Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Buzan, Barry. 国会图书馆编目出版数据 巴里·布赞。
Security: a new framework for analysis/by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 安全：分析新框架 / 巴里·布赞，奥勒·韦弗，雅普·德·维尔德著。
Includes bibliographical references and index. 包含参考书目和索引。
ISBN 1-55587-603-X (hc:alk. paper). ISBN 1-55587-603-X（精装：碱性纸）
ISBN 1-55587-784-2 (pb:alk. paper) ISBN 1-55587-784-2（平装：碱性纸）
Security, International. 2. National security. 安全，国际。2. 国家安全。
Regionalism. 4. International economic relations. I. Wæver, 地区主义。4. 国际经济关系。I. Wæver，
Ole, 1960- . II. Wilde, Jaap de. III. Title. Ole，1960- 。II. Wilde，Jaap de。III. 题名。
KZ5588.B89 1997
303.48’2—dc21 97-21300
CIP
British Cataloguing in Publication Data 英国出版物编目数据
A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book 本书的馆藏编目记录
is available from the British Library. 可从英国图书馆获得。
Printed and bound in the United States of America 在美利坚合众国印刷和装订
(0) The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. （0）本出版物所用纸张符合美国国家标准 Z39.48-1984《印刷图书馆资料用纸耐久性标准》的要求。
54
Contents 目录
Preface … vii 前言 … vii
1 Introduction … 1 1 引言 … 1
2 Security Analysis: Conceptual Apparatus … 21 2 安全分析：概念工具 … 21
3 The Military Sector … 49 3 军事领域 … 49
4 The Environmental Sector … 71 4 环境领域 … 71
5 The Economic Sector … 95 5 经济领域 … 95
6 The Societal Sector … 119 6 社会领域 … 119
7 The Political Sector … 141 7 政治领域 … 141
8 How Sectors Are Synthesized … 163 8 领域的综合 … 163
9 Conclusions … 195 结论 … 195
Bibliography … 215 参考文献 … 215
Acronyms … 231 缩略语 … 231
Index … 233 索引 … 233
About the Book … 239 关于本书 … 239
Preface 前言
This book sets out a new and comprehensive framework of analysis for security studies. Establishing the case for the wider agenda, it both answers the traditionalist charge that the wider agenda makes the subject incoherent and formulates security to incorporate the traditionalist agenda. It examines the distinctive character and dynamics of security in five sectors: military, political, economic, environmental, and socictal. It rejects the traditionalists’ case for restricting security to one sector, arguing that security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues. And it offers a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization-for understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions. 本书提出了一个新的、全面的安全研究分析框架。通过确立更广泛议程的合理性，它既回应了传统主义者认为更广泛议程使该学科变得不连贯的指责，又将安全概念扩展以涵盖传统主义议程。书中考察了军事、政治、经济、环境和社会五个领域中安全的独特特征和动态。它反对传统主义者将安全限制在单一领域的观点，认为安全是一种特定类型的政治，适用于广泛的问题。并且，它提供了一种建构主义的操作方法，用以区分安全化过程与政治化过程——理解谁能在何种条件下对何事进行安全化。
The original motive for the book was to update regional security complex theory (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1990). reflecting the widespread feeling in the mid-1990s that the post-Cold War international system was going to be much more decentralized and regionalized in character. We wanted to bring security complex theory in line with the wider post-Cold War security agenda so we could use it to analyze the emergent international (dis)order. Our question was, How could security complex theory be blended with the wider agenda of security studies, which covered not only the traditional military and political sectors but also the economic, societal, and environmental ones? This question was a natural outgrowth of the conIradiction, already evident in People, States and Fear (Buzan 1991), between an argument for a wider conception of security on the one hand and a presentation of security complex theory cast largely in traditional military-political terms on the other. The question also followed naturally from our two earlier books (Buzan et al. 1990; Wæver et al. 1993), the first of which was based on state-centric security complex theory and the second of which sought to unfold the societal component of the wider security mpernda. 这本书的最初动机是更新区域安全复合体理论（Buzan 1991；Buzan 等 1990），反映了 20 世纪 90 年代中期普遍的感觉，即冷战后国际体系将更加分散和区域化。我们希望使安全复合体理论与更广泛的冷战后安全议程保持一致，以便用它来分析新兴的国际（无）秩序。我们的问题是，如何将安全复合体理论与涵盖不仅传统军事和政治领域，还包括经济、社会和环境领域的更广泛的安全研究议程相结合？这个问题是《人民、国家与恐惧》（Buzan 1991）中已经显现的矛盾的自然延伸，一方面主张更广泛的安全概念，另一方面则主要以传统军事政治术语呈现安全复合体理论。这个问题也自然而然地继承了我们之前的两本书（Buzan 等 1990；Wæver 等）。 1993 年，其中第一个基于以国家为中心的安全复合体理论，第二个则试图展开更广泛安全议程中的社会成分。
Traditional security complex theory has considerable power to explain intil predict both the formation of durable regional patterns of security relalions and the pattern of outside intervention in these regions. But could this sumbe logic be extended into the newer sectors as the relative importance of 传统的安全复合体理论在解释甚至预测安全关系的持久区域模式及外部干预这些地区的模式方面具有相当的力量。但这种总体逻辑能否扩展到较新的领域，因为军事政治安全在冷战结束后相对重要性下降？
military-political security declined after the end of the Cold War? In pursuing this question, we found it necessary to take up the challenge that the wider security agenda is intellectually incoherent. As a consequence, the project became more ambitious, evolving into a general consideration of how to understand and analyze international security without losing sight of the original purpose. 在探讨这个问题时，我们发现有必要接受更广泛安全议程在智识上不连贯的挑战。因此，该项目变得更加雄心勃勃，发展成为如何理解和分析国际安全的总体考量，同时不失去最初的目的。
Much of the conceptualization and writing of the book has been a genuinely joint enterprise, with all of the authors making substantial inputs into every chapter. But different parts do have distinctive individual stamps. Barry Buzan was the main drafter of Chapters 1,3,51,3,5, and 9 ; was largely responsible for the sectoral approach; and took overall responsibility for editing and coordinating the work. Ole Wæver was the main drafter of Chapters 2, 6, 7, and 8 , as well as the third section of Chapter 9 , and was the primary supplier of the securitization approach to defining the subject. Jaap de Wilde, the newest member of the Copenhagen research group, was the main drafter of Chapter 4 and the first two sections of Chapter 8 , made substantial inputs into Chapters 5 and 9, and restrained the other two from taking a too unquestioning position toward realist assumptions. 本书的大部分概念化和写作是真正的联合创作，所有作者都对每一章做出了实质性贡献。但不同部分确实有各自独特的个人印记。Barry Buzan 是第 和第 9 章的主要起草人；主要负责部门方法；并全面负责编辑和协调工作。Ole Wæver 是第 2、6、7 和 8 章以及第 9 章第三部分的主要起草人，是定义该主题的安全化方法的主要提供者。Jaap de Wilde 是哥本哈根研究小组中最新的成员，是第 4 章和第 8 章前两部分的主要起草人，对第 5 和第 9 章做出了重大贡献，并制约另外两人不过于无条件接受现实主义假设。
We have received a great amount of help with this project. First and foremost, our thanks to the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, whose generous grant made it possible for Buzan to devote his main attention to this book during the years 1995-1996, for us to assemble a team of experts who provided continual critical scrutiny, and for the support of the cost of a research assistant. Next, thanks to Håkan Wiberg and the staff at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, who provided a supportive, stimulating, and congenial atmosphere in which to work. Thanks also to our consultantsMohammed Ayoob, Owen Greene, Pierre Hassner, Eric Helleiner, Andrew Hurrell, and Thomas Hylland-Eriksen-who lent us both their expertise and their wider judgment. All of the consultants made extensive written comments at various stages of the drafting of the book. This final version owes much to their input, although they bear no formal responsibility for what is written here. And thanks to Eva Maria Christiansen and Mads Vöge, our research assistants, who handled most of the logistical tasks and sometimes worked unreasonable hours without complaint. Finally, our thanks to people who volunteered comments along the way and whose insights have helped to shape our arguments: Didier Bigo, Anne-Marie le Gloannec, Lene Hansen, Helge Hveem, Emile Kirschner, Wojciech Kostecki, Grazina Miniotaite, Bjørn Møller, Marie-Claude Smouts, Michacl Williams, and an anonymous reviewer for Lynne Rienner Publishers. 我们在这个项目中得到了大量帮助。首先，衷心感谢 Fritz Thyssen Stiftung，其慷慨的资助使 Buzan 能够在 1995-1996 年期间将主要精力投入到本书的撰写中，使我们能够组建一支专家团队，持续进行严格的批判性审查，并支持研究助理的费用。其次，感谢 Håkan Wiberg 和哥本哈根和平研究所的工作人员，他们提供了一个支持性、激励性和友好的工作环境。还要感谢我们的顾问 Mohammed Ayoob、Owen Greene、Pierre Hassner、Eric Helleiner、Andrew Hurrell 和 Thomas Hylland-Eriksen，他们不仅贡献了专业知识，还提供了更广泛的判断。所有顾问在书稿的各个阶段都做了大量书面评论。最终版本在很大程度上得益于他们的意见，尽管他们对书中内容不承担正式责任。感谢我们的研究助理 Eva Maria Christiansen 和 Mads Vöge，他们处理了大部分后勤工作，有时在不合理的时间工作也从不抱怨。 最后，感谢在此过程中自愿提供意见并帮助塑造我们论点的各位：Didier Bigo、Anne-Marie le Gloannec、Lene Hansen、Helge Hveem、Emile Kirschner、Wojciech Kostecki、Grazina Miniotaite、Bjørn Møller、Marie-Claude Smouts、Michacl Williams，以及 Lynne Rienner Publishers 的一位匿名审稿人。
Barry Buzan
Ole Waver 奥勒·韦弗
Jaap de Wilde 雅普·德·维尔德
CHAPTER 1 第一章
Introduction 引言
The purpose of this book is to set out a comprehensive new framework for security studies. Our approach is based on the work of those who for well over a decade have sought to question the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security. This questioning has come from diverse sources rarely coordinated with each other. Some has come from the policy side, representing organizations (including the state) trying either to achieve recognition for their concerns or to adapt themselves to changed circumstances. Other questions have come from academia: from peace research, from feminists, from international political economy, and from security (and strategic) studies. Their move has generally taken the form of attempts to widen the security agenda by claiming security status for issues and referent objects in the economic, environmental and societal sectors, as well as the military-political ones that define traditional security studies (known in some places as strategic studies). 本书的目的是提出一个全面的新安全研究框架。我们的方法基于那些十多年来一直试图质疑军事因素和国家在安全概念化中主导地位的学者的工作。这种质疑来自多种来源，且很少相互协调。一部分来自政策方面，代表包括国家在内的组织，试图获得对其关切的认可或适应变化的环境。其他质疑则来自学术界：来自和平研究、女性主义、国际政治经济学以及安全（和战略）研究。他们的努力通常表现为试图通过为经济、环境和社会领域的问题及其参照对象争取安全地位，来拓宽安全议程，此外还有定义传统安全研究（某些地方称为战略研究）的军事政治领域。
As a consequence, two views of security studies are now on the table, the new one of the wideners and the old military and state-centered view of the traditionalists. ^(-1){ }^{-1} It is time to compare these two views and assess their costs and benefits. Doing so requires both unifying concepts and a method for pursuing the wider agenda in a coherent fashion. It also requires us to provide a classification of what is and what is not a security issue, to explain how issues become securitized, and to locate the relevant security dynamics of the different types of security on levels ranging from local through regional to global. Identifying security issues is easy for traditionalists, who, broadly speaking, equate security with military issues and the use of force. But it is more difficult when security is moved out of the milifary sector. There are intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking lle word security onto an ever wider range of issues. 因此，安全研究现在有两种观点摆在桌面上，一种是扩展派的新观点，另一种是传统派的以军事和国家为中心的旧观点。现在是比较这两种观点并评估其利弊的时候了。这样做需要统一的概念和一种以连贯方式推进更广泛议程的方法。还需要我们对什么是安全问题、什么不是安全问题进行分类，解释问题如何被安全化，并定位从地方到区域再到全球不同层次的各种安全类型的相关安全动态。对于传统派来说，识别安全问题很容易，他们大致将安全等同于军事问题和武力使用。但当安全从军事领域移出时，这就变得更加困难。简单地将“安全”一词附加到越来越广泛的问题上存在智识和政治上的危险。
In this chapter, the next section surveys the debate between the new alld the traditional approaches to security studies. The following two seclions define the concepts that structure the analysis in this book. The first scis out our understanding of levels of analysis (spatial locations from macro to micro, where one can find both sources of explanation and outcomes), and the second addresses sectors (views of the whole that seleet a 在本章中，下一节将调查新安全研究方法与传统安全研究方法之间的辩论。接下来的两节定义了构成本书分析框架的概念。第一节阐明了我们对分析层次的理解（从宏观到微观的空间位置，在这些位置上既可以找到解释的来源，也可以找到结果），第二节则涉及部门（对整体的视角，选择特定类型的互动）。
particular type of interaction). The rest of the chapter deals with regions, looking at how they relate to levels of analysis, outlining “classical” security complex theory as we have used it to this point, and unveiling some of the problems with trying to extend security complex thinking into the nontraditional sectors (economic, societal, environmental). 特定类型的互动）。本章其余部分讨论地区，考察它们如何与分析层次相关，概述我们迄今为止使用的“经典”安全复合体理论，并揭示试图将安全复合体思维扩展到非传统部门（经济、社会、环境）时遇到的一些问题。
The "Wide" Versus "Narrow" Debate About Security Studies 关于安全研究的“广义”与“狭义”辩论
The “wide” versus “narrow” debate grew out of dissatisfaction with the intense narrowing of the field of security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War. This dissatisfaction was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and 1980s and later by the rise of concerns with identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990s. The issue-driven widening eventually triggered its own reaction, creating a plea for confinement of security studies to issues centered around the threat or use of force. A key argument was that progressive widening endangered the intellectual coherence of security, putting so much into it that its essential meaning became void. This argument perhaps masked a generally unspoken political concern that allowing nonmilitary issues to achieve security status would have undesirable and counterproductive effects on the entire fabric of social and international relations (more on this in Chapter 9). “广义”与“狭义”之争源于对冷战期间军事和核问题对安全研究领域的极度狭窄化的不满。这种不满最初是由 20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代国际关系中经济和环境议程的兴起所激发，随后在 90 年代又因身份问题和跨国犯罪的关注上升而加剧。以议题为驱动的扩展最终引发了反弹，出现了将安全研究限制在围绕威胁或使用武力的问题上的呼声。一个关键论点是，逐步扩展危及安全的智识连贯性，投入过多内容使其本质意义变得空洞。这个论点或许掩盖了一种普遍未明说的政治担忧，即允许非军事议题获得安全地位会对整个社会和国际关系结构产生不良且适得其反的影响（第 9 章将对此有更多论述）。
Those arguing explicitly for widening include Ullman (1983); Jahn, Lemaitre, and Wæver (1987); Nye and Lynn-Jones (1988); Matthews (1989); Brown (1989); Nye (1989); Crawford (1991); Haftendorn (1991); Tickner (1992); and Wæver et al. (1993), most taking off from the urgency of new, often nonmilitary sources of threat. There has also been a strong thread in international political economy linking patterns in the economic and military sectors (Gilpin 1981; Crawford 1993, 1995; Gowa 1994; Mansfield 1994). Buzan (1991) is a widener, but he has been skeptical about the prospects for coherent conceptualizations of security in the economic (see also Luciani 1989) and environmental (see also Deudney 1990) sectors. Buzan has argued for retaining a distinctively military subfield of strategic studies within a wider security studies (1987; 1991, chapter 10). Ullman (1983) and Buzan (1991, chapter 3) have specifically widened the definition of threat away from a purely military to a more general formulation. The other two authors of this book are also wideners, de Wilde from a liberal-pluralist background and Wæver self-defined as a postmodern realist. 明确主张扩展安全概念的包括 Ullman（1983）；Jahn、Lemaitre 和 Wæver（1987）；Nye 和 Lynn-Jones（1988）；Matthews（1989）；Brown（1989）；Nye（1989）；Crawford（1991）；Haftendorn（1991）；Tickner（1992）；以及 Wæver 等人（1993），大多数人都基于新出现的、通常是非军事的威胁来源的紧迫性出发。此外，国际政治经济学中也有一条强烈的脉络，将经济和军事领域的模式联系起来（Gilpin 1981；Crawford 1993, 1995；Gowa 1994；Mansfield 1994）。Buzan（1991）是扩展派，但他对经济领域（参见 Luciani 1989）和环境领域（参见 Deudney 1990）中安全概念的连贯性持怀疑态度。Buzan 主张在更广泛的安全研究中保留一个独特的军事战略研究子领域（1987；1991，第 10 章）。Ullman（1983）和 Buzan（1991，第 3 章）特别将威胁的定义从纯军事范畴扩展到更一般的表述。本书的另外两位作者也是扩展派，de Wilde 来自自由多元主义背景，Wæver 自我定义为后现代现实主义者。
The defense of the traditionalist position got underway as the Cold War unraveled. Until rather late one could still find arguments for restricting the field to “anything that concerns the prevention of superpower nuclear war” 随着冷战的解体，传统主义立场的辩护开始展开。直到相当晚的时候，人们仍然可以找到将领域限制在“任何涉及防止超级大国核战争的事情”的论据
(Lebow 1988: 508). But as the main task of the strategic communityanalysis of East-West military confrontation-evaporated, a period of disorientation occurred. The function, and therefore the status and funding, of the entire edifice of strategic studies built up during the Cold War seemed to be at risk; consequently, the military focus of strategic analysis seemed extremely vulnerable to pressure from the wideners. Indicative of this period was the 1989 issue of Survival (31:6) devoted entirely to “nonmilitary aspects of strategy.” （Lebow 1988：508）。但随着战略共同体的主要任务——东西方军事对抗的分析——消失，一段迷茫期随之而来。整个冷战期间建立起来的战略研究体系的功能，因此其地位和资金，似乎都面临风险；因此，战略分析的军事焦点似乎极易受到扩展者的压力。1989 年《生存》杂志（31:6）完全专注于“战略的非军事方面”，这期刊物正是这一时期的标志。
Traditionalists fought back by reasserting conventional arguments about the enduring primacy of military security (Gray 1994b). In varying degrees, they accepted the need to look more widely at nonmilitary causes of conflict in the international system and made little explicit attempt to defend the centrality of the state in security analysis at a time when so many nonstate actors were playing vigorously in the military game. Most Iraditionalists insist on military conflict as the defining key to security and are prepared to loosen their state centrism. But some-Jahn, Lemaitre, and Waver (1987) and Ayoob (1995)—hold the political sector as primary and Ayoob the state as the focal point, and ease the link to military conflict. Some traditionalists (Chipman 1992; Gray 1992) have argued that there was simply a return to the natural terrain of the subject after the artificial nuclear narrowing of the Cold War, but the key strategy was to allow widening only inasmuch as it could be linked to concerns about the threat or actual use of force between political actors. As Chipman (1992: 129) put it: 传统主义者通过重新强调军事安全的持久重要性（Gray 1994b）进行了反击。在不同程度上，他们接受了需要更广泛地关注国际体系中非军事冲突原因的观点，但在许多非国家行为者积极参与军事游戏的时代，他们几乎没有明确尝试捍卫国家在安全分析中的核心地位。大多数传统主义者坚持将军事冲突视为安全的决定性关键，并准备放松他们的国家中心主义。但有些人——Jahn、Lemaitre 和 Waver（1987）以及 Ayoob（1995）——认为政治领域是首要的，Ayoob 则将国家视为焦点，并减弱了与军事冲突的联系。一些传统主义者（Chipman 1992；Gray 1992）认为，这不过是冷战时期核威胁狭隘视角之后对该主题自然领域的回归，但其关键策略是仅在能够与政治行为者之间威胁或实际使用武力的关切联系起来时，才允许视野的拓宽。正如 Chipman（1992: 129）所说：
The structuring element of strategic analysis must be the possible use of force. . . . Non-military aspects of security may occupy more of the strategist’s time, but the need for peoples, nations, states or alliances to procure, deploy, engage or withdraw military forces must remain a primary purpose of the strategic analyst’s inquiries. 战略分析的结构要素必须是可能使用武力。……安全的非军事方面可能占据战略家的更多时间，但人民、民族、国家或联盟获取、部署、使用或撤回军事力量的需求，必须始终是战略分析者调查的主要目的。
Although he is clearly trying to keep the lid on the subject, Chipman’s statement is interesting because it explicitly moves away from strict state centrism by acknowledging that peoples and nations, as well as states and alliances, can be strategic users of force in the international system. 尽管他显然试图对这一主题保持克制，Chipman 的陈述仍然很有趣，因为它明确地摆脱了严格的国家中心主义，承认人民和民族，以及国家和联盟，都可以是国际体系中武力的战略使用者。
Stephen Walt gives perhaps the strongest statement on the traditionalist position. He argues that security studies is about the phenomenon of war and that it can be defined as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force.” Against those who want to widen the agenda outside this strictly military domain, he argues that doing so Stephen Walt 或许给出了传统主义立场最有力的陈述。他认为安全研究是关于战争现象的，可以定义为“对军事力量的威胁、使用和控制的研究。”针对那些想要将议题扩大到严格军事领域之外的人，他认为这样做
devise solutions to any of these important problems. (Walt 1991: 212-213) 设计解决方案以应对任何这些重要问题。（Walt 1991：212-213）
Walt (1991: 227; see also Dorff 1994; Gray 1994a) does allow “economics and security” into his picture but only as they relate to military issues rather than as economic security per se. Walt（1991：227；另见 Dorff 1994；Gray 1994a）确实允许“经济学和安全”进入他的视野，但仅限于它们与军事问题的关系，而非经济安全本身。
The traditionalists’ criticism that wideners risk intellectual incoherence can be a powerful point. The wider agenda does extend the range of knowledge and understanding necessary to pursue security studies. More worryingly, it also does two other things. First, given the political function of the word security, the wider agenda extends the call for state mobilization to a broad range of issues. As Deudney (1990) has pointed out, this may be undesirable and counterproductive in the environmental sector, and the argument could easily be extended into other sectors. Second, the wider agenda tends, often unthinkingly, to elevate “security” into a kind of universal good thing-the desired condition toward which all relations should move. But as Wæver (1995b) has argued, this is a dangerously narrow view. At best, security is a kind of stabilization of conflictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state. Although security in international relations may generally be better than insecurity (threats against which no adequate countermeasures are available), a secure relationship still contains serious conflicts-albeit ones against which some effective countermeasures have been taken. Even this degree of relative desirability can be questioned: liberals, for example, argue that too much economic security is destructive to the workings of a market economy. Security should not be thought of too easily as always a good thing. It is better, as Wæver argues, to aim for desecuritization: the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere. 传统主义者批评扩展者可能导致智识上的不连贯，这一点可能非常有力。更广泛的议程确实扩展了追求安全研究所需的知识和理解范围。更令人担忧的是，它还带来了另外两个问题。首先，鉴于“安全”一词的政治功能，更广泛的议程将国家动员的呼吁扩展到广泛的问题领域。正如 Deudney（1990）指出的，这在环境领域可能是不受欢迎且适得其反的，这一论点也很容易扩展到其他领域。其次，更广泛的议程往往在无意识中将“安全”提升为一种普遍的美好事物——所有关系都应朝向的理想状态。但正如 Wæver（1995b）所论，这是一种危险的狭隘观点。充其量，安全是一种通过国家紧急动员实现的冲突或威胁关系的稳定。 尽管国际关系中的安全通常优于不安全（即没有有效对策的威胁），但安全的关系仍然包含严重的冲突——尽管已经采取了一些有效的对策。即使这种相对可取的程度也可以被质疑：例如，自由主义者认为过度的经济安全会破坏市场经济的运作。安全不应被轻易视为总是好事。正如 Wæver 所主张的，更好的目标是去安全化：将问题从紧急状态转移到政治领域的正常谈判过程中。
The main purpose of this book is to present a framework based on the wider agenda that will incorporate the traditionalist position. Our solution comes down on the side of the wideners in terms of keeping the security agenda open to many different types of threats. We argue against the view that the core of security studies is war and force and that other issues are relevant only if they relate to war and force (although in Buzan’s view [1991, chapter 10] such an approach would fit nicely with the idea of strategic studies remaining a militarily focused specialism within the new security studies). Instead, we want to construct a more radical view of security studies by exploring threats to referent objects, and the securitization of those threats, that are nonmilitary as well as military. We take seriously the traditionalists’ complaint about intellectual incoherence but disagree that the retreat into a military core is the only or the best way to deal with such incoherence. We seek to find coherence not by confining security to the military sector hul by exploring the logic of security itself to find out what 本书的主要目的是提出一个基于更广泛议程的框架，该框架将纳入传统主义立场。我们的解决方案倾向于支持扩大者的观点，即保持安全议程对多种不同类型的威胁开放。我们反对将安全研究核心视为战争和武力，认为其他问题只有在与战争和武力相关时才具有意义的观点（尽管在 Buzan 的观点中[1991，第 10 章]，这种方法与战略研究作为新安全研究中军事专门领域的想法相契合）。相反，我们希望通过探讨对参照对象的威胁及这些威胁的安全化过程，构建一个更激进的安全研究观点，这些威胁既包括非军事的也包括军事的。我们认真对待传统主义者关于智识不连贯的批评，但不同意退回到军事核心是应对这种不连贯的唯一或最佳方式。我们寻求通过探索安全本身的逻辑来寻找连贯性，而不是将安全局限于军事领域。
differentiates security and the process of securitization from that which is merely political. This solution offers the possibility of breaking free from the existing dispute between the two approaches. 区分了安全和安全化过程与仅仅是政治的事物。这个解决方案提供了摆脱两种方法之间现有争议的可能性。
The need is to construct a conceptualization of security that means something much more specific than just any threat or problem. Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and nonmilitary, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind. These criteria are explained in detail in Chapter 2, and they show how the agenda of security studies can be extended without destroying the intellectual coherence of the field. 需要构建一个安全的概念化，其含义比任何威胁或问题都要具体得多。威胁和脆弱性可以出现在许多不同领域，军事和非军事领域，但要算作安全问题，它们必须满足严格定义的标准，将其与普通的仅仅是政治的问题区分开来。它们必须被安全化行为者作为对参照对象的生存威胁来呈现，从而产生对超出通常约束规则的紧急措施的认可。这些标准在第二章中有详细解释，展示了如何在不破坏该领域知识连贯性的情况下扩展安全研究的议程。
Levels of Analysis 分析层次
For more than three decades, the debate about levels of analysis has been central to much of international relations theory (Buzan 1994c; Onuf 1995). Levels also run through all types of security analysis, whether in debates about preferred referent objects for security (individuals versus states) or about the causes of war (system structure versus the nature of states versus human nature). Since our project started with questions about the relationship between regional security theory and the multisectoral security agenda, it, too, depends on an understanding of levels of analysis. In the following chapters, we use levels of analysis extensively to locate the actors, referent objects, and dynamics of interaction that operate in the realm of security. 三十多年来，关于分析层次的争论一直是国际关系理论的核心内容（Buzan 1994c；Onuf 1995）。分析层次也贯穿于各种安全分析中，无论是在关于安全的首选参照对象（个人与国家）还是关于战争原因（体系结构与国家性质与人性）的辩论中。由于我们的项目始于关于区域安全理论与多部门安全议程之间关系的问题，因此它也依赖于对分析层次的理解。在接下来的章节中，我们广泛使用分析层次来定位安全领域中运作的行为者、参照对象和互动动态。
By levels, we mean objects for analysis that are defined by a range of spatial scales, from small to large. Levels are locations where both outcomes and sources of explanation can be located. Theories may suggest causal explanations from one level to another-for example, top down from system structure to unit behavior (e.g., market to firms, anarchy to states) or bottom up from human nature to the behavior of human collectivities, whether firms, states, or nations. But nothing is intrinsic to levels themselves that suggests any particular pattern or priority of relations among them. Levels are simply ontological referents for where things happen rather than sources of explanation in themselves. 这里所说的层级，是指通过一系列空间尺度定义的分析对象，从小到大。层级是既可以定位结果也可以定位解释来源的位置。理论可能会提出从一个层级到另一个层级的因果解释——例如，从系统结构到单位行为的自上而下（如市场到企业，无政府状态到国家）或自下而上从人性到人类集体行为，无论是企业、国家还是民族。但层级本身并不内在地暗示它们之间的任何特定模式或关系优先顺序。层级仅仅是事物发生位置的本体论指称，而非解释的来源。
In the study of international relations, the five most frequently used levels of analysis are as follow: 在国际关系研究中，最常用的五个分析层级如下：
International systems, meaning the largest conglomerates of interacting or interdependent units that have no system level above them. Currently, this level encompasses the entire planet, but in 国际体系，指的是没有更高体系层级的最大规模的相互作用或相互依赖单位的集合。目前，这一层级涵盖了整个地球，但在
earlier times several more or less disconnected international systems existed simultaneously (Buzan and Little 1994). 早期，曾同时存在几个或多或少相互独立的国际体系（Buzan 和 Little 1994）。
International subsystems, meaning groups of units within the international system that can be distinguished from the entire system by the particular nature or intensity of their interactions with or interdependence on each other. Subsystems may be territorially coherent, in which case they are regional (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], the Organization of African Unity [OAU|), or not (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), in which case they are not regions but simply subsystems. 国际子系统，指国际体系内的单位群体，这些群体因其相互之间的互动性质或强度或相互依赖性而有别于整个体系。子系统可能在领土上具有连贯性，在这种情况下它们是区域性的（如东南亚国家联盟[ASEAN]，非洲统一组织[OAU]），也可能不是（如经济合作与发展组织，石油输出国组织），在这种情况下它们不是区域而仅仅是子系统。
Units, meaning actors composed of various subgroups, organizations, communities, and many individuals and sufficiently cohesive and independent to be differentiated from others and to have standing at the higher levels (e.g., states, nations, transnational firms). 单位，指由各种子群体、组织、社区和许多个体组成的行为体，这些行为体足够有凝聚力和独立性，能够与其他单位区分开来，并在更高层次上具有地位（例如，国家、民族、跨国公司）。
Subunits, meaning organized groups of individuals within units that are able (or that try) to affect the behavior of the unit (e.g., bureaucracies, lobbies). 子单位，指单位内部有组织的个体群体，这些群体能够（或试图）影响单位的行为（例如，官僚机构、游说团体）。
Individuals, the bottom line of most analysis in the social sciences. 个体，是社会科学大多数分析的最底层。
Levels provide a framework within which one can theorize; they are not theories in themselves. They enable one to locate the sources of explanation and the outcomes of which theories are composed. Neorealism, for example, locates its source of explanation (structure) at the system level and its main outcome (self-help) at the unit level. Bureaucratic politics locates its source of explanation (process) at the subunit level and its outcome (irrational behavior) at the unit level. Up to a point, levels also enable one to locate many of the actors, forums, and other elements involved in international relations. Some organizations (the UN) and structures (the global market, international society) operate at the system level; others (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union [EU|, the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], ASEAN) are clearly subsystemic. But it is not always possible to locate actors clearly within a given level. A lobby group such as the national farmers’ union may sit clearly at the subunit level, but transnational organizations such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International cross levels. They may act in part on the subunit level and in part on the subsystem and system ones. The same can be said for multinational firms. 层级提供了一个理论化的框架；它们本身并不是理论。层级使人们能够定位解释的来源以及理论所组成的结果。例如，新现实主义将其解释来源（结构）定位于体系层级，其主要结果（自助）定位于单位层级。官僚政治将其解释来源（过程）定位于子单位层级，其结果（非理性行为）定位于单位层级。在一定程度上，层级还使人们能够定位国际关系中涉及的许多行为体、论坛和其他要素。一些组织（联合国）和结构（全球市场、国际社会）在体系层级运作；其他组织（北大西洋公约组织、欧盟 [EU]、北美自由贸易协定 [NAFTA]、东盟）显然属于子体系层级。但并不总是能够清晰地将行为体定位于某一特定层级。像国家农民联盟这样的游说团体可能明确位于子单位层级，但跨国组织如 Greenpeace 或 Amnesty International 则跨越多个层级。 它们可能部分作用于子单元层面，部分作用于子系统和系统层面。跨国公司也是如此。
Because the levels-of-analysis debate in international relations has been closely associated with neorealism, it has tended to reflect that theory’s state centrism, picturing subunits as within states and subsystems and systems as made up of states. On this basis, the levels-of-analysis scheme has been criticized lior reinforcing the state centrism and inside-outside 由于国际关系中的分析层次争论与新现实主义密切相关，它往往反映了该理论的国家中心主义，将子单元视为国家内部的部分，将子系统和系统视为由国家组成。在此基础上，分析层次方案被批评为强化了国家中心主义和内外之分。
assumptions typical of international relations (Walker 1993; Onuf 1995). In this view, the scheme is not just an innocent, abstract typology but presents a specific ontology that obscures and discriminates against those transnational units that do not fit clearly into the scheme. If one wants to see political time and space structured along different lines, the levels-of-analysis scheme in its neorealist form will be seen as problematic. There is no necessity for levels to privilege states-the unit level can encompass much more than states. Since in this project we are trying to open up a greater diversity of security units, and since one can argue that by necessity any unit has an inside and an outside (Wæver 1994, forthcoming-b), we do not accept the far-reaching version of the critique. But we do accept the reminder that in international relations one should be aware of the tendency for the levels-of-analysis scheme to reinforce state-centric thinking. 国际关系中典型的假设（Walker 1993；Onuf 1995）。在这种观点中，该方案不仅仅是一个无辜的、抽象的类型学，而是呈现了一种特定的本体论，掩盖并歧视那些不明确符合该方案的跨国单位。如果有人想看到政治时间和空间沿着不同的线路结构，层次分析方案在其新现实主义形式中将被视为有问题的。层次不必优先考虑国家——单位层次可以包含远不止国家。由于在本项目中我们试图开放更多样化的安全单位，并且可以认为任何单位必然有内外之分（Wæver 1994，待发表-b），我们不接受批评的极端版本。但我们接受这样一个提醒：在国际关系中，应当意识到层次分析方案强化以国家为中心思维的倾向。
Sectors 部门
What does it mean to adopt a more diversified agenda in which economic, societal, and environmental security issues play alongside military and political ones? Thinking about security in terms of sectors simply grew up with little reflection during the later decades of the Cold War as new issues were added to the military-political agenda. The practice of resorting to sectors is common but is seldom made explicit. Realists from Morgenthau to Waltz talk in terms of political theory, thereby assuming that sectors mean something analytically significant. It has become common when discussing international relations to qualify the identity of systems in terms of particular sectors of activity within them, as in “the international economic system” or “the international political system.” Michael Mann (1986, chapter 1) thinks about power in terms of distinctions among ideology, economic, military, and political power. Indeed, the entire division of social and other sciences into disciplines is based largely on a preference for thinking in terms of sectors-a practice reflected in the general discourse, which often assumes that economy, society, and politics can somehow be separated without thinking too hard about how to do so. Embracing the wider security agenda means we need to consider what sectors mean. 采用一个更加多元化的议程意味着什么，其中经济、安全、社会和环境安全问题与军事和政治问题并列？在冷战后期，随着新问题被加入军事政治议程，按领域思考安全问题几乎没有经过深思熟虑而自然形成。诉诸领域的做法很常见，但很少被明确说明。从摩根索到沃尔兹的现实主义者都以政治理论的术语来谈论，因此假设领域在分析上具有重要意义。在讨论国际关系时，常常用特定活动领域来限定系统的身份，比如“国际经济体系”或“国际政治体系”。迈克尔·曼（1986，第 1 章）则从意识形态、经济、军事和政治权力的区分来思考权力。 事实上，社会科学及其他科学的整体划分在很大程度上基于对按部门思考的偏好——这一做法反映在一般话语中，通常假设经济、社会和政治可以在不深入思考如何分离的情况下被某种程度上分开。拥抱更广泛的安全议程意味着我们需要考虑部门的含义。
One way of looking at sectors is to see them as identifying specific rypes of interaction. In this view, the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere. 看待部门的一种方式是将其视为识别特定类型互动的标识。在这种观点中，军事部门涉及强制性胁迫的关系；政治部门涉及权威、治理地位和认可的关系；经济部门涉及贸易、生产和金融的关系；社会部门涉及集体认同的关系；环境部门涉及人类活动与地球生物圈之间的关系。
Buzan (1991: 19-20) set out sectors in security analysis as follows. Buzan（1991：19-20）在安全分析中提出了部门的划分如下。
Generally speaking, the military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. 一般来说，军事安全涉及国家武装进攻和防御能力的双重互动，以及国家对彼此意图的认知。政治安全涉及国家的组织稳定性、政府体制及赋予其合法性的意识形态。经济安全涉及获取维持可接受福利水平和国家权力所必需的资源、资金和市场。社会安全涉及在可接受的演变条件下，传统语言、文化、宗教和民族身份及习俗模式的可持续性。环境安全涉及维护局部和全球生物圈，作为所有其他人类活动赖以依存的基本支持系统。
In more recent work (Wæver et al. 1993: 24-27), we modified this statement to move away from its implicit (and sometimes explicit) placement of the state as the central referent object in all sectors. If a multisectoral approach to security was to be fully meaningful, referent objects other than the state had to be allowed into the picture. The present book extends this line of argument much further. 在最近的研究中（Wæver 等，1993：24-27），我们修改了这一说法，避免将国家作为所有领域中中心参照对象的隐含（有时甚至是明确）定位。如果多领域的安全方法要真正有意义，除了国家之外的参照对象必须被纳入视野。本书在这一论点的基础上进行了更深入的扩展。
Sectors serve to disaggregate a whole for purposes of analysis by selecting some of its distinctive pattems of interaction. But items identified by sectors lack the quality of independent existence. Relations of coercion do not exist apart from relations of exchange, authority, identity, or environment. Sectors might identify distinctive patterns, but they remain inseparable parts of complex wholes. The purpose of selecting them is simply to reduce complexity to facilitate analysis. 各领域通过选择其独特的互动模式来分解整体以便分析。但由领域识别的项目并不具备独立存在的特性。强制关系并不存在于交换、权威、身份或环境关系之外。领域可能识别出独特的模式，但它们仍是复杂整体中不可分割的部分。选择它们的目的是简化复杂性以便于分析。
The use of sectors confines the scope of inquiry to more manageable proportions by reducing the number of variables in play. Thus, the economist looks at human systems in terms that highlight wealth and development and justify restrictive assumptions, such as the motivation of behavior by the desire to maximize utility. The political realist looks at the same systems in terms that highlight sovereignty and power and justify restrictive assumptions, such as the motivation of behavior by the desire to maximize power. The military strategist looks at the systems in terms that highlight offensive and defensive capability and justify restrictive assumptions, such as the motivation of behavior by opportunistic calculations of coercive advantage. The environmentalist looks at systems in terms of the ecological underpinnings of civilization and the need to achieve sustainable development. In the societal sector, the analyst looks at the systems in terms of patterns of identity and the desire to maintain cultural independence. Each is looking at the whole but is seeing only one dimension of its reality. 部门的使用通过减少变量数量，将调查范围限制在更易于管理的范围内。因此，经济学家以强调财富和发展的术语来看待人类系统，并以此为基础做出限制性假设，例如行为动机是追求效用最大化。政治现实主义者以强调主权和权力的术语来看待同一系统，并以此为基础做出限制性假设，例如行为动机是追求权力最大化。军事战略家以强调进攻和防御能力的术语来看待系统，并以此为基础做出限制性假设，例如行为动机是基于机会主义的强制优势计算。环境保护者以文明的生态基础和实现可持续发展的需求来看待系统。在社会部门，分析者以身份模式和维护文化独立的愿望来看待系统。每个人都在观察整体，但只看到其现实的一个维度。
The analytical method of sectors thus starts with disaggregation but must end with reassembly. The disaggregation is performed only to achieve simplification and clarity. To achieve understanding, it is necessary to reassemble the parts and see how they relate to each other, a task we undertake in Chapter 8. 因此，部门的分析方法始于分解，但必须以重组结束。分解的目的是为了实现简化和清晰。为了达到理解，有必要将各部分重新组装起来，看看它们如何相互关联，这项任务我们将在第 8 章进行。
Regions 地区
Our interest in regions as a focus for security analysis stems not only from our previous work on regional security complex theory but also from an interest in the widespread assumption that in the post-Cold War world, international relations will take on a more regionalized character. The reasoning behind this assumption is that the collapse of bipolarity has removed the principal organizing force at the global level. The remaining great powers are no longer motivated by ideological rivalries, and they all show conspicuous signs of wanting to avoid wider political engagements unless their own interests are immediately and strongly affected. This situation creates weak leadership at the global level and, consequently, leads to the assumption that more than before, regions will be left to sort out their own affairs. Reinforcing this tendency is the fact that the weakening of the commitment to global engagement among the great powers is matched by ever rising power capabilities in most parts of the world. The long period of European and Western power advantage is being steadily eroded by the diffusion of industrial, military, and political capability among an ever wider circle of states and peoples. 我们对地区作为安全分析焦点的兴趣，不仅源于我们之前关于区域安全复合体理论的研究，还源于对一种普遍假设的关注，即在冷战后世界，国际关系将呈现出更加区域化的特征。该假设背后的推理是，两极格局的崩溃消除了全球层面的主要组织力量。剩余的大国不再受意识形态对立的驱动，并且它们都明显表现出希望避免更广泛政治介入的意愿，除非其自身利益受到直接且强烈的影响。这种情况导致全球层面领导力的薄弱，因此，人们假设比以往更多，地区将被留给自己解决事务。强化这一趋势的是，大国对全球参与承诺的减弱，与世界大部分地区权力能力的不断提升相匹配。 欧洲和西方长期的权力优势正因工业、军事和政治能力在越来越多的国家和民族中扩散而逐渐被削弱。
In terms of level of analysis, regions are a special type of subsystem. ^(2){ }^{2} Geographical clustering does seem to be a sufficiently strong feature of international subsystems to be worth studying in its own right: Why should states tend to form regional clusters, and do other units behave in the same way? One has only to think of the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the South Pacific Forum, the Southern African Development Community, the OAU, and others to see the importance of territorially defined subsystems. Regions are objects of analysis in themselves, particular locations where one can find outcomes and sources of explanation. Why does this type of territorial subsystem (or any particular instance of it) come into being and sustain itself as a feature of the wider international system? 就分析层面而言，地区是一种特殊类型的子系统。地理聚集似乎是国际子系统中一个足够强烈的特征，值得单独研究：为什么国家倾向于形成区域集群，其他单位是否也有类似行为？只需想到欧盟、北美自由贸易协定、东盟、南亚区域合作联盟、南太平洋论坛、南部非洲发展共同体、非洲统一组织等，就能看出领土定义的子系统的重要性。地区本身就是分析对象，是可以找到结果和解释来源的特定地点。为什么这种类型的领土子系统（或其任何特定实例）会出现并作为更广泛国际体系的一个特征得以维持？
Perhaps the best general explanation of regional state systems can be derived from the thinking of Hans Mouritzen (1995,1997)(1995,1997). He starts with the simple but seldom considered fact that the units (states) are fixed rather than mobile. In contemporary international relations theory, it is taken for granted that the main political units are not mobile, but this was not always so. For thousands of years prior to the fifteenth century, barbarian tribes were a major feature of the international system. These tribes could and did move over long distances. In those times, it was not uncommon to find one morning that one had a great power as a neighbor where there had been no neighbor before. Mouritzen argues that if units are mobile, each unit’s average environment will, after a reasonable time, constitute the system as such rather than any particular segment of that system. By contrast, if the units 也许对区域国家体系的最佳一般性解释可以从汉斯·莫里岑（Hans Mouritzen）的思想中得出。他从一个简单但很少被考虑的事实开始，即单位（国家）是固定的而非流动的。在当代国际关系理论中，主要政治单位是不流动的这一点是理所当然的，但情况并非一直如此。在十五世纪之前的数千年里，野蛮部落是国际体系的一个重要特征。这些部落可以并且确实会长距离迁移。在那个时代，早晨醒来发现邻居变成了一个大国而之前并无邻居的情况并不罕见。莫里岑认为，如果单位是流动的，那么经过合理时间后，每个单位的平均环境将构成整个体系本身，而非该体系的任何特定部分。相比之下，如果单位
are nonmobile, each unit will face a relatively stable regional environment consisting of the major units in its geographical proximity; each unit will be characterized by a specific location in the system’s structure (Mouritzen 1980: 172, 180). 是非流动的，每个单位将面临一个相对稳定的区域环境，该环境由其地理邻近的主要单位组成；每个单位将在体系结构中具有特定的位置特征（莫里岑 1980：172，180）。
The failure to account for the effect of nonmobile units explains in part why the subsystem level has been relatively neglected in international relations theory. Hollis and Smith (1991: 7-9), for example, do not even mention it in their scheme. Identifying the mechanism that forms regions underpins the argument for paying attention to the regionalizing aspect of the subsystem level in the analysis of international security. 未能考虑非流动单位的影响，部分解释了为何国际关系理论中对子系统层面的关注相对较少。例如，Hollis 和 Smith（1991：7-9）在他们的框架中甚至未提及这一点。识别形成区域的机制是强调在国际安全分析中关注子系统层面区域化方面的论点基础。
This discussion relates mostly to states, where the mobility/immobility question is relatively clear. Mouritzen’s argument, with its focus on the military and political sectors, provides additional justification for classical, state-centric security complex theory and also gives us clues about how to begin thinking about security relations in other sectors. In the societal sector, for example, one might expect units such as nations to display immobility logic similar to that of states and thus to find regional formations among them. But in the economic sector, units such as firms and criminal gangs may be highly mobile. There, in an echo of the barbarians, one might expect to find system-level logic working more strongly and therefore expect little in the way of regional formations. 这段讨论主要涉及国家，在这里流动性/非流动性的问题相对明确。穆里岑的论点，侧重于军事和政治领域，为经典的以国家为中心的安全复合体理论提供了额外的正当性，同时也为我们如何开始思考其他领域的安全关系提供了线索。例如，在社会领域，人们可能期望像国家一样，单位如民族表现出类似的非流动性逻辑，从而在它们之间形成区域性结构。但在经济领域，单位如公司和犯罪团伙可能高度流动。在那里，呼应蛮族的情形，人们可能期望系统层面的逻辑更为强烈，因此几乎不会出现区域性结构。
"Classical" Security Complex Theory “经典”安全复合体理论
This section summarizes “classical” security complex theory as developed up to 1991 and can be skipped by those familiar with Buzan (1991, chapter 5). Security complex theory was first sketched by Buzan in the first edition of People, States and Fear in 1983 (pp. 105-115). The theory was applied to South Asia and the Middle East (Buzan 1983), then elaborated and applied in depth to the case of South Asia (Buzan and Rizvi 1986), and later applied to Southeast Asia (Buzan 1988). Väyrynen (1988), Wriggins (1992), and Ayoob (1995) have applied versions of the theory to several regional cases, and Wæver (1989b, 1993), Buzan and colleagues (1990), Buzan and Waver (1992), and Wæver and colleagues (1993) have used it to study the post-Cold War transformation in Europe. The most recent updates to the theory have been presented in Buzan (1991, chapter 5). 本节总结了截至 1991 年发展起来的“经典”安全复合体理论，熟悉 Buzan（1991，第 5 章）的人可以跳过。安全复合体理论最初由 Buzan 在 1983 年《人民、国家与恐惧》第一版中勾勒（第 105-115 页）。该理论最初应用于南亚和中东地区（Buzan 1983），随后在南亚案例中进行了详细阐述和应用（Buzan 和 Rizvi 1986），后来又应用于东南亚（Buzan 1988）。Väyrynen（1988）、Wriggins（1992）和 Ayoob（1995）将该理论的版本应用于多个地区案例，Wæver（1989b，1993）、Buzan 及其同事（1990）、Buzan 和 Waver（1992）以及 Wæver 及其同事（1993）则用它研究了冷战后欧洲的转型。该理论的最新更新见于 Buzan（1991，第 5 章）。
The logic of security regions stems from the fact that international security is a relational matter. International security is mostly about how human collectivitics relate to each other in terms of threats and vulnerabilities, although sometimes it addresses the ways such collectivities relate to threats from the natural environment. The emphasis on the relational nature of security is in line with some of the most important writings in security studies (Herz 1950; Wolfers 1962; Jervis 1976), which have stressed rela- 安全区域的逻辑源于国际安全是一个关系性问题这一事实。国际安全主要涉及人类集体如何在威胁和脆弱性方面相互关联，尽管有时它也涉及这些集体如何应对来自自然环境的威胁。对安全关系性质的强调与安全研究中一些最重要的著作相一致（Herz 1950；Wolfers 1962；Jervis 1976），这些著作强调了关系动态，如安全困境、权力平衡、军备竞赛和安全机制。
tional dynamics such as security dilemmas, power balances, arms races, and security regimes. Little of interest can be said about the security of an isolated object (e.g., the security of France); thus, security must be studied in a wider context. 诸如安全困境、权力平衡、军备竞赛和安全机制等国际动态。关于孤立对象的安全（例如法国的安全）几乎无可谈论，因此安全必须在更广泛的背景下进行研究。
The widest context, the global level, is useful for studying the great powers, and also for thinking about systemic referent objects (the global environment, the world economy, international society). In the traditional (i.e., military-political) mode of security analysis, global security is integrated insufficiently to make much sense for most units: The securities of Togo and the Kurds might be deteriorating, whereas those of Argentina and Israel are improving and those of Sweden and Japan remain unchangedwithout any of these situations being affected by the others. The rationale behind classical security complex theory was that for most of the actors at the unit level, military-political security falls into some in-between-sized clusters, and the theory claimed the most relevant scale was the regional one. Whether this rationale remains true within a multisectoral approach to security is one of the issues we address in this book. 最广泛的语境，即全球层面，有助于研究大国，也有助于思考系统性参照对象（全球环境、世界经济、国际社会）。在传统的（即军事-政治）安全分析模式中，全球安全整合不足，难以对大多数单位产生实际意义：多哥和库尔德人的安全可能在恶化，而阿根廷和以色列的安全在改善，瑞典和日本的安全保持不变，且这些情况彼此之间没有任何影响。经典安全复合体理论背后的理由是，对于大多数单位层面的行为体来说，军事-政治安全属于某些中等规模的集群，该理论声称最相关的尺度是区域层面。我们在本书中探讨的一个问题是，这一理由在多部门安全方法中是否仍然成立。
Classical security complex theory posits the existence of regional subsystems as objects of security analysis and offers an analytical framework for dealing with those systems. Also, like most other traditionalist work in this area, the theory has focused primarily on the state as the key unit and on the political and military sectors. This framework was designed to highlight the relative autonomy of regional security relations and to set those relations within the context of the unit (state) and system levels. One of its purposes was to provide area specialists with the language and concepts to facilitate comparative studies across regions, which is a notable weakness in the existing literature. Another purpose was to offset the tendency of power theorists to underplay the importance of the regional level in international security affairs. This tendency was exacerbated by the rise of neorealism in the late 1970s (Waltz 1979), which focused almost exclusively on the power structure at the system level. It seems reasonable to expect this bias to decline with the demise of strong bipolarity at the system level and the advent of a more diffuse international power structure. 古典安全复合体理论假设区域子系统的存在作为安全分析的对象，并提供了处理这些系统的分析框架。同样，像该领域大多数其他传统主义工作一样，该理论主要关注国家作为关键单位以及政治和军事领域。该框架旨在突出区域安全关系的相对自主性，并将这些关系置于单位（国家）和体系层面的背景中。其目的之一是为地区专家提供语言和概念，以促进跨区域的比较研究，这是现有文献中的一个显著弱点。另一个目的是抵消权力理论家低估区域层面在国际安全事务中重要性的倾向。随着 1970 年代末新现实主义的兴起（Waltz 1979），这种倾向加剧了，新现实主义几乎完全关注体系层面的权力结构。随着体系层面强双极格局的消亡和更分散的国际权力结构的出现，预计这种偏见将有所减弱，这似乎是合理的。
All of the states in the system are enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence. But because most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity. Most states fear their neighbors more than dislant powers; consequently, security interdependence across the international system as a whole is far from uniform. The normal pattern of security interdependence in a geographically diverse, anarchic international system is one of regionally based clusters, which we label security complexes. Security interdependence is markedly more intense among the states inside such complexes than among states outside them. Security complexes are about the relalive intensity of interstate security relations that lead to dis- 系统中的所有国家都交织在一个全球性的安全相互依赖网络中。但由于大多数政治和军事威胁在短距离上比长距离更容易传播，不安全感通常与邻近性相关。大多数国家比起远方大国，更害怕邻国；因此，整个国际体系中的安全相互依赖远非均匀分布。地理多样且无政府状态的国际体系中，安全相互依赖的常态模式是基于区域的集群，我们称之为安全复合体。安全相互依赖在这些复合体内部的国家之间明显更为强烈，而在复合体外的国家之间则较弱。安全复合体涉及导致不安的国家间安全关系的相对强度——
tinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity. A security complex is defined as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are generated by the states within that complex-by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other. Individual security complexes are durable but not permanent features of the international system. The theory posits that in a geographically diverse, anarchic international system, security complexes are a normal and expected feature; if they are not present, one wants to know why. 由权力分布和历史上的友好与敌对关系共同塑造的独特区域格局。安全复合体被定义为一组国家，其主要的安全认知和关切紧密相连，以至于它们的国家安全问题无法合理地分开分析或解决。安全复合体的形成动力和结构由该复合体内的国家产生——通过它们对彼此的安全认知和互动。个别安全复合体是国际体系中持久但非永久的特征。该理论认为，在地理多样化、无政府状态的国际体系中，安全复合体是正常且预期的特征；如果不存在，则需要探究原因。
Because they are formed by local groupings of states, classical security complexes not only play a central role in relations among their members; they also crucially condition how and whether stronger outside powers penetrate the region. The internal dynamics of a security complex can be located along a spectrum according to whether the defining security interdependence is driven by amity or enmity. At the negative end lies conflict formation (Senghaas 1988; Väyrynen 1984), in which interdependence arises from fear, rivalry, and mutual perceptions of threat. In the middle lie security regimes (Jervis 1982), in which states still treat each other as potential threats but have made reassurance arrangements to reduce the security dilemma among them. At the positive end of the spectrum lies a pluralistic security community (Deutsch et al. 1957: 1-4), in which states no longer expect or prepare to use force in their relations with each other. Regional integration will eliminate a security complex with which it is coextensive by transforming it from an anarchic subsystem of states to a single, larger actor within the system. Regional integration among some members of a complex will transform the power structure of that complex. 由于它们由地方国家集团形成，经典安全复合体不仅在其成员之间的关系中发挥核心作用；它们还关键地影响更强大的外部势力是否以及如何渗透该地区。安全复合体的内部动态可以沿着一个光谱定位，取决于定义性安全相互依赖是由友好还是敌意驱动的。在负面端是冲突形成（Senghaas 1988；Väyrynen 1984），其中相互依赖源于恐惧、竞争和相互威胁的感知。中间是安全机制（Jervis 1982），国家仍将彼此视为潜在威胁，但已建立了安抚安排以减少彼此间的安全困境。在光谱的正面端是多元安全共同体（Deutsch 等人 1957：1-4），国家不再期望或准备在相互关系中使用武力。区域一体化将通过将其从一个无政府状态的国家子系统转变为系统内的单一更大行为体，消除与之共存的安全复合体。 某些成员之间的区域一体化将改变该复合体的权力结构。
The theory assumes that security complexes, like the balance of power, are an intrinsic product of anarchic international systems. Other things being equal, one should therefore expect to find them everywhere in the system. Two conditions explain why a security complex may not be present. First, in some areas local states have so few capabilities that their power projects little, if at all, beyond their own boundaries. These states have domestically directed security perspectives, and there is insufficient security interaction among them to generate a local complex. The second condition occurs when the direct presence of outside powers in a region is strong enough to suppress the normal operation of security dynamics among the local states. This condition is called overlay, which normally involves extensive stationing of armed forces in the area overlain by the intervening great power(s) and is quite distinct from the normal process of intervention by greal powers into the affairs of local security complexes. Intervention ustailly reinforces the local security dynamics; overlay subordinates them to the lager pattern of major power rivalries, and may even 该理论假设安全复合体，像权力平衡一样，是无政府国际体系的内在产物。在其他条件相同的情况下，因此应当预期在体系中的任何地方都能发现它们。两个条件解释了为什么安全复合体可能不存在。首先，在某些地区，当地国家的能力非常有限，其权力几乎无法超出自身边界。这些国家的安全视角主要面向国内，彼此之间的安全互动不足以形成局部复合体。第二个条件发生在外部大国在某一地区的直接存在足够强大，以至于抑制了当地国家之间安全动态的正常运作。该条件称为叠加，通常涉及干预大国在被叠加地区大量驻军，这与大国对地方安全复合体事务的正常干预过程截然不同。干预通常加强地方安全动态；而叠加则使其服从于大国竞争的更大格局，甚至可能...
obliterate them. The best examples of overlay are the period of European colonialism in what is now the Third World and the submergence of European security dynamics by superpower rivalry after World War II. Under overlay, one cannot see the local security dynamics with any clarity and therefore cannot identify a local complex; one only knows what the local dynamics were before overlay. 消灭他们。叠加的最佳例子是欧洲殖民主义时期，即现在的第三世界，以及二战后超级大国竞争对欧洲安全动态的淹没。在叠加下，人们无法清晰地看到当地的安全动态，因此无法识别当地的安全复合体；人们只能知道叠加之前当地的动态是什么。
Security complexes are subsystems-miniature anarchies-in their own right, and by analogy with full systems they have structures of their own. Since security complexes are durable rather than permanent features of the overall anarchy, seeing them as subsystems with their own structures and patterns of interaction provides a useful benchmark against which to identify and assess changes in the patterns of regional security. 安全复合体本身就是子系统——微型无政府状态，并且通过与完整系统的类比，它们有自己的结构。由于安全复合体是持久的而非永久的整体无政府状态特征，将其视为具有自身结构和互动模式的子系统，为识别和评估地区安全模式的变化提供了有用的基准。
Essential structure is the standard by which one assesses significant change in a classical security complex. The three key components of essential structure in a security complex are (1) the arrangement of the units and the differentiation among them (this is normally the same as for the international system as a whole, and if so it is not a significant variable at the regional level), (2) the patterns of amity and enmity, and (3) the distribution of power among the principal units. Major shifts in any of these components would normally require a redefinition of the complex. This approach allows one to analyze regional security in both static and dynamic terms. If security complexes are seen as structures, one can look for outcomes resulting from either structural effects or processes of structural change. 基本结构是评估经典安全复合体中重大变化的标准。安全复合体中基本结构的三个关键组成部分是：(1) 单元的排列及其之间的区分（这通常与整个国际体系相同，如果是这样，则在区域层面上不是一个重要变量），(2) 友好与敌对的模式，以及 (3) 主要单元之间的权力分布。任何这些组成部分的重大变化通常都需要对复合体进行重新定义。这种方法使人们能够从静态和动态两个方面分析区域安全。如果将安全复合体视为结构，就可以寻找由结构效应或结构变化过程引起的结果。
The changes bearing on any given local security complex are usually numerous and continuous. Power relativities are in constant motion, and even patterns of amity and enmity shift occasionally. The key question is, do such changes work to sustain the essential structure or do they push it toward some kind of transformation? Four broad structural options are available for assessing the impact of change on a security complex: maintenance of the status quo, internal transformation, external transformation, and overlay. 影响任何特定地方安全复合体的变化通常是众多且持续不断的。权力相对关系处于不断运动中，甚至友好与敌对的模式也偶尔发生变化。关键问题是，这些变化是维持基本结构，还是推动其走向某种转变？评估变化对安全复合体影响时，有四种广泛的结构性选择：维持现状、内部转变、外部转变和叠加。
Maintenance of the status quo means the essential structure of the local complex-its distribution of power and pattern of hostility-remains fundimentally intact. This outcome does not mean no change has taken place. Rather, it means the changes that have occurred have tended, in the aggregille, either to support or not seriously to undermine the structure. 维持现状意味着地方复合体的基本结构——其权力分布和敌对模式——基本保持完整。这个结果并不意味着没有发生变化。相反，这意味着发生的变化总体上要么支持该结构，要么没有严重破坏该结构。
Internal transformation of a local complex occurs when its essential slructure changes within the context of its existing outer boundary. Such change can come about as a result of regional political integration, decisive shifts in the distribution of power, or major alternations in the pattern of imnity and enmity. 地方复合体的内部转变发生在其基本结构在现有外部边界范围内发生变化时。这种变化可能是由于区域政治一体化、权力分布的决定性转变，或敌意与敌对模式的重大变化所致。
External transformation occurs when the essential structure of a comflex is altered by eilher the expansion or contraction of its existing outer boundary. Minor adjusments to the boundary may not significantly affect 当一个复合体的基本结构因其现有外部边界的扩展或收缩而发生变化时，就会发生外部转变。对边界的轻微调整可能不会显著影响基本结构。
the essential structure. The addition or deletion of major states, however, is certain to have a substantial impact on both the distribution of power and the pattern of amity and enmity. 然而，主要国家的增加或减少必然会对权力分布以及友好与敌对的格局产生重大影响。
Overlay means one or more external powers moves directly into the regional complex with the effect of suppressing the indigenous security dynamic. As argued earlier, this situation is distinct from the normal process of intervention by great powers into the affairs of regional security complexes. 叠加意味着一个或多个外部大国直接进入区域复合体，抑制本土的安全动态。如前所述，这种情况有别于大国干预区域安全复合体事务的正常过程。
Once the regional level has been established, the full range of layers that comprise a comprehensive analytical framework for security can be sketched out. At the bottom end lies the domestic security environment of individual states and societies. Next come the regional security complexes. One would expect security relations to be relatively intense within these complexes and relatively subdued among them, but in some instances significant interplay can occur across the boundaries of indifference that mark off one complex from another. Thus relations among security complexes also comprise a layer within the framework, one that becomes important if major changes in the pattern of security complexes are underway. At the top end, one finds the higher, or great-power, complex that constitutes the system level. One would expect security relations among the great powers to be intense and to penetrate in varying degrees into the affairs of the local complexes. The method of analysis within this framework is first to understand the distinctive security dynamic at each layer and then to see how the patterns at each layer interact with each other. 一旦确立了区域层面，就可以勾勒出构成全面安全分析框架的全部层次。在最底层是各个国家和社会的国内安全环境。接下来是区域安全复合体。人们预计这些复合体内部的安全关系相对紧密，而复合体之间的关系则相对平淡，但在某些情况下，标志一个复合体与另一个复合体之间冷漠界限的边界上可能会发生显著的相互作用。因此，安全复合体之间的关系也构成框架中的一层，当安全复合体的格局发生重大变化时，这一层变得尤为重要。在最高层，是构成体系层面的更高层次或大国复合体。人们预计大国之间的安全关系是紧张的，并且在不同程度上渗透到地方复合体的事务中。该框架内的分析方法首先是理解每一层的独特安全动态，然后观察各层的格局如何相互作用。
In one sense, security complexes are theoretical constructs the analyst imposes on “reality.” But within the theory they have ontological status: They reflect an observable patterning of global politics and so cannot be constructed merely at random. One can argue about the correct interpretation of the dividing lines, but one cannot simply use the term security complex to describe any group of states (Norden, the Warsaw Pact, the NonProliferation Treaty members). A distinctive territorial pattern of security interdependence must exist that marks off the members of a security complex from other neighboring states. And this pattern has to be strong enough to make the criteria for inclusion and exclusion reasonably clear. ^(3){ }^{3} Thus, there is a European security complex but not a Nordic one (because Norden is part of a larger pattern of security interdependence), a Middle Eastern complex but not a Mediterranean one (because the Mediterranean states are parts of several other regional complexes). South Asia is a clear example of a security complex centered on the rivalry between India and Pakistan, with Burma acting as the border with the complex in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan delineating the border with the Middle East complex, and China looming as an intervening great power. 从某种意义上说，安全复合体是分析者强加于“现实”的理论构建。但在理论内部，它们具有本体论地位：它们反映了全球政治的可观察模式，因此不能仅凭随意构建。关于分界线的正确解释可以有争议，但不能简单地用安全复合体一词来描述任何一组国家（如 Norden、华沙条约组织、核不扩散条约成员国）。必须存在一种独特的领土安全相互依赖模式，将安全复合体成员与其他邻近国家区分开来。而且这种模式必须足够强烈，使得纳入和排除的标准相当明确。因此，存在欧洲安全复合体，但不存在北欧安全复合体（因为 Norden 是更大安全相互依赖模式的一部分），存在中东安全复合体，但不存在地中海安全复合体（因为地中海国家是多个其他地区复合体的一部分）。 南亚是一个以印度和巴基斯坦之间的竞争为中心的安全复合体的明显例子，缅甸作为与东南亚复合体的边界，阿富汗划定了与中东复合体的边界，而中国则作为一个介入的大国隐现其中。
One value of elassical security complex theory is that it draws attention away from the extremes ol national and global security and focuses it on 经典安全复合体理论的一个价值在于它将注意力从国家和全球安全的极端情况转移开，集中于...
the region, where these two extremes interplay and where most of the action occurs. Security complex theory also links studies of internal conditions in states, relations among states of the region, relations among regions, and relations between regions and globally acting great powers. More ambitiously, and as demonstrated in our 1990 book (Buzan et al.), security complex theory can be used to generate definitive scenarios and thus to structure the study of, as well as predictions about, possibilities for stability and change. The theory offers descriptive concepts for both static and dynamic analysis and provides benchmarks for locating significant change within the structure of international security relations. Once the structure of any given complex has been identified, it can be used to narrow possible options for change. The theory is prescriptive to the extent that it identifies appropriate (and inappropriate) realms for action and organization and suggests a range of states of being (conflict formation, security regime, security community) that can serve as frameworks for thinking about policy objectives. 该地区是这两个极端相互作用并且大部分行动发生的地方。安全复合体理论还将国家内部状况的研究、该地区国家之间的关系、地区之间的关系以及地区与全球大国之间的关系联系起来。更雄心勃勃的是，正如我们在 1990 年出版的著作（Buzan 等人）中所展示的，安全复合体理论可以用来生成明确的情景，从而构建对稳定与变革可能性的研究和预测。该理论为静态和动态分析提供了描述性概念，并为定位国际安全关系结构中的重大变化提供了基准。一旦确定了任何给定复合体的结构，就可以用它来缩小变革的可能选项。该理论具有规范性，因为它识别了适当（和不适当）的行动和组织领域，并提出了一系列存在状态（冲突形成、安全体制、安全共同体），这些状态可以作为思考政策目标的框架。
Moving Beyond Classical Security Complex Theory 超越经典安全复合体理论
The classical approach to regional security analysis looks for patterns of security interdependence that are strong enough to mark off a group of units from its neighbors (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993, chapter 5). Security complexes are formed from the inside out, by the interactions among their constituent units. Because classical security complex theory was formulated for thinking about the political and military sectors, states were its referent objects. Security regions therefore had the following characteristics: 经典的区域安全分析方法寻找足够强烈的安全相互依赖模式，以将一组单位与其邻居区分开来（Buzan、Jones 和 Little 1993，第 5 章）。安全复合体是由其组成单位之间的相互作用从内向外形成的。由于经典安全复合体理论是为思考政治和军事领域而制定的，国家是其参照对象。因此，安全区域具有以下特征：
i. They were composed of two or more states. i. 它们由两个或更多国家组成。
2. These states constituted a geographically coherent grouping (because threats in these sectors travel more easily over short distances than over long ones). 2. 这些国家构成了一个地理上连贯的群体（因为这些领域的威胁更容易在短距离内传播，而非长距离）。
3. The relationship among these states was marked by security interdependence, which could be either positive or negative but which had to be significantly stronger among them than between them and outside states. 3. 这些国家之间的关系以安全相互依赖为标志，这种依赖可以是正面的也可以是负面的，但必须在它们之间显著强于它们与外部国家之间的依赖。
4. The pattern of security interdependence had to be deep and durable (i.e., much more than a one-time interaction), although not permanent. 4. 安全相互依赖的模式必须是深刻且持久的（即远不止一次性的互动），但并非永久性的。
In other words, security regions were a type of international political ubsystem and were relatively autonomous microversions of the larger international political system within which they were embedded. Becaluse the units of analysis were states, security regions tended to be a lairly large- 换句话说，安全区域是一种国际政治子系统，是嵌入其中的较大国际政治体系的相对自治的微型版本。由于分析单位是国家，安全区域往往是相当大规模的现象。
scale phenomenon. Most security complexes were subcontinental or continental in size: South Asia, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Europe, South America, and the like. 规模现象。大多数安全复合体的规模为次大陆级或大陆级：南亚、中东、南部非洲、欧洲、南美洲等。
One of the ways in which this book moves beyond classical security complex theory (CSCT) is by opening the analysis to a wider range of sectors. To what extent are regional patterns discernible when one no longer sticks to the state and privileges the political and military sectors? Will the security dynamics in the nontraditional sectors generate significant regional formations, or will their security logics place their main focus on higher (system) or lower (subunit) levels? Will the other sectors show dynamics that are mainly global, mainly local, a mess, or what? The answers to these questions will hinge on whether the relevant units are fixed or mobile and on whether threats and vulnerabilities are strongly shaped by distance. If units are not fixed or if threats are not shaped by distance, regionalizing logic may be weak. Even if we find “regions” in several or all sectors, will they line up-for example, are the regions in the environmental sector at all like those in the political sector? Will environmental sectors cluster, for example, around seas (the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Sea of Japan, and so on) and rivers (the Nile, Euphrates, and Jordan), whereas the political and societal sectors will be mainly land-based and continental? Discovering the answers to these questions is the work of Chapters 3 through 7 , and putting the findings together is that of Chapter 8. 本书超越经典安全复合体理论（CSCT）的方式之一，是将分析范围扩大到更多领域。当不再局限于国家，并且不再优先考虑政治和军事领域时，区域模式在多大程度上仍然可辨识？非传统领域的安全动态是否会产生显著的区域性结构，还是它们的安全逻辑主要关注更高（系统）或更低（子单位）层级？其他领域会表现出主要是全球性的、主要是地方性的、混乱的，还是其他什么样的动态？这些问题的答案取决于相关单位是固定的还是流动的，以及威胁和脆弱性是否受到距离的强烈影响。如果单位不是固定的，或者威胁不受距离影响，那么区域化逻辑可能较弱。即使我们在若干或所有领域中发现了“区域”，它们是否会一致——例如，环境领域的区域是否与政治领域的区域相似？ 环境部门是否会聚集，例如围绕海洋（地中海、波罗的海、黑海、日本海等）和河流（尼罗河、幼发拉底河和约旦河），而政治和社会部门则主要基于陆地和大陆？发现这些问题的答案是第 3 至第 7 章的工作，将这些发现整合起来则是第 8 章的任务。
Logically, there are two possible ways of opening security complex theory to sectors other than the military-political and to actors other than states: 从逻辑上讲，有两种可能的方式将安全复合体理论开放给除军事政治部门之外的其他部门，以及除国家之外的其他行为体：
Homogeneous complexes. This approach retains the “classical” assumption that security complexes are concentrated within specific sectors and are therefore composed of specific forms of interaction among similar types of units (e.g., power rivalries among states). This logic leads to different types of complexes that occur in different sectors (e.g., military complexes made up predominantly of states, a societal complex of various identity-based units, and the like). 同质复合体。这种方法保留了“经典”假设，即安全复合体集中在特定部门内，因此由类似类型单位之间的特定形式互动组成（例如，国家之间的权力竞争）。这种逻辑导致在不同部门中出现不同类型的复合体（例如，主要由国家组成的军事复合体、由各种基于身份的单位组成的社会复合体等）。
Heterogeneous complexes. This approach abandons the assumption that security complexes are locked into specific sectors, It assumes that the regional logic can integrate different types of actors interacting across two or more sectors (e.g., states + nations + firms + confederations interacting across the political, economic, and societal sectors). 异质复合体。这种方法放弃了安全复合体被锁定在特定领域的假设，假设区域逻辑可以整合跨越两个或多个领域互动的不同类型行为体（例如，国家 + 民族 + 公司 + 联盟在政治、经济和社会领域之间互动）。
There is no reason to choose between these alternatives. In principle, both are possible, and the analyst needs to determine which alternative best fits the case under study. 没有理由在这些选择之间做出抉择。原则上，两者都是可能的，分析者需要确定哪种选择最适合所研究的案例。
Heterogemeons security complexes have the advantage of linking actors across sectors, thus enabling the amalyst to keep the entire picture in 异质安全复合体的优势在于连接跨领域的行为体，从而使分析者能够保持整体视角。
a single frame and also to keep track of the inevitable spillovers between sectors (military impacts on economic developments and the like). A, B, C, and D could be nations, a state, and a supranational institution such as the EU, and the security dynamics of Europe can perhaps best be understood as a constellation of security fears and interactions among nations, states, and the EU (Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 4; Wæver 1996b, forthcoming-a). A similar logic might be applied to the Middle East, where the security complex contains both states and nations (e.g., Kurds, Palestinians). 单一框架，同时跟踪部门之间不可避免的溢出效应（如军事对经济发展的影响等）。A、B、C 和 D 可以是国家、一个州以及像欧盟这样的超国家机构，欧洲的安全动态或许最好被理解为国家、州和欧盟之间安全恐惧和互动的星座（Wæver 等，1993，第 4 章；Wæver，1996b，forthcoming-a）。类似的逻辑也可以应用于中东地区，该安全复合体包含国家和民族（例如库尔德人、巴勒斯坦人）。
Homogeneous, or sector-specific, security complexes (which would include the classical political-military, state-dominated model) require the construction of separate frames for each sector. They offer the possibility of isolating sector-specific security dynamics (politico-military, economic, societal, and so forth), but they also present the challenge of how to reassemble the separate frames into a holistic picture and the danger that linkages across sectors will be lost or obscured. Looking at security complexes sector by sector, one might find patterns that do not line up. In the chapters that follow, we take the sector-by-sector approach on the grounds that we need to explore the as yet poorly understood security dynamics of sectors and because it seems to be the best way to set out the framework. This should not be read as privileging the homogeneous approach over the heterogeneous one, as becomes apparent in Chapter 8. 同质的或特定部门的安全复合体（包括经典的政治-军事、国家主导模型）需要为每个部门构建独立的框架。它们提供了隔离部门特定安全动态（政治-军事、经济、社会等）的可能性，但也带来了如何将各个独立框架重新组装成整体图景的挑战，以及跨部门联系可能丢失或被掩盖的风险。逐部门审视安全复合体，可能会发现不一致的模式。在接下来的章节中，我们采用逐部门的方法，理由是我们需要探索尚未充分理解的部门安全动态，并且这似乎是阐述框架的最佳方式。这不应被解读为偏重同质方法而忽视异质方法，正如第 8 章所示。
Each of the sector chapters contains a subsection that asks, where are the security dynamics of this sector predominantly located, and what are the trends? Are they regional, global, or maybe local? Two types of considerations affect how we answer those questions. First is the cause-effect nature of the issues around which securitization takes place: the “facilitating conditions” for securitization. Second is the process of securitization itself. Facilitating conditions are sometimes clearly located on a level and sometimes not. Issues are clearly global when they have global causes and effects-for example, planetary temperature change, sea-level rises, and the like. They are local when they have local causes and effects-for example, pollution of water by industrial waste or sewage discharge. Water pollution inay occur in many places worldwide, but that does not make it a globallevel issue in the sense we use that term here but rather a case of parallel local issues. The difference is not whether pollution is felt locally-sealevel rises are too-but that one case could take place without the other. Rising sea level, in contrast, is an integrated phenomenon; it is impossible for it to rise in one region and not in another. But in principle its causes could be local, caused, for example, by energy consumption in one country. 每个部门章节都包含一个小节，询问该部门的安全动态主要位于何处，以及趋势如何？它们是区域性的、全球性的，还是可能是本地的？两类考虑因素影响我们如何回答这些问题。首先是围绕安全化发生的问题的因果性质：“促进安全化的条件”。其次是安全化过程本身。促进条件有时明确位于某一层面，有时则不然。当问题具有全球性的原因和影响时，它们显然是全球性的——例如，地球温度变化、海平面上升等。当问题具有本地性的原因和影响时，它们就是本地性的——例如，工业废水或污水排放导致的水污染。水污染可能在全球许多地方发生，但这并不意味着它是我们这里所说的全球层面的问题，而更像是多个平行的本地问题。区别不在于污染是否在本地感受到——海平面上升也是如此——而在于这两种情况可以独立发生。 相比之下，海平面上升是一个综合现象；它不可能在一个地区上升而在另一个地区不变。但原则上，其原因可能是局部的，例如由一个国家的能源消耗引起。
It is possible to mix levels and have, for example, local causes and clobal effects (the earlier example) or global causes and local effects (such as holes in the orone layer). This situation, however, is all about the level of the issue, nor necessarily of its securitization. As in classical security complex theory, the more important criterion is which actors are actually 可能会混合不同层次，例如局部原因导致全球影响（前面的例子）或全球原因导致局部影响（如臭氧层的空洞）。然而，这种情况完全是关于问题的层次，而不一定是其安全化的层次。正如经典的安全复合体理论，更重要的标准是哪些行为体实际上
linked by their mutual security concerns. If the Middle Eastern powers become locked into a security rivalry and thus form a security complex, it is irrelevant whether some analyst can argue that the “real” threat to those powers is Russia or the United States. If the actors make their major securitizations so the Middle East becomes tied together, it constitutes a regional security complex. 由于共同的安全关切而相互联系。如果中东大国陷入安全竞争，从而形成安全复合体，那么某些分析家是否能争辩说对这些大国的“真正”威胁是俄罗斯还是美国就无关紧要了。如果行为体进行主要的安全化，使中东地区联系在一起，那么它就构成了一个区域安全复合体。
More generally in this investigation, the criterion for answering the levels question is ultimately political: what constellation of actors forms on this issue. The nature of the issue-causes and effects-can often be an indicator of the likely level, but it is not what ultimately answers the question. In the process of securitization, the key issue is for whom security becomes a consideration in relation to whom. For example, a water shortage could become securitized at the global level, but the major battles will more likely be regional. Upstream and downstream powers and other potential beneficiaries from a particular river or lake will see each other as both threats and potential allies, which might play into other rivalries and constellations in the region and thus become tied into a more general regional security complex. This result is not determined purely by the nature of the issue: If all downstream nations could join together and push for global regulations on water usage, they could securitize the issue at the global level. The outcome that materializes is a result of politics, and our answer to the levels question thus must pay attention to the actual securitizations and not only to the objective qualities of the issue itself. The defining feature is the size of the political security constellation that is formed around the issue. 更一般地说，在这项研究中，回答层级问题的标准最终是政治性的：在这个问题上形成了什么样的行为体星座。问题的性质——原因和影响——通常可以作为可能层级的一个指标，但它并不是最终回答问题的依据。在安全化过程中，关键问题是安全对谁来说成为考虑对象，以及相对于谁而言。例如，水资源短缺可能在全球层面被安全化，但主要的争斗更可能发生在区域层面。上游和下游国家以及某条特定河流或湖泊的其他潜在受益者会将彼此视为威胁和潜在盟友，这可能会影响该地区的其他竞争和星座，从而与更广泛的区域安全复合体联系起来。这个结果并非纯粹由问题的性质决定：如果所有下游国家能够联合起来推动全球水资源使用的法规，它们就可以在全球层面实现该问题的安全化。 最终结果是政治的产物，因此我们对层级问题的回答必须关注实际的安全化过程，而不仅仅是问题本身的客观特性。决定性特征是围绕该问题形成的政治安全星座的规模。
Because we opt for the homogeneous, sector-specific approach in Chapters 3 through 7, there is a problem in pinning down the meaning of region and, more generally, of levels. In line with the scheme presented in the section Levels of Analysis, we would have preferred to think of regions and units in terms appropriate to specific sectors. Thus, in the military and political sectors the units would be states and regions would be sets of adjacent states, but, say, in the societal sector, units might be nations and regions sets of adjacent nations. The problem with this approach is that unit and region can mean very different things in different sectors: The politicomilitary unit Nigeria, for example, might contain several societal “regions.” We therefore adopt a state-centric frame for the purpose of getting a fixed scale against which to measure levels. Thereby, we achieve consistency in the meaning of region by using the political, state-defined sense of the term as a standard measure no matter which sector we are discussing. We do this not to determine or privilege the state as an actor but merely to achieve consistency in discussions. Other units exist, but only one is chosen as the instrument of measurement. 由于我们在第 3 至第 7 章中选择了同质的、特定领域的方法，因此在确定“区域”以及更广义上的“层级”含义时存在问题。根据“分析层级”一节中提出的方案，我们更愿意根据具体领域来思考区域和单位。因此，在军事和政治领域，单位是国家，区域是相邻国家的集合；但在社会领域，单位可能是民族，区域则是相邻民族的集合。这种方法的问题在于，单位和区域在不同领域中可能意味着截然不同的事物：例如，政治军事单位尼日利亚可能包含多个社会“区域”。因此，我们采用以国家为中心的框架，以获得一个固定的尺度来衡量层级。通过这种方式，我们通过使用政治上由国家定义的区域含义作为标准度量，实现了区域含义的一致性，无论讨论的是哪个领域。我们这样做并非为了确定或优先考虑国家作为行动者，而仅仅是为了在讨论中实现一致性。 其他单位存在，但只有一个被选为测量工具。
Thus, by region we mean a spatially coherent territory composed of 因此，我们所说的地区是指由空间上连贯的领土组成的
two or more states. Subregion means part of such a region, whether it involves more than one state (but fewer than all of the states in the region) or some transnational composition (some mix of states, parts of states, or both). Microregion refers to the subunit level within the boundaries of a state. 两个或更多国家。子地区是指这样一个地区的一部分，无论它是否涉及多个国家（但少于该地区的所有国家）或某种跨国组成（某种国家、国家部分或两者的混合）。微地区指的是国家边界内的子单位级别。
The second way in which we move beyond CSCT is by taking an explicitly social constructivist approach to understanding the process by which issues become securitized. CSCT addressed this issue simply in terms of patterns of amity and enmity (which entailed some constructivist deviation from objectivist, material realism-amity and enmity are generated by the actors and are not reflections of material conditions); adopting the wider agenda requires a more sophisticated approach. That approach is the subject of Chapter 2, which makes the case for understanding security not just as the use of force but as a particular type of intersubjective politics. Chapter 2 attempts to clarify two analytical issues: (1) how to identify what is and what is not a security issue, or, put another way, how to differentiate between the politicization and the securitization of an issue; and (2) how to identify and distinguish security actors and referent objects. These clarifications aim to meet the criticism of the broad security agenda which holds that opening up the agenda risks securitizing everything, therefore voiding the security concept of any meaning. We hope to show how the essential meaning of security can be carried across sectors (thus achieving the desired aim of broadening) without so diluting the concept that its distinclive meaning is destroyed. 我们超越 CSCT 的第二种方式是采取明确的社会建构主义方法来理解问题成为安全化的过程。CSCT 仅仅通过友敌模式来处理这个问题（这包含了一些建构主义对客观主义、物质现实主义的偏离——友敌是由行为者产生的，而不是物质条件的反映）；采用更广泛的议程则需要更复杂的方法。这个方法是第二章的主题，该章主张理解安全不仅仅是使用武力，而是一种特定类型的主体间政治。第二章试图澄清两个分析问题：（1）如何识别什么是安全问题，什么不是，或者换句话说，如何区分一个问题的政治化和安全化；（2）如何识别和区分安全行为者和参照对象。这些澄清旨在回应对广泛安全议程的批评，即开放议程有使一切都安全化的风险，从而使安全概念失去任何意义。 我们希望展示安全的基本含义如何能够跨越各个领域传达（从而实现拓宽的预期目标），而不会使这一概念被稀释到其独特含义被破坏的程度。
Each of Chapters 3 through 7 covers one of the principal sectors that define the attempt to construct a broader agenda for international security studies. These chapters have a common structure: each asks what the security agenda is within the sector, what types of actors are distinctive to the sector, what logic of threats and vulnerabilities operates within the sector, and how the security dynamics within the sector divide among the local, regional, and global scales. Each of these chapters is a lens that isolates a specific sector for analytical purposes and tries to uncover its distinctive necurity dynamics. The assumptions are that these dynamics may be differcnt and that the overall character of security relations will change as the dominant focus of security concerns shifts among sectors. Investigating whether we should expect a strong regional logic in the nontraditional secfors is one of the main purposes of the inquiry. 第 3 章到第 7 章分别涵盖了定义构建更广泛国际安全研究议程的主要领域之一。这些章节具有共同的结构：每章都会探讨该领域内的安全议程是什么，该领域特有的行为者类型有哪些，该领域内威胁和脆弱性的逻辑如何运作，以及该领域内的安全动态如何在地方、区域和全球层面上分布。这些章节都是为分析目的而隔离特定领域的透镜，试图揭示其独特的安全动态。假设这些动态可能不同，且随着安全关注重点在各领域间的转移，安全关系的整体特征也将发生变化。调查我们是否应预期非传统领域中存在强烈的区域逻辑，是本次研究的主要目的之一。
Chapter 8 attempts the reaggregation, first in terms of how the security dynamics in the five sectors align with each other but mainly in terms of thw reintegration of sectors by actors in the policymaking process. Chapter ^(1){ }^{1} reflects on the approach used to pull security studies into a coherent francwork, compares the new framework with the traditional one, and lawks all implications for security complex theory. 第八章尝试重新整合，首先从五个领域的安全动态如何相互协调的角度出发，但主要是从政策制定过程中行为者对各领域的再整合角度进行探讨。本章反思了将安全研究纳入一个连贯框架的方法，比较了新框架与传统框架，并考察了对安全复合体理论的所有影响。
Abstract 摘要
Notes 1. A possible third contender is the newly launched “critical security studies,” committed to sceking alternatives to realist, statist, and positivist orthodoxies. Some of what follows might be seen as fitting that description, but we have no prior commitment to antistate or antirealist positions, and we are driven more by methodological collectivism than by methodological individualism. More on critical security studies in Chapter 2. 2. We are aware that in some other literatures the term region has a different meaning from ours. The term was originally introduced at the subunit level. In nine-teenth-century France, a political movement formulated regionalism as an ideal for political organization that was located in the middle of the continuum between centralized government and political autonomy. This politicized notion of the region lives on in separatist movements. Also, contemporary journals like Regional Politics and Policy (published since 1990), International Regional Science Review (since 1975), Journal of Regional Science (since 1958), and Regional Studies (since 1967) are devoted primarily to the situation of ethnic minorities in specific subunit regions and to issues of administration and planning at different political levelsthat is, political centralization and decentralization. Additionally, there is a Europe of the regions: The contemporary map of the EU is subdivided not only into states but also into thousands of smaller units (a Swissification of Europe) and also increasingly into a variety of transnational “regions” (the Baltic Sea region, the Alpe-Adriatic, and the like), which in our terminology would appear as subregions and transregions, respectively. In this study, region refers to what that other literature sometimes calls macroregions (cf. Joenniemi 1993, 1997). 3. The security complex is not objective in the sense of “independent of actors.” In much traditional security analysis, region is defined “objectively” purely in terms of geography or history (cf. current debates about whether Russia is a part of Europe). In this sense, a region is simply an arena for security and one that is not influenced by security policies-the analyst observes “objective” reality and tells the actors to which region they belong. In contrast, security complexes are specifically defined by security interactions among units. Since we argue that security is not an objective issue but a product of the behavior of actors, security complexes are not objective in the traditional sense. Nor is the security complex to be seen as a discursive construction by the actors. We are not (in this context) interested in whether the actors define themselves as a region or whether they claim that their true region is something larger or smaller. Security complexes do not require that their members think in terms of the concept security complex (cf. note 6, Chapter 2). Analysts apply the term security complex (and therefore designate a region) based upon the contingent, historically specific, and possibly changing constellation generated by the interdependent security practices of the actors. On this basis, lines can be drawn on a map, and the theory can be put into operation. 注释 1. 另一个可能的第三竞争者是新近兴起的“批判性安全研究”，致力于寻求现实主义、国家主义和实证主义正统观念的替代方案。以下内容中的某些部分可能符合这一描述，但我们并不预先承诺反国家或反现实主义立场，我们更多地受方法论集体主义而非方法论个人主义驱动。关于批判性安全研究的更多内容见第二章。2. 我们意识到在其他一些文献中，region 一词的含义与我们的不同。该术语最初是在子单位层面引入的。在十九世纪的法国，一个政治运动将区域主义作为政治组织的理想，位于中央集权政府与政治自治之间的连续体中间。这个政治化的区域概念在分离主义运动中依然存在。 此外，像《Regional Politics and Policy》（自 1990 年起出版）、《International Regional Science Review》（自 1975 年起）、《Journal of Regional Science》（自 1958 年起）和《Regional Studies》（自 1967 年起）等当代期刊，主要致力于特定子区域内少数民族的状况以及不同政治层面的行政和规划问题——即政治的中央集权与分权。此外，欧洲存在一个“地区的欧洲”：欧盟的当代地图不仅划分为各个国家，还划分为数千个更小的单位（欧洲的瑞士化），并且越来越多地划分为各种跨国“地区”（如波罗的海地区、阿尔卑斯-亚得里亚地区等），在我们的术语中，这些分别被视为子区域和跨区域。在本研究中，region 指的是其他文献有时称之为宏观区域的概念（参见 Joenniemi 1993, 1997）。3. 安全复合体并非“独立于行为者”的客观存在。在许多传统的安全分析中，region 被“客观地”定义为纯粹基于地理或历史（参见当前关于俄罗斯是否属于欧洲的争论）。 从这个意义上说，地区仅仅是一个安全的舞台，并且不受安全政策的影响——分析者观察“客观”的现实，并告诉行为者他们属于哪个地区。相比之下，安全复合体是由单位之间的安全互动具体定义的。由于我们认为安全不是一个客观的问题，而是行为者行为的产物，安全复合体在传统意义上并非客观的。安全复合体也不应被视为行为者的论述建构。我们（在此语境中）并不关心行为者是否将自己定义为一个地区，或他们是否声称他们的真实地区更大或更小。安全复合体不要求其成员以安全复合体的概念来思考（参见第 2 章注释 6）。分析者基于行为者相互依赖的安全实践所产生的偶然的、历史特定的、可能变化的星座来应用“安全复合体”一词（因此指定一个地区）。基于此，可以在地图上划定界线，并将理论付诸实践。
CHAPTER 2 第二章
Security Analysis: Conceptual Apparatus 安全分析：概念工具
What Is Security? 什么是安全？
What quality makes something a security issue in international relations? It is important to add the qualification “in international relations,” because the character of security in that context is not identical to the use of the term in everyday language. Although it shares some qualities with “social security,” or security as applied to various civilian guard or police functions, international security has its own distinctive, more extreme meaning Unlike social security, which has strong links to matters of entitlement and social justice, international security is more firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics. We are not following a rigid domestic-international distinction, because many of our cases are not state defined. But we are claiming that international security has a distinctive agenda. ^(1){ }^{1} 什么特质使某事成为国际关系中的安全问题？重要的是要加上“在国际关系中”这一限定，因为该语境下安全的性质与日常语言中该词的使用并不相同。虽然它与“社会保障”或应用于各种民用警卫或警察职能的安全有一些共同点，但国际安全有其独特的、更极端的含义。与社会保障密切关联于权利和社会正义问题不同，国际安全更牢固地根植于权力政治的传统。我们并未遵循严格的国内-国际区分，因为我们的许多案例并非由国家定义。但我们主张国际安全有其独特的议程。
The answer to what makes something an international security issue can be found in the traditional military-political understanding of security. In this context, security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle exisiential threats. Traditionally, by saying “security,” a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development (Wæver 1988, 1995b). 什么使某事成为国际安全问题的答案可以在传统的军事-政治安全理解中找到。在这种背景下，安全关乎生存。当某个问题被呈现为对指定的参照对象（传统上但不一定是国家，包括政府、领土和社会）构成生存威胁时，安全问题就出现了。安全威胁的特殊性质使得采取非常措施来应对成为合理。安全的提出是合法化使用武力的关键，但更广泛地说，它为国家动员或采取特殊权力以应对生存威胁开辟了道路。传统上，通过说“安全”，国家代表宣布紧急状态，从而声称有权使用任何必要手段阻止威胁性发展（Wæver 1988, 1995b）。
When we consider the wider agenda, what do the terms existential threat and emergency measures mean? How, in practice, can the analyst draw the line between processes of politicization and processes of securitiration on this basis? Existential threat can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question. We are not dealing here with a miversal standard based in some sense on what threatens individual luman life. The essential guality of existence will vary preally 当我们考虑更广泛的议程时，存在性威胁和紧急措施这两个术语意味着什么？在实践中，分析者如何基于此划分政治化过程和安全化过程？存在性威胁只能根据相关参照对象的特定性质来理解。我们这里并不是在处理某种基于威胁个体人类生命的普遍标准。存在的本质特性实际上会有所不同。
across different sectors and levels of analysis; therefore, so will the nature of existential threats. 跨越不同的部门和分析层次；因此，存在性威胁的性质也将如此。
In the military sector, the referent object is usually the state, although it may also be other kinds of political entities. It is also possible to imagine circumstances in which threats to the survival of the armed forces would elevate those forces to referent object status in their own right, perhaps serving to justify a coup against the existing government and its policy (whether of disarmament or of hopeless conflict). Traditional security studies tends to see all military affairs as instances of security, but this may not be the case. For many of the advanced democracies, defense of the state is becoming only one, and perhaps not even the main de facto, function of the armed forces. Their militaries may be increasingly trained and called upon to support routine world order activities, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention, that cannot be viewed as concerning existential threats to their states or even as emergency action in the sense of suspending normal rules. 在军事领域，参照对象通常是国家，尽管也可能是其他类型的政治实体。也可以想象在某些情况下，对武装力量生存的威胁会使这些武装力量本身成为参照对象，或许这可以用来为推翻现有政府及其政策（无论是裁军政策还是无望的冲突政策）辩护。传统的安全研究倾向于将所有军事事务视为安全的实例，但情况可能并非如此。对于许多发达民主国家来说，保卫国家正逐渐成为武装力量的众多职能之一，甚至可能不是其主要的事实职能。它们的军队可能越来越多地接受训练并被要求支持常规的世界秩序活动，如维和或人道主义干预，这些活动不能被视为涉及其国家的生存威胁，甚至不能被视为暂停正常规则的紧急行动。
In the political sector, existential threats are traditionally defined in terms of the constituting principle-sovereignty, but sometimes also ideology - of the state. Sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority. Among the ever more interdependent and institutionalized relations characteristic of the West (and increasingly of the international system as a whole), a variety of supranational referent objects are also becoming important. The European Union (EU) can be existentially threatened by events that might undo its integration process. International regimes, and international society more broadly, can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute those regimes. 在政治领域，存在性威胁传统上是根据构成原则——主权，有时也包括意识形态——来定义的。主权可能会因任何质疑其认可、合法性或治理权威的事物而受到存在性威胁。在西方（以及日益成为整个国际体系特征的）日益相互依存和制度化的关系中，各种超国家的参照对象也变得重要。欧盟（EU）可能会因可能破坏其一体化进程的事件而受到存在性威胁。国际制度以及更广泛的国际社会，可能会因破坏构成这些制度的规则、规范和机构的情况而受到存在性威胁。
In the economic sector, the referent objects and existential threats are more difficult to pin down. Firms are most commonly existentially threatened by bankruptcy and sometimes by changes to laws that make them illegal or unviable (as after communist revolutions). But in the market economy firms are, with few exceptions, expected to come and go, and only rarely do they try to securitize their own survival. National economies have a greater claim to the right of survival, but rarely will a threat to that survival (national bankruptcy or an inability to provide for the basic needs of the population) actually arise apart from wider security contexts, such as war. Unless the survival of the population is in question, the huge range of the national economy doing better or doing worse cannot be seen as existentially threatening. As in the political sector, supranational referent objects from specific regimes to the global market itself can be existentially threatened by factors that might undermine the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute them. 在经济领域，参照对象和生存威胁更难以确定。企业最常见的生存威胁是破产，有时也会因法律变更而变得非法或不可行（如共产主义革命后）。但在市场经济中，企业通常被期望有来有去，只有极少数情况下它们会试图保障自身的生存。国家经济对生存权有更大的主张，但除非在更广泛的安全背景下（如战争），否则国家破产或无法满足人口基本需求等生存威胁很少真正出现。除非人口的生存受到质疑，否则国家经济表现好坏的巨大差异不能被视为生存威胁。与政治领域类似，从特定政权到全球市场本身的超国家参照对象，可能会受到破坏构成它们的规则、规范和制度的因素的生存威胁。
In the socictal sector, as we have defined it, the referent object is largescale collective identitie’s that con function independent of the state, such as 在我们定义的社会领域中，参照对象是能够独立于国家运作的大规模集体身份，例如
nations and religions. Given the peculiar nature of this type of referent object, it is extremely difficult to establish hard boundaries that differentiate existential from lesser threats. Collective identities naturally evolve and change in response to internal and external developments. Such changes may be seen as invasive or heretical and their sources pointed to as existential threats, or they may be accepted as part of the evolution of identity. Given the conservative nature of “identity,” it is always possible to paint challenges and changes as threats to identity, because “we will no longer be us,” no longer the way we were or the way we ought to be to be true to our “identity.” Thus, whether migrants or rival identities are securitized depends upon whether the holders of the collective identity take a relatively closed-minded or a relatively open-minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained. The abilities to maintain and reproduce a language, a set of behavioral customs, or a conception of ethnic purity can all he cast in terms of survival. 民族和宗教。鉴于这种类型的参照对象的特殊性质，极难划定明确的界限来区分存在性威胁与较小的威胁。集体身份自然会随着内部和外部的发展而演变和变化。这些变化可能被视为侵入性或异端，其来源被指认为存在性威胁，或者被接受为身份演变的一部分。鉴于“身份”的保守性质，总是可以将挑战和变化描绘为对身份的威胁，因为“我们将不再是我们”，不再是我们曾经的样子或为了忠于我们的“身份”应有的样子。因此，移民或竞争身份是否被安全化，取决于集体身份持有者对其身份构成和维持方式是持相对封闭还是相对开放的态度。维持和再现一种语言、一套行为习俗或一种族纯洁观念的能力，都可以被视为生存问题。
In the environmental sector, the range of possible referent objects is very large, ranging from relatively concrete things, such as the survival of individual species (tigers, whales, humankind) or types of habitat (rain forests, lakes), to much fuzzier, larger-scale issues, such as maintenance of the planetary climate and biosphere within the narrow band human beings have come to consider to be normal during their few thousand years of civilization. Underlying many of these referent objects are baseline concerns about the relationship between the human species and the rest of the biosphere and whether that relationship can be sustained without risking a collapse of the achieved levels of civilization, a wholesale disruption of the planet’s biological legacy, or both. The interplay among all of these factors is immensely complicated. At either the macro or the micro extreme are some clear cases of existential threat (the survival of species, the survival of human civilization) that can be securitized. In between, somewhat as in the economic sector, lies a huge mass of problems that are more difficult, alhough not impossible, to construct in existential terms. 在环境领域，可能的参照对象范围非常广泛，从相对具体的事物，如个别物种（老虎、鲸鱼、人类）或栖息地类型（雨林、湖泊）的生存，到更模糊、更大规模的问题，如维持地球气候和生物圈在狭窄范围内的稳定，这一范围是人类在几千年的文明过程中认为正常的。许多这些参照对象的基础关切是关于人类物种与生物圈其他部分之间的关系，以及这种关系是否能够维持而不冒着文明成就水平崩溃、地球生物遗产全面破坏或两者兼有的风险。这些因素之间的相互作用极其复杂。在宏观或微观极端，有一些明确的生存威胁案例（物种的生存，人类文明的生存）可以被安全化。在两者之间，类似于经济领域，存在大量更难以构建为生存性问题的难题，尽管并非不可能。
Securitization 安全化
“Sccurity” is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of Ilic game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as uluve politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of polilicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum limping from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is 110 in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) lhough politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other lom of commmail governance) to secoritized (meanimg, the issuce is pre- “安全”是将政治推向超越既定规则的行动，将问题框定为一种特殊类型的政治或极端政治。因此，安全化可以被视为政治化的更极端版本。理论上，任何公共议题都可以定位在从非政治化（意味着国家不处理该议题，且在其他方面也未成为公共辩论和决策的问题）到政治化（意味着该议题成为公共政策的一部分，需要政府决策和资源分配，或更少见的某种形式的共同治理）再到安全化（意味着该议题被预先—
sented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure). In principle, the placement of issues on this spectrum is open: Depending upon circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum. ^(2){ }^{2} In practice, placement varies substantially from state to state (and also across time). Some states will politicize religion (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Burma) and some will not (France, the United States). Some will securitize culture (the former USSR, Iran) and some will not (the UK, the Netherlands). In the case of issues (notably the environment) that have moved dramatically out of the nonpoliticized category, we face the double question of whether they have merely been politicized or have also been securitized. This link between politicization and securitization does not imply that securitization always goes through the state; politicization as well as securitization can be enacted in other fora as well. As will be seen later, it is possible for other social entities to raise an issue to the level of general consideration or even to the status of sanctioned urgency among themselves. 被视为一种存在威胁，需采取紧急措施并证明采取超出正常政治程序范围的行动是合理的）。原则上，问题在这一光谱上的位置是开放的：根据具体情况，任何问题都可能出现在光谱的任何部分。实际上，不同国家（以及不同时间）的问题定位差异很大。有些国家会将宗教政治化（伊朗、沙特阿拉伯、缅甸），有些则不会（法国、美国）。有些国家会将文化安全化（前苏联、伊朗），有些则不会（英国、荷兰）。对于那些显著脱离非政治化范畴的问题（尤其是环境问题），我们面临着一个双重问题，即它们是否仅仅被政治化，还是也被安全化。政治化与安全化之间的这种联系并不意味着安全化总是通过国家进行；政治化和安全化也可以在其他场合进行。正如后文将看到的，其他社会实体也可以将某个问题提升到一般关注的层面，甚至提升到彼此认可的紧急状态。
In this approach, the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and is not something we can define analytically or philosophically according to what would be “best.” The meaning lies not in what people consciously think the concept means but in how they implicitly use it in some ways and not others. In the case of security, textual analysis (Wæver 1988, 1995b, 1995c) suggests that something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority. This is the reason we link the issue to what might seem a fairly demanding criterion: that the issue is presented as an existential threat. If one can argue that something overflows the normal political logic of weighing issues against each other, this must be the case because it can upset the entire process of weighing as such; “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way).” Thereby, the actor has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game (e.g., in the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing society’s energy and resources on a specific task). “Security” is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue-not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat. 在这种方法中，概念的意义在于其使用方式，而不是我们可以根据“最佳”标准进行分析或哲学定义的东西。意义不在于人们有意识地认为该概念意味着什么，而在于他们以某些方式而非其他方式隐含地使用它。以安全为例，文本分析（Wæver 1988, 1995b, 1995c）表明，某个问题被指定为国际安全问题，是因为可以论证该问题比其他问题更重要，应该获得绝对优先权。这就是我们将该问题与看似相当苛刻的标准联系起来的原因：该问题被呈现为一种生存威胁。 如果有人能够论证某事超出了正常的政治逻辑，即将问题相互权衡的逻辑，那么这一定是因为它可能扰乱整个权衡过程本身；“如果我们不解决这个问题，其他一切都将变得无关紧要（因为我们将不存在或无法以我们自己的方式自由处理它）。”因此，行为者声称有权通过非常手段处理该问题，打破正常的政治游戏规则（例如，以保密、征税或征兵的形式，限制原本不可侵犯的权利，或将社会的精力和资源集中于特定任务）。因此，“安全”是一种自指的实践，因为正是在这种实践中，问题成为安全问题——不一定是因为存在真实的生存威胁，而是因为该问题被呈现为这样的威胁。
Of course, places do exist where secrecy or violation of rights is the rule and where security arguments are not needed to legitimize such acts. The earlier illustrations were for a liberal-democratic society; in other societies there will also be “rules,” as there are in any society, and when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is “normal politics,” we have a case of 当然，确实存在一些地方，秘密或侵犯权利是常态，安全论据并不需要用来为此类行为合法化。之前的例子是针对自由民主社会的；在其他社会中也会有“规则”，正如任何社会中都会有的那样，当一个安全化行动者使用存在性威胁的修辞，从而将某个议题从在那些条件下的“正常政治”中剥离出来时，我们就遇到了一个案例。
sccuritization. Thus, the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects. Securitization can le studied directly; it does not need indicators. The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient clfect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization. 安全化。因此，安全化的确切定义和标准是通过主体间建立的具有足够显著性的生存威胁，从而产生实质性的政治影响。安全化可以直接研究；它不需要指标。研究安全化的方法是研究话语和政治格局：何时具有这种特定修辞和符号结构的论点能够产生足够的效果，使听众容忍本应遵守的规则被违反？如果通过关于生存威胁的优先性和紧迫性的论证，安全化行为者成功摆脱了他或她本应遵守的程序或规则，我们就见证了一个安全化的案例。
Even if the general logic of securitization is clear, we have to be precise about its threshold. A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization-this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only If and when the audience accepts it as such. (Accept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as on consent. Since securitization can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case.) We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be idlopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain rough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been pussible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of (II) return, and necessity. If no signs of such acceptance exist, we can talk unly of a securitizing move, not of an object actually being securitized. The distinction between a securitizing move and successful securitization is important in the chapters that follow. 即使安全化的一般逻辑是清晰的，我们也必须明确其门槛。以将某事呈现为对参照对象的生存威胁的形式出现的话语本身并不会创造安全化——这是一种安全化动作，但只有当受众接受它为如此时，问题才被安全化。（接受并不一定意味着在文明、无支配的讨论中；它仅意味着一个秩序总是建立在强制和同意之上。由于安全化永远不可能仅仅被强加，因此有必要为自己的立场辩护。）我们不会将要求推得如此之高，认为必须采取紧急措施，只是认为必须论证生存威胁并大致获得共鸣，从而建立一个平台，使得可以合法化紧急措施或其他如果话语未以生存威胁、不可回头点（point of (II) return）和必要性形式出现则不可能采取的步骤。如果不存在这种接受的迹象，我们只能谈论安全化动作，而不能说某个对象实际上被安全化了。 在接下来的章节中，区分安全化行动与成功的安全化是非常重要的。
Securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking rules (which can take minly forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) hul by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules. Still, we have a problem of size or significance. Many actions can take this form (III : small scale-for example, a family securitizing its lifestyle as depenArm on keeping a specific job (and therefore using dirty tricks in competi(1וU at the firm) or the Pentagon designating hackers as “a catastrophic |lircit” and “a serious threat to national security” (San Francisco ('limicle, May 23, 1996: A11), which could possibly lead to actions within Ilw computer field but with no cascading effects on other security issues. ') 1 II concept of international security has a clear definition of what we are interested in, but it does not tell us how we sort the important cases from the less important ones. We do not want to sort by arbitrarily assigning heprees of importance to referent objects and sectors, for instance, defining sate as more important han environment or military as more securitylike 安全化不仅仅是通过破坏规则（这可以采取多种形式）或仅仅通过存在性威胁（这可能导致无结果）来实现的，而是通过存在性威胁使破坏规则合法化的情况来实现的。然而，我们面临规模或重要性的问题。许多行为可以采取这种形式（例如：小规模——例如，一个家庭将其生活方式安全化，依赖于保持特定工作（因此在公司竞争中使用肮脏手段）或五角大楼将黑客指定为“灾难性威胁”和“对国家安全的严重威胁”（旧金山纪事报，1996 年 5 月 23 日：A11），这可能导致计算机领域内的行动，但不会对其他安全问题产生连锁反应）。国际安全的概念对我们感兴趣的内容有明确的定义，但它并没有告诉我们如何区分重要案例和不那么重要的案例。我们不想通过任意分配重要性等级给参照对象和领域来排序，例如，将国家定义为比环境更重要，或将军事定义为比安全更相关。
than identity. Doing so would undermine the logic of both widening the security agenda and taking a securitization approach to that agenda. It would constrain arbitrarily and a priori what we can see and thus make it impossible to capture the extent to which the security agenda has actually changed or been widened. 而非身份认同。这样做将破坏扩大安全议程和采取安全化方法的逻辑。它会任意且先验地限制我们所能看到的内容，从而使得捕捉安全议程实际发生变化或扩展的程度变得不可能。
A better measure of importance is the scale of chain reactions on other securitizations: How big an impact does the securitizing move have on wider patterns of relations? A securitizing move can easily upset orders of mutual accommodation among units. The security act is negotiated between securitizer and audience-that is, internally within the unit-but thereby the securitizing agent can obtain permission to override rules that would otherwise bind it. Typically, the agent will override such rules, because by depicting a threat the securitizing agent often says someone cannot be dealt with in the normal way. In the extreme case-war-we do not have to discuss with the other party; we try to eliminate them. This self-based violation of rules is the security act, and the fear that the other party will not let us survive as a subject is the foundational motivation for that act. In a securitized situation, a unit does not rely on the social resources of rules shared intersubjectively among units but relies instead on its own resources, demanding the right to govern its actions by its own priorities (Wæver 1996b). A successful securitization thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules. 衡量重要性的更好标准是对其他安全化行为链式反应的规模：安全化行为对更广泛关系模式的影响有多大？安全化行为很容易打乱单位之间相互适应的秩序。安全行为是在安全化者与受众之间协商的——也就是说，在单位内部——但通过这种方式，安全化代理人可以获得超越原本约束其的规则的许可。通常，代理人会超越这些规则，因为通过描绘威胁，安全化代理人常常表示某些人无法用正常方式处理。在极端情况下——战争——我们不必与对方讨论；我们试图消灭他们。这种基于自身的规则违反就是安全行为，而对方不让我们作为主体生存的恐惧是该行为的根本动机。在安全化情境中，一个单位不依赖于单位间共享的规则的社会资源，而是依赖自身资源，要求以自身优先事项来管理其行动的权利（Wæver 1996b）。 成功的安全化因此包含三个组成部分（或步骤）：生存威胁、紧急行动，以及通过打破规则对单位间关系的影响。
The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action “because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure”). This definition can function as a tool for finding security actors and phenomena in sectors other than the military-political one, where it is often hard to define when to include new issues on the security agenda. Must new issues affect the military sector or be as “dangerous” as war (Deudney 1990)? To circumvent these restrictive ties to traditional security, one needs a clear idea of the essential quality of security in general. 安全化的显著特征是一种特定的修辞结构（生存、行动优先“因为如果问题现在不处理，就会太晚，我们将无法弥补我们的失败”）。这个定义可以作为一个工具，用于在军事政治领域之外寻找安全行为者和现象，在这些领域中，往往很难界定何时将新问题纳入安全议程。新问题必须影响军事领域或像战争一样“危险”吗（Deudney 1990）？为了规避这些对传统安全的限制性联系，需要对安全的本质特征有一个清晰的认识。
That quality is the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to assess some objective threats that “really” endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the acl. By saying the words, something is done (like belling, giving a promise, naming a ship) (Wever 1988; Austin 1975: 9817.). 这种特质是将存在性问题置于政治之上，从而提升其政治地位。在安全话语中，一个问题被戏剧化并呈现为至高无上的优先事项；因此，通过将其标记为安全，行为者声称有必要且有权利通过非常手段来处理它。分析者要理解这一行为，任务不是评估某些“真正”威胁某个需要防御或保障的对象的客观威胁；而是要理解构建对什么应被视为威胁并集体应对的共享理解的过程。安全化过程在语言理论中被称为言语行为。它并非作为指向更真实事物的符号而有趣；而是言语本身即是行为。通过说出这些话，某种行为得以完成（如敲钟、许诺、命名船只）（Wever 1988；Austin 1975：9817）。
Sectors and Institutionalization of Security 安全的部门与制度化
What we can study is this practice: Who can “do” or “speak” security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects? It is important to note that the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience. There will be instances in which the word security appears without this logic and other cases that (川)erate according to that logic with only a metaphorical security reference. As spelled out later, in some cases securitization has become institutionalized. Constant drama does not have to be present, because it is implicitly insumed that when we talk of this (typically, but not necessarily, defense issues), we are by definition in the area of urgency: By saying “defense” (or, in Holland, “dikes”), one has also implicitly said security and priority. We use this logic as a definition of security because it has a consistency and precision the word as such lacks. There is a concept of international securily with this specific meaning, which is implied in most usages of the word. 我们可以研究这种做法：谁能成功地 "做 "或 "说 "安全，在什么问题上，在什么条件下，产生什么效果？必须指出的是，安全言论行为并不是通过说出安全一词来定义的。最重要的是指出存在的威胁，需要采取紧急行动或特别措施，并得到重要听众的认可。在有些情况下，安全一词的出现并不符合这一逻辑，而在其他情况下，（川）则是按照这一逻辑出现的，只是一种隐喻性的安全指代。正如下文所述，在某些情况下，安全化已经制度化。持续的戏剧性并不一定存在，因为我们隐含地认为，当我们谈论这个问题（通常是，但不一定是国防问题）时，顾名思义，我们是在谈论紧迫性：说到 "防卫"（或者在荷兰说到 "堤坝"），也就暗含了安全和优先的意思。我们使用这一逻辑作为安全的定义，因为它具有安全一词所缺乏的一致性和精确性。 国际安全有一个特定含义的概念，这在大多数使用该词的场合中都隐含其中。
Our claim is that it is possible to dig into the practice connected to this concept of security in international relations (which is distinct from other concepts of security) and find a characteristic pattern with an inner logic. If we place the survival of collective units and principles-the politics of existential threat-as the defining core of security studies, we have the hasis for applying security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality of the concept. This is the answer to those who hold Ilial security studies cannot expand its agenda beyond the traditional mili-litry-political one without debasing the concept of security itself. 我们的主张是，有可能深入探讨与国际关系中的安全概念相关的实践（这与其他安全概念不同），并发现具有内在逻辑的特征性模式。如果我们将集体单位和原则的生存——存在威胁的政治——作为安全研究的定义核心，我们就有了将安全分析应用于各种领域而不失去该概念本质特征的基础。这是对那些认为国际安全研究无法将其议程扩展到传统军事政治领域之外而不贬低安全概念本身的人的回应。
Sectors are “views of the international system through a lens that highliphts one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of Is constituent units” (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 31). Given that the illialytical purpose of sectors is to differentiate types of interaction (mililiry, political, economic, societal, and environmental), it seems reasonable for expect (1) that one will find units and values that are characteristic of, and rooted in, particular sectors (although, like the state, they may also appear in other sectors); and (2) that the nature of survival and threat will difler across different sectors and types of unit. In other words, security is a peneric term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form. Security means inivival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential llicalt is not the same across different sectors. One purpose of the following diapters is to unfold this sectoral logic of security more fully. 部门是“通过一种透镜观察国际体系，突出所有组成单位之间关系和互动的某一特定方面的视角”（Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 31）。鉴于部门的分析目的是区分不同类型的互动（军事、政治、经济、社会和环境），因此合理地预期（1）会发现具有特定部门特征并根植于该部门的单位和价值观（尽管像国家一样，它们也可能出现在其他部门）；（2）生存和威胁的性质将在不同部门和单位类型之间有所不同。换句话说，安全是一个通用术语，具有明确的含义但形式各异。安全意味着在面对生存威胁时的存活，但什么构成生存威胁在不同部门中并不相同。以下章节的一个目的就是更充分地展开这种部门安全逻辑。
