closure rules; and deciding whether to depart from the law in cases of exceptional injustice or extraordinary harm. But our paradigm theories of legal interpretation do not even address most of these activities. For example, intentionalism, purposivism, and textualism have nothing to say about how to fix defendants’ sentences within a statutory range, how to fashion new legal standards, and whether to depart from the law in cases of exceptional injustice.
有几个因素阻碍了将法律解释理解为寻求争议的最佳整体解决方案。首先，这种理解将排除非解决具体争议的参与者从事法律解释的可能性。它甚至会在机构不考虑如何解决争议时，排除其在权威意见中进行法律解释的可能性。其次，更重要的是，在这种对法律解释的理解下，它将包含几种不同的活动：确定法律是什么；创建所谓的决策规则以实施广泛的法律规范，如宪法原则；做出不受决定性法律标准约束的自由裁量决定，例如在指定允许刑期范围的法规下确定刑事判决；制定新的法律标准；在适用的第一级法律规范未解决争议时，通过适用举证责任或其他终结规则来找出解决争议的方法；以及在特殊不公正或极端伤害的情况下决定是否偏离法律。 但我们关于法律解释的范式理论甚至没有涉及这些活动中的大多数。例如，意图主义、目的主义和文本主义对于如何在法定范围内确定被告的刑期、如何制定新的法律标准以及在极端不公正案件中是否偏离法律等问题均未置一词。

2.3 A Provision’s Contribution to the Content of the Law
2.3 条款对法律内容的贡献

On this position, theories of legal interpretation seek to discover how determinants of the content of the law, such as the ratification of the Constitution or the enactment of a bill, affect the content of the law. Increasingly, there is a perceptible trend toward recognizing this position.^[11] On this approach, the linguistic meanings of legal texts are obviously a highly relevant factor, but theories of legal interpretation seek more than just the linguistic meaning of legal texts; they seek to ascertain the law. Theories of legal interpretation do not, however, purport to offer guidance on other issues, such as how to make discretionary decisions not controlled by legal standards or whether to follow the law.
在这一立场上，法律解释理论试图揭示诸如宪法批准或法案颁布等法律内容的决定因素如何影响法律内容。越来越明显的是，人们正趋向于认可这一立场。 ^[11] 按照这一方法，法律文本的语言意义显然是一个高度相关的因素，但法律解释理论寻求的不仅仅是法律文本的语言意义；它们旨在确定法律。然而，法律解释理论并不声称能为其他问题提供指导，例如如何做出不受法律标准约束的自由裁量决定，或是否遵循法律。

The most important arguments in favor of this understanding of legal interpretation are the main arguments against the linguistic-meaning and dispute-resolution understandings. If legal interpretation is to resolve many disputes, and judges are in general bound to follow the law, then (assuming that there often are relevant legal standards) legal interpretation must at least yield the content of the law. On the other hand, theories of legal interpretation do not include components that would be necessary if they were theories of how to resolve disputes generally. Similarly, though the term “legal interpretation” is often used loosely and is sometimes used in a way that encompasses activities such as creating law interstitially, when the different activities necessary to resolve disputes are carefully distinguished, few would classify all of them as part of legal interpretation. For example, it would stretch the term beyond recognition to categorize deciding whether to refuse to follow the law as legal interpretation.
支持这种法律解释理解的最重要论点，正是反对语言意义说和纠纷解决说的主要论据。如果法律解释旨在解决众多争议，且法官通常受法律约束，那么（假设相关法律标准常存在）法律解释至少必须揭示法律的内容。另一方面，法律解释理论若作为普遍解决争议的理论，则缺乏必要的构成要素。同样，尽管“法律解释”一词常被宽泛使用，有时甚至涵盖诸如填补法律空隙等行为，但当仔细区分解决争议所需的不同活动时，很少有人会将它们全部归类为法律解释的一部分。例如，将决定是否拒绝遵循法律归为法律解释，会使这一术语的含义扭曲到无法辨识的程度。

Moreover, if we use the term “legal interpretation” for the entire process of resolving disputes, it will not pick out a theoretically unified subject. What is involved in, for example, ascertaining the content of the law is extremely different from what is involved in fashioning new legal standards, making discretionary decisions, and deciding whether to refuse to apply the law. Understanding legal interpretation as seeking a provision’s contribution to the content of the law has the great advantage that it gives legal interpretation a theoretically unified subject matter.
此外，若我们将“法律解释”这一术语用于指代解决争议的整个过程，它将无法识别出一个理论统一的主题。例如，确定法律内容所涉及的因素与制定新法律标准、作出自由裁量决定以及决定是否拒绝适用法律所涉及的因素截然不同。将法律解释理解为寻求某条款对法律内容的贡献，具有极大优势，因为它为法律解释提供了一个理论统一的研究对象。

One objection is that many of the arguments that courts and theorists make suggest that they are engaged in a broader enterprise than merely ascertaining the law (a point closely related to the argument, noted in section 3.2, that the typically eclectic approach to evaluating methods of legal interpretation favors the dispute-resolution understanding of legal interpretation). For example, Justice Scalia, the most prominent advocate of textualism, often argued that any other approach would leave judges less constrained and make them more likely to decide cases in accordance with their personal preferences (e.g., 1997, 17–18, 23). And early originalists, including Scalia and Robert Bork, used similar kinds of arguments to advocate originalism (Bork 1971, 7; Scalia, 1989, 862–63).
一种反对意见认为，法院和理论家提出的许多论点表明，他们所从事的事业比单纯查明法律更为广泛（这一观点与第 3.2 节提到的论点密切相关，即评价法律解释方法时通常采用的折衷主义倾向支持将法律解释理解为争议解决）。例如，文本主义最著名的倡导者斯卡利亚大法官经常辩称，任何其他方法都会减少对法官的约束，使他们更可能根据个人偏好裁决案件（如 1997 年著作第 17-18 页、23 页）。包括斯卡利亚和罗伯特·博克在内的早期原旨主义者也曾用类似论点来支持原旨主义（博克 1971 年著作第 7 页；斯卡利亚 1989 年著作第 862-63 页）。

In the influential textualist and originalist movements, however, there has been a discernible trend away from arguments about restraining judges and toward arguments that textualism and originalism accurately identify the content of the law. Berman (2018, 1340–44) identifies this trend in originalist scholarship. (See also Whittington 2004, 608–09.) As Randy Barnett puts it, “the original meaning of the text provides the law that legal decision-makers are bound by” (Barnett 2013, 417). See, e.g., Calabresi and Prakash 1994, 552; Bork, 1990, 5, 144. Similarly, textualists seem to be gravitating towards the idea that “the text is the law.” Scalia 1997, 22; Scalia and Garner 2012, 383, 397–98; Easterbrook, 2017, 82. As Berman (2018, 1343 n. 60) points out, however, Scalia was not consistent in this regard. See Scalia and Garner 2012, xxviii–xxix, 22, 364–66, 394–96.
然而，在颇具影响力的文本主义与原旨主义运动中，存在一个明显的趋势：从关于约束法官的论点转向主张文本主义和原旨主义能准确识别法律内容的论点。Berman（2018, 1340–44）在原旨主义学术研究中指出了这一趋势。（另见 Whittington 2004, 608–09。）正如 Randy Barnett 所言，“文本的原始含义提供了法律决策者必须遵循的法律”（Barnett 2013, 417）。参见，例如，Calabresi and Prakash 1994, 552; Bork, 1990, 5, 144。同样，文本主义者似乎倾向于“文本即法律”的观点。Scalia 1997, 22; Scalia and Garner 2012, 383, 397–98; Easterbrook, 2017, 82。不过，正如 Berman（2018, 1343 n. 60）所指出的，Scalia 在这方面并不一致。参见 Scalia and Garner 2012, xxviii–xxix, 22, 364–66, 394–96。

On the other hand, as noted, prominent new originalists insist that the term “constitutional interpretation” should be used for identifying the meaning of the constitutional text. As they officially draw the interpretation/construction distinction, however, it contains no stage at which a court ascertains the content of the law; when a court is not interpreting, it is engaged in constitutional construction, which is supposed to be a creative and political process of constructing meaning (Barnett 2013, 619; 1999, 645–46; Whittington 1999a, 7). See section 3. A charitable reading of the new originalists might therefore take them to assume that a provision’s contribution is constituted by the meaning of the text or simply to equate a provision’s contribution with “the meaning of the text.” In that case, the new originalists may be understood, despite their rhetoric, as taking legal interpretation to seek a provision’s contribution.^[12] (In addition, as we will see in section 4.2, what the new originalists’ take to be the meaning of the text – “public meaning” – is probably best understood as not a kind of linguistic meaning at all.)
另一方面，正如所指出的，著名的新原旨主义者坚持认为，“宪法解释”这一术语应用于确定宪法文本的含义。然而，当他们正式区分解释与建构时，这一过程并不包含法院确定法律内容的阶段；当法院不进行解释时，它便是在进行宪法建构，这被认为是一个创造性和政治性的意义构建过程（Barnett 2013, 619; 1999, 645–46; Whittington 1999a, 7）。参见第 3 节。因此，对新原旨主义者的一种善意解读可能是，他们认为条款的贡献由文本的含义构成，或简单地将条款的贡献等同于“文本的含义”。在这种情况下，尽管他们的言辞如此，新原旨主义者可能被理解为将法律解释视为寻求条款的贡献。 ^[12] （此外，正如我们将在第 4.2 节中看到的，新原旨主义者所认为的文本含义——“公共含义”——很可能最好不被理解为一种语言含义。）

Resistance to understanding legal interpretation as the search for a provision’s contribution to the content of the law may be due in some quarters to a tacit assumption that there is no clear line between searching for a provision’s contribution to the law and creating legal norms or finding ways of resolving disputes when there is no applicable first-order law. Although many lawyers and judges seem to be attracted to some version of this assumption, it’s not entirely clear how to make sense of it. On the face of it, the factors and decisions relevant to ascertaining the content of the law are very different from those relevant to fashioning legal norms or to deciding how to resolve disputes not controlled by legal norms.
某些领域对将法律解释视为探寻条款对法律内容的贡献持抵制态度，可能源于一种默认假设，即探寻条款对法律的贡献与创制法律规范或寻找解决无适用一级法律时的争议方法之间并无明确界限。尽管许多律师和法官似乎倾向于接受这一假设的某种版本，但如何理解它并不完全清楚。表面上看，确定法律内容相关的因素和决策与塑造法律规范或决定如何解决不受法律规范控制的争议所涉及的因素和决策截然不同。

One possibility is that lawyers and judges have a tendency, encouraged by early 20^th century movements like logical empiricism and American legal realism, to confuse uncertainty with indeterminacy. (See the entry on logical empiricism.) There is often uncertainty about how a provision contributes to the content of the law. Any interesting legal interpretation begins from such uncertainty. If one confuses such uncertainty with indeterminacy, then one will conclude that legal interpretation includes cases in which it is indeterminate how the relevant provisions contribute to the content of the law – and therefore that legal interpretation must not be limited to ascertaining the content of the law.
一种可能性是，律师和法官受到 20 世纪初逻辑实证主义（logical empiricism）与美国法律现实主义（American legal realism）等思潮的影响，倾向于将不确定性（uncertainty）与不确定性（indeterminacy）混为一谈。（参见关于逻辑实证主义的条目。）关于某项条款如何影响法律内容，常常存在不确定性。任何有意义的法律解释都始于这种不确定性。若将此类不确定性与不确定性相混淆，便会得出法律解释包含相关条款如何影响法律内容尚不确定的情形——进而认为法律解释绝不能仅限于确定法律的内容。

A related point is that much legal interpretation seems to involve value judgments. If one assumes a metaphysics of law according to which the content of the law cannot depend on such value judgments – as some legal theorists do – then one will think that legal interpretation must not be merely a search for provisions’ contributions to the law.
一个相关的观点是，许多法律解释似乎涉及价值判断。如果一个人采用的法律形而上学认为法律的内容不能依赖于这样的价值判断——正如一些法律理论家所做的那样——那么他就会认为法律解释绝不能仅仅是对条款对法律贡献的探寻。

These issues cannot be pursued further here. The discussion in sections 3 and 4 of different substantive theories of legal interpretation will not assume a particular view of legal interpretation’s constitutive aim. Section 5 develops the point that the plausibility of particular substantive theories, and the aptness of arguments for and against them, depends on legal interpretation’s constitutive aim.
这些问题在此无法进一步探讨。第 3 节和第 4 节中关于法律解释的不同实质性理论的讨论，将不会预设法律解释构成性目标的特定观点。第 5 节将阐述一个观点，即特定实质性理论的合理性，以及支持或反对这些理论的论据的恰当性，取决于法律解释的构成性目标。

3. Overview of Methods of Legal Interpretation
3. 法律解释方法概述

This section provides a brief overview of several well-known methods of legal interpretation. The goal is to introduce readers to standard formulations, not to offer in-depth analysis of what the methods actually come to. The section therefore sketches the way in which proponents typically gloss their methods, without attempting to look behind these characterizations.
本节简要概述了几种著名的法律解释方法，旨在向读者介绍标准表述，而非深入分析这些方法的实质内涵。因此，本部分仅勾勒支持者通常对其方法的表面描述，并不试图探究这些描述背后的深层含义。

Textualism  文本主义

Textualists give priority in statutory and constitutional interpretation to the relevant texts.^[13] Textualism is typically formulated in opposition to intentionalism or purposivism, as it rejects the search for legislative intentions or more general statutory purposes – at least to the extent that they are not enacted in the text. If the meaning of a text is taken to be clear, textualists reject the appeal to other sources to modify or depart from that meaning, even when the meaning of the text seems to be in tension with apparent legislative purposes. (Eskridge 1990, 686; Scalia 1997, 17–23; Manning 2001, 7, 17; 2006, 92–93, 110–11). A prominent feature of contemporary textualism is a rejection of appeals to legislative history, which textualists regard as unreliable and manipulable (Scalia 1997, 29–37; Scalia and Garner 2012, 376–78; Easterbrook 1990, 448–49; 1994, 65; 2017, 90–91; Manning 2011, 123–24).
文本主义者优先考虑法规和宪法解释中的相关文本。 ^[13] 文本主义通常与意图主义或目的主义相对立，因为它拒绝寻找立法意图或更广泛的法规目的——至少在这些意图或目的未被写入文本的情况下。如果文本的含义被认为是明确的，文本主义者会拒绝诉诸其他来源来修改或偏离该含义，即使文本的含义似乎与明显的立法目的存在冲突（Eskridge 1990, 686; Scalia 1997, 17–23; Manning 2001, 7, 17; 2006, 92–93, 110–11）。当代文本主义的一个显著特点是拒绝诉诸立法历史，文本主义者认为这些历史不可靠且易被操纵（Scalia 1997, 29–37; Scalia and Garner 2012, 376–78; Easterbrook 1990, 448–49; 1994, 65; 2017, 90–91; Manning 2011, 123–24）。

Intentionalism  意向主义

Intentionalists maintain that the primary or exclusive role of the interpreter is finding the intentions of the enacting legislature or of the constitutional framers or ratifiers (Bork 1971; Alexander and Prakash 2004; Knapp and Michaels 2005; Fish 2005; 2008; Michaels 2009; Alexander 2013). Although the meaning of the text is an important guide to the relevant intentions, intentionalism contemplates that other evidence of intentions, including legislative history, may override the evidence of the text. The discussion of intentionalism below will distinguish between several kinds of legislative intentions that are frequently conflated in the legal interpretation literature. These distinctions yield several kinds of intentionalism. See below section 4.1.
意向主义者认为，解释者的主要或唯一职责在于探寻立法机关制定法律时的意图，或宪法制定者与批准者的意图（Bork 1971; Alexander and Prakash 2004; Knapp and Michaels 2005; Fish 2005; 2008; Michaels 2009; Alexander 2013）。尽管文本含义是推断相关意图的重要依据，但意向主义理论允许其他意图证据（包括立法历史）优先于文本证据。下文对意向主义的讨论将区分法律解释文献中常被混为一谈的几种立法意图类型，这些区分衍生出多种意向主义理论。详见第 4.1 节。

