Legal Positivism  法實證主義

Legal positivism is the thesis that the existence and content of law depends on social facts and not on its merits. The English jurist John Austin (1790–1859) formulated it thus:
法証實證主義是關於法律的存在及其內容依賴於社會事實,而非其優點的論點。英國法學家約翰·奧斯丁(1790-1859)是這樣闡述的。

The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. (1832 [1995: 157])
法律的存在是一回事;它的優缺點是另一回事。它是否存在是一個探究;它是否符合假定的標準是另一個探究。(1832 [1995: 157])

The positivist thesis does not say that law’s merits are unintelligible, unimportant, or peripheral to the philosophy of law. It says that they do not determine whether laws or legal systems exist. Whether a society has a legal system depends on the presence of certain structures of governance, not on the extent to which it satisfies ideals of justice, democracy, or the rule of law. What laws are in force in that system depends on what social standards its officials recognize as authoritative; for example, legislative enactments, judicial decisions, or social customs. The fact that a policy would be just, wise, efficient, or prudent is never sufficient reason for thinking that it is actually the law, and the fact that it is unjust, unwise, inefficient or imprudent is never sufficient reason for doubting it. According to positivism, law is a matter of what has been posited (ordered, decided, practiced, tolerated, etc.). Austin thought the thesis “simple and glaring”. While it is probably the dominant view among analytically inclined philosophers of law, it is also the subject of competing interpretations together with persistent criticisms and misunderstandings.
實證主義論點並非說法律的價值不可理解、不重要或是法哲學的邊緣問題。它說明,這些因素並非決定法律或法律體系是否存在的因素。一個社會是否有法律體系,取決於其治理結構的存在,而非符合正義、民主或法治理想的程度。該體系施行的法律,取決於其官員所認可的社會標準,例如立法、司法判決或習俗。某項政策具有正義、智慧、效率或審慎的事實,並不足以認定其即為法律;反之,其不公正、愚笨、低效或急躁的事實,亦不足以質疑其法律效力。根據實證主義,法律是關乎某事物的被確立(命令、決定、實踐、容忍等)。奧斯丁認為此論點「簡單明瞭」。雖然此論點可能是當前分析型法哲學家的主導觀點,卻也面臨著持續的解釋與批評。

• 1. Development and Influence
  開發及影響
• 2. The Existence and Sources of Law
  法律的存在與來源
• 3. Moral Principles and the Boundaries of Law
  道德原則和法律邊界
• 4. Law and Its Merits
  法律及其優點
  • 4.1 The Fallibility Thesis
    可靠性論
  • 4.2 The Separability Thesis
    4.2 可分割性論題
  • 4.3 The Neutrality Thesis
    4.3 中立性論題
• Bibliography  參考書目
• Academic Tools  學術工具
• Other Internet Resources
  其他網路資源
• Related Entries  相關條目

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1. Development and Influence
發展與影響

Legal positivism has a long history and a broad influence. It has antecedents in ancient political philosophy and is discussed, and the term itself introduced, in mediaeval legal and political thought (see Finnis 1996). The modern doctrine, however, owes little to these forbears. Its most important roots lie in the political philosophies of Hobbes and Hume, and its first full elaboration is due to Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) whose account Austin adopted, modified, and popularized. For much of the next century an amalgam of their views, according to which law is the command of a sovereign backed by force, dominated English philosophical reflection about law. By the mid-twentieth century, however, this account had lost its influence among working legal philosophers. Its emphasis on legislative institutions was replaced by a focus on law-applying institutions such as courts, and its insistence of the role of coercive force gave way to theories emphasizing the systematic and normative character of law. The most important architects of contemporary legal positivism are the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) and the two dominating figures in the analytic philosophy of law, H.L.A. Hart (1907–92) and Joseph Raz, among whom there are clear lines of influence, but also important contrasts. Legal positivism’s importance, however, is not confined to the philosophy of law. It can be seen throughout social theory, particularly in the works of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, and also among many lawyers, including the American “legal realists” and most contemporary feminist scholars. Although they disagree on many other points, these writers all acknowledge that law is essentially a matter of social fact. Some of them are, it is true, uncomfortable with the label “legal positivism” and therefore hope to escape it. Their discomfort is sometimes the product of confusion. Lawyers often use “positivist” abusively, to condemn a formalistic doctrine according to which law is always clear and, however pointless or wrong, is to be rigorously applied by officials and obeyed by subjects. It is doubtful that anyone ever held this view, but it is in any case false and has nothing to do with legal positivism. Among the philosophically literate another, more intelligible, misunderstanding may interfere. Legal positivism is here sometimes associated with the homonymic but independent doctrines of logical positivism (the meaning of a sentence is its mode of verification) or sociological positivism (social phenomena can be studied only through the methods of natural science). While there are historical connections and commonalities of temper among these ideas, they are essentially different. The view that the existence and content of law depends ultimately on social facts does not rest on a particular semantic thesis, and it is compatible with a range of theories about how one investigates the social world, including non-naturalistic accounts. To say that the existence of law depends on facts and not on its merits is a thesis about the relation among laws, facts, and merits, and not otherwise a thesis about the individual relata. Hence, many traditional “natural law” moral doctrines—including the belief in a universal, objective morality grounded in human nature—do not contradict legal positivism. The only influential positivist moral theories are the views that moral norms are valid only if they have a source in divine commands or in social conventions. Such theists and relativists apply to morality the constraints that legal positivists think hold for law.
法律實證主義有著悠久的歷史和廣泛的影響力。它可以追溯到古代政治哲學,並在中世紀的法律和政治思想中被討論和提出(參見 Finnis 1996)。然而,現代教義與這些前輩關係不大。其最重要的根源在於霍布斯和休謨的政治哲學,而其最初的全面理論化則歸功於傑里米·本森(1748–1832),奧斯汀接受、修改並推廣了他的觀點。在接下來的一個世紀裡,根據這一觀點,法律是由主權者下達並以武力作為後盾的命令,這一觀點主宰了英國法律哲學的反思。然而,到了二十世紀中期,這一觀點已不再影響實踐中的法律哲學家。它對立法機構的強調被對法律適用機構(如法院)的關注所取代,其對強制力作用的堅持也讓位於強調法律系統性和規範性的理論。當代法律實證主義最重要的建築師是奧地利法學家漢斯·凱爾森(1881–1973)以及法哲學分析領域的兩大宗師 H.L.A.哈特(1907–92)和約瑟夫·拉茨,他們之間既有明顯的影響脈絡,也存在重要差異。然而,法律實證主義的重要性並不局限於法哲學領域,它貫穿於整個社會理論,尤其體現在馬克思、韋伯和涂爾幹的著作中,也廣泛存在於許多律師,包括美國"法律現實主義者"和當代大多數女性主義學者的著作中。儘管在許多其他問題上存在分歧,這些作家都承認法律本質上是一種社會事實。有些人確實對"法律實證主義"這個標籤感到不適,因而希望逃離它。但這種不舒服有時只是由於誤解所致。 法律工作者常常以"實證主義"一詞進行辱罵,以譴責一種形式主義的學說,據此,法律總是明確的,不論其是否無意義或錯誤,都應由官員嚴格適用並受到臣民的遵守。令人懷疑是否真有任何人持有這種觀點,但無論如何這是一種錯誤的觀點,與法律實證主義無關。在哲學素養較高的人群中,另一種更可理解的誤解也可能發生。法律實證主義有時會與論理實證主義(一個句子的意義在於其驗證方式)或社會學實證主義(社會現象只能通過自然科學的方法進行研究)這些同音異義的但獨立的學說相關聯。儘管這些思想之間存在歷史聯繫和情感上的共通點,但它們實質上是不同的。認為法律的存在和內容最終取決於社會事實,並不依賴於某種特定的語義論點,它與各種探究社會世界的理論,包括非自然主義的理論,都是相容的。說法律的存在取決於事實而非其優點,這是一個關於法律、事實和優點之間關係的論點,而不是關於個別項目的論點。因此,許多傳統的"自然法"道德學說——包括對植根於人性的普遍客觀道德的信仰——並不與法律實證主義相抵觸。具有影響力的實證主義道德理論,僅包括道德規範只有在源自神的命令或社會慣例時才有效的觀點。這些神學家和相對主義者將法律實證主義者認為適用於法律的約束應用於道德。

2. The Existence and Sources of Law
法律的存在與來源

Every human society has some form of social order, some way of marking and encouraging approved behavior, deterring disapproved behavior, and resolving disputes about that behavior. What then is distinctive of societies with legal systems and, within those societies, of their law? Before exploring some positivist answers, it bears emphasizing that these are not the only questions worth asking about law. While an understanding of the nature of law requires an account of what makes law distinctive, it also requires an understanding of what it has in common with other forms of social control. Some Marxists are positivists about the nature of law while insisting that its distinguishing characteristics matter less than its role in replicating and facilitating other forms of domination. (Though other Marxists disagree: see Pashukanis 1924). They think that the specific nature of law casts little light on their primary concerns. But one can hardly know that in advance; it depends on what the nature of law is.
每個人類社會都有某種形式的社會秩序,某種方式來標記和鼓勵認可的行為,阻止不認可的行為,並解決有關該行為的爭議。那麼,擁有法律系統的社會以及這些社會中的法律有何獨特之處呢?在探索一些實證主義者的回答之前,必須強調這並非探討法律的唯一值得提出的問題。雖然了解法律本質需要闡述什麼使法律具有獨特性,但它也需要理解法律與其他形式社會控制的共性。有些馬克思主義者是關於法律本質的實證主義者,同時堅持它的區分特徵不如其在複製和促進其他形式統治方面的作用重要。(但其他馬克思主義者則不同:見帕修卡尼斯 1924 年)。他們認為,法律的具體性質對於他們的主要關切問題並沒有太大啟發作用。但人們事先並不知道這一點;這取決於法律的本質是什麼。