Securitization can be either ad hoc or institutionalized. If a given type of threat is persistent or recurtent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized. This situation is most visiWe in the military sector, where states have long endured threats of armed 安全化可以是临时的，也可以是制度化的。如果某种类型的威胁是持续的或反复出现的，那么反应和紧迫感变得制度化也就不足为奇了。这种情况在军事领域最为明显，国家长期承受武装威胁。
procedures, and military establishments to deal with those threats. Although such a procedure may seem to reduce security to a species of normal politics, it does not do so. The need for drama in establishing securitization falls away, because it is implicitly assumed that when we talk of this issue we are by definition in the area of urgency. As is the case for defense issues in most countries and for the dikes in the Netherlands, urgency has been established by the previous use of the security move. There is no further need to spell out that this issue has to take precedence, that it is a security issue by saying “defense” or “dikes,” one has also implicitly said “security” and “priority.” This can be shown by trying to inquire about the rationale for decisions in these areas. Behind the first layers of ordinary bureaucratic arguments, one will ultimately find a-probably irritated-repetition of a security argument so well established that it is taken for granted. 程序和军事机构来应对这些威胁。尽管这样的程序似乎将安全简化为一种普通政治，但事实并非如此。确立安全化的戏剧性需求消失了，因为当我们谈论这个问题时，默认情况下我们处于紧迫状态。正如大多数国家的防御问题和荷兰的堤坝一样，紧迫性是通过先前的安全行动确立的。无需进一步说明该问题必须优先处理，说“防御”或“堤坝”时，也隐含地表达了“安全”和“优先”。通过试图探究这些领域决策的理由可以看出这一点。在普通官僚论点的表层之下，最终会发现一个——可能是恼怒的——安全论点的重复，这一论点已被广泛接受，视为理所当然。
Some security practices are not legitimized in public by security discourse, because they are not out in the public at all (e.g., the “black programs” in the United States, which are not presented in the budget), but this is actually a very clear case of the security logic. In a democracy, at some point it must be argued in the public sphere why a situation constitutes security and therefore can legitimately be handled differently. One could not take something out of the budget without giving a reason for the use of such an extraordinary procedure. When this procedure has been legitimized through security rhetoric, it becomes institutionalized as a package legitimization, and it is thus possible to have black security boxes in the political process. The speech act reduces public influence on this issue, but in democracies one must legitimize in public why from now on the details will not be presented publicly (because of the danger of giving useful information to the enemy and the like). In all cases, the establishment of secret services has some element of this logical sequence. Not every act is presented with the drama of urgency and priority, because it has been established in a general sense that this is an entire field that has been moved to a form of treatment legitimate only because this area has been defined as security. 一些安全实践并未通过安全话语在公众中获得合法化，因为它们根本没有公开（例如，美国的“黑色项目”，未在预算中列出），但这实际上是安全逻辑的一个非常明确的案例。在民主社会中，必须在某个阶段在公共领域论证为何某种情况构成安全问题，因此可以合法地以不同方式处理。不能在没有说明采用如此非常规程序理由的情况下将某项内容从预算中剔除。当这一程序通过安全话语获得合法化后，它就作为一揽子合法化被制度化，因此在政治过程中可以存在黑色安全盒子。言语行为减少了公众对此问题的影响，但在民主国家，必须公开合法化为何从此以后细节不再公开（因为担心向敌人提供有用信息等）。在所有情况下，情报机构的建立都包含这一逻辑序列的某些元素。 并非每个行为都以紧迫性和优先性的戏剧性呈现，因为人们普遍认为这是一个整体领域，之所以被视为合法处理，仅仅是因为该领域已被定义为安全。
In well-developed states, armed forces and intelligence services are carefully separated from normal political life, and their use is subject to elaborate procedures of authorization. Where such separation is not in place, as in many weak states (Nigeria under Abacha, the USSR under Stalin) or in states mobilized for total war, much of normal politics is pushed into the security realm. ^(3){ }^{3} The prominence of institutionalized military security underpins not only the claim of those who want to confine security studies to the military sector but also the de facto primacy of the state in security affairs. But nothing is necessary about this particular construction; it comes out of a certain history and has formidable institutional momentum but is not lixed for all time. Where the threat profiles warrant them, one call see onther types of institulionalized security structures, such as those concerned with liond control in the Nellecilands. One of the diffi- 在发达国家，武装部队和情报机构与正常的政治生活被严格分开，其使用须经过复杂的授权程序。在许多薄弱国家（如阿巴查时期的尼日利亚、斯大林时期的苏联）或为全面战争动员的国家中，这种分离不存在，许多正常的政治活动被推入安全领域。制度化的军事安全的显著地位不仅支持了那些希望将安全研究局限于军事领域的人的主张，也支持了国家在安全事务中事实上的主导地位。但这种特定的构造并非必然；它源于特定的历史，具有强大的制度惯性，但并非永远固定不变。在威胁形势需要时，人们可以看到其他类型的制度化安全结构，例如那些关注荷兰殖民地控制的结构。困难之一是—
rullics facing those attempting to securitize environmental issues is that the threats are both new (or newly discovered) and controversial regarding Ifsir existential urgency. Consequently, they do not (yet) have institutions, mid they find themselves operating in a political context dominated by security institutions designed for other types of threat. 面临试图将环境问题安全化的那些规则性问题是，威胁既是新的（或新发现的），又在存在紧迫性方面存在争议。因此，它们尚未拥有相应的机构，并且发现自己在一个由为其他类型威胁设计的安全机构主导的政治环境中运作。
Although in one sense securitization is a further intensification of moliticization (thus usually making an even stronger role for the state), in another sense it is opposed to politicization. Politicization means to make iII issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided "1, quad11\quad 11 and that therefore entails responsibility, in contrast to issues that ciller could not be different (laws of nature) or should not be put under political control (e.g., a free economy, the private sphere, and matters for experl decision). By contrast, securitization on the international level (illhough often not on the domestic one) means to present an issue as quad1g,m\quad 1 \mathrm{~g}, \mathrm{~m} and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leadin prior to other issues. 虽然从某种意义上说，安全化是政治化的进一步强化（因此通常使国家的作用更加强大），但从另一个意义上说，它与政治化是相对立的。政治化意味着使某个问题看起来是开放的，是一种选择，是“我”决定的事情，因此涉及责任，这与那些根本不可能不同（自然法则）或不应置于政治控制之下的问题（例如，自由经济、私人领域以及专家决策事项）形成对比。相比之下，国际层面的安全化（尽管通常不适用于国内层面）意味着将某个问题呈现为生存性和存在性的，重要到不应暴露于正常的政治讨价还价之中，而应由最高领导层在其他问题之前果断处理。
National security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposi11141 :nd has given power holders many opportunities to exploit “threats” Int domestic purposes, to claim a right to handle something with less demoifitic control and constraint. Our belief, therefore, is not “the more security Hw better.” Basically, security should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal will issues as normal politics. Ideally, politics should be able to unfold Hucurding to routine procedures without this extraordinary elevation of spe-- ilic “threats” to a prepolitical immediacy. In some cases securitization of INHes is unavoidable, as when states are faced with an implacable or barhutian iggressor. Because of its prioritizing imperative, securitization also hiis litical attractions-for example, as a way to obtain sufficient attention lin civironmental problems. But desecuritization is the optimal long-range "णlion, since it means not to have issues phrased as “threats against which wi have countermeasures” but to move them out of this threat-defense - पnewe and into the ordinary public sphere (Wæver 1995b). 国家安全不应被理想化。它起到了压制反对声音的作用，并且赋予权力持有者许多机会利用“威胁”作为国内目的，声称有权以较少的民主控制和约束来处理某些事务。因此，我们的观点不是“安全越多越好”。基本上，安全应被视为一种消极状态，是未能将问题作为正常政治来处理的表现。理想情况下，政治应能够按照常规程序展开，而不必将特定“威胁”提升到一种超越政治的紧迫状态。在某些情况下，问题的安全化是不可避免的，比如当国家面临无情或野蛮的侵略者时。由于其优先性的命令，安全化也具有政治吸引力——例如，作为引起对环境问题足够关注的一种方式。但去安全化是最佳的长期选择，因为这意味着不再将问题表述为“我们有对策的威胁”，而是将其从威胁-防御框架中移出，进入普通公共领域（Wæver 1995b）。
Whell considering securitizing moves such as “environmental security” in in “war on crime,” one has to weigh the always problematic side effects of川川lying: it mind-set of security against the possible advantages of focus, H1/ whion, and mobilization. Thus, although in the abstract desecuritization is (14) Ilval, in specific situations one can choose securitization-only one lumlal not believe this is an innocent reflection of the issue being a security Ihnon! Il is always a political choice to securitize or to accept a securitization. 在考虑诸如 "反犯罪战争 "中的 "环境安全 "之类的安全化举措时，我们必须权衡川川说谎的副作用：安全的心态与聚焦、H1/whion 和动员的可能优势。因此，尽管抽象地说，"去证券化"（14）是一种选择，但在具体情况下，人们可以选择 "安全化"--只是人们不能认为这是问题是安全问题的无辜反映！证券化或接受证券化始终是一种政治选择。
Sulbective, Objective, and Intersubjective Security 主观安全、客观安全与间主观安全
Sathelmp: The essemial quality of imlernational secmity takes one some Sathelmp：国际安全的基本特质使人们感受到一些东西
meaning of the concept that can operate both within and beyond the traditional military-political understanding of that concept. But this does not solve all of the problems. Commentators on security at least as far back as Arnold Wolfers (1962: 151) have noted that security can be approached both objectively (there is a real threat) and subjectively (there is a perceived threat) and that nothing ensures that these two approaches will line up. This distinction turns out to be crucial in formulating an international security concept for a multisectoral agenda. 该概念的含义既可以在传统的军事-政治理解范围内运作，也可以超越该范围。但这并不能解决所有问题。至少早在 Arnold Wolfers（1962: 151）就有评论者指出，安全可以从客观角度（存在真实威胁）和主观角度（存在感知威胁）来理解，而这两种方法未必会一致。这一区分在为多部门议程制定国际安全概念时显得尤为关键。
Our argument is that securitization, like politicization, has to be understood as an essentially intersubjective process. Even if one wanted to take a more objectivist approach, it is unclear how this could be done except in cases in which the threat is unambiguous and immediate. (An example would be hostile tanks crossing the border; even here, “hostile” is an attribute not of the vehicle but of the socially constituted relationship. A foreign tank could be part of a peacekeeping force.) It is not easy to judge the securitization of an issue against some measure of whether that issue is “really” a threat; doing so would demand an objective measure of security that no security theory has yet provided. Even if one could solve the measurement problem, it is not clear that the objectivist approach would be particularly helpful. Different states and nations have different thresholds for defining a threat: Finns are concerned about immigration at a level of 0.3 percent foreigners, whereas Switzerland functions with a level of 14.7 percent (Romero 1990). ^(4){ }^{4} 我们的观点是，安全化过程，像政治化一样，必须被理解为一种本质上的主体间过程。即使有人想采取更客观主义的方法，也不清楚除了在威胁明确且迫在眉睫的情况下如何做到这一点。（一个例子是敌对坦克越过边境；即使在这里，“敌对”也是一种属性，不是车辆本身的属性，而是社会构成的关系属性。外国坦克可能是维和部队的一部分。）很难根据某种标准来判断一个问题的安全化是否“真正”构成威胁；这样做需要一个客观的安全衡量标准，而目前还没有任何安全理论提供过。即使能够解决测量问题，也不清楚客观主义方法是否特别有帮助。不同的国家和民族对威胁的定义有不同的阈值：芬兰人对 0.3%的外国移民比例感到担忧，而瑞士则在 14.7%的水平下正常运作（Romero 1990）。
Regardless of whether an analyst finds that an actor’s disposition toward high or low thresholds leads to correct assessments, this disposition has real effects. And other actors need to grasp the logic this unit follows. When states or nations securitize an issue-“correctly” or not-it is a political fact that has consequences, because this securitization will cause the actor to operate in a different mode than he or she would have otherwise. This is the classical diplomatic (and classical realist) lesson, which holds that good statesmanship has to understand the threshold at which other actors will feel threatened and therefore more generally to understand how the world looks to those actors, even if one disagrees (Carr 1939; Kissinger 1957; Wæver 1995d). 无论分析者是否发现某个行为者对高或低门槛的倾向导致了正确的评估，这种倾向都有实际影响。其他行为者需要理解该单位所遵循的逻辑。当国家或民族对某个问题进行安全化——无论是否“正确”——这都是一个具有后果的政治事实，因为这种安全化会导致行为者以不同于原本的方式运作。这是经典的外交（以及经典现实主义）教训，即良好的治国之道必须理解其他行为者感到威胁的门槛，因此更广泛地理解这些行为者眼中的世界，即使持不同意见（Carr 1939；Kissinger 1957；Wæver 1995d）。
In some cases, however, it does matter how others judge the reasonableness of a securitization, because this influences how other actors in the system will respond to a security claim. What may seem a legitimate securitization within a given political community may appear paranoid to those outside it (e.g., Western perceptions of Soviet concerns about pop music and jeans). Conversely, outsiders may perceive that a political community undersecuritizes a “real” threat and thus endangers itself or free rides (e.g., U.S. perceptions of Danish defense policy during the Cold War). The way the securitization processes of one actor fit with the perceptions of others about what constitutes a “real” threat matters in shaping the interplay of 然而，在某些情况下，其他人如何判断安全化的合理性确实很重要，因为这会影响系统中其他行为者对安全主张的反应。在特定政治共同体内看似合理的安全化，可能在外部看来是偏执的（例如，西方对苏联对流行音乐和牛仔裤担忧的看法）。相反，外部人士可能认为某个政治共同体对“真实”威胁的安全化不足，从而危及自身或搭便车（例如，冷战期间美国对丹麦防御政策的看法）。一个行为者的安全化过程与其他人对“真实”威胁的认知如何契合，对于塑造国际体系内安全互动的方式至关重要。
scurities within the international system. Both within and between actors, lloc extent of shared intersubjective understandings of security is one key to muderstanding behavior. 国际体系内的安全互动。无论是在行为者内部还是行为者之间，共享的安全的主体间理解程度是理解行为的关键之一。
In any case, it is neither politically nor analytically helpful to try to weline “real security” outside of the world of politics and to teach the actors (1) understand the term correctly. Such rationalist universalism will easily be “right” on its own terms, but it will be of very little help in political anialysis. It is more relevant to grasp the processes and dynamics of securillation, because if one knows who can “do” security on what issue and intiler what conditions, it will sometimes be possible to maneuver the interwetion among actors and thereby curb security dilemmas. 无论如何，试图将“真正的安全”划定在政治世界之外，并教导行为者正确理解该术语，既不具备政治上的帮助，也不具备分析上的帮助。这种理性主义的普遍主义在其自身的条件下很容易是“正确”的，但在政治分析中几乎没有什么帮助。更重要的是把握安全化的过程和动态，因为如果知道谁能在什么问题上以什么条件“实施”安全，有时就有可能在行为者之间进行干预，从而遏制安全困境。
The distinction between subjective and objective is useful for highluhling the fact that we want to avoid a view of security that is given ohjectively and emphasize that security is determined by actors and in this mepect is subjective. The label subjective, however, is not fully adequate. Whether an issue is a security issue is not something individuals decide ulonc. Securitization is intersubjective and socially constructed: Does a refewll object hold general legitimacy as something that should survive, which entails that actors can make reference to it, point to something as a Ilreat, and thereby get others to follow or at least tolerate actions not otherwise legitimate? 'This quality is not held in subjective and isolated minds; it is it social quality, a part of a discursive, socially constituted, intersubjeclive realm. For individuals or groups to speak security does not guarantee -Hicess (cf. Derrida 1977a; Wæver 1995b). Successful securitization is not decitled by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act: Docs the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared villuc? Thus, security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the wiects nor with the subjects but among the subjects (cf. Arendt 1958, I1559; Wæver 1990; Huysmans 1996). 主观与客观的区分有助于强调我们希望避免一种客观赋予的安全观，而强调安全是由行为者决定的，在这方面是主观的。然而，主观这一标签并不完全恰当。某个问题是否是安全问题，并非个人单独决定。安全化是主体间的、社会建构的：某个参照对象是否具有作为应当被保护的事物的一般合法性，这意味着行为者可以引用它，将某事指为威胁，从而使他人跟随或至少容忍本来不合法的行为？这种特质不存于主观且孤立的心灵中；它是一种社会特质，是话语的、社会构成的、主体间领域的一部分。个人或群体发出安全话语并不保证成功（参见 Derrida 1977a；Wæver 1995b）。成功的安全化不是由安全化者决定，而是由安全话语行为的受众决定：受众是否接受某事是对共同价值的生存威胁？ 因此，安全（与所有政治一样）最终既不依赖于权力者，也不依赖于被统治者，而是在被统治者之间（参见 Arendt 1958, I1559；Wæver 1990；Huysmans 1996）。
Social Power and Facilitating Conditions 社会权力与促进条件
This relationship among subjects is not equal or symmetrical, and the posuhility for successful securitization will vary dramatically with the position li:l|l by the actor. Security is thus very much a structured field in which 31116 actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepled voices of security, by having the power to define security (Bigo 11リ.1, 1996, forthcoming). This power, however, is never absolute: No one 1. puaranteed the ability to make people accept a claim for necessary secufly action (as even the Communist elites of Eastern Europe learned; see Wiver 1995b), nor is anyone excluded from attempts to articulate alternalive interpretalions af security. The field is structured or biased, but no one “onclusively “holds” the power of securitization.” Therefore, it is our view 主题之间的这种关系并不平等或对称，成功安全化的可能性将随着行为者所处的位置而大不相同。因此，安全是一个高度结构化的领域，其中许多行为者因被普遍接受为安全的声音、拥有定义安全的权力而被置于权力位置（Bigo 11リ.1，1996，待发表）。然而，这种权力从来不是绝对的：没有人能够保证让人们接受必要安全行动的主张（正如东欧共产主义精英所学到的；参见 Wiver 1995b），也没有人被排除在表达安全替代解释的尝试之外。该领域是结构化或有偏见的，但没有人“最终‘拥有’安全化的权力”。因此，我们的观点是
(contra Bigo) that one can not make the actors of securitization the fixed point of analysis-the practice of securitization is the center of analysis. In concrete analysis, however, it is important to be specific about who is more or less privileged in articulating security. To study securitization is to study the power politics of a concept. （反对 Bigo）不能将安全化的行为者作为分析的固定点——安全化的实践是分析的中心。然而，在具体分析中，明确谁在表达安全时更有特权是很重要的。研究安全化就是研究一个概念的权力政治。
Based on a clear idea of the nature of security, securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful). 基于对安全本质的清晰认识，安全化研究旨在越来越精确地理解谁在进行安全化，针对哪些问题（威胁），为了谁（参照对象），为什么，取得了什么结果，以及最重要的，在什么条件下（即，什么解释了安全化何时成功）。
The impossibility of applying objective standards of securityness relates to a trivial but rarely noticed feature of security arguments: They are about the future, about alternative futures-always hypothetical-and about counterfactuals. A security argument always involves two predictions: What will happen if we do not take “security action” (the threat), and what will happen if we do (How is the submitted security policy supposed to work?). A security theory that could tell politicians and citizens what actually constitute security problems and what do not would demand that such predictions should be possible to make on a scientific basis, which means society would have to be a closed, mechanical, and deterministic system. Even this condition, however, would not be enough, because a second complication is that securityness is not only a matter of degree-“how threatening”-but is also a qualitative question: Do we choose to attach the security label with its ensuing effects? Actors can choose to handle a major challenge in other ways and thus not securitize it. The use of a specific conceptualization is always a choice-it is politics, it is not possible to decide by investigating the threat scientifically. 应用客观安全标准的不可能性与安全论证的一个微不足道但很少被注意到的特征有关：它们关于未来，关于替代的未来——总是假设性的——以及关于反事实。安全论证总是涉及两个预测：如果我们不采取“安全行动”（威胁）会发生什么，以及如果我们采取行动会发生什么（提交的安全政策应如何运作？）。一种能够告诉政治家和公民什么实际上构成安全问题、什么不构成安全问题的安全理论，要求这些预测必须能够以科学的基础进行，这意味着社会必须是一个封闭的、机械的、确定论的系统。然而，即使满足这一条件也不够，因为第二个复杂因素是安全性不仅是一个程度问题——“多么威胁”——也是一个质的问 题：我们是否选择附加安全标签及其随之而来的影响？行为者可以选择以其他方式处理重大挑战，从而不将其安全化。 使用特定的概念化总是一种选择——这是政治，而不是通过科学地调查威胁来决定的。
An objective measure for security can never replace the study of securitization, because the security quality is supplied by politics, but this does not mean a study of the features of the threat itself is irrelevant. On the contrary, these features rank high among the “facilitating conditions” of the security speech act. Facilitating conditions are the conditions under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act misfires or is abused (Austin 1975 [1962]). Conditions for a successful speech act fall into two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical-to follow the rules of the act (or, as Austin argues, accepted conventional procedures must exist, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures), and (2) the external, contextual and social-to hold a position from which the act can be made (“The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked” |Austin 1975 (1962): 34]). 一个客观的安全衡量标准永远无法取代对安全化的研究，因为安全的质量是由政治提供的，但这并不意味着对威胁本身特征的研究无关紧要。相反，这些特征在安全言语行为的“促进条件”中排名很高。促进条件是言语行为起作用的条件，与行为失效或被滥用的情况相反（Austin 1975 [1962]）。成功言语行为的条件分为两类：（1）内部的、语言-语法的——遵循行为的规则（或者，正如 Austin 所论证的，必须存在被接受的惯例程序，且行为必须按照这些程序执行）；（2）外部的、情境和社会的——持有一个可以实施该行为的立场（“在特定情况下，特定的人和环境必须适合调用所调用的特定程序”|Austin 1975 (1962): 34）。
A successful speech act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic feallures of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speed (Bourdien 1991 [1982|: Butler 1996a, b). Among the 一次成功的言语行为是语言与社会的结合，既包括言语的内在特征，也包括授权并认可该言语的群体（Bourdien 1991 [1982]；Butler 1996a, b）。在……
internal conditions of a speech act, the most important is to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes exisiential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out - the general grammar of security as such plus the particular dialects of the different sectors, such as talk identity in the societal sector, recognition and sovereignty in We political sector, sustainability in the environmental sector, and so on (cf. Wæver 1996b). The external aspect of a speech act has two main conditions. One is the social capital of the enunciator, the securitizing actor, who must be in a position of authority, although this should not be defined as ollicial authority. The other external condition has to do with threat. It is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally held to be threatening-be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters. In themselves, these objects never make for necessary securitization, but they are definitely facilitating conditions. 言语行为的内部条件中，最重要的是遵循安全形式、安全语法，并构建一个包含存在性威胁、不可回头点以及可能的出路的情节——即安全的一般语法，以及不同领域的特定方言，例如社会领域中的身份话语、政治领域中的认同和主权、环境领域中的可持续性，等等（参见 Wæver 1996b）。言语行为的外部方面有两个主要条件。一是发话者的社会资本，即安全化行为者，必须处于权威地位，尽管这不应被定义为官方权威。另一个外部条件与威胁有关。如果能够指代某些普遍被认为具有威胁性的对象——无论是坦克、敌对情绪还是被污染的水域——那么制造安全威胁的可能性更大。这些对象本身并不必然导致安全化，但它们无疑是促进条件。
After thus subdividing the social, external speech-act conditions into actor authority and threat related, we can sum up the facilitating conditions us follows: (1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammitr of security, (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor-that is, the relationship between speaker and mudience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and (3) features of the alleged threats that cither facilitate or impede securitization. 在将社会的、外部言语行为条件细分为行为者权威和威胁相关后，我们可以总结出促进条件如下：（1）言语行为内部对遵循安全语法的要求，（2）关于安全化行为者权威地位的社会条件——即说话者与听众之间的关系，从而影响听众接受安全化尝试中所提出主张的可能性，以及（3）被指称威胁的特征，这些特征要么促进，要么阻碍安全化过程。
Actor and Analyst in Securitization Studies 安全化研究中的行为者与分析者
Approaching security from a speech-act perspective raises questions about the relationship between actors and analysts in defining and understanding llue security agenda. As analysts, we define security as we have done here hecause it is the only way that makes coherent sense of what actors do. We hive identified a particular sociopolitical logic that is characteristic of wicurity, and that logic is what we study. Although analysts unavoidably plity a role in the construction (or deconstruction) of security issues (viz., He long argument between peace research and strategic studies or the U.S. Whitle about the securityness of the Vietnam War), it is not their primary lisk 10 determine whether some threat represents a “real” security problem. 从言语行为的角度接近安全问题，会引发关于行为者与分析者在定义和理解安全议程中的关系的问题。作为分析者，我们之所以像这里所做的那样定义安全，是因为这是唯一能够连贯解释行为者所做之事的方式。我们已经识别出一种特定的社会政治逻辑，这是安全的特征，而这正是我们研究的逻辑。尽管分析者不可避免地在安全问题的构建（或解构）中扮演角色（例如，和平研究与战略研究之间的长期争论，或美国关于越南战争安全性的争论），但他们的主要任务并不是确定某些威胁是否构成“真正”的安全问题。
Objective security assessment is beyond our means of analysis; the main point is that actors and their audiences securitize certain issues as a inpecific form of political act. Actors who securitize do not necessarily say “ecurity,” nor does their use of the term security necessarily always constilute a security act. We use our criteria to see if they take the form of “polilies of existential threats.” with the argument that an issue takes priority aver everylhing else and therefore allows for a breaking of the rules. As a hims step, the designation of whal constitules at security issme comes from 客观的安全评估超出了我们的分析能力；关键在于行为者及其受众将某些问题作为一种特定形式的政治行为进行安全化。进行安全化的行为者不一定会说“security”，他们使用“security”一词也不一定总是构成安全行为。我们使用我们的标准来判断他们是否采取了“存在性威胁政策”的形式，认为某个问题优先于其他一切，因此允许打破规则。作为第一步，什么构成安全问题的界定来自于
political actors, not analysts, but analysts interpret political actors’ actions and sort out when these actions fulfill the security criteria. It is, further, the analyst who judges whether the actor is effective in mobilizing support around this security reference (i.e., the attempted securitizers are “judged” first by other social actors and citizens, and the degree of their following is then interpreted and measured by us). Finally, to assess the significance of an instance of securitization, analysts study its effects on other units. The actor commands at only one very crucial step: the performance of a political act in a security mode. 政治行为者，而非分析者，但分析者解释政治行为者的行为，并理清这些行为何时符合安全标准。此外，正是分析者判断行为者在围绕这一安全参照动员支持方面是否有效（即，试图进行安全化的行为者首先被其他社会行为者和公民“评判”，然后我们对其追随程度进行解释和衡量）。最后，为了评估一次安全化实例的重要性，分析者研究其对其他单位的影响。行为者仅在一个非常关键的步骤中发挥指挥作用：以安全模式执行政治行为。
Thus, it is the actor, not the analyst, who decides whether something is to be handled as an existential threat. This does not make analysts hostage to the self-understanding of actors for the duration of the analysis. In all subsequent questions of cause-effect relationships-what are the effects of these security acts, who influenced decisions, and so on-we do not intend to give actors any defining role. Thus, a concept such as security complex is defined not by whether actors label themselves a complex (they do not!) but by analysts’ interpretation of who is actually interconnected in terms of security interaction. ^(6){ }^{6} (Security complex is basically an analytical term; security is a political practice that we have distilled into a specific, more precise category on the basis of the way the concept is used.) The speechact approach says only that it is the actor who by securitizing an issue-and the audience by accepting the claim-makes it a security issue. At that level, the analyst cannot and should not replace the actor. 因此，决定某事是否被视为生存威胁的是行为者，而不是分析者。这并不意味着分析者在整个分析过程中会成为行为者自我理解的俘虏。在所有后续的因果关系问题中——这些安全行为的效果是什么，谁影响了决策，等等——我们并不打算赋予行为者任何定义性的角色。因此，诸如安全复合体这样的概念，并不是由行为者是否将自己标记为复合体（他们并没有！）来定义的，而是由分析者对谁在安全互动方面实际上相互关联的解释来定义的。（安全复合体基本上是一个分析术语；安全是一种政治实践，我们基于该概念的使用方式将其提炼为一个更具体、更精确的类别。）言语行为方法仅指出，正是行为者通过将某个议题安全化——以及观众通过接受这一主张——使其成为安全议题。在这个层面上，分析者既不能也不应取代行为者。
This point does not suggest that we feel obliged to agree with this securitizing act. One of the purposes of this approach should be that it becomes possible to evaluate whether one finds it good or bad to securitize a certain issue. One rarely manages to counter a securitizing attempt by saying as an analyst. “You are not really threatened, you only think so.” But it is possible to ask with some force whether it is a good idea to make this issue a security issue-to transfer it to the agenda of panic politics-or whether it is better handled within normal politics. As witnessed in the discussion about environmental security, even environmentalists have had strong second thoughts about the effects of putting the environmental agenda in security terms. The securitization approach serves to underline the responsibility of talking security, the responsibility of actors as well as of analysts who choose to frame an issue as a security issue. They cannot hide behind the claim that anything in itself constitutes a security issue. 这一点并不意味着我们必须同意这一安全化行为。该方法的目的之一应是使人们能够评估将某一问题安全化是好是坏。作为分析者，很少有人能通过说“你实际上并未受到威胁，你只是这么认为”来反驳安全化尝试。但可以有力地质疑，将某一问题作为安全问题——将其转移到恐慌政治议程上——是否是个好主意，或者是否更适合在正常政治框架内处理。正如关于环境安全的讨论所显示的，即使是环保主义者也对将环境议题置于安全范畴的影响产生了强烈的反思。安全化方法强调了谈论安全的责任，无论是行为者还是选择将某一问题框定为安全问题的分析者，都不能以“任何事物本身都构成安全问题”为借口来逃避责任。
The relationship of analyst to actor is one area in which our approach differs from that taken by many scholars with whom we share some theoretical premises. An emerging school of “critical security studies” (CSS) wants to challenge comventional security studies by applying postpositivist perspectives, sucll as critical theory and poststructuralism (Krause and Williams (9)(b, 1997). Much of its work, like ours, deals with the social construction of seculty (cf. also Klein 1994; Campbell 1993), but CSS mosily has the imbon (known from posistructuralism as well as from con- 分析者与行为者的关系是我们的方法与许多与我们共享某些理论前提的学者所采取的方法不同的一个领域。一个新兴的“批判安全研究”（CSS）学派希望通过应用后实证主义视角，如批判理论和后结构主义（Krause 和 Williams (9)(b, 1997)），来挑战传统安全研究。其许多工作，像我们的研究一样，涉及安全的社会建构（参见 Klein 1994；Campbell 1993），但 CSS 主要具有来自后结构主义以及来自 con- 的影响。
structivism in international relations) of showing that change is possible because things are socially constituted. 结构主义国际关系理论）表明变化是可能的，因为事物是社会构成的。
We, in contrast, believe even the socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do analysis also on the basis that it continues, using one’s understanding of the social construction of security not only to criticize this fact but also to understand the dynamics of security and thereby maneuver them. This leads us to a stronger emphasis on collectivities and on understanding thresholds that trigger securitization in order to avoid them. With our securitization perspective, we abstain from attempts to talk about what “real security” would be for people, what are “actual” security problems larger than those propagated by elites, and the like. To be able to talk about these issues, one has to make basically different ontological choices than ours and must define some emancipatory ideal. Such an approach is therefore complementary to ours; it can do what we voluntarily abstain from, and we can do what it is unable to: understand the mechanisms of securitization while keeping a distance from security-that is, not assuming that security is a good to be spread to ever more sectors. 相比之下，我们认为即使是社会构成的事物，往往也会沉淀为结构，并成为相对稳定的实践，因此必须基于其持续存在进行分析，利用对安全社会建构的理解，不仅批判这一事实，还要理解安全的动态，从而加以操控。这使我们更加重视集体性以及理解触发安全化的阈值，以避免这些阈值。通过我们的安全化视角，我们避免讨论“真正的安全”对人们意味着什么，哪些是比精英宣传的更“实际”的安全问题等。要讨论这些问题，必须做出与我们基本不同的本体论选择，并定义某种解放理想。因此，这种方法是对我们方法的补充；它可以做我们自愿回避的事情，而我们可以做它无法做到的事情：理解安全化的机制，同时保持与安全的距离——即不假设安全是一种应当扩展到更多领域的善。
There are other differences between the two approaches (much of CSS takes the individual as the true reference for security-human securityand thus in its individualism differs from our methodological collectivism and focus on collectivities; cf. Chapter 9), but the political attitude and its corresponding view of constructivism and structuralism is probably the most consistent one. The analyst in critical security studies takes on a larger burden than the analyst in our approach; he or she can brush away existing security construction disclosed as arbitrary and point to some other issues that are more important security problems. Our approach links itself more closely to existing actors, tries to understand their modus operandi, and assumes that future management of security will have to include handling these actors-as, for instance, in strategies aimed at mitigating security dilemmas and fostering mutual awareness in security complexes. Although our philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in holding security to always be a political construction and not something the analyst can describe as it “really” is, in our purposes we are closer to traditional security studies, which at its best attempted to grasp security constellations and thereby steer them into benign interactions. This stands in contrast to the “critical” purposes of CSS, which point toward a more wholesale refutation of current power wielders. 这两种方法之间还有其他差异（CSS 的大部分内容将个体视为安全——人类安全的真正参照，因此在其个人主义上与我们的方法论集体主义及对集体的关注不同；参见第 9 章），但政治态度及其对应的建构主义和结构主义观点可能是最一致的。批判性安全研究中的分析者承担的责任比我们方法中的分析者更大；他或她可以驳斥现有的安全建构，指出其任意性，并指出其他更重要的安全问题。我们的方法更紧密地联系现有行为者，试图理解他们的运作方式，并假设未来的安全管理必须包括对这些行为者的处理——例如，在旨在缓解安全困境和促进安全复合体中相互意识的策略中。 尽管我们的哲学立场在某种意义上更为激进的建构主义，认为安全始终是一种政治建构，而不是分析者能够描述其“真实”状态的东西，但在我们的目的上，我们更接近传统安全研究，后者在其最佳状态下试图把握安全格局，从而引导其进入良性互动。这与 CSS 的“批判”目的形成对比，后者指向对当前权力掌控者的更全面否定。
The Units of Security Analysis: Actors and Referent Objects 安全分析的单位：行为者与参照对象
The speech-act approach to securily reguires a distinction among three types of units involved in secority analysis. 言语行为方法对安全的分析要求区分安全分析中涉及的三种单位。
Referent objects: things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival. 参照对象：被视为存在性受到威胁且有合法生存权利的事物。
Securitizing actors: actors who securitize issues by declaring some-thing-a referent object-existentially threatened. 安全化行为者：通过宣称某物——一个被存在性威胁的参照对象——来进行安全化的行为者。
Functional actors: actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security. A polluting company, for example, can be a central actor in the environmental sector-it is not a referent object and is not trying to securitize environmental issues (quite the contrary). 功能性行为者：影响某一领域动态的行为者。既不是参照对象，也不是代表参照对象呼吁安全的行为者，而是在安全领域的决策中具有重要影响力的行为者。例如，一家污染企业可以是环境领域的核心行为者——它不是参照对象，也不试图将环境问题安全化（恰恰相反）。
The most important and difficult distinction is that between referent objects and securitizing actors, and this distinction requires some discussion. We deal with functional actors in the sector chapters. 最重要且最难区分的是参照对象与安全化行为者之间的区别，这一区别需要一些讨论。我们将在各领域章节中讨论功能性行为者。
The referent object for security has traditionally been the state and, in a more hidden way, the nation. For a state, survival is about sovereignty, and for a nation it is about identity (Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 2). But if one follows the securitization approach outlined earlier, a much more open spectrum of possibilities has to be allowed. In principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object. In practice, however, the constraints of facilitating conditions mean actors are much more likely to be successful with some types of referent objects than with others. Security action is usually taken on behalf of, and with reference to, a collectivity. The referent object is that to which one can point and say, “It has to survive, therefore it is necessary to . . .” 安全的指称对象传统上是国家，以及更隐晦地说，是民族。对于一个国家来说，生存关乎主权；对于一个民族来说，生存关乎身份认同（Wæver 等，1993，第 2 章）。但如果遵循前面概述的安全化方法，则必须允许更为开放的可能性范围。原则上，安全化行为者可以试图将任何事物构建为指称对象。然而在实践中，促进条件的限制意味着行为者在某些类型的指称对象上比其他类型更可能取得成功。安全行动通常是代表并参照一个集体进行的。指称对象是可以指向并说“它必须生存，因此有必要……”的那个对象。
Size or scale seems to be one crucial variable in determining what constitutes a successful referent object of security. At the micro end of the spectrum, individuals or small groups can seldom establish a wider security legitimacy in their own right. They may speak about security to and of themselves, but few will listen. At the system end of the scale, problems also exist in establishing security legitimacy. For example, attempts have been made to construct all of humankind as a security referent-most notably in terms of shared fears of nuclear annihilation during the Cold War but also in the context of environmental fears. Another system-scale attempl was the failed move by socialists in 1914 to mobilize in the name of the international working class. Thus far, however, the system level has rarely been able to compete with the middle scale, although this does not mean it will nol become more attractive in the future as international circumstances change. 规模或大小似乎是决定什么构成成功的安全参照对象的一个关键变量。在光谱的微观端，个人或小团体很少能够凭借自身建立更广泛的安全合法性。他们可能会谈论自身的安全，但很少有人会倾听。在规模的系统端，建立安全合法性也存在问题。例如，曾试图将全人类构建为安全参照对象——最显著的是在冷战期间基于对核毁灭的共同恐惧，以及在环境恐惧的背景下。另一个系统规模的尝试是 1914 年社会主义者以国际工人阶级的名义动员的失败行动。然而，到目前为止，系统层面很少能够与中间规模竞争，尽管这并不意味着随着国际环境的变化，它将来不会变得更具吸引力。
In practice, he middle scale of limited collectivities has proved the most amenable to securitization as durable referent objects. One explanation for this success is that such limited collectivities (states, nations, and, as anticipateal by Huntimg(ons, civilizalions) engage in self-reinforcing rival- 在实践中，中等规模的有限集体已被证明是作为持久参照对象最易于安全化的。一种解释是，这些有限集体（国家、民族，以及正如亨廷顿所预见的文明）参与自我强化的竞争——
ries with other limited collectivities, and such interaction strengthens their “we” feeling. Because they involve a reference to a “we,” they are social constructs operative in the interaction among people. A main criterion of this type of referent is that it forms an interpretative community-it is the context in which principles of legitimacy and valuation circulate and within which the individual constructs an interpretation of events. The referent is a social context with the dignity of a “site of judgment” (Foucault 1979). If rivalry is a facilitating condition for successful securitization, middle-level collectivities will always have an advantage over the system level in this respect. Somehow, the system-level candidates are still too subtle and indirect to trigger the levels of mass identity necessary for securitization. Lacking the dynamic underpinning of rivalry, their attempt at universalist political allegiance confronts the middle-level collectivities and loses. ^(7){ }^{7} 与其他有限的集体发生竞争，这种互动加强了他们的“我们”感。因为它们涉及对“我们”的指涉，它们是在人与人互动中起作用的社会建构。这类指称的一个主要标准是它形成了解释性共同体——这是合法性和价值原则流通的语境，个体在其中构建对事件的解释。指称是具有“判断场所”尊严的社会语境（福柯 1979）。如果竞争是成功安全化的促进条件，中层集体在这方面总是比系统层具有优势。不知何故，系统层的候选者仍然过于微妙和间接，无法激发安全化所需的大规模身份认同水平。缺乏竞争的动态支撑，他们对普遍主义政治忠诚的尝试面对中层集体时失败了。
The apparent primacy of the middle-level, limited collectivities opens the way for an attack on our approach from traditional state-centric security analysts (and perhaps also from certain types of liberals). Their argument goes like this: Security, by definition, is and should be about the state, and the state is and should be about security, with the emphasis on military and political security. A hard-line liberal might say the state has no legitimate functions other than security. When security is expanded beyond the state, we have problematic securitizations such as environmental security; when the state expands beyond security, we have problems such as the conflation of economic security with protectionism. It is possible to take the statesecurity position and argue politically against all attempts to “do” security with reference to other referent objects on the ground that only through the state can the process of securitization be controlled democratically and kept in check. 中层有限集体的明显优先地位为传统以国家为中心的安全分析师（也许还有某些类型的自由主义者）对我们方法的攻击打开了道路。他们的论点是这样的：安全，按定义，是且应该是关于国家的，而国家是且应该是关于安全的，重点是军事和政治安全。一个强硬的自由主义者可能会说，国家除了安全之外没有合法的职能。当安全扩展到国家之外时，我们就会遇到诸如环境安全之类的问题性安全化；当国家扩展到安全之外时，我们就会遇到诸如将经济安全与保护主义混为一谈的问题。可以采取国家安全立场，政治上反对所有试图“做”安全而参考其他指涉对象的尝试，理由是只有通过国家，安全化过程才能被民主地控制并加以制约。
We acknowledge that there is some analytical truth, as well as a legitimate political position, in this tight link between state and security. But the logic of our approach forces us to reject the use of such a narrow and selfclosing definitional move. We have constructed a wider conceptual net within which the state-centric position is a possible but not a predetermined outcome. In using this scheme, one may still find that the state is the most important security referent; if so, this finding would carry much more force than if it were made true by definition and would also remain open to change. We do not say security is only about the state (although there is much truth to the argument that the state is the ideal security actor) nor that security is equally available to all-states and other social movements. Security is an area of competing actors, but it is a biased one in which the state is still generally privileged as the actor historically endowed with security tasks and most adequately structured for the purpose. This explanation acknowledges the difference between a state-centric approach and a state-dominated field. 我们承认，国家与安全之间存在某种分析上的真实性以及合法的政治立场。但我们的方法逻辑迫使我们拒绝采用如此狭隘且自我封闭的定义性操作。我们构建了一个更广泛的概念网络，在其中以国家为中心的立场是可能的，但不是预定的结果。使用这一框架时，人们仍可能发现国家是最重要的安全参照对象；如果是这样，这一发现将比通过定义使其成立更具说服力，并且也保持开放以便变化。我们并不说安全仅仅关乎国家（尽管国家是理想的安全行为体这一论点有很大真实性），也不认为安全对所有国家和其他社会运动同等适用。安全是一个竞争行为体的领域，但这是一个偏向性的领域，国家通常仍被优先视为历史上承担安全任务且最适合此目的的行为体。这一解释承认了以国家为中心的方法与国家主导领域之间的区别。
But whereas the midde level in general, and the state in particular, 但一般来说，中间层，特别是国家，
might enjoy primacy in the selection of referent objects, that is not the end of the story. Being a middle-level, limited collectivity is insufficient for achieving status as a referent object. This is probably best illustrated in the case of economic security, where one would think firms are the natural limited collectivity units. But by their very nature, firms rarely have a strong claim to a right of survival. If the survival of a firm is threatened, the firm will not be able to legitimize action beyond the normal, legal rules of the game. We rarely see middle-level security policy in this field except when economic arguments can be linked to what in economic terms is the secondary unit-the state-which can claim a natural right to survive, to defend its existence, and to take extraordinary measures (protectionism and the like) on a national issue (such as maintaining the capability for military mobilization) if deemed necessary. 可能在参照对象的选择中占据首要地位，但这并不是故事的结局。作为一个中层的有限集体是不足以获得参照对象地位的。这一点在经济安全的案例中可能表现得最为明显，人们会认为企业是自然的有限集体单位。但从本质上讲，企业很少有强烈的生存权主张。如果企业的生存受到威胁，企业将无法在正常的法律规则之外合法化行动。除非经济论点能够与经济学上被视为次级单位的国家联系起来，否则我们很少看到该领域的中层安全政策——国家可以主张自然的生存权，捍卫其存在，并在必要时对国家问题（如维持军事动员能力）采取非常措施（如保护主义等）。
Nor do system-level referent objects always lose out. Thus far they have done so in the military and political sectors, where the security of humankind has generally had less appeal than that of the state. But the story is different in other sectors. The environment is becoming an interesting case, because groups are using a securitizing logic that exactly follows the format prescribed in the previous section: The environment has to survive; therefore, this issue should take priority over all others, because if the environment is degraded to the point of no return all other issues will lose their meaning. If the normal system (politics according to the rules as they exist) is not able to handle this situation, we (Greenpeace and especially the more extremist ecoterrorists) will have to take extraordinary measures to save the environment. Sustainability might be the environmentalists’ equivalent of the state’s sovereignty and the nation’s identity; it is the essential constitutive principle that has to be protected. If this idea catches on, the environment itself may be on the way to becoming a referent object-an object by reference to which security action can be taken in a socially significant way. We discuss this more fully in Chapter 4. 系统层面的参照对象也并非总是处于劣势。到目前为止，它们在军事和政治领域确实如此，在这些领域中，人类的安全通常不如国家的安全更具吸引力。但在其他领域情况则不同。环境问题正成为一个有趣的案例，因为各团体正在使用一种完全遵循前一节所规定格式的安全化逻辑：环境必须生存；因此，这一问题应优先于所有其他问题，因为如果环境恶化到无法挽回的地步，所有其他问题都将失去意义。如果正常的系统（按照现有规则的政治）无法处理这种情况，我们（绿色和平组织，尤其是更激进的生态恐怖分子）将不得不采取非常措施来拯救环境。可持续性可能是环保主义者相当于国家主权和民族认同的概念；它是必须保护的基本构成原则。 如果这个观点被接受，环境本身可能正走向成为一个参照对象——一个可以通过其作为参照而采取具有社会意义的安全行动的对象。我们将在第四章中对此进行更详细的讨论。
Once this door is opened, one can see other plausible candidates for security referent objects at the system level. Humankind as a whole achieved some status as a referent object in relation to nuclear weapons and could do so again-perhaps more successfully-in relation to environmental disasters, such as new ice ages or collisions between the earth and one or more of the many large rocks that occupy near-earth space. The level of human civilization could also become the referent object in relation to environmental threats. In the economic sector, system-level referents may be more elfeclive vehicles for security discourse than limited collectivities, such as the firm and the state. Already, systems of rules or sets of principles, such as “the liberal world economy” and “free trade,” have some status is referent objects in the economic sector. A similar practice could grow in the political sector around intermational society or democracy (the latter as an extension of the democracy == peace hypothesis). Our position is that 一旦这扇门被打开，人们就可以看到系统层面上其他合理的安全指称对象候选者。整个人类作为一个整体，在核武器问题上已经获得了一定的指称对象地位，并且可能在环境灾难方面——例如新的冰河时代或地球与近地空间中多个大型岩石的碰撞——再次获得这种地位，甚至可能更为成功。人类文明的层面也可能成为环境威胁的指称对象。在经济领域，系统层面的指称对象可能比有限的集体（如企业和国家）更有效地成为安全话语的载体。已经存在的规则体系或原则集合，如“自由世界经济”和“自由贸易”，在经济领域中已具有一定的指称对象地位。类似的做法也可能在政治领域围绕国际社会或民主（后者作为民主和平假说的延伸）发展。我们的立场是，
no principled, logical exclusion of referent objects should take place at the system level; therefore, we investigate the issue in each of the sector chapters. 在系统层面不应进行有原则的、逻辑上的指称对象排除；因此，我们在各个部门章节中探讨这一问题。
Also, the individual is again a factor in security debate. As argued by Ken Booth (1991, 1994, 1995), much of security analysis blanks out the effects on actual human beings of the issues discussed; thus, his argument is an attempt to securitize concrete individuals in their competition with aggregate categories. Emma Rothschild (1995) has argued that historically, a major part of liberal thought had the individual as the referent of security; thus, there is a respectable philosophical tradition to build on. In the 1980s, with projects like the Brandt and Palme Commissions, security thought drifted back toward the individual, and Rothschild argues convincingly that regardless of whether it is intellectually coherent or ethically ideal, securitization of the individual is a real political practice of our times. (In this book, the individual will reappear primarily in the political-sector chapter, because it is usually a question of establishing the principle of, for example, human rights rather than of specific individuals appearing one by one as securitized referent objects. ^(8){ }^{8} ) 此外，个体再次成为安全辩论中的一个因素。正如 Ken Booth（1991、1994、1995）所论述的，许多安全分析忽略了所讨论问题对实际人类的影响；因此，他的论点试图将具体个体在与总体类别的竞争中进行安全化。Emma Rothschild（1995）则认为，历史上，自由主义思想的一个重要部分将个体作为安全的参照对象；因此，有一个值得尊敬的哲学传统可供借鉴。20 世纪 80 年代，随着 Brandt 和 Palme 委员会等项目的推进，安全思想重新回归个体，Rothschild 有力地论证了无论这种做法在智识上是否连贯或在伦理上是否理想，个体的安全化都是我们时代一种真实的政治实践。（在本书中，个体主要会在政治部门章节中再次出现，因为通常这是确立例如人权原则的问题，而不是具体个体一个接一个地作为被安全化的参照对象出现。）
To conclude, one can study security discourse to learn what referent objects are appealed to and can study outcomes to see which hold security legitimacy so an appeal to their necessary survival is able to mobilize support. Traditionally, the middle level has been the most fruitful generator of referent objects, but lately more has been heard about system- and microlevel possibilities (Rothschild 1995). Referent objects must establish security legitimacy in terms of a claim to survival. Bureaucracics, political regimes, and firms seldom hold this sense of guaranteed survival and thus are not usually classed as referent objects. Logically, they could try to establish a claim to survival and thus to security legitimacy, but empirically this is not usually possible. In practice, security is not totally subjective. There are socially defined limits to what can and cannot be securitized, although those limits can be changed. This means security analysis is interested mainly in successful instances of securitization-the cases in which other people follow the securitizing lead, creating a social, intersubjective constitution of a referent object on a mass scale. Unsuccessful or partially successful attempts at securitization are interesting primarily for the insights they offer into the stability of social attitudes toward security legitimacy, the process by which those attitudes are maintained or changed, and the possible future direction of security politics. In these larger patterns, desecuritization is at least as interesting as securitization, but the successful acts of securitization take a central place because they constitute the currently valid specific meaning of security. 总之，可以通过研究安全话语来了解诉诸的参照对象，并通过研究结果来观察哪些对象具有安全合法性，从而诉诸其生存的必要性以动员支持。传统上，中间层级是参照对象最富有成效的生成者，但最近关于系统层级和微观层级的可能性讨论增多了（Rothschild 1995）。参照对象必须以生存权利的主张来确立安全合法性。官僚机构、政治体制和企业很少具有这种生存保障感，因此通常不被归类为参照对象。从逻辑上讲，它们可以尝试确立生存权利，从而获得安全合法性，但从经验上看，这通常是不可能的。实际上，安全并非完全主观。社会上对什么可以被安全化、什么不可以被安全化有明确界限，尽管这些界限是可以改变的。这意味着安全分析主要关注安全化成功的实例——即其他人跟随安全化引导，在大规模上共同构建参照对象的社会性、主体间构成的案例。 失败或部分成功的安全化尝试主要因其对社会态度稳定性、安全合法性、这些态度维持或变化的过程以及安全政治未来可能方向的洞见而具有趣味性。在这些更大的模式中，去安全化至少和安全化一样有趣，但成功的安全化行为占据中心位置，因为它们构成了当前有效的安全具体含义。
Critics will undoubtedly protest our abdication of the critical use of objective security measures as a way to question dominant definitions (cf. MeSweeney 1996). When a threat is not securitized, should one not be able 批评者无疑会抗议我们放弃了客观安全衡量的批判性使用，作为质疑主导定义的一种方式（参见 MeSweeney 1996）。当威胁未被安全化时，难道不应该能够...
to show that this is a threat? Yes, the securitization perspective, which basically removes the objective ground from the dominant discourse, opens the possibility of problematizing both actual securitization and the absence of securitization, but it cannot do so by proving that something “is” a security problem-at least not without shifting from the role of analyst to securitizing actor. Thus, it is not advisable to add to our basic securitization perspective that there are also objective security problems (to hold against false securitizations and the lack thereof). Doing so would introduce an incompatible ontology that would ultimately undermine the basic idea of security as a specific social category that arises out of, and is constituted in, political practice. 要表明这是一个威胁吗？是的，安全化视角基本上消除了主导话语中的客观基础，开启了对实际安全化和安全化缺失两者进行问题化的可能性，但它无法通过证明某事“是”安全问题来做到这一点——至少不能在不从分析者角色转变为安全化行为者的情况下做到。因此，不建议在我们基本的安全化视角中加入也存在客观安全问题的观点（以对抗错误的安全化及其缺失）。这样做会引入一种不兼容的本体论，最终破坏安全作为一种特定社会范畴的基本理念，而这种范畴是从政治实践中产生并构成的。
What one can add are arguments about the likely effects. ^(9){ }^{9} One can try to show the effects of either excessive securitization-security dilemmasor of not securitizing-the inability to handle an issue effectively unless it is securitized. Only within society and by one’s own participation in political practice can one contribute to securitization or desecuritization, which is a different matter from the threat “being” a security problem. Things can be facilitators of securitization-it is made easier if one can point to matters associated with threats, but the ultimate locus of securityness is social rather than technical, and it is between a securitizing actor and its audience in reference to something they value. 可以补充的是关于可能影响的论点。人们可以尝试展示过度安全化——安全困境的影响，或者不进行安全化——除非将某个问题安全化，否则无法有效处理该问题的影响。只有在社会内部并通过自身参与政治实践，才能促成安全化或去安全化，这与威胁“本身”是否构成安全问题是不同的。事物可以成为安全化的促进因素——如果能够指出与威胁相关的事项，安全化会更容易实现，但安全性的最终所在是社会性的，而非技术性的，它存在于安全化行为者与其受众之间，且涉及他们所重视的事物。
A securitizing actor is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act. Common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups. These actors are not usually the referent objects for security, because only rarely can they speak security through reference to the need to defend their own survival. Their argument will normally be that it is necessary to defend the security of the state, nation, civilization, or some other larger community, principle, or system. Only occasionally will actors such as governments or firms be able to speak successfully of security on their own behalf. 安全化行为者是指执行安全言语行为的个人或团体。常见的角色包括政治领导人、官僚机构、政府、游说者和压力团体。这些行为者通常不是安全的指涉对象，因为他们很少能通过强调自身生存的必要性来表达安全。他们的论点通常是必须捍卫国家、民族、文明或其他更大社区、原则或体系的安全。只有在少数情况下，像政府或企业这样的行为者才能成功地代表自身发声谈论安全。
The notion of an “actor” is in itself problematic. To say precisely who or what acts is always tricky, because one can disaggregate any collective into subunits and on down to individuals and say, “It is not really 'the state” that acts but some particular department-or in the last instance individuals." But to disaggregate everything into individuals is not very helpful, because much of social life is understandable only when collectivities are seen as more than the sum of their “members” and are treated as social realities (methodological collectivism). “行为者”这一概念本身就是有问题的。准确地说谁或什么在行动总是很棘手，因为可以将任何集体拆分成子单元，甚至拆分到个人，并说，“真正行动的不是‘国家’，而是某个特定部门——或者最终是个人。”但将一切拆分到个人层面并不十分有用，因为只有当集体被视为超过其“成员”总和的社会现实，并作为社会现实对待时（方法论上的集体主义），社会生活的许多方面才是可以理解的。
Identilying actors is thus more complicated than identifying referent objects. The former involves a level-of-analysis problem: The same event can be attributed 10 dilferent levels (individual, bureaucracy, or state, for instance). Unlike tie case with the referent object, a speech act is often not self-defining inl terms of whor or what speaks, and the designation “actor” is thus in some sense abilatry. Ulimately, individuals can always be said to 因此，识别行为者比识别参照对象更为复杂。前者涉及分析层次的问题：同一事件可以归因于不同的层次（例如个人、官僚机构或国家）。与参照对象的情况不同，言语行为往往在“谁”或“什么”发声方面并不自我定义，因此“行为者”这一称谓在某种意义上是任意的。最终，总是可以说个人是...
be the actors, but if they are locked into strong roles it is usually more relevant to see as the “speaker” the collectivities for which individuals are designated authoritative representatives (e.g., parties, states, or pressure groups)-for example, France-materialized-as-de Gaulle rather than the person de Gaulle. If one wants to downgrade the role of the analyst in defining actors, one option is to let other actors settle the matter. Other states treated de Gaulle as acting on behalf of France and held France responsible for his acts; thus, in the world of “diplomatics” France was constituted as the actor (Manning 1962; Wæver forthcoming-c). How to identify the securitizing actor is in the last instance less a question of who performs the speech than of what logic shapes the action. Is it an action according to individual logic or organizational logic, and is the individual or the organization generally held responsible by other actors? Focusing on the organizational logic of the speech act is probably the best way to identify who or what is the securitizing actor. 他们是行为者，但如果他们被锁定在强烈的角色中，通常更相关的是将“发言者”视为那些个人被指定为权威代表的集体（例如，政党、国家或压力团体）——例如，法国-体现为-戴高乐，而不是个人戴高乐。如果想降低分析者在定义行为者中的作用，一种选择是让其他行为者来解决这个问题。其他国家将戴高乐视为代表法国行事，并认为法国对他的行为负责；因此，在“外交学”的世界中，法国被构成作为行为者（Manning 1962；Wæver 即将出版-c）。如何识别安全化行为者，归根结底不是谁发表了言论的问题，而是何种逻辑塑造了行动。是根据个人逻辑还是组织逻辑的行动，其他行为者通常认为是个人还是组织负责？关注言语行为的组织逻辑可能是识别谁或什么是安全化行为者的最佳方式。
The difference between actor and referent object in any specific case will also usually mean there is a separate category of “audience,” those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issue. One danger of the phrases securitization and speech act is that too much focus can be placed on the acting side, thus privileging the powerful while marginalizing those who are the audience and judge of the act (Huysmans 1996). 在任何具体情况下，行为者和指称对象之间的区别通常也意味着存在一个单独的“受众”类别，即安全化行为试图说服其接受因某些问题的特定安全性质而采取的特殊程序的人群。术语“安全化”和“言语行为”的一个危险在于，过多关注行为方，从而使权力者获得特权，而边缘化那些作为行为受众和评判者的人（Huysmans 1996）。
One use of the distinction between actors and referent objects is to avoid reifying some security units-for example, nations. When we say in the chapter on societal security (and in Wæver et al. 1993) that societal security is often about nations and their survival, we do not want to say that “a nation acts to defend itself,” which would represent reifying and anthropomorphic terminology. Someone-some group, movement, party, or elite-acts with reference to the nation and claims to speak or act on behalf of the nation. 行为者与指称对象之间区分的一个用途是避免将某些安全单位实体化——例如，国家。当我们在社会安全章节（以及 Wæver 等人 1993 年）中说社会安全通常关乎国家及其生存时，我们并不想说“一个国家为自我防卫而行动”，这将代表实体化和拟人化的术语。某个人——某个群体、运动、政党或精英——以国家为参照进行行动，并声称代表国家发言或行动。
The distinction between securitizing actor and referent object is less of a problem in the context of the state and therefore has not previously been clearly noted. The state (usually) has explicit rules regarding who can speak on its behalf, so when a government says “we have to defend our national security,” it has the right to act on behalf of the state. The government ii is the state in this respect. No such formal rules of representation exist for nations or the environment; consequently, the problem of legitimacy is larger in these areas than in the case of the state. When someone acts in the name of a nation, certain discursive rules are imposed on the actor, because he or she has to speak in terms of identity, in terms that follow the logic of “nation,” and these terms shape the discourse and action in a way that differs from that appropriate to other referent objects. But only in the weakest sense does this mean the nation is “acting.” The rules for what one can do in the name of a nation are less rigid than those for a state; therefore, it will 在国家的语境中，安全化行为者与参照对象之间的区分问题较小，因此以前并未被明确指出。国家（通常）有明确的规则规定谁可以代表其发言，所以当政府说“我们必须捍卫我们的国家安全”时，它有权代表国家采取行动。在这方面，政府就是国家。对于民族或环境，则不存在这样的正式代表规则；因此，在这些领域中，合法性问题比国家的情况更为突出。当某人以民族的名义行事时，某些话语规则会强加给行为者，因为他或她必须以身份的角度发言，使用符合“民族”逻辑的术语，这些术语塑造了话语和行动，其方式不同于适用于其他参照对象的方式。但这仅在最弱的意义上意味着民族在“行动”。以民族名义所能做的事情的规则不如国家的规则严格；因此，它将会…
be easier to talk of the state acting than of the nation doing so. This is a matter of degree rather than necessarily a qualitative difference. Consequently, the analyst who writes about a fringe neo-Nazi group that tries to mobilize people to defend “our national survival” against the threat posed by immigrants will feel uncomfortable phrasing this as “the nation acting,” It feels more correct to make the distinction between who actually does the acting and what those actors are referring to as that which should survive and then see how successful they are in asserting a claim to speak for that higher entity. 谈论国家的行为比谈论民族的行为更容易。这是程度上的差异，而不一定是质的区别。因此，分析者在写关于一个边缘的新纳粹组织试图动员人们捍卫“我们的民族生存”免受移民威胁时，会觉得用“民族行动”来表述不太合适。更正确的做法是区分实际行动者是谁，以及这些行动者所指的应当生存的对象，然后观察他们在代表那个更高实体发声的主张上有多成功。
These arguments show why it is important to distinguish between securitizing actors and referent objects. But the distinctions are contextual rather than intrinsic to specific units: In many cases, the securitizing actors will be different from the referent object, but in others-most notably the state-the referent object will in a sense speak for itself through its authorized representatives. In all cases, however, the analyst is obliged to question the success or failure of the securitizing speech act. Even governments can fail at securitization, as happened to Britain over the Suez, the United States in Vietnam, and the European Communist regimes domestically in the late 1980s. 这些论点说明了区分安全化行为者和参照对象的重要性。但这种区分是情境性的，而非特定单位固有的：在许多情况下，安全化行为者与参照对象是不同的，但在其他情况下——尤其是国家——参照对象在某种意义上通过其授权代表为自己发声。然而，在所有情况下，分析者都有义务质疑安全化言语行为的成功或失败。即使是政府也可能在安全化上失败，比如英国在苏伊士事件中、美国在越南战争中，以及欧洲共产主义政权在 20 世纪 80 年代末的国内情况。
In applying the distinction among referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors to the five sector chapters that follow, it is important first to clarify the referent object(s) in each sector. In some cases, this will constitute most of the exercise. To map societal security around the world, it is probably more interesting-and at least logically primary-to know where people are mobilized in the name of nations, civilizations, religions, or tribes than to know where mobilization is effected by political parties, where by state elites, where by social movements, where by churches, and where by intellectuals. In the military sector, the referent object may almost always be the state, and the securitizing actor may in some sense also be “the state,” but a number of functional actors may also influence decisions. If so, one would need to spend more space tracking down these functional actors. Thus, the sector chapters will vary in terms of the weight of analysis given to the three types of security unit. In an ideal situation-perhaps in more complete future case studies based on this approach-all three types will be covered fully, in particular the articulation of referent objects and securitizing actors. 在将指称对象、安全化行为者和功能行为者之间的区分应用于接下来的五个部门章节时，首先需要澄清每个部门中的指称对象。在某些情况下，这将构成大部分工作。为了绘制全球的社会安全图谱，了解人们以国家、文明、宗教或部落的名义动员的地点，可能比了解政治党派、国家精英、社会运动、教会和知识分子动员的地点更有趣——至少在逻辑上更为基础。在军事部门，指称对象几乎总是国家，安全化行为者在某种意义上也可能是“国家”，但许多功能行为者也可能影响决策。如果是这样，就需要花更多篇幅追踪这些功能行为者。因此，各部门章节在对这三种安全单位的分析权重上会有所不同。 在理想情况下——也许在基于这种方法的更完整的未来案例研究中——所有三种类型都会被充分涵盖，特别是指称对象和安全化行为者的表达。
Regions and Other Constellations of Securitization 地区与其他安全化星座
In the part of this work aimed at tracing security complexes, the approach is to look at the pattern of security connectedness. The investigation proceeds in three steps: (1) Is the issue securitized successfully by any actors? 在本部分旨在追踪安全复合体的工作中，方法是观察安全关联的模式。调查分三步进行：（1）该问题是否被任何行为者成功安全化？
(2) If yes, track the links and interactions from this instance–how does the security action in this case impinge on the security of others, and where does this then echo significantly? (3) These chains can then be collected as a cluster of interconnected security concerns. When this case along with the patterns from all of the other cases (of the sector in the case of homogeneous sector-specific analysis or across sectors in the case of heterogeneous security complex analysis; cf. Chapters 1 and 8 ) are aggregated, we can see the level on which the processes of securitization and the patterns of interaction are concentrated. （2）如果是，追踪这一实例的联系和互动——该案例中的安全行动如何影响他人的安全，以及这又在哪些地方产生显著回响？（3）然后可以将这些链条收集为一个相互关联的安全关切集群。当该案例连同所有其他案例的模式（在同质部门特定分析中为该部门案例，或在异质安全复合体分析中跨部门；参见第 1 章和第 8 章）被汇总时，我们可以看到安全化过程和互动模式集中的层面。
Our general assumption, and one of the key motivations for this project, is that the post-Cold War world will exhibit substantially higher levels of regionalization and lower levels of globalization than was the case during the Cold War. One of our purposes is to adapt security complex theory to deal with this more complicated world. In the sector chapters that follow, however, we keep this question open. It may be that the security logic of some sectors inherently inclines toward regionalization, whereas in other sectors it does not. This is what we need to investigate in these chapters. And we do so in basically the same way as is done in classical security complex theory: by combining the concerns of major actors into a constellation, a knot of mutual security relations. 我们的总体假设，也是本项目的主要动机之一，是冷战后世界将表现出比冷战时期更高水平的区域化和更低水平的全球化。我们的目的之一是调整安全复合体理论以应对这个更复杂的世界。然而，在接下来的各个领域章节中，我们对此问题保持开放态度。某些领域的安全逻辑可能本质上倾向于区域化，而其他领域则不然。这正是我们需要在这些章节中探讨的内容。我们基本上采用经典安全复合体理论中的方法：将主要行为体的关切结合成一个星座，即相互安全关系的结。
One final problem in thinking about security regions is how to tie such thinking into the discussion of actors and referent objects in the previous section. Is a security complex defined by actors or referent objects? As just argued, the security complex is actually a constellation of security concerns; the different instances of securitization as such form the nodes among which the lines can be drawn and the complex mapped. Because referent objects are the more basic, enduring, and salient features on the security landscape, the answer to our earlier question is the referent objects. Some might object that according to our scheme referent objects do not act and therefore cannot be the units in subsystems that are defined by interactions. This is an illusion. Security actors speak and act in the name of referent objects, and they generally see threats as emanating from other referent objects. There is thus a real sense in which India and Pakistan, Turkey and the Kurds, or Chile and ITT interact. 思考安全区域的最后一个问题是如何将这种思考与上一节中关于行为体和参照对象的讨论联系起来。安全复合体是由行为体还是参照对象定义的？正如刚才所论述的，安全复合体实际上是一组安全关切的星座；不同的安全化实例构成了节点，节点之间可以画线并绘制出复合体的图谱。由于参照对象是安全格局中更基本、持久且显著的特征，我们之前的问题的答案是参照对象。有人可能会反对，认为根据我们的方案，参照对象不具备行动能力，因此不能作为由互动定义的子系统中的单位。这是一种错觉。安全行为体以参照对象的名义发言和行动，他们通常将威胁视为来自其他参照对象。因此，印度与巴基斯坦、土耳其与库尔德人，或智利与 ITT 之间确实存在某种意义上的互动。
Since referent objects are the socially constituted units, they are often actors for each other, even if some analytical theories point to other links in the chains as the actors. For instance, states are to some extent real as states and they act as states even if the literal acting is done by statesmen, because states ascribe intentions and responsibility to each other as states (Manning 1962; Wæver forthcoming-c). This reflection is structured by the motivation of security complex analysis, which is to reach a dynamic analysis of security situations. We want to be able to grasp the connections between the security of AA and that of BB, the security dilemmas as well as mulually rein- 由于参照对象是社会构成的单位，它们常常彼此作为行动者，即使一些分析理论指出链条中的其他环节是行动者。例如，国家在某种程度上作为国家是真实存在的，并且它们以国家的身份行动，即使实际的行动是由政治家完成的，因为国家相互赋予意图和责任（Manning 1962；Wæver 即将出版-c）。这种反思由安全复合体分析的动机构成，其目的是实现对安全形势的动态分析。我们希望能够把握 与 的安全之间的联系、安全困境以及相互强化的安全循环。
forcing security loops. Therefore, it is essential that we organize the regional analysis around nodes that are simultaneously that which is (claimed to be) threatened and that which is (depicted as) the source of threat. 因此，至关重要的是我们围绕那些既是（被声称为）受到威胁的对象，又是（被描绘为）威胁源的节点来组织区域分析。
In classical security complex theory (CSCT), the definition was phrased in terms of primary security concerns; in the current framework, it must be instances of securitization that connect and form the complex. In both cases, the core is obviously the articulation of threats by the major actors. Unfortunately, there is little conceptual literature on threats. In discussions of the concept of security, some participants claim an actor-based threat is a precondition for something to be a security problem (Deudney 1990). It is difficult to see what justifies this as a logical step, although it could be an empirical connection, a structural proclivity making threats attributed to actors more easy to securitize. We do not, however, want to define security problems such that actors have to be the problem. Probably, they usually are. 在经典安全复合体理论（CSCT）中，定义是以主要安全关切为表述；而在当前框架中，必须是安全化的实例将其连接并形成复合体。在这两种情况下，核心显然是主要行为者对威胁的表达。不幸的是，关于威胁的概念性文献很少。在关于安全概念的讨论中，一些参与者声称基于行为者的威胁是某事成为安全问题的前提条件（Deudney 1990）。虽然这可能是一种经验上的联系，是一种结构性倾向使得归因于行为者的威胁更容易被安全化，但很难看出这作为逻辑步骤的正当性。然而，我们并不想将安全问题定义为必须是行为者的问题。可能它们通常确实是。
It follows from our general securitization perspective that what interests us is the attribution of security problems to specific sources rather than the actual origins of what appear as security problems. As argued by attribution theory, there is a general psychological tendency to overestimate the degree of choice for alter while emphasizing necessity as to ego (Hart 1978; Jervis 1976). One will therefore gencrally tend to “actorize” the other side-that is, fashion the other as a willful chooser rather than a chain in a series of events. In most cases, the fact that the other is a strategic actor with several choices is an amplifying factor in any threat perception and therefore assists in pushing an issue across the security threshold. Because the other is an actor, not just a wheel in a machine, it has the potential of outwitting us, of having intentions, or of bending or suppressing our will to replace it with its own (cf. Clausewitz 1983 [1832]; Wæver 1995b). 根据我们的一般安全化视角，我们关注的是将安全问题归因于特定来源，而不是那些看似安全问题的实际起因。正如归因理论所论述的，人们普遍存在一种心理倾向，即高估他者的选择自由度，同时强调自我行为的必然性（Hart 1978；Jervis 1976）。因此，人们通常倾向于“行为者化”对方——即将对方塑造成一个有意志的选择者，而非一系列事件中的一个环节。在大多数情况下，对方作为一个具有多种选择的战略行为者这一事实，是威胁感知的放大因素，因此有助于推动某一议题跨越安全门槛。因为对方是一个行为者，而不仅仅是机器中的一个齿轮，它有可能智胜我们，拥有意图，或弯曲或压制我们的意志，以用其自身意志取代我们的意志（参见 Clausewitz 1983 [1832]；Wæver 1995b）。
This focus on actors could seem to point to securitizing actors rather than to referent objects. This deduction, however, is probably false. What the attribution argument implies is not that we should focus on those units we see as actors but rather that whatever is presented as the cause of security problems is most likely also actorized. If securitizing actor “a” on behalf of community “A” claims A is threatened by B\mathbf{B}, he or she will present B\mathbf{B} as an actor, as responsible for the threat, as an agent who had a choice. Therefore, we do not have to define security complexes in terms of what we have labeled actors in our analytical framework: The actors might operate with other actors and thereby point to the bigger, more abstract cate-gories-the referent objects. On the other hand, threats do not need to be attributed to the same categories as those the other side acted with reference to. Actual events are likely to be varied and complex, requiring a pragmatic approach that allows us to find the specific units of the case. 这种对行为者的关注似乎指向了安全化行为者，而非指涉对象。然而，这种推断很可能是错误的。归因论证所暗示的并不是我们应该关注那些我们视为行为者的单位，而是无论什么被呈现为安全问题的原因，很可能也被行为者化了。如果代表社区“A”的安全化行为者“a”声称 A 受到威胁，他或她将把威胁对象呈现为一个行为者，作为威胁的责任者，作为一个有选择权的代理人。因此，我们不必用我们分析框架中标记为行为者的单位来定义安全复合体：这些行为者可能与其他行为者一起行动，从而指向更大、更抽象的类别——指涉对象。另一方面，威胁不需要归因于与对方所参考的类别相同的类别。实际事件可能多样且复杂，需要一种务实的方法，使我们能够找到具体的案例单位。
For instance, Churchill as a securitizing actor could have securitized Nazism as a threan. This does not necessarily mean a countersecuritization 例如，丘吉尔作为一个安全化行为者，可能将纳粹主义安全化为一种威胁。这并不一定意味着反安全化。
is performed either by Nazism as actor or with Nazism as referent object. Instead, Hitler could securitize England (the referent object of Churchill, so far so good) as the threat in the name of Germany, all Germans, and the Aryan race. What constitutes the threat for one is not necessarily the referent object for the other. This procedure was much easier in CSCT where security was conducted for and by India, which was also the (perceived) threat to Pakistan and vice versa. The argument from attribution theory gives us reason to believe that most threats will be linked to actors and that what we analyze as referent objects will often be constructed by other actors as actors. If, however, one draws the map too finely, a number of actors will be securitizing slightly different referent objects (the German race, the German people, Germany, Aryans)-differences that are important when one is trying to look into the politics of securitizing moveswhereas we in security complex analysis need to find the main patterns of interaction and therefore need to bundle together the various versions of securitizing “Germany” as one node. 要么由纳粹主义作为行动者执行，要么以纳粹主义作为指涉对象执行。相反，希特勒可以以德国、所有德国人和雅利安种族的名义，将英格兰（丘吉尔的指涉对象，到目前为止还好）作为威胁进行安全化。对一个人构成威胁的事物不一定是另一个人的指涉对象。在 CSCT 中，这一过程要容易得多，因为安全是由印度为自己和由印度进行的，而印度同时也是巴基斯坦的（感知的）威胁，反之亦然。归因理论的论点使我们有理由相信，大多数威胁将与行动者相关联，而我们分析为指涉对象的东西往往会被其他行动者构建为行动者。然而，如果绘制地图过于细致，许多行动者将对稍有不同的指涉对象（德国种族、德国人民、德国、雅利安人）进行安全化——这些差异在试图研究安全化行动的政治时非常重要，而在安全复合体分析中，我们需要找到主要的互动模式，因此需要将各种版本的安全化“德国”捆绑为一个节点。
When generating the security complex, the best way to define the points between which the security arrows go might be to point to conglomerates of a referent object and the corresponding securitizing actor. In the extreme case, this means we have referent objects with stable spokespersons. A stable combination of referent object and “voice” points to the classical concept of the state as a clear instance. But even the state and sovereignty as referent object is appealed to by other than the one official voice. There are several actual securitizing actors, and the state as well as the other actors occasionally securitize other referents, such as the nation, the European Union (EU), or some principles of international society. In the case of France, Japan, and Sudan, the name makes a relatively clear reference to a dense network of correlated referent objects and securitizing actors. The different securitizing actors are connected by competing for the representation of the same referent object; the different referent objects are unified by their mutual substitutability for each other. There is more a chain of family resemblances than a clear-cut criterion or one primary unit. In each case, a conglomerate of actors and referent objects is unified by the density of overlapping security discourse and usually also nominally by a name: the security of “France” (which can mean several different referent objects and a large number of possible actors), of Europe and the EU, and of “the environment.” (See the further discussion on pp. 171-175.) 在生成安全复合体时，定义安全箭头所指向的点之间的最佳方式可能是指向指称对象的集合体及相应的安全化行为者。在极端情况下，这意味着我们拥有具有稳定发言人的指称对象。指称对象与“声音”的稳定组合指向国家这一经典概念，作为一个明确的实例。但即使是国家和主权作为指称对象，也不仅仅由唯一的官方声音来诉求。实际上存在多个安全化行为者，国家以及其他行为者偶尔也会对其他指称对象进行安全化，例如民族、欧盟（EU）或国际社会的一些原则。在法国、日本和苏丹的案例中，名称相对明确地指向一个密集的相关指称对象和安全化行为者网络。不同的安全化行为者通过争夺同一指称对象的代表权而相互联系；不同的指称对象则通过它们彼此的相互替代性而统一。这里更多的是一系列家族相似性链条，而非明确的标准或单一的主要单位。 在每种情况下，一群行为者和参照对象通过重叠的安全话语的密度而统一，通常也名义上由一个名称统一：如“法国”的安全（这可以指几个不同的参照对象和大量可能的行为者）、欧洲和欧盟的安全，以及“环境”的安全。（参见第 171-175 页的进一步讨论。）
The key question in security analysis is, who can “do” security in the name of what? For a time, experts could get away with analyzing only “states,” and the system was then the sum of the states. Regional security meant the sum of national securities or rather a particular constellation of security interdependence among a group of states. The approach developed here offers more types of units to choose from, but the basic idea of securjty complexes can be carried over into a world of multiple units. 安全分析中的关键问题是，谁可以以什么名义“实施”安全？曾几何时，专家们只分析“国家”，系统就是国家的总和。区域安全意味着国家安全的总和，或者说是一组国家之间特定的安全相互依赖的星座。这里提出的方法提供了更多类型的单位可供选择，但安全复合体的基本理念可以延续到多单位的世界中。
Notes 注释
The history of the word security is complex (Kaufmann 1970; Der Derian 1993; Delumeau 1986; Corze 1984), but in the 1940s it was established in international affairs with a fairly distinct meaning (Rosenberg 1993). Much of this meaning was so easily installed because it rested on an old argument that had used the word security much less systematically-an argument about “necessity” previously contained primarily in the concept of raison d’état (Butterfield 1975). Especially from the mid-nineteenth century, when the state enters a juridical self-limitation and self-control, this “is balanced by the designation of a range of ‘governmental acts’ which are immune to legal challenge. This juridical reserve area of executive power is . . . the qualification which . . . calculations of security impose as a condition for the political feasibility of a liberal democracy” (Gordon 1991: 33; cf. Foucault 1991 [1978]). The classical argument, which holds that in extreme cases the government can use all means necessary, becomes concentrated as a specific, exceptional case (Wæver 1988, 1995b). This meaning of security evolved separately from the use of security in various domestic contexts (although connections definitely exist; see Kaufman 1970). This international type of security starts to spread to new referents and new actors; therefore, we want to retain a focus on international security because it has a distinct meaning, but we do not exclude the possibility that we will meet this kind of security increasingly in domestic contexts. “security”一词的历史复杂（Kaufmann 1970；Der Derian 1993；Delumeau 1986；Corze 1984），但在 20 世纪 40 年代，它在国际事务中确立了一个相当明确的含义（Rosenberg 1993）。这一含义之所以能如此轻易地确立，是因为它基于一个较早的论点，该论点较少系统地使用“security”一词——这是一个关于“必要性”的论点，之前主要包含在 raison d’état 的概念中（Butterfield 1975）。尤其是从 19 世纪中叶开始，当国家进入法律上的自我限制和自我控制时，“这被一系列‘政府行为’的指定所平衡，这些行为免于法律挑战。行政权力的这一法律保留区……是……安全计算作为自由民主政治可行性的条件所施加的限定”（Gordon 1991:33；参见 Foucault 1991 [1978]）。经典论点认为，在极端情况下，政府可以使用一切必要手段，这一论点被集中为一个具体的、例外的情况（Wæver 1988, 1995b）。 安全的这一含义是独立于安全在各种国内语境中的使用而发展的（尽管确实存在联系；参见 Kaufman 1970）。这种国际类型的安全开始扩展到新的指称对象和新的行为者；因此，我们希望保持对国际安全的关注，因为它具有独特的含义，但我们并不排除在国内语境中越来越多地遇到这种安全的可能性。
This argument does not imply that private issues could not in some sense be political, an argument made forcefully by feminists. To claim such is a politicizing move. 这一论点并不意味着私人问题在某种意义上不能是政治性的，这一论点被女权主义者有力地提出。声称如此是一种政治化的举动。
The concept of strong and weak states is elaborated and defined in Buzan (1991: 96-107) and rests on the degree of sociopolitical cohesion within the state, which is high for strong states and low for weak ones. The concept should not be confused with the distinction between strong and weak powers, which is about their capabilities vis-à-vis other powers. 强国和弱国的概念在 Buzan（1991：96-107）中进行了阐述和定义，基于国家内部社会政治凝聚力的程度，强国的凝聚力高，弱国的凝聚力低。该概念不应与强权和弱权的区分混淆，后者是关于它们相对于其他大国的能力。
Baldwin (1997) is the most sophisticated and consistent attempt to define security and to structure security studies according to the idea that the purpose and task is to assist decisionmakers in correctly assessing the relative attention to devote to different threats. 鲍德温（1997）是最为复杂且一致的尝试，旨在定义安全并根据这样一个理念来构建安全研究：其目的和任务是帮助决策者正确评估应给予不同威胁的相对关注度。
The importance of “cultural capital” to the ability to perform a speech act has been argued by Pierre Bourdieu (1991 [1982]). A speech act is not only linguistic; it is also social and is dependent on the social position of the enunciator and thus in a wider sense is inscribed in a social field. However, Bourdieu made this argument to counter a tendency of some poststructuralists and philosophers of everyday language to make the purely linguistic, internal features of a speech act completely determining (Bourdieu 1996). He has accepted the critique by Judith Butler (1996a, b) that since the speech act needs to include an idea of-with his own phrase-the “social magic” whereby some are accepted as holding authority and others are not, it has to be indeterminate, open for surprises. This is not purely a question of a formal position of authority (Austin’s example in which “I declare you man and wife” is an effective speech act only when performed by a properly authorized authority; 1975 |1962]: 8-158-15 ). There is a performative force to the speech act; to use Bourdicu’s own concepts, it has a magical efficiency, it makes what it says. A speech act is interesting exactly because it holds the insurrecting potential to break the ordinary, to establish meaming that is not already within the context-it reworks or produces a conlext ly the performative success of the act. Although it is important to study the social conditions of suceessful speech acts, it is necessary always to keep open the possibility that ill ate that had previously succeeded and for which the formal resenrees and position ane in place may fail and, conversely, that new 皮埃尔·布迪厄（Pierre Bourdieu，1991 [1982]）论证了“文化资本”对执行言语行为能力的重要性。言语行为不仅是语言的；它也是社会的，依赖于发话者的社会地位，因此在更广泛的意义上，它被铭刻在一个社会场域中。然而，布迪厄提出这一论点是为了反驳一些后结构主义者和日常语言哲学家将言语行为的纯语言、内部特征视为完全决定性的倾向（布迪厄 1996）。他接受了朱迪思·巴特勒（Judith Butler，1996a, b）的批评，即由于言语行为需要包含一个他自己用语称之为“社会魔力”的概念，即某些人被接受为拥有权威而其他人则不被接受，因此它必须是不确定的，开放于意外。这不仅仅是权威的正式地位问题（奥斯汀的例子中，“我宣布你们为夫妻”只有在由正式授权的权威执行时才是有效的言语行为；1975 |1962]）。言语行为具有施为力；用布迪厄自己的概念来说，它具有魔法般的效力，它使所说的成为现实。 言语行为之所以有趣，正是因为它具有打破常规的潜力，能够建立不在既有语境中的意义——它通过行为的施为成功重新构建或产生语境。虽然研究成功言语行为的社会条件很重要，但始终有必要保持开放的可能性，即先前成功且形式要件和位置已到位的言语行为可能会失败，反之亦然，新
actors can perform a speech act they had previously not been expected to perform (Butler 1996a, b; Derrida 1977a [1972], 1977b, 1988). Therefore, the issues of “who can do security” and “was this a case of securitization” can ultimately be judged only in hindsight (Wæver et al. 1993: 188). They cannot be closed off by finite criteria for success. 行为者可以执行他们之前未被预期执行的言语行为（Butler 1996a, b；Derrida 1977a [1972], 1977b, 1988）。因此，“谁能进行安全行动”以及“这是否是安全化的案例”这些问题最终只能事后判断（Wæver 等，1993：188）。它们不能被有限的成功标准所封闭。
This stands in contrast to some other studies of regions where one is interested in the construction of regions by actors (Neumann 1994; Joenniemi and Wæver 1992; Joenniemi 1997). Both approaches to regions are relevant, but for different purposes. 这与一些关注行为者构建区域的研究形成对比（Neumann 1994；Joenniemi 和 Wæver 1992；Joenniemi 1997）。这两种区域研究方法都是相关的，但目的不同。
For those interested in pinpointing our position within the field of international relations theory, this is probably the passage to pick. We do not take the state or sovereignty as representing fixed limits, but we are skeptical of individualism as the traditional alternative to state centrism. We therefore form a picture of a world of multiple units, which might be called postsovereign realism. The units can be overlapping (in contrast to the exclusivity of sovereign territorial states), but this does not necessarily lead to any benign transnationalism in which the focus is on the multiple identities of individuals relativizing all units and collectivities. Although each individual in a world of overlapping units is a “member” of several units, instead of focusing on any such softening effects produced by overlap, we study how the units can continue to conduct power politics; think, for example, of the work of Susan Strange (state-firm diplomacy; 1994) and Robert Kaplan (a very anarchic anarchy after sovereignty; 1994). Each unit has a possibility of becoming the reference for security action, but since the different units overlap and are placed at different levels, there is no fixed line between domestic and international-what is internal to one unit can be interunit when one thinks of other units. More importantly a distinction exists between individual and collective security. This argument is important for the present project, because if domestic and international were fixed, there would be a risk of generating a cozy Western view of politics: Domestic politics is normal and without security, whereas the extreme is relegated to the international space. In other parts of the world, domestic is not cozy. This fact can be grasped by focusing on those units and collectivities that are mobilized in such contexts: These domestic security relations are interunit because in these places the most powerful referent objects are smaller than the state. 对于那些有兴趣确定我们在国际关系理论领域中位置的人来说，这可能是最值得选择的段落。我们不认为国家或主权代表固定的界限，但我们对作为国家中心主义传统替代方案的个人主义持怀疑态度。因此，我们形成了一个多元单位的世界图景，可以称之为后主权现实主义。这些单位可以重叠（与主权领土国家的排他性相反），但这不一定导致任何以个体多重身份为焦点、相对化所有单位和集体的良性跨国主义。尽管在一个重叠单位的世界中，每个个体都是多个单位的“成员”，我们并不关注重叠所产生的任何此类软化效应，而是研究这些单位如何继续进行权力政治；例如，可以参考 Susan Strange 的工作（国家-企业外交；1994 年）和 Robert Kaplan 的工作（主权之后的极度无政府状态；1994 年）。 每个单位都有可能成为安全行动的参照对象，但由于不同单位相互重叠且处于不同层级，国内与国际之间没有固定界限——对一个单位来说是内部的事，对考虑其他单位时则可能是跨单位的。更重要的是，个体安全与集体安全之间存在区别。这个论点对当前项目很重要，因为如果国内与国际是固定的，就有可能产生一种舒适的西方政治观：国内政治是正常且无安全问题的，而极端情况则被归入国际领域。在世界其他地区，国内并不舒适。通过关注在此类背景下动员的那些单位和集体，可以理解这一事实：这些国内安全关系是跨单位的，因为在这些地方，最强大的参照对象比国家还小。
One can contemplate cases in which concern seems to focus on a particular individual: one girl in Sarajevo or Salman Rushdie. To a large extent, these individuals are given such prominence and more resources are spent on them than on most others because they are taken to represent principles. Action for some specific individual always depends on a construction of that person as representing some category, as deserving protection because he or she belongs to a particular social cate-gory-for example, leader, representative, free intellectual, or revealing test case. 人们可以考虑一些关注点似乎集中在某个特定个人的情况：比如萨拉热窝的一个女孩或萨尔曼·鲁西迪。在很大程度上，这些个人之所以被赋予如此显著的地位，并且在他们身上投入的资源超过大多数其他人，是因为他们被视为代表某些原则。对某个具体个人的行动总是依赖于将该人构建为代表某一类别，认为他或她应当受到保护，因为他或她属于某个特定的社会类别——例如，领导者、代表、自由知识分子或具有启示性的试验案例。
The analyst can also intervene to countersay actors in relation to the use of the word security. Sloppy talk of “economic security” or “environmental security” can be questioned by arguing that the security act has not really been performed and that the securitizing actor has not managed to establish a case for treating the threat as existential. Whether the threat really is or is not existential in relation to the referent object is impossible to decide from the outside, but we can study the discourse and see if the issue has been securitized in this sense. This is primarily an intervention into the debate among observers over the appropriateness of the use of the security label. When intervening in direct policy debates over a securitization, the mode of argumentation will typically be in terms of comparing the likely effects of having the issue securitized or desecuritized. 分析者还可以介入，反驳有关“安全”一词使用的行为者。对“经济安全”或“环境安全”的草率谈论可以通过争辩安全行为实际上并未真正执行，以及安全化行为者未能建立将威胁视为生存性威胁的理由来质疑。威胁是否真的对指称对象构成生存性威胁，从外部无法判断，但我们可以研究话语，看看该问题是否已在此意义上被安全化。这主要是对观察者之间关于安全标签使用适当性的辩论的介入。在直接介入有关安全化的政策辩论时，论证方式通常是比较将该问题安全化或去安全化可能产生的影响。
CHAPTER 3 第三章
The Military Sector 军事领域
The Military Security Agenda 军事安全议程
This chapter covers the core subject of traditional security studies, and we hope to show how the method unfolded in Chapter 2 allows us both to incorporate that agenda and to add some new insights. The military sector is the one in which the process of securitization is most likely to be highly institutionalized. This is not necessarily so, but it reflects the particular historical condition of the contemporary international system. It is also worth noting that, contrary to the traditionalist position, not everything in the military sector is necessarily about security. Given the criteria for securitization set out in Chapter 2, it is easy to see that for some states an increasing number of military functions are not security issues at all. In the mid1990s, most Western European states face little in the way of existential military threats. But they maintain substantial armed forces and often use those forces in roles that have much more to do with political and economic relations than with military ones. If Danish or Japanese troops participate in peacekeeping organizations ( PKOs ) in Africa, this has nothing to do with existential threats to Denmark or Japan and everything to do with the normal politics of those countries’ international roles. For states living in security communities, rather substantial parts of their military activities may fall into the political rather than the security sphere. 本章涵盖了传统安全研究的核心主题，我们希望展示第二章中展开的方法如何既能纳入该议程，又能带来一些新的见解。军事领域是安全化过程最有可能高度制度化的领域。这并非必然如此，但反映了当代国际体系的特定历史状况。同样值得注意的是，与传统主义立场相反，军事领域中的一切并不一定都与安全有关。根据第二章中提出的安全化标准，很容易看出，对于一些国家来说，越来越多的军事职能根本不是安全问题。20 世纪 90 年代中期，大多数西欧国家几乎没有存在性的军事威胁。但它们维持着大量武装力量，并且经常将这些力量用于更多与政治和经济关系相关的角色，而非军事角色。 如果丹麦或日本军队参与非洲的维和组织（PKO），这与丹麦或日本面临的生存威胁无关，而完全与这些国家国际角色的正常政治有关。对于生活在安全共同体中的国家来说，其军事活动中相当大一部分可能属于政治领域，而非安全领域。
In the military sector, the state is still the most important-but not the only-referent object, and the ruling elites of states are the most impor-tant-but not the only-securitizing actors. This situation exists not only because states generally command far greater military resources than other actors but also because governing elites have evolved legally and politically as the prime claimants of the legitimate right to use force both inside and outside their domain. 在军事领域，国家仍然是最重要的——但不是唯一的——参照对象，国家的统治精英是最重要的——但不是唯一的——安全化行为者。这种情况存在不仅因为国家通常掌握比其他行为者更多的军事资源，还因为统治精英在法律和政治上已经发展成为在其领域内外使用武力的合法权利的主要主张者。
The modern state is defined by the idea of sovereignty-the claim of exclusive right to self-government over a specified territory and its population. Because force is particularly effective as a way of acquiring and controlling territory, the fundamentally territorial nature of the state underpins the traditional primacy of its concern with the use of force. Throughout his- 现代国家的定义基于主权的理念——即对特定领土及其人口拥有排他性自治权的主张。由于武力作为获取和控制领土的手段特别有效，国家根本上的领土性质支撑了其对武力使用的传统优先关注。贯穿其-
tory, the right to govern has been established by the capability to assert and defend that claim against armed challengers from within and without. The agenda of military security is thus focused largely around states, although as is shown later other referent objects and securitizing actors are also in play. The main exception to this rule occurs when the state itself either fails to take root or spirals into disintegration. This situation can lead to prolonged periods of primal anarchy, as is currently the case in Afghanistan and various parts of Africa, in which the state is only a shadow and reality is one of rival warlords and gangs. 历史，统治权的确立依赖于能够对内外武装挑战者主张并捍卫该权利的能力。因此，军事安全议程主要围绕国家展开，尽管如后文所示，其他参照对象和安全化行为者也在发挥作用。该规则的主要例外情况发生在国家本身未能扎根或陷入解体螺旋时。这种情况可能导致长期的原始无政府状态，正如当前阿富汗和非洲部分地区的情况，国家仅是一个影子，现实则是各方军阀和帮派的纷争。
Military security matters arise primarily out of the internal and external processes by which human communities establish and maintain (or fail to maintain) machineries of government. The process of government is, of course, about much more than the use of force. The terms and conditions of political legitimacy, and the extent to which those terms are accepted both between rulers and ruled and among different sets of rulers, are at least as important as military considerations. In practice, the military security agenda revolves largely around the ability of governments to maintain themselves against internal and external military threats, but it can also involve the use of military power to defend states or governments against nonmilitary threats to their existence, such as migrants or rival ideologies. 军事安全问题主要源于人类社会内部和外部的过程，这些过程决定了社会如何建立和维持（或未能维持）政府机制。政府过程当然不仅仅关乎武力的使用。政治合法性的条款和条件，以及这些条款在统治者与被统治者之间以及不同统治者群体之间被接受的程度，至少与军事因素同样重要。实际上，军事安全议程主要围绕政府抵御内部和外部军事威胁的能力展开，但它也可能涉及使用军事力量来防御非军事威胁对国家或政府存在的威胁，例如移民或竞争意识形态。
Although the political and military sectors are conceptually distinct, the partial interchangeability of force and consent in the process of government links them together. Like the state itself, this linkage must face in two directions: inward, into the domestic construction and life of the state, and outward, to its position in and relation to the other members of the international system. Threats against which military responses may be effective can arise either inside or outside the state-or sometimes, as in the case of “fifth columns,” both. The securitization of such threats may reflect a genuine fear of attack (e.g., South Korean perceptions of the North), a desire by ruling elites to consolidate their domestic and international legitimacy (e.g., apartheid, South Africa’s anticommunism), or both. The amity-enmity component of security complex theory reflects the outcomes of these securitization processes. 尽管政治和军事领域在概念上是不同的，但在政府运作过程中，武力与同意的部分可互换性将它们联系在一起。像国家本身一样，这种联系必须面向两个方向：向内，进入国家的国内构建和生活；向外，面向其在国际体系中其他成员的位置和关系。可能引发军事反应有效的威胁既可能来自国家内部，也可能来自外部——有时，如“第五纵队”的情况，两者兼有。这类威胁的安全化可能反映了对攻击的真实恐惧（例如，韩国对北方的看法）、统治精英巩固其国内外合法性的愿望（例如，南非的种族隔离和反共主义），或两者兼有。安全复合体理论中的友敌成分反映了这些安全化过程的结果。
Among the principal domestic functions of government are the maintenance of civil order and peace, as well as administration and law. The maintenance of the territorial integrity of the state might be added, but territory is not always securitized, and on occasion governments freely negotiate substantial reorganizations, as in the recent splittings up of Czechoslovakia and the former Soviet Union. When the perceived threat is internal, military security is primarily about the ability of the ruling elite to maintain civil peace, territorial integrity, and, more controversially, the machinery of government in the fice of chatlenges from its citizens (Ayoob 1995). The typical forms of such challenges are militant separatist, revolutionary, terrorist, or criminal ogamizalions or movements, although some governments also 政府的主要国内职能之一是维护社会秩序与和平，以及行政管理和法律。还可以加上维护国家领土完整，但领土并不总是被安全化，有时政府会自由协商重大重组，比如最近捷克斯洛伐克和前苏联的分裂。当感知到的威胁是内部的，军事安全主要关乎统治精英维持社会和平、领土完整以及更具争议性的政府机器抵御公民挑战的能力（Ayoob 1995）。此类挑战的典型形式是激进的分离主义、革命、恐怖主义或犯罪组织或运动，尽管有些政府也
securitize unarmed challengers to their authority or jurisdiction in order to use force against them. 将非武装的权威或管辖权挑战者安全化，以便对其使用武力。
It is noteworthy that the most extreme modern form of the state, the European or Westphalian state, has consolidated itself by a progressive disarming of the citizenry and a movement toward an ideal in which the state is the only legitimate wielder of force in society and effectively commands far greater instruments of force, both domestically and externally, than those illegitimate (mostly criminal) armed elements that remain. Even in the West, only during the nineteenth century did this development become effective enough to allow the separation of police from military functions, and in many new states this distinction still has shallow roots. This contrasts with the situation within feudal states and most forms of classical empires, where both the capability and the right to use force normally existed at more than one level of society (feudal barons, cities, and freelance mercenaries; governors and other local rulers in classical imperial systems) (Watson 1992; Buzan and Little 1996). Among the developed states, the United States has conspicuously deviated from the Westphalian ideal, constitutionally retaining the right of its citizens to bear arms and of its component states to retain their own militias as a defense against the hegemony of the federal government (Deudney 1995). Switzerland, Israel, and South Africa also retain strong elements of armed citizenry, the former linked to territorial defense and the latter two to individual security. 值得注意的是，现代国家中最极端的形式——欧洲或威斯特伐利亚国家——通过逐步解除公民武装并朝着国家成为社会中唯一合法武力持有者的理想迈进，从而巩固了自身地位。国家实际上掌握了远远超过那些仍然存在的非法（主要是犯罪性质的）武装力量的武力工具，无论是在国内还是对外。即使在西方，这一发展直到十九世纪才足够成熟，允许警察职能与军事职能分离，而在许多新兴国家，这种区分仍然根基浅薄。这与封建国家和大多数古典帝国形式的情况形成对比，在那些社会中，使用武力的能力和权利通常存在于社会的多个层面（封建男爵、城市和自由雇佣兵；古典帝国体系中的总督和其他地方统治者）（Watson 1992；Buzan 和 Little 1996）。 在发达国家中，美国明显偏离了威斯特伐利亚理想，宪法上保留了公民持有武器的权利以及各组成州保留自己的民兵以防范联邦政府霸权的权利（Deudney 1995）。瑞士、以色列和南非也保留了强大的武装公民元素，前者与领土防御相关，后两者则与个人安全相关。
When securitization is focused on external threats, military security is primarily about the two-level interplay between the actual armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states on the one hand and their perceptions of each other’s capabilities and intentions on the other. External threats range from fear of the complete obliteration of state, society, and people to gunboat diplomacy-style coercion and intimidation on particular issues of policy. Fear responses may also work on prospective future capabilities rather than on present ones, as in some contemporary perceptions of China (Dibb 1995). Crude forms of realist theory notwithstanding, there is no absolute correlation between the existence of external military capability and its securitization. The literature on democracy and peace, for example, builds on the idea that democratic states do not fear each other’s military capabilities (Ember, Ember, and Russett 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Mintz and Geva 1993; Lake 1992; Owen 1994; Schweller 1992; Weart 1994). Desecuritization is possible even in the presence of separate military capabilities. 当安全化关注于外部威胁时，军事安全主要涉及一方面国家实际的武装进攻和防御能力，另一方面则是它们对彼此能力和意图的认知之间的双重互动。外部威胁范围从对国家、社会和人民完全毁灭的恐惧，到在特定政策问题上的炮舰外交式胁迫和恐吓。恐惧反应也可能针对未来潜在的能力，而非当前的能力，如对中国的某些当代认知（Dibb 1995）。尽管存在粗糙的现实主义理论形式，但外部军事能力的存在与其安全化之间并无绝对关联。例如，关于民主与和平的文献建立在民主国家彼此不惧怕对方军事能力的观点之上（Ember, Ember, and Russett 1992；Maoz and Russett 1993；Mintz and Geva 1993；Lake 1992；Owen 1994；Schweller 1992；Weart 1994）。即使存在独立的军事能力，去安全化也是可能的。
But separate military capabilities do create the potential for securitization. When elites and populations begin to treat the armed forces of other states as threatening, interstate relations generate the classic military security dilemma involving on the one hand the proliferation of military technologies, arms racing, and the interplay of national policies for defense and deterrence and on the other the array of policies amed at muting the securi- 但独立的军事能力确实创造了安全化的潜力。当精英和民众开始将其他国家的武装力量视为威胁时，国家间关系便产生了经典的军事安全困境，一方面涉及军事技术的扩散、军备竞赛以及国防和威慑的国家政策相互作用，另一方面则是旨在缓解安全化的各种政策。
ty dilemma, such as arms control, arms reduction, nonoffensive defense, and at times alliances (Jervis 1978; Buzan and Herring forthcoming 1998; Møller 1991). Once military relations become securitized, this agenda is heavily shaped by the instruments of force possessed by states and the impact of these instruments and changes in these instruments on the way in which states interact. The military agenda then has its own distinctive logic and technological imperative, but it does not operate in isolation. The entire interplay of military capabilities between states is deeply conditioned by political relations. At the interstate level, the military security agenda is primarily about the way in which states equip themselves to use force and how their behavior in this regard is interpreted and responded to by other states. Where states have failed and primal anarchy prevails among gangs and warlords, the logic of threat perception linked to the armed capabilities of other actors works more directly. 类型困境，如军备控制、军备裁减、防御性非攻击性防御，以及有时的联盟（Jervis 1978；Buzan 和 Herring 即将出版 1998；Møller 1991）。一旦军事关系被安全化，这一议程就会被国家所拥有的武力工具及这些工具的变化对国家间互动方式的影响所深刻塑造。军事议程因此具有其独特的逻辑和技术必然性，但它并非孤立运作。国家间军事能力的整体互动深受政治关系的制约。在国家间层面，军事安全议程主要关乎国家如何装备自己以使用武力，以及其他国家如何解读和回应其在这方面的行为。当国家失败，原始无政府状态在帮派和军阀中盛行时，与其他行为者武装能力相关的威胁感知逻辑则更直接地发挥作用。
Referent Objects and Security Actors 参照对象与安全行为体
Referent Objects 参照对象
Much of traditional theory and practice in international relations is built around the idea that the state is the only legitimate referent object for military security. In the state-centric, Westphalian conception of international society that grew up in Europe and was transplanted to the rest of the world, the state was conceived to be, and in some places came close to being, the sole repository of both the right and the capability to use force. In this conception, the state evolved from dynastic absolutism, in which the prince lay at the center of sovereignty and security, to popular sovereignty, in which the nation and civil society, as well as the government, played those roles. Although both dynastic and national states claimed exclusivity as the legitimate referent object for military security, as sovereignty came to be located more broadly, the security content of the state expanded. If the national state was militarily threatened, so were its civic constituents, as well as its government. 传统国际关系理论和实践的大部分内容都围绕着国家是军事安全唯一合法参照对象的观点构建。在以国家为中心的威斯特伐利亚国际社会观念中，这一观念起源于欧洲并传播到世界其他地区，国家被认为是，且在某些地方几乎成为，拥有使用武力的权利和能力的唯一载体。在这一观念中，国家从以君主为主权和安全中心的王朝专制演变为以民族和公民社会以及政府共同承担这些角色的人民主权。尽管王朝国家和民族国家都声称作为军事安全的唯一合法参照对象，但随着主权范围的扩大，国家的安全内涵也随之扩展。如果民族国家受到军事威胁，其公民组成部分以及政府也同样受到威胁。
In practice, however, many states are less than perfect manifestations of the national model, and even those that approach it do not fully incorporate all elements of their civil societies. In many places, tension still exists between the rulers and the ruled. This leaves a great deal of room for other units, especially lribes or nations, to be inserted as referent objects for military securily within and between states-a process all too evident in the Balkans and the Caucasus, as well as in parts of Asia and much of Africa. But in the modern world, many of these nonstate units are seeking to acquire statehoorl, and il they succeed they have only transitional status as nonstate referent ohjects. 然而，实际上，许多国家并非国家模型的完美体现，即使那些接近该模型的国家，也未能完全纳入其公民社会的所有要素。在许多地方，统治者与被统治者之间仍然存在紧张关系。这为其他单位，特别是部落或民族，作为国家内部和国家之间军事安全的参照对象留下了很大空间——这一过程在巴尔干地区和高加索地区，以及亚洲部分地区和非洲大部分地区都非常明显。但在现代世界，许多这些非国家单位正寻求获得国家地位，如果他们成功了，他们作为非国家参照对象的身份也只是过渡性的。
In the contemporary international system, some prestate referent objects are still active. The remnants of tribal barbarians still exist in parts of Central Asia and Africa. Some hint of how these tribes worked as referent objects for military security can be gleaned from contemporary civil wars in Afghanistan and Somalia. Kings and princes, empires, and cities have largely disappeared or have ceased to play a role as referent objects in the military sector, although royal families such as those in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia still preserve some autonomy as referent objects. Private armies also remain relevant, as was seen during the 1930s when the Chinese state had partially disintegrated, resulting in largely autonomous warlords ruling large swaths of territory. 在当代国际体系中，一些前国家的参照对象仍然活跃。部落野蛮人的残余仍存在于中亚和非洲的部分地区。从阿富汗和索马里当代的内战中，可以略窥这些部落如何作为军事安全的参照对象运作。国王和王子、帝国以及城市在军事领域作为参照对象的角色大多已经消失或停止发挥作用，尽管科威特和沙特阿拉伯等地的王室家族仍保留作为参照对象的一些自主权。私人军队也依然相关，正如 1930 年代中国国家部分解体时所见，大量自治的军阀统治着大片领土。
Religion remains potentially available as a referent object for military securitization, but as the cases of the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East show, in the modern world religion is often entangled with state (Israel, Iran) or nation (Serbia, Croatia). In the contemporary world, religion has not yet transcended the state as a referent object for military security except on the small scale of extremist cults (Branch Davidians, Aum Shin Rykyo). Lying in the background, however, are Western fears of Islam, the rise of “Hindu nationalism,” and theories about the “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1993, 1996)—all of which suggest that the Westphalian state’s claim to exclusivity as the referent object for military security is not beyond challenge from both larger and smaller entities. 宗教仍然有可能作为军事安全化的参照对象，但正如前南斯拉夫和中东的案例所示，在现代世界中，宗教常常与国家（以色列、伊朗）或民族（塞尔维亚、克罗地亚）纠缠在一起。在当代世界，宗教尚未超越国家，成为军事安全的参照对象，除非是在极端主义教派（Branch Davidians，Aum Shin Rykyo）这样的小范围内。然而，西方对伊斯兰教的恐惧、“印度民族主义”的兴起以及“文明冲突”理论（Huntington 1993, 1996）潜藏其后——所有这些都表明，威斯特伐利亚国家作为军事安全参照对象的排他性主张，正面临来自更大和更小实体的挑战。
The national state is also vulnerable to challenges from within. The most obvious candidates are secessionists, unionists, revolutionaries, and other would-be states. These groups are asserting a claim to statehood but do not yet have the power either to free themselves from or to overthrow government by others and do not yet enjoy widespread recognition of their claim by other states. Membership in this category is diverse. It includes secessionist and autonomist movements (Chechens, Tamils, Kurds, Karens, East Timorese, Quebecois, Basques, and the now successful Eritreans), unrequited nationalities spread across several states (Kurds, Palestinians, Serbs, and possibly Russians), and rebel movements (the Khmer Rouge and UNITA). In many cases, would-be states are in effect nations claiming status as actors at the unit level, as in the failed Ibo attempt to secede from Nigeria. Since nations can reproduce themselves and, up to a point, act, there is a case for accepting them as autonomous units (Wæver et al. 1993). The very nature of would-be states, and their position in the international system, means they are frequently objects of military interest and action and therefore of securitization. They can easily be cast as threats to state sovereignty and, by the kind of statelike activities they engage in, can motivate the existing state to use military force to secure its monopoly over legitimate violence. 民族国家也容易受到内部挑战。最明显的候选者是分裂主义者、联邦主义者、革命者以及其他潜在的国家。这些群体主张国家地位，但尚无能力摆脱他人统治或推翻他人政府，也尚未获得其他国家对其主张的广泛认可。该类别的成员多种多样，包括分裂主义和自治运动（车臣人、泰米尔人、库尔德人、克伦人、东帝汶人、魁北克人、巴斯克人以及现已成功的厄立特里亚人）、分布在多个国家的未被满足的民族（库尔德人、巴勒斯坦人、塞尔维亚人，可能还有俄罗斯人）以及叛乱运动（红色高棉和联合全国解放阵线）。在许多情况下，潜在国家实际上是作为单位层面的行为者主张地位的民族，例如伊博族试图从尼日利亚分裂未遂。由于民族能够自我繁衍并在一定程度上行动，因此有理由将其视为自治单位（Wæver 等，1993）。 准国家的本质及其在国际体系中的地位，意味着它们经常成为军事关注和行动的对象，因此也成为安全化的对象。它们很容易被视为对国家主权的威胁，并且通过它们所从事的类国家活动，能够促使现有国家使用军事力量来确保其对合法暴力的垄断。
In addition to would-be states, the state also has challengers that have no aspiration to replace it or to seek the status of states. These include so- 除了准国家之外，国家还有一些挑战者，这些挑战者既不渴望取代国家，也不寻求国家地位。这些包括诸如-
called militias, like those that became prominent in the United States during the early 1990s as military self-defense groups against what they saw as the erosion of individual liberties by the state, and criminals organizing outside the state to pursue economic activities free from state regulation and taxation. Both militias and mafias can serve their members as referent objects for military security. And when the state fails-as in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, several places in Africa, and, in a much milder sense, Italymilitias, mafias, clans, and gangs come to the fore. Some still speak in the name of the state, but others become self-seeking and self-referencing security entities (Kaplan 1994). 被称为民兵的组织，比如那些在 1990 年代初期美国兴起的，作为对他们认为国家侵蚀个人自由的军事自卫团体，以及在国家之外组织起来以追求免受国家监管和税收的经济活动的犯罪团伙。民兵和黑手党都可以作为其成员的军事安全参照对象。当国家失败时——如阿富汗、南斯拉夫、非洲的几个地方，以及在较温和的意义上意大利——民兵、黑手党、氏族和帮派便会崛起。有些仍以国家的名义发声，但其他的则成为自我追求和自我参照的安全实体（Kaplan 1994）。
Here we find ourselves on the border between international and domestic security. Worth noting, although not normally an international security issue, is the way intrasocietal violence has recently risen on the agenda in the West. From Russia to the United States, a sense of pervasive societal violence is a platform national politicians can utilize in the classical securitizing move of law and order to the point at which human rights are threatened by countercrime policies and “strong man” logic begins to emerge. This situation does not normally involve the military; it is clearly a police affair, but it is placed on the security agenda for two interrelated reasons. In the West, the police are normally an institutionalized part of society that ensures continuous functioning. But the image in the United States and much of the post-Soviet world is rather that having police would be a good idea-that the situation is out of control and “something has to be done.” Second, securitization takes place, and extraordinary measures are advocated. The securitization itself has society at large as its referent object (or its law-abiding part) and state agents or politicians as major actors. This deviates from standard security only by being directed inward. 这里我们处于国际安全与国内安全的边界。值得注意的是，尽管通常不被视为国际安全问题，西方社会内部暴力最近却成为议程上的一个重要议题。从俄罗斯到美国，普遍存在的社会暴力感成为国家政治家们利用的一个平台，通过经典的安全化手段推动法律与秩序，以至于反犯罪政策威胁到人权，“强人”逻辑开始显现。这种情况通常不涉及军事，显然是警察事务，但由于两个相互关联的原因被纳入安全议程。在西方，警察通常是社会制度化的一部分，确保社会的持续运作。但在美国和许多后苏联国家的形象中，拥有警察被视为一个好主意——局势失控，“必须采取措施”。其次，安全化过程发生，主张采取非常措施。安全化本身以整个社会（或其守法部分）为参照对象，国家代理人或政治家为主要行动者。 这与标准的安全概念的偏离仅在于其指向内部。
A final issue at the substate level is not massive at present but is interesting to note. In some countries-notably the United States and Canadagender and race are becoming securitized even in relation to violence. Domestic violence and race-biased patterns of violence and prosecution are far from new, but what is new is that these patterns are increasingly seen by active groups as a collective phenomenon. If a wife is beaten up at home, that situation is not easy to securitize. But if feminists can construct an image of collective violence being conducted by one group-men-against another-women-and, for instance, conceptualize rape as a security problem for all women because of the existence of men, new collectivities begin to emerge as referent objects on the violence agenda. 在亚国家层面上的一个最终问题目前还不算重大，但值得注意。在一些国家——尤其是美国和加拿大——性别和种族即使在与暴力相关的领域也正在被安全化。家庭暴力和种族偏见的暴力及起诉模式并不新鲜，但新的情况是，这些模式越来越被积极的群体视为一种集体现象。如果妻子在家中被殴打，这种情况不容易被安全化。但如果女权主义者能够构建一种集体暴力的形象，即由一群人——男性——对另一群人——女性——进行暴力，并且例如将强奸概念化为所有女性的安全问题，因为男性的存在，那么新的集体性开始作为暴力议程上的参照对象出现。
Although as a rule military securitization is focused strongly on states and would-he stales, some possibilities exist for securitization of referent objects at the subsystem and system levels. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Orgallization (NATO) and, in a different way, the EU/Western European Union (WEU), with its aspiration to a common security policy, can achicve this shatus (see Chapter 8). In one sense, this simply 尽管军事安全化通常强烈聚焦于国家和准国家，但在子系统和系统层面上，安全化的参照对象仍存在一些可能性。诸如北大西洋公约组织（NATO）这样的联盟，以及以不同方式追求共同安全政策的欧盟/西欧联盟（WEU），都可以实现这一地位（见第 8 章）。从某种意义上说，这仅仅是...