Purposivism  目的主义

One important strand of intentionalism has come to be called purposivism. According to the seminal account, interpreters should “decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved” on the assumption that the legislature consisted of “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.” (Hart and Sacks 1994, 1374, 1378). This formulation makes clear that the relevant purpose is not a psychological state of any actual person or body, but an “objectified” purpose that is imputed to the provision based on an idealization (though some writers understand purposivism as making an empirical assumption about actual intentions). (On “objectified” intentions, see section 4.1.) For purposivists, the meaning of the words is to be subordinated to, and interpreted in light of, the purpose of the provision.
意向主义的一个重要分支被称为目的论。根据开创性论述，解释者应“在假定立法机关由‘理性人合理追求合理目的’的基础上，决定应归因于法规及其任何相关从属条款的目的”（Hart and Sacks 1994, 1374, 1378）。这一表述明确表明，相关目的并非任何实际个人或团体的心理状态，而是基于理想化归因于条款的“客体化”目的（尽管部分学者将目的论理解为对实际意图的经验性假设）。（关于“客体化”意图，参见 4.1 节。）对于目的论者而言，词语的含义应从属于条款目的并依此进行解释。

Originalism  原旨主义

Originalism comprises the family of theories of constitutional interpretation that give primacy to some aspect of the Constitution at the time it was ratified. This original aspect is variously taken to be the intentions of the framers or ratifiers of the Constitution, the meaning of the text, the way in which the text would have been understood by the ratifiers of the Constitution, or well-established practices at the time.^[14] See entry on Constitutionalism. Originalism thus includes both intentionalist and non-intentionalist theories of interpretation. What the various forms of originalism have in common is their taking the correct interpretation of the Constitution to be fixed by a particular feature of the Constitution at the time of ratification. It promotes clarity to frame this core idea in terms of the Constitution’s contribution to the content of the law (though originalists do not always do so): that contribution is fixed by the relevant aspect of the Constitution at the time of ratification and does not change thereafter.
原旨主义包含了一系列宪法解释理论，这些理论将宪法在批准时的某些方面置于首要地位。这一原始方面被不同地理解为宪法制定者或批准者的意图、文本的含义、宪法批准者对文本的理解方式，或是当时确立已久的惯例。 ^[14] 参见宪政主义条目。因此，原旨主义既包括意图主义的解释理论，也包括非意图主义的解释理论。各种形式的原旨主义的共同点是，它们认为宪法的正确解释是由宪法在批准时的某一特定特征所固定的。为了清晰起见，可以用宪法对法律内容的贡献来表述这一核心思想（尽管原旨主义者并不总是这样做）：这一贡献是由宪法在批准时的相关方面所固定的，此后不会改变。

The intentionalist approach to constitutional interpretation, which takes the relevant aspect of the Constitution to be the framers’ or ratifiers’ intentions, flourished for a time in the second half of the 20^th century (fading in the 1980s), but, in recent decades, originalists have shifted their focus to original meaning (see Whittington 2013, 379–82; Kesavan and Paulsen 2003, 1134–48). Contemporary originalism tends to focus on “original public meaning,” by which originalists mean, roughly speaking, the way in which reasonable readers of the Constitution would have understood its meaning at the time it was ratified. See section 4.2 below.
宪法解释的意图主义方法，将宪法的相关方面视为制定者或批准者的意图，在 20 世纪下半叶（20 世纪 80 年代逐渐式微）曾一度盛行，但近几十年来，原旨主义者已将关注点转向原始含义（参见 Whittington 2013, 379–82; Kesavan and Paulsen 2003, 1134–48）。当代原旨主义倾向于关注“原始公共含义”，原旨主义者大致指的是宪法在批准时合理读者对其含义的理解方式。详见下文第 4.2 节。

New Originalism  新原旨主义

A prominent camp of public meaning originalists are the new originalists (Whittington 2004; 2013; Barnett 1999; 2013; Solum 2010; 2013a; 2013b; 2015; see also Goldsworthy 1997).
公共意义原旨主义者的一个重要阵营是新原旨主义者（Whittington 2004; 2013; Barnett 1999; 2013; Solum 2010; 2013a; 2013b; 2015; 另见 Goldsworthy 1997）。

In addition to the focus on public meaning, as mentioned in the previous section, a characteristic position of the new originalists is an emphasis on – in their vocabulary – a distinction between “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional construction.” As the new originalists draw this distinction, constitutional interpretation involves ascertaining the “public meaning” of the Constitution at the time it was ratified. (On “public meaning,” see section 4.2.) Constitutional construction, as defined by some of the new originalists, involves constitutional adjudication in cases where the original meaning “runs out,” “fails to provide a unique rule of law,” or does not “dictate a unique application”. Barnett 2013, 619; 1999, 645–46; Whittington 1999a, 7. In such cases, the new originalists think that “an act of creativity beyond interpretation” – “the construction of meaning” – is required. Whittington 1999a, 7. Solum (2010) and Barnett (2011) draw the distinction importantly differently, taking constitutional construction to be the ascertaining of the “legal effect” of a provision, including both its contribution and its application to particular cases (see Berman and Toh 2013 564–70).
除了前一节提到的对公共意义的关注外，新原旨主义者的一个典型立场是强调——用他们的术语来说——“宪法解释”与“宪法构建”之间的区别。按照新原旨主义者的划分，宪法解释涉及确定宪法在批准时的“公共意义”（关于“公共意义”，参见第 4.2 节）。而一些新原旨主义者定义的宪法构建，则是指在原始意义“耗尽”、“未能提供唯一的法律规则”或不能“规定唯一适用”的情况下进行的宪法裁决（Barnett 2013, 619; 1999, 645–46; Whittington 1999a, 7）。在这些情况下，新原旨主义者认为需要“超越解释的创造性行为”——即“意义的构建”（Whittington 1999a, 7）。 索伦（2010）和巴尼特（2011）对这一区分提出了重要不同的看法，认为宪法建构是对条款“法律效力”的确定，包括其对具体案件的贡献和适用（参见伯曼和托 2013 年著作第 564-70 页）。

Non-originalism  非原旨主义

Non-originalism and living constitutionalism are terms used for positions that deny that the proper interpretation of the Constitution is fixed at the time of ratification (e.g., Eisgruber 2001; Breyer 2005; Strauss 2010). See entry on Constitutionalism. Aleinikoff 1988 and Eskridge 2005 are examples of non-originalist theories of statutory interpretation.
非原旨主义与活宪法主义是指那些否认宪法正确解释应固定于批准时点的立场所使用的术语（例如，Eisgruber 2001；Breyer 2005；Strauss 2010）。参见宪法主义条目。Aleinikoff 1988 和 Eskridge 2005 是法规解释中非原旨主义理论的例证。

Notice that it is consistent with some versions of originalism that the correct application of constitutional norms may be different from the way in which the Constitution was originally intended and expected to apply. In one kind of case, the correct application of the Constitution changes over time as a result of changes in circumstances. The commerce clause, for example, specifies that Congress shall have power over “commerce among the several states” (U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 8, clause 3). If the relevant original aspect of the Constitution is the meaning of the words or the framers’ intention about what legal rule to adopt (on such intentions, see section 4.1), then, without any change in constitutional law, changes in the country’s economy may have the effect that types of businesses that were formerly not within the scope of Congress’s power over interstate commerce may now be within the scope of the power. (Greenberg and Litman 1998).
需要注意的是，某些版本的原始主义认为，宪法规范的正确适用可能与宪法最初意图和预期适用的方式有所不同。其中一种情况是，由于环境的变化，宪法的正确适用会随时间而改变。例如，商业条款规定国会对“各州之间的商业”拥有权力（美国宪法第一条第八款第三项）。如果宪法相关的原始方面是词语的含义或制定者关于采用何种法律规则的意图（关于此类意图，参见第 4.1 节），那么即使宪法法律本身没有变化，国家经济的变化也可能导致某些原本不在国会州际商业权力范围内的商业类型现在被纳入该权力范围。（Greenberg and Litman 1998）

In a second kind of case, original intentions about the application of a provision were based on beliefs now understood to be false. If the relevant original aspect of the Constitution is, say, the rule that the framer’s intended to enact, the correct application of the Constitution will be governed by the best understanding of what falls under that rule, not the original false beliefs. To take a simple example, consider someone who, at the time of ratification, was believed to be ineligible to be president because he was incorrectly believed to have been born in a foreign country and therefore not “a natural born Citizen” (U.S. Constitution Article II, section 1, clause 5). In this case, the way in which the provision was originally understood to apply was incorrect even at the time of ratification (Whittington 2013, 384).
在第二种情形中，关于条款适用的原始意图是基于如今被认定为错误的信念。如果宪法的相关原始方面是制宪者意图颁布的规则，那么宪法的正确适用将取决于对该规则适用范围的最佳理解，而非最初的错误信念。举一个简单的例子：假设某人在批准宪法时被认为不具备总统任职资格，因为人们错误地认为他出生在外国，因此不属于"本土出生的公民"（《美国宪法》第二条第一款第五项）。在这种情况下，该条款在批准之时就被错误理解其适用范围（Whittington 2013, 384）。

Despite this point, it is common to classify a theory as non-originalist if it allows that the application of the Constitution should be governed by the best available understanding of what falls under broad language of the Constitution – especially when that language includes moral terms. For example, a theory that allows that punishments not considered cruel at the time the Constitution was ratified may violate the eighth amendment because they are in fact cruel would standardly be considered a non-originalist theory. See entry on Constitutionalism, section 9. Such a position is, however, consistent with the Constitution’s contribution to the law’s being fixed by the original linguistic meaning of the text or by certain kinds of original intentions (see Whittington 2004, 610–11). There is thus an anomaly in the use of the originalism and non-originalism labels: positions that meet the definition of originalism given by its own proponents are standardly treated by both sides of the debate as non-originalist (see Eisgruber 2001, 27).
尽管如此，通常会将一种理论归类为非原旨主义，如果它认为宪法的适用应受制于对宪法宽泛语言（尤其是包含道德术语的表述）的最佳现有理解。例如，一种理论允许宪法批准时不被视为残酷的惩罚可能因实际上构成残酷而违反第八修正案，这种理论通常会被视为非原旨主义理论。参见“宪政主义”条目第 9 节。然而，这种立场与宪法通过文本原始语言含义或特定类型的原始意图对法律确定性所作的贡献是一致的（参见 Whittington 2004, 610–11）。因此，在原旨主义与非原旨主义标签的使用中存在一种反常现象：符合原旨主义支持者所给定义的观点，在辩论双方中通常被当作非原旨主义对待（参见 Eisgruber 2001, 27）。

Because non-originalism is simply defined as the denial of originalism, it does not pick out a distinctive method of interpretation, but encompasses several different positions. For example, common-law constitutionalism holds that courts develop constitutional law based on a body of precedents and past practices in much the same way that they develop common law (Strauss 1996; 2010; Waluchow 2007). I now turn to several other non-originalist positions – Ronald Dworkin’s view, pluralism, and pragmatism – that also apply to statutory interpretation.
由于非原旨主义被简单地定义为对原旨主义的否定，它并未指明一种独特的解释方法，而是涵盖了多种不同立场。例如，普通法宪政主义认为，法院基于一系列先例和过往实践发展宪法法律，其方式与普通法的发展极为相似（Strauss 1996；2010；Waluchow 2007）。接下来我将探讨其他几种同样适用于法律解释的非原旨主义立场——罗纳德·德沃金的观点、多元主义以及实用主义。

Dworkin’s Law as Integrity
德沃金的“法律作为整体性”

Ronald Dworkin’s influential work yields a distinctive account of legal interpretation. Two points are critical to an understanding of Dworkin’s contribution. First, Dworkin begins from a general theory of creative (as opposed to conversational and scientific) interpretation – one that encompasses, for example, literature, art, and non-legal social practices (1986, 50-51). According to this theory, an interpreter tries to show the object of interpretation in its best light, all things considered, by imposing a point or purpose on it. The best interpretation of an object is the one that makes it the best of its type or genre that it can be. (Dworkin 1986, chapter 2). Dworkin uses the term constructive interpretation for this distinctive type of interpretation (Dworkin, 1986, 52).
罗纳德·德沃金具有影响力的著作提出了一种独特的法律解释理论。理解德沃金的贡献有两个关键点。首先，德沃金从一种关于创造性（而非对话性和科学性）解释的普遍理论出发——这一理论涵盖了例如文学、艺术和非法律的社会实践（1986 年，50-51 页）。根据这一理论，解释者试图通过赋予对象某种观点或目的，在全面考虑下展示其最佳面貌。对对象的最佳解释是使其成为其类型或类别中尽可能最好的解释（德沃金 1986 年，第 2 章）。德沃金用“建构性解释”这一术语指代这种独特的解释类型（德沃金，1986 年，52 页）。

Second, Dworkin’s law as integrity theory is primarily a theory of law – of how the content of the law is determined (metaphysically) – rather than a theory of legal interpretation. (See the entry on legal interpretivism.) According to law as integrity, the content of the law is constituted by the best constructive interpretation of the legal system (as well as more specific consequences that follow from those principles) (Dworkin 1986, chap. 7). Thus, Dworkinian constructive interpretation figures centrally in his account of what determines the content of the law. Dworkin further argues that the best interpretation of the legal system is the set of principles that best fits and justifies the legal practices, including constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions (1986, chaps. 4–10). And he offers a well-known account of the dimensions of fit and justification (1986, especially chapter 7).
其次，德沃金的法律整体性理论主要是一种关于法律的理论——即法律内容如何（形而上学地）被确定——而非法律解释理论。（参见“法律解释主义”条目。）根据法律整体性观点，法律的内容由对法律体系的最佳建构性解释（以及从这些原则中得出的更具体结果）所构成（Dworkin 1986, 第 7 章）。因此，德沃金式的建构性解释在其关于法律内容决定因素的论述中占据核心地位。德沃金进一步主张，对法律体系的最佳解释是那些最能契合并证成法律实践（包括宪法条款、制定法、法规及司法判决）的原则集合（1986, 第 4-10 章）。他还提出了关于契合度与证成性维度的著名论述（1986, 尤见第 7 章）。

Thus, despite the importance of interpretation in Dworkin’s work, his focus is on the theory of law, not on legal interpretation as it is understood here. He seems to take for granted that there is little or no space between a theory of law and a theory of legal interpretation. (On the issue of how such theories may come apart, see section 5.2.) Consequently, he assumes that, if he is right that the content of the law is constitutively determined by constructive interpretation, then the best way to ascertain a provision’s contribution is to ask which principles best fit and justify the enactment or ratification of the provision.
因此，尽管解释在德沃金的工作中非常重要，但他的关注点在于法律理论，而非此处所理解的法律解释。他似乎理所当然地认为，法律理论与法律解释理论之间几乎没有或根本没有空间。（关于这些理论如何可能分离的问题，请参见第 5.2 节。）因此，他假设，如果他对法律内容由建构性解释构成性决定的观点是正确的，那么确定某一条款贡献的最佳方式就是询问哪些原则最能契合并证明该条款的制定或批准。

Dworkin’s work has inspired other theories of constitutional interpretation. A notable example is Sager’s (2004) justice-seeking theory of constitutional interpretation.
德沃金的著作启发了其他宪法解释理论。一个显著的例子是萨格（2004）提出的追求正义的宪法解释理论。