For Bentham and Austin, law is a phenomenon of societies with a sovereign: a determinate person or group who have supreme and absolute de facto power—they are obeyed by all or most others but do not themselves similarly obey anyone else. The laws in that society are a subset of the sovereign’s commands: general orders that apply to classes of actions and people and that are backed up by threat of force or “sanction”. This imperatival theory is positivist, for it identifies the existence of law with patterns of command and obedience that can be ascertained without considering whether the sovereign has a moral right to rule or whether their commands are meritorious. It has two other distinctive features. The theory is monistic: it represents all laws as having a single form, imposing obligations on their subjects, though not on the sovereign itself. The imperativalist acknowledges that ultimate legislative power may be self-limiting, or limited externally by what public opinion will tolerate, and also that legal systems contain provisions that are not imperatives (for example, permissions, definitions, and so on). But they regard these as part of the non-legal material that is necessary for every legal system. (Austin is a bit more liberal on this point). The theory is also reductivist, for it maintains that the normative language used in describing and stating the law—talk of authority, rights, obligations, and so on—can all be analyzed without remainder in factual terms, typically as concatenations of statements about power and obedience.
為邊沁和奧斯汀而言,法律是一個主權統治下的社會現象:一個確定的個人或群體擁有最高和絕對的事實權力 - 他們被所有或大多數其他人服從,但自己卻不受任何人的同樣遵從。該社會中的法律是主權的命令的一個子集:適用於行動和人類類別的一般命令,並得到武力或"制裁"的支持。這種命令式理論是實證主義的,因為它將法律的存在等同於可以確定的命令和服從的模式,而不需要考慮主權是否有道德權利統治或他們的命令是否值得稱道。它還有其他兩個顯著的特徵。該理論是一元論的:它表示所有法律都有單一的形式,在主權本身之外對其臣民施加義務。理論的支持者承認,最終的立法權力可能會自我限制,或者受到公眾意見所容忍的外部限制,而且法律體系也包含並非命令的條款(例如,許可、定義等)。但是,他們認為這些都是每個法律體系所必需的非法律材料。(奧斯汀在這一點上更自由一些)。這個理論也是還原論的,因為它認為在描述和陳述法律時使用的規範性語言 - 關於權威、權利、義務等的談論 - 都可以完全分析為事實性的術語,通常是關於權力和服從的陳述的組合。

Imperatival theories are now without influence in legal philosophy (but see Ladenson 1980 and Morison 1982). What survives of their outlook is the idea that legal theory must ultimately be rooted in some account of the political system, an insight that came to be shared by all major positivists save Kelsen. Their particular conception of a society under a sovereign commander, however, is friendless (except among Foucauldians, who strangely take this relic as the ideal-type of what they call “juridical” power). It is clear that in complex societies there may be no one who has all the attributes of sovereignty, for ultimate authority may be divided among organs and may itself be limited by law. Moreover, sovereignty is a normative concept. A legislator is one who has authority to make laws, and not merely someone with great social power, and it is doubtful that “habits of obedience” is a candidate reduction for explaining authority. To distinguish genuine obedience from coincidental compliance we need something like the idea of subjects being oriented to, or guided by, the commands. Explicating this will carry us far from the power-based notions with which classical positivism hoped to work. The imperativalists’ account of the character of individual laws is also subject to decisive objections (Hart 1961 [2012: 26–78]; and Hacker 1973). Treating all laws as commands conceals important differences in their social functions, in the ways they operate in practical reasoning, and in the sort of justifications to which they are liable. For instance, laws conferring the power to marry command nothing; they do not obligate people to marry, or even to marry according to the prescribed formalities. Nor is reductivism any more plausible here: we speak of legal obligations when there is no probability of sanctions being applied and when there is no provision for sanctions (as in the duty of courts to apply the law). Moreover, we take the existence of legal obligations to be a reason for imposing sanctions, not a consequence or constituent of it.
法律哲學理論中,規範論(命令論)已失去影響力(但請參見 Ladenson 1980 和 Morison 1982)。其觀點僅存的是,法律理論必須最終建立在對政治體系某種說明之上,這是所有主要實證主義者(除了 Kelsen)所共享的見解。他們關於一個在主權統治者之下的社會的特定概念,卻無人支持(除了福柯主義者,他們奇怪地將這一殘餘視為他們所謂的"司法"權力的理想類型)。很明顯,在複雜的社會中,可能沒有任何人擁有主權的所有屬性,因為最終權力可能被分散到各個機構,並且可能受到法律的限制。此外,主權是一個規範性概念。立法者是擁有制定法律的權威的人,而不僅僅是擁有強大社會地位的人,"服從習慣"也不太可能成為解釋權威的方式。我們需要類似於臣民被命令所引導或指引的觀念,來區分真正的服從和偶然的順從。將此發展下去,將使我們遠離古典實證主義所希望運用的基於權力的理念。規範論者對個別法律性質的說明也面臨決定性的反對(Hart 1961 [2012: 26–78]; 和 Hacker 1973)。將所有法律都視為命令,掩蓋了它們在社會功能、在實踐推理中的運作方式,以及它們所面臨的正當化方式等方面的重要差異。例如,賦予結婚權力的法律並沒有下達任何命令;它們並未強迫人們結婚,甚至也未規定必須按照規定的形式結婚。還原論在這裡也不太可信:我們在法院有義務適用法律,且沒有施加制裁的可能性時,仍然會談論法律義務。 此外,我們認為存在法律義務是施加制裁的理由,而不是其後果或組成部分。

Hans Kelsen retains the imperativalists’ monism but abandons their reductivism. On his view, law is characterized by a singular form and basic norm. The form of every law is that of a conditional order, directed at the courts, to apply sanctions if a certain behavior (the “delict”) is performed. On this view, law is an indirect system of guidance: it does not tell subjects what to do; it tells officials what to do to its subjects under certain conditions. Thus, what we ordinarily regard as the legal duty not to steal is for Kelsen merely a logical correlate of the primary norm which stipulates a sanction for stealing (1945 [1961: 61]). The objections to imperatival monism apply also to this more sophisticated version: the reduction misses important facts, such as the point of having a prohibition on theft; the law is not indifferent between, on the one hand, people not stealing and, on the other, stealing and suffering the sanctions. But in one respect the conditional sanction theory is in worse shape than is imperativalism, for it has no way to fix on the delict as the duty-defining condition of the sanction—that is but one of a large number of relevant antecedent conditions, including the legal capacity of the offender, the jurisdiction of the judge, the constitutionality of the offense, and so forth. Which among all these is the content of a legal duty?
漢斯·凱爾森保留了命令主義者的單一論,但放棄了他們的簡約主義。在他看來,法律是以特有的形式和基本規範來定義的。每部法律的形式都是以條件性命令的方式向法院發出,如果出現某種行為(「犯罪」),則適用制裁。在這一觀點中,法律是一種間接的指導系統:它不告訴受規範者應該做什麼,而是告訴官員在某些條件下應該對受規範者做些什麼。因此,我們通常認為不偷盜是法律義務的,凱爾森看來只是主要規範中規定偷盜將受到制裁的邏輯對應。命令主義的單一論所面臨的反對理由同樣適用於這個更加複雜的版本:簡約主義忽視了一些重要事實,例如禁止盜竊的意義;法律並不對「不偷盜」和「偷盜但受到制裁」持中立態度。但就條件性制裁理論而言,它比命令主義處於更糟的境地,因為它無法確定以「犯罪」作為制裁的義務界定條件 - 這只是眾多相關前提條件中的一個,包括行為人的法律能力、法官的管轄權、犯罪的合憲性等等。這些中的哪一個才是法律義務的內容?

Kelsen’s most important contribution lies in his attack on reductivism and his doctrine of the “basic norm”. He maintains that law is a normative domain and must understood as such. Might does not make right—not even legal right—so the philosophy of law must explain the fact that law imposes obligations on its subjects. Moreover, law is a normative system: “Law is not, as it is sometimes said, a rule. It is a set of rules having the kind of unity we understand by a system” (1945 [1961: 3]). For the imperativalists, the unity of a legal system consists in the fact that all its laws are commanded by one sovereign. For Kelsen, it consists in the fact that they are all links in one chain of authority. For example, a by-law is legally valid because it is created by a corporation lawfully exercising the powers conferred on it by the legislature, which confers those powers in a manner provided by the constitution, which was itself created in a way provided by an earlier constitution. But what about the very first constitution, historically speaking? Its authority, says Kelsen, is “presupposed”. The condition for interpreting any legal norm as binding is that the first constitution is validated by the following “basic norm:” “the original constitution is to be obeyed”. Now, the basic norm cannot be a legal norm—we cannot explain the bindingness of law by reference to more law without an infinite regress. Nor can it be a social fact, for Kelsen maintains that the reason for the validity of a norm must always be another norm—no ought from is. It follows, then, that a legal system must consist of norms all the way down. It bottoms in a hypothetical, transcendental norm that is the condition of the intelligibility of any (and all) other norms as binding. To “presuppose” this basic norm is not to endorse it as good or just—presupposition is a cognitive stance only—but it is, Kelsen thinks, the necessary precondition for a non-reductivist account of law as a normative system.
凱爾森最重要的貢獻在於他對還原論的攻擊以及他的「基本規範」學說。他堅持法律是一個規範性領域,必須被理解為這樣。力量並不等同於正義,甚至連法律的正義也不是如此。因此,法哲學必須解釋法律如何對其主體施加義務。此外,法律是一個規範性系統:「法律不是,正如有時所說,一條規則。它是一組具有我們所理解的系統統一性的規則」(1945 [1961: 3])。對於命令主義者而言,法律體系的統一性在於所有法律都是由一個主權者命令的。對於凱爾森而言,它在於它們都是一個權力鏈條上的環節。例如,一項附例之所以合法有效是因為它是由合法行使立法機關授予權力的公司制定的,而立法機關又是以憲法規定的方式授予那些權力的。但是,對於最初的那部憲法而言,它的權威性是「假定的」。將任何法律規範解釋為具有約束力的前提條件是,第一部憲法由以下「基本規範」所認可:「應當服從最初的憲法」。現在,基本規範不能是一個法律規範 —我們不能通過引用更多的法律來解釋法律的約束力,這會導致無窮迴歸。它也不能是一個社會事實,因為凱爾森主張規範的有效性理由必須永遠是另一個規範 —不能從事實推出義務。因此,一個法律體系必須從頭到尾都由規範組成。它以一個假設的、超越性的規範為基礎,這是將任何(和所有)其他規範理解為具有約束力的必要前提條件。「假定」這一基本規範並不意味著認可它為善或公正 —假定只是一種認知立場 —但是,凱爾森認為,這是一個非還原的法律作為規範性系統的必要前提。