entails adding together the claims of a set of states, but in another it overlaps with larger-scale referent objects such as civilizations. To invoke the security of the EU is little different from invoking the security of European civilization, and to invoke the security of NATO is little different from invoking that of the West. So far, the EU has not been significantly invoked in the military sector, but during the Cold War NATO was successfully invoked as representing the military security of the West. 意味着将一组国家的主张加在一起，但在另一个层面上，它与更大规模的参照对象如文明重叠。援引欧盟的安全与援引欧洲文明的安全几乎没有区别，援引北约的安全与援引西方的安全也几乎没有区别。到目前为止，欧盟在军事领域尚未被显著援引，但在冷战期间，北约被成功地援引为代表西方的军事安全。
More abstractly, principles such as the balance of power, international society, nonproliferation of some types of weapons (nuclear, biological, chemical, or blinding), and international law (nonaggression) can also be invoked as referent objects of military security. Again, there may be a direct link to state security, but the call for action is made in terms of some general principle, such as human rights, collective security, or international stability. Nuclear nonproliferation is particularly interesting here given that some states explicitly hinge their own security on possession of these weapons while at the same time arguing that the acquisition of these weapons by other states constitutes a security threat to the international system. Also interesting is the United Nations which in the context of its peacekeeping operations (PKOs) has begun to acquire the beginnings of referent object status (voiced in terms of concern about the future credibility and functional survival of the organization should it suffer too many PKO defeats or failures). 更抽象地说，诸如权力平衡、国际社会、某些类型武器（核、生物、化学或致盲武器）不扩散以及国际法（不侵略）等原则，也可以被作为军事安全的参照对象。同样，可能与国家安全有直接联系，但行动的呼吁是以某些普遍原则为基础，如人权、集体安全或国际稳定。核不扩散在这里尤其有趣，因为一些国家明确将自身安全建立在拥有这些武器的基础上，同时又主张其他国家获得这些武器构成对国际体系的安全威胁。同样值得关注的是联合国，在其维和行动（PKO）的背景下，已开始获得参照对象的初步地位（以对未来信誉和功能存续的关切表达，担心如果遭遇过多维和行动的失败或挫折，组织的生存将受到威胁）。
Securitizing Actors 安全化行为者
As discussed in Chapter 2, when the referent object is the state, fairly clear rules usually exist about which state representatives can speak security on its behalf. For less institutionalized units such as nations, the rules are less clear, and the legitimacy of attempts to speak security is determined by the scale and depth of support they receive. State representatives will speak on behalf of their state, but as military security managers they are also the most likely to invoke more abstract principles (balance of power) or more collective ones (civilization, NATO, nuclear nonproliferation). Officials of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations or NATO, also have some authority to invoke more abstract and collective principles as referent objects of military security. 如第二章所述，当指称对象是国家时，通常存在相当明确的规则，规定哪些国家代表可以代表其国家谈论安全。对于诸如民族等较不制度化的单位，规则则不那么明确，谈论安全的合法性取决于他们获得的支持规模和深度。国家代表将代表其国家发言，但作为军事安全管理者，他们也最有可能援引更抽象的原则（权力平衡）或更集体的原则（文明、NATO、核不扩散）。政府间组织（IGOs）的官员，如联合国秘书长或 NATO，也有一定权力将更抽象和集体的原则作为军事安全的指称对象。
One cannot assume, however, that the state is always coherent. In democracies, many voices, including pressure groups and defense intellectuals, will engage in the discourse of securitization-sometimes effectively, as in the case of U.S. opposition to the Vietnam War. States can also lose control over their armed forces, as happened in Japan during the 1930s, when the army pursued an independent policy in Manchuria, and possibly in Russiat starting in 1095 , when the govermment seemed to fose control 然而，不能假设国家总是保持一致。在民主国家中，许多声音，包括压力团体和国防知识分子，将参与安全化话语——有时效果显著，如美国反对越南战争的例子。国家也可能失去对其武装部队的控制，就像 1930 年代日本陆军在满洲推行独立政策时发生的那样，可能还有从 1095 年开始的俄罗斯，当时政府似乎失去了对军事行动的控制。
over military operations in Chechnya. Intelligence services may also come to think of themselves as the true guardians of national security, as possessing the full picture, and on this basis they may pursue their own security policies (although they seldom give voice to doing so). 在车臣。情报部门也可能认为自己是真正的国家安全守护者，掌握全局，因此可能会推行自己的安全政策（尽管他们很少公开表达这一点）。
Since many of the other units that serve as referent objects for military security are both aspirants to statehood and organized as political hierarchies, they often share with the state relatively clear rules about who can speak security on behalf of the organization. Mafias, gangs, clans, tribes, and rebel or secessionist movements are all likely to have clearly defined and authoritative leadership. Think, for example, of Chief Buthelezi’s role as leader of the Zulu nation in South Africa or Pol Pot’s role in Cambodia. Because military security generally requires a highly organized and wellequipped collective response, it is less prone to ambiguity about legitimate securitizing actors than other sectors and is more likely to reflect the structure of power relations. This logic remained broadly true in premodern times, when cities, empires, leagues, principalities, religions, tribal federations, and other referent objects for military security generally came equipped with hierarchical structures. In modern national states, however, the logic does not rule out significant roles for others in opposing or supporting specific processes of securitization. 由于许多作为军事安全参照对象的其他单位既是国家地位的追求者，又组织成政治等级结构，因此它们通常与国家共享相对明确的规则，规定谁可以代表该组织谈论安全问题。黑手党、帮派、氏族、部落以及叛乱或分离主义运动都可能拥有明确且权威的领导层。例如，想想布特莱齐酋长作为南非祖鲁民族领导人的角色，或波尔布特在柬埔寨的角色。由于军事安全通常需要高度组织化和装备精良的集体响应，因此在合法的安全行动者方面不太容易出现歧义，更可能反映权力关系的结构。这一逻辑在前现代时期大体上依然成立，当时城市、帝国、联盟、公国、宗教、部落联盟以及其他军事安全的参照对象通常都配备了等级结构。然而，在现代民族国家中，这一逻辑并不排除其他人在反对或支持特定安全化过程中的重要作用。
Functional Actors 功能性行动者
The military sector is rich in actors that influence the dynamics of the sector without being either referent objects or securitizing actors. Many of these actors are either the agencies of force, ranging from assassins and mercenary companies through defense bureaucracies to armies, or providers of the instruments of force, most notably the arms industry. Individuals can and do use force against each other, but this situation is not normally considered “military” and does not typically fall within the purview of international relations. 军事领域中有许多影响该领域动态的行为体，但它们既不是参照对象，也不是安全化行为者。许多此类行为体要么是武力机构，涵盖从刺客和雇佣军公司到国防官僚机构再到军队，要么是武力工具的提供者，最显著的是军火工业。个人之间可以且确实会使用武力，但这种情况通常不被视为“军事”行为，也通常不属于国际关系的范畴。
Subunits within the state are of interest in military security terms either because of an ability to shape the military or foreign policy of the state or because they have the capability to take autonomous action. Within a modern state, many subunits have the ability to influence the making of military and foreign policy; this is the familiar world of bureaucratic politics (Allison 1971). Governments (here narrowly defined as the present holders of military power) are the most obvious of such actors. Governments may have survival interests of their own (usually wanting to keep themselves in power) that call be distinguished from the national interest (generally defined in terms ol ilreats to the sovereignty or survival of the state). Since the govemment is llo :ulhorized securitizing actor for the state, separating the two can be difficult. Some nondemocratic governments may be able to securitize lleir uwn survival direclly without embarrassment. But most 国家内部的子单位在军事安全方面受到关注，要么因为它们能够影响国家的军事或外交政策，要么因为它们有能力采取自主行动。在现代国家中，许多子单位有能力影响军事和外交政策的制定；这就是熟悉的官僚政治世界（Allison 1971）。政府（这里狭义地定义为当前掌握军事权力的持有者）是最明显的此类行为者。政府可能有自身的生存利益（通常是希望保持其执政地位），这可以与国家利益区分开来（通常以对国家主权或生存的威胁来定义）。由于政府是国家的授权安全化行为者，区分两者可能很困难。一些非民主政府可能能够直接安全化其自身的生存而不感到尴尬。但大多数
governments, especially democratic ones, resort to linking their own survival to that of the state. 政府，尤其是民主政府，会将自身的生存与国家的生存联系起来。
Also prominent are the armed services, whose individual cultures exert strong pressures on military strategy and procurement. The preferences of navies for large surface ships and of air forces for manned aircraft, regardless of cost-effectiveness, are well-known examples. In addition, the typical division of armed services into distinct branches (army, air force, and navy) generates the much studied phenomenon of interservice rivalry in decisions about military procurement. Other subunits, such as the Defense, Finance, and Foreign Ministries, are also key players in making military policy. 武装部队也很突出，其各自的文化对军事战略和采购施加着强大的压力。海军偏好大型水面舰艇，空军偏好有人驾驶的飞机，无论成本效益如何，这些都是众所周知的例子。此外，武装部队通常分为不同的军种（陆军、空军和海军），这产生了关于军事采购决策中军种间竞争的广泛研究现象。其他子单位，如国防部、财政部和外交部，也是制定军事政策的重要参与者。
Outside government, one has to take into account various private-sector players, most notably the firms that make up the arms industry. In the late nineteenth century, European arms companies were sufficiently independent to gain notoriety as the “merchants of death.” Their salesmen were not above a little private diplomacy to stoke tensions and conflicts to improve the market for their wares. Since the 1930s, most arms manufacturers’ activities have been regulated by government licensing, but even so they can pressure the state on issues such as employment, balance of payments, and the maintenance of industrial skills and production capacity necessary for mobilization. 在政府之外，人们必须考虑各种私营部门的参与者，尤其是组成军火工业的公司。十九世纪末，欧洲军火公司足够独立，以至于因被称为“死亡商人”而声名狼藉。他们的推销员不惜进行一些私人外交，以激化紧张局势和冲突，从而改善其产品的市场。自 1930 年代以来，大多数军火制造商的活动已受到政府许可的监管，但即便如此，他们仍能在就业、国际收支平衡以及维持动员所需的工业技能和生产能力等问题上对国家施加压力。
The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities 威胁与脆弱性的逻辑
As argued in Chapter 2, securitization is essentially an intersubjective process. The senses of threat, vulnerability, and (in)security are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent. Nevertheless, it is easier to achieve securitization under some conditions than under others. Heavily armed neighbors with a history of aggression are more easily construed as threats than are lightly armed, pacifist ones. As illustrated in NATO by the diversity of the intensity of threat perceptions of the Soviet Union (e.g., the United States compared with Denmark), different societies will respond to the same “objective” security situation in different ways. Short of tanks coming across the border, there are very few objective threats. Paranoia (the securitization of nonexistent threats) and complacency (the nonsecuritization of apparent threats) are both possible. But other things being equal, historical and material facilitating conditions affect the processes of securitization and desecuritization in a fairly systematic way. Once military securitization has occurred, issues such as balance and technology development take on a more autonomous role. 正如第二章所论述的，安全化本质上是一个主体间的过程。威胁感、脆弱感和（不）安全感是社会建构的，而非客观存在或不存在的。然而，在某些条件下实现安全化比在其他条件下更容易。拥有侵略历史的重武装邻国比轻武装的和平主义邻国更容易被视为威胁。正如北约中对苏联威胁感知强度的多样性所示（例如，美国与丹麦相比），不同社会对同一“客观”安全形势的反应会有所不同。除非坦克越过边境，否则几乎没有客观威胁。偏执（对不存在威胁的安全化）和自满（对明显威胁的不安全化）都是可能的。但在其他条件相同的情况下，历史和物质的促进条件会以相当系统的方式影响安全化和去安全化的过程。一旦军事安全化发生，诸如平衡和技术发展等问题就会变得更加自主。
Military threats and vulnerabilities have traditionally been accorded primacy in thinking about national security, for several good reasons. Unlike some other types of threat, military ones are frequently intentional and directed. When used, they represent a breakdown or abandonment of 军事威胁和脆弱性在国家安全思考中历来被赋予首要地位，原因有很多。与其他类型的威胁不同，军事威胁通常是有意的且有针对性的。当军事威胁被使用时，它们代表着正常政治关系的破裂或放弃，
normal political relations and a willingness to have political, economic, and social issues decided by brute force. Restraints on behavior in such contests are few and fragile. Societies engaged in war put at risk not only the lives and welfare of their citizens but also their collective political, economic, and social achievements. Losing a war against a ruthless opponent can be a catastrophe. Think, for example, of the Nazi occupation in Poland and the Soviet Union or of the Japanese occupation of China. Think of Bosnia. Military threats threaten everything in a society, and they do so in a context in which most of the rules of civilized behavior either cease to function or move sharply into the background. They are the existential threat par excellence. 通过蛮力决定政治、经济和社会问题的意愿。在这种竞争中，对行为的约束很少且脆弱。处于战争状态的社会不仅危及其公民的生命和福祉，也危及其集体的政治、经济和社会成就。输给无情的对手可能是一场灾难。例如，想想纳粹对波兰和苏联的占领，或日本对中国的占领。想想波斯尼亚。军事威胁威胁着社会中的一切，而且它们发生在大多数文明行为规则要么停止发挥作用，要么被大幅边缘化的背景下。它们是卓越的生存威胁。
Other things being equal, in this sector the logic of threats and vulnerabilities between any two units in an international system is a function of the interplay between their respective military capabilities and their degree of amity and enmity, which are the outcomes of the (de)securitization process. Once the process of securitization has locked into enmity as the framework of relations, threats and vulnerabilities will be perceived primarily in terms of the military capabilities of possible aggressors. In making these calculations, both the absolute capabilities of opponents and their capabilities relative to one’s own must be taken into account. The absolute capabilities of potential attackers determine the nature and extent of military threats. An opponent equipped with large numbers of nuclear weapons and suitable delivery systems can pose a threat of the rapid obliteration of a society that is not available to an opponent that does not possess weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, the size and equipment of armies shape the type of threat they pose. Large, heavy mobile forces of the type deployed by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War generate threats of invasion in a way smaller and less mobile armies do not. Japan, for example, has tried to avoid threatening its neighbors by denying itself both the longrange strike weapons and the sealift and airlift capability that would allow it to project force off its home islands. 在其他条件相同的情况下，在这一领域中，国际体系中任意两个单位之间的威胁与脆弱性的逻辑，是它们各自军事能力与友好和敌对程度相互作用的函数，而这些友好和敌对程度是（去）安全化过程的结果。一旦安全化过程将敌对作为关系框架锁定，威胁和脆弱性将主要根据潜在侵略者的军事能力来感知。在进行这些计算时，必须同时考虑对手的绝对能力及其相对于自身的能力。潜在攻击者的绝对能力决定了军事威胁的性质和程度。装备有大量核武器及适当投送系统的对手，能够构成对未拥有大规模杀伤性武器的社会的迅速毁灭威胁。同样，军队的规模和装备也决定了它们所构成威胁的类型。 冷战期间，北约和华沙条约组织部署的那种大型、重型机动部队所产生的入侵威胁，是较小且机动性较差的军队无法比拟的。例如，日本试图通过放弃远程打击武器以及能够将军力投射到本土岛屿之外的海运和空运能力，来避免对邻国构成威胁。
The dialectic of relative military capabilities between established rivals can be elaborated almost endlessly according to variations in strength, technology, and strategy (Buzan 1987; Buzan and Herring forthcoming 1998). The dialectic spins into the larger matter of balance of power versus bandwagoning and whether military security is best sought by internal balancing (increasing one’s own strength to reduce vulnerability), external balancing (finding allies who share one’s perception of threat), or bandwagoning (appeasement of, or subordination to, the main source of threat). It also involves extensive debate about the nature of technology: high tech versus low tech, conventional versus nuclear, and the like. These matters are familiar ground athd do not require elaboration here. The point to make is that the orthodox logics of military dialectics apply mainly after securitization has taken roor. Military capabilities, whether absolute or relative, do 既定对手之间相对军事能力的辩证关系几乎可以根据力量、技术和战略的变化进行无尽的阐述（Buzan 1987；Buzan 和 Herring 即将出版 1998）。这种辩证关系延伸到更大的问题，即权力平衡与攀附之间的关系，以及军事安全是否最好通过内部平衡（增强自身力量以减少脆弱性）、外部平衡（寻找与自己威胁感知相同的盟友）或攀附（对主要威胁来源的安抚或从属）来实现。它还涉及关于技术性质的广泛讨论：高技术与低技术、常规与核武器等。这些问题是熟悉的领域，此处无需详细阐述。要指出的是，军事辩证法的正统逻辑主要适用于安全化已经生根之后。军事能力，无论是绝对的还是相对的，都会...
not determine the process of securitization itself. If they did, Western European states would have worried as much about U.S. capabilities as about Soviet military capabilities after 1945 (as indeed some of their citizens did). A number of variables other than military capability can play a significant role in the establishment (or not) and maintenance of military securitization; the principal ones are geography, history, and politics. 并不决定安全化过程本身。如果决定了，西欧国家在 1945 年后会像担心苏联军事能力一样担心美国的能力（实际上他们的一些公民确实如此担心）。除军事能力外，还有许多变量在军事安全化的建立（或未建立）和维持中起着重要作用；主要因素是地理、历史和政治。
Geography shapes the perception and operation of military threats and vulnerabilities in two ways: through distance and terrain. Distance works on the traditional principle that military threats are more difficult to mount and easier to defend against when they have to travel over longer distances than over shorter ones. Most states have the capability to make threats of attack or invasion against their immediate neighbors. Great powers can generally project military power beyond their immediate neighbors and into their regions. In modern times, only a handful of states have developed the capability to operate militarily worldwide. As modern military capability has diffused throughout the international system, mounting a global military posture has become increasingly more difficult than it was in the days when the Spanish conquistador Pizarro was able to overthrow the Inca Empire with 164 men, 62 horses, and two cannons. Arguably, only the United States now falls into the world military power class. 地理通过距离和地形两方面影响对军事威胁和脆弱性的认知与运作。距离遵循传统原则，即军事威胁在必须跨越较长距离时更难发动，且更易防御。大多数国家具备对其邻国发动攻击或入侵威胁的能力。大国通常能够将军事力量投射到邻国之外及其所在地区。现代社会中，只有少数国家具备全球范围内进行军事行动的能力。随着现代军事能力在国际体系中的扩散，建立全球军事姿态比西班牙征服者皮萨罗仅凭 164 名士兵、62 匹马和两门大炮推翻印加帝国时代更加困难。可以说，现今只有美国属于世界军事强国级别。
The effect of distance is what underlies the regional premise of security complex theory. Although world-class powers can engage and defeat significant opponents at great distances (Britain’s takeover of India during the eighteenth century, the U.S. role in World Wars I and II and the Gulf War), the general rule of military relations is that states are worried more about their neighbors than about distant powers. With nontraditional military relations, the distance rule applies more unevenly. It remains largely true for local criminal and inner-city scenarios and failed-state anarchies, but terrorists and mafias may deliver threats with little concern for distance, and speculation about cyberwar points toward modes of conflict in which distance may not matter much (Der Derian 1992). 距离效应是安全复合体理论区域前提的基础。尽管世界级大国能够在远距离与重要对手交战并击败他们（如十八世纪英国对印度的接管、美国在第一次和第二次世界大战及海湾战争中的角色），军事关系的一般规律是，国家更关心邻国而非遥远的大国。在非传统军事关系中，距离规则的适用更加不均衡。对于地方犯罪、城市内部情景和失败国家的无政府状态，这一规律仍大体成立，但恐怖分子和黑手党可能无视距离发出威胁，而关于网络战争的猜测则指向一种距离可能不那么重要的冲突模式（Der Derian 1992）。
Terrain works similarly to distance in that it tends to amplify or reduce vulnerability to military threats. Countries such as Poland and the Ukraine occupy largely flat terrain that poses few obstacles to military movement. By contrast, Japan and Britain have benefited from the logistical obstacle to invasions by neighbors created by open water. It is hard to imagine that Taiwan would exist as a separate state were it not for the protection offered by the Taiwan Strait. Switzerland has benefited from its mountain barriers, Russia from its distances and climate. Israel and Kuwait, by contrast, have no strategic depth and few physical barriers to invasion. 地形的作用类似于距离，因为它倾向于放大或减少对军事威胁的脆弱性。像波兰和乌克兰这样的国家占据了大部分平坦的地形，这种地形对军事行动几乎没有障碍。相比之下，日本和英国受益于邻国入侵时由开阔水域形成的后勤障碍。很难想象如果没有台湾海峡的保护，台湾会作为一个独立的国家存在。瑞士受益于其山脉屏障，俄罗斯则受益于其距离和气候。相比之下，以色列和科威特没有战略纵深，也几乎没有物理屏障阻止入侵。
History affects military threats largely in terms of the impact of past experience on present perception. The existence of historical enmity and repeated war will tend to amplify present perceptions of threat. After World War I, France feared Germany even when the latter was disamed. Poland 历史主要通过过去经验对当前认知的影响来影响军事威胁。历史敌意的存在和反复的战争往往会放大当前对威胁的感知。第一次世界大战后，法国即使在德国被削弱时也对其心存畏惧。波兰
has long historical suspicions of Germany and Russia, Korea and China of Japan, Vietnam of China, Greece and Armenia of Turkey, and Iraq and Iran of each other. Such memories can be very long and deep (Vietnam and China, Iraq and Iran-especially if viewed as Arabs versus Persians), or they can be fairly recent (France and Germany). Some seem almost ineradicable (Greece and Turkey), whereas others have either faded from military significance or been replaced by more recent events (Britain and France, Denmark and Sweden). As was seen during the Cold War, history is not a necessary condition for strong feelings of military threat. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union/Russia had any serious history of enmity before they plunged into the Cold War. But the existence of a bitter history and memories of previous wars facilitate the process of securitization. As Japan and Germany have learned, such memories can obstruct the process of desecuritization even when well-established present political and military realities seem to pose no objective grounds for threat perception. 长期以来，德国和俄罗斯、韩国和日本、中国和越南、希腊和亚美尼亚、土耳其以及伊拉克和伊朗之间都存在历史上的猜疑。这些记忆可能非常悠久且深刻（越南和中国，伊拉克和伊朗——尤其是如果被视为阿拉伯人与波斯人之间的对立），也可能相当近期（法国和德国）。有些记忆几乎难以根除（希腊和土耳其），而另一些则已经失去军事意义或被更近的事件所取代（英国和法国，丹麦和瑞典）。正如冷战期间所见，历史并非强烈军事威胁感的必要条件。美国和苏联/俄罗斯在陷入冷战之前并无严重的敌对历史。但痛苦的历史和以往战争的记忆促进了安全化的过程。正如日本和德国所体会到的，即使当前政治和军事现实已确立且似乎没有客观的威胁感，这些记忆仍可能阻碍去安全化的进程。
Political factors affect military threats in two ways: through the degree of recognition that exists between the actors and through harmonies and disharmonies in their political ideologies. In the case of the Cold War, historical enmities were largely absent, but the United States and the Soviet Union were locked into a zero-sum ideological conflict that served just as well to stimulate the process of securitization. The confrontations among democratic, fascist, and Communist powers during the 1930s had a similar quality, and the same dynamics can be found when religious divisions interact with military threats, as between Israel and the Arabs, India and Pakistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and within Bosnia. 政治因素通过两种方式影响军事威胁：一是通过行为体之间存在的认可程度，二是通过它们政治意识形态中的和谐与不和谐。在冷战时期，历史敌意基本不存在，但美国和苏联陷入了零和的意识形态冲突，这同样有效地促进了安全化过程。1930 年代民主、法西斯和共产主义势力之间的对抗具有类似的特征，当宗教分歧与军事威胁相互作用时，也能发现相同的动态，比如以色列与阿拉伯国家、印度与巴基斯坦、亚美尼亚与阿塞拜疆，以及波斯尼亚内部的情况。
Ideological divisions can operate in international systems when the political units continue to recognize each other as legal equals. But one does not have to look far back in history (or perhaps far ahead into the future) to find it accepted as normal that both states and peoples should regard each other in hierarchical terms, as superior and subordinate. In historical terms, the decades since the end of World War II represent a sharp break with historical practice. Decolonization made it necessary, at least for a time, to accept all states as legal equals and all peoples as equally human. The establishment of human rights means the human side of this equation will probably endure, but there are real questions as to whether a number of postcolonial states will be able to govern themselves well enough to sustain their status as equal members of international society. Some-such as Haiti, Somalia, Liberia, Bangladesh, and Cambodia-might already be slipping into a kind of mandate status, not as colonies but as dependents on the internationall community. 意识形态分歧可以在国际体系中发挥作用，当政治单位继续相互承认彼此为法律上的平等体时。但回顾历史（或许展望未来）并不难发现，国家和民族普遍以等级关系来看待彼此，视对方为上级和下属，这被视为正常。从历史角度看，二战结束后的几十年代表了与历史惯例的明显断裂。去殖民化使得至少在一段时间内，必须接受所有国家作为法律上的平等体，所有民族作为同等的人类。人权的确立意味着这一人类层面的原则可能会持续存在，但对于一些后殖民国家是否能够良好治理自身，从而维持其作为国际社会平等成员的地位，存在真实的疑问。一些国家——如海地、索马里、利比里亚、孟加拉国和柬埔寨——可能已经开始滑向某种委托地位，不是作为殖民地，而是作为国际社会的依赖者。
Differences in stallus make a difference to military threats. When one political unit does not recognize another as of equal status or, even worse, does not recognize ils polilical status at all, a variety of significant restraints on the resort to force are removed. The process of securitization 地位的差异对军事威胁产生影响。当一个政治实体不承认另一个实体具有平等地位，或者更糟的是，根本不承认其政治地位时，对诉诸武力的各种重要限制就会被解除。安全化的过程
is correspondingly facilitated, because behavior by the other-which one would have to live with if it were a recognized state-can more easily be castigated as an unacceptable threat to, say, one’s supplies of necessary goods or the security of one’s citizens abroad. Relations between Europe and much of Asia had this unequal quality during the nineteenth century, a story told excellently by Gerrit Gong (1984). 因此相应地变得更加容易，因为对方的行为——如果它是一个被承认的国家，人们就必须接受——更容易被谴责为对某人的必要物资供应或海外公民安全的不可接受威胁。十九世纪欧洲与亚洲大部分地区之间的关系就具有这种不平等的特质，这一故事由 Gerrit Gong（1984 年）精彩叙述。
Elements of this “standard of civilization” approach recently reappeared in Europe, when some post-Cold War successor states were confronted with conditions regarding democracy, human rights, and economic law before being accorded recognition. When a political unit is not recognized by others, its sociopolitical institutions are not considered to embody legitimacy, and its territory is considered politically empty and available for occupation. If, in addition, the people are not recognized by others as fully human, they risk being treated either like domesticated animals and so enslaved or like vermin and so eradicated. Some parts of the European expansion into the Americas, Africa, and Australia approached this extreme, as did Nazi policy against Jews and Slavs during World War II. Between the exterminations in Tasmania and parts of Africa and the Americas and the unequal treaties between Europe and such Asian countries as Japan, China, Siam, and Turkey lay a whole range of degrees of unequal treatment. Political and social recognition do not begin to guarantee freedom from military threat, but their absence makes military threats much more open to securitization (Buzan 1996). “文明标准”方法的某些元素最近在欧洲重新出现，当时一些冷战后继国家在获得承认之前，面临有关民主、人权和经济法的条件。当一个政治实体未被他国承认时，其社会政治机构不被视为具有合法性，其领土被视为政治上的空白地带，可供占领。如果此外，该民族未被他国视为完全的人类，他们就有可能被当作家畜般奴役，或被当作害虫般消灭。欧洲向美洲、非洲和澳大利亚的扩张部分地区接近了这种极端情况，二战期间纳粹对犹太人和斯拉夫人的政策也是如此。在塔斯马尼亚及非洲和美洲部分地区的灭绝行为与欧洲与日本、中国、暹罗和土耳其等亚洲国家之间的不平等条约之间，存在着一系列不平等待遇的程度。政治和社会承认并不能保证免受军事威胁，但缺乏承认使军事威胁更容易被安全化（Buzan 1996）。
Regionalizing Dynamics? 区域化动态？
In the military sector, the end of the Cold War has caused a marked shift away from global-level security concerns and toward regional and locallevel ones. A case can be made that the international system is emerging from a long period in which the regional level of military security had been suppressed. Initially, this suppression took the form of European and, later, Japanese and U.S. imperialism. Especially when imperialism was formal (as opposed to when it was informal), it largely replaced regional security dynamics with a system-level pattern of great-power relationships. 在军事领域，冷战的结束导致了从全球层面的安全关注转向区域和地方层面的显著转变。可以认为，国际体系正从一个长期抑制区域军事安全的时期中走出。最初，这种抑制表现为欧洲，后来是日本和美国的帝国主义。特别是当帝国主义是正式的（而非非正式的）时，它在很大程度上用大国关系的体系级模式取代了区域安全动态。
The Cold War played a major role in breaking down the formal imperial framework and in doing so freed the former colonial countries of the Third World to begin to find their own local patterns of regional military security relations. Part of the decolonization process was the diffusion of modern weapons to new states throughout the international system. At the same time, however, the extreme bipolarity of the Cold War also imposed overlay on some regions and heavy levels of outside pressure on, and intervention in, many others. During the Cold War, most regional security dynamics could not avoid strong interactions with the superpower rivalry. 冷战在打破正式的帝国框架中发挥了重要作用，并且通过这样做，使第三世界的前殖民国家得以开始寻找它们自身的地方性区域军事安全关系模式。去殖民化过程的一部分是现代武器向国际体系中新兴国家的扩散。然而，与此同时，冷战的极端两极对某些地区也施加了叠加影响，并对许多其他地区施加了强烈的外部压力和干预。在冷战期间，大多数区域安全动态无法避免与超级大国的竞争产生强烈互动。
The end of the Cold War can thus be seen as greatly reinforcing the liberation of regional military security dynamics begun by the process of decolonization. 因此，冷战的结束可以被视为极大地加强了由去殖民化进程开始的区域军事安全动态的解放。
In principle, three types of development can undermine the natural dominance of the regional level in military security in favor of the global level. The first occurs if military threats cease to matter in international relations, in which case all of the military sector would fade into the background and emphasis would shift relatively to the other sectors, some of which (especially the economic sector) are more globalized. The second occurs if military technology becomes so advanced and cost-effective that distance and geography cease to matter in the transmission of military threats, in which case the distinctive logic of regional security complexes would disappear. The third occurs if the concentration of power in the international system becomes so great that the regional level either ceases to exist (because all states are globally operating great powers or integrated regions) or ceases to matter (because the great powers overlay regional security complexes). 原则上，有三种发展可能削弱地区层面在军事安全中的自然主导地位，转而 favor 全球层面。第一种情况是如果军事威胁在国际关系中不再重要，那么整个军事领域将退居次要地位，重点相对转向其他领域，其中一些领域（尤其是经济领域）更加全球化。第二种情况是如果军事技术变得如此先进且具有成本效益，以至于距离和地理在军事威胁的传递中不再重要，那么地区安全复合体的独特逻辑将消失。第三种情况是如果国际体系中的权力集中度变得如此之大，以至于地区层面要么不复存在（因为所有国家都是全球运作的大国或一体化地区），要么变得无关紧要（因为大国覆盖了地区安全复合体）。
In the post-Cold War world, a case can be made that military threats are ceasing to matter in relations among the advanced industrial democracies. A substantial part of the international system, including most of its major centers of power, now lives in a pluralistic security community in which the members neither expect nor prepare to use force in their relations with each other. Opinion varies as to whether this is evidence for the “democracy and peace” or the “interdependence and peace” hypothesis or simply a result of historical war weariness and nuclear deterrence. Whichever is right, it has become undeniably more difficult and perhaps impossible to securitize military relations among these states. 在冷战后世界中，可以认为军事威胁在先进工业民主国家之间的关系中正逐渐失去重要性。国际体系的一个重要部分，包括其大多数主要权力中心，现在生活在一个多元安全共同体中，成员国既不期望也不准备在相互关系中使用武力。关于这是否证明了“民主与和平”假说、“相互依存与和平”假说，或仅仅是历史战争疲劳和核威慑的结果，意见不一。无论哪种观点正确，在这些国家之间将军事关系安全化已变得无可否认地更加困难，甚至可能不可能。
In some regions, notably Western and Central Europe and North America, this development means the logic of mutual military threats has virtually ceased to exist within the region, replaced by a shared commitment to political means of conflict resolution and a displacement of security and rivalry to other sectors. At best, as sometimes in Europe, past memory is invoked as a future possibility to sustain commitment to the desecuritized arrangements. Except for a number of quasi-global regimes restricting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, there is little sign that this development is about to become systemwide. Its principal effect is more on relations among the great powers at the global level than on the regional level. Some analysts (Goldgeier and McFaul 1992; Singer and Wildavsky 1993) characterize this development in terms of two worlds, one within which the military factor has largely been expunged from relations between states and the other in which it continues to operate in classical realist form-albeit lightly constrained by arms control regimes. 在某些地区，特别是西欧、中欧和北美，这一发展意味着相互军事威胁的逻辑在该地区几乎不复存在，取而代之的是对政治手段解决冲突的共同承诺，以及安全和竞争向其他领域的转移。充其量，如欧洲有时所见，过去的记忆被用作未来可能性，以维持对非安全化安排的承诺。除了一些限制大规模杀伤性武器及其运载系统扩散的准全球性机制外，几乎没有迹象表明这一发展将扩展到整个体系。其主要影响更多体现在全球层面大国之间的关系上，而非区域层面。一些分析人士（Goldgeier 和 McFaul 1992；Singer 和 Wildavsky 1993）将这一发展描述为两个世界：一个世界中军事因素在国家间关系中已被大体剔除，另一个世界中军事因素仍以经典现实主义形式运作——尽管受到军备控制机制的轻度约束。
A case can also be made than distance and geography matter less than 也可以认为距离和地理因素的重要性不如...
they used to in relations between states. In the economic realm, transportation costs have dropped virtually to zero, enabling goods to be produced competitively almost anywhere on the planet for consumption almost anywhere else. It was only a few hundred years ago that civilizations were able to exist in virtual political, social, and military isolation from each other because of the barriers posed by distance and geography. 他们曾经在国家之间的关系中使用。在经济领域，运输成本几乎降至零，使得商品几乎可以在地球上的任何地方有竞争力地生产，并在几乎任何其他地方消费。几百年前，文明能够因为距离和地理带来的障碍而在政治、社会和军事上几乎相互隔离地存在。
Yet the present situation has little affected military relations for most states. A few great powers can deliver huge amounts of military power anywhere on the planet within a short period of time, and the combination of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles means distance and geography matter less in relations between the great powers. The proliferation of technologies of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) and the means to deliver them (missiles) might indicate a more general move toward global capability, but if so that move is very slow and very partial. Most existing and potential nuclear weapons states (Britain, France, China, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, and Iraq) have means of delivery confined largely to their own regions, thus reinforcing the regional military security dynamics. For the bulk of states, such weapons play no role in present status or future plans. For them, the reality remains that conventional forces are very much constrained by distance and that the regional logic of military security relations remains prime. 然而，目前的局势对大多数国家的军事关系影响甚微。少数几个大国能够在短时间内向地球上的任何地方投送大量军事力量，核武器与远程导弹的结合意味着距离和地理在大国关系中变得不那么重要。大规模杀伤性武器（核、生化）及其投送手段（导弹）的扩散可能表明向全球能力的更普遍转变，但如果真是如此，这一转变非常缓慢且非常有限。大多数现有和潜在的核武器国家（英国、法国、中国、韩国、日本、台湾、印度、巴基斯坦、以色列、伊朗和伊拉克）拥有的投送手段主要局限于本地区域，从而强化了区域军事安全动态。对于大多数国家来说，这类武器在当前地位或未来计划中没有作用。对他们而言，现实仍然是常规军队受到距离的很大限制，区域军事安全关系的逻辑仍然占主导地位。
In terms of the concentration of power, the direction of events seems to be firmly away from any globalizing trend and toward the diffusion of power and regionalization of interaction. The era of European imperialism and the Cold War both represent versions of power concentration that were able to override the regional logic. Both of these eras have passed, and in going both have encouraged an underlying diffusion of military power. Most of the major centers of power are now rather inward looking, concerned with their own problems, and disinclined to use military power abroad either for expansion or for more than minor peacemaking efforts in local conflicts. They will use substantial force when their interests are threatened, as in the war against Iraq, but in general the major powers are not driven to use force abroad either by rivalry with each other or by internal pressures. They have become resistant to the appeal of military securitization. 就权力集中而言，事件的发展方向似乎坚定地远离任何全球化趋势，转向权力的扩散和区域互动的区域化。欧洲帝国主义时代和冷战时期都代表了能够超越区域逻辑的权力集中版本。这两个时代都已过去，在此过程中都促进了军事力量的潜在扩散。大多数主要权力中心现在相当内向，关注自身问题，不倾向于在海外使用军事力量，无论是为了扩张还是仅仅在局部冲突中进行小规模的维和努力。当其利益受到威胁时，如对伊拉克的战争，他们会使用大量武力，但总体而言，主要大国并非因相互竞争或内部压力而被驱使在海外使用武力。他们已对军事安全化的号召产生抵触。
It might be argued that the United States retains a unipolar militarytechnological superiority and level of expenditure so overwhelming as to sustain a centralizing trend. But although it is true in a technical sense, this fact is offset by the deep U.S. unwillingness to bear the costs or take the risks of using this power for any but a few select contingencies. The United States enjoys a kind of technical-military unipolarity, but U.S. aversion to casualties and entanglements marginalizes its impact on the other factors pushing toward regionalization. As Somalia demonstrated, most states and even some nonstates now have the capability to resist effectively any 有人可能会认为，美国保持着一种单极的军事技术优势和压倒性的开支水平，从而维持一种集中的趋势。但尽管从技术角度来看这是事实，这一事实却被美国深刻的不愿承担使用这种力量的成本或风险所抵消，除非是少数特定的紧急情况。美国享有一种技术-军事上的单极地位，但美国对伤亡和纠缠的厌恶使其对推动区域化的其他因素的影响被边缘化。正如索马里所示，大多数国家甚至一些非国家行为体现在都有能力有效抵抗任何...
attempt at military occupation. Many are able to mount serious attacks on their neighbors. Although one might see the process of diffusion of power as leading eventually to a multipolar world of great powers, that outcome is still a long way away. In the military sector, for the near and middle-term future, current developments point away from globalization and toward regionalization. Some regimes are restraining the spread of weapons of mass destruction, but these are not watertight; in general, regional security dynamics are much freer to operate than they have been for a long time. 军事占领的尝试。许多国家能够对邻国发动严重攻击。尽管有人可能认为权力扩散的过程最终会导致一个多极化的大国世界，但这一结果仍然遥远。在军事领域，近期和中期的未来，当前的发展趋势远离全球化，转向区域化。一些政权正在限制大规模杀伤性武器的扩散，但这些限制并不严密；总体而言，区域安全动态比长期以来更加自由地运作。
The introversion of the great powers is complemented by the diffusion of power to the regional states, few of which are constrained about securitizing their relations with their neighbors. This development should extend the process begun by decolonization of increasing the importance of regional security dynamics relative to that of the great powers. As military power diffuses in the system, intervention by outside great powers into regional conflicts becomes more difficult and costly. The war against Iraq illustrates this fact well. That war demonstrated U.S. military superiority, but the situation was far removed from the days when all great powers needed to do to intervene was to send a gunboat and a few troops. This same lesson can be taken from the U.S. experience in Vietnam and the Soviet one in Afghanistan. Thus, to the extent that bipolar conflict has disappeared and the concentration of power in the center is weakening, the current outlook should favor less competitive military intervention by the great powers in regional security affairs. Whether a lower weight of intervention will mute or exacerbate regional conflicts very much depends upon the circumstances conditioning securitization within the various regions. 大国的内向转变伴随着权力向地区国家的扩散，而这些地区国家在将其与邻国的关系安全化方面几乎没有受到限制。这一发展应当延续去殖民化所开启的进程，即相对于大国，地区安全动态的重要性日益增加。随着军事力量在体系中的扩散，外部大国干预地区冲突变得更加困难且代价高昂。对伊拉克的战争很好地说明了这一点。那场战争展示了美国的军事优势，但情况远非所有大国只需派遣一艘炮舰和几名士兵就能干预的时代。美国在越南的经验和苏联在阿富汗的经验也得出了同样的教训。因此，随着两极冲突的消失和中心权力集中度的减弱，当前的前景应有利于大国在地区安全事务中减少竞争性的军事干预。 干预力度较轻是否会抑制或加剧地区冲突，很大程度上取决于各地区安全化的具体情况。
The Cold War fostered a habit of superpower intervention in Third World military conflicts, both domestic and regional. Local powers appealed to the superpowers for support by trying to locate their own security concerns within the context of superpower rivalry. In turn, the United States and the Soviet Union defined their security in global terms. The Cold War facilitated the process of military securitization all around. The superpowers saw many local conflicts as expressions or extensions of their own rivalry, notably in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and they frequently viewed the outcomes of such conflicts as significant indicators of success or failure in their own wider struggle. This meant they were willing to supply arms and support to local conflicts, often to balance the fear or perception that the other side was already doing so. On this basis, the two superpowers pumped vast resources into Third World conflicts, thereby increasing the scale, intensity, and duration of armed confrontations in many places. 冷战促使超级大国介入第三世界的军事冲突，无论是国内的还是地区性的。地方势力通过试图将自身的安全关切置于超级大国对抗的背景下，向超级大国寻求支持。反过来，美国和苏联则以全球视角定义自己的安全。冷战促进了军事安全化的进程。超级大国将许多局部冲突视为自身对抗的表现或延伸，尤其是在中东和东南亚地区，并且他们经常将这些冲突的结果视为自己更广泛斗争中成败的重要指标。这意味着他们愿意向地方冲突提供武器和支持，通常是为了平衡对方已经这样做的恐惧或认知。在此基础上，两大超级大国向第三世界冲突投入了大量资源，从而增加了许多地区武装对抗的规模、强度和持续时间。
It would be diflicult to prove that the Cold War actually generated many conflicts in the Third World except in a few instances, such as the division of Korea. But it is easy to show how the United States and the 除了少数例外，如朝鲜的分裂，很难证明冷战实际上在第三世界引发了许多冲突。但很容易展示美国和
Soviet Union were drawn into local conflicts, with the consequence of synergy between the global and local security dynamics. The United States poured arms into Pakistan, South Vietnam, Israel, and Iran, whereas the Soviet Union did the same for India, North Vietnam, Syria, Egypt (up to 1972), and Iraq. Both sides poured arms into Somalia, Angola, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. In the post-Cold War world, global-level military securitization will be much harder to achieve; consequently, this kind of military and political support will be much less readily available. Arms will still be plentiful from an expanding array of producers, but they will have to be paid for. And given the absence of ideological or strategic motivation, the major powers are unlikely to be easily moved to intervene directly in Third World conflicts, as they were in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Of the other great powers potentially capable of projecting significant military influence, neither the EU nor Japan has either the will or the constitutional capability to do so. Both are introverted, absorbed in their own problems, and extremely hesitant to resort to military means. 苏联被卷入地方冲突，导致全球与地方安全动态之间产生协同效应。美国向巴基斯坦、南越、以色列和伊朗大量提供武器，而苏联则向印度、北越、叙利亚、埃及（直到 1972 年）和伊拉克提供同样的支持。双方都向索马里、安哥拉、尼加拉瓜和阿富汗大量输送武器。在冷战后时代，实现全球层面的军事安全化将更加困难；因此，这种军事和政治支持将不那么容易获得。武器仍将由日益增多的生产者大量供应，但必须付费购买。鉴于缺乏意识形态或战略动机，主要大国不太可能像在越南和阿富汗那样轻易被推动直接干预第三世界冲突。在其他可能具备投射重大军事影响力的强国中，欧盟和日本既没有意愿，也没有宪法上的能力这样做。两者都内向，专注于自身问题，并且极为犹豫诉诸军事手段。
For all of these reasons, the end of the Cold War seems likely to bring greater freedom for the operation of local military security dynamics. This effect is easiest to illustrate in Europe, where decades of heavy superpower overlay virtually extinguished the natural (and historically very vigorous) operation of the European security complex. With the end of the Cold War, the implosion of Soviet power, and the weakening of U.S. engagement, the European states are once again faced with the necessity of sorting out their relations. Institutions such as the EU and NATO, which bind potential rivals into strong patterns of military integration and political cooperation, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Partnership for Peace (PFP), which provide security regimes as a first line of defense against the process of securitization, obviously make a huge difference in comparison with pre-1945, when no such barriers to securitization existed. 出于所有这些原因，冷战的结束似乎很可能为地方军事安全动态的运作带来更大的自由。这一效果在欧洲最容易说明，几十年来，超级大国的重重干预几乎扼杀了欧洲安全复合体的自然（且历史上非常活跃的）运作。随着冷战的结束、苏联力量的崩溃以及美国介入的减弱，欧洲各国再次面临理清彼此关系的必要性。欧盟和北约等机构将潜在的竞争对手绑定在强有力的军事一体化和政治合作模式中，而欧洲安全与合作组织（OSCE）和和平伙伴关系（PFP）则提供了作为安全化进程第一道防线的安全机制，这些显然与 1945 年前没有此类安全化障碍的情况相比，产生了巨大的不同。
In Eastern Europe, an entire set of new or newly independent states are groping toward a pattern of security relations for which no historical precedent exists. In some parts of this huge region (the Caucasus, the Balkans, around Hungary, between Russia and the Ukraine, Central Asia), conflict dynamics are either active or in the offing (Buzan et al. 1990; Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 1). As the dust of the Soviet collapse settles, we could be looking at the formation of several new security complexes. Crucial to this process will be how well or how badly the EU handles the tensions of its integrative-disintegrative dynamics. Also crucial will be whether Russia succeeds in reasserting itself as the hegemonic player within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and whether the EU and the CIS conduct their relationship so as to create one integrated security region or two separate ones (Wiever 1996a). It is still an open question whether 在东欧，一整套新的或新独立的国家正在摸索一种安全关系模式，而这种模式在历史上没有先例。在这个庞大地区的某些部分（高加索、巴尔干、匈牙利周围、俄罗斯与乌克兰之间、中亚），冲突动态要么正在活跃，要么即将发生（Buzan 等，1990；Wæver 等，1993，第 1 章）。随着苏联解体的尘埃落定，我们可能正目睹几个新的安全复合体的形成。这个过程的关键在于欧盟如何处理其整合-解体动态的紧张局势，无论是处理得好还是处理得不好。同样关键的是俄罗斯是否能重新确立自己作为独联体（CIS）内霸权玩家的地位，以及欧盟和独联体是否能以一种方式开展关系，形成一个整合的安全区域，还是形成两个独立的安全区域（Wiever 1996a）。目前仍是一个悬而未决的问题，
the EU and Russia will succeed in maintaining the desecuritization of their relationship that ended the Cold War or whether a process of resecuritization will gather strength. 欧盟和俄罗斯是否能成功维持结束冷战的关系非安全化，还是非安全化过程将被重新安全化的进程所取代并逐渐增强。
The end of the Cold War also seems likely to have a sharp effect on regional security in East Asia. With the removal of Soviet power and the reduction of the U.S. presence, the states of this region are-for the first time in their modern history-facing the need to sort out their relations with each other largely free from the foreign presence that has dominated the area since the mid-nineteenth century. One possibility is that East Asia will turn into a balance-of-power regional system (Buzan 1994b; Buzan and Segal 1994; Dibb 1995; Buzan 1997). In many ways, the region resembles nineteenth-century Europe; it is a cluster of substantial powers packed together. Many of these are industrializing, with the result that nationalism is high and the distribution of power unstable. One large, centrally located, rapidly growing power threatens most of the others in a context in which nearly all of the states in the region have territorial, status, and historical disputes with their neighbors. Habits of cooperation are weak; historical memories are long, active, and mostly negative; and apart from ASEAN, regional institutions are remarkably underdeveloped. Modernization of armaments has been proceeding apace, and many of the states in the region could quickly become nuclear powers if the need arose. 冷战的结束似乎也很可能对东亚的地区安全产生深远影响。随着苏联势力的消退和美国存在的减少，该地区的国家首次在现代历史上面临着在很大程度上摆脱自十九世纪中叶以来主导该地区的外国势力影响的情况下，理清彼此关系的需求。一种可能性是，东亚将转变为一个权力平衡的地区体系（Buzan 1994b；Buzan 和 Segal 1994；Dibb 1995；Buzan 1997）。在许多方面，该地区类似于十九世纪的欧洲；它是一个由多个重要大国聚集而成的群体。这些国家中许多正在工业化，导致民族主义高涨，权力分布不稳定。在几乎所有该地区国家与邻国存在领土、地位和历史争端的背景下，一个位于中心、快速增长的大国威胁着大多数其他国家。合作的习惯薄弱；历史记忆悠长、活跃且大多为负面；除东盟外，地区机构发展显著不足。 武器现代化进展迅速，该地区的许多国家如果有需要，可能很快就会成为核大国。
Military relations between the two Koreas and the two Chinas are already acutely securitized. Under these conditions, other relations could easily become securitized. All that stands against such a process are strong domestic resistance to it in Japan (which ironically could increase the threat others perceive from China), a few rather feeble-looking transregional institutions (the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and a shared interest in maintaining the momentum of economic development. There is a curious duality to the security discourse in this region, with much rhetoric about cooperative security (i.e., desecuritization) on the one hand (and some real cooperative measures, as in ASEAN) combined with blunt and regular expressions of fear and hatred, as when Chinese and South Korean leaders jointly recall Japanese wartime atrocities in public. 朝鲜半岛和两岸中国之间的军事关系已经高度安全化。在这种情况下，其他关系也很容易被安全化。阻止这一过程的只有日本国内的强烈抵制（具有讽刺意味的是，这可能会增加其他国家对中国的威胁感知）、一些看起来相当薄弱的跨区域机构（东盟地区论坛和亚太经济合作组织）以及维护经济发展势头的共同利益。该地区的安全话语存在一种奇特的二元性，一方面有大量关于合作安全（即去安全化）的言论（以及一些实际的合作措施，如东盟），另一方面则是直白且频繁的恐惧和仇恨表达，比如中国和韩国领导人公开共同回忆日本战争时期的暴行。
Europe and East Asia stand out, because the overlay effects of the Cold War on their regional dynamics were extreme. The release of those effects has inevitably had strong local consequences. The effect of the end of the Cold War has generally been less dramatic in the Third World than in Europe and East Asia, but the principle is the same: A much weakened superpower presence leaves more room for local sccurity dynamics to take their own shape and to operate more on the basis of local resources, issues, and perceptions. The consequences of this greater regional security autonomy are by no means uniform. In some areas, the superpower withdrawal 欧洲和东亚尤为突出，因为冷战对其地区动态的叠加效应极为显著。这些效应的释放不可避免地带来了强烈的地方性后果。冷战结束的影响在第三世界通常不如在欧洲和东亚那样戏剧性，但原则是相同的：超级大国的存在大大减弱，为地方安全动态提供了更多空间，使其能够更多地基于地方资源、问题和认知来形成和运作。这种更大区域安全自主性的后果绝非统一。在某些地区，超级大国的撤退
seems to have facilitated desecuritization; in others, it seems to have unleashed higher levels of local securitization. 似乎促进了去安全化；而在其他地区，则似乎引发了更高水平的地方安全化。
The main beneficiaries of this autonomy appear to be Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Southern Africa. In all three of these regions, the end of the Cold War has coincided with substantial desecuritization and a move toward the settlement of the issues underlying conflict. In the Middle East, the loss or weakening of superpower sponsorship helped Israel and the Arabs come to the negotiating table. In Southern Africa and Southeast Asia, the collapse of ideological conflict at the center has undercut parallel confrontations at the periphery and has thus facilitated dialogue and conflict resolution at the local level. The anti-Communist stance of the South African government and the Communist affiliations of the African National Congress (ANC) lost much of their significance when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Settlements were facilitated in Namibia and Mozambique; although the settlement in Angola succumbed to local rivalries, that conflict is no longer supported by ideologically motivated external arms supplies and interventions. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, Vietnam’s loss of Soviet ideological and military support encouraged it to move toward membership in ASEAN. ASEAN, for its part, sees the significance of its connection to the United States declining and is aware of the need to create a more coherent regional regime to deal with expanding Chinese power. 这一自治权的主要受益者似乎是东南亚、中东和南部非洲。在这三个地区，冷战的结束与实质性的去安全化以及朝着解决冲突根源问题的方向发展同时发生。在中东，超级大国支持的丧失或削弱促使以色列和阿拉伯国家坐到谈判桌前。在南部非洲和东南亚，中心意识形态冲突的崩溃削弱了边缘地区的类似对抗，从而促进了地方层面的对话和冲突解决。南非政府的反共立场和非洲国民大会（ANC）的共产主义关联在苏联解体后失去了很大意义。纳米比亚和莫桑比克的和解得以促进；尽管安哥拉的和解因地方竞争而失败，但该冲突不再受到意识形态驱动的外部武器供应和干预的支持。同样，在东南亚，越南失去苏联的意识形态和军事支持，促使其向加入东盟迈进。 东盟方面，认为其与美国的联系重要性正在下降，并意识到需要建立一个更有凝聚力的区域机制来应对不断扩大的中国力量。
The main losers from the post-Cold War release of regional security dynamics are the Caucasus, the Balkans, and Central Asia. In all three of these regions, the collapse of Soviet power has unleashed intense processes of securitization and local conflicts over territory, population, and status. Active wars have occurred both between states (Croatia and Serbia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and within them (Bosnia, Georgia, Tadjikistan, Russia). Even where wars have been avoided, the security dilemma is often strong, and military-political tensions exist that could easily lead to war. Numerous minority problems and many unresolved border disputes exist in all three regions. In Central Asia, strong potential exists for disputes over water resources in the river systems that focus on the Aral Sea. In the Balkans, the status of some new states-notably Bosnia and Macedonia-is still in question with their neighbors, as is the ultimate relationship between both the Albanian and Serbian and the Croatian and Serbian states and their respective nations. Between Eastern Europe and the Caucasus lies the simmering possibility of rivalry between Russia and the Ukraine. The resources for successful securitization are plentiful and the restraints against it far from overwhelming. 冷战后地区安全动态释放的主要受害者是高加索、巴尔干和中亚。在这三个地区，苏联权力的崩溃引发了激烈的安全化进程以及围绕领土、人口和地位的地方冲突。国家之间（克罗地亚与塞尔维亚，亚美尼亚与阿塞拜疆）和国家内部（波斯尼亚、格鲁吉亚、塔吉克斯坦、俄罗斯）都发生了激烈的战争。即使避免了战争，安全困境依然严重，存在可能轻易引发战争的军事政治紧张局势。三个地区都存在众多少数民族问题和许多未解决的边界争端。在中亚，围绕以咸海为中心的河流系统的水资源争端潜力很大。在巴尔干，一些新国家的地位——尤其是波斯尼亚和马其顿——仍然受到邻国质疑，阿尔巴尼亚与塞尔维亚以及克罗地亚与塞尔维亚国家及其各自民族之间的最终关系也尚未确定。在东欧和高加索之间，俄罗斯与乌克兰之间潜藏着激烈的竞争可能性。 成功安全化的资源丰富，而对其的限制远未达到压倒性的程度。
In other Third World regions, the effect of freer regional security dynamics is as yet difficult to call. In both South Asia and the Gulf, longstanding patterns of rival military securitization continue much as before. India and Pakistan have lost their superpower allies and supporters; unless 在其他第三世界地区，更自由的区域安全动态的影响尚难以判断。在南亚和海湾地区，长期存在的军事安全化竞争模式基本保持不变。印度和巴基斯坦已经失去了他们的超级大国盟友和支持者；除非
Pakistan can compensate by strengthening its Islamic or Chinese connections, over time this development should favor the naturally greater military weight of India. Should it do so, a shift to explicit postures of nuclear deterrence in the region will become more likely. In the Gulf, external intervention still plays a strong role in the wake of the war against Iraq. The interest of outside powers in oil resources is likely to make this area one in which continued great-power involvement can be guaranteed. Nevertheless, the basic regional security dynamics among Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia look set to continue, and here, too, the threat of nuclearization exists, although probably not on as short a timescale as is possible in South Asia. 巴基斯坦能够通过加强其伊斯兰或中国的联系来弥补，随着时间推移，这一发展应有利于印度自然更强的军事力量。如果真是如此，该地区转向明确的核威慑姿态的可能性将增加。在海湾地区，外部干预在对伊拉克战争之后仍然发挥着重要作用。外部大国对石油资源的兴趣可能使该地区成为持续大国介入的保障区域。然而，伊拉克、伊朗和沙特阿拉伯之间的基本区域安全动态似乎将继续存在，在这里，核化的威胁也存在，尽管可能不会像南亚那样在短时间内实现。
For the most part, interstate relations in Latin America were not heavily affected by the Cold War and, except for Cuba, are little affected by its demise. Serious wars among Latin American states have been rare, although military rivalries and tensions have been somewhat common, as has the use of force in domestic politics. To the extent that the current democratization in the region is a product of the end of the Cold War (because of the weakening of the anti-Communist justification for authoritarianism), Latin America is probably a beneficiary, enjoying a significant and sustained trend of desecuritization. In the longer run, however, the question is still open about what kind of international relations will develop in this region. On the one hand, there are firm signs of moves toward a regional security regime, as indicated, inter alia, by the regional nuclear weapons-free zone and the significant desecuritizing moves between Argentina and Brazil. On the other hand, Brazil still harbors a strong image of itself as a great power, and the region contains many territorial disputes and status rivalries that periodically generate the process of securitization. Either trend could dominate in an international environment that favors the operation of regional security dynamics. 在很大程度上，拉丁美洲的国家间关系并未受到冷战的严重影响，除古巴外，也很少受到冷战结束的影响。拉丁美洲国家之间的严重战争很少见，尽管军事竞争和紧张局势较为常见，国内政治中使用武力的情况也时有发生。在一定程度上，当前该地区的民主化是冷战结束的产物（因为反共主义为专制政权提供的正当性减弱），拉丁美洲可能是受益者，享有显著且持续的去安全化趋势。然而，从长远来看，该地区将发展出何种国际关系仍是一个悬而未决的问题。一方面，有明确迹象表明该地区正朝着区域安全机制迈进，例如区域无核武器区以及阿根廷和巴西之间显著的去安全化举措。另一方面，巴西仍然抱有作为大国的强烈形象，该地区存在许多领土争端和地位竞争，这些争端和竞争周期性地引发安全化过程。 在有利于区域安全动态运作的国际环境中，任何一种趋势都可能占据主导地位。
In Africa, other than the southern subregion, the immediate military effect of the end of the Cold War is fairly small, and the longer-term effect is unclear. The new South Africa and its neighbors have undergone a process of desecuritization as profound as that in Europe and are well advanced in turning what was a zone of confrontation into a southern African regional security regime. But most other states in Africa are weak, and some seem to be disintegrating. Security problems are often more domestic than interstate, and spillovers from domestic conflicts are more significant than international wars. Except in the Horn of Africa, no strong patterns of regional military security interdependence have emerged. One can see possible beginnings in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in Liberia, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, and the interplay of internal instabilities in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, and Uganda; over time, these may evolve into regional security complexes. In most of Alricia, as in Latin America, the main impact of the Cold War and of its end was on domestic rather than international politics. 在非洲，除南部次区域外，冷战结束的直接军事影响相当小，长期影响尚不明确。新南非及其邻国经历了与欧洲同样深刻的去安全化进程，并在将曾经的对抗区转变为南部非洲区域安全机制方面取得了显著进展。但非洲大多数其他国家都较为薄弱，有些似乎正在解体。安全问题往往更多是国内问题而非国家间问题，国内冲突的溢出效应比国际战争更为显著。除非洲之角外，尚未出现明显的区域军事安全相互依赖模式。可以看到西非国家经济共同体（ECOWAS）对利比里亚的干预、坦桑尼亚对乌干达的干预，以及卢旺达、布隆迪、扎伊尔和乌干达内部不稳定因素的相互作用，可能是区域安全复合体形成的初步迹象。与拉丁美洲类似，冷战及其结束对非洲大部分地区的主要影响是对国内政治而非国际政治。
Great-power engagement in Africa’s conflicts was, with few exceptions, never large. Post-Cold War, it will probably be even more minimal, as the disengagement of the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, France from the region attests. Many domestic conflicts in Africa were largely ignored by the international community during the Cold War, and as the recent tragedies in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Somalia suggest, this policy will probably continue. Interstate regional security dynamics in Africa are weak, because few states are capable of projecting much force beyond their own boundaries. Africa is potentially a morass of territorial and population disputes, like the former Yugoslavia on a huge scale. The nature of the issues and the limits of power available to local actors suggest the possibility of numerous microcomplexes rather than the larger regional patterns one finds in areas where stronger states and powers prevail. 大国在非洲冲突中的介入，除少数例外，历来不多。冷战后，这种介入可能会更加有限，正如苏联以及在较小程度上法国从该地区撤出的事实所证明的那样。冷战期间，国际社会在很大程度上忽视了非洲的许多国内冲突，正如最近利比里亚、塞拉利昂、卢旺达和索马里发生的悲剧所表明的，这一政策可能会继续。非洲的洲际区域安全动态较弱，因为很少有国家能够在本国边界之外投射大量武力。非洲潜在地是一个领土和人口争端的泥潭，类似于前南斯拉夫，但规模更大。问题的性质以及地方行为者可用力量的限制，表明可能存在众多微型复杂冲突，而非在强国和大国主导的地区所见的较大区域模式。
Military security in Africa will very much depend upon what Africans make of the strange sociopolitical legacy the combination of their own cultural patterns and the colonial impositions of the Europeans has left them (Buzan 1994a). Only in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and perhaps Central Asia does one find conditions similar to those prevailing in much of Africa. The danger is not of external intervention but of the international community simply ignoring these places. The abortive humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Rwanda and perhaps Bosnia will act as a deterrent to intervention in subsequent collapses of domestic political order elsewhere. 非洲的军事安全在很大程度上将取决于非洲人如何看待他们自身文化模式与欧洲殖民强加的社会政治遗产的奇异结合（Buzan 1994a）。只有在巴尔干地区、高加索地区，或许还有中亚，才会发现与非洲大部分地区类似的状况。危险不在于外部干预，而在于国际社会对这些地区的简单忽视。索马里和卢旺达，以及或许还有波斯尼亚的失败人道主义干预，将成为对未来其他地方国内政治秩序崩溃时干预的威慑。
In places such as these, where weak states totter toward collapse, there is a real possibility that the diffusion in military security away from the global level will not stop at the regional level but will unravel all the way down to the local one. This scenario, captured powerfully by Robert Kaplan (1994), is already visible in places such as Bosnia, Somalia, Liberia, Colombia, Afghanistan, Tadjikistan, Sudan, and Sierra Leone, where failed states are opening the way for gangs, clans, and mafias. For the peoples involved, such developments mean military (in) security becomes a paramount feature of daily life, which takes on many features of a Hobbesian anarchy. Such political failures are extremely difficult and costly to remedy from outside, and they can gain support from the internationally organized mafias that are the dark side of increasing economic liberalization and that can make good use of areas that lack effective state control. 在像这样的地方，弱国摇摇欲坠，濒临崩溃，军事安全从全球层面向下扩散不仅可能止步于地区层面，还可能一直瓦解到地方层面。这个情景由 Robert Kaplan（1994 年）有力地描绘出来，已经在波斯尼亚、索马里、利比里亚、哥伦比亚、阿富汗、塔吉克斯坦、苏丹和塞拉利昂等地显现出来，那里的失败国家为帮派、氏族和黑手党打开了通道。对于相关人民来说，这种发展意味着军事（不）安全成为日常生活的一个重要特征，呈现出许多霍布斯式无政府状态的特征。这种政治失败极其难以且代价高昂地通过外部力量加以补救，而且它们可能获得国际组织的黑手党的支持，后者是经济自由化日益加深的阴暗面，能够充分利用缺乏有效国家控制的地区。
This localizing dynamic can be seen as part of a much wider process in which increasing liberalization is weakening state structures everywhere and pushing individuals toward more “tribalist” forms of association (Horsman and Marshall 1995). Where states are strong and societies well developed and relatively cohesive, such weakening may be manageable. But where states are weak and societies poorly developed and fragmented, the real danger exists that the localizing of military security will corrode most of the foundations of political order. Substantial areas of Africa and 这种地方化动态可以被视为一个更广泛过程的一部分，在这个过程中，日益增加的自由化正在削弱各地的国家结构，并推动个人走向更“部落主义”的联合形式（Horsman 和 Marshall 1995）。当国家强大、社会发达且相对凝聚时，这种削弱可能是可控的。但当国家薄弱、社会发展不良且分裂时，真正的危险在于军事安全的地方化将腐蚀政治秩序的大部分基础。非洲和
the Middle East, as well as some parts of Asia and Latin America, have the potential to drift toward this fate, including some significant countries such as Nigeria and Zaire. Should such tendencies develop, they would result in the unstable microcomplexes of a primal anarchy. 中东的大部分地区，以及亚洲和拉丁美洲的一些部分，有可能走向这种命运，包括一些重要国家如尼日利亚和扎伊尔。如果这种趋势发展，将导致原始无政府状态下不稳定的微观复杂体。
Summary 摘要
States and would-be states have traditionally been, and largely remain, the primary referent objects for military security. Protecting the territorial integrity of the state is the traditional object of military security, and the two immediate environments for the state-regional and domestic-are again the main concerns in this sector. Most of the subsystems found in this sector are geographically coherent and thus constitute security complexes. Some alliances and regional organizations and some general principles of international society also have some status as referent objects in this sector. When states disintegrate, lesser units emerge as the primary carriers of military (in)security. As a rule, there is little ambiguity about securitizing actors in the military sector. Relative and absolute military capabilities do not determine securitization, although they can facilitate it. Geographical, historical, and political factors also shape the process of securitization. Once securitization has taken root, military security relations can fall into well-understood patterns of action and reaction. 国家和准国家传统上一直是军事安全的主要参照对象，并在很大程度上仍然如此。保护国家的领土完整是军事安全的传统目标，而国家的两个直接环境——区域和国内——再次成为该领域的主要关注点。该领域中发现的大多数子系统在地理上是连贯的，因此构成了安全复合体。一些联盟和区域组织以及国际社会的一些一般原则在该领域也具有一定的参照对象地位。当国家解体时，较小的单位成为军事（不）安全的主要承载体。通常，军事领域中的安全化行为者几乎没有歧义。相对和绝对的军事能力并不决定安全化，尽管它们可以促进安全化。地理、历史和政治因素也影响安全化的过程。一旦安全化扎根，军事安全关系就可能陷入众所周知的行动与反应模式。
After a long period in which the global level has dominated this sector, a clear shift is now underway toward primacy for regional military security dynamics. In some cases, this has muted regional conflicts; in other cases, it has exacerbated them. In a few regions, processes of desecuritization have largely eliminated the military security dilemma among local states. In regions dominated by weak or failed states, real prospects exist that the local level will become dominant, with securitization forming microregions. To the list of microregions we should perhaps add the Hobbesian anarchies in some inner cities of megalopolises. When political authority breaks down, inter alia, the distinction between police and military dissolves. 在全球层面长期主导该领域之后，现在正明显转向区域军事安全动态的主导地位。在某些情况下，这抑制了区域冲突；在其他情况下，则加剧了冲突。在少数地区，去安全化进程在很大程度上消除了当地国家之间的军事安全困境。在由弱国或失败国家主导的地区，存在地方层面成为主导的真实可能性，安全化形成了微观区域。我们或许应将某些大都市内城区的霍布斯式无政府状态也加入微观区域的名单。当政治权威崩溃时，警察与军队之间的界限等也随之消失。
The main conclusion is that the military sector is still dominated by regional security dynamics but with an increased prospect for local dynamics in weak states-that is, regional security complexes and microcomplexes. Open to further research is the question of whether these microcomplexes will link up to form a major disruption of the international system as such-to create holes, as it were, in the fabric of international society (Kaplan 1994; de Wilde 1995). But in general, the logic of classical security complex theory remains substantially valid for this sector. 主要结论是，军事领域仍然由区域安全动态主导，但在弱国中地方动态的前景有所增加——即区域安全复合体和微复合体。尚待进一步研究的问题是，这些微复合体是否会联结起来，形成对国际体系本身的重大扰动——可以说是在国际社会结构中制造“漏洞”（Kaplan 1994；de Wilde 1995）。但总体而言，经典安全复合体理论的逻辑在该领域仍然基本有效。
CHAPTER 4 第四章
The Environmental Sector 环境部门
The Environmental Security Agenda 环境安全议程
Some analysts describe environmental security as “ultimate security” (Myers 1993a), others as a pollution of security proper (Deudney 1990). Most others oscillate somewhere in between. ^(1){ }^{1} Some scholars filter environmental security through a political and military lens (Homer-Dixon 1991), others perceive it as a social welfare issue (as reflected, e.g., in Article 130R of the Treaty of the European Union). In the study of international relations, moreover, the environment seems to be a welcome garden for case studies in regime theory (Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993). But attempts to securitize environmental values have a very short history compared to what can be seen with regard to the other four sectors we discuss. The discourses, power struggles, and securitizing moves in the other sectors are reflected by and have sedimented over time in concrete types of organizations - notably states (in terms of Tilly 1990, the product of sword and capital), nations (identity configurations), and the UN system. It is as yet undetermined what kinds of political structures environmental concerns will generate. So far, epistemic communities, social movements, governmental departments, and international organizations have emerged from the environmental discourse, but whether these groups represent just the beginning or the pinnacle of this development is hard to say-especially given the fluctuations in environmental threat perceptions. 一些分析人士将环境安全描述为“终极安全”（Myers 1993a），另一些则认为它是对安全本身的污染（Deudney 1990）。大多数人则介于两者之间。一些学者通过政治和军事的视角来过滤环境安全（Homer-Dixon 1991），另一些则将其视为社会福利问题（例如，反映在《欧洲联盟条约》第 130R 条中）。此外，在国际关系研究中，环境似乎是制度理论案例研究的一个受欢迎的领域（Haas、Keohane 和 Levy 1993）。但与我们讨论的其他四个部门相比，试图将环境价值安全化的历史非常短暂。其他部门中的话语、权力斗争和安全化行动通过具体类型的组织得以反映并随着时间沉淀——尤其是国家（根据 Tilly 1990，剑与资本的产物）、民族（身份构型）以及联合国体系。环境问题将产生何种政治结构，目前尚未确定。 到目前为止，认知共同体、社会运动、政府部门和国际组织已经从环境话语中出现，但这些群体是否仅仅代表了这一发展的开始或顶峰，尚难以断言——尤其考虑到环境威胁认知的波动性。
This discourse has been manifest only since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. More than twenty years later, it has gained enough momentum to turn the environment into a lens through which to observe politics. There is even a new professional journal called Environment and Security. We are not arguing that the environment (or any of the other sectors) should be securitized; we merely observe that at least some actors are attempting to do so. 这一话语自 1972 年联合国人类环境会议以来才开始显现。二十多年后，它已获得足够的动力，将环境转变为观察政治的一个视角。甚至出现了一本名为《环境与安全》的新专业期刊。我们并不主张环境（或其他任何领域）应被安全化；我们仅仅观察到至少有一些行为者正在尝试这样做。
One of the most striking features of the environmental sector is the existence of two different agenda: a scientific agenda and a political agenda. Although they overlap and shape each other in part, the scientific agenda is typically embedded in the (mainly natural) sciences and nongovern- 环境领域最显著的特征之一是存在两个不同的议程：科学议程和政治议程。尽管它们部分重叠并相互影响，科学议程通常嵌入于（主要是自然）科学和非政府机构中——
mental activity. It is constructed outside the core of politics, mainly by scientists and research institutions, and offers a list of environmental problems that already or potentially hamper the evolution of present civilizations. The political agenda is essentially governmental and intergovernmental. It consists of the public decisionmaking process and public policies that address how to deal with environmental concerns. As such, the political agenda reflects the overall degree of politicization and securitization (as contrasted with private securitizing and desecuritizing moves). The two agenda overlap in the media and in public debates. Ultimately, the scientific agenda underpins securitizing moves, whereas the political agenda is about three areas: (1) state and public awareness of issues on the scientific agenda (how much of the scientific agenda is recognized by policymakers, their electorates, and their intermediaries-the press); (2) the acceptance of political responsibility for dealing with these issues; and (3) the political management questions that arise: problems of international cooperation and institutionalization-in particular regime formation, the effectiveness of unilateral national initiatives, distribution of costs and benefits, free-rider dilemmas, problems of enforcement, and so forth. 心理活动。它是在政治核心之外构建的，主要由科学家和研究机构构成，提供了一份已经或可能阻碍现有文明发展的环境问题清单。政治议程本质上是政府和政府间的。它包括处理环境问题的公共决策过程和公共政策。因此，政治议程反映了整体的政治化和安全化程度（与私人安全化和去安全化行动相对）。这两个议程在媒体和公共辩论中有所重叠。 最终，科学议程支撑着安全化行动，而政治议程则涉及三个方面：（1）国家和公众对科学议程中问题的认知（政策制定者、其选民及其中介机构——媒体——对科学议程的认可程度）；（2）接受处理这些问题的政治责任；以及（3）由此产生的政治管理问题：国际合作与制度化的问题——特别是体制形成、单边国家举措的有效性、成本与利益的分配、搭便车困境、执法问题等等。
Obviously, the scientific agenda-like the political one-is a social construct, albeit a different one. The scientific agenda is about the authoritative assessment of threat for securitizing or desecuritizing moves, whereas the political agenda deals with the formation of concern in the public sphere about these moves and the allocation of collective means by which to deal with the issues raised. 显然，科学议程——像政治议程一样——是一个社会建构，尽管是不同的建构。科学议程关注的是对安全化或去安全化行动的威胁的权威评估，而政治议程则处理公众领域中对这些行动的关注形成以及分配集体手段以应对所提出问题的过程。
A very practical argument favors this distinction. If a politician or a civilian is told by a specialist or a group of respected scientists that the oceans are overfished, the hole in the ozone layer will cause widespread skin cancer, and population growth is exceeding the carrying capacity of the earth, he or she has no reason to question this report (apart from general healthy skepticism). Two years later, if new investigations point to opposite conclusions, again the individual has no choice but to follow those conclusions (or to dismiss them for secondary reasons). The general public can do no more than trust or mistrust the professionals and make its political choices on that intuitive basis. 一个非常实际的论点支持这种区分。如果一位政治家或平民被一位专家或一群受人尊敬的科学家告知海洋被过度捕捞，臭氧层的空洞将导致广泛的皮肤癌，人口增长超过地球的承载能力，他或她没有理由质疑这一报告（除了普遍的健康怀疑态度）。两年后，如果新的调查得出相反的结论，个人同样只能接受这些结论（或因次要原因而否定它们）。公众只能信任或不信任专业人士，并基于这种直觉做出政治选择。
This is true for all of the sectors under consideration, but the extent to which scientific argument structures environmental security debates strikes us as exceptional. The particular difficulty in dealing with the cumulative global effects of local developments, as well as in many cases threat assessment within a time frame beyond present generations, causes this specific form of dependence upon scientific authority. According to James Rosenau, the demand for scientific proof is a broader emerging characteristic in the international system: “Questions of evidence and proof have become organising foci of global controversies” (1989: 36; see also Rosenau 1990: 425-429). Given the relatively recent emergence of the environment as a 这对于所有正在考虑的领域都是如此，但科学论证在环境安全辩论中的作用程度让我们觉得尤为特殊。处理地方发展累积的全球影响的特殊困难，以及在许多情况下在超越当前世代的时间框架内进行威胁评估，导致了对科学权威的这种特定依赖。根据 James Rosenau 的说法，对科学证据的需求是国际体系中一个更广泛的新兴特征：“证据和证明的问题已成为全球争议的组织焦点”（1989: 36；参见 Rosenau 1990: 425-429）。鉴于环境作为一个相对较新的议题的出现，...
