权益 W10-12 打印

W10 Fiduciaries I - Fiduciary
W10 受托人 I - 受托人

What is a Fiduciary? 什么是受托人？

Definition: A fiduciary is someone who has agreed to act for, or on behalf of, another person in a specific matter. This agreement creates a relationship built on trust and confidence. Think of it as someone stepping into another's shoes for a particular purpose.
定义：受托人是指已同意在特定事项中为他人或代表他人行事的人。此协议建立了一种基于信任和信心的关系。可以将其视为某人为特定目的而踏入了他人的行列。
Core Duty: Loyalty: The absolute defining characteristic is loyalty. The fiduciary must be entirely dedicated to the principal's interests in the context of their agreed role, putting the principal's interests before their own or anyone else's. This is often called "single-minded loyalty."
核心义务：忠诚：绝对的定义性特征是忠诚。受托人必须完全致力于委托人的利益，在其约定的角色范围内，将委托人的利益置于其自身或任何其他人的利益之上。这通常被称为“一心一意的忠诚”。
Key Facets of Loyalty (as per Millett LJ in Bristol & West v Mothew): These are specific applications of the core loyalty principle:
忠诚的关键方面（根据米利特 LJ 在 Bristol & West v Mothew 案中的陈述）：这些是核心忠诚原则的具体应用：

Act in Good Faith: This means acting honestly and sincerely in the principal's interests.
真诚行事：这意味着诚实和真诚地为委托人的利益行事。
No Profit: Fiduciaries cannot personally profit from their position unless the principal knows about it and agrees (informed consent). This prevents them from exploiting their role for personal gain.
不得获利：受托人不得利用其职位亲自获利，除非委托人知情并同意（知情同意）。这可以防止他们利用自己的角色来获取个人利益。
No Conflict: Fiduciaries must avoid situations where their personal interests clash, or could potentially clash, with their duty to the principal. This ensures their judgment isn't clouded by self-interest.
不得冲突：受托人必须避免其个人利益与委托人的义务发生冲突或可能发生冲突的情况。这确保了他们的判断不会因自身利益而受到影响。
No Acting for Self/Third Party without Consent: They cannot use their position to benefit themselves or someone else without the principal's fully informed permission.
未经同意不得为自己/第三方行事：他们不得利用其职位使自己或他人受益，除非获得委托人完全知情的许可。

Established Fiduciary Relationships
已确立的信托关系

These are relationships where the law automatically presumes a fiduciary duty exists due to the nature of the relationship:
这些关系是指由于关系的性质，法律自动推定存在信义义务的关系：

Trustee & Beneficiary: The trustee manages property purely for the beneficiary's benefit. This is often seen as the strongest fiduciary relationship.
受托人与受益人：受托人完全为了受益人的利益管理财产。这通常被认为是较强的信托关系。
Agent & Principal: The agent acts on the principal's behalf, often with authority to affect the principal's legal position.
代理人与委托人：代理人代表委托人行事，通常有权影响委托人的法律地位。
Solicitor & Client: The solicitor provides legal advice and acts in the client's best legal interests.
律师与客户：律师提供法律建议，并以客户的最佳法律利益行事。
Employee & Employer: Senior employees, especially, owe duties of loyalty regarding the employer's business interests.
雇员与雇主：特别是高级雇员，对雇主的商业利益负有忠诚义务。
Director & Company: Directors must act in the best interests of the company as a whole (meaning the shareholders collectively, not individually).
董事与公司：董事必须以整个公司的最佳利益行事（意味着股东的集体利益，而非个人利益）。
Partners: Partners owe fiduciary duties to each other regarding the partnership business.
合伙人：合伙人对彼此负有与合伙业务相关的信义义务。

How Else Fiduciary Relationships Arise
信义关系的其它产生方式

Not Fixed Categories: The law recognises that fiduciary duties can arise outside these established categories depending on the specific facts and circumstances.
类别并非固定：法律承认，根据具体事实和情况，信义义务可能在这些既定类别之外产生。
Two Broad Sources (Brennan CJ in Breen v Williams, cited in Libertarian):
两种广泛的来源（Brennan CJ 在 Breen v Williams 案中指出，该案在 Libertarian 中被引用）：

Agency: Where someone undertakes to act financially for another, like handling money or property.
代理：指某人承诺为另一人进行财务行为，例如处理金钱或财产。
Ascendency/Influence/Trust: Where one party has power or influence over another who is dependent or relies on them. This often involves vulnerability and the need to protect the weaker party from potential abuse of power.
优势/影响力/信任：指一方对另一方具有权力或影响力，而另一方依赖或信任该方。这通常涉及脆弱性以及需要保护较弱一方免受潜在的权力滥用。

Voluntary Assumption (HKSAR v Luk Kin Peter Joseph): Even without a formal contract, if someone puts themselves in a position where they can act for another and chooses to do so, they might take on fiduciary duties. In Luk Kin Peter, D1 wasn't formally an agent but acted as if finding a buyer for the company, triggering duties under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO). The court rejected the idea that a pre-existing legal relationship was always required.
自愿承担（香港特别行政区诉陆建彼得·约瑟夫）：即使没有正式合同，如果某人将自己置于可以为他人行事的位置并选择这样做，他们也可能承担信托义务。在陆建彼得案中，D1 并非正式的代理人，但其行为如同为公司寻找买家，从而触发了《防止贿赂条例》（POBO）下的义务。法院驳回了必须始终存在先前存在的法律关系的观点。
Commercial Relationships: While parties in business deals usually look after their own interests (acting "at arm's length"), fiduciary duties can arise if one party undertakes to act in the other's interest within that commercial context. However, courts are careful not to impose these duties lightly in purely commercial settings where parties are expected to protect themselves.
商业关系：虽然商业交易中的各方通常会照顾自己的利益（以“公平交易”的方式行事），但如果一方承诺在该商业环境中为另一方的利益行事，则可能会产生信托义务。但是，法院会谨慎地不在纯粹的商业环境中轻易施加这些义务，因为在这些环境中，各方应期望保护自己。