There are many difficulties with this, not least of which is the fact that if we are going to accept the basic norm as the solution it is not clear what we thought was the problem in the first place. One cannot say both that presupposing the basic norm is what validates all inferior norms and also that an inferior norm is part of the legal system only if it is connected by a chain of validity to the basic norm. We need a way into the circle. Moreover, it draws the boundaries of legal systems incorrectly. The Canadian Constitution of 1982 was lawfully created by an Act of the U.K. Parliament, and on that basis Canadian law and English law should be parts of a single legal system, rooted in one basic norm: “The (first) U.K. constitution is to be obeyed”. Yet English law is not binding in Canada, and a purported repeal of the Constitution Act by the U.K. would be without legal effect there.
此問題存在許多困難,其中最主要的是,如果我們接受基本標準作為解決方案,那就不太清楚我們原本認為什麼才是問題。我們既不能說預設基本標準是驗證所有次等標準的方式,也不能說次等標準只有在與基本標準存在有效性聯繫時,才能成為法律體系的一部分。我們需要找到一個進入這個圈子的方式。此外,它也對法律體系的邊界劃分存在錯誤。1982 年的加拿大憲法是由英國議會的法案合法創造的,因此加拿大法律和英國法律應該是源自同一基本標準「英國(首次)憲法必須被遵守」的單一法律體系的一部分。然而,英國法律在加拿大並不具有約束力,英國對憲法法案的任何企圖性廢除在加拿大也都是無效的。

If law cannot ultimately be grounded in force, or in a presupposed norm, on what does its authority rest? The most influential solution is perhaps H.L.A. Hart’s. His solution resembles Kelsen’s in its emphasis on the normative foundations of legal systems, but Hart rejects Kelsen’s transcendentalist, Kantian view of authority in favor of an empirical, Weberian one. For Hart, the authority of law is social. The ultimate criterion of validity in a legal system is neither a legal norm nor a presupposed norm, but a social rule that exists only because it is actually practiced, that is, used to guide conduct. Law ultimately rests on custom: customs about who shall have the authority to decide disputes, what they shall treat as binding reasons for decision, i.e., as sources of law, and how laws may be changed. Of these three “secondary rules”, as Hart calls them, the source-determining rule of recognition is most important, for it specifies the ultimate criteria of validity in the legal system. It exists only because it is practiced by officials, and it is not only that the recognition rule best explains their practice, it is the rule to which they actually appeal in arguments about what standards they are bound to apply. Hart’s account is therefore in one sense conventionalist (see Marmor 1998 and Coleman 2001): ultimate legal rules are social norms, although they are neither the product of express agreement nor conventions in the Schelling-Lewis sense (see Green 1999). Thus for Hart too the legal system is rule-based all the way down, but at its root is a social norm that has the kind of normative force that customs have. It is a regularity of behavior regarding which officials take “the internal point of view:” they use it as a standard for guiding and evaluating their own and others’ behavior, and this use is displayed in their conduct and speech, including the resort to various forms of social pressure to support the rule and the ready application of normative terms such as “duty” and “obligation” when invoking it.
如果法律的基礎不在於力量或預先假定的規範,那麼其權威何在?或許最具影響力的解決方案是 H.L.A. Hart 的觀點。他的解決方案在強調法律體系的規範基礎方面與凱爾森相似,但 Hart 拒絕凱爾森超越主義和康德式的權威觀,轉而採取韋伯式的經驗主義。對於 Hart 來說,法律的權威是社會性的。法律體系中的最終效力標準不是法律規範或預先假定的規範,而是只因實際被實踐而存在的社會規則,即用於指引行為的規則。法律最終是建立在習慣之上的:關於誰有權決裁糾紛、什麼被視為具有約束力的決定理由(即法律來源)以及如何修改法律的習慣。在 Hart 所稱的這三種"次要規則"中,最重要的是認定來源的規則,因為它規定了法律體系中的最終效力標準。這一規則之所以存在,是因為它被官員們實際實踐,而且不僅最能解釋他們的實踐,也是他們在論證所須適用的標準時實際援引的規則。因此,Hart 的論述在某種意義上是習慣主義的(見 Marmor 1998 和 Coleman 2001):最終的法律規則是社會規範,儘管它們既非明確協議的產物,也非舍林-路易斯意義上的慣例(見 Green 1999)。因此,對於 Hart 而言,法律體系最終也是規則基礎的,但其根源是具有習慣規範性質的社會規則。 官員對所謂的「內在觀點」採取一種行為規律:他們將其用作指導和評估自己及他人行為的標準,並在行為和言語中表現出這種使用,包括動用各種社會壓力來支持規則,以及在援引規則時慣常使用「職責」和「義務」等規範性術語。

Law, then, has its ultimate basis in the behaviors and attitudes of its officials. In the eyes of some this still seems to imply a mystifying reduction: how can we generate the oughts of the legal world from the is of official consensus? Concerns of this type part motivate Scott Shapiro’s understanding of law and his attempt to break with Hart’s theory: laws, he suggests, should be conceived of as “generalized plans, or planlike norms, issued by those who are authorized to plan for others” (2011: 155). Understanding law on the model of social planning, Shapiro suggests, frees us from misplaced concerns about its metaphysical basis. Just as you or I can adopt a plan for our day just by willing it, so a legal system’s officials can create or recognize plans for its subjects. To the extent there remains an issue, however, it is not clear that the notion of planning itself offers any deeper explanation. To begin with, planning, whether by an individual or a group, involves setting rules with the aim of achieving certain ends. So the ontology of plans folds into and becomes part of the more general ontology of rules on which Hart was rightly focused. Second, it is unclear whether the mechanics of law are accurately captured under the label of planning (is the law against theft, for example, to be thought of as a plan that people not deprive others of their property?—a somewhat implausible reading of the relevant injunction—or is the planning element exhausted by the decision to create the prohibition, in which case the law is not the plan). Nonetheless, Shapiro’s account helpfully reminds us that the theoretical complexity of law as a social kind does not render implausible an understanding of its foundation based in the everyday actions of its agents. In this he joins Hart.
法律則深根於其官員的行為和態度。在某些人看來,這似乎仍然意味著一種神秘的簡化:我們如何從官方共識的 "是" 中產生法律世界的 "應該"？這類擔憂部分激發了斯科特·夏皮羅對法律的理解和他試圖打破哈特理論的嘗試：他建議,法律應被視為"授權者為他人制定的概括性計劃或類似計劃規範"(2011:155)。夏皮羅提出根據社會計劃模型理解法律,讓我們脫離對其形而上學基礎的錯誤擔憂。就像您或我可以自願採取一天的計劃一樣,法律體系的官員也可以為其對象創建或確認計劃。然而,如果仍有問題存在,計劃本身的概念也不太可能提供任何更深入的解釋。首先,無論個人還是群體制定計劃,都涉及制定旨在實現某些目標的規則。因此,計劃的本體論融入並成為哈特正確關注的更一般規則本體論的一部分。其次,不太清楚法律的機制是否準確地被納入計劃的範疇(例如,禁止盜竊的法律是否可視為人們不剝奪他人財產的計劃？這是對相關禁令的一種不太可信的解讀；還是計劃要素僅限於創造禁令的決定,在這種情況下,法律本身並非計劃)。儘管如此,夏皮羅的說法很好地提醒我們,法律作為一種社會類型的理論複雜性並不意味著其基礎理解不可能建立在其代理人的日常行動之上。在這一點上,他與哈特不謀而合。

It is an important feature of Hart’s account that the rule of recognition is an official custom, and not a standard necessarily shared by the broader community. If the imperativalists’ picture of the political system was pyramidal power, Hart’s is more like Weber’s rational bureaucracy. Law is normally a technical enterprise, characterized by a division of labor. Ordinary subjects’ contribution to the existence of law may therefore amount to no more than passive compliance, and in an extreme case perhaps less than this. Thus, Hart’s necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal system are that
哈特的法律體系存在的必要和充分條件是,法律是官方習慣,而不必是整個社區均共享的標準。如果命令論者的政治體系圖景是金字塔型權力,哈特的則更近似韋伯理性官僚制。法律通常是一項技術性工作,具有勞動分工特徵。因此,一般人對法律的存在貢獻可能不過是被動服從,在極端情況下甚至更少。

those rules of behavior which are valid according to the system’s ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and…its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behavior by its officials. (1961 [2012: 116])
根據系統最終有效性標準而有效的那些行為規則,必須普遍遵守,以及它的承認規則、法律有效性標準和變更及裁決的規則,必須為其官員普遍接受作為官方行為的共同公共標準。

And this division of labor is not a normatively neutral fact about law; it is politically charged, for it sets up the possibility of law becoming remote from the life of a society, a hazard to which Hart is acutely alert (1961 [2012: 117]; cf. Waldron 1999 and Green 2008).
法律的分工並非一個中性事實;它是政治上的問題,因為它使法律有可能與社會生活疏遠,這是哈特深感警覺的危險(1961 [2012: 117];參見沃爾德龍 1999 和格林 2008)。

Although Hart introduces the rule of recognition through a speculative anthropology of how it might emerge in response to deficiencies in a customary social order, he is not committed to the view that law is a cultural achievement. To the contrary, the idea that legal order is always a good thing, and that societies without it are deficient, is a familiar element of many anti-positivist views, beginning with Henry Maine’s criticism of Austin on the ground that his theory would not apply to certain Indian villages. The objection embraces the error it seeks to avoid. It imperialistically assumes that it is always a bad thing to lack law, and then makes a dazzling inference from ought to is: if it is good to have law, then each society must have it, and the concept of law must be adjusted to show that it does. If one thinks that law is a many splendored thing, one will be tempted by a very wide understanding of law, for it would seem improper to charge others with missing out. Positivism releases the harness. Law is a distinctive form of political order, not a moral achievement, and whether it is necessary or even useful depends entirely on its content and context. Societies without law may be perfectly adapted to their environments, missing nothing.
儘管哈特通過對習俗社會秩序缺陷的推測人類學引入了承認規則,但他並不支持法律是文化成就的觀點。相反,法律秩序總是一件好事,沒有它的社會存在缺陷,這是一個眾所周知的反實證主義觀點,源於亨利·梅因對奧斯汀理論不適用於某些印度村莊的批評。這種反對包含了它試圖避免的錯誤。它帝國主義地假設缺乏法律總是一件壞事,然後從應該推到是:如果擁有法律是好的,那麼每個社會都必須擁有,法律概念也必須調整以證明它確實存在。如果認為法律是光彩燦爛的,就會被廣泛理解法律的誘惑所吸引,因為指責別人錯失似乎是不當的。實證主義解除了束縛。法律是政治秩序的一種特殊形式,而不是道德成就,它是否必要甚至有用完全取決於其內容和背景。沒有法律的社會可能完全適應其環境,一無所缺。

