Corporate governance and strategic human resource management: Four archetypes and proposals for a new approach to corporate sustainability
公司治理与战略人力资源管理：四种原型及企业可持续发展的新方法建议

A central focus of strategic human resource management (SHRM) concerns the relationship between people management policies and practices and the business strategy of organizations (Huselid & Becker, 2011) but a number of commentators have highlighted the failure of this literature to engage with the wider context in which firms, strategy, human capital and human resources (HR) actors are embedded (Delbridge and Keenoy, 2010, Shen, 2011, Wright et al., 2014). In particular, the SHRM literature has failed to integrate recent work on different modes of how firms are governed, which represents highly important conditioning influences on firms' investments in human capital and how people are managed in organizations (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005).
战略人力资源管理（SHRM）的一个核心关注点是人力管理政策和实践与组织商业战略之间的关系（Huselid & Becker, 2011），但许多评论者指出，这些文献未能与公司、战略、人力资本和人力资源（HR）参与者所嵌入的更广泛背景进行互动（Delbridge 和 Keenoy, 2010，Shen, 2011，Wright 等, 2014）。特别是，SHRM 文献未能整合关于公司治理不同模式的最新研究，这些模式对公司在人力资本上的投资以及如何管理组织中的人员具有重要的影响（Gospel 和 Pendleton, 2005）。

This lack of integration is puzzling since how firms conceptualize and approach corporate governance has fundamental implications for SHRM. For example, Daily, Dalton, and Canella Jr. (2003: 371) define corporate governance as “the determination of the broad uses to which organizational resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad of participants in organizations”. Similarly, Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson (2008: 475) define it as the “mechanisms to ensure that executives respect the rights and interests of company stakeholders, and that those stakeholders are held accountable for acting morally and responsibly for the generation, protection and distribution of wealth invested in the firm”. Despite such clear statements of scope, implicating SHRM in governance, we have little understanding of the ways in which governance modes and SHRM choices and the implementation of these choices are associated. Consequently, there is a need to understand how both concepts interact.
这种缺乏整合令人困惑，因为公司如何概念化和处理公司治理对战略人力资源管理（SHRM）具有根本性的影响。例如，Daily、Dalton 和 Canella Jr.（2003: 371）将公司治理定义为“确定组织资源将被广泛使用的方式以及解决组织中众多参与者之间的冲突”。类似地，Aguilera、Filatotchev、Gospel 和 Jackson（2008: 475）将其定义为“确保高管尊重公司利益相关者的权利和利益的机制，以及确保这些利益相关者对道德和负责任地生成、保护和分配投资于公司的财富负责”。尽管有如此明确的范围声明，暗示 SHRM 与治理的关系，但我们对治理模式与 SHRM 选择及其实施之间的关联知之甚少。因此，有必要理解这两个概念如何相互作用。

Three important questions emerge from our statement of this problem. First, what effect does the choice of governance mode have on the way people are managed in a firm? Second, how do certain HR practices affect the governance approach of a firm? Third, what are the traditional and non-traditional ways in firms are governed and what are the implications of these for the management of people?
从我们对这个问题的陈述中出现了三个重要问题。首先，治理模式的选择对公司人员管理方式有什么影响？其次，某些人力资源实践如何影响公司的治理方式？第三，企业的传统和非传统治理方式是什么，这对人员管理有什么影响？

In this paper we develop a typology to explain the linkages between choice of corporate governance mode and SHRM choice. With theories of institutional logics as our foundation (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013, Friedland, 2012, Friedland and Alford, 1991, Thornton et al., 2012), we present four ideal-typical archetypes of corporate governance and SHRM: (a) a market-based, agency-led shareholder value model (b) a relational, communitarian stakeholder model; (c) a strategy-led enlightened shareholder value model, and (d) an employee-ownership model. The shareholder and stakeholder models are familiar ideal types but (c) and (d) represent hybrid ideal types. Hybrid organizations (c.f. Battilana and Lee, 2014, Pache and Santos, 2010, Pache and Santos, 2013) have become increasingly common in addressing issues of the types of organizational complexity promoted by pluralistic demands (Aoki and Jackson, 2008, Greenwood et al., 2011). Such organizational forms are important in governance literature and practice addressing different ways of dealing with the agency problem at one extreme (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007), and the problem of excessive democracy at the expense of managerial efficiency at the other (Kaarsemaker et al., 2010, Lan and Heracleous, 2010). To build our typology, we draw on the concept of ‘institutional complementarities’ (Aoki and Jackson, 2008, Hall and Soskice, 2001), defined as mutually constitutive relationships between institutional logics at societal, field, and organizational levels, to link the four corporate governance archetypes to ideal-typical approaches in SHRM.
在本文中，我们开发了一种类型学，以解释公司治理模式选择与战略人力资源管理（SHRM）选择之间的联系。以制度逻辑理论为基础（Delbridge 和 Edwards, 2013; Friedland, 2012; Friedland 和 Alford, 1991; Thornton 等, 2012），我们提出了四种理想典型的公司治理和 SHRM 原型：(a) 基于市场的、代理主导的股东价值模型；(b) 关系型的、共同体的利益相关者模型；(c) 战略主导的开明股东价值模型；以及 (d) 员工持股模型。股东模型和利益相关者模型是熟悉的理想类型，但 (c) 和 (d) 代表了混合理想类型。混合组织（参见 Battilana 和 Lee, 2014; Pache 和 Santos, 2010; Pache 和 Santos, 2013）在应对多元化需求所促进的组织复杂性问题时变得越来越普遍（Aoki 和 Jackson, 2008; Greenwood 等, 2011）。 这种组织形式在治理文献和实践中非常重要，涉及在一端处理代理问题的不同方式（Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007），以及在另一端以牺牲管理效率为代价的过度民主问题（Kaarsemaker et al., 2010, Lan and Heracleous, 2010）。为了构建我们的分类，我们借鉴了“制度互补性”的概念（Aoki and Jackson, 2008, Hall and Soskice, 2001），定义为社会、领域和组织层面上制度逻辑之间的相互构成关系，以将四种公司治理原型与 SHRM 中的理想典型方法联系起来。

Following the development of our typology we extend our theorizing to offer a new approach, based on corporate sustainability (Benn, Dunphy, and Griffths, 2014; Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2010, Mayer, 2014) and socially responsible human resource management (Aguinas and Glavas, 2012, Shen and Benson, 2014), as over-riding principles of good governance. These proposals deal with many of the challenges associated with the previous four archetypes, and provides a way forward to deal with the impact of organizations on current and future generations of stakeholders.
在我们类型学的发展之后，我们扩展了我们的理论，提出了一种基于企业可持续性（Benn, Dunphy, and Griffths, 2014; Linnenluecke and Griffiths, 2010, Mayer, 2014）和社会责任人力资源管理（Aguinas and Glavas, 2012, Shen and Benson, 2014）的新方法，作为良好治理的首要原则。这些提案解决了与之前四种原型相关的许多挑战，并提供了一种应对组织对当前和未来利益相关者影响的前进方向。

Our paper makes three contributions to existing theory on governance and SHRM. First we contribute to the literature on corporate governance by showing the impact of governance choices on how people are managed within organizations. Our typology elucidates the linkages between choice of governance mode and the mode of SHRM, deepening our understanding of the effects of governance through the organization. Further we answer calls to develop our knowledge of non-traditional corporate governance by highlighting hybrid organizations in our typology and their impact on the structure and management of people within the firm (Besharov and Smith, 2014, Delbridge and Edwards, 2013, Greenwood et al., 2011). Second, we contribute to the literature on SHRM by showing, through our classification, how the choices of HR actors on the SHRM approach can reproduce the governance mode of the firm, extending previous perceptions of the influence of HR in how a firm is configured. Moreover, through clarifying the link between SHRM and corporate governance, we deepen our understanding of the dimensions of strategy that SHRM is intended to include. Third, through our development of the linkage between SHRM and sustainability, we respond to calls for more normative theorizing in governance (Suddaby, 2014) by proposing some suggestions for a new model of governance-SHRM linkages embodying the principles of corporate sustainability.
我们的论文对现有的治理和战略人力资源管理（SHRM）理论做出了三项贡献。首先，我们通过展示治理选择对组织内部人员管理的影响，丰富了企业治理文献。我们的分类法阐明了治理模式选择与 SHRM 模式之间的联系，加深了我们对治理在组织中影响的理解。此外，我们回应了对发展非传统企业治理知识的呼吁，通过在我们的分类法中突出混合组织及其对公司内部人员结构和管理的影响（Besharov 和 Smith，2014 年，Delbridge 和 Edwards，2013 年，Greenwood 等，2011 年）。其次，我们通过我们的分类展示了人力资源参与者在 SHRM 方法上的选择如何再现公司的治理模式，从而丰富了对人力资源在公司配置中影响的先前认知。此外，通过澄清 SHRM 与企业治理之间的联系，我们加深了对 SHRM 所应包含的战略维度的理解。 第三，通过我们对 SHRM 与可持续性之间联系的研究，我们回应了对治理中更多规范性理论的呼吁（Suddaby, 2014），提出了一些关于新治理-SHRM 联系模型的建议，体现企业可持续性的原则。

Our paper is structured as follows. First, we outline issues in corporate governance and the control of resources. Then we develop our typology of corporate governance and SHRM archetypes. In the Discussion section, we present our normative theorizing on corporate sustainability and SHRM. We conclude with directions for future research.
我们的论文结构如下。首先，我们概述了公司治理和资源控制中的问题。然后，我们发展了公司治理和战略人力资源管理（SHRM）原型的分类。 在讨论部分，我们提出了关于企业可持续性和战略人力资源管理的规范性理论。最后，我们总结了未来研究的方向。

Drawing on the elemental categories, we now describe the archetypes presented in Fig. 1. The detail of each archetype is summarized in Table 1. We argue that the four ideal-types are central to understanding how organizations operate in society, how people are managed within them, and how and why the approach to SHRM tends to reproduce these archetypes in a dynamically stable manner. We also point out the challenges created by these archetypes for SHRM practice. Finally, however, we also wish to engage with normative theorizing by proposing a corporate sustainability perspective as a guide to tackle many of the problems associated with the archetypes.
基于基本类别，我们现在描述图 1 中呈现的原型。每个原型的细节总结在表 1 中。我们认为这四种理想类型对于理解组织在社会中的运作、人员管理方式以及 SHRM 方法如何以及为何以动态稳定的方式再现这些原型至关重要。我们还指出了这些原型给 SHRM 实践带来的挑战。最后，我们希望通过提出企业可持续性视角来参与规范性理论的探讨，以指导解决与这些原型相关的许多问题。

• (1)
  Agency-led Shareholder Value
  代理主导的股东价值

Institutional logics. This first archetype is based on shareholder primacy principles, in which company boards are exhorted to exercise their wealth generation, protection, and distribution roles in the economic interests of the company shareholders (Lan & Heracleous, 2010). This perspective has a strong technical/rationalist underpinning based on Friedman (1970) classical free-market dictum that companies maximize social welfare by using resources and engaging in activities that maximize profits over time, so long as they do so “in open and free competition without deception or fraud” (Friedman (1970): 4). It is also consistent with the arguments of Sternberg (2004) that for managers to pursue social objectives at the expense of shareholder objectives would contravene the property rights of owners.
制度逻辑。第一个原型基于股东优先原则，公司董事会被敦促在公司股东的经济利益下行使其财富创造、保护和分配的角色（Lan & Heracleous, 2010）。这一观点有着强烈的技术/理性基础，基于弗里德曼（Friedman, 1970）经典的自由市场格言，即公司通过使用资源和参与最大化利润的活动来最大化社会福利，只要它们“在公开和自由的竞争中不欺骗或欺诈”（Friedman (1970): 4）。这也与斯特恩伯格（Sternberg, 2004）的论点一致，即管理者如果以牺牲股东目标为代价追求社会目标，将违反所有者的财产权。