Core Fiduciary Duties (derived from Loyalty)
核心信托义务（源于忠诚）

The "No-Conflict" Rule: “无冲突”规则：

The Rule: A fiduciary cannot allow a situation where their personal interest does conflict, or might possibly conflict, with their duty to the principal. The rule is preventative; it stops fiduciaries from being swayed by personal interests.
规则：受托人不得允许其个人利益与对委托人的义务发生冲突或可能发生冲突的情况。该规则具有预防性；它可以阻止受托人受到个人利益的影响。
Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie Bros: A company director was also a partner in a firm that contracted with the company. Held: Conflict existed; the contract could be voided. His duty was to get the lowest price for the railway, his interest was to get the highest price for his firm.
阿伯丁铁路公司诉布莱基兄弟公司：一家公司的董事同时也是与该公司签订合同的公司的合伙人。判决：存在利益冲突；合同可能被撤销。他的职责是为铁路公司争取最低的价格，而他的利益是为他的公司争取最高的价格。
Keech v Sandford (Lease Renewal): This classic case shows the rule's strictness. The trustee couldn't renew the lease for the child beneficiary. When the trustee took the lease himself, the court said he held it on trust. Rationale: Prevents temptation. If trustees could take leases beneficiaries were refused, they might not try hard enough to get the renewal for the beneficiary. It seems harsh, but protects the beneficiary from potential (even unconscious) bias.
基奇诉桑福德（租赁续约）：这个经典案例展示了该规则的严格性。受托人无法为儿童受益人续签租赁合同。当受托人自己承租该租赁物时，法院表示他以信托方式持有该租赁物。理由：防止诱惑。如果受托人可以获得受益人被拒绝的租赁权，他们可能不会尽力为受益人争取续约。这似乎很苛刻，但可以保护受益人免受潜在的（甚至是无意识的）偏见。
No Competition: This is a specific application of the no-conflict rule. A fiduciary cannot set up a competing business that harms the principal's interests or diverts opportunities (Re Thompson - executor setting up rival yacht broker business enjoined). Enticing clients away is also a breach (Wang Mei Lee v Lau Pit Chuen).
禁止竞争：这是禁止冲突规则的一个具体应用。受托人不得设立损害委托人利益或转移机会的竞争业务（Re Thompson - 执行人设立竞争对手的游艇经纪业务被禁止）。诱导客户离开也是一种违约行为（Wang Mei Lee v Lau Pit Chuen）。

The "No-Profit" Rule: “禁止盈利”规则：

The Rule: Fiduciaries must not make secret or unauthorised profits from their position. Any profit made through the fiduciary role belongs to the principal unless the principal gives fully informed consent.
规则：受托人不得从其职位中获取秘密或未经授权的利润。通过受托人角色获得的任何利润均属于委托人，除非委托人给予充分知情的同意。
Strict Liability (Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver): This case demonstrates the rule's inflexibility. Directors invested their own money to help the company acquire leases (which the company couldn't fully finance). They acted honestly and the company benefited. Later, new owners sued the former directors for the personal profit they made when the whole business was sold. Held: The directors had to account for their profits. Why? The opportunity and knowledge to make the profit came because they were directors. Their honesty or the company's benefit was irrelevant. Liability arises simply from making a profit in the circumstances due to the fiduciary position.
严格责任（Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver）：本案展示了该规则的僵化性。董事们投资了自己的资金以帮助公司收购租赁权（公司无法完全资助）。他们的行为是诚实的，公司也从中受益。后来，新的所有者起诉了前董事，因为他们在整个业务出售时获得的个人利润。判决：董事们必须交代他们的利润。为什么？获得利润的机会和知识是因为他们是董事。他们的诚实或公司的利益无关紧要。责任的产生仅仅是因为他们在受托人地位的情况下获得了利润。
Boardman v Phipps (Information as Property): Again, highlights strictness. Boardman (solicitor) and Tom Phipps used information gained while acting for the trust to buy shares personally. This information was effectively "trust property." Even though they acted honestly, intended to benefit the trust, and the trust itself couldn't buy the shares, they profited from their fiduciary position/access. They had to account for the profit (though were compensated for their work).
Boardman v Phipps（信息作为财产）：再次强调严格性。Boardman（律师）和 Tom Phipps 利用在为信托机构服务时获得的信息亲自购买股票。这些信息实际上是“信托财产”。即使他们的行为是诚实的，打算使信托受益，并且信托本身也无法购买股票，他们还是从他们的受托人地位/访问权限中获利。他们必须交代利润（尽管获得了工作报酬）。
Scope: Covers bribes, commissions, using confidential info, using principal's property, taking opportunities belonging to the principal.
范围：涵盖贿赂、佣金、使用保密信息、使用委托人的财产、利用属于委托人的机会。
Director's Scope Exception?: While Regal and Boardman are strict, some cases suggested directors might take opportunities genuinely outside the company's line of business (Queensland Mines - but here there was arguably informed consent/acquiescence ). However, later cases (Bhullar, O'Donnell) lean towards the stricter view that if an opportunity is relevant to the company, the director might breach duty by taking it, even if found personally. The CFA case Poon Ka Man Jason v Cheng Wai Tao should be consulted for the current HK position.
董事范围例外？：虽然 Regal 和 Boardman 的案例非常严格，但有些案例表明，董事可以抓住真正超出公司业务范围的机会 (Queensland Mines - 但这里存在有知情同意/默认)。然而，后来的案例（Bhullar, O'Donnell）倾向于更严格的观点，即如果某个机会与公司相关，董事可能会因抓住该机会而违反职责，即使该机会是其个人发现的。关于香港目前的立场，应参考 CFA 案例 Poon Ka Man Jason v Cheng Wai Tao。
Trustee Pay: The no-profit rule means trustees generally work unpaid (Robinson v Pett). Exceptions:
受托人报酬：非营利原则意味着受托人通常是无偿工作（Robinson v Pett）。例外情况：