Pluralism  多元主义

Judges, lawyers, and legal academics are commonly pluralists, relying on many different kinds of sources, methods, and modes of reasoning, including, for example, textual analysis, purposive reasoning, consideration of historical sources, precedent-based reasoning, forward-looking assessment of consequences, and appeals to moral values such as fairness, democracy, and rule of law (e.g., Fallon 1987; Eskridge and Frickey 1990; Breyer 2005; see Berman 2018, 1341–42).
法官、律师及法学学者通常持多元主义立场，他们依赖多种不同的来源、方法和推理模式，例如文本分析、目的性推理、历史资料考量、基于先例的推理、前瞻性后果评估，以及对公平、民主和法治等道德价值的诉求（参见 Fallon 1987; Eskridge and Frickey 1990; Breyer 2005; 另见 Berman 2018, 1341–42）。

Philip Bobbitt, the best-known pluralist theorist of constitutional interpretation, distinguished six modalities of constitutional argumentation. These include, for example, structural, ethical, and prudential argumentative modalities. (Bobbitt 1982; 1991). Bobbitt’s work is neither merely descriptive of existing practice, nor based on a larger underlying theory, e.g., of what determines the content of the law. Instead, Bobbitt takes constitutional practices generally to legitimate the use of the different modalities, though in some instances he offers criticisms of existing practices (Bobbitt 1982; 1991).
宪法解释领域最著名的多元主义理论家菲利普·博比特区分了六种宪法论证模式，包括结构论证、伦理论证和审慎论证等（Bobbitt 1982; 1991）。博比特的著作既非单纯描述现有实践，也非基于某种更宏大的基础理论（例如关于法律内容决定因素的理论）。相反，他认为宪法实践总体上为不同论证模式的运用提供了正当性，尽管在某些情况下他也对现有实践提出批评（Bobbitt 1982; 1991）。

Pluralism is probably the approach to interpretation employed by a majority of practitioners and legal academics (though often not under that name). (See Berman 2011, 413–414; Griffin 1994, 1758–61.) (It is more difficult to say whether it is the most commonly endorsed approach among scholars who explicitly theorize about statutory and constitutional interpretation.) ^[15]
多元主义可能是大多数从业者和法律学者所采用的解释方法（尽管通常不以该名称出现）。（参见 Berman 2011, 413–414; Griffin 1994, 1758–61。）（较难断言在明确理论化研究成文法和宪法解释的学者中，它是否是最受普遍认可的方法。） ^[15]

An obvious question for pluralism is how to resolve conflicts between different interpretive sources and methods. For the most part, pluralist theorists have not tried to give a rigorous answer to this question (Berman 2011, 414; Griffin 1994, 1764–65; but see Berman 2018).
多元主义面临的一个明显问题是如何解决不同解释来源和方法之间的冲突。多数情况下，多元主义理论家并未试图给出严格的解答（Berman 2011, 414; Griffin 1994, 1764–65; 但参见 Berman 2018）。

Pragmatism  实用主义

Pragmatism is most prominently associated with Judge Richard Posner (Posner 1998; 2003; 2008).^[16] The basic idea is to resolve cases in the way that produces the best results. Constitutional provisions, statutes, judicial decisions, and the like are relevant only to the extent that paying attention to them will yield better results. According to Posner, pragmatism seeks “the best decision having in mind present and future needs, and so does not regard the maintenance of consistency with past decisions as an end in itself, but only as a means for bringing about the best results in the present case” (Posner 1998, 238).
实用主义最著名的代表人物是法官理查德·波斯纳（Posner 1998; 2003; 2008）。其核心理念是以产生最佳结果的方式裁决案件。宪法条款、法规、司法判决等只有在关注它们能带来更好结果时才具有相关性。波斯纳认为，实用主义追求"考虑到当前和未来需求的最佳判决，因此不将保持与过往判决的一致性视为目的本身，而仅视其为在当前案件中实现最佳结果的手段"（Posner 1998, 238）。

Although the pragmatist judge will take into account authoritative texts, he or she does not regard them as binding, but merely as factors that are relevant to what will produce the best results. Given this emphasis on producing the best results going forward, pragmatism gives more weight to empirical matters, including both the specific facts of the controversy and empirical – especially economic – theory than to the authoritative texts (Posner 1998, 238–241). Pragmatism’s attitude towards legal rights and duties thus bears comparison with consequentialist approaches to moral rights and duties. (See the entry on consequentialism.)
尽管实用主义法官会考虑权威文本，但他或她并不将其视为具有约束力，而仅视作影响最佳结果产生的相关因素。鉴于这种对创造未来最佳结果的强调，实用主义更重视经验性事项，包括争议的具体事实以及经验性——尤其是经济学——理论，而非权威文本（Posner 1998, 238–241）。因此，实用主义对法律权利与义务的态度可与后果论对道德权利与义务的进路相提并论。（参见关于后果论的条目。）

Pragmatism as I have explicated the position is almost never endorsed by judicial opinions and has few advocates among theorists of legal interpretation, though, as Berman (2011, 415) notes, some pluralists who emphasize the importance of results, classify themselves as pragmatists (e.g., Eskridge and Frickey 1990).
如我所阐释的实用主义立场几乎从未得到司法意见的认可，且在法律解释理论家中也鲜有支持者，尽管如 Berman（2011, 415）所指出的，一些强调结果重要性的多元论者自称为实用主义者（例如 Eskridge 和 Frickey 1990）。

This chapter will focus on a few of the positions sketched above, especially textualism, intentionalism, purposivism, and original public meaning originalism. One reason for this focus is that the debate between textualism and intentionalism or purposivism has dominated recent theoretical discussion in the statutory field. And, in the constitutional field, originalism has set the terms of debate. (As explained below, original intent originalism will be included in the discussion of intentionalism and public meaning originalism will be included in the discussion of textualism.) Space constraints do not permit in-depth exploration of all of the positions in the field, and the focus adopted here provides a natural and topical way of introducing many of the fundamental issues concerning legal interpretation.
本章将重点讨论上述概述的几种立场，尤其是文本主义、意图主义、目的论以及原初公共含义原旨主义。聚焦于此的原因在于，文本主义与意图主义或目的论之间的争论主导了近期制定法领域的理论探讨。而在宪法领域，原旨主义则设定了辩论的框架（下文将说明，原初意图原旨主义将纳入意图主义的讨论范畴，公共含义原旨主义则归入文本主义的探讨范围）。限于篇幅，无法对所有立场进行深入探究，此处选取的焦点为引入法律解释诸多核心问题提供了一种自然而切题的路径。

4. Theories of Legal Interpretation
4. 法律解释理论

In recent years, textualism has taken center stage in discussions of legal interpretation. (As the term is used here, it includes both textualism in statutory interpretation and “public meaning” originalism in constitutional interpretation. (See section 4.2.) There is a lively debate between textualism on the one hand and intentionalism and purposivism on the other, including a debate about how and whether the opposing positions differ (see, e.g., Molot 2006; Manning 2006; 2011; Nelson 2005). This section examines intentionalism (including purposivism) and textualism more closely. It introduces several distinctions necessary to get clear about what the positions involve and raises important problems for the positions.
近年来，文本主义在法律解释的讨论中占据了核心地位。（此处使用的术语既包括制定法解释中的文本主义，也涵盖宪法解释中的“公共含义”原旨主义。（参见第 4.2 节）当前存在文本主义与意图主义及目的主义之间的激烈辩论，包括关于对立立场如何及是否存异的讨论（例如参见 Molot 2006；Manning 2006；2011；Nelson 2005）。本节将更细致地审视意图主义（含目的主义）与文本主义，通过引入若干必要区分以厘清各立场内涵，并针对这些立场提出关键性质疑。

4.1. Intentionalism and Purposivism
4.1. 意图主义与目的主义

Intentionalists give primacy to the intentions of lawmakers (the legislature in the case of statutory law or framers or ratifiers in the case of constitutional law).
意向主义者优先考虑立法者的意图（在成文法中为立法机关，在宪法中为制定者或批准者）。

According to these theorists, interpreters should effectuate the lawmakers’ intentions even when they conflict with the meaning of the text. Accordingly, the interpreter should consult evidence of the relevant intentions other than the text.
根据这些理论家的观点，即使立法者的意图与文本含义相冲突，解释者也应贯彻立法者的意图。因此，解释者应参考文本以外的相关意图证据。

Legislative intent is probably the most common factor cited by courts in statutory interpretation, and the original intent approach to constitutional interpretation flourished for a time in the second half of the 20^th century (fading in the 1980s). The importance of legislative intent in statutory interpretation and of original intent in constitutional interpretation is often thought to follow from the demands of democracy. A familiar democratic idea, for example, is that courts should faithfully carry out the intentions of the people’s chosen representatives. Though initially appealing, intentionalism has been subjected to a battery of important criticisms.
立法意图可能是法院在法规解释中最常引用的因素，而宪法解释中的原旨主义方法在 20 世纪下半叶（于 1980 年代逐渐式微）曾一度盛行。人们通常认为，法规解释中立法意图的重要性以及宪法解释中原旨意图的重要性源于民主的要求。例如，一个常见的民主理念是，法院应忠实执行人民所选代表的意图。尽管最初颇具吸引力，但意图主义已遭到一系列重要批评。

4.1.1 Types of Legislative Intentions
4.1.1 立法意图的类型

In the literature on legal interpretation, an important three-way distinction is made between 1) actual, or subjective, intention; 2) conventional, or presumed, intention; and 3) objectified intention.
在法律解释的文献中，一个重要且分为三类的区分被提出：1）实际的或主观的意图；2）惯例的或推定的意图；3）客观化的意图。

An actual intention is a real psychological state of the relevant body. A conventional intention, by contrast, is a rationale treated as if it were the intention of the relevant body regardless of psychological reality. For example, a court might treat as the legislature’s intention a rationale explicitly offered for a statute by its sponsors or other legislative leaders in reports of legislative committees, floor debates, or the like. Finally, an objectified intention is the intention that a reasonable person would attribute to the legislature under specified conditions. Since intentions are mental items, and conventional and objectified intentions are not – a body can have such “intentions” despite the absence of any corresponding mental state – conventional and objectified intentions are not genuine intentions at all.
实际意图是相关机构的真实心理状态。相比之下，常规意图是一种被视为相关机构意图的理由，无论其心理现实如何。例如，法院可能会将立法委员会报告、议会辩论等中由提案者或其他立法领导人明确提出的法规理由视为立法机关的意图。最后，客观化意图是一个理性人在特定条件下会归因于立法机关的意图。由于意图是心理项目，而常规和客观化意图并非如此——一个机构可以在没有任何相应心理状态的情况下拥有这样的“意图”——因此，常规和客观化意图根本就不是真正的意图。

This actual/conventional/objectified distinction concerns the metaphysical status of the intention. A second distinction, not generally recognized in the literature, involves the content of the intention. A lawmaking body may have many intentions with different contents with respect to one provision. A minimal legislative intention is an intention to enact legislation by voting for a particular bill. A semantic intention is an intention that concerns semantic matters, such as an intention to use particular words with particular meanings in a given combination. A communicative intention is an intention, by uttering specific words, to communicate a particular message at a relatively granular level such as that of individual sentences. A legal intention is an intention to create a particular legal norm. An application intention is an intention that a particular type of entity or situation be covered by or excluded by a legal standard. A policy intention is an intention to achieve some policy goal, for example to stimulate the economy. An interpretive intention is an intention concerning what method of interpretation should be used (see Bassham 1992, 29).
这种实际/常规/客观化的区分涉及意图的形而上学状态。第二个在文献中通常未被明确区分的区别则关乎意图的内容。立法机构可能针对某一项规定持有多种内容各异的意图。最低限度的立法意图是指通过投票支持特定法案来制定法律的意图。语义意图涉及语义事项，如意图在特定组合中使用具有特定含义的词语。交流意图是通过说出特定词语，在相对细化的层面（如单个句子层面）传达特定信息的意图。法律意图是创建特定法律规范的意图。适用意图是希望特定类型的实体或情境被法律标准涵盖或排除的意图。政策意图是实现某些政策目标的意图，例如刺激经济。解释意图则是关于应采用何种解释方法的意图（参见 Bassham 1992, 29）。

Discussions of legislative intentions often fail to distinguish between these different kinds of intentions. It is especially common to conflate legal, application, and communicative intentions. A legislature might intend a legal rule that requires (all and only) persons with contagious diseases to be quarantined for two weeks (a legal intention). The legislature might also intend that a particular disease that is in fact not contagious, e.g., psoriasis, be included within the quarantine (an application intention). These two intentions are in conflict with each other, so it is important for an intentionalist to be clear about which one is the relevant one. Similarly, a lawmaker may intend to use a particular sentence to communicate a particular content in the service of creating a complex legal norm, not recognizing that the intended communication is ill-suited to accomplish the legal intention (Greenberg 2011a, 241–50). One might think that it would require carelessness to make a mistake about whether a particular communicative content is well-chosen to effectuate a given legal intention, but in complex statutes, the way in which information conveyed sentence by sentence relates to the creation of an intended legal norm is not straightforward (see citations to recent empirical work below).
关于立法意图的讨论常常未能区分这些不同类型的意图。尤其常见的是将法律意图、适用意图和沟通意图混为一谈。立法机关可能意图制定一项法律规则，要求（所有且仅）患有传染性疾病的人隔离两周（法律意图）。立法机关也可能意图将实际上并不具有传染性的特定疾病（如牛皮癣）纳入隔离范围（适用意图）。这两种意图相互冲突，因此对意图主义者而言，明确哪一种意图是相关的尤为重要。同样，立法者可能意图使用特定句子来传达特定内容，以服务于创建复杂的法律规范，却没有意识到所意图的沟通并不适合实现法律意图（Greenberg 2011a, 241–50）。 人们可能会认为，要判断某个特定的交流内容是否精心设计以实现特定的法律意图需要格外谨慎，但在复杂的法规中，逐句传递的信息与预期法律规范的创建之间的关系并非直截了当（参见下文引用的近期实证研究）。

The metaphysical-status and content distinctions cut across each other. In order to specify the relevant intention, we therefore need to specify both dimensions. For example, we might be interested in actual communicative intentions, conventional legal intentions, or objectified legal intentions. Unfortunately, theorists tend to write simply of “legislative intent.” Traditional intentionalists are probably best understood as concerned with actual intentions, but it is less clear where they stand with respect to the second distinction.
形而上学状态与内容区分相互交叉。因此，为明确相关意图，我们需要同时界定这两个维度。例如，我们可能关注实际交流意图、惯例法律意图或客观化法律意图。遗憾的是，理论家们往往简单地统称为"立法意图"。传统意图主义者最可能被理解为关注实际意图，但他们在第二个区分上的立场则较不明确。

4.1.2 Problems with Legislative Intentions
4.1.2 立法意图的问题

Appeals to actual legislative intentions in statutory and constitutional interpretation have been powerfully criticized on several fronts – metaphysical, existential, and epistemic.^[17]
在成文法与宪法解释中诉诸实际立法意图的做法，已在多个层面——形而上层面、存在层面及认知层面——遭到强有力的批判。 ^[17]

The metaphysical problem concerns what would constitute a collective intention of the framers or ratifiers in the case of a constitution or of a multimember and bipartite or tripartite legislature under the complex, competitive, and disunified conditions typical of contemporary legislatures.
形而上问题关注的是，在宪法或由多成员、两党或三党组成的立法机构中，在当代立法机构典型的复杂、竞争且不统一的条件下，什么才能构成制定者或批准者的集体意图。

Even if we understood what would constitute the intention of a legislature (or of a constitution’s framers or ratifiers), we face the existential problem: do the relevant bodies in fact typically have collective intentions – and ones that are precise and detailed enough to be helpful in resolving difficult questions of legal interpretation?
即使我们理解了立法机关（或宪法制定者或批准者）的意图构成，我们仍面临一个存在性问题：相关机构是否真的通常具有集体意图——并且这些意图是否足够精确和详细，以有助于解决法律解释中的难题？