Core corporate governance logics. Dominated by a capitalist market logic (Zajac & Westphal, 2004), which prioritizes the property rights of ownership, this corporate governance model emerged in the 1980s as a means of resolving the agency problem associated with explaining how organizations can maximize efficiency under constraints of imperfect informational flows in imperfect markets (Dalton et al., 2007). The resolution of this problem largely rested on the use of high-powered incentives or close monitoring to align managerial agents with shareholders when there was an imbalance of information asymmetry between these managers and the investors in the business (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The contribution of agency theory to this way of operating cannot be underestimated (Khurana, 2007). Agency theory viewed share prices as the best guide to the future worth of the firm through the efficient markets hypothesis (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It further proposed that societal-level welfare could only be maximized by capitalizing on shareholder value (Friedman, 1970). Managerial agents sometimes followed their natural self-serving interests, however, which were potentially harmful to shareholders unless they were strictly supervised and incentivized—so-called agency loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus the main aim of corporate governance research shifted to solving the agency problem through governance mechanisms designed to constrain opportunistic managerial actions by linking managerial pay to shareholder value and to appoint independent directors who would be able to stand up to powerful executives (Withers, Hillman, & Cannella, 2012). Related governance research has focused on legal and technical arguments about board structure, composition, and rewards to ensure that managerial agents act in the best interests of shareholders (e.g. Dalton & Dalton, 2010).
核心公司治理逻辑。受资本主义市场逻辑的主导（Zajac & Westphal, 2004），该公司治理模型在 1980 年代出现，作为解决代理问题的一种手段，旨在解释组织如何在不完善市场中在不完美的信息流约束下最大化效率（Dalton et al., 2007）。解决这一问题在很大程度上依赖于使用高效激励或密切监控，以在管理者与投资者之间存在信息不对称时，使管理代理人与股东保持一致（Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976）。代理理论对这种运作方式的贡献不可低估（Khurana, 2007）。代理理论将股价视为通过有效市场假说（Jensen & Meckling, 1976）预测公司未来价值的最佳指南。它进一步提出，只有通过资本化股东价值，才能最大化社会层面的福利（Friedman, 1970）。 管理代理人有时会追随他们自然的自利利益，然而，这可能对股东造成潜在的损害，除非他们受到严格的监督和激励——这被称为代理损失（Jensen & Meckling, 1976）。因此，企业治理研究的主要目标转向通过治理机制解决代理问题，这些机制旨在通过将管理层薪酬与股东价值挂钩以及任命能够对抗强大高管的独立董事来限制机会主义的管理行为（Withers, Hillman, & Cannella, 2012）。相关的治理研究集中在关于董事会结构、组成和奖励的法律和技术论证上，以确保管理代理人以股东的最佳利益行事（例如，Dalton & Dalton, 2010）。

Inter-organizational relationships. The degree of complexity of financial relationships has been low, traditionally relying mainly on institutional investors and, more recently, new sources of finance, including hedge funds, private equity and sovereign wealth funds operating within largely unregulated financial markets at least in Anglo-Saxon economies (Buchan et al., 2012, Lok, 2010). Nevertheless, as, researchers have pointed out (Mayer, 2014, Pendleton and Gospel, 2013), different kinds of equity investors have varying objectives and legal rights in controlling company management, especially in countries outside of the influence of British and American corporate law. Typically, however, this reliance on equity investment has been associated with short-termism (Applelbaum and Batt, 2014), an active market for corporate control (Mayer, 2014), a focus on ‘lean thinking’ and internal labor market flexibility to control fixed costs (Thompson, 2011).
跨组织关系。金融关系的复杂程度一直较低，传统上主要依赖于机构投资者，最近则是依赖于新的融资来源，包括对冲基金、私募股权和主权财富基金，这些基金在很大程度上在几乎不受监管的金融市场中运作，至少在盎格鲁-撒克逊经济体中（Buchan et al., 2012, Lok, 2010）。然而，正如研究人员所指出的（Mayer, 2014, Pendleton and Gospel, 2013），不同类型的股权投资者在控制公司管理方面有着不同的目标和法律权利，尤其是在不受英国和美国公司法影响的国家。然而，通常情况下，这种对股权投资的依赖与短期主义（Applelbaum and Batt, 2014）、活跃的公司控制市场（Mayer, 2014）、关注“精益思维”和内部劳动力市场灵活性以控制固定成本（Thompson, 2011）相关。

Cultural-cognitive system. This is best described as embracing a unitary frame of reference (Fox, 1974), which emphasizes social order and hierarchy as a natural state of affairs, in which only shareholders' interests matter. In doing so, it treats conflict over the notion of shareholder value as a disease to be cured, thus rendering the notion of stakeholders as irritants in the system and emphasizes traditional bureaucratic organization exercised through hard power (Courpasson, 2000, Courpasson and Clegg, 2006).
文化认知系统。这最好被描述为拥抱一个统一的参考框架（Fox, 1974），强调社会秩序和等级作为一种自然状态，在这种状态下，只有股东的利益才重要。在这样做的过程中，它将关于股东价值的冲突视为一种需要治愈的疾病，从而将利益相关者的概念视为系统中的刺激因素，并强调通过硬权力行使的传统官僚组织（Courpasson, 2000, Courpasson and Clegg, 2006）。

The focus on a control/calculative approach to SHRM creates strategic fit with business objectives and internal fit amongst HRM policies (Beer et al, 1984). For the majority of shareholder value-governed firms, this also led to attributions of success to individual leaders (Grint, 2009), typically CEOs and independent directors, who were frequently recruited from a small inner circle (Withers et al., 2012). These leaders were seen as a critical part of wealth generation, but only when constrained from pursuing their natural self-interest by active markets for corporate control and by linking their pay to share performance (Khurana, 2002).
对 SHRM 采取控制/计算方法的重点与商业目标之间创造了战略契合，并在 HRM 政策之间实现了内部契合（Beer 等，1984）。对于大多数以股东价值为导向的公司，这也导致了对个别领导者（Grint，2009）的成功归因，通常是首席执行官和独立董事，他们通常是从一个小的核心圈子中招募的（Withers 等，2012）。这些领导者被视为财富创造的关键部分，但只有在受到活跃的公司控制市场的约束，并将他们的薪酬与股票表现挂钩时（Khurana，2002）。

Challenges. While shareholder value has its adherents, it has come under increasing scrutiny and criticism because of the increasing focus on ethics in business, and the corporate scandals that have characterized much of the last few decades. These criticisms have extended to SHRM (Pfeffer, 2010, Spector, 2003). Thus, a number of critics of shareholder value models (Aoki and Jackson, 2008, Appelbaum and Batt, 2014, Davis, 2009a, Davis, 2013, Gospel and Pendleton, 2013) have argued that people management is heavily influenced by different forms of finance in a number of ways, including investor threats to sell equity if business strategies are not to their liking, time frames for returns and the methods used to calculate returns, the extent to which business strategies stress financial aspects and cost leadership, the approach to securing employee commitment and engagement, and the extent of inter-firm cooperation.
挑战。尽管股东价值有其支持者，但由于对商业伦理的日益关注以及过去几十年中许多企业丑闻的影响，它受到了越来越多的审查和批评。这些批评也扩展到了 SHRM（Pfeffer, 2010, Spector, 2003）。因此，一些对股东价值模型的批评者（Aoki and Jackson, 2008, Appelbaum and Batt, 2014, Davis, 2009a, Davis, 2013, Gospel and Pendleton, 2013）认为，人力资源管理在多个方面受到不同形式的金融的重大影响，包括投资者威胁在商业战略不符合其期望时出售股权、回报的时间框架和计算回报的方法、商业战略在多大程度上强调财务方面和成本领先、确保员工承诺和参与的方式，以及企业间合作的程度。

For example, HR decisions to implement an exclusive talent management approach results in disproportionate economic rents being secured by an exclusive group of high value-adding employees (Martin, Gollan, & Grigg, 2011). For the majority, however, this approach to SHRM is often associated with little more than compliance with legislative requirements on issues such as pay and diversity, the (re)introduction of transactional contracts focused on short-term employment relationships, and directed primarily at performance outcomes (Cappelli, 1999). Employees become socially constructed (and, in some cases, construct themselves) as ‘human capital’ or ‘human resources’ rather than ‘resourceful humans’ (Wright & MacMahan, 2011). The short-term profits focus of the traditional shareholder value model prevents long-term investment in training and well-being initiatives, as evidenced especially in liberal market economies of the UK and the USA (Davis, 2013, Konzelmann et al., 2006). In brief, this SHRM approach promises to deliver short-term financial returns, rather than incurring the costs associated with investing in long-term human and social capital (Groysberg, 2010). As such firms operating with this approach often developed a low trust dynamic between employer and employees (Appelbaum et al., 2013, Fox, 1974, Siebert et al., 2015).
例如，人力资源决策实施独占的人才管理方法导致一小部分高价值员工获得不成比例的经济租金（Martin, Gollan, & Grigg, 2011）。然而，对于大多数人来说，这种战略人力资源管理方法通常仅与遵守立法要求（如薪酬和多样性）相关，重新引入以短期雇佣关系为重点的交易性合同，并主要针对绩效结果（Cappelli, 1999）。员工被社会构建（在某些情况下，自我构建）为“人力资本”或“人力资源”，而不是“有资源的人类”（Wright & MacMahan, 2011）。传统股东价值模型的短期利润关注阻碍了对培训和福祉倡议的长期投资，尤其在英国和美国的自由市场经济中表现明显（Davis, 2013, Konzelmann et al., 2006）。简而言之，这种战略人力资源管理方法承诺提供短期财务回报，而不是承担与投资于长期人力和社会资本相关的成本（Groysberg, 2010）。 因此，采用这种方法运营的公司通常在雇主与员工之间发展出一种低信任动态（Appelbaum et al., 2013, Fox, 1974, Siebert et al., 2015）。

• (2)
  Strategy-led Enlightened Shareholder Value
  战略引导的开明股东价值

Institutional logics. Dissatisfaction in some quarters with the dominant market logic underpinning shareholder value, most notably Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar (2004), along with a perceived need to present shareholder value in a more acceptable light with key stakeholders, has resulted in what we see as a hybridized model of corporate governance (Jannsens and Steyart, 2012, Pache and Santos, 2013, Thornton et al., 2012). We have labeled this a strategy-led, enlightened shareholder value archetype because it attempts to reconcile a dominant market logic that focus on value maximization for shareholders with a democratic logic that attempts to engage others with interests in the business (Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2010).
制度逻辑。对以股东价值为基础的主导市场逻辑的不满，尤其是 Freeman、Wicks 和 Parmar（2004）的观点，以及对以更可接受的方式向关键利益相关者呈现股东价值的需求，导致了我们所看到的混合型公司治理模型（Jannsens 和 Steyart，2012；Pache 和 Santos，2013；Thornton 等，2012）。我们将其称为以战略为导向的开明股东价值原型，因为它试图调和以股东价值最大化为重点的主导市场逻辑与试图吸引其他对企业有利益的人士的民主逻辑（Freeman、Harrison 和 Wicks，2010）。