politicized set of values, one may expect this process to be comparatively strong in this sector. This view is consistent with the “epistemic communities approach,” which is based on the assumption that state actors are not only pursuers of power and wealth but are also “uncertainty reducers” (Haas 1992). Faced with the complexity of an international system in which many processes are beyond the control of individual governments, the urgency to decrease uncertainty about the effectiveness of policy initiatives has risen. This situation has enhanced the prestige and power of epistemic communities, particularly because most of them are transnational in scope and hence are able to accumulate knowledge not easily available to government departments. 政治化的价值观集合，人们可以预期这一过程在该领域相对较为强烈。这一观点与“认知共同体方法”一致，该方法基于这样一个假设：国家行为者不仅是权力和财富的追求者，还是“不确定性的减少者”（Haas 1992）。面对一个许多过程超出单个政府控制的国际体系的复杂性，减少对政策举措有效性不确定性的紧迫性日益增加。这种情况提升了认知共同体的声望和权力，特别是因为它们大多数具有跨国范围，因此能够积累政府部门难以获得的知识。
Despite an obvious overlap and interdependence, the two agenda follow different cycles. The scientific agenda must meet academic standards (again, however arbitrary these may be). The political agenda can be shaped by governmental, media, and public standards, which are influenced much more by short-term events. Critical for the political agenda is not whether specific threats to the environment are real or speculative but whether their presumed urgency is a political issue. Such securitizing moves will often be dominated by immediate threats to the environmentthe Chernobyl-type lessons (de Wilde 1994). Additionally, the political agenda deals with more substantial parts of the scientific agenda, as was seen during the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 1992. The impact of this agenda is often less visible, because environmental considerations have entered a variety of intergovernmental negotiations and national policymaking practices. In the early phases of regime development, for example, scientific actors tend to play a particularly important role in agenda setting. These actors are often involved in both science and politics: for example, scientists who are attentive to political logic-for instance, who are aware of the necessity to develop scientific consensus positions–but who are also obliged to avoid being stabbed in the back scientifically. Typically, these actors will link up with political actors who have specialized in relating to the field of science; thus, a chain forms from science to politics without the two having to meet in their pure forms (Skodvin 1994). 尽管两者明显重叠且相互依赖，但这两个议程遵循不同的周期。科学议程必须符合学术标准（尽管这些标准可能是任意的）。政治议程则可以由政府、媒体和公众标准塑造，而这些标准更多地受短期事件的影响。对政治议程来说，关键不在于对环境的具体威胁是真实的还是推测的，而在于其假定的紧迫性是否成为政治议题。这类安全化行动通常会被对环境的直接威胁所主导——切尔诺贝利式的教训（de Wilde 1994）。此外，政治议程还涉及科学议程中更实质的部分，正如 1992 年联合国环境与发展大会（UNCED）所展示的那样。该议程的影响往往不那么显著，因为环境考量已进入各种政府间谈判和国家政策制定实践中。例如，在制度发展初期，科学参与者往往在议程设定中扮演特别重要的角色。 这些行为者通常同时参与科学和政治：例如，关注政治逻辑的科学家——例如，意识到发展科学共识立场的必要性——但他们也必须避免在科学上被背后捅刀。通常，这些行为者会与专门从事与科学领域相关事务的政治行为者联系起来；因此，形成了一条从科学到政治的链条，而两者无需以其纯粹形式直接接触（Skodvin 1994）。
It should be emphasized that the political agenda does not only address the more sensational, emotional manifestations of environmental issues but has also become a part of ordinary politics. Political parties, departments, and many firms must formulate environmental policies as a part of their ordinary activities, regardless of whether they believe in them. This situation constitutes politicization rather than securitization. As long as environmental concerns fall outside established economic and political practices and routines, their advocates tend to-and probably must-overemphasize the overwhelming importance of those values and issues. Many securitizing moves can be found in the reports that bridge both agenda, ranging from 应当强调的是，政治议程不仅关注环境问题中更为轰动和情绪化的表现形式，而且已经成为日常政治的一部分。政党、部门和许多公司必须将环境政策作为其日常活动的一部分来制定，无论他们是否认同这些政策。这种情况构成了政治化，而非安全化。只要环境问题仍然处于既定的经济和政治实践与常规之外，其倡导者往往—and probably must—会过度强调这些价值和问题的极端重要性。在连接两者议程的报告中，可以发现许多安全化的举措，范围从…
the Club of Rome reports to the work of the Brundtland Commission. These reports present Silent Spring-type lessons (de Wilde 1994; Carson 1962): It is not the actual disasters but their prediction that leads to securitization. Concepts such as resource scarcity and sustainability have successfully mobilized public concern. When picked up by governments and firms, however, these concerns are often merely politicized; they constitute a subagenda within the larger political context. The environmental sector displays more clearly than any other the propensity for dramatic securitizing moves but with comparatively little successful securitization effects (i.e., those that lead to extraordinary measures). This finding points to the unsettled standing of the environmental discourse as such within public debate. 罗马俱乐部的报告参考了布伦特兰委员会的工作。这些报告呈现了类似《寂静的春天》中的教训（de Wilde 1994；Carson 1962）：导致安全化的不是实际的灾难，而是对灾难的预测。资源稀缺性和可持续性等概念成功地激发了公众的关注。然而，当这些关注被政府和企业采纳时，往往仅仅被政治化；它们构成了更大政治背景下的一个子议程。环境领域比任何其他领域更明显地表现出戏剧性安全化行动的倾向，但成功的安全化效果（即导致非常措施的效果）相对较少。这个发现表明，环境话语在公共辩论中的地位尚未稳定。
Priorities within the two agenda are not always clear. Disagreement exists over what type of concerns have to be politicized and what issues require immediate, extraordinary investments to turn the tides. Obviously, concrete disasters (such as Chernobyl and Bhopal) dictate action to make sure they will never happen again. In general, geographic location and level of welfare play decisive roles in determining the issue ranking on both agenda. Governments in poor countries tend to perceive industrial environmental policies as a luxury, an add-on dimension of regular economic policies, something they cannot afford (MacNeill, Winsemius, and Yakushiji 1991). People upstream on a river may perceive a new source of political power in the ability to control the quantity and quality of the water supply downstream, as with Turkey’s potential clout over Iraq and Syria because it controls the headwaters of the Euphrates (Schulz 1995). Other states may discover and accept their interdependence of a common water resource, as did the members of the nineteenth-century Rhine and Danube River commissions. Similarly, within national societies the price of taking up the scientific agenda is distributed rather unevenly: For example, the scientific agenda on fishery management is less likely to convert traditional fishing communities throughout Europe than it is to convert white-collar workers in Brussels. 两个议程中的优先事项并不总是清晰明确。对于哪些类型的问题需要政治化，哪些问题需要立即进行非常规投资以扭转局势，存在分歧。显然，具体的灾难（如切尔诺贝利和博帕尔）要求采取行动，确保此类事件不再发生。总体而言，地理位置和福利水平在确定两个议程中问题的优先级方面起决定性作用。贫穷国家的政府往往将工业环境政策视为奢侈品，是常规经济政策的附加维度，是他们负担不起的东西（MacNeill, Winsemius, and Yakushiji 1991）。河流上游的人们可能会将控制下游水量和水质的能力视为一种新的政治权力来源，就像土耳其因控制幼发拉底河源头而对伊拉克和叙利亚具有潜在影响力一样（Schulz 1995）。其他国家可能会发现并接受他们对共同水资源的相互依赖，就像十九世纪莱茵河和多瑙河委员会的成员所做的那样。 同样，在国家社会内部，承担科学议程的代价分布相当不均：例如，关于渔业管理的科学议程不太可能改变整个欧洲的传统渔业社区，而更可能影响布鲁塞尔的白领阶层。
The environmental sector is made complicated by its great variety of issues. In the literature that draws up the scientific agenda, several partly overlapping key issues reappear (de Wilde 1994: 161; compare also the agenda presented in MacNeill, Winsemius, and Yakushiji 1991: 131, and Böge 1992). This is the widest formulation of the environmental agenda and therefore includes issues the present study deals with primarily in other sectors. 环境领域因其问题的多样性而变得复杂。在制定科学议程的文献中，几个部分重叠的关键问题反复出现（de Wilde 1994: 161；也可参见 MacNeill、Winsemius 和 Yakushiji 1991: 131，以及 Böge 1992 中提出的议程）。这是环境议程最广泛的表述，因此包括本研究主要在其他领域处理的问题。
Disruption of ecosystems includes climate change; loss of biodiversity; deforestation, desertification, and other forms of erosion; depletion of the ozone layer; and various forms of pollution. 生态系统的破坏包括气候变化；生物多样性的丧失；森林砍伐、沙漠化及其他形式的侵蚀；臭氧层的消耗；以及各种形式的污染。
Energy problems include the depletion of natural resources, such as fuel wood; various forms of pollution, including management disas- 能源问题包括自然资源的枯竭，如燃料木材；各种形式的污染，包括管理灾难—
ters (related in particular to nuclear energy, oil transportation, and chemical industries); and scarcities and uneven distribution. 相关问题（特别是与核能、石油运输和化工行业相关）；以及资源稀缺和分布不均。
Population problems include: population growth and consumption beyond the earth’s carrying capacity; epidemics and poor health conditions in general; declining literacy rates; and politically and socially uncontrollable migrations, including unmanageable urbanization. 人口问题包括：人口增长和消费超出地球承载能力；流行病和普遍的健康状况不佳；识字率下降；以及政治和社会上无法控制的迁移，包括无法管理的城市化。
Food problems include poverty, famines, overconsumption, and diseases related to these extremes; loss of fertile soils and water resources; epidemics and poor health conditions in general; and scarcities and uneven distribution. 食品问题包括贫困、饥荒、过度消费以及与这些极端情况相关的疾病；肥沃土壤和水资源的流失；流行病和普遍的健康状况不佳；以及资源稀缺和分布不均。
Economic problems include the protection of unsustainable production modes, societal instability inherent in the growth imperative (which leads to cyclical and hegemonic breakdowns), and structural asymmetries and inequity. 经济问题包括保护不可持续的生产模式、增长强制性所固有的社会不稳定（导致周期性和霸权性崩溃），以及结构性不对称和不公平。
Civil strife includes war-related environmental damage on the one hand and violence related to environmental degradation on the other. 内战包括一方面与战争相关的环境破坏，另一方面与环境恶化相关的暴力。
Obviously, not every publication on environmental security deals with all of these topics, and not all of them are permanently subject to securitization. It is also unclear that a consensus exists regarding this comprehensive list. “Disruption of ecosystems” is the most purely environmental issue area. The other items on this agenda overlap with the agenda of other sectors, but here they are viewed through an environmental lens. Western-oriented agenda put more emphasis on the role of population issues; Southernoriented agenda put more emphasis on the role of economic issues. Gareth Porter and Janet Brown (1991) are probably right in arguing that both population growth and economic activity fall at the bottom of the entire agenda. 显然，并非所有关于环境安全的出版物都涉及所有这些主题，也并非所有主题都始终处于安全化的状态。关于这份全面清单是否存在共识也尚不明确。“生态系统的破坏”是最纯粹的环境问题领域。议程上的其他项目与其他部门的议程有所重叠，但在这里它们是通过环境视角来审视的。西方导向的议程更强调人口问题的作用；南方导向的议程更强调经济问题的作用。加雷斯·波特和珍妮特·布朗（1991）可能是正确的，他们认为人口增长和经济活动在整个议程中处于底层。
Security Actors and Referent Objects 安全行为体与参照对象
On the face of it, the environment as such, or some strategic part of the environment, is the referent object of environmental security. This is the implicit view of many Greens, which is seen in the presentation of lists of urgent issues meant to enter the realm of high politics (Lodgaard 1992; Myers 1993a). Yet in much of the debate another concern can be detected: a concern for the preservation of existing levels of civilization. In this view, the ultimate referent object of environmental security is the risk of losing achieved levels of civilization-a return to forms of societal barbarismwhile apparently being able to prevent doing so. 表面上看，环境本身或环境的某些战略部分是环境安全的参照对象。这是许多绿党人士的隐含观点，可以在他们提出的旨在进入高层政治领域的紧迫问题清单中看到（Lodgaard 1992；Myers 1993a）。然而，在大部分辩论中可以察觉到另一种关切：对现有文明水平的保护。在这种观点中，环境安全的最终参照对象是失去已取得的文明水平的风险——一种回归社会野蛮形式的风险——而表面上又能够防止这种情况的发生。
The envirommental security debate has taken over from the anti- 环境安全的辩论已经取代了反-
nuclear weapon lobby this concern about the loss of civilization, a shift registered in the cinema by the move from postnuclear war (Mad Max) to postenvironmental apocalypse (Waterworld) barbarism. But the debate moves beyond this Northern middle-class Hollywood perspective. The referent object applies to every achieved level of civilization, whether northern elite, middle class, or Amazon Indian. The concern in all cases is whether the ecosystems that are crucial to preserve (or further develop) the achieved level of civilization are sustainable. Implicitly, this concern forms the deeper motive behind many, although not all, environmental debates. At stake is the maintenance of achieved levels of civilization, including a development perspective free of environmental disasters. In short, environmental security “concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend” (Buzan 1991: 19-20). 核武器游说团体对文明丧失的担忧，这种转变在电影中表现为从后核战争（疯狂的麦克斯）到后环境末日（水世界）的野蛮状态。但这一辩论超越了北方中产阶级好莱坞的视角。参照对象适用于每一个已实现的文明层级，无论是北方精英、中产阶级，还是亚马逊印第安人。在所有情况下，关注点都是那些对维持（或进一步发展）已实现文明层级至关重要的生态系统是否可持续。隐含地，这种关注构成了许多（尽管不是全部）环境辩论背后的深层动机。关键在于维持已实现的文明层级，包括一个免于环境灾难的发展视角。简而言之，环境安全“关乎维持地方和全球生物圈，作为所有其他人类事业赖以依存的基本支持系统”（Buzan 1991: 19-20）。
It is in relation to this ultimate referent object (human enterprise) that a paradox arises similar to that inherent in the classic security dilemma in an anarchic system: The only way to secure societies from environmental threats is to change them. In the twentieth century, civilization-simply perceived as a process of spiral progress from the Stone Age to the pre-sent-has reached potentially self-defeating forms. This is true for civilization writ large and particularly for various small, local communities in their immediate environment. 正是与这一终极参照对象（人类事业）相关，产生了一个类似于无政府体系中经典安全困境固有的悖论：保护社会免受环境威胁的唯一途径是改变社会本身。在二十世纪，文明——仅仅被视为从石器时代到现在的螺旋式进步过程——已经达到了潜在的自我挫败形式。这对于整体文明来说是如此，尤其对于各种小型地方社区及其直接环境更是如此。
It is important to note that in this reading of it, environmental security is not about threats to nature or to “Mother Earth” as such. From a geological point of view, no problem even exists: The earth has been in its place for billions of years, and what has been happening on its crust since, say, the Industrial Revolution is rather unimportant. Also, for the crust itself a nuclear winter, global warming, a hole in the ozone layer, the disappearance of dinosaurs, and the future marginalization of human beings are relatively meaningless events. 需要注意的是，在这种解读中，环境安全并非关于对自然或“地球母亲”的威胁。从地质学角度看，根本不存在问题：地球已经存在了数十亿年，自工业革命以来其地壳上发生的事情其实并不重要。同样，对于地壳本身来说，核冬天、全球变暖、臭氧层空洞、恐龙的消失以及人类未来的边缘化都是相对无关紧要的事件。
Thus, in the environmental sector two different kinds of referent objects represent two wings within the environmental movement: the environment itself and the nexus of civilization and environment. So far, these wings have coexisted in coalition. It is worth noting, however, that by definition the coalition is not harmonious. Especially when it involves the protection of endangered species-like elephants, whales, and rhinos-those who have the environment as such in mind collide with those who put the security of human enterprise at the top. 因此，在环境领域中，两种不同类型的参照对象代表了环境运动的两个翼：环境本身以及文明与环境的联系。到目前为止，这两个翼一直以联盟的形式共存。然而，值得注意的是，从定义上讲，这个联盟并不和谐。特别是当涉及保护濒危物种——如大象、鲸鱼和犀牛——时，那些关注环境本身的人与将人类企业安全置于首位的人发生冲突。
Consensus does exist, however, about the underlying problem: Human enterprise is not merely determined by environmental conditions but is also conditioning the environment itself. Awareness of this fact is relatively recent. Instead of a one-way, linear causal relationship between structural environmental conditions and likely policy options (classical geopolitics), a dynamic, interdependent relationship exists between environment and poli- 然而，对于根本问题确实存在共识：人类企业不仅受环境条件的决定，同时也在影响环境本身。对此事实的认识相对较新。与传统地缘政治中结构性环境条件与可能政策选项之间的单向线性因果关系不同，环境与政治之间存在动态的、相互依存的关系——
tics: Civilization is held responsible for part of its own structural environmental conditions, which limit or enlarge its development options and influence incentives for cooperation and conflict. 政治：文明被认为对其自身部分结构性环境条件负有责任，这些条件限制或扩大了其发展选项，并影响合作与冲突的激励。
A high degree of controversy surrounds environmental issues. In addition to securitizing actors are actors who oppose securitizing moves by either contesting or ignoring the attempt to prioritize a threat. Of course, this might also be said for the military sector, where peace movements sometimes try either to debunk state moves toward securitization (by denying the validity of the threat) or to turn the state against itself (by pointing to the securitization itself as the threat-e.g., in generating arms races or raising the risk of war). But in the environmental sector, the security status of issues has only recently been asserted and, lacking any depth of social sedimentation, is much more vulnerable to such countermoves. Porter and Brown (1991) have captured this concept using the idea of lead actors, veto actors, and veto coalitions. (Their exact term is veto states, but they also apply that term to firms and other functional actors.) These categories embody both political and security moves, but they do give useful insight into the security actors in this sector. 环境问题周围存在高度争议。除了安全化行动者外，还有反对安全化举动的行动者，他们通过质疑或忽视将某一威胁置于优先地位的尝试来反对。当然，这种情况也可以用来描述军事领域，在那里，和平运动有时试图揭穿国家走向安全化的举动（通过否认威胁的有效性）或使国家自我对立（通过指出安全化本身就是威胁——例如，在引发军备竞赛或增加战争风险方面）。但在环境领域，问题的安全地位直到最近才被确立，且由于缺乏深厚的社会沉淀，更容易受到此类反制举动的影响。Porter 和 Brown（1991）通过引入主导行动者、否决行动者和否决联盟的概念，捕捉了这一观点。（他们的确切术语是否决国家，但他们也将该术语应用于公司和其他功能性行动者。）这些类别既体现了政治动作，也体现了安全动作，但确实为理解该领域的安全行动者提供了有用的见解。
Lead actors have a strong commitment to effective international action on an environmental issue in specific cases. These actors may be states. Australia, for example, took the lead in regime formation for Antarctica. Sweden and Norway pushed international action on transboundary air pollution, especially acid rain. Related to the scientific agenda, however, the lead actor is not a state but a global, environmental epistemic community (Haas 1992) that investigates the urgency of a wide range of environmental subjects, constructs an agenda, and communicates that agenda to the press and political elites. It is worthwhile to consider this loose “community” as an independent political force in this sector, because its members have proved able to exert major political influence. For the political agenda, the distinctive lead actors are activist and lobbying nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), of which Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund are among the most outstanding examples. Securitizing the environment is their trade. 主要行动者在特定案例中对环境问题的有效国际行动有强烈的承诺。这些行动者可能是国家。例如，澳大利亚在南极体制的形成中起了主导作用。瑞典和挪威推动了跨界空气污染，特别是酸雨的国际行动。然而，与科学议程相关的主导行动者不是国家，而是一个全球性的环境知识共同体（Haas 1992），该共同体调查各种环境议题的紧迫性，构建议程，并将该议程传达给媒体和政治精英。值得将这个松散的“共同体”视为该领域的独立政治力量，因为其成员已被证明能够施加重大政治影响。对于政治议程，独特的主导行动者是激进主义和游说的非政府组织（NGOs），其中绿色和平组织和世界自然基金会是最杰出的例子。将环境安全化是他们的专长。
Porter and Brown (1991: 36-37) distinguish several strategies for lead actors, in particular the states among them. They might raise awareness of an issue by financing research and informing public opinion in target states (i.e., mobilizing the scientific agenda). For this purpose, they can make use of the environmental epistemic community to support their position abroad. These actors may take unilateral action (lead by example), or they may use diplomacy to put the issue on the agenda of international organizations or to isolate veto actors. In most cases, however, these initiatives cannot be called securitizing moves; they constitute politicization. This is characteristic of the entire practice of environmental regime formation in the international system. Porter 和 Brown（1991：36-37）区分了几个主导行为者的策略，特别是其中的国家。他们可能通过资助研究和向目标国家的公众舆论传达信息来提高对某一问题的认识（即动员科学议程）。为此，他们可以利用环境知识共同体来支持他们在国外的立场。这些行为者可能采取单边行动（以身作则），或者他们可能利用外交手段将该问题纳入国际组织的议程，或孤立否决行为者。然而，在大多数情况下，这些举措不能被称为安全化行动；它们构成了政治化。这是国际体系中环境制度形成整个实践的特征。
Veto actors can also take the form of NGOs, such as industrial and agricultural Iobbies (e.g., the U.S.-based Global Climate Coalition) that try to play down environmental issues, but the main actors are states and firms. Obviously, the veto power of states and firms is different, because the latter lack formal sovereignty rights. But they may have actual veto power because of monopolies or quasi-monopolies on technological knowledge and implementation or effective lobbying, winning states for their positions. 否决行为者也可以采取非政府组织的形式，例如工业和农业游说团体（如总部位于美国的全球气候联盟），他们试图淡化环境问题，但主要的行为者是国家和企业。显然，国家和企业的否决权不同，因为后者缺乏正式的主权权利。但由于在技术知识和实施上的垄断或准垄断地位，或有效的游说，赢得国家支持其立场，他们可能拥有实际的否决权。
Lead or veto positions tend to be issue specific. Environmental politics are therefore not ruled by fixed hegemonic power structures or balance-ofpower structures. The positions are strategic: Japan is a leading blocking state in the veto coalition in relation to whaling; “Brazil, India, and China could block an international agreement on climate change by refusing to curb the use of fossil fuels in their own development programs” (Porter and Brown 1991: 17). In the 1950s and 1960s, international shipping-organized as the International Chamber of Shipping and the International Marine Forum-and the Seven Sisters first blocked and then determined the content of environmental regimes on maritime (oil) pollution. During the 1970 s and 1980 s, international action on ozone protection was blocked by the 19 chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)-producing chemical companies, especially Du Pont ( 25 percent of world production), Allied Chemical, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), and Great Lakes Chemical (Porter and Brown 1991: 65-66; Benedick 1991). Similarly, veto actors can be identified in relation to biodiversity (e.g., states and companies involved in the exploitation of tropical forests), acid rain (industries with high emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide), river pollution (upstream states and companies), and even population growth, where the policies of specific states (China, Indonesia, and India in particular) may make a difference. 领导或否决立场往往是针对具体议题的。因此，环境政治并不受固定的霸权权力结构或权力平衡结构所支配。这些立场具有战略性：日本是反捕鲸否决联盟中的主要阻挠国家；“巴西、印度和中国可能通过拒绝在自身发展计划中限制化石燃料的使用，阻止国际气候变化协议的达成”（Porter 和 Brown 1991: 17）。在 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代，国际航运——以国际航运商会和国际海事论坛的形式组织——以及七姐妹公司，首先阻挠了环境制度中关于海洋（石油）污染的内容，随后决定了其内容。在 1970 年代和 1980 年代，关于臭氧层保护的国际行动被 19 家氯氟烃（CFC）生产化工公司阻挠，尤其是杜邦公司（占全球产量的 25%）、联合化学公司、帝国化学工业公司（ICI）和大湖化学公司（Porter 和 Brown 1991: 65-66；Benedick 1991）。 同样，可以识别出与生物多样性相关的否决行为者（例如，参与热带森林开发的国家和公司）、酸雨（高排放二氧化硫和氮氧化物的工业）、河流污染（上游国家和公司），甚至人口增长，其中某些特定国家（尤其是中国、印度尼西亚和印度）的政策可能会产生影响。
Geopolitically, one might expect veto actors to operate around the physical sources of environmental problems. They can be determined geographically and functionally, whether the home ports of fishing fleets, the location of unsafe nuclear reactors, or the workplace of firms logging tropical forests. Leading actors are generally found on or close to troubled areas-the areas affected by environmental degradation. Direct victims of degradation can be expected to be found in the front lines (for example, Sweden and Norway over acid rain)—provided they are not occupied with more imminent threats to their existence. 从地缘政治角度来看，人们可能期望否决行为者围绕环境问题的物理源头运作。它们可以从地理和功能上确定，无论是渔船的母港、不安全核反应堆的位置，还是采伐热带森林公司的工作场所。主要行为者通常位于或接近受困地区——受环境退化影响的地区。环境退化的直接受害者预计会出现在前线（例如，瑞典和挪威在酸雨问题上）——前提是他们没有被更紧迫的生存威胁所占据。
When victims lack the resources to lead (as is true for most developing countries), they are likely to be support actors. Leading actors, and support actors even more so, are not by definition located at the danger spots. Especially when the issue is global (such as ozone depletion), economic (as with the demand side of the tropical forest issue), or moral (such as whaling), these actors can be found anywhere-although this generally means in countries that can afford to put energy into remote problems and in which 当受害者缺乏领导资源时（大多数发展中国家都是如此），他们很可能成为支持者。领导者和支持者更是如此，他们并不一定位于危险地点。尤其当问题具有全球性（如臭氧层消耗）、经济性（如热带森林问题的需求方）或道德性（如捕鲸）时，这些参与者可以出现在任何地方——尽管这通常意味着在那些能够投入精力解决远程问题的国家，并且在这些国家中
people are free to do so. Because of the issue-specific nature of these positions, they have (so far) not cumulated in overall power constellations. Nor have environmental values (yet) become a conscious ordering device for society as a whole in the way military, economic, and identity interests have done. 人们有自由这样做。由于这些立场具有特定问题的性质，它们（迄今为止）尚未积累成整体的权力格局。环境价值观也尚未像军事、经济和身份利益那样，成为社会整体的有意识的秩序安排工具。
As with the military sector, the environmental one is rich in functional actors. One large category is economic actors (transnational corporations [TNCs]; state firms; agricultural, chemical, and nuclear industries; fishing; mining; and the like), whose activity is directly linked to the quality of the environment. These are functional actors whose behavior affects ecosystems but who generally do not intend to politicize, let alone securitize, this activity. Their common denominator is that they are large-scale economic actors, generally motivated by profit making. They exploit ecosystems to build or maintain the human habitat. Much of the environmental debate is concerned with how these actors operate. What are the acceptable types and limits of exploitation? Can one find sustainable forms, living from nature’s interest (and if possible increasing that interest) rather than spending its capital? This places these actors in the spotlight of environmental security debates, often in a negative sense. 与军事领域一样，环境领域也充满了功能性行为者。一个重要类别是经济行为者（跨国公司[TNCs]；国有企业；农业、化工和核工业；渔业；采矿等），其活动直接关系到环境质量。这些是功能性行为者，其行为影响生态系统，但他们通常并不打算将这类活动政治化，更不用说安全化了。他们的共同点是作为大规模经济行为者，通常以盈利为动机。他们利用生态系统来建设或维持人类栖息地。环境辩论的大部分内容都关注这些行为者的运作方式。什么样的开发类型和限度是可接受的？是否能找到可持续的形式，从自然的利益中生活（并在可能的情况下增加这种利益），而不是消耗其资本？这使得这些行为者成为环境安全辩论的焦点，且往往是以负面形象出现。
Another set of functional actors is composed of governments and their agencies and also some IGOs. Governments set the environmental rules for economic actors and determine how well (or how badly) these rules are enforced. They allow some institutionalization of environmental security concerns by forming (sub)departments of environmental affairs, creating IGOs such as the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), developing international law, and adding new tasks to existing IGOs such as, for example, the FAO and the World Bank (White 1996, Chap. 10). But governments and their agencies also share some of the roles and responsibilities of economic actors. Also in relation to military functions, they are major exploiters of the environment in such activities as nuclear testing; military exercises; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons production; dumping of surplus weapons and retired naval vessels; and the like. 另一组功能性行为者由各国政府及其机构以及一些政府间组织组成。政府为经济行为者制定环境规则，并决定这些规则的执行情况（好或坏）。他们通过设立环境事务（子）部门、创建联合国环境规划署（UNEP）等政府间组织、制定国际法以及为现有政府间组织（如粮农组织和世界银行）增加新任务，允许环境安全问题的某种制度化（White 1996，第 10 章）。但政府及其机构也承担着经济行为者的一些角色和责任。在军事职能方面，他们也是环境的主要利用者，涉及核试验、军事演习、核武器、化学武器和生物武器的生产、过剩武器和退役海军舰艇的倾倒等活动。
The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities 威胁与脆弱性的逻辑
In principle, three relationships of threat define the possible universe of environmental security. 原则上，三种威胁关系定义了环境安全的可能范畴。
Threats to human civilization from the natural environment that are not caused by human activity. Earthquake and volcanic events count (although even here there are debates about human agency), but the most incontrovertible examples are fears of large meteorite strikes and concerns about a natural swing back into a cycle of extensive glaciation. 来自自然环境的对人类文明的威胁，这些威胁并非由人类活动引起。地震和火山事件也算在内（尽管即使在这里也存在关于人类作用的争论），但最无可争辩的例子是对大型陨石撞击的恐惧以及对自然周期性进入大规模冰川期的担忧。
Threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet when the changes made do seem to pose existential threats to (parts of) civilization. Obvious examples here are, at the global level, greenhouse gas emissions and the effects of CFCs and other industrial emissions on the ozone layer. At the regional and local levels, this relates to environmental exploitation (by extraction, dumping, or accidental destruction) beyond the carrying capacity of smaller ecosystems, which upsets the economic base and social fabric of the states involved. 来自人类活动对地球自然系统或结构的威胁，当所做的改变似乎对（部分）文明构成生存威胁时。明显的例子是在全球层面上的温室气体排放以及氯氟烃和其他工业排放对臭氧层的影响。在区域和地方层面，这涉及对较小生态系统承载能力之外的环境开发（通过开采、倾倒或意外破坏），这扰乱了相关国家的经济基础和社会结构。
Threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet when the changes made do not seem to pose existential threats to civilization. An example of this might be the depletion of various mineral resources, which may be inconvenient but which can almost certainly be handled by advances in technology (i.e., the shift from copper to silicon in the electronics industry and potentially a shift from metal to ceramics in some engineering applications). 人类活动对地球自然系统或结构的威胁，当所做的改变似乎并不构成对文明的生存威胁时。例如，矿产资源的枯竭，虽然可能带来不便，但几乎可以通过技术进步来应对（例如，电子工业中从铜向硅的转变，以及在某些工程应用中可能从金属向陶瓷的转变）。
The last of these relationships registers little in the discourse of environmental security, with the notable exception of concerns over the extinction of various animals (especially birds and large mammals). The first does register but only at the margins. It could grow if the scientific agenda provides more compelling reasons to worry about it or if those securitizing actors that have an interest in it (e.g., the space defense lobby) become more influential. 这些关系中的最后一种在环境安全话语中几乎没有被提及，显著的例外是对各种动物（尤其是鸟类和大型哺乳动物）灭绝的关注。第一种关系确实有所体现，但仅限于边缘。如果科学议程提供了更多令人信服的理由来担忧它，或者那些对其有兴趣的安全化行为者（例如，太空防御游说团体）变得更有影响力，这种关系可能会增长。
The second relationship is the main reason to talk about environmental security: It represents a circular relationship of threat between civilization and the environment in which the process of civilization involves a manipulation of the rest of nature that in several respects has achieved selfdefeating proportions. From a global perspective, this circular relationship is mainly the result of two developments: the explosive growth of both the world population and economic activity in the second half of the twentieth century. During the last 2,000 years, world population increased from an estimated hundred million to about 6 billion. In the 10,000 years before that, world population grew from a mere 4 million to a hundred million (Ponting 1991: 90, 92, 241; Porter and Brown 1991: 4). Between 1960 and 1990, the estimated gross world product almost quadrupled, from about $6\$ 6 trillion to almost $20\$ 20 trillion (Porter and Brown 1991: 5). Ideas for integrating environmental concerns into economic accounting are fairly new (van Dieren 1987) but are being pushed by the rise in pollution statistics in the late twentieth century. 第二种关系是讨论环境安全的主要原因：它代表了文明与环境之间的威胁循环关系，其中文明进程涉及对自然其余部分的操控，在多个方面已经达到了自我挫败的程度。从全球视角来看，这种循环关系主要是两个发展的结果：二十世纪下半叶世界人口和经济活动的爆炸性增长。在过去的 2000 年里，世界人口从估计的一亿增加到约 60 亿。在之前的 1 万年里，世界人口从仅有的 400 万增长到一亿（Ponting 1991: 90, 92, 241；Porter and Brown 1991: 4）。1960 年至 1990 年间，估计的全球总产值几乎翻了四倍，从约 万亿增长到接近 万亿（Porter and Brown 1991: 5）。将环境问题纳入经济核算的理念相当新颖（van Dieren 1987），但由于二十世纪末污染统计数据的上升，这一理念正在被推动。
Crucial for understanding environmental security is the idea that it is within human power to turn the tide. The problem is one of humankind’s struggle not with nature but with the dynamics of its own cultures-a civilizational issue that expresses itself mainly in economic and demographic 理解环境安全的关键在于认识到人类有能力扭转局势。问题不在于人类与自然的斗争，而在于人类自身文化动态的斗争——这是一个文明问题，主要表现为经济和人口维度，
dimensions and that potentially affects the degrees of order in the international system and its subsystems. 这些维度可能影响国际体系及其子系统中的秩序程度。
This basic principle of population concentration and the concentration of economic activity straining or exceeding the existing carrying capacity of ecosystems is foundational at all levels of analysis, not just the global level. Urbanization, for example, is typically related to local problems of overpopulation, pollution is typically related to local industrial problems, and soil erosion is typically related to combined small-scale economic and population pressures. 人口集中和经济活动集中导致生态系统承载能力紧张或超负荷的这一基本原则，是所有分析层面上的基础，不仅仅是全球层面。例如，城市化通常与局部的人口过剩问题相关，污染通常与局部工业问题相关，土壤侵蚀通常与小规模的经济和人口压力共同作用有关。
At first sight, there seems to be more room for natural hazards of the first type of threat: Nature threatens civilization, and this is securitized. Many societies are structurally exposed to recurring extreme natural events, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, cyclones, floods, droughts, and epidemics. ^(2){ }^{2} They are vulnerable to these events, and much of their history is about this continuous struggle with nature. The risks involved are often explicitly securitized and institutionalized. In the Netherlands, for example, protection against the sea and flooding rivers is a high-ranking national interest; the same goes for protection against earthquakes in Japan. 乍一看，似乎第一类威胁中的自然灾害有更多的空间：自然威胁文明，这被安全化了。许多社会在结构上暴露于反复发生的极端自然事件，如地震、火山爆发、气旋、洪水、干旱和流行病。它们对这些事件很脆弱，其历史很大程度上就是与自然的持续斗争。所涉及的风险通常被明确地安全化和制度化。例如，在荷兰，防御海洋和洪水河流是一个高优先级的国家利益；在日本，防震也是如此。
As soon as some form of securitization or politicization occurs, howev-er-that is, when some measure of human responsibility replaces the role of fate or God-even this group of conflicts tends to develop a social character (the second type of threat). Following the river floods in the low countries in 1995, the debate in the Netherlands was about political responsibility for the dikes: Who was to blame, and what should be done? In Japan, following the Kobe earthquake in early 1995, designers of seismological early warning systems and of construction techniques, as well as governmental civil emergency plans, were under fire. Where the means to handle natural threats are thought to exist, the security logic works less against nature than against the failure of the human systems seen as responsible. Moreover, with links suspected between human activities and “natural” catastrophes, the distinction between natural and manmade hazards is becoming blurred. Therefore, except for cases in which people undergo natural hazards without any question, the logic that environmental security is about “threats without enemies” (Prins 1993) is often misleading. 一旦某种形式的安全化或政治化发生——也就是说，当某种程度的人类责任取代了命运或上帝的角色时——即使是这类冲突群体也倾向于发展出社会性质（第二类威胁）。1995 年低地国家发生河流洪水后，荷兰的辩论集中在堤坝的政治责任上：谁应承担责任，应采取何种措施？1995 年初神户地震后，日本的地震预警系统设计者、建筑技术设计者以及政府的民事应急计划都受到了批评。当处理自然威胁的手段被认为存在时，安全逻辑更多地针对被视为负责的人类系统的失败，而非自然本身。此外，随着人类活动与“自然”灾害之间的联系被怀疑，自然灾害与人为灾害之间的界限变得模糊。因此，除非人们在面对自然灾害时毫无疑问，否则认为环境安全是“无敌威胁”（Prins 1993）的逻辑往往具有误导性。
The basic logic of environmental security is that in a global perspective, humankind is living beyond the carrying capacity of the earth. In local and regional circumstances, this condition is often even more manifest. The exact meaning of the concept carrying capacity is disputed, but for the present context it can be defined as the total patterns of consumption the earth’s natural systems can support without undergoing degradation (cf. Ehrlich 1994). These patterns of consumption involve several variables, such as total population, production modes, and gross per capita consumption levels. In short, carrying capacity depends on numbers, technology, 环境安全的基本逻辑是，从全球视角来看，人类的生活已经超出了地球的承载能力。在地方和区域环境中，这种状况往往更加明显。承载能力这一概念的确切含义存在争议，但在当前语境中，它可以被定义为地球自然系统能够支持而不发生退化的总消费模式（参见 Ehrlich 1994）。这些消费模式涉及多个变量，如总人口、生产方式和人均总消费水平。简而言之，承载能力取决于数量、技术，
and lifestyle. Compare also the notorious E=PAT\mathrm{E}=\mathrm{PAT} equation (Environmental degradation == Population xx\times Affluence xx\times type of Technology), which, despite criticism of its operational value, still captures the three main elements of the environmental security agenda. One billion Westerners is enough to tilt the system; around 4 billion people in low-income economies will do the same. ^(3){ }^{3} The limits-to-growth scenarios (Meadows, Meadows, and Randers 1992; Meadows et al. 1972) tried to reveal the critical breaking points for the earth’s carrying capacity for each combination of trends in these variables. 和生活方式。还可以比较臭名昭著的方程式（环境退化 人口 富裕 技术类型），尽管其操作价值受到批评，但仍然捕捉到了环境安全议程的三个主要要素。十亿西方人足以倾斜系统；约 40 亿低收入经济体的人口也会产生同样的影响。增长极限情景（Meadows, Meadows, and Randers 1992；Meadows 等人 1972）试图揭示地球承载能力在这些变量趋势组合下的关键临界点。
The security debate addresses the reliability of such predictions (Meadows’s work, for example, is widely contested), the prevention of breaking points, and measures to reduce vulnerabilities in case prevention fails. The ultimate question is whether there are civilized ways out of the problems created by civilization. How will people adapt to the new constraints of their environment? So far, two debates about threats and vulnerabilities have arisen in response. Both are substantially affected by a lack of knowledge of the actual levels and probabilities of threat and of what measures might reasonably be taken. 安全辩论涉及此类预测的可靠性（例如，梅多斯的工作广受争议）、防止临界点的措施以及在预防失败时减少脆弱性的手段。最终的问题是，是否存在文明解决文明所创造问题的方式。人们将如何适应其环境的新限制？迄今为止，针对威胁和脆弱性已经出现了两场辩论。这两场辩论都在很大程度上受到对实际威胁水平和概率以及可能合理采取的措施缺乏了解的影响。
The first debate is about the economic-liberal case that questions whether we should do anything. The Economist (1-7 April 1995) argues for discounting the future to avoid huge, perhaps unnecessary economically disruptive expenditures in the present. The argument here is to let the future (with its presumably greater resources and more knowledge) take care of itself. Critics call this unlimited faith in the skills of future generations to deal with problems created here and now “the myth of the techno-fix” (Smith, Okoyo, de Wilde, and Deshingkar 1994). 第一场辩论是关于经济自由主义观点，质疑我们是否应该采取任何行动。《经济学人》（1995 年 4 月 1-7 日）主张对未来进行折现，以避免当前可能造成巨大且不必要的经济破坏性支出。这里的论点是让未来（凭借其假定更丰富的资源和更多的知识）自行解决问题。批评者称这种对未来几代人处理当前问题能力的无限信任为“技术修复神话”（Smith、Okoyo、de Wilde 和 Deshingkar，1994 年）。
The second debate takes the form of a powerful agenda for the periphery against the center (the West), and many studies treat it as such (e.g., WCED 1987; Adams 1990; MacNeill, Winsemius, and Yakushiji 1991; Myers 1993a, 1993b [1984]; Williams 1993; Smith, Okoyo, de Wilde, and Deshingkar 1994). The time seems ripe for a neo-New International Economic Order (NIEO) debate in North-South relations. The asymmetries and inequities in the economic, political, and military sectors-legitimized by the global dominance of Western values-mirror the structures of poverty and affluence that, for different reasons, cause progressive deterioration of the environment. The local variant of this debate is about the domestic balance of interests among elite, middle class, and poor and their respective burdening of the environment. 第二场辩论以边缘对中心（西方）的强大议程形式出现，许多研究也将其视为如此（例如，WCED 1987；Adams 1990；MacNeill、Winsemius 和 Yakushiji 1991；Myers 1993a，1993b [1984]；Williams 1993；Smith、Okoyo、de Wilde 和 Deshingkar 1994）。当前似乎正是北南关系中新国际经济秩序（NIEO）辩论的成熟时期。经济、政治和军事领域中的不对称和不公——由西方价值观的全球主导地位所合法化——反映了贫困与富裕的结构，这些结构因不同原因导致环境的逐步恶化。这场辩论的地方变体则涉及精英、中产阶级和贫困群体之间的国内利益平衡及其对环境的各自负担。
It should be noted that a major difference in these debates involves whether one discusses causes or effects. The essence of the environmental lobby is to deal with causes -attempts to change society by coordinated effort before nature changes it through disaster. Although this policy involves many securitizing moves, it primarily results in politicization only. In terms of politicizing causes, much is happening, but most of the threats 应当注意，这些辩论中的一个主要区别在于讨论的是原因还是结果。环境游说的本质是处理原因——通过协调努力在自然通过灾难改变社会之前尝试改变社会。尽管这一政策涉及许多安全化举措，但它主要只导致政治化。在政治化原因方面，正在发生很多事情，但大多数威胁
are too distant to lead to securitization. Environmental issues often point to an unspecified, relatively remote future and therefore involve no panic politics. It is assumed that it hardly matters whether we act now or next year; therefore, “urgency” becomes reappropriated as a part of “normal politics.” This, of course, is exactly what radical environmentalists question. They argue that taking action is literally an urgent matter, and their rhetoric is definitely one of securitization: It will soon be too late, we have to act even when we must take unpleasant steps that would normally be totally outside the acceptable spectrum, because the nature of the threat demands this. 过于遥远，无法导致安全化。环境问题通常指向一个不确定的、相对遥远的未来，因此不会引发恐慌政治。人们普遍认为现在行动或明年行动几乎无关紧要；因此，“紧迫性”被重新定义为“正常政治”的一部分。当然，这正是激进环保主义者所质疑的。他们认为采取行动确实是一个紧迫的问题，他们的言辞无疑属于安全化：很快就会太晚，我们必须采取行动，即使必须采取通常完全不可接受的令人不快的措施，因为威胁的性质要求如此。
Generally, however, “emergency measures” are still designed and developed in the realm of ordinary policy debates. Especially when we look at regime formation (at the global and regional levels) or at the work of departments of environmental affairs (at the local level), it is difficult to label this work as securitization. Obviously, environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace try to securitize causes as well as effects. Institutes like World Watch Institute do the same in a somewhat more sophisticated manner. Especially intergovernmental organizations such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) have manifest reasons to view environmental issues in terms of existential threats, although overall they have achieved little more than politicization. 然而，一般来说，“紧急措施”仍然是在普通政策辩论的范围内设计和制定的。特别是当我们观察政权形成（在全球和区域层面）或环境事务部门的工作（在地方层面）时，很难将这些工作称为安全化。显然，像 Greenpeace 这样的环境非政府组织试图将原因和影响都安全化。像 World Watch Institute 这样的机构也以稍微复杂的方式做同样的事情。特别是像 Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)这样的政府间组织，有明显的理由将环境问题视为生存威胁，尽管总体上他们所取得的成就不过是政治化。
When crises force the debate to change from one about causes to one about effects, the focus of securitization tends to move into other sectors. Once the AOSIS states have actually been swallowed by a sea-level rise, it is no longer useful to try to securitize the environmental dimension of their problems: The issue becomes one of political and societal disintegration, of migration, of finding or conquering new land on which to live. These are not environmental security issues. 当危机迫使辩论从原因转向影响时，安全化的焦点往往会转移到其他领域。一旦 AOSIS 国家实际上被海平面上升吞没，试图将其问题的环境维度安全化就不再有意义：问题变成了政治和社会解体、迁徙、寻找或征服新的居住土地。这些都不是环境安全问题。
Effects come in two types, each of which involves different forms of securitization. The first type is that of acute disasters. Here, in the early stages securitization of effects is still occurring in the form of acute crisis or disaster management. The making of contingency plans beforehand is not necessarily a form of securitization, but the execution of those plans is. The preparation phase is like discussing the size and sources of a fire brigade, the police, or the army: It is an aspect of ordinary politics unless the allocation of resources is possible only with securitization. But once the fire, the riot, or the war breaks out, the contingency plan receives priority and replaces ordinary politics. 影响分为两种类型，每种类型涉及不同形式的安全化。第一种类型是急性灾难。在早期阶段，影响的安全化仍以急性危机或灾难管理的形式进行。事先制定应急计划不一定是安全化的形式，但执行这些计划则是。准备阶段就像讨论消防队、警察或军队的规模和来源：除非资源分配只能通过安全化实现，否则这是普通政治的一个方面。但一旦火灾、骚乱或战争爆发，应急计划就会优先执行，取代普通政治。
The second manifestation is that of creeping disasters: a slow but steady deterioration of living conditions. Here, most of the effects are open to securitization mainly along nonenvironmental lines. In many cases, the creeping types of environmental disaster cannot be compared with fires, riots, and wars but rather with slow decay: Soil erosion and overpopulation, for example, do not endanger living conditions overnight. It takes time to pass certain thresholds and points of no return, at which point it is simply 第二种表现形式是缓慢灾难：生活条件的缓慢但持续恶化。在这里，大多数影响主要沿非环境路线开放给安全化。在许多情况下，缓慢类型的环境灾难不能与火灾、骚乱和战争相比，而更像是缓慢的衰退：例如，土壤侵蚀和人口过剩不会在一夜之间危及生活条件。达到某些临界点和不可回头点需要时间，此时情况就变得简单明了。
too late for contingency plans. In cases where erosion or overuse has evidently contributed to conflicts, there has been no serious attempt to securitize these environmental problems (the wars in Sudan are just one example). In most cases, the securitization focuses on conflicts in other sectors: Environmental degradation may lead to interstate wars, ethnic conflict, political disintegration or civil strife, and economic deprivation (hunger and poverty). Hylke Tromp (1996) has argued that environmental conflicts will express themselves along the traditional fault lines in societies. This argument seems plausible when securitization moves occur in reaction to the slow effects of environmental problems, provided disaster management is impossible, too late, or not prepared for. Moreover, given the short history of manifest environmental concerns, as well as the issue-specific nature of most actor constellations, firmly rooted environmental enemy images are hard to find. 为应急计划已为时过晚。在侵蚀或过度使用明显导致冲突的情况下，尚未有认真尝试将这些环境问题安全化（苏丹战争只是一个例子）。在大多数情况下，安全化关注的是其他领域的冲突：环境恶化可能导致国家间战争、民族冲突、政治解体或内乱，以及经济匮乏（饥饿和贫困）。Hylke Tromp（1996）认为，环境冲突将沿着社会中的传统断层线表现出来。当安全化是在对环境问题缓慢影响的反应中发生时，这一观点似乎合理，前提是灾难管理不可能、为时已晚或未做好准备。此外，鉴于明显的环境关注历史较短，以及大多数行为体组合的特定问题性质，难以找到根深蒂固的环境敌人形象。
In other words, the environmental sector provides a lens that enables us to highlight root causes of existential threats that become manifest in other sectors. This finding is similar to that for the economic sector. This may sometimes point to misperception or scapegoat functions (e.g., blaming Jews for the economic depression in the 1930s) and sometimes to the overspill from one sector to another: For example, failing to distribute scarce water jeopardizes basic human needs and will stimulate “my family first” policies-that is, extremism. If we define environmental security in terms of sustaining ecosystems that are necessary for the preservation of achieved levels of civilization, it follows that when and where this security fails, the conflicts will be over threats to these levels of civilization - that is, threats to nonenvironmental existential values. The environment, modified by human interference, sets the conditions for sociopolitical-economic life. When these conditions are poor, life is poor. 换句话说，环境部门提供了一个视角，使我们能够突出存在性威胁的根本原因，这些威胁在其他部门中表现出来。这一发现与经济部门的情况类似。这有时可能指向误解或替罪羊功能（例如，指责犹太人导致 1930 年代的经济大萧条），有时则指向一个部门向另一个部门的溢出效应：例如，未能分配稀缺的水资源危及基本人类需求，并将刺激“我的家人优先”政策——即极端主义。如果我们将环境安全定义为维持对已实现文明水平至关重要的生态系统，那么当且仅当这种安全失败时，冲突将围绕对这些文明水平的威胁展开——也就是说，对非环境存在性价值的威胁。环境在人的干预下被改变，设定了社会政治经济生活的条件。当这些条件恶劣时，生活也会变得艰难。
Regionalizing Dynamics? 区域化动态？
The contemporary environmental agenda was originally conceived as global. Its emergence is not the result of the globalization of local developments but, on the contrary, of the discovery of global consequences of seemingly harmless individual or local practices. This contrasts with the development of other security agenda, which evolved out of the gradual globalization of problems that originally had a local character-military security, for example, in which it took centuries for warfare to develop on a global scale. Hence, the rhetoric of the political agenda makes us believe we are dealing with an essentially globalized sector. The bulk of the literature is arguing that, to use the words of Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (1992: 2), 当代的环境议程最初被设想为全球性的。它的出现并非地方发展全球化的结果，而恰恰相反，是由于发现了看似无害的个人或地方行为所带来的全球性后果。这与其他安全议程的发展形成对比，后者是由最初具有地方性质的问题逐渐全球化而演变而来——例如军事安全，战争在全球范围内的发展花费了几个世纪。因此，政治议程的言辞让我们相信我们正在处理一个本质上全球化的领域。大量文献认为，用 Andrew Hurrell 和 Benedict Kingsbury（1992: 2）的话来说，
Humanity is now faced by a range of environmental problems that are global in the strong sense that they affect everyone and can only be effectively managed on the basis of cooperation between all, or at least a very high percentage, of the states of the world: controlling climate change and the emission of greenhouse gases, the protection of the ozone layer, safeguarding biodiversity, protecting special regions such as Antarctica or the Amazon, the management of the sea-bed, and the protection of the high seas are among the principal examples. 人类现在面临一系列环境问题，这些问题在强烈意义上是全球性的，影响所有人，且只能通过世界上所有国家，或至少是非常高比例的国家之间的合作来有效管理：控制气候变化和温室气体排放、保护臭氧层、维护生物多样性、保护南极洲或亚马逊等特殊地区、海底管理以及公海保护，都是主要的例子。
This sounds good, but it is not entirely true. The concern here is global, but most pollution-related problems require first and foremost joint action by the highly industrialized states only; in principle, the protection of Antarctica, except for the hole in the ozone layer, could be left to the seven states that have legal rights there. The Amazon region (and thus, to a large extent, biodiversity) would be protected best by leaving it alone, a decision that rests essentially with the Brazilian government and a few business enterprises. The global dimension is present but not as overwhelmingly as is often suggested. 这听起来不错，但并不完全正确。这里的关注点是全球性的，但大多数与污染相关的问题首先需要高度工业化国家的联合行动；原则上，除了臭氧层空洞外，南极洲的保护可以留给拥有合法权利的七个国家。亚马逊地区（因此在很大程度上包括生物多样性）最好通过不干预来保护，这一决定本质上取决于巴西政府和少数企业。全球维度存在，但并不像常常所说的那样压倒性。
Threats and vulnerabilities in the environmental sector are issue specific and seldom universal. Moreover, causes and effects may be located at different levels and in different regions. Global events seldom have the total character of a potential nuclear winter. Most global events, including climate change and massive migrations, can be compared to events such as the two world wars and the Great Depression: Every corner of the earth is affected but not to the same degree. World War I, for instance, caused more Australian than Dutch casualties, even though the Dutch lived a mere 200 kilometers from the main front. Most global environmental crises have similar uneven effects and involvements. For a proper assessment, it is therefore necessary in every case to establish a chain of cause-effect relationships and to position actors and regions along this chain in terms of the immediacy and the nature of their involvement. 环境领域的威胁和脆弱性具有特定问题性，且很少具有普遍性。此外，原因和影响可能位于不同层级和不同地区。全球事件很少具有潜在核冬天的全面性质。大多数全球事件，包括气候变化和大规模迁徙，可以与两次世界大战和大萧条等事件相比较：地球的每个角落都受到影响，但程度不同。例如，第一次世界大战造成的澳大利亚伤亡多于荷兰，尽管荷兰距离主战场仅 200 公里。大多数全球环境危机也具有类似的不均衡影响和参与程度。因此，为了进行适当评估，每个案例都需要建立因果关系链，并根据参与的紧迫性和性质，将行为者和地区沿此链条定位。
A useful starting point for tracing security complexes in the environmental sector is disaster scenarios. What if the hole in the ozone layer widens, sea levels rise, massive migrations occur, or another Chemobyltype accident occurs? Who is immediately affected? How permanent is the damage? What are the regional political consequences, and are there global consequences? In other words, what is the highest level on which the effects will occur? 追踪环境领域安全复合体的一个有用起点是灾难情景。如果臭氧层的空洞扩大，海平面上升，大规模迁徙发生，或者发生另一场切尔诺贝利式的事故，会怎样？谁会立即受到影响？损害有多持久？区域政治后果是什么，是否有全球后果？换句话说，影响将发生在哪个最高层面？
The next question is, at what level are the causes located? What and who are causing the hole in the ozone layer, the sea level rise, and the like? These locations can sometimes be linked in coherent regions: For example, acid rain in the Nordic countries originates in Britain and Central Europe. Sometimes the complexes of causes and effects are less coherent: The hole 下一个问题是，原因位于哪个层面？是什么和谁导致了臭氧层空洞、海平面上升等？这些位置有时可以在连贯的区域中找到联系：例如，北欧国家的酸雨起源于英国和中欧。有时原因和影响的复合体不那么连贯：空洞
in the ozone layer (effect) can be located regionally, whereas the causes are cumulative and dispersed worldwide. 在臭氧层中（影响）可以局部定位，而原因是累积的并分散在全球范围内。
Because cause and effect do not always match, a third sequence of questions is required-namely, about the actual securitizing moves that are made. What possibilities exist to turn the tide? What are the immediate costs? How can success be assessed? Who has to pay the costs? Who can be held responsible? The last two questions are especially important in light of the fact that causes and effects are not necessarily located at the same level and do not always involve the same actors. Prevention of a Chernobyl-type accident, for example, requires proper management of the nuclear power plant in question-a local issue. The scale of the damage caused by mismanagement, however, turns the issue into an international one that involves all of Europe: A regional regime for the proper management of nuclear power plants seems to be required. In other words, it makes a difference whether the causes are securitized (e.g., local safety prescriptions) or the effects are (e.g., regional international regimes). 因为因果关系并不总是匹配，所以需要第三组问题——即关于实际采取的安全化行动。有哪些可能性可以扭转局势？立即的代价是什么？如何评估成功？谁必须承担代价？谁可以被追究责任？最后两个问题尤其重要，因为原因和结果不一定位于同一层面，也不总是涉及相同的行为者。例如，防止切尔诺贝利式事故需要对相关核电站进行妥善管理——这是一个地方性问题。然而，由于管理不善造成的损害规模，将该问题转变为一个涉及整个欧洲的国际问题：似乎需要一个区域性核电站妥善管理的制度。换句话说，原因被安全化（例如，地方安全规定）还是结果被安全化（例如，区域国际制度）是有区别的。
The third sequence of questions is decisive, because it is here that a political constellation of mutual security concerns is formed. Who feels threatened? Who must those parties cooperate with if action is to be effective? Effects and causes are significant conditions in disposing who will become involved with whom and how, but they do not fully determine outcomes. Securitization always involves political choice; thus, actors might choose to ignore major causes for political or pragmatic reasons and therefore may form a security constellation that is different from what one would expect based on one’s knowledge of effects and causes. 第三个问题序列是决定性的，因为正是在这里形成了一个相互安全关切的政治星座。谁感到受到威胁？如果行动要有效，这些各方必须与谁合作？影响和原因是在决定谁将与谁以及如何参与时的重要条件，但它们并不完全决定结果。安全化总是涉及政治选择；因此，行为者可能出于政治或务实原因选择忽视主要原因，因此可能形成一个与基于对影响和原因的认识所预期不同的安全星座。
Occasionally, pragmatism may prescribe global action, but even then it is necessary to subdivide global issues according to the context of their causes and effects. Dealing with the causes of, for instance, global warming requires a global context. The fossil CO_(2)\mathrm{CO}_{2} emissions that contribute to the greenhouse effect occur worldwide and are therefore a global problem, even though important regional differences should be realized. ^(4){ }^{4} Meeting the causes of global warming points to the urgency of a global regime, which was recognized at UNCED where the climate treaty that became effective in March 1994 was signed. It is telling, however, that at the fol-low-up conference in Berlin (28 March-7 April 1995), saving the intentions declared at UNCED was the optimum goal. Further decisionmaking and regime formation were postponed to the third Climate Summit, to be held in Tokyo in 1997. This postponement is in part a result of the fact that those who have to pay the price for prevention are different from those who pay the price of failure. 有时，实用主义可能要求采取全球行动，但即使如此，也有必要根据其原因和影响的背景对全球问题进行细分。例如，应对全球变暖的原因需要全球背景。导致温室效应的化石燃料排放发生在全球范围内，因此是一个全球性问题，尽管应认识到重要的区域差异。应对全球变暖的原因凸显了全球机制的紧迫性，这一点在联合国环境与发展大会（UNCED）上得到了认可，气候条约于 1994 年 3 月生效并签署。然而，值得注意的是，在 1995 年 3 月 28 日至 4 月 7 日于柏林举行的后续会议上，挽救 UNCED 所宣示的意图成为最佳目标。进一步的决策和机制形成被推迟到 1997 年在东京举行的第三次气候峰会。这一推迟部分是因为那些必须为预防付出代价的人与那些为失败付出代价的人不同。
The effects of global warming are perhaps a global problem in moral terms and in secondary effects, but they are much more localized in immediate existential effects. Some coastal areas are vulnerable to a sea-level rise of even a lew tens of cemimeters. In case of a sea-level rise of one 全球变暖的影响在道德层面和次生效应上或许是一个全球性问题，但在直接的生存影响上则更加局部化。一些沿海地区甚至对几十厘米的海平面上升都非常脆弱。如果海平面上升一米，
meter, many of these areas will disappear or become uninhabitable because of tidal waves and storm surges. At the same time, global warming may be a benefit for Russia and Canada because of the thawing of huge permafrost areas. This discrepancy of localized effects, of course, has a major impact on building successful international regimes. Arriving at a consensus is difficult, and it is hardly surprising that 35 of the most potentially vulnerable states joined forces in AOSIS. 许多这些地区将因海啸和风暴潮而消失或变得不适宜居住。与此同时，全球变暖可能对俄罗斯和加拿大有利，因为巨大的永久冻土区正在解冻。这种局部效应的差异当然对建立成功的国际机制产生重大影响。达成共识很困难，35 个最有潜在脆弱性的国家联合成立了 AOSIS 也就不足为奇了。
This issue-specific set of questions intended to link (potential) disaster with cause and securitization is not an entirely novel approach. The line of thinking is typical for international relations (IR) theories in the functionalist tradition. ^(5){ }^{5} It also reflects the praxis of many regional regime formations around environmental values. Illustrative are, for example, the 13 regional arrangements for cooperation in combating maritime pollution. The mere fact that very similar arrangements are required for almost all seas allows us to conclude that we are dealing with a common set of problems. But is this therefore a global problem? Yes and no. No because effective management on the regional level is possible. Cleaning up the Baltic Sea is not conditional on cleaning up the Mediterranean or vice versa. Incentives to negotiate a comprehensive scheme that includes both seas are therefore absent: The seas are separate, sector-specific regional security complexes. On the other hand, both require similar knowledge, research and development (R&D), investments, political cooperation, legal schemes, and the like. In other words, on the scientific agenda one can expect maritime pollution to be presented as a global challenge, whereas it will boil down to its specific regional contexts on the political agenda. 这一针对特定问题的一组问题旨在将（潜在的）灾难与原因及安全化联系起来，这并不是一种全新的方法。这种思路是功能主义传统中的国际关系（IR）理论的典型表现。它也反映了许多围绕环境价值形成的区域制度的实践。例如，13 个区域合作安排用于应对海洋污染就是一个说明。几乎所有海域都需要非常相似的安排这一事实，使我们得出结论：我们面对的是一组共同的问题。但这因此就是一个全球性问题吗？是也不是。不是，因为在区域层面上可以实现有效管理。清理波罗的海并不依赖于清理地中海，反之亦然。因此，谈判一个涵盖这两个海域的综合方案的动力不存在：这些海域是独立的、特定领域的区域安全复合体。另一方面，这两个海域都需要类似的知识、研究与开发（R&D）、投资、政治合作、法律方案等。 换句话说，在科学议程上，海洋污染可以被视为一个全球性挑战，而在政治议程上则会归结为其具体的区域背景。
Certainly, not all regional and global action on the environment deserves the label security policy. In 1980s, for instance, when the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was signed, followed by the 1991 Madrid Protocol for the Protection of the Antarctic Environment, these events pointed at politicization but not securitization. It may even be better to perceive such events as acts to prevent the need for securitization. With timely management of potential problems, panic politics can be avoided. The Madrid Protocol banned mining activities for 50 years, for example, and the CCAMLR is trying to set up rules for the extraction of krill (a main link in the food chain). 当然，并非所有关于环境的区域和全球行动都应被贴上安全政策的标签。例如，在 20 世纪 80 年代，当《南极海洋生物资源保护公约》（CCAMLR）签署，随后是 1991 年《保护南极环境的马德里议定书》时，这些事件指向的是政治化而非安全化。甚至更好地看待这些事件，是作为防止安全化需求的行为。通过及时管理潜在问题，可以避免恐慌政治。例如，马德里议定书禁止了 50 年的采矿活动，而 CCAMLR 正试图制定磷虾（食物链中的主要环节）开采的规则。
The popular motto “think globally, act locally” fits the environmental sector very well. All disaster scenarios and the ways to prevent them involve local features, which consist of several aspects. First, much of the debate ultimately does focus on specific groups (certain professions and industries) that have to change their behavior more than other groups. Not everyone in every society is expected to pay the same price, and enforcement of specific measures is clearly needed. This may explain why environmentalists count few captains of industry among their members (retired 流行的格言“全球思考，地方行动”非常适合环境领域。所有灾难情景及其预防方式都涉及地方特征，这些特征包含多个方面。首先，许多辩论最终确实聚焦于必须比其他群体更多改变行为的特定群体（某些职业和行业）。并非每个社会中的每个人都被期望付出同样的代价，明确需要执行具体措施。这也许能解释为什么环保主义者中很少有工业领袖（当然不包括退休的）。
ones excluded, of course). It also explains why Galician fishermen fail to see the necessity to stop fishing halibut off the shores of Newfoundland: The potential loss of 7,000 jobs is involved. ^(6){ }^{6} 当然，排除在外的人）。这也解释了为什么加利西亚渔民未能看到停止在纽芬兰海岸捕捞比目鱼的必要性：这涉及到 7000 个工作岗位的潜在损失。
This is the first way in which localizing dynamics are present in this sector: When specific interest groups are forced out of business for the general good, opposition can be expected. Most of this opposition will come from local groups or firms. The question then is whether the measures for the general good of the public sphere can be properly implemented despite local opposition against them. This will often be a question of cross-sectoral conflicts: Local opposition to environmental security policies may cause or aggravate tensions in the other security sectors, in particular leading to political tensions (the legitimacy of the political regime is at stake), economic tensions (the well-being of specific groups is at stake), and societal tensions (if the affected groups have an ethnic or a cultural identity). 这是该领域中地方动态存在的第一种方式：当特定利益集团为了整体利益被迫停业时，可以预期会有反对意见。大多数反对意见将来自地方团体或公司。问题在于，尽管存在地方反对，是否能够妥善实施为了公共领域整体利益的措施。这通常是跨领域冲突的问题：对环境安全政策的地方反对可能引发或加剧其他安全领域的紧张局势，特别是导致政治紧张（政治体制的合法性受到威胁）、经济紧张（特定群体的福祉受到威胁）和社会紧张（如果受影响的群体具有民族或文化身份）。
Whether this type of localizing dynamics will flourish is not decided by environmental criteria alone. A more important factor seems to be the resilience of the states involved: The stronger the state (in Buzanian terms), the less likely it is that environmental problems will create political insecurities at the local (substate) level. Another modifying factor in avoiding local conflicts caused by environmental problems is the work of NGOs and IGOs. In regions characterized by weak states (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa), these global and subsystem actors are especially important: They fill a vacuum at the unit level. 这种类型的地方动态是否会蓬勃发展，不仅仅取决于环境标准。一个更重要的因素似乎是相关国家的韧性：国家越强大（用布赞的术语来说），环境问题在地方（次国家）层面引发政治不安全的可能性就越小。避免因环境问题引发地方冲突的另一个调节因素是非政府组织和政府间组织的工作。在以弱国为特征的地区（例如撒哈拉以南非洲），这些全球和子系统行为者尤为重要：它们填补了单位层面的真空。
The reference to the general good is important; it implies that local conflicts are the result of considerations about wider contexts. Dealing with the causes leads to preemptive, low-intensity conflicts to avoid high-intensity disaster. In the face of such environmental security policies, the local scale may be the main level of implementation and conflict, but it is not the level at which security in this sector crystallizes. The fear of cumulative negative effects on regional and global scales motivates the policies. 提及整体利益很重要；这意味着地方冲突是对更广泛背景的考量结果。处理根本原因会导致预防性的、低强度的冲突，以避免高强度的灾难。在面对这样的环境安全政策时，地方层面可能是实施和冲突的主要层级，但这并不是该领域安全形成的层级。对区域和全球范围内累积负面影响的担忧推动了这些政策的制定。
Obviously, small-scale environmental problems require action, too; in pragmatic terms of enduring environmental disasters or, the opposite, contributing to sustainability, however, the local level is largely negligible in physical terms. It does not dominate the logic of the scientific agenda and, except for a few particular cases, seldom dominates the political one. Only when cameras are present can the local drama perform important symbolic or mythic functions. If, additionally, similar situations exist worldwide (think, for example, of pollution problems in urbanized areas), negative and positive experiences can become chapters in social learning. The precondition, however, is the presence of a reporter (the press, a researcher, or a foreign diplomat) and an audience on a wider scale. Hence, in terms of the political agenda, regional and global communication networks determine the context of most local environmental disasters. In their absence, very few local experiences (and then only negative ones) will have physical 显然，小规模的环境问题也需要采取行动；从持久环境灾难或相反的、促进可持续性的务实角度来看，地方层面在物理意义上基本可以忽略不计。它并不主导科学议程的逻辑，除少数特殊情况外，也很少主导政治议程。只有在有摄像机在场时，地方戏剧才能发挥重要的象征性或神话功能。如果此外，类似情况在全球范围内存在（例如，考虑城市化地区的污染问题），负面和正面的经验可以成为社会学习的章节。然而，前提是有记者（新闻媒体、研究人员或外国外交官）和更广泛的观众。因此，就政治议程而言，区域和全球通信网络决定了大多数地方环境灾难的背景。在缺乏这些网络的情况下，极少数地方经验（且仅限于负面经验）会产生物理上的影响。
regional or global repercussions. Who outside of Kuwait remembers the more than 300 oil lakes and excessive fires in the desert during the Gulf War? 区域或全球影响。除了科威特之外，有谁还记得海湾战争期间沙漠中超过 300 个油湖和过度燃烧的火灾？
There is one important exception to this general argument: the risk that local events will cumulate or escalate into larger-scale problems (e.g., many small fires compose a big one or one small fire can expand). Urbanization problems provide an important example: How will the world deal with urbanization problems when up to 50 percent of the world population lives in cities in the year 2000? ^(7){ }^{7} The destruction of the Aral and Caspian Sea regions is another example, with many different water extraction projects cumulating in the drying up of the two inland seas. Also, local accidents related to nuclear waste, such as the nuclear submarines at the bottom of the Barents Sea, should be mentioned. In such cases, ocean currents may spread the pollution, turning it into a regional risk. 这个一般性论点有一个重要的例外：地方事件可能累积或升级为更大规模问题的风险（例如，许多小火灾组成一场大火，或者一场小火灾可能蔓延）。城市化问题提供了一个重要的例子：当 2000 年世界上多达 50%的人口生活在城市时，世界将如何应对城市化问题？咸海和里海地区的破坏是另一个例子，许多不同的取水项目累积导致这两个内陆海的干涸。此外，还应提及与核废料相关的地方事故，如巴伦支海底的核潜艇。在这种情况下，洋流可能会传播污染，将其转变为区域性风险。
To better trace the essence of such localizing, regionalizing, and globalizing dynamics, empirical research is needed issue area by issue area. For a concrete assessment of security dynamics in the environmental sector, the following sequence of questions should be answered: 为了更好地追踪这种地方化、区域化和全球化动态的本质，需要针对具体议题领域进行实证研究。为了对环境领域的安全动态进行具体评估，应回答以下一系列问题：
(a) What does the disaster scenario look like? How does it manifest itself in time and space? This involves mainly the scientific agenda and provides structural (physical) characteristics of the issue area. (b) Is the disaster scenario (expected to be) politicized and securitized? In other words, at what point are we talking about environmental security in this issue area? This involves the political agenda. (a) 灾难情景是什么样的？它如何在时间和空间上表现出来？这主要涉及科学议程，并提供该问题领域的结构性（物理）特征。(b) 灾难情景是否（预计会）被政治化和安全化？换句话说，我们在该问题领域的哪个阶段谈论环境安全？这涉及政治议程。
(a) Who are the veto and other functional actors in this issue area? In other words, who is causing the problem? This provides structural characteristics. (b) Who are the actual or potential lead and support actors? This provides political characteristics of the issue area. The resulting actor typology provides a strong indication of the localizing, regionalizing, and globalizing dynamics of the political agenda. If actors become interconnected in a political constellation over these security issues, they represent a security complex. (a) 在该问题领域中，谁是否决者和其他功能性行为者？换句话说，谁在制造问题？这提供了结构性特征。(b) 谁是实际或潜在的主导和支持行为者？这提供了该问题领域的政治特征。由此产生的行为者类型学强烈表明了政治议程的地方化、区域化和全球化动态。如果行为者在这些安全问题上形成政治联盟，他们就构成了一个安全复合体。
How independent an issue area are we dealing with? (a) Is there structural issue linkage? For example, in poverty-related forms of desertification, the issue of erosion is linked to those of population growth and domestic and North-South economic asymmetries. This again mainly involves the scientific agenda. (b) Is there political issue linkage? Structurally unrelated issues may become interlinked by veto and lead actors, as, for example, when biodiversity in rain forests is linked to debt negotiations. This type of linkage will show from the political agenda. 我们正在处理的议题领域有多独立？（a）是否存在结构性议题关联？例如，在与贫困相关的荒漠化形式中，侵蚀问题与人口增长以及南北经济不对称问题相关联。这主要涉及科学议程。（b）是否存在政治议题关联？结构上无关的议题可能因否决权和主要参与者而相互关联，例如，当雨林中的生物多样性与债务谈判相关联时。这种关联类型将体现在政治议程中。
We expect that on this basis, maps can be drawn presenting crucial regions with concentrated environmental problems, often securitized ones. 我们预计基于此，可以绘制出呈现关键区域的地图，这些区域集中存在环境问题，通常是被安全化的问题。
One such map has already been mentioned: potential victims of a sea-level rise. Clearly, these areas form a nonregional subset of the international system. Other examples can be given in regard to hydropolitics. In the mid1990 s, there are many unresolved international water issues. The most quoted examples are located in the Middle East: Iraq, Syria, and Turkey form a water security complex because of their disputes over sharing the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. Their security interdependence involves the issues of dams, reduced water flow, salinization, and hydroelectricity. The Jordan, Yarmuk, Litani, and West Bank aquifer links Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and West Bank Palestinians in another hydro security complex, with conflicts occurring over the allotment of water (Ohlsson 1995). It is typical that some charts of the Jordan aquifer are qualified as top secret by the Israeli army (Warner 1996). Other examples of emergent water security complexes include Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan (over the Nile); India and Pakistan (over the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej Rivers); Burma and China (over the Salween); Kampuchea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam (over flooding, irrigation, and hydroelectricity in the Mekong); and various others (Ohlsson 1995: 21). 已经提到过这样一张地图：海平面上升的潜在受害者。显然，这些地区构成了国际体系中的一个非区域子集。关于水政治，还可以举出其他例子。在 1990 年代中期，许多国际水资源问题尚未解决。最常被引用的例子位于中东：伊拉克、叙利亚和土耳其因争夺幼发拉底河和底格里斯河的水资源，形成了一个水安全复合体。他们的安全相互依赖涉及大坝、减少水流、盐碱化和水力发电等问题。约旦河、亚尔穆克河、利塔尼河和西岸含水层将以色列、约旦、叙利亚、黎巴嫩和西岸巴勒斯坦人联系在另一个水安全复合体中，围绕水资源分配发生冲突（Ohlsson 1995）。以色列军方通常将约旦含水层的一些图表定为绝密（Warner 1996）。 其他新兴水安全复杂体的例子包括埃及、埃塞俄比亚和苏丹（围绕尼罗河）；印度和巴基斯坦（围绕印度河、杰鲁姆河、切纳布河、拉维河、比亚斯河和苏特莱杰河）；缅甸和中国（围绕萨尔温江）；柬埔寨、老挝、泰国和越南（围绕湄公河的洪水、灌溉和水电）；以及其他各种情况（Ohlsson 1995: 21）。
Similar maps can be made for virtually all aspects of environmental degradation. A map of soil erosion and desertification shows 14 “erosion hot spots” (Myers 1993b) yielding regional subsystems ranging from the Himalayan foothills and the Sahel to parts of the United States. Regional regimes are probably the most effective for dealing with each of these hot spots. In the Himalayas the problem is deforestation, in the Sahel the problem is wind erosion, and in the United States it is unsustainable pressure on soils in the grain lands. But the incentive for building such regimes is clearly global because of the long-term effects of the cumulative loss. Another way of drawing maps of regional environmental security complexes is by linking the issues. This has been done for the former Soviet Union (Feshbach and Friendly 1992). 几乎所有环境退化的方面都可以制作类似的地图。一张土壤侵蚀和沙漠化的地图显示了 14 个“侵蚀热点”（Myers 1993b），形成了从喜马拉雅山麓和萨赫勒地区到美国部分地区的区域子系统。区域治理体系可能是应对这些热点问题的最有效方式。在喜马拉雅山，问题是森林砍伐；在萨赫勒，问题是风蚀；在美国，问题是粮食产区对土壤的不可持续压力。但建立此类治理体系的动力显然是全球性的，因为累积损失的长期影响。绘制区域环境安全复合体地图的另一种方法是将相关问题联系起来。前苏联地区已经采用了这种方法（Feshbach 和 Friendly 1992）。
Central Asia is confronted with “the greatest single, manmade ecological catastrophe in history” (Feshbach and Friendly 1992: 88). The dehydration of the Aral Sea will trigger an “eco-domino effect,” ultimately creating a “united front of ecological degradation from Scandinavia to the Black Sea” (Wolfson and Spetter 1991, quoted in Does and Gerrits 1994: 409). René Does and André Gerrits (1994) identify three types of environmentrelated conflicts in this region: (i) interstate conflicts over the distribution of water and land in Central Asia, over pollution and economic exploitation of the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, over the nuclear power stations in Armenia, and over Semipalatinsk; ^(8){ }^{8} (2) interregional conflicts among the CIS member states (especially in the Krim, Kalmykia, Dagestan, and Karakalpakstan); and (3) “ethnocide” of the Karakalpaks and the small ethnic groups in the north. 中亚正面临“历史上最大的人为生态灾难”（Feshbach 和 Friendly 1992: 88）。咸海的干涸将引发“生态多米诺效应”，最终形成“从斯堪的纳维亚到黑海的生态退化统一战线”（Wolfson 和 Spetter 1991，转引自 Does 和 Gerrits 1994: 409）。René Does 和 André Gerrits（1994）指出该地区存在三种类型的环境相关冲突：（i）中亚国家间关于水资源和土地分配、里海和黑海的污染及经济开发、亚美尼亚核电站以及塞米巴拉金斯克的冲突；（2）独联体成员国之间的区域间冲突（特别是在克里米亚、卡尔梅克、达吉斯坦和卡拉卡尔帕克斯坦）；（3）对卡拉卡尔帕克人及北部小族群的“种族灭绝”。
The earlier research questions and the geophysical maps of hot spots allow us to pin down the regional security complexes of the environment more concretely. In many cases, there will be an interplay of global motive (steered by the politicization of remote effects) and local, relatively independent troubled areas or disturbing practices; in many other cases there will be strong securitization of local drama for its own sake; in still other cases there will be regions of cumulative environmental problems-states caught up in intense security interdependence in the face of preserving their country in the most literal terms. 早期的研究问题和热点地区的地球物理图使我们能够更具体地确定环境的区域安全复合体。在许多情况下，全球动机（由远程效应的政治化驱动）与局部相对独立的动荡地区或扰乱行为之间会相互作用；在许多其他情况下，会为了自身利益而强烈地对局部事件进行安全化；在还有一些情况下，会出现累积环境问题的地区——各国在保护本国最直接利益的压力下，陷入了紧密的安全相互依赖之中。
Summary 摘要
The system level seems dominant in this sector, because most securitizing moves take place at that level as a result of the existence of an international environmental epistemic community that drafts and securitizes the environmental agenda. The political power of that community, however, is limited, which results in the need to distinguish two agenda: the scientific agenda of the environmental epistemic community and a political one of how this agenda is accepted as high politics by public spheres and transnational corporations. This turns the unit level, and hence localizing dynamics, into the second dominant level in this sector. Crucial for environmental security is whether states, major economic actors, and local communities embrace the scientific agenda. In other words, even when the concern is global, its political relevance is decided at the local level. 系统层面在该领域似乎占主导地位，因为大多数安全化行动都是在该层面进行的，这是由于存在一个国际环境知识共同体，该共同体起草并推动环境议程的安全化。然而，该共同体的政治权力有限，这导致需要区分两个议程：环境知识共同体的科学议程和公众领域及跨国公司如何将该议程接受为高政治的政治议程。这使得单位层面，因此本地化动态，成为该领域的第二个主导层面。环境安全的关键在于国家、主要经济行为者和地方社区是否接受科学议程。换句话说，即使关注点是全球性的，其政治相关性也在地方层面决定。
Securitizing moves at the global level have resulted in considerable politicization, but successful securitization has been limited. Successful securitization has occurred mainly at the local level, where the actual disasters take place and thresholds of sustainability are passed. But even so, it is not necessarily the environment that is securitized: Environmental conflict often travels under the guise of political turmoil or ethnic strife. 全球层面的安全化行动导致了相当程度的政治化，但成功的安全化却有限。成功的安全化主要发生在实际灾难发生和可持续性阈值被突破的地方，即地方层面。但即便如此，安全化的对象不一定是环境：环境冲突常常以政治动荡或民族冲突的伪装出现。
Because of the strong localizing dynamics, regional environmental regimes are only in part a spin-off of global structures. The concern and knowledge that feed the emergence of these regions are global-the cognitive dimension is global-but the size of security complexes is determined bottom-up. These complexes cover the smallest areas within which specific environmental issues can be addressed-that is, they are the largest expression of local security interdependence. There are, for example, more than 10 regional arrangements for cooperation in combating maritime pollution, not because of global competition or the inability to create one comprehensive global arrangement but because a regional approach proved more effective. 由于强烈的地方化动态，区域环境制度只是全球结构的部分衍生。促使这些区域出现的关注和知识是全球性的——认知维度是全球的——但安全复合体的规模是自下而上决定的。这些复合体覆盖了可以解决特定环境问题的最小区域——也就是说，它们是地方安全相互依赖的最大表现。例如，存在十多个区域合作安排来应对海洋污染，这并非因为全球竞争或无法创建一个全面的全球安排，而是因为区域方法被证明更有效。
A tour de globe of regional subsystems is difficult, not because the 环游全球的区域子系统是困难的，这并不是因为
regions are not there but because they are based on so many different issue areas. World maps exist of regions related to water issues, land issues, pollution, deforestation, population pressure, and so forth. 地区并不存在，而是因为它们基于许多不同的问题领域。世界地图上存在与水问题、土地问题、污染、森林砍伐、人口压力等相关的地区。
Another difficulty in analyzing environmental security in terms of regions is that causes and effects of environmental issues frequently involve different regions and different actors-the actors who cause environmental damage are distinct from those who suffer from it. There may be one set of actors in one region whose security interdependence is high if one wants to deal with the causes of a specific ecoproblem (e.g., agricultural policies in semiarid regions), whereas another set of actors in another region may be involved in case of failure caused by the spillover of negative developments (e.g., environmental refugees fleeing hunger after crop failure). This leads to larger and more complex patterns of security linkage. 在以地区为单位分析环境安全时，另一个难点是环境问题的原因和影响常常涉及不同的地区和不同的行为者——造成环境破坏的行为者与遭受其影响的行为者是不同的。可能在某一地区有一组行为者，其安全相互依赖性很高，如果想要解决某一具体生态问题的根源（例如，半干旱地区的农业政策），而在另一地区则可能有另一组行为者涉及因负面发展溢出效应导致的失败（例如，环境难民在作物歉收后逃离饥荒）。这导致了更大且更复杂的安全联系模式。
What kinds of security complexes are created? Global warming has worldwide causes, but its likely negative effects are not global. Conversely, strictly local or regional problems, as in many cases the protection of endangered species, are securitized in the global debate about biodiversity. The same is true for local dramas, such as the Exxon Valdez accident, Chernobyl, or French nuclear testing on Muroroa. NGO activities combined with wide media coverage turn these local problems into global issues. This global village image of the environmental sector is a strong nonregional feature. Yet, many of the manifest existential threats involved are expressing themselves locally, which means people usually do not have to wait for a global-level solution to tackle these local problems. 创建了哪种安全复合体？全球变暖有全球性的原因，但其可能的负面影响并非全球性的。相反，严格的地方性或区域性问题，如许多情况下对濒危物种的保护，在关于生物多样性的全球辩论中被安全化。地方性事件也是如此，例如埃克森瓦尔迪兹事故、切尔诺贝利事故或法国在穆罗罗阿的核试验。非政府组织的活动结合广泛的媒体报道，将这些地方性问题转变为全球性议题。环境领域的这种全球村形象是一个强烈的非区域性特征。然而，许多明显的生存威胁表现为地方性，这意味着人们通常不必等待全球层面的解决方案来应对这些地方性问题。
In sum, securitizing moves are attempted at almost all levels but mostly at the global level. Most successful securitization, however, is local. Some subsystemic formations do emerge, regional as well as nonterritorial. 总之，安全化行动几乎在所有层面上都有尝试，但主要是在全球层面。然而，最成功的安全化是地方性的。一些子系统形成确实出现了，既有区域性的，也有非领土性的。
Notes 注释
Over the past ten years, there has been an impressive output of articles and books on environmental security, some at a descriptive level and others more theoretically. A comprehensive list cannot be offered here, but see, in addition to the various direct references in this chapter, for example, Brock 1991; the various “State of the World” reports of the Worldwatch Institute (e.g., Brown et al. 1993); Brown 1989; Carroll 1988; Käkönen 1992, 1994; Levy 1995a, 1995b; Lodgaard 1992; Lodgaard and Ornäs 1992; Matthew 1995; Matthews 1989; Sjöstedt 1993; Thomas 1992; Westing 1988, 1990. 在过去的十年中，关于环境安全的文章和书籍产出令人印象深刻，有些处于描述层面，有些则更具理论性。这里无法提供全面的列表，但除了本章中各种直接引用外，还可参见例如 Brock 1991；世界观察研究所的各种“世界状况”报告（例如，Brown 等，1993）；Brown 1989；Carroll 1988；Käkönen 1992，1994；Levy 1995a，1995b；Lodgaard 1992；Lodgaard 和 Ornäs 1992；Matthew 1995；Matthews 1989；Sjöstedt 1993；Thomas 1992；Westing 1988，1990。
Be aware, however, of potential myths about the impact of natural disasters on humanity as such. In the branch of research on disasters and natural hazards, scholars calculated the ratio of reported deaths from disasters during the twentieth century (1900-1990): 48.6 percent died as a consequence of civil strife, 39.1 percent of famine, and the remaining 12.3 percent from earthquakes ( 4.7%4.7 \% ), volcanic outbursts ( 2.1%2.1 \% ), cyclones ( 1.75%1.75 \% ), epidemics ( 1.65%1.65 \% ), floods ( 1.6%1.6 \% ), and other hazards ( 0.5%0.5 \% ). (Source: Disaster History, "Significant Data on Major Disasters 然而，要注意关于自然灾害对人类影响的潜在神话。在灾害和自然危害研究领域，学者们计算了 20 世纪（1900-1990 年）报告的灾害死亡比例：48.6%死于内乱，39.1%死于饥荒，剩余的 12.3%死于地震（ ）、火山爆发（ ）、气旋（ ）、流行病（ ）、洪水（ ）及其他危害（ ）。（来源：灾害历史，“重大灾害的重要数据”）
Worldwide." Washington, D.C.: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1990; quoted in Blaikie et al. 1994: 4.) If one considers that most of the war-related deaths occurred during the two world wars, famines stand out even more profoundly as the dominant potential threat to human life. 全球范围内。” 华盛顿特区：外国灾难援助办公室，1990 年；引自 Blaikie 等人 1994 年：4 页。）如果考虑到大多数与战争相关的死亡发生在两次世界大战期间，饥荒作为对人类生命的主要潜在威胁显得更加突出。
3. Population figures (in millions): low-income economies, 3,127 in 1991 ( 3,686 in 2000); middle-income economies, 1,401 in 1991 (1,561 in 2000); highincome economies, 822 in 1991 (864 in 2000) (World Bank 1993: 288-289). 3. 人口数字（以百万计）：低收入经济体，1991 年为 3127（2000 年为 3686）；中等收入经济体，1991 年为 1401（2000 年为 1561）；高收入经济体，1991 年为 822（2000 年为 864）（世界银行 1993 年：288-289 页）。
4. In 1991, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries accounted for 49.5 percent of the emissions, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 21.1 percent, China 11 percent, and the other developing countries around 18.4 percent (percentages are derived from figures in Thomas 1992: 171); in terms of per capita contributions, the share of the OECD multiplies significantly, since it hosts less than 20 percent of the world population. None lived up to the intention expressed at the Framework Convention on Climate Change to reduce emissions to 1990 levels. Meanwhile, the developing countries’ share will rise to about 50 percent in 2025 as a result of industrialization and population growth. Emissions in China, the worst example, had risen 80 percent since 1980, making it the world’s second-largest emitter by 1994. Emissions in Brazil rose 8 percent between 1990 and 1993; India’s rose 13 percent and Turkey’s rose 16 percent during the same period (Flavin and Tunali 1995: 13). 4. 1991 年，经济合作与发展组织（OECD）国家占排放量的 49.5%，前苏联和东欧占 21.1%，中国占 11%，其他发展中国家约占 18.4%（百分比来源于 Thomas 1992:171 的数据）；按人均贡献计算，OECD 的份额显著增加，因为其人口不到世界总人口的 20%。没有一个国家达到《气候变化框架公约》中表达的将排放量减少到 1990 年水平的目标。与此同时，由于工业化和人口增长，发展中国家的份额将在 2025 年上升到约 50%。中国的排放量是最严重的例子，自 1980 年以来增长了 80%，使其在 1994 年成为世界第二大排放国。巴西的排放量在 1990 年至 1993 年间增长了 8%；印度同期增长了 13%，土耳其增长了 16%（Flavin 和 Tunali 1995:13）。
5. The functionalist tradition of IR started in the 1920s and 1930s with people like David Mitrany and Francis Delaisi (de Wilde 1991); the tradition flourished during the late 1940s and 1950s, developed into neo-functionalist integration theory (Haas) and social communication theory (Deutsch), but was discredited in the 1960s because of the sclerosis in European integration. In the 1970s, it returned in themes like transnationalism and interdependence theory (Keohane, Nye, Rosenau) and developed into regime theory (Ruggie, Krasner, Keohane; see Hansenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1996). Keohane’s institutionalist approach is the latest step in the process. 5. 国际关系的功能主义传统始于 1920 年代和 1930 年代，代表人物有大卫·米特拉尼和弗朗西斯·德莱西（de Wilde 1991）；该传统在 1940 年代末和 1950 年代蓬勃发展，演变为新功能主义一体化理论（哈斯）和社会传播理论（德意志），但由于欧洲一体化的僵化，1960 年代遭到质疑。1970 年代，该传统以跨国主义和相互依赖理论（基欧恩、奈、罗森诺）等主题回归，并发展为制度理论（鲁吉、克拉斯纳、基欧恩；参见汉森克莱弗、迈耶和里特伯格 1996）。基欧恩的制度主义方法是这一过程的最新阶段。
6. In May 1995, a confrontation occurred between these fishermen and Canadian authorities in which the latter used environmental arguments to legitimize extraordinary measures, whereas the former legitimized their protest in terms of sovereignty and international law-a typical cross-sectoral clash of interests. 6. 1995 年 5 月，这些渔民与加拿大当局发生冲突，后者以环境理由为非常措施辩护，而前者则以主权和国际法为抗议的合法性依据——这是一场典型的跨部门利益冲突。
7. In 1900, a mere 14 percent of the world population lived in urban centers (Myers 1993a: 197). 7. 1900 年，全球仅有 14%的人口居住在城市中心（迈尔斯 1993a: 197）。
8. Semipalatinsk-21 was the name of the secret nuclear city Kurtshatov in Kazakhstan. It was the biggest test site in Kazakhstan but not the only one. According to Does and Gerrits (1994: 423), 20 million hectares of the total Kazakh territory of 270 million hectares was reserved for testing. From 1949 to 1962, 113 aboveground nuclear tests occurred; since the Partial Test Ban Treaty, another 343 underground tests have been conducted. In 1989, the antinuclear movement Nevada-Semipalatinsk was created and has since become a political force of some importance. 8. 塞米巴拉金斯克-21 是哈萨克斯坦秘密核城库尔恰托夫的名称。它是哈萨克斯坦最大的试验场，但不是唯一的。根据 Does 和 Gerrits（1994: 423），在哈萨克斯坦总面积 2.7 亿公顷中，有 2000 万公顷被划为试验用地。从 1949 年到 1962 年，进行了 113 次地面核试验；自《部分禁止核试验条约》以来，又进行了 343 次地下核试验。1989 年，反核运动“内华达-塞米巴拉金斯克”成立，后来成为一个具有一定政治影响力的力量。
CHAPTER 5
The Economic Sector 第五章 经济部门
The Economic Security Agenda 经济安全议程
The whole idea of economic security is exceedingly controversial and politicized. In a capitalist system, the very concept is fraught with contradictions and complications, not the least being that actors in a market are supposed to feel insecure; if they do not, the market will not produce its efficiencies (Buzan 1991, chapter 6; Cable 1995; Luciani 1989). This chapter sketches the main sources and positions in the debate about economic security. Using the definitions from Chapter 2, it tries to distinguish what can genuinely be thought of as economic security from both that which is merely politicized economics and that which reflects security spillover from the economic sector to other sectors. 经济安全的整个概念极具争议性且政治化。在资本主义体系中，这一概念充满了矛盾和复杂性，其中一个重要原因是市场中的参与者本应感到不安全；如果他们不感到不安全，市场就无法产生其效率（Buzan 1991，第 6 章；Cable 1995；Luciani 1989）。本章概述了关于经济安全的主要来源和立场。利用第 2 章的定义，试图区分真正可以被视为经济安全的内容，与仅仅是政治化经济学的内容以及反映经济部门向其他部门安全溢出的内容。
The idea of economic security is located squarely in the unresolved and highly political debates about international political economy concerning the nature of the relationship between the political structure of anarchy and the economic structure of the market (Buzan 1991: 230). The main contending positions reflect different views about whether states and societies or markets should have priority and whether private economic actors have security claims of their own that must be weighed against the verdict of the market. Baldly stated, the positions are as follow. 经济安全的概念明确地位于关于无政府政治结构与市场经济结构关系性质的国际政治经济学中未解决且高度政治化的辩论之中（Buzan 1991: 230）。主要的对立观点反映了关于国家和社会还是市场应当优先，以及私人经济行为者是否拥有必须与市场裁决权衡的安全主张的不同看法。简而言之，这些立场如下。
Mercantilists and neomercantilists put politics first, seeing the state as both embodying the social and political purposes for which wealth is generated and providing the security necessary for the operation of firms and markets. From this perspective, economic security is simply part of a wider priority given to state or “national” security, and economic success tends to be seen as zero sum. 重商主义者和新重商主义者将政治置于首位，认为国家既体现了财富产生的社会和政治目的，又提供了企业和市场运作所必需的安全保障。从这个角度看，经济安全仅仅是对国家或“民族”安全更广泛优先权的一部分，经济成功往往被视为零和游戏。
Liberals put economics first, arguing that the economy should be at the root of the social fabric and that the market should be left to operate as freely as possible without interference by the state. The state is necessary to provide law and politico-military security and to support the social fabric in areas in which the market fails to do so. From this perspective, the main object of economic security is to develop rules that create factor mobility among national economies, although it can also be argued that liberalism is 自由主义者将经济置于首位，认为经济应当是社会结构的根基，市场应尽可能自由运作，不受国家干预。国家的作用是提供法律和政治军事安全，并在市场无法发挥作用的领域支持社会结构。从这个角度看，经济安全的主要目标是制定规则，促进国家经济之间的要素流动，尽管也有人认为自由主义是
about protecting the position of the capitalist elite. Liberals value economic efficiency and take a positive-sum, joint gains view of economic relations. 保护资本家精英地位的。自由主义者重视经济效率，并持有经济关系中的正和、共同收益观点。
Socialists fall awkwardly in between the two, arguing that economics is at the root of the entire social fabric and that to the extent that states can escape this logic, their task is to tame economics toward social and political goals of justice and equity. The security focus of socialists is toward the economically weak and against the strong. 社会主义者处于两者之间，认为经济是整个社会结构的根本，国家在一定程度上可以摆脱这一逻辑，其任务是将经济驯服于社会和政治的正义与公平目标。社会主义者的安全关注点是经济弱势群体，反对强势群体。
In a very broad sense, both socialists and mercantilists can be seen as species of economic nationalism, wanting to privilege the state over the economy, albeit for different purposes. Most states claiming to be socialist have pursued economic nationalist policies, especially those under Communist governments where strict economic control is necessary for their project of social transformation. These perspectives represent incompatible ideological positions and generate different logics and priorities of economic security (McKinlay and Little 1986). There is no denying the existence of a substantial securitizing discourse in the economic sector, albeit one that pulls in several different directions. Sometimes individuals are the object of securitization, sometimes the state, and sometimes the international economy. 从广义上讲，社会主义者和重商主义者都可以被视为经济民族主义的不同类型，尽管目的不同，但都希望国家优先于经济。大多数自称社会主义的国家都推行了经济民族主义政策，尤其是在共产主义政府下，严格的经济控制对于其社会转型项目是必要的。这些观点代表了不兼容的意识形态立场，并产生了不同的经济安全逻辑和优先事项（McKinlay 和 Little 1986）。不可否认，经济领域存在大量的安全化话语，尽管这些话语方向各异。有时个体是安全化的对象，有时是国家，有时是国际经济。
The crushing victory of the West in the Cold War marginalized the socialist element of the ideological debate and weakened, but by no means eliminated, the economic nationalist element. In rhetorical terms, that victory pushed much of the ideological debate (probably temporarily) into the background, leaving an economic security discourse shaped largely by liberal concerns and by the effect of an international political economy attempting to operate under liberal rules. Moreover, the type of liberalism now in fashion is particularly pure. It has much less attachment to the national economy than did its nineteenth-century predecessor, and it has pushed aside much of the “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982) enshrined in the post-1945 Bretton Woods system. In its more virulent forms, this liberalism seeks to recreate Karl Polanyi’s (1957 [1944]) nightmare of the total subordination of social values to market values. 冷战中西方的压倒性胜利使意识形态辩论中的社会主义元素边缘化，并削弱了经济民族主义元素，但绝非完全消除。从修辞角度看，这场胜利（可能是暂时地）将大部分意识形态辩论推到了背景中，留下了一个主要由自由主义关切和试图在自由规则下运作的国际政治经济影响塑造的经济安全话语。此外，当前流行的自由主义类型尤为纯粹。它对国家经济的依附远不及十九世纪的前身，并且排除了大量被纳入 1945 年后布雷顿森林体系的“嵌入式自由主义”（Ruggie 1982）。在其更激烈的形式中，这种自由主义试图重现卡尔·波兰尼（Karl Polanyi）（1957 [1944]）所描述的社会价值完全服从市场价值的噩梦。
In practice, much economic nationalism remains, finding its political space in the ambiguity that exists within the liberal position over how large the role of the state should be and the extent to which the market should be allowed to override national and individual security. Trade continues to evoke fierce opposition between liberal and protectionist forces, but production and, even more so, finance have developed an increasingly unrestricted global transnational character. The liberal ideal is ultimately to dissolve national economies, with their exclusive currencies and restrictions on factor movement, into a global economy with relatively few restraints on the movement of goods, capital, services, and (more hesitantly) people. The problems are how to maintain economic and political stability and how to handle the widening gap between the very rich and the very poor that 在实践中，经济民族主义仍然存在很大程度，政治空间存在于自由主义立场中关于国家角色应有多大以及市场应在多大程度上凌驾于国家和个人安全之上的模糊性之间。贸易继续在自由主义和保护主义力量之间引发激烈对抗，但生产，尤其是金融，已经发展出越来越不受限制的全球跨国特征。自由主义的理想最终是将拥有专属货币和对要素流动有限制的国家经济融入一个对商品、资本、服务以及（更为谨慎地）人员流动几乎没有限制的全球经济。问题在于如何维持经济和政治稳定，以及如何应对贫富差距不断扩大这一问题。
unrestricted markets tend to generate while simultaneously removing many powers and functions from states. This explains the concern within the field of international political economy (IPE) about how to maintain order and stability in a liberal international political economy, with the focus first on hegemons (Kindleberger 1973, 1981; Gilpin 1987) and then on regimes and institutions (Keohane 1980, 1984). 不受限制的市场往往会产生，同时剥夺国家的许多权力和职能。这解释了国际政治经济学（IPE）领域内关于如何在自由国际政治经济中维持秩序和稳定的关注，最初关注的是霸权（Kindleberger 1973, 1981；Gilpin 1987），随后关注的是制度和机构（Keohane 1980, 1984）。
These developments mean the discourse on economic security is now shaped largely by the dominance of the liberal agenda and by the consequences of attempts to implement that agenda in the areas of trade, production, and finance. The particular characteristics of the liberal ascendance mean the contemporary discourse on economic security centers on concerns about instability and inequality. Concern about instability raises questions about the relative economic decline of the United States as hegemon and about the domestic and international management problems arising from the increasing integration and liberalization of the world economy. Concern about inequality raises questions domestically about the role of the state and internationally about the disadvantaged economic position of most Third World states. 这些发展意味着，关于经济安全的论述现在主要由自由主义议程的主导地位以及在贸易、生产和金融领域实施该议程的尝试所带来的后果所塑造。自由主义崛起的特殊特征意味着当代关于经济安全的论述集中在对不稳定性和不平等的关注上。对不稳定性的关注引发了关于美国作为霸权国家相对经济衰退的问题，以及由世界经济日益一体化和自由化所带来的国内和国际管理问题。对不平等的关注则在国内引发了关于国家角色的问题，在国际上则涉及大多数第三世界国家处于不利经济地位的问题。
The relative U.S. decline was an inevitable result of the exaggerated position of global dominance it held in 1944. This position was challenged by both Europe and Japan as they recovered from World War II and by some newly decolonized countries that were finding effective paths to modemization. By the 1970s, some in the United States were already beginning to feel threatened by dependence on imported oil, trade deficits, and pressure on the dollar. The inclination to securitize this process arose in part from sheer U.S. unfamiliarity with the pains of economic interdependence but mostly from concerns about hegemonic decline and the effect of a weaker United States on the global order. 美国相对衰落是其在 1944 年所拥有的夸大全球主导地位的必然结果。随着欧洲和日本从第二次世界大战中恢复过来，以及一些新近去殖民化国家找到有效的现代化路径，这一地位受到了挑战。到了 1970 年代，美国内部已有部分人开始感受到对进口石油的依赖、贸易逆差以及美元压力带来的威胁。将这一过程安全化的倾向部分源于美国对经济相互依存痛苦的陌生感，但更多是出于对霸权衰落的担忧以及美国实力减弱对全球秩序影响的顾虑。
Alongside U.S. decline was the growing integration and liberalization of the global economy, first in trade and, beginning in the 1970s, also in finance. This condition had two effects. First, it meant national economies became progressively more exposed to competition from other producers in a global market and to ever more powerful transnational corporations and financial markets. The effects of the global economy in promoting unemployment and deindustrialization came to be seen as a threat to both welfare and sovereignty by those who were not doing well within it. Some also saw the global economy as a threat to the state itself or at least to much of the traditional conception of what the state was supposed to do (Cerny 1995). Second, this condition meant all national economies that had become adapted to an open global trading and financial system were dependent upon its continued stability and smooth functioning. All of these economies were therefore threatened by the possibility of systemic crises that might disrupt the worldwide flows of goods and capital. 随着美国的衰落，全球经济的整合和自由化不断加深，首先是在贸易领域，随后从 20 世纪 70 年代开始也扩展到金融领域。这种状况产生了两个影响。首先，这意味着各国经济逐渐暴露于全球市场中其他生产者的竞争，以及日益强大的跨国公司和金融市场的影响之下。全球经济在促进失业和去工业化方面的影响，被那些在其中处境不佳的人视为对福利和主权的威胁。一些人甚至将全球经济视为对国家本身，或者至少对传统国家职能观念的威胁（Cerny 1995）。其次，这种状况意味着所有适应了开放的全球贸易和金融体系的国家经济，都依赖于该体系的持续稳定和顺畅运行。因此，所有这些经济体都面临着可能扰乱全球商品和资本流动的系统性危机的威胁。
The particular plight of Third World countries arose from the depen- 第三世界国家的特殊困境源于依赖—
dent economic position as suppliers of primary goods many had inherited from their colonial period. These countries found themselves locked into disadvantageous terms of trade that some argued prevented their economic and sociopolitical development. Viewed from another perspective, these countries found themselves politically independent but heavily penetrated by outside market and political interests and burdened with societies and leaderships whose traditions, skills, resources, and internal divisions often provided poor foundations for the development of a modern political economy (Galtung 1971). 作为初级商品供应国的经济地位受损，许多国家继承了殖民时期的遗产。这些国家发现自己被锁定在不利的贸易条件中，有人认为这阻碍了它们的经济和社会政治发展。从另一个角度看，这些国家政治上独立，但却被外部市场和政治利益深度渗透，负担着传统、技能、资源和内部分裂往往为现代政治经济发展提供了薄弱基础的社会和领导层（加尔通 1971）。
Out of these general conditions grew a varied agenda of specific issues cast in terms of economic security: 在这些总体条件下，形成了以经济安全为主题的多样化具体议题：
The ability of states to maintain independent capability for military production in a global market or, more broadly, the relationship of the economy to the capability for state military mobilization 国家在全球市场中维持独立军事生产能力的能力，或更广义地说，经济与国家军事动员能力之间的关系
The possibility that economic dependencies within the global market (particularly oil) will be exploited for political ends or, more broadly, questions of the security of supply when states abandoned the inefficient security of self-reliance for the efficient insecurity of dependence on outside sources of supply 经济依赖性在全球市场中（特别是石油）可能被利用于政治目的，或者更广泛地说，当各国放弃了低效的自力更生安全，转而依赖外部供应来源所带来的高效但不安全的依赖时，供应安全问题的可能性
Fears that the global market would generate more losers than winners and would heighten existing inequalities (manifested internationally at the top of the range by U.S. fears of hegemonic decline, at the bottom by developing country fears of exploitation, debt crises, and marginalization, and domestically by fears of permanent unemployment and growing social polarization) 对全球市场将产生更多失败者而非赢家的担忧，并加剧现有的不平等（在国际上表现为美国对霸权衰落的担忧，在底层表现为发展中国家对剥削、债务危机和边缘化的担忧，在国内表现为对永久失业和日益加剧的社会两极分化的担忧）
Fears that the international economy itself would fall into crisis from some combination of weakening political leadership, increasing protectionist reactions, and structural instability in the global financial system 对国际经济本身因政治领导力减弱、保护主义反应增加以及全球金融体系结构性不稳定等多种因素组合而陷入危机的担忧
One peculiar characteristic of economic security under liberalism is that it is about the creation of stable conditions in which actors can compete mercilessly. In this sense, economic security has parallels with military security in Europe during the ancien régime and the nineteenth century. The monarchs of the ancien régime recognized the need for rules about warfare to keep wars within limits but not to avoid wars. Similarly, the Concert of 自由主义下经济安全的一个特殊特征是，它关乎创造稳定的条件，使行为者能够无情地竞争。从这个意义上说，经济安全与欧洲旧制度时期和十九世纪的军事安全有相似之处。旧制度的君主们认识到需要制定战争规则，以将战争限制在一定范围内，但并非为了避免战争。同样，协约体系
Europe was meant to avoid only certain wars (great-power wars on the continent). But warfare as a legitimate instrument of diplomacy, if not the fulfillment of successful diplomacy, was banned in Europe only after the “European Civil War” of 1914-1945. 欧洲的目的是仅避免某些战争（大陆上的大国战争）。但作为外交合法手段的战争，如果不是成功外交的实现，直到 1914-1945 年的“欧洲内战”之后，战争才在欧洲被禁止。
This ancien régime character of economic liberalism shapes the essence of the discourse about economic security, much of which is driven by the tension between vulnerability and efficiency (Buzan 1991: 236237). As long as the world economy lacks a global welfare system (i.e., global social security) -and we can assume this will remain a structural feature for a long time-states and individuals will favor efficiency only when they expect to be efficient enough to profit from it. This is one of the reasons hegemonic powers tend to advocate free trade. 经济自由主义的这种旧制度特征塑造了关于经济安全话语的本质，其中很大一部分是由脆弱性与效率之间的紧张关系驱动的（Buzan 1991: 236237）。只要世界经济缺乏全球福利体系（即全球社会保障）——我们可以假设这将长期作为一种结构性特征存在——国家和个人只有在预期能够足够高效以从中获利时，才会偏向效率。这也是霸权国家倾向于倡导自由贸易的原因之一。
Related to hegemonic power or power positions in general, states are faced with an economic security dilemma: Relative economic growth plays a major role in determining the power of states in the system (Kennedy 1989; Gilpin 1987). In contrast to military power, however, relative wealth is not normally of a zero-sum character; for example, the rise of Japan has not made the rest of the OECD poorer. If the Japanese economy were to collapse tomorrow, the resultant loss of capital and markets would drag the rest of the OECD economies down with it. In other words, economic interdependence is much less black or white when it comes to enmity and amity than military interdependence; consequently, economic security is a much more blurred concept than military security. In a liberal system, as illustrated by the tensions in U.S.-Japanese trade relations, the preservation of joint gains vies with that of individual ones. 与霸权力量或一般权力地位相关，国家面临经济安全困境：相对经济增长在决定国家在体系中的权力方面起着重要作用（Kennedy 1989；Gilpin 1987）。然而，与军事力量相比，相对财富通常不是零和性质；例如，日本的崛起并没有使经合组织其他成员国变得更贫穷。如果日本经济明天崩溃，随之而来的资本和市场损失将拖累经合组织其他经济体。换句话说，经济相互依存在敌意和友好方面远没有军事相互依存那么非黑即白；因此，经济安全的概念比军事安全更加模糊。在自由主义体系中，如美日贸易关系中的紧张局势所示，维护共同利益与维护个体利益相竞争。
It is often difficult to separate attempts to securitize economic issues from the more general political contest between liberal and nationalist approaches to economic policy. During the Cold War, the superpower rivalry muted protectionist voices because of the overriding common military and political security concern all of the capitalist powers shared against the Soviet Union. As long as the Soviet threat existed, the capitalist states worried more about it than about the commercial rivalry among themselves. But after 1989, with the ideological confrontation consigned to history, the common interest that had kept the capitalist economies together despite their rivalry was significantly weakened. 将经济问题安全化的尝试与自由主义和民族主义经济政策之间更广泛的政治竞争区分开来往往很困难。在冷战期间，由于所有资本主义大国共同面对苏联的军事和政治安全威胁，超级大国的对抗压制了保护主义的声音。只要苏联威胁存在，资本主义国家更担心的是这一威胁，而非彼此之间的商业竞争。但在 1989 年之后，随着意识形态对抗被历史所取代，尽管存在竞争，曾经将资本主义经济体团结在一起的共同利益显著减弱。
One of the central questions in this chapter is, how much of what is talked about as economic security actually qualifies for that label? The focus will be on how to answer this question in terms of the prevailing mode of pure liberalism. The argument will be that because of the essentially competitive nature of market relations, much of it does not properly rise above the merely politicized. Much of that which does rise above the politicized does so because of its effects in other sectors. Under extreme forms of liberalism, little can be counted as purely economic securily. 本章的一个核心问题是，所谓的经济安全中有多少真正符合这一标签？重点将放在如何根据现行的纯自由主义模式来回答这个问题。论点是，由于市场关系本质上的竞争性，其中很大一部分实际上并未真正超越单纯的政治化。那些真正超越政治化的部分，往往是因为它们在其他领域产生了影响。在极端形式的自由主义下，几乎没有什么可以被视为纯粹的经济安全。
Security Actors and Referent Objects 安全行为体与参照对象
In the economic sector, it is important to remember that although each sector generates its own distinctive units, once established these units can show up as key players in other sectors. The state is remarkable for showing up in all sectors; even though its roots are in the political and military sectors, it is one of the major units in the economic one. 在经济领域，重要的是要记住，尽管每个领域都会产生其独特的单位，但一旦确立，这些单位可能会作为关键角色出现在其他领域。国家在所有领域中都表现突出；尽管其根源在政治和军事领域，但它是经济领域的主要单位之一。
The economic sector is rich in referent objects, ranging from individuals through classes and states to the abstract and complex system of the global market itself. These objects often overlap. Concern about the global economy might be securitized in its own terms, but it might also be securitized in terms of a national economy or of groups of individuals within a national economy (such as displaced workers). The most immediate peculiarity of the sector is that under liberal logic its most distinctive unit, the firm, has a relatively weak claim to status as a security referent object because of the contradiction between the inherently instrumental, ephemeral nature of the firm and the logic of existential threats that underlies security. In the liberal perspective, firms are fundamentally organizations of convenience. They may grow very large and may last a long time, but even the oldest and largest are subject to the market, and when they cease to be efficient or to produce desired goods and services, they are dissolved and replaced by new firms. Firms struggle to survive; when industry-dominating names such as Pan Am, Austin, or Triumph disappear, however, there may be shock and regret, but few consider the event unnatural or wrong. Apple and IBM may be replaced by newer computer makers with little disturbance. 经济领域拥有丰富的参照对象，范围从个人、阶级和国家到全球市场这一抽象而复杂的系统。这些对象常常相互重叠。对全球经济的关注可能以其自身的方式被安全化，但也可能以国家经济或国家经济内部某些群体（如失业工人）的角度被安全化。该领域最直接的特殊性在于，在自由主义逻辑下，其最具特色的单位——企业，由于企业本质上是工具性的、短暂的，与安全所依赖的存在性威胁逻辑之间存在矛盾，因此企业作为安全参照对象的地位相对较弱。在自由主义视角中，企业本质上是便利的组织。它们可能发展得非常庞大且存在时间较长，但即使是最古老和最大的企业也受市场制约，当它们不再高效或无法生产所需的商品和服务时，就会被解散并由新企业取代。 公司努力求生存；当像泛美航空、奥斯汀或凯旋这样行业主导的名字消失时，虽然可能会引起震惊和遗憾，但很少有人认为这是不自然或错误的。苹果和 IBM 可能会被更新的电脑制造商取代，几乎不会引起动荡。
Only two sorts of securitizing logic can usually attempt to elevate firms to the status of referent objects. The first is local and concerns the immediate effect on individuals and towns when a firm goes under. Individuals, trade unions, city governments, and the local political representative of the national government may all attempt to save the company by casting its demise in security terms. The second type of securitizing logic is national and involves the government’s attitude toward the place of a firm in the state’s industrial base. For example, if the government is committed to a high degree of self-reliance for military mobilization, this argument may extend very widely-covering firms as diverse as boot makers, shipyards, and electronics. Here, the securitizing actor may be the firm itself (pleading for subsidies or government orders) or a trade union or local elected government official (concerned about jobs), or it may be the state acting preemptively in pursuit of its own sense of military security. Economic nationalist governments embrace such arguments, whereas liberal ones resist them. Perhaps the major exceptions even for liberal governments are very large manufacturing firms and especially banks, whose col- 通常只有两种安全化逻辑会试图将企业提升为参照对象。第一种是地方性的，涉及企业倒闭时对个人和城镇的直接影响。个人、工会、市政府以及国家政府的地方政治代表都可能试图通过将企业的倒闭描述为安全问题来挽救公司。第二种安全化逻辑是国家层面的，涉及政府对企业在国家工业基础中地位的态度。例如，如果政府致力于实现军事动员的高度自给自足，这种论点可能会广泛延伸，涵盖从制靴厂、造船厂到电子企业等各种企业。在这里，安全化行为者可能是企业本身（请求补贴或政府订单），也可能是工会或地方民选政府官员（关心就业），或者是国家为了自身的军事安全感而采取的先发制人行动。经济民族主义政府支持此类论点，而自由主义政府则抵制。 也许即使对于自由政府来说，主要的例外是非常大型的制造企业，尤其是银行，其..
lapse would threaten the stability of the entire economy and, in the case of banks, possibly the stability of the international financial system. 失误将威胁整个经济的稳定，在银行的情况下，可能威胁国际金融体系的稳定。
There is some difficult ground here in which the rhetoric of security may be misused in pursuit of merely political objectives, such as employment, regional development, or pork barrel politics (misused in the sense that this is not really an attempt to securitize because the full sequence, from existential threats to extraordinary countermeasures is not present; it is rather a loose use of the word security). In a liberal economy, the local argument usually fails unless it is linked to the national one. The national argument remains strong as long as states think they might have to fight a serious war-especially if they might have to do so alone. But where states are embedded in liberal security communities-as we see now in Europe and the West-the imperative for military self-reliance declines, and the willingness to depend on external sources for supplies of weapons and other military materiel rises. Even traditionally self-reliant European powers are increasingly dependent on each other and on the United States for weapons and military supplies. Thus, only in special circumstances, when firms are seen as crucial to the stability of the market system itself, can firms be successfully securitized in a liberal system. 这里存在一些棘手的问题，安全的言辞可能被滥用以追求纯粹的政治目标，比如就业、区域发展或地方利益政治（滥用的意思是这并不是真正试图实现安全化，因为从存在性威胁到非常规对策的完整序列并不存在；这更像是对“安全”一词的宽泛使用）。在自由经济中，除非与国家层面的论点相联系，否则地方论点通常难以成立。只要国家认为可能不得不打一场严重的战争——尤其是可能不得不单独作战时——国家论点依然强有力。但当国家嵌入自由安全共同体中时——正如我们现在在欧洲和西方所见——军事自给自足的必要性下降，依赖外部来源供应武器和其他军事物资的意愿上升。即使是传统上自给自足的欧洲强国，也越来越依赖彼此以及美国提供武器和军事物资。 因此，只有在特殊情况下，当企业被视为市场体系本身稳定的关键时，企业才能在自由体系中成功实现证券化。
The Marxist logic of class “war” could be read as elevating classes to the status of referent object, with the class depending upon whose side one is on. Although politically effective for several generations, this rhetoric failed to attract a wide following in international security terms, as illustrated most famously by the failure of both workers and intellectuals to rally to the socialist international in 1914 and the willingness of most of them to respond to the security symbolism of state and nation. If the explicit attempt to securitize the working class failed, a case might be made that much liberal rhetoric about economic efficiency and stability masks an implicit attempt to securitize the interests of a transnational capitalist class. Such an argument would appeal to most types of economic nationalists but would be rejected by liberals on the grounds that market efficiency serves the wider community, not just the elite. Classes cannot be ruled out as potential referent objects of economic security, but so far the attempt to securitize class has had only patchy and short-lived success. It is worth noting that nonmonetary economies (especially subsistence farming) have the family or even the extended family as their unit. Although entire regions (especially sub-Saharan Africa) are based on this principle, there is no politicization or securitization of these economic activities except for some community-based development literature. 马克思主义的阶级“战争”逻辑可以被解读为将阶级提升为参照对象，其定义取决于站在哪一方。尽管这种修辞在政治上对几代人有效，但在国际安全领域未能吸引广泛支持，最著名的例子是工人和知识分子在 1914 年未能团结到社会主义国际阵营，以及他们大多数愿意响应国家和民族的安全象征。如果明确尝试将工人阶级安全化失败，那么可以认为许多关于经济效率和稳定的自由主义言论实际上掩盖了将跨国资本阶级利益安全化的隐含尝试。这种论点会吸引大多数经济民族主义者，但自由主义者会以市场效率服务于更广泛社区而非仅仅精英为由予以拒绝。阶级不能被排除为经济安全的潜在参照对象，但迄今为止，将阶级安全化的尝试仅取得了零星且短暂的成功。 值得注意的是，非货币经济（尤其是自给农业）以家庭甚至大家庭为单位。尽管整个地区（尤其是撒哈拉以南非洲）都基于这一原则，但除了某些基于社区发展的文献外，这些经济活动并未被政治化或安全化。
At the unit level, states far outshine firms and classes as the principal referent objects of economic security, even for liberals. When security arguments are used to legitimize, for instance, a violation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules, the basis is a security logic 在单位层面上，国家远远胜过企业和阶级，成为经济安全的主要参照对象，即使对于自由主义者也是如此。当安全论据被用来为例如违反《关税与贸易总协定》（GATT）规则进行合法化时，其基础是一种安全逻辑。
related to state interests rather than a firm. The principal reasons for this situation may lie outside the economic sector, either in concerns about military capability (especially for great powers) or in concerns about threats to political status (declining hegemons, marginalized developing countries) or threats of political leverage (exploitation by suppliers of import dependen-cies-for example, oil, food, or weapons). Whether the national economy itself can meet the criteria for securitization is an interesting question that is taken up in the next section. 与国家利益相关，而非与公司相关。这种情况的主要原因可能存在于经济领域之外，要么是对军事能力的关注（尤其是对大国而言），要么是对政治地位威胁的关注（衰落的霸权国家、边缘化的发展中国家），或者是对政治杠杆威胁的关注（依赖进口的供应商的剥削——例如石油、食品或武器）。国家经济本身是否能满足安全化的标准是一个有趣的问题，下一节将对此进行探讨。
Much the same question arises in relation to subsystem- and systemlevel referent objects in the economic sector. These referent objects may be relatively concrete, in the form of IGOs-understood here as everything from regimes (most-favored-nation [MFN] agreements) through treaties (GATT, NAFTA) to permanent organizations (the World Trade Organization [WTO], the World Bank, or the EU)–or relatively abstract, principally the liberal international economic order (LIEO)-meaning the entire nexus of rules and norms about open trading and financial arrangements. These higher-level referent objects are typically securitized by officials of the IGOs or by representatives of states, industry, or capital with interests in their maintenance. 在经济领域，关于子系统和系统层面的参照对象也出现了类似的问题。这些参照对象可能相对具体，表现为政府间组织（IGOs）——这里指从制度（最惠国待遇[MFN]协议）到条约（关贸总协定[GATT]、北美自由贸易协定[NAFTA]）再到常设组织（世界贸易组织[WTO]、世界银行或欧盟[EU]）——或者相对抽象，主要是自由国际经济秩序（LIEO）——指关于开放贸易和金融安排的全部规则和规范网络。这些较高级别的参照对象通常由政府间组织的官员或代表国家、产业或资本利益维护者的代表进行安全化。
But does the securitizing call come primarily for economic reasons or for reasons in other sectors? Again, the linkage to military-political concerns is strong. The example of the 1930s is still used frequently to warn against measures of national economic closure that may threaten the LIEO. In part, this comparison is about levels of prosperity and fears of repeating the Great Depression, but it also reflects the concern raised in Cordell Hull’s famous dictum that “if goods can’t cross borders, soldiers will” (Buzan 1984). It is not clear whether the key worry is about economic chaos itself or about the impact economic closure will have on politico-military relations. 但是，安全化的呼吁主要是出于经济原因，还是出于其他领域的原因？同样，与军事政治关切的联系非常紧密。1930 年代的例子仍然经常被用来警示可能威胁到 LIEO 的国家经济封闭措施。部分原因是这种比较涉及到繁荣水平和对重演大萧条的担忧，但它也反映了科德尔·赫尔著名格言中提出的担忧：“如果货物不能跨越边界，士兵就会”（Buzan 1984）。目前尚不清楚关键的担忧是经济混乱本身，还是经济封闭对政治军事关系的影响。
The strongest attempts to securitize the economy are those that make clear that although doing so is a question of economic loss and thus part of the ordinary business of life, it is a matter not of degree but of a possible collapse of welfare. This argument can be used in relation to the LIEO or with a specific state or group of individuals as referent: If, for example, we are left out of the next round of information technology, we will be on a steady downward curve relative to the global economy and will therefore be unable to uphold levels of welfare; ultimately, this situation can lead to social instability, breakdown of order, even revolution. This attempt can either be defined out of the sector as a political threat, or it could be kept in the economic sector as a class securitization: Such arguments are often thinly veiled claims about a potential economic-political threat to our position. 对经济进行安全化的最强有力尝试是那些明确指出，尽管这样做涉及经济损失，因此属于日常生活事务的一部分，但这不是程度上的问题，而是可能导致福利崩溃的问题。这个论点可以用来针对自由国际经济秩序（LIEO）或特定国家或群体作为参照对象：例如，如果我们被排除在下一轮信息技术之外，我们将在全球经济中处于持续下滑的曲线，因此将无法维持福利水平；最终，这种情况可能导致社会不稳定、秩序崩溃，甚至革命。这种尝试可以被定义为政治威胁而排除在经济领域之外，或者可以作为阶级安全化保留在经济领域内：此类论点往往是对我们地位潜在经济政治威胁的含蓄主张。
Similar arguments can be made about regional institutions, most notably the EU. Part of the founding logic of formal European integration 关于地区性机构，尤其是欧盟，也可以提出类似的论点。正式欧洲一体化的部分创立逻辑是...