A positivist account of the existence and content of law, along any of the above lines, offers a theory of the validity of law in one of the two main senses of that term (see Harris 1979: 107–111). Kelsen says that validity is the specific mode of existence of a norm. In this sense a valid law is one that is systemically valid in the jurisdiction—it is part of the legal system, and identified as such by virtue of its dependence on the system’s social sources. The idea is distinct from that of validity as moral propriety, i.e., a sound justification for respecting the norm. For the legal positivist, this depends on the norm’s merits. One indication that these senses differ is that one may know that a society has a legal system, and know what its laws are, without having any idea whether they are morally justified. For example, one may know that the law of ancient Athens included the punishment of ostracism without knowing whether it was justified, because one does not know enough about its effects, about the social context, and so forth.
實證主義關於法律存在和內容的說明,無論上述哪一種,都提供了法律效力的理論(見 Harris 1979: 107–111)。Kelsen 說,效力是規範存在的特定方式。在這個意義上,有效的法律是在司法管轄區內系統性有效的法律——它是法律體系的一部分,並因依賴於該體系的社會來源而被認定為是如此。這個概念與作為道德適當性、即尊重規範的合理理由的效力不同。對於法律實證主義者來說,這取決於規範的優點。這些意義的不同之處之一是,人們可以知道一個社會有一個法律體系,以及它們的法律是什麼,而不知道它們是否得到了道德上的正當化。例如,人們可能知道古希臘雅典的法律包括驅逐制度的懲罰,而不知道它是否得到了正當化,因為他們不了解它的影響、社會背景等。

No legal positivist argues that the systemic validity of law establishes its moral validity, i.e., that it should be obeyed by subjects or applied by judges. Even Hobbes, to whom this view is sometimes ascribed, required that law actually be able to keep the peace, failing which we owe it nothing. Bentham and Austin, as utilitarians, hold that such questions always turn on the consequences, and both acknowledge that disobedience is therefore sometimes fully justified. Kelsen insists that “The science of law does not prescribe that one ought to obey the commands of the creator of the constitution” (1960 [1967: 204]). Hart believes that law may generate a prima facie duty to obey, grounded in but also limited by fairness—so there is no obligation to unfair or pointless laws (Hart 1955: 185–186). Raz goes further still, arguing that there isn’t even a prima facie duty to obey the law, not even in a just state (Raz 1979 [2009: 233–249]). The peculiar accusation that positivists believe the law is always to be obeyed is without foundation. Indeed, Hart’s own view is that an overweening deference to law consorts more easily with theories that imbue it with moral ideals, permitting
法律實證主義者都不會主張,法的系統性效力建立了其道德有效性,即應該由當事人遵守或法官適用。即使霍布斯有時被歸於此觀點,他也要求法律實際能夠維持和平,否則我們不欠它任何東西。本杰明和奧斯汀作為功利主義者,認為這樣的問題總是取決於後果,他們都承認違背法律有時完全可以被正當化。凱爾森堅持認為「法學不規定人們應該服從憲法創造者的命令」(1960 [1967:204])。哈特認為,法律可能產生有條件的服從義務,這是基於公平性的,但也受到限制——因此對於不公平或無意義的法律沒有義務遵守(哈特 1955:185–186)。拉茲進一步認為,甚至在一個公正的國家裡,也沒有義務服從法律(拉茲 1979 [2009:233–249])。認為實證主義者認為法律總是應該被服從的特殊指責是沒有根據的。事實上,哈特自己的觀點是,過度崇敬法律更容易與賦予其道德理想的理論相輔相成,從而允許

an enormous overvaluation of the importance of the bare fact that a rule may be said to be a valid rule of law, as if this, once declared, was conclusive of the final moral question: “Ought this law to be obeyed?” (Hart 1958: 75)
對於這一條規則可以被稱為一條有效的法律規則這個單純事實的重要性的巨大高估,好像一旦被宣稱,就可以決定最終的道德問題:「我們應該服從這項法律嗎?」(Hart 1958: 75)

3. Moral Principles and the Boundaries of Law
道德原則與法律邊界

The most influential criticisms of legal positivism all flow, in one way or another, from the suspicion that it fails to give morality its due. A theory that insists on the facticity of law seems to contribute little to our understanding that law has important functions in making human life go well, that the rule of law is a prized ideal, and that the language and practice of law is highly moralized. Accordingly, positivism’s critics maintain that the most important features of law are not to be found in its source-based character, but in law’s capacity to advance the common good, to secure human rights, or to govern with integrity.
法律實證主義受到最廣泛影響的批評,源於這樣一種懷疑,即它沒有給予道德應有的地位。一種堅持法律的事實性的理論,似乎對我們理解法律在使人類生活更美好方面扮演著重要的功能,法治是一種受人尊崇的理想,以及法律的語言和實踐是高度道德化的這種認識,貢獻甚微。因此,實證主義的批評者認為,法律最重要的特徵不在於其源頭性,而在於其促進公共利益、保護人權或以正直的方式進行統治的能力。

It is beyond doubt that moral and political considerations bear on legal philosophy. As Finnis says, the reasons we have for establishing, maintaining or reforming law include moral reasons, and these reasons therefore shape our legal concepts (1980 [2011: 266–273] and 1996: 204). But which concepts? If one accepts, as Finnis does, that the existence and content of law can be identified without recourse to moral argument, and that “human law is artefact and artifice; and not a conclusion from moral premises” (1996: 205), it becomes hard to see how the natural law theory he develops rivals rather than accommodates the truth of legal positivism (see Gardner 2001, 225–227). This vitiates also Lon Fuller’s criticisms of Hart (Fuller 1958 and 1964). Fuller has two main points. First, he thinks that it isn’t enough for a legal system to rest on customary social rules, since law could not guide behavior without also being at least minimally clear, consistent, public, prospective and so on—that is, without exhibiting to some degree those virtues collectively called “the rule of law”. It suffices to note that this is consistent with law being source-based. Even if moral properties were identical with, or supervened upon, these rule-of-law properties, they do so in virtue of their rule-like character. Whatever virtues inhere in or follow from clear, consistent, prospective, and open practices can be found not only in law but in all other social practices with those features, including custom and positive morality. And such virtues, if they exist, are minor: there is little, if anything, to be said in favor of a clear, consistent, prospective, public and impartially administered system of racial segregation, for example. Fuller’s second worry is that if law is a matter of fact, then we are without an explanation of the duty to obey. He asks how “an amoral datum called law could have the peculiar quality of creating an obligation to obey it” (Fuller 1958: 656). One possibility he neglects is that it doesn’t. But even if Fuller is right in his unargued assumption, the “peculiar quality” whose existence he doubts is a familiar feature of many practices. Compare promises: whether a society has a practice of promising, and what someone has promised to do, are matters of social fact. Yet promising creates moral obligations of performance or compensation. An “amoral datum” may indeed figure, together with other premises, in a sound argument to moral conclusions.
毫無疑問,道德和政治考慮涉及到法律哲學。正如芬尼斯所說,我們建立、維護或改革法律的理由包括道德理由,這些理由因此塑造了我們的法律概念(1980 [2011: 266–273]和 1996: 204)。但是哪些概念呢?如果人們接受芬尼斯的觀點,即法律的存在和內容可以在不訴諸道德論證的情況下確定,並且"人法是人工製品和技巧;不是從道德前提得出的結論"(1996: 205),那麼很難看出他所發展的自然法理論如何不是而是取代了法律實證主義的真理(見加德納 2001 年,225–227 頁)。這也損害了洛隆·富勒對哈特的批評(富勒 1958 年和 1964 年)。富勒有兩個主要觀點。首先,他認為法律體系不能僅僅建立在習俗性的社會規則之上,因為法律不能指導行為,除非至少在某種程度上也明確、一致、公開、具有前瞻性等——也就是說,不具備所謂的"法治"美德。值得注意的是,這與法律是基於源頭的概念並不矛盾。即使道德屬性與這些法治屬性同一或從中派生,它們也是因為其規則性質如此。任何內在於或遵循於明確、一致、前瞻及公開做法的美德,都不僅可見於法律,也可見於所有具有這些特徵的其他社會實踐中,包括習俗和積極道德。而這些美德(如果真的存在)也微不足道:一個明確、一致、前瞻性、公開和公正管理的種族隔離制度,很難說有什麼可贊同的。富勒的第二個擔憂是,如果法律是一個事實問題,那麼我們就無法解釋服從義務。他問道,一個被稱為法律的"非道德事實"怎麼能具有產生服從義務的特殊品質呢(富勒 1958 年:656 頁)。 一種可能性是他忽視了它並不存在。但即使富勒在他未經論證的假設中是正確的,他懷疑存在的"獨特品質"是許多實踐的熟悉特徵。比如承諾:一個社會是否有承諾的慣例,以及某人承諾要做什麼,都是社會事實。然而承諾卻創造了履行或補償的道德義務。一個"非道德的事實"確實可能與其他前提一起構成一個有效的論證,得出道德結論。

While Finnis and Fuller’s views are thus compatible with the positivist thesis, the same cannot be said of Ronald Dworkin’s important works (Dworkin 1978, 1986 and 2011). Positivism’s most influential critic rejects the theory on every conceivable level. He denies that there can be any general theory of the existence and content of law; he denies that local theories of particular legal systems can identify law without recourse to its merits, and he rejects the whole institutional focus of positivism. A theory of law is for Dworkin a theory of how cases ought to be decided and it begins, not with an account of political organization, but with an abstract ideal regulating the conditions under which governments may use coercive force over their subjects. Coercion must not be deployed, he claims,
芬尼斯和富勒的觀點與實證主義論題是兼容的,但羅納德·德沃金的重要著作(1978 年、1986 年和 2011 年)卻不盡然如此。實證主義最具影響力的批評者在各個層面上都拒絕了這一理論。他否認存在任何關於法律存在和內容的一般理論;他否認特定法律體系的地方理論可以在不訴諸其功績的情況下確定法律,他還拒絕了實證主義的整個制度重點。對於德沃金來說,法律理論是一個關於如何裁決案件的理論,它從不是關於政治組織的說明,而是從一個抽象的理想開始,規範政府可以對其臣民使用強制力的條件。他聲稱,不應該部署強制力,

except as licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about when collective force is justified. (Dworkin 1986: 93)
除非個別權利和責任要求或授權,來自過去有關何時正當使用集體力量的政治決定。（Dworkin 1986: 93）