Core corporate governance logics. This emergent model is associated with changing legal obligations and new codes of practice. These include disclosure of information concerning corporate board workings with key stakeholders, directors acting in the interests of the corporation as a whole, and recent pressures placed on firms to take the interests of the community and social obligations into account (Shen, 2011). Huse (2009) has described this as a strategy-led form of governance, in which boards and directors have been exhorted to take a more active role in managing the long-term direction of organizations rather than restricting themselves to monitoring firm performance in the interests of, increasingly, short-term investors. Indeed much of the impetus for this strategy-led enlightened perspective has come from long-term institutional investors and shareholder pressure groups seeking to invest in corporate social performance and reputations as well as economic performance (Cox, Brammer, and Millington, 2004). Freeman et al. (2004), key proponents of strategy-led stakeholder theory have argued, regardless of the ultimate aim of a corporation, managers and boards have no option but to have regard for key stakeholders whose legitimate interests are affected by, and affect, what the corporation does and how it is managed. To do otherwise, they argue, would be to ensure the long-term destruction of the business.
核心企业治理逻辑。这个新兴模型与法律义务的变化和新的实践规范相关。这些包括与关键利益相关者的信息披露、董事在整体公司利益下行事，以及最近对企业施加的压力，要求其考虑社区利益和社会责任（Shen, 2011）。Huse（2009）将其描述为一种以战略为导向的治理形式，在这种形式中，董事会和董事被敦促在管理组织的长期方向上发挥更积极的作用，而不是仅仅限制于监控企业绩效，以满足日益增多的短期投资者的利益。实际上，这种以战略为导向的开明视角的推动力主要来自于长期机构投资者和寻求投资于企业社会绩效和声誉以及经济绩效的股东压力团体（Cox, Brammer, and Millington, 2004）。Freeman 等。 （2004），战略导向利益相关者理论的主要支持者们认为，无论公司的最终目标是什么，管理者和董事会都必须考虑那些合法利益受到影响并影响公司行为及管理方式的关键利益相关者。他们认为，若不这样做，将确保企业的长期毁灭。

Inter-organizational relationships. The changes in legal obligations have resulted in a much more complex set of inter-organizational relationships that need to be considered beyond those of investors. Jensen (2001), one of the original authors of agency theory, belatedly recognized that long-term value maximization has to engage employees and managers, as well as other key stakeholders. He argued that an enlightened theory needs firms to specify long-term value maximization as their mission, set out a single (not a balanced) dimensional score for measuring performance that reconciles different stakeholder interests, and for boards and managers to work together to create strategies that will achieve this mission.
组织间关系。法律义务的变化导致了一个更为复杂的组织间关系体系，这需要超越投资者的考虑。詹森（Jensen，2001），代理理论的原始作者之一，迟迟意识到长期价值最大化必须涉及员工和管理者，以及其他关键利益相关者。他认为，一个开明的理论需要公司将长期价值最大化作为其使命，制定一个单一（而非平衡）维度的绩效衡量标准，以调和不同利益相关者的利益，并要求董事会和管理者共同努力制定实现这一使命的战略。

Cultural-cognitive system. Despite drawing on some ‘soft’ pluralist rhetoric and principles, however, we argue that the cultural-cognitive system in this strategy-led enlightened shareholder archetype remains essentially a variant of unitarism, designed to rescue shareholder value as the overarching goal of firms (Van Buren and Greenwood, 2013). Thus, this enlightened perspective still represents a hierarchical form of governance, casting corporate boards and senior executives as the pre-eminent actors in corporate decision-making (Lan & Heracleous, 2010). Moreover, in some versions (e.g. Jensen, 2001), it is still committed to shareholder value maximization as the single most important measure of firm and managerial performance. However, it also places a moral obligation on boards and senior executives to treat all employees with dignity and respect (Adams et al., 2011, Ferrary, 2009).
文化认知系统。尽管借鉴了一些“软性”多元主义的修辞和原则，但我们认为，这种以战略为导向的开明股东原型中的文化认知系统本质上仍然是单一主义的一种变体，旨在将股东价值作为公司的首要目标（Van Buren and Greenwood, 2013）。因此，这种开明的视角仍然代表了一种等级治理形式，将公司董事会和高级管理人员视为公司决策中的主要参与者（Lan & Heracleous, 2010）。此外，在某些版本中（例如，Jensen, 2001），它仍然致力于将股东价值最大化作为公司和管理绩效的唯一最重要衡量标准。然而，它也对董事会和高级管理人员施加了道德义务，要求他们以尊严和尊重对待所有员工（Adams et al., 2011, Ferrary, 2009）。

SHRM approach. Compared to the agency-led shareholder value archetype, the enlightened version is associated with a softer and more inclusive form of HR rhetoric on talent management and the engagement of the non-core workforce (Boxall and Macky, 2009, Lok, 2010). We see this SHRM approach as a hybrid, involving high commitment/collaborative practices and control/calculative practices. This rhetoric seeks to create high trust relations and the conditions for employees to display self-driven commitment and assume greater responsibility for their own behavior rather than being compliant with managerial control initiatives.
SHRM 方法。与以机构为主导的股东价值原型相比，开明版本与对人才管理和非核心劳动力参与的更温和和更具包容性的 HR 言辞相关（Boxall 和 Macky，2009 年，Lok，2010 年）。我们将这种 SHRM 方法视为一种混合，涉及高承诺/协作实践和控制/计算实践。这种言辞旨在创造高度信任的关系，并为员工展示自我驱动的承诺和承担更大责任的行为创造条件，而不是顺从于管理控制措施。

The enlightened shareholder value model can be described as a compromise by firms embracing a market logic that remains dominant in its governance functioning but, nevertheless, are able to reconcile it with a, somewhat less central, democratic logic arising from demands and expectations of stakeholders (Besharov and Smith, 2014, Pache and Santos, 2013). A structure and culture of ‘soft’ bureaucracy (Courpasson, 2000, Courpasson and Clegg, 2006) is at the heart of this model. Soft bureaucracy, however, is not meant to convey a rejection of traditional hierarchical principles associated with a unitarist view of the firm, but occurs when “centralization and entrepreneurial forms of governance are combined” (Courpasson, 2000: 131). Such softening of bureaucracy follows from incorporating key professionals and other scarce, high value-adding employees into decision-making (Courpasson & Clegg, 2006). It is also a result of protecting and attempting to engage more vulnerable, arguably less value-adding and scarce employees through inclusive, high-commitment HRM practices (Boxall & Macky, 2009).
启蒙股东价值模型可以被描述为一种妥协，企业在其治理功能中接受主导的市场逻辑，但仍能够与来自利益相关者的需求和期望所产生的、相对不那么中心的民主逻辑进行调和（Besharov 和 Smith, 2014; Pache 和 Santos, 2013）。这种模型的核心是“软性”官僚制的结构和文化（Courpasson, 2000; Courpasson 和 Clegg, 2006）。然而，软性官僚制并不是要传达对与单一主义视角相关的传统等级原则的拒绝，而是在“中央集权和企业家治理形式相结合时”出现的（Courpasson, 2000: 131）。这种官僚制的软化源于将关键专业人员和其他稀缺的高附加值员工纳入决策过程（Courpasson & Clegg, 2006）。这也是通过包容性、高承诺的人力资源管理实践来保护和试图吸引更脆弱、可以说是附加值较低且稀缺的员工的结果（Boxall & Macky, 2009）。

Challenges. Just as Freeman et al.'s (2010) stakeholder theory itself struggles with the minimalist need to reconcile market logics to maximize shareholder value with the broader ethical argument to satisfy other stakeholder (Mansell, 2013), this hybrid model is riven with inconsistencies in SHRM. The increasingly influential exclusive talent management approach to human capital does not always sit comfortably with an inclusive version of talent management for all segments of the workforce. Nor does the rhetoric of sophisticated HRM always match the reality (Legge, 1995/2005). Thus the tensions between competing institutional logics for SHRM are often evident, for example, among banks that pay disproportionately high rewards to an exclusive group of core employees, while simultaneously promoting distributional fairness and inclusivity as principles of talent management (Martin et al., 2011). Thus, critical HRM theorists have suggested that this enlightenment project is little more than sophisticated image management (Edwards, 2010). Clegg, Harris, and Hopfl (2011) have argued that it is a form of ‘persuasive propaganda’ designed to send ‘honest’ signals to employees that management cares about them by espousing an inclusive talent rhetoric, but which are frequently seen as ‘dishonest’ by employees as a result of firms pursuing exclusive talent management policies in practice (Legge, 1995/2005). An even more skeptical reading sees this soft power approach, often based on high commitment principles, as a manipulative disguise of an organizational agenda seeking to intensify work. This approach guarantees the job security enjoyed by a small core of high value-adding and unique staff at the expense of job insecurity among a much larger number of non-core, readily substitutable employees and contractors (Ramsay, Scholarios, and Harley, 2000).
挑战。正如 Freeman 等人（2010）的利益相关者理论本身在将市场逻辑与满足其他利益相关者的更广泛伦理论点之间进行调和时面临的简约需求（Mansell, 2013），这种混合模型在战略人力资源管理（SHRM）中充满了不一致性。日益影响力巨大的专属人才管理方法与面向所有员工群体的包容性人才管理版本并不总是相得益彰。复杂的人力资源管理（HRM）话语也并不总是与现实相符（Legge, 1995/2005）。因此，SHRM 中竞争性制度逻辑之间的紧张关系往往显而易见，例如，在一些银行中，这些银行对一小部分核心员工支付不成比例的高额奖励，同时又将分配公平和包容性作为人才管理的原则（Martin et al., 2011）。因此，批判性人力资源管理理论家们建议，这一启蒙项目不过是复杂的形象管理（Edwards, 2010）。 Clegg、Harris 和 Hopfl（2011）认为，这是一种“说服性宣传”的形式，旨在向员工传递“诚实”的信号，表明管理层关心他们，通过倡导包容性的人才言辞，但由于公司在实践中追求排他性的人才管理政策，这些言辞常常被员工视为“不诚实”（Legge，1995/2005）。一种更为怀疑的解读认为，这种基于高承诺原则的软实力方法，是一种操控性的伪装，旨在强化工作。这种方法保证了少数高价值和独特员工所享有的工作安全，而以更大数量的非核心、易于替代的员工和承包商的工作不安全为代价（Ramsay、Scholarios 和 Harley，2000）。

As such, these criticisms point to a response by firms to competing logics as a de-coupling strategy (Pache & Santos, 2013), in which organizations give the appearance of conforming to demands for stakeholder involvement but fail to operationalize these in practice. Trust relations under such a regime might be described as calculative, whereby employees have little faith in boards to act in their best interests and show only limited willingness to trust senior managers (Fox, 1974, Siebert et al., 2015). Thus managing trust relations in such a governance model becomes a key strategic priority.
因此，这些批评指出，企业对竞争逻辑的反应是一种脱钩策略（Pache & Santos, 2013），在这种情况下，组织表面上看似遵循对利益相关者参与的要求，但在实践中未能将其落实。在这种体制下，信任关系可以被描述为计算性的，员工对董事会在其最佳利益上采取行动几乎没有信心，并且对高管的信任意愿也非常有限（Fox, 1974, Siebert et al., 2015）。因此，在这种治理模式下管理信任关系成为一个关键的战略优先事项。