TI clause allowing payment.
允许付款的 TI 条款。
Agreement by all adult beneficiaries (sui juris) who are fully informed.
所有成年受益人（完全行为能力人）在充分知情的情况下达成的协议。
Court authorisation (inherent power, e.g., Re Duke of Norfolk's ST; or as allowance for work done, Boardman v Phipps).
法院授权（固有权力，例如，Re Duke of Norfolk's ST；或作为对已完成工作的补偿，Boardman v Phipps）。
Statute: TO s.41Q-T (new rules allowing reasonable pay for professional/trust corp trustees if not prohibited); TO s.43 (Court appointing trust corp).
法规：TO s.41Q-T（允许为专业/信托公司受托人支付合理报酬的新规则，如果未被禁止）；TO s.43（法院任命信托公司）。
Cradock v Piper rule: Solicitor-trustee can charge for litigation work done for self and co-trustees (limited exception).
Cradock v Piper 规则：律师-受托人可以为自己和共同受托人进行的诉讼工作收费（有限例外）。
Re Northcote: Can be paid for managing overseas assets if local agent would be needed anyway.
Re Northcote 案：如果无论如何都需要当地代理人，则可以支付管理海外资产的费用。

Buying Principal's Property
购买委托人的财产

Self-Dealing Rule (Tito v Waddell (No 2)):
自我交易规则（蒂托诉沃德尔案（第 2 号））:

What it is: A trustee cannot buy trust property from the trust. If they do (i.e., they are both seller and buyer), the transaction can be undone by any beneficiary automatically, without needing to prove it was unfair.
定义：受托人不得从信托购买信托财产。如果他们这样做（即，他们既是卖方又是买方），任何受益人都可以自动撤销该交易，而无需证明其不公平。
Rationale: Prevents the obvious conflict: trustee's duty is to sell high, personal interest is to buy low. The rule avoids the difficulty of judging fairness when the trustee has all the information.
理由：防止明显的冲突：受托人的职责是高价出售，个人利益是低价购买。该规则避免了在受托人掌握所有信息时判断公平性的困难。
Voidable ex debito justitiae: Means "voidable as of right." The beneficiary doesn't need to show loss or unfairness; they just need to ask the court to set it aside in reasonable time (Campbell v Walker).
当然，请看下面的翻译：可因权利当然使其无效 (Voidable ex debito justitiae)：指“因权利当然可使其无效”。受益人无需证明损失或不公平；他们只需在合理的时间内请求法院将其撤销（Campbell v Walker）。
Strictness: Applies even if the price seems fair or the trustee overpays.
严格性：即使价格看起来合理或受托人支付过高，也适用。
Remedy: Rescission (undoing the sale) if possible. If the trustee resold, they must account for any profit made.
补救措施：如果可能，撤销（取消销售）。如果受托人已转售，则必须说明所获利润。
Exceptions: 例外情况：

(1) TI explicitly allows it;
(1) TI 明确允许；
(2) Court approves the sale beforehand;
(2) 法院事先批准出售；
(3) Holder v Holder exception (rare - executor technically trustee but never really acted, bought property at open auction, beneficiaries knew);
(3) Holder v Holder 例外情况（罕见 - 执行人技术上是受托人，但从未真正采取行动，在公开拍卖会上购买了房产，受益人知情）；
(4) All beneficiaries (adult, fully informed) agree.
(4) 所有受益人（成年、充分知情）均同意。

Fair-Dealing Rule (Tito v Waddell (No 2)):
公平交易规则 (Tito v Waddell (No 2)):

What it is: Applies when a trustee buys the beneficial interest (i.e., the beneficiary's share or rights under the trust) from the beneficiary directly.
定义：适用于受托人直接从受益人处购买受益权益（即受益人在信托项下的份额或权利）的情况。
Difference from Self-Dealing: Trustee isn't buying from the trust; they are buying from the beneficiary. The beneficiary can theoretically protect their own interests.
与自我交易的区别：受托人不是从信托机构购买，而是从受益人处购买。受益人理论上可以保护自己的利益。
Not Automatically Voidable: Transaction stands unless the beneficiary challenges it.
并非自动可撤销：除非受益人提出异议，否则交易仍然有效。
Burden on Trustee: If challenged, the trustee must prove the transaction was totally fair and honest. They must show:
受托人的举证责任：如果受到质疑，受托人必须证明交易完全公平和诚实。他们必须证明：

They didn't abuse their position or influence.
他们没有滥用职权或影响力。
They disclosed all relevant facts they knew to the beneficiary.
他们向受益人披露了他们所知的所有相关事实。
The price was adequate/fair.
价格是足够/公平的。
The beneficiary acted freely, possibly with independent advice.
受益人系自由行事，可能获得了独立的建议。

If Trustee Fails Burden: Transaction can be set aside if restitutio in integrum (putting things back to the original position) is possible (Tate v Williamson).
如果受托人未履行举证责任：如果恢复原状（使事物恢复到原始状态）是可能的，则交易可以被撤销 (Tate v Williamson)。

Confidential Information 保密信息

Duty: Fiduciaries have a duty not to misuse confidential information received during the fiduciary relationship for their own or others' benefit (Seager v Copydex). This overlaps with the no-profit rule.
义务：受托人有义务不得滥用在受信关系期间收到的保密信息，以获取自身或他人的利益 (Seager v Copydex)。这与不得牟利规则重叠。
Conflict (Solicitors): A law firm cannot act for a new client against a former client if the firm possesses confidential information from the former client that might be relevant to the new matter (Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG). Similarly, a firm cannot act for two current clients with conflicting interests without informed consent from both (Marks & Spencer v Freshfields). Information barriers ("Chinese walls") might sometimes work, but courts are cautious.
利益冲突（律师）：如果律师事务所掌握前客户的保密信息，且该信息可能与新事项相关，则该律师事务所不得为新客户代理，以对抗前客户（Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG）。同样，如果律师事务所在未经双方知情同意的情况下为两个当前客户代理存在利益冲突的事项，也是不被允许的(Marks & Spencer v Freshfields)。信息隔离墙（“中国墙”）有时可能有效，但法院对此持谨慎态度。