A society has a legal system only when, and to the extent that, it honors this ideal, and its law is the set of all considerations that the courts of such a society would be morally justified in applying, whether or not those considerations are determined by any source. To identify the law of a given society we must always engage in moral and political argument, for the law is whatever requirements are consistent with an interpretation of its legal practices that shows them to be best justified in light of this animating ideal. In addition to these philosophical considerations, Dworkin invokes two features of the phenomenology of judging, as he sees it. He finds deep controversy among lawyers and judges about how important cases should be decided, and he finds diversity in the considerations that they hold relevant to deciding them. The controversy suggests to him that law cannot rest on an official consensus, and the diversity suggests that there is no single social rule that validates all relevant reasons, moral and non-moral, for judicial decisions.
一個社會只有在尊重這個理想,並且其法律是由法院在道德上正義地應用的一切考慮因素時,才會有一個法律制度,無論這些考慮因素是否由任何來源決定。要確定一個特定社會的法律,我們必須進行道德和政治論證,因為法律是與最能最好地證明其法律實踐是合理的這一基本理想相一致的所有要求。除了這些哲學考慮之外,德沃金還援引了裁判過程現象學的兩個特徵。他發現律師和法官們在如何裁決重要案件上存在深刻分歧,並且他們持有不同的相關考慮因素。這種分歧表明法律不能建立在官方共識之上,而多樣性則表明沒有單一的社會規則可以驗證所有相關的道德和非道德理由。

Dworkin’s rich and complex arguments attracted various lines of reply from positivists. One response denies the relevance of the phenomenological claims. Controversy is a matter of degree, and a consensus-defeating amount of it is not proved by the existence of adversarial argument in the high courts, or indeed in any courts. As important is the broad range of settled law that gives rise to few doubts and which guides social life outside the courtroom (see Leiter 2009). As for the diversity argument, so far from being a refutation of positivism, this is an entailment of it. Positivism identifies law, not with all valid reasons for decision, but only with the source-based subset of them. It is no part of the positivist claim that the rule of recognition tells us how to decide cases, or even identifies all relevant reasons for a decision. Positivists accept that moral, political or economic considerations are properly operative in legal decisions, just as linguistic or logical ones are. Modus ponens holds in court as much as outside, but not because it was enacted by the legislature or decided by the judges, and the fact that there is no social rule that validates both modus ponens and also the Municipalities Act is true but irrelevant. The authority of principles of logic (or morality) is not something to be explained by legal philosophy; the authority of acts of Parliament must be; and accounting for the difference is a central task of the philosophy of law.
杜沃金充滿富有深度和複雜性的論點吸引了實證主義者各種回應。其中一種回應否認了現象學主張的相關性。存在爭議是一個程度問題,法院高層甚至任何其他法院中存在對抗性論點的事實本身並未證明存在足以打破共識的爭議程度。重要的是,大量得到普遍接受的成文法為日常生活提供指引,很少存在懷疑(參見萊特 2009 年)。關於多元化論點,它不是對實證主義的反駁,反而是其必然結果。實證主義將法律界定為不是所有有效的決策理由,而僅僅是以來源為基礎的部分。聲稱認可規則告訴我們如何裁決案件,或者確定所有相關的決策理由並不是實證主義的一部分。實證主義者接受道德、政治或經濟因素在法律決策中發揮適當作用,就像語言或邏輯因素一樣。在法庭內外,模式否定同樣成立,但並非因為它們由立法機關制定或法官裁決,而且社會規則同時認可模式否定和《市政法》的事實雖然是 true,但與問題無關。邏輯(或道德)原則的權威性不需要通過法哲學來解釋;但國會法案的權威性必須如此解釋,而解釋這種差異正是法哲學的核心任務。

Other positivists respond differently to Dworkin’s phenomenological points, accepting their relevance but modifying the theory to accommodate them. So-called “inclusive positivists” (e.g., Soper, Lyons, Coleman, Waluchow (to whom the term is due), Kramer and Himma) argue that the merit-based considerations may indeed be part of the law, if they are explicitly or implicitly made so by source-based considerations. For example, Canada’s constitution explicitly authorizes for breach of Charter rights, “such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances”. In determining which remedies might be legally valid, judges are thus expressly told to take into account their morality. And judges may develop a settled practice of doing this whether or not it is required by any enactment; it may become customary practice in certain types of cases. Reference to moral principles may be implicit in the web of judge-made law, for instance in the common law principle that no one should profit from his own wrongdoing. Such moral considerations, inclusivists claim, are part of the law because the sources make them so, and thus Dworkin is right that the existence and content of law might turn on its merits, and wrong only in his explanation of this fact. Legal validity depends on morality, not because of the interpretative consequences of some ideal about how the government may use force, but because that is one of the things that may be customarily recognized as an ultimate determinant of legal validity. It is the sources that make the merits relevant.
其他實證主義者對德沃金的現象學觀點做出不同的回應,承認其相關性,但修改理論以容納它們。所謂的「包容性實證主義者」(如 Soper、Lyons、Coleman、Waluchow(用此術語)、Kramer 和 Himma)認為,以價值為基礎的考慮確實可能是法律的一部分,如果它們被源自的考慮明示或暗示地納入其中。例如,加拿大憲法明確授權法院在懸案中「考慮恰當和公正的救濟」。在確定可能有效的救濟措施時,法官因此被明確要求考慮他們的道德性。即使任何法案都沒有要求這樣做,法官也可能發展出一種固定的做法;在某些類型的案件中,這可能成為慣例做法。道德原則可能隱含在判例法的網絡中,例如,在不應從自己的不當行為中獲利的普通法原則中。包容主義者聲稱,這些道德考慮是法律的一部分,因為來源使它們成為如此,因此,德沃金是正確的,即法律的存在和內容可能取決於它的價值,他只是在解釋這一事實上犯了錯誤。法律效力取決於道德,不是因為關於政府如何使用武力的某種理想的解釋後果,而是因為這可能被慣例認為是法律效力的最終決定因素之一。這些來源使價值相關。

To understand and assess this response some clarifications are needed. First, it is not plausible to hold that the merits are relevant to a judicial decision only when the sources make them so. It would be odd to think that justice is a reason for decision only because some source directs an official to decide justly. It is of the nature of justice that it properly bears on certain controversies. In legal decisions, especially important ones, moral and political considerations are present of their own authority; they do not need sources to propel them into action. On the contrary, we expect to see a source—a statute, a decision, or a convention—when judges are constrained not to appeal directly to the merits (see Raz 2004a). Second, the fact that there is moral language in judicial decisions does not establish the presence of moral tests for law, for sources come in various guises. What sounds like moral reasoning in the courts is sometimes really source-based reasoning. For example, when the Supreme Court of Canada says that a publication is criminally “obscene” only if it is harmful, it is not applying J.S. Mill’s harm principle, for what that court means by “harmful” is that which is regarded by the community as degrading or intolerable. That is a source-based test, not a moral one. This is just one of many appeals to positive morality, i.e., to the moral customs actually practiced by a given society, and no positivist denies that positive morality may be a source of law. Moreover, it is important to remember that law is dynamic and that even a decision that does apply morality itself becomes a source of law, in the first instance for the parties and possibly for others as well. Over time, by the doctrine of precedent where it exists or through the gradual emergence of an interpretative convention where it does not, this gives a factual edge to normative terms. Thus, if a court decides that money damages are in some instances not a “just remedy” then this fact will join with others in fixing what “justice” means for these purposes. This process may ultimately detach legal concepts from their moral analogs (thus, legal “murder” may require no intention to kill, legal “fault” no moral blameworthiness, an “equitable” remedy may be manifestly unfair, etc.). Bearing in mind these complications, however, there undeniably remains a great deal of moral reasoning in adjudication. Courts are often called on to decide what would reasonable, fair, just, cruel, etc. by explicit or implicit requirement of statute or common law, or because this is the only proper or intelligible way to decide. When the law itself licenses such reasoning should we understand it, with the inclusive positivist, to incorporate moral standards, or, as per the views of their rival, the exclusive positivist, only to make reference to moral principles?
為了理解和評估這一回應,需要一些澄清。首先,認為優點對於司法決定只有在源頭如此規定時才相關,這是不可信的。認為正義是決定的原因,僅僅因為某個來源指示官員公正裁決,這是奇怪的。正義性質就是它適當地影響某些爭議。在法律決定中,尤其是重要的決定,道德和政治考量本身具有權威;它們不需要來源來推動行動。相反,我們期望看到一個來源——法律、判決或慣例——當法官受限不直接訴諸於優點時(見拉茲 2004 年)。其次,司法決定中有道德語言的事實並不確立法律有道德測試,因為來源有各種面貌。法院中聽起來像是道德推理,有時實際上是基於來源的推理。例如,當加拿大最高法院說一篇出版物在道德上"猥褻"的唯一理由是有害性時,它並非在適用密爾的危害原則,因為該法院所說的"有害"是指社區視為有違道德或不可容忍的事物。這是基於來源的測試,而非道德測試。這只是眾多援引積極道德,即給定社會實際實踐的道德習俗的眾多案例之一,而任何實證主義者都不否認積極道德可能是法律的來源。此外,重要的是要記住,法律是動態的,即使一個決定本身適用了道德倫理,它也會成為法律的來源,首先是對於當事方,可能也是對於其他人。隨著時間的推移,通過先例原則(如果存在的話)或解釋慣例的逐步形成(如果不存在的話),這會給規範性術語增添實際性。 因此,如果法院決定金錢賠償在某些情況下不是「正義的救濟」,那麼這一事實將與其他事實一起決定「正義」在此目的下的意義。這一過程最終可能將法律概念從其道德類比中分離出來(因此,法律「謀殺」可能不需要殺害的意圖,法律「過錯」可能沒有道德責任,「公平」的救濟可能明顯不公平,等等)。但是,考慮到這些複雜性,仍然有大量的道德推理存在於裁決中。法院經常被要求決定什麼是合理的、公平的、正義的、殘酷的等,這是由法律法規或普通法的明示或隱含要求,或因為這是決定的唯一適當或可理解的方式。當法律本身授權進行這種推理時,我們是應該理解它,與包容性實證主義者一樣,將道德標準納入其中,還是,如同其競爭對手排斥性實證主義者的觀點,只是參考道德原則呢?