• (3)
  Communitarian Stakeholder Archetype
  共同体利益相关者原型

Institutional logics. This archetype, like the agency-led shareholder value archetype, is based on a dominant societal logic, but, in this case, it is the democratic logic. Both of the previous shareholder value-based archetypes originate from Anglo-Saxon legal systems (Blair and Stout, 1999, Stout, 2012), the American business model, and U.S.-influenced SHRM research (Batt & Banerjee, 2011), the latter of which is firmly located in a unitary ideology of the firm and society (Fox, 1974). In contrast, certain continental European countries and Japan (Adler, 2014, Gospel and Pendleton, 2003, Mayer, 2014) have been characterized by a different version of capitalism associated with a pluralistic, democratic stakeholder logic (Ferrary, 2009, Friedland and Alford, 1991). These coordinated market economies typically recognize a wide range of legitimate interests in the firm, including the rights of employee representative groups to express and co-manage employee interests. As such, a communitarian stakeholder model of corporate governance aims to devise structures to balance diverse interests (Lan & Heracleous, 2010).
制度逻辑。这个原型与以代理为主导的股东价值原型一样，基于一种主导的社会逻辑，但在这种情况下，它是民主逻辑。前面提到的基于股东价值的原型都源于盎格鲁-撒克逊法律体系（Blair and Stout, 1999; Stout, 2012）、美国商业模式以及受美国影响的人力资源管理研究（Batt & Banerjee, 2011），后者牢牢植根于公司与社会的单一意识形态中（Fox, 1974）。相比之下，某些大陆欧洲国家和日本（Adler, 2014; Gospel and Pendleton, 2003; Mayer, 2014）则以与多元化、民主的利益相关者逻辑相关的不同版本的资本主义为特征（Ferrary, 2009; Friedland and Alford, 1991）。这些协调市场经济通常承认公司内各种合法利益，包括员工代表团体表达和共同管理员工利益的权利。因此，社区利益相关者的公司治理模型旨在设计结构以平衡多样化的利益（Lan & Heracleous, 2010）。

In this archetype, firms are considered to have both social and economic consequences as they affect the communities of which they are a part. These social responsibilities are external—towards society at large—and internal—in terms of how employees are treated by managers, given the impact of work on their lives (Chen, 2011). They are not, however, perceived as competing logics: the compatibility and centrality of both social and economic goals are typically aligned (Besharov & Smith, 2014), although there is evidence that this alignment may be subject to significant tensions (Gospel & Pendleton, 2013). For example, in societies such as Germany that reflect a communitarian stakeholder approach, codetermination systems are mandated by law, ensuring an employee representative is present on the supervisory board of management to provide a voice for employees in managerial decision-making. This helps to maintain the economic and social balance in the firm.
在这一原型中，企业被认为对其所处社区产生社会和经济影响。这些社会责任是外部的——面向整个社会——也是内部的——涉及员工如何被管理者对待，考虑到工作对他们生活的影响（Chen, 2011）。然而，它们并不被视为相互竞争的逻辑：社会目标和经济目标的兼容性和中心性通常是一致的（Besharov & Smith, 2014），尽管有证据表明这种一致性可能会面临显著的紧张关系（Gospel & Pendleton, 2013）。例如，在像德国这样的社会中，反映了共同体利益相关者的方法，法律规定了共同决策制度，确保员工代表在管理监督委员会中出席，以便在管理决策中为员工发声。这有助于维持企业的经济和社会平衡。

Core corporate governance logics. As the most widely debated alternative to the shareholder value model, the stakeholder value model has its origins in criticisms of unfettered free markets (Cooper, 2009, Daily et al., 2003) and neo-institutional theory (Powell, 2007). It proposes that sustainable economic performance of organizations rests on creating more democratic corporate governance structures that attempt to balance the legitimacy claims of a wide range of corporate constituents (Lan & Heracleous, 2010), both from a strategic and moral perspective (Jannsens and Steyart, 2012, Noland and Phillips, 2010). This relational perspective (Paauwe, 2009) raises social obligations, especially to employees and wider society, and sustainable value creation to the same (or even greater) plane as economic performance. In essence, this is an argument for patient capital, ensuring that company boards include representatives of all stakeholders, including providers of finance and labor (Kaufmann and Englander, 2005, O'Brien, 2006), and making a virtue of incorporating employee voice in key decisions (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005).
核心企业治理逻辑。作为对股东价值模型最广泛争论的替代方案，利益相关者价值模型源于对不受限制的自由市场（Cooper, 2009; Daily et al., 2003）和新制度理论（Powell, 2007）的批评。它提出，组织的可持续经济绩效依赖于创建更具民主性的企业治理结构，这些结构试图从战略和道德的角度平衡广泛企业利益相关者的合法性主张（Lan & Heracleous, 2010）（Jannsens and Steyart, 2012; Noland and Phillips, 2010）。这种关系视角（Paauwe, 2009）提升了社会责任，特别是对员工和更广泛社会的责任，以及可持续价值创造与经济绩效处于同等（甚至更高）水平。本质上，这是对耐心资本的论证，确保公司董事会包括所有利益相关者的代表，包括资金和劳动力的提供者（Kaufmann and Englander, 2005; O'Brien, 2006），并在关键决策中重视员工声音的价值（Gospel and Pendleton, 2005）。

Stakeholder theory attempts to address a different set of corporate governance questions from shareholder value, by focusing on ethical questions including community, legitimacy, fairness and tolerance (Laplume et al., 2008, Mansell, 2013). It also posits that shareholders are only one class of constituents to take into account and may need to be monitored closely so that they do not follow their natural self-serving interests by exploiting the interests of other stakeholders (Lan & Heracleous, 2010). The role of boards, with the help of their executive teams is to ensure that all interests are balanced, which often translates into concession bargaining, the very essence of pluralism (Fox, 1974).
利益相关者理论试图解决与股东价值不同的一系列公司治理问题，关注包括社区、合法性、公平和宽容在内的伦理问题（Laplume et al., 2008, Mansell, 2013）。它还认为，股东只是需要考虑的一类利益相关者，并可能需要被密切监控，以防他们通过剥削其他利益相关者的利益来追求自身的自利利益（Lan & Heracleous, 2010）。董事会的角色在于与其执行团队的帮助下，确保所有利益得到平衡，这通常转化为让步谈判，这正是多元主义的本质（Fox, 1974）。

Inter-organizational relationships. Because of the need to recognize multiple stakeholders and interest groups, inter-organizational relationships tend to be complex. This is the case in the financing of such enterprises, which has traditionally relied on bank loans, internal financing and, in some cases, local and national government investment to fund growth. Such sources of finance, it is argued, allow firms to take a longer-term perspective and deal with the interests of multiple stakeholders (Buchan et al., 2012). This creates a relational-insider system that allow firms to take a patient capital perspective (Davis, 2009a, Pendleton and Gospel, 2013). Stakeholder models, such as those associated with coordinated market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001), tend to be associated with larger firms, more concentrated ownership, often in family firms, long term debt and so-called ‘thin’ equity markets, loans that provide equity rights, loans between corporations, and under-developed markets for corporate control (Gospel and Pendleton, 2013, Mayer, 2014). Volkswagen in Germany provides a good illustration of this model, with the Porsche family owning nearly 51% of voting rights and the State of Lower Saxony holding 20% (Volkwagen Shareholder Structure, 2015).
组织间关系。由于需要识别多个利益相关者和利益团体，组织间关系往往是复杂的。这在此类企业的融资中尤为明显，传统上依赖于银行贷款、内部融资，以及在某些情况下，地方和国家政府投资来支持增长。有人认为，这些融资来源使企业能够采取更长期的视角，并处理多个利益相关者的利益（Buchan et al., 2012）。这创造了一种关系内部人系统，使企业能够采取耐心资本的视角（Davis, 2009a, Pendleton and Gospel, 2013）。利益相关者模型，如与协调市场经济相关的模型（Hall & Soskice, 2001），往往与较大企业、更集中所有权（通常在家族企业中）、长期债务以及所谓的“薄”股权市场、提供股权权利的贷款、企业间贷款以及不发达的企业控制市场相关（Gospel and Pendleton, 2013, Mayer, 2014）。 德国的大众汽车很好地说明了这一模型，保时捷家族拥有近 51%的投票权，下萨克森州持有 20%（大众汽车股东结构，2015 年）。

Cultural-cognitive system. This is reflected in executive values that are intended to express trustworthiness through the expression of benevolence and integrity, as well as competence (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 2007), whilst being other-regarding rather than self-regarding (Adams et al., 2011). The system recognizes the value of distributed leadership and the vital role of followership in constructing effective leadership (Thorpe, Gold, and Lawler, 2011). It also focuses on a moral and strategic case for employment diversity and the exercise of corporate social responsibility (Noland & Phillips, 2010). The nature of the cultural-cognitive system in based on pluralist values (Fox, 1974), which accords legitimacy to conflicting interests and recognizes the need for managers to balance these interests to maintain a dynamic long-term stability in the firm.
文化认知系统。这体现在旨在通过仁爱和诚信的表达以及能力来表达可信度的执行价值观上（Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 2007），同时关注他人而非自我（Adams et al., 2011）。该系统认识到分布式领导的价值以及追随者在构建有效领导中的重要作用（Thorpe, Gold, and Lawler, 2011）。它还关注就业多样性和企业社会责任的道德和战略案例（Noland & Phillips, 2010）。文化认知系统的本质基于多元价值观（Fox, 1974），这赋予了冲突利益合法性，并认识到管理者需要平衡这些利益，以维持公司的动态长期稳定。

SHRM approach. Such a system is consistent with a high-commitment-collaborative SHRM approach, in which SHRM structures, processes and actor agency similarly reflect democratic principles of equality, co-determination and involvement of all employees, an inclusive definition of talent, and a regard for long-term sustainability and employment. The high commitment/collaborative SHRM model is based on the relational aspects of the employment contract, such as those that stress employee participation and voice (Boxall & Macky, 2009). The underlying theory is that employee involvement secures employee co-operation and commitment (Farndale, Van Ruiten, Kelliher, and Hope Hailey, 2011). In turn, this involvement improves firm-level outcomes, but only if the benefits from this form of SHRM accrue to both the organization and to most, if not all, employees (Konzelmann et al., 2006).
SHRM 方法。这样的系统与高承诺协作的 SHRM 方法是一致的，在这种方法中，SHRM 结构、过程和参与者的代理同样反映了平等、共同决策和所有员工参与的民主原则、对人才的包容性定义，以及对长期可持续性和就业的关注。高承诺/协作 SHRM 模型基于雇佣合同的关系方面，例如强调员工参与和发声的那些方面（Boxall & Macky, 2009）。其基本理论是员工参与确保员工的合作和承诺（Farndale, Van Ruiten, Kelliher, and Hope Hailey, 2011）。反过来，这种参与改善了公司层面的结果，但前提是这种 SHRM 形式的收益同时惠及组织和大多数员工，甚至所有员工（Konzelmann et al., 2006）。

Pluralist theory puts more emphasis on worker representation in governance, employee participation, long-term investments in employee development and well-being, and investments in social as well as human capital. There is still a requirement for financial returns to investors, but at the same time, there is a perceived need to meet concurrent social demands from social partners. In this context, labor unions are much more active in the SHRM arena, and are seen as legitimate partners for collective bargaining and valued members of company boards. We might refer to the model of SHRM as having a balance of economic and social demands, similar to the enlightened shareholder value model. However, this latter model is driven by a strong underlying profit motive, whereas the communitarian stakeholder model is motivated and enacted more through democratic and humanitarian beliefs in the rights of employees to be treated as valuable and resourceful humans, rather than human resources (Jackson, 2002, Paauwe, 2004). Thus, Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips (2006) label this approach as a developmental ideology that seeks to generate a high trust dynamic between boards and employees (Fox, 1974).
多元主义理论更加重视工人在治理中的代表性、员工参与、对员工发展和福祉的长期投资，以及对社会和人力资本的投资。虽然仍然需要为投资者提供财务回报，但同时也感受到满足社会伙伴的社会需求的必要性。在这种背景下，工会在战略人力资源管理（SHRM）领域更加活跃，被视为集体谈判的合法伙伴和公司董事会的有价值成员。我们可以将 SHRM 模型视为经济和社会需求的平衡，类似于开明股东价值模型。然而，后者模型是由强烈的利润动机驱动的，而共同体利益相关者模型则更多地通过对员工作为有价值和有能力的人类而非人力资源的权利的民主和人道主义信念来激励和实施（Jackson, 2002, Paauwe, 2004）。因此，Clegg、Courpasson 和 Phillips（2006）将这种方法称为一种发展意识形态，旨在在董事会和员工之间产生高度信任的动态（Fox, 1974）。