W11 Fiduciaries II - Trustees
W11 受托人 II - 托管人

Trustee as Fiduciary 作为受信人的受托人

A trustee holds legal title to property but must manage it strictly for the benefit of beneficiaries. This places them in a prime fiduciary position. While all trustees owe basic fiduciary duties, the extent might differ (e.g., an express trustee appointed under a deed usually has more extensive duties than someone deemed a constructive trustee by law due to circumstances like receiving mistaken payment).
受托人拥有财产的合法所有权，但必须严格为了受益人的利益管理该财产。这使他们处于首要的信托地位。虽然所有受托人都负有基本的信托责任，但程度可能有所不同（例如，根据契约指定的明示受托人通常比因错误收款等情况而被法律视为推定受托人的人承担更广泛的责任）。

Administration - Source Hierarchy
管理 - 来源层级

Trust Instrument (TI): This is the deed or will creating the trust. Its terms are paramount. Settlors can specify duties, powers, limits etc.
信托文件（TI）：这是创建信托的契约或遗嘱。其条款至关重要。委托人可以指定义务、权力、限制等。
Trustee Ordinance (TO): If the TI is silent or ambiguous on a matter, the TO provides default powers and rules. These statutory powers apply in addition to TI powers unless the TI explicitly says the statutory power should not apply ("contrary intention").
《受托人条例》（Trustee Ordinance，简称 TO）：如果信托文书（TI）对某一事项保持沉默或含义模糊，则《受托人条例》规定了默认的权力和规则。除非信托文书明确表示不应适用该法定权力（“相反意图”），否则这些法定权力将适用于信托文书权力之外。
Common Law: If neither the TI nor statute covers a situation, courts rely on established case law principles.
普通法：如果信托文件和法规均未涵盖某种情况，法院将依赖已确立的判例法原则。

Appointing, Removing & Replacing Trustees
任命、免除和更换受托人

Who can appoint/remove? 谁可以委任/免职？

Settlor: Can reserve this power, but may have tax/control implications (Kan Lai Kwan).
委托人：可以保留此项权力，但可能存在税务/控制影响（Kan Lai Kwan）。
TI Nominee: The TI might name someone with the power to appoint/remove.
TI 被提名人：TI 可能会指派某人拥有任命/罢免的权力。
Statute (TO): Provides default mechanisms if TI is silent or appointer unwilling/unable.
法规（TO）：如果 TI 未作规定或指定人不愿意/不能指定，则提供默认机制。
Court: Has statutory (s.42) and inherent power.
法院：具有法定权力（第 42 条）和固有权力。
Beneficiaries: Limited power under TO s.40A.
受益人：根据《受托人条例》第 40A 条规定的有限权力。

Trustee Requirements: Needs legal capacity; must accept; trust property vested in them. Usually need min 2 individuals or 1 trust corporation, max 4 for land.
受托人要求：需要法律行为能力；必须接受；信托财产归属于他们。通常需要至少 2 个个人或 1 个信托公司，土地最多 4 个。
Statutory Power (TO s.37): This is a key practical provision. It allows remaining trustees (or PRs of last one) to appoint a replacement if a trustee: dies, is abroad >12 months, wants out, refuses, is unfit/incapable (e.g., mentally), is a minor, or removed by TI power. The new trustee gets all the original powers. This avoids needing court intervention in many common scenarios.
法定权力（TO s.37）：这是一项关键的实用条款。它允许剩余的受托人（或最后一个受托人的遗产管理人）在受托人出现以下情况时指定替代者：死亡、在国外超过 12 个月、想要退出、拒绝、不适合/无能力（例如，精神上）、未成年，或被信托文书权力免职。新受托人获得所有原始权力。这避免了在许多常见情况下需要法院干预。
Court Power (TO s.42): Used when it's "expedient" but difficult/impractical to appoint without court help. Examples: replacing bankrupt or imprisoned trustees. The court has wide discretion.
法院权力（TO 第 42 条）：当“权宜”但没有法院帮助难以/不切实际地任命时使用。示例：更换破产或被监禁的受托人。法院有广泛的自由裁量权。
Court's Inherent Power: Used less now due to statute, but exists to remove trustees where their continuation would harm the trust, even without actual misconduct, focusing on beneficiaries' welfare (Letterstedt v Broers).
法院的固有权力：现在因法规使用较少，但仍然存在，可以在没有实际不当行为的情况下，为了受益人的福祉，撤换继续担任会损害信托的受托人 (Letterstedt v Broers)。
Court Appointment Factors (Re Tempest): When choosing a trustee, court considers: settlor's wishes; fairness to all beneficiaries (not appointing someone biased); impact on trust execution; avoiding conflicts of interest.
法院委任因素 (Re Tempest)：在选择受托人时，法院会考虑：委托人的意愿；对所有受益人的公平性（不委任有偏见的人）；对信托执行的影响；避免利益冲突。
Beneficiary Power (TO s.40A/B): A significant power for beneficiaries where they collectively own the entire trust interest and are adults (sui juris). Allows them to direct retirement/appointment if TI doesn't specify who appoints and sufficient trustees remain. s.40B applies if the existing trustee incapacitated. Settlor can opt out via deed.
受益人权力（TO 第 40A/B 条）：对于集体拥有全部信托权益且为成年人（完全行为能力）的受益人来说，这是一项重要的权力。如果信托文书没有指定谁来指定且有足够的受托人留任，则允许他们指示退休/任命。第 40B 条适用于现有受托人丧失行为能力的情况。委托人可以通过契约选择退出。
Vesting: Critical step. Property must be legally transferred to new trustees for them to act. Done via vesting declaration in appointment deed (s.41) or court vesting order (s.45).
财产归属：关键步骤。财产必须合法转移给新的受托人，他们才能采取行动。通过委任契据中的财产归属声明（第 41 条）或法院财产归属令（第 45 条）完成。
Ending Trusteeship: Besides replacement: Retirement (s.40) requires co-trustee/beneficiary consent & sufficient remaining trustees; Death (automatic vesting in survivors/PRs); Trust termination (final distribution).
终止受托管理：除更换外：退休（第 40 条）需要共同受托人/受益人同意，且有足够的剩余受托人；死亡（自动归属于幸存者/PRs）；信托终止（最终分配）。
Kan Lai Kwan v Poon Lok To Otto (Impact): Showed that reserving extensive powers (like appointing/removing trustees) can lead courts to view the settler as retaining significant control, potentially making trust assets accessible in contexts like divorce settlements.
简丽筠诉潘乐陶 (影响)：表明保留广泛的权力（如指定/移除受托人）可能导致法院认为委托人保留了重要的控制权，从而可能在离婚协议等情况下使信托资产可被获取。