Finally, the epistemic problem is how such intentions could be reliably identified if they existed. Space does not permit a thorough discussion of these problems with actual legislative intentions. Instead, the flavor of the difficulties will be briefly sketched.
最后，认识论问题在于，如果这些意图确实存在，如何可靠地识别它们。篇幅所限，无法对实际立法意图中的这些问题进行全面讨论。因此，我们将简要概述这些困难的本质。

It is plausible that groups, such as families, can have genuine intentions, at least when the groups are relatively small, cohesive, and cooperative. In the circumstances of contemporary multi-member bicameral legislatures, however, there are many problems. To begin with, it is unclear what constitutes the relevant group. In the case of the U.S. Constitution, is it a group composed of the members of the state conventions that ratified the Constitution? Or, more plausibly, the group composed of the state conventions, each of which may have its own collective intention? What about the delegates to the Constitutional Convention?
可以合理认为，像家庭这样的群体能够拥有真实的意图，至少在群体规模较小、凝聚力强且合作性高的情况下是如此。然而，在当代多成员两院制立法机构的背景下，存在诸多问题。首先，难以界定何为相关群体。以美国宪法为例，这个群体是由批准宪法的各州制宪会议成员组成的吗？或者更合理地说，是由各州制宪会议（每个会议可能都有其自身的集体意图）构成的群体？那么参加制宪会议的代表们又该如何看待？

In the case of Congress or state legislatures, is the relevant collective intention that of both houses and the president or governor who signs the legislation? Or is the relevant group comprised only of those in the majority who voted for (or signed) the bill? Or is the collective intention constituted by the intentions of pivotal political actors who occupy veto gates in the legislative process? (see McNollgast 1992; 1994). What about statutes that are enacted piecemeal by different legislatures over time? Suppose, for example, that a later legislature amends a small part of a complex statute. In such a case, in interpreting the complex statute, including the amendment, is the relevant intention that of a collective comprising both the original legislature that enacted most of the existing statute and the later legislature that passed the amendment? (See, e.g., Texas v. United States.)
在国会或州立法机构的情况下，相关的集体意图是两院及签署法案的总统或州长的共同意图吗？还是仅由投票支持（或签署）法案的多数派构成的群体意图？又或者，集体意图是由立法过程中占据否决关键节点的核心政治行动者的意图所构成？（参见 McNollgast 1992; 1994）。对于由不同立法机构随时间分段颁布的法规又该如何看待？例如，假设后来的立法机构对复杂法规的一小部分进行了修订。在此情况下，解释包括修正案在内的复杂法规时，相关意图是否应包含最初制定大部分现行法规的立法机构与后来通过修正案的立法机构共同构成的集体意图？（参见案例 Texas v. United States。）

Even more pressing, when, as is often the case, the relevant members of a legislature have extremely different and often competing attitudes, what makes it the case that a particular intention is the collective intention of the group? Even among members who vote for the bill, there will typically be a great deal of disagreement about, for example, the intended legal effect. (For simplicity, let’s suppose that what matters is only the legislature’s legal intentions, not its communicative or application intentions.)
更为紧迫的是，当立法机构的相关成员（这种情况很常见）持有极其不同且常常相互冲突的态度时，是什么使得某一特定意图成为该集体的共同意图？即使在投票支持法案的成员中，通常也会对诸如预期的法律效果等问题存在大量分歧。（为简化起见，我们假设这里仅涉及立法机构的法律意图，而非其交流意图或适用意图。）

To take a concrete example, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, the Supreme Court faced the question whether employers could voluntarily adopt affirmative action programs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which specified that employers may not “discriminate … because of … race” in hiring. Some of the legislators who voted for the Civil Rights Act may have intended to establish a legal rule banning only invidious discrimination; others may have intended to establish a legal rule banning any use of race. Many members may have had little or no intention with respect to legal effect – they may have voted for the bill for irrelevant motives without giving much thought to what legal effect it would produce. Granting that groups can have collective intentions in some circumstances, how plausible is it that the Congress and President in fact had a collective intention on the crucial issue in this case?
举一个具体的例子，在“美国钢铁工人联合会诉韦伯案”中，最高法院面临的问题是：雇主是否可以根据《1964 年民权法案》第七章自愿采取平权行动项目，该条款规定雇主在招聘时不得“因种族……而歧视”。一些投票支持《民权法案》的立法者可能意图建立仅禁止恶意歧视的法律规则；其他人则可能意图建立禁止任何种族因素使用的法律规则。许多成员可能对法律效果几乎没有或根本没有具体意图——他们可能出于无关动机投票支持该法案，而并未过多考虑它将产生的法律效果。假设群体在某些情况下可以具有集体意图，那么国会和总统在此案关键问题上实际拥有集体意图的说法又有多大可信度呢？

In criticizing intentionalism, contemporary textualists have emphasized the messiness and opacity of the legislative process, and the importance of compromise in that process (see Manning 2001, 71–78; 2003, 2408–19; Easterbrook 1983, 540–41; 1988, 63–64; 1990, 444–48; 1994, 68; 2010, 916, 922; 2012, xxii; Scalia and Garner 2012, 392–93). Individual legislators who originally propose legislation may have a specific legal intention – to enact a particular legal rule. But, in order to secure passage of the legislation, compromises have to be made. Legislative bargains are often verbal rather than substantive – that is, they often take the form of adding particular words to the legislation without reaching agreement on the net effect of the change in wording. Indeed, compromises are often successful precisely because controversial issues are left opaque and unresolved. In the case of complex and controversial legislation, there may be no reason to think that there is a coherent and discoverable legal intention. (That’s not to say that there isn’t a semantic intention – to use these words – or a minimal intention – to modify the law by passing this bill.) Even setting aside the metaphysical question of what would constitute a collective intention in the relevant circumstances, it is often extremely implausible that a collective legal intention exists and that, if it did, courts could reliably identify it.
在批评意图主义时，当代文本主义者强调了立法过程的混乱与不透明性，以及妥协在该过程中的重要性（参见 Manning 2001, 71–78; 2003, 2408–19; Easterbrook 1983, 540–41; 1988, 63–64; 1990, 444–48; 1994, 68; 2010, 916, 922; 2012, xxii; Scalia and Garner 2012, 392–93）。最初提出立法的个别议员可能怀有特定的法律意图——即制定一项具体的法律规则。然而，为了确保立法获得通过，必须作出妥协。立法交易往往是形式上的而非实质性的——也就是说，它们通常表现为在立法中添加特定措辞，却未就措辞变化的实际效果达成一致。事实上，妥协之所以常常成功，恰恰是因为争议性问题被刻意模糊化且悬而未决。在涉及复杂且具争议性的立法时，可能没有理由认为存在一种连贯且可被发现的法律意图。 （这并不是说没有语义意图——即使用这些词语——或最低限度的意图——即通过这项法案来修改法律。）即使抛开在相关情况下什么构成集体意图这一形而上学问题不谈，集体法律意图的存在以及即使存在，法院能否可靠地识别它，通常也是极不可信的。

It is even less likely that the legislature has communicative intentions with respect to most provisions that generate interpretive controversies. Recall that a communicative intention is an intention to communicate a particular message by uttering specific words. Most members of the legislature will not have read a typical provision and, in statutes of any complexity, lack the technical skill to understand what message would need to be communicated in order to create a particular legal norm or achieve a specific policy goal. (For recent empirical work suggesting that members of the legislature rarely engage with the details of the statutory text and, even if they did, would not be capable of working out whether the text is well calculated to effect their legal or policy intentions, see Bressman and Gluck 2013; 2014.) Thus, even if members of the legislature had relevant legal intentions with respect to provisions that are at the center of interpretive disputes, it is far-fetched to take them to have corresponding communicative intentions.
立法机关对大多数引发解释争议的条款具有交流意图的可能性更低。需知交流意图是指通过特定措辞传递特定信息的意图。多数立法成员不会阅读典型条款，且面对任何复杂程度的法规时，他们缺乏技术能力去理解需要传达何种信息才能创设特定法律规范或实现具体政策目标。（近期实证研究表明，立法成员很少参与法规文本细节的讨论，即便参与，也无力判断文本是否有效贯彻其法律或政策意图，参见 Bressman 和 Gluck 2013；2014。）因此，即便立法成员对处于解释争议核心的条款具有相关法律意图，认为他们拥有相应交流意图的想法也过于牵强。

In response to skeptics who make these kinds of points – for example, that many individual legislators do not have the relevant intentions, and that, even when they do, the intentions of individual legislators conflict with each other – it is sometimes objected that individual legislators’ intentions are not the issue. Despite difficulties regarding individual intentions, the legislature as an institution may still have a collective intention.
针对持此类观点的怀疑论者——例如，许多立法者个人并不具备相关意图，且即便有，个体立法者的意图也相互冲突——有时会有人反驳说，个体立法者的意图并非问题所在。尽管在个体意图方面存在困难，但立法机构作为一个整体仍可能拥有集体意图。

It is plausible that collective intentions are not mere aggregations of individual intentions. But pointing out the mere possibility that a collective intention exists, despite deep conflict between – and in many cases an absence of – individual intentions, does not take us very far.
集体意图并非仅仅是个人意图的简单聚合，这一观点有其合理性。然而，仅仅指出集体意图可能存在的可能性——尽管个人意图之间存在深刻冲突，甚至许多情况下个人意图缺失——并不能让我们走得更远。

According to the most developed proposal, because the legislature has a standing secondary intention “to stand ready to change the law when there is good reason to do so,” which all legislators share, when the legislature enacts a bill, the legislature has a primary legal intention whose content is the content of the bill, regardless of the intentions of individual legislators (Ekins and Goldsworthy 2014, 65; Ekins 2012, 56–58, 224). The proposal faces an uphill battle to establish the psychological reality of its central claim. The proposal runs into further difficulty by explicating the “content of the bill” as what the speaker intended to communicate (which may go well beyond the literal meaning of the text) (Ekins 2012, chap. 7; Ekins and Goldsworthy 2014, 66–67).^[18] The proposal therefore seems to address worries about the existence of collective legislative intentions by appealing to a collective legislative intention. In addition, in the case of contemporary legislation, it is typical that a form of words is chosen as a compromise in order to enable a bill to pass without agreement on what that form of words is to communicate (or what legal norm it is to create). See section 4.2. So it is question begging to assume the existence of the crucial communicative intention that is supposed to constitute the content of the text and, in turn, the legislature’s primary intention. When the verbal formulation constitutes the compromise, it is of no help to say that “the nature of [legislators’] compromise may be discernible from the text and publicly available contextual and purposive evidence” (Ekins and Goldsworthy 2014, 66).
根据最成熟的提案，由于立法机关拥有一个常设的次要意图——“随时准备在有充分理由时修改法律”，这是所有立法者共有的，因此当立法机关通过一项法案时，无论个别立法者的意图如何，立法机关都有一个主要的法律意图，其内容即为法案的内容（Ekins and Goldsworthy 2014, 65; Ekins 2012, 56–58, 224）。该提案在确立其核心主张的心理现实性方面面临艰巨挑战。此外，提案将“法案的内容”解释为说话者意图传达的信息（可能远超文本的字面意义），这进一步增加了其难度（Ekins 2012, 第 7 章; Ekins and Goldsworthy 2014, 66–67）。 ^[18] 因此，该提案似乎通过诉诸集体立法意图来解决对集体立法意图存在性的担忧。另外，在当代立法实践中，典型情况是选择某种措辞形式作为妥协，以使法案得以通过，而无需就该措辞形式所要传达的内容（或所要创设的法律规范）达成一致。 参见第 4.2 节。因此，假设存在那种本应构成文本内容进而体现立法机关主要意图的关键性沟通意图，实为循环论证。当文字表述本身构成妥协时，声称“（立法者的）妥协性质可从文本及公开可得的语境与目的证据中辨识”（Ekins 与 Goldsworthy 2014, 66 页）并无助益。

4.1.3 The Relevance of Different Kinds of Legislative Intentions
4.1.3 不同类型立法意图的相关性

There is another type of problem with the suggestion about collective intention. Suppose that a philosopher develops an account of what constitutes the collective intention of a large, diverse group whose members’ attitudes conflict with each other. According to this account, let’s further suppose, the collective intention of such a group depends in a complex way on how the group would behave in various counterfactual circumstances. (One complication is that it might be that what constitutes the collective intention of a group is relative to the purposes for which the question is asked. But let’s set this complication aside for the sake of argument.) Even if the philosopher’s account is a correct account of the nature of group minds, it is a further question whether and to what extent legal interpretation should care about the intentions specified by such an account. That question cannot be resolved by the philosophy of mind, for the answer depends on distinctively legal concerns, and the details of the putative account of collective intentions would obviously matter.
关于集体意图的建议还存在另一类问题。假设一位哲学家提出了一种理论，用于界定一个庞大、多元且成员间态度相互冲突的群体的集体意图构成。根据这一理论，我们进一步假设，此类群体的集体意图以一种复杂的方式依赖于该群体在各种反事实情境下可能表现出的行为。（其中一个复杂之处在于，群体的集体意图构成可能相对于提问目的具有相对性。但为了论证方便，我们暂且搁置这一复杂性。）即便该哲学家的理论是对群体思维本质的正确阐述，法律解释是否应当以及在多大程度上关注该理论所界定的意图，仍是一个有待探讨的问题。这个问题无法通过心智哲学来解决，因为答案取决于独特的法律考量因素，而假定的集体意图理论的具体细节显然至关重要。

The issue concerns not the nature, existence, or ascertainment of the intentions, but to what extent they should make a difference in legal interpretation. Suppose that, according to the hypothetical philosophical account of group minds, the legislature that enacted a particular provision had a collective intention that supports an interpretation not discernible from the words of the provision. Allowing such a legislative intention to control the provision’s interpretation raises serious questions of democracy, rule of law, and fairness. For example, rule of law values require that legal rules be readily publicly available. Democratic values militate against the relevance of legislative intentions that were not expressed in the bills voted on by the legislature. (This kind of point is closely related to familiar textualist arguments against the use of legislative history (see section 4.2).
问题并不在于意图的性质、存在或确定，而在于这些意图在法律解释中应起到多大的作用。假设根据群体心智的假设性哲学描述，制定某一条款的立法机构拥有一种集体意图，该意图支持一种无法从条款文字中辨识的解释。允许这种立法意图主导条款的解释，会引发关于民主、法治和公平的严重问题。例如，法治价值要求法律规则易于公众获取。民主价值则反对那些未在立法机构投票通过的法案中表达的立法意图的相关性。（这一观点与反对使用立法历史的常见文本主义论点密切相关（参见第 4.2 节）。

This issue is really an aspect of a larger issue about the relevance of different kinds of legislative intentions in light of what legal interpretation seeks. For example, if legal interpretation seeks the linguistic meaning of the relevant legal texts, then legal, as opposed to semantic and communicative, intentions will have little or no relevance. The linguistic meaning of a text does not depend on what legal rules people intend to create by adopting the text.^[19] Similarly, application intentions are only weak evidence of linguistic meaning. By contrast, for example, communicative intentions are highly relevant to pragmatically conveyed content such as speaker meaning (see section 4.2 and entries on Pragmatics; Implicature; Paul Grice).
这个问题实际上是关于法律解释所追求的目标下，不同类型立法意图相关性的一个更广泛议题的体现。例如，如果法律解释寻求的是相关法律文本的语言学意义，那么与语义和交际意图相对的法律意图将几乎或完全不相关。文本的语言学意义并不取决于人们通过采纳该文本意图创造的法律规则。 ^[19] 同样，适用意图对语言学意义而言也只是微弱的证据。相比之下，交际意图则与语用传递内容（如说话者意义）高度相关（参见第 4.2 节及关于语用学、隐含意义、保罗·格莱斯的条目）。