Exclusive positivists offer two main arguments for stopping at social sources. The first is due to Raz (1994: 201–37) and has to do with law’s role in practical reasoning (for criticism see Perry 1989, Waluchow 1994, Coleman 2001, Dworkin 2002, Kramer 2004 and Himma 2019). Although law does not necessarily have legitimate authority, Raz suggests it lays claim to it, and can intelligibly do so only if it is the kind of thing that could have legitimate authority. It may fail, therefore, in certain ways only, for example, by being unjust, pointless, or ineffective. But law cannot fail to be a candidate authority, for it is constituted in that role by our political practices. According to Raz, practical authorities mediate between subjects and the ultimate reasons for which they should act. Authorities’ directives should be based on such reasons, and they are justified only when compliance with the directives makes it more likely that people will comply with the underlying reasons that apply to them. But they can do that, he suggests, only if is possible to know what the directives require independent of appeal to those underlying reasons. If law were to incorporate the moral standards to which it refers it would no longer be able to play this mediating role; identifying the law would require identifying the reasons underlying it. Because the nature of law is partly determined by its role in giving practical guidance, Raz concludes, there is theoretical reason for stopping at source-based considerations.
專有實證主義者提出兩個主要論點,以停留在社會來源上。第一個是歸因於拉茲(1994:201–37),與法律在實踐推理中的作用有關(有關批評見佩里 1989,沃魯科 1994,科爾曼 2001,德沃金 2002,克拉默 2004 和希馬 2019)。雖然法律不一定具有合法的權威,但拉茲認為它聲稱具有合法性,並且只有在它是一種可能擁有合法權威的東西時,才能夠以可理解的方式這樣做。因此,它只能在某些方式上失敗,例如不公正、毫無意義或無效。但法律不能失敗成為一個候選權威,因為它是由我們的政治實踐構成的這種角色。根據拉茲,實用權威在主體和他們應該採取行動的最終理由之間起中介作用。權威的指令應該基於這些理由,並且只有在遵守指令使人們更有可能遵守適用於他們的潛在理由時才是合理的。但他建議,只有在可以獨立於訴諸這些潛在理由而知道指令要求什麼的情況下,它們才能做到這一點。如果法律要吸收它所指涉的道德標準,它就無法再發揮這種中介作用;確定法律需要確定支撐它的理由。由於法律的性質部分由它在提供實踐指引中的作用決定,拉茲得出結論,有理論依據停留在基於來源的考慮。

The second argument challenges an underlying idea of inclusive positivism, what we might call the Midas Principle. “Just as everything King Midas touched turned into gold, everything to which law refers becomes law …” (Kelsen 1945 [1961: 161]). Kelsen thought that it followed from this principle that
黃金原則

It is…possible for the legal order, by obliging the law-creating organs to respect or apply certain moral norms or political principles or opinions of experts to transform these norms, principles, or opinions into legal norms, and thus into sources of law. (Kelsen 1945 [1961: 132])
法律秩序有可能 通過強制創造法律的機構尊重或適用某些道德規範或政治原則或專家意見,將這些規範、原則或意見轉化為法律規範,從而成為法律的源泉。(凱爾森 1945 [1961: 132])

(Though he regarded this transformation as effected by a sort of tacit legislation.) If sound, the Midas Principle holds in general and not only with respect to morality, as Kelsen makes clear. Suppose then that the Income Tax Act penalizes overdue accounts at 8% per annum. In a relevant case, an official can determine the content of a legal obligation only by calculating compound interest. Does this make mathematics part of the law? A contrary indication is that it is not subject to the rules of change in a legal system—neither courts nor legislators can repeal or amend the law of commutativity. The same holds of other social norms, including the norms of foreign legal systems. A conflict-of-laws rule may direct a Canadian judge to apply Mexican law in a Canadian case. The conflicts rule is obviously part of the Canadian legal system. But the rule of Mexican law is not, for although Canadian officials can decide whether or not to apply it, they can neither change it nor repeal it, and the best explanation for its existence and content makes no reference to Canadian society or its political system. In like manner, moral standards, logic, mathematics, principles of statistical inference, or English grammar, though all properly applied in cases, are not themselves the law, for legal organs have applicative but not creative power over them. The inclusivist thesis is actually groping towards an important, but different, truth. Law is an open normative system (Raz 1975 [1990: 152–154]): it adopts and enforces many other standards, including moral norms and the rules of social groups. There is no warrant for adopting the Midas Principle to explain how or why it does this.
儘管他認為這種轉變是通過一種默示立法而實現的。如果是可靠的,米達斯原則在一般情況下都成立,不僅適用於道德,正如凱爾森所指出的那樣。假設所得稅法對逾期帳款徵收年利率 8%的罰款。在一個相關的案例中,官員只能通過計算複利來確定法律義務的內容。這是否意味着數學成為法律的一部分?相反的跡象是,它不受法律體系變革規則的約束——法院和立法機構既不能廢除也不能修改交換律。同樣的情況也適用於其他社會規範,包括外國法律體系的規範。衝突法規則可能會指導加拿大法官在一個加拿大案件中適用墨西哥法。衝突規則顯然是加拿大法律體系的一部分。但是,墨西哥法律規則不是,因為儘管加拿大官員可以決定是否適用它,但他們既不能改變它也不能廢除它,而且解釋它的存在和內容的最佳解釋並未提及加拿大社會或其政治體系。同樣地,道德標準、邏輯、數學、統計推理原則或英語語法,雖然都適當地應用於案件,但本身並不構成法律,因為法律機關對它們只有應用的權力,而沒有創造的權力。包容主義論點實際上是在探索一個重要但不同的真理。法律是一個開放的規範體系(Raz 1975 [1990: 152–154])︰它採用並執行許多其他標準,包括道德規範和社會群體的規則。沒有理由採用米達斯原則來解釋它是如何或為什麼這樣做的。

As noted above, Dworkin’s arguments against positivism depend upon claims about the phenomenology of adjudication and about the constraints imposed on jurisprudence by legal disagreement. Mark Greenberg’s recent work takes as its starting point many of Dworkin’s claims, but his conclusions are in several ways more radical (see Greenberg 2004 and 2014). Greenberg’s central argument against positivism is methodological: no one, he suggests, would deny that the content of the law depends at least in part upon social facts. However, the question of which facts—the semantic content or intended effect of legislation, for example—cannot be answered by reference to further of the same: “law practices…cannot determine their own relevance” (2004: 185). Appeal must therefore be made to other kinds of considerations—for Greenberg, considerations about the moral import of our social practices. It is positivism’s error to suggest that law could be practice-based all the way down. That the content of law depends upon social sources, however, is a truth borne out by law in general, as opposed to being established within local legal practices. There is a categorical difference between the validity of the sources thesis—a truth about law as a kind of social practice—and the claim that in the UK, for example, statute renders it is illegal to drive above 70 miles an hour on the motorway. In this way the former explains the latter without circularity, and without the need for appeal to morality.
德沃金對實證主義的爭論依賴於對法律裁決現象及法律分歧所施加之限制的主張。格林伯格近期的工作以德沃金的許多主張為起點,但其結論在幾個方面更加激進。格林伯格對實證主義的核心論點是方法論上的:任何人都不會否認法律內容至少部分依賴於社會事實。然而,究竟哪些事實 - 如立法的語義內容或預期效果 - 不能由更多的同類事實來決定:"法律實踐...不能確定其自身的相關性"。因此必須訴諸於其他類型的考慮因素 - 對於格林伯格來說,考慮我們社會實踐的道德意義。實證主義的錯誤是認為法律可以完全建立在實踐之上。然而,法律內容依賴於社會來源這一事實是由法律作為一種社會實踐得出的普遍真理,而不是在特定法律實踐中確立的。源泉理論的有效性 - 關於法律作為一種社會實踐的真理 - 與聲稱在英國,例如,法律規定高速公路上不得超過 70 英里的聲明之間存在範疇上的區別。這種方式使前者在沒有循環論證和對道德的訴諸的情況下解釋了後者。

4. Law and Its Merits
法律及其優點

It may clarify the philosophical stakes in legal positivism by comparing it to a number of other theses with which it is sometimes wrongly identified, and not only by its opponents (see also Hart 1958, Füßer 1996, and Schauer 1996).
法律實證主義中哲學利害關係可能會透過與其他一些論點作比較加以闡明,而這些論點有時被錯誤地認定為相同,不僅是由其對手(也請參考哈特 1958 年,福瑟 1996 年,以及舍爾 1996 年)。

4.1 The Fallibility Thesis
脆弱性論

Law does not necessarily satisfy the conditions by which it is appropriately assessed (Lyons 1984: 63; Hart 1961 [2012: 185–186)]. Law should be just, but it may not be; it should promote the common good, but sometimes it doesn’t; it should protect moral rights, but it may fail miserably. This we may call the moral fallibility thesis. The thesis is correct, but it is not the exclusive property of positivism. Aquinas accepts it, Fuller accepts it, Finnis accepts it, and Dworkin accepts it. Only a crude misunderstanding of ideas like Aquinas’s claim that “an unjust law seems to be no law at all” might suggest the contrary. Law may have an essentially moral character and yet be morally deficient. Even if every law always does one kind of justice (formal justice; justice according to law), this does not entail that it does every kind of justice. Even if every law has a prima facie claim to be applied or obeyed, it does not follow that it has such a claim all things considered. The gap between these partial and conclusive judgments is all a natural law theory needs to accommodate the fallibility thesis. It is sometimes said that positivism gives a more secure grasp on the fallibility of law, for once we see that it is a social construction we will be less likely to accord it inappropriate deference and better prepared to engage in a clear-headed moral appraisal of the law. This claim appealed to several positivists, including Bentham and Hart. But while this might follow from the truth of positivism, it cannot provide an independent argument for it. If law has an essentially moral character then it is obfuscating, not clarifying, to describe it as a source-based structure of governance.
法律並不必然滿足妥當評估其的條件(Lyons 1984: 63; Hart 1961 [2012: 185–186]）。法律應該是公正的,但可能並非如此;它應該促進共同利益,但有時卻沒有做到;它應該保護道德權利,但可能慘敗。我們可以稱之為道德錯誤論。這一論點是正確的,但不是唯一的實證主義專有品性。亞奎那(Aquinas)接受了這一論點,富勒(Fuller)接受了這一論點,芬尼斯(Finnis)接受了這一論點,德沃金(Dworkin)也接受了這一論點。只有對亞奎那等人的"不公正的法律似乎根本不是法律"這一主張的粗陋誤解,才可能提出相反的論點。即使法律具有根本的道德性質,但也可能存在道德缺陷。即使每一條法律都能實現某種正義(形式正義;法律正義),但這並不意味著它能實現各種正義。即使每一條法律都有表面上的要求被適用或遵守的理據,但這並不意味著它在所有情況下都有這樣的理據。自然法理論只需要容納這些部分判斷和最終判斷之間的差距,就能適應錯誤論。有人說,實證主義能更好地把握法律的錯誤性,因為一旦我們認識到法律是一種社會建構,我們就不太可能給予它不恰當的尊重,並更好地準備對法律進行明智的道德評估。這一論點吸引了包括本塔姆和哈特在內的幾位實證主義者。但是,儘管這可能源自實證主義的真理,但它不能為實證主義提供獨立的論證。如果法律具有根本的道德性質,那麼將其描述為基於來源的治理結構就是模糊化,而不是澄清。