was to link the basic industries (iron, steel, coal, and nuclear) of Europe together in a way that would reduce states’ capability for independent military mobilization. This linkage between economic structure and militarypolitical security goes back to arguments between liberals and mercantilists about the nature of the international political economy. The liberals have largely held the high ground in linking the neomercantilist policies of the 1930s to the slide toward world war, successfully sidetracking the case that the failure of an unstable liberal system was what started the ball rolling (Polanyi 1957 [1944]). 目的是将欧洲的基础工业（铁、钢、煤炭和核能）连接起来，以减少各国独立进行军事动员的能力。这种经济结构与军事政治安全之间的联系可以追溯到自由主义者和重商主义者关于国际政治经济性质的争论。自由主义者在将 1930 年代的新重商主义政策与走向世界大战的趋势联系起来方面基本占据了上风，成功地回避了不稳定的自由体系失败是引发这一切的起因这一论点（Polanyi 1957 [1944]）。
To sum up, in the economic sector one finds a range of referent objects at the unit, subsystem, and system levels of which the most important seem to be the state and the LIEO. Securitizing actors can be found at all levels, although the representatives of states and IGOs and sometimes, more quietly, firms are generally the most effective. Abstract entities such as the LIEO are incapable of having voice and can only appear as referent objects. Under liberalism, the unit most distinctive to the sector-the firm-appears mainly in the role of a functional security actor that affects the security dynamics within the sector, most notably as the demon or savior of lessdeveloped national economies. The state also plays this role, as do IGOs. The state’s gatekeeper function regarding how permeable it allows its borders to be to economic transactions sets the basic conditions for the IGOs and the international political economy as a whole. The question of whether the motive for securitization lies primarily in the economic sector or in other sectors is as yet unanswered, and it is to that question that we now turn. 总结来说，在经济领域中，可以在单位、子系统和系统层面找到一系列的参照对象，其中最重要的似乎是国家和自由国际经济秩序（LIEO）。安全化行为者可以在所有层面找到，尽管国家和政府间组织（IGOs）的代表以及有时更为低调的企业通常是最有效的。像自由国际经济秩序这样抽象的实体无法发声，只能作为参照对象出现。在自由主义下，该领域最具特色的单位——企业——主要以功能性安全行为者的角色出现，影响该领域内的安全动态，最显著的是作为欠发达国家经济的恶魔或救世主。国家也扮演着这一角色，政府间组织亦然。国家在其边界对经济交易的渗透性方面所扮演的守门人角色，为政府间组织和整个国际政治经济设定了基本条件。关于安全化动机是否主要源自经济领域或其他领域的问题尚未有定论，我们现在将转向这个问题。
The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities 威胁与脆弱性的逻辑
How do threats and vulnerabilities in the economic sector measure up to the securitization criteria, especially existential threat? As we saw in the previous section, there are clear links from economic issues to other security sectors (and it is worth noting that these operate in reverse, with warsboth hot and cold-and environmental crises capable of inflicting serious damage on local, national, and world economies). But within the difficult and contradiction-ridden terrain of the economic sector itself, where is the boundary between politicization and securitization? Given that insecurity is a basic feature of life in a market economy, how do economic issues move up the scale from simply technical problems to politicized problems to securitized ones? 经济领域中的威胁和脆弱性如何符合安全化标准，特别是存在性威胁？正如我们在上一节中看到的，经济问题与其他安全领域之间存在明确的联系（值得注意的是，这些联系是双向的，热战与冷战以及环境危机都可能对地方、国家和世界经济造成严重损害）。但在经济领域这个充满困难和矛盾的领域内，政治化与安全化的界限在哪里？鉴于不安全感是市场经济生活的基本特征，经济问题如何从单纯的技术问题上升为政治化问题，再到安全化问题？
What constitutes an existential economic threat depends upon the referent object. For individuals, economic security can be understood most clearly in terms of basic human needs. Individuals live or die (or, in the case of malnutrition in children, have their development as human beings 什么构成存在性的经济威胁取决于参照对象。对于个人来说，经济安全最清楚地可以理解为基本人类需求。个人的生存或死亡（或者在儿童营养不良的情况下，其作为人的发展）
compromised) according to the provision of the basic necessities for sustaining human life: adequate food, water, clothing, shelter, and education. So-called food security, and calls to eradicate mass starvation are clearly within the realm of basic human needs, as is disaster relief. But beyond these basics, it is not clear that the individual can legitimately be securitized in the economic sector. Issues of relative levels of welfare, of differential access to more exotic resources, and even of unemployment may be enormously important to individuals and indeed to societies, but in economic terms they are not about survival. Lacking an existential quality, they remain economic or political (or possibly societal or environmental) issues and not security ones. 根据维持人类生命基本必需品的规定：充足的食物、水、衣物、住所和教育，处于危机中的情况。所谓的粮食安全和消除大规模饥荒的呼吁显然属于基本人类需求的范畴，灾难救援也是如此。但超出这些基本需求之外，个人是否能在经济领域被合法地视为安全问题尚不明确。福利的相对水平、对更稀有资源的不同获取途径，甚至失业问题，对个人乃至社会可能极为重要，但从经济角度来看，它们并非关乎生存。由于缺乏生存的本质特征，它们仍然是经济、政治（或可能是社会或环境）问题，而非安全问题。
In the liberal perspective, firms, as discussed earlier, generally lack the existential qualities needed for economic securitization unless, as with major banks, their demise threatens the economy itself. The word security is often used in economic relations, most notably in relation to investment. Investment has both economic and political risks. The latter are now related less to the ideological color of states than to potential civil strife-the weak-strong state criterion (Buzan 1991: 96-107). Another political risk remains that of collective boycotts: Investors in Libya and Iraq have lost money as a result of international economic boycott. At present, no clear trend seems to exist in the international excommunication of states. Moreover, it is unlikely that such a trend would be allowed to take on proportions that threaten the world economy as such. Regional subsystems, however, might be put at risk; in the past, the UN member states have not shied away from that risk in Southern Africa. Investment “security” is not, however, of the same quality as international security. 在自由主义视角中，如前所述，企业通常缺乏经济安全化所需的存在性特质，除非像大型银行那样，其倒闭会威胁到整个经济。安全一词常用于经济关系中，尤其是在投资方面。投资既有经济风险，也有政治风险。后者现在与国家的意识形态色彩关系较小，而更多与潜在的内乱——弱国与强国的标准有关（Buzan 1991: 96-107）。另一种政治风险是集体抵制：利比亚和伊拉克的投资者因国际经济抵制而蒙受损失。目前，国际社会对国家的排斥似乎没有明显趋势。此外，这种趋势不太可能被允许发展到威胁全球经济的程度。然而，区域子系统可能会面临风险；过去，联合国成员国在南部非洲并未回避这种风险。然而，投资“安全”与国际安全的性质不同。
Unlike firms, states do have the qualities necessary for securitization. They are expected to be (although they are not always) permanently rooted structures. The fact that states are seen as indissoluble causes problems for their role as actors in the global economy. Whereas firms are expected to disappear as economic actors if they play the economic game unsuccessfully and become bankrupt, states cannot disappear. States can technically go bankrupt (as was the case with Mexico during the debt crisis and almost again in 1995), but they cannot be dissolved, and the inhabitants cannot be fired-although many may try to migrate. Takeovers are rare and difficult, and as Iraq discovered with Kuwait, hostile takeovers are now generally treated as illegal. The end of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is an isolated recent case of a successful takeover of one state by another. Attempts by TNCs to control local politics and military security run up against the same adverse logic of costs that inspired decolonization. For firms, the costs of taking on governmental responsibilities are higher than the risk of unwanted nationalizations of property abroad. There is, after all, a powerful logic in that most central of liberal arguments, the division of labor between states and firms: Neither can do the other’s job efficiently. 与公司不同，国家确实具备实现安全化所需的特质。人们期望国家是（尽管并非总是如此）永久根植的结构。国家被视为不可解散的事实给其作为全球经济参与者的角色带来了问题。公司如果在经济活动中失败并破产，预期会消失，而国家则不能消失。技术上讲，国家可以破产（如墨西哥在债务危机期间以及 1995 年几乎再次发生的情况），但不能被解散，居民也不能被解雇——尽管许多人可能会尝试迁移。接管事件罕见且困难，正如伊拉克对科威特的经历所示，敌意接管现在通常被视为非法。德意志民主共和国（GDR）的终结是近期一个孤立的成功被另一国家接管的案例。跨国公司（TNCs）试图控制地方政治和军事安全时，会遇到与去殖民化时相同的高昂成本逻辑。对于公司来说，承担政府职责的成本高于在国外遭遇不受欢迎的财产国有化的风险。 毕竟，在自由主义最核心的论点——国家与企业之间的劳动分工——中，有一种强有力的逻辑：两者都无法高效地完成对方的工作。
States are thus peculiarly immune to some existential threats that bear on other actors in the economic sector. The bankruptcy of a state may threaten its political security (by having the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank infringe upon its sovereignty) or its military security (by raising threats of forceful debt collection, as in the gunboat diplomacy of the colonial era-which is no longer acceptable), but it rarely affects a state’s economic security. 因此，国家对经济领域中其他行为者所面临的一些生存威胁具有特殊的免疫力。国家破产可能威胁其政治安全（国际货币基金组织[IMF]和世界银行侵犯其主权）或军事安全（通过提高强制债务催收的威胁，如殖民时代的炮舰外交——这已不再被接受），但很少影响国家的经济安全。
The logic of economic security for states is similar to that for individuals except that in principle (although rarely in practice) states can form entirely self-contained economic systems. There is, in effect, a state equivalent of basic human needs. Unless a state is self-reliant in the resources required to feed its population and industry, it needs access to outside supplies. If that need is threatened, the national economy can be clearly and legitimately securitized. 国家经济安全的逻辑与个人类似，只是原则上（尽管实际上很少）国家可以形成完全自给自足的经济体系。实际上，存在一个相当于基本人类需求的国家等价物。除非一个国家在养活其人口和工业所需资源方面自给自足，否则它需要获得外部供应。如果这种需求受到威胁，国家经济可以被明确且合法地安全化。
Beyond this basic level, however, it is difficult to see how economic security can be legitimately invoked by liberals. Whereas economic nationalists have no problem invoking economic security in state terms, liberals are (or should be) constrained from doing so by their commitment to efficiency and thus to openness and competition. In principle, this commitment should exclude from securitization a great range of things that might count as serious economic or political issues: how well or how badly states do in the race for industrialization and development, how well they do in competition for market share, how fair or unfair the terms of trade and access to credit and investment are perceived to be, whether the presence of direct and indirect foreign investment is economically beneficial, whether global competition is good for development, whether absolute economic gains are more important than relative ones, and the like. 然而，超出这一基本层面，难以看出自由主义者如何能合法地援引经济安全。经济民族主义者在国家层面援引经济安全毫无问题，而自由主义者则因其对效率的承诺，从而对开放和竞争的承诺，理应受到限制。原则上，这种承诺应排除将许多可能被视为严重经济或政治问题的事项纳入安全化范畴：国家在工业化和发展竞赛中的表现如何，国家在市场份额竞争中的表现如何，贸易条件和信贷及投资准入被认为是公平还是不公平，直接和间接外国投资的存在是否经济上有益，全球竞争是否有利于发展，绝对经济收益是否比相对收益更重要，诸如此类。
Perhaps the only thing liberals can try to treat as an economic security issue is the need to sustain the reform programs that keep the national economy in line with the international economy. Without such reforms, states risk the marginalization or even devastation of their economies because of debt default, loss of investment, or currency instability. But this situation scarcely reaches existential proportions and rarely comes in a form abrupt or dramatic enough to lift it out of normal politics. Like the issues listed earlier, it is much more likely to be about how well or how badly the state does in absolute and relative terms than it is to be about the existence of the state or the national economy. To the extent that clear existential threats arise from such economic issues, they do so because of their impact in other sectors rather than their impact within the economic sector itself. When economic securitization is attempted, the actor will often use the element of security logic, which is a dramatic break point: Yes, this is about levels of welfare but not in a gradual or incremental sense; if we take a downward course, it points toward a situation that does contain existential threats. 也许自由主义者唯一能尝试作为经济安全问题来处理的是维持改革计划的必要性，这些改革计划使国家经济与国际经济保持一致。没有这些改革，国家的经济可能因债务违约、投资流失或货币不稳定而面临边缘化甚至毁灭的风险。但这种情况几乎不会达到生存层面的严重程度，也很少以足够突然或戏剧性的形式出现，从而使其超出正常政治范畴。像前面列举的问题一样，这更可能关乎国家在绝对和相对层面上的表现好坏，而不是关乎国家或国民经济的存在。若此类经济问题确实带来明确的生存威胁，那也是因为它们对其他领域的影响，而非仅仅对经济领域本身的影响。 当尝试进行经济安全化时，行为者通常会使用安全逻辑的元素，这是一个戏剧性的转折点：是的，这确实涉及福利水平，但不是以渐进或递增的方式；如果我们走向下坡路，这指向一个确实包含生存威胁的局面。
What is merely economic or political within the economic sector may have security implications in other sectors. Can society, with its wider set of values, survive the impact of international marketization? Will breakdowns in the international economy lead to war? Does the spread of mass consumption market economies threaten to overwhelm the planetary ecosystem? The logical difficulties within liberalism caused by the acceptance of economic insecurity as the price of efficiency work against attempts to securitize issues in the economic sector. They do not prevent such attempts, although it is easier for economic nationalists than for liberals to make those attempts. It is difficult for liberals to speak of economic security without becoming intellectually incoherent. 在经济领域内仅仅是经济或政治的问题，在其他领域可能具有安全影响。社会能否凭借其更广泛的价值体系，承受国际市场化的冲击？国际经济的崩溃会导致战争吗？大众消费市场经济的扩散是否威胁到地球生态系统的承载能力？自由主义内部由于接受经济不安全作为效率代价而产生的逻辑困难，阻碍了在经济领域进行安全化的尝试。虽然这并不阻止此类尝试，但经济民族主义者比自由主义者更容易进行这些尝试。自由主义者很难谈论经济安全而不陷入智识上的自相矛盾。
One interesting feature of the economic sector is that system-level structures (the market, the trading system, the financial system) and the institutions associated with them are routinely invoked as objects of security. This contrasts with the discourse in the political sector, where, although various regimes and institutions and even international society itself can become referent objects, the anarchic structure as such is almost never invoked in this way (even though the obsession with sovereignty implies support for an anarchic structure). When economic systems-whether abstract markets or concrete IGOs-are constructed as referent objects of security, the question of what constitutes an existential threat can be answered only in terms of the principles by which such systems are organized. The LIEO is existentially challenged by anything that threatens to unravel commitments to remove border constraints on the international movement of goods, services, and finance. More subtly, it is also threatened by the development of monopolies, which undercut the rationales of competition and efficiency that underpin the system. The LIEO thus lives in permanent tension with impulses toward both protectionism and monopoly. To the extent that these other impulses gain ground, the LIEO is diminished and eventually extinguished. The same logic applies to IGOs. In the economic sector, something like the EU can be existentially threatened by whatever might unglue the rules and agreements that constitute its single market (cf. Chapter 8). 经济领域的一个有趣特征是，系统层面的结构（市场、交易系统、金融系统）及其相关机构常被作为安全的对象。这与政治领域的论述形成对比，尽管各种政权和机构甚至国际社会本身都可能成为参照对象，但无政府状态结构本身几乎从未以这种方式被提及（尽管对主权的痴迷暗示了对无政府状态结构的支持）。当经济系统——无论是抽象的市场还是具体的政府间组织——被构建为安全的参照对象时，什么构成生存威胁的问题只能根据这些系统的组织原则来回答。自由国际经济秩序（LIEO）受到任何威胁解除国际货物、服务和金融流动边界限制承诺的事物的生存挑战。更微妙的是，垄断的发展也威胁着它，因为垄断削弱了支撑该系统的竞争和效率的合理性。 因此，LIEO 永远处于保护主义和垄断冲动的持续紧张状态中。在这些其他冲动占据上风的程度上，LIEO 会被削弱并最终消失。同样的逻辑也适用于政府间组织。在经济领域，类似欧盟的组织可能会因任何可能破坏构成其单一市场的规则和协议的因素而面临生存威胁（参见第 8 章）。
Although clear in principle, this criterion for securitization is not so simple in practice. At least two questions arise: When does the scale of a threat become sufficient to count as a legitimate security issue, and how does one deal with systemic crises and their effects on the units within the system? 尽管原则上明确，但这一安全化标准在实践中并不简单。至少会出现两个问题：威胁的规模何时足以被视为合法的安全问题，以及如何处理系统性危机及其对系统内各单位的影响？
The problem with scale is endemic to all kinds of security logic. In principle, any armed force in the hands of a neighboring state can be constructed as a threat to military security, but in practice, only when such forces become capable of invading or massively damaging others and are accompanied by perceptions of hostility can they easily be made to take on the full character of credible security threats. With liberal economic sys- 规模问题是所有安全逻辑的普遍问题。原则上，邻国手中的任何武装力量都可以被构建为对军事安全的威胁，但实际上，只有当这些力量具备入侵或大规模破坏他国的能力，并伴随着敌意的感知时，它们才能轻易被视为具有可信安全威胁的全部特征。随着自由经济体系—
tems, any moves toward monopoly or protectionism can be taken as security issues, but to do so, as in the case of small military forces, risks paranoia. Considerable ebb and flow will always occur around basic organizing principles within the huge complexities of international market systems. Some states may need temporary protectionist measures to ease adjustments within the larger framework. This need can be accepted and institutionalized within an overall liberal framework and so need not trigger securitizing reactions. The postwar regimes of “embedded liberalism” contained escape clauses to make such adjustment possible without threatening the ordering principles (Ruggie 1982). 在体系中，任何走向垄断或保护主义的举动都可以被视为安全问题，但这样做，如同小型军事力量的情况一样，存在导致偏执的风险。在国际市场体系的巨大复杂性中，围绕基本组织原则总会有相当的起伏。一些国家可能需要临时的保护主义措施以缓解在更大框架内的调整需求。这种需求可以被接受并在整体自由主义框架内制度化，因此不必引发安全化反应。战后“嵌入式自由主义”体制包含了逃避条款，使这种调整成为可能，而不会威胁到秩序原则（Ruggie 1982）。
The Cold War period, moreover, demonstrated that a “world” economy can flourish even without the participation of large parts of the world (the Communist bloc). Like humans, firms, and states, systems can lose an arm or a leg without being existentially threatened. Security threats to such systems occur when leading actors or large numbers of members begin either to question the constitutive principles of the system or to break or fail to support the rules and practices that uphold the system. 此外，冷战时期表明，即使没有世界大部分地区（共产主义集团）的参与，“世界”经济仍能繁荣发展。像人类、公司和国家一样，体系可以失去一只手臂或一条腿而不至于存在性威胁。当主要行为者或大量成员开始质疑体系的构成原则，或破坏、未能支持维系体系的规则和惯例时，这些体系才会面临安全威胁。
Securitization is sometimes attempted on less significant threats. Such attempts usually fail, but sometimes they function to legitimize action against dissenters from the global liberal economic order. One can see this in elements of U.S. policy toward Cuba and in the emerging tougher international stand toward the Swiss banking policy. 有时会尝试将不太重要的威胁进行安全化。这类尝试通常会失败，但有时它们起到了使针对全球自由经济秩序异见者的行动合法化的作用。可以在美国对古巴的部分政策以及对瑞士银行政策日益强硬的国际立场中看到这一点。
Systemic crises may result from such disaffected behavior, but they may also result from malfunctions or cyclical patterns within the system. Are disruptions that affect the structure of (large parts of) the system to be considered security issues, and if so, what or who can be presented as existentially threatened? In this view, individual actors, such as TNCs, or specific trade relations may not be important, but the key issue is stability in the global traffic of goods, money, services, and people. “Stability” means changes occur only within known limits-that is, that the misfortune of individual actors or relations does not trigger damaging chain reactions that threaten the system. “Known limits” can be interpreted as socially accepted risks of economic enterprise or as calculated risk. The Great Depression is the classic example of a chain reaction shredding the entire fabric beyond calculated risk. Black Monday (October 1987) shows, however, that similar crises can now be handled–although not without costs. The international debt crisis (in the early 1980s) is another example of disaster traveling fast through the international economic system and testing its resilience. 系统性危机可能由这种不满行为引起，但也可能源于系统内部的故障或周期性模式。影响（系统大部分）结构的中断是否应被视为安全问题？如果是，什么或谁可以被视为存在威胁？在这种观点下，个别行为者，如跨国公司（TNCs）或特定的贸易关系，可能并不重要，关键问题是全球货物、资金、服务和人员流动的稳定性。“稳定性”意味着变化仅在已知的限度内发生——即个别行为者或关系的不幸不会引发破坏性连锁反应，威胁系统。“已知的限度”可以被解释为经济企业的社会接受风险或计算风险。大萧条是超出计算风险的连锁反应撕裂整个结构的经典例子。然而，1987 年 10 月的“黑色星期一”表明，类似的危机现在可以被应对——尽管代价不小。20 世纪 80 年代初的国际债务危机是另一个灾难迅速在国际经济系统中传播并测试其韧性的例子。
When such chain reaction disasters bring down the system, as occurred in the 1930s, they clearly fit within the logic of security in terms of existential threats to the system. This possibility underlies and justifies much of the economic nationalist position (focusing on the dangers of exposure under liberalism) and also of the liberal attempt to securitize protectionism (as the supposed catuse of systemic crises). Such views maly well justify 当这种连锁反应灾难导致系统崩溃时，如 1930 年代发生的那样，它们显然符合以系统存在性威胁为逻辑的安全范畴。这种可能性是经济民族主义立场（关注自由主义下暴露的危险）以及自由主义试图将保护主义安全化（作为系统性危机的假定原因）的基础和正当理由。这些观点很可能为
securitizing responses to events that are less than threatening to the entire system but that may trigger chain reactions. 对那些对整个系统威胁不足但可能引发连锁反应的事件采取安全化反应提供正当理由。
But here, some of the inherent contradictions of liberal economic security arise to obscure the picture. How does liberal security logic deal with systems whose organizing principles are themselves defective in the sense that they create a significant probability of systemic crises (Polanyi 1957 [1944])? What does it mean to protect the stability of a system if the system is a threat to itself? This question takes us back to the basic ideological disputes at the heart of IPE. It can be argued, for example, that the LIEO contains such faults. The relentless pursuit of free trade may eventually create such pressures of adjustment and loss on states, as well as the polarization of societies, that it triggers reactions against the basic principles of the system. Or financial deregulation may give certain kinds of economic actors (futures “securities” traders are ironically the currently favored candidate) sufficient freedom to pursue their own interests that they overreach the carrying capacity of the system and bring it down. The typical case here would be a chain reaction collapse of credit that might result from the huge resources now being gambled on futures and derivatives. It is difficult to know in what sense, if any, one can think of such prospects as threats to the system, although one way into the problem may be to think in terms of threats to the joint gains fostered by the LIEO. 但在这里，自由经济安全的一些内在矛盾开始使情况变得模糊。自由安全逻辑如何处理那些其组织原则本身存在缺陷、从而产生系统性危机显著可能性的体系（Polanyi 1957 [1944]）？如果一个系统本身就是威胁，保护该系统的稳定意味着什么？这个问题将我们带回国际政治经济学核心的基本意识形态争论。例如，可以认为自由国际经济秩序（LIEO）就存在这样的缺陷。对自由贸易的无情追求最终可能对国家造成巨大的调整压力和损失，以及社会的两极分化，从而引发对该体系基本原则的反应。或者，金融放松管制可能赋予某些类型的经济行为者（讽刺的是，期货“证券”交易者目前是最受青睐的候选者）足够的自由去追求自身利益，以至于超出系统的承载能力并导致其崩溃。这里的典型案例可能是由目前在期货和衍生品上赌注巨大的资源引发的信用连锁反应崩溃。 很难确定是否以及以何种意义上可以将此类前景视为对系统的威胁，尽管解决问题的一种方法可能是从对 LIEO 所促进的共同利益的威胁来思考。
The other obvious way to think about threats in security terms is to shift to thinking of systemic crises as threats to the units (states, firms, IGOs) within the system. Here, it might be argued that what matter are the speed and scale of fundamental change-its shock value. If Japan dropped out of the world economy tomorrow (e.g., as a result of a hypothetical natural disaster of the Atlantis class), the entire system would be disrupted. But if an economic power like Japan diminishes slowly and graduallysay, over a period of one or two generations, as Britain has done (albeit not without two world wars)-the system can adapt to the process. 以安全术语思考威胁的另一个明显方式是将系统性危机视为对系统内单位（国家、公司、国际政府组织）的威胁。在这里，可以认为重要的是根本性变化的速度和规模——其冲击价值。如果日本明天退出世界经济（例如，因假设的亚特兰蒂斯级自然灾害），整个系统将被扰乱。但如果像日本这样的经济大国缓慢且逐渐地衰退——比如在一两代人的时间里，正如英国所经历的（尽管经历了两次世界大战）——系统可以适应这一过程。
Sudden and massive structural change thus might count as an economic security issue as it does at other levels. Losing a job on the spot creates huge insecurities, as does finding one’s house burned down, whereas receiving notice a year ahead allows for timely adjustments. Many mechanisms exist for providing security against the effects of unexpected systemic disruption on units within the system. Insurance companies are a classic example, although they typically exclude damage from many disasters that would cause widespread claims, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and wars. Social security systems cushion the blow of unemployment and are also important in preventing a spillover of economic conflicts into political ones. Banks may play a similar role for firms. But these examples all concern measures to help individual units that get into trouble. Most either cease to function or are swept away if the system itself collapses. 突然且大规模的结构性变化因此可能被视为一个经济安全问题，就像在其他层面一样。突然失业会带来巨大的不安全感，就像发现自己的房子被烧毁一样，而提前一年的通知则允许及时调整。存在许多机制来提供对系统内单位因意外系统性破坏所带来影响的保障。保险公司是一个经典的例子，尽管它们通常排除许多会导致广泛索赔的灾害损失，如地震、飓风和战争。社会保障系统缓冲失业的冲击，也在防止经济冲突蔓延为政治冲突方面发挥重要作用。银行可能对企业起到类似的作用。但这些例子都涉及帮助陷入困境的个体单位的措施。如果系统本身崩溃，大多数措施要么停止运作，要么被淘汰。
The increasing internationalization of the world economy and the fear 世界经济日益国际化以及对其的担忧
of another 1920s-style collapse have led to the increasing institutionalization of system-level security guarantors in the LIEO. The IMF and the World Bank provide support for states that get into economic trouble, and the GATT-WTO contributes to resilience against crises by providing rules and settling disputes. Central banks operate more and more independent of national governments, and their representatives meet regularly to discuss and coordinate policy in forums such as the Bank for International Settlements and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (Underhill 1995). The major OECD banks are also connected by hot lines to enable immediate communication and coordination in case of a crisis. Such measures suggest a serious and sustained response to threats against economic security at the system level. One astute observer even compared the personnel involved in these arrangements to the “mafia of nuclear strategists” who once inhabited the military security world (Healey 1989: 413). 另一次 1920 年代风格的崩溃导致了 LIEO 中系统级安全保障机构的日益制度化。国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行为陷入经济困境的国家提供支持，关税与贸易总协定-世界贸易组织（GATT-WTO）通过提供规则和解决争端来增强对危机的抵御能力。中央银行越来越独立于国家政府运作，其代表定期在国际清算银行和国际证券委员会组织（IOSCO）（Underhill 1995）等论坛上会面，讨论和协调政策。主要的经济合作与发展组织（OECD）银行也通过热线相连，以便在危机发生时实现即时沟通和协调。这些措施表明对系统层面经济安全威胁的严肃且持续的应对。一位敏锐的观察者甚至将参与这些安排的人员比作曾经活跃于军事安全领域的“核战略家黑手党”（Healey 1989: 413）。
The securitization of systemic crises runs up against the arguments made earlier that within the economic sector, existential threats constitute a fairly narrow range of conditions. But given the particular nature and vulnerability of the LIEO as a referent object for economic security, the system level would seem to be the strongest legitimate candidate for securitization in this sector (as well as having impacts in other sectors). Although some other aspects of the economic sector can be securitized, they are relatively few and reflect extreme cases. Because of the basic nature of a liberal economy, much of what might be seen as economic security issues is in fact either normal or politicized economic relations. One feature of security in this sector is that although genuine economic security issues are relatively rare, normal and politicized economic activity frequently spills over into other sectors, with security consequences. Another feature is that although frequent attempts at securitization are made, covering many types of referent objects, few attract wide support. These discourses of securitization are part of the ideological disputes about policy for the political economy. When pure liberalism is in the ascendant, few economic security claims will be able to surmount the hurdle that insecurity is the price to be paid for participating in the global market economy. Under this logic, losers are part of the game, and their attempts to securitize their plight are dismissed as attempts to change the rules of the game. 系统性危机的安全化遇到了之前提出的论点，即在经济领域内，生存威胁构成的条件范围相当狭窄。但鉴于 LIEO 作为经济安全参照对象的特殊性质和脆弱性，系统层面似乎是该领域中最有力且合法的安全化候选对象（同时也对其他领域产生影响）。尽管经济领域的其他一些方面可以被安全化，但它们相对较少且反映极端情况。由于自由经济的基本性质，许多被视为经济安全问题的内容实际上要么是正常的，要么是政治化的经济关系。该领域安全的一个特点是，尽管真正的经济安全问题相对罕见，正常和政治化的经济活动经常溢出到其他领域，带来安全后果。另一个特点是，尽管频繁尝试进行安全化，涵盖多种类型的参照对象，但很少获得广泛支持。 这些安全化话语是关于政治经济政策意识形态争论的一部分。当纯粹的自由主义占上风时，很少有经济安全主张能够克服这样一个障碍：不安全是参与全球市场经济必须付出的代价。在这种逻辑下，失败者是游戏的一部分，他们试图将自己的困境安全化的努力被视为试图改变游戏规则的行为而被驳回。
Regionalizing Dynamics? 区域化动态？
Are the main trends in the security dynamics of the economic sector local, regional, or global? One of the problems in answering this question is the intrinsic difficulty of applying security logic to competitive economic relations. Another, as shown carlier, is that whereas the strictly economic logic 经济部门安全动态的主要趋势是地方性的、区域性的还是全球性的？回答这个问题的一个难点是将安全逻辑应用于竞争性经济关系的内在困难。另一个问题，如前所示，是严格的经济安全逻辑相当狭窄，
of security is rather narrow, economic dynamics have many security effects in other sectors. These linkages are what underpins IPE as a cross-sectoral enterprise. Keeping the economic security agenda distinct from other sectors is not easy or generally a good idea. 经济动态在其他部门具有许多安全效应。这些联系是国际政治经济学作为跨部门事业的基础。将经济安全议程与其他部门区分开来既不容易，也通常不是一个好主意。
Globalizing Trends 全球化趋势
On the face of it, one would expect the dynamics of contemporary economic security to be dominated by the strong globalizing tendencies that mark the LIEO as a whole. Unlike military and political relations, economic ones are currently little affected by geography and distance. The costs of worldwide shipping and communications today are very low, and in the LIEO many large firms are globally mobile. Many markets (particularly financial ones) now operate globally, and it is no longer an exaggeration to speak of a global economic system. Indeed, some writers (e.g., Cerny 1995) see the development of a global-scale division of Iabor as sufficiently advanced to be marginalizing the state. 表面上看，人们会认为当代经济安全的动态主要受标志整个自由国际经济秩序（LIEO）强烈全球化倾向的支配。与军事和政治关系不同，经济关系目前几乎不受地理和距离的影响。如今，全球运输和通信的成本非常低，在自由国际经济秩序中，许多大型企业具有全球流动性。许多市场（尤其是金融市场）现在在全球范围内运作，谈论全球经济体系已不再夸张。事实上，一些作者（例如，Cerny 1995）认为全球规模的劳动分工发展已足够先进，以至于边缘化国家。
The emergence and intensification of a global market economy is one of the major developments of our time, and the security question arising is about the stability of this complex network of competitive and collaborative relations. There has long been a debate about the coming destabilization of the liberal international economic order consequent upon the decline (or, in some versions, corruption) of the United States as a hegemonic leader (Hirsch and Doyle 1977; Keohane 1980, 1984; Strange 1984; Gilpin 1987; Kindleberger 1981). With the end of the Cold War, this debate has taken on an ironic Leninist twist with the possibility that the removal of their shared fear of communism and Soviet power will cause the main centers of capitalist power to fall into a gathering crisis of competition among themselves. The fashionable talk about competition for market shares (Strange 1994) cuts just close enough to Lenin’s ideas of imperialism and to the struggle to redivide a saturated global market to generate a deep sense of unease. It also tends to undermine the main hope of political economy institutionalists, already understood as a fragile option, that shared understandings and ideologies plus a collection of international regimes and institutions (the Group of Seven [G7], the World Bank, the WTO, the IMF) might be able to sustain the liberal international economic order on the basis of collective hegemony (Keohane 1984). 全球市场经济的出现和加剧是我们时代的重大进展之一，随之而来的安全问题是关于这一复杂的竞争与合作关系网络的稳定性。长期以来，关于自由国际经济秩序因美国作为霸权领导者的衰落（或在某些版本中为腐败）而导致的即将到来的不稳定性存在争论（Hirsch 和 Doyle 1977；Keohane 1980, 1984；Strange 1984；Gilpin 1987；Kindleberger 1981）。随着冷战的结束，这场辩论带上了一种讽刺的列宁主义色彩，即共同对共产主义和苏联力量的恐惧消除后，资本主义主要力量中心可能陷入相互竞争的日益加剧的危机。关于市场份额竞争的流行讨论（Strange 1994）恰好触及列宁关于帝国主义和重新瓜分饱和全球市场斗争的思想，激发出深刻的不安感。 它还倾向于削弱政治经济制度主义者的主要希望，这一希望已被理解为一种脆弱的选择，即共享的理解和意识形态加上一系列国际制度和机构（七国集团[G7]、世界银行、世贸组织、国际货币基金组织）可能能够在集体霸权的基础上维持自由国际经济秩序（Keohane 1984）。
What looms on the horizon, therefore, is the possibility of a major crisis in the global political economy involving a substantial collapse of the liberalizing regime developed during the Cold War. Two sets of pressures seem to be converging simultaneously on the weakening Cold War economic order. One is the intensification of trade competition that is consequent upon the increasing number of suppliers in almost every area of production (Paye 1994). The successful industrialization of areas outside the 因此，地平线上显现的是全球政治经济可能发生重大危机的可能性，这涉及到冷战期间发展起来的自由化体制的实质性崩溃。两组压力似乎同时汇聚在日益衰弱的冷战经济秩序上。一是贸易竞争的加剧，这是几乎所有生产领域供应商数量增加的结果（Paye 1994）。成功的工业化使得西方以外地区的市场规模扩大。
West has increased the size of markets. But even more, it has generated surplus capacity in many industries. Surplus capacity intensifies competition and results in deindustrialization when older producers have become uncompetitive. 但更重要的是，它在许多行业中产生了过剩产能。过剩产能加剧了竞争，并导致当老旧生产者失去竞争力时的去工业化。
This globalizing of economic efficiency is good for consumers, but it places tremendous pressures of adaptation on states and societies, which have continually to reconfigure the way in which they earn a living. As liberal economists seem too easily to forget, to be a consumer one has to produce something to trade or sell. In older developed areas such as Europe, intensified trade competition confronts states and societies with major questions about social and political values. What, for example, do they do with the increasing segment of the population for whom no jobs seem likely to be available as a result of automation and the exodus of low-skilled agricultural and industrial jobs to cheaper labor countries abroad? The long, drawn-out saga of the GATT Uruguay Round was the bellwether of this gathering crisis in which the pursuit of economic efficiency creates societal and political costs that are increasingly difficult to sustain in a democratic political context. The barely successful conclusion of the round in December 1993 reflected a desperate hope that further liberalization would stimulate sufficient overall growth to stave off the accumulating social and political problems. Left unaddressed is the underlying tension between the economic realm on the one hand and the political and societal realms on the other and the intensifying pressures for protectionism these tensions feed. 经济效率的全球化对消费者有利，但它给国家和社会带来了巨大的适应压力，迫使它们不断重新配置谋生方式。正如自由经济学家们似乎过于轻易地忘记的那样，作为消费者，必须生产某种商品以进行贸易或销售。在欧洲等较早发展的地区，日益激烈的贸易竞争使国家和社会面临关于社会和政治价值的重大问题。例如，对于由于自动化以及低技能农业和工业岗位外流到劳动力成本较低的国家而导致似乎找不到工作的日益增多的人口部分，他们该怎么办？关贸总协定乌拉圭回合这场旷日持久的谈判正是这一日益加剧的危机的风向标，在这场危机中，追求经济效率带来了在民主政治环境中越来越难以维持的社会和政治成本。 1993 年 12 月回合的勉强成功结束反映出一种绝望的希望，即进一步的自由化能够刺激足够的整体增长，以避免日益积累的社会和政治问题。未被解决的是经济领域一方面与政治和社会领域另一方面之间的潜在紧张关系，以及这些紧张关系所带来的日益加剧的保护主义压力。
The second set of pressures concerns the financial liberalization that has been underway since the 1970s. The progressive removal of states’ financial controls has undermined the original postwar design for the global political economy set out at Bretton Woods. The Bretton Woods idea was to consolidate the welfare state by protecting it from the instabilities of deregulated finance that had precipitated the great crash in the late 1920s. Trade would be deregulated, but finance would not, and a system of stable exchange rates would facilitate trade. 第二组压力涉及自 20 世纪 70 年代以来正在进行的金融自由化。各国逐步取消金融管制，破坏了布雷顿森林体系设定的战后全球政治经济的原始设计。布雷顿森林体系的理念是通过保护福利国家免受导致 20 世纪 20 年代末大崩盘的金融放松管制不稳定性的影响来巩固福利国家。贸易将被放松管制，但金融不会，稳定的汇率体系将促进贸易。
Financial deregulation has both undermined the welfare state (in some places, such as the UK, intentionally so) and blown away any hope for exchange rate stability. Powerful financial markets organized on a global scale can now attack national currencies at will and wreck projects such as Europe’s exchange rate mechanism (ERM) that, if successful, would greatly reduce the profits to be made from currency exchange and speculation. Deregulation has also reduced the financial management tools available to states, leaving them with only interest rates and fiscal policy-both of which are notoriously difficult to use in this way, because they have immediate and severe impacts on the domestic economy and are difficult to coordinate given the different rhythms of national economic cycles (Cox 1994; Helleiner 1994a; Webb 1994; and Stubbs and Underhill 1994). This development exacerbates the trate erisis in (wo ways: It weakens the ahility of 金融放松管制既削弱了福利国家（在某些地方，如英国，是有意为之），也摧毁了任何对汇率稳定的希望。如今，强大的全球性金融市场可以随意攻击国家货币，破坏诸如欧洲汇率机制（ERM）等项目，如果成功，这些项目本可以大大减少通过货币兑换和投机获得的利润。放松管制还减少了国家可用的金融管理工具，只剩下利率和财政政策——这两者都以这种方式使用极为困难，因为它们对国内经济有即时且严重的影响，并且由于各国经济周期节奏不同，协调起来也很困难（Cox 1994；Helleiner 1994a；Webb 1994；以及 Stubbs 和 Underhill 1994）。这一发展加剧了贸易危机的两方面：它削弱了……
the welfare state to deal with the domestic consequences of intense competition, and it complicates trade and industrial policy by deranging exchange rates. The development also opens up the possibility of a major financial crisis resulting from overextensions of credit, like the one that triggered the Great Depression. 福利国家用以应对激烈竞争带来的国内后果，同时通过扰乱汇率使贸易和产业政策变得复杂。这一发展还带来了因信贷过度扩张而引发重大金融危机的可能性，就像引发大萧条的那场危机一样。
The combination of these three factors-weakened U.S. leadership, surplus productive capacity, and financial instability-explains the seemingly peculiar combination of pervasive economic angst on the one hand and liberal euphoria over the end of history and the defeat of communism on the other. Some writers are predicting a severe “time of troubles” ahead (Wallerstein 1993; Huntington 1993, 1996; Spence 1994: 4; Kaplan 1994). This crisis may or may not come to pass, but the prospect of it and awareness of its possibility provide the basis for securitization of system-level regimes, consultative mechanisms, and organizations that sustain the LIEO. A major economic breakdown would have repercussions not only in the economic sector but also in terms of political and military security. Attempting to prevent such a breakdown and to retain the known productive efficiencies of the LIEO is the main globalizing dynamic for economic security. 这三个因素的结合——美国领导力的削弱、过剩的生产能力和金融不稳定——解释了表面上看似矛盾的现象：一方面是普遍的经济焦虑，另一方面是对历史终结和共产主义失败的自由主义狂喜。一些作者预测未来将出现严重的“动荡时期”（Wallerstein 1993；Huntington 1993, 1996；Spence 1994: 4；Kaplan 1994）。这一危机可能会发生，也可能不会，但其前景和可能性的意识为系统级制度、协商机制及维持自由国际经济秩序（LIEO）的组织的安全化提供了基础。一次重大的经济崩溃不仅会在经济领域产生影响，还会在政治和军事安全方面带来连锁反应。试图防止这种崩溃并保持自由国际经济秩序已知的生产效率，是经济安全全球化的主要动力。
Regional Dynamics 区域动态
Interestingly, a strong connection seems to exist between global concerns about the security of the LIEO and securitizing dynamics at the regional level. Economic regionalism (Helleiner 1994b; Anderson and Blackhurst 1993; Fawcett and Hurrell 1995) has come back into fashion as a result of the widening and deepening of integration in the EU since the late 1980s and the construction of NAFTA. The most ambitious of these projects, the EU, trundles onward despite all of its difficulties and has unquestionably become the central focus of security in Europe (Buzan et al. 1990; Wæver et al. 1993). These two regional projects at the core of the global political economy have spawned imitators (the ASEAN Free Trade Area [AFTA] in Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] linking Australasia and North America, the Southern Cone Common Market [MERCOSUR] covering the Southern Cone of South America), as well as much discussion about other regional economic zones (ECOWAS in West Africa, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC] in South Asia, The South African Development Community [SADC] in Southern Africa, the CIS covering the former Soviet Union). East Asia is a puzzling case, with some interpreting it as lacking formal economic regionalism (and therefore vulnerable) and others seeing it as developing a distinctive informal, transnational model of regional integration. 有趣的是，全球对 LIEO 安全的关注与区域层面的安全化动态之间似乎存在着密切联系。经济区域主义（Helleiner 1994b；Anderson 和 Blackhurst 1993；Fawcett 和 Hurrell 1995）由于自 20 世纪 80 年代末以来欧盟一体化的扩大和深化以及北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）的建立而重新流行起来。这些项目中最雄心勃勃的是欧盟，尽管面临诸多困难，仍在稳步前进，并无疑已成为欧洲安全的核心焦点（Buzan 等，1990；Wæver 等，1993）。这两个处于全球政治经济核心的区域项目催生了模仿者（东南亚的东盟自由贸易区[AFTA]，连接澳大拉西亚和北美的亚太经济合作组织[APEC]，涵盖南美南锥体的南方共同市场[MERCOSUR]），以及关于其他区域经济区的广泛讨论（西非经济共同体[ECOWAS]，南亚区域合作联盟[SAARC]，南部非洲发展共同体[SADC]，涵盖前苏联的独联体[CIS]）。 东亚是一个令人费解的案例，有些人将其解读为缺乏正式的经济区域主义（因此脆弱），而另一些人则认为其正在发展一种独特的非正式、跨国的区域一体化模式。
Regionalization comes in many different forms of integration, with many different degrees of identity, depth, and institutionalization. Perhaps the main difference is that between formal, rule-bound, institutionalized 区域化以多种不同形式的整合出现，具有不同程度的身份认同、深度和制度化。也许主要的区别在于正式的、规则约束的、制度化的
versions (e.g., the EU) and informal versions led by “undirected processes of social and economic interaction,” as in East Asia (Hurrell 1995: 333-338). As with the global level, the regional one can be securitized in itself or can overlap with securitizations at the state and individual levels. The debates about the European Monetary Union have this overlapping quality. 版本（例如欧盟）和由“无方向的社会和经济互动过程”主导的非正式版本，如东亚（Hurrell 1995: 333-338）。与全球层面一样，区域层面本身也可以被安全化，或者可以与国家和个人层面的安全化重叠。关于欧洲货币联盟的辩论就具有这种重叠的特性。
The low cost of transportation and communication makes the undeniable enthusiasm for economic regionalism look at first peculiar. Given the intrinsic mobility of so many economic factors, in purely economic terms it would make as much sense for Britain to be linked with North America or Japan as to be part of the EU. 低廉的交通和通信成本使得对经济区域主义的不可否认的热情乍看之下显得奇怪。鉴于许多经济因素的内在流动性，从纯经济角度来看，英国与北美或日本相连与成为欧盟一部分同样合理。
Why do we find economic regionalism at a time when globalizing economic forces are so strong? The most obvious answer is that economic regionalism is a response to globalization. It can help states to cope not only with the success or failure of the LIEO but also with its day-to-day operation. To the extent that states fear a breakdown of the LIEO, it is prudent to construct regional blocs as a fallback position. There are dangers in this strategy, most notably that the insurance measure could take on an economic nationalist hue and could itself become the cause of the feared breakdown. But few want to see a breakdown of the LIEO all the way down to the state level, and regions are an obvious stopping point. 为什么在全球化经济力量如此强大的时候，我们还会看到经济区域主义？最明显的答案是，经济区域主义是对全球化的回应。它不仅可以帮助各国应对自由国际经济秩序（LIEO）的成功或失败，还能应对其日常运作。在各国担心自由国际经济秩序崩溃的情况下，构建区域集团作为后备方案是明智的。这一策略存在风险，最显著的是这种保险措施可能带有经济民族主义色彩，反而可能成为引发担忧的崩溃的原因。但很少有人希望看到自由国际经济秩序彻底崩溃到国家层面，而区域则是一个显而易见的停靠点。
If no crisis occurs and the LIEO performs successfully, regional groupings offer the additional benefit of providing a stronger platform for operating and negotiating in the global economy (although again this can tend toward mercantilism). They can, as Andrew Hurrell (1995: 346, 356) argues, provide both a more achievable institutional scale for handling the problems of collective management posed by global liberalization and a way of preserving particular forms of political economy (such as the EU’s Keynesian welfare statism). Regional groupings also offer potentially congenial ways of arranging economic relations between dominant local economic powers (e.g., Germany, the United States, India, South Africa, Japan) and their neighbors. Additionally, technical arguments explain some regionalizing trends in spite of powerful globalizing forces. In some places, local knowledge and sociocultural compatibility may favor regional patterns of trade and investment. In others, transportation costs may matter, as in Southeast Asia’s so-called growth triangles, which seek to integrate production across compatible adjacent sources of capital, labor, and materials (Ariff 1996: 4). 如果没有危机发生，且自由国际经济秩序（LIEO）运行成功，区域集团还提供了一个更强有力的平台，以便在全球经济中运作和谈判（尽管这又可能趋向于重商主义）。正如安德鲁·赫雷尔（Andrew Hurrell，1995: 346, 356）所论述的，它们既能为应对全球自由化带来的集体管理问题提供一个更易实现的制度规模，也能保护特定形式的政治经济（如欧盟的凯恩斯主义福利国家主义）。区域集团还可能为主导的地方经济大国（如德国、美国、印度、南非、日本）与其邻国之间安排经济关系提供潜在的和谐方式。此外，技术性论点解释了尽管存在强大的全球化力量，某些区域化趋势依然存在。在某些地区，当地知识和社会文化的兼容性可能有利于形成区域性的贸易和投资模式。在其他地区，运输成本可能起作用，比如东南亚所谓的增长三角，旨在整合相邻且资本、劳动力和材料相兼容的生产来源（Ariff 1996: 4）。
The economic logic of regionalism can thus be seen mainly as a response to top-down threats from the dominant framework of globalization, although, as with the EU, significant bottom-up logics also support it. As long as economic regionalism remains liberal in its outlook, the two developments are compatible. Unlike the situation in the 1930s, most contemporary regional boes have fairly liberat internal trading structures and in many ways are open 10 world markels. Their purposes are to reduce the 区域主义的经济逻辑主要可以被视为对全球化主导框架自上而下威胁的回应，尽管像欧盟那样，也有重要的自下而上的逻辑支持它。只要经济区域主义保持自由主义的观点，这两种发展是兼容的。与 1930 年代的情况不同，大多数当代区域集团内部具有相当自由的贸易结构，并且在许多方面对世界市场开放。它们的目的是减少...
pressures of an open global economy without sacrificing all economies of scale and to try to reduce the overstretched management demands of an open global economy by moving many of those demands to a more intimate regional scale. Economically, the trading structures are attempts to build stronger operating platforms from which to engage in the ever more intense trade and financial competition in the global market. And they are fallback bastions in case the global liberal economy succumbs to the effects of weak management, financial turbulence, or intensifying trade competition. Part of this function is about genuine economic security; the rest is about seeking an advantage in the politico-economic logic of competition within a global market. 在不牺牲所有规模经济的前提下，应对开放全球经济的压力，并试图通过将许多管理需求转移到更紧密的区域层面，来减少开放全球经济中管理过度紧张的要求。在经济上，贸易结构是试图建立更强大的运营平台，以便在全球市场中参与日益激烈的贸易和金融竞争。它们也是在全球自由经济因管理不善、金融动荡或贸易竞争加剧而陷入困境时的后备堡垒。这一功能部分涉及真正的经济安全；其余则是为了在全球市场内的政治经济竞争逻辑中寻求优势。
Regionalization could become the dominant trend, but that would require a shift from liberal to economic nationalist views of the political economy and a consequent redefinition of what constitutes economic security. For the time being, regionalization is more derivative from than threatening to the LIEO. Nevertheless, the geographic element of economic regionalism is worrying to liberals because it seems to run counter to the efficiencies of a global market; it is worrying to strategists because it has echoes of the neomercantilist blocs of the 1930s that were forerunners of World War II. This parallel with the 1930s seems misplaced. The contemporary economic blocs differ in crucial ways from those of the interwar period, as do the incentives affecting imperialism and war (Buzan 1991: 258-261). 区域化可能成为主导趋势，但这需要从自由主义转向经济民族主义的政治经济观，并相应地重新定义什么构成经济安全。目前，区域化更多是从属而非威胁 LIEO。然而，经济区域主义的地理因素令自由主义者担忧，因为它似乎与全球市场的效率背道而驰；战略家们也感到担忧，因为它让人联想到 20 世纪 30 年代的新重商主义集团，这些集团是第二次世界大战的先驱。将其与 20 世纪 30 年代相提并论似乎不妥。当前的经济集团在关键方面与战间期的集团不同，影响帝国主义和战争的激励机制也有所不同（Buzan 1991: 258-261）。
Although they do not point toward preparation for war, as was true in the 1930s, the contemporary economic blocs do have security roles in other sectors. They are, for example, politico-cultural defense mechanisms against the powerful homogenizing effects of open markets. Liberals like to think of the global market as, ideally, a place of uniform rules and universal logics of behavior. But one aspect of economic regionalism may be culturally based. As Eric Helleiner (1994b) points out, the three main economic groupings all have distinctive characters. Europe is heavily institutionalized and is driven by social democratic values. North America is lightly institutionalized and reflects liberal values. East Asia relies mostly on transnational links and reflects national development values. 虽然它们不像 1930 年代那样指向战争准备，但当代经济集团在其他领域确实具有安全作用。例如，它们是针对开放市场强大同质化效应的政治文化防御机制。自由主义者喜欢将全球市场理想化为一个规则统一、行为逻辑普遍的地方。但经济区域主义的一个方面可能是基于文化的。正如 Eric Helleiner（1994b）指出的，三大经济集团各具特色。欧洲高度制度化，受社会民主价值观驱动。北美制度化程度较低，反映自由主义价值观。东亚主要依赖跨国联系，体现国家发展价值观。
It could be that part of contemporary economic regionalism is based in the desire to preserve societal security. In this perspective, Islamic economies might eventually qualify as a separate type that has regionalizing tendencies, although this would depend upon the outcome of the integrating versus fragmenting dynamics discussed in Chapters 3, 6, and 7. At least in the banking sphere, Islamic norms and principles are sometimes different from capitalist ones (in Islamic economies, for example, it is forbidden to calculate interest on loans). When Islamic and capitalist economies do relate to one another, the situation might be like that with IBM and Macintosh computer systems: The two are compatible rather than 当代经济区域主义的部分原因可能基于维护社会安全的愿望。从这个角度来看，伊斯兰经济最终可能被视为一种具有区域化倾向的独立类型，尽管这将取决于第 3、6 和 7 章中讨论的整合与分裂动态的结果。至少在银行领域，伊斯兰规范和原则有时与资本主义不同（例如，在伊斯兰经济中，禁止对贷款计算利息）。当伊斯兰经济与资本主义经济相互关联时，情况可能类似于 IBM 和 Macintosh 计算机系统：两者是兼容的，而不是
hostile, but there are permanent translation costs. The difference might contribute to regionalization (higher economic interdependence among the users of the same system). 敌对的，但存在持续的转换成本。这种差异可能促成区域化（同一系统用户之间更高的经济相互依赖）。
In more conventional military-political terms, some realists have viewed regionalization as an attempt to construct superpowers. The EU is commonly seen this way both by its more extreme federalist advocates and by possible rivals in the United States and Russia. This argument was more convincing during the Cold War, when big was beautiful, and it has faded somewhat with the disintegration of the USSR and resistance to deeper integration within Europe. 用更传统的军事政治术语来说，一些现实主义者将区域化视为构建超级大国的尝试。欧盟通常被其更激进的联邦主义支持者以及美国和俄罗斯的潜在竞争对手这样看待。这个论点在冷战期间更具说服力，那时“大即是美”，但随着苏联的解体和欧洲内部对更深层次一体化的抵制，这一观点有所减弱。
Localizing Dynamics 地方动态
Given the overwhelming force of globalization and the regionalizing responses to it, little room is left for serious security dynamics at the local level. Even the state, which not long ago would have factored very strongly at this level, has largely surrendered to the imperatives of liberalization, with domestic debates now dominated by system-level arguments. There are, however, economic security consequences to liberalization that clearly manifest themselves at the local level. Here, one would need to look at factors ranging from collapses in the provision of basic human needs (e.g., famine) through the local consequences of deindustrialization or financial crises (e.g., Mexico, Russia) to the antidevelopment of some national economies in which gross national product (GNP) per capita is in decline (e.g., Africa). In terms of security logic, these situations can clearly be constructed as security issues when they threaten the provision of basic human needs or the survival of the state. Also, there may increasingly be political room for actors at local levels as the state becomes weakened by the deregulating global economic order. 鉴于全球化的压倒性力量及其区域化的回应，地方层面几乎没有留下严肃的安全动态空间。即使是国家，曾几何时在这一层面上占有很大比重，也在很大程度上屈服于自由化的必然要求，国内的辩论现已被系统层面的论点所主导。然而，自由化带来了明显在地方层面表现出来的经济安全后果。在这里，需要关注的因素包括从基本人类需求的供应崩溃（例如，饥荒），到去工业化或金融危机的地方后果（例如，墨西哥、俄罗斯），再到一些国民经济的反发展，其中人均国民生产总值（GNP）呈下降趋势（例如，非洲）。从安全逻辑来看，当这些情况威胁到基本人类需求的供应或国家的生存时，显然可以被构建为安全问题。此外，随着国家因去监管的全球经济秩序而变得弱化，地方层面的行为者可能会有越来越多的政治空间。
Summary 摘要
Because of the nature of economic relations under liberalism, economic security is a peculiarly difficult subject. This difficulty has to do in part with the instrumental quality of economic units and the inherent insecurity of market relations and in part with the pervasive and substantial consequences of economic activity in other sectors. Except at a very basic level, the logic of survival is difficult to argue within the economic sector itself. Attempts to securitize economic issucs are essentially a part of the politi-cal-ideological policy debate within IPE. In this context, the language of securitization is a way of taking economic nationalist positions in economic policy debates without having to abandon superficial commitments to the liberal consensus. Perhaps the man exception to this condition is seen in 由于自由主义下经济关系的性质，经济安全是一个特别困难的课题。这种困难部分源于经济单位的工具性特征和市场关系的固有不安全性，部分源于经济活动在其他领域的广泛且重大影响。除非在非常基础的层面上，否则在经济领域内部很难论证生存逻辑。试图将经济问题安全化本质上是国际政治经济学中政治-意识形态政策辩论的一部分。在这种背景下，安全化的语言是一种在经济政策辩论中采取经济民族主义立场的方式，而无需放弃对自由主义共识的表面承诺。或许对此状况的主要例外见于
the system-level referent objects-the institutions and organizations of the LIEO. Here, a clear logic of survival exists that entails obvious and drastic consequences. Liberal orders can collapse. As with political regimes and institutions (see Chapter 4, “The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities”), they are vulnerable to nonacceptance, violations, and challenges and also to the logic of the domino theory. Nobody knows whether any given violation, defection, collapse, or crisis of confidence will be the one that begins the slide toward a comprehensive unraveling of the system. Within that context, regionalism also takes on some security qualities. 系统层面的参照对象——LIEO 的制度和组织。在这里，存在一种明确的生存逻辑，带来明显且剧烈的后果。自由秩序可能崩溃。正如政治政权和制度（见第四章，“威胁与脆弱性的逻辑”）一样，它们容易受到不接受、违反和挑战的影响，也容易受到多米诺骨牌理论的逻辑影响。没有人知道任何特定的违反、背叛、崩溃或信任危机是否会成为引发系统全面瓦解的开端。在这种背景下，区域主义也具有某些安全特性。
Although little of a strictly economic security agenda exists within liberalism, cconomic activity fairly easily triggers survival issues in all of the other sectors-sometimes on the basis of economic failures (e.g., famine, negative development) and sometimes on the basis of economic successes (cultural homogenization, loss of autonomy in military production, pollution, the gutting of state functions). This overspill quality means that much of what is talked about as “economic security” has in fact to do with logics of survival in other sectors and not the economic one. If one reconsiders the list of issues said to constitute the current agenda of economic security (see “The Economic Security Agenda”) this overspill effect is rather clear. 尽管自由主义中几乎不存在严格的经济安全议程，但经济活动相当容易引发所有其他领域的生存问题——有时基于经济失败（例如，饥荒、负面发展），有时基于经济成功（文化同质化、军事生产自主权丧失、污染、国家职能削弱）。这种溢出特性意味着，许多被称为“经济安全”的讨论实际上与其他领域的生存逻辑有关，而非经济领域本身。如果重新审视被认为构成当前经济安全议程的问题清单（见“经济安全议程”），这种溢出效应就相当明显。
The ability of states to maintain an independent capability for mobilization is affected by the globalization of production, which gives states the choice of having lower-quality, more expensive domestically produced weapons or higher-quality, cheaper ones that are wholly or in part produced abroad. In the LIEO, security of supply is underpinned not by indigenous control of production but by the existence of surplus production capacity and a buyer’s market. 国家维持独立动员能力的能力受到生产全球化的影响，这使得国家可以选择质量较低、价格更高的国产武器，或者部分或全部在国外生产的质量更高、价格更低的武器。在自由国际经济秩序（LIEO）中，供应安全不是依赖于本土生产控制，而是依赖于过剩的生产能力和买方市场的存在。
Much the same logic applies to concerns about security of supply. The possibility of economic dependencies within the global market (particularly oil) being exploited for political ends is offset by the existence of surplus capacity in nearly all commodities as well as a buyer’s market. 关于供应安全的担忧也适用类似的逻辑。全球市场中经济依赖关系（尤其是石油）可能被用于政治目的的可能性，被几乎所有商品的过剩产能以及买方市场的存在所抵消。
Fears that the global market will generate more losers than winners and will heighten inequalities are not survival issues unless they undermine the provision of basic human needs. They are instead the political consequence of an economic system that requires winners and losers. 对全球市场将产生更多失败者而非赢家并加剧不平等的担忧，除非它们破坏了基本人类需求的满足，否则并非生存问题。它们反而是一个经济体系的政治后果，该体系需要赢家和输家。
Fears of trade in drugs and weapons of mass destruction are sociopolitical and military security issues rather than economic ones, and fears of pollution are environmental security issues rather than economic ones. 对毒品和大规模杀伤性武器贸易的担忧是社会政治和军事安全问题，而非经济问题；对污染的担忧则是环境安全问题，而非经济问题。
Only fears that the international economy will fall into crisis are clearly economic security issues. 只有对国际经济陷入危机的担忧明确属于经济安全问题。
To say that economic security is difficult and blurry may be true, but this description is not very helpful. At most, it sends a warning and invites care in the use and reception of securitization attempts in this sector. But given the desire of liberals to separate the economic sector from politics, the fact that most of the security consequences of economic liberalism turn up in other sectors is of more than passing interest. Liberal economics can only maintain its apparent pristine quality by making such separations; it is only when they are placed into a wider context that most of its security consequences come clearly into view. This conclusion points toward Chapter 9, where we expand the idea of security spillovers from the economic sector as a way of understanding the imperatives behind the entire phenomenon of the wider security agenda. 说经济安全难以界定且模糊不清可能是事实，但这种描述并不十分有用。最多，它发出警告并提醒在该领域使用和接受安全化尝试时要谨慎。但鉴于自由主义者希望将经济领域与政治分离的愿望，大多数经济自由主义的安全后果出现在其他领域这一事实值得关注。自由经济学只有通过这种分离才能保持其表面上的纯净；只有将其置于更广泛的背景中，大多数安全后果才会清晰显现。这个结论指向第 9 章，我们将在那里扩展经济领域安全溢出的概念，以理解更广泛安全议程背后的驱动力。
CHAPTER 6 第六章
The Societal Sector 社会领域
The Societal Security Agenda 社会安全议程
National security has been the established key concept for the entire area of security affairs, but, paradoxically, there has been little reflection on the nation as a security unit. The focus has been on the political, institutional unit-the state-and accordingly on the political and military sectors. If one zooms in on the nation, another sector enters the picture-the societal one. Societal security is closely related to, but nonetheless distinct from, political security, which is about the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy. 国家安全一直是整个安全事务领域的既定关键概念，但矛盾的是，对于作为安全单位的国家本身却鲜有反思。关注点一直在政治的、制度的单位——国家——以及相应的政治和军事领域。如果将视角聚焦于国家，另一个领域便进入视野——社会领域。社会安全与政治安全密切相关，但仍有区别，政治安全关乎国家、政府体系及赋予政府和国家合法性的意识形态的组织稳定性。
Only rarely are state and societal boundaries coterminous. This provides a first motive for taking societal security seriously (for example, in thinking about the security of the Kurds), but second, even the state and society “of the same people” are two different things (and, when they are referent objects for security, they generate two different logics). State is based on fixed territory and formal membership, whereas societal integration is a much more varied phenomenon-possibly occurring at both smaller and larger scales and sometimes even transcending the spatial dimension altogether. For international security analysis, the key to society is those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. These identities are distinct from, although often entangled with, the explicitly political organizations concerned with government. 国家和社会的边界很少完全重合。这为认真对待社会安全提供了第一个动机（例如，在考虑库尔德人的安全时），但其次，即使是“同一民族”的国家和社会也是两回事（当它们成为安全的参照对象时，会产生两种不同的逻辑）。国家基于固定的领土和正式的成员资格，而社会整合则是一个更加多样化的现象——可能发生在更小或更大的尺度上，有时甚至完全超越空间维度。对于国际安全分析来说，社会的关键是那些将个人认定为社会群体成员的观念和实践。社会关乎身份，是社区的自我认知以及个体将自己认同为社区成员的过程。这些身份与明确关注政府的政治组织不同，尽管两者常常交织在一起。
The organizing concept in the societal sector is identity. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community. Despite the impression one might get from the present and, especially, previous presentations, the definition is not in terms of nations. Definitionally, societal security is about large, self-sustaining identity groups; what these are empirically varies in both time and place. In contemporary Europe (for which the concept was originally elaborated; see Waver et al. 1993), these groups are 社会领域中的组织概念是身份认同。当各种社区将某种发展或潜在情况定义为对其作为一个社区生存的威胁时，社会不安全就存在。尽管从当前，尤其是以往的表述中可能会产生这样的印象，但定义并不是以国家为单位。从定义上讲，社会安全关乎大型、自我维持的身份群体；这些群体在时间和地点上都有所不同。在当代欧洲（该概念最初在此地提出；参见 Wæver 等，1993 年），这些群体是
mainly national, but in other regions religious or racial groups have more relevance. The concept could also be understood as “identity security.” 主要是民族群体，但在其他地区，宗教或种族群体更具相关性。该概念也可以理解为“身份安全”。
Two misunderstandings about the term societal should be avoided. First, societal security is not the same as social security. Social security is about individuals and is largely economic. Societal security is about collectives and their identity. Empirical links will often exist when the social conditions for individual life influence processes of collective identification (cf. Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 2). The concept of societal security, however, refers not to this individual level and to mainly economic phenomena but to the level of collective identities and action taken to defend such “we identities.” (The extent to which and how individual security can enter our study is discussed in Chapters 2, 5, and 7.) 应避免对“社会”一词的两种误解。首先，社会安全与社会保障不同。社会保障关注个人，主要是经济方面的。社会安全关注集体及其身份。当个人生活的社会条件影响集体认同过程时，通常会存在经验上的联系（参见 Wæver 等，1993 年，第 2 章）。然而，社会安全的概念并不指向个人层面和主要的经济现象，而是指集体身份层面以及为捍卫这种“我们身份”所采取的行动。（个人安全在多大程度上以及如何进入我们的研究，在第 2、5 和 7 章中讨论。）
Second, a problem with societal is that the related term society is often used to designate the wider, more vague state population, which may refer to a group that does not always carry an identity. In this terminology, Sudanese society, for example, is that population contained by the Sudanese state but which is composed of many societal units (e.g., Arab and black African). This is not our use of societal; we use societal for communities with which one identifies. ^(1){ }^{1} 其次，关于“社会”的一个问题是，相关术语“社会”常被用来指代更广泛、更模糊的国家人口，这可能指的是一个不总是具有身份认同的群体。例如，苏丹社会指的是苏丹国家所包含的人口，但该人口由许多社会单元组成（如阿拉伯人和黑非洲人）。这不是我们对“社会”的用法；我们使用“社会”指的是个体认同的社区。
The word nation contains the same ambiguity, since actual nations operate differently: Some self-define their nation in terms of the people living in and loyal to the same state; others define theirs as an ethnic, organic community of language, blood, and culture. In the former case, emotional attachment is to something nonorganic and more political, whereas in other cases-and sometimes among competing groups in the same case-the ethnic community of “the real X people” is contrasted with the more amorphous group of all those who happen to live on the territory. “nation”一词包含同样的歧义，因为实际的国家运作方式不同：有些国家将其民族定义为生活在同一国家并忠于该国家的人民；另一些则将其定义为语言、血缘和文化的民族有机共同体。在前一种情况下，情感依附于非有机且更具政治性的事物，而在其他情况下——有时在同一案例中竞争的群体之间——“真正的 X 民族”的民族共同体与那些恰好生活在该领土上的更模糊的群体形成对比。
These terminological complexities are ultimately derived from the nature of identity-based communities; they are self-constructed “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983). Nationhood is not a question of some abstract, analytical category applied to various cases in which it fits more or less nicely. Objective factors such as language or location might be involved in the idea of national identity, but it nevertheless remains a political and personal choice to identify with some community by emphasizing some trait in contrast to other available historical or contemporary ties. Threats to identity are thus always a question of the construction of something as threatening some “we”-and often thereby actually contributing to the construction or reproduction of “us.” Any we identity can be constructed in many different ways, and often the main issue that decides whether security conflicts will emerge is whether one or another self-definition wins out in a society. If Russia is defined by Slavophiles or Euro-Asianists, several issues will constitute security problems that would not be considered such if Russia defined itself in a Western way. To engage in self-redefinition will in many cases be an important security strategy, whereas in other 这些术语复杂性最终源于基于身份的社区的本质；它们是自我构建的“想象的共同体”（Anderson 1983）。民族身份不是某种抽象的、分析性的类别，应用于各种案例中，适合程度或多或少。语言或地理位置等客观因素可能涉及民族认同的概念，但认同某个社区仍然是一个政治和个人的选择，通过强调某些特征来区别于其他可用的历史或当代联系。因此，对身份的威胁总是关于将某物构建为威胁某个“我们”的问题——而且通常实际上有助于“我们”的构建或再生产。任何“我们”的身份都可以通过多种不同方式构建，决定安全冲突是否会出现的主要问题往往是社会中哪种自我定义占上风。如果俄罗斯被斯拉夫主义者或欧亚主义者定义，那么几个问题将构成安全问题，而如果俄罗斯以西方方式定义自己，这些问题则不会被视为安全问题。 进行自我重新定义在许多情况下将是一种重要的安全策略，而在其他情况下
cases the identity is so stable that the best security strategy is for others to take this security concern into account (cf. Buzan and Wæver 1997). 身份如此稳定，以至于最好的安全策略是让他人考虑这一安全关切（参见 Buzan 和 Wæver 1997）。
The societal security agenda has been set by different actors in different eras and regions. The most common issues that have been viewed as threats to societal security are outlined here: 社会安全议程由不同时代和地区的不同参与者设定。这里概述了被视为对社会安全威胁的最常见问题：
Migration- XX people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of YY people; the XX community will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population; XX identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population (e.g., Chinese migration into Tibet, Russian migration into Estonia). 迁移——人们被大量涌入的人群淹没或稀释；社区将不再是原来的样子，因为其他人将构成居民；身份因人口构成的变化而改变（例如，中国人迁入西藏，俄罗斯人迁入爱沙尼亚）。
Horizontal competition-although it is still XX people living here, they will change their ways because of the overriding cultural and linguistic influence from neighboring culture YY (e.g., Quebecois fears of anglophone Canada and, more generally, Canadian fears of Americanization). 水平竞争——尽管这里仍然有人居住，但他们会因为邻近文化的主导性文化和语言影响而改变他们的生活方式（例如，魁北克人对讲英语的加拿大人的恐惧，更广泛地说，加拿大人对美国化的恐惧）。
Vertical competition-people will stop seeing themselves as XX, because there is either an integrating project (e.g., Yugoslavia, the EU) or a secessionist-“regionalist” project (e.g., Quebec, Catalonia, Kurdistan) that pulls them toward either wider or narrower identities. Whereas one of these projects is centripetal and the other centrifugal, they are both instances of vertical competition in the sense that the struggle is over how wide the circles should be drawn or rather-since there are always numerous concentric circles of iden-tity-to which to give the main emphasis. 垂直竞争——人们将不再将自己视为单一身份，因为存在一个整合项目（例如，南斯拉夫、欧盟）或一个分离主义-“地区主义”项目（例如，魁北克、加泰罗尼亚、库尔德斯坦），这些项目将他们拉向更广泛或更狭窄的身份。虽然这些项目中一个是向心的，另一个是离心的，但它们都是垂直竞争的实例，因为斗争在于圈子的范围应该多大，或者更确切地说——因为总是存在许多同心的身份圈——应该强调哪个圈子。
A possible fourth issue could be depopulation, whether by plague, war, famine, natural catastrophe, or policies of extermination. Depopulation threatens identity by threatening its carriers, but it is not specifically a part of the societal sector’s logic of identity, except perhaps in cases where extermination policies are motivated by the desire to eliminate an identity and in extreme cases-such as AIDS in Uganda-where quantity turns into quality. As with unemployment and crime, these are threats primarily to individuals (threats in society); only if they threaten the breakdown of society do they become societal security issues. 第四个可能的问题是人口减少，无论是由于瘟疫、战争、饥荒、自然灾害，还是灭绝政策。人口减少通过威胁其承载者来威胁身份认同，但它并不是社会部门身份逻辑的具体部分，除非在灭绝政策出于消除某种身份认同的动机的情况下，或者在极端情况下——如乌干达的艾滋病——数量转化为质量。与失业和犯罪一样，这些主要是对个人的威胁（社会中的威胁）；只有当它们威胁到社会的崩溃时，才成为社会安全问题。
Although analytically distinct, in practice these three types of threats to identity can easily be combined. They can also be placed on a spectrum running from intentional, programmatic, and political at one end to unintended and structural at the other. Migration, for example, is an old human story. People may make individual decisions to move for reasons varying from economic opportunity to environmental pressure to religious freedom. But they may also move as part of a political program to homogenize the population of the state, as in the Sinification of Tibet and the Russification of Central Asia and the Baltic stales. Horizontal competition may simply 尽管在分析上有所区分，但在实践中，这三种对身份的威胁类型很容易结合在一起。它们也可以被放置在一个光谱上，一端是有意的、程序化的和政治性的，另一端是无意的和结构性的。例如，迁移是一个古老的人类故事。人们可能会出于经济机会、环境压力或宗教自由等各种原因做出个人迁移的决定。但他们也可能作为政治计划的一部分迁移，以实现国家人口的同质化，比如对西藏的汉化以及对中亚和波罗的海国家的俄罗斯化。横向竞争可能仅仅
reflect the unintended effects of interplay between large, dynamic cultures on the one hand and small, anachronistic ones on the other. But it can also become intentional, as in the remaking of occupied enemies (e.g., the Americanization of Japan and Germany) and in the cultural aspects of contemporary trade policy. Vertical competition is more likely to be found at the intentional end of the spectrum. 反映了大型动态文化与小型过时文化之间相互作用的无意后果。但它也可能变得有意，如对被占领敌人的改造（例如，美国对日本和德国的美国化）以及当代贸易政策中的文化方面。纵向竞争更可能出现在光谱的有意一端。
Integration projects, whether democratic or imperial, that seek to shape a common culture to match the state may attempt to control some or all of the machineries of cultural reproduction (e.g., schools, churches, language rights). In more repressive instances, minorities may lose the ability to reproduce their cultures because the majority uses the state to structure educational, media, and other systems to favor the majority culture. Thus, some types of societal security issues are fought in the hearts and minds of individuals, whereas others are about more tangible matters that influence identity. In the first case, the threat is about conversion-people start to think of themselves as something else. In the second, political decisions will influence identity, such as using migration or political structures to compromise the reproduction of a culture that lacks control of the institutions required for cultural reproduction. Societal security issues are always ultimately about identity; in some cases, the medium in which they are fought is also identity (horizontal and vertical competition), whereas in others it is not (migration, infrastructure of reproduction). 无论是民主还是帝国的整合项目，旨在塑造与国家相匹配的共同文化，可能会试图控制部分或全部文化再生产机制（例如，学校、教堂、语言权利）。在更压制性的情况下，少数群体可能会失去再生产其文化的能力，因为多数群体利用国家来构建教育、媒体和其他系统，以偏向多数文化。因此，某些类型的社会安全问题是在个人的内心和思想中进行斗争，而另一些则涉及影响身份的更具体事务。在第一种情况下，威胁是关于转变——人们开始将自己视为另一种身份。在第二种情况下，政治决策将影响身份，例如通过迁移或政治结构来削弱缺乏控制文化再生产所需机构的文化的再生产。社会安全问题最终总是关于身份；在某些情况下，斗争的媒介也是身份（横向和纵向竞争），而在其他情况下则不是（迁移、再生产基础设施）。
Society can react to such threats in two ways: through activities carried out by the community itself or by trying to move the issue to the political (and potentially the military) sector by having the threat placed on the state agenda. At the state level, the threat of immigration, for example, can be addressed through legislation and border controls. State-oriented responses are fairly common, which makes the societal sector difficult to analyze because it often merges gradually with the political sector. 社会可以通过两种方式应对此类威胁：通过社区自身开展的活动，或试图将问题转移到政治（甚至可能是军事）领域，将威胁纳入国家议程。在国家层面，例如，移民威胁可以通过立法和边境控制来应对。以国家为导向的应对措施相当普遍，这使得社会领域难以分析，因为它常常逐渐与政治领域融合。
In some cases, however, societies choose to handle what they perceive as identity threats through nonstate means. One example might be that of minorities that do not try to secede into their own state but still have a strategy for how to survive as a distinct culture. Generally, minorities strive for one of three basic options: to dominate the existing government (e.g., Tutsis, whites under apartheid), to form their own government (Slovenes, Zionists), or to be left alone (traditionally, Jews in Europe). The Chinese, when forming minorities abroad, typically do not use the institutions of the host society but prefer to try to run their own system of law, order, and social security. 然而，在某些情况下，社会选择通过非国家手段来处理他们所感知的身份威胁。一个例子可能是那些不试图分裂成自己国家的少数群体，但仍有一套生存为独特文化的策略。一般来说，少数群体争取三种基本选择之一：统治现有政府（例如，图西族，种族隔离时期的白人）、建立自己的政府（斯洛文尼亚人，犹太复国主义者）或被放任不管（传统上，欧洲的犹太人）。华人在海外形成少数群体时，通常不使用东道国的制度，而倾向于尝试运行自己的法律、秩序和社会保障体系。
The choice of whether to see societal threats as a task for society itself, as one for an existing state, or as an argument for gaining or regaining statehood can have a decisive impact on regional dynamics. In our terminology, that choice can be seen as a question of what actor to turn to and 是否将社会威胁视为社会自身的任务、现有国家的任务，或作为争取或恢复国家地位的理由，这一选择可能对地区动态产生决定性影响。在我们的术语中，这一选择可以看作是转向哪个行为体的问题，且...
whether to forge close ties between the societal and political sectors. We have shown in a previous analysis of Europe how a strong link between these two sectors and thus remobilization of the state on identity issues would constitute a major threat to European integration, whereas a more separate securitization in terms of societal security could be more compatible with further integration-which, in turn, stimulates this increasing differentiation of society from state (Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 4). 是否在社会领域和政治领域之间建立紧密联系。我们在之前对欧洲的分析中已经表明，这两个领域之间的紧密联系，从而在身份认同问题上重新动员国家，将构成对欧洲一体化的重大威胁，而在社会安全方面更为独立的安全化则可能更符合进一步一体化的要求——反过来，这又促进了社会与国家之间日益加深的区分（Wæver 等，1993，第 4 章）。
Security Actors and Referent Objects 安全行为体与参照对象
The referent objects in the societal sector are whatever larger groups carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form and to a degree that can create a socially powerful argument that this “we” is threatened. Since we are talking about the societal sector, this “we” has to be threatened as to its identity. Historically, such referent objects have been rather narrow. For most people, they have been local or family based: the village, a clan, a region (in the local rather than international sense), or a city-state. In some eras, these objects were closely tied to political structures (city-states, clans, and the like). In others, political loyalties operated distinct from societal forms, as in classical empires in which political loyalties were to kings or emperors and people’s “we” loyalties were mainly tied to families and religion. Communists tried to mobilize according to class but largely failed. 社会领域中的指称对象是那些较大的群体，这些群体以某种形式和程度承载着主体的忠诚和奉献，从而能够形成一种社会上有力的论据，表明这个“我们”受到威胁。既然我们谈论的是社会领域，这个“我们”必须在身份认同上受到威胁。历史上，这样的指称对象相当狭窄。对大多数人来说，它们是基于地方或家庭的：村庄、氏族、地区（指地方意义上的，而非国际意义上的）或城邦。在某些时代，这些对象与政治结构紧密相连（如城邦、氏族等）。在其他时代，政治忠诚与社会形式分开运作，比如古典帝国中，政治忠诚属于国王或皇帝，而人们的“我们”忠诚主要与家庭和宗教相关。共产主义者试图根据阶级进行动员，但大多失败了。
In the present world system, the most important referent objects in the societal sector are tribes, clans, nations (and nationlike ethnic units, which others call minorities), ^(2){ }^{2} civilizations, religions, and race. The operations of these different societal referent objects are spelled out in more detail in the following sections, in which the different regions are visited and their distinctive patterns of conflict in the societal sector outlined. 在当前的世界体系中，社会领域中最重要的参照对象是部落、氏族、民族（以及类似民族的族群，其他人称之为少数民族）、文明、宗教和种族。以下各节将更详细地阐述这些不同社会参照对象的运作，介绍不同地区及其在社会领域中独特的冲突模式。
Nations sometimes closely correspond to a state, and in such cases references to the nation and its identity are often made by persons in positions of state power. In some instances, state leaders use references to state and sovereignty; in others, to nation and identity. This difference is in itself interesting and worth investigating. There might be a pattern in which oppositional political forces-that is, actors of traditional political form who are bidding for state power but do not possess it-use references to nation more than to state. The defense of state and sovereignty will tend to strengthen those in power. It is possible but complicated to argue that those in power imperil the security of the state; the logic of state security will tend to privilege the power holders as the natural interpreters of what should be done to secure the state. It is easier to argue that the nation is endangered; because the present leaders are not paying sufficient attention to this siluation, we should be brought into power-a typical rhetorical 民族有时与国家紧密对应，在这种情况下，处于国家权力位置的人们常常提及民族及其身份。在某些情况下，国家领导人使用对国家和主权的提及；在其他情况下，则使用对民族和身份的提及。这种差异本身就很有趣，值得研究。可能存在一种模式，即反对的政治力量——即那些竞逐国家权力但尚未拥有权力的传统政治形式的行为者——更多地使用对民族的提及而非国家。对国家和主权的捍卫往往会加强掌权者的地位。可以但复杂地论证掌权者危及国家安全；国家安全的逻辑往往会使权力持有者成为解释如何保障国家安全的自然权威。更容易论证的是民族受到威胁；因为现任领导人未能充分关注这一状况，我们应当被带入权力中心——这是一种典型的修辞。
strategy of nationalist politicians. The nation, with its mixture of connection to and separation from the state, is ideal for such oppositional political maneuvers. 民族主义政治家的策略。民族与国家既有联系又有分离，这种混合使其成为进行此类对立政治操作的理想对象。
Whereas these instances used references to the nation to get to the state, one can also make appeals about threats to the nation without wanting state power. This is the case with various social movements-nationalist, cultural, anti-EU, or anti-immigrant. In instances where state and nation do not line up, the minority nation will be the point of reference for actors ranging from a counterelite trying to achieve secession or independence (and thereby becoming the new state elite) to groups defending the cultural identity of the minority. 虽然这些例子利用对民族的引用来达到国家的目的，但也可以在不追求国家权力的情况下，呼吁关注对民族的威胁。这种情况出现在各种社会运动中——民族主义、文化、反欧盟或反移民。在国家与民族不一致的情况下，少数民族将成为从试图实现分离或独立（从而成为新的国家精英）的反精英，到捍卫少数民族文化认同的群体等行为者的参照点。
In all of these cases, the media is an important actor that contributes significantly to the definition of situations. Who are the parties to conflicts; what are the conflicts about? With its attraction to simple stories, the media will often tell the news in terms of “us” and “them” or, in the case of foreign news, of “Serbs” and “Muslims.” When ethnic or religious categories are established as the interpretative instruments for understanding a situation, the media has often played a role in this. 在所有这些情况下，媒体是一个重要的参与者，对情境的定义起着重要作用。冲突的各方是谁；冲突的内容是什么？由于媒体倾向于简单的故事，媒体常常以“我们”和“他们”的方式报道新闻，或者在外国新闻中，以“塞尔维亚人”和“穆斯林”的方式报道。当族群或宗教类别被确立为理解某一情境的解释工具时，媒体往往在其中扮演了角色。
Religious identification usually corresponds to some official or semiof-ficial-often contested-leaders who claim to be able to speak on behalf of the religious community. In many cases, however, there is not one generally recognized, tight hierarchy; therefore, various local groups-for example, fundamentalists in Egypt–can make their own appeals in the name of all Muslims and mobilize security action against the West and its local lackeys. The major religions vary as to their degree of formalized and generally recognized lines of authority. Tribes vary even more, and less can be said in a general sense about securitizing actors in their case. 宗教认同通常对应于一些官方或半官方的——常常存在争议的——领导人，他们声称能够代表宗教群体发言。然而，在许多情况下，并不存在一个普遍认可的紧密层级结构；因此，各种地方团体——例如埃及的原教旨主义者——可以以全体穆斯林的名义提出诉求，并动员针对西方及其地方走狗的安全行动。主要宗教在其正式化和普遍认可的权威线条方面存在差异。部落的情况更为复杂，关于其安全化行为者的一般性描述则更少。
The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities 威胁与脆弱性的逻辑
Different societies have different vulnerabilities depending upon how their identity is constructed. If one’s identity is based on separateness, on being remote and alone, even a very small admixture of foreigners will be seen as problematic (e.g., Finland). Nations that control a state but only with a small numeric margin (e.g., Latvia) or only through repression of a majority (e.g., Serbs in Kosovo) will be vulnerable to an influx or superior fertility rate of the competing population (e.g., Russians, Albanians). If national identity is tied to specific cultural habits, a homogenizing “global” culture, such as the U.S.-Western Coca-Cola (or, more recently, McDonalds) imperialism, will be threatening (e.g., Bhutan, Iran, Saudi Arabia). If language is central to national identity, the contemporary global victory of English combined with an increasing interpenetration of societies will be problematic (e.g., France). If a nation is built on the integration of a number of eth- 不同的社会根据其身份认同的构建方式具有不同的脆弱性。如果一个人的身份认同基于分离、孤立，即使是极少量的外国人混入也会被视为问题（例如，芬兰）。那些控制国家但仅凭少数人数优势（例如，拉脱维亚）或仅通过压制多数群体（例如，科索沃的塞尔维亚人）来维持统治的国家，将容易受到竞争人口（例如，俄罗斯人、阿尔巴尼亚人）涌入或更高生育率的影响。如果民族身份与特定的文化习惯相关联，那么一种同质化的“全球”文化，如美西方的可口可乐（或最近的麦当劳）帝国主义，将构成威胁（例如，不丹、伊朗、沙特阿拉伯）。如果语言是民族身份的核心，当代全球英语的胜利结合社会间日益加深的渗透将成为问题（例如，法国）。如果一个国家建立在多个族群的融合基础上——
nic groups with mobilizable histories of distinct national lives, a general spread of nationalism and ideas of self-determination can be fatal (e.g., the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, India, Nigeria, South Africa); if a nation is built on a melting-pot ideology of different groups blending into one new group, the existing national identity will be vulnerable to a reassertion of racial and cultural distinctiveness and incommensurability (e.g., multiculturalism in the United States). If the nation is tied closely to the state, it will be more vulnerable to a process of political integration (e.g., Denmark, France) than will be the case if the nation has a tradition of operating independent of the state and of having multiple political layers simultaneously (e.g., Germany). 具有可动员的不同民族生活历史的民族群体，民族主义和自决思想的普遍传播可能是致命的（例如，苏联、南斯拉夫、捷克斯洛伐克、英国、印度、尼日利亚、南非）；如果一个民族建立在不同群体融合成一个新群体的“大熔炉”意识形态上，现有的民族认同将容易受到种族和文化差异性及不可通约性的重新主张的影响（例如，美国的多元文化主义）。如果民族与国家紧密相连，它将比那些有独立于国家运作传统并同时拥有多重政治层次的民族更容易受到政治整合过程的影响（例如，丹麦、法国），后者的情况则不同（例如，德国）。
The variation in vulnerability has to be kept in mind during the following discussion in which the different kinds of societal threats are compared. In generalizations, it will be argued that one type of threat is generally more intense at some specific distance than another, but a particular unit may be more concerned about the distant threat than about the closer one, because it is more vulnerable to that kind of threat. 在接下来的讨论中比较不同类型的社会威胁时，必须牢记脆弱性的差异。一般来说，人们会认为某种威胁在某个特定距离上通常比另一种更为强烈，但某个特定单位可能对远处的威胁比近处的威胁更为关切，因为它对那种威胁更为脆弱。
Keeping this caveat in mind, it is possible to compare the regionalizing and globalizing dynamics of different kinds of threats, following the earlier distinction among three kinds of societal threats-migration, vertical competition, and horizontal competition-arranged along a spectrum from intentional to structural threats. Migration operates most intensely as intraregional and neighboring region dynamics, as in the flow of Hispanics into the United States and concerns in Western Europe about immigrants from North Africa and the former Soviet empire. But long-distance migration also exists and might be growing. Some echoes former colonial overlay, such as patterns of intercontinental migration into erstwhile metropoles (e.g., South Asia and the Caribbean to Britain, North Africa to France, Indonesia to the Netherlands). But much long-distance migration simply responds to patterns of economic incentive, as in South and Southeast Asian migrations to the Gulf and Latin American and Chinese migration to the United States, to which is added the increasing flow of political refugees. 牢记这一警告，有可能比较不同类型威胁的区域化和全球化动态，遵循之前关于三种社会威胁——迁移、垂直竞争和水平竞争——的区分，这些威胁沿着从有意威胁到结构性威胁的光谱排列。迁移最强烈地表现为区域内和邻近区域的动态，例如西班牙裔流入美国以及西欧对来自北非和前苏联帝国移民的关注。但长距离迁移也存在，且可能在增长。一些情况反映了前殖民地的影响，如跨大陆迁移到昔日宗主国的模式（例如，南亚和加勒比地区迁移到英国，北非迁移到法国，印度尼西亚迁移到荷兰）。但许多长距离迁移仅仅是对经济激励模式的响应，如南亚和东南亚迁移到海湾地区，拉丁美洲和中国迁移到美国，此外还有不断增加的政治难民流动。
Vertical competition is the most intense when there are either political integration projects (e.g., the EU, the former Soviet Union and now within many of its successor states, Sudan, in some ways India and Pakistan) or fragmenting, secessionist ones (e.g., the former Yugoslavia, Belgium, Sri Lanka). Fragmentation and integration may occur together, as with the stimulation of substate identity projects in Western Europe within the context of the EU (e.g., Catalans, Scots, Corsicans, northern Italy). 当存在政治一体化项目（例如欧盟、前苏联及其许多继承国、苏丹、某种程度上的印度和巴基斯坦）或分裂、分离主义项目（例如前南斯拉夫、比利时、斯里兰卡）时，垂直竞争最为激烈。分裂和一体化可能同时发生，比如在欧盟背景下西欧激发的次国家身份项目（例如加泰罗尼亚人、苏格兰人、科西嘉人、意大利北部）。
Horizontal competition occurs at every level. Minorities within states (e.g., Welsh, Quebecois) worry about the influence of the dominant culture (English, Canadian). Smaller neighbors (e.g., Canada, Malaysia) worry about the influence of larger ones (the United States, China). At the global level, the “clash of civilizations” (Iluntington 1993, 1996) comes into play, 水平竞争发生在各个层面。国家内部的少数民族（例如威尔士人、魁北克人）担心主导文化（英语、加拿大文化）的影响。较小的邻国（例如加拿大、马来西亚）担心较大国家（美国、中国）的影响。在全球层面，“文明的冲突”（亨廷顿 1993，1996）开始发挥作用，
with Islamic and some East Asian worries about the influence of Americanization-Westernization. Concerns about intended-particularly coercive - threats tend to focus on tensions between integrating state projects and minorities, but they also surface in international trade negotiations when cultural issues become constructed as protectionism (e.g., the United States versus France and Japan). 伴随着伊斯兰和一些东亚对美国化-西方化影响的担忧。关于有意的——特别是强制性的——威胁的担忧，往往集中在整合国家项目与少数民族之间的紧张关系上，但当文化问题被构建为保护主义时（例如，美国与法国和日本之间），这些担忧也会在国际贸易谈判中浮现。
Regionalizing Dynamics? 区域化动态？
Just as military threats-other things being equal-travel more easily over short than over long distances, there is also a spatial dimension to the societal sector. It is easier to migrate over a short distance than over a long one and for cultural impulses to travel to neighbors than to faraway places. Competing ideas of who “we” are will usually be regional in the sense that the same person can be seen as Hindu, Indian, or South Asian or as European, British, and Scottish but only with some difficulty as Swede, Australian, and Muslim and not likely as Russian, Latin American, and Buddhist. But the spatial factor is not necessarily region producing in the same sense as exists in the military sector; even if it does produce regions, they are not necessarily the same regions. This was the foundational puzzle for the present book. When we wrote a book about societal security (Wæver et al. 1993), we did not want to invent a separate societal security complex; nor could we be sure there was one cross-sectoral complex in which to study societal security. So we took the easy route of generating the security complex mainly in the political and military sectors (where we knew it worked) and then adding societal security problems and dynamics into a complex thus established (Wæver et al. 1993, chapters 1, 10). But if the military and political sectors are no longer necessarily dominant and the other sectors are nonregional or differently regional, the security complexes might lose coherence, or we might have to contemplate studying sectorspecific complexes. 正如军事威胁——其他条件相同——更容易在短距离而非长距离传播一样，社会领域也具有空间维度。迁移短距离比长距离更容易，文化冲动传播给邻近地区比远方更容易。关于“我们”是谁的竞争性观念通常具有区域性，因为同一个人可以被视为印度教徒、印度人或南亚人，或者被视为欧洲人、英国人和苏格兰人，但要被视为瑞典人、澳大利亚人和穆斯林则较为困难，更不可能被视为俄罗斯人、拉丁美洲人和佛教徒。但空间因素不一定像军事领域那样产生区域；即使它确实产生区域，这些区域也不一定相同。这是本书的基础性难题。当我们撰写关于社会安全的书籍（Wæver 等，1993）时，我们不想发明一个独立的社会安全复合体；我们也无法确定是否存在一个跨领域的复合体来研究社会安全。 因此，我们选择了一个简单的路径，主要在政治和军事领域生成安全复合体（我们知道它在那里有效），然后将社会安全问题和动态加入到这样建立的复合体中（Wæver 等，1993，第 1 章，第 10 章）。但如果军事和政治领域不再必然占主导地位，而其他领域是非区域性的或区域性不同，安全复合体可能会失去连贯性，或者我们可能需要考虑研究特定领域的复合体。
Thus, the guiding question in the present section is whether societal security issues produce regionalizing dynamics and, if so, in what patterns and what regions-the same as those in other sectors, or different ones? 因此，本节的指导性问题是社会安全问题是否产生区域化动态，如果产生，是以何种模式和哪些区域——与其他领域相同，还是不同？
Africa 非洲
In Africa, the main societal referent objects are a mix of premodern-the extended family, village, clan, and tribe-and modern, the “state-nation.” 3 Most attempts at constructing political authority take the form of state building, usually with ensuing attempts at nation building. Some social strata-especially the higher ones and the military-have some loyalty to these larger units from which they derive their income and prestige. Other 在非洲，主要的社会参照对象是前现代的——大家庭、村庄、氏族和部落——与现代的“国家-民族”的混合体。大多数构建政治权威的尝试都采取国家建设的形式，通常伴随着随后的民族建设尝试。一些社会阶层——尤其是较高阶层和军队——对这些较大的单位有一定的忠诚度，他们从中获得收入和声望。其他的
strata are more prone to attaching loyalty to ethnic identities that cut across state boundaries or at least cut up state units. 阶层更容易将忠诚归属于跨越国家边界或至少跨越国家单位的族群身份。
As argued in Chapter 3, little of Africa (except Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and possibly the Maghreb) has the typical security complex type of threats in which one state threatens another. Military threats occur more often within states (over competition for state power) than between them (where capability for military power projection is low). As argued elsewhere (Chapter 8 in the present book; Wæver 1995c, chapter 11), an economic or societal issue is more likely to develop into economic or societal insecurity if the sender and receiver already perceive each other in security terms as a result of conflicts in other sectors (e.g., the military one). Thus, in the societal sector, the African states are usually less concerned about threats from other states than about threats from vertically competing loyalties (tribes and the like). The competition might take the form of an ethnification of state politics (political parties de facto being ethnic parties) or, more directly, of a struggle between the state center and other loci of authority (e.g., decentralization or disintegration of state control, secession). 正如第三章所论述的，非洲大部分地区（除南部非洲、非洲之角以及可能的马格里布地区外）并不具备典型的安全复合体类型的威胁，即一个国家威胁另一个国家。军事威胁更多地发生在国家内部（围绕国家权力的竞争），而非国家之间（因为军事力量投射能力较低）。正如本书第八章及 Wæver 1995c 年第十一章所论述的，如果发送方和接收方由于其他领域（例如军事领域）的冲突已经在安全层面上相互认知，那么经济或社会问题更可能发展为经济或社会不安全。因此，在社会领域，非洲国家通常不太关心来自其他国家的威胁，而更关心来自垂直竞争忠诚（如部落等）的威胁。这种竞争可能表现为国家政治的族群化（政党实际上成为族群政党），或者更直接地表现为国家中心与其他权力中心之间的斗争（例如国家控制的分权或解体、分离主义）。
Seen from the other referent object-the tribe-the cause of societal insecurity can be either other tribes or the state (state-nation building). The concrete form of threat among tribes can be migrational (e.g., South Africa) or about the control of political power (thus merging into the political sector; e.g., Nigeria) or territory (Ghana). Threats from the state are typically vertical; the state often tries to construct a competing loyalty, making people less oriented toward the old identity and thinking more in terms of a new one (cultural means), and the state can use the coercive means at its disposal to break up the tribal community (political and military means, as in Sudan). 从另一个参照对象——部落——来看，社会不安全的原因可能是其他部落或国家（国家-民族建设）。部落之间具体的威胁形式可以是迁徙性的（例如，南非），也可以是关于政治权力的控制（因此融入政治领域；例如，尼日利亚）或领土的争夺（加纳）。来自国家的威胁通常是垂直的；国家常常试图构建一种竞争性的忠诚，使人们不再倾向于旧的身份认同，而更多地以新的身份认同来思考（文化手段），国家还可以利用其掌握的强制手段来瓦解部落社区（政治和军事手段，如苏丹）。
As argued by Robert Kaplan (1994), units other than states have created new lines of division that operate differently from those on our maps. The booming megacities in the Third World, with their enormous slum suburbs, produce large populations that identify neither with their clans or tribes nor with states or nations. In some cases, these populations are the backbone of religious mobilization (as in Iran, Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey), but in many cases their identification reference is still largely open. Large groups of people who focus on immediate material survival needs become nonidentity factors and might enter the sociopolitical realm as the joker at some later point when they suddenly do acquire or generate an identity. 正如罗伯特·卡普兰（1994 年）所论述的，除了国家之外的单位创造了新的分界线，这些分界线的运作方式与我们地图上的不同。第三世界蓬勃发展的超级大城市及其庞大的贫民区，产生了大量既不认同其氏族或部落，也不认同国家或民族的人口。在某些情况下，这些人口是宗教动员的中坚力量（如伊朗、阿尔及利亚、埃及和土耳其），但在许多情况下，他们的认同参照仍然很大程度上是开放的。大量关注即时物质生存需求的人群成为非认同因素，可能在某个后期突然获得或产生认同时，作为“王牌”进入社会政治领域。
Another effect of Kaplanesque anarchy, especially the disease-crime-population-migration circles in Africa, is the unofficial erection of Atlantic and Mediterranean walls by which North Americans and Europeans define a category of Africa and Africans as the major zone of anarchy, danger, and disease to be shut off from “our world.” So far, this has mainly been an identity category operating from the outside (thereby constituting a partial 卡普兰式无政府状态的另一个影响，尤其是非洲的疾病-犯罪-人口-迁移循环，是北美人和欧洲人非官方地竖起了大西洋和地中海的墙，将非洲和非洲人定义为无政府状态、危险和疾病的主要区域，并将其与“我们的世界”隔离开来。到目前为止，这主要是一个从外部运作的认同类别（从而构成部分）
identification of “us rich Northerners” up against the dangerous premodern Third World). But to the extent that this wall is experienced the way it is intended to be-that is, by Africans running up against it-it could contribute to the formation of a similar mega-identity on the other side. “我们这些富裕的北方人”与危险的前现代第三世界的对立认同）。但在这种隔阂被非洲人以预期的方式体验到的程度上——也就是说，被非洲人所感受到——它可能有助于在另一边形成类似的超级身份认同。
Except for these global-level clashes of civilization-type patterns, the patterns generated by these societal threats are similar to those of the military sector. They generally produce very small security complexes-not an African complex or even an Africa of, say, four or five complexes but microcomplexes focused within a state or, where identities cross state borders, on a small group of states. 除了这些全球层面的文明类型冲突之外，这些社会威胁产生的模式与军事领域的模式相似。它们通常产生非常小的安全复合体——不是非洲复合体，甚至不是由四五个复合体组成的非洲，而是集中在一个国家内部，或者当身份跨越国家边界时，集中在少数几个国家的小型复合体。
Latin America 拉丁美洲
Latin America is also an odd continent in this sector. As in Africa but for different reasons, military security dynamics are relatively weak; in some ways, they are close to forming a traditional security complex but are still not clearly profiled. Being weak, they do not amplify insecurities in other sectors. 拉丁美洲在这一领域也是一个奇特的大陆。与非洲类似，但原因不同，军事安全动态相对较弱；在某些方面，它们接近形成传统的安全复合体，但仍未明确成型。由于较弱，它们不会放大其他领域的不安全感。
In the societal sector, there are two important perceived threats: Some segments within the dominant societies see an interregional threat from U.S. cultural and other imperialism; and some nondominant, nonstate soci-eties-Indians-are threatened by the state-building, modernizing projects of the dominant societies (in very direct and brutal forms, with attacks on their land, lives, and resources, and in indirect forms, with increasing difficulties for the reproduction of cultural forms). Most of the other societal threats are absent. Migration is primarily an intranational problem-people are migrating to the major cities. There is little international or interregional migration, except for Central America-that is, through Mexico into the United States (few Latinos in the United States are South American; most are Mexican and Central American). 在社会领域，有两个重要的感知威胁：主导社会中的某些群体认为美国的文化及其他帝国主义构成了跨区域威胁；而一些非主导的、非国家社会——印第安人——则受到主导社会国家建设和现代化项目的威胁（以非常直接和残酷的形式，攻击他们的土地、生命和资源，以及以间接形式，使他们的文化形式再生产变得越来越困难）。大多数其他社会威胁不存在。迁移主要是国内问题——人们迁移到大城市。国际或跨区域迁移很少，除中美洲外——即通过墨西哥进入美国（美国的拉丁裔很少是南美人；大多数是墨西哥和中美洲人）。
No significant vertical identity threats exist-no projects for Latin American identity or major cases of secessionism and other forms of microregionalism. There is a long history of economic projects for regional cooperation, and the old integration literature exhibited optimism that Latin America would follow Europe as the second region to integrate. This did not happen. There was no grand project; nor was it clear what a “we” Latin America would be about. The Catholic Church offers some glue, but generally the cultural area is divided because of the language factor and the big problem of Brazil thinking either in hegemonic terms or out of the region as a world-scale power that is too big for Latin America. When regional economic integration begins to operate again, one of the forms it takes is, revealingly, of NAFTA gradually admitting new members-from Mexico to Chile to . . ? The other form is a concentric circle, a bit like Europe with MERCOSUR forming an inner elite core as the motor for the next layer of regional cooperation (Peña 1995). It is tow early to saly whether this integrat 没有显著的垂直身份威胁——没有拉丁美洲身份的项目，也没有重大分裂主义和其他形式的微区域主义案例。拉丁美洲有着长期的区域经济合作项目历史，旧的整合文献对拉丁美洲会像欧洲一样成为第二个整合区域持乐观态度。但这并未发生。没有宏大的项目，也不清楚“我们”拉丁美洲的身份到底是什么。天主教会提供了一些凝聚力，但总体上由于语言因素以及巴西要么以霸权主义思维，要么作为一个超出拉丁美洲、具有世界级影响力的大国的重大问题，文化区域被分裂。当区域经济一体化再次开始运作时，其形式之一是显而易见的 NAFTA 逐渐接纳新成员——从墨西哥到智利，再到……？另一种形式是同心圆，有点像欧洲，MERCOSUR 形成了一个内核精英核心，作为下一层区域合作的动力（Peña 1995）。现在判断这种整合是否会继续还为时过早。
tion will take on a regional identity quality and, if so, whether that identity will be Latin American, Southern Cone, or hemispherical. Regionalism is thus fairly unclear in the case of Latin America. Local (interethnic) and interregional (cultural, crime and drugs) threats are at play, but not much at the middle level. tion 将具有区域身份特质，如果是这样，该身份将是拉丁美洲、南方锥体，还是半球性的。因此，拉丁美洲的区域主义相当不明确。地方（族群间）和区域间（文化、犯罪和毒品）威胁存在，但中间层面的威胁不多。
North America 北美洲
North America is an interesting and intriguing case in the societal sector and is often ignored in regional security analysis. Since the region is unipolarized, normal mechanisms, such as the security dilemma and balance of power, are largely suspended. Military security and even political security are rather insignificant in North America, where the main agenda is constituted by the global role(s) of the United States. In the societal sector, however, dynamics can be found on national and regional scales. 北美是社会领域中一个有趣且引人入胜的案例，且常被区域安全分析所忽视。由于该地区是单极化的，诸如安全困境和平衡力量等正常机制在很大程度上被暂停。军事安全甚至政治安全在北美相当不重要，主要议程由美国的全球角色构成。然而，在社会领域，可以在国家和区域层面发现动态。
What are the referent objects for societal security; who are the “we” in North America? There is loyalty to Canada and the United States but also to Quebec and Texas. Increasingly, there is ethno-racial, multicultural attachment to the idea that African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans (“first nations”), and other ethno-racial groups have a demand on the independent definition of their own culture, needs, and rules of social interaction against a general U.S.-societal set of norms and “universal” rules suspected of being a cover for a dominant Euro-white particularism (cf. Taylor 1992). To these should be added the older conception of regional differences, most importantly the South in the United States. State identity is rarely outspoken (it is mostly a negative, mobilized as a defense against federal authority when that authority is resisted for other reasons), but in cases such as California, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas, a certain state patriotism exists. Thus, the U.S. political universe is increasingly constituted as a complex constellation of overlapping and crosscutting identity groups in which the securitizing actors will typically be relatively small activist groups but the referent objects are fairly large collectivities such as African Americans and Hispanics, which make up 12.4 percent and 9.5 percent of the population, respectively (Bureau of the Census 1996). 社会安全的参照对象是什么；北美的“我们”指的是谁？人们对加拿大和美国有忠诚感，但也对魁北克和德克萨斯有忠诚感。越来越多的人在种族、多元文化方面认同这样一种观点：非裔美国人、西班牙裔美国人、亚裔美国人、土著美国人（“第一民族”）以及其他种族群体要求独立定义他们自己的文化、需求和社会互动规则，以对抗被怀疑是掩盖主导的欧洲白人特殊主义的一般美国社会规范和“普遍”规则（参见 Taylor 1992）。此外，还应加上较早的地区差异观念，最重要的是美国南部。州身份很少被公开表达（大多是消极的，当联邦权威因其他原因受到抵制时，作为防御联邦权威的动员），但在加利福尼亚、马萨诸塞、纽约和德克萨斯等州，存在一定的州爱国主义。 因此，美国的政治宇宙越来越被构成一个复杂的重叠和交叉的身份群体星座，其中安全化行为者通常是相对较小的激进团体，但参照对象是相当大的集体，如非裔美国人和西班牙裔，他们分别占人口的 12.4%和 9.5%（美国人口普查局 1996 年）。
All of these issues are more than security issues. They are general questions on the political and cultural agenda, but they often take on a security dimension because they are argued in terms of the survival of specific cultures (Native American, African American, and, on the other side, a white male U.S. culture that feels threatened by the new particularism). Mainstream liberals end up discussing whether the state should guarantee the survival of the distinct cultures within it (Taylor 1992). Most would argue-in at striking parallel to the logic of the economic sector-that “constitutional democracies respect a broad range of cultural identities. but they ghamantee survival to nome” (Gamman l994: x ) 所有这些问题不仅仅是安全问题。它们是政治和文化议程上的一般性问题，但它们常常带有安全维度，因为它们以特定文化（美洲原住民、非裔美国人，以及另一方面感受到新特殊主义威胁的白人男性美国文化）的生存为论据。主流自由主义者最终讨论国家是否应保证其内部不同文化的生存（泰勒 1992 年）。大多数人会以与经济部门逻辑惊人相似的方式争辩——“宪政民主尊重广泛的文化身份，但它们保证某些身份的生存”（加曼 1994 年：x）。
Whereas the classical divisions in the United States-the separate states-could be politicized and depoliticized in waves but could not really be securitized in recent times, the cultural and racial categories have a clear potential for escalating beyond politicization into securitization. As the Oklahoma City bombing and the growth of the militias have shown, fairly violent action can be deduced from an argument that defends the “true America” against what is seen as a coalition of all kinds of decadent racial and sexual minorities and liberal state lovers who curb the autonomy of straight, white Americans to live a “real” American life. The remobilization of the militias might be seen as an indication of the importance of the states (the Montana militia, the Michigan militia), but, with the exception of Texas, the often dramatic actions are taken not in the name of the state and its sovereignty but in the name of a people and a lifestyle-the real Americans and their idea of freedom-which are projected as a kind of national identity sanctioned by the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence but violated by various misinterpretations. 而美国的传统划分——各个独立的州——虽然可以在不同阶段被政治化和去政治化，但近年来并未真正被安全化，而文化和种族类别则明显具有从政治化升级为安全化的潜力。正如俄克拉荷马城爆炸案和民兵组织的增长所显示的那样，可以从一种辩护“真正的美国”免受被视为各种颓废的种族和性少数群体以及限制直白白人美国人过“真正”美国生活的自由州爱好者联盟的论点中推断出相当暴力的行动。民兵组织的重新动员可能被视为各州重要性的一个标志（如蒙大拿民兵、密歇根民兵），但除了德克萨斯州之外，这些常常戏剧性的行动并非以州及其主权的名义进行，而是以一个民族和一种生活方式——真正的美国人及其自由观念的名义进行，这种观念被视为由宪法和独立宣言认可的国家身份，但却被各种误读所侵犯。
It is thus a peculiar kind of defense against a state (the United States) that is seen not as illegitimate as such but as illegitimate only when it operates beyond some very minimal tasks; thus, it is a defense not in the name of protosecessionist local units but an all-American defense of something like a nation, which is defined in its identity by having very little state and thus is threatened by what should be its own state (Wills 1995). This lifestyle-freedom-national identity is then intermingled with more classical reactionary rhetoric (Hirschman 1991) and articulated as a defense against perverted minorities and un-American racial and social groups. Here, the radical white categorizations often line up with the attempts of the avowed progressives of the movements of minorities, multiculturalism, and political correctness to produce a general U.S. trend toward a redefinition of cultural and societal categories in terms of distinct racial and gender groups. The one side wants these groups recognized to ensure affirmative action in favor of the disfavored; the other side wants to use these categories to picture minorities as the threat to them and thereby to the whole because as a particular group they simultaneously represent the universal American identity. 这是一种对一个国家（美国）的特殊防御，这个国家本身并不被视为非法，只有当它超越某些极其有限的职能时才被视为非法；因此，这种防御不是以原始分离主义地方单位的名义进行的，而是一种全美式的防御，捍卫的是类似于一个国家的东西，这个国家的身份定义在于拥有极少的国家权力，因此受到本应属于它自己的国家的威胁（Wills 1995）。这种生活方式-自由-民族认同随后与更为传统的反动言论（Hirschman 1991）交织在一起，并被表达为对堕落少数群体和非美国种族及社会群体的防御。在这里，激进的白人分类常常与少数群体、多元文化主义和政治正确运动中公开的进步主义者试图通过明确的种族和性别群体来重新定义文化和社会类别的总体美国趋势相一致。 一方希望这些群体被认可，以确保对不受青睐者的积极行动；另一方则希望利用这些类别将少数群体描绘成对他们乃至整个社会的威胁，因为作为一个特定群体，他们同时代表了普遍的美国身份。
This entire redefinition of the structuration of cultural space in North Amcrica interacts with the second main factor on the societal agenda: migration. Migration was already once the key factor in a total reconstitution of North American society when immigrants, mainly from Europe, outnumbered and eventually overpowered the original population. Today, this dominant group faces a gradual shift in the population with an increase especially in the percentage of Spanish-speaking and Asian peoples, suggesting that the percentage of non-Hispanic whites will drop from 75.2 in 1991 to 60.5 in 2030 (Bureau of the Census 1996). At present, migration is securitized mainly at the state level for those areas-especially Callifornia-in which the population balance has already shifted the most 这种对北美文化空间结构的全面重新定义与社会议程上的第二个主要因素相互作用：移民。移民曾经是北美社会全面重组的关键因素，当时主要来自欧洲的移民数量超过并最终取代了原住人口。如今，这一主导群体面临人口结构的逐渐变化，尤其是讲西班牙语和亚洲人的比例增加，预计非西班牙裔白人的比例将从 1991 年的 75.2%下降到 2030 年的 60.5%（美国人口普查局 1996 年数据）。目前，移民问题主要在州一级被安全化，尤其是在加利福尼亚等人口结构已经发生最大变化的地区。
significantly because of immediate adjacency to the mainland of origin for immigrants-Mexico. The two issues (changing self-definition and the physical change in the composition of the population) interact in several ways but perhaps most importantly in the reactions of white European Americans, who see immigration as a threat not so much because the United States could become Spanish speaking (whites could become a minority) but rather because the increasing self-assuredness of different minorities threatens to produce a less unified, more multicultural, and thereby less universalistic United States. 由于与移民原籍国墨西哥大陆的直接邻近，这一情况发生了显著变化。这两个问题（自我定义的变化和人口构成的物理变化）以多种方式相互作用，但也许最重要的是白人欧洲裔美国人的反应，他们将移民视为威胁，不是因为美国可能变成讲西班牙语的国家（白人可能成为少数群体），而是因为不同少数群体日益自信，威胁到美国变得不那么统一，更加多元文化，从而不那么普遍主义。
The North American case has been given extra treatment here because it raises some interesting and unusual questions. One might ask, are novel phenomena such as multiculturalism really about societal security; do they not constitute social security instead? Since these phenomena are about various groups in society and are obviously “domestic,” should they be included here? Yes, because they are about collective identities-“we blacks,” “we real Americans”-and even identities that many people increasingly see as their main frame of reference. Thus, these phenomena clearly qualify as societal security. The sense of unease about including them in that category probably stems from two unconscious assumptions about units in international security studies, and the case can therefore help us to clarify important conceptual questions. 北美案例在此被特别处理，因为它提出了一些有趣且不同寻常的问题。有人可能会问，多元文化主义等新现象真的关乎社会安全吗；它们不应该属于社会保障范畴吗？既然这些现象涉及社会中的各种群体，且显然是“国内”的，是否应将它们纳入此处？答案是肯定的，因为它们关乎集体身份——“我们黑人”，“我们真正的美国人”——甚至是许多人日益视为其主要参照框架的身份。因此，这些现象显然符合社会安全的定义。对将它们归入该类别感到不安的原因，可能源于国际安全研究中对单位的两种无意识假设，因此该案例有助于我们澄清重要的概念性问题。
First, it is well-known that the major difference between Europe and the United States is that in Europe “nations” are largely territorial, whereas in the United States identity groups and political-territorial groups produce two crosscutting systems. The North American equivalents of Europe’s nations-what today is often called race-live mixed among each other but still function similar to nations in many ways, even occasionally using the term nation, as in “the nation of Islam” and “first nations” (cf. also Hacker 1992; Rex 1995: 253). ^(4){ }^{4} There should be no presumption of territoriality in our concept of units in societal security; thus, the North American case fully qualifies in this respect. As registered by the use of terms like tribalization on European as well as North American developments (Horsman and Marshall 1995), we might see an increasing need for a conceptual apparatus able to discern ethnic and other identificational groups that operate separately from the state map both in Africa and in areas traditionally conceived of in state terms. 首先，众所周知，欧洲和美国之间的主要区别在于，欧洲的“民族”在很大程度上是基于领土的，而在美国，身份群体和政治-领土群体形成了两个交叉系统。北美相当于欧洲民族的群体——如今常被称为种族——彼此混居，但在许多方面仍然类似于民族，甚至偶尔使用“民族”一词，如“伊斯兰民族”和“第一民族”（参见 Hacker 1992；Rex 1995: 253）。在我们对社会安全单位的概念中，不应假设其具有领土性；因此，北美的情况在这方面完全符合要求。正如在欧洲和北美的发展中使用“部落化”等术语所表明的（Horsman 和 Marshall 1995），我们可能会看到对一种能够区分在非洲及传统上以国家概念理解的地区之外运作的族群及其他身份认同群体的概念工具的日益需求。
The second source of unease is probably related to the fact that these dynamics are obviously “domestic,” should this not be a book about international security? In this book, we take the core meaning of security-its basic speech-act function-as it has emerged in the international field and study how this operation is increasingly performed in other contexts. Explicitly (see Chapter 2), we do not limit our study to states, but we do want to avoid the individualizalion of security; thus, for us security is an interunit phenomenon, and the units in this sector-chapter are identity groups regardess of wheller they opreate across state boders. 第二个不安的来源可能与这样一个事实有关：这些动态显然是“国内的”，难道这本书不应该是关于国际安全的吗？在本书中，我们采用安全的核心含义——其基本的言语行为功能——正如它在国际领域中出现的那样，研究这种运作如何越来越多地在其他语境中进行。明确地（见第二章），我们不将研究局限于国家，但我们确实想避免安全的个体化；因此，对我们来说，安全是一种单位间现象，而本章节中的单位是身份群体，无论它们是否跨越国家边界运作。
Europe 欧洲
In Europe, societal security is mainly about nations and nationlike ethnic groups-minorities, regions, and Europe sometimes conceived in nationbuilding terms. We covered this topic extensively in our 1993 book (Wæver et al. 1993) and will not repeat the arguments at length here. In summary, Europe has strong regionalizing dynamics in the societal sector. The issue of minorities, nation, and Europe has produced a complex constellation of multilayered identities. And it can be argued that the fate of European integration and thereby of security is determined largely by the fate of this con-stellation-do the different identities evolve in a pattern of complementarity, or will some be seen by others as so threatening that they trigger panic reactions: the implementation of societal security policy and the use of extraordinary measures that block European integration (Wæver et al. 1993, chapters 1,4 , and 10 ; Wæver forthcoming-a). 在欧洲，社会安全主要涉及国家和类似国家的民族群体——少数民族、地区，以及有时以国家建设术语构想的欧洲。我们在 1993 年的著作中对此话题进行了广泛讨论（Wæver 等，1993），这里不再详细重复论点。总之，欧洲在社会领域具有强烈的区域化动态。少数民族、国家和欧洲的问题产生了复杂的多层次身份结构。可以说，欧洲一体化的命运及其安全在很大程度上取决于这一结构的命运——不同身份是以互补的模式发展，还是某些身份被他人视为极具威胁，从而引发恐慌反应：实施社会安全政策和采取阻碍欧洲一体化的非常措施（Wæver 等，1993，第 1、4 和 10 章；Wæver 即将出版-a）。
More immediately, many local conflicts are related to vertical competition between nations-states and minorities-nations, and even those that are seemingly horizontal nation-state against nation-state usually have some of the minority, secession-irredentism element as the trigger or object of contest. Although in principle these various societal regionalizing dynamics could lead to regions rather different from those of the political and military sectors, in the case of Europe the intersectoral interplay tends to produce relatively convergent regions. Those threats in one sector that line up with urgent fears in another sector will tend to be feared more; thus, the different sectors leave a sufficient imprint on each other to create a relatively clear region in at least the military, political, and societal senses. 更直接地说，许多地方冲突与民族国家与少数民族国家之间的垂直竞争有关，即使那些看似是民族国家与民族国家之间的水平竞争，通常也带有少数民族、分裂主义和复国主义元素，作为冲突的触发点或争夺对象。虽然原则上这些各种社会区域化动态可能导致与政治和军事部门截然不同的区域，但在欧洲的情况下，部门间的相互作用往往产生相对趋同的区域。一个部门中的威胁如果与另一个部门的紧迫恐惧相一致，往往会被更加恐惧；因此，不同部门相互留下足够的印记，至少在军事、政治和社会意义上形成相对清晰的区域。
Among interregional and globalizing dynamics, the most important is the relationship to the Middle East, which is colored by migrants as well as historically conditioned religious suspicion. Migrants from Africa are also likely to be a continual concern. 在区域间和全球化动态中，最重要的是与中东的关系，这种关系受到移民以及历史上形成的宗教猜疑的影响。来自非洲的移民也可能持续成为关注的焦点。
Middle East 中东
In the case of the Middle East, societal security has some of the same features it has in Europe. There is a constellation of states in which nations do not always fit into state boundaries. There are stateless minorities (e.g., Kurds, Palestinians). And there are overarching identities (Islamic and Arabic) that play several, sometimes contradictory roles: They can be seen as threatening to, and as threatened by, attempts to construct specific national identities and as useful in mobilizing on the international level. The various types of vertical identity conflicts presented in the European context can therefore also be found in the Middle East, with religion (the Shi’ia-Sunni divide) playing a stronger role than it does in modern Europe (but perhaps a similar role to that in post-Reformation, pre-Westphalian Europe). 在中东的情况下，社会安全具有与欧洲相似的一些特征。这里存在一个由多个国家组成的星座，其中民族并不总是与国家边界相符。存在无国籍的少数民族（例如库尔德人、巴勒斯坦人）。还有一些总体身份（伊斯兰和阿拉伯）扮演着多重、有时相互矛盾的角色：它们既可以被视为对构建特定民族身份的尝试构成威胁，也可以被视为受到威胁，同时在国际层面动员时又非常有用。因此，在欧洲背景下呈现的各种垂直身份冲突类型也可以在中东找到，宗教（什叶派-逊尼派分裂）比现代欧洲中扮演的角色更为重要（但可能与宗教改革后、西伐利亚体系前的欧洲所扮演的角色相似）。
There are two main differences between vertical identity conflicts in the Middle East and those in Europe (which should be expected to counter 中东的垂直身份冲突与欧洲的主要有两个区别（这应当是预料之中的）
each other). First, despite the dominant rhetorics, the unifying Arabism and Islamism, the region is actually less integrated, more conflictual, and more a balance-of-power system than Europe. Second, the region has a stronger perception of external threat-of Western-orchestrated conspiracies, threats of divide and rule, cultural and economic imperialism, exterminism against Muslims in the Gulf and in Bosnia, and the like. Of course, the two are perfectly compatible if Western divide and rule is seen as a major reality, because the first feature-divisions-is then explained. Here, the picture is a complicated mixture of, on the one hand, a post-Ottoman, Westernimposed territorial fragmentation that only sometimes (e.g., Morocco, Egypt, Iran) reflected historical state traditions and, on the other hand, a wealth of local antagonisms arising over territory, ideology (conservative versus radical), kinship groups, religion, and attitudes toward the West. Evidence suggests that the state system is steadily deepening its roots, weakening the overarching Arab and Islamic identities, and taking on the characteristics of a classical security complex (Barnett 1995). 彼此）。首先，尽管占主导地位的修辞是统一的阿拉伯主义和伊斯兰主义，但该地区实际上整合程度较低，冲突更多，更像是一个权力平衡体系，而非欧洲。其次，该地区对外部威胁的感知更强烈——西方策划的阴谋、分而治之的威胁、文化和经济帝国主义、针对海湾和波斯尼亚穆斯林的灭绝主义等。当然，如果将西方的分而治之视为一个重大现实，这两点是完全兼容的，因为第一个特征——分裂——就得到了说明。在这里，情况是一个复杂的混合体，一方面是后奥斯曼时期、西方强加的领土分裂，这种分裂只有在某些情况下（如摩洛哥、埃及、伊朗）反映了历史国家传统；另一方面是围绕领土、意识形态（保守派与激进派）、亲属群体、宗教以及对西方态度产生的众多地方对立。证据表明，国家体系正在稳步深化其根基，削弱整体的阿拉伯和伊斯兰身份，呈现出经典安全复合体的特征（Barnett 1995）。
Migration in the Middle East is mainly intraregional (Palestinians, Egyptians, Yemenis, and others seeking work in the Gulf states) but with some inward (temporary) economic migration from Europe and South and Southeast Asia, also mostly to the Gulf. In some Gulf states, migrants compose a substantial proportion of the population, which poses problems of cultural difference and political exclusion. 中东地区的迁移主要是区域内迁移（巴勒斯坦人、埃及人、也门人以及其他在海湾国家寻求工作的人员），但也有一些来自欧洲、南亚和东南亚的临时经济迁移，主要也是流向海湾。在一些海湾国家，移民占人口的很大比例，这带来了文化差异和政治排斥的问题。
The Middle East is in many ways the ideal type case of a regional security complex today, with deep divisions and recurring conflicts. Also, societal security concerns are largely focused within the region. There is, however, also a high degree of identification with a mostly religiously, panIslamic but in part pan-Arabic (thus metanationalist)-defined defense against Western dominance, cultural imperialism, and the imposition of Western standards of international society. 中东在许多方面是当今区域安全复合体的理想典型，存在深刻的分裂和反复的冲突。此外，社会安全关注主要集中在该地区内部。然而，也存在高度的认同感，主要是以宗教为基础的泛伊斯兰主义，但部分也带有泛阿拉伯主义（因此具有超民族主义特征），以抵御西方的主导地位、文化帝国主义以及西方国际社会标准的强加。
South Asia 南亚
South Asia’s main security concerns have occurred in the political-military sector organized by the struggle between India and Pakistan. This conflict had some societal elements in that one root cause was the incompatible principles on which politics and identity were linked in the two countries (Buzan et al. 1986). India is multiethnic and to some extent multiconfessional, thereby posing to Pakistan a vision of including all of the subcontinent (including Pakistan). Pakistan, on the other hand, is religiously based and through this particularist logic questions the secular federal basis of India. 南亚的主要安全关切发生在由印度和巴基斯坦之间斗争组织的政治军事领域。这场冲突具有一些社会元素，其根本原因之一是两国政治与身份认同所依赖的原则不兼容（Buzan 等，1986）。印度是多民族的，在某种程度上也是多宗教的，因此对巴基斯坦构成了包括整个次大陆（包括巴基斯坦）在内的愿景。另一方面，巴基斯坦是基于宗教的，通过这种特殊主义逻辑质疑印度的世俗联邦基础。