On the other hand, if legal interpretation seeks a provision’s contribution to the content of the law, then the relevance of different legislative intentions depends on the bearing of those intentions on the content of the law. Does the content of the law depend on what legal rule the legislature actually intended? Or on what legal rule a reasonable person under specified circumstances would have taken a hypothetical coherent lawmaker to have intended to create by uttering the words of the provision? Or, perhaps, on what the legislature asserted or said? Normative arguments might be relevant at this juncture. For example, there may be reasons of democracy why legal intentions have an important bearing on the content of the law only if they are publicly available in certain authoritative sources.
另一方面，如果法律解释寻求某条款对法律内容的贡献，那么不同立法意图的相关性取决于这些意图对法律内容的影响。法律内容是否取决于立法机关实际意图确立的法律规则？还是取决于在特定情况下，一个理性人会认为假设的连贯立法者通过表述该条款的措辞意图创设的法律规则？又或者，可能取决于立法机关所主张或陈述的内容？此时，规范性论证可能具有相关性。例如，出于民主的考量，只有当法律意图在某些权威来源中公开可得时，它们才对法律内容具有重要影响。

One variation on actual legislative intention is counterfactual intention (see Posner 1986). To say that the legislature had a particular counterfactual intention is to say that, if the legislature had considered the relevant issue, it would have had the intention in question. The metaphysical, existential, and epistemic problems are especially severe for counterfactual intentions. Moreover, because the focus is on what the legislature would have intended with respect to the specific issue before the court, counterfactual intentions tend to be understood as counterfactual application intentions rather than as counterfactual legal or communicative intentions. And the relevance of application intentions to legal interpretation is especially problematic. (see Greenberg and Litman 1998; Berman 2007, 385; 2009, 28; McConnell 1997, 1284; Whittington 2013, 382–83).
实际立法意图的一个变体是反事实意图（参见 Posner 1986）。所谓立法机关具有某种反事实意图，是指如果立法机关考虑了相关问题，它就会具有该意图。对于反事实意图而言，形而上学、存在论和认识论上的问题尤为严重。此外，由于关注点在于立法机关对法院面临的特定问题会作何意图，反事实意图往往被理解为反事实适用意图，而非反事实法律或沟通意图。而适用意图对法律解释的相关性尤其成问题（参见 Greenberg 和 Litman 1998；Berman 2007, 385；2009, 28；McConnell 1997, 1284；Whittington 2013, 382–83）。

Conventional intentions exist and can be identified when the relevant sources, such as committee reports, floor debates, and the like, identify rationales for the relevant legislation. Of course, when the sources identify conflicting rationales, the existence of conventional intentions becomes problematic. More fundamentally, however, there are well-known objections to treating conventional intentions as consequential. As critics of the use of legislative history have emphasized, it is relatively easy for legislators to insert ostensible purposes for legislation into the legislative history (see Scalia 1997, 29–37; Scalia and Garner 2012, 376–78; Easterbrook 1990, 448–49; 1994, 65). Such rationales are often offered with extraneous motives, such as to defeat the legislation by making its purposes seem unacceptably broad or to increase the chances of passage by making the purposes seem unexceptionable. There is no reason in general to take such proffered rationales as representative of the attitudes of members of the legislature, and they are not part of what is voted on by the legislature. Probably for this kind of reason, conventional intentions are assigned a relatively minor role by most contemporary theorists of legal interpretation. For a critique of reliance on conventional intentions, see Eskridge 1994, 18–21.
当相关来源（如委员会报告、议会辩论等）明确了相关立法的理由时，常规意图便存在并可被识别。当然，若这些来源呈现相互冲突的理由，常规意图的存在就会变得成问题。然而，更根本的是，将常规意图视为具有决定性作用存在众所周知的反对意见。正如立法历史使用批评者所强调的，立法者很容易将表面上的立法目的插入立法历史中（参见 Scalia 1997, 29–37; Scalia and Garner 2012, 376–78; Easterbrook 1990, 448–49; 1994, 65）。这类理由往往出于无关动机而提出，例如通过使立法目的显得过于宽泛来阻挠立法，或通过使目的显得无可争议来增加通过概率。通常没有理由认为这些提出的理由能代表立法机构成员的态度，且它们并非立法机构投票表决的内容。 可能正是出于这种原因，大多数当代法律解释理论家赋予常规意图相对次要的角色。关于依赖常规意图的批评，参见 Eskridge 1994, 18–21。

4.1.4 Objectified Intentions and Purposivism
4.1.4 客观化意图与目的论

Objectified intentions are imputed to the legislature by making various, typically counterfactual, assumptions about the audience and the author of the legislation. For example, we might ask what legal norm a reasonable person would have taken a coherent and reasonable lawmaker to have intended to create by enacting the words of a statutory provision.
客观化的意图通过关于立法受众和立法者的各种（通常是反事实的）假设被归因于立法机关。例如，我们可能会问，一个理性人会认为一个连贯且合理的立法者通过制定法律条款的文字意图创造什么样的法律规范。

Because there are many possible objectified intentions of the legislature depending on what idealizing assumptions are made, any specific set of assumptions needs defense. Talk of objectified intentions is, in fact, misleading; the methodology of asking what a reasonable member of the audience would attribute, given certain stipulations, is really just a way of constructing a content – whether that content is taken to be an intention, a provision’s contribution to the content of the law, a linguistic content, or something else.
由于根据不同的理想化假设，立法机关可能存在多种客观化的意图，因此任何特定的假设集都需要辩护。事实上，谈论客观化意图具有误导性；在给定某些规定的情况下，询问一个理性的听众会归因于什么的方法论，实际上只是构建内容的一种方式——无论该内容被视为意图、条款对法律内容的贡献、语言内容还是其他东西。

Purposivism is best understood as a form of intentionalism that is concerned with objectified intentions. Given the closeness in meaning of the terms intentions and purposes, it is confusing that intentionalism and purposivism are frequently distinguished in the legal interpretation literature. The term intentionalism tends to be used for positions that focus on relatively specific communicative, application, or legal intentions of the legislature that enacted the statute, while purposivism is reserved for positions that give central place to more general legal or policy purposes that might reasonably be attributed to the statute.
目的主义最好被理解为一种关注客观化意图的意图主义形式。鉴于“意图”与“目的”这两个词在含义上的相近性，法律解释文献中经常对意图主义和目的主义进行区分，这令人困惑。术语“意图主义”倾向于用于那些关注立法机关在制定法规时相对具体的沟通、适用或法律意图的立场，而“目的主义”则保留给那些将核心地位赋予可以合理归因于法规的更普遍的法律或政策目的的立场。

According to the seminal account of purposivism, interpreters should “decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved” on the assumption that the statute consisted of “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably” (Hart and Sacks 1994, 1374, 1378). This formulation makes clear that the relevant purpose is not that of any actual person or body, but a purpose that is imputed based on an idealization. In addition, the meaning of the words is to be subordinated to the objectified purpose: purposivists “[i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry out the purpose” as well as possible (Hart and Sacks 1994, 1374). Barak (2005, chaps. 6–8) develops a more complex position that gives a role to both actual and objectified purpose.
根据目的主义的核心论述，解释者应"在假定该法规由'理性人以合理方式追求合理目标'构成的前提下，决定哪些目的应被归于该法规及其可能涉及的从属条款"（Hart and Sacks 1994, 1374, 1378）。这一表述明确指出，相关目的并非任何实际个人或机构的目的，而是基于理想化假设所归因的目的。此外，词语的含义应服从于客体化目的：目的主义者"尽可能通过解释相关法规条文来实现该目的"（Hart and Sacks 1994, 1374）。Barak（2005 年，第 6-8 章）提出了一个更为复杂的立场，同时赋予实际目的与客体化目的以解释功能。

As noted, the relevant type of purpose seems to be legal or even policy, certainly not semantic or communicative (see Eskridge 1993, 1744–45; 1994, 29; Hart and Sacks 1994, 148; Barak 2005; Dickerson 1975, 88–90; Manning 2006; Scalia and Garner 2012, 35–39). The famous purposivist case of Church of the Holy Trinity illustrates this point. The case concerned whether a statute that made it unlawful to facilitate the immigration of a foreigner under a pre-existing contract to perform “labor or service of any kind” applied to a church’s attempt to hire an English minister. The Supreme Court relied on evidence outside of the text of the statute to find that the purpose of the statute was limited to regulating the immigration of manual laborers, though the Court conceded that the meaning of the words covered the work of a clergyman.
如前所述，相关类型的目的似乎是法律性的，甚至是政策性的，而肯定不是语义或交际性的（参见 Eskridge 1993, 1744–45; 1994, 29; Hart and Sacks 1994, 148; Barak 2005; Dickerson 1975, 88–90; Manning 2006; Scalia and Garner 2012, 35–39）。著名的目的论解释案例“圣三一教堂案”便阐明了这一点。该案争议焦点在于，一项禁止依据预先合同协助外国人入境从事“任何种类劳动或服务”的法令，是否适用于某教堂试图聘请一位英国牧师的行为。最高法院依据法令文本之外的证据，认定该法令的目的仅限于规范体力劳动者的移民问题，尽管法院承认法令文字的含义涵盖了牧师的工作。

Writers have criticized purposivism on the ground that the assumption that the legislature consists of reasonable people with reasonable purposes is false (Posner 1985, 288–89). The assumption is best understood not as an empirical one, however, but as an idealizing stipulation used to construct a content. As noted, objectified intentions are not genuine intentions at all. Purposivism, like any theory of legal interpretation that appeals to constructed contents based on counterfactual assumptions, faces challenges both to specify the relevant assumptions in a way that yields a unique content and, more fundamentally, to explain why the content thus constructed should be given primacy in legal interpretation (see further discussion in section 4.2). For example, the simple democratic rationale that may seem to support an appeal to actual intentions – that courts should carry out the intentions of the elected representatives of the people – does not apply to objectified intentions, as they are not in fact the intentions of the legislature.
学者们对目的主义提出了批评，理由是立法机关由理性人出于合理目的而组成的这一假设并不成立（Posner 1985, 288–89）。然而，这一假设最好被理解为一种理想化的设定，用于构建内容。如前所述，客观化的意图并非真实的意图。与任何依赖基于反事实假设构建内容的法律解释理论一样，目的主义面临双重挑战：既要明确相关假设以得出唯一内容，更根本的是要解释为何如此构建的内容应在法律解释中享有优先地位（进一步讨论见第 4.2 节）。例如，支持诉诸真实意图的简单民主理由——即法院应执行民选代表意图——并不适用于客观化意图，因为它们实际上并非立法机关的意图。

4.1.5 Linguistically Motivated Intentionalism
4.1.5 语言学驱动的意图主义

Traditional forms of intentionalism were motivated by democratic ideas, including especially the idea that the courts should be faithful agents of the legislature. A relatively recent development is the emergence of a strong form of intentionalism driven by linguistic arguments.
传统形式的意图主义受到民主理念的驱动，尤其是法院应忠实作为立法机关代理人的观念。近期发展中出现了一种由语言学论证推动的强烈意图主义形式。

One popular argument starts from the premise that sounds or marks produced without intentions are meaningless. Proponents of this argument take this premise to imply that a text means whatever the author intends it to mean. From this proposition, they conclude that legal interpretation must seek the intention of the legislature. In light of the claim that a text means whatever the author intends, the relevant intention is best understood as a communicative intention, and some of the theorists in this camp are explicit on this point. Also, given the nature of the argument, the relevant intentions must be actual intentions. Proponents of this kind of intentionalism often tend to be surprisingly unconcerned about whether the relevant communicative intentions exist and, if so, how they could be ascertained.^[20]
一种流行论点始于这样的前提：无意图产生的声音或符号是无意义的。该论点的支持者认为这一前提意味着文本的意义即作者意图赋予它的意义。由此命题出发，他们得出结论：法律解释必须探寻立法机关的意图。鉴于“文本意义即作者意图”的主张，相关意图应被理解为一种交流意图，这一阵营中部分理论家明确指出了这一点。此外，基于该论证的性质，相关意图必须是实际存在的意图。这类意图主义的支持者往往出人意料地不太关心相关交流意图是否存在，以及若存在应如何确认的问题。 ^[20]

Even if we grant for the sake of argument the not-at-all-obvious premise that marks without intentions are meaningless, the proposition that a text means whatever the author intends does not follow (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; Berman 2009, 47-49) – and it is false. Given the premise, the marks “the cat is on the mat” would have no meaning unless their maker produced them intentionally. So, let’s assume that an author produces those marks intentionally – specifically, with the intention of using those words in English – and, in addition, intends the words to mean that dogs are carnivorous. Regardless of the latter intention, the sentence “the cat is on the mat” does not mean that dogs are carnivorous, though (by hypothesis) the speaker, in uttering it, means that dogs are carnivorous.
即便我们为了论证而暂且接受“无意图的符号毫无意义”这一远非显而易见的假设，也不能推导出“文本意义等同于作者意图”的命题（参见 Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; Berman 2009, 47-49）——且该命题本身是错误的。根据该假设，符号"the cat is on the mat"若未经制造者有意为之便毫无意义。那么假设某作者有意制造这些符号——具体而言，是带着用英语使用这些词语的意图——同时还意图让这些词语表达"狗是肉食动物"的含义。无论后一种意图如何，句子"the cat is on the mat"并不表示"狗是肉食动物"，尽管（根据假设）说话者通过说出这句话意在表达"狗是肉食动物"。

The argument runs roughshod over the distinction between word meaning and speaker meaning. The proponents of the argument deny the existence of word meaning, claiming, in effect, that the only meaning is speaker meaning. But their argument does not support the denial, and much of what speakers mean (and successfully communicate) would not be possible if it were not for word meaning.^[21] You could not use the words, “children under 11 may enter free” to mean that children 11 and over must pay for admission if the words did not have a stable conventional meaning in English.
这一论点粗暴地忽视了词语意义与说话者意义之间的区别。该论点的支持者否认词语意义的存在，实际上声称唯一的意义就是说话者意义。但他们的论点并不支持这种否认，而且如果没有词语意义，说话者所表达的许多内容（以及成功传达的信息）将无法实现。 ^[21] 如果“11 岁以下儿童可免费入场”这些词在英语中没有稳定的约定俗成的含义，你就无法用它们来表达“11 岁及以上的儿童必须购票入场”的意思。

There is a more fundamental and more interesting problem with the position – one that is endemic to much literature on legal interpretation. The position moves without argument from a claim about linguistic meaning to a conclusion about the correct method of legal interpretation. Even if it were true that a text meant whatever the speaker meant or intended to communicate, it would not follow that legal interpretation should seek the speaker’s communicative intention. Substantive argument is needed to derive claims about legal interpretation from claims about language and communication. As set out above, there are powerful reasons for thinking that legal interpretation seeks at least a provision’s contribution to the content of the law. (Even if it seeks the overall best resolution of disputes, it must still ascertain a provision’s contribution, given the importance of the law to the resolution of disputes.) A provision’s contribution to the content of the law may be something other than its linguistic meaning, such as the objectified legal intention, the best justification for the enactment of the provision, or a complex function of multiple factors.^[22] And there are strong reasons for rejecting the general proposition that the legal impact of an action is constituted by the actor’s communicative intention (see Greenberg 2011a).
该立场存在一个更为根本且更有趣的问题——这也是许多关于法律解释文献中普遍存在的现象。它未经论证就从关于语言意义的断言直接跳跃到关于法律解释正确方法的结论。即便文本确实意味着说话者所表达或意图传达的内容，也不能因此得出法律解释应当追寻说话者交流意图的结论。要从关于语言和交流的主张推导出关于法律解释的主张，需要实质性的论证。如前所述，有充分理由认为法律解释至少寻求条款对法律内容的贡献。（即使其追求争议的最佳整体解决方案，鉴于法律对解决争议的重要性，仍须确定条款的贡献。）条款对法律内容的贡献可能并非其语言意义，而可能是客观化的法律意图、对该条款颁布的最佳正当理由，或是多重因素的复杂函数。 ^[22] 而且有充分的理由拒绝这样一种普遍主张，即某一行为的法律影响是由行为者的交流意图所构成的（参见 Greenberg 2011a）。