4.2 The Separability Thesis
分離性命題

At one point, Hart identifies legal positivism with
法實證主義與

the simple contention that it is no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so. (1961 [2012: 185–186])
簡單的論點是,法律再現或滿足某些道德要求並非必然真理,儘管事實上它們經常如此。(1961 [2012: 185-186])

Many other philosophers, encouraged also by the title of Hart’s famous essay, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, (1958) treat the theory as the denial that there is a necessary connection between law and morality—they must be in some sense “separable” even if not in fact separate (Coleman 1982). The separability thesis is generally construed so as to tolerate any contingent connection between morality and law, provided only that it is conceivable that the connection might fail. Thus, the separability thesis is consistent with all of the following: (i) moral principles may be part of the law; (ii) law is usually, or even always in fact, valuable; (iii) the best explanation for the content of a society’s laws includes reference to the moral ideals current in that society; and (iv) a legal system cannot survive unless it is seen to be, and thus in some measure actually is, just. All four claims are counted by the separability thesis as contingent connections only; they do not hold of all possible legal systems—they probably don’t even hold of all historical legal systems. As merely contingent truths, it is said that they do not affect the concept of law itself. If we think of the positivist thesis this way, we might interpret the difference between exclusive and inclusive positivism in terms of the scope of the modal operator:
許多其他哲學家,也受到 Hart 著名論文《實證主義與法律與道德的分離》(1958)的標題鼓舞,將這一理論視為否認法律和道德之間存在必然聯繫 - 即使事實上並非完全分開,它們在某種程度上也必須是"可分離的"(Coleman 1982)。可分離性論點通常被解釋為允許道德和法律之間存在任何偶然聯繫,只要可以設想這種聯繫可能會失效。因此,可分離性論點與以下所有主張是一致的:(i)道德原則可能是法律的一部分;(ii)法律通常或甚至總是有價值的;(iii)解釋一個社會法律內容的最佳方式包括參考該社會當前的道德理想;和(iv)一個法律體系除非被認為是正義的,否則無法生存,因此在某種程度上實際上就是正義的。這四種主張都被可分離性論點視為只是偶然聯繫;它們不適用於所有可能的法律體系 - 它們可能甚至不適用於所有歷史上的法律體系。作為僅僅偶然真理,據說它們不影響法概念本身。如果我們以這種方式考慮實證主義論點,我們可能會根據模態運算符的範圍來解釋排他性實證主義和包容性實證主義之間的差異。

• (EP) It is necessarily the case that there is no connection between law and morality.
  法律和道德之間沒有任何聯繫。
• (IP) It is not necessarily the case that there is a connection between law and morality.
  法律與道德之間不一定存在任何聯繫。

In reality, however, legal positivism is not to be identified with either thesis: both are false. There are many necessary “connections”, trivial and non-trivial, between law and morality. As John Gardner notes, legal positivism takes a position on only one of them; it rejects any dependence of the existence of law on its merits (Gardner 2001). And with respect to this dependency relation, legal positivists are concerned with much more than the relationship between law and morality, for in the only sense in which they insist on a separation of law and morals they must insist also—and for the same reasons—on a separation of law and economics.
事實上,然而,法律實證主義不應被認同為任何論點:兩者皆為錯誤。法律與道德之間確實存在許多必要的"聯繫",無論是瑣碎或重大。正如約翰·加德納所指出,法律實證主義只對其中一個立場,即拒絕以法律本身的價值來決定其存在(加德納,2001)。而就這種依賴關係而言,法律實證主義者關注的不只是法律與道德之間的關係,因為在他們堅持法律與道德分離的唯一意義上,他們還必須堅持—出於同樣的理由—法律與經濟的分離。

To exclude this dependency relation, however, is to leave intact many other interesting possibilities. For instance, it is possible that moral value derives from the existence of law (Raz 1975 [1990: 165–170]). If Hobbes is right, any order is better than chaos and in some circumstances order may be achievable only through positive law. Or perhaps in a Hegelian way every existing legal system expresses deliberate governance in a world otherwise dominated by chance; law is the spirit of the community come to self-consciousness. Notice that these claims are consistent with the fallibility thesis, for they do not deny that these supposedly good things might also bring evils, such as too much order or the will to power. Perhaps such derivative connections between law and morality are thought innocuous on the ground that they show more about human nature than they do about the nature of law. The same cannot be said of the following necessary connections between law and morality, each of which goes to the heart of our concept of law (on which see further Green 2008):
排除這種關係依賴,卻可能留下許多其他有趣的可能性。例如,道德價值可能源於法律的存在(Raz 1975 [1990: 165–170])。如果霍布斯是對的,任何秩序都好過混沌,而在某些情況下,秩序只能通過積極的法律來實現。或者,在黑格爾的方式下,每個現有的法律體系都表達了在其他被機會主宰的世界中的有意識的管理;法律是社區精神的自我意識。請注意,這些主張與可錯誤性論題是一致的,因為它們並不否認這些所謂的美好事物也可能帶來災難,比如過度的秩序或權力意志。也許這種法律與道德之間的派生聯繫被認為是無害的,因為它們顯示了更多關於人性的東西,而不是法律本質。以下這些法律與道德之間必要聯繫卻無法如此說, 它們都觸及我們對法律概念的核心(更多信息請見 Green 2008)。

• (1) Necessarily, law deals with moral matters.
  必然地，法律涉及道德事务。

Kelsen writes,   凱爾森寫道,

Just as natural and positive law govern the same subject-matter, and relate, therefore, to the same norm-object, namely the mutual relationships of men—so both also have in common the universal form of this governance, namely obligation. (Kelsen 1928 [1973: 34])
正如自然法和積極法治理同一主題,並因此與同一規範對象相關,即人與人之間的相互關係,因此這兩者在治理的普遍形式上也有共同之處,即義務。(凱爾森 1928 [1973: 34])

This is a matter of the content of all legal systems. Where there is law there is also morality, and they regulate the same matters by analogous techniques. Of course to say that law deals with morality’s subject matter is not to say that it does so well, and to say that all legal systems create obligations is not to endorse the duties so created. This notion is distinct from Hart’s “minimum content” thesis according to which there are basic rules governing violence, property, fidelity, and kinship that any legal system must encompass if it aims at the survival of social creatures like ourselves (Hart 1961 [2012: 193–200]). Hart regards this as a matter of “natural necessity” and in that measure is willing to qualify his endorsement of the separability thesis. But even a society that prefers national glory or the worship of gods to survival will charge its legal system with the same tasks its morality pursues. Unlike the rules of a health club, law has broad scope and reaches to the most important things in any society, whatever they may be. Indeed, our most urgent political worries about law and its claims flow from just this capacity to regulate our most vital interests, and law’s wide reach must figure in any argument about its legitimacy. (A distinct argument, developed most fully by Raz (1994) and Gardner (2012a), is that law not only occupies itself with moral matters but makes moral claims over us. For criticism see Kramer 1999: 83–9; Duarte d’Almeida and Edwards 2014.)
這是一個涉及所有法律體系內容的問題。有法律就有道德,它們運用類似的技術來規範相同的事項。當然,說法律處理道德主題並不意味著它做得很好,說所有法律體系都創造義務並不意味著認同所創造的義務。這個概念與哈特的"最低內容"論題不同,後者認為任何法律體系都必須包含關於暴力、財產、忠誠和親屬的基本規則,以確保社會生物如我們的生存(哈特 1961[2012:193–200])。哈特將此視為"自然必然性"的問題,在某種程度上願意修正他對可分離性論題的支持。但即使一個社會更偏好國家榮耀或神明崇拜而非生存,它也會賦予其法律體系與其道德追求相同的任務。不同於健身俱樂部的規則,法律的範圍廣泛,涉及任何社會最重要的事物,無論它們是什麼。事實上,我們對法律及其主張最迫切的政治擔憂,正源於其調整我們最緊要利益的能力,法律的廣泛影響必須體現在任何關於其合法性的論證中。(拉茲(1994)和加德納(2012a)發展的一個不同論點是,法律不僅涉及道德問題,而且對我們提出道德要求。批評見克拉默(1999:83–9)和杜阿特•達爾梅達和愛德華茲(2014)。)

• (2) Necessarily, law is justice-apt.
  必然地,法律是適合正義的。

In view of the normative function of law in creating and enforcing obligations and rights, it always makes sense to ask whether law is just, and where it is found deficient to demand reform. Legal systems are therefore the kind of thing that is apt for appraisal as just or unjust. This is a significant feature of law. Not all human practices are justice-apt. It makes no sense to ask whether a certain fugue is just or to demand that it become so. The musical standards of fugal excellence are pre-eminently internal—a good fugue is a good example of its genre; it should be melodic, interesting, inventive etc.—and the further we get from these internal standards of excellence the more diverse evaluative judgments about it become. While some formalists flirt with similar ideas about law, this seems inconsistent with law’s place amongst human practices. Even if law has internal standards of merit—virtues uniquely its own that inhere in its law-like character—these cannot preclude or displace its assessment on independent criteria of justice. A fugue may be at its best when it has all the virtues of fugacity; but law is not best when it excels in legality; law must also be just. A society may therefore suffer not only from too little of the rule of law, but also from too much of it. This does not presuppose that justice is the only, or even the first, virtue of a legal system. It means that our concern for its justice as one of its virtues cannot be side lined by any claim of the sort that law’s purpose is to be law, to its most excellent degree. Law stands continuously exposed to demands for justification, and that too shapes its nature and role in our lives and culture.
在法律創造和強制義務和權利的規範性功能方面,總是有必要問法律是否公正,以及在發現缺陷時要求改革。因此,法律體系是適合評判為正義或不公正的事物。這是法律的一個重要特徵。並非所有人類實踐都適合追求正義。問某一賦格曲是否公正或要求其成為公正是毫無意義的。賦格曲的音樂標準首先是內在的 —— 一首優秀的賦格曲是該類型的一個優秀範例;它應該悅耳動聽、有趣、創新等等 —— 我們越偏離這些內在的卓越標準,對它的評價也就越多元化。儘管有些形式主義者對法律提出類似的想法,但這似乎與法律在人類實踐中的地位不符。即使法律有內在的優秀標準 —— 作為法律的特有品格而存在的美德 —— 這也不能阻止或取代按照獨立的正義標準對其進行評估。一首賦格曲在具備了所有賦格特性的美德時就達到了最佳狀態;但法律在完全達到合法性時並不就是最佳的,法律還必須是公正的。因此,一個社會可能不僅因法治不足而遭受困擾,也可能因法治過度而受苦。這並不意味著正義是法律體系唯一甚至首要的美德。這意味著我們對其正義性作為其美德之一的關切,不能被任何宣稱法律的目的就是成為法律,達到最高卓越程度的主張所側邊化。法律不斷面臨正當性的要求,這也塑造了它在我們生活和文化中的性質和角色。