This dominant single-conflict dynamic, which integrated many dimensions in one conflict formation, is potentially giving way to a much more general, complicated, and confusing security scene in which societal conflicts within the states have become more prominent. Pakistan has tensions among its Ponjabi, P’athan. Ballach, and Siadhi peoples, and its main port- 这种以单一冲突为主导的动态，整合了多维度于一体的冲突形态，可能正在让位于一个更加普遍、复杂且混乱的安全局面，其中国家内部的社会冲突变得更加突出。巴基斯坦在其旁遮普、普什图、俾路支和锡亚奇族群之间存在紧张关系，其主要港口—
Karachi-is plagued by ethnically based political and criminal violence. India has a variety of ethnoreligious secessionist movements, most conspicuously the Sikhs and Kashmiris. Tension between its Hindu majority and Muslim minority continues to generate regular outbursts of communal violence, and the rise of Hindu nationalism as a political force could threaten the founding basis of the Indian state. Sri Lanka is still engaged in a long ethnoreligious civil war between Tamils (linked to a large community in southern India) and Sinhalese (Buddhists). 卡拉奇受到基于种族的政治和犯罪暴力的困扰。印度有各种族宗教分离主义运动，最显著的是锡克教徒和克什米尔人。其印度教多数与穆斯林少数之间的紧张关系持续引发定期的社区暴力爆发，印度教民族主义作为一种政治力量的崛起可能威胁印度国家的建国基础。斯里兰卡仍在进行一场长期的种族宗教内战，交战双方是泰米尔人（与印度南部的一个庞大社区有关联）和僧伽罗人（佛教徒）。
All of these situations create vertical identity conflicts between the states and the societal entities within them, and in many of these cases both sides have resorted to coercive strategies and military means. The resulting dynamics of insecurity pit defenders of the state and of its identity project (e.g., India, Pakistan) against a variety of ethnoreligious entities willing to challenge the state on the grounds of being unable to maintain their identity within it. To some extent, these internal insecurity dynamics are part of the old India-Pakistan conflict formation. Each government regularly accuses the other of aiding and arming its internal dissidents, but the societal dynamics also have a dynamic of their own. 所有这些情况都在国家与其内部的社会实体之间产生了垂直身份冲突，在许多情况下，双方都诉诸于强制策略和军事手段。由此产生的不安全动态使国家及其身份项目的捍卫者（例如印度、巴基斯坦）与各种愿意以国家无法维护其身份为由挑战国家的民族宗教实体对立。在某种程度上，这些内部不安全动态是旧有的印巴冲突格局的一部分。每个政府经常指责对方援助和武装其内部异见分子，但社会动态本身也有其自身的动态。
Southeast Asia 东南亚
Southeast Asia shows clear regionalizing trends institutionalized in ASEAN. The societal security agenda has two main elements one global, one local-transnational. No strong elements of interlocking societal fears are found at the scale of the region. The global issue has to do with the conflict between a Western-dominated international agenda and “Asian values,” in which Singapore and Malaysia have taken an ideological lead in articulating the counterposition to the West. The more successful (and authoritarian) of the East and Southeast Asian states are the most likely challengers to the West, because they have the credibility of an alternative development model that works. 东南亚展现出在东盟制度化的明显区域化趋势。社会安全议程有两个主要元素，一个是全球性的，一个是地方-跨国性的。在区域范围内没有发现强烈的相互交织的社会恐惧因素。全球性问题涉及西方主导的国际议程与“亚洲价值观”之间的冲突，新加坡和马来西亚在阐述对西方的对立立场方面发挥了意识形态上的领导作用。东亚和东南亚中较为成功（且专制）的国家最有可能挑战西方，因为它们拥有一个行之有效的替代发展模式的信誉。
In terms of the ethnic map of Southeast Asia, various minorities are in conflict with the central powers, but the most interesting and generalizable factor is the issue of the Chinese versus the locals, which has some similarities to the tensions between Jews and their host societies in Europe. Southeast Asia is one of the places in the world where “Greater China” as an ethnic empire is felt clearly for better (as an economically promising connection) and for worse (fear of Chinese economic dominance and political influence, especially in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia). This is one factor that reinforces the case made in the military chapter for analytically merging Southeast Asia into East Asia. 就东南亚的民族地图而言，各种少数民族与中央政权存在冲突，但最有趣且具有普遍性的因素是华人与当地人之间的问题，这与欧洲犹太人与其寄居社会之间的紧张关系有些相似。东南亚是世界上“中华大地”作为一个民族帝国感受最为明显的地方之一，这种感受既有积极的一面（作为经济上有前景的联系），也有消极的一面（对华人经济主导地位和政治影响力的担忧，尤其是在马来西亚、越南和印度尼西亚）。这是军事章节中提出将东南亚分析性地合并入东亚的一个强化因素。
East Asia 东亚
In East Asia, which is likely to become more of a region in the military and political sectors (with general rivalry and power balancing among China, 在东亚，这一地区很可能在军事和政治领域成为一个更为统一的区域（中国之间普遍存在竞争和权力平衡），
Japan, Korea, and others), trends in the societal sector are mainly subregional (nationalizing) and interregional-global-that is, this is a case of sectors out of joint in which the regions produced by the different sectoral maps do not correspond. One of the jokers in East Asia is the coherence versus the regionalization of China (Segal 1994). Even if China does not follow the Soviet Union into decomposition, it could still be increasingly shaped by struggles between “layers,” by vertical struggles rather than the horizontal interstate politics foreseen in the military and political sectors. On the other hand, if China grows as much as is expected, it might become powerful enough to be both more decentralized and still very powerful regionally; thus, the regional and intra-Chinese power games will be locked in one power constellation. It is difficult to judge to what extent Chinese regionalism should be seen as societal-that is, driven by identity diversi-ty-or whether instead it is driven by a mixture of politics (control over the state apparatus) and the economy (different strategies and positioning) and is thus more a replay of warlords than a European-like pattern of nations. 日本、韩国等国家，社会领域的趋势主要是次区域性（国家化）和跨区域-全球性的——也就是说，这是一个部门失调的情况，不同部门地图所产生的区域并不对应。东亚的一个变数是中国的统一性与区域化之间的关系（Segal 1994）。即使中国没有像苏联那样解体，它仍可能越来越受到“层级”之间斗争的影响，是垂直斗争，而非军事和政治领域预见的水平国家间政治。另一方面，如果中国如预期那样发展壮大，它可能会变得既更加分权又在区域内非常强大；因此，区域内和中国内部的权力博弈将锁定在一个权力格局中。很难判断中国的区域主义在多大程度上应被视为社会性的——即由身份多样性驱动——还是更多地由政治（对国家机器的控制）和经济（不同策略和定位）的混合驱动，因此更像是军阀割据的重演，而非欧洲式的民族模式。
Obviously, the region also has cases of the repression of minorities and thereby of well-known societal security dynamics, especially in the case of Tibet. This situation may feed into the more general and elsewhere less radical issue of region versus center. 显然，该地区也存在对少数民族的压制案例，因此存在众所周知的社会安全动态，尤其是在西藏的情况。这种情况可能加剧更普遍且在其他地方较不激进的地区与中央的矛盾问题。
In the case of Japan, the most relevant societal security issues are (despite a beginning interest in its own minorities and regions, most importantly Ainus and Okinawans) those related to globalizing-U.S. culture and national identity. Whereas this chapter has often run into the political-soci-etal-sector boundary, Japan might be a case of economic-cultural connections. Japanese distinctiveness and difference is used as an argument in trade disputes, especially with the United States (but also with Europe), whereas some U.S. arguments about how one must organize to produce truly fair trade come very close to a demand for a U.S. socioeconomic and cultural model. After a defensive period during which the United States used arguments about the Japanese primarily to defend its own protectionism, recent years have witnessed a more offensive line in which Americans have tried (again) to structure a global regime according to their visions. This time, however, the United States has gone much further in saying other societies have to become multicultural, radical-pluralist, and the like. 在日本的情况下，最相关的社会安全问题是（尽管开始关注自身的少数民族和地区，最重要的是阿伊努人和冲绳人）那些与全球化的美国文化和国家认同相关的问题。虽然本章经常涉及政治-社会-部门的界限，但日本可能是经济-文化联系的一个案例。日本的独特性和差异性被用作贸易争端中的论据，特别是与美国（也包括欧洲）的争端中，而一些美国关于如何组织以实现真正公平贸易的论点则非常接近于对美国社会经济和文化模式的要求。在美国主要利用关于日本的论点来为自身保护主义辩护的防御时期之后，近年来出现了更具进攻性的路线，美国人试图（再次）根据他们的愿景构建一个全球体系。然而，这一次，美国更进一步，表示其他社会必须变得多元文化、激进多元主义等。
There is a strong logic to this argument. When tariffs are reduced, nontariff bärriers to trade become more important. When nontariff barriers are decimated, one will discover that trade does not distribute randomly. For example, Germans will keep preferring German beer even though they lost the case for using the Reinheitsgebot as legitimization for banning other beers. They will still drink more German beer simply because their taste and national prejudices callse them to prefer it. Likewise, the Japanesedespite their cultural addiction 10 things American–strongly believe in both the superionity of their own products and the collective rationality 这个论点有很强的逻辑性。当关税降低时，非关税贸易壁垒变得更加重要。当非关税壁垒被消除时，人们会发现贸易并不是随机分布的。例如，德国人即使在使用纯净法（Reinheitsgebot）作为禁止其他啤酒的合法理由的案件中失败了，仍然会继续偏爱德国啤酒。他们仍然会喝更多的德国啤酒，仅仅因为他们的口味和民族偏见促使他们偏爱它。同样，尽管日本人对美国文化有着强烈的依赖，但他们坚信自己产品的优越性和集体理性。
tion will continue, especially for those nations that are the most homogeneous, the most Gemeinschaft-like, and that operate the most on implicit, unspoken social rules-with Japan the prime case. Japan and the United States are therefore destined to continue to conflict at the interface of culture and economy. 这种冲突将继续存在，尤其是对于那些最为同质化、最像社区（Gemeinschaft）并且最依赖隐含、未明说的社会规则运作的国家——日本是典型例子。因此，日本和美国注定将在文化与经济的交汇处继续发生冲突。
Thus, East Asia is a complicated mixture of increasing security com-plex-like intraregional rivalries in the other sectors, possible societal disintegration in the case of China (which in terms of pure size could easily constitute a region itself; cf. de Wilde 1995), and societal conflict at the global level. 因此，东亚是一个复杂的混合体，除了其他领域日益增长的安全复合体式的区域内竞争外，还有中国可能的社会解体（就纯粹规模而言，中国本身就足以构成一个区域；参见 de Wilde 1995），以及全球层面的社会冲突。
Former Soviet Union 前苏联
The former Soviet region is probably still the most complex case for regional analysis. It is unclear into which regions this territory should be divided: Where does Europe end, where does Asia end? Is there a Russiacentered sphere that includes most of the post-Soviet countries (the CIS), and is there a Central Asian security complex? 前苏联地区可能仍然是区域分析中最复杂的案例。目前尚不清楚该领土应划分为哪些区域：欧洲在哪里结束，亚洲在哪里结束？是否存在一个以俄罗斯为中心的圈子，包括大多数后苏联国家（独联体），以及是否存在一个中亚安全复合体？
Here again, societal, political, and military security are closely linked. Several of the new states are fragile projects. Their nature (ethnocratic or multiethnic) remains unsettled, and their degree of autonomy in relation to Russia is equally uncertain. Thus, we have problems of minorities-both narrowly geographical, in the sense of questionable borders (because concentrations of Russians are found right on the other side of the border in, for example, Estonia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan), and more generally as a certain percentage of the population in most of the new states. These Russian minorities are one of the main sources of incongruence among different components of nation-building projects in cases such as the Ukraine and the Baltics, where an inclusive, state-defined identity seems necessary for stability but an ethnically defined identity is an almost unavoidable component of nation and state building (Waver et al. 1993, chapter 6; Poulsen-Hansen and Wæver 1996). This situation can be conceptualized as one of competing programs for the same state or as vertical competition between different circles of identity (e.g., ethno-Ukrainian, state-Ukrainian, neoimperial Russian). 在这里，社会、安全和军事安全再次紧密相连。几个新兴国家是脆弱的项目。它们的性质（种族统治或多民族）尚未确定，与俄罗斯的自治程度也同样不确定。因此，我们面临少数民族问题——既有狭义的地理问题，即边界的可疑性（因为俄罗斯族群集中分布在边界另一侧，例如爱沙尼亚、乌克兰和哈萨克斯坦），也有更广义的问题，即大多数新兴国家中一定比例的人口。这些俄罗斯少数民族是乌克兰和波罗的海国家等案例中民族建设项目不同组成部分之间不协调的主要来源之一，在这些国家中，包容性、国家定义的身份似乎对稳定至关重要，但以种族定义的身份几乎是民族和国家建设不可避免的组成部分（Waver 等，1993，第 6 章；Poulsen-Hansen 和 Wæver，1996）。 这种情况可以被概念化为同一国家内不同方案的竞争，或者不同身份圈层之间的垂直竞争（例如，乌克兰族群、国家乌克兰、新帝国主义俄罗斯）。
In the former Soviet region, there are also cases of seemingly more classical interstate–that is, horizontal-conflict between two states or nations (most importantly Armenia-Azerbaijan). But again, as in the case of Europe, the trigger is a vertical problem-handling the status of a subunit, Nagorno-Karabach. The dominant type of security problem in the area is the combined societal-political issue of what units should exist and how they should be defined: Should there be several sovereign, equal states or one new Russian empire (plus possibly some smaller remnants such as West Ukraine and Southern Kazakhstan)? 在前苏联地区，也存在看似更经典的国家间——即水平冲突——的案例（最重要的是亚美尼亚与阿塞拜疆）。但同样，如欧洲的情况，导火索是一个垂直问题——处理一个子单位的地位，纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫。该地区主要的安全问题类型是社会政治的综合问题，即哪些单位应该存在以及它们应如何定义：应该有几个主权平等的国家，还是一个新的俄罗斯帝国（加上一些可能较小的残余，如西乌克兰和南哈萨克斯坦）？
It is still too early to say what kinds of security regions will emerge 目前还为时过早，无法确定将会出现何种类型的安全区域。
from the political-societal-military conflicts in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Central Asia is again a meeting point of many regions. China, Iran, Turkey, and Russia all compete for influence there, but it seems unlikely that all these powers will be drawn into one region; they all have primary or at least equal concerns elsewhere. Minority problems, water disputes, and awkward boundaries offer ample scope for the new states to drift into the classical form of a local complex. There is also a strong regionalizing dynamic in the sense that the problem of and for Russia is probably going to be the decisive issue that structures the entire region and ties a large number of security problems together into one complex. 来自中亚和高加索地区的政治-社会-军事冲突。中亚再次成为多个地区的交汇点。中国、伊朗、土耳其和俄罗斯都在争夺该地区的影响力，但似乎不太可能所有这些大国都会被卷入同一个地区；它们都有主要的或至少同等重要的其他关切。少数民族问题、水资源争端和尴尬的边界为新兴国家陷入传统的地方复杂体提供了充足的空间。还有一种强烈的区域化动态，即俄罗斯的问题可能将成为决定性议题，构建整个地区并将大量安全问题联系成一个复杂体。
Past migration from Russia into the other republics is the origin of the most important minority problems, and the remigration of these people returning to Russia is exacerbating social problems there. Interregional migration exists-both into and out of the region-but is secondary to internal migration. 过去从俄罗斯向其他共和国的迁移是最重要的少数民族问题的起源，而这些人返回俄罗斯的再迁移正在加剧那里的社会问题。区域间迁移存在——既有进入也有离开该地区的迁移——但相较于内部迁移而言是次要的。
The interregional, horizontal concern about other identities intruding is mainly a problem for Russia, which is worried about both the potential Islamification or Turkification of Central Asia and, more globally, a “world order” of concentric circles, with Russia somewhere in the second circle. The West/United States as a global factor plays an important role for Russia, both at the societal level in terms of a problematic privatization and marketization-which leads to a critique of the Western-imposed strate-gy-and at the diplomatic level in terms of a search for a dignified role for Russia. 跨区域的、横向的对其他身份入侵的担忧主要是俄罗斯的问题，俄罗斯担心中亚可能的伊斯兰化或突厥化，更广泛地说，担心一个同心圆的“世界秩序”，俄罗斯处于第二圈。西方/美国作为全球因素对俄罗斯起着重要作用，既体现在社会层面上，涉及问题的私有化和市场化——这导致对西方强加战略的批评——也体现在外交层面上，俄罗斯寻求一个有尊严的角色。
All in all, strong regionalizing forces are pulling in the direction of some kind of complex that will be not purely societal but a mix of societal, political, and probably military; that will be organized by problems for and with Russia; and that will link-something like the CIS-most of the former Soviet Union, probably excepting the Baltic states. The outer boundary of this region and the nature of its relationship to neighboring regions remain uncertain, especially in the South but also toward the West and East. Global-level dynamics are present, but they also tie into the organizing controversy that is focused on Russia: What kind of Russia should exist, with what kind of regional order and what kind of global role? 总的来说，强烈的区域化力量正推动形成某种复杂体，这种复杂体不仅仅是社会性的，而是社会、政治，可能还有军事的混合体；它将围绕与俄罗斯相关的问题进行组织；并且将连接类似独联体的大部分前苏联地区，可能不包括波罗的海国家。该地区的外部边界及其与邻近地区的关系性质仍不确定，尤其是在南部，同时也涉及西部和东部。全球层面的动态存在，但它们也与围绕俄罗斯的核心争议相关联：应当存在怎样的俄罗斯，拥有怎样的区域秩序和怎样的全球角色？
Finally, one might ask if we have overlooked some forms of identification by proceeding by region. The major religions were registered where they were active and thus were not overlooked. One potential factor, however, could be the emerging cosmopolitan-postnational elite. As argued, for example, by Reich (1991, 1992 [1991]) and UNRISD (1995), the globalizing economy of the information age produces a winning class of symbolic analysts who do not think of themselves as tied to a national economy and do not necessarily see why they should feel any solidarity with unemployed people who happen to live in the same combry. The industrial workers have decreasing impritate and the solidatity and loyally of the nation-state atre 最后，有人可能会问，我们是否在按地区划分时忽略了某些身份形式。主要宗教被登记在其活跃的地区，因此没有被忽视。然而，一个潜在因素可能是新兴的世界主义-后民族精英。正如 Reich（1991，1992 [1991]）和联合国研究所（UNRISD，1995）所论述的，信息时代的全球化经济产生了一批胜出的符号分析师阶层，他们不认为自己与国家经济有联系，也不一定理解为什么他们应该对恰好生活在同一社区的失业者感到任何团结。工业工人的重要性和民族国家的团结与忠诚正在减少。
therefore of less value. For this elite, lifestyles and patterns of movement clearly transcend the nation-state as well. (Remembering how Benedict Anderson [1983] singled out career routes as decisive in the formation of nationalism and nation-states, the emergence of global patterns of career options might be crucial signs of a new era.) 因此变得不那么重要。对于这批精英来说，生活方式和流动模式显然也超越了民族国家。（回想本尼迪克特·安德森[1983]如何将职业路径视为民族主义和民族国家形成的决定性因素，全球职业选择模式的出现可能是新时代的重要标志。）
What can be argued here is, first, that the emotional attachment to the nation-state is weakened for this crucial group. It is less clear whether these elites build up some other point of identification. In some cases, a loyalty to the multinational corporation for which one is working might substitute; in most cases, however, nothing but pure individualism prevails. In numerous instances-from the overall orientation of the United States after the Cold War to attitudes toward the EU in the northern part of Western Europe-the conflict runs between a cosmopolitan, liberal, internationalized part of society and a more locally tied, communitarian resistance. Much of societal security in the richest part of the world is related to this possibly overarching conflict-that is, the opposition is more between universalizing and particularizing cultures than between different particularizing cultures (Hassner 1996). In less privileged parts of the world the patterns are different, either because wider segments expect to gain from internationalization (e.g., EU support in southern Europe) or because much of the elite takes part in nationalist operations (the former Yugoslav area). 可以论证的是，首先，对于这一关键群体来说，对民族国家的情感依附被削弱了。是否这些精英建立了某种其他的认同点则不太清楚。在某些情况下，可能会以对所工作的跨国公司的忠诚作为替代；但在大多数情况下，只有纯粹的个人主义占主导地位。在许多实例中——从冷战后美国的整体取向到西欧北部对欧盟的态度——冲突在于社会中一个世界主义、自由主义、国际化的部分与一个更本地化、社群主义的抵抗之间。世界最富裕地区的社会安全很大程度上与这一可能的总体冲突有关——即对立更多是在普遍化文化与特殊化文化之间，而非不同特殊化文化之间（Hassner 1996）。在较不富裕的地区，模式则不同，要么是因为更广泛的群体期望从国际化中获益（例如，南欧的欧盟支持），要么是因为许多精英参与民族主义行动（前南斯拉夫地区）。
Summary 摘要
Proceeding region by region might produce a bias toward noticing regional dynamics, but even in this procedure some globalizing trends and factors were found. Interregional migrants played a role, especially in Europe; interregional cultural, religious, and civilizational factors were at play, especially in the Middle East and East Asia but also in Europe. 按地区逐步进行可能会导致对地区动态的关注偏向，但即使在这一过程中，也发现了一些全球化的趋势和因素。跨地区的移民发挥了作用，尤其是在欧洲；跨地区的文化、宗教和文明因素也在起作用，特别是在中东和东亚，但欧洲也存在这些因素。
The main forces in the societal sector that push toward globalization are probably (1) the cycle of poverty in the South, migration, poverty-related diseases transmitted through migration, and migration-related organized or unorganized crime; and (2) the clash of civilizations, especially the dialectics of Westernization-a trend toward cultural homogenization and reactions against it. At least for the short to medium term, the second fac-tor-the international political economy of culture-is probably the more important. Some claim the first factor will show its singular importance in the long run. 推动全球化的社会领域主要力量可能是（1）南方的贫困循环、移民、通过移民传播的与贫困相关的疾病，以及与移民相关的有组织或无组织犯罪；（2）文明的冲突，特别是西方化的辩证法——一种文化同质化的趋势及其反应。至少在短期到中期内，第二个因素——文化的国际政治经济——可能更为重要。有些人声称第一个因素将在长期内显示其独特的重要性。
These two types of societal security problems are likely to take on increasing power in the future. But so will some of the more regional problems presented in the previous section, notably the multiculturalist fragmentation of the United States, the potential regionalization or fragmenta- 这两种类型的社会安全问题在未来可能会变得越来越重要。但上一节中提到的一些更具区域性的问题也同样如此，特别是美国的多元文化分裂、印度和中国的潜在区域化或分裂、
tion of India and China, the tribal-state conflicts in Africa, the new decentered identity constellations of Europe-nation-minority in Europe, and the problems of state and nation building in the former Soviet area. Thus, instead of concluding that globalizing dynamics will be strengthened relative to regional dynamics, it seems more appropriate to suggest that societal insecurity per se will be of increasing importance relative to other sectors, and that this will be the case at least as much in a regionalizing fashion as in a globalizing fashion. 印度和中国的分裂、非洲的部落与国家冲突、欧洲民族-少数民族的新去中心化身份构型，以及前苏联地区的国家和民族建设问题。因此，与其得出全球化动态相对于区域动态将被加强的结论，不如更恰当地认为，社会不安全本身相对于其他领域将变得越来越重要，而且这种重要性至少在区域化的方式上与全球化的方式一样显著。
In several cases, the regions generated by societal dynamics are essentially the same as, and are heavily intermingled with, those in the military and political sectors (Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union, Middle East, and, in its general confusion, Africa). In at least two cases (Latin America and East Asia), regional societal dynamics are weaker than the regional dynamics in other sectors, and in one case (North America) societal security dynamics are found when the two classical security sectors find little as regional and mostly act globally; it is not yet clear, however, whether the societal dynamics in North America are regional or more local. 在若干情况下，由社会动态产生的区域本质上与军事和政治领域的区域相同，并且与之密切交织（欧洲、南亚、东南亚、前苏联、中东，以及在其普遍混乱中非洲）。在至少两个案例中（拉丁美洲和东亚），区域社会动态弱于其他领域的区域动态；而在一个案例中（北美），当两个传统安全领域几乎没有区域性并主要采取全球行动时，发现了社会安全动态；然而，目前尚不清楚北美的社会动态是区域性的还是更局部的。
Notes 注释
Although our criterion for “society” does not demand that something take a romantic, organic form, it must entail more than the technical functioning together of the thinnest “society.” To put this in terms of the familiar GemeinschaftGesellschaft distinction (Tönnies 1926 [1887]), society can be merely a rational, contractual arrangement among individuals (Gesellschaft), or it can contain an emotional attachment and some sense of organic connectedness (Gemeinschaft). Since Gemeinschaft is traditionally translated as community in English, one could argue that our concept is really community security, but that will not do because in some cases it is possible to be loyal to a Gesellschaft (“association” in the translation of Tönnies’s book) without this loyalty taking the form of organic connectedness (e.g., the United States). If we followed the widespread tendency to use society to refer to the population of any state, this would produce units that are not societies for themselves but that are societies only according to the state. That situation would remove independent judgment from the societal sector and make it derivative of state classifications. 虽然我们对“社会”的标准并不要求其呈现浪漫的、有机的形式，但它必须包含比最薄弱的“社会”技术性协作更多的内容。用熟悉的 Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft 区分（Tönnies 1926 [1887]）来说，社会可以仅仅是个体之间的理性契约安排（Gesellschaft），也可以包含情感依附和某种有机联系感（Gemeinschaft）。由于 Gemeinschaft 在英语中传统上被翻译为社区，有人可能会认为我们的概念实际上是社区安全，但这行不通，因为在某些情况下，人们可以忠于 Gesellschaft（Tönnies 书中翻译为“association”），而这种忠诚并不表现为有机联系（例如，美国）。如果我们沿用普遍的倾向，将社会用来指任何国家的人口，这将产生本身并非社会的单位，而仅仅是根据国家定义的社会。这种情况会剥夺社会部门的独立判断，使其成为国家分类的派生物。
Nation here can refer to the ethnoracial-type nation (Germanic) or to more state-related, civic nations, which some prefer to call societies; for example, some Dutch thinking in terms of the loyalty among all citizens of the Netherlands across ethnonational identification. In our terminology, this contrast is not between nation and society, but between two kinds of nations. We use the concept of society as the generic name for referent objects in the societal sector (cf. Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 2). 这里的“民族”可以指种族类型的民族（如日耳曼民族），也可以指更与国家相关的公民民族，有些人更喜欢称之为社会；例如，一些荷兰人从所有荷兰公民之间的忠诚度角度思考，而不考虑种族民族认同。在我们的术语中，这种对比不是民族与社会之间的对比，而是两种民族之间的对比。我们使用“社会”这一概念作为社会部门中指称对象的通用名称（参见 Wæver 等，1993 年，第 2 章）。
The term state-nation is used differently by different authors, but it is commonly taken to refer to nations being constructed by the states-cases in which state comes “before” mation-in combast to at least the self-understanding of the classical mation states, in which mation was assumed to come first (Buzan 1991, 73 74). “国家民族”一词在不同作者中使用方式不同，但通常被理解为指由国家构建的民族——即国家先于民族的案例——这与经典民族国家的自我理解形成对比，后者假设民族先于国家（Buzan 1991，第 73-74 页）。
“In the United States we deal with what Herder would have recognized as national differences (differences, in Charles Taylor’s formulation, between one society and another within the American nation) through concepts of ethnicity.” And “the major collective identities that demand recognition in North America currently are religion, gender, ethnicity, ‘race,’ and sexuality” (Appiah 1994: 151). “在美国，我们处理的是赫尔德所认知的民族差异（查尔斯·泰勒的表述中，一个社会与美国民族内另一个社会之间的差异），通过族裔概念。”以及“目前在北美要求被认可的主要集体身份是宗教、性别、族裔、‘种族’和性取向”（Appiah 1994: 151）。
CHAPTER 7 第七章
The Political Sector 政治领域
The Political Security Agenda 政治安全议程
Political security is about the organizational stability of social order(s). The heart of the political sector is made up of threats to state sovereignty. Since threats can also be leveled through military means and the military sector has its own chapter, the political sector will take care of nonmilitary threats to sovereignty. 政治安全关乎社会秩序的组织稳定。政治领域的核心是对国家主权的威胁。由于威胁也可以通过军事手段发起，而军事领域有其独立章节，政治领域将处理对主权的非军事威胁。
From this core, political security concerns spread out in two directions. First, they include the equivalent nonmilitary threats to political units other than states. Second, beyond the units as such, we can also think of political security in defense of system-level referents, such as international society or international law. Among the principles that can be securitized are human rights and other demands relating directly to the condition of individuals; thus, this sector is probably the primary locus at which (seemingly) individual-level security appears on the security agenda. 从这一核心出发，政治安全关注点向两个方向扩展。首先，它们包括对除国家以外的政治单位的等同非军事威胁。其次，超越这些单位本身，我们还可以考虑为系统层面的参照物辩护的政治安全，例如国际社会或国际法。在可以被安全化的原则中，有人权和其他直接关系到个人状况的要求；因此，这一领域可能是（看似）个体层面安全出现在安全议程上的主要场所。
A case can be made that each sector is the most difficult. When we wrote a book specifically on societal security (Wæver et al. 1993), it was because we thought that sector was the most understudied. Economic security is inherently problematic, and the environment raises unique problems. But perhaps now that the societal sector has been defined, the political sector will turn out to be the one that is the most perplexing. It easily gets squeezed between the military and societal sectors (for instance, in several articles Buzan has condensed arguments by combining sectors into either military-political or political-societal sectors) (Buzan 1994a, 1994b, 1996). 可以说每个领域都是最困难的。当我们专门写了一本关于社会安全的书（Wæver 等，1993 年）时，是因为我们认为该领域是研究最少的。经济安全本质上具有问题性，环境领域也带来了独特的问题。但也许现在社会领域已经被定义，政治领域将被证明是最令人困惑的。它很容易被挤压在军事和社会领域之间（例如，在几篇文章中，Buzan 通过将领域合并为军事-政治或政治-社会领域来简化论点）（Buzan 1994a, 1994b, 1996）。
The problem with the political sector is that, paradoxically, it is the widest sector and is therefore also a residual category: In some sense, all security is political (Jahn, Lemaitre, and Wæver 1987; Ayoob 1995). All threats and defenses are constituted and defined politically. Politicization is political by definition, and, by extension, to securitize is also a political act. Thus, in a sense societal, economic, environmental, and military security really mean “political-societal security,” “political-economic security,” and so forth. When a political theat to the organizational stability of a state is made as a threal lo its sociely (identity). hios is cataloged ass societal securi- 政治领域的问题在于，矛盾的是，它是最广泛的领域，因此也是一个剩余类别：在某种意义上，所有安全都是政治性的（Jahn、Lemaitre 和 Wæver 1987；Ayoob 1995）。所有威胁和防御都是政治上构成和定义的。政治化本质上就是政治行为，延伸而言，安全化也是一种政治行为。因此，从某种意义上说，社会、安全、经济、安全、环境安全和军事安全实际上意味着“政治-社会安全”、“政治-经济安全”等等。当对国家组织稳定性的政治威胁被视为对其社会（身份）的威胁时，这被归类为社会安全——
ty; if military means are used, it is military security (although it is political too), and so forth. Thus, the political sector constitutes that subgroup of political threats that do not use massive military, identificational, economic, or environmental means. Therefore, there is a risk that the category will become less coherent than most of the others. From one point of view, as a sector it is produced by subtracting all of the other sectors. And the characteristics of political security will usually be general characteristics of security, because all security is political. Still, a sector exists that is made up of those cases in which the threats themselves are predominantly political in form, which does after all give the sector a certain coherence. 例如，如果使用军事手段，则是军事安全（尽管它也是政治性的），诸如此类。因此，政治领域构成了那些不使用大规模军事、身份认同、经济或环境手段的政治威胁的子群体。因此，该类别有可能变得不如其他大多数类别那样连贯。从某种角度看，作为一个领域，它是通过减去所有其他领域而产生的。政治安全的特征通常是安全的一般特征，因为所有安全都是政治性的。不过，确实存在一个领域，由那些威胁本身主要以政治形式出现的情况组成，这毕竟赋予了该领域一定的连贯性。
From another perspective, there is definitely an organizing problematic for this sector: What is necessary for stable organization? What is political security? According to Buzan (1991: 118ff.): 从另一个角度来看，这个领域确实存在一个组织上的问题：稳定组织所必需的是什么？什么是政治安全？根据布赞（1991: 118 及以下）：
Political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state. Their purpose may range from pressuring the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the government, to fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state so as to weaken it prior to military attack. The idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organizing ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal target of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones. This is particularly so if the target is a weak state. 政治威胁针对的是国家的组织稳定性。其目的可能从对政府某一特定政策施加压力，到推翻政府，再到煽动分裂主义，以及破坏国家的政治结构，以在军事攻击前削弱国家。国家的理念，特别是其民族认同和组织意识形态，以及表达这些理念的机构，通常是政治威胁的目标。由于国家本质上是一个政治实体，政治威胁可能和军事威胁一样令人畏惧。尤其当目标是一个薄弱国家时，更是如此。
This quote shows how it is possible to define political security but also how difficult it is to circumscribe it, especially in relation to societal and military security-societal as indicated by the mention of national identity, and military as obvious throughout. 这段引述展示了如何定义政治安全的可能性，但也表明了界定政治安全的困难，特别是在与社会安全和军事安全的关系上——社会安全通过提及民族认同体现出来，军事安全则贯穿始终，显而易见。
Typically, political threats are about giving or denying recognition, support, or legitimacy (which explains why it is possible to have purely political threats, that is, threats that do not use military, economic, or other means from other sectors-words matter in relation to recognition and related political demands). But what is politics? Much academic blood has been spilled over this question. A short definition that covers most of what people have tried to incorporate into the concept is Buzan’s, in which politics is “the shaping of human behaviour for the purpose of governing large groups of people” (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 35). As was the case when we defined “society” in our book on societal security (Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 2), our aim is not to be original or controversial; on the contrary, we need to establish a middle ground or a consensual view corresponding to what is generally taken to be the meaning of the term. 通常，政治威胁涉及给予或拒绝承认、支持或合法性（这也解释了为什么可能存在纯粹的政治威胁，即不使用军事、经济或其他领域手段的威胁——言辞在承认及相关政治诉求中具有重要意义）。但什么是政治？学术界为此问题付出了大量努力。一个涵盖大多数人试图纳入该概念的简短定义是巴赞的定义，即政治是“为了治理大群体人类而塑造人类行为”（Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 35）。正如我们在关于社会安全的著作中定义“社会”时所做的（Wæver et al. 1993，第 2 章），我们的目标不是原创或争议；相反，我们需要建立一个中间立场或共识观点，与该术语通常被理解的含义相符。
Therefore, we can attach our definition to neither extreme in what we might label two of the three dimensions of debates on the meaning of politics. These three dimensions can roughly be summarized as Arendt versus Easton, Schmitt versus Habermas, and Weber versus Laclau. In terms of 因此，我们不能将我们的定义附加到我们可能标记为政治意义辩论的三个维度中的任何一个极端。这三个维度大致可以总结为阿伦特与伊斯顿、施密特与哈贝马斯、韦伯与拉克劳。在……方面
Arendt versus Easton, politics is not purely expressive; it is not about the individual doing great deeds and thereby striving for immortality (Arendt, Nietzsche). Nor is it purely functional, in which a sector of society performs specific tasks necessary for the whole (Easton, Parsons). In terms of Schmitt versus Habermas, politics cannot be reduced to the friend-enemy distinction (Schmitt); nor can it be seen as community and consensus (Habermas, Rawls). On both dimensions, both extremes are too narrow for our purpose; we want to steer a middle course as indicated by the Buzan definition. 在阿伦特与伊斯顿之间，政治不仅仅是表达性的；它不是关于个人做出伟大行为从而追求不朽（阿伦特，尼采）。也不是纯粹功能性的，其中社会的一个部门执行对整体必要的特定任务（伊斯顿，帕森斯）。在施密特与哈贝马斯之间，政治不能简化为朋友-敌人区分（施密特）；也不能被视为社区与共识（哈贝马斯，罗尔斯）。在这两个维度上，两个极端都过于狭隘，不适合我们的目的；我们希望如布赞定义所示，走一条中间路线。
On the third dimension, Weber versus Laclau, we must be more elaborate. This line of controversy is about identifying politics with stabilization or destabilization. On one side of this debate, “political” is used to cover the institutionalization of rule and the stabilization of authority. When rule is given relative permanence, the unit and the relationship that results are political (e.g., Max Weber). In contrast, writers like Ernesto Laclau define political as that which upsets stabilized patterns-politicization questions the taken-for-grantedness of social relations. ^(1){ }^{1} This Weber-Laclau duality might explain the puzzle noticed earlier about all sectors being political in some key sense. We use something like the Laclau sense when we talk of “politicization” in the sequence politicization-securitization (and in the contrast between the two, when politicization opens up and securitization closes down), but what is particular to the political sector is politics as something closer to Weber’s meaning of the term: the relatively stable institutionalization of authority. ^(2){ }^{2} 在第三个维度上，韦伯与拉克劳的对立，我们必须更详细地说明。这场争论的焦点在于将政治等同于稳定化或不稳定化。在这场辩论的一方，“政治”被用来涵盖统治的制度化和权威的稳定化。当统治获得相对的持久性时，所形成的单位和关系就是政治的（例如，马克斯·韦伯）。相反，像埃内斯托·拉克劳这样的作家将政治定义为扰乱已稳定模式的事物——政治化质疑社会关系的理所当然性。韦伯-拉克劳的二元对立或许可以解释之前注意到的一个谜题，即所有领域在某种关键意义上都是政治的。当我们谈论“政治化”在政治化-安全化序列中（以及两者的对比中，当政治化打开而安全化关闭时）时，我们使用的是类似拉克劳的意义，但政治领域的特殊之处在于政治更接近韦伯对该术语的含义：权威的相对稳定的制度化。
Implied in this definition of politics is an image of specifically political types of units. Charles Tilly offers one way into this subject with his definition of states (we prefer political units) as coercion-wielding organizations that are “distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories. The term therefore includes city-states, empires, theocracies, and many other forms of government, but excludes tribes, lineages, firms, and churches as such” (1990: 1-2). This definition could be relaxed to include time-space locales that are not necessarily territorial in the classical sense, such as a church that takes on a political capacity (which Tilly opens up to with the phrase “as such”). A political unit is a collectivity that has gained a separate existence distinct from its subjects. It can be a firm or a church, not in their basic capacities as economic or religious units but only to the extent that they act according to the political logic of governing large groups of people. 在这个政治定义中隐含着对特定政治类型单位的形象。查尔斯·蒂利通过他对国家（我们更倾向于称之为政治单位）的定义提供了进入这一主题的一种方式，即作为行使强制权力的组织，“与家庭和亲属群体不同，并在某些方面对所有其他组织在广阔领土内具有明确优先权。因此，该术语包括城邦、帝国、神权政治以及许多其他形式的政府，但排除了部落、宗族、公司和教会本身”（1990: 1-2）。这一定义可以放宽，以包括不一定是传统意义上领土性的时空场所，例如具有政治能力的教会（蒂利通过“本身”一词对此有所开放）。政治单位是一个集体，已获得与其主体不同的独立存在。它可以是公司或教会，但不是作为其基本的经济或宗教单位，而仅限于它们按照治理大群体的政治逻辑行事的程度。
Over time, these units have been of many different kinds. In some periods one type of political unit dominated, at others different kinds coexisted (Buzan and Little 1994, 1996). For a time (the seventeenth to twentieth centuries), politics converged on the sovereign “national state” as the form, and security became focused on this unit. But it is not necessary to preseribe a permanem combimity of the state as the dominant political form- 随着时间的推移，这些单位经历了许多不同的类型。在某些时期，一种政治单位占主导地位，而在其他时期，不同类型的单位共存（Buzan 和 Little 1994，1996）。在一段时间内（十七世纪到二十世纪），政治集中于主权“民族国家”这一形式，安全也聚焦于这一单位。但并不一定要规定国家作为主导政治形式的永久组合——
not even, despite the allegations of some critics, for realists (Carr 1939; Herz 1959; Morgenthau 1966) and neorealists (Ruggie 1983; Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993; Wæver forthcoming-b). Other units have in the past, and presumably will in the future, attain political primacy. 即使有些批评者的指控，也不一定适用于现实主义者（Carr 1939；Herz 1959；Morgenthau 1966）和新现实主义者（Ruggie 1983；Buzan、Jones 和 Little 1993；Wæver 即将出版-b）。过去其他单位曾经，并且很可能将来仍会，获得政治上的主导地位。
Beyond political units, politics can also be focused on political structures, processes, and (interunit) institutions. This opens up in the next section to a discussion of security that is focused not only on political units as referent objects but also on system-level referent objects. 超越政治单位，政治也可以聚焦于政治结构、过程和（单位间）制度。下一节将展开讨论安全，不仅关注作为指涉对象的政治单位，也关注系统层面的指涉对象。
Political security as distinct from politics in general is about threats to the legitimacy or recognition either of political units or of the essential patterns (structures, processes or institutions) among them. This follows naturally from the earlier argument about politics-and “political”-as characterized by attempts to establish order(s), to stabilize some political arrangement, some frame for the continued struggle. In the classical tradition that contains Machiavelli as well as Arendt, politics is a continuous struggle to establish the quasi-permanence of an ordered public realm within a sea of change. Then, the critical variables are obviously the recognition of such an arrangement from within and without that lends it legitimacy and thereby the stability needed for political activities to be framed by it rather than to be about it. As argued by English school theorists (Manning, Wight, Bull, and others), as well as contemporary constructivists (Wendt 1992, 1994), the identity of an international unit is not something it has for and with itself; it is very much a question of generally established categories of international subjectivity, of statehood and other forms of international being, to which the individual unit has to relate. 政治安全不同于一般的政治，它关乎政治单位或它们之间的基本模式（结构、过程或制度）的合法性或认可所面临的威胁。这自然源于之前关于政治及“政治性”的论述，即通过努力建立秩序，稳定某种政治安排，某种持续斗争的框架。在包含马基雅维利和阿伦特的古典传统中，政治是一场持续的斗争，旨在在变化的海洋中建立有序公共领域的准永久性。那么，关键变量显然是这种安排从内部和外部获得的认可，这赋予其合法性，从而为政治活动提供了所需的稳定性，使其能够被该安排所框定，而不是围绕该安排进行。 正如英国学派理论家（曼宁、怀特、布尔等）以及当代建构主义者（温特 1992，1994）所论述的，国际单位的身份并非其自身固有的；这在很大程度上是一个关于普遍确立的国际主体性类别、国家地位及其他国际存在形式的问题，个别单位必须与之相关联。
Political threats are thus made to (1) the internal legitimacy of the political unit, which relates primarily to ideologies and other constitutive ideas and issues defining the state; and (2) the external recognition of the state, its external legitimacy. Threats from outside are not necessarily directed at sovereignty but can very well aim at its ideological legitimacythat is, its domestic pillar. It is possible for legitimacy to be contested from outside. In the India-Pakistan case and also during the Cold War, legitimacy was questioned externally (in the mutual exclusiveness of political forms) without this aiming to be a questioning of recognition. There is, however, good reason to focus specifically on external legitimacy, the recognition of the state as a state. A typical sequence of accusations and counteraccusations arises when political threats cross borders; see the section “The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities” in this chapter. 政治威胁因此针对（1）政治单位的内部合法性，主要涉及定义国家的意识形态及其他构成性观念和问题；以及（2）国家的外部承认，即其外部合法性。来自外部的威胁不一定针对主权，但很可能针对其意识形态合法性，即其国内支柱。合法性有可能受到外部质疑。在印巴问题以及冷战期间，合法性在外部被质疑（在政治形式的相互排斥中），但这并不意味着对承认的质疑。然而，有充分理由特别关注外部合法性，即国家作为国家的承认。当政治威胁跨越边界时，通常会出现一系列指责与反指责；详见本章“威胁与脆弱性的逻辑”部分。
Only the modern, territorial, sovereign state has a clear, standardized form of recognition that constitutes an entire international system of equal and “like” units. But all units that interact need to achieve some kind of recognition in a general sociological sense. They need to be accepted as parties to be dealt with in their own right-if possible as equals, if necessary as vassals, but definitely not through their component parts (which 只有现代的、领土性的、主权国家才拥有明确、标准化的承认形式，这构成了一个由平等且“相似”单位组成的完整国际体系。但所有互动的单位都需要在一般社会学意义上获得某种形式的承认。它们需要被接受为可以独立处理的当事方——如果可能的话作为平等方，如果必要的话作为附庸，但绝对不能通过其组成部分来处理（这
means the external power has ignored and undercut the existence of the unit). Even in relationships of inequality, one wants to be recognized as vassal or as lord; if one wants to be recognized as lord or equal and achieves recognition only as vassal, this is a serious security threat, a threat to the political identity assumed by oneself. 意味着外部势力忽视并削弱了该单位的存在）。即使在不平等的关系中，人们也希望被承认为附庸或领主；如果一个人希望被承认为领主或平等方，却只获得附庸的承认，这就是一个严重的安全威胁，是对自身所假定的政治身份的威胁。
In the modern state system, issues of political recognition are normally “either/or” matters: Basically, states do or do not recognize each other as equals. (The few cases of almost states that are almost recognized, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, are so notorious exactly because they are exceptions to an otherwise rather rigid system.) In the postdecolonization world, international relations of formal political inequality are rare. In most of history before 1945, unequal political relations were the norm (empires and protectorates, mandates, colonies; suzerains and vassals). In the Middle Ages, for example, kings would sign treaties with equals, as well as with superiors (emperors, the pope) and inferiors-their own or other’s subjects (local lords and other potentates, cities and monasteries) (Mattingly 1955; Holzgrefe 1989). In a study of medieval security, the greater variety of political actors and status would make the political sector more complicated, but in our late modern system, where states still dominate, political recognition has more clarity. Threats will typically be made to either the external pillar of stability-recognition-or the internal pillar of stability-legitimacy. In the latter, all kinds of idcological concerns can enter, as can factors relating to the role of the state as socioeconomic provider, thus, its legitimacy is tied to economic and social success. 在现代国家体系中，政治承认问题通常是“非此即彼”的问题：基本上，国家要么承认彼此为平等，要么不承认。（那些几乎被承认的准国家案例，如巴勒斯坦解放组织，正因为它们是一个相对僵化体系中的例外而臭名昭著。）在后殖民化世界中，正式的政治不平等的国际关系很少见。在 1945 年之前的大部分历史中，不平等的政治关系是常态（帝国和保护国、托管地、殖民地；宗主国和附庸国）。例如，在中世纪，国王会与平等者签订条约，也会与上级（皇帝、教皇）和下级——他们自己的或他人的臣民（地方领主和其他权贵、城市和修道院）签订条约（Mattingly 1955；Holzgrefe 1989）。在对中世纪安全的研究中，更加多样的政治行为者和地位使政治领域更加复杂，但在我们晚近的现代体系中，国家仍然占主导地位，政治承认则更加清晰。 威胁通常会针对稳定的外部支柱——认可，或内部支柱——合法性。在后者中，各种意识形态问题都可能介入，也可能涉及国家作为社会经济提供者的角色，因此，其合法性与经济和社会的成功密切相关。
Security Actors and Referent Objects 安全行为体与参照对象
The predominant form of political organization in the contemporary international system is the territorial state, which is obviously the main referent object of the political sector. Other statelike or state-paralleling political organizations (i.e., other unit-level referent objects) that can sometimes serve as referent objects at the unit level are (1) emerging quasi-superstates, such as the EU; (2) some of the self-organized, stateless societal groups dealt with in the societal chapter-tribes, minorities, and clans-which have strong political institutions although not of the formal type international society recognizes (only those that take on very strong coercionwielding and institutionalized forms enter this chapter; otherwise they are dealt with as societal); and (3) transnational movements that are able to mobilize supreme allegiance from adherents. Some world religions occasionally qualify here (the Catholic Church in earlier times, Muslims at times following such appeals but lacking one generally recognized authority), and more clearly but less significantly, some smaller sects clearly operate this way. Ideological movements also take this tramsational form, but 当代国际体系中占主导地位的政治组织形式是领土国家，这显然是政治领域的主要参照对象。其他类国家或与国家平行的政治组织（即其他单位层面的参照对象），有时也可以作为单位层面的参照对象，包括：(1) 新兴的准超级国家，如欧盟；(2) 一些自组织的无国家社会群体，在社会章节中讨论——部落、少数民族和氏族——它们拥有强大的政治机构，尽管不是国际社会认可的正式类型（只有那些采取非常强制性和制度化形式的才进入本章，否则作为社会群体处理）；(3) 能够动员追随者最高忠诚度的跨国运动。一些世界宗教偶尔符合此类条件（早期的天主教会，穆斯林有时会响应此类号召但缺乏一个普遍认可的权威），更明确但影响较小的是，一些较小的教派明显以这种方式运作。意识形态运动也采取这种跨国形式，但...
this phenomenon is often blurred by the fact that a movement strong enough to operate with power in international relations has a base in one or more states in which it is in power (e.g., communism in the Soviet Union). Gradually, the state-centered raison d’état of this homeland of the revolution comes to override the transnational logic of the movement as such (Herz 1950; Wight 1978; Der Derian 1987, chapter 7; Armstrong 1993). 这一现象常常被这样一个事实所模糊：一个足够强大的运动能够在国际关系中发挥作用，其基础存在于一个或多个掌权的国家中（例如，苏联的共产主义）。渐渐地，这个革命故土的以国家为中心的国家利益理性开始凌驾于该运动本身的跨国逻辑之上（Herz 1950；Wight 1978；Der Derian 1987，第 7 章；Armstrong 1993）。
By commanding supreme allegiance and wielding coercive power over subjects, all of these units will also be able to perform the security act. If the authoritative voice claims the survival of the unit is at stake, this will be a very powerful invocation. 通过指挥最高的效忠并对臣民行使强制权力，所有这些单位也将能够执行安全行为。如果权威声音声称单位的生存岌岌可危，这将是一种非常强有力的呼吁。
The securitizing actors who can make appeals about the survival of these referent objects are-in contrast to some of the other sectors-relatively well defined. States by definition have authoritative leaders, the EU has a formal (though terribly complex) institutional structure, strong soci-etal-political units also usually have clear leaders, and transnational movements normally have some persons in official locations. In the case of the latter, however, there can often be competing “leaders,” such as the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties during the Cold War and different Muslim leaders today. 能够就这些参照对象的生存发出诉求的安全化行为者——与其他一些领域相比——相对明确。国家按定义拥有权威领导人，欧盟拥有正式（尽管极其复杂）的制度结构，强大的社会政治单位通常也有明确的领导人，跨国运动通常在官方场所有人物。然而，在后者的情况下，常常存在竞争的“领导者”，例如冷战期间的中国共产党和苏联共产党，以及当今不同的穆斯林领导人。
In the case of a state, the government will usually be the securitizing actor. A government will often be tempted to use security arguments (in relation to the state) when its concern is actually that the government itself is threatened. This can be the case in relation to external threats as well as internal threats. Internal threats will be typical of weak states (Buzan 1991: 99-103), which are marked by a lack of firmly established stateness (Ayoob 1995: 4). In a weak state, the authority of the government as such is contested to a much greater degree than in strong states, where the framework and thus some basic legitimacy of the government are usually accepted. In weak states, basic institutions as well as ideologies are often challenged, and political violence is extensive; therefore, when the power holders try to make appeals in the name of the state, their authority to do so will be contested more systematically. Many will view the government’s action as taken on behalf of its own interests rather than on those of the state (e.g., Zaire, Burma/Myanmar, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia). 在国家的情况下，政府通常是安全化行为者。政府常常会倾向于使用安全论点（与国家相关），而实际上其关切的是政府本身受到威胁。这种情况既可能涉及外部威胁，也可能涉及内部威胁。内部威胁通常出现在弱国（Buzan 1991: 99-103），其特征是缺乏牢固确立的国家性（Ayoob 1995: 4）。在弱国中，政府的权威受到的质疑远比强国严重，强国中政府的框架及其基本合法性通常被接受。在弱国中，基本制度和意识形态常常受到挑战，政治暴力广泛存在；因此，当权力持有者试图以国家名义进行呼吁时，他们的权威将更系统地受到质疑。许多人会认为政府的行动是为了自身利益，而非国家利益（例如，扎伊尔、缅甸、尼日利亚、沙特阿拉伯）。
In a strong state, especially a liberal-democratic one, there is a much stronger assumption that the government acts only as the legitimate agent of the nation-state and that its claims are subject to public scrutiny and are open to questioning. Also in the strong state, it is generally assumed that “national security can be viewed primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from outside threat and interference” (Buzan 1991: 100), to which should probably be added “and allegedly exceptional cases of domestic activities deemed unacceptable and threatening by a great majority of the populace (e.g., terrorism).” When the state accepted a selflimitation in the form of rule of law, this was compensated by a clearer 在一个强大的国家，尤其是自由民主国家中，人们普遍更强烈地假设政府仅作为民族国家的合法代理人行事，其主张接受公众审查并且可以被质疑。同样在强大的国家中，通常认为“国家安全主要可以被视为保护国家组成部分免受外部威胁和干涉”（Buzan 1991: 100），此外可能还应补充“以及被大多数民众认为不可接受且具有威胁性的所谓例外国内活动（例如恐怖主义）。”当国家接受以法治形式的自我限制时，这通过更明确的
specification of the exceptional cases in which because of security the government was to be immune (Gordon 1991: 33). 对因安全原因政府应享有豁免权的例外情况进行了具体说明（Gordon 1991: 33）。
A final question to be dealt with in relation to referent objects and actors is that of systemic referent objects. Appeals can clearly be made about the survival of “our unit,” but security-structured arguments can also be made in relation to institutions, structures, or processes in the international system. At present, the main candidates are the institutions and organizations of international governance, which are generally valued (mostly by state and international business elites) as a precondition for continued political stability. In principle, stability can refer either to the participating units or to the relations among those units (whether on the global or the regional level). Collective institutions can stabilize units individually, or they can serve to stabilize something larger, such as a pattern among or across them. 关于指称对象和行为者的最后一个问题是系统性指称对象的问题。显然，可以诉诸于“我们单位”的生存，但也可以就国际体系中的机构、结构或过程提出安全结构化的论点。目前，主要的候选者是国际治理的机构和组织，这些机构和组织通常被（主要是国家和国际商业精英）视为持续政治稳定的前提。原则上，稳定性既可以指参与单位本身，也可以指这些单位之间的关系（无论是在全球还是区域层面）。集体机构可以单独稳定各单位，或者它们可以用来稳定更大的东西，比如它们之间或跨越它们的某种模式。
In practice, these two functions are often combined and blurred. ASEAN, for example, was superficially about restraining conflict among the member states and creating some unity against a shared Communist threat, but it was also very much about preserving domestic stability in the member states (Acharya 1992). The EU might be seen in a similar light, as superficially about preventing conflict within the region but with a subtext of anticommunism, both internal and against the Soviet Union. NATO and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime are more clearly directed against international threats. Despite the apparently international orientation of the Security Council, some aspects of the UN are predominantly domestic. Many small member states would barely exist or function as states without the supporting framework of the UN, in terms of both diplomatic services and the embodying principles (self-determination, racial equality, sovereign equality) crucial for their political survival (Jackson 1990). A possible gray zone exists in the case of political unions that progress to the point at which they begin to take on statelike qualities and thus become ambiguous as to whether they are new units or forms of international regional institutionsfor example, the EU. 在实践中，这两个功能常常被结合并模糊处理。例如，东盟表面上是为了抑制成员国之间的冲突，并在共同的共产主义威胁面前创造某种统一，但它也非常注重维护成员国内部的稳定（Acharya 1992）。欧盟也可以从类似的角度看待，表面上是为了防止该地区内部的冲突，但其潜台词是反共主义，既针对内部也针对苏联。北约和核不扩散机制则更明确地针对国际威胁。尽管安全理事会表面上具有国际导向，联合国的某些方面实际上主要是国内性的。许多小成员国如果没有联合国提供的支持框架，无论是在外交服务还是在体现其政治生存关键的原则（自决、种族平等、主权平等）方面，几乎无法存在或作为国家运作（Jackson 1990）。 在政治联盟发展到开始具备类国家特征，从而变得难以判断它们是新的单位还是国际区域机构形式的情况下，可能存在一个灰色地带，例如欧盟。
These elements of what some call international society typically have a certain ambiguity in terms of being instrumental for securing states or being aims in themselves. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, for example, can be seen as both a self-serving move to restrict membership in the nuclear club and a system-serving move aimed at reducing the chances of nuclear war. As argued in the international society literature, such norms and institutions are not basically cosmopolitan arrangements among the human beings of the world; they are arrangements among and of the states-a society of states (Wight 1978; Bull 1977). 这些被一些人称为国际社会的元素，通常在是否是为了保障国家安全的工具，还是自身即为目标方面存在一定的模糊性。例如，《核不扩散条约》既可以被视为限制核俱乐部成员资格的自利举措，也可以被视为旨在减少核战争可能性的系统性举措。正如国际社会文献中所论述的，这些规范和机构基本上不是世界人类之间的宇宙主义安排；它们是国家之间及由国家组成的安排——一个国家社会（Wight 1978；Bull 1977）。
Somewhat in contrast to the more American, more utilitarian, and rational choice-inspired school of institutionalism, however, the internafional society literature also shows how these institutions carry some ele- 然而，与更具美国特色、更功利主义和理性选择启发的制度主义学派稍有不同，国际社会文献也展示了这些机构所承载的一些元素——
ment of commitment. They are interwoven with classical themes of international law, ethics, and world politics and discussions of common morality and common law; thus, they carry a legitimacy not only of utility in relation to some state calculus of interests but also as manifestations of obligations beyond the nation-state or to principles held to be morally binding (Nardin and Mapel 1992; Butterfield 1965; Wight 1978; Hurrell 1993; Wæver forthcoming-c). From this dual source of collective state stability and direct commitment, various norms, principles, and institutions in the international political realm gain a stability and salience that make them possible referent objects for security action. 承诺的体现。它们与国际法、伦理学和世界政治的经典主题以及关于共同道德和普通法的讨论交织在一起；因此，它们不仅具有与某些国家利益计算相关的实用性合法性，还作为超越民族国家的义务表现或被视为具有道德约束力的原则（Nardin 和 Mapel 1992；Butterfield 1965；Wight 1978；Hurrell 1993；Wæver 即将出版-c）。正是基于这种集体国家稳定性和直接承诺的双重来源，国际政治领域中的各种规范、原则和制度获得了稳定性和显著性，使它们成为安全行动可能的参照对象。
As a next step in defining systemic referent objects, we must recall the basic security criterion. The issue has to be a threat of a dramatic nature, portrayable as threatening the breakdown or ruin of some principle or some other irreparable effect whereby one can then legitimate extreme steps. A clear case is that of the basic principles of international society, as seen when the United States and the United Nations liberated Kuwait and attacked Iraq over Iraq’s violation of an international principle-the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a recognized sovereign state. ^(3){ }^{3} 作为定义系统参照对象的下一步，我们必须回顾基本的安全标准。问题必须是具有戏剧性性质的威胁，可以被描绘为威胁某种原则的崩溃或毁灭，或其他无法弥补的影响，从而使得采取极端措施合法化。一个明确的例子是国际社会基本原则的案例，如美国和联合国在科威特被解放以及对伊拉克发动攻击时，因伊拉克违反了国际原则——一个被承认的主权国家的主权和领土完整。
In thinking about systemic referent objects in the political sector, one must keep the distinction between securitization and politicization carefully in mind. Such referent objects must have a certain stability, be seen as pillars of the general international order, and be able to break down in some drastic (not purely gradual or incremental) sense. Concerns about the EU may well be on the political agenda. To lead to securitization, a concern has to follow the characteristic format presented in Chapter 2; some important principleand thereby the international or regional political order–has to face an existential threat. This is exactly the scenario in the EU argument that Europe needs integration to avoid fragmentation (Buzan et al. 1990; Wæver 1993; Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 1)-an argument that has played a powerful role in post-1989 European politics, as it also did in the early postwar years. When put in the characteristic security form, the case for integration gains urgency, because its alternative is fragmentation-a self-propelling process that by definition will destroy the European project. Whether “Europe” will exist or not appears to be an either-or question. For Europe, fragmentation becomes an existential threat, because there is a risk of a development that will pass a point of no return at which the project of Europe will be irredeemably lost (Wæver 1996b). We return to this case in Chapter 9. 在思考政治领域中的系统性参照对象时，必须谨慎区分安全化和政治化。这些参照对象必须具有一定的稳定性，被视为国际秩序的支柱，并且能够以某种剧烈的（而非纯粹渐进或递增的）方式崩溃。对欧盟的关切很可能出现在政治议程上。要导致安全化，关切必须遵循第二章中提出的典型格式；某个重要原则——从而国际或地区政治秩序——必须面临生存威胁。这正是欧盟论点中的情形，即欧洲需要一体化以避免分裂（Buzan et al. 1990；Wæver 1993；Wæver et al. 1993，第 1 章）——这一论点在 1989 年后欧洲政治中发挥了强大作用，正如它在战后初期也曾如此。当以典型的安全形式表达时，一体化的理由变得紧迫，因为其替代方案是分裂——一个自我推动的过程，按定义将摧毁欧洲项目。“欧洲”是否存在似乎是一个非此即彼的问题。 对于欧洲来说，分裂成为一种生存威胁，因为存在一种发展风险，即将越过一个不可回头的点，届时欧洲项目将不可挽回地丧失（Wæver 1996b）。我们将在第 9 章回到这个案例。
The UN occupies a distinctive position as systemic referent object for political security because of its central role as the repository of the basic principles of international society and international law. It represents the key idea that some (however rudimentary) international order exists, a location where some principles and norms are enshrined and upheld, and that these principles and their sanctity might have to be defended if they are violated in a way that threatens to unavel or seriously weaken them. The 联合国作为政治安全的系统参照对象，具有独特的地位，因为它在国际社会和国际法基本原则的储存中扮演着核心角色。它代表了某种（尽管是初步的）国际秩序存在的关键理念，是一个某些原则和规范被确立和维护的场所，而这些原则及其神圣性如果以威胁解体或严重削弱它们的方式被侵犯，可能必须被捍卫。
principles that have had this status have changed over time. At present, quite a few (although not the entire UN Charter) seem to be seen as basic, efficient, and consensual enough to legitimate action in their defense, including sovereign equality (nonintervention), human rights (nongenocide), balance of power (nonhegemony), self-determination (noncolonization), and racial equality (antiapartheid). Human rights in a broad sense is not consensual, and neither is much of the environmental agenda. The nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strategic missiles and possibly nonfascism are perhaps close to achieving consensus status. This does not mean these principles are always and uniformly defended nor that each appeal to them will be effective but only that these are the principles at the international level to which one can make reference in a security way and have a chance of legitimating extraordinary action or of mobilizing strong international collective action (Mayall 1996; Roberts 1995-1996; Wheeler 1996). 具有这种地位的原则随着时间的推移发生了变化。目前，虽然不是整个联合国宪章，但相当多的原则似乎被视为基本的、高效的且具有共识性，足以为其辩护行动提供合法性，包括主权平等（不干涉）、人权（反种族灭绝）、权力平衡（反霸权）、自决（反殖民）和种族平等（反种族隔离）。广义上的人权并非完全具有共识，环境议程的大部分内容也不具备共识。大规模杀伤性武器和战略导弹的不扩散以及可能的反法西斯主义或许接近达成共识。这并不意味着这些原则总是被一致且统一地捍卫，也不意味着每次援引它们都会有效，但仅表明这些是在国际层面上可以以安全方式引用并有机会为非常规行动提供合法性或动员强大国际集体行动的原则（Mayall 1996；Roberts 1995-1996；Wheeler 1996）。
The securitizing actors operating in relation to the systemic referent objects are first of all the states, because most of these principles are principles of international society-the society of states-and are often legal or semilegal in international law. But the leading international media (“the CNN factor”) also plays an obvious role here, and so occasionally might NGOs and INGOs (international nongovernmental organizations). Whereas most units in the political sector have relatively clearly specified spokespersons compared to the other sectors, the systemic referent objects are usually much more open to variable securitization, to competition among different actors trying to define security for the wider international community. Such attempts to define security for a community one does not officially represent will typically be the focus of intense political struggle. 与系统参照对象相关的安全化行为者首先是各国国家，因为这些原则大多是国际社会——国家社会——的原则，且在国际法中通常具有法律或准法律性质。但主流国际媒体（“CNN 因素”）在这里也扮演着显著角色，偶尔非政府组织和国际非政府组织（INGOs）也可能参与。相比其他领域，大多数政治领域的单位拥有相对明确的发言人，而系统参照对象通常更容易受到多样化的安全化影响，不同行为者之间会竞争为更广泛的国际社会定义安全。试图为一个自己并未正式代表的社区定义安全的行为，通常会成为激烈政治斗争的焦点。
One collective actor is endowed with a formalized role as securitizing actor in a way similar to the government in the case of the state. In the UN Charter (and the interpretation that has emerged), we have a very clear instance of the logic of the speech-act function of security. If the UN Security Council acts under chapter 7 of the Charter, it has some far-reaching competences. It is able to break the otherwise inviolable sovereignty of member states by pronouncing the words “this is a threat to international peace and security.” As one can see by studying the resolutions and negotiations in relation to the various major regional wars and crises that led or did not lead to UN-sanctioned interventions, the use of this formula is decisive and very conscious. As soon as these words are pronounced (from this specific position), the issue is transformed, because now the Security Council and even some members commissioned by it can legitimately do things they otherwise could not. Thus, the more skeptical members of the Security Council will be careful about crossing this line (Mayall 1991, 1996; Krause Iソ93). 一个集体行为者被正式赋予了安全行为者的角色，其方式类似于国家中的政府。在《联合国宪章》（以及已经出现的解释）中，我们可以非常清楚地看到安全的言论行为功能的逻辑。如果联合国安理会根据《宪章》第 7 章行事，它就拥有一些影响深远的权限。只需宣布 "这是对国际和平与安全的威胁"，它就能打破成员国原本不可侵犯的主权。通过研究与各种重大地区战争和危机有关的决议和谈判（这些战争和危机导致或没有导致联合国批准的干预行动），我们可以看到，这一公式的使用是决定性的，而且是非常有意识的。一旦（从这一特定立场）说出这些话，问题就发生了转变，因为现在安全理事会，甚至是受其委托的一些成员，可以合法地做他们原本不能做的事情。因此，安全理事会中持怀疑态度的成员会小心谨慎，避免越过这一底线（Mayall 1991, 1996; Krause Iソ93）。
At the level of systemic political referent objects, these formalized 在系统性政治参照对象的层面上，这些形式化的
securitizing acts by the UN Security Council form some kind of core, but they do not exhaust the list of possible securitizations at this level. We also include cases in which this form is not adopted, but some other actors manage to establish a general acceptance that some principle or institution is threatened and can therefore act in ways they could otherwise not. 联合国安全理事会的安全化行为构成某种核心，但它们并未穷尽该层面可能的安全化列表。我们还包括未采用这种形式的情况，但其他一些行为者设法确立了一种普遍接受的观点，即某些原则或机构受到威胁，因此可以采取他们原本无法采取的行动。
The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities 威胁与脆弱性的逻辑
Starting with the sovereign state, which makes up most of the political sector, we can approach the issue of threats and vulnerabilities through the argument that a state consists of three components: idea, physical base, and institutions (Buzan 1991, chapter 2). Subtracting those issues that fall into other sectors (most threats made directly to the physical base must be military, economic, or environmental), we are left with ideas (minus identity ideas independent of institutions) and institutions as such. It is all a question of the ideas on which political institutions are built. Ideas that hold a state together are typically nationalism (especially civic nationalism but sometimes ethnonationalism) and political ideology. By threatening these ideas, one can threaten the stability of the political order. Such threats might be to the existing structure of the government (by questioning the ideology that legitimates it), to the territorial integrity of the state (by encouraging defections from the state identity), or to the existence of the state itself (by questioning its right to autonomy). As discussed in “The Political Security Agenda” section earlier, political threats take the form either of the subversion of legitimacy or of the denial of recognition (either total denial or denial of sovereign equality). 从主权国家开始，主权国家构成了大部分政治领域，我们可以通过这样一个论点来探讨威胁和脆弱性的问题：一个国家由三个组成部分构成：理念、物质基础和制度（Buzan 1991，第 2 章）。扣除那些属于其他领域的问题（大多数直接针对物质基础的威胁必须是军事的、经济的或环境的），我们剩下的是理念（减去独立于制度的身份理念）和制度本身。这完全是关于政治制度所建立的理念的问题。维系一个国家的理念通常是民族主义（尤其是公民民族主义，但有时也包括族群民族主义）和政治意识形态。通过威胁这些理念，可以威胁政治秩序的稳定。这类威胁可能针对现有政府结构（通过质疑使其合法化的意识形态）、国家的领土完整（通过鼓励背离国家身份）或国家本身的存在（通过质疑其自治权）。 如前文“政治安全议程”部分所述，政治威胁表现为合法性的颠覆或承认的否认（包括完全否认或否认主权平等）。
For states, there is an organizing focus for most of this-sovereignty. Existential threats to a state are those that ultimately involve sovereignty, because sovereignty is what defines the state as a state. Threats to state survival are therefore threats to sovereignty. Even minor violations of sovereignty are threats, because sovereignty is a principle that claims the ultimate right of self-government; thus, it becomes endangered if it becomes partial in any sense. Anything that can be portrayed as a violation of sovereignty (an intervention) can be presented as a security problem. 对于国家来说，大多数情况下的组织焦点是主权。对国家的生存威胁最终涉及主权，因为主权定义了国家作为国家的身份。因此，对国家生存的威胁就是对主权的威胁。即使是对主权的轻微侵犯也是威胁，因为主权是一项宣称最终自治权的原则；因此，如果主权在任何意义上变得部分化，它就会受到威胁。任何可以被描述为对主权的侵犯（干预）的行为都可以被视为安全问题。
As suggested in “The Political Security Agenda,” external actors probably often aim at less than sovereignty in their hostile actions, but the logic of securitization(s) that is likely to ensue will nevertheless focus on sovercignty. During the Cold War, the West generally did not question the recognition of the Soviet Union as a sovereign state in the international system but aimed at weakening its domestic legitimacy. Similarly, in South Africa, for instance, the struggle was not (and in this case neither was the outcome) about a change in sovereignty but of a reestablishment of sovereignty on a new political basis. We should, however, remember our specific way of 正如《政治安全议程》中所建议的，外部行为者在其敌对行动中可能往往目标低于主权，但随之而来的安全化逻辑仍然会聚焦于主权。在冷战期间，西方通常不质疑苏联作为国际体系中主权国家的承认，而是旨在削弱其国内合法性。同样，例如在南非，斗争的焦点（在这种情况下结果也如此）不是主权的改变，而是在新的政治基础上重新确立主权。然而，我们应当记住我们在本书中分析安全的特定方式：
analyzing security in this book: When is this type of action securitized and in what terms? 这种类型的行动何时被安全化，以及以何种术语被安全化？
What did the government claim it defended? Not just its own political position but sovereignty in its external and internal senses. Almost all threats that come (or that can be presented as coming) from abroad, if designated as “threats” and “security problems,” will be so with reference to their violation of sovereignty and its sister concept, nonintervention. 政府声称它捍卫的是什么？不仅是其自身的政治地位，还有主权的外部和内部含义。几乎所有来自国外（或可以被呈现为来自国外）的威胁，如果被指定为“威胁”和“安全问题”，都会以其对主权及其姊妹概念——不干涉的侵犯为依据。
In some cases, the international society is able to legitimize intervention by referring to genocide, aggression, or, increasingly, simply the lack of “good governance.” In such cases, a dual securitization is in play. The government will undoubtedly protest because its sovereignty has been violated (not by trying to argue its right to perform genocide but by claiming a right to do whatever is decided domestically). On the other side, international society will act with reference to some principle that has allegedly been violated; because the violation of sovereignty and nonintervention is such a drastic step in the modern state system, the intervening actor will have to make a strong and extraordinary appeal, which often means that claim will have to take a security form. The countersecuritization of the intervened upon will be with reference to one specific international principle, albeit the most powerful such principle: sovereignty. 在某些情况下，国际社会能够通过提及种族灭绝、侵略，或越来越多地仅仅是“良好治理”的缺失来使干预合法化。在这种情况下，存在双重安全化。政府无疑会抗议，因为其主权受到了侵犯（不是试图辩称其有权进行种族灭绝，而是声称有权执行国内决定的任何行为）。另一方面，国际社会将依据某些被指称已被侵犯的原则采取行动；由于主权和不干涉原则的侵犯在现代国家体系中是如此严厉的步骤，干预方必须提出强有力且非常规的诉求，这通常意味着该诉求必须采取安全化的形式。被干预方的反安全化将以一个特定的国际原则为依据，尽管这是最强大的原则：主权。
Typically, the intervenor will try not to question the legitimacy of the unit as a unit. The U.S. invasion of Panama was different from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in that only the latter aimed at removing the sovereignty of the attacked. Intention is, however, not very relevant here. The EU might not intend to undermine national identities in its member countries, but the process nevertheless generates such fears (cf. Chapter 6). Similarly, the government intervened against in the political sector will not be satisfied with the qualifying rhetoric of the intervenor and will protest with reference to its sovereignty. 通常，干预者会尽量不质疑该单位作为一个单位的合法性。美国入侵巴拿马不同于伊拉克入侵科威特，后者的目标是剥夺被攻击国的主权。然而，意图在这里并不十分相关。欧盟可能并不打算削弱其成员国的国家认同，但这一过程仍然会引发此类担忧（参见第 6 章）。同样，政治领域中被干预的政府不会满足于干预者的限定性修辞，并将以其主权为由进行抗议。
Our specific speech-act approach thus points toward a rather focused agenda and a typical sequence of securitization and countersecuritization. At first this will sound strange, because it differs from what are normally scen as political thrcats as a result of the difference between an objectivist and a speech-act approach. In objectivist (e.g., People, States and Fear [Buzan 1991]) terminology, one would say the state is based on the following pillars, ard one of these is undermined by this action, and it is therefore a political security problem. With the speech-act approach, the focus is on the security argument, and it will be with reference to sovereignty for the securitizing state. 我们特定的言语行为方法因此指向一个相当集中的议程和典型的安全化与反安全化的序列。起初这听起来会很奇怪，因为它不同于通常被视为政治威胁的情况，这是由于客观主义和言语行为方法之间的差异。在客观主义（例如，《人民、国家与恐惧》[Buzan 1991]）术语中，人们会说国家基于以下支柱，其中之一被此行动破坏，因此这是一个政治安全问题。采用言语行为方法，焦点则放在安全论证上，并且将以主权为参照，针对安全化的国家。
Such sequences can lead to intensely political situations. Different, high-profile political principles are at stake, and different actors claim different orders of priority among them while making controversial interpretations of what threatens “their” relerent object. In contrast to many of the other cases of secoritization explored in this book, we have bere explicitly a 这种序列可能导致极具政治性的局势。不同的高调政治原则处于争议之中，不同的行为者在它们之间主张不同的优先顺序，同时对威胁“他们”的参照对象做出有争议的解释。与本书中探讨的许多其他安全化案例相比，我们在这里明确地……
constellation in which security is pitted directly against security. On both sides, the question of who has the competence to define security threats will typically be controversial - on the international side this is necessarily so since no formal procedure exists, and domestically, in the state defending its sovereignty, there will be oppositional forces (and often a silent majority of the population) who agree with the principle defended internationally (human rights, good governance, nonproliferation) and disagree with the priority given to sovereignty. But according to the modern state system, the government as state representative structurally has the option of invoking sovereignty. 安全直接对抗安全的格局。在双方，谁有能力定义安全威胁的问题通常都会有争议——在国际层面上，这必然如此，因为不存在正式程序；在国内，作为捍卫主权的国家，会有反对力量（以及通常是沉默的大多数民众）同意国际上所捍卫的原则（人权、良好治理、防扩散），但不同意给予主权的优先权。但根据现代国家体系，作为国家代表的政府在结构上有权选择援引主权。
Some confusion is bound to be produced by the relationship between state and government. The government is the usual, and usually legitimate, voice of the state. But the government can try to use rhetoric about the security of the state when more reasonably there is only a threat to the government itself. If there is a threat to the government (the ruling elite and its ideology), it is only a threat to the form of the state and not to the state as such. This, however, will qualify as a threat to the state as well if it has to violate sovereignty (self-determination) on the way. Sovereignty implies a right to decide on the political form of the state without external forceful interference, which means that even if this form is decided by undemocratic means-and thus hardly qualifies as self-determination by the people-it is self-determination in the negative sense of avoiding foreign decisions by virtue of being self-contained within the political space of the state. A government threatened from abroad therefore will always with some right be able to invoke the security of the state, because sovereignty can be claimed to be violated if the political form is suddenly to be decided or even decisively influenced from abroad. 国家与政府之间的关系必然会引起一些混淆。政府通常是国家的声音，且通常是合法的。但政府可能会试图利用关于国家安全的言辞，而实际上更合理的情况只是对政府本身的威胁。如果对政府（执政精英及其意识形态）构成威胁，这仅仅是对国家形式的威胁，而非对国家本身的威胁。然而，如果这种威胁必须通过侵犯主权（自决权）来实现，那么这也将被视为对国家的威胁。主权意味着有权决定国家的政治形式而不受外部强制干涉，这意味着即使这种形式是通过非民主手段决定的——因此几乎不能算作人民的自决——它仍然是在消极意义上的自决，即通过在国家政治空间内自我封闭来避免外国决策。 因此，一个受到国外威胁的政府总是有一定理由能够援引国家安全，因为如果政治形式突然由国外决定甚至被决定性地影响，主权就可以被认为受到侵犯。
The distinction between strong and weak states is important here, because it highlights different degrees of vulnerability to political threat. A strong state will typically be fairly invulnerable in the political sector; it will not be ethnically divided and thus not open to secessionist action. Its government will be neither divorced from the general opinions of its citizens nor dependent upon suppressing views and information and therefore will be fairly invulnerable to external actors supporting oppositional voices. 这里区分强国和弱国很重要，因为它突显了对政治威胁的不同脆弱程度。一个强国在政治领域通常相当不可侵犯；它不会在民族上分裂，因此不会开放给分裂主义行动。其政府既不会与公民的普遍意见脱节，也不依赖于压制观点和信息，因此对支持反对声音的外部行为者相当不可侵犯。
Such states may nonetheless feel politically threatened. During the Cold War, the United States perceived a political (as well as a military) threat from the Soviet Union in terms of the question of the legitimacy and efficiency of U.S. democratic capitalism raised by the existence and performance of the Communist rival. Strong states can also experience political security threats from integration projects that threaten their sovereignty (and their recognition and status). This is clearly illustrated by the political discourse within some of the EU member states (Wæver et al. 1993, chap- 这样的国家仍可能感到政治上的威胁。在冷战期间，美国从政治（以及军事）角度感受到来自苏联的威胁，主要体现在共产主义对手的存在和表现所提出的美国民主资本主义的合法性和效率问题上。强大的国家也可能因威胁其主权（以及其认可和地位）的整合项目而经历政治安全威胁。这一点在一些欧盟成员国的政治话语中得到了清晰的体现（Wæver 等，1993，第 4 章）。
ter 4). This is a strange kind of threat, because it is substantially selfimposed. States enter a process-for economic reasons or because of regional security concerns (Buzan et al. 1990)—and this process has the potential to cut away at their sovereignty. 这是一种奇怪的威胁，因为它本质上是自我施加的。国家出于经济原因或区域安全考虑（Buzan 等，1990）进入这一进程——而这一进程有可能削弱它们的主权。
Depending upon what kind of weakness the state exhibits, it will be worried about different vulnerabilities and will therefore securitize differently. The ethnic case is rather straightforward. When state and nation do not correspond-as is generally the case-there is potential for destabilization. This can take the form of secession if a part of the population wants to form its own state (e.g., Eritreans, Ibos, Tibetans), of expropriation by a power that claims inclusion of what it sees as a part of its people (North and South Korea, China and Taiwan), or of irredentism in which a part of the population or territory is claimed by another state (Kashmir, the Kurile Islands, Nagorno-Karabakh). In all cases, external actors are already related to the story; thus, their action will easily be seen as inciting this threatening potentiality. 根据国家表现出的弱点类型，其关注的脆弱性也不同，因此其安全化方式也会有所不同。民族问题相对直接。当国家与民族不对应时——这通常是情况——就存在不稳定的潜在风险。这可能表现为部分人口希望建立自己的国家而引发的分离主义（例如，厄立特里亚人、伊博族、西藏人），也可能表现为某一权力声称包含其视为自己人民一部分的地区而进行的征用（朝鲜南北、中华人民共和国与台湾），或者表现为另一国家声称部分人口或领土的复国主义（克什米尔、千岛群岛、纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫）。在所有这些情况下，外部行为者已经与事件相关，因此他们的行动很容易被视为煽动这种威胁潜力。
In the case of domestic divisions on ideological grounds, there can be a fear of foreign intervention in the ideological or political arena. But there can also be a fear of more structural threats from the global political order, or international society, if that order develops in the direction of a general promotion of some principle such as democracy or human rights that is not compatible with the existing political order of the state (e.g., Muslim and Asian reactions against human rights). 在基于意识形态的国内分裂情况下，可能会担心外国干预意识形态或政治领域。但如果全球政治秩序或国际社会朝着某种原则（如民主或人权）的普遍推广方向发展，而该原则与国家现有的政治秩序不兼容（例如，穆斯林和亚洲对人权的反应），也可能会担心来自这种秩序的更结构性的威胁。
Since the end of the Cold War, international society has been marked by a relatively high degree of homogeneity organized as concentric circles around a dominant Western center (Bull and Watson 1983; Buzan 1993). In addition to demanding a market economy and democracy, this hegemonic set of rules prescribes self-opening if one wants to become an insiderincreased interpenetration and thereby decreasing insistence upon farreaching interpretations of sovereignty. The trend is toward interpreting sovereignty less as an attribute of individual countries within international society and more as operational within a collective relationship among insiders (international society) and between insiders and outsiders. One can become an insider, in which case one opens oneself (which means one defines more things as legitimate interaction and fewer as illegitimate intervention). Or one resists this process, thus becoming an outsider (or semiperiphery) in which one operates in the more traditional way, with more extensive use of the slogans of nonintervention and sovereignty-and thereby also with more extensive use of the label security to describe threats to the state (Buzan and Segal 1992; Wæver 1995a, 1996b). Outsider states face a double bind. It has become accepted as part of the emerging “standard of civilization” that a civilized state is a democratic, open-market economy. States must either atcept this (and so open themselves to the cen- 自冷战结束以来，国际社会表现出相对较高的同质性，组织形式为围绕一个主导的西方中心的同心圆（Bull 和 Watson 1983；Buzan 1993）。除了要求市场经济和民主之外，这套霸权规则还规定，如果想成为内部成员，就必须自我开放——增加相互渗透，从而减少对主权广泛解释的坚持。趋势是将主权的解释从作为国际社会中各个国家的属性，转向作为内部成员（国际社会）之间以及内部成员与外部成员之间集体关系中的运作。人们可以成为内部成员，在这种情况下，人们会自我开放（这意味着将更多的行为定义为合法互动，减少被视为非法干预的行为）。 或者有人抵制这一过程，从而成为一个局外人（或半边缘），在其中以更传统的方式运作，更广泛地使用不干涉和主权的口号——因此也更广泛地使用“安全”这一标签来描述对国家的威胁（Buzan 和 Segal 1992；Wæver 1995a，1996b）。局外国面临双重困境。作为新兴的“文明标准”的一部分，已经被接受的是，一个文明国家是一个民主的、开放市场经济的国家。国家必须要么接受这一点（从而向中心开放），
ter) or reject it (and face not only exclusion from the highest rank of states but also risk becoming less of a state in the eyes of international society and thereby more exposed to intervention by the center) (Buzan 1996). 要么拒绝它（不仅面临被排除在最高等级国家之外的风险，还面临在国际社会眼中变得不那么像国家的风险，从而更容易受到中心的干预）（Buzan 1996）。
Political threats to international referent objects-international law, international order, international society-are not cast in terms of sovereignty. These objects represent established orders. They can thus be threatened by nonacceptance (e.g., holdouts against the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]), violation (Iraq, North Korea, and the NPT), and challenge (Mao’s China and the NPT). Some of these threats, especially challengers, have traditionally been discussed in terms of revolutionary states (Kissinger 1957; Wight 1978; Skoçpol 1979; Halliday 1990; Armstrong 1993)-that is, states that challenge the international order (or do not accept its organizing principle). The revolutionary state is a power whose cooperation is necessary for a stable international order; it is a great power that denies the international order by putting forward its alternative principle (or pure power) as another vision for the system. But the revolutionary state is not the entire story. In some situations a smaller power, not viewed as a systemic challenger as such, can be seen as a threat to a political principle or principles; examples include Iraq (to self-determination and nonproliferation), Iran (to nonintervention and nonproliferation), Serbia(ns) (to ethnic equality and human rights), and South Africa under apartheid (to racial equality). Nonacquiescence, violations, and challenges often produce the distinctive security logic of domino theories: “This seemingly limited and local problem is a general one, because it will set precedents that define future behavior. Our failure here will tempt others to make aggressive challenges to the international order.” 对国际参照对象——国际法、国际秩序、国际社会——的政治威胁并不是以主权的术语来表达的。这些对象代表既定的秩序。因此，它们可能受到不接受（例如，反对《核不扩散条约》（NPT）的顽固分子）、违反（伊拉克、朝鲜与 NPT）和挑战（毛泽东时代的中国与 NPT）的威胁。其中一些威胁，尤其是挑战者，传统上被称为革命国家（基辛格 1957；怀特 1978；斯科茨波尔 1979；哈利迪 1990；阿姆斯特朗 1993）——即挑战国际秩序（或不接受其组织原则）的国家。革命国家是一种其合作对稳定的国际秩序至关重要的强权；它是一个通过提出其替代原则（或纯粹的权力）作为体系的另一种愿景来否定国际秩序的大国。但革命国家并不是全部故事。 在某些情况下，一个较小的国家，虽然不被视为系统性挑战者，但可能被视为对某一政治原则或多项原则的威胁；例如伊拉克（对自决权和防扩散的威胁）、伊朗（对不干涉和防扩散的威胁）、塞尔维亚人（对民族平等和人权的威胁）以及种族隔离时期的南非（对种族平等的威胁）。不服从、违反和挑战常常产生多米诺骨牌理论的独特安全逻辑：“这个看似有限且局部的问题实际上是一个普遍性问题，因为它将树立定义未来行为的先例。我们在这里的失败将诱使其他人对国际秩序发起侵略性挑战。”
Regionalizing Dynamics? 区域化动态？
In terms of international security, the political sector by definition is not strong on localizing trends, and the decisive issue will be the balance between unit-to-unit dynamics and actions with reference to system-level referent objects-that is, a discussion of a possibly increasing role for the UN, regional principles, or both. The regional tour (as conducted in the military and societal chapters) is therefore not obvious in this sector (it is not in the economic and environmental sectors either). First, there is no systematic distribution of one kind of security dynamics in one region and another kind in another region; instead, some basic types intermix among each other. Second, it is not immediately clear that the regional level can be the starting point, because strong dynamics exist at other levels too. 在国际安全方面，政治领域按定义并不擅长本地化趋势，决定性的问题将是单位对单位动态与涉及系统级参照对象的行动之间的平衡——也就是说，可能增加联合国、区域原则或两者角色的讨论。因此，区域视角（如军事和社会章节中所进行的）在该领域并不明显（在经济和环境领域也不是）。首先，没有一种安全动态在某一区域系统性分布，而另一种在另一地区；相反，一些基本类型相互交织。其次，区域层面不一定是起点，因为其他层面也存在强烈的动态。
The traditional case of political security involves one state making appeals in the name of sovereignty, trying to fend off some threat from another actor that is usually external, such as another state, but that is often 传统的政治安全案例涉及一个国家以主权名义提出诉求，试图抵御通常来自另一个行为体的威胁，该行为体通常是外部的，如另一个国家，但往往是...
combined with an internal threat. Within this broad category, it would be useful to have some subdivision to clarify when the security action is focused on what kind of threat and thereby what kind of security interactions are started. 结合内部威胁。在这个广泛的类别中，进行一些细分将是有益的，以明确安全行动针对的是哪种威胁，从而启动哪种安全互动。
As argued earlier, states can be subdivided according to the source of their vulnerability (a state-nation split or political ideology); for some kinds of threats, we can also distinguish between intentional threats and threats caused inadvertently by the constellation of organizing and legitimizing principles of different units. (The strong-weak state distinction does not point to distinct phenomena or constitute systematic variation in this case; it is simply that most threats are more alarming to weak states.) Finally, passing out of the pure unit-to-unit cases, it is possible that the source of the threat is systemic trends or organizing principles. Before we proceed to cases other than states (system-level referent objects, as well as other units), we will examine these different types of state situations, in each case asking for their regionalizing and nonregionalizing dynamics and their geographical location-are they typical of some regions and absent from others? 如前所述，国家可以根据其脆弱性的来源进行细分（国家-民族分裂或政治意识形态）；对于某些类型的威胁，我们还可以区分有意的威胁和由不同单位的组织和合法化原则的星座无意中引起的威胁。（强国-弱国的区分在此情况下并不指向不同的现象或构成系统性变异；只是大多数威胁对弱国来说更令人警惕。）最后，超出纯粹的单位对单位的情况，威胁的来源可能是系统性趋势或组织原则。在我们继续研究除国家之外的案例（系统层面的参照对象以及其他单位）之前，我们将考察这些不同类型的国家状况，在每种情况下询问其区域化和非区域化的动态及其地理位置——它们是否是某些地区的典型而在其他地区缺失？
Intentional threats to (weak) states on the basis of their state-nation split. Because state and nation do not line up, it is possible for some other actor-within the state or neighboring it-to raise secessionist or irredentist claims. There are numerous possible examples: Hungary against Romania, Russia against the Ukraine, Somalia against its neighbors, Kurds threatening Iraq and Turkey. This kind of threat is found in almost all regions of the world (Prescott 1987). It is endemic to Eastern Europe, and Belgium and perhaps the UK are examples in Western Europe. In the Middle East, this type of threat is relevant in relation to Palestinians, Kurds, Arabs in Iran, and Shiites in Iraq and the Gulf states. In Africa, many states are weak in this regard, but this situation mainly creates domestic security problems of a societal nature; rarely (e.g., Ibos, Eritreans) is the state as such openly challenged by a claim for different borders (although this could easily change in the future). In Asia, the major cases of this type are Tibet-China and Kashmir, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, various groups in India, self-claiming nations within China, and the opposite way around (with a nation covering more than one state) in the Korean situation. There are few examples in North America, by far the most conspicuous being Quebecois secessionism. 基于国家与民族分裂的（弱）国家的有意威胁。由于国家与民族不一致，某些国家内部或邻近的其他行为体可能提出分裂主义或复国主义的主张。有许多可能的例子：匈牙利对罗马尼亚，俄罗斯对乌克兰，索马里对其邻国，库尔德人威胁伊拉克和土耳其。这种威胁几乎存在于世界所有地区（Prescott 1987）。它在东欧是普遍存在的，比利时和可能的英国是西欧的例子。在中东，这种威胁与巴勒斯坦人、库尔德人、伊朗的阿拉伯人以及伊拉克和海湾国家的什叶派有关。在非洲，许多国家在这方面较弱，但这种情况主要造成社会性质的国内安全问题；很少有（例如伊博族、厄立特里亚人）国家本身被公开以不同边界的主张所挑战（尽管未来这种情况可能轻易改变）。 在亚洲，这类主要案例包括西藏-中国和克什米尔，斯里兰卡的泰米尔人，印度的各种群体，中国境内自称为民族的群体，以及相反的情况（一个民族覆盖多个国家）在朝鲜半岛的情况。北美的例子很少，最显著的是魁北克的分离主义。
Most of the concrete cases also have societal dimensions and are dealt with in more detail in the chapter on that sector. In the political sector, we primarily look upon this type of threat in terms of the effects on the stability of state structures and the undermining of state-carrying national or state ideologies. Usually, these controversies generate bilateral or trilateral conflicts, and they fieguenty tie together different sectors-societal, political, 大多数具体案例也具有社会层面的维度，并在关于该领域的章节中有更详细的讨论。在政治领域，我们主要从对国家结构稳定性的影响以及对国家承载的民族或国家意识形态的破坏来观察这类威胁。通常，这些争议会引发双边或三边冲突，并且它们经常将不同领域——社会、政治、
and often military. They constitute a major chunk of international security problems. 以及军事领域联系在一起。它们构成了国际安全问题的主要部分。
2. Intentional threats to (weak) states on political-ideological grounds. Here, the ideology on which the regime operates is not widely accepted. Threats can be leveled against the state on this basis, and the regime claims these are security problems. Examples are North and South Korea and the United States against Cuba. Whereas this category could be said to capture the nature of what for around 40 years constituted the major conflict in the system-the Cold War (which also had elements of type 4)it seems to be much more rare in the post-Cold War system. Those cases that do exist often blend into type 1, as with Korea where the national factor is obviously also at play; type 4 , as with the Cold War and IndiaPakistan; or type 7, where the general trend in the legitimizing principles of the system is at odds with the principles of one particular state. It is a fairly striking finding that although internal divisions and political-ideological weaknesses are often among the main concerns of regimes, it is rare for foreign actors to challenge directly the legitimacy of regimes, although it is somewhat more common for weak regimes to blame domestic unrest on foreign orchestration. The position of the Arab states toward Israel was such a case, but even this situation is changing. This surprising situation probably testifies to the continued strength of the principle of sovereignty and nonintervention: to question a regime as such is problematic. One either has a direct conflict with the country or tries to have it branded by international society as breaching more basic rules (e.g., nonapartheid, genocide), or one must abstain from major moves against the legitimacy of the regime and the state. 2. 基于政治意识形态理由对（弱）国家的蓄意威胁。在这里，政权所依赖的意识形态并未被广泛接受。基于此，国家可能会受到威胁，政权则声称这些是安全问题。例子有朝鲜和韩国，以及美国对古巴的态度。虽然这一类别可以说捕捉了大约 40 年来构成体系主要冲突的性质——冷战（其中也包含类型 4 的元素），但在后冷战体系中似乎要罕见得多。现存的案例往往与类型 1 融合，如朝鲜，显然也涉及民族因素；类型 4，如冷战和印巴冲突；或类型 7，即体系合法化原则的总体趋势与某一特定国家的原则相冲突。一个相当显著的发现是，尽管内部分裂和政治意识形态弱点常常是政权的主要关切之一，但外国行为者直接挑战政权合法性的情况却很少，尽管弱政权将国内动乱归咎于外国策划的情况则稍微常见一些。 阿拉伯国家对以色列的立场就是这样一种情况，但即使这种情况也在发生变化。这种令人惊讶的情况可能证明了主权和不干涉原则的持续强大：质疑一个政权本身是有问题的。要么直接与该国发生冲突，要么试图让国际社会将其标记为违反更基本规则（例如，非种族隔离、种族灭绝），否则就必须避免对政权和国家的合法性采取重大行动。
3. Inadvertent, unit-based threats to state-nation vulnerable states. Unintentional threats should be sorted into two groups. Accidental, onetime threats are not very interesting to us. Unavoidable, interlocking, inadvertent threats, however, happen when two or more states are locked into a security conflict because of incompatible organizing principles. Here, we can try out the distinction between nation-state and political-ideological vulnerabilities to see if it produces systematic variation. 3. 对国家-民族脆弱国家的无意、基于单位的威胁。无意的威胁应分为两类。偶发的、一次性的威胁对我们来说不太重要。然而，不可避免的、相互交织的无意威胁发生在两个或多个国家因组织原则不兼容而陷入安全冲突时。在这里，我们可以尝试区分民族国家和政治意识形态脆弱性，看看是否会产生系统性的差异。
Inadvertent threats based on a state-nation split could be illustrated by the case of Estonia and Russia, in which the Estonian definition of Estonia is perceived as a threat to the Russians in Estonia (and thereby in Russian politics too); simultaneously, a Russia defined in a certain way is by definition a threat to Estonia. A Croatia defined on a territorial basis (the borders of the old part-state of Yugoslavia) and a Serbia defined on an ethnic basis (the nation of Serbs) are difficult to reconcile as well (Wiberg 1993). Such security dilemmas can be handled only through processes that involve critical self-reflection by the involved parties on their own identity and concept of stateness. The political struggles within each society over how to articulate state and nation are at the heart of this type of security predicament. 基于国家-民族分裂的无意威胁可以通过爱沙尼亚和俄罗斯的案例来说明，其中爱沙尼亚对爱沙尼亚的定义被俄罗斯人在爱沙尼亚（从而也在俄罗斯政治中）视为威胁；同时，以某种方式定义的俄罗斯本质上对爱沙尼亚构成威胁。以领土为基础定义的克罗地亚（南斯拉夫旧部分国家的边界）和以民族为基础定义的塞尔维亚（塞尔维亚民族）也难以调和（Wiberg 1993）。这种安全困境只能通过涉及相关各方对自身身份和国家概念进行批判性自我反思的过程来处理。每个社会内部围绕如何表达国家和民族的政治斗争正是这种安全困境的核心。
Such cases are found in the same regions as type 1. They basically involve the same factors; they are simply a particularly vicious version. 这类情况出现在与第一类相同的地区。它们基本上涉及相同的因素；只是表现为一种特别恶劣的版本。
4. Unintentional threats to states on political-ideological grounds. This type of threat constellation can be illustrated by the Cold War, as noted earlier. The clearest example, however, remains that of the India-Pakistan conflict, which hinges on competing ideas of the state-different basic political legitimizing principles that are not only mutually exclusive but are also unavoidably threatening to each other. Pakistan is based on religious exclusivity, whereas India is a continentwide, inclusive state able to accommodate ethnic and religious differences-thus also including Muslims. (Not to overdo the emphasis on abstract principles: If India were to change its self-definition toward Hindu nationalism, this would in some logical sense solve the problem vis-à-vis Pakistan; however, since in practice that situation would produce a number of local conflicts between religious and ethnic groups into which the India-Pakistan dimension would be drawn, it is unlikely to be much of a solution to the regional security dilemma.) The relationship between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization was another case (although with elements of type 3 ) in which for a long time the self-definition of each group included the negation of the possible existence of the other (or rather, of the other as that which the other wanted to be). The way in which this conflict constellation has been modified is perhaps instructive for the nature of this type of conflict: It is possible only to move the conflict out of the space of “no compromise possible” through processes that touch the heart of political identity and that therefore become of the utmost political intensity within each. 4. 基于政治意识形态理由对国家的无意威胁。这种威胁类型可以用前面提到的冷战来说明。然而，最清晰的例子仍然是印巴冲突，其核心是国家的竞争性理念——不同的基本政治合法化原则不仅相互排斥，而且不可避免地对彼此构成威胁。巴基斯坦基于宗教排他性，而印度是一个涵盖整个大陆的包容性国家，能够容纳民族和宗教差异——因此也包括穆斯林。 （不想过分强调抽象原则：如果印度改变其自我定义，转向印度教民族主义，从某种逻辑意义上讲，这将解决与巴基斯坦的矛盾；然而，实际上这种情况会在宗教和族群之间产生许多局部冲突，印度-巴基斯坦的维度也会被卷入其中，因此这不太可能成为区域安全困境的有效解决方案。）以色列与巴勒斯坦解放组织之间的关系是另一个案例（尽管带有第 3 类的元素），长期以来，每个群体的自我定义都包含对另一个群体可能存在的否定（或者更确切地说，否定对方想成为的那个“他者”）。这种冲突格局的变化方式或许对理解此类冲突的本质具有启示意义：只有通过触及政治身份核心的过程，才能将冲突从“无妥协可能”的状态中移出，因此这些过程在各自内部会变得极具政治强度。
Conflicts of this type are not common. They are serious and often longstanding when they do appear but are not the typical form of political security conflict. 这种类型的冲突并不常见。它们一旦出现，通常是严重且长期存在的，但并不是政治安全冲突的典型形式。
5. Security of and against supranational, regional integration. This category is not intended to distinguish between regional and global, but there is a difference between principles and organization-between the systemic political principles discussed in “The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities” in this chapter and in types 6 and 7 and organizations that try to take over a broad range of state functions on a regional scale. Principles are relevant mainly at the global but also at the regional level; supranational political organization is relevant mainly at the regional level, and it is primarily in the EU that such organization becomes threatening to state sovereignty. Examples beyond those of the EU threatening memberstate sovereignty could be pan-Arabism in its best days and potentially the CIS in the future. 5. 超国家、区域一体化的安全及其对抗。此类别并非旨在区分区域与全球，但原则与组织之间存在差异——本章中“威胁与脆弱性的逻辑”以及类型 6 和 7 中讨论的系统性政治原则，与试图在区域范围内接管广泛国家职能的组织不同。原则主要在全球层面，但也适用于区域层面；超国家政治组织主要在区域层面相关，且主要是在欧盟中，这种组织对国家主权构成威胁。除欧盟威胁成员国主权的例子外，泛阿拉伯主义在其鼎盛时期以及未来可能的独联体也属于此类。
Whenever the regional formation takes on such a solid quality, one can also talk of political security the other way around: The supranational, regional integration formation can begin to have its own security discourse in which the member states and nations can be among the theats when they 每当区域形成具有如此坚实的特质时，也可以反过来说政治安全：超国家的区域一体化形成可以开始拥有其自身的安全话语，其中成员国和民族可能成为威胁对象，当他们
react against integration-for example, on the basis of their fear of the integrating organization. In the case of the EU, the very principle of integration (the negation of nation-based fragmentation) seems to be the equivalent of sovereignty, the principle that can be threatened; if it is violated in some specific instance, it can do so in a way that becomes self-propelling (fragmentation and power balancing) and that thus constitutes an existential threat (Wæver 1996b; Chapter 8 in the present book). 反对一体化时——例如，基于他们对一体化组织的恐惧。在欧盟的情况下，一体化的基本原则（否定基于民族的分裂）似乎等同于主权，这一原则可能受到威胁；如果在某些具体情况下被侵犯，它可能以自我推动的方式发生（分裂和平衡权力），从而构成一种生存威胁（Wæver 1996b；本书第 8 章）。
6. Systemic, principled threats against states that are vulnerable because of a state-nation split. A historic instance of this type of threat is the Austrian (and Austrian-Hungarian) case vis-à-vis the nationalist movement in the nineteenth century; for a time, this case seemed to be mainly of historical relevance. Again, however, we are experiencing a general wave of national self-determination, of “every nation its state” thinking-a new spring of nations-and all multinational and otherwise non-nation-corresponding states have good reason to be worried. 6. 针对因国家与民族分裂而脆弱的国家的系统性、有原则的威胁。这类威胁的历史实例是十九世纪奥地利（及奥匈帝国）对民族主义运动的应对；一度，这一案例似乎主要具有历史意义。然而，我们再次经历了一波民族自决的浪潮，即“每个民族一个国家”的思想——民族的新春——所有多民族国家及其他不对应民族的国家都有充分理由感到担忧。
7. Structural (systemic) threats to (weak) states on political-ideological grounds. Here, a state’s political system is challenged but this time not by another state but by a general development of international society on principles that are incompatible with those of the state. The classical example, now resolved, was that of antiapartheid and South Africa. The most important contemporary cases in which security actions are taken against this type of threat are in East Asia and the Middle East-“Asian” values and national sovereignty defended against an allegedly Western universalism (China, Singapore, and Malaysia), and Islamic values similarly posited as threatened not only by Western culture but also by what is seen as a Western attempt to organize the international system on its principles. 7. 对（弱）国家在政治意识形态基础上的结构性（系统性）威胁。在这里，国家的政治体系受到挑战，但这次不是来自另一个国家，而是来自国际社会在与该国家原则不兼容的原则上的一般发展。经典的例子是反种族隔离和南非问题，现已解决。当前采取安全行动应对此类威胁的最重要案例是在东亚和中东——“亚洲”价值观和国家主权被用来抵御所谓的西方普遍主义（中国、新加坡和马来西亚），伊斯兰价值观同样被视为不仅受到西方文化的威胁，还受到被视为西方试图以其原则组织国际体系的威胁。
These seven are the different kinds of threats to states, the main unit of this sector. We have pointed to two other major categories: other unit-level candidates, notably transnational movements, and system-level political principles and institutions. 这七种是对国家这一部门主要单位的不同类型威胁。我们还指出了另外两大类：其他单位层面的候选者，特别是跨国运动，以及系统层面的政治原则和制度。
8. Threats to transnational movements that command supreme loyalty from their members. No large movements of this type are very effective today; thus, they could all be seen (to the extent that they qualify as referent objects in the political sector) as experiencing severe security problems, as threatened by the sovereign states that try to command the supreme loyalty of their subjects. The Communist movement is obviously of minor relevance here and has not been a factor for some time-some would say not since the 1920s or 1930s when it became de facto a Soviet state-centered organization. Others would say the movement has not been a factor since the Sino-Soviet split. If one focuses on the way members in other countries felt loyalty to a transnational movement, however, one could claim the Communist movement was a reality until the end of the 1980s. The movement was sometimes experienced with fear by states (but that fear was most often overlaid by the fear of the Soviet Union and thus is not a category of 8. 对那些获得其成员最高忠诚度的跨国运动的威胁。如今，没有哪种大型此类运动非常有效；因此，它们都可以被视为（在政治领域中作为参照对象的范围内）正经历严重的安全问题，受到试图获得其臣民最高忠诚度的主权国家的威胁。共产主义运动显然在这里相关性较小，并且已经有一段时间不再是一个因素——有人会说自 1920 年代或 1930 年代以来就不再是，因为它实际上成为了一个以苏联国家为中心的组织。还有人会说自中苏分裂以来，该运动就不再是一个因素。然而，如果关注其他国家成员对跨国运动的忠诚感，可以说共产主义运动直到 1980 年代末仍然存在。该运动有时被国家视为恐惧的对象（但这种恐惧通常被对苏联的恐惧所掩盖，因此不属于一种类别的）
its own), and the movement itself acted in relation to what it saw as threats. Today, no transnational political movements of this caliber are found, perhaps only religious ones, with Islam the strongest candidate. 它自身），而该运动本身是针对其视为威胁的事物采取行动的。如今，没有发现具有此类规模的跨国政治运动，或许只有宗教运动，其中伊斯兰教是最有力的候选者。
9. Threats to international society, order, and law. The most obvious recent example of this type is Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, but it is so obvious, so overused (including our own previous discussion in this chapter), and probably now perceived by many as the exception to some rule (no similar swift and determined action came in the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda) that it is not very useful. An alternative ilfustration could be the North Korea-nonproliferation-U.S. story. The general logic of such security actions was spelled out in the previous section. An external power, the United States, makes reference to some general principles and points to threats to international stability; by doing so, it tries to mobilize others in support of its actions toward North Korea. In this case (in contrast to Iraq), the United States uses the securitization mostly to legitimize its own acts. North Korea sees these acts as interventions in domestic affairs and violations of sovereignty, because it is the sovereign choice of states whether to leave an international treaty like the NPT or not. With reference to the emerging international principles of nonproliferation and openness, the United States claims a right to pressure North Korea both to open itself up to more extensive inspections than other states and to stay in the NPT regime. On the basis of this securitization of international principles (which was convincing because it coincided with the treaty review conference), the United States could make both official threats about (not very relevant) economic sanctions and unofficial, more drastic threats (or rumors) about possible surgical attacks. 9. 对国际社会、秩序和法律的威胁。最近最明显的例子是伊拉克入侵科威特，但这个例子过于明显，过于被滥用（包括我们本章之前的讨论），而且现在可能被许多人视为某种规则的例外（在波斯尼亚和卢旺达的案例中没有类似迅速而果断的行动），因此并不是很有用。另一个例子可以是朝鲜-防扩散-美国的故事。此类安全行动的一般逻辑在上一节中已经阐述。一个外部大国——美国，引用一些普遍原则并指出对国际稳定的威胁；通过这样做，它试图动员其他人支持其对朝鲜的行动。在这种情况下（与伊拉克不同），美国主要利用安全化来合法化其自身行为。朝鲜则将这些行为视为对内政的干涉和对主权的侵犯，因为是否退出像《不扩散核武器条约》（NPT）这样的国际条约是国家的主权选择。 关于新兴的国际不扩散和开放原则，美国声称有权施压朝鲜，要求其接受比其他国家更广泛的检查，并留在《不扩散核武器条约》体系内。基于对国际原则的这种安全化（之所以有说服力，是因为它与条约审查会议相吻合），美国既可以正式威胁实施（不太相关的）经济制裁，也可以非正式地发出更严厉的威胁（或谣言），如可能的外科手术式打击。
Are these nine types of threats predominantly local, regional, or global? They are almost never local in the sense of intrastate (as we see it in, for example, the environmental sector). But they are frequently less than regional-that is, bilateral. A few are unilateral-global in the sense of one state trying to defend itself against some international trend or principle. Clearly dominant, however, are relationships between two or among a few states. Does this go against the regional perspective (i.e., is it too small or subregional)? No, regions are made up of networks of unit-to-unit threats; the small constellations could be the first steps toward larger formations. 这九种威胁主要是地方性的、区域性的还是全球性的？它们几乎从不是地方性的，指的是国内的（正如我们在环境领域中所见）。但它们经常小于区域性——即双边的。有些是单边-全球性的，指的是一个国家试图防御某种国际趋势或原则。然而，显然占主导地位的是两个或几个国家之间的关系。这是否违背了区域视角（即是否过于狭小或亚区域性）？不，区域是由单位对单位威胁的网络组成的；这些小的星座可能是迈向更大形成的第一步。
The question therefore is, do these threats typically link up and generate chains and networks of regional conflict constellations? Not as much as is the case in the military sector, where means (power) are generally more fungible: If A threatens B, and C-weakened by its conflict with D-also fears A,C\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{C} can come to the aid of B by engendering some additional threat against A, perhaps by soliciting the help of its ally E. This scheme is possible because military power is relatively easy to cumulate, calculate, and fansfer. The fore of C can supplement that of B and thereby counterbal- 因此，问题是，这些威胁是否通常会相互联系，形成区域冲突星座的链条和网络？情况并不像军事领域那样多，在军事领域，手段（权力）通常更具流动性：如果 A 威胁 B，而 C 因与 D 的冲突而削弱，也可能通过对 A 产生额外威胁来帮助 B，或许是通过寻求其盟友 E 的帮助。这种方案之所以可能，是因为军事力量相对容易积累、计算和转移。C 的力量可以补充 B 的力量，从而抵消 A 的影响。
ance A. This is rarely the case in the political sector. Chain reactions do not occur at the level of power, although they may at the level of principles. If A threatens B by violating the principle of nonintervention (e.g., assisting secessionists), this will be of great interest to C , which also has a large minority and therefore supports B 's protests against A . ance A。这在政治领域很少发生。连锁反应不会在权力层面出现，尽管它们可能在原则层面发生。如果 A 通过违反不干涉原则（例如，协助分裂主义者）威胁 B，这将引起 C 的极大关注，C 也有大量少数群体，因此支持 B 对 A 的抗议。
The main linkages in this sector seem to be in terms of principles rather than power. Principles travel relatively more easily than (military) power. But principles occasionally have a regional component: This is unacceptable behavior in Europe, the African charter of human rights, the Asian concept of values, the unacceptable involvement of an extra-hemispherical actor in the Americas, and so forth. Simultaneously, at the level of principles is a very strong global component-international society. The balance between regional and global principles varies among regions. In all cases, the global level is in some sense the more prominent in that most international law and UN quasi-law is developed for the entire system. But if the most operative and controversial elements are given a distinctive regional twist, the regional level can still be the most powerful referent in a given political instance. 该领域的主要联系似乎更多体现在原则层面，而非权力层面。原则的传播相对比（军事）权力更为容易。但原则有时具有区域性成分：例如，在欧洲这是不可接受的行为，非洲有人权宪章，亚洲有价值观念，美洲则不可接受外半球行为者的介入，诸如此类。同时，在原则层面存在一个非常强烈的全球成分——国际社会。区域与全球原则之间的平衡在各地区有所不同。在所有情况下，全球层面在某种意义上更为突出，因为大多数国际法和联合国准法律都是为整个体系制定的。但如果最具操作性和争议性的元素带有明显的区域色彩，那么在特定政治实例中，区域层面仍然可以是最有力的参照。
Thus, it is possible to briefly survey the different regions after all, now that the question is clearer. Are there important regional constellations of principles, violations, fears, support campaigns, and the like? For Europe yes, Africa yes, Asia not much but emerging “Asian values.” For North America no, only some rules of the Organization of American States (OAS) that are close to those of the UN, amounting mostly to universal rules plus nonintervention for extra-hemispheric powers. For Latin America no, except as for North America. Thus, for all of America some. For the Middle East yes. 因此，现在问题更清晰了，毕竟可以简要地考察不同地区。是否存在重要的区域性原则、违规行为、恐惧、支持运动等的区域性组合？欧洲有，非洲有，亚洲不多，但出现了“亚洲价值观”。北美没有，只有一些美洲国家组织（OAS）的规则，这些规则与联合国的规则接近，主要是普遍规则加上对半球外大国的不干涉原则。拉丁美洲没有，除了与北美相同的情况。因此，对于整个美洲来说，有一些。中东地区有。
In cases where principles are regional to a significant extent, the smaller bilateral, trilateral, and subregional constellations will tie together at the regional level to some extent because other actors in the region will be mobilized to support one or the other side; other actors will have their own interest in taking positions because these principles are of relevance to conflicts in which they are engaged or are worried about. 在原则在区域内具有显著影响的情况下，较小的双边、三边和次区域性组合将在一定程度上在区域层面上联系起来，因为该地区的其他行为者将被动员支持某一方；其他行为者也会因为这些原则与他们所参与的冲突相关或他们对此感到担忧而有自己的立场利益。
Summary 摘要
There are many bilateral political security constellations, and they sometimes link up in regional patterns. The principles that create this linking are as much global as regional; therefore, some security actions-such as major UN operations-are also based on global domino theories and make cross-regional linkages. The main dynamics of this sector, however, operate at levels from bilateral to regional, with various smaller constellations included that would often register as subcomplexes in other sectors, espe- 存在许多双边政治安全星座，它们有时会在区域模式中相互联系。创造这种联系的原则既是全球性的，也是区域性的；因此，一些安全行动——如重大的联合国行动——也基于全球多米诺理论，并形成跨区域的联系。然而，这一领域的主要动态在双边到区域层面运作，包含各种较小的星座，这些星座在其他领域中通常被视为子复合体，特别是在军事领域。
cially the military one. If there were only this sector, these dynamics might remain bilateral or as microcomplexes. But with the interaction among sectors, such dynamics become tied into bigger complexes they rarely cut across or in other ways complicate; on their own, they do not generate such large complexes. For instance, territorial disputes (Sabah) between Malaysia and the Philippines quietly mobilize other ASEAN states, first because they threaten to weaken ASEAN as such and second because similar disputes are occurring in the area and other states therefore have views on how the Malaysia-Philippines disputes should be resolved. 如果只有这一领域，这些动态可能保持双边或作为微复合体存在。但随着各领域之间的互动，这些动态被纳入更大的复合体中，它们很少跨越或以其他方式复杂化；单独存在时，它们不会产生如此大的复合体。例如，马来西亚和菲律宾之间的领土争端（沙巴）悄然动员了其他东盟国家，首先是因为这些争端威胁到东盟整体的稳定，其次是因为该地区存在类似的争端，其他国家因此对马来西亚-菲律宾争端的解决方式有自己的看法。
Generally, issues that are typically bilateral or trilateral become regionalized because other actors within the same regime of principles will take positions because of their interest in either the specific outcome of the contest or the effect on those principles. In the case of highly visible or crucial rule-defining events (e.g., Iraq-Kuwait), the conflict can become globalized and draw in many countries, but the networks of principles have a density at the regional level that often lifts local conflicts to this plane. 一般来说，通常是双边或三边的问题会区域化，因为同一原则体系内的其他行为者会因为他们对竞赛的具体结果或对这些原则的影响感兴趣而采取立场。在高度显著或关键的规则定义事件（例如伊拉克-科威特）中，冲突可能全球化并吸引许多国家参与，但原则网络在区域层面具有密度，这常常将地方冲突提升到这一层面。
Notes 注释
According to Max Weber, a political unit is defined by its relationship to a specific instrument-organized violence (1972 [1922]: 30). The state is defined as one form of such political organization, one that “within a specific territory … (successfully) claims the monopoly on legitimate political violence” (Weber 1972 [1922]: 822, our translation; the parentheses are Weber’s). The state is a specific form of Herrschaftsverhältnis for which the achieved legitimacy is the most remarkable. Thus, the focus is on the way otherwise fluid relations become institutionalized and authority established. With writers such as Ernesto Laclau and Claude Lefort, in contrast, the political is almost the opposite of this. Politicization means to open up petrified relationships, and the political is opposed to the social, when the latter refers to sedimented practices as unreflected “natural” ways of being and doing that can be moved into the sphere of choice and contestation by politicization. As soon as some political practice has been successful in establishing something “fixed,” it stops being political-and political practice will be that which upsets this order, which dislocates its discursive underpinning (Laclau 1990: 68). 根据马克斯·韦伯，政治单位是由其与特定工具化暴力的关系定义的（1972 [1922]: 30）。国家被定义为这种政治组织的一种形式，即“在特定领土内……（成功地）声称对合法政治暴力的垄断权”（韦伯 1972 [1922]: 822，译者注；括号为韦伯所加）。国家是一种特定形式的 Herrschaftsverhältnis，其获得的合法性最为显著。因此，重点在于原本流动的关系如何被制度化并确立权威。相比之下，像埃内斯托·拉克劳和克洛德·勒福尔特这样的作家认为，政治几乎是这一观点的对立面。政治化意味着打破僵化的关系，而政治与社会相对立，后者指的是沉积的实践，作为未经反思的“自然”存在和行为方式，通过政治化可以被转移到选择和争论的领域。 一旦某种政治实践成功地建立了某种“固定”的东西，它就不再是政治性的——而政治实践将是那种颠覆这一秩序、扰乱其话语基础的行为（Laclau 1990: 68）。
On this third axis, “the shaping” leans somewhat to the Weberian side with its emphasis on governing, but it is a bit more open-ended and emphasizes the attempt more than at least is commonly attributed to Weber (although Weber loved gerunds - nouns made from verbs - so the transformation into activity, process, and attempt is after all rather Weberian). We want to retain the Weberian ring to the “politics” of the political sector, whereas “politicization” refers to the Laclau side. Thus, we use “political” to describe the orders and arrangements attempted and in part achieved by people regarding the organization of political power, “the shaping of human behavior for the purpose of governing large groups of people.” 在第三个轴线上，“塑造”有些倾向于韦伯式，强调治理，但它更开放，强调尝试，至少比通常归因于韦伯的更为突出（尽管韦伯喜欢动名词——由动词构成的名词——因此转化为活动、过程和尝试毕竟相当韦伯式）。我们希望保留“政治”在政治领域中的韦伯式韵味，而“政治化”则指向 Laclau 一方。因此，我们用“政治的”来描述人们试图并部分实现的关于政治权力组织的秩序和安排，即“为了治理大群体而塑造人类行为”。
Principles are much more likely to be referent objects for security action than are values because principles can be violated, and small cases can be depicted as of langer significance because they theaten a principle. Cases that infringe upon values will typically be more gradnal-a litte less, a litte more-and inerehy diffi- 原则比价值更有可能成为安全行动的参照对象，因为原则可以被违反，而小的案例可以被描绘为具有更大意义，因为它们威胁到一个原则。侵犯价值的案例通常更渐进——稍微少一点，稍微多一点——因此更难以安全化。
cult to securitize. If values are made the central concept of security theory, one is more likely to end on the aggregative, individualizing road that most likely securitizes widely, because most things individuals value are “threatened” in numerous ways. By focusing on principles, we retain a conception in which referent objects can be posited as existentially threatened; their survival is at stake, according to securitizing actors. Values point to gradualism, individual security, and the unending expansion of securitization; principles point to either-or, to intersubjective constitution, and to a more limited security agenda. 如果将价值作为安全理论的核心概念，人们更可能走上聚合化、个体化的道路，这条路最有可能广泛地进行安全化，因为个人重视的大多数事物以多种方式被“威胁”。通过关注原则，我们保留了一种观念，即参照对象可以被假定为存在性地受到威胁；根据安全化行为者的说法，它们的生存岌岌可危。价值指向渐进主义、个体安全和安全化的无休止扩展；原则则指向非此即彼、主体间构成以及更有限的安全议程。
CHAPTER 8 第八章
How Sectors Are Synthesized 部门如何被综合
People, States and Fear (Buzan 1991) led to clear-cut conclusions about the importance of regional security complexes in the military and political sectors. These complexes showed strong territorial coherence. In other words, one of the primary locations in which to find the sources of explanation and the outcomes of traditional security dynamics is the regional level. Does securitization related to the referent objects of the other sectors also result in coherent regional security complexes? If so, are these regions identical to the military-political ones? 《人民、国家与恐惧》（Buzan 1991）得出了关于军事和政治领域区域安全复合体重要性的明确结论。这些复合体表现出强烈的领土连贯性。换句话说，寻找传统安全动态的解释来源和结果的主要地点之一是区域层面。与其他领域的参照对象相关的安全化是否也会导致连贯的区域安全复合体？如果是，这些区域是否与军事-政治领域的区域相同？
To assess overall trends among local, regional, and global levels is complicated by the often polemical nature of the arguments. As soon as someone puts too much emphasis on localization, regionalization, or glohalization, it is easy to raise counterarguments. If one, for example, stresses the increasing regionalization in economics in terms of territorial bloc formation (the EU, NAFTA, and APEC), another can counter this by pointing (1) globalization in terms of interaction capacity (e.g., low transportation costs, international capital) or to global regimes (the rules set by the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank, and the G7). If the global structure is emphasized, it is easy to point to the importance of regional or even national economics. In the first part of this chapter, we try to break out of this trap by decomposing the question, summing up the analysis we carried out in the previous chapters sector by sector. 评估地方、区域和全球层面的整体趋势因论点常带有争议性而变得复杂。一旦有人过分强调本地化、区域化或全球化，便很容易引发反驳。例如，如果有人强调经济领域中以领土集团形成（如欧盟、北美自由贸易区和亚太经合组织）为标志的区域化趋势，另一方则可能通过指出（1）以互动能力（如低运输成本、国际资本）或全球制度（国际货币基金组织、世界贸易组织、世界银行和七国集团制定的规则）为特征的全球化来反驳。如果强调全球结构，则很容易指出区域甚至国家经济的重要性。在本章的第一部分，我们试图通过分解问题，总结前几章按部门进行的分析，来摆脱这一困境。
One of the assumptions in our study is that we are working within an international system that is global in scale. On the face of it, one might expect that the shrinking world and globalization arguments mean the terriInrial factor is disappearing from politics. The revolution in interaction capacity-including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and jumbo icts, satellites, and the development of cyberspace - has eroded the significance of distance. Changing global regimes characterize periods in what is rightly called world history: the cras of imperialism, world war, decolonizalion, bipolarity, and global interdependence. 我们研究中的一个假设是，我们正在一个全球范围的国际体系内工作。表面上看，人们可能会认为世界的缩小和全球化论点意味着领土因素正在从政治中消失。交互能力的革命——包括洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）和大型飞机、卫星以及网络空间的发展——削弱了距离的重要性。全球制度的变化标志着被正确称为世界历史的时期：帝国主义的崩溃、世界大战、非殖民化、两极格局以及全球相互依存。
Despite the apparently triumphal march of globalization, the evidence from our sector chapters suggests this is only part of the story. The ability foravel worldwide does not mean everyone is doing so. The strengthening 尽管全球化似乎势不可挡，但我们各部门章节的证据表明，这只是故事的一部分。全球范围内的旅行能力并不意味着每个人都在这样做。加强的...