4.2 Textualism  4.2 文本主义

In recent decades, in part in reaction to skepticism about actual legislative intentions, theorists of both statutory and constitutional interpretation have moved away from accounts that focus on intentions. One important trend has been toward textualism in statutory interpretation and “public meaning” originalism in constitutional interpretation. (Textualism here will be used to encompass public meaning originalism, including the position of the so-called new originalists.^[23])
近几十年来，部分出于对实际立法意图的怀疑，成文法与宪法解释的理论家们逐渐从关注意图的论述转向。一个重要趋势是成文法解释中的文本主义与宪法解释中的“公共含义”原旨主义。（此处文本主义将涵盖公共含义原旨主义，包括所谓新原旨主义者的立场。 ^[23] ）

The core idea of textualism is that the text prevails over other factors. Traditional textualism focused on “plain meaning” and held that, if the plain meaning is clear, a court should not consult other indications of legislative intent. This older textualism saw itself as seeking legislative intent, but took the position that a clear text is the best evidence of that intent.
文本主义的核心观点是文本优先于其他因素。传统文本主义聚焦于“字面含义”，主张若字面含义清晰，法院不应参考其他立法意图的迹象。这种早期文本主义自视为追寻立法意图，但认为清晰的文本是该意图的最佳证据。

The focus here will be on a more recently influential form of textualism, sometimes called new textualism. New textualists are skeptical about the existence of coherent and discoverable legislative intentions. For reasons for such skepticism, see section 4.1. They emphasize, not plain meaning, but a reasonable reading of the text in context.
这里的重点将放在一种最近颇具影响力的文本主义形式上，有时被称为新文本主义。新文本主义者对存在连贯且可发现的立法意图持怀疑态度。关于这种怀疑的理由，参见第 4.1 节。他们强调的不是字面意义，而是在语境中对文本的合理解读。

Textualism’s emphasis on the text has to be understood as an emphasis on the linguistic meaning of the text, rather than the text understood as marks on a page. Within linguistic meaning, there are two basic types: semantic content and pragmatically conveyed content (or pragmatic content, for short). See entry on Pragmatics. There is a lively debate in philosophy of language and linguistics over how exactly to draw the line between semantics and pragmatics. Roughly speaking, however, semantic content is what is conventionally encoded in the words, and pragmatic content is what a speaker or author, by an utterance of words on a particular occasion in a particular context, manages to convey beyond, or different from, the semantic content of the words.^[24] Central to pragmatic content are the communicative intentions of the speaker. To take a well-known type of example, when one says to a new acquaintance at a dinner party, “I have three children,” one likely intends to communicate that one has exactly three children and the hearer will likely recognize that intention, though the literal meaning of the words is that one has at least three children. This chapter uses “linguistic content” to encompass both semantic content and pragmatic content.
文本主义对文本的强调应被理解为对文本语言意义的重视，而非将文本视为页面上的符号。在语言意义中，存在两种基本类型：语义内容与语用传递内容（简称语用内容）。参见《语用学》条目。关于如何准确划分语义学与语用学的界限，语言哲学和语言学领域存在激烈争论。但粗略而言，语义内容是词语中约定俗成编码的内容，而语用内容则是说话者或作者在特定场合、特定语境中通过话语所传递的、超越或不同于词语语义内容的信息。 ^[24] 语用内容的核心在于说话者的交际意图。以一个经典例子说明：当某人在晚宴上对新认识的人说"我有三个孩子"时，其意图很可能是传达"恰好有三个孩子"，听者通常也能识别这一意图，尽管这句话的字面含义仅是"至少有三个孩子"。 本章使用“语言内容”来涵盖语义内容和语用内容。

On the face of it, pragmatic content seems a poor candidate for what textualists are after, given their skepticism about legislative intentions (though we will see that much of what they say points toward pragmatic content nevertheless).
从表面上看，鉴于文本主义者对立法意图的怀疑（尽管我们将看到他们的大部分论述仍指向语用内容），语用内容似乎不太符合文本主义者的追求。

Given textualism’s emphasis on text and objective meaning, it would be natural to understand it as seeking semantic content.^[25] This cannot be the right understanding of contemporary textualism, however. Leading textualists explicitly reject literal meaning (a rough synonym for semantic content), which they associate with the more traditional “plain meaning” textualism. They insist that textualism seeks a reasonable reading in context, not a literal one (Scalia 1997, 23–24; Easterbrook 1994, 64, 67; Manning 2001, 108–15; 2003, 2457–58; 2006, 79–81; see also Whittington 1999a, 176–77). As Justice Scalia puts it: “A text should not be construed strictly…; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means” (Scalia 1997, 23).
鉴于文本主义对文本和客观意义的强调，人们很自然地会将其理解为寻求语义内容。 ^[25] 然而，这不能是对当代文本主义的正确理解。主要的文本主义者明确拒绝字面意义（语义内容的近似同义词），他们将其与更传统的“平义”文本主义联系起来。他们坚持认为，文本主义寻求的是语境中的合理解读，而非字面解读（斯卡利亚 1997，23-24；伊斯特布鲁克 1994，64，67；曼宁 2001，108-15；2003，2457-58；2006，79-81；另见惠廷顿 1999a，176-77）。正如斯卡利亚大法官所言：“文本不应被严格解释……；而应被合理地解释，以包含其所有公平的含义”（斯卡利亚 1997，23）。

At first blush, the idea of a reasonable reading seems hard to quarrel with. On closer examination, however, it raises a host of problems largely unrecognized by textualists. To begin with, what is reasonable depends on what one seeks and what one knows or believes.
乍看之下，合理解读的概念似乎难以反驳。然而，仔细审视后，它引发了一系列文本主义者大多未认识到的问题。首先，何为合理取决于一个人所追求的目标以及他所知道或相信的内容。

In ordinary communication, in interpreting a note from one’s spouse or an instruction manual, say, the goal is normally to identify what the speaker or author meant or intended to communicate, as opposed, for example, to what the words literally mean or what a reasonable person with certain assumptions would take the speaker to have intended to communicate. In other words, one is successful in interpreting in ordinary communication just to the extent that one accurately recovers what the speaker intended to communicate.^[26] A reasonable interpretation in a conversational setting is therefore one that is reasonably calculated to recover the speaker’s communicative intentions given the audience’s beliefs about the speaker and the situation. On the other hand, if one is engaged in a different enterprise – playing a word game, trying to decide whether a witness committed perjury (see Bronston v. United States), interpreting a poem, or working out the impact on the law of the enactment of a provision – what is reasonable might be quite different. Textualists do not clearly address what a reasonable reader is supposed to be seeking in part because they have not recognized the issue, saying things that point in different directions.
在日常交流中，比如解读配偶的便条或说明书，目标通常是识别说话者或作者想要表达的意思或意图，而不是字面意思或基于某些假设的理性人认为说话者想要传达的内容。换句话说，在普通交流中，只有当一个人准确还原了说话者想要传达的意图时，才算成功解读。 ^[26] 因此，在对话环境中，合理的解读是指在考虑到听众对说话者和情境的信念后，能够合理推断出说话者沟通意图的解读。另一方面，如果从事的是不同的活动——比如玩文字游戏、判断证人是否作伪证（参见 Bronston 诉美国案）、解读诗歌，或者研究某条款的颁布对法律的影响——那么合理的解读可能就大不相同了。 文本主义者并未明确说明一个理性的读者应当寻求什么，部分原因在于他们尚未认识到这一问题，其言论往往指向不同方向。

Some examples that textualists offer suggest that they are assuming the model of ordinary communication. In the well-known case of Smith v. United States, Smith had offered to trade a gun for cocaine. The Supreme Court divided over the question whether he was properly sentenced under a statute that provides for increased penalties if the defendant “uses … a firearm” in a drug-trafficking or violent crime. In a much-quoted dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia pointed out that “When someone asks ‘Do you use a cane?’ he is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather’s silver handled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know whether you walk with a cane” (508 U.S. 223, 242; see Manning 2003, 2460). Properly understood, the example illustrates that, in ordinary conversation, in the imagined situation, the speaker would likely intend to ask whether you walk with a cane. The communication would therefore be successful if the audience correctly identified that intention.^[27] Textualists also endorse the use of linguistic canons of interpretation that, properly understood, are rules of thumb for inferring what a speaker likely intended to communicate, as opposed to the literal meaning of the words (e.g., Scalia 1997, 25–26).^[28]
文本主义者提供的一些例子表明，他们假设的是日常交流的模式。在著名的史密斯诉美国案中，史密斯提出用枪支交换可卡因。最高法院对于他是否应根据一项规定“在毒品交易或暴力犯罪中‘使用…枪支’”将面临加重刑罚的法规被判刑产生了分歧。斯卡利亚大法官在一份被广泛引用的异议意见中指出：“当有人问‘你用拐杖吗？’时，他并不是在询问你是否将祖父的银柄手杖陈列在门厅；他想知道的是你是否拄拐杖走路”（508 U.S. 223, 242；参见 Manning 2003, 2460）。正确理解这个例子说明，在日常对话中，在设想的情境下，说话者很可能意在询问你是否拄拐杖行走。因此，如果听众正确识别了这一意图，交流就算是成功的。 文本主义者也赞同使用语言解释准则，这些准则在正确理解下，是用于推断说话者可能意图传达的内容的经验法则，而非字面意义（例如，Scalia 1997, 25–26）。

Thus, the examples that textualists give involving the interpretation of ordinary communications and their use of certain canons of interpretation suggest that the relevant inquiry is what it would be reasonable to take the speaker to intend to communicate. Indeed, textualists often assert that what words mean is what a reasonable person would take the speaker to mean or to intend to convey – thus confusing word meaning with reasonable inferences about communicative intent (e.g., Scalia and Garner 2012, 16, 56). Similarly, textualists often say that the relevant inquiry is “objectified legal intention,” understood as what a reasonable person, given the context, would take the legislature to have intended.^[29]
因此，文本主义者提供的关于日常交流解释及其对某些解释准则的运用实例表明，相关探究在于何种理解可合理视为说话者意图传达的内容。事实上，文本主义者常声称词语的意义等同于理性人认为说话者想表达或意图传递的意义——这便将词语意义与对交流意图的合理推断混为一谈（如 Scalia 和 Garner 2012 年著作第 16、56 页）。类似地，文本主义者常将相关探究称为"客观化的法律意图"，即理性人在特定语境下会认定立法机关所持有的意图。 ^[29]

The notion of what a reasonable person would take the speaker to have intended to communicate is coherent (though what a reasonable person would take the speaker to have intended to communicate is not the meaning of a text or utterance). In the case of legislation, however, by the textualists’ own lights, it is not reasonable to take the legislature to have intended to communicate anything. (For skepticism about legislative intentions, see section 4.1)
“一个理性人会认为说话者意图传达什么”这一概念是连贯的（尽管理性人所理解的说话者意图传达的内容并非文本或话语的含义）。然而，就立法而言，根据文本主义者自身的观点，认为立法机关意图传达任何内容都是不合理的。（关于立法意图的质疑，参见第 4.1 节）

A textualist could respond by suggesting that we stipulate fictional assumptions about the speaker or the situation. In this way, we could construct counterfactual-based contents. Plainly, we would get diverse such contents depending on which stipulations we make (see Alexander 2011, 91–93). For example, one might ask what a reasonable person would have taken the speaker’s communicative intention to be if the text of a provision had been uttered by one rational speaker in ordinary conversation with the goal of communicating a message. It is important to note that, as stated, the answer to this question will likely be indeterminate – that is, without more specification of, for example, the reasonable person’s beliefs about the speaker and the conversational context, there will be no fact of the matter as to what the reasonable person would have taken the speaker’s intention to be. Moreover, fleshing out the counterfactual situation in a specific way, rather than indefinitely many others, needs to be justified. Why should legal interpretation be concerned with what a reasonable person would take a speaker to intend under this particular set of fictional assumptions? (See Greenberg 2020, 116–124, for extended discussion of the options available to textualism and difficulties with those options.)
文本主义者可能会回应说，我们可以对说话者或情境设定虚构的假设。通过这种方式，我们可以构建基于反事实的内容。显然，根据我们做出的不同假设，会得到多样化的此类内容（参见 Alexander 2011, 91-93）。例如，有人可能会问，如果一个法律条款的文本是由一位理性的说话者在普通对话中为了传达信息而说出的，那么一个理性的人会如何理解说话者的交流意图。需要注意的是，正如所述，这个问题的答案很可能是无法确定的——也就是说，如果没有进一步具体说明，比如理性人对说话者和对话背景的信念，那么关于理性人会如何理解说话者的意图就没有事实依据。此外，以一种特定的方式而非无限多的其他方式来充实反事实情境，需要得到合理解释。为什么法律解释要关注理性人在这一特定虚构假设下会如何理解说话者的意图？ （关于文本主义可选项及其面临困境的详细讨论，参见 Greenberg 2020, 116–124。）

5. How to Argue for and Evaluate Theories of Legal Interpretation
5. 如何论证和评价法律解释理论

5.1 Theories of Legal Interpretation and Theories of Law
5.1 法律解释理论与法律理论

In the literature on legal interpretation, theorists offer various arguments in favor of their preferred theories of legal interpretation. As noted, normative arguments, appealing to moral values such as democracy, fairness, and the rule of law, are the most common. For example, both textualists and intentionalists offer arguments based on democracy (see Eskridge 1994, 13; Eskridge and Frickey 1990, 326; Barak 2005, 248; Alexander 2013, 540; Easterbrook 1994, 63). According to Justice Scalia, “it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.” (Scalia 1997, 17.)
在法律解释的文献中，理论家们为其偏好的法律解释理论提供了各种论证。如前所述，诉诸民主、公平和法治等道德价值的规范性论证最为常见。例如，文本主义者和意图主义者都提出了基于民主的论证（参见 Eskridge 1994, 13; Eskridge and Frickey 1990, 326; Barak 2005, 248; Alexander 2013, 540; Easterbrook 1994, 63）。斯卡利亚大法官认为："让法律的含义由立法者的意图而非其颁布的文本决定，这完全与民主政府——甚至公平政府——不相容。"（Scalia 1997, 17.）

Typical linguistic arguments defend a particular approach to legal interpretation by appealing to claims about how language or communication works. For example, in section 3, we saw that a recent form of intentionalism is defended on the ground that any linguistic text must mean whatever its author intends it to mean. And theorists influenced by philosophy of language have argued that the proper approach to legal interpretation is to find the total pragmatically conveyed content of the legal texts, on the ground that that is what linguistic interpretation normally seeks.^[30]
典型的语言学论证通过诉诸关于语言或交流如何运作的主张，来为特定的法律解释方法辩护。例如，在第 3 节中，我们看到一种新近的有意论形式基于这样的理由被辩护：任何语言文本必须意指其作者意图让它表达的意思。受语言哲学影响的理论家们则主张，法律解释的正确方法是寻找法律文本的全部语用传达内容，理由是这通常是语言解释所追求的目标。 ^[30]

Conceptual arguments claim that a particular approach to legal interpretation follows from the concept of interpretation, the concept of law, the concept of authority, or some other relevant concept (e.g., Neale 2012 [Other Internet Resources]; see Berman 2009, 37–68). For example, as noted in section 2, some writers have argued that any approach to a text that does not seek the intentions of the author does not count as interpretation (Fish 2005; Graglia 1992).^[31]
概念性论点主张，某种法律解释方法源自解释的概念、法律的概念、权威的概念或其他相关概念（例如 Neale 2012 [其他网络资源]；参见 Berman 2009, 37–68）。例如，如第 2 节所述，一些作者认为，任何不寻求作者意图的文本处理方法都不能算作解释（Fish 2005; Graglia 1992）。 ^[31]