Management Duties of Trustees (General)
受托人的管理职责（一般）

Acquaint & Carry Out Trust: Fundamental duty to learn the trust terms/assets and follow them meticulously. Unauthorized deviation is a breach.
熟悉并执行信托：学习信托条款/资产并严格遵守的基本义务。未经授权的偏差构成违约。

Discretion: If TI gives discretion (e.g., whom to pay, how much), trustees must exercise it responsibly: consider purpose of power, relevant factors, ignore irrelevant ones (Edge v Pensions Ombudsman). Courts rarely interfere if discretion is absolute and exercised in good faith (Gisborne).
酌处权：如果信托文书赋予酌处权（例如，向谁支付、支付多少），受托人必须负责任地行使该权力：考虑权力的目的、相关因素，忽略不相关因素（Edge v Pensions Ombudsman）。如果酌处权是绝对的且以诚实信用行使，法院很少干预 (Gisborne)。
Hastings-Bass Rule / Pitt v Holt: If a trustee makes a decision within their powers, but based on flawed considerations (e.g., bad tax advice), can it be undone? Pitt v Holt clarified: The decision is only voidable if the flawed deliberation was so bad it amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty (e.g., acting recklessly, not just making an honest mistake). If the decision was outside the scope of the power (excessive execution) or fraudulent, it's void. Mistake (a separate legal doctrine) might also allow setting aside, as happened in Pitt v Holt itself.
Hastings-Bass 规则 / Pitt v Holt：如果受托人在其权力范围内做出决定，但基于有缺陷的考虑（例如，糟糕的税务建议），该决定是否可以撤销？Pitt v Holt 澄清：只有当有缺陷的考虑非常糟糕以至于构成违反信义义务时（例如，轻率行事，而不仅仅是犯了诚实的错误），该决定才是可撤销的。如果该决定超出权力范围（过度执行）或具有欺诈性，则该决定无效。错误（一种独立的法律原则）也可能允许撤销，正如 Pitt v Holt 本身发生的那样。

Act Unanimously: All trustees must agree on decisions. One trustee cannot act alone or bind others; a majority cannot override a minority (Luke v South Kensington Hotel). This protects beneficiaries from actions not agreed by all appointed guardians.
一致行动：所有受托人必须就决策达成一致。一位受托人不得单独行动或约束他人；多数不得否决少数（Luke v South Kensington Hotel）。这可以保护受益人免受未经所有指定监护人同意的行为的影响。
Invest: Trustees must make the trust fund productive, balancing income for current beneficiaries and capital growth for future ones.
投资：受托人必须使信托基金产生效益，在当前受益人的收入和未来受益人的资本增长之间取得平衡。

Powers: Defined by TI or TO s.4 (list of authorized investments). Settlor can retain control (s.41X).
权力：由《受托人投资法》第 4 条（授权投资清单）定义。委托人可以保留控制权（第 41X 条）。
Unauthorized Investments: If trustee invests outside permitted powers = breach. Liable for any loss (Knott v Cottee). Trustee holds the investment personally and must repay the trust fund (Wright v Morgan). If profit is made, it belongs to the trust. Adult beneficiaries can choose to adopt the investment (Re Patten).
未经授权的投资：如果受托人进行超出允许权限范围的投资 = 违约。对任何损失负责（Knott v Cottee 案）。受托人以个人名义持有投资，并且必须偿还信托基金（Wright v Morgan 案）。如果产生利润，则该利润归信托所有。成年受益人可以选择采纳该投资（Re Patten 案）。
Investment Considerations (Cowan v Scargill): Primary duty is beneficiaries' best financial interests. Non-financial factors (e.g., ethical concerns of trustees) are generally irrelevant unless they risk financial detriment (e.g., alienating customers/suppliers) or fall into exceptions.
投资考虑因素 (Cowan v Scargill)：首要义务是受益人的最佳财务利益。非财务因素（例如，受托人的道德顾虑）通常无关紧要，除非它们会带来财务损害的风险（例如，疏远客户/供应商）或属于例外情况。
Ethical Investment Exceptions (Cowan; Harries): Trustees can consider ethics if: (1) TI permits/requires it; (2) All adult beneficiaries consent; (3) For charities, if investment conflicts with charitable aims (e.g., cancer research charity avoiding tobacco stock), provided sufficient financial return possible from alternative ethical investments.
伦理投资例外情况 (Cowan; Harries)：受托人可以在以下情况下考虑伦理因素：(1) TI 允许/要求；(2) 所有成年受益人同意；(3) 对于慈善机构，如果投资与慈善目的相冲突（例如，癌症研究慈善机构避免烟草股票），前提是可从替代伦理投资中获得足够的财务回报。