of the global level does not obliterate other levels. Tom Nierop (1994, 1995) rightly remarks that even most of the people who invented and created cyberspace are living in one place-Silicon Valley. Despite the overall global structure, there are regional differences that are too crucial to be neglected. Different rules of the game apply in various subsystems. The invisible hands, types of anarchy, and international regimes that condition the margins for cooperation and conflict in each of the sectors vary widely from region to region. This points to their relative independence. 全球层面的存在并不抹杀其他层面。Tom Nierop（1994，1995）正确地指出，即使是发明和创造网络空间的大多数人也生活在一个地方——硅谷。尽管整体上存在全球结构，但区域差异非常关键，不能被忽视。不同的子系统适用不同的游戏规则。无形的手、无政府状态的类型以及调节各部门合作与冲突边界的国际制度在各个地区差异很大。这表明它们具有相对的独立性。
In the postbipolar system, in many places regional dynamics are significantly less constrained than they were previously. But the end of the Cold War also lifted constraints on globalization, most notably in the economic sector, because all of the so-called Second World was now opened up. There have also been strong localizing developments, especially in the societal and environmental sectors-to some extent as the dialectical other side of globalization. The model for security analysis presented in this book is meant to be instrumental in sorting and comparing these uneven effects. 在后两极体系中，许多地区的区域动态比以前受的限制明显减少。但冷战的结束也解除了一些对全球化的限制，尤其是在经济领域，因为所有所谓的第二世界现在都开放了。同时也出现了强烈的地方化发展，特别是在社会和环境领域——在某种程度上作为全球化的辩证另一面。本书提出的安全分析模型旨在帮助理清和比较这些不均衡的影响。
The first subsection sets up levels of analysis as a way of compating the sectors and summarizes the five sector chapters into one matrix according to the weight of the levels at which securitization occurs. Section 2 looks at linkages across the sectors and states conclusions about what can be said at the aggregate level about the relative weights of the different levels and whether congruent regions form in the different sectors. Section 3 contrasts this approach with one that starts from the actors, with each synthesizing the different sectors in its specific weighing and possibly connecting of security concerns. Section 4 offers a brief survey of how cross-sectoral weighing of security operates for some different units (France, Japan, Third World states, Sudan, the LIEO, and the environment). In contrast to this impressionistic overview, section 5 is an empirically based case study of the EU. Space does not allow great amounts of documentation, but the case study is intended to illustrate a possible method for studying securitization. The final section discusses the merits of different forms of synthesizing sectors-aggregate, as in sections 1 and 2 , or by the units, as in sections 3, 4, and 5-for different purposes. 第一小节设定了分析层次作为比较各部门的方法，并根据安全化发生的层次权重，将五个部门章节总结成一个矩阵。第二节考察了各部门之间的联系，并对不同层次的相对权重以及不同部门中是否形成一致区域的总体情况得出结论。第三节将这种方法与从行为者出发的方法进行对比，后者在其特定的权衡中综合不同部门，并可能连接安全关切。第四节简要调查了跨部门安全权衡在一些不同单位（法国、日本、第三世界国家、苏丹、LIEO 和环境）中的运作情况。与这种印象式概述形成对比的是，第五节是基于实证的欧盟案例研究。篇幅有限，无法提供大量文献资料，但该案例研究旨在展示一种研究安全化的可能方法。 最后一部分讨论了不同形式的部门汇总综合的优缺点——如第 1 和第 2 节所示的整体汇总，或如第 3、4 和 5 节所示的按单位汇总——以适应不同的目的。
Levels of Analysis as a Way of Comparing Sectors 作为比较部门的一种分析层次
In the sector chapters, we traced the globalizing, regionalizing, and localizing tendencies in the security debates about the referent objects and threats in each sector. At what level does the securitization within each of the sectors appear? Does the subsystem level show coherent regional security complexes in geopolitical terms within each and across all of the sectors? In each chapter, we have assessed the importance of securitization at the different levels of analysis, and these arguments are summed up in Figure 8.1. Globalizing dynamics operate at the system level. At the subsystem 在各部门章节中，我们追踪了关于各部门参照对象和威胁的安全辩论中的全球化、区域化和本地化趋势。各部门内部的安全化现象出现在哪个层次？子系统层次是否在地缘政治意义上显示出各部门内及跨部门的连贯区域安全复合体？在每章中，我们评估了不同分析层次上安全化的重要性，这些论点总结于图 8.1。全球化动态在系统层次上运作。子系统层次
Figure 8.1 Securitization at Different Levels of Analysis 图 8.1 不同分析层次上的安全化
Regional 区域性
**** - dominant securitization; *** - subdominant securitization; ** - minor securitization; * - no securitization **** - 主导安全化；*** - 次主导安全化；** - 次要安全化；* - 无安全化
level, there are two possible patterns: regionalization if patterns are geographically coherent and nonregional subsystemic if they are not. Finally, there are localizing dynamics at the subunit level. ^(1){ }^{1} 在该层面，有两种可能的模式：如果模式在地理上连贯，则为区域化；如果不连贯，则为非区域子系统化。最后，在子单元层面存在本地化动态。
Can we add up the results and arrive at an overall conclusion about whether a dominant trend exists across the spectrum? Yes and no. Not every observer will give equal weight to each sector. There is a classical debate over whether to put politics before economics or the reverse. Environmentalists will disagree either way, and some argue that identity issues are behind everything. Traditional security studies weights the military sector so heavily that it becomes the only one worth studying. 我们能否将结果加总起来，得出一个关于整个领域是否存在主导趋势的总体结论？答案是肯定的，也是否定的。并非每个观察者都会对每个领域给予同等的重视。关于是将政治置于经济之前还是相反，存在经典的争论。环境保护者无论哪种观点都会持不同意见，有些人则认为身份认同问题是背后的根源。传统安全研究对军事领域的权重如此之大，以至于它成为唯一值得研究的领域。
For our purposes, the relative weight of sectors should depend primarily upon the degree of securitization but should also consider the relative importance of types of issues when sectoral concerns clash. For instance, relatively speaking, the economic sector has the least successful securitization (which is one of the major reasons the regional level continues to have a claim for primacy, because the economic sector is probably the most strongly globalized), but the degree of securitization is not the only factor to consider. In terms of relative importance, it is worth remembering an argument from traditional security studies (which is not as entirely conclusive as its proponents claim but is partly correct nevertheless): When a calculation relating to a military conflict meets a concern from one of the other sectors, military-political arguments carry the most weight. This is not always correct. however, since both identity and environment can become very strong motives. But the basic approach is correct: We should look for whal comes most when different concerns conflict. This conclasion is importan when we try impressionistically to balatace the findings of the differell sectors. 就我们的目的而言，各部门的相对权重应主要取决于安全化的程度，但在部门利益冲突时也应考虑问题类型的相对重要性。例如，相对而言，经济部门的安全化最不成功（这也是区域层级继续主张优先地位的主要原因之一，因为经济部门可能是全球化最强的），但安全化程度并不是唯一需要考虑的因素。在相对重要性方面，值得记住传统安全研究中的一个论点（虽然其支持者声称该论点完全成立，但实际上只是部分正确）：当与军事冲突相关的计算遇到其他部门的关切时，军事政治论点具有最大的分量。然而，这并非总是正确，因为身份和环境也可能成为非常强烈的动机。但基本方法是正确的：我们应关注在不同关切冲突时哪一方占据主导地位。 当我们试图印象派地平衡不同部门的发现时，这一结论非常重要。
The overall picture indicates that regional security complexes dominate the military, political, and societal sectors; that they are potentially strong in the economic one; and that they are present in the environmental sector. The global level is dominant in the economic sector, but global dynamics themselves stimulate regionalization. Global-level dominance in the environmental sector refers mainly to the level of the debate. Environmental issues as such are spread across all levels; some affect local structures only, others affect the international system as such, and some fall in between and form regional clusters of interdependent issues. Most successful securitization here is local. When we draw upon the finding that the economic sector has comparatively little successful securitization, a rough weighing points to the regional level as still fairly central despite the move to a wider security agenda. 整体情况表明，区域安全复合体主导着军事、政治和社会部门；它们在经济部门中潜力强大；并且它们存在于环境部门。全球层面在经济部门占主导地位，但全球动态本身刺激了区域化。环境部门的全球层面主导主要指的是辩论层面。环境问题本身分布在所有层级；有些仅影响地方结构，有些影响国际体系本身，还有一些介于两者之间，形成区域性相互依赖的问题集群。这里最成功的安全化是地方性的。当我们依据经济部门相对较少成功安全化的发现时，粗略权衡表明，尽管安全议程范围扩大，区域层面仍相当核心。
Linkages Across Sectors 跨部门联系
It is impossible, however, to conclude on the basis of this study whether the regional security complexes are always identical in each sector. In principle, we could find that security dynamics in most sectors were regional but that the regions were different. Is military Europe the same as political Europe and societal Europe? Is economic East Asia the same as political East Asia and environmental East Asia? Whether these sectoral subsystems overlap and thus form coherent regions can be answered only tentatively and on a descriptive basis. Examples of relatively coherent regions across sectors are the Middle East, Europe, the CIS, Southeast Asia, Southern Africa, and North America. Potential cases are found in East Africa, Central and Latin America, East Asia, and perhaps the Pacific. But in all of these cases, one can always point to exceptions. 然而，仅凭这项研究无法得出区域安全复合体在每个领域是否总是相同的结论。原则上，我们可能发现大多数领域的安全动态是区域性的，但这些区域是不同的。军事欧洲是否与政治欧洲和社会欧洲相同？经济东亚是否与政治东亚和环境东亚相同？这些领域子系统是否重叠，从而形成连贯的区域，只能暂时且基于描述性地回答。跨领域相对连贯的区域例子有中东、欧洲、独联体、东南亚、南部非洲和北美。潜在案例出现在东非、中美和拉美、东亚，或许还有太平洋。但在所有这些情况下，总能指出例外。
Obviously, the answers to these questions are of crucial importance, not the least for IR theory; the more the dynamics of the five sectors highlight identical regions, the more they lead to overall congruent power configurations and thereby make the regional level more powerful in explanations. One factor that supports a tendency toward congruence among sectoral regional subsystems is that in the end, the actors themselves must make up their minds as to how the securitization of different values adds up. The next three sections develop this question of how sectors are synthesized by actors. 显然，这些问题的答案至关重要，尤其对于国际关系理论而言；五个领域的动态越是突出相同的地区，它们就越能导致整体一致的权力结构，从而使区域层面在解释中更具影响力。支持各领域区域子系统趋向一致的一个因素是，最终，行为者必须自己决定不同价值的安全化如何综合起来。接下来的三节将展开讨论行为者如何综合各领域的问题。
The question of whether the regional security complexes match across sectors is answered in part by looking at the ways in which the sectors are linked to one another. Although we maintain that the disaggregated world of sectors makes analytical sense because different agenda, values, discourses, and the like can be reasonably clustered in these five sectors, it 是否各领域的区域安全复合体相互匹配的问题，部分通过观察各领域之间的联系方式来回答。尽管我们认为分解的领域世界在分析上是合理的，因为不同的议程、价值观、话语等可以合理地归类于这五个领域，
should be remembered that sectors are lenses focusing on the same world. Not surprisingly, the sector chapters are full of cross-references. 但应当记住，领域是聚焦同一世界的透镜。不出所料，各领域章节中充满了交叉引用。
In the chapter about the military sector, for instance, it was noted that military security serves functions in the other sectors, whereas warfare tends to disrupt stability in the other sectors. This refers to the security debate with which we are so familiar: What do we see when we perceive all sectors through the lens in which military rationales (the use of, or protection against the use of, violence) ultimately dominate? But the question can also be phrased the other way around. Problems that on the surface seem to be military might, on closer inspection, turn out to be motivated by fears in the other four sectors. Wars of independence, for example, may focus on separatism and border conflicts, whereas they are better understood in terms of identity concerns; wars against a ruling government might actually represent mere frustration about deteriorating living conditions caused by environmental decline. The sector linkages resemble the ultimate consequence of Karl von Clausewitz’s dictum: War is the continuation of politics with the admixture of other means. 例如，在关于军事部门的章节中指出，军事安全在其他部门中发挥着作用，而战争往往会破坏其他部门的稳定。这涉及我们非常熟悉的安全辩论：当我们通过军事理性（使用暴力或防止暴力使用）的视角来看待所有部门时，我们看到的是什么？但问题也可以反过来表述。表面上看似军事力量的问题，经过仔细观察，实际上是由其他四个部门的恐惧驱动的。例如，独立战争可能集中在分离主义和边界冲突上，但更好地理解应基于身份认同问题；反对统治政府的战争实际上可能仅仅是对环境恶化导致生活条件恶化的挫败感。部门之间的联系类似于卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨格言的最终结果：战争是政治的延续，只是掺杂了其他手段。
Such linkages can be formulated for all 10 dyads among the five sectors. Military operations can be the continuation of environmental conflict or, the reverse, can be constrained by environmental limitations. Raising the “identity flag” can entail the continuation of economics with the admixlure of other means-for example, legitimizing protectionism-or, the reverse, economic free trade arguments can be used as a means in rapprochement policies. It is important to know how sectoral concerns feed into one another. When do they reinforce and when do they modify each other? Chapters 3-7 contain examples for each of the sector dyads. Disaggregating security into sectors has been helpful in distilling distinclive patterns of vulnerabilities and threats, differences regarding referent objects and actors, and different relationships to territorializing and deterritorializing trends in the system. The number of cross-linkages, however, stands as a massive warning against treating the sectors as closed syslems. 这种联系可以针对五个部门之间的所有 10 个二元组进行制定。军事行动可以是环境冲突的延续，反之，也可能受到环境限制的约束。举起“身份旗帜”可能意味着经济的延续并掺杂其他手段——例如，合法化保护主义——或者相反，经济自由贸易论点可以作为和解政策的手段。了解各部门关切如何相互影响非常重要。它们何时相互强化，何时相互调整？第 3 至 7 章包含了每个部门二元组的示例。将安全分解为各个部门有助于提炼出独特的脆弱性和威胁模式、关于参照对象和行为者的差异，以及与系统中领土化和去领土化趋势的不同关系。然而，交叉联系的数量对将各部门视为封闭系统提出了严重警告。
Cross-Sectoral Security Connections Through the Actor's Lens 通过行为者视角的跨部门安全联系
In the present book, we have dissected the world of security into five seclors. The purpose of such a disaggregating exercise is to put security back logether in, it is hoped, a more transparent form. The reconnecting job can be done in two ways that are not incompatible but that serve different purposes. The section “Levels of Analysis an a Way of Comparing Sectors” weighed the findings of all the seetors both as a total picture and as a gener- 在本书中，我们将安全领域分解为五个部门。这样分解的目的是希望以一种更透明的形式将安全重新整合起来。重新连接的工作可以通过两种方式完成，这两种方式并不矛盾，但服务于不同的目的。“分析层次及比较部门的方法”一节权衡了所有部门的发现，既作为整体图景，也作为一种通用的——
al lesson about security in its different forms. That section looked at the different pictures that emerged in the particular sectors and at the ways these five pictures could possibly be combined. 关于安全不同形式的全面课程。该部分考察了各个特定领域中出现的不同图景，以及这五种图景可能的组合方式。
In Chapter 1, however, we asked whether one should study security sector by sector and then try to relate the different sector-specific maps of the world to one another or rather try to see all security interaction as one constellation and security as an integrated field. The section “Levels of Analysis as a Way of Comparing Sectors” viewed the five sectors from the analyst’s outside perspective. The rest of this chapter does so from the inside, through the actor’s perspective. In both cases, one can draw on the lessons of Chapters 3-7 because one needs an understanding of the peculiarities of security of each of the types - economic, military, and so forth. 然而，在第一章中，我们曾问过，是否应该逐个部门地研究安全领域，然后尝试将不同部门特定的世界图谱相互关联，还是应该将所有安全互动视为一个星座，将安全视为一个综合领域。“作为比较部门的方法的分析层次”一节从分析者的外部视角审视了五个部门。本章的其余部分则从内部，即行动者的视角进行探讨。在这两种情况下，都可以借鉴第三至第七章的经验教训，因为需要理解每种类型——经济、安全等——的安全特性。
The case for looking through the actor’s lens is as follows. Sectors are not ontologically separate realms; they are not, like levels, separate subsystems (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 30-33). Some units, particularly the state, appear in several or all of the sectors, although at different strengths. We see sectors as a purely analytical device, as different lenses through which to see different views of the same issues. 通过行动者视角观察的理由如下。各部门并非本体上独立的领域；它们不像层次那样，是独立的子系统（Buzan, Jones 和 Little 1993: 30-33）。某些单位，特别是国家，出现在多个或所有部门中，尽管其影响力不同。我们将部门视为纯粹的分析工具，是通过不同的透镜来观察同一问题的不同视角。
But although they are analytical devices, sectors exist not only in a theoretician’s head but also in policy heads, where the concept of security itself is the integrating force. Actors think about economics, politics, and other areas but judge their main security problems across the board. Thus, units do not exist in sectors; sectors exist in units as different types of security concerns (political, economic, etc.). These different concerns are weighed and aggregated by the units. ^(2){ }^{2} One unit (say, the United States) can feel threatened mainly by military matters and will define security in narrow military terms (which, in turn, allows it to define its own uses of nonmilitary means as “ordinary interaction” rather than security issues, regardless of how others perceive them; Wæver 1989b, 1995b). Another unit (say, the former USSR) has existential fears about sociocultural penetration by a dynamic neighboring area and insists that the concept of security should be wider and should include “nonmilitary security problems.” A third state (say, Latvia) might see demographic developments as existential and apply the security approach to these. 但尽管它们是分析工具，部门不仅存在于理论家的头脑中，也存在于政策制定者的头脑中，在那里安全的概念本身是整合的力量。行为体考虑经济、政治及其他领域，但会全面评估其主要的安全问题。因此，单位并不存在于部门中；部门存在于单位中，作为不同类型的安全关切（政治的、经济的等）。这些不同的关切由单位进行权衡和汇总。一个单位（比如美国）可能主要感受到军事事务的威胁，并将安全定义为狭义的军事范畴（这反过来又使其能够将自身使用的非军事手段定义为“普通互动”，而非安全问题，无论其他人如何看待；Wæver 1989b, 1995b）。另一个单位（比如前苏联）对来自一个充满活力的邻近地区的社会文化渗透有生存恐惧，坚称安全的概念应更广泛，应包括“非军事安全问题”。第三个国家（比如拉脱维亚）可能将人口发展视为生存问题，并将安全方法应用于此。
To grasp political dynamics, one needs to focus on the most dynamic interactions, the loops, the vicious circles-regardless of whether these stay within one sector. A political analysis searches for constellations of interlinking securitizations and is open about whether these interlinkages operate across sectors. ^(3){ }^{3} The sectors should not be projected out as a map of the world cut up into sectors (each to be filled with units, aims, threats, and dynamics); they should be sent in, into the actors as different kinds of security concerns. 要把握政治动态，需要关注最具活力的互动，即循环、恶性循环——无论这些是否局限于一个部门。政治分析寻求相互关联的安全化星座，并且坦率地承认这些关联是否跨部门运作。部门不应被投射为一个被切分成多个部门的世界地图（每个部门都充满单位、目标、威胁和动态）；它们应被送入行动者内部，作为不同类型的安全关切。
The basic argument here is about analytical sequence: A specific security analysis does not start by cutting the world into sectors. We have done so in this book because it was necessary to do so to resolve misunderstand- 这里的基本论点是关于分析顺序：具体的安全分析并不是从将世界切分为部门开始的。我们在本书中这样做是因为有必要这样做以解决关于安全一般领域的误解。
ings about the general domain of security. But in a specific analysis, the sequence is (1) securitization as a phenomenon, as a distinct type of praclice; (2) the security units, those units that have become established as legitimate referent objects for security action and those that are able to securitize-the securitizing actors; and (3) the pattern of mutual references among units-the security complex. 但在具体分析中，顺序是（1）安全化作为一种现象，作为一种独特的实践类型；（2）安全单位，即那些已被确立为安全行动合法参照对象的单位，以及那些能够进行安全化的行动者——安全化行动者；（3）单位之间相互参照的模式——安全复合体。
Looking sector by sector, there is a risk of missing even intense securi1y1 y dilemmas in cases where the threat of A against BB lies in one sector and We threat to which A is reacting (and thereby possibly reinforcing) from B is found in another sector. Illustrations could be Estonia-Russia (military fears and security for and against minorities) and Turkey-Syria (Kurdish separatism versus water control). Therefore, one should look at all kinds of security and look unit by unit, conflict by conflict-and thereby build the complex as the constellation of main security concerns (“main” is defined by the actors). 逐个部门来看，存在错过即使是激烈的安全困境的风险，尤其是在 A 对 B 的威胁位于一个部门，而 A 所反应（并可能因此加强）的威胁来自另一个部门的情况下。例子可以是爱沙尼亚-俄罗斯（军事恐惧和对少数民族的安全与反安全）以及土耳其-叙利亚（库尔德分离主义与水资源控制）。因此，应当关注各种安全类型，并逐单位、逐冲突进行观察，从而将复杂体构建为主要安全关切的星座（“主要”由行为体定义）。
Accordingly, our 1993 book has no “societal security complex” and only hesitantly introduces a “societal security dilemma” (Waver et al. 1993; see further Kelstrup 1995). There is one European security complex; societal security plays a part in this complex if important units act according to this logic and their action is significant enough to feed into the security policy of other actors and thus to become part of the chain of security interdependencies forming the regional security complex. 因此，我们 1993 年的著作中没有“社会安全复杂体”，仅是犹豫地引入了“社会安全困境”（Wæver 等，1993；另见 Kelstrup，1995）。欧洲存在一个安全复杂体；如果重要单位按照这一逻辑行动，且其行动足够重要以影响其他行为体的安全政策，从而成为形成区域安全复杂体的安全相互依赖链的一部分，那么社会安全就在该复杂体中发挥作用。
A further reason for paying close attention to cross-sectoral dynamics is that doing so might solve the problem of having to deal with one or sevcral sector-specific maps of security complexes. Where these seem to line up (and the previous section argued that they often do), the explanation will probably be found in cross-sectoral dynamics. From a functionalist perspective, one might expect that the economic security complexes would come out differently from the military ones, which again would have differint borders from the environmental security complexes. The nature of environmental affairs-even the main units-differs from affairs in economics, which, in turn, differ from military matters; thus, one should expect size and constellations to be very different. Truly, there are major deviances illiong sectors, but there are also some surprising consistencies. 关注跨部门动态的另一个原因是，这样做可能解决必须处理一个或多个特定部门安全复合体地图的问题。当这些地图似乎一致时（上一节论证了它们经常是一致的），解释很可能在于跨部门动态。从功能主义的角度来看，人们可能会预期经济安全复合体与军事安全复合体不同，而军事安全复合体的边界又与环境安全复合体不同。环境事务的性质——甚至主要单位——与经济事务不同，而经济事务又与军事事务不同；因此，应该预期其规模和构成会有很大差异。确实，各部门之间存在重大差异，但也有一些令人惊讶的一致性。
In the societal security chapter, for instance, it was noticed that strong instances of societal security were found in Europe and to some extent in the Middle East, which taken independently should have been expected to generate smaller complexes (e.g., to focus on subregions, such as the Balkans or even Transylvania). Because of cross-sectoral connections, cspecially with the political sector, however, the different societal conflicts were tied together, and states acted in a generalized sense in relation to minority conflicts and self-determination with a view to regional dynamics and to principles that are partly systemic, partly regional (in this case European). 例如，在社会安全章节中，注意到欧洲以及在某种程度上中东地区存在强烈的社会安全实例，单独来看这些实例本应产生较小的复合体（例如，聚焦于子区域，如巴尔干半岛甚至特兰西瓦尼亚）。然而，由于跨部门的联系，特别是与政治部门的联系，不同的社会冲突被联系在一起，国家在少数民族冲突和自决问题上以一种广义的方式行动，考虑到区域动态以及部分是系统性的、部分是区域性的原则（在此案例中为欧洲的原则）。
In the exomomice chapter, it was noticed that whereas the firm is not an 在 exomomice 章节中，注意到尽管该公司不是一个
easily securitizable unit, the state is, which in the classical case involves the argument that some specific production is necessary for the state in an argument that draws upon other sectors, traditionally the military or at least the political sector. Furthermore, a conspicuous finding in the economic chapter was the role of system-level referent objects, notably the LIEO, which points to the securitization of principles. This situation has created an interaction and probably a synergy between the political and economic sectors, in which the interpretations of who are insiders and who are outsiders in the two spheres are mutually reinforcing. The degree of danger involved in a breach of principles in one sector is determined in part by judging the location of an actor in the other sector: If Japan, for example, violates a political principle, it will be of greater concern to the United States because the latter suspects Japan of evading the principles of the economic game. 容易被安全化的单位，国家就是这样，在经典情况下，这涉及到一个论点，即某些特定的生产对于国家是必要的，这一论点借鉴了其他部门，传统上是军事部门或至少是政治部门。此外，经济章节中一个显著的发现是系统层面参照对象的作用，特别是 LIEO，这指向了原则的安全化。这种情况在政治和经济部门之间创造了一种互动，可能还有协同效应，在这两个领域中，谁是内部人、谁是外部人的解释相互加强。一个部门中原则被破坏所涉及的危险程度部分取决于对另一个部门中行为者位置的判断：例如，如果日本违反了一个政治原则，这将引起美国更大的关注，因为后者怀疑日本在逃避经济游戏的原则。
Also in the economic sector, the political (and perhaps the military) sector helps to explain the peculiar phenomenon of economic regionalization. The political interpretation of who represents a strategic economic competitor seems to be involved in the formation of economic unions and blocs, which, in turn, creates an increasing rationale for political competition along these lines. As argued in Chapter 5, societal factors are also involved in the formation of regional economic blocs: “They are cultural defense mechanisms against the powerful homogenizing effects of open markets.” To preserve societal security, a certain regional variation in political economic models has been necessary (cf. Helleiner 1994b). 同样在经济领域，政治（也许还有军事）领域有助于解释经济区域化这一特殊现象。谁代表战略经济竞争者的政治解读似乎参与了经济联盟和集团的形成，而这反过来又为沿着这些线路的政治竞争创造了越来越多的理由。正如第五章所论述的，社会因素也参与了区域经济集团的形成：“它们是对开放市场强大同质化效应的文化防御机制。”为了维护社会安全，政治经济模式的某种区域变异是必要的（参见 Helleiner 1994b）。
An important reason for these elements of consistency is the way security perceptions in one field color the interpretation of what constitutes a security problem in another sector. It is important to remember that we are not mapping all environmental interaction, only the constellations of interaction relating to environmental security (as is true in the other sectors). When is one likely to define an environmental problem as an environmental security problem? 这些一致性元素的重要原因在于，一个领域的安全感知如何影响对另一个领域安全问题构成的解释。重要的是要记住，我们并不是在绘制所有环境互动，而只是绘制与环境安全相关的互动星座（这在其他领域也是如此）。什么时候人们可能会将环境问题定义为环境安全问题？
Beyond the factors that generally influence how dramatic the issue appears is often the perception of some actor connected to the problem. A water dependency on another country may be unpleasant and may cause one to be concerned about that country’s pollution and overuse of water, but if one has a conflict with that country for other reasons, one is much more likely to define the water problem as a security problem. Thus, through the attachment of the security label, sectors insert themselves into each other. 除了通常影响问题显得多么严重的因素外，通常还存在与问题相关的某个行为体的感知。对另一个国家的水资源依赖可能令人不快，并可能引发对该国污染和过度用水的担忧，但如果因其他原因与该国存在冲突，人们更有可能将水资源问题定义为安全问题。因此，通过贴上安全标签，各个领域相互渗透。
Does this imply a return to the traditional idea that the military sector is, after all, the dominant one and that only when nonmilitary factors are linked to military threats are they security relevant? It could, but it does not have to. There is no necessity for one sector to be foundational to all the others, only for sectors to interconnect through the act of security labeling. In this perspective, states approach secority as aggregate security, not as 这是否意味着回归传统观点，即军事部门毕竟是主导部门，只有当非军事因素与军事威胁相关联时，它们才具有安全相关性？这可能是，但不一定。没有必要某一个部门成为所有其他部门的基础，只需各部门通过安全标记行为相互连接。从这个角度看，国家将安全视为整体安全，而不是作为
five separate fields. They judge which threats are most serious across sectors. As in the debate on aggregate power, in practice this may mostly involve addressing how military power can be brought to bear on nonmilitary issues, but in principle it can just as well be about economic power used in a military conflict. The principal issue is whether sectors have achieved sufficient autonomy and whether the costs of translating from one to the other sector have become so high that one can no longer aggregate security or power. 五个独立的领域。他们评判哪些威胁在各个领域中最为严重。正如关于综合力量的辩论中所述，实际上这可能主要涉及如何将军事力量应用于非军事问题，但原则上也可以是关于在军事冲突中使用经济力量。主要问题在于各领域是否已实现足够的自主性，以及从一个领域转化到另一个领域的成本是否已经高到无法再综合安全或力量。
Illustrations and Devising an Empirical Investigation 举例说明和设计实证调查
What is the relevant unit for this type of analysis? At the end of Chapter 2, we discussed which of our three kinds of units-referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors-should be at the center of an analysis that leads to a construction of security complexes. We argued that referent objects precede securitizing actors but that for the purpose of security complex analysis, in which one should be able to connect different nodes, we have to form more general “units”-such as France, the EU, or the Baltic Sea environment-which in each case combine several slightly different but partly overlapping referent objects (such as state, nation, people, and government) and their main securitizing actors. To approach our question about cross-sectoral security definitions, we look first at some states, then move on to other kinds of units-economic and environmental-and finally turn to a more extensive analysis of the EU. 这种类型的分析的相关单位是什么？在第二章末尾，我们讨论了我们三种单位——参照对象、安全化行为者和功能行为者——中哪一种应成为导致安全复合体构建的分析中心。我们认为参照对象先于安全化行为者，但为了安全复合体分析的目的，在这种分析中应能够连接不同的节点，我们必须形成更一般的“单位”——例如法国、欧盟或波罗的海环境——在每种情况下，这些单位结合了几个稍有不同但部分重叠的参照对象（如国家、民族、人民和政府）及其主要的安全化行为者。为了探讨跨部门安全定义的问题，我们首先观察一些国家，然后转向其他类型的单位——经济和环境单位，最后进行对欧盟的更广泛分析。
France 法国
France is articulated as a referent object in three main forms: as (1) EuropeFrance, (2) as the French state, and (3) as the French nation. (See Figure 8.2.) 法国作为参照对象以三种主要形式表现：（1）欧洲法国，（2）法国国家，以及（3）法国民族。（见图 8.2）
Europe-France: All major securitizing actors, but mainly the state elite, appeal to the defense of France in a mode in which the fate of France is tied to that of Europe. Europe is constructed as a larger France, and France is thus defended by defending this Europe. France-Europe is defended (la) in global competition with the United States and Japan and (1b) against a return of its own past in the form of wars and power struggles (more on this in the next section). The latter includes peacekeeping in Bosnia and other efforts to avoid wars in Europe. Ideally, such operations should be shaped in a way that simultaneously maximizes the European clement and thus serves to create an independent European security identity. During the early Chirac period, the ( 1 it) argument, with its emphasis on comployment and social stability, gained a prominent position, although it 欧洲-法国：所有主要的安全化行为者，但主要是国家精英，都以捍卫法国的方式呼吁防御法国，其命运与欧洲的命运紧密相连。欧洲被构建为一个更大的法国，因此通过捍卫这个欧洲来捍卫法国。法国-欧洲在与美国和日本的全球竞争中受到保护，并且（1b）反对以战争和权力斗争形式回归其自身的过去（下一节将详细讨论）。后者包括在波斯尼亚的维和行动以及其他避免欧洲战争的努力。理想情况下，这些行动应以一种同时最大化欧洲温和性并因此有助于创造独立的欧洲安全身份的方式来塑造。在希拉克早期时期，（1 it）论点强调合作和社会稳定，获得了显著地位，尽管它
Figure 8.2 The Security of France 图 8.2 法国的安全性
2. The French state: The state considered more separately as France is the second referent object. It is appealed to (2a) first by the government in the form of cautious references to a possible German problem and the rationale of French policy as handling this problem through integration and multiple balances with the UK, Spain-Italy, or even Russia. Alternative voices in France (those skeptical of the EU, more national unilateralist voices) make the Germany-related arguments even more strongly, and (2b) they project French sovereignty as threatened by EU integration. 2. 法国国家：作为法国更为独立考虑的国家是第二个指称对象。政府首先（2a）以谨慎提及可能的德国问题以及法国政策通过整合和与英国、西班牙-意大利甚至俄罗斯的多重平衡来处理该问题的理由来诉诸于此。法国的替代声音（那些对欧盟持怀疑态度、更具民族单边主义倾向的声音）更加强烈地提出与德国相关的论点，并且（2b）他们将法国主权描绘为受到欧盟一体化的威胁。
3. The French nation: The nation itself is presented as threatened. Most obviously, a campaign is constructing this scenario in parallel with the sovereignty threat from the EU–Europe as a threat to identity-which often goes together with immigrants as a threat to nation and identity (3a). In more official circles, however, a cultural defense of France has also become more distinct (3b). The Chirac government upgraded this defense in parallel with its continuation of an EU-based overall strategy close to Mitterrand’s. 3. 法国民族：民族本身被呈现为受到威胁。最明显的是，一场运动正在构建这一情景，与来自欧盟的主权威胁——欧洲作为对身份的威胁——并行，这通常与移民作为对民族和身份的威胁相伴随（3a）。然而，在更官方的圈子里，法国的文化防御也变得更加明显（3b）。希拉克政府在继续执行接近密特朗的欧盟整体战略的同时，也提升了这种防御。
Economic arguments are significant in French security rhetoric, and they mainly channel into (1a), the global interpretation in which France and Europe are two sides of the same coin. Societal security concerns are structured even more clearly according to an overarching pattern of definitions derived from the political setup. Virtually the same argument can end up meaning opposite things depending upon the political rationale with which it is articulated. Politically, two main programs attempt to articulate the security of France. One basically draws on the EU-France doubling of the Mitterrand era and presents security as occurring primarily at the level of 经济论据在法国安全话语中具有重要意义，主要体现在（1a）中，即法国和欧洲是同一枚硬币的两面。社会安全关切则更清晰地按照源自政治结构的总体定义模式来构建。几乎相同的论点根据其表达的政治理由，可能意味着截然相反的内容。在政治上，有两个主要方案试图阐述法国的安全。其中一个基本上借鉴了密特朗时代的欧盟-法国双重结构，并将安全主要视为发生在...
the system (global competition) and as a general strategy for Europe (avoiding war and handling Germany). The new twist is to attempt to combine this program with a more segregated defense of French culture, probably as a compensatory move to take energy out of the competing program, which more clearly appeals to “France” as separate from Europe (and thereby from Germany). ^(4){ }^{4} Both of these main programs articulate threats in several sectors and integrate them narratively; thus, the separate threats are strongly colored by each other. (This interpretation of France draws heavily on Holm 1993; and Wæver, Holm, and Larsen forthcoming). 该体系（全球竞争）以及作为欧洲的一般战略（避免战争和处理德国问题）。新的转折是试图将这一方案与对法国文化更为分隔的防御相结合，可能作为一种补偿性举措，以削弱竞争方案的能量，该方案更明确地诉诸于作为独立于欧洲（从而独立于德国）的“法国”。这两个主要方案都在多个领域阐述威胁并将其叙事整合；因此，单独的威胁相互强烈影响。（对法国的这种解读大量借鉴了 Holm 1993；以及 Wæver、Holm 和 Larsen 即将出版的著作）。
Japan 日本
Japan is famous in the field of security studies for its concept of comprehensive security. Formally, this refers primarily to the formula delineating that security policy should operate at three levels: to influence positively the overall international environment, to cope unilaterally with threats, and to act in solidarity with “countries sharing the same ideals and interests” (Barnett 1984: 1; Tanaka 1994: 34). When one reads through actual Japanese calculations and reasoning about threats and efforts, the function of the concept seems to be mainly to stress the interconnectedness of problems to ensure that Japan does not have to deal specifically with problems that are painful (usually historical) or that demand types of action Japan wants to avoid (usually political-military). Conveniently, Japan can almost always interpret problems at least in part as economic development issues and can therefore point to a possible Japanese contribution to security policy in the form of economic assistance (e.g., Tanaka 1994: 46f). This is a very interesting case of a country constructing aggregate-comprehensive security as a general category and thereby achieving an increased ability to take action in its preferred sector regardless of the sector from which the threat emerges. 日本以其综合安全的概念在安全研究领域闻名。正式来说，这主要指的是一个公式，划定安全政策应在三个层面运作：积极影响整体国际环境、单方面应对威胁，以及与“拥有相同理想和利益的国家”团结行动（Barnett 1984: 1；Tanaka 1994: 34）。当人们阅读日本关于威胁和努力的实际计算和推理时，这一概念的功能似乎主要是强调问题的相互关联性，以确保日本不必专门处理那些痛苦的（通常是历史性的）问题，或那些需要日本想要避免的行动类型（通常是政治-军事）的情况。方便的是，日本几乎总能将问题至少部分解释为经济发展问题，因此可以指出日本在安全政策中可能的贡献形式，即经济援助（例如，Tanaka 1994: 46f）。 这是一个非常有趣的案例，展示了一个国家如何将综合性安全构建为一个一般类别，从而在其偏好的领域中增强采取行动的能力，而不论威胁来自哪个领域。
"Third World" States “第三世界”国家
Regarding what are sometimes too easily generalized as third world states, it has been argued as a general characteristic that domestic political concerns tend to be the lens through which other threats are judged-“although this does not mean external threats do not exist, it does imply that such threats often attain prominence largely because of the conflicts that abound within Third World states” (Ayoob 1995: 7). Mohammed Ayoob further asserts that for Third World states the definition of security should be primarily political, because other realms “must be filtered through the political realm” (Ayooh 1995: 8). Because of the general vulnerability of states and regimes, this concern will most often be the criterion by which to judge the other valuerabilities-economic or ecological-what defintely do exish. 关于有时被过于轻率地概括为第三世界国家的问题，有人认为一个普遍特征是国内政治关切往往成为评判其他威胁的视角——“虽然这并不意味着外部威胁不存在，但这暗示了此类威胁往往因第三世界国家内部普遍存在的冲突而获得突出地位”（Ayoob 1995: 7）。穆罕默德·阿尤布进一步断言，对于第三世界国家，安全的定义应主要是政治性的，因为其他领域“必须通过政治领域来过滤”（Ayoob 1995: 8）。由于国家和政权普遍脆弱，这种关切通常将成为评判其他确实存在的脆弱性——无论是经济还是生态——的标准。
The relationship between internal and external factors is symbiotic (Ayoob 1995: 51), but the internal vulnerability-in Ayoob’s argument, defined by the political elites-is so central that even third world states’ collective concern regarding their status in the international system is largely an extension of the internal security situation as far as third world elites are concerned (Ayoob 1995: 191). 内部因素与外部因素之间的关系是共生的（Ayoob 1995: 51），但内部脆弱性——在 Ayoob 的论述中，由政治精英定义——是如此核心，以至于即使是第三世界国家对其在国际体系中地位的集体关切，在第三世界精英看来，也在很大程度上是内部安全状况的延伸（Ayoob 1995: 191）。
To pick a specific case from the third world, we can draw on Francis Deng’s study of Sudan and summarize the complex analysis brutally as follows. The conflict is generally recognized as basically an identity conflict, a conflict both between identities (the northern Arab-Muslim and the southern, African Christian-Animist) and within identities, notably the contested nature of the dominant northern-Sudanese project (cf., e.g., Deng 1995: 3ff., 135ff., 348). Paradoxically, the South, which the North is trying to assimilate, is also the Other against which the North’s identity is stabilized, as is also the case the other way around (Deng 1995: 402). The entire affair is unquestionably intensely securitized, but this seemingly remains within the societal sector. The conflict, however, has its focus on-and is often triggered by-the control of state structures (Deng 1995: viii, 135 ff ., 484ff.). 以第三世界的一个具体案例为例，我们可以借鉴 Francis Deng 对苏丹的研究，并将复杂的分析粗暴地总结如下。该冲突通常被认为基本上是身份认同冲突，即身份之间的冲突（北方的阿拉伯-穆斯林与南方的非洲基督教-泛灵论者）以及身份内部的冲突，特别是对主导的北苏丹项目的争议性质（参见例如 Deng 1995: 3 页起，135 页起，348 页）。矛盾的是，南方是北方试图同化的对象，同时也是北方身份得以稳定的“他者”，反之亦然（Deng 1995: 402 页）。整个事件无疑高度安全化，但这似乎仍局限于社会领域。然而，冲突的焦点并且常常由对国家结构的控制引发（Deng 1995: viii 页，135 页起，484 页起）。
External factors are important to the conflict. As perceptively argued by Deng, 外部因素对冲突也很重要。正如邓敏锐地指出，
It is important to distinguish between foreign involvement in the conflict and external systems that act as models for the perceptions of Sudanese identity. While direct foreign involvement has had minimal lasting effect, externally based models of identity have been at the core of the racial, ethnic, cultural and religious configuration of the Sudan. (1995: 347) 区分外国介入冲突与作为苏丹身份认知模型的外部体系非常重要。虽然直接的外国介入对苏丹的持久影响甚微，但基于外部的身份模型一直是苏丹种族、民族、文化和宗教构成的核心。（1995：347）
Thus, we see internal and external factors merged but with the domestic constellation defining the issues, and we see politics setting the sceneboth of which reconfirm Ayoob’s general statements. In this case, identity issues (societal security) make up most of the conflict, but they are structured largely by the political sector; otherwise, one would have expected the conflict simply to multiply within and across state borders in a network of clan, tribe, and religious conflicts. The relatively focused Sudanese conflicts testify to the importance of struggles over state power and its usage and thus to the role of the political sector in structuring extensive societal security problems, in this case organizing around a localizing-that is, intrastate-conflict. 因此，我们看到内部和外部因素融合，但以国内的星座定义问题，同时看到政治设定了场景——这两者都再次确认了阿尤布的一般性陈述。在这种情况下，身份问题（社会安全）构成了大部分冲突，但它们主要由政治部门构建；否则，人们本会预期冲突仅在国家边界内外以氏族、部落和宗教冲突网络的形式扩散。相对集中的苏丹冲突证明了争夺国家权力及其使用的重要性，因此也证明了政治部门在构建广泛社会安全问题中的作用，在此案例中围绕地方化——即国内冲突——进行组织。
States are typically involved in all sectors, even if their hierarchies differ among the different sectors. Also, we could expect to find the EU involved in all sectors and possibly securitizing in several, because functionally it covers all fields and has state qualities. With cases like the LIEO or the environment/Greenpeace, one might at first expect single-sector appearances, but here we also find that more sectors are usually involved, even if there is a clear or a formal focus on one sector. 国家通常参与所有领域，尽管它们在不同领域中的层级结构有所不同。此外，我们可以预期欧盟参与所有领域，并可能在多个领域进行安全化，因为从功能上讲它涵盖所有领域并具有国家特质。像 LIEO 或环境/绿色和平这样的案例，起初可能会预期只出现在单一领域，但在这里我们也发现通常涉及更多领域，即使有明确或正式聚焦于某一领域。
The Liberal International Economic Order 自由国际经济秩序
Moving on to the less statelike cases, the liberal international economic order (a referent object, not an actor except in the Wall Street Journal) was touched upon earlier. It is appealed to mostly by the leading capitalist states, which use it both against each other in the case of alleged violations of GATT-WTO rules and against outsiders and would-be insiders who are molded into appropriate modes of behavior and, to some extent, modes of being. And as argued previously, this effort blends with the politics of international society-the concern for the principles of the political sectorwhere especially the definition of insiders and outsiders serves to connect the two sectors. Societal dynamics are also present in the dialectics between regionalism and liberal globalism because of the legitimation of regionalism as a defense of cultural distinctiveness. 继续讨论那些不太像国家的情况，早先提到过自由国际经济秩序（一个参照对象，而非行动者，除非是在《华尔街日报》中）。它主要被主要资本主义国家所诉诸，这些国家在指控违反关贸总协定-世界贸易组织规则时既相互对抗，也对外部人士和准内部人士施加影响，使其形成适当的行为模式，在某种程度上也形成存在模式。正如之前所论述的，这一努力与国际社会政治的政治部门原则关切相融合——特别是内部人士和外部人士的定义连接了这两个部门。社会动态也体现在区域主义与自由全球主义之间的辩证关系中，因为区域主义作为文化独特性的防御而获得合法性。
The Environment 环境
In the environmental sector, linkages across sectors are legion, and for the purpose of a security complex analysis it seems possible to take dense packages of referent objects and actors as a focus. When one looks to the lypical environmental actors, such as environmentalist groups, their arguments often point to threats that are really societal, economic, or military. As argued in Chapter 4, the rhetoric of environmentalists seems at first to be in defense of “the environment”; when more skeptical audiences have to be convinced, the arguments are phrased in terms of threats to societal stability, long-term economic sustainability, and even the dangers of wars over scarce resources. The intersection of environmental problems with threats from other sectors forms the basis of much successful securitization by environmental activists. 在环境领域，跨部门的联系非常多，对于安全复合体分析的目的来说，似乎可以将密集的参照对象和行为者组合作为焦点。当人们关注典型的环境行为者，如环保团体时，他们的论点常常指向实际上是社会、经济或军事的威胁。正如第四章所论述的，环保主义者的言辞乍看之下似乎是在捍卫“环境”；当需要说服更为怀疑的听众时，论点则以对社会稳定、长期经济可持续性，甚至因稀缺资源引发战争的危险的威胁来表达。环境问题与其他领域威胁的交叉构成了环保活动家成功实现安全化的基础。
Thus, even in the more challenging sectors, we find that security actors do not function in separate sectors. States appear in all sectors, and even when some referent objects or actors are clearly rooted in one specific sector, there are links to other sectors. This finding does not substantiate, although it does support, the far-reaching thesis presented in “CrossSectoral Security Connections Through the Actor’s Lens” that security lunctions mostly as aggregate security for actors and that therefore they weigh the different sectors against each other. We as analysts therefore do not have to connect fully packaged, separate sectors-they are interrelated in the securitization process. The credibility of this theory demands more detailed empirical studies of the way units securitize. To what extent do their securitizations in one sector influence, and become influenced by, those from other sechors’? Ouly if such linkages exist can aggregate security te at play. Space does not allow a full range of case studies here, so we presollt one relatively systematic case will somewhat more complete doce mentation thath those surveyed sa far. 因此，即使在更具挑战性的领域中，我们也发现安全行为者并不在独立的领域中运作。国家出现在所有领域中，即使某些参照对象或行为者明显根植于某一特定领域，也存在与其他领域的联系。这个发现虽然没有完全证实，但支持了《CrossSectoral Security Connections Through the Actor’s Lens》中提出的深远论断，即安全功能主要作为行为者的综合安全，因此他们会权衡不同领域之间的关系。因此，作为分析者，我们不必将完全独立的领域连接起来——它们在安全化过程中是相互关联的。该理论的可信度需要对单位如何进行安全化的方式进行更详细的实证研究。在多大程度上，它们在一个领域的安全化会影响并受到其他领域安全化的影响？只有存在这样的联系，综合安全才能发挥作用。篇幅有限，无法在此提供完整的案例研究，因此我们呈现一个相对系统的案例，其文献记录比迄今为止调查的案例更为完整。
The case(s) should also serve to investigate whether cross-sectoral connections mean one specific sector is always dominant (the military one, as traditionally claimed, or the political sector as considered in Chapter 7 and, for example, in Jahn, Lemaitre, and Wæver 1987, and Ayoob 1995) or whether the connection is one of mutual coloring-that is, all sectors are interpreted in light of the general security issue: overdetermination. In part, the issue of aggregate versus sector-specific security is about burcaucraticinstitutional questions: To what extent is security centralized in a specific organ (e.g., a national security council) or decentralized? Aggregate security does not demand that actors view all security issues through some grand conception of the total situation, only that there is a kind of ranking at the top with which actors perceive some issue(s) as primary instances of security as such. This is exactly what we should expect because of the nature of security: Since security is about priority, about elevating issues to absolute priority, it is natural that different candidates will battle it out (politically) with each other. If an issue has not pushed almost all other issues aside, it has not been fully securitized. Therefore, it is in the nature of security as conceived here (securitization) that the five sectors can not remain separate but must vie for primacy. 这些案例还应当用于调查跨部门联系是否意味着某一特定部门始终占主导地位（如传统上所称的军事部门，或第 7 章以及例如 Jahn、Lemaitre 和 Wæver 1987 年、Ayoob 1995 年中所考虑的政治部门），或者这种联系是否是一种相互影响——即所有部门都在总体安全问题的光照下被解读：过度决定性。部分而言，总体安全与部门特定安全的问题涉及官僚机构问题：安全在多大程度上集中于某一特定机构（例如国家安全委员会）或分散？总体安全并不要求行为者通过某种对整体局势的宏大构想来看待所有安全问题，只要求在最高层存在某种排序，使行为者将某些问题视为安全的主要实例。这正是我们应当预期的，因为安全的本质：安全关乎优先权，关乎将问题提升为绝对优先，因此不同的候选者（政治上）相互竞争是很自然的。 如果一个问题没有几乎将所有其他问题排除在外，那么它就没有被完全安全化。因此，正如这里所设想的安全本质（安全化）所示，五个领域不可能保持分离，而必须争夺主导地位。
We need to investigate whether this mechanism of cross-sectoral interpretation actually operates and, if so, how (for instance, whether the military sector does dominate all others or the sectors influence each other in more complex ways). We must also investigate how it is possible to conduct security complex analysis in a cross-sectoral mode instead of building sector-specific complexes. To find the answers requires an empirical study of some units that define security and, preferably, also of security interaction among units. This entails three questions: (1) choice of units, (2) choice of method, and (3) choice of material and sources. 我们需要调查这种跨部门解释机制是否真正运作，如果运作，具体如何运作（例如，军事部门是否主导所有其他部门，或者各部门之间是否以更复杂的方式相互影响）。我们还必须研究如何以跨部门模式进行安全复合体分析，而不是构建特定部门的复合体。要找到答案，需要对定义安全的一些单位进行实证研究，最好还包括单位之间的安全互动。这涉及三个问题：（1）单位的选择，（2）方法的选择，以及（3）材料和资料来源的选择。
The unit chosen is the EUE U. We have made a number of impressionistic comments on various other cases, but we want to study at least one systematically. Choosing a state would be problematic in a book that wants to show that other units can be referent objects and actors. But some of the more extreme cases are too obviously dominated by one sector to be worth an entire study (cf. Greenpeace, described previously). The EU is a nonstate but with some statelike features and is interesting because of its involvement in complex, multilayered politics. 选择的单位是 。我们对其他各种案例做了一些印象式的评论，但我们希望至少系统地研究一个。选择一个国家在一本想要展示其他单位也可以是指称对象和行动者的书中会有问题。但一些更极端的案例显然被某一部门主导，无法值得整本研究（参见之前描述的绿色和平组织）。欧盟是一个非国家实体，但具有一些类国家特征，因其参与复杂、多层次的政治而具有趣味性。
How should we study our cases? The obvious method is discourse analysis, since we are interested in when and how something is established by whom as a security threat. The defining criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse. 我们应该如何研究我们的案例？显而易见的方法是话语分析，因为我们关心的是何时以及如何由谁将某事确立为安全威胁。安全的定义标准是文本性的：必须在话语中定位的特定修辞结构。
We will not use any sophisticated linguistic or quantitative techniques. What follows is discourse analysis simply in the sense that discourse is studied as a subject in its own right, not as an indicator of something else. By this method we will not find moderlying motives, hidden agenda, or 我们不会使用任何复杂的语言学或定量技术。接下来的是话语分析，仅仅是指将话语作为一个独立的研究对象，而不是作为其他事物的指标。通过这种方法，我们不会发现潜在动机、隐藏议程，或
such. There might be confidential sources that could reveal intentions and tactics, but the purpose of discourse analysis is not to get at something else. One of its weaknesses is that it is a poor strategy for finding real motives. If one’s theory points toward questions at another level than intentions however, this critique is irrelevant. Discourse analysis can uncover one thing: discourse. Whenever discourse and the structures thereof are interesting in themselves, discourse analysis makes sense. This is the case if one has reason to believe discourse has structures that are sufficiently rigid to shape possible policy lines (Wæver 1994; Wæver, Holm, and Larsen forthcoming) or if one wants to locate a phenomenon that is defined by a characteristic discursive move (e.g., this book). The technique is simple: Read, looking for arguments that take the rhetorical and logical form defined here as security. 如此。可能存在能够揭示意图和策略的机密来源，但话语分析的目的并不是为了揭示其他内容。其弱点之一是它不是寻找真实动机的有效策略。然而，如果某个理论指向的是不同于意图层面的问题，那么这种批评就无关紧要。话语分析能够揭示一件事：话语。每当话语及其结构本身具有趣味时，话语分析就有意义。如果有理由相信话语具有足够刚性的结构以塑造可能的政策路线（Wæver 1994；Wæver、Holm 和 Larsen 即将出版），或者如果想定位由特征性话语动作定义的现象（例如，本书），情况就是如此。该技术很简单：阅读，寻找符合此处定义为安全的修辞和逻辑形式的论点。
Discourse analysis is not the exclusive method of securitization studies. A complete analysis will also include more traditional political analysis of units interacting, facilitating conditions, and all of the other dimensions of security complex theory. But to see whether securitizations are separate or are defined by each other, a study of the actual phrasing of the securitizing moves seems appropriate. Furthermore, this small case study has a second purpose beyond the specific Chapter 8 question: to see whether our Chapter 2 definitions are operational. Is it possible to recognize securitization when one meets it? Are the criteria so vague that there will be too many cases, making the entire exercise meaningless, or are the demands too high and instances therefore extremely rare? The study of the EU discourse aims to show whether the rhetorical structure of securitization is sufficiently distinct that a close reading of texts can lead to a relatively indisputable list of instances. 话语分析并不是安全化研究的唯一方法。完整的分析还将包括对互动单位、促进条件以及安全复合体理论的所有其他维度的更传统的政治分析。但为了判断安全化是否是相互独立的，还是由彼此定义的，研究安全化行动的实际措辞似乎是合适的。此外，这个小案例研究除了针对第 8 章的具体问题外，还有第二个目的：检验我们第 2 章的定义是否具有操作性。遇到安全化时是否能够识别出来？标准是否过于模糊，以至于案例过多，使整个研究毫无意义，还是要求过高，导致实例极为罕见？对欧盟话语的研究旨在展示安全化的修辞结构是否足够独特，从而通过对文本的细读能够得出相对无可争议的实例列表。
3. The analysis should be conducted on texts that are central in the sense that if a security discourse is operative in this community, it should be expected to materialize in this text because this occasion is sufficiently important (cf. Wæver 1989a: 190ff.). The logic is that if a securitization is socially empowered in a given society (when “a” argues that all of A is threatened by B, this is generally accepted as valid and powerful, and “a” thereby gains acceptance for doing xx ), we should expect “a” to use this argument whenever a debate is sufficiently important. Since the security argument is a powerful instrument, it is against its nature to be hidden. Therefore, if one takes important debates, the major instances of securitizalion should appear on the scene to battle with each other for primacy; thus, one docs not need to read everything, particularly not obscure texts. 3. 分析应当针对那些具有核心地位的文本进行，因为如果某个社区中存在安全话语，那么预计它会在这些文本中体现出来，因为这些场合足够重要（参见 Wæver 1989a: 190 及以下页）。其逻辑是，如果某种安全化在特定社会中获得了社会授权（当“a”主张整个 A 受到 B 的威胁时，这一观点通常被认为有效且有力，“a”因此获得了进行安全化的认可），那么我们应当预期“a”会在任何足够重要的辩论中使用这一论点。由于安全论证是一种强有力的工具，其本质上不可能被隐藏。因此，如果选取重要的辩论，主要的安全化实例应当会出现并相互竞争以争夺主导地位；因此，无需阅读所有内容，尤其是不必阅读晦涩难懂的文本。
We have selected texts of an overall nature. ^(5){ }^{5} Although the choice of general debates rather than more specific debates on concrete measures has the advanlage of struclurally including the criterion of importance-actors have to prioritize which issues and arguments to select in a general “free” session-it has the disadvantage of being less clear about what the measure advocaled or legitimated is. Offen, it will therefore be easior on find the lïrst 我们选择了总体性质的文本。虽然选择一般性辩论而非关于具体措施的更具体辩论具有结构性地包含重要性标准的优势——参与者必须在一般“自由”会议中优先选择哪些问题和论点——但其缺点是对所倡导或合法化的措施不够明确。因此，通常更容易找到第一个。
part of the securitization move-arguing for existential threats and urgency-and less clear whether this points to specific emergency measures and a violation of normal politics or established rules. Therefore, an aftercheck is carried out in the form of reading a wide selection of texts that relate specifically to the different sector subjects. ^(6){ }^{6} Because of the limited space available in the present context, findings from these texts are reported only when they deviate significantly from the main analysis. The texts were chosen from a limited period-1995-both to maximize possible structural cross-determination and to minimize arbitrariness in the selection of instances. It is better to have a limited set of texts and a complete representation of securitization instances than a large set from which the authors pick at liberty. In each document, a search for security arguments is carried out, and each finding is investigated as to its context, the referent object, the threat, and-not least-its connection to other sectors, that is, whether the security nature of the issue is derived from the fact that the source of the threat is already securitized in another sector. ^(7){ }^{7} 作为安全化行动的一部分——主张存在性威胁和紧迫性——但不太清楚这是否指向具体的紧急措施以及对正常政治或既定规则的违反。因此，进行了事后检查，形式是阅读大量与不同部门主题具体相关的文本。由于当前环境中空间有限，只有当这些文本的发现显著偏离主要分析时才予以报告。所选文本来自有限的时期——1995 年——既为了最大化可能的结构性相互决定，也为了最小化实例选择的任意性。拥有有限的文本集和安全化实例的完整代表性，比拥有大量文本而作者随意挑选更好。在每份文件中，都会进行安全论证的搜索，并对每个发现进行调查，包括其背景、参照对象、威胁，以及——尤其是——其与其他部门的联系，即该问题的安全性质是否源于威胁来源已在另一个部门被安全化。
If this were a case study of a region, of a security complex, it would have to include several referent objects, their securitizations, and-not least-the interaction among them. After reading the EU case, it might seem impossible to do this for all parties to a complex. Will security complex analysis always have to involve that much discourse analysis, that much close reading of texts? No! It is simply a question of the level of detail in a case study. 如果这是一个关于某个地区、安全复合体的案例研究，它必须包括几个参照对象，它们的安全化过程，以及——最重要的——它们之间的互动。读完欧盟案例后，似乎不可能对复杂体中的所有参与方都这样做。安全复合体分析是否总是必须涉及那么多话语分析，那么多对文本的细致解读？不！这仅仅是案例研究细节层次的问题。
In CSCT, the security complex was also built from the concerns and perceptions of the actors, but rarely did a security complex analysis involve a formalized, empirical study of these factors (Buzan and Rizvi et al. 1986 probably comes the closest). Most analyses of regional security complexes would concentrate on the aggregation, on pulling together the regional story, and would - much in the tradition of security studies-base themselves on a rather impressionistic interpretation of the different actors. Security experts usually draw upon a varied repertoire of sources, newspapers, conversations, theories, and other academic writings on the case, which all come together in their skillful judgment about the nature of Russian security concerns or what is most central to Indian security. The documentation is rarely spelled out in any formal way. (The judgment of the security expert-where formal evidence ends-is found relevant exactly because he or she is an expert and the evidence is inconclusive. In this, the security expert is more like a management consultant, who is asked to evaluate a situation, than like a traditional scientist whose argument counts only as far as the evidence is conclusive.) 在 CSCT 中，安全复合体也是由行为体的关切和认知构建而成，但很少有安全复合体分析涉及对这些因素的正式、实证研究（Buzan 和 Rizvi 等人 1986 年的研究可能最接近）。大多数区域安全复合体的分析会集中于汇总，整合区域故事，并且——在安全研究的传统中——基于对不同行为体的相当印象主义的解读。安全专家通常借助多样的资料来源，如报纸、对话、理论以及其他关于案例的学术著作，这些都汇聚在他们对俄罗斯安全关切的本质或印度安全最核心问题的熟练判断中。相关文献很少以任何正式方式详细说明。（安全专家的判断——在正式证据终止之处——之所以被认为相关，正是因为他或她是专家，而证据并不确定。） 在这方面，安全专家更像是一位管理顾问，被要求评估一种情况，而不像传统科学家那样，其论点仅在证据确凿时才有分量。
The following, rather detailed investigation of the micrologic of one node in a security complex is thus the corollary to other studies of actors that in CSCT should be done in a book-length analysis of a complex but that would be left out and replaced with qualified judgment in a more brief analysis that concentrates on that which is particular to security complex 因此，以下对安全复合体中一个节点的微观逻辑的相当详细的调查，是对其他行为者研究的推论，这些研究在 CSCT 中应在一本书长的分析中完成，但在更简短的分析中会被省略，并以有资格的判断取代，集中于安全复合体特有的内容。
analysis-the regional totality. With the revised security complex analysis, one can still do the regional analysis without engaging in discourse analysis on each actor. But it is probably useful to try it a few times to get an understanding of the microdynamics of regional security. 分析——区域整体性。通过修订后的安全复合体分析，仍然可以进行区域分析，而无需对每个行为者进行话语分析。但尝试几次以理解区域安全的微观动态可能是有益的。
The European Union: A Reading 欧洲联盟：一种解读
On his final step to becoming president of the Commission, Jacques Santer, in his 17 January 1995 speech (Santer 1995a: 14), used security arguments in a few contexts. First: 在成为委员会主席的最后一步中，雅克·桑特在他 1995 年 1 月 17 日的演讲中（Santer 1995a: 14）在几个语境中使用了安全论点。首先：
Europe has witnessed great events over the past five years: Germany has been reunited, Communism has fallen. But, as Vaclav Havel has said, everything is possible but nothing is certain any more. We are experiencing once again the resurgence of rabid nationalism, erupting in some cases into bloody conflict, as in what was the former Yugoslavia. This tragedy teaches us one fundamental lesson: it is more important than ever that the Union remain an axis of peace and prosperity for the continent of Europe. First of all, we must preserve and develop what we have built over the past fifty years. It is something of a miracle that war between our peoples should have become unthinkable. To squander this legacy would be a crime against ourselves. Secondly, the Union cannot be a haven of peace in a troubled sca. Hence the importance of future enlargements. Hence, too, the importance of developing a genuine foreign and security policy. 过去五年，欧洲经历了重大事件：德国实现了统一，共产主义已经崩溃。但正如瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔所说，一切皆有可能，但没有什么是确定的。我们再次经历了狂热民族主义的复苏，在某些情况下爆发成血腥冲突，如前南斯拉夫的情况。这场悲剧教给我们一个根本的教训：欧盟比以往任何时候都更重要，必须成为欧洲大陆和平与繁荣的轴心。首先，我们必须保护和发展过去五十年所建立的一切。各国人民之间的战争变得不可想象，这几乎是一个奇迹。浪费这一遗产将是对我们自己的犯罪。其次，欧盟不能成为动荡海域中的和平避风港。因此，未来的扩展非常重要。同样，发展真正的外交和安全政策也至关重要。
The fact that this legacy can possibly be “squandered” implies that the miracle of the Western European security community is a precarious achievement and that integration as such has to be defended to preserve peace. ^(8){ }^{8} This points to the general conclusion of keeping the process of integration alive and to the specific inferences that enlargement and common foreign and security policy are mandatory. 这一遗产可能被“浪费”的事实意味着西欧安全共同体的奇迹是一项不稳定的成就，必须捍卫一体化本身以维护和平。这指向了保持一体化进程活力的一般结论，以及扩大和共同外交与安全政策是强制性的具体推论。
Second, “our venture will fail” if it remains “the prerogative of a select band of insiders” (Santer 1995a). Ordinary Europeans want to participate, and they want clear signs that the EU will act on matters of importance to them. So far, it is difficult to know what conclusions to draw from this argument-more and more often heard-although it is often strongly dramatized. Thus, it cannot yet be seen as a clear securitization. 其次，如果“我们的事业失败”，那是因为它仍然是“一小撮内部人士的特权”（Santer 1995a）。普通欧洲人希望参与，他们希望看到欧盟在对他们重要的事务上采取行动的明确迹象。到目前为止，很难从这一论点中得出结论——这一论点越来越常被听到——尽管它常被强烈渲染。因此，它尚不能被视为明确的安全化。
Equally weak, and thus below the threshold of security, are references to the threat from new technologies potentially dominated by others (the United States and Japan)-“I want to see European traffic on the global information highways”-and the use of terms such as securing the survival of the European social model, environmental problems with their potential of “jeopardizing future generations” chances of meeting their needs," and protection of “rusal areas and smaller towns.” Although here they do not lake elear security lorms, each of ile subjects returns later in other contexts with the next slep mone clearly indicaned. 同样薄弱，因此低于安全门槛的，还有对可能被他国（美国和日本）主导的新技术威胁的提及——“我想看到欧洲在全球信息高速公路上的流量”——以及使用诸如保障欧洲社会模式生存、环境问题及其“危及未来几代人满足其需求的机会”、保护“农村地区和小城镇”等术语。尽管这里它们没有形成明确的安全形式，但每个主题稍后在其他语境中以更清晰的下一步形式出现。
The word security is mentioned in the fixed expression "common foreign and security policy"9 and beyond this-and more distinctly-in the context of internal security, of legal and internal cooperation to combat crime, drugs, and illegal immigration. In the work program (section 4), a similar reference is made to internal security, even stating that “criminal organizations have already shown that they can and will exploit weak points in the defence of the Union.” Therefore, it is argued, the Commission will be using its competencies to the limit (European Commission 1995: section 4; Santer 1995a: 16, 1995b: 107), and there is at least a tone here of “we can do this because it is about security” or “you must understand that we have to do this.” “安全”一词出现在固定表达“共同的外交与安全政策”中 9，除此之外——更明确地说——还出现在内部安全的语境中，即为打击犯罪、毒品和非法移民而进行的法律和内部合作。在工作计划（第 4 节）中，也有类似的提及内部安全，甚至指出“犯罪组织已经表明他们能够并且将会利用联盟防御中的薄弱环节。”因此，有人认为，委员会将充分发挥其职权（欧洲委员会 1995 年：第 4 节；桑特 1995a：16，1995b：107），这里至少有一种“我们之所以能这样做，是因为涉及安全”或“你必须理解我们必须这样做”的语气。
The other documents from the Commission and from Santer repeat variations on these themes, although they differ in sometimes giving a more dramatic expression of the environmental argument or more dramatic expressions regarding internal security. We will visit the two other institutions in turn-first the Council, then the European Parliament-then sum up and analyze the findings. 委员会和桑特的其他文件重复了这些主题的不同变体，尽管它们有时在环境论点或关于内部安全的表达上更为戏剧化。我们将依次访问另外两个机构——先是理事会，然后是欧洲议会——然后总结并分析这些发现。
The Cannes Declaration (June 1995) from the European Councilsummits of heads of states and governments-is almost free of security arguments (European Council 1995a). There are hints of such arguments in formulations about a currency crisis, about stability (in relation to Russia), and perhaps most strongly on police cooperation (in the annex on EuroMediterranean cooperation). The Madrid Declaration (December 1995) is totally free of securitization (European Council 1995b). Given its composi-tion-member states-it is understandable that this body securitizes less for Europe, that is, that it hesitates to give “Europe” extraordinary powers. A little more securitization is found in the other Council documents. 1995 年 6 月的戛纳宣言来自欧洲理事会国家元首和政府首脑峰会，几乎没有安全论据（European Council 1995a）。在关于货币危机、稳定性（与俄罗斯相关）以及可能最强烈的警察合作（关于欧地中海合作的附件）等表述中，有安全论据的暗示。1995 年 12 月的马德里宣言完全没有安全化内容（European Council 1995b）。鉴于其成员构成——成员国——可以理解该机构对欧洲的安全化较少，即它对赋予“欧洲”特殊权力持犹豫态度。其他理事会文件中则有稍多的安全化内容。
The other form in which the Council appears in our material is as the president of the Council (the head of state or government representing the country chairing the EU for that half year). This situation is more complex in the sense that a Spanish prime minister speaks according to both Spanish and Council logic; he speaks differently from, say, a German chancellor and also differently from the way he would speak if he were not in the EU chair (for instance, he is more positive about Eastern enlargement). Technically, he represents the Council, although the collective “check” is fairly loose. There is nevertheless a certain role framing, and especially on occasions such as the ones we are dealing with here, the prime minister or president speaks with the knowledge that his speech must be tolerable to all of the states. Of this type we have François Mitterrand’s grand farewell speech of 15 March 1995 and Felipe Gonzáles Márquez’s as part of the State of the Union debate in November 1995. 理事会在我们材料中出现的另一种形式是理事会主席（代表该国担任欧盟轮值主席国的国家元首或政府首脑）。这种情况更为复杂，因为西班牙首相既按照西班牙的逻辑发言，也按照理事会的逻辑发言；他的发言方式不同于德国总理，也不同于如果他不是欧盟轮值主席时的发言方式（例如，他对东扩持更积极的态度）。从技术上讲，他代表理事会，尽管集体“制衡”相当松散。然而，仍然存在一定的角色框架，尤其是在我们这里讨论的场合，首相或总统发言时知道他的讲话必须为所有国家所容忍。在这类情况下，我们有弗朗索瓦·密特朗 1995 年 3 月 15 日的盛大告别演讲，以及费利佩·冈萨雷斯·马尔克斯 1995 年 11 月作为国情咨文辩论一部分的发言。
Mitterrand’s speech contained two parts-a normal presentation of the program of the French presidency and a personal part, his European testament. In the normal part, he is most dramatic in the section on internal 密特朗的演讲包含两个部分——法国轮值主席国计划的正常介绍和个人部分，他的欧洲遗嘱。在正常部分，他在关于内部安全的章节中最为激动人心，
security, which is given as the first example of the need for citizens to feel concretely the utility of the EU. 这被作为公民切实感受到欧盟效用的第一个例子。
I am thinking firstly . . . of the EUROPOL Convention . . . the general rule that we must all move forward together-in particular, in the area of security. As far as the right of asylum and immigration is concerned, a great deal remains to be done. . . . Europe will be a people’s Europe only if our people feel secure in Europe, and because of Europe. I could say as much . . . about cooperation on justice. or about coordinated action to combat terrorism and organized crime. (Mitterrand 1995: 48) 我首先想到的是……欧洲刑警组织公约……我们必须共同前进的一般原则——特别是在安全领域。至于庇护权和移民问题，还有很多工作要做……只有当我们的人民在欧洲感到安全，并因欧洲而感到安全时，欧洲才会成为人民的欧洲。我也可以说……关于司法合作，或者关于协调行动打击恐怖主义和有组织犯罪。（密特朗 1995：48）
The other remarkable element in that part of the speech which was picked up the most often by the parliamentarians, was his argument about Europe’s need for “a soul, so that it can give expression-and let us use more modest language here-to its culture” (Mitterrand 1995: 48). This leads to an argument for the specifically French position, which also became, however, EU policy-the cultural exception in the GATT. “It [the principle of cultural exception] stems from the belief that the cultural idenlity of our nations, the right of each people to develop its own culture, is in jeopardy. It embodies the will to defend freedom and diversity for all counIries, to refuse to cede the means of representation in other words, the means of asserting one’s identity-to others” (read: the United States) (Mitterrand 1995: 48). The arguments point to relatively innocent policies such as more education about Europe, multilingual teaching, and the like; more controversially, the French-led policy in the audiovisual sector is presented as “a matter of urgency” (Mitterrand 1995: 49). All of this builds loward arguments for refusing “the logic of a blind market-or the blind logic of the market” and thus for maintaining GATT-WTO exceptions and resistance against the general trend toward opening and deregulation. 演讲中被议员们最常提及的另一个显著内容，是他关于欧洲需要“一个灵魂，以便能够表达——这里让我们用更谦逊的语言——其文化”的论点（Mitterrand 1995: 48）。这引出了一个关于法国特定立场的论点，然而这一立场也成为了欧盟政策——关贸总协定中的文化例外原则。“它[文化例外原则]源于这样一种信念：我们国家的文化认同、每个民族发展自身文化的权利正面临威胁。它体现了捍卫所有国家自由与多样性的意愿，拒绝将表现手段——换句话说，主张自身认同的手段——让渡给他人”（指美国）（Mitterrand 1995: 48）。这些论点指向相对无害的政策，如加强欧洲教育、多语种教学等；更具争议的是，由法国主导的视听领域政策被描述为“一项紧迫事务”（Mitterrand 1995: 49）。 所有这些都为拒绝“盲目市场的逻辑——或市场的盲目逻辑”提供了有力论据，因此支持维持关贸总协定-世贸组织的例外条款，并抵制普遍趋向开放和放松管制的趋势。
In the personal part of the speech (1995: 51), Mitterrand tells the story of his relationship to World Wars I and II and the task of his generation to pass on the experience and memory and thus the motivation for the reconciliation and peace-building functions of the EU. In effect, this is the same argument as Santer’s first-the peace-integration argument-only more dramatic: 在演讲的个人部分（1995: 51），密特朗讲述了他与第一次和第二次世界大战的关系，以及他这一代人传承经验和记忆的任务，从而激发欧盟和解与和平建设功能的动机。实际上，这与桑特的第一个论点——和平一体化论点——是相同的，只是更具戏剧性：
What I am asking you to do is almost impossible, because it means overcoming our past. And yet, if we fail to overcome our past, let there be no mistake about what will follow: ladies and gentlemen, nationalism means war! [loud applause] War is not only our past, it could also be our future! And it is us, it is you, ladies and gentlemen, the Members of the European Parliament, who will henceforth be the guardians of our peace, our securily and our future! (Mitterrand 1995: 51) 我请求你们做的几乎是不可能的，因为这意味着要超越我们的过去。然而，如果我们未能超越过去，请不要误会接下来会发生什么：女士们，先生们，民族主义意味着战争！【热烈掌声】战争不仅是我们的过去，也可能是我们的未来！而且正是我们，是你们，女士们，先生们，欧洲议会议员们，将从此成为我们和平、安全和未来的守护者！（密特朗 1995: 51）
Gomzáles used some of the same arguments, especially regarding the mostable continent afler the Cold Wiar and Euro-skepticism as a threat to 戈麦斯使用了一些相同的论点，特别是关于冷战后最易受影响的大陆以及欧盟怀疑主义作为威胁的问题
fragment the European continent. After unemployment, which is given first priority although not in a security form, “the second great challenge lies in security policy-that is, action to make it possible for us to resist organized international crime, the drugs traffic, terrorism and so on-of immediate concern to our citizens” (Gonzáles 1995: 155). Therefore, he argues more strongly here than anywhere else the need to give the EU additional tools (Gonzáles 1995: 142). 瓦解欧洲大陆。在失业问题之后，虽然优先级最高但并非以安全形式出现，“第二大挑战在于安全政策——即采取行动使我们能够抵御有组织的国际犯罪、毒品贩运、恐怖主义等——这是我们公民的直接关切”（戈麦斯 1995：155）。因此，他在这里比其他任何地方都更强烈地主张需要赋予欧盟更多工具（戈麦斯 1995：142）。
With the field of internal security, one could argue that this is a different kind of security, that there has always been talk about internal security that should be kept separate from our concept of international security. Didier Bigo (1996), however, has shown how internal and external security merge during these years; especially in the Europeanization of internal security, this concept is used to link a diversity of issues (terrorism, drugs, organized crime, transnational crime, and illegal immigration) and, with reference to this new political entity, to empower certain security agencies to operate freely across a European space. It should be noticed that these arguments are actually in a mode more analogous to international security than to the “law and order for the safety of the individual” logic of internal security. They are about distinct threats, alien and malignant actors such as terrorists, organized crime, and drug traffickers. 在内部安全领域，有人可能会认为这是一种不同类型的安全，内部安全的讨论一直应与我们的国际安全概念分开。然而，Didier Bigo（1996 年）展示了内部安全与外部安全在这些年中是如何融合的；特别是在内部安全的欧洲化过程中，这一概念被用来连接多种问题（恐怖主义、毒品、有组织犯罪、跨国犯罪和非法移民），并且，借助这一新的政治实体，赋予某些安全机构在欧洲空间内自由行动的权力。需要注意的是，这些论点实际上更类似于国际安全的模式，而非内部安全中“为个人安全维护法律与秩序”的逻辑。它们关注的是截然不同的威胁，即恐怖分子、有组织犯罪分子和毒贩等异质且恶意的行为者。
Finally, there are hints in many places that the project of European Monetary Union (EMU) has been securitized. Because of its embeddedness in the volatile global financial system, EMU can fall in a speculative rush; furthermore, it is of principled importance to the EU. Mitterrand said “the introduction of a single currency is the only means of ensuring that Europe remains a great economic and monetary power, and it is the best means of ensuring the sustained growth of our economies” (1995: 46). Still, the Council is generally careful with this: On the one hand, it appeals for more consistency in policies enabling the introduction of the single currency and the third phase of EMU, but on the other hand, there is a hesitancy to say too clearly that the whole thing falls if EMU falls. Everybody knows it is distinctly possible that this goal will not be reached, and there is no reason to risk pulling everything down with EMU in that case. 最后，在许多地方都有迹象表明欧洲货币联盟（EMU）项目已被安全化。由于其嵌入在动荡的全球金融体系中，EMU 可能会在投机性冲击中崩溃；此外，它对欧盟具有原则性的重要性。密特朗曾说：“引入单一货币是确保欧洲保持伟大的经济和货币强国地位的唯一手段，也是确保我们经济持续增长的最佳手段”（1995：46）。尽管如此，理事会通常对此持谨慎态度：一方面，它呼吁在推动单一货币引入和 EMU 第三阶段的政策上更加一致，但另一方面，对于明确表示如果 EMU 失败整个计划也将失败则有所犹豫。大家都知道这一目标很可能无法实现，也没有理由在这种情况下冒险让一切随着 EMU 一起崩溃。
In the debates in the European Parliament, eight distinct themes for securitization appeared. 在欧洲议会的辩论中，出现了八个不同的安全化主题。
The biggest threat, many argue, is the complex of unemployment, social marginalization, and-linked to this-xenophobia (e.g., MEP Lilli Gyldenkilde, European Parliament 1995a: 24): “These are the real challenges if we are to achieve a secure Europe.” In itself, this threat can point to several contrary lines of action; therefore, its articulation with other arguments is decisive. It is sometimes offered as an argument against the dominant Euro-construction in which growth and new technology are seen as the solution. This argument is advanced both by people like 许多人认为，最大的威胁是失业、社会边缘化以及与之相关的排外主义的复杂结合（例如，欧洲议会议员 Lilli Gyldenkilde，欧洲议会 1995a：24）：“如果我们要实现一个安全的欧洲，这些才是真正的挑战。” 这一威胁本身可以指向几条相反的行动路线；因此，它与其他论点的结合是决定性的。它有时被用作反对以增长和新技术为解决方案的主导欧洲建设的论据。这一论点由诸如...的人提出。
Gyldenkilde, who are skeptical of European integration, and by some who support integration, such as MEP Alexander Langer (in European Parliament 1995a: 26)-who argues, however, that growth and competition destroy regional and social roots, the very identities of European citizens. The technogrowth people, of course, present their line as the way to master the threat. In between these views, the leaders of the largest group in Parliament-the socialists-merge competitiveness with social argument. MEP Pauline Green, for instance, (in European Parliament 1995a: 21) makes the connection gender equality => >\Rightarrow> utilize all qualifications =>=> compete globally =>=> protect the European social model. And MEP Wilfried A. E. Martens argues that social policy, the environment, research, and new lechnology are necessary because “at the same time, the union must preserve its model of development with a human face and invest in its intellecIual capital, so as to remain in the vanguard of the world’s great technological powers into the twenty-first century” (European Parliament 1995a: 22). Gyldenkilde 对欧洲一体化持怀疑态度，一些支持一体化的人，如欧洲议会议员 Alexander Langer（见 European Parliament 1995a: 26）则认为，增长和竞争破坏了地区和社会根基，即欧洲公民的身份认同。当然，技术增长派将他们的观点视为应对威胁的方式。在这些观点之间，议会中最大党派——社会党派的领导人将竞争力与社会论点结合起来。例如，欧洲议会议员 Pauline Green（见 European Parliament 1995a: 21）将性别平等、充分利用所有资质、全球竞争与保护欧洲社会模式联系起来。欧洲议会议员 Wilfried A. E. Martens 则认为，社会政策、环境、研究和新技术是必要的，因为“与此同时，联盟必须保持其具有‘人性面貌’的发展模式，并投资于其智力资本，以便在进入二十一世纪时，继续处于世界主要技术强国的前列”（European Parliament 1995a: 22）。
2. The European social model is the term used to refer to the welfare state, which varies greatly among European states and can appear as “the European model” only in a comparison with non-Europe, which is exactly what happens. The European social model is defined in contrast to the United States and Japan and is to be defended against these others, as well as against those among its own reformers who, to compete globally, will sacrifice this model (and thereby a part of what is “Europe”). This consiruction has the political merit of linking a sociopolitical issue to the fate of “Europe” as such. 2. 欧洲社会模式是指福利国家的术语，在欧洲各国之间差异很大，只有在与非欧洲的比较中才会被称为“欧洲模式”，这正是实际情况。欧洲社会模式是与美国和日本相对定义的，并且需要防御这些国家，以及那些为了全球竞争而牺牲该模式（从而牺牲部分“欧洲”特质）的改革者。这种构建具有将社会政治问题与“欧洲”命运联系起来的政治价值。
3. MEP Klaus Hänsch, in contrast, who is also rather dramatic in discussing unemployment (it “undermines people’s faith in justice and democ"racy, and therefore in the stability of our societies in Europe”; European Parliament 1995c: 135), wants Europe to do more to improve competitiveness and especially to fend off the threatening perspective of “other economic regions of the world-Japan, USA, all of South East Asia-dominating key technologies. We should not allow that in the Europe of our children all TV-sets are Japanese and all TV-programmes American and we Europeans only observers. We should not allow this to happen” (European Parliament 1995c: 135). In this case, the argument supports the mainstream policy of flexibilization, reform of social systems, and investment in new lechnologies. 3. 欧洲议会议员克劳斯·汉施则相反，他在讨论失业问题时颇为戏剧化（他认为失业“削弱了人们对正义和民主的信仰，因此也削弱了我们欧洲社会的稳定性”；欧洲议会 1995c: 135），他希望欧洲能做更多工作以提升竞争力，特别是抵御“世界其他经济区域——日本、美国、整个东南亚——主导关键技术的威胁性前景。我们不应允许在我们子孙的欧洲，所有电视机都是日本制造，所有电视节目都是美国制作，而我们欧洲人只是旁观者。我们不应允许这种情况发生”（欧洲议会 1995c: 135）。在这种情况下，该论点支持灵活化的主流政策、社会系统改革以及对新技术的投资。
4. In the case of those emphasizing unemployment, that problem is olten linked to the frequently heard argument (cf. also Santer 1995a, quoted carlier) that without the support of Europe’s people the process will fail. Thus, the issue is dramatic because it is the main threat to individual Eupopeans and, not least, because it is one of the major threats to the Enropean project (e.g., (irecol in European Parliament 1995c: 46). 4. 对于那些强调失业问题的人来说，这个问题通常与经常听到的论点有关（参见 Santer 1995a，前文引用），即如果没有欧洲人民的支持，这一进程将会失败。因此，这个问题非常严峻，因为它是对个别欧洲人的主要威胁，且同样重要的是，它是对欧洲项目的主要威胁之一（例如，欧洲议会 1995c: 46 中的引用）。
These first four lines - memployment, the European social model, new wehology, and pepmar suppert low the Ell-and the relevan delemses ane 这最初的四条线——失业、欧洲社会模式、新技术以及对欧盟的支持——存在潜在的相互紧张关系，但也可能紧密相关。
potentially in tension with each other but are also potentially closely linked. Therefore, much of the politics of the Parliament is about attempts to articulate these lines, to interpret one in the light of the others—for example. the necessity of new technology to compete but thereby also to solve unemployment and save the European social model. 彼此之间可能存在紧张关系，但也可能密切相关。因此，议会的许多政治活动都围绕着试图阐明这些界限，试图从其他方面来解释其中之一——例如，竞争所必需的新技术，同时也解决失业问题并拯救欧洲社会模式。
The first three lines have an element of the issue itself being almost of security quality - unemployment at the social or individual level, competitiveness as economic security, the European social model as an identity issue-but when rhetoric must reach the highest levels and existential élan has to be achieved, the specific argument is given the twist that it is the fate of integration that is at stake. Therefore, the EU has to make progress in those areas “closest to the citizen”-the economy. 前三行包含了问题本身几乎具有安全性质的元素——社会或个人层面的失业，作为经济安全的竞争力，作为身份问题的欧洲社会模式——但当修辞必须达到最高层次并且必须实现存在的活力时，具体论点被赋予了一个转折，即整合的命运岌岌可危。因此，欧盟必须在那些“最贴近公民”的领域取得进展——经济领域。
Still, all of this is only the first step in a securitization. It establishes an existential threat and probably also gets some acceptance of this-it is close to a consensus position in the Parliament, as well as in the other two institutions dealt with here (therefore, struggle sets in about how to articulate it and we get the competing programs of the different political wings). But we have not yet seen attempts to suggest specific measures of a radical nature. For the purpose of this chapter, however, it is interesting to see how the cross-sectoral connections work out: The securityness of economic issues is multiplied by a political argument (about the survival of integration). 尽管如此，这一切仅仅是安全化的第一步。它确立了一种存在威胁，并且可能也获得了一定的接受——这在议会以及这里涉及的另外两个机构中接近共识立场（因此，关于如何表达这一点的斗争开始了，我们看到了不同政治派别的竞争方案）。但我们尚未看到提出激进性质具体措施的尝试。然而，对于本章的目的来说，观察跨部门联系如何发挥作用是有趣的：经济问题的安全性通过一个政治论点（关于整合的生存）被放大了。
5. More in line with the peace-integration argument presented by Santer, it is argued by, for example, Martens (European Parliament 1995a: 22) that the dialectics of deepening and enlargement will be decisive for the success or failure of the European political project. And MEP Gijs M. De Vries argues (in European Parliament 1995a: 23) that “security has become the major assignment of the Union”; the Union has to be the “accuser of nationalism and provincial suspicion.” Both these arguments draw on the general picture of a potential weakening of integration-because of either enlargement or growing nationalism-and therefore of a need to insist on deepening. Langer argued more dramatically that nationalism is on the march, and ethnic cleansing appears in many forms; therefore, Europe “needs high and positive examples of a road leading to integration, democracy, peace, social justice and conservation of the environment” (in European Parliament 1995a: 26). The citizens must notice that integration is preferable to breakup. This argument was put even more bluntly by the German chair and president of the Parliament, Hänsch, at the State of the Union session: 5. 更符合 Santer 提出的和平一体化论点，例如，Martens（欧洲议会 1995a: 22）认为，深化与扩大这两种辩证关系将决定欧洲政治项目的成败。欧洲议会议员 Gijs M. De Vries（欧洲议会 1995a: 23）则认为“安全已成为联盟的主要任务”；联盟必须成为“民族主义和地方猜疑的控诉者”。这两种论点都基于这样一个总体观点：由于扩大或民族主义抬头，可能导致一体化的弱化，因此必须坚持深化。一些人如 Langer 更为激烈地指出，民族主义正在兴起，种族清洗以多种形式出现；因此，欧洲“需要高尚且积极的榜样，展示通向一体化、民主、和平、社会正义和环境保护的道路”（欧洲议会 1995a: 26）。公民必须意识到一体化优于分裂。德国议会主席兼议会主席 Hänsch 在国情咨文会议上更直言不讳地表达了这一观点：
war Europe! [applause] Not for years has anyone put it as clearly as François Mitterrand did in his farewell speech in this House in January this year, when he said that nationalism is war, and in the new [applause] undivided Europe that has existed since 1990 it is still the case that no state must ever again be allowed to become so sovereign that it can decide alone on war and peace and on the weal and woe of its neighbours. (Hänsch 1995: 135) 战争，欧洲！[掌声] 多年来，没有人能像弗朗索瓦·密特朗今年一月在本院告别演讲中那样清楚地表达，他说民族主义就是战争，在自 1990 年以来存在的新[掌声]统一的欧洲中，情况依然是，没有哪个国家可以再次被允许拥有如此主权，以至于能够单独决定战争与和平以及邻国的福祉与祸患。（Hänsch 1995: 135）
The threat is not only nationalism, it is also sovereignty. The various new dangers Hänsch further mentions-to the East and the South-are serious because they threaten to bring the EU countries back into rivalry. 威胁不仅是民族主义，还有主权。Hänsch 进一步提到的东部和南部的各种新危险是严重的，因为它们威胁将欧盟国家重新带回竞争状态。
Security logic is used by MEP Eolo Parodi when he argues that the EU is in a crisis of power and therefore he abstains from a showdown with the Commission, as he thinks one should otherwise have aimed. This cannot be risked due to the crisis and the potential for unraveling of the EU (European Parliament 1995a: 29). 欧洲议会议员埃奥洛·帕罗迪使用安全逻辑时认为欧盟正处于权力危机，因此他避免与委员会对峙，因为他认为本应采取对抗措施。但由于危机和欧盟可能解体的风险，这种对抗是不可冒的。（欧洲议会 1995a: 29）
6. In foreign policy, the parliamentarians criticize the other institutions for not doing enough to defend human rights (European Parliament 1995a: 24, 27, 41). At one level, the argument is that security ultimately stems from the inside, that the only true basis for solid security is the state of law and respect for human rights (e.g., European Parliament 1995a: 23). This looks like the general liberal, missionary idea of security, but it also has a specific twist because “human rights” are seen as a European idea. By conrlucting a human rights-based foreign policy, the EU not only defends the rights of concrete people around the world or a general universal principle; it also defends its own values and distinctiveness. Human rights are signifi(ant, because “despite national and political frontiers, we have succeeded in finding a common language” (MEP Jannis Sakellariou in European I’arliament 1995a: 41). 6. 在外交政策方面，议员们批评其他机构未能充分捍卫人权（欧洲议会 1995a: 24, 27, 41）。在某种程度上，论点是安全最终源自内部，坚实安全的唯一真正基础是法治状态和对人权的尊重（例如，欧洲议会 1995a: 23）。这看起来像是一般的自由主义传教士式的安全观念，但它也有一个具体的转折，因为“人权”被视为一种欧洲理念。通过执行以人权为基础的外交政策，欧盟不仅捍卫世界各地具体人的权利或普遍的普世原则；它也捍卫自身的价值观和独特性。人权之所以重要，是因为“尽管存在国家和政治边界，我们已经成功地找到了共同的语言”（欧洲议会 1995a: 41，欧洲议员雅尼斯·萨凯拉里乌）。
This argument is especially characteristic of European Parliament logic. It has to be something European that is threatened. The Parliament’s securitizations are most often attempts to define the specific object threatcned as linked to Europe as such. As with the “unraveling” arguments (number 4 and 5), this argument manages to place the EU (or even “Europe”) as at stake but this time less through a political-IR argument and more through an identity argument. Argument 2 (the European social model) had elements of this, too. 这个论点尤其具有欧洲议会逻辑的特点。必须是某种受到威胁的欧洲事物。议会的安全化往往试图将具体的威胁对象定义为与欧洲本身相关联。与“解体”论点（第 4 和第 5 条）类似，这个论点设法将欧盟（甚至“欧洲”）置于风险之中，但这次更多是通过身份认同论点，而非政治-国际关系论点。论点 2（欧洲社会模式）也包含了这一元素。
7. In the field of internal security, there is a general (and fairly logical) piattern in which the Council and the Commission use more classical securilization to obtain more powers, police cooperation (including secrecy and monitoring), and the Europeanization of competences, whereas the l’arliament also wants attention to the issue but equally for the purpose of ohserving the observers and policing the police-that is, of trying to profile the rights of citizens in the name of European values (e.g., Martens in I:uropean P’arliament 1095b: III; MEP Alonso José Puerta in European 7. 在内部安全领域，理事会和委员会通常采用更传统的安全化方式以获得更多权力、警务合作（包括保密和监控）以及职权的欧洲化，这是一种普遍且相当合乎逻辑的模式，而议会也关注这一问题，但同样是为了监督观察者和监管警察——即试图以欧洲价值观的名义界定公民权利（例如，欧洲议会的马滕斯 1095b：III；欧洲议会议员阿隆索·何塞·普埃尔塔）。
Parliament 1995b: 113; Hänsch in European Parliament 1995c: 136f). Parliamentarians press mostly for a Europeanization of internal security but do not want this to lead to secrecy and loss of parliamentary control. Parties vary on this issue largely along a left-right axis. But the leading voices in the Parliament that speak on behalf of the major groups seem very much aware of the difference between their position and that of the other institutions. From the Commission, the Council, and those parliamentarians who push mainly for more attention to internal security, the case is often bolstered by giving internal security a second-order security importance: “Citizens will not see the benefits of the frontier-free area unless the Union can demonstrate its capacity to guarantee their security and combat the drugs traffic and organized crime” (Santer 1995b: 107). 议会 1995b：113；Hänsch 在欧洲议会 1995c：136f）。议员们主要推动内部安全的欧洲化，但不希望这导致秘密化和议会控制的丧失。各政党在这一问题上的立场大多沿着左右翼轴线分化。但代表主要党派发声的议会领导者似乎非常清楚他们的立场与其他机构的不同。从委员会、理事会以及那些主要推动更多关注内部安全的议员来看，这一论点常常通过赋予内部安全第二级安全重要性来加强：“除非联盟能够展示其保障公民安全、打击毒品贩运和有组织犯罪的能力，否则公民不会看到无边界区的好处”（Santer 1995b：107）。
8. Finally, the environment is often mentioned as an area of great importance when serious threats are present (more on this later). 8. 最后，环境常被提及为在存在严重威胁时极为重要的领域（稍后将详细讨论）。
There are a number of single-instance security hints of less significance. 有一些不太重要的单一实例安全提示。
An analysis of these instances of securitization shows that one security argument is shared across institutional settings: the peace argument. In addition, the different actors have some smaller securitizations. 对这些安全化实例的分析表明，有一个安全论点在各个制度环境中是共通的：和平论点。此外，不同的行为者还有一些较小的安全化现象。
Interestingly, the Council has few securitizations. One reason could be that it ultimately works from national perspectives and therefore does not want systematically (only in limited, ad hoc instances) to equip the EU with emergency powers or automaticity. Another reason could be that the Council is the most powerful institution; if it says something is a security problem it must act on it, whereas the Parliament especially uses its arguments mostly to criticize the inaction of others. 有趣的是，理事会的安全化现象很少。一个原因可能是它最终是从国家视角出发，因此不想系统性地（仅在有限的临时情况下）赋予欧盟紧急权力或自动性。另一个原因可能是理事会是最有权力的机构；如果它认为某事是安全问题，就必须采取行动，而议会则主要利用其论点来批评他人的不作为。
In the Parliament, the use of a wide range of securitizations (although mostly in rather mild form) should be seen as part of a more general search for priority areas wherein because it is a parliament, it tries to find issues closer to “the citizen”-that is, concrete matters on which people can register the value of EU action. In this search, there are two criteria; one is importance to ordinary people, the other is that the theme should somehow have a specific European quality. Therefore, arguments tend to converge around slogans such as “the European social model” and “human rights (a European idea),” as well as the peace argument: European integration is the alternative to European wars and power balancing. Except for the latter, it is not clear that all these cases should overrule normal politics or principled reservations. But the peace argument is central in arguments vis-à-vis national politics (not least in Germany) in upholding an integration-oriented policy and thus overruling concerns about sovereignty and identity. The environmental argument also has some peculiar features. These are notable in the arguments of the Parliament but also in those of the Commission. Section 1.12 of the Work Programme for 1995 says: “At the international 在议会中，广泛使用各种安全化手段（尽管大多以较温和的形式出现）应被视为一种更普遍的优先领域探索的一部分，因为作为议会，它试图找到更贴近“公民”的议题——即人们能够感受到欧盟行动价值的具体事务。在这一探索中，有两个标准；一是对普通人的重要性，二是主题应以某种方式具有特定的欧洲特质。因此，论点往往围绕诸如“欧洲社会模式”和“人权（一个欧洲理念）”等口号，以及和平论点展开：欧洲一体化是欧洲战争与权力平衡的替代方案。除后者外，目前尚不清楚所有这些案例是否应凌驾于正常政治或原则性保留之上。但和平论点在与国家政治（尤其是在德国）对话中处于核心地位，支持一体化导向的政策，从而压倒了对主权和身份的担忧。环境论点也具有一些特殊特征。这些特征在议会的论述中以及委员会的论述中都很显著。 1995 年工作计划第 1.12 节指出：“在国际
level, the EU should follow up on the Rio summit by striving for a leading position in global questions about the environment and sustainable development and by walking in the front on issues.” 10 层面上，欧盟应通过在环境和可持续发展全球问题上争取领导地位，并在相关议题上走在前列，来跟进里约峰会。”10
What is at play here has been shown by Markus Jachtenfuchs in his dissertation on the EU and the greenhouse effect (Jachtenfuchs 1994). The concept of leadership, in which the EU is endowed with a special role in international environmental politics, was originally invented in the greenhouse case but was later “transferred to the totality of EC [European Community] environmental policy” (Jachtenfuchs 1994: 245). Especially for the Commission, environmental leadership forged a link to integration as such and to an international role for the Community. 马库斯·雅赫滕福克斯在其关于欧盟与温室效应的论文中展示了这里所涉及的问题（Jachtenfuchs 1994）。领导力的概念，即赋予欧盟在国际环境政治中一个特殊角色，最初是在温室气体问题中提出的，但后来被“转移到欧洲共同体环境政策的整体上”（Jachtenfuchs 1994: 245）。特别是对于委员会来说，环境领导力建立了与一体化本身以及共同体国际角色的联系。
Environmental leadership conveys the image of the EC as a new type of power, dealing with contemporary problems in appropriate terms, and contrasts this image to that of the United States as a traditional military power neglecting problems that cannot be solved with traditional means of foreign policy. “Leadership” underlines the EC’s aspiration to become a superpower, but a modern one. By promoting the leadership concept, the Commission could enhance its own role and status as the representative and speaker of the Community. (Jachtenfuchs 1994: 275) 环境领导力传达了欧共体作为一种新型力量的形象，能够以适当的方式处理当代问题，并将这一形象与美国作为传统军事强国、忽视无法通过传统外交手段解决的问题的形象形成对比。“领导力”强调了欧共体成为超级大国的愿望，但这是一个现代化的超级大国。通过推广领导力概念，委员会能够提升其作为共同体代表和发言人的角色和地位。（Jachtenfuchs 1994: 275）
This case brings out clearly what has also been seen in fragments on other issues: The specific issue is articulated with the general issue of “integration” as such, and typically this is where the security quality is added. 这个案例清楚地展示了在其他问题的片段中也曾见过的情况：具体问题与“整合”这一一般性问题相结合，通常正是在这里加入了安全质量。
The arch example of this is, however, the most clearly securitized issue in EU discourse: the peace argument of integration as the bulwark against a return to Europe’s past of balance of power and wars. This argument is the one used the most consistently in all instances in the EU and the one that is the most strongly securitized. Europe as a project, as history, is at a crossroads, and security is at play as the question of integration versus fragmentation (Wæver 1996a, b; de Wilde 1996). Integration is made an aim in itself (because the alternative is fragmentation). ^(11){ }^{11} Thereby security legitimacy is obtained for the rationale the EU Commission and bureaucracy have used all along: that any specific policy question should always be subject to a dual estimate, that of the issue itself and of its effects in terms of strengthening or weakening integration (Jachtenfuchs and Huber 1993). By adding the security argument, integration gains urgency because its alternative is a self-propelling process that by definition will destroy “Europe” as a project and reopen the previous insecurity caused by balance of power, nationalism, and war. Integration gains a grammatical form closer to security logic. Whether “Europe” exists or not appears as a “to be or not to be” question (for a more elaborate analysis, see Wæver 1996b). 然而，这一典型例子是欧盟话语中最明显被安全化的问题：将一体化作为防止欧洲重回权力平衡与战争过去的堡垒的和平论点。这个论点在欧盟的所有场合中被最为一致地使用，也是被最强烈安全化的。作为一个项目和历史的欧洲正处于十字路口，安全问题体现为一体化与分裂的抉择（Wæver 1996a, b；de Wilde 1996）。一体化被视为自身的目标（因为替代方案是分裂）。因此，安全的合法性为欧盟委员会和官僚机构一直以来所采用的理由提供了支持：任何具体政策问题都应始终接受双重评估，即问题本身及其在加强或削弱一体化方面的影响（Jachtenfuchs 和 Huber 1993）。通过加入安全论点，一体化获得了紧迫性，因为其替代方案是一个自我推动的过程，按定义将摧毁作为项目的“欧洲”，并重新引发由权力平衡、民族主义和战争所导致的先前不安全状态。 一体化获得了更接近安全逻辑的语法形式。“欧洲”是否存在，表现为一个“生存还是毁灭”的问题（有关更详细的分析，见 Wæver 1996b）。
This is Europe’s or the EU’s unique security argument, which is likely the reason it very often structures other, more tentative security questions. It is basic because it defines the EU’s existence. In interaction with ohter 这是欧洲或欧盟独特的安全论点，这很可能是它经常构建其他更为试探性的安全问题的原因。它是基本的，因为它定义了欧盟的存在。在与其他因素的互动中
securitizations, it narratively fuses societal, economic, environmental, political, and military arguments into one specific plot. Has this situation shown multi- and cross-sectoral dynamics, or could it be argued to have one dominant sector because it is basically political? This argument is cross-sectoral and thus constitutes “aggregate security” because it draws on arguments from the other sectors. In the case of the economy, for example, competitiveness is reconfigured as a question of Europe’s quality as global actor and is thereby merged with the political “existence” (international presence) argument. Threats such as new technologies, unemployment, and U.S. and Japanese competition become increasingly central to the motivation for the necessity of integration-for Europe. 安全化的互动中，它叙事性地将社会、经济、环境、政治和军事论点融合成一个具体的情节。这种情况是否表现出多部门和跨部门的动态，或者可以说它有一个主导部门，因为它基本上是政治性的？这个论点是跨部门的，因此构成了“综合安全”，因为它借鉴了其他部门的论点。例如，在经济领域，竞争力被重新构建为欧洲作为全球行为体的质量问题，从而与政治“存在”（国际存在）论点合并。新技术、失业以及美国和日本的竞争等威胁，变得越来越成为推动欧洲一体化必要性的核心动因。
It is possible to reach conclusions from this brief case study, first in terms of the possibility of reading for security and second in relation to the aggregation of sectors by actors. Methodologically, the results were fairly encouraging. It would have been problematic if no instances of securitization had been found, but it would have been even more so if there had been hundreds of examples in each text. Actually, we found a limited, manageable, and meaningful list: four instances by the Commission, of which one was clearly primary, and eight by the Parliament, although most of these were only tentative securitizing moves with little sign of what extraordinary action should follow. The Council, revealingly, used very little securitization. Clearly, the lesson is that it is possible to read with the securitization gauge whether arguments take the specific form of presenting existential threats (and, if they constitute full securitization, to point toward extraordinary steps that possibly violate normal procedures). It is possible to judge which cases qualify and which do not. The criteria are not formalized enough to send hundreds of students into the coding laboratory in the style of 1960 s behavioralist IR. The criteria are a little more interpretative, but it does not seem farfetched to conclude that people working with an understanding of securitization theory would have reproducible findings. 从这个简短的案例研究中可以得出结论，首先是在安全解读的可能性方面，其次是在行为者对部门的聚合方面。从方法论上看，结果相当令人鼓舞。如果没有发现任何安全化的实例，那将是个问题，但如果每篇文本中都有数百个例子，那情况会更糟。实际上，我们发现了一个有限的、可管理的、有意义的列表：委员会有四个实例，其中一个明显是主要的，议会有八个，尽管其中大多数只是试探性的安全化动作，几乎没有迹象表明应采取何种非常措施。理事会显著地几乎没有使用安全化。显然，教训是可以通过安全化指标来判断论点是否采取了呈现生存威胁的具体形式（如果构成完全的安全化，则指向可能违反正常程序的非常措施）。可以判断哪些案例符合条件，哪些不符合。 这些标准还不够正式，无法像 20 世纪 60 年代行为主义国际关系学那样，将数百名学生送入编码实验室。标准更具解释性，但得出这样一个结论似乎并不牵强：那些基于安全化理论理解工作的人会有可重复的发现。
In relation to the other purpose of this chapter-the sector aggregation issue-we have three findings. 关于本章的另一个目的——部门聚合问题——我们有三个发现。
The securitizations in different sectors are connected. The main instances of securitization are narratives that draw upon elements from several sectors to produce images of existential threats and necessary action-typically, sustained integration. 不同部门的安全化是相互关联的。安全化的主要实例是利用多个部门元素的叙述，来构建存在性威胁和必要行动的形象——通常是持续的整合。
Just as nations have identity and states sovereignty as their organizing principle and security focus, the different securitizations around the EU seem to converge on integration as the equivalent generalized measure. ^(12){ }^{12} 正如国家有身份认同，国家有主权作为其组织原则和安全焦点，欧盟周围的不同安全化似乎也趋向于将整合作为等同的普遍衡量标准。
Not only different national and party political origins produce variation in securitizations; the different institutional settings also differ in themes and emphasis. This makes sense because of their different 不仅不同的国家和政党政治背景会导致安全化的差异；不同的制度环境在主题和重点上也存在差异。这是有道理的，因为它们的不同
positions in relation to long-term integration and, concretely, in terms of their different degrees of responsibility for action and implementation. Securitizing actors make a difference, even when they appeal to the same referent object. 在长期整合方面的位置，具体来说，是指他们在行动和执行责任上的不同程度。安全化行为者即使诉诸相同的参照对象，也会产生不同的影响。
Conclusion: Purposes 结论：目的
The different ways of aggregating sectors set out in this chapter are not a question of finding the superior form of security analysis; they point instead to the different purposes a security analysis might have. The sector-by-sector approach ties into a logic of complexity, which can be found in a superficial form as a craving for complexity and in a more sophisticated macrohistorical version. The units-as-synthesizers approach is attached to a logic of constellations that is oriented toward analyzing contemporary political situations. 本章中列出的不同部门聚合方式并非为了寻找更优越的安全分析形式；它们反而指向安全分析可能具有的不同目的。逐部门的方法与复杂性的逻辑相关，这种逻辑在表面上表现为对复杂性的渴望，在更复杂的宏观历史版本中也能找到。作为综合体的单位方法则附属于星座逻辑，旨在分析当代政治形势。
For many wideners, security analysis functions as a proof of complexi1 y . The inclusion of more sectors says the traditionalist’s military story is too simple, too narrow. And more actors serve to counter a state-based account. Whether the new image becomes simple enough to render another story is not the main issue; it is used primarily to counter excessively narrow conceptions: “Don’t forget the environment,” and “This is not the whole story-security is also about . . .” The image becomes a kind of checklist, a large matrix on which one can put sectors along one side and units along the other and then say, "There are all these types-see how the cstablishment only looks at the small corner up there (at best 4 boxes), but there are 25 " (cf. de Wilde 1995). 对许多扩展者来说，安全分析起到了复杂性的证明作用。纳入更多的领域意味着传统的军事故事过于简单、过于狭隘。更多的行为体则用来反驳以国家为基础的叙述。新的图景是否变得足够简单以呈现另一种故事并不是主要问题；它主要用于反驳过于狭隘的观念：“别忘了环境”，以及“这不是全部故事——安全还涉及……”。这个图景变成了一种清单，一张大型矩阵，一边是领域，一边是单位，然后说，“这里有这么多类型——看看体制只关注那个小角落（最多 4 个格子），但实际上有 25 个”（参见 de Wilde 1995）。
In contrast, the focus on constellations and dynamics is aimed at reduclion, at finding the turning points that might decide the way the future will unfold and thus function as a political analysis-one that could be of help in political choices. The main difference is simply what kind of analysis one is interested in-complexity versus constellations. ^(13){ }^{13} 相比之下，关注星座和动态旨在简化，寻找可能决定未来走向的转折点，从而发挥政治分析的作用——这可能有助于政治决策。主要区别仅在于感兴趣的分析类型——复杂性与星座。
The first type-the matrix with many boxes-functions as a political argument only at an aggregate level, because it rarely comes to any conclusions or sums up in any way that makes it much of an analysis of a specific siluation. This type can be used as a critique of established policies as too narrow. But unless one assumes that because there are 25 boxes each should receive 4 percent of political attention, it says little about what could constitute good policy. A general problem with this method, as with much liberalist IR theory, is that it only complicates matters in an attempt lo give detailed one-to-one maps of the world instead of trying to simplify, as realist theories are at least (some would say more than) willing to do. 第一种类型——带有许多方框的矩阵——仅在总体层面上作为政治论证起作用，因为它很少得出任何结论或以任何方式总结，使其成为对特定情境的深入分析。这种类型可以用来批评既定政策过于狭隘。但除非假设因为有 25 个方框，每个方框都应获得 4%的政治关注，否则它对什么构成良好政策几乎没有说明。这种方法的一个普遍问题，正如许多自由主义国际关系理论一样，是它只是在试图提供世界的一对一详细地图，而不是像现实主义理论至少（有人甚至认为更愿意）那样尝试简化问题。
The matrix approach is also useful for macrohistory (e.g., Buzan 1995a; Buzan and Litlle 1094, 109); Buzan and Segal 1997), which aims all 矩阵方法对于宏观历史学也很有用（例如，Buzan 1995a；Buzan 和 Litlle 1094，109；Buzan 和 Segal 1997），其目标是所有方面的研究。
a global, theoretical analysis of trends and wants to disaggregate and aggregate in the analysis: What is the general trend regarding the relative importance of sectors; what are the relations between economic security and political security that explain large trends in global developments? Here, a number of events and decisions are summed up, and it is noticed that, for example, more and more security struggles are over environmental issues. This summary can become part of a grand narrative on the direction of the international system at the end of the twentieth century (and the second millennium). 对趋势进行全球性的理论分析，并希望在分析中进行分解和聚合：各部门相对重要性的一般趋势是什么；经济安全与政治安全之间的关系如何解释全球发展中的重大趋势？在这里，总结了一些事件和决策，并注意到，例如，越来越多的安全斗争涉及环境问题。这个总结可以成为关于二十世纪末（以及第二个千年）国际体系方向的宏大叙事的一部分。
But if one’s aim is to conduct a concrete contemporary political analysis, the second approach is superior. In such an analysis, one wants to grasp a political constellation, the main lines of struggle, the crucial decisions, the cross-pressures operating on key actors, and the likely effects of different moves. One cannot, for example, look at Europe sector by sector-the units are the nodes, and the way they balance sectoral threats will be included in a constellation made up of units. The actual security concernsthe securitizations-of the actors are the basic building blocks of such constellations. 但如果目标是进行具体的当代政治分析，第二种方法更为优越。在这样的分析中，人们希望把握政治星座、主要的斗争线索、关键决策、作用于关键行为者的交叉压力，以及不同行动可能产生的影响。例如，不能逐个部门地看待欧洲——单位是节点，它们平衡部门威胁的方式将包含在由单位组成的星座中。行为者的实际安全关切——即安全化——是构成这种星座的基本构件。
This chapter has shown that actors do act in terms of aggregate securi-ty-that is, they let security concerns from one sector color their security definitions in other sectors, or they add everything up and make a judgment on the basis of some overarching narrative that structures security as such. For example, whether an economic issue is labeled a security problem is not unrelated to how the actors involved perceive their general relationship with each other. If Turkey changes some regulations in the economic field in relation to Syria, for example, this is likely to be perceived as a security affair because Turkey also controls the water tap, which Syria depends on, and the Turkish-Syrian relationship is tense because of the Kurdish issue, which Syria uses to counterbalance these other threats. If Poland makes the same change in regulations vis-à-vis the Czech Republic, this is more likely to be framed simply as an economic issue-perhaps heavily criticized but not considered a security issue, a threat, an aggressive action. 本章表明，行为者确实以整体安全的角度行事——也就是说，他们让一个领域的安全关切影响他们对其他领域安全的定义，或者他们将所有因素加总起来，并基于某种结构化安全的总体叙事做出判断。例如，某个经济问题是否被标记为安全问题，与相关行为者如何看待彼此的整体关系密切相关。比如，如果土耳其在经济领域针对叙利亚改变某些法规，这很可能被视为安全事务，因为土耳其还控制着叙利亚依赖的水源，而土叙关系因库尔德问题而紧张，叙利亚利用该问题来平衡其他威胁。如果波兰对捷克共和国做出同样的法规调整，这更可能被简单地视为经济问题——或许会受到严厉批评，但不会被认为是安全问题、威胁或侵略行为。