Such arguments for particular theories of legal interpretation are typically offered without any account of why these arguments are the relevant ones and often without consideration of other kinds of arguments. What is the appropriate way to choose between competing theories of legal interpretation? What kinds of arguments are relevant? How do we adjudicate between competing arguments if they conflict? It is unusual for theorists to explicitly address the question of how to choose between competing theories of interpretation. For exceptions, see, e.g., Shapiro 2009 chaps. 1, 12–13; Greenberg 2017a; Fallon 1999.
这类支持特定法律解释理论的论点通常在没有说明为何这些论点是相关的情况下提出，且往往未考虑其他类型的论点。如何在相互竞争的法律解释理论之间做出适当选择？哪些类型的论点是相关的？如果论点之间存在冲突，我们如何裁决？理论家们很少明确探讨如何在相互竞争的解释理论之间进行选择的问题。例外情况可参见 Shapiro 2009 第 1 章、12–13 章；Greenberg 2017a；Fallon 1999。

Section 2 made the point that which method of legal interpretation is correct – and which reasons or arguments count in favor of a method – depends on what legal interpretation seeks. To a first approximation, whether a method of legal interpretation is correct depends on whether it reliably yields what legal interpretation seeks. For example, if legal interpretation seeks the best resolution of disputes, then a method of legal interpretation is correct if, and only if, it yields the best resolution of disputes.^[32]
第 2 节指出，法律解释的正确方法——以及支持某种方法的理由或论据——取决于法律解释所追求的目标。粗略而言，一种法律解释方法是否正确，取决于它是否能可靠地实现法律解释所寻求的目标。例如，如果法律解释旨在寻求争议的最佳解决方案，那么一种法律解释方法正确当且仅当它能产生争议的最佳解决方案。 ^[32]

We saw that the strongest candidate for what legal interpretation seeks is provisions’ contribution to the content of the law. (As noted, even if legal interpretation seeks the best resolution of disputes, legal interpretation must begin by seeking provisions’ contributions, given plausible assumptions. See section 2.) If that is what legal interpretation seeks, then a method cannot be a good one unless it reliably yields the content of the law.
我们发现，法律解释最有力的追求目标是法律条款对法律内容的贡献。（如前所述，即使法律解释追求的是争议的最佳解决，基于合理的假设，法律解释也必须从寻求条款的贡献开始。参见第 2 节。）如果这是法律解释所追求的，那么除非一种方法能可靠地得出法律内容，否则它不可能是一种好方法。

Let’s use the term legal facts for facts about the content of the law, for example, the fact that, in California, contracts for the sale of land are not valid unless in writing.^[33] Legal facts are not among the most basic facts of the universe. They are determined by metaphysically more basic facts, such as facts about what various people and institutions have said and done and decided and, on some views, moral or other normative facts. A theory of law is an account of how the more basic, determining facts determine the legal facts.^[34] Different theories of law make different claims about what the determining facts are and how they combine to determine the legal facts.
让我们用“法律事实”这一术语来指代关于法律内容的事实，例如，在加利福尼亚州，土地销售合同除非以书面形式订立否则无效的事实。 ^[33] 法律事实并非宇宙中最基本的事实。它们由形而上学上更为基本的事实所决定，比如关于各种个人和机构所言、所行、所决定的事实，以及在某些观点中，道德或其他规范性事实。法律理论是对这些更基本的、决定性的事实如何决定法律事实的说明。 ^[34] 不同的法律理论对决定性事实是什么以及它们如何结合以决定法律事实提出了不同的主张。

The most widely held theory of law, at least in law schools, is HLA Hart’s (1994) inclusive positivist theory, and many theorists of legal interpretation profess to accept Hartian positivism (Alexander 2015; Baude and Sachs 2018; Baude 2015, 2364–65; Sachs 2014, 2261; 2015, 825–26; Fallon 2018, 90–91; Goldsworthy 2019). What are its implications for legal interpretation? On Hart’s account, the content of the law is determined at the most fundamental level by the convergent practices of judges and other officials.^[35] In Hart’s well-known terminology, judges’ convergent practices and attitudes constitute a rule of recognition that specifies how the content of the law is determined (Hart 1994, 100–10).^[36] (For simplicity, I restrict attention to judges.) To illustrate with respect to statutes, if judges (in a particular jurisdiction): (1) regularly treat statutes as contributing to the law in a particular way; (2) are disposed to criticize other judges who fail to do so (or threaten to fail to do so); and (3) regard such criticisms as justified, then the rule of recognition in the jurisdiction is that statutes contribute to the content of the law in that way. (See entry on Legal Positivism.)
目前法学界（至少在法学院中）最主流的法律理论是 HLA 哈特（1994）提出的包容性实证主义理论，许多法律解释理论家都宣称接受哈特式的实证主义立场（Alexander 2015; Baude and Sachs 2018; Baude 2015, 2364–65; Sachs 2014, 2261; 2015, 825–26; Fallon 2018, 90–91; Goldsworthy 2019）。这对法律解释意味着什么？根据哈特的理论，法律内容在最根本层面上是由法官及其他官员的趋同性实践所决定的。 ^[35] 用哈特著名的术语来说，法官们趋同的实践与态度构成了"承认规则"，该规则明确了法律内容的确定方式（Hart 1994, 100–10）。 ^[36] （为简化起见，本文仅聚焦法官群体。）以制定法为例，如果某司法管辖区内的法官：（1）通常以特定方式将制定法视为法律组成部分；（2）倾向于批评其他未遵循此方式的法官（或可能违反者）；（3）认为此类批评具有正当性，那么该管辖区的承认规则就是"制定法以该特定方式构成法律内容"。 （参见法律实证主义条目。）

In addition to the rule of recognition’s specification of how sources of law contribute to the content of the law at the most fundamental level, legal norms that are themselves validated by the rule of recognition could further specify how sources of law are to contribute to the content of the law.
除了承认规则在最基本层面上对法律渊源如何构成法律内容的规定外，那些本身由承认规则确认的法律规范，还可以进一步具体规定法律渊源应如何对法律内容作出贡献。

Thus, if Hart’s theory is true, in order to defend a preferred theory of legal interpretation, a theorist must argue either: 1) that the way in which the theory takes a provision to contribute to the content of the law is incorporated in the rule of recognition because it is treated as correct by a large majority of judges; or 2) that the way in which the theory takes a provision to contribute to the content of the law is validated by a criterion that, in turn, is treated as correct by a large majority of judges.^[37] This would be a challenging task. (As these are the only two possibilities that Hart’s account allows, to the extent that there is no consensus on a theory of legal interpretation and no criterion grounded in consensus that validates a particular theory of interpretation, it is indeterminate which theory of interpretation is correct.)^[38]
因此，如果哈特的理论成立，要为某种偏好的法律解释理论辩护，理论家必须论证：1）该理论认为某条款对法律内容的贡献方式已被纳入承认规则，因为大多数法官视其为正确；或 2）该理论认为某条款对法律内容的贡献方式得到了某一标准的验证，而该标准本身被大多数法官视为正确。 ^[37] 这将是一项艰巨的任务。（由于哈特的理论只允许这两种可能性，若对法律解释理论缺乏共识，且不存在基于共识验证特定解释理论的标准，那么何种解释理论正确就是不确定的。） ^[38]

Take the first possibility. There seems to be no consensus among judges about the proper method of legal interpretation. Instead, there is widespread controversy (Hart and Sacks 1994, 1169; Eskridge 1994, 13–47; Eskridge, Frickey & Garret 2007, 689–846; for a few haphazardly chosen examples, see the various methods employed and advocated in the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith, Bond, Yates, Weber, and King v. Burwell). A theorist could try to argue that, at a high level of generality, there is a consensus among judges on the theorist’s preferred method of interpretation, and that the disagreement is in the application of that consensus.
以第一种可能性为例。法官们对于法律解释的正确方法似乎并未达成共识，反而存在广泛的争议（Hart and Sacks 1994, 1169; Eskridge 1994, 13–47; Eskridge, Frickey & Garret 2007, 689–846；随意选取的几个例子可参见美国最高法院在 Smith、Bond、Yates、Weber 及 King v. Burwell 等案件判决中所采用和主张的各种方法）。理论家或许会试图论证，在高度概括的层面上，法官们对理论家所偏好的解释方法存在共识，而分歧仅在于如何应用这一共识。

The only kind of consensus among judges, however, is on bland platitudes such as that original meaning matters or legislative intention is important. Such platitudes are too underspecified to yield a uniquely correct application. Which kind of original meaning? Semantic content? Communicative content? “Public meaning”? Exactly how does original meaning matter, and what other factors matter and in what way? Which kind of legislative intention?
然而，法官之间唯一达成的共识仅限于一些平淡无奇的陈词滥调，比如“原初意义很重要”或“立法意图很关键”。这些陈词滥调过于笼统，无法得出唯一正确的适用标准。究竟是哪种原初意义？语义内容？交际内容？还是“公共含义”？原初意义究竟如何发挥作用，其他因素又以何种方式相关？又是指哪种立法意图？

The second possibility is a little more promising. It is possible for judges to agree on a criterion (or chain of criteria) that validates a particular method of legal interpretation, yet be unaware that the criterion does so because the application of the criterion is controversial. Thus, for example, a theorist could try to argue that the judges agree on a normative criterion, but they disagree about what that criterion, properly understood, entails. Or a theorist could argue that judges converge on a descriptive criterion, but they have a factual disagreement about what that descriptive criterion entails. Perhaps there is a forgotten custom, validated by the rule of recognition, that specifies (when understood as the rule of recognition requires) that statutes contribute to the law according to their literal meaning, and there are no conflicting norms validated by the rule of recognition. Such possibilities can’t be ruled out a priori, but it is clear that it would be a tall order to show that there is consensus on a criterion that, properly understood, yields a controversial method of interpretation.
第二种可能性稍显乐观。法官们有可能就某一（或一系列）验证法律解释特定方法的标准达成一致，却因该标准的应用存在争议而未能意识到其验证作用。例如，理论家或许试图论证法官们认同某一规范性标准，但对于该标准在正确理解下所蕴含的内容存在分歧。又或者，理论家可能主张法官们对某一描述性标准形成共识，但就该描述性标准所衍生的具体事实存在认知差异。或许存在某种被承认规则验证却遭遗忘的惯例，该惯例规定（当按照承认规则的要求理解时）成文法应依其字面含义贡献于法律体系，且不存在经承认规则验证的冲突性规范。这类可能性无法先验地排除，但显然要证明存在一个经正确理解便能产生争议性解释方法的标准共识，实非易事。

In sum, on Hart’s theory of law, it is difficult to defend any controversial theory of legal interpretation.^[39] (But see Baude and Sachs 2017; 2018.)
总之，根据哈特的法律理论，很难为任何有争议的法律解释理论辩护。 ^[39] （但参见 Baude 和 Sachs 2017; 2018。）

Dworkin’s well-known “law as integrity” theory of law, sketched above, is the most influential alternative to Hart’s account. See section 3. (Dworkin 1986, 225, Ch. 7.) As discussed, Dworkin does not consider the distinction between theory of law and theory of legal interpretation – i.e., between an account of how the content of the law is determined and an account of how to ascertain the content of the law. He assumes that, if his theory of law is true, the proper method of legal interpretation is simply to seek the set of principles that best justify the legal practices.
上文概述的德沃金著名的“法律即整全性”理论，是哈特理论最具影响力的替代方案。参见第 3 节（Dworkin 1986, 225, 第 7 章）。如前所述，德沃金并未区分法律理论与法律解释理论——即关于法律内容如何确定的说明与如何查明法律内容的说明。他认为，如果他的法律理论成立，那么正确的法律解释方法就是寻找最能证成法律实践的那套原则。

In principle, however, a proponent of a different theory of legal interpretation, textualism, say, could argue that Dworkin’s theory of law in fact supports textualism. The theorist would have to argue that textualism is the best method of ascertaining the set of principles that best justify the legal practices.
然而从理论上说，其他法律解释理论（比如文本主义）的支持者可以主张，德沃金的法律理论实际上支持文本主义。这类理论家需要论证：文本主义才是查明那套最能证成法律实践之原则的最佳方法。

In light of these implications of well-known theories of law for how to defend theories of legal interpretation, it’s worth returning to the kinds of arguments that theorists of legal interpretation in fact offer to support their preferred accounts. As already noted, normative arguments are probably the most common. The typical argument is that a method is supported by a certain value – democracy or fairness, for example – because the method treats sources of law as contributing to the law in the way that that value requires.
鉴于这些广为人知的法律理论对如何为法律解释理论辩护所蕴含的意义，值得重新审视法律解释理论家们实际上为支持其偏好的解释方法所提出的论证类型。如前所述，规范性论证可能是最常见的。典型的论证是，某种方法受到某种价值——例如民主或公平——的支持，因为该方法将法律渊源对法律的贡献方式与该价值的要求相吻合。

It may be that theorists give such arguments simply because they have not carefully considered what legal interpretation seeks. But are such arguments apt – that is, are they an appropriate way of defending a theory of legal interpretation given the assumption that legal interpretation seeks a provision’s contribution to the content of the law?
理论家们提出此类论证，或许仅仅是因为他们未曾仔细思考法律解释的追求。但这些论证是否恰当——也就是说，在假设法律解释旨在探求某条款对法律内容的贡献的前提下，它们是否为辩护法律解释理论的合适方式？

The fact that a method of legal interpretation treats a provision as contributing to the law in the way that is supported by fairness (say) is an argument in favor of the correctness of that method only if fairness is relevant to the method’s ability to identify a provision’s contribution to the content of the law. But whether fairness is relevant in this way depends on how the content of the law is determined. Thus, whether typical normative arguments are apt depends on how the content of the law is determined. For example, if normative factors play no role in determining the content of the law, then it’s hard to see how the fact that a method of interpretation treats a source as contributing to the law in a way that is fair bears on whether it accurately identifies a provision’s contribution to the content of the law.
一种法律解释方法若将某条款视为以符合公平（例如）的方式对法律作出贡献，这一事实仅当公平性关系到该方法识别条款对法律内容贡献的能力时，才构成支持该方法正确性的论据。但公平性是否以这种方式相关，取决于法律内容是如何被确定的。因此，典型规范性论证是否恰当，取决于法律内容的确定方式。例如，若规范性因素在确定法律内容时不发挥作用，则很难看出一种解释方法将某法律渊源视为以公平方式对法律作出贡献的事实，如何能影响其准确识别条款对法律内容贡献的能力。

Returning to Hartian positivism, normative factors can play a role if, and only if, there is a consensus among judges that does the necessary work (or a consensus on another criterion that picks out those normative factors). If, as seems likely, there is no consensus among judges that does the necessary work, Hart’s theory implies that normative factors do not play a role in determining the content of the law. In that case, the fact that a method of legal interpretation is supported by democracy, fairness, or other values has no bearing on whether it accurately ascertains the content of the law.
回到哈特式的实证主义，规范因素能够发挥作用的前提是，且仅当法官们达成共识来完成必要的工作（或就另一项筛选出这些规范因素的标准达成共识）。如果正如很可能发生的那样，法官们未能形成完成必要工作的共识，哈特的理论意味着规范因素在确定法律内容时不发挥作用。在这种情况下，某种法律解释方法是否得到民主、公平或其他价值观的支持，与其能否准确确定法律内容无关。

Exclusive positivist theories of law, by contrast with inclusive accounts like Hart’s, maintain that normative factors can play no role in determining the content of the law at any level (Raz 1979; 1994; Shapiro 2011, 271–81; Leiter 1998, 535–36; see entry on Legal Positivism). On such accounts, it is clear that normative arguments have no bearing on whether a theory of interpretation is true.
与哈特等包容性理论相对，排他性法律实证主义理论主张，规范性因素在任何层面上都不能决定法律的内容（Raz 1979; 1994; Shapiro 2011, 271–81; Leiter 1998, 535–36；参见“法律实证主义”条目）。根据此类理论，显然规范性论证对解释理论的真实性毫无影响。