Act Personally (Non-Delegation): Trustees are chosen for their judgment and generally must exercise it themselves.
亲自行动（不得转授）：选择受托人是基于他们的判断，通常必须由他们自己行使判断。

Delegation Authority: Allowed if TI permits, or by statute, or for tasks necessity/custom dictates (e.g., hiring stockbroker) (Ex p Belchier).
授权：如果信托文件允许，或根据法规，或根据必要性/惯例决定的任务（例如，聘请股票经纪人）（Ex p Belchier）允许。
Duty of Care in Delegation: Must be prudent in: selecting the agent (choose someone suitable/qualified - Fry v Tapson); formulating instructions; and supervising the agent's actions (Re Lucking's WT).
委托中的注意义务：必须审慎地：选择代理人（选择合适/有资格的人 - Fry v Tapson）；制定指示；以及监督代理人的行为 (Re Lucking's WT)。
Statutory Delegation (TO):
法定权力委托 (TO):

s.27: Temporary delegation (max 12 mo) by individual trustee via power of attorney.
第 27 条：由个人受托人通过授权委托书进行的临时委托（最长 12 个月）。
Post-2013 rules (s.41B etc): Allow delegation of many functions (including investment management) to agents, except core duties like distribution decisions, trustee appointments, fee allocation. Can appoint nominees (hold title) and custodians (hold documents/assets). Trustees must review delegates (s.41M/N). If the trustee complied with duty of care in appointing/supervising, generally not liable for delegate's default (s.41O).
2013 年后的规则（第 41B 条等）：允许将许多职能（包括投资管理）委托给代理人，但分配决定、受托人任命、费用分配等核心职责除外。可以指定被提名人（持有所有权）和托管人（持有文件/资产）。受托人必须审查受委托人（第 41M/N 条）。如果受托人在任命/监督方面遵守了注意义务，通常不对受委托人的违约行为负责（第 41O 条）。

Distribute & Act Fairly: Pay correct amounts to correct beneficiaries per TI terms. Act impartially between different beneficiaries or classes (e.g., income vs capital beneficiaries - Lloyds Bank v Duker). Howe v Dartmouth rule aims to balance interests between life tenant and remainderman for certain types of property.
分配和公平行事：根据 TI 条款向正确的受益人支付正确的金额。在不同的受益人或类别之间公正行事（例如，收益受益人与资本受益人 - Lloyds Bank v Duker）。Howe v Dartmouth 规则旨在平衡终身租户和剩余受益人在某些类型的财产中的利益。
Account: Keep clear, accurate records of trust assets, income, expenses. Provide accounts and information to beneficiaries on request (Walker v Walker). Beneficiaries generally entitled to see trust documents (e.g., TI, accounts, legal advice paid by trust). Failure to account properly can lead to liability for losses.
账户：清晰、准确地记录信托资产、收入、支出。应受益人的要求提供账户和信息（Walker v Walker）。受益人通常有权查阅信托文件（例如，TI、账户、信托支付的法律咨询）。未能妥善说明可能导致损失责任。

Exception: Trustees usually don't have to disclose reasons for exercising discretion (Re Londonderry).
例外：受托人通常不必披露行使酌处权的理由 (Re Londonderry)。

Breach of Trust: Liability & Analysis Framework
背信：责任与分析框架

Step 1: Power? Did the trustee act within the powers given by the TI and statute?
第一步：权力？受托人是否在信托文书和法规授予的权力范围内行事？

If NO (acted ultra vires): It's a breach of trust. Trustee is liable for the resulting loss. Example: Making an investment not authorised by TI or TO s.4. The trustee must restore the fund.
如果否（行为超越权限）：属于违反信托。受托人对由此造成的损失承担责任。示例：进行未经《信托文书》或《1925 年受托人条例》第 4 条授权的投资。受托人必须恢复基金。

Step 2: Duty of Care? If the action was within powers ( intra vires), did the trustee exercise the required standard of care in doing it?
第二步：注意义务？如果该行为在权力范围内（intra vires），受托人在执行该行为时是否已尽到要求的注意义务标准？

If NO: It's a breach of the duty of care. Trustee liable for loss caused by carelessness. Example: Making an authorised investment but choosing it recklessly without proper advice or investigation.
如果否：属于违反谨慎义务。受托人对因疏忽造成的损失承担责任。示例：进行一项授权投资，但在没有适当建议或调查的情况下轻率地选择该投资。
Trustees aren't liable just because an authorised, carefully chosen investment loses value (mere error of judgment).
受托人不会仅仅因为一项经过授权且经过谨慎选择的投资贬值而承担责任（仅是判断失误）。