With this confirmation of cross-sectoral securitization and that described in “Linkages Across Sectors,” which holds that the regional-territorial subsystemic level is still an important level of security interaction, it seems possible to reformulate security complex theory in a postsovereign form. Security complex analysis was originally formulated for states only (a security complex consisted of states) and mainly for the political and military sectors. Although we employed security complex analysis, we also subverted it through our attempts to broaden the concept of security to both new actors beyond the state and new sectors beyond the political and military. In our work on the new sectors, we further found it necessary and useful to change the overall perspective to a constructivist understanding of 通过对跨部门安全化的确认以及“跨部门联系”中所描述的内容，即区域-领土子系统层面仍然是安全互动的重要层面，似乎有可能以后主权形式重新表述安全复合体理论。安全复合体分析最初仅为国家制定（安全复合体由国家组成），且主要针对政治和军事部门。尽管我们采用了安全复合体分析，但我们也通过尝试将安全概念扩展到国家之外的新行为体和政治及军事之外的新部门，从而颠覆了这一分析。在我们对新部门的研究中，我们进一步发现有必要且有益于将整体视角转变为建构主义理解。
security, in which security becomes a specific social practice rather than some objective question of threats or psychological spirits. It was unclear for a time whether the concept of security complexes could be restated on this more multifarious basis. On the basis of this chapter, it seems we can still identify both the securitizing actors and the referent objects they securitize and will therefore be able to complete the mapping of how the processes of securitization interact: the security complex. 安全，在这里安全成为一种特定的社会实践，而不是某种关于威胁或心理状态的客观问题。一段时间内，是否可以在这种更加多样化的基础上重新表述安全复合体的概念尚不清楚。基于本章内容，我们似乎仍然可以识别出安全化行为者和他们所安全化的参照对象，因此能够完成安全化过程如何相互作用的映射：安全复合体。
Notes 注释
The unit and subunit levels are collapsed into one, because in interaction terms there is no unit level proper. If units interact with each other, they either produce subsystems (nonregional subsystems or regional security complexes) or their interaction is part of the system-defining structure. If the interaction occurs within the unit. it is an interaction among subunits and is treated as “localizing.” Complicated border cases are boundary-crossing interactions among subunits on a scale approximately like the unit. This will be classified as localizing. 单元和子单元层级合并为一体，因为在互动层面上不存在真正的单元层级。如果单元之间相互作用，它们要么产生子系统（非区域子系统或区域安全复合体），要么它们的互动是系统定义结构的一部分。如果互动发生在单元内部，则是子单元之间的互动，并被视为“本地化”。复杂的边界情况是子单元之间跨界的互动，其规模大致相当于单元。这将被归类为本地化。
The use of the term security unit-with some ambiguity in comparison with the previous precision regarding referent object or actor-is motivated in the argument at the end of Chapter 2 about which units are the building blocks of security complexes. 术语“安全单元”的使用——与之前关于指称对象或行为者的精确定义相比存在一定模糊性——是在第二章末尾关于哪些单元构成安全复合体的基本构件的论证中提出的动机。
The word constellation is used here to emphasize that it is not the units themselves in a static way that make up the whole; it is the way their movements, actions, and policies relate to each other that forms a truly political pattern at the level of relations of relations (cf. Elias 1978 [1939]; Lasswell 1965 [1935]). A security complex consists not simply of India and Pakistan; it consists of an Indian set of perceptions and policies as they form a specific constellation with Pakistani perceptions and policies. This is even more complicated for all larger regions. 这里使用“星座”一词是为了强调，构成整体的并不是单位本身以静态的方式存在；而是它们的运动、行动和政策相互关联的方式，形成了真正的政治模式，即关系的关系层面（参见 Elias 1978 [1939]；Lasswell 1965 [1935]）。一个安全复合体不仅仅由印度和巴基斯坦组成；它由印度的一套认知和政策构成，这些认知和政策与巴基斯坦的认知和政策形成了特定的星座。对于所有更大的地区来说，这种情况更加复杂。
This is paradoxical in relation to the normally expected pattern of state and nation (sovereigny and identity) (cf. Chapter 7; Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 4; Waver 1995a, forthcoming-a). The logic of the different referent objects operates as it should-nation is defended as identity, the state as sovereignty-but the securilizing actors are surprising because the state elite uses a distinct reference to the nation-culture, whereas the competing voice claims to represent the true state intercst. (A possible explanation could be the one we give in Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 4, and Wæver forthcoming-a, that long-term integration demands increasing separalion between state security and societal security. We imagined this, however, as implying increasingly separate voices, whereas in France the state tries to articulate both–separately but by the state.) 这与通常预期的国家与民族（主权与认同）模式形成了悖论（参见第 7 章；Wæver 等，1993 年，第 4 章；Wæver，1995a，即将出版-a）。不同参照对象的逻辑按应有的方式运作——民族作为认同被捍卫，国家作为主权被捍卫——但安全化行为者令人惊讶，因为国家精英使用了对民族文化的独特指涉，而竞争的声音声称代表真正的国家利益。（一个可能的解释是我们在 Wæver 等，1993 年，第 4 章，以及 Wæver 即将出版-a 中提出的，长期整合要求国家安全与社会安全之间日益分离。然而，我们设想的是越来越分离的声音，而在法国，国家试图同时表达这两者——分开但由国家表达。）
Specifically, the texts (all from 1995) are the speech by President (chairman of the Commission) Jacques Santer to the Parliament and the ensuing debate in Parliament on the question of accepting the new Commission, 17 January; President Mitterrand’s speech to the Parliament that same day and debate on the plans of the lrench presidency; the Commission’s Work Programme for 1995, its presentation speech by Santer to the Parliament on 15 February and debate hereon in Parliament 1.5 February and 15 March; the conclusions from the meetings of the European Conncil in Cannes, 26-27 Junc, and Madrid, 15-16 December; and the declarations of the three “presidents” on “the state of the European Union” and debate on these III latianent, 15 November (a new lradition, practiced for the lirst lime in 1995). 具体来说，这些文本（均来自 1995 年）包括：主席（委员会主席）雅克·桑特尔向议会发表的演讲以及随后议会就接受新委员会问题的辩论，时间为 1 月 17 日；密特朗总统同日向议会发表的演讲及关于法国主席计划的辩论；委员会 1995 年工作计划，桑特尔于 2 月 15 日向议会的介绍演讲及随后在议会于 2 月 15 日和 3 月 15 日的辩论；欧洲理事会在戛纳（6 月 26-27 日）和马德里（12 月 15-16 日）会议的结论；以及三位“主席”关于“欧洲联盟状况”的声明及 11 月 15 日对此的辩论（这是 1995 年首次实行的新传统）。
This list includes some key occasions for the three most relevant institutions:-the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission-ignoring here the powerful Court, which is subject to a different kind of political rationale that is not impossible to include but that raises new questions that go beyond the present context. 该列表包括三个最相关机构的一些关键场合：理事会、议会和委员会——这里忽略了强大的法院，法院受制于不同类型的政治逻辑，虽然并非无法纳入，但会引发超出当前语境的新问题。
6. At least one text has been selected from each area: military (a, the WEUdefense; b, Yugoslavia), environmental (a, general environmental policy; b, one specific case), societal (European culture and citizenship), economic (a, general state of the economy; b, foreign economic policy), and political (general politics is covered by the overall debates listed in note 5; a more specific area is citizenship). This has been done for each of the three institutional contexts: the European Parliament (debates), the European Commission (reports, White or Green Books), and the Council (declarations). 6. 已从每个领域至少选择了一篇文本：军事（a，WEU 防务；b，南斯拉夫）、环境（a，一般环境政策；b，一个具体案例）、社会（欧洲文化与公民身份）、经济（a，一般经济状况；b，外交经济政策）和政治（一般政治由注释 5 中列出的整体辩论涵盖；一个更具体的领域是公民身份）。这已针对三个制度背景完成：欧洲议会（辩论）、欧洲委员会（报告、白皮书或绿皮书）和理事会（声明）。
7. The full analysis is printed as Ole Wæver, COPRI Working Paper no. 1997: 25. 7. 完整分析刊载于 Ole Wæver，COPRI 工作论文第 1997 号：25 页。
8. Elsewhere, Santer has made this point, stressing “that the unification of Europe is a daily effort, a permanent struggle against centrifugal forces and the temptations of the past.” And “the cost of non-Europe would be exorbitant” (Santer 1995c: 138). 8. 在其他地方，桑特强调了这一点，指出“欧洲统一是一个日常的努力，是对离心力和过去诱惑的持续斗争。”并且“非欧洲的代价将是高昂的”（桑特 1995c：138）。
9. The arguments about “foreign and security policy” are mostly very vague about how these issues actually constitute serious threats to Europe(ans) and thus are unclear as to whether “security policy” is “security” according to our criteria (cf. Chapter 3 about nonsecurity defense matters). Foreign and security policy, however, begins to take on security importance in a different sense than the classical one of being about military threats. Santer argues that through foreign policy, through external relations (especially among large, regional groups), we are “affirming our collective identity on the world scene and encouraging others to overcome the traditional approach of every man for himself” (Santer 1995c: 139). Thus, in relation to security arguments about whether Europe “exists” (Wind 1992; Furet 1995)-truly an existential matter-the identity question becomes less the internal one of “how alike” Europeans are and more the external issue of appearing as one on the international scene. In this sense, foreign and security policy is of primary security importance to the EU (cf. Wæver 1996b, forthcoming-e). 9. 关于“外交和安全政策”的论点大多非常模糊，不清楚这些问题实际上如何构成对欧洲的严重威胁，因此也不清楚“安全政策”是否符合我们的标准中的“安全”定义（参见第 3 章关于非安全防御事项）。然而，外交和安全政策开始以不同于传统军事威胁的意义体现出安全重要性。Santer 认为，通过外交政策，通过外部关系（尤其是在大型区域集团之间），我们“在世界舞台上确认我们的集体身份，并鼓励其他人克服传统的各自为政的做法”（Santer 1995c: 139）。因此，关于欧洲是否“存在”的安全论点（Wind 1992；Furet 1995）——真正的生存问题——身份问题不再是内部的“欧洲人有多相似”，而更多是作为一个整体在国际舞台上出现的外部问题。从这个意义上说，外交和安全政策对欧盟具有首要的安全重要性（参见 Wæver 1996b，待发表-e）。
10. A parallel case is found in Santer (1995a) in relation to development and aid: “The Union must continue to play its leading role in development cooperation and humanitarian aid, for they both contribute to peace and stability in certain areas of the world. It is essential to be active out in the field and the Commission will be doing just that” (p. 15). From here the text leads on to: “Nobody could deny that the Union is an economic giant and yet this is not reflected in the political role it plays. This is why the Maastricht Treaty set out to lay the foundations for a more ambitious political approach by developing a common foreign and security policy” (p. 15). Thus, development has been tied into the reasoning about the EU achieving a voice and an international presence. 10. 在发展和援助方面，Santer（1995a）中也有类似的例子：“欧盟必须继续在发展合作和人道援助中发挥其领导作用，因为它们都为世界某些地区的和平与稳定做出贡献。积极参与实地工作至关重要，委员会将正是这样做的”（第 15 页）。接着文本指出：“没人能否认欧盟是一个经济巨人，但这并未反映在其所扮演的政治角色中。这就是为什么《马斯特里赫特条约》旨在通过发展共同的外交和安全政策，为更有雄心的政治方法奠定基础”（第 15 页）。因此，发展被纳入了关于欧盟实现发声和国际存在的论述中。
11. Europe’s Other is not Russia, not Muslims, not even East Asian competitiveness; Europe’s Other is Europe itself, Europe’s past (Baudrillard 1994 [1992]; Derrida 1992 [1991]; Rytkønen (1995); Wæver 1996b, forthcoming-e). Ideas such as balance of power that have been seen as quintessential Europeanness (Boer 1993) are now transformed so that anti-balance of power (integration) comes to be seen as a European value. 11. 欧洲的“他者”不是俄罗斯，不是穆斯林，甚至不是东亚的竞争力；欧洲的“他者”是欧洲自身，是欧洲的过去（博德里亚 1994 [1992]；德里达 1992 [1991]；赖特科宁（1995）；韦弗 1996b，待刊-e）。诸如权力平衡这样被视为典型欧洲特质的观念（博尔 1993）如今已被转化为反权力平衡（整合）被视为一种欧洲价值。
12. It is not “us Europeans unified in our state” that has to be defended; there is no project to defend a sovereignty (which is not established) or a communal identity (which would be self-defeating because it would challenge the member nations). The fact that something as unusual as a process or a project and a large 12. 需要被捍卫的不是“我们这些统一于国家的欧洲人”；没有捍卫主权（尚未确立）或共同身份（这将是自我挫败的，因为它会挑战成员国）的项目。某种如过程或项目以及一个宏大历史叙事作为安全参照物的出现，说明了欧盟超越我们通常政治范畴的新颖和实验性质（参见韦弗 1995a，1996b，待刊-e）。
historical narrative emerges as a referent for security illustrates the novel and experimental character of the EU beyond our usual political categories (cf. Wæver 1995a, 1996b, forthcoming-e). 历史叙事作为安全参照物的出现，说明了欧盟超越我们通常政治范畴的新颖和实验性质（参见韦弗 1995a，1996b，待刊-e）。
13. On the two approaches, see also Kostecki 1996, chapter 3. He labels them integrative and aggregative approaches. 13. 关于这两种方法，另见科斯特基 1996，第 3 章。他将其称为整合性和聚合性方法。
CHAPTER 9 Conclusions 第九章 结论
Security Studies: The New Framework for Analysis 安全研究：新的分析框架
The new framework results from the expansion of the security agenda to include a wider range of sectors than the traditional military and political. Expanding the security agenda is not a simple or a trivial act, nor is it without political consequences. It is not just about tacking the word security onto economic, environmental, and societal. Pursuing the wider security agenda requires giving very careful thought to what is meant by security ind applying that understanding to a range of dynamics, some of which are lundamentally different from military-political ones. As argued earlier, this ipproach does not exclude traditional security studies. Indeed, we hope it will largely lay to rest the rather scholastic argument between traditionalists and wideners. More important, we hope it will dissolve the unhelpful boundary between security studies and the international political economy (IPE). Much of the agenda that emerges from the new framework lies in the realm of IPE, not least because of the propensity of liberal economics to spill security issues over into other sectors. Consequently, security studies needs to draw upon the expertise available in IPE. In return, this linkage will allow IPE to confront the security aspects of its agenda rather than pushing them into the sterile and unfriendly boundary zone between IPE’s “rone of peace” and security studies’s “zone of conflict.” 新框架源于将安全议程扩展到比传统军事和政治更广泛的领域。扩展安全议程既不是简单的，也不是微不足道的行为，也不是没有政治后果的。这不仅仅是将“安全”一词附加到经济、环境和社会领域。追求更广泛的安全议程需要非常仔细地思考安全的含义，并将这种理解应用于一系列动态，其中一些从根本上不同于军事-政治领域。如前所述，这种方法并不排除传统安全研究。事实上，我们希望它能在很大程度上终结传统主义者与扩展主义者之间相当学究式的争论。更重要的是，我们希望它能消除安全研究与国际政治经济学（IPE）之间无益的界限。新框架所产生的议程大部分属于国际政治经济学领域，尤其是因为自由经济学倾向于将安全问题溢出到其他领域。因此，安全研究需要借鉴国际政治经济学中可用的专业知识。 作为回报，这种联系将使国际政治经济学能够正视其议程中的安全方面，而不是将其推入国际政治经济学的“和平区”和安全研究的“冲突区”之间那片贫瘠且不友好的边界地带。
In the previous eight chapters, we set out a new framework for security : tudies. In Chapter 2, we presented a method for understanding the process ul’ securitization in any sector. Without a general method for distinguishing iccurity issues from merely political ones, it is impossible to pursue the wider agenda coherently. The danger is that all things seen as problems will muhinkingly be classified as security issues. By defining security almost "xclusively in terms of one sector (the military), traditional security studies has avoided ever having to think very hard about what security actually muans. As argued in Chapter 3, it is possible to conceive of some aspects of military policy as not constituting security. 在前八章中，我们提出了一个新的安全研究框架。在第二章中，我们介绍了一种理解任何领域安全化过程的方法。没有一种区分安全问题与单纯政治问题的通用方法，就不可能连贯地推进更广泛的议程。危险在于所有被视为问题的事物都会被错误地归类为安全问题。由于传统安全研究几乎“专门”将安全定义为一个领域（军事领域），因此它避免了深入思考安全究竟意味着什么。正如第三章所论述的，有些军事政策的方面可以被认为不构成安全问题。
In Chapters 3 Itrough 7, we applied this method to the five principal wectors of the subject. The sectoral approach is crucial to the new frame- 在第三至第七章中，我们将此方法应用于该主题的五个主要领域。部门方法对于新的框架至关重要——
work for three reasons. First, it maintains a strong link to traditional security studies. Although traditional security studies is more or less monosectoral, that fact enables it to be fitted easily into the wider scheme of a multisectoral approach. The use of sectors thus maintains interoperability between the old and new approaches, enabling the latter to incorporate smoothly the insights of the former. 起作用有三个原因。首先，它保持了与传统安全研究的紧密联系。尽管传统安全研究或多或少是单一部门的，但这一事实使其能够轻松地融入多部门方法的更广泛框架中。因此，部门的使用保持了新旧方法之间的互操作性，使后者能够顺利地吸收前者的见解。
Second, the sectoral approach reflects what people are actually doing with the language by adding “security” onto sector designators (economic, environmental, and the like). This behavior is a vital part of the securitization process despite the fact that in the discourse it often reflects impulsive or superficially tactical moves designed to raise the priority of a given issue in the general political melee. These moves can, if successful, nevertheless generate deeper political consequences. Sectors are distinctive arenas of discourse in which a variety of different values (sovereignty, wealth, identity, sustainability, and so on) can be the focus of power struggles. The rhetoric of sectors generates a need for analytical follow-up to get some handles on how these consequences might unfold. 其次，部门方法反映了人们实际上如何使用语言，通过在部门指示词（经济的、环境的等）前加上“安全”一词。尽管在话语中，这种行为常常表现为冲动或表面上的战术性举动，旨在提高某一特定议题在整体政治混战中的优先级，但这种行为是安全化过程的重要组成部分。如果这些举动成功，仍然可能产生更深远的政治后果。部门是话语的独特领域，在这些领域中，各种不同的价值观（主权、财富、身份、可持续性等）可能成为权力斗争的焦点。部门话语的修辞产生了对分析性后续研究的需求，以便掌握这些后果可能如何展开。
This points to the third reason for using sectors, which is that they provide a way of understanding the different qualities of security that are features of the wider agenda. Although some qualities of security are common across sectors, each sector also has its own unique actors, referent objects, dynamics, and contradictions that need to be understood in their own terms. The first task of these five chapters was therefore to identify the new or different security qualities that will be added into security studies as a consequence. Their second task was to explore the consequences of widening the agenda for the place of regional formations in security analysis. 这指向使用部门划分的第三个原因，即它们提供了一种理解更广泛议程中安全不同性质的方法。尽管某些安全性质在各部门间是共通的，但每个部门也有其独特的行为者、指涉对象、动态和矛盾，这些都需要以其自身的方式加以理解。因此，这五章的首要任务是识别将作为结果被纳入安全研究的新安全性质或不同安全性质。第二个任务是探讨扩大议程对区域形态在安全分析中地位的影响。
Disaggregation into sectors opens up a wealth of insight, but it also poses the problem of how security studies is to be organized. Does the sectoral approach simply create four new subfields to be placed alongside traditional security studies and dealt with largely in isolation from each other, or can the sectors be reintegrated into a single field? Chapter 8 noted that the patterns within the different sectors sometimes did line up in layer-cake complexes (i.e., with regional security patterns in different sectors fitting into the same geographical space) but that in general there was too much overlap and interplay among the sectors to warrant treating them in isolation. The chapter built on this conclusion by arguing that units integrate the sectors both in their policymaking processes and in the way they relate to each other. Therefore, in political terms, there is one integrated field of security. 分解为各个部门带来了丰富的洞见，但也提出了安全研究如何组织的问题。部门方法是否仅仅创造了四个新的子领域，与传统安全研究并列，并且在很大程度上相互隔离处理，还是这些部门可以重新整合为一个统一的领域？第 8 章指出，不同部门内的模式有时确实呈现出层叠复杂体（即不同部门的区域安全模式适合于相同的地理空间），但总体而言，部门之间存在过多的重叠和相互作用，不足以支持将它们孤立对待。本章基于这一结论，论证了单位在其政策制定过程中以及相互关系中整合了各个部门。因此，从政治角度看，存在一个整合的安全领域。
This new framework raises a number of questions: (1) What are the implications of the new framework for classical security complex theory? (2) What are the problems associated with the social constructivist methodology we have employed? (3) How do the new framework and traditional 这一新框架提出了若干问题：（1）新框架对经典安全复杂体理论有何影响？（2）我们采用的社会建构主义方法论存在哪些问题？（3）新框架与传统框架如何相互关系？
security studies compare in terms of costs and benefits? Addressing these questions is the substance of this chapter. 安全研究在成本和收益方面如何比较？解决这些问题是本章的实质内容。
Implications of the New Security Studies for Classical Security Complex Theory 新安全研究对经典安全复合体理论的影响
We started this project with a question about how to combine the regional focus of CSCT with the wider agenda of security studies. Since we have set out what we think is a compelling case for the new framework, we have not escaped this obligation. On the face of it, we appear to have made life difficult for ourselves by throwing a lot of awkward complications into what was a fairly neat and clear-cut theory. CSCT was a product of thinking in the mode of traditional security studies - state centric and organized around military-political security concerns. Within the military-political nexus, CSCT gave reasons to expect regional formations, explained how those formations were structured and how they mediated intervention by outside powers, and offered ways of specifying and, to a point, predicting outcomes. Since we have attacked traditional security studies (TSS), have we not also attacked CSCT? 我们从一个关于如何将 CSCT 的区域焦点与更广泛的安全研究议程相结合的问题开始这个项目。既然我们已经提出了一个令人信服的新框架论点，我们就不能回避这个责任。表面上看，我们似乎通过将许多棘手的复杂因素引入一个相当简洁明了的理论中，使自己陷入了困境。CSCT 是传统安全研究模式下的产物——以国家为中心，围绕军事政治安全关切组织。在军事政治纽带内，CSCT 给出了预期区域形成的理由，解释了这些形成是如何构建的以及它们如何调节外部大国的干预，并提供了具体化和在一定程度上预测结果的方法。既然我们批判了传统安全研究（TSS），难道我们没有也批判 CSCT 吗？
This question can be answered yes and no. In favor of “no” is the fact that although we have rejected the method of TSS, we have not rejected its subject matter, which we have located as one part of our larger picture. Our focus on socially constructed rather than objective security does not affect CSCT, because that element was already strongly built into it with the role given to amity-enmity as a key structuring variable and the consequent spectrum of conflict formation, security regime, and security community. The idea of intersubjective constructions of securitization and desecuritization processes fits comfortably into the idea of security interdependence, which lies at the heart of CSCT. One has only to think of how the Cold War ended, how desecuritization has occurred in southern Africa, or how the process of securitization continues to be sustained in the Middle East and between India and Pakistan to see how comfortable this fit is. From this perspective, CSCT remains relevant when appropriate conditions obtain. 这个问题的答案可以是肯定的，也可以是否定的。支持“否定”的理由是，尽管我们拒绝了 TSS 的方法，但我们并没有拒绝其主题内容，我们将其定位为我们更大图景中的一部分。我们对社会建构的安全而非客观安全的关注并不影响 CSCT，因为这一元素已经通过赋予友敌关系作为关键结构变量的角色以及由此产生的冲突形成、安全机制和安全共同体的光谱，强烈地融入其中。安全化和去安全化过程的主体间建构的理念与安全相互依赖的理念相契合，而安全相互依赖正是 CSCT 的核心。只需思考冷战是如何结束的，南部非洲是如何实现去安全化的，或者中东以及印巴之间的安全化过程是如何持续的，就能看出这种契合的舒适性。从这个角度来看，只要条件适当，CSCT 仍然具有相关性。
It would, however, be boring to leave it at that. From the arguments in Chapters 3-7, it is clear that interesting regional dynamics are found in all of the new sectors. But only exceptionally will it be appropriate to treat these as self-contained, homogeneous “security complexes” within a single sector. Sometimes, but not always, the regionalizing dynamics in different sectors will line up to produce a layer-cake formation that can be treated as a single complex. Although sectoral analysis may be a clarifying way to begin analysis, the logic of overspill is strong almost everywhere, and as argued in Chapter XX, actors will generally reintegrate sectors in their own 然而，仅此而已会显得乏味。从第 3 至第 7 章的论述中可以清楚地看出，所有新兴领域中都存在有趣的区域动态。但只有在极少数情况下，才适合将这些视为单一领域内自成一体、同质的“安全复合体”。有时，但并非总是，不同领域中的区域化动态会对齐，形成可以作为单一复合体处理的层叠结构。尽管领域分析可能是开始分析的一个澄清方式，但溢出逻辑几乎在任何地方都很强烈，正如第 章所论述的，行为体通常会在自身的过程中重新整合各领域。
processes of securitization. Threat perceptions in one sector are shaped by a unit’s primary fears, even if these stem from other sectors. Given this more diverse and more complicated conception of security, can security complex theory be reformulated to operate in a world in which the state is no longer the only referent object and the military-political sector is no longer the only arena for security relations? 安全化过程。一个领域中的威胁感知是由该单位的主要恐惧塑造的，即使这些恐惧源自其他领域。鉴于这种更为多样和复杂的安全概念，安全复合体理论能否被重新构建，以适应一个国家不再是唯一参照对象，军事政治领域不再是安全关系唯一舞台的世界？
Recall the basic definition of a security complex from Chapter 1: 回顾第 1 章中安全复合体的基本定义：
Security interdependence is markedly more intense among the states inside such complexes than with states outside them. Security complexes are about the relative intensity of interstate security relations that lead to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity. A security complex is defined as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are generated by the states within that complex-by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other. 安全相互依赖在此类复合体内的国家之间明显比与外部国家之间更为强烈。安全复合体涉及国家间安全关系的相对强度，这种强度导致了由权力分布以及友好与敌对的历史关系共同塑造的独特区域模式。安全复合体被定义为一组国家，其主要的安全认知和关切紧密相连，以至于其国家安全问题无法合理地彼此分开进行分析或解决。安全复合体的形成动力和结构由该复合体内的国家产生——通过它们对彼此的安全认知和互动。
In light of the arguments in this book, this definition has to change to be compatible with the new framework. One issue is that the original formulation of security complex theory was based on the logic of regions being generated purely by interactions among states (see Chapter 1, “'Classical” Security Complex Theory" and “Moving Beyond Classical Security Complex Theory”). In the political and military sectors, it was the projection of power by states that led to regional complexes, with their specific security dilemmas, balances of power, and patterns of enmity and amity. With the new framework, security complexes cannot be limited to state and interstate relations and to politico-military issues; they must make room for other types of security units and issues. 鉴于本书中的论点，这一定义必须改变，以适应新的框架。一个问题是，安全复合体理论的最初表述是基于地区纯粹由国家间互动产生的逻辑（见第一章，“‘经典’安全复合体理论”和“超越经典安全复合体理论”）。在政治和军事领域，正是国家的权力投射导致了地区复合体，伴随着特定的安全困境、权力平衡以及敌友模式。根据新的框架，安全复合体不能仅限于国家及国家间关系和政治军事问题；它们必须为其他类型的安全单位和问题留出空间。
A second problem is the question of whether the idea of exclusively bottom-up (or inside-out) construction can be retained. Although that form of regional construction remains the dominant one, we have also identified regions created by top-down processes. In the environmental and, more arguably, the economic sectors, regions can be created as patterns within system-level processes, such as a group of countries finding themselves sharing the local effects of a climate change or a cluster of countries all finding themselves in the periphery. 第二个问题是是否可以保留完全自下而上（或由内而外）构建的理念。尽管这种区域构建形式仍然占主导地位，但我们也发现了由自上而下过程创建的区域。在环境领域，更有争议的是在经济领域，区域可以作为系统级过程中的模式被创建，例如一组国家发现自己共同承受气候变化的局部影响，或者一群国家都发现自己处于边缘地带。
This second difficulty can be handled in terms of the spectrum from conflict formation through security regime to security community. CSCT instead assumed that security complexes had their origins as conflict formations (thus forming from the bottom up) and that they might or might not evolve toward more amity-based types of security interdependence (still working in the bottom-up mode). This was the story in Europe and seemed also to be the case elsewhere (e.g., Southeast Asia, Southern Africa, 第二个难题可以通过从冲突形成到安全体制再到安全共同体的光谱来处理。CSCT 则假设安全复合体起源于冲突形成（因此是自下而上形成的），并且它们可能会或可能不会向更基于友好类型的安全相互依赖演变（仍然是在自下而上的模式中运作）。这是欧洲的情况，似乎在其他地方也是如此（例如东南亚、南部非洲）。
North America). In the military-political realm, history offered little evidence of any other pattern, and to a very considerable extent this assumption will remain valid. In Chapter 1, “Regions,” this regionalizing dynamic was explained by the immobile character of the dominant political unitthe state. 北美）。在军事政治领域，历史几乎没有提供其他模式的证据，在很大程度上这一假设仍然有效。在第一章“地区”中，这种区域化动态被解释为主导政治单位——国家的不动性特征。
This logic is not confined to the military and political sectors. It can also be found in the environmental sector; some environmental issues have strong geographical fixtures. The logic of hydropolitics, for example, is largely about subsets of actors that are highly interdependent in the face of one river system or sea or pollution problem. In such cases, the regional security complex is the upper limit of the politics related to environmental issues in that specific geographical location. The bottom-up formulation can be found in the other sectors as well. In the societal sector, we find territorially based identity groups interacting with their neighbors. In the economic sector, we find states clustering together to produce regional free trade associations (FTAs), common markets, or unions. When, as in this latter case, the interaction is more that of a security regime or a security community (rather than a conflict formation), it may well reflect, and have repercussions on, security relations outside the complex. When units enter into the amity half of the spectrum, cooperating over their security, this may be a way to both resolve security dilemmas between them and present some form of common front to outside actors. This line of thinking provides the key to dealing with security regions formed from the top down. 这种逻辑不仅限于军事和政治领域。在环境领域也能找到类似情况；一些环境问题具有强烈的地理特征。例如，水政治的逻辑主要涉及在一个河流系统、海洋或污染问题面前高度相互依赖的行为体子集。在这种情况下，区域安全复合体是与该特定地理位置环境问题相关政治的上限。自下而上的形成方式也存在于其他领域。在社会领域，我们发现基于领土的身份群体与邻居互动。在经济领域，我们发现国家聚集在一起，形成区域自由贸易协定（FTA）、共同市场或联盟。当像后者这种情况中，互动更多表现为安全机制或安全共同体（而非冲突形成）时，它很可能反映并影响复合体外的安全关系。 当单位进入友好半边的光谱，合作保障彼此的安全时，这可能是一种既解决它们之间安全困境，又向外部行为者展示某种共同阵线的方式。这种思路为处理自上而下形成的安全区域提供了关键。
With the wider agenda, it is possible to envisage regional security interdependence arising less from interactions between units than from collective responses to shared fates arising from outside systemic pressure. One could imagine, for example, the formation of regional security interdependence on the basis of shared concerns about the (in)stability of the LIEO or about the interplay of climate change and water supply. When security interdependence comes top down rather than bottom up, it seems highly likely that the resultant security complex will be found at the amity end of the spectrum (a security regime or community) rather than at the enmity end (conflict formation). Although common threats could set units against each other, they are more likely to bring them together. One danger to watch out for here is mistaking subregional security regimes for security complexes. The Gulf Cooperation Council constitutes a security regime but is nevertheless part of the Gulf subcomplex and is not a security complex in its own right. 在更广泛的议程下，可以设想区域安全相互依赖更多地源于对外部系统性压力所引发的共同命运的集体反应，而非单元之间的互动。例如，可以想象基于对 LIEO（自由国际经济秩序）稳定性或气候变化与水资源供应相互作用的共同关切，形成区域安全相互依赖。当安全相互依赖是自上而下形成而非自下而上时，极有可能产生的安全复合体位于友好端（安全体制或社区）而非敌对端（冲突形成）。尽管共同威胁可能使各单元相互对立，但更可能将它们团结在一起。这里需要警惕的一个危险是将次区域安全体制误认为安全复合体。海湾合作委员会构成了一个安全体制，但它仍是海湾次区域复合体的一部分，并非独立的安全复合体。
Thus, in all sectors the logic of regionalization can be the result of bot-lom-up processes that find their upper limit at the subsystem level. But regionalization can also result from top-down processes when the subsystem is triggered by global structures, interaction capacities, and processes. In the first case, the leading methodological question is, what is the minimum scale, or the lowess level, at which sources of explanation can be 因此，在所有领域中，区域化的逻辑可以是自下而上的过程的结果，这些过程在子系统层面找到其上限。但当子系统被全球结构、互动能力和过程触发时，区域化也可以是自上而下过程的结果。在第一种情况下，主要的方法论问题是，解释来源可以被定位而不产生不连贯分析的最小规模或最低层次是什么？
located without creating incoherent analyses? Do we need arguments that are located at a higher level of analysis? In other words, what is the smallest environment of a specific security issue? This is the method behind classical security complex theory. 我们是否需要位于更高分析层次的论据？换句话说，特定安全问题的最小环境是什么？这就是经典安全复合体理论背后的方法。
In the second case, the global level is the smallest environment. The leading methodological question here is, does the location of the sources of explanation at the global level provide a coherent analysis of security issues throughout the system? And if not, do the differences show coherent patterns that allow us to conclude the presence of specific regional or nonregional subsystems? The difference is that the bottom-up regions exist independently within the international system and the top-down regions exist because of the international system. Given the overall condition of a global international system, regions will generally be a mixture of bottomup and top-down processes but usually with one process clearly dominant. 在第二种情况下，全球层面是最小的环境。这里的主要方法论问题是，解释来源位于全球层面是否能够对整个系统的安全问题提供连贯的分析？如果不能，这些差异是否显示出连贯的模式，使我们能够得出存在特定区域或非区域子系统的结论？区别在于，自下而上的区域在国际体系内独立存在，而自上而下的区域则因国际体系而存在。鉴于全球国际体系的整体状况，区域通常是自下而上和自上而下过程的混合体，但通常其中一个过程明显占主导地位。
As explained in Chapter 1, “‘Classical’ Security Complex Theory,” security complexes are ultimately defined by the interaction among their units; thus, the top-down-bottom-up question is only one about the causes behind that process: The security complex as such is the pattern of security interaction. This means that already in CSCT the constructivist element was that a security complex is what states actually do (not what they say they do-we do not ask, for example, if Arafat thinks there is a Middle East security complex-but the pattern of fears and actions they act upon). For instance, if an analyst found that in terms of “objective” threats the Middle East was the wrong scale by which the actors should define their horizonthey ought to join together against their real threat, the West-this would be of little importance. In actuality, the states would still be locked into patterns of rivalry and alliances that constituted a regional security complex. Similarly, for sea pollution the real factor that defines the security complex is the actions taken by the units and thus the constellations they form. 如第一章“‘经典’安全复合体理论”中所述，安全复合体最终是由其单元之间的互动所定义的；因此，自上而下与自下而上的问题仅仅是关于该过程背后原因的问题：安全复合体本身就是安全互动的模式。这意味着在经典安全复合体理论中，建构主义元素已经存在，即安全复合体是国家实际所做的（而非他们所说的——例如，我们不会问阿拉法特是否认为存在中东安全复合体——而是他们基于恐惧和行动所形成的模式）。例如，如果分析者发现就“客观”威胁而言，中东并不是行为体定义其水平的正确尺度——他们应该联合起来对抗真正的威胁，即西方——这将毫无意义。实际上，国家仍然会被锁定在构成区域安全复合体的竞争和联盟模式中。同样，对于海洋污染，定义安全复合体的真正因素是单元采取的行动及其形成的星座。
The novelty is that in CSCT it was also assumed that the causality behind the formation of the security complex was bottom up, that the interaction of mutual security concerns within the region had produced the complex. Now we open up the possibility that causation can be top down; thus, it is sometimes necessary to start from the system level to explain the formation of the complex. Still, the complex itself is defined by the actions and relations in the region; if it was not, if it was defined solely by globallevel considerations and actions, it would not be a regional security complex. Arguments about the nature of joint problems (top down) can therefore never exhaust the explanation of security complexes; they are only facilitating conditions. The very act of securitization always has autonomy; therefore, the security complex is defined by the securitizations that take place inside it. 新颖之处在于，在 CSCT 中也假设安全复合体形成的因果关系是自下而上的，即区域内相互安全关切的互动产生了该复合体。现在我们开放了因果关系可以自上而下的可能性；因此，有时有必要从系统层面出发来解释复合体的形成。然而，复合体本身是由该区域内的行动和关系定义的；如果不是，如果仅由全球层面的考虑和行动定义，那它就不是一个区域安全复合体。因此，关于共同问题性质的论证（自上而下）永远无法穷尽对安全复合体的解释；它们只是促成条件。安全化的行为本身总是具有自主性；因此，安全复合体是由发生在其内部的安全化所定义的。
With these thoughts in mind, the definition of security complexes can be reformulated as follows: 带着这些思考，安全复合体的定义可以重新表述如下：
Security interdependence is markedly more intense among the units inside such complexes than with units outside them. Security complexes are about the relative intensities of security relations that lead to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and relations of amity and enmity. A security complex is defined as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are normally generated by the units within it-by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other. But they may also arise from collective securitizations of outside pressures arising from the operation of complex metasystems, such as the planetary environment or the global economy. 安全相互依赖在此类复合体内部的单位之间明显比与外部单位之间更为强烈。安全复合体涉及安全关系的相对强度，这些关系导致由权力分布以及友好与敌对关系共同塑造的独特区域模式。安全复合体被定义为一组单位，其主要的安全化、去安全化过程或两者相互关联，以至于其安全问题无法合理地分开分析或解决。安全复合体的形成动力和结构通常由其中的单位产生——通过它们对彼此的安全感知和互动。但它们也可能源自对外部压力的集体安全化，这些压力来自复杂元系统的运作，如地球环境或全球经济。
Armed with this revised definition, we still have to resolve security complex theory with the arguments about security constellations made in Chapter 8. How relevant does the particular regional formation remain when actors are synthesizing security across a range of sectors, each of which may have rather different dynamics? Does it remain relevant only when military-political security dynamics dominate, or can it be applied to other aspects of the wider security agenda? 有了这个修订后的定义，我们仍需将安全复合体理论与第 8 章中关于安全星座的论点相结合。当行为体在多个领域综合安全时，每个领域可能具有截然不同的动态，特定的区域形成还具有多大相关性？它是否仅在军事政治安全动态占主导地位时才相关，还是可以应用于更广泛安全议程的其他方面？
Security constellations is a much wider concept than security complexes, reflecting as it does the totality of possible security interrelationships at all levels. One needs to think about the concept not just in relation to security complexes but in relation to the entire framework of which they were a part. CSCT located security complexes at the regional level within a fourtiered framework that ran from substate through regional and interregional to system. Each of these tiers represented a distinctive level of interaction: within states (focusing especially on weak states), between states (linking them into regional complexes), between complexes ta minor or residual category except in places where the boundaries between complexes were unstable), and between great powers (defining the system level or, in neoreallist terms, the polarity of the system). The idea was to separate these four liers for purposes of analysis and to put them back together to get the whole picture, emphasizing one or another tier depending on the objective of the malysis (whether a particular state, a region, or the international system as a whole). 安全星座是一个比安全复合体更广泛的概念，因为它反映了所有层面上可能存在的安全相互关系的整体。人们需要不仅仅从安全复合体的角度来思考这个概念，还要从它们所处的整个框架来考虑。CSCT 将安全复合体定位于区域层面，置于一个由四个层级组成的框架中，这个框架从次国家层级经过区域层级和跨区域层级直到系统层级。每个层级代表一种独特的互动水平：国家内部（特别关注弱国）、国家之间（将它们连接成区域复合体）、复合体之间（除非复合体之间的边界不稳定，否则属于次要或残余类别）以及大国之间（定义系统层级，或者用新现实主义术语来说，是系统的极性）。这个想法是为了分析目的将这四个层级分开，然后再将它们组合起来以获得整体图景，根据分析目标（无论是特定国家、一个区域还是整个国际体系）强调其中一个或另一个层级。
Security constellations can be fitted into a similar sort of framework, albeit probably a more complicated one. They reflect the entire range of security relations we looked at in Chapters 3-7 in terms of localizing, regionalizing, subglobalizing, and globalizing dynamics. As in CSCT, there is no reason to expect that territorially coherent regions should involve more than one subset of security constellations. The reason for focusing on them is because ol their relative neglect as a structuring feature of internalional security and their importance in mediating relations between local mits and ontside powers. Compared with the CSCT Pramework, security 安全星座可以被纳入类似的框架，尽管可能更为复杂。它们反映了我们在第 3 至 7 章中所讨论的安全关系的全部范围，涉及本地化、区域化、次全球化和全球化动态。正如在 CSCT 中一样，没有理由期望领土上连贯的地区会涉及多个安全星座的子集。关注它们的原因在于它们作为国际安全结构特征的相对忽视，以及它们在调解地方单位与外部势力关系中的重要性。与 CSCT 框架相比，安全
constellations will almost certainly generate a much fuller set of nonregional subglobal patterns (such as those created by the sets of countries that export copper or those countries vulnerable to sea-level rises). 星座几乎肯定会产生更完整的非区域性次全球模式（例如由出口铜的国家集合或那些易受海平面上升影响的国家所形成的模式）。
The politico-military focus of CSCT allowed little room for nonregional subglobal patterns. Because politico-military relations are strongly mediated by distance, adjacency is a main element that determines interaction capacity. Threats are expected to travel more easily over shorter distances; thus, security interdependence among neighbors is, in general, more intense than that with more remote actors. Moreover, the dominant units of the sys-tem-states-owe much of their identity, as well as their political, military, and economic power, to their territorial sovereignty rights. In the original formulation of security complex theory, therefore, the international system consisted of geopolitical building blocks: states, regional security complexes, and global structures. In this sector, nonregional subsystemic patterns would be unusual, if not wholly absent. CSCT 的政治军事焦点几乎没有为非区域性次全球模式留下空间。由于政治军事关系受到距离的强烈影响，邻近性是决定互动能力的主要因素。威胁预计更容易在较短距离内传播；因此，邻国之间的安全相互依赖通常比与更远的行为体更为紧密。此外，体系的主导单位——国家——其身份以及政治、军事和经济权力很大程度上依赖于其领土主权权利。因此，在安全复合体理论的最初表述中，国际体系由地缘政治构建块组成：国家、区域安全复合体和全球结构。在这一领域，非区域性子系统模式是不寻常的，甚至完全不存在。
But once other sectors and units are added in, the picture changes. Relations in the economic and environmental sectors in particular are much less mediated by distance, which opens more possibility for nonregional security formations. Nonregional subsystems consist of units bound by common interests that are unrelated to adjacency. An example is AOSIS, the Alliance of Small Island States-the potential victim states of a sealevel rise. These 35 states will disappear if politics fails to deal with the causes of global warming and the disaster scenarios hold true. AOSIS is clearly a subset, to be located at the subsystem level, but it is not a region. Nonregional subsystems are typically issue specific and are defined top down. The chance that the AOSIS states have something more in common than a shared fate under global warming is virtually nil. This means that unlike regional subsystems, the chances of cross-sectoral congruence in nonregional subsystems are low. 但一旦加入其他部门和单位，情况就会发生变化。特别是在经济和环境部门，关系受距离影响较小，这为非区域安全结构打开了更多可能性。非区域子系统由基于共同利益而非邻近关系绑定的单位组成。一个例子是 AOSIS，即小岛屿国家联盟——这些国家是海平面上升的潜在受害者。如果政治未能解决全球变暖的原因，且灾难情景成真，这 35 个国家将会消失。AOSIS 显然是一个子集，应定位于子系统层面，但它不是一个区域。非区域子系统通常是特定议题驱动的，并且是自上而下定义的。AOSIS 国家之间除了在全球变暖下的共同命运外，几乎没有其他共同点。这意味着，与区域子系统不同，非区域子系统中跨部门一致性的可能性较低。
Thus, as with CSCT, the regional level still plays a distinctive role in security constellations. There may be times and places in which it does not, as there were for CSCT, and with the wider agenda there may well be nonregional as well as regional security formations at the subsystem level. In understanding the absence of security complexes, one would now have to add sectoral considerations to the two existing explanations (overlay and states with too little power to interact sufficiently to create a regional formation). When the security agenda is dominated by economic or environmental concerns, regionalizing tendencies may be weak (although not necessarily so, depending on the type of issue). But there are three good reasons for thinking the regional level will remain an important focus of security analysis within the new framework. 因此，与 CSCT 一样，区域层面在安全星座中仍然扮演着独特的角色。可能会有时间和地点它不发挥作用，就像 CSCT 那样，在更广泛的议程中，子系统层面可能既存在非区域的也存在区域的安全形态。在理解安全复合体缺失时，现在必须在已有的两种解释（叠加和权力不足以充分互动以形成区域形态的国家）基础上加入部门考虑。当安全议程以经济或环境问题为主导时，区域化倾向可能较弱（尽管不一定如此，取决于问题类型）。但有三个充分的理由认为，在新框架内，区域层面将继续是安全分析的重要焦点。
As long as political life is structured primarily by states, territoriality will continue to be important and will be predisposed toward regional 只要政治生活主要由国家构成，领土性将继续重要，并且倾向于区域性
formations. States, in other words, will tend to construct political responses in their own territorial image. As noted in Chapter 7, the political sector does in some senses permeate all of the others. Only if political life became truly neomedieval, with authority divided in partly nonterritorial ways, would the regional imperative be greatly weakened. 形态。换句话说，国家倾向于以自身的领土形象构建政治回应。如第 7 章所述，政治领域在某种意义上确实渗透到所有其他领域。只有当政治生活真正变得新中世纪化，权威以部分非领土的方式分割时，区域性命令才会大大减弱。
On current evidence, regional security dynamics remain strong in many parts of the world in the sectors in which security relations are the most strongly mediated by distance (i.e., political, military, and societal). New security complexes, such as those in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and West Africa, and ongoing ones, such as those in South Asia and Southern Africa, clearly contain mixtures of politico-military and societal security dynamics, actors, and referent objects. As long as that remains the case, regional formations will be a natural and expected outcome. A spillover effect is that these formations influence the way in which less obviously territorial issues in the economic and environmental sectors are seen. Once the regional formation is present, it acts as a lens through which to focus other issues into its own structure. This situation is perhaps most obvious in Europe, where the EU represents a fusion of economic with military-political concerns. The opposite case will unfold in East Asia, where the possibilities for economic regionalism face the obstacle of a possible conflict formation in the security complex emerging in the military-political sphere (Buzan 1997). 根据现有证据，区域安全动态在世界许多地区依然强劲，尤其是在安全关系最受距离影响的领域（即政治、军事和社会领域）。新的安全复合体，如巴尔干、南高加索和西非，以及持续存在的复合体，如南亚和南部非洲，显然包含了政治-军事和社会安全动态、行为体及参照对象的混合。只要这种情况持续存在，区域形成将是自然且预期的结果。一个溢出效应是，这些形成影响了经济和环境领域中那些不那么明显的领土性问题的看法。一旦区域形成出现，它就成为一个透镜，通过它将其他问题聚焦到自身结构中。这种情况在欧洲尤为明显，欧盟代表了经济与军事-政治关切的融合。相反的情况将在东亚展开，经济区域主义的可能性面临军事-政治领域中可能出现的安全复合体冲突形成的障碍（Buzan 1997）。
Some environmental and economic issues are structured so as to reinforce existing regional security complexes. Thus, water-sharing issues in the Middle East and pipeline questions in the CIS both add to existing regionalizing imperatives. 一些环境和经济问题的结构方式加强了现有的区域安全复合体。因此，中东的水资源共享问题和独联体的管道问题都加剧了现有的区域化需求。
The Constructivist Approach 建构主义方法
At stake here is where to locate oneself analytically on a spectrum that ranges from constructivist to objectivist. On this issue, we will compare our securitization approach to two other approaches: traditional security studies (TSS) and critical security studies (CSS). This approach is complex because the axis has to be used twice-once regarding “security” (how socially constituted is the security nature of issues) and also in regard to social relations in general. Especially in the comparison between CSS and our position, one is more constructivist on one axis and the other is more constructivist on the other axis; therefore, this must be differentiated to grasp the differences. 这里的关键是分析上应将自己定位于从建构主义到客观主义的光谱上的何处。在这个问题上，我们将把我们的安全化方法与另外两种方法进行比较：传统安全研究（TSS）和批判安全研究（CSS）。这种方法很复杂，因为这个轴线必须使用两次——一次是关于“安全”（问题的安全性质在多大程度上是社会构成的），另一次是关于社会关系本身。特别是在 CSS 与我们立场的比较中，一个在一个轴线上更倾向于建构主义，而另一个在另一个轴线上更倾向于建构主义；因此，必须区分这两者以理解差异。
Traditional security studies is usually objectivist regarding security in the sense that security studies is about telling what the real threats are, how best to deal with them, and- as al second-order question - how actors mannge or mismanage seconty policy becathse of intellectual or hureatatac 传统安全研究通常在安全问题上持客观主义立场，认为安全研究是关于揭示真实威胁是什么、如何最好地应对这些威胁，以及作为二阶问题——行为体如何因智力或认知失败而管理或误管理安全政策。
failures. Usually, TSS is also generally objectivist. It sees states as the given, eternal form of units; it views interests as something objective; and it has rules about the behavior of states that take on something close to natural science status, such as balance of power and arms race theory. 通常，传统安全研究也普遍是客观主义的。它将国家视为既定的、永恒的单位形式；将利益视为客观存在；并且它对国家行为有一些规则，这些规则接近自然科学的地位，比如权力平衡和军备竞赛理论。
Critical security studies, in contrast, views the system very much in constructivist terms. If states dominate the arena, this is a feat of power politics repressing other dimensions of reality that could potentially replace the states if an emancipatory praxis could-with the help of critical theo-ry-empower other subjectivities than those that dominate at present. ^(1){ }^{1} The social world does not exhibit any iron laws, all regularities can be broken, and it is the task of critical theory to show this-as well as to expose how some logics came to be seen as necessary when in fact they are contingent. 相比之下，批判安全研究非常强调建构主义视角来看待体系。如果国家主导了舞台，这是权力政治压制其他现实维度的结果，而这些维度有可能在解放性实践的帮助下——借助批判理论——赋权于当前主导之外的其他主体性。社会世界不存在任何铁律，所有规律都可以被打破，批判理论的任务就是展示这一点——同时揭示某些逻辑为何被视为必然，实际上它们是偶然的。
On the issue of security, however, CSS is often less constructivist than one would expect. As part of the argument against established discourses of security, CSS will often try to mobilize other security problems-environmental problems, poverty, unemployment-as more important and more threatening, thereby relativizing conventional wisdom. By this method, CSS often ends up reproducing the traditional and objectivist concept of security: Security is about what is a threat, and the analyst can tell whether something really is a security problem and for whom. Also, this approach will often contribute to the general securitization of ever larger spheres of social life (Wæver 1995b). First-generation security wideners such as Scandinavian peace research, as discussed in Chapter 1, often fall very close to the upper left corner (objective security, constructed social relations). Critical security studies stretches from this view toward the more poststructuralist parts of the movement, which emphasize the politics of defining what constitutes security, in the upper right quadrant of Figure 9.1. 然而，在安全问题上，CSS 往往不如人们预期的那样建构主义。作为反对既定安全话语的一部分，CSS 常常试图动员其他安全问题——环境问题、贫困、失业——作为更重要和更具威胁性的，从而相对化传统智慧。通过这种方法，CSS 往往最终再现了传统的客观主义安全概念：安全关乎什么是威胁，分析者可以判断某事是否真的是安全问题以及对谁构成威胁。此外，这种方法常常助长了社会生活越来越多领域的普遍安全化（Wæver 1995b）。第一代安全扩展者，如第一章中讨论的斯堪的纳维亚和平研究，通常非常接近左上角（客观安全，建构的社会关系）。批判性安全研究则从这一观点延伸到运动中更具后结构主义色彩的部分，强调定义什么构成安全的政治性，位于图 9.1 的右上象限。
Our securitization approach is radically constructivist regarding security, which ultimately is a specific form of social praxis. Security issues are made security issues by acts of securitization (cf. Chapter 2). We do not try to peek behind this to decide whether it is really a threat (which would reduce the entire securitization approach to a theory of perceptions and misperceptions). Security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them, which means to stage them on the political arena in the specific way outlined in this book and then to have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves. 我们的安全化方法在安全问题上采取了激进的建构主义立场，安全最终是一种特定形式的社会实践。安全问题是通过安全化行为而成为安全问题的（参见第二章）。我们不试图探究其背后是否真的是威胁（那样的话，整个安全化方法将沦为感知与误解的理论）。安全是一种由行为者通过安全化注入问题的特质，这意味着按照本书所述的特定方式将其呈现在政治舞台上，并获得足够的观众接受，以批准非常规的防御措施。
Defining security as a self-referential praxis must constitute radical constructivism-on the security axis. Regarding general social relations, however, we are less constructivist than most authors of CSS. When one has adopted a basically constructivist position that assumes social relations are not laws of nature but the contingent product of human action and always potentially open for restructuration, one can emphasize the contingency of a construction (for instance, the state or an identity) and then base one’s analysis on the possibility that it could change in part by one 将安全定义为一种自我指涉的实践必须构成安全轴上的激进建构主义。然而，关于一般社会关系，我们比大多数 CSS 作者的建构主义立场要弱。当人们采纳一种基本的建构主义立场，认为社会关系不是自然法则，而是人类行为的偶然产物，并且始终有可能被重构时，可以强调某种建构（例如国家或身份）的偶然性，然后基于其部分可能发生变化的可能性来进行分析
Figure 9.1 Schools of Security Studies 图 9.1 安全研究学派
exposing the processes that made it what it is. Or one can assume that this construction belongs among the more durable and keep it as constant throughout one’s analysis (to focus variation on other dimensions). 揭示使其成为现状的过程。或者可以假设这种建构属于较为持久的范畴，并在整个分析过程中将其保持不变（以便将变化集中在其他维度上）。
The latter approach does not imply that one has to take the construction as necessary, as in principle and forever unchangeable (Buzan and Wæver 1997). Structures are sedimented practices that are not currently politicized and thereby not widely seen as a matter of choice. One can therefore take them as likely frameworks for some discussions, but it is also possiblemore critically-always to conclude that since they are in principle contingent, we should talk about how they could change. 后一种方法并不意味着必须将该建构视为必要的，像原则上和永远不可改变的那样（Buzan 和 Wæver 1997）。结构是沉淀下来的实践，目前并未被政治化，因此并未被广泛视为一种选择问题。因此，人们可以将其视为某些讨论的可能框架，但也可以更批判性地得出结论：既然它们原则上是偶然的，我们就应该讨论它们如何可能发生变化。
This is probably what has caused most of the critique of our previous book: Since we studied security conducted in the name of identities (socictal security), we must be objectifying identities (see, most strongly, McSweeney 1996). We do take identities as socially constituted but not radically moreso than other social structures. Identities as other social constructions can petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with. At specific points, this “inert constructivism” enables modes of analysis very close to objectivist-for example, Waltzian neorealism, as long as one remembers that in the final instance the ontology is not Waltz’s naturalism and atomism but some form of constructivism or even, in line with classical realism, rhetorical foundations (Dessler 1989; Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993, part 3; Wæver 1994, forthcoming-b). 这大概是导致我们之前书籍受到大部分批评的原因：由于我们研究的是以身份名义进行的安全（社会安全），我们必须将身份客体化（见，最强烈的是，McSweeney 1996）。我们确实认为身份是社会构成的，但并不比其他社会结构更为根本。身份和其他社会建构一样，可能僵化并成为相对固定的元素，需要加以考虑。在特定时刻，这种“惰性建构主义”使得分析模式非常接近客观主义——例如，沃尔兹式的新现实主义，只要记住最终本体论不是沃尔兹的自然主义和原子论，而是某种形式的建构主义，甚至按照经典现实主义，是修辞基础（Dessler 1989；Buzan、Jones 和 Little 1993，第 3 部分；Wæver 1994，待发表-b）。
We try to reinsert continuity (and in other contexts even structures) wilhin constructivism; therefore, we do not want to create a security theory that can only tell how everything could be different. We also want to understand why actors oproate the wily they do, both now and very likely also 我们试图在建构主义中重新引入连续性（在其他语境中甚至是结构）；因此，我们不想创造一种只能说明一切如何可能不同的安全理论。我们也想理解行为者为何以他们现在以及很可能将来也会以的方式行动。
tomorrow. Transformation is one but not always the most reasonable strategy for improving security; in many cases, as analyst one can help more by grasping the patterns of action among units as they are and thereby help to avoid escalations, to steer vicious circles toward managed security complexes and eventually security communities. 明天。转型是一种策略，但并不总是改善安全的最合理策略；在许多情况下，作为分析师，可以通过把握单位之间的行动模式来提供更多帮助，从而避免升级，推动恶性循环走向受控的安全复合体，最终形成安全共同体。
Our relative objectivism on social relations has the drawback of contributing to the reproduction of things as they are, of contributing to the taking for granted that CSS wants to upset. The advantage is-totally in line with classical security studies-to help in managing relations among units. 我们对社会关系的相对客观主义有一个缺点，即助长了事物现状的再生产，助长了对 CSS 想要颠覆的现状的理所当然。其优点——完全符合经典安全研究——是有助于管理单位之间的关系。
The advantages and disadvantages of our radical constructivism regarding security are probably more controversial. The main disadvantage is our inability to counter securitizations (say, of immigrants) with an argument that this is not really a security problem or that the environment is a bigger security problem. We can engage in debates over factual matters relating to the securitization (are projections for future immigrants realistic; do cultures lose coherence if they live together with foreigners, or are they more likely to be strengthened), but since the meaning of security is to lift it to a different kind of politics, we cannot contest this in terms of truth; only pragmatically or ethically can we ask, what are the likely effects of securitizing this issue? Will doing so be a helpful way of handling this issue, and what are the side effects of doing it in a security mode? We can expose the unnecessary nature of the securitization but not its falsity. 我们激进建构主义关于安全的优缺点可能更具争议。主要的缺点是我们无法用论点反驳安全化（比如对移民的安全化），即这并不是真正的安全问题，或者环境才是更大的安全问题。我们可以就与安全化相关的事实问题展开辩论（未来移民的预测是否现实；文化在与外国人共同生活时是否会失去凝聚力，还是更有可能被强化），但由于安全的意义在于将其提升到一种不同的政治层面，我们无法用真理来质疑这一点；我们只能从务实或伦理的角度提出问题，即安全化这一议题可能产生的影响是什么？这样做是否是处理该问题的有效方式，以及以安全模式处理的副作用是什么？我们可以揭示安全化的非必要性，但不能揭示其虚假性。
A major part of our attempt to engage critically with securitizations will be-since we are international relationists and undertake security stud-ies-to point to likely effects on interactions with other units. If we securitize this way, we will create fears in B, and then we have a security dilemma. A desecuritization of the issue, in contrast, will leave it to other procedures. It is possible to participate in the debate over the likely events if the situation is left desecuritized but not to close this debate by giving a scientific measurement about whether the situation constitutes a threat, which would demand a deterministic social universe. 我们试图批判性地参与安全化过程的一个重要部分是——因为我们是国际关系学者并从事安全研究——指出这种安全化可能对与其他单位的互动产生的影响。如果我们以这种方式进行安全化，我们将在 B 中制造恐惧，然后我们就会陷入安全困境。相反，问题的去安全化将交由其他程序处理。如果情况保持去安全化状态，有可能参与关于可能事件的辩论，但不能通过科学测量来结束这场辩论，即判断该情况是否构成威胁，因为那将要求一个决定论的社会宇宙。
Most of the comments we have had so far are about this kind of issue, about the role of the analyst and thus about essentially political issueswhich is revealing in a discipline that previously saw itself as engaging in value-free social science. A gain from raising the securitization debate will be to involve other schools of security studies more openly in debates about the political role of security analysts. 到目前为止，我们收到的大多数评论都涉及这类问题，关于分析者的角色，因此本质上是政治问题——这在一个此前自认为从事无价值判断社会科学的学科中具有启示意义。提出安全化辩论的一个收获是能够更公开地让其他安全研究学派参与关于安全分析师政治角色的辩论。
A second kind of advantage and disadvantage of the debate relates to the kinds of analytical questions that can or cannot be dealt with. The major new opening is probably an ability to historicize security, to study transformations in the units of security affairs. Traditional security studies defines the units (states) and the instruments (military) that by definition make any security phenomena elsewhere invisible. Much of critical security studies 辩论的第二种优势和劣势与能够或不能处理的分析性问题类型有关。主要的新突破可能是能够将安全历史化，研究安全事务单位的转变。传统安全研究定义了单位（国家）和工具（军事），这些定义使得任何其他地方的安全现象都变得不可见。批判性安全研究的大部分内容...
has an individualist, reductionist ontology and therefore also translates everything into a homogeneous currency-individual security. Securitization studies can analyze how and when new referent objects attain the status of something in the name of which one can successfully undertake security and can study the degree to which the new sectors actually exhibit politics in the form of security. It becomes possible to draw a map of security in between the closed, predefined world of traditionalists, the every-thing-is-security of the wideners, and the everything-could-be-different of CSS. To the traditionalist, this map will seem transient because it is not founded on material factors but only on sedimented patterns of security practice; to the critical theorist, it will be reactionary in reproducing the world as it is and not as it could be. 具有个人主义的、还原论的本体论，因此也将一切转化为同质的货币-个体安全。安全化研究可以分析新的参照对象如何以及何时获得以其名义成功进行安全行动的地位，并可以研究新领域在多大程度上实际上以安全的形式表现出政治。可以绘制一张安全地图，介于传统主义者封闭、预定义的世界、扩展者的“万物皆安全”以及 CSS 的“万物皆可不同”之间。对传统主义者来说，这张地图看起来是短暂的，因为它不是建立在物质因素上，而仅仅是建立在沉积的安全实践模式上；对批判理论家来说，它是反动的，因为它再现了现有世界，而非可能的世界。
Contrasting Our New Framework with the Traditional Approach 将我们的新框架与传统方法进行对比
The most obvious difference between our new framework and the traditional approach to security studies is in the choice of a wide (multisectoral) versus a narrow (monosectoral) agenda. Wideners must keep an open mind about the balance among the sectors, the cross-linkages between them, and the types of threat, actor, and referent object that might be dominant in any given historical time. By contrast, traditional security studies gives permanent priority to one sector (the military) and one actor (the state) plus any links or crossovers from other sectors that relate directly to the use of force. The two approaches are also incompatible methodologically to the extent that our definition of security is based on the social construction of threats and referent objects, whereas traditionalists take an objectivist view of these factors. In principle, this difference of method could lead to rather different understandings of security, even in the military sector and relating to the state. In practice, traditionalists cannot afford to get too far out of line with socially constructed threats without risking marginalization. The langer here is that the traditionalists’ objectification of threat and referent object will push them into the role of securitizing actors. This danger has been a part of long-standing peace research and more recent CSS warnings about TSS. 我们新框架与传统安全研究方法最明显的区别在于议程的选择：广泛的（多部门）与狭窄的（单部门）。广泛派必须对各部门之间的平衡、它们之间的交叉联系，以及在任何特定历史时期可能占主导地位的威胁类型、行为者和参照对象保持开放的心态。相比之下，传统安全研究始终优先关注一个部门（军事）和一个行为者（国家），以及与使用武力直接相关的其他部门的任何联系或交叉。这两种方法在方法论上也不兼容，因为我们的安全定义基于威胁和参照对象的社会建构，而传统主义者则对这些因素持客观主义观点。原则上，这种方法差异可能导致对安全的理解截然不同，即使是在军事部门和涉及国家的情况下。实际上，传统主义者不能偏离社会建构的威胁太远，否则将面临边缘化的风险。 这里的更深层含义是，传统主义者对威胁和参照对象的客体化将推动他们成为安全化行为者。这种危险一直是长期和平研究和最近关于 TSS 的批判性安全研究警告的一部分。
Apart from this methodological difference, the general subject matter of TSS can be seen as one subset of our new framework. Both share a methodological collectivism that leads them to draw a boundary between international security and a wider political theory of security. Unlike some peace research and parts of its recent spin-off, critical security studies, our framework, and TSS reject reductionism (giving priority to the individual as the ulimate referen object of security) as an unsound approach to international secority. This does not mean they reject the validity of individual- 除了方法论上的差异外，TSS 的一般主题可以被视为我们新框架的一个子集。两者都共享一种方法论上的集体主义，这使它们在国际安全与更广泛的安全政治理论之间划定了界限。与某些和平研究及其最近的衍生领域——批判性安全研究不同，我们的框架和 TSS 都拒绝还原主义（即优先考虑个体作为安全的最终参照对象）作为一种不可靠的国际安全方法。这并不意味着它们否定个体的有效性——
level security, only that they see it as relatively marginal to understanding international security. By international security, we mainly mean relations between collective units and how those are reflected upward into the system. We keep the term international despite its ambiguities, both because it is an established usage and because its ambiguities hint at multisectorality (“nation” rather than “state”). 级别安全，只是他们认为这在理解国际安全方面相对边缘。我们所说的国际安全，主要指集体单位之间的关系以及这些关系如何向上反映到体系中。我们保留“国际”一词，尽管它存在歧义，既因为它是一个既定用法，也因为其歧义暗示了多部门性（“民族”而非“国家”）。
In weighing the costs and benefits of the two approaches, at least two different qualities need to be taken into account: their relative intellectual coherence and the way in which they handle the potent rhetorical power of the security concept. 在权衡这两种方法的成本和收益时，至少需要考虑两个不同的品质：它们相对的智力连贯性以及它们如何处理安全概念强大的修辞力量。
In terms of intellectual coherence, there is perhaps little to choose. We think we have answered the traditionalists’ charge set out in Chapter 1. By making the use of sectors explicit and differentiating between politicization and securitization, it is possible both to retain a distinctive subject area and to restore intellectual coherence to the wider agenda. Traditional security studies is not immune to the charge of intellectual incoherence itself (Buzan 1987). Although its concentration within a single sector does give it the superficial appearance of intellectual (and sociological) coherence, its boundaries are by no means well-defined. The “use of force” criterion, the most common delineation of the field, cannot be (or has not yet been) used to set clear boundaries. Any attempt to do so quickly finds the subject extending into large areas of peace research and into much of the general study of international relations. It would be extremely difficult to differentiate TSS from either realist approaches to international relations or substantial swaths of international political economy (such as hegemony theory). The new framework may be more complicated than the traditional method, but it has equal claim to intellectual respect, and its complexity is open and accessible rather than hidden and undiscussed. 在智识连贯性方面，或许难以做出明显选择。我们认为已经回应了第一章中传统主义者的指责。通过明确使用领域并区分政治化与安全化，既可以保留一个独特的研究领域，也能恢复更广泛议程的智识连贯性。传统安全研究本身也难免被指责智识不连贯（Buzan 1987）。尽管其集中于单一领域使其表面上看起来具有智识（和社会学）连贯性，但其边界绝非明确定义。“使用武力”标准作为该领域最常见的划分依据，无法（或尚未）被用来设定清晰的界限。任何尝试这样做的努力都会迅速发现该主题延伸至大量和平研究领域以及国际关系的一般研究中。要将传统安全研究与国际关系的现实主义方法或国际政治经济学的大部分领域（如霸权理论）区分开来，将极为困难。 新的框架可能比传统方法更复杂，但它同样值得智力上的尊重，其复杂性是公开且易于理解的，而非隐藏和未被讨论的。
The second comparison between the new framework and TSS is in terms of how well they handle the potent rhetorical power of the security concept. For both approaches, security is an empowering word-setting political priorities and justifying the use of force, the intensification of executive powers, the claim to rights of secrecy, and other extreme measures. The way security is understood and used profoundly affects the way political life is conducted. As is well-known, excessive securitization produces the international equivalents of autism and paranoia. Closed states, such as the erstwhile Soviet Union, Iran, and North Korea, that are trying to promote distinctive development projects securitize everything from nuclear missiles and opposing armies to miniskirts and pop music. Such wide-ranging securitization stifles civil society, creates an intrusive and coercive state, cripples (eventually) the economy, and maximizes the intensity of the security dilemma with neighbors that do not share the ideological project. Avoiding excessive and irrational securitization is thus a legitimate social, political, and economic objective of considerable importance. 新框架与 TSS 之间的第二个比较是它们如何处理安全概念强大的修辞力量。对于这两种方法来说，安全都是一个赋权的词——设定政治优先事项并为使用武力、加强行政权力、主张保密权利以及其他极端措施辩护。安全的理解和使用方式深刻影响政治生活的进行。众所周知，过度的安全化会产生国际上的自闭症和偏执症的等价物。像前苏联、伊朗和朝鲜这样的封闭国家，试图推动独特的发展项目，将从核导弹和敌对军队到迷你裙和流行音乐的一切都安全化。这种广泛的安全化扼杀了公民社会，制造了一个侵入性和强制性的国家，最终削弱经济，并最大化与不共享意识形态项目的邻国之间的安全困境的强度。因此，避免过度和非理性的安全化是一个具有相当重要性的合法社会、政治和经济目标。
The academic debate about how to constitute security studies cannot responsibly proceed in isolation from this real-world political context. 关于如何构建安全研究的学术辩论，不能脱离这一现实世界的政治背景而负责任地进行。
The question is how best to limit claims to security so the costs and benefits of securitization are reasonably balanced. Progress on this question is closely linked to the much wider sense of progress attached to the development of Western international society as a whole. It perhaps begins with the construction of the Hobbesian state in the eighteenth century. The creation of the Leviathan was aimed at opening a sphere of public economic and political life, and this could not be done without pushing the use of force back into a contained space controlled by the state. Under the Leviathan, citizens could not draw swords over economic grievances or political disagreements, which were to be handled by the rule of law and the market. The logic of existential threat and the right to use force over economic or political relationships were reserved to the state and thus were largely desecuritized among the citizens (Williams 1996, forthcoming). 问题在于如何最好地限制对安全的主张，以便安全化的成本和收益能够合理平衡。对此问题的进展与西方国际社会整体发展的更广泛进步感密切相关。它或许始于十八世纪霍布斯式国家的构建。利维坦的创建旨在开启一个公共经济和政治生活的领域，而这无法在不将武力使用推回由国家控制的受限空间的情况下实现。在利维坦体制下，公民不能因经济不满或政治分歧而拔剑相向，这些问题应由法治和市场来处理。存在性威胁的逻辑以及对经济或政治关系使用武力的权利被保留给国家，因此在公民之间在很大程度上实现了去安全化（Williams 1996，待发表）。
This domestic development pointed the way to the wider sense of progress as desecuritization, inherent in the liberals’ project since the nineteenth century of attempting the intellectual and political separation of economics from politics. To the extent that this separation can be achieved, it desecuritizes the international economic realm to leave people, firms, and states freer to pursue efficiency without the constraints of self-reliance and the need to consider calculations of relative gain. Paradoxically, this separation and the interdependence that follows from it are then supposed to allow desecuritization to spill over into military-political relations. 这一国内发展指明了更广义的进步方向，即去安全化，这在自由主义者自十九世纪以来的项目中固有，即试图在智识和政治上将经济与政治分离。在这种分离能够实现的程度上，它使国际经济领域去安全化，使个人、企业和国家能够更自由地追求效率，而不受自力更生的限制，也不必考虑相对收益的计算。矛盾的是，这种分离及其带来的相互依赖随后被认为能够使去安全化蔓延到军事政治关系中。
The desecuritization of economics is central to the ideology of capitalism. This project has been taken the furthest in the “zone of peace” that now characterizes Western international society (Goldgeier and McFaul 1992; Singer and Wildavsky 1993; or in an earlier version, Keohane and Nye 1977). With the demise of the Communist counterproject and the closed states and societies associated with it, the prospect exists for a more widespread dissolving of borders, desecuritizing most kinds of political, social, and economic interaction. This development is the most advanced within the EU, but it is also inherent in the shift from modern to postmodern states and from more closed to more open political constructions that is going on in many parts of the world. 经济的去安全化是资本主义意识形态的核心。这个项目在现在代表西方国际社会特征的“和平区”中被推到了极致（Goldgeier 和 McFaul 1992；Singer 和 Wildavsky 1993；或在早期版本中，Keohane 和 Nye 1977）。随着共产主义反项目及其相关的封闭国家和社会的消亡，出现了更广泛的边界消解的前景，去安全化了大多数政治、社会和经济互动。这一发展在欧盟内部最为先进，但它也内在于从现代国家向后现代国家的转变，以及从更封闭到更开放的政治结构的转变，这种转变正在世界许多地区进行。
On the face of it, this project to limit the scope of securitization would seem to argue in favor of the traditionalists, with their narrow agenda, and against the wideners. It is indeed rather surprising that such a line of attack has not been used against the wideners, except in a limited way by Daniel Deudney (1990) (and in our own previous reflections; see Buzan 1995b, and Wæver 1995b). The wider agenda seems to be more vulnerable to excesses of securitization than the traditional military one (which is vulnerable enough by itself if taken to the extreme). Reserving security for the military sector has a pleasing, “lasis resort” ring about it and fits comfortably 表面上看，这个限制安全化范围的项目似乎支持传统主义者及其狭隘议程，而反对扩展者。确实令人惊讶的是，除了丹尼尔·杜德尼（1990 年）有限度地使用过这种攻击路线（以及我们自己之前的反思；见布赞 1995b 和韦弗 1995b），这种攻击并未被用来针对扩展者。相比传统的军事议程（如果走向极端本身就足够脆弱），更广泛的议程似乎更容易受到安全化过度的影响。将安全限定在军事领域听起来颇具“最后手段”的意味，并且与当前享受冷战后上升期的广泛自由主义意识形态相契合。
with the broadly liberal ideology that is now enjoying its post-Cold War ascendance. In this perspective, widening the security agenda can be cast as a retrograde move. It threatens the hard-won desecuritizing achievements of liberalism and perhaps even those of the Hobbesian Leviathan over the past three centuries and is out of line with the imperatives toward more openness in the post-Cold War world. 从这个角度看，扩大安全议程可以被视为一种倒退。它威胁到了自由主义艰难取得的去安全化成果，甚至可能威胁到过去三百年来霍布斯式利维坦的成就，并且与冷战后世界朝着更开放方向发展的必然趋势不符。
We do not wish to question the general progress of Western international society, and we are on record here and elsewhere arguing in favor of desecuritization as the long-range political goal. But note that the liberal approach to desecuritization is primarily about detaching and freeing other sectors from the use of force and thus eventually reducing and marginalizing the military sector itself. Demilitarization by sector has been the characteristic liberal approach to desecuritization, and in that sense traditional security studies is, surprisingly, one of its products (rather than a product of conservatism, as one might first think). For what is TSS about if not the isolation of the military sector as embodying “security” (and for some of its more liberal practitioners, it is hoped, then, its eventual marginalization in international relations). 我们并不想质疑西方国际社会的一般进展，我们在此及其他地方都主张将非安全化作为长期的政治目标。但请注意，自由主义的非安全化方法主要是关于将其他领域从使用武力中分离和解放出来，从而最终减少和边缘化军事领域本身。按领域的非军事化一直是自由主义非安全化的典型方法，从这个意义上说，传统安全研究令人惊讶地是其产物之一（而不是像人们最初想的那样是保守主义的产物）。因为传统安全研究如果不是关于将军事领域孤立为体现“安全”的话（对于其一些更自由主义的从业者来说，希望它最终在国际关系中被边缘化）。
This liberal approach has costs as well as benefits. It is one way of understanding desecuritization but arguably not the best and certainly not the most appropriate in current circumstances. Ironically, the very success of the liberal project is now giving rise to the demand for a wider security agenda, for a reinvention of security in terms other than military. Rather than an atavistic assault on the three-century liberal project, we see the new framework as a constructive and necessary response to that project. 这种自由主义方法既有成本也有收益。这是一种理解去安全化的方式，但可以说不是最好的，也绝对不是当前情况下最合适的。具有讽刺意味的是，自由主义项目的成功正促使人们对更广泛的安全议程提出需求，要求以非军事的方式重新定义安全。我们并不将其视为对三百年自由主义项目的返祖式攻击，而是将这一新框架视为对该项目的建设性且必要的回应。
Even during the Cold War, two costs of the liberal approach that equated demilitarization with desecuritization were already evident. One was its ideological role in international power politics, and the second was its vulnerability to politico-military logics of oversecuritization. 即使在冷战期间，将非军事化等同于去安全化的自由主义方法的两个成本已经显现。其一是其在国际权力政治中的意识形态作用，其二是其对政治军事逻辑的过度安全化的脆弱性。
Whether intentionally or not, liberal desecuritization legitimized the post-1945 U.S.-Western imperium, which operated on the demand for access rather than in the traditional European style of direct control. The desecuritization of economic relations facilitated this imperium of access. It made economic penetration by the strong legitimate and threw political obstacles in the way of the weak, who viewed their security in much wider terms than just military relations. For many states and peoples on the periphery of the international system, the attempted liberal desecuritization of the political economy was itself a security issue. The self-serving qualities of liberal choices about defining the security agenda were seen as invidious, whatever their merits elsewhere. Liberal states were able to delegitimize the nonmilitary security claims of other actors, in the process subordinating them to the “normal” politics of the market economy and pluralist politics. By itself, this situation justified a wider perspective on security, but only the voices of the weak calling for a new international economic 无论是有意还是无意，自由主义的去安全化使得战后 1945 年美国-西方帝国合法化，该帝国运作基于对准入的需求，而非传统欧洲式的直接控制。经济关系的去安全化促进了这一准入帝国。它使强者的经济渗透合法化，并在弱者面前设置政治障碍，弱者将其安全视为远超军事关系的更广泛范畴。对于国际体系边缘的许多国家和民族来说，政治经济的自由主义去安全化尝试本身就是一个安全问题。自由主义在定义安全议程上的自利特质被视为令人反感，无论其在其他方面的优点如何。自由主义国家能够使其他行为体的非军事安全主张失去合法性，在此过程中将其置于市场经济和多元政治的“正常”政治之下。仅凭这一点，就证明了对安全采取更广泛视角的合理性，但只有弱者的声音呼吁建立新的国际经济体系。
order supported it, and it was largely drowned out by the titanic military confrontation of the superpowers. 秩序支持了它，但它在超级大国之间的巨大军事对抗中基本上被淹没了。
This confrontation can be seen as evidence of the vulnerability of politico-military logics to oversecuritization. By equating “security” with “military,” the Western-particularly the U.S.–political establishment exposed itself to an objectivist, externally determined definition of security that was extraordinarily difficult to break. That definition drove the logic of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, paved the way for the disaster in Vietnam, and legitimized the self-mutilation of McCarthyism. This objectivist, military understanding of security all but forecloses the option of fundamentally questioning any securitization. When locked into a military sector defined as “security” and faced with a military threat, it is difficult to do more than argue about how dangerous the threat is. In this mode of thinking, asking whether something military should be securitized is extremely difficult, since it requires not only making a case for the issue at hand but also redefining the terms of the discourse. One advantage of the securitization approach advocated here is that it points to the responsibility involved in talking about security (or desecuritization) for policymakers, analysts, campaigners, and lobbyists. It is a choice to phrase things in security (or desecurity) terms, not an objective feature of the issue or the relationship itself. That choice has to be justified by the appropriateness and the consequences of successfully securitizing (or desecuritizing) the issue at hand. 这种对抗可以被视为政治军事逻辑对过度安全化脆弱性的证据。通过将“安全”与“军事”等同，西方——特别是美国——的政治体制使自己暴露于一种客观主义的、外部决定的安全定义之下，这种定义极其难以打破。该定义推动了与苏联的核平衡逻辑，为越南灾难铺平了道路，并使麦卡锡主义的自我残害合法化。这种客观主义的军事安全理解几乎排除了从根本上质疑任何安全化的可能性。当被锁定在被定义为“安全”的军事领域并面临军事威胁时，除了争论威胁有多危险之外，很难做更多的事情。在这种思维模式中，质疑某事是否应被军事化为安全极为困难，因为这不仅需要为当前问题提出理由，还需要重新定义话语的术语。 这里所倡导的安全化方法的一个优点是，它指出了政策制定者、分析师、活动家和游说者在谈论安全（或去安全化）时所承担的责任。将问题表述为安全（或去安全）问题是一种选择，而不是该问题或关系本身的客观特征。这个选择必须通过成功地将手头的问题安全化（或去安全化）的适当性和后果来证明其合理性。
With the end of the Cold War, the extension of the market economy into nearly all of the formerly Communist world, and the intensification of global finance, investment, and production, the case for a wider security agenda has become stronger. The demise of the Cold War has, at least for the time being, greatly reduced military rivalries among the great powers. Security concerns are more about the consequences of how the open international system operates-a set of issues that affects the strong actors as much as it does the weaker ones. This development is most obvious in the case of the international economy (Rosenau 1990; Ruggie 1993; Cerny 1995; Strange 1994). The rise of economic security is not just a throwback to classical mercantilism. It is a reaction against the various dangers of global liberalization-the risk of becoming a loser; the general hazard of system instability, especially financial; and the dark side of trade in the form of criminal activities in drugs, weapons, and other banned products (e.g., CFCs). The rise is also about the crossover effects of the global economy on environmental issues, domestic political autonomy and stability, and military self-reliance. As we argued in our 1993 book (Wæver et al.), some of the postmodern liberal moves in the international system-most notably the integration of the EU-were also crucial to the generation of societal security problems. 随着冷战的结束，市场经济扩展到几乎所有前共产主义国家，以及全球金融、投资和生产的加剧，推动了更广泛安全议程的必要性。冷战的终结至少在目前大大减少了大国之间的军事竞争。安全关注更多地集中在开放的国际体系如何运作的后果上——这是一系列影响强国和弱国的议题。这一发展在国际经济领域表现得尤为明显（Rosenau 1990；Ruggie 1993；Cerny 1995；Strange 1994）。经济安全的兴起不仅仅是对古典重商主义的回归。它是对全球自由化各种风险的反应——成为失败者的风险；系统不稳定的普遍危险，尤其是金融方面；以及贸易的阴暗面，如毒品、武器和其他禁运产品（例如 CFCs）的犯罪活动。经济安全的兴起还涉及全球经济对环境问题、国内政治自主与稳定以及军事自给自足的交叉影响。 正如我们在 1993 年出版的书中所论述的（Wæver 等人），国际体系中的一些后现代自由主义举措——尤其是欧盟的一体化——对于社会安全问题的产生也起到了关键作用。
In the posi-Cold War worta, therefore, it can be angued that a wider 因此，在后冷战时期，可以认为一个更广泛的
security agenda is a necessary response to the global success of the liberal project. Among other things, this can be seen in the number of system- and subsystem-level referent objects uncovered in Chapters 3 through 7. In some central ways, the liberal project does seem to have succeeded in marginalizing military security and along with it the approach of traditional security studies. But in so doing it has raised new security problems that can only be handled in a multisectoral framework. The danger of excessive securitization remains, and a core part of the new framework must therefore be to provide the means of identifying and criticizing counterproductive claims to securitization (including military ones). 安全议程是对自由主义项目全球成功的必要回应。其中之一可以在第 3 至第 7 章中发现的系统级和子系统级参照对象数量中看到。在某些核心方面，自由主义项目似乎确实成功地边缘化了军事安全及其传统安全研究方法。但在这样做的过程中，它提出了只能在多部门框架内处理的新安全问题。过度安全化的危险依然存在，因此新框架的核心部分必须提供识别和批评适得其反的安全化主张（包括军事主张）的方法。
But to assume that the post-Cold War world has been successfully desecuritized or that only military security issues remain would risk misunderstandings equal to or greater than those associated with the wider agenda. Our approach has the basic merit of conceptualizing security as a labeling for which actors can be held responsible rather than an objective feature of threats. Thus, although the multisectoralism of the approach enables a proliferation of securitization, its constructivism delivers the means for questioning and politicizing each specific instance. This contrasts with the approach of TSS, which puts a firm sectoral limit on what constitutes security but which has objectified, depoliticized, and indeed naturalized it as the only allowable understanding of security. On this test as well, the new framework can hold its own against the traditional one. 但假设后冷战世界已经成功去安全化，或者只有军事安全问题仍然存在，这将带来与更广泛议程相关的误解相等或更大的风险。我们的方法的基本优点在于将安全概念化为一种标签，责任主体可以被追究，而不是威胁的客观特征。因此，尽管该方法的多部门性使得安全化现象得以扩散，其建构主义则提供了质疑和政治化每一个具体实例的手段。这与 TSS 的方法形成对比，后者对安全的构成设定了严格的部门界限，但却将其客观化、去政治化，甚至自然化为唯一允许的安全理解。在这一考验中，新框架同样能够与传统框架抗衡。
Note 注释
In this respect, critical security studies is more closely linked to critical theory and parts of poststructuralism in IR than to what passes for constructivism in the larger discipline. What is probably the dominant strand of constructivism in IR is affiliated with names such as Alexander Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995), Peter Katzenstein (1996a, 1996b), Emanuel Adler (1992, 1995), and Michael Barnett (1995; Adler and Barnett 1996, forthcoming). For various reasons, these authors are often deliberately state centric and want to show how constructivism can explain state action better than traditional realist or liberalist explanations. One of the reasons for this tendency could be the birth of this constructivism in the agent-structure debate (Wendt 1987), which was translated into IR as agent-state, structure-international structure (Wæver 1994). Also, this constructivism is usually very careful to distinguish itself from anything sounding poststructuralist (cf. Wæver 1996c). The term constructivist, however, could easily cover a much wider range of possible positions and probably will increasingly as authors in the part of the spectrum that could be called either nonconfrontational poststructuralism or radical constructivism launch their works. Within security studies, we have only recently seen a systematic attempt to launch “mainstream constructivism” as an approach to security (Katzenstein’s weighty edited volume [1996b] is the flagship), whereas the school we discuss here, critical security studies, has been emerging gradually and consistently over the last several years, drawing upon mixtures of critical theory 在这方面，批判性安全研究与国际关系中的批判理论和部分后结构主义联系更为紧密，而不是与更大领域中所谓的建构主义联系更紧密。国际关系中可能占主导地位的建构主义流派与 Alexander Wendt（1992、1994、1995）、Peter Katzenstein（1996a、1996b）、Emanuel Adler（1992、1995）和 Michael Barnett（1995；Adler 和 Barnett 1996，待出版）等名字相关。出于各种原因，这些作者通常有意以国家为中心，试图展示建构主义如何比传统的现实主义或自由主义解释更好地解释国家行为。这种倾向的一个原因可能是这种建构主义诞生于主体-结构辩论（Wendt 1987），该辩论被翻译为国际关系中的主体-国家、结构-国际结构（Wæver 1994）。此外，这种建构主义通常非常谨慎地将自己与任何听起来像后结构主义的东西区分开来（参见 Wæver 1996c）。 然而，术语“建构主义者”很容易涵盖更广泛的可能立场，并且随着处于光谱中既可称为非对抗性后结构主义或激进建构主义的作者们陆续推出他们的作品，这一范围可能会越来越广。在安全研究领域，我们最近才看到系统性尝试将“主流建构主义”作为安全研究的一种方法（卡岑斯坦的重要编辑卷[1996b]是旗舰作品），而我们在此讨论的学派——批判安全研究——则是在过去几年中逐渐且持续地兴起，借鉴了批判理论的混合
(Marx, Gramsci, Habermas). poststructuralism, and mainstream constructivism (Booth 1979, 1991, 1994, 1995; Dalby 1988, 1990; Klein 1990, 1994: Krause 1992, 1993; Krause and Williams 1997; Luke 1989; Walker 1988, 1990; Wynn-Jones 1995; for a critical discussion of some of these works, see Hansen 1994). （马克思，葛兰西，哈贝马斯）。后结构主义，和主流建构主义（Booth 1979, 1991, 1994, 1995；Dalby 1988, 1990；Klein 1990, 1994：Krause 1992, 1993；Krause 和 Williams 1997；Luke 1989；Walker 1988, 1990；Wynn-Jones 1995；关于这些作品的一些批判性讨论，见 Hansen 1994）。
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Acronyms 缩略语
AFTA
ASEAN Free Trade Area 东盟自由贸易区
AIDS 艾滋病
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 获得性免疫缺陷综合症
ANC 非国大
African National Congress 非洲民族大会
AOSIS 小岛屿发展中国家联盟
Alliance of Small Island States 小岛屿国家联盟
APEC 亚太经合组织
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 亚太经济合作组织
ASEAN 东南亚国家联盟
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 东南亚国家联盟
CCAMLR 南极海洋生物资源保护公约
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 南极海洋生物资源保护公约
CFCs chlorofluorocarbons 氯氟烃
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 独联体
COPRI
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute 哥本哈根和平研究所
CSCT classical security complex theory CSCT 古典安全复合体理论
CSS critical security studies CSS 批判性安全研究
EC European Community 欧洲共同体
ECOWAS 西共体
Economic Community of West African States 西非国家经济共同体
EMU 经济货币联盟
European Monetary Union 欧洲货币联盟
EP 欧洲议会
European Parliament 欧洲议会
ERM exchange rate mechanism ERM 汇率机制
EU European Union 欧盟 欧洲联盟
FTA free trade association FTA 自由贸易协会
GATT 关税及贸易总协定
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 关税及贸易总协定
GDR 德意志民主共和国
German Democratic Republic 德意志民主共和国
GNP 国民生产总值
gross national product 国民生产总值
G7 七国集团
Group of Seven 七国集团
1BM
International Business Machines 国际商业机器公司
ICBM 洲际弹道导弹
intercontinental ballistic missile 洲际弹道导弹
ICI 帝国化学工业公司
IGO 国际政府间组织
Imperial Chemical Industries 帝国化学工业公司
intergovernmental organization 政府间组织
IMF 国际货币基金组织
International Monetary Fund 国际货币基金组织
INGO 国际非政府组织
international nongovernmental organization 国际非政府组织
IIE 国际经济研究院
international political economy 国际政治经济学
IR 国际关系
international relations 国际关系
I’I"
LIEO
liberal international economic order 自由国际经济秩序
MEP
Member of the European Parliament 欧洲议会议员
MERCOSUR
Southern Cone Common Market 南方共同市场
MFN
most-favored nation 最惠国
NAFTA
North American Free Trade Agreement 北美自由贸易协定
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 北大西洋公约组织
NGO
nongovernmental organization 非政府组织
NIEO
New International Economic Order 新国际经济秩序
NPT
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 核不扩散条约
OAU
Organization of African Unity 非洲统一组织
OAS
Organization of American States 美洲国家组织
OECD
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 经济合作与发展组织
OPEC
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 石油输出国组织
PFP
Partnership for Peace 和平伙伴关系
PKO
peacekeeping operation 维和行动
R&D 研发
research and development 研究与开发
SAARC
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 南亚区域合作联盟
SADC
Southern African Development Community 南部非洲发展共同体
TNC
transnational corporation 跨国公司
UK
United Kingdom 英国
UN
United Nations 联合国
UNCED
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 联合国环境与发展会议
UNEP
United Nations Environment Program 联合国环境规划署
U.S.
United States 美国
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 苏维埃社会主义共和国联盟
WEU
Western European Union 西欧联盟
WTO
World Trade Organization 世界贸易组织
LIEO liberal international economic order
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MERCOSUR Southern Cone Common Market
MFN most-favored nation
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIEO New International Economic Order
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAU Organization of African Unity
OAS Organization of American States
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PFP Partnership for Peace
PKO peacekeeping operation
R&D research and development
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC Southern African Development Community
TNC transnational corporation
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
U.S. United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU Western European Union
WTO World Trade Organization| LIEO | liberal international economic order |
| :--- | :--- |
| MEP | Member of the European Parliament |
| MERCOSUR | Southern Cone Common Market |
| MFN | most-favored nation |
| NAFTA | North American Free Trade Agreement |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NGO | nongovernmental organization |
| NIEO | New International Economic Order |
| NPT | Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OAS | Organization of American States |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OPEC | Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| PFP | Partnership for Peace |
| PKO | peacekeeping operation |
| R&D | research and development |
| SAARC | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| TNC | transnational corporation |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCED | United Nations Conference on Environment and Development |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Program |
| U.S. | United States |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| WEU | Western European Union |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |
Africa: post-Cold War effects in, 67, 68-69; tribal-state conflicts in, 126-128 非洲：冷战后影响，67，68-69；部落国家冲突，126-128
Aggregate security, 170-171. 173; versus sector-specific security, 175, 176, 189-190 综合安全，170-171，173；与部门特定安全对比，175，176，189-190
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). 83, 87, 202 小岛屿国家联盟（AOSIS）。83，87，202
ASEAN, 66-67, 134, 147, 161 东盟，66-67，134，147，161
Attribution theory, actors and referent objects in, 44-45 归因理论，行为者与参照对象，44-45
Cannes Declaration, 180 戛纳宣言，180
China, potential regionalization of, 135 中国，潜在的区域化，135
Class, as referent object, 101 作为指称对象的阶级，101
Cold War: end of, security impact of, 2-3, 65-67, 210-212; regional military securitization and, 61-62, 63, 64 冷战：结束，安全影响，2-3，65-67，210-212；地区军事安全化与，61-62，63，64
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 65 独立国家联合体（CIS），65
Critical security studies, 34-35; constructivist methodology in, 203-204 批判性安全研究，34-35；建构主义方法论，203-204
Desecuritization: of economics, ideology of capitalism and, 209; liberal agenda and, 207-209; progress as, 4, 29, 209 非安全化：经济学的非安全化，资本主义意识形态的非安全化，209；自由主义议程与非安全化，207-209；作为非安全化的进步，4，29，209
Discourse analysis, 177-179 话语分析，177-179
I İast Asia: post-Cold War regional security in, 66; regional integration in, 东亚：冷战后地区安全，66；地区一体化，
113; societal security trends in, 134-136 113；社会安全趋势，134-136
I’astern Europe, integrative-disintegrative dynamics in, 65-66 东欧的整合-解体动力，65-66
Economic liberalism: ancien régime character of, 98-99; elfects on national and 'Third World connomics. 经济自由主义：旧制度特征，98-99；对国家和“第三世界经济”的影响。
97-98; securtization issues in. 97-98；安全化问题。
95-96, 104, 105, 106-107; status of firms in, 100-101 95-96，104，105，106-107；公司地位，100-101
Economic security: collapse of welfare argument in, 102; cross-sectoral dynamics in, 169-170; defined, 8; degree of securitization and, 165; firms as referent object in, 38 , 100-101; globalizing trends in, 110-115; for individuals, 103-104; localizing dynamics in, 115; mercantilism/neomercantilism in, 95, 96, 103, 113; mobility/immobility logic in, 10, 95; overspill effect in, 116-117; protectionism and, 37; regional dynamics in, 112-115, 170; securitization criteria in, 103-109; socialist and nationalist perspective in, 96; structures, subsystem- and system-level, 38,102,106,11638,102,106,116; systemic crises in, 107-109; threats and referent objects in, 22, 99-109. See also Liberal international economic order 经济安全：福利崩溃论，102；跨部门动态，169-170；定义，8；安全化程度，165；公司作为参照对象，38，100-101；全球化趋势，110-115；个人安全，103-104；本地化动态，115；重商主义/新重商主义，95，96，103，113；流动性/非流动性逻辑，10，95；溢出效应，116-117；保护主义，37；区域动态，112-115，170；安全化标准，103-109；社会主义和民族主义视角，96；结构，子系统和系统层面；系统性危机，107-109；威胁和参照对象，22，99-109。另见自由国际经济秩序
Environmental security: actors in, 77-79; concept carrying capacity and, 81-82; cross-sector linkages in, 175; defined, 8; institutionalization of, 79; localizing, regionalizing, and globalizing dynamics in, 84-91; media and, 88-89; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and, 77, 78, 83,88 ; policy debates, 82-8382-83; political structures in, 29, 71; politicaliza-lion-securitization debate in, 73-74, 87; regional regime formations in. 环境安全：参与者，77-79；承载能力概念，81-82；跨部门联系，175；定义，8；制度化，79；本地化、区域化和全球化动态，84-91；媒体，88-89；非政府组织（NGO），77，78，83，88；政策辩论；政治结构，29，71；政治化-安全化辩论，73-74，87；区域制度形成。
87; scientilic versus political agenda in, 71-75; securitizing moves in. 87；科学与政治议程的对立，71-75；安全化行动。
72-74, 77, 80. 92: as undexirable. 4. 34 72-74，77，80。92：作为不受欢迎的。4。34
Environmental threats：to achieved level of civilization，75－77；assessment time frame in，72－73；categories and relationships of，79－84；causes and effects in，82－83，85－86；existential urgency and， 29,73 ；global warming as，86－87；referent object and，23， 38 环境威胁：达到文明水平，75-77；评估时间框架，72-73；类别及关系，79-84；原因与影响，82-83，85-86；存在紧迫性，29，73；全球变暖作为，86-87；指称对象，23，38
Epistemic communities approach， 73 认识论共同体方法，73
Europe：exchange rate mechanism （ERM）in，111；fragmentation as existential threat in， 148 ；local and regional military security dynamics in， 65,66 ；societal sector dynamics in，132；vertical identity conflicts in， 132－133 欧洲：汇率机制（ERM）中，111；作为生存威胁的分裂，148；地方和区域军事安全动态，65,66；社会部门动态，132；垂直身份冲突，132－133
European integration project，102－103， 112，184－185；as security threat， 132 欧洲一体化项目，102－103，112，184－185；作为安全威胁，132
European Monetary Union，113， 182 欧洲货币联盟，113，182
European security complex，superpower overlay of， 65 欧洲安全复合体，超级大国叠加，65
European Union，65，66，112，146，147， 151，157，158；contemporary map of， 20 n .2 ；cross－sectoral security analy－ sis of，171－189；peace－integration argument in，179，184，187；securiti－ zation themes，182－186 欧洲联盟，65，66，112，146，147，151，157，158；当代地图，20 注 2；跨部门安全分析，171－189；和平整合论点，179，184，187；安全化主题，182－186
Existential threat：nature of，21－22；as securitization criterion，24－26，27， 28；versus securitizing move，25．See also specific sector 生存威胁：性质，21－22；作为安全化标准，24－26，27，28；与安全化行动的对比，25。另见具体部门
Former Soviet region，state and nation building problems in，136－137 前苏联地区，国家与民族建设问题，136－137
France，cross－sectoral security analysis of，172－173 法国，跨部门安全分析，172－173
Functional actors，36，42，56－57； defined， 36 功能性行为体，36，42，56－57；定义，36
Santer，Jacques， 179 桑特，雅克，179
Sectoral analysis，7－8，27，195－196； actor＂s perspective in，168－171 部门分析，7－8，27，195－196；行动者视角，168－171
Sectors，defineel．7－8 部门，定义．7－8
Securitizalion，23－33；costs and benefits balance in， 2(1)-2102(1)-210 ；definition and criteria ol＇， 2.3-252.3-25 ，27，existential threat，in，24，27，external military capability ind， 51 ；facilitating condi－ tions for，17，32，36，37；institution－ alized，27－29）；as intersubjective process，30－31；levels of analysis in， 5－6，6－7，17－18，164－166；liberal， 210－211；military linkage with，211； as political act，29，30，33，34；politi－ cization and，23－24，29，143，148； process，amity and enmity outcomes of， 58 ；securitizing move versus， 25 ； social power and，31－32；as speech act，26， 27 安全化，23－33；成本与收益平衡；定义和标准，27；存在性威胁，24，27；外部军事能力指标，51；促进条件，17，32，36，37；制度化，27－29；作为主体间过程，30－31；分析层次，5－6，6－7，17－18，164－166；自由主义，210－211；与军事的联系，211；作为政治行为，29，30，33，34；政治化，23－24，29，143，148；过程，友好与敌对结果，58；安全化行动与，25；社会权力，31－32；作为言语行为，26，27
Securitizing actors，41－45；analysts innl． 33－35；attribution theory and， 44－45；cross－sector，175；defined． 40；as distinguished from referent objects，41－42；legitimacy of，＇ 41－42；social capital of，31－31 安全化行动者，41－45；分析者，33－35；归因理论与，44－45；跨部门，175；定义，40；与参照对象区分，41－42；合法性，41－42；社会资本，31－31
Security（international）：concepl mil criteria，5，21，27，29－30，4（11 I．．＂＇1 stellations，168，191п．3，201：小． course，24－29．19（；cmphasis on 安全（国际）：概念军事标准，5，21，27，29－30，4（11 I．．＂＇1 星座，168，191 页 3，201：小．课程，24－29．19（；强调
collectivities in, 35, 36; interdependence in, 11-12; issue, defined, 21; rhetoric, 208-209; sectoral logic in, 27 集体，35，36；相互依赖，11-12；议题，定义，21；修辞，208-209；部门逻辑，27
Security analysis: actors and referent objects in, 35-45; analytical sequence in, 168-169; cross-sectoral, 171-189; size and scale in, 36-37, 106-107; as subjective versus objective, 30-31 安全分析：行动者和参照对象，35-45；分析序列，168-169；跨部门，171-189；规模和范围，36-37，106-107；作为主观与客观，30-31
Security complex(es): actors and referent objects in, 43-45; analytical framework, 14 ; bottom-up versus top-down construction in, 198-200; concept, 11-12, 20n.3, 34; conflict formation in, 12; homogeneous (sec-tor-specific) and heterogeneous, 16-17; as mobile or fixed, 9-10; overlay versus intervention in, 12-13; pattern of security connectedness in, 42-45; reformulated definition of, 200-201; regional, crosssectoral congruence and linkages in, 166-167; structure, 13-14 安全复合体：行动者和参照对象，43-45；分析框架，14；自下而上与自上而下构建，198-200；概念，11-12，20 注 3，34；冲突形成，12；同质（部门特定）与异质，16-17；作为移动或固定，9-10；叠加与干预，12-13；安全关联模式，42-45；重新定义，200-201；区域性，跨部门一致性与联系，166-167；结构，13-14
Security complex theory (classical), 10-15, 178-179; amity-emnity component of, 50,58 ; new security studies and, 197-203; regional premise of, 12,15-16,5912,15-16,59; securitizing actors and referent objects in, 42-45; value of, 14-15 安全复合体理论（经典），10-15，178-179；友敌成分，50，58；新安全研究与，197-203；区域前提；安全化行动者和参照对象，42-45；价值，14-15
Security speech act, 26, 27, 28, 46-47n.5, 149, 151; actor identification in, 40-41; facilitating conditions for, 32-33 安全言语行为，26，27，28，46-47 注 5，149，151；行为者识别，40-41；促进条件，32-33
Security studies: actor and analyst roles in, 33-35; importance of sectoral approach in, 195-196; objectivist and constructivist approach in, 203-204; postpositivist perspectives in, 34-35; reductionism in, 207; “wide” versus “narrow” debate in, 2-5, 197-203, 207-212. See also Critical securities studies; Security complex theory 安全研究：行为者与分析者角色，33-35；部门方法的重要性，195-196；客观主义与建构主义方法，203-204；后实证主义视角，34-35；简化主义，207；“广义”与“狭义”之争，2-5，197-203，207-212。另见批判性安全研究；安全复合体理论
Societal sector: cosmopolitan-postnational elite in, 137-138; religious identification in, 124; Westernization and cultural homogenization in, 135, 138 社会部门：世界主义-后民族精英，137-138；宗教认同，124；西方化与文化同质化，135，138
Societal security: agenda, 119-123; concept, 8,120,139n.18,120,139 \mathrm{n} .1; cross- 社会安全：议程，119-123；概念，；交叉-
sectoral dynamics in, 169; horizental competition in, 121-122, 125, 136; identity as organizing concept in, 119-120; media and, 124; migration and, 121,125,129-130,133121,125,129-130,133, 部门动态，169；横向竞争，121-122，125，136；身份作为组织概念，119-120；媒体与，124；移民与，
137-138; mobility/immobility logic in, 10; nationhood and, 120 ; referent objects in, 22-23, 123-124; regionalizing and globalizing dynamics in, 123-124, 125-126, 138; reifying and anthropomorphic terminology in, 41; securitizing actors in, 124; social security and, 131; threats and vulnerabilities in, 22-23, 124-126; vertical competition in, 121, 122-123, 127, 132-133, 134 137-138；流动性/非流动性逻辑，10；民族身份，120；指称对象，22-23，123-124；区域化和全球化动态，123-124，125-126，138；具体化和拟人化术语，41；安全化行为者，124；社会安全，131；威胁与脆弱性，22-23，124-126；垂直竞争，121，122-123，127，132-133，134
South Africa, post-Cold War security effects in, 67 南非，冷战后安全影响，67
South Asia, societal security in, 133-134 南亚，社会安全，133-134
Southeast Asia, security agenda in, 67, 134 东南亚，安全议程，67，134
Soviet Union. See Cold War; former Soviet region 苏联。参见冷战；前苏联地区
Speech act. See Security speech act State: cross-sector security linkages and, 174,175 ; government as securitizing actor for, 146-147, 152; logic of economic security for, 104-105; political security threats to, 142 , 144-145, 155-157; as referent object, 36, 101-102, 123-124 言语行为。参见安全言语行为 国家：跨部门安全联系，174,175；作为安全化行为者的政府，146-147, 152；经济安全逻辑，104-105；对政治安全的威胁，142, 144-145, 155-157；作为指涉对象，36, 101-102, 123-124
State centrism, 3, 8, 11; in levels-ofanalysis scheme, 6-7 国家中心主义，3, 8, 11；在分析层级方案中，6-7
State sovereignty: political threats to, 150-153; “standard of civilization” and, 153-154 国家主权：政治威胁，150-153；“文明标准”与，153-154
Strategic studies. See Security studies 战略研究。参见安全研究
Subregion, defined, 19 子区域，定义，19
Subsystems, international, 164-165; defined, 6 ; regional, 9-10,119-10,11 子系统，国际，164-165；定义，6；区域，
Subunit, defined, 6 子单位，定义，6
Subunit level, interactions at, 165, 191n. 1 分单位层面，交互，165，191 注 1
Third World states: cross-sectoral security analysis of, 173-174; global economy as threat to, 97-9897-98 第三世界国家：跨部门安全分析，173-174；全球经济作为对其的威胁，
United Nations: Charter, security speech act in, 149; Conference on 联合国：宪章，安全言语行为，149；会议
Environment and Development, 73, 86; as referent object, 147, 148-149; securitizing acts by, 150 环境与发展，73，86；作为参照对象，147，148-149；通过其进行安全化行为，150
United States: hegemonic decline effects, 97-98, 110; militia remobilization in, 130; multicultural fragmentation in, 129-130; regional military security dynamics of, 63; 美国：霸权衰落影响，97-98，110；民兵重新动员，130；多元文化分裂，129-130；地区军事安全动态，63；
Russia and. 137: societal sector dynamics in, 129-132; trade disputes with Japan. 135-136 俄罗斯及，137：社会部门动态，129-132；与日本的贸易争端，135-136
Units: as levels of analysis, 6,19ln.16,19 \mathrm{ln} .1; sectors and, 168 单位：作为分析层级；部门与单位，168
Westphalian state, right to use force in, 51, 52 威斯特伐利亚国家，使用武力的权利，51，52
About the Book 关于本书
Two schools of thought now exist in security studies: traditionalists want to restrict the subject to politico-military issues; while wideners want to extend it to the economic, societal, and environmental sectors. This book sets out a comprehensive statement of the new security studies, establishing, the case for the broader agenda. 目前安全研究领域存在两大学派：传统主义者希望将研究对象限制在政治军事问题上；而扩展派则希望将其扩展到经济、社会和环境领域。本书提出了新安全研究的全面论述，确立了更广泛议程的理由。
The authors argue that security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues. Answering the traditionalist charge that this model makes the subject incoherent, they offer a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization. Their approach incorporates the traditionalist agenda and dissolves the artificial boundary between security studies and international political economy, opening the way for a fruitful interplay between the (wo fields. It also shows how the theory of regional security complexes remains relevant in today’s world. 作者认为安全是一种适用于广泛议题的特殊政治类型。针对传统主义者认为该模型使学科变得不连贯的指责，他们提出了一种建构主义的操作方法，用以区分安全化过程与政治化过程。他们的方法融合了传统主义议程，打破了安全研究与国际政治经济之间的人为界限，为两者之间的富有成效的互动开辟了道路。同时，该方法也展示了区域安全复合体理论在当今世界的持续相关性。
Barry Buzan is research professor of international studies at the University of Westminster and project director of the European Security Group at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). His numerous publications include People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations and (with Ole Wœver et al.) Identity, Migration. and the New Security Agenda in Europe. Ole Wever is senior rescarch fil low at COPRI. He is author (with Pim den Boer and Peter Brugge) wh Th History of the European Idea. Jaap de Wilde is lecturer in internitional relations at the University of Twente (the Netherlands). He is attlow wh Saved from Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of th’ 'On" Century and editor (with Hakan Wiberg) of Organized Anarchy: Thi Rいle of States and Intergovernmental Organizations. 巴里·布赞是威斯敏斯特大学国际研究的研究教授，同时担任哥本哈根和平研究所（COPRI）欧洲安全小组的项目主任。他的众多著作包括《人民、国家与恐惧：国际关系中的国家安全问题》和（与奥勒·韦弗等合著的）《身份、移民与欧洲新安全议程》。奥勒·韦弗是 COPRI 的高级研究员。他是（与皮姆·登博尔和彼得·布鲁格合著的）《欧洲理念史》的作者。雅普·德·维尔德是荷兰特温特大学国际关系讲师。他是《从遗忘中拯救：20 世纪上半叶的相互依存理论》的作者，并与哈坎·维贝格合编了《有组织的无政府状态：国家与政府间组织的角色》。
“A sophisticated and important work. . . . Provides insights into both traditional and emergent thinking, as well as developing a powerful and innovative new perspective.” “一部复杂且重要的著作……提供了对传统与新兴思维的洞见，同时发展出一种强大且创新的新视角。”
Also of Interest: 另荐：
The Arms Dynamic in World Politics by Barry Buzan and Eric Herring 《世界政治中的军备动态》，作者：巴里·布赞与埃里克·赫林
“This is a winner-a signal contribution to the fields of security/strategic studies and peace studies. Here is a volume that raises all the essential issues and cuts through hundreds of books and articles to get at the center of matters relating to arms in international relations. . . . Every teacher of international relations should have a copy.” “这是一个赢家——对安全/战略研究和和平研究领域的重大贡献。这本书提出了所有关键问题，穿透了数百本书籍和文章，直击国际关系中与军备相关的核心问题……每一位国际关系教师都应该拥有一本。”
-Kal Holsti -卡尔·霍尔斯蒂
runs the risk of expanding “Security Studies” excessively; by this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to “security.” Defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to 有过度扩展“安全研究”风险；按照这种逻辑，污染、疾病、虐待儿童或经济衰退等问题都可以被视为“安全”的威胁。以这种方式定义该领域将破坏其学术连贯性，并使其更加难以
In this new climate of opinion a new nationalism is emerging, which often also appears in disguised form and alleges, in tones of political correctness, that although it may be for Europe it is against political union. Let us not be fooled. The new nationalism, which has little regard for what we have managed to build up in Western Europe over the past fifty years or even wants to destroy it, that new nationalism leads straight back to pre- 在这种新的舆论氛围中，一种新的民族主义正在兴起，这种民族主义常常以伪装的形式出现，并以政治正确的语气声称，虽然它可能支持欧洲，但反对政治联盟。我们不要被蒙蔽。新的民族主义几乎不顾我们在过去五十年里在西欧所建立的一切，甚至想要摧毁它，这种新的民族主义直接导致回到战前状态。
in World Politics. Tampere: Tampere Peace Rescim li hastont (IAI’R1), pp. 208-282.
Macmillan, pp. 220-260. Macmillan，页 220-260。
1995/1).
