Jean-Claude Juncker, Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel and Xi Jinping smile and talk in Paris in 2019
Then German chancellor Angela Merkel, joined Jean Claude Juncker and Emmanuel Macron for Xi Jinping’s visit to Paris in 2019. Her successor Olaf Scholz was absent during Xi’s visit last week © Christophe Morin/Bloomberg
时任德国总理安格拉-默克尔(Angela Merkel)与让-克洛德-容克(Jean Claude Juncker)和埃马纽埃尔-马克龙(Emmanuel Macron)一起参加了习近平2019年对巴黎的访问。默克尔的继任者奥拉夫-肖尔茨(Olaf Scholz)上周缺席了习近平的访问 © Christophe Morin/Bloomberg

The writer is editorial director and a columnist at Le Monde
作者是《世界报》编辑部主任和专栏作家

When Xi Jinping came to Paris five years ago for a bilateral visit, Emmanuel Macron invited Angela Merkel, then the German chancellor, and Jean-Claude Juncker, then president of the European Commission, to join him for the talks. They met China’s strongman as a European team. Last week Macron hosted Xi again, but this time the only German at the table was Juncker’s successor, Ursula von der Leyen. Chancellor Olaf Scholz chose to stay away.
五年前,当习近平来到巴黎进行双边访问时,埃马纽埃尔-马克龙邀请了时任德国总理的安格拉-默克尔和时任欧盟委员会主席的让-克洛德-容克一起参加会谈。他们以欧洲团队的形式会见了中国的强人。上周,马克龙再次接待了习近平,但这次唯一的德国人是容克的继任者乌苏拉-冯德莱恩(Ursula von der Leyen)。德国总理奥拉夫-肖尔茨(Olaf Scholz)选择置身事外。

That was unfortunate. Scholz’s absence at the Elysée weakened the message on China’s “overcapacity” flooding European markets, conveyed to Xi with new determination by von der Leyen and France’s president. It also showed how difficult it is for some western leaders to grasp the profound changes brought about by Covid-19 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Until 2022, France and Germany had pursued the same complacent policy towards Russia. The lessons their leaders now draw from those mistakes, though, are different. 
这是不幸的。肖尔茨在爱丽舍宫的缺席削弱了冯德莱恩和法国总统以新的决心向习近平传达的关于中国 "产能过剩 "充斥欧洲市场的信息。这也表明,一些西方领导人很难理解 "科维德-19 "和全面入侵乌克兰所带来的深刻变化。直到 2022 年,法国和德国一直对俄罗斯奉行同样的自满政策。不过,两国领导人现在从这些错误中汲取的教训是不同的。

Berlin’s immediate reaction to Moscow’s assault on Ukraine in February 2022, reflected in the chancellor’s bold “Zeitenwende” speech signalling a “new era”, was rightly commended. Germany had invested so much in its relationship with Russia that only a clean break, though painful, could be envisaged. Within a year, Germany got rid of its unhealthy dependence on Russian gas. A question arose: would the EU’s biggest economy follow the same logic in its relationship with China
柏林对莫斯科 2022 年 2 月进攻乌克兰的立即反应,反映在总理大胆的 "时代文德 "演讲中,标志着一个 "新时代 "的到来。德国在与俄罗斯的关系上投入了如此之多,只有一刀两断,尽管是痛苦的,但也是可以预见的。一年之内,德国摆脱了对俄罗斯天然气的不健康依赖。问题来了:欧盟最大的经济体在与中国的关系中会遵循同样的逻辑吗?

Scholz’s record so far suggests otherwise. While the EU has hardened its stance on China, the chancellor has taken a go-it-alone approach, declining Macron’s suggestion of a joint visit to Beijing in 2022. Last month, he did not brief his colleagues at the European Council on his second trip to China when they met in Brussels the day after his return. He met with Xi for more than three hours but made few public statements, marked by a conciliatory tone.  
肖尔茨迄今为止的记录表明情况并非如此。在欧盟对华态度强硬的同时,这位总理却采取了单打独斗的方式,拒绝了马克龙提出的在 2022 年联合访问北京的建议。上个月,当欧洲理事会的同事们在他回国后的第二天在布鲁塞尔开会时,他没有向他们介绍他第二次访华的情况。他与习近平会晤了三个多小时,但几乎没有发表公开声明,语气温和。