W12 Fiduciaries III - Breach, Remedies, Defences
W12 受托人 III - 违约、救济、抗辩

Duty of Care Standards 注意义务标准

Common Law Baseline (Speight v Gaunt): The standard expected of an ordinary prudent person managing their own affairs. This applies to general trust administration.
普通法基准（Speight v Gaunt）：管理自己事务的普通谨慎之人所应达到的标准。这适用于一般信托管理。
Common Law Investment Standard (Re Whiteley): Higher threshold for investments: the care an ordinary prudent person would take when investing for others for whom they feel "morally bound to provide". This recognises the responsibility to protect capital for future beneficiaries, not just generate immediate income. Requires more caution than investing purely for oneself.
普通法投资标准（Re Whiteley）：更高的投资门槛：一个普通谨慎的人在为那些他/她感到“在道义上有义务提供”的人进行投资时会采取的谨慎态度。这承认了为未来受益人保护资本的责任，而不仅仅是产生即时收入。这比纯粹为自己投资需要更加谨慎。
Common Law - Special Skill (Re Whiteley): Traditionally, a lay trustee wasn't held to a higher standard just because they happened to possess special skills. The standard was objective (ordinary prudent person). However, they were expected to seek expert advice when needed (e.g., legal, valuation).
普通法 - 特殊技能 (Re Whiteley)：传统上，即使一个非专业受托人碰巧拥有特殊技能，也不会因此被要求达到更高的标准。该标准是客观的（普通谨慎之人）。但是，他们应该在需要时寻求专家建议（例如，法律、估值）。
Common Law - Paid/Professional Trustees (Re Waterman's; Bartlett): Explicitly higher standard. A bank or trust company holding itself out as having expertise is expected to use that expertise. They are liable for losses caused by failing to exercise the special skill they profess to have.
普通法 - 有偿/专业受托人 (Re Waterman's; Bartlett)：明显更高的标准。一家银行或信托公司如果自称拥有专业知识，则应运用该专业知识。如果他们未能运用其声称拥有的特殊技能而导致损失，他们将承担责任。
Statutory Duty of Care (TO s.3A): Applies post-1 Dec 2013 to specific functions unless excluded. Codifies and potentially raises the standard:
法定义务的注意义务 (TO s.3A)：适用于 2013 年 12 月 1 日之后的特定职能，除非排除。编纂并可能提高标准：

Requires care/skill "reasonable in the circumstances".
要求具备“在当时情况下合理的”谨慎/技能。
Crucially, regard must be had to:
至关重要的是，必须考虑到：

(a) Any special knowledge/experience the trustee actually has or claims to have. This makes the standard partly subjective – if you know better, you must do better.
(a) 受托人实际拥有或声称拥有的任何专门知识/经验。这使得标准部分上具有主观性——如果你知道得更多，你就必须做得更好。
(b) If acting professionally, the standard reasonably expected of that profession. This confirms the higher standard for professionals seen in Bartlett.
(b) 如果以专业身份行事，则应达到该专业合理预期的标准。这证实了在 Bartlett 案中看到的对专业人士的更高标准。

If s.3A applies, it replaces the common law duty for that specific function.
如果第 3A 条适用，则它将取代普通法对该特定职能的义务。

Liability for Breach 违反责任

Breach of Trust vs Negligence: A breach of trust involves breaching a fiduciary duty (loyalty, good faith) or acting outside powers. Mere carelessness might be negligence at common law but not breach of trust if the trustee acted honestly and within powers (Bristol & West v Mothew). However, breaching the duty of care (common law or statutory) is considered a type of breach of trust leading to liability.
违反信托义务与疏忽：违反信托义务涉及违反受信义务（忠诚、诚信）或超出职权范围行事。仅仅是粗心大意在普通法上可能构成疏忽，但如果受托人诚实行事且在职权范围内，则不构成违反信托义务 (Bristol & West v Mothew)。但是，违反注意义务（普通法或成文法）被认为是导致责任的一种违反信托义务。
Joint & Several Liability: Because trustees must act together, if a breach occurs, all trustees involved (including those who were passive or simply went along) are generally liable for the entire loss. The beneficiary can choose to sue one, some, or all. Being a "sleeping trustee" is no excuse (Bahin v Hughes).
连带责任：由于受托人必须共同行动，如果发生违约行为，所有相关受托人（包括那些被动的或只是随波逐流的受托人）通常对全部损失承担责任。受益人可以选择起诉其中一人、部分人或所有人。“沉睡的受托人”不能作为借口 (Bahin v Hughes)。
Limited Exceptions: A trustee might escape liability if they reasonably relied on a co-trustee with specialist skills (Re Lucking's - but this requires genuine, reasonable deference, not just apathy). A trustee who actively defrauds might be solely liable compared to innocent co-trustees.
有限的例外情况：如果受托人合理地依赖具有专业技能的共同受托人，则该受托人可能免于承担责任 (Re Lucking's - 但这需要真正、合理的尊重，而不仅仅是冷漠)。与无辜的共同受托人相比，积极欺诈的受托人可能单独承担责任。
Scope of Liability: Liability extends beyond the trustee's lifetime (claim against estate). New trustees aren't liable for old breaches (Re Strahan). Retiring trustees remain liable for breaches during their term, and can even be liable for breaches by successors if they retired specifically to enable the breach (Head v Gould).
责任范围：责任范围超出受托人的有生之年（针对遗产的索赔）。新受托人不对之前的违约行为负责 (Re Strahan)。退休的受托人仍然对其任期内的违约行为负责，甚至可能对其继任者的违约行为负责，如果他们退休的目的是为了促成违约 (Head v Gould)。

The principle from Head v Gould requires that for a retiring trustee (Roger) to be liable for a breach committed by their successor (Sophie), it must be shown that Roger "contemplated" the very breach which was actually committed when the retirement and appointment took place. Simply worrying that the successor might be inexperienced or might mismanage assets is generally not enough; Roger needed to foresee the specific negligent act Sophie committed.
《Head v Gould》案中的原则要求，如果退休的受托人（Roger）要对其继任者（Sophie）所犯的违约行为承担责任，则必须证明 Roger 在退休和任命发生时“预见”了实际发生的违约行为。仅仅担心继任者可能缺乏经验或可能管理不善通常是不够的；Roger 需要预见到 Sophie 所犯的具体疏忽行为。

Remedies for Breach 违约救济

Goal: Make good the loss or recover the profit, essentially putting the trust fund back where it should have been. Equity aims for restitution.
目标：弥补损失或追回利润，本质上是将信托基金恢复到应有的状态。衡平法的目标是赔偿。
Causation (Target Holdings): Crucial link needed. The loss must flow directly from the breach itself. If the loss would have happened even without the breach, the trustee isn't liable for that loss. Example: Trustee invests improperly (breach), but global market crash causes loss that would have hit even proper investments. Trustee liable for difference between actual loss and loss expected from proper investment, not necessarily the whole loss (subject to specific assessment rules).
因果关系（目标控股公司案）：需要关键的联系。损失必须直接源于违约本身。如果即使没有违约也会发生损失，则受托人不承担该损失的责任。示例：受托人进行不当投资（违约），但全球市场崩盘导致即使是适当的投资也会遭受损失。受托人对实际损失与适当投资预期损失之间的差额负责，不一定是全部损失（受特定评估规则约束）。
Personal Remedies (Against Trustee):
个人救济（针对受托人）：