As we saw above, Dworkin’s theory makes normative arguments relevant. But the type of normative argument that it makes relevant is very different from the normative arguments typically offered in favor of theories of legal interpretation. On Dworkin’s theory, the way to show that a method of interpretation accurately identifies how sources, such as statutory and constitutional provisions, contribute to the law is to show that the method yields the principles that best justify the enactment of those provisions. An argument that a method yields the best justification of enactments is, however, very different from the kind of normative argument typically offered in favor of theories of legal interpretation.
正如我们之前所见，德沃金的理论使规范性论证变得相关。然而，该理论所涉及的规范性论证类型与通常支持法律解释理论的规范性论证大相径庭。在德沃金的理论中，要证明某种解释方法能准确识别诸如成文法条款和宪法条款等渊源如何对法律作出贡献，就需要展示该方法能产生最能证明这些条款制定合理性的原则。然而，论证某种方法能对法律制定提供最佳正当性，这与通常支持法律解释理论的规范性论证截然不同。

One theory of law – really a family of theories – offers a natural explanation of the relevance of the typical normative arguments. Theories in this family hold that legal obligations are constituted by certain genuine normative (or moral) obligations.^[40] For example, according to the moral impact theory, the relevant obligations are, roughly speaking, those that obtain in virtue of the actions of legal institutions (Greenberg 2014). At the fundamental level, therefore, what the determinants of the content of the law are – and how they contribute to the content of the law – is determined by all relevant values. Thus, for example, a statute’s contribution to the content of the law is the impact of its enactment, in light of fairness, democracy, and any other relevant values, on our obligations (and rights, permissions, powers, and so on). Consequently, on the moral impact theory, a natural way to argue for a method of interpretation is to argue that the way in which the method of interpretation takes sources to contribute to the content of the law is supported, on balance, by the relevant values.
一种法律理论——实际上是一系列理论——为典型规范性论证的相关性提供了自然的解释。这一理论家族认为，法律义务由某些真实的规范性（或道德）义务构成。 ^[40] 例如，根据道德影响理论，相关义务大致上是指那些因法律机构的行为而产生的义务（Greenberg 2014）。因此，从根本上说，法律内容决定因素是什么——以及它们如何影响法律内容——是由所有相关价值决定的。例如，一项法规对法律内容的贡献，是基于公平、民主及其他相关价值，其颁布对我们义务（以及权利、许可、权力等）所产生的影响。因此，在道德影响理论下，为某种解释方法辩护的自然方式是论证：该解释方法认为法律渊源对法律内容的贡献方式，总体上得到了相关价值的支持。

The moral impact theory thus seems to fit nicely the way in which theorists of legal interpretation employ normative arguments to defend their theories (see Greenberg 2020, 133–34). And, perhaps surprisingly, on many competing theories of law, it may be difficult to defend the aptness of such normative arguments. Of course, the moral impact theory implies that it is not enough to argue, as theorists often do, that a particular democratic or fairness consideration supports a preferred theory of interpretation. What is needed is an argument that the way in which a theory takes sources to contribute to the content of the law is supported, on balance, by all relevant values.
因此，道德影响理论似乎与法律解释理论家运用规范性论证来捍卫其理论的方式相契合（参见 Greenberg 2020, 133–34）。或许出人意料的是，在许多相互竞争的法律理论中，要为此类规范性论证的恰当性辩护可能颇为困难。当然，道德影响理论意味着，仅如理论家们常做的那样，论证某一民主或公平考量支持某种偏好的解释理论是不够的。需要的是这样一种论证：即某一理论认为法律渊源如何影响法律内容的方式，总体上得到了所有相关价值的支持。

5.2 The Potential for Divergence between Theories of Law and Theories of Legal Interpretation
5.2 法律理论与法律解释理论之间潜在的分歧

In the preceding subsection, I relied on the simplifying assumption that, if legal interpretation seeks the content of the law, then whether a method of legal interpretation is correct depends only on whether it treats the determinants of the content of the law as contributing to the content of the law in the way that they in fact do so. On this assumption, there is no gap between a theory of law and a theory of legal interpretation. If the correct theory of law is that the content of the law is determined by, say, the semantic content of the authoritative legal texts, then the best method of legal interpretation is to ascertain the semantic content of the authoritative legal texts.
在前一小节中，我依赖于一个简化假设：如果法律解释旨在探寻法律的内容，那么一种法律解释方法是否正确，仅取决于它是否将法律内容的决定因素以这些因素实际发挥作用的方式纳入法律内容。基于这一假设，法律理论与法律解释理论之间不存在间隙。如果正确的法律理论认为法律内容是由权威法律文本的语义内容所决定的，那么最佳的法律解释方法就是确定权威法律文本的语义内容。

Depending on how we understand the province of a theory of legal interpretation, it may be important to qualify this straightforward approach in several ways. (See Greenberg 2020, 136–141 for fuller discussion.) To begin with, legal interpretation is sensitive to evidentiary considerations in a way that the theory of law is not. Thus, a theory of legal interpretation may provide guidance as to what kinds of evidence are most reliable. Differently, there may be legal or moral reasons – as opposed to reasons of accuracy – not to permit consulting certain kinds of evidence. For example, it is plausible that, for reasons of democracy and fairness, private diaries of legislators are not appropriate kinds of evidence, even if consulting them would yield more accurate conclusions about the content of the law.
根据我们如何理解法律解释理论的适用范围，可能需要在几个方面对这种直接方法加以限定。（更全面的讨论参见 Greenberg 2020, 136-141 页）。首先，法律解释对证据考量的敏感度是法律理论所不具备的。因此，法律解释理论可以提供关于哪些证据最为可靠的指导。此外，可能存在法律或道德上的理由——与准确性理由相对——不允许参考某些类型的证据。例如，出于民主和公平的考虑，立法者的私人日记不适合作为证据，即使查阅它们会得出关于法律内容的更准确结论。

More generally, the theory of legal interpretation may take into account goals other than accurately identifying a provision’s contribution. For example, it is often suggested that courts should adhere to the plain meaning of a provision in order to provide an incentive for good drafting. Improving the drafting of statutory and other provisions may in the long run help legal interpreters to identify provisions’ contributions accurately as well as providing other benefits. In the short run, however, the goal of improving the drafting of legal texts may conflict with the goal of accurately identifying a provision’s contribution. There is an important question to what extent it is appropriate for legal interpretation to pursue the former goal at the expense of the latter. To take a very different kind of example, there may be moral reasons why some kinds of mistakes are worse than others (or why mistakes by certain decision-makers are worse than mistakes by others). Such reasons may support following methods that would minimize the more problematic kinds of mistakes at the expense of overall accuracy.
更广泛地说，法律解释理论可能考虑除准确识别条款贡献之外的其他目标。例如，人们常建议法院应遵循条款的字面含义，以激励良好的法律起草。从长远来看，改进成文法及其他条款的起草工作不仅有助于法律解释者准确识别条款贡献，还能带来其他益处。然而短期内，提升法律文本起草质量的目标可能与准确识别条款贡献的目标产生冲突。一个重要的问题是：法律解释在多大程度上可以为了追求前者而牺牲后者？再举一个截然不同的例子：某些类型的错误（或某些决策者的错误）比其他错误更严重可能存在道德层面的原因。这类理由可能支持采用那些以牺牲整体准确性为代价、却能最大限度减少更严重错误的方法。

Another important departure from the straightforward assumption that the correct theory of legal interpretation simply tracks the true theory of law would take into account the abilities and limitations of legal interpreters. Consideration of bounded rationality raises important issues for a theory of legal interpretation. Judges, to take an especially important group, operate with limited time and information and they are subject to human cognitive limitations and biases much discussed in recent literature. See entry on Bounded Rationality. Given these facts, it might be counterproductive for judges to directly aim to treat legal sources as contributing to the law in the way that they in fact contribute. They might do better overall at accurately identifying the way in which sources contribute to the content of the law if they instead followed some kind of relatively simple rule of thumb.^[41] Similarly, we might also have special accounts for other participants in the legal system, for example, for legislators, executive officials, and police officers.
另一个重要偏离于“正确的法律解释理论仅需追踪真实法律理论”这一直接假设的观点，会考虑法律解释者的能力与局限。有限理性的考量对法律解释理论提出了重要问题。以法官这一尤为重要的群体为例，他们在有限的时间和信息下运作，并受制于人类认知局限和偏见——这些在近期文献中已有大量讨论（参见“有限理性”条目）。鉴于这些事实，若法官直接以“法律渊源实际贡献法律的方式”作为处理依据，反而可能适得其反。若他们转而遵循某种相对简单的经验法则，或许能更准确地识别出法律渊源对法律内容的贡献方式。 ^[41] 同样，我们可能还需要为法律体系中的其他参与者——如立法者、行政官员和警察——制定特殊解释方案。

It could be debated whether taking into account agents’ abilities and limitations properly belongs in the theory of legal interpretation. It might be, for example, that the proper place to take into account judges’ biases and limitations is the theory of adjudication. Let’s set aside this largely terminological question. Instead, we can distinguish between different degrees and kinds of idealization in the theory of legal interpretation. For example, one type of highly idealized theory asks how a legal interpreter without cognitive or time limitations best ascertains what the law is given the legally and morally permissible evidence (without taking into account values other than accuracy, except for the restriction to permissible evidence). A somewhat less idealized kind of theory asks how agents with specific abilities and limitations would, under real-world conditions, including limited time, do best at accurately identifying provisions’ contributions. Finally, we could ask how a legal interpreter should proceed taking into account not just accuracy, but also the kinds of values illustrated above, such as promoting good drafting.
关于是否应将行为人的能力与局限纳入法律解释理论范畴，这一问题尚存争议。例如，法官的偏见与局限或许更应属于裁判理论的讨论范畴。我们暂且搁置这个主要涉及术语划分的问题，转而关注法律解释理论中不同程度与类型的理想化区分。例如，一种高度理想化的理论探讨的是：当法律解释者不受认知或时间限制时，如何在法律与道德允许的证据范围内（除准确性外不考虑其他价值，仅受限于证据的合法性）最准确地确定法律内容。另一种稍弱理想化的理论则追问：具备特定能力与局限的行为人，在现实条件（包括时间有限性）下，如何最精准地识别法律条款的实质贡献。最后，我们还可以探讨法律解释者应如何在兼顾准确性的同时，纳入上文所述的其他价值考量（如促进立法完善）来推进解释工作。

6. Conclusion  6. 结论

Several competing approaches to legal interpretation, such as intentionalism and textualism, are familiar to lawyers and legal theorists. Despite a large literature, there is a great deal of unclarity about what these approaches amount to – that is, about precisely which methods they recommend. Understanding can be greatly improved by attention to how language and meaning work and by explication of important distinctions, such as those between different types of intentions.
律师和法律理论家们对法律解释的几种竞争性方法，如意图主义和文本主义，都颇为熟悉。尽管相关文献浩繁，但这些方法究竟主张什么——即它们具体推荐哪些解释方法——仍存在大量不明确之处。通过关注语言和意义如何运作，并厘清重要区分（如不同类型意图之间的区别），可以极大提升理解。

But there is a more fundamental question that has to be addressed in order to make progress on the question of which method of legal interpretation is correct. The question is what legal interpretation, by its nature, seeks. Although this question is not often explicitly addressed, several different candidates can be found in the literature. We assessed these candidates and saw that there is a powerful case that legal interpretation seeks provisions’ contribution to the law.
但要推进关于何种法律解释方法正确的讨论，首先需要解决一个更为根本的问题：法律解释本质上追求的目标是什么。虽然这个问题鲜少被明确探讨，但文献中可见若干不同观点。我们评估了这些观点后发现，强有力的证据表明法律解释寻求的是法律条款对法律体系的贡献。

Given this conclusion, which method of interpretation is correct will depend on how the content of the law is determined. On Hart’s theory of law and other influential accounts, many familiar arguments deployed to defend methods of interpretation are not even of the appropriate sort.
根据这一结论，解释方法的正确性将取决于法律内容如何确定。按照哈特的法律理论及其他有影响力的论述，许多用于为解释方法辩护的常见论证甚至不属于适当的类型。

Although attention to the theory of law is critical to progress in the field of legal interpretation, there is space between the theory of legal interpretation and the theory of law. The theory of legal interpretation may take into account values other than accurately identifying the content of the law. And there is also the possibility that legal interpreters will more accurately identify the content of the law by following relatively simple rules of thumb than by trying to identify the content of the law directly.
尽管关注法律理论对法律解释领域的进步至关重要，但法律解释理论与法律理论之间存在一定空间。法律解释理论可能考虑除准确识别法律内容之外的其他价值。此外，法律解释者通过遵循相对简单的经验法则，可能比直接尝试识别法律内容更准确地确定法律内容。

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Manuscripts  手稿

• Greenberg, Mark, 2016, “Principles of Legal Interpretation,” unpublished manuscript.
  格林伯格，马克，2016 年，《法律解释原则》，未发表手稿。
• Neale, Stephen, 2008, “Textualism with Intent,” unpublished manuscript.
  尼尔·斯蒂芬，2008 年，《带有意图的文本主义》，未发表手稿。
• –––, 2012, “Convergentism & the Nature of Law,” paper presented at the Oslo Workshop on the Pragmatics of Legal Language.
  ——，2012 年，《趋同论与法律的本质》，奥斯陆法律语言语用学研讨会论文。

Court Cases  法院案例

• Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011)
  邦德诉美国案，564 U.S. 211（2011 年）
• Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973)
  布伦斯顿诉美国案，409 U.S. 352（1973 年）
• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
  哥伦比亚特区诉赫勒案，554 U.S. 570（2008 年）
• Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)
  圣三一教堂诉美国案，143 U.S. 457（1892 年）
• King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)
  金诉伯韦尔案，135 S. Ct. 2480（2015 年）
• Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993)
  史密斯诉美国案，508 U.S. 223（1993 年）
• Texas v. United States, 340 F.Supp.3d 579 (N.D. Tex., 2018), argued, No. 19-10011 (5th Cir. July 9, 2019)
  德克萨斯州诉美国案，340 F.Supp.3d 579（德州北区地方法院，2018 年），上诉案号 19-10011（第五巡回上诉法院，2019 年 7 月 9 日）
• United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
  美国钢铁工人联合会诉韦伯案，443 U.S. 193（1979 年）
• Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015)
  耶茨诉美国案，135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015)

Related Entries  相关条目

assertion | bounded rationality | consequentialism | constitutionalism | empiricism: logical | Grice, Paul | law: and language | legal reasoning: precedent and analogy in | meaning, theories of | naturalism: in legal philosophy | nature of law: interpretivist theories | nature of law: legal positivism | pragmatics
断言 | 有限理性 | 结果主义 | 宪政主义 | 经验主义：逻辑的 | 格莱斯，保罗 | 法律与语言 | 法律推理：先例与类比 | 意义理论 | 自然主义：法哲学中的 | 法律本质：解释主义理论 | 法律本质：法律实证主义 | 语用学

Acknowledgments  致谢

I thank Mitch Berman, David Dolinko, Erik Encarnacion, Russell Korobkin, Jennifer Mnookin, Steve Munzer, Seana Shiffrin, and many other UCLA colleagues for helpful comments. For excellent research assistance, I am grateful to Sarah Burns, Jennifer Erickson, Zak Fisher, Ricky Fox, Martin Gandur, Shahin Mohammadi, Bronson Van Opijnen, and Jordan Wolf.
我感谢 Mitch Berman、David Dolinko、Erik Encarnacion、Russell Korobkin、Jennifer Mnookin、Steve Munzer、Seana Shiffrin 以及许多其他 UCLA 同事提供的宝贵意见。对于出色的研究协助，我要感谢 Sarah Burns、Jennifer Erickson、Zak Fisher、Ricky Fox、Martin Gandur、Shahin Mohammadi、Bronson Van Opijnen 和 Jordan Wolf。