Challenges. Increasingly, stakeholder theory is being proposed as a realistic alternative to the shareholder value model, especially following the global financial crisis, and the growing importance of government in key industries that are vital to economies' national interests (Davis, 2009b, Jensen et al., 2011). In stakeholder economies, focusing on longer-term returns is acceptable due to investors having a long-term relationship with the firm, so striking a greater balance between the interests of labor and capital than under the shareholder value model. Consequently there is a greater emphasis in SHRM terms on labor interests such as training for high skill levels and job security (Gospel & Pendleton, 2003), and on investment in social capital as a source of innovation (Cappelli, Singh, Singh, and Useem, 2010).
挑战。越来越多的利益相关者理论被提议作为股东价值模型的现实替代方案，特别是在全球金融危机之后，以及政府在对经济国家利益至关重要的关键行业中日益重要的情况下（Davis, 2009b，Jensen et al., 2011）。在利益相关者经济中，由于投资者与公司之间存在长期关系，关注长期回报是可以接受的，因此在劳动和资本的利益之间比股东价值模型下更能取得平衡。因此，在战略人力资源管理（SHRM）方面，更加重视劳动利益，例如高技能水平的培训和工作保障（Gospel & Pendleton, 2003），以及将社会资本作为创新来源的投资（Cappelli, Singh, Singh, and Useem, 2010）。

However, stakeholder theory can be said to contradict a basic premise of a market economy, whereby it is not clear which ‘stakeholder’ is to provide the legitimate objective for the organization to pursue (Mansell, 2013). It is also unrealistic to expect that all interests of all stakeholders can be equally represented simultaneously (Gioia, 1999). Similarly, taking into account multiple voices can lead to a lack of flexibility, with decision-making process taking considerably longer than in the more short-term shareholder-driven corporate governance model.
然而，利益相关者理论可以说与市场经济的基本前提相矛盾，因为不清楚哪个“利益相关者”应提供组织追求的合法目标（Mansell, 2013）。同时，期望所有利益相关者的所有利益能够同时得到平等代表也是不现实的（Gioia, 1999）。同样，考虑多个声音可能导致缺乏灵活性，决策过程所需时间远长于以短期股东为驱动的公司治理模式。

• (4)
  Employee-Ownership  员工持股

Institutional logics. Our second multi-logic hybrid model of corporate governance is employee-ownership. This model has been in existence in modern form since the 1970s in many developed economies, often promoted by governments seeking to align employee (agents) and owner (principals) interests (Hansmann, 1996, Kaarsemaker et al., 2010). Lampel et al. (2014) argue that employee-ownership has been garnering greater attention because of its financial resilience to economic shocks such as the global financial crisis. They attribute such resilience to the mode of governance, characterized by employee involvement and being able to take longer-term time horizons following input and funding from employees. Since most employee-owned businesses operate in liberal market economies, they are, however, also influenced by a capitalist market logic that, from time to time, will come to the fore in shaping organizational decisions and actions that may not always be compatible with the dominant democratic logic.
制度逻辑。我们第二个多逻辑混合的公司治理模型是员工持股。自 1970 年代以来，这一模型在许多发达经济体中以现代形式存在，通常由寻求使员工（代理人）和所有者（委托人）利益一致的政府推动（Hansmann, 1996; Kaarsemaker et al., 2010）。Lampel 等（2014）认为，员工持股因其对经济冲击（如全球金融危机）的财务韧性而受到越来越多的关注。他们将这种韧性归因于治理模式，特点是员工参与，并能够在员工的投入和资金支持下采取更长期的时间视角。然而，由于大多数员工持股企业在自由市场经济中运营，它们也受到资本主义市场逻辑的影响，这种逻辑不时会在塑造组织决策和行动时凸显出来，而这些决策和行动可能并不总是与主导的民主逻辑相兼容。

Core corporate governance logics. Employee-owned firms are likely to be influenced by a corporate logic that embodies managerial capitalism (Lan & Heracleous, 2010), which focuses on managers' concerns with growth and the market position of the firm (Thornton et al., 2012). The underlying aim, however, is to balance the long-term interests of diverse stakeholders by allowing employees to participate in financial and socio-psychological ownership but not necessarily overall control.
核心公司治理逻辑。员工拥有的公司可能会受到体现管理资本主义的公司逻辑的影响（Lan & Heracleous, 2010），该逻辑关注于管理者对公司增长和市场地位的关切（Thornton et al., 2012）。然而，其根本目标是通过允许员工参与财务和社会心理的所有权来平衡多元利益相关者的长期利益，但不一定是整体控制。

Inter-organizational relationships. Employee ownership is not a simple concept and may embrace a range of options and governance systems. These include: social ownership, worker/producer co-operatives, direct ownership, and employee stock option plans, the last of which has been heavily promoted in the U.S. and U.K. (Pierce et al., 1991). A common theme is that a significant number of employees, usually more than fifty percent, are entitled to have a capital stake in the organization, and to have a heightened level of voice and participation (in some form) in the decision-making in the firm (Kaarsemaker & Poutsma, 2006). A corollary of this is that the governance structure is arranged so that employees receive enhanced communication and information and are seen as co-owners, thus embracing a democratic logic as dominant.
跨组织关系。员工持股并不是一个简单的概念，可能包含一系列选项和治理系统。这些包括：社会所有制、工人/生产者合作社、直接所有权和员工股票期权计划，最后一种在美国和英国得到了广泛推广（Pierce et al., 1991）。一个共同的主题是，许多员工，通常超过百分之五十，有权在组织中拥有资本股份，并在公司决策中以某种形式拥有更高的发言权和参与度（Kaarsemaker & Poutsma, 2006）。其结果是，治理结构被安排为员工获得增强的沟通和信息，并被视为共同所有者，从而将民主逻辑视为主导。

Cultural-cognitive system. This is typically based on a pluralist frame of reference, in which competing interests are seen as a natural state of affairs but are sufficiently compatible to be reconciled by employee ownership of stock and social-psychological ownership. Employee-owned businesses are seen to have strong effects on staff attitudes, promoting greater participation and through this encouraging psychological ownership, including increasing employee involvement, workers' responsibilities for their jobs, and levels of trust between senior managers and employees (Lampel et al., 2014).
文化认知系统。这通常基于一种多元主义的参考框架，其中竞争利益被视为一种自然状态，但足够兼容，可以通过员工持股和社会心理所有权来调和。员工拥有的企业被认为对员工态度有强烈影响，促进更大的参与，从而鼓励心理所有权，包括增加员工参与、工人对工作的责任感，以及高层管理者与员工之间的信任水平（Lampel et al., 2014）。

SHRM approach. Studies have shown that employee-ownership involves a move towards greater adoption of high commitment/collaborative HRM practices. For example, Pendleton and Robinson (2011) showed that employee share ownership plans have a positive relationship with employer-provided training and development. In worker-controlled organizations, Bacon, Wright, and Demina (2004) showed, in a sample of 140 U.K. buy-outs completed between 1994 and 1997, that employee buy-outs caused increased incidence of high commitment/collaborative HRM practices. Such practices included: a more strategic approach to HRM; labor unions recognized for collective bargaining both before and after the buy-out; the protection of employment levels; a greater number of methods used by management to communicate with employees; harmonized terms and conditions; annual appraisals alongside merit pay and employee share-ownership; and employee involvement in quality circles and teams. In prominent cases of employee-ownership, including Mondragon, John Lewis and Lafour (Guy, 2009), these clearly show how an approach to employee participation and involvement is supported by core developmental, progressive HRM practices.
SHRM 方法。研究表明，员工持股涉及向更大程度采用高承诺/协作人力资源管理实践的转变。例如，Pendleton 和 Robinson（2011）显示，员工持股计划与雇主提供的培训和发展之间存在正相关关系。在工人控制的组织中，Bacon、Wright 和 Demina（2004）在 1994 年至 1997 年间完成的 140 个英国收购样本中显示，员工收购导致高承诺/协作人力资源管理实践的发生率增加。这些实践包括：对人力资源管理的更具战略性的方法；在收购前后都被认可的工会进行集体谈判；保护就业水平；管理层与员工沟通的更多方法；协调的条款和条件；与绩效工资和员工持股一起进行年度评估；以及员工参与质量圈和团队。 在员工拥有制的显著案例中，包括蒙德拉贡、约翰·刘易斯和拉福（Guy, 2009），这些案例清楚地表明，员工参与和参与的方式得到了核心发展、进步的人力资源管理实践的支持。

Challenges. The core of employee-ownership may become the subject of dispute resulting from multiple expectations and inconsistent practices (Besharov & Smith, 2014). Thus, the governance challenge focuses on devising a structure that allows employees to participate in financial and social-psychological ownership, while allowing managers sufficient control and flexibility to meet the demands associated with operating in a market economy and the pursuit of growth. Such problems are influenced by the complexity of inter-organizational relationships and the nature of financing of employee-owned businesses. Such arrangements can vary from situations in which employees own all shares, where employees buy out the business, or where owners gift the business to employees through a trust fund, to those in which employees have a minority stake, such as the majority of ESOP schemes.
挑战。员工持股的核心可能成为由于多重期望和不一致的实践而引发争议的主题（Besharov & Smith, 2014）。因此，治理挑战集中在设计一个结构，使员工能够参与财务和社会心理的所有权，同时允许管理者有足够的控制和灵活性，以满足在市场经济中运营和追求增长所带来的需求。这些问题受到组织间关系复杂性和员工拥有企业融资性质的影响。这些安排可以从员工拥有所有股份的情况、员工收购企业的情况，或所有者通过信托基金将企业赠予员工的情况，到员工拥有少数股份的情况，例如大多数员工持股计划（ESOP）。

In addition, alongside the high commitment/collaborative SHRM approach, there is also expected to be evidence of the employee efficiency practices as seen in the control/calculative approach. As noted, the employee-owned business archetype is influenced by a market logic in which employees themselves are looking for financial returns on their investment. We might therefore expect such firms to have practices in place such as performance-based pay, and other quantifiable elements in contractual agreements.
此外，除了高度承诺/协作的战略人力资源管理（SHRM）方法外，还预计会有员工效率实践的证据，如控制/计算方法所示。如前所述，员工拥有的商业原型受到市场逻辑的影响，在这种逻辑中，员工自己在寻求对其投资的财务回报。因此，我们可能会期望这些公司实施一些实践，例如基于绩效的薪酬以及合同协议中的其他可量化元素。