Account: The process of requiring the trustee to show their dealings with the trust fund. It's a right, not a remedy itself, but necessary to identify losses/profits.
账目：要求受托人展示其与信托基金交易的过程。这是一种权利，而不是补救措施本身，但对于识别损失/利润是必要的。
Account of Profits: Requires trustee to pay over unauthorised profits made from the breach.
利润追溯：要求受托人支付因违约而产生的所有未经授权的利润。
Equitable Compensation: Monetary payment to cover the loss caused by the breach. Aims to restore the trust fund's value. Assessed flexibly based on putting trust back in position "but for" the breach.
衡平法上的赔偿：以金钱支付以弥补违约造成的损失。旨在恢复信托基金的价值。根据使信托回到“若非”违约情况下的地位进行灵活评估。
Election (Tang Man Sit, Tang Ying Loi): Where a trustee misuses funds to make profit, the beneficiary can choose after judgment: either get the original money back (plus interest) OR claim the profit/asset acquired with it. Cannot have both for the same breach. Account identifies the options; the election chooses the best one.
选择（邓文硕，邓颖莱）：如果受托人滥用资金牟利，受益人可以在判决后选择：要么取回原始资金（加上利息），要么索取用该资金获得的利润/资产。同一次违约行为不能两者兼得。“账户”确定了选项；“选择”选择了最佳选项。

Proprietary Remedies (Against Property):
专属救济（针对财产）：

Constructive Trust: Court declares trustee holds misappropriated assets or resulting profits on trust for the beneficiary. Gives beneficiary priority over trustee's other creditors. Allows tracing into new forms of property.
建设性信托：法院宣布受托人以信托方式为受益人持有被挪用的资产或由此产生的利润。赋予受益人优先于受托人其他债权人的权利。允许追溯到新的财产形式。

Injunction: Court order to stop a threatened breach.
禁令：法院命令停止威胁的违约行为。
Criminal Sanctions: Relevant HK ordinances (like POBO) impose criminal liability for acts like bribery or using documents to deceive.
刑事制裁：香港相关条例（如《防止贿赂条例》）对贿赂或使用文件进行欺骗等行为规定了刑事责任。

Avoiding Liability / Defences
避免责任/抗辩

Exemption Clauses: Clauses in TI limiting trustee liability.
免责条款：信托文件中限制受托人责任的条款。

Valid for negligence/innocent breach, but cannot exclude liability for trustee's own fraud/dishonesty (Armitage v Nurse). There's an "irreducible core" of honest performance that can't be excluded.
对疏忽/无意违约有效，但不能排除受托人自身欺诈/不诚实行为的责任 (Armitage v Nurse)。存在一个不可减少的诚实履行“核心”，不能被排除。
TO s.41W (Post-2013/14): For paid professional trustees, clauses relieving liability for their own fraud, wilful misconduct, or gross negligence are invalid. This provides significant protection against professionals contracting out of basic competence/honesty standards. Note: applies prospectively.
《受托人条例》第 41W 条（2013/14 年后）：对于有偿专业受托人，免除其自身欺诈、故意不当行为或重大过失责任的条款无效。这为防止专业人士通过合同免除基本能力/诚实标准提供了重要保障。注意：仅适用于未来。

Crucially, s.41W(3) states that for trusts created before 1 Dec 2013, this restriction applies "with effect on and after 1 December 2014".
至关重要的是，第 41W(3)条规定，对于 2013 年 12 月 1 日之前设立的信托，该限制“自 2014 年 12 月 1 日起生效”。

Court Relief (TO s.60): Powerful tool allowing court to excuse a trustee despite liability. Requires trustee prove they acted:
法院救济（《受托人条例》第 60 条）：强大的工具，允许法院在受托人负有责任的情况下免除其责任。要求受托人证明其行为：

Honestly: No deceit or improper motive.
诚实：没有欺骗或不正当动机。
Reasonably: Objective standard - did they act as a prudent person would? This is often hard for professionals to meet if they fell below professional standards (Bartlett). A simple mistake might be reasonable for a lay trustee but not a professional.
合理：客观标准——他们的行为是否像谨慎的人一样？如果他们的行为低于专业标准（Bartlett），专业人士通常很难达到这个标准。对于非专业受托人来说，一个简单的错误可能是合理的，但对于专业人士来说则不然。
Ought Fairly be Excused: Overall justice consideration – is it fair to make them personally liable given circumstances?
应当公平地被原谅：整体公正的考量——考虑到具体情况，让他们承担个人责任是否公平？

Inherent Jurisdiction: Court's underlying power to relieve, especially honest charity trustees (A-G v Exeter). Taking prompt steps to rectify breach helps (A-G v Pretyman).
内在管辖权：法院具有救济的根本权力，尤其是对于诚实的慈善受托人（A-G v Exeter）。及时采取措施纠正违约行为会有所帮助（A-G v Pretyman）。
Beneficiary Consent/Acquiescence/Release: A fully informed adult beneficiary who clearly consents to, knowingly accepts (acquiesces in), or formally releases a trustee from liability for a breach cannot later sue for that breach. This requires full disclosure by the trustee.
受益人同意/默认/弃权：如果一位充分知情的成年受益人明确同意、知情地接受（默认）或正式免除受托人对违约行为的责任，则不得在事后就该违约行为提起诉讼。这要求受托人充分披露信息。
Limitation Period: Generally 6 years for breach of trust action, but time may not run if breach is fraudulent or concealed.
诉讼时效：一般违反信托行为的诉讼时效为 6 年，但如果违约行为涉及欺诈或隐瞒，则诉讼时效可能不适用。