• (3) Necessarily, law is morally risky.
  必然地,法律是道德風險。

It is a curious fact that almost all theories that insist on the essentially moral character of law take law’s character to be essentially good. The gravamen of Fuller’s philosophy is that law is essentially a moral enterprise, made possible only by a robust adherence to its own inner morality. The thought that the law might have an inner immorality never occurred to him. But, as Hart recognized, where there is “a union of primary and secondary rules”—that is to say, wherever there is law—moral risks emerge as a matter of necessity. There are not only newly efficient forms of oppression, unavailable in communities with more diffuse forms of social organization, there are also new vices: the possible alienation of community and value, the loss of transparency, the rise of a new hierarchy, and the possibility that some who should resist injustice may be bought off by the goods that legal order brings. Although law has its virtues, it also necessarily risks certain vices, and this marks a connection between law and morality of a reverse kind.
幾乎所有堅持法律具有本質性道德特質的理論,都認為法律的性質是本質上良善的,這是一個有趣的事實。Fuller 哲學的要義是,法律本質上是一種道德事業,只有堅持自身的內在道德性,才能得以實現。他從未想過法律可能存在內在的不道德性。然而,正如 Hart 所認識到的,只要有"主要規則和次要規則的結合" - 也就是說,只要有法律存在 - 道德風險就會必然而生。不但出現了在更分散的社會組織中所未見的新型壓迫形式,也出現了新的缺陷:社區和價值觀的可能疏離、透明度的喪失、新階層的興起,以及一些本應抵制不公的人可能被法律秩序帶來的利益所誘惑。儘管法律具有其美德,但它也必然存在某些缺陷,這標誌著法律與道德之間的逆向聯繫。

These three theses establish connections between law and morality that are both necessary and highly significant. Each of them is consistent with the positivist thesis that the existence and content of law depends on social facts, not on the law’s merits. Each of them contributes to an understanding of the nature of law. The once-popular idea that legal positivism insists on the separability of law and morality is therefore significantly mistaken.
法理與道德的重要關聯

4.3 The Neutrality Thesis
中和論

The preceding theses together establish that law is not value-neutral. Although some lawyers regard this idea as a revelation (and others as provocation) it is in fact banal. The thought that law could be value neutral does not even rise to falsity—it is incoherent. Law is a normative system, promoting certain values and repressing others. Law is not neutral between victim and murderer or between owner and thief. When people complain of the law’s lack of neutrality, they are in fact voicing very different aspirations, such as the demand that it be fair, just, impartial, and so forth. A condition of law’s achieving any of these ideals is that it is not neutral in either its aims or its effects.
法律並非價值中立。一些律師將此視為啟示(另一些人則視為挑釁),但事實上它很平庸。認為法律可以是價值中立的想法根本無法成立——它是矛盾的。法律是一個規範體系,促進某些價值並壓制其他價值。法律在受害人與謀殺犯或所有者與竊賊之間並非中立。當人們抱怨法律缺乏中立性時,他們實際上是在表達截然不同的理想,如要求其公平、公正、公平無私等。法律實現這些理想的前提是,其目標或影響並非中立。

Positivism is however sometimes more credibly associated with the idea that legal philosophy is or should be value-neutral. Kelsen, for example, says, “the function of the science of law is not the evaluation of its subject, but its value-free description” (1960 [1967: 68]) and Hart at one point described his work as “descriptive sociology” (1961 [2012: v]). But a description of what? “Law” is an anthropocentric subject, dependent not merely on our sensory embodiment but also, as its necessary connections to morality show, on our moral sense and capacities. Legal kinds such as courts, decisions, and rules will not appear in a purely physical description of the universe and may not even appear in every social description. (This may limit the prospects for a “naturalized” jurisprudence; though for a defense of the contrary view, see Leiter 1997). Legal positivism, to be sure, is not an “evaluation of its subject”, i.e., an evaluation of the law. And to say that the existence of law depends on social facts does not commit one to thinking that it is a good thing that this is so (nor does it preclude it: see MacCormick 1985 and Campbell 1996). But it does not follow that legal philosophy therefore offers a “value-free description” of its subject. There is a sense, of course, in which every description is value-laden. It selects and systematizes only a subset of the infinite number of facts about its subject. To describe law as resting on customary social rules is to omit many other truths about it including, for example, truths about its connection to the demand for paper or silk. What forms the warrant for our prioritizing the former over the latter? Finnis (1980 [2011: 3–19]) thinks that the only possibility here has to do with the moral reasons we might have for wanting law (that we answer “what?” by answering “why?”) and that the failure of methodological positivism, the failure to achieve a value-free description of the subject, results in the failure of legal positivism. But the question of social significance is not exhausted by our moral register, and especially not only by its positive valence (on which see Dickson 2001). Others point to the notion of conceptual or metaphysical truth as setting the bounds of the question that positivism seeks to answer (for discussion see Raz 2004b). But however these difficult issues are to be resolved, we should not expect legal positivism itself to contribute much. A thesis about the nature of law is not at the same time a thesis about how to understand the nature of law.
法實證主義有時更可信地與法哲學是或應該是價值中立的理念相關。凱爾森例如說："法律科學的職能不是評價其主題,而是對其進行無價值描述"(1960 [1967: 68]),哈特在某種程度上也將其工作描述為"描述性社會學"(1961 [2012: v])。但是,描述的是什麼呢?"法律"是一個以人類為中心的主題,不僅依賴於我們的感官身體,而且還依賴於我們的道德感和能力。法院、裁決和規則等法律類型在對宇宙的純物理描述中是看不到的,在每一個社會描述中也未必會出現。(這可能會限制"自然化"法律學的前景;儘管有支持相反觀點的辯護,見 Leiter 1997)。法實證主義當然不是對其主題的"評價",即對法律的評價。說法律的存在取決於社會事實,並不意味著必須認為這是一件好事(也並不排斥這種可能性:見 MacCormick 1985 和 Campbell 1996)。但這並不意味著法哲學因此提供了對其主題的"無價值描述"。當然,在某種意義上,每一個描述都是帶有價值的。它只挑選和系統化了無限多事實中的一個子集。將法律描述為建基於習慣性社會規則,就意味著忽略了關於它的許多其他真理,包括例如關於它與對紙或絲的需求的聯繫。那麼,我們為什麼要將前者置於後者之上呢? 費尼斯(1980 [2011: 3–19])認為,這裡唯一的可能性與我們可能有的道德理由為想要法律(我們通過回答"為什麼?"來回答"什麼?"),以及方法論實證主義的失敗、無法實現對主題的無價值描述,導致法律實證主義的失敗。但是,社會意義的問題並不完全由我們的道德規範決定,尤其不僅僅是其正面意義(見 Dickson 2001)。其他人指出,概念性或形而上學真理的概念設定了實證主義試圖回答的問題的界限(見 Raz 2004b 的討論)。但是,無論這些困難問題如何解決,我們都不應該期望法律實證主義本身能有多大貢獻。關於法律本質的論題,並不等同於理解法律本質的論題。

It may seem, however, that legal positivism at least requires a stand on the so-called “fact-value” problem. There is no doubt that certain positivists, especially Kelsen, believe this to be so. In reality, positivism may cohabit with a range of views here—value statements may be entailed by factual statements; values may supervene on facts; values may be kinds of fact. Legal positivism requires only that it be in virtue of its facticity rather than its meritoriousness that something is law, and that we can describe that facticity without assessing its merits.
這可能看似然而,法律實證主義至少需要對所謂的「事實—價值」問題採取立場。毫無疑問,某些實證主義者,尤其是凱爾森,認為這是如此。事實上,實證主義可能與這裡的一系列觀點共存 - 價值陳述可能由事實陳述所蘊含;價值可能是基於事實的;價值可能是某種事實。法律實證主義僅要求,某事物之所以成為法律,乃是由於其事實性而非其優秀性,而我們可以描述這種事實性,而無需評估其優點。

Evaluative argument is, of course, central to the philosophy of law more generally. No legal philosopher can be only a legal positivist. A complete understanding of law requires also an account of what kinds of things could possibly count as the merits of law (must law be efficient or elegant as well as just?); of what role law should play in adjudication (should valid law always be applied?); of what claim law has on our obedience (is there a duty to obey?); and also the more practical questions of what laws we should have and whether we should have law at all. Legal positivism does not aspire to answer these questions (although cf. Murphy 2014: 88–108 for the argument that the theory has important first-order implications for legal practice). Nonetheless, positivism’s claim that the existence and content of law depends only on social facts does give them shape.
評價性論證當然是法哲學更廣泛的核心。任何法律哲學家都不能只是法律實證主義者。對法律的完整理解也需要說明哪些事物可能被視為法律的優點(法律除了要公正,是否還必須有效率或優雅的特質?);法律在審判過程中應扮演什麼角色(是否應該始終適用有效的法律?);法律對於我們的服從有什麼要求(是否有服從的義務?);以及我們應該制定什麼樣的法律,或是是否應該有法律等更實際的問題。法律實證主義並不打算回答這些問題(不過參考墨菲 2014:88-108 頁的論點,這個理論對法律實踐有重要的一級影響)。儘管如此,實證主義關於法律的存在和內容只取決於社會事實的主張,仍然為這些問題勾勒了輪廓。

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