We have argued that the approaches to, and enactment of SHRM within an organization is heavily conditioned by the ways in which corporate governance is conceived and enacted. We have also proposed that these four governance-SHRM relationships are deeply embedded in societal and organizational level institutional logics (Almandoz, 2014, Friedland and Alford, 1991, Thornton et al., 2012) triggering institutional complementarities (Aoki and Jackson, 2008, Hall and Soskice, 2001). To make our case, we have reasoned from a definition of corporate governance as the arrangements put in place to control the generation, protection, and distribution of the wealth invested in a firm, which identifies the rights and interests of different actors involved, as well as the accountabilities of boards and senior executives. As such, we have developed a typological framework comprising four ideal types of corporate governance derived from the literature, each having major implications for managing employees to the benefit of shareholders or a broader stakeholder group. However, we have also highlighted the challenges inherent in these archetypes, which we now address.
我们认为，组织内人力资源战略管理（SHRM）的方法和实施受到公司治理观念和实践方式的严重影响。我们还提出，这四种治理-SHRM 关系深深植根于社会和组织层面的制度逻辑中（Almandoz, 2014; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012），触发了制度互补性（Aoki and Jackson, 2008; Hall and Soskice, 2001）。为了支持我们的论点，我们从公司治理的定义出发，认为公司治理是为了控制在公司中投资的财富的生成、保护和分配而制定的安排，这些安排识别了不同参与者的权利和利益，以及董事会和高级管理人员的问责制。因此，我们开发了一个类型学框架，包含四种理想类型的公司治理，这些类型源自文献，每种类型对管理员工以惠及股东或更广泛的利益相关者群体都有重大影响。然而，我们也强调了这些原型固有的挑战，我们现在将对此进行讨论。

To-date, the Anglo-Saxon dominated SHRM literature has clearly emphasized how SHRM supports the agency-led shareholder value archetype of corporate governance and the principles of agency theory. The challenges of such a model are, however, clear, whereby significant financing decisions largely based on shareholder whims heavily influence SHRM activities (Aoki and Jackson, 2008, Appelbaum and Batt, 2014) and trust in the organization (Appelbaum, Batt and Clark, 2013). Exclusive talent management produces an imbalance between strategically valuable and non-valuable employees, whilst people management is about short-term exploitation of the human resources to the benefit of the firm, largely guided by compliance demands (Wright & MacMahan, 2011).
迄今为止，英美主导的战略人力资源管理（SHRM）文献明确强调了 SHRM 如何支持以代理人为主导的股东价值企业治理原型和代理理论的原则。然而，这种模型的挑战显而易见，基于股东意愿的重大融资决策在很大程度上影响着 SHRM 活动（Aoki and Jackson, 2008; Appelbaum and Batt, 2014）和对组织的信任（Appelbaum, Batt and Clark, 2013）。独占的人才管理在战略上有价值和没有价值的员工之间产生了不平衡，而人员管理则是为了公司的利益，短期内对人力资源的剥削，主要受到合规要求的指导（Wright & MacMahan, 2011）。

Such challenges combined with recent events have produced an increased interest in a strategy-led enlightened shareholder value archetype, recognizing the claims and interests of employees, which has led to a greater focus on a high commitment/collaborative SHRM approach (Appelbaum et al., 2013, Gooderham et al., 2008). Nevertheless critics (e.g. Delbridge and Keenoy, 2010, Fox, 1974, Keenoy, 1999, Van Buren et al., 2011) have variously pointed to the sophistry of such theory, especially its inability to restore declining levels of trust in corporations and a genuine employee-focus, and the failure to bring back ethics into management. We have also highlighted the complexity of managing the tensions of such a model from a competing logics perspective. Whilst rejecting the pluralist, legitimacy-led stakeholder model, its one-size-fits-all nature fails to take into account some of the major contingencies facing corporations operating across diverse business systems (Gospel & Pendleton, 2013) and, from a critical HRM perspective, its ideological nature (Delbridge & Keenoy, 2010).
这些挑战与近期事件相结合，产生了对以战略为导向的开明股东价值原型的更大兴趣，承认员工的权利和利益，这导致对高承诺/协作型人力资源管理方法的更大关注（Appelbaum et al., 2013; Gooderham et al., 2008）。然而，批评者（例如，Delbridge 和 Keenoy, 2010; Fox, 1974; Keenoy, 1999; Van Buren et al., 2011）则各自指出了这种理论的诡辩，特别是其无法恢复企业中信任水平的下降和真正的员工关注，以及未能将伦理带回管理中。我们还强调了从竞争逻辑的角度管理这种模型的紧张关系的复杂性。尽管拒绝了多元主义、以合法性为导向的利益相关者模型，但其一刀切的特性未能考虑到在多样化商业系统中运营的企业面临的一些主要偶然情况（Gospel & Pendleton, 2013），并且从批判性人力资源管理的角度来看，其意识形态特性（Delbridge & Keenoy, 2010）。

The communitarian stakeholder archetype attempts to redress the balance between control and commitment, giving greater priority to the interests of a broad range of stakeholders. In so doing, it also creates its own set of challenges, namely the ability to actually address this variety of interests sufficiently for all stakeholders to remain committed and have their full interests represented. Finally, the employee-ownership archetype again highlights the complexities of hybrid organizations: balancing interests of a specific group of stakeholders—employee-owners—with control issues for management. We argue that a combination of both high-commitment and calculative SHRM are required to strike this balance.
共同体利益相关者原型试图在控制与承诺之间重新平衡，给予广泛利益相关者的利益更大的优先权。在这样做的过程中，它也创造了自己的一系列挑战，即能够充分满足所有利益相关者的多样化利益，以使他们保持承诺并充分代表他们的利益。最后，员工拥有原型再次突显了混合组织的复杂性：在特定利益相关者群体——员工拥有者——的利益与管理控制问题之间取得平衡。我们认为，需要结合高承诺和计算型战略人力资源管理，以实现这种平衡。

In summary, we argue that there are a number of fundamental corporate governance challenges related to SHRM that cut across each of the archetypes presented here. First, at the societal level, institutional logics theorists point to tensions between a market and democratic logic, and in achieving a balance between the two. Second, at the organization level, the cultural-cognitive systems again switch between unitarist and pluralist goals, supporting short or long-term aims. Finally, the SHRM approach adopted takes on either a control/calculative role, or one focused on high commitment and collaboration. The result of these dichotomies raises issues such as an inherent lack of independence of boards, and a lack of trust between management and employees. Thus, the challenges posed by all four corporate governance archetypes concerning whose interests should be paramount in ownership and how to balance of the control with the commitment of stakeholders, can be seen as corporate sustainability issues. Therefore, recourse to this literature may help to explore potential solutions, which we now turn to as a potential contribution to normative theory in the governance/SHRM literature.
总之，我们认为，与战略人力资源管理（SHRM）相关的许多基本公司治理挑战贯穿于这里提出的每一种原型。首先，在社会层面，制度逻辑理论家指出市场逻辑与民主逻辑之间的紧张关系，以及在两者之间实现平衡的挑战。其次，在组织层面，文化-认知系统再次在单一目标和多元目标之间切换，支持短期或长期目标。最后，所采用的 SHRM 方法要么采取控制/计算的角色，要么专注于高度承诺和协作。这些二元对立的结果引发了诸如董事会固有缺乏独立性以及管理层与员工之间缺乏信任等问题。因此，所有四种公司治理原型所提出的挑战，涉及在所有权中谁的利益应当优先以及如何平衡控制与利益相关者的承诺，可以视为公司可持续性问题。因此，参考这些文献可能有助于探索潜在的解决方案，我们现在将其作为对治理/SHRM 文献中规范理论的潜在贡献进行探讨。

Sustainability in its broadest sense is fast becoming a societal logic that is beginning to shape corporate governance (Dunphy et al., 2014, Lo and Sheu, 2007). By this, we mean sustainability is a perspective on the long-term survival and prosperity of societies and, indeed, the planet (Dunphy et al., 2014). This societal logic is reflected in the governance regimes of some large corporations, such as GE, Honda and Toyota, in what has become known as corporate sustainability, which integrates the short and long-term perspectives of firms (Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002). This extends beyond a simple market/democratic dichotomy, introducing other economic, social and environmental sustainability logics.
可持续性在其最广泛的意义上，正迅速成为一种社会逻辑，开始影响企业治理（Dunphy et al., 2014, Lo and Sheu, 2007）。我们所指的可持续性是对社会及地球长期生存和繁荣的视角（Dunphy et al., 2014）。这种社会逻辑在一些大型公司的治理制度中得以体现，例如通用电气、本田和丰田，这被称为企业可持续性，它整合了企业的短期和长期视角（Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002）。这超越了简单的市场/民主二分法，引入了其他经济、社会和环境可持续性的逻辑。

This logic also extends beyond the sometimes instrumentalist and short-term case for firms to adopt socially responsible policies as a means of securing legitimacy or strategic differentiation (Aguinas and Glavas, 2012, Doh et al., 2010). It does so by focusing on actions in the three domains of sustainability—economic, social and environmental. This corporate sustainability model has recently been examined in the governance literature to propose ways in which governance and ownership structures might be changed to meet the aims of sustainable organizations. To an extent, the decision of US firms such as Apple, Pfizer and AT & T in 2015 to give long term shareholders a greater say in boardroom appointments through so-called proxy access is step in this direction. Mayer (2014) goes further by arguing that independent management boards are an essential element of sustainable organizations or what he calls ‘the trust firm’, whose principal objective is to balance the diverse interests of present and future stakeholders. However, board independence and focus on the long term can only be guaranteed if it is accompanied by the establishment of an elected board of trustees, whose principal function is to exercise governance over the commitment of the firm to a sustainable future by establishing a set of corporate values and shaping a culture consistent with corporate sustainability. Such boards of trustees would be elected by shareholders to select directors and oversee the performance of management boards that have to determine the balance between commitment and control objectives.
这种逻辑不仅限于公司采用社会责任政策作为获取合法性或战略差异化的手段（Aguinas 和 Glavas, 2012; Doh 等, 2010），还超越了这种有时工具主义和短期的论点。它通过关注可持续性的三个领域——经济、社会和环境——来实现这一点。最近，这种企业可持续性模型在治理文献中得到了研究，以提出可能改变治理和所有权结构以实现可持续组织目标的方法。在某种程度上，2015 年美国公司如苹果、辉瑞和 AT&T 决定通过所谓的代理访问给予长期股东在董事会任命中更大发言权，朝着这个方向迈出了一步。Mayer（2014）进一步论证，独立管理董事会是可持续组织或他所称的“信任公司”的一个重要元素，其主要目标是平衡当前和未来利益相关者的多元利益。 然而，董事会的独立性和对长期目标的关注只有在建立一个选举产生的信托委员会的情况下才能得到保证，其主要职能是通过建立一套企业价值观并塑造与企业可持续性一致的文化来对公司对可持续未来的承诺进行治理。这些信托委员会将由股东选举产生，以选择董事并监督管理董事会的表现，管理董事会必须在承诺与控制目标之间确定平衡。

In a similar vein, a team production legal theory of corporate governance (Blair & Stout, 1999), asserts the need for strong, independent boards to govern not only in the interests of shareholders but to act as ‘mediating hierarchies’ to maximize the interests of selected stakeholders—internal and external—that create long-term value, risk their human and social capital investments, and have the capacity to provide strategically important information (Lan & Heracleous, 2010). Team production theorists advocate that boards should be more representative of such stakeholders and draw on their expertise, especially those employees, managers and outsiders, who “bring the firm's know-how to the table” (Kaufmann & Englander, 2005: 9). This also includes those who incur above average risk to their human and financial investments, which involves developing partnerships through mutual gain agreements on economic, social and environmental issues with key groups of labor (Lucio & Stuart, 2005).
类似地，团队生产法律理论的公司治理（Blair & Stout, 1999）主张需要强大、独立的董事会，不仅要代表股东的利益，还要作为“中介层级”来最大化特定利益相关者——内部和外部——的利益，这些利益相关者创造长期价值，承担人力和社会资本投资的风险，并具备提供战略性重要信息的能力（Lan & Heracleous, 2010）。团队生产理论家主张，董事会应更具代表性，能够吸纳这些利益相关者的专业知识，特别是那些“将公司的专业知识带到桌面上的”员工、管理者和外部人士（Kaufmann & Englander, 2005: 9）。这还包括那些对其人力和财务投资承担高于平均水平风险的人，这涉及通过与关键劳动力群体在经济、社会和环境问题上的互利协议来发展合作伙伴关系（Lucio & Stuart, 2005）。