The notable absence of the ministers of foreign affairs and of the economy from the chancellor’s delegation, which included 12 representatives of major German companies, was a message in itself: the two ministers, both members of the Greens, are much more hawkish on China — and on Ukraine. This points to the political nature of the debate on China policy in Germany. As was the case for Russia, Scholz’s Social Democrats, or at least a leading strand of the party, seem stuck in a 20th-century vision of engagement through economic relations, a legacy of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. “Germany’s structural economic dependence on China is at the heart of this relationship”, notes Abigaël Vasselier, an expert at Merics, a Berlin-based think-tank on China. “Scholz led this visit as if Covid and the war in Ukraine had not happened, as if strategic dependence was not an issue”.  
德国外交部和经济部部长明显缺席了总理的代表团,其中包括 12 位德国大型企业的代表,这本身就是一个信息:这两位部长都是绿党成员,对中国和乌克兰的态度更为鹰派。这表明了德国对华政策辩论的政治性质。与对俄政策一样,肖尔茨领导的社会民主党,或者至少是该党的领导层,似乎仍停留在 20 世纪通过经济关系进行接触的愿景中,这是威利-勃兰特的 "东部政策"(Ostpolitik)的遗产。"柏林中国智库 Merics 的专家 Abigaël Vasselier 指出:"德国对中国的结构性经济依赖是这种关系的核心。"肖尔茨率领的这次访问仿佛科维德事件和乌克兰战争没有发生,仿佛战略依赖不是一个问题"。

This vision omits another structural change taking place in the global economy. In a report published just days before Scholz’s trip to China, Allianz, the German insurance company, warned that Germany and China were moving “from complementarity to substitution”, with some Chinese companies moving up the value chain and surpassing German businesses.
这一愿景忽略了全球经济正在发生的另一个结构性变化。就在肖尔茨访华的前几天,德国保险公司安联(Allianz)在一份报告中警告说,德国和中国正在 "从互补走向替代",一些中国企业正在向价值链的高端发展,并超越德国企业。

These are the kind of changes that Macron had in mind when, in his customary dramatic way, he proclaimed in a speech last month that the EU was in “mortal” danger. Like Scholz and Merkel, the French leader long held the belief that engaging with Vladimir Putin was the right recipe, until events forced him to face the reality. Today he says a more radical shift is needed, on all fronts. 
上个月,马克龙在一次演讲中以其惯用的戏剧性方式宣称欧盟正面临 "致命 "危险,他所考虑的正是这些变化。与肖尔茨和默克尔一样,这位法国领导人长期以来一直认为与普京接触是正确的选择,直到事态发展迫使他面对现实。今天,他说需要在各条战线上进行更彻底的转变。

A tougher stance on China is easier for France, whose companies have a lighter presence there than Germany’s. But Macron’s attitude to both China and Russia, very much in line with the European Commission’s current views, stems from the same philosophy: the world has changed, mostly for the worse, and Europe needs to be much more forceful to counter those negative trends.
与德国相比,法国企业在中国的业务较少,因此更容易对中国采取强硬立场。但马克龙对中国和俄罗斯的态度与欧盟委员会目前的观点非常一致,都源于同样的理念:世界已经发生了变化,而且大多是向坏的方面变化,欧洲需要更有力地应对这些负面趋势。

Included in such trends are two big powers, China and the United States, that “don’t respect the rules” of international trade any more. Macron preaches “strategic ambiguity” with Russia, raises the possibility of sending troops to Ukraine and promotes stronger European defence that could only be financed by Eurobonds. Europe must protect itself and think strategically.   
在这种趋势中,中国和美国这两个大国 "不再尊重 "国际贸易规则。马克龙宣扬对俄罗斯的 "战略模糊性",提出向乌克兰派兵的可能性,并提倡加强欧洲防务,而这只能通过欧洲债券来实现。欧洲必须保护自己,进行战略思考。

Most of this is anathema to Scholz and some other European leaders. There is room for debate on Macron’s ideas — while France is a nuclear power, it does not have Germany’s economic leverage. But clinging to an outdated paradigm will not impress Putin, Xi or Trump, freed from the yoke of the old international order.
这对肖尔茨和其他一些欧洲领导人来说大多是一种诅咒。关于马克龙的主张还有争论的余地--虽然法国是一个核大国,但它没有德国那样的经济影响力。但是,固守过时的模式并不能打动摆脱旧国际秩序束缚的普京、习近平或特朗普。


    


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