A corporate logic (Gospel and Pendleton, 2003, Thornton et al., 2012), which favors independent boards and the rights of managers to set firm-level strategy, is advocated and can play an important check on the excesses that sometimes accompany market and democratic-participative logics (Lan & Heracleous, 2010). For example, the enlightened shareholder value thinking raises the need for boards to govern on a more sustainable basis, and address criticisms of the egoist ethical basis of agency theory in the hope of restoring declining levels of trust in modern corporations (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). We draw heavily on the importance of independent boards and executives in emphasizing the potential contribution of corporate sustainability to ensure that current and future stakeholders' interests are taken into account, including those of employees, customers and society at large (Mayer, 2014).
一种企业逻辑（Gospel 和 Pendleton, 2003; Thornton 等, 2012），倡导独立董事会和管理者设定公司层面战略的权利，并且可以在市场和民主参与逻辑有时伴随的过度行为上发挥重要的制衡作用（Lan & Heracleous, 2010）。例如，开明的股东价值思维提出了董事会需要以更可持续的基础进行治理，并解决对代理理论自私伦理基础的批评，以期恢复现代企业中日益下降的信任水平（Gillespie & Dietz, 2009）。我们在强调独立董事会和高管的重要性时，深刻认识到企业可持续性对确保当前和未来利益相关者的利益得到考虑的潜在贡献，包括员工、客户和整个社会的利益（Mayer, 2014）。

The cultural–cognitive system in the corporate sustainability model is typically based on a pluralist frame of reference that recognizes the legitimate interests of customers, employees, short and long-term investors, suppliers and the communities that are affected by the firms operations, both now and in the future. For example, Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2010) have drawn on a competing values framework and Scott and Davis (2006) open systems model to argue that organizations that are externally-focused and employ flexible structures to coordinate and control their activities and people are more likely to emphasize social and environmental sustainability in their pursuit of corporate sustainability. However, they acknowledge that an integrationist perspective on culture (Martin, 2002), which assumes a firm-level consensus on shared values, beliefs and assumptions, supported by strong leadership is not always possible or, indeed, productive in all contexts. Instead, they propose that a differentiation perspective on culture, which acknowledges the co-existence of different subcultures in which employees may hold different attitudes to corporate sustainability, may be more realistic and lead to greater innovation in the long run. Such an approach is supported by Besharov and Smith (2014) alignment notion inherent in hybrid organizations.
企业可持续性模型中的文化–认知系统通常基于一种多元主义的参考框架，承认客户、员工、短期和长期投资者、供应商以及受公司运营影响的社区的合法利益，无论是现在还是将来。例如，Linnenluecke 和 Griffiths (2010) 借鉴了竞争价值框架和 Scott 和 Davis (2006) 的开放系统模型，认为那些以外部为导向并采用灵活结构来协调和控制其活动和人员的组织，更有可能在追求企业可持续性时强调社会和环境的可持续性。然而，他们承认，关于文化的整合主义视角（Martin, 2002），即假设在共享价值观、信念和假设上存在公司层面的共识，并得到强有力的领导支持，并不总是在所有背景下都是可能的，甚至是富有成效的。 相反，他们提出了一种文化的差异化视角，该视角承认不同亚文化的共存，员工可能对企业可持续性持有不同的态度，这可能更为现实，并在长期内促进更大的创新。这种方法得到了 Besharov 和 Smith（2014）在混合组织中固有的对齐概念的支持。

If firms are able to adopt aspects of corporate sustainability thinking we propose that this may form the basis of a new approach to SHRM, which aligns the tensions between a firms' economic, social and environmental aims, its modes of financing (especially the balance between long and short-term investors), and the needs to balance an integrationistist-differentiation perspectives on organizational culture (see Fig. 1). It requires a balancing act in which firms adopt SHRM policies that reflect the needs of a firm to be simultaneously legitimate and different with multiple stakeholders (Bitektine, 2011, Deephouse and Suchman, 2008, Paauwe, 2004). By legitimate, we are referring to the generalized perception of an organization by multiple stakeholders that its actions and cultural attributes are desirable or appropriate from the perspective of a society's socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995). Firms in a market-driven economy, however, also require to be differentiated from others because they are competitive rivals for resources and their ranking in relation to others matters to their short and long-term success. Thus, they have to seek ways of claiming symbolic or material distinctiveness or uniqueness whilst remaining legitimate (Bitektine, 2011, Doh et al., 2010).
如果企业能够采纳企业可持续性思维的某些方面，我们建议这可能形成一种新的战略人力资源管理（SHRM）方法的基础，该方法协调企业的经济、社会和环境目标之间的紧张关系、其融资模式（特别是长期投资者与短期投资者之间的平衡），以及在组织文化上平衡整合主义与差异化的视角（见图 1）。这需要一种平衡的行为，企业采用反映其在多个利益相关者中同时合法和不同需求的 SHRM 政策（Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Paauwe, 2004）。我们所说的合法，是指多个利益相关者对一个组织的普遍看法，即其行为和文化特征在社会构建的规范、价值观、信念和定义体系中是可取或适当的（Suchman, 1995）。然而，在市场驱动的经济中，企业还需要与其他企业区分开来，因为它们是资源的竞争对手，并且它们与其他企业的排名对其短期和长期成功至关重要。 因此，他们必须寻求在保持合法性的同时，声称象征性或物质上的独特性或独特性（Bitektine, 2011, Doh et al., 2010）。

In some respects and in certain contexts, the corporate sustainability SHRM approaches will resemble those of the hybrid enlightened shareholder value and employee-ownership archetypes in balancing control and commitment/collaboration. However, we propose that there are also legitimacy issues that also need incorporating, building an internal and external form of moral legitimacy with past, present and future stakeholders (Bitektine, 2011). Based on these ideas on organizational legitimacy and Mayer (2014), and extending the ideas of Shen and Benson (2014) and Wright et al. (2014), we propose here that the high-legitimacy practices associated with such an approach to SHRM might include the following ten elements: (1) focus on creating a high trust dynamic among all levels/types of employment; (2) sustainability, ethics and diversity as key principles of the management of legitimacy; (3) training for high skill levels, including environmental, ethical and diversity issues; (4) a focus on job sustainable employment practices; (5) investment in social capital as a source of innovation; (6) providing for employee voice and employee involvement in a corporate sustainability agenda; (7) employee share ownership linked to long-term commitment to firm and market value; (8) employer branding focused on sustainability, ethics and diversity; (9) preventing the negative impact of employee actions on environment, ethics and diversity, and supporting implementation of environment-friendly systems; and (10) performance appraisal and rewards linked to sustainability, ethics and diversity.
在某些方面和特定背景下，企业可持续性的人力资源管理方法将类似于混合的开明股东价值和员工拥有权原型，在控制与承诺/合作之间取得平衡。然而，我们提出还有合法性问题需要纳入，构建与过去、现在和未来利益相关者的内部和外部道德合法性（Bitektine, 2011）。基于这些关于组织合法性的观点以及 Mayer（2014）的研究，并扩展 Shen 和 Benson（2014）以及 Wright 等人的观点。 （2014），我们在此提出，与这种人力资源管理战略相关的高合法性实践可能包括以下十个要素：（1）关注在所有层级/类型的就业中创造高信任动态；（2）可持续性、伦理和多样性作为合法性管理的关键原则；（3）针对高技能水平的培训，包括环境、伦理和多样性问题；（4）关注可持续就业实践；（5）将社会资本作为创新的来源进行投资；（6）为员工发声和员工参与企业可持续发展议程提供机会；（7）员工持股与对公司和市场价值的长期承诺相关联；（8）专注于可持续性、伦理和多样性的雇主品牌；（9）防止员工行为对环境、伦理和多样性产生负面影响，并支持实施环保系统；（10）与可持续性、伦理和多样性相关的绩效评估和奖励。

The preceding discussion can be summarized according to the choices of key actors in firms in balancing economic and social legitimacy aims, and the claims and rent-seeking of single interest groups such as those of shareholders or powerful executives versus stakeholders and the wider society in which organizations exist. From a theoretical perspective, to explain this balancing act, we have drawn on institutional logics and institutional complementarities to explore corporations' need for legitimacy. We have also drawn on modern theories of bureaucracy and hybridization (Battilana and Lee, 2014, Besharov and Smith, 2014, Courpasson and Clegg, 2006, Pache and Santos, 2013), which are aligned with these corporate governance theories, to explain the nature of SHRM approaches.
前面的讨论可以根据公司中关键参与者在平衡经济和社会合法性目标方面的选择进行总结，以及单一利益集团（如股东或强大高管）与利益相关者及组织所存在的更广泛社会之间的索赔和寻租。从理论角度来看，为了解释这种平衡行为，我们借鉴了制度逻辑和制度互补性来探讨企业对合法性的需求。我们还借鉴了现代官僚制和混合化理论（Battilana and Lee, 2014, Besharov and Smith, 2014, Courpasson and Clegg, 2006, Pache and Santos, 2013），这些理论与公司治理理论相一致，以解释 SHRM 方法的性质。

By building archetypes, we have assumed a level of coherence within each archetype that “comes from the consistent relationship between an interpretive scheme and an organization's structure and systems” (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993: 1056). Two of the archetypes are well-known, and can be seen as embracing a single dominant logic central to the organizations' functioning, with others peripheral at best (Besharov & Smith, 2014): the agency-led shareholder value archetype linked to the traditional control/calculative SHRM approach, and the communitarian stakeholder archetype aligned with the high commitment/collaborative SHRM approach. However, our two proposed additional archetypes have multiple logics that vie for attention in relation to the organizations' functioning. The strategy-led enlightened shareholder value archetype attempts to deal with tensions created by the differentiation-legitimacy problems faced by corporations (e.g. Schultz, 2012). As such it is a hybrid, embracing Courpasson (2000) concept of soft bureaucracy and soft power, and the notion of sophisticated SHRM (Guest, 2001). The employee-ownership archetype is also a hybrid, drawing on democratic and market logics. These hybrid models are tension-laden with a confusion of multiple logics, which if not managed effectively, can lead to system breakdown and demands for change (Besharov and Smith, 2014, Pache and Santos, 2013).
通过构建原型，我们假设每个原型内部存在一种连贯性，这种连贯性“来自于解释性方案与组织结构和系统之间的一致关系”（Greenwood & Hinings, 1993: 1056）。其中两个原型是众所周知的，可以被视为拥抱对组织运作至关重要的单一主导逻辑，而其他原型充其量只是边缘的（Besharov & Smith, 2014）：与传统控制/计算性 SHRM 方法相关的以代理为主的股东价值原型，以及与高承诺/协作 SHRM 方法相一致的共同体利益相关者原型。然而，我们提出的两个额外原型具有多重逻辑，争夺与组织运作相关的关注。以战略为导向的开明股东价值原型试图应对企业面临的差异化-合法性问题所带来的紧张关系（例如，Schultz, 2012）。因此，它是一种混合体，融合了 Courpasson（2000）关于软官僚制和软权力的概念，以及复杂 SHRM 的概念（Guest, 2001）。 员工拥有制原型也是一种混合体，借鉴了民主和市场逻辑。这些混合模型充满了多重逻辑的紧张，如果管理不当，可能导致系统崩溃和变革的需求（Besharov 和 Smith，2014；Pache 和 Santos，2013）。

Our integrative framework is typological, which offers conceptually and empirically derived archetypes, answering Snow and Ketchen (2014) call for new typologies on governance structures and Delbridge and Fiss (2013) call for typologies in organizational studies. As Doty and Glick (1994) note, in developing theory from typologies, three important steps must be taken. First, the constructs (archetypes) must be identified and incorporate multiple dimensions. Second, relationships among the multiple dimensions within each archetype must be specified (elemental categories). Third, is the requirement of falsifiability; this involves the ability to measure the deviation between actual organizations and the archetypes, and to use this deviation to predict how organizations and individuals behave. This final step of falsifiability requires empirical research to test the integrative framework developed here.
我们的综合框架是类型学的，提供了概念上和实证上衍生的原型，回应了 Snow 和 Ketchen（2014）对治理结构新类型的呼吁，以及 Delbridge 和 Fiss（2013）对组织研究中类型的呼吁。正如 Doty 和 Glick（1994）所指出的，在从类型学发展理论时，必须采取三个重要步骤。首先，必须识别构念（原型）并纳入多个维度。其次，必须明确每个原型内多个维度之间的关系（元素类别）。第三，是可证伪性的要求；这涉及到测量实际组织与原型之间偏差的能力，并利用这种偏差预测组织和个人的行为。可证伪性的最后一步需要实证研究来测试这里开发的综合框架。

We believe we have provided a starting point for how SHRM researchers might understand the implications of different corporate governance models, which are embedded in societal logics, for their field of study and to apply this in empirical research. The descriptions provided have, however, been at a strategic level, rather than exploring detailed HRM practices. Therefore, there are multiple lines of research that may stem from this initial review. First, researchers may wish to understand more about the extent to which these archetypes exist in practice – the empirical question. Second, we may also want to understand the potential for senior managers and professionals, including HR professionals, whose values and morals are inconsistent with a particular archetype, to lead rather than follow archetypal change (Farndale et al., 2011). Third, researchers may wish to explore alternative corporate governance archetypes. We have suggested a normative overlaying of corporate sustainability interventions across all archetypes to address some of the challenges that they pose. However, there may also be other archetypes that already address these issues. Thus, for example, focusing on the importance of national business systems and different national legal frameworks regarding incorporation as key influences on corporate governance (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005), Aguilera et al. (2008) propose a context-dependency model of governance: what can we learn from Chinese state capitalism and its governance approaches? To what extent will the global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis influence the communitarian stakeholder archetype evident in the Eurozone, already under strain from global forces of competition?
我们相信，我们提供了一个起点，帮助 SHRM 研究人员理解不同公司治理模型的含义，这些模型嵌入在社会逻辑中，适用于他们的研究领域，并将其应用于实证研究。然而，所提供的描述主要处于战略层面，而不是探讨详细的人力资源管理实践。因此，从这一初步审查中可能衍生出多条研究线索。首先，研究人员可能希望了解这些原型在实践中存在的程度——这是一个实证问题。其次，我们也可能想要了解高级管理人员和专业人士，包括人力资源专业人士，其价值观和道德观与特定原型不一致，如何能够引领而不是跟随原型变革（Farndale et al., 2011）。第三，研究人员可能希望探索替代的公司治理原型。我们建议在所有原型上叠加公司可持续性干预措施，以应对它们所带来的某些挑战。然而，也可能存在其他已经解决这些问题的原型。 因此，例如，关注国家商业系统和不同国家法律框架在公司治理中的重要性（Gospel 和 Pendleton，2005），Aguilera 等（2008）提出了一种治理的情境依赖模型：我们可以从中国国家资本主义及其治理方法中学到什么？全球金融危机和主权债务危机在多大程度上会影响在全球竞争力量下已经承受压力的欧元区的共同体利益相关者原型？

Fourth, there is the managerialist model (Lan & Heracleous, 2010), which is both a description of how corporate governance often works in practice (i.e., boards being merely figureheads rubber stamping powerful CEO decisions), and a prescription proposed by some legal theorists of how it should work in the future (i.e. by devising a structure that provides managers with the maximum amount of discretion for innovation, risk-taking, and flexibility). The descriptive version of such a model has been severely critiqued as being associated with the rise of the managerialist ‘caste’ (Locke & Spender, 2011), governance failure, financial crisis, and spiraling executive pay, especially in situations where regulation has been weak (Varoufakis, 2011). It is also associated with a view of director selection as a socialized rather than rational economic process, which emphasizes biases and other social processes rather than attempts to meet the governance and shareholder needs of firms (Withers et al., 2012).
第四，存在管理主义模型（Lan & Heracleous, 2010），它既是对公司治理在实践中如何运作的描述（即，董事会仅仅是象征性地批准强势 CEO 的决策），也是一些法律理论家提出的关于未来应如何运作的建议（即，通过设计一种结构，为管理者提供最大程度的创新、冒险和灵活性的自由裁量权）。这种模型的描述性版本受到严厉批评，因为它与管理主义“阶层”的兴起（Locke & Spender, 2011）、治理失败、金融危机以及高管薪酬飙升相关，尤其是在监管薄弱的情况下（Varoufakis, 2011）。它还与董事选择被视为一种社会化而非理性经济过程的观点相关，强调偏见和其他社会过程，而非试图满足公司的治理和股东需求（Withers et al., 2012）。

These are exactly the situations that agency theory, shareholder value, and stakeholder theory have been developed to counteract. Yet the managerialist model does have its proponents, especially if regulatory constraints can be built in to curb excessive managerial power. To some extent, team production theory is an attempt to deal with this issue. Thus, an important line of research could focus on the extent to which SHRM can exercise a rational and moral influence in dealing with these problems of unchecked managerialism by influencing board selection, development and values. The corporate sustainability idea of independent management boards takes this argument one step further. Additionally, are there people in senior HR positions who would be credible and skilled enough to exercise such influence, whether or not formally appointed as board members? A related question concerns the role of diversity in boards and the extent to which SHRM policies on diversity have impacted board selection, values and practice: does this provide a further check on self-serving managerial power?
这些正是代理理论、股东价值和利益相关者理论发展出来以应对的情况。然而，管理主义模型确实有其支持者，特别是在可以建立监管约束以遏制过度管理权力的情况下。在某种程度上，团队生产理论试图解决这个问题。因此，一个重要的研究方向可以集中在 SHRM 在通过影响董事会的选择、发展和价值观来应对这些不受控制的管理主义问题时，能够发挥多大程度的理性和道德影响力。独立管理董事会的企业可持续性理念将这一论点进一步推进。此外，是否有高级人力资源职位的人能够具备足够的可信度和技能来施加这种影响，无论他们是否正式被任命为董事会成员？一个相关的问题是董事会多样性的作用，以及 SHRM 在多样性方面的政策对董事会选择、价值观和实践的影响程度：这是否进一步对自利的管理权力提供了制衡？

Finally, future research might also theorize about the kinds of institutional work or internal governance (Hansmann, 1996) undertaken by senior HR managers that reproduces or transforms the corporate governance structures which impinge on SHRM (Kraatz and Block, 2008, Lawrence et al., 2009, Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005), and how they are cast as actors in governance systems (Delbridge & Edwards, 2013). This would move the static representation of archetypes represented here to a more dynamic level. At the structural level, there is also the opportunity to explore how a more dynamic perspective of SHRM strategies and practices may potentially reinforce or change the institutions of corporate governance at societal and organizational field level. For example, just as the shareholder value model has implications for talent management by selecting, developing and rewarding executives whose values fit with entrepreneurship and self-interest, in turn the methods of selecting and incentivizing these executives has had a significant effect on the governance of these corporations (Khurana, 2002).
最后，未来的研究也可能会理论化高级人力资源经理所进行的各种制度性工作或内部治理（Hansmann, 1996），这些工作再生产或转变影响战略人力资源管理（Kraatz and Block, 2008，Lawrence et al., 2009，Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005）的公司治理结构，以及他们如何被视为治理系统中的参与者（Delbridge & Edwards, 2013）。这将把这里所代表的原型的静态表现提升到一个更动态的层面。在结构层面上，还有机会探讨战略人力资源管理策略和实践的更动态视角如何可能在社会和组织领域层面上强化或改变公司治理的制度。例如，正如股东价值模型通过选择、发展和奖励与企业家精神和自利相符的高管对人才管理产生影响一样，选择和激励这些高管的方法对这些公司的治理也产生了显著影响（Khurana, 2002）。

In summary, the main contributions of this paper have been to refine the traditional shareholder-value versus stakeholder debate into a more rigorous conceptualization of ideal-typical corporate governance-SHRM archetypes, which begins to identify directions for future research on more sustainable models of governance SHRM connections. The framework and reasoning we have presented bring together the corporate governance and SHRM literature through theories of institutional logics and institutional complementarity. We have done so by addressing four different archetypes, and rather than identifying one as necessarily better than another, uncovering the challenges of each and suggesting sustainability solutions to these challenges. We recognize the tensions between economic and social goals, the long history in organization theory of trying to bring about a balance between them, and the problems this creates for SHRM legitimacy. The archetypes presented here, of course, are ideal types in the sense of being theoretical abstractions rather than normative models. This approach has facilitated reference to a more complex reality for the purposes of contrast and comparison of questions facing practice and research. However, the integrative framework combining a focus on interests and control contributes to extant literature by demonstrating how different archetypes of corporate governance have different implications for SHRM. Finally, we have proposed the basis for an alternative archetype based on the notion of corporate sustainability, which we argue can address some of the shortcomings of the more traditional ways of approaching governance/SHRM connections. We stopped short of proposing it as a fifth archetype because there is so little that has been written about it, thus creating a fruitful area for further research, including, we hope, research of our own in the not too distant future.
总之，本文的主要贡献在于将传统的股东价值与利益相关者的辩论细化为对理想典型公司治理-SHRM 原型的更严格的概念化，这开始为未来关于更可持续的治理与 SHRM 连接模型的研究指明方向。我们所提出的框架和推理通过制度逻辑和制度互补性的理论将公司治理和 SHRM 文献结合在一起。我们通过探讨四种不同的原型来实现这一点，而不是简单地将其中一种认定为优于另一种，而是揭示每种原型面临的挑战，并提出应对这些挑战的可持续解决方案。我们认识到经济目标与社会目标之间的紧张关系，以及在组织理论中长期以来试图实现两者之间平衡的历史，以及这给 SHRM 合法性带来的问题。当然，这里呈现的原型是理想类型，意味着它们是理论抽象而非规范模型。 这种方法促进了对更复杂现实的参考，以便对实践和研究面临的问题进行对比和比较。然而，结合对利益和控制的关注的综合框架通过展示不同的公司治理原型对战略人力资源管理（SHRM）具有不同的影响，丰富了现有文献。最后，我们提出了基于企业可持续性概念的替代原型的基础，我们认为这可以解决更传统的治理/SHRM 连接方法的一些不足之处。我们没有将其提议为第五种原型，因为关于它的文献非常少，因此为进一步研究创造了一个富有成效的领域，包括我们希望在不久的将来进行